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TO

AARON J. VANDERPOEL, Esq.,

OF THE NEW YORK BAR,

THIS BOOK IS INSCRIBED ALIKE AS A TRIBUTE TO HIS HIGH PROFESSIONAIi

CHARACTER, AND AS AN EXPRESSION OF THE AUTHOR'S

PERSONAL REGARD.

PREFACE TO THE FOURTH EDITION.

The last edition of this work was published in 1894. Since

that time so many decisions upon important questions of Code

Pleading have been reported that another edition has become

necessary. To collect, cite, and classify these decisions with

reference to the topics discussed in the text, and thus place them

at the convenient disposal of members of the legal profession,

as well as students of the law, has been the main purpose of the

present editor. This required a large amount of space, but as

the original text included considerable matter that was theoreti-

cal rather than of present practical value, as well as extended

PREFACE TO THE FOURTH EDITION.

quotations that properly belonged in the notes, it has been possi-

ble to do much in the way of omission and condensation. At

the same time everything essential to the subject has been in-

cluded, and it is believed that the text as so amended presents a

more concise and systematic view than in its original form.

In some cases the text has been re-written, such altered por-

tions being indicated by brackets, and in a few instances verbal

changes have been made without being indicated. The para-

graphs of the text have been supplied with appropriate black-
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letter headings. Many of the notes of the author and of the

previous editor have been condensed, but the cases have all been

retained. Nearly three hundred pages of new matter have been

added, while the new cases cited number over four thousand,

with dates and references to both the official Reports and the

THE LAST EDITION of this work was published in 1894. Sin e
that time so many decisions upon important que tion of Code
Pleading have been reported that another edition has become
necessary. To collect, cite, and classify these decisions with
reference to the topics discussed in the text, and thus place them
at the convenient di posal of members of the legal profession,
as well as students of the law, has been the main purpose of the
present editor. This required a large amount of space, but as
the original text included considerable matter that was theoretical rather than of present practical value, as well as extended
quotations that properly belonged in the notes, it has been possible to do much in the way of omission and condensation. At
the same time everything essential to the subject has been included, and it is believed that the text as so amended presents a
more concise and systematic view than in its original form.
In some cases the text has been re-written, such altered portions being indicated by brackets, and in a few instances verbal
changes have been made. without being indicated. The paragraphs of the text have been supplied with apprnpriate blackletter headings. Many of the notes of the author and of the
previous editor have been condensed, but the cases have all been
retained. Nearly three hundred pages of new matter have b n
added, while the new cases cited. number over four thousand,
with dates and reference to both the official Report and the

P E ACF. T

THE F

RT H

DITIOX.

X PREFACE TO THE FOURTH EDITION.

National Reporter system. New topics have been treated in the

en r ated in he
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text, h
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notes, with suitable italic or black-letter headings, and in all cases

the new notes, as well lus the new portions of the text, have been

distinguished by brackets.

n

The statutory references and citations have been fully revised,

the references now being made to the latest revisions of the

statutes. These notes on the statutory provisions are believed

to present the most complete view of the details of the various

n fuU y r vised,

Code^ now conveniently available to the profession in a work of

i ions of the
are believed
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tliis kind, and it is hoped they will prove useful in determining

the vidue of cases decided in the different States, The Table of

Contents has been wholly re-written, and made more complete,

u

while the Index and the Table of Cases have also been recon-

structed. The paragraphs of the text as they now stand have

been numbered consecutively, but the original numbers have

been retained, and distinguished by stars.

(iranted that Professor Pomeroy's criticisms of Common Law

Pleading were not always just, his eulogies of the " Reformed

System '' not always deserved, and that he was too much given
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to tlieoretical discussion of practical subjects, still it may justly

be said that as a writer upon the Code he stands without a rival.

Tiie facts make it my duty to acknowledge here my deep

obligation to Kdson R. Sunderland, assistant professor of law in

the University of Michigan, for most valuable assistance rendered

me throughout the preparation of this edition.

THOMAS A. BOGLE.

Ukivkksity ok Michigan,

Ann AitiK.K, .Fulv *J7. 1004.
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PREFACE TO THE SECOND EDITION.

A SECOND EDITION of this work has for some time been

needed, and the delay in preparing it must be attributed to an

overwhelming pressure of other engagements. In now present-

ing it to the profession, I desire to express my sincere thanks for

the favor with which the book has been received by the Bar and

the Bench. The work, when originally published, was to some

extent an experiment. It was, I believe, the first attempt pro-

fessedly to treat of those features which are common to all the codes

of procedure, and which constitute the essential elements of the

new system. In it I ventured to call that system the "Reformed

American Sj^stem of Procedure," and was gratified to know that

PREFACE TO THE SECOND EDITION.

the name was accepted by one of its principal authors as distinc-

tive and appropriate. The abbreviated title by which my book

is commonly known, — " Remedies," — and which it is now too

late to change, is in some respects misleading ; for it fails to in-

dicate the real subject-matter and purpose of the work. In the

full title given to it, the words " by the civil action " were meant

to be the most emphatic and important. The work is intended

to be both a scientific and a practical treatise of the fundamental
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principles and essential elements of the " Civil Action," as the

instrument for administering justice established by the Reformed

Procedure in all the Code States of our own country, and in Eng-

land, and in many of the British colonies. Whatever varieties of

A SECOND EDITION of this work has for some time been
needed, and the delay in preparing it must be attributed to an
overwhelming pressure of other engagements. In now presenting it to the profession, I desire to express my sincere thanks for
the favor with which the book has been received by the Bar and
the Bench. The work, when originally published, was to some
extent an experiment. It was, I believe, the first attempt professe·dly to treat of those features which are common to all the codes
of procedure, and which constitute the essential elements of the
new system. In it I ventured to call that system the" Reform ed
American System of Procedure," and was gratified to know that
the name was accepted by one of its principal authors as distinctive and appropriate. The abbreviated title by which my book
is commonly known, - " Remedies," - and which it is now too
late to change, is in some respects misleading; for it fails to indicate the real subject-matter and purpose of the work. In the
full title given to it, the words "by the civil action " were meant
to be the most emphatic and important. The work is intended
to be both a scientific and a practical treatise of the fundamental
principles and essential elements of the " Civil Action," as the
instrument for administering justice established by th e Reform ed
Procedure in all the Code States of our own country, and in England, and in many of the British colonies. Whatever varieties of
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State codes, these principles and elements are fundamental and

essential, and are inherent in the Reformed Procedure wherever

it prevails, whether in the United States or in Great Britain.

They are the union of legal and equitable rights of action and

remedies in the same civil action, resulting from the abolition of

the distinction between actions at law and suits in equity, and

of the forms of legal actions ; the equitable instead of the legal

theory of parties ; the general principles of pleading, including

the union of causes of action in the same complaint or petition ;

the mode of stating causes of action; the answer of "denial,"

and what defences may be proved under it; the answer of " new

th

matter,"' and what defences it embraces, and equitable defences ;

the counter-claim, including all affirmative relief, legal or equita-

ble, to the defendant : the final reliefs, or judgments. In adjudi-

cating upon these most important matters, the courts of the vari-

ous Code States have, with a remarkable unanimity, substantially

reached the same conclusions. At the inauguration of the new

system, it is not surprising that there should have been some
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discrepancy of judicial opinion ; but every year has shown a

stronger tendency towards a complete agreement, so that the

unity of the system throughout the Code States is now virtually

m

established. It would be a source of the highest gratification if

I might believe that my own book had contributed anything to

the attainment of this result. These are the subjects with which

it deals ; and by citing and comparing the corresponding sections

of the codes, as well as the decisions interpreting them, in differ-

er»t Stetes, it endeavors to present all that is essential to the

reformed procedure, as one complete whole, and as both scien-

tifically and practically superior to the common-law methods

which it has displaced.

In preparing tliis edition, I have not thought it expedient to

alter in any substiintial manner the original text ; a few mistakes

and omibsions have been corrected, but the text stands virtually

Ii h
Iu l

I h< · no th ucrh it xp dient t
ial rn 1 ner lie Jl'i<rin. 1 t x : a f w mi · ak
IJ Cl COl l ·ct cl l1ut th t xt stand irtually
c clitio11.

r

PREFACE TO THE SECOND EDITION.

xiii

PREFACE TO THE SECOND EDITION. xiii

unchanged. I have seen no sufficient reason to modify any of

its theoretical conclusions, and several of its practical conclusions

have been sustained by the courts ; none, so far as I am aware,

have been distinctly condemned. The new matter is, therefore,

chiefly confined to the notes ; and it brings the discussions of the

text, as illustrated by judicial opinion, down to the present day.

The important decisions in each of the Code States and Territo-

ries, made since the publication of the first edition, have been

collected and arranged in the notes in connection with the doc-

trines and rules to which they relate. Some cases may have

been overlooked, but I believe the additions will enable the

reader to discover the present condition of the law and of judi-

cial authority upon all the important topics discussed in the text.

A new and much fuller Index has also been added. I had re-

ceived complaints from several sources that the Index of the first

edition was too meagre for the wants of the practising lawyer ;

I trust it will be found that this defect has been cured. All

other substantial additions, and new materials or modes of treat-

ment, are reserved for the supplemental work on the Civil Action,
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by which I still hope to complete my original design.

The Reformed Procedure is no longer an experiment. It is

certain to become universal wherever the common law and equity

jurisprudence is found. The fact that it was accepted, in all of

its essentials, by the ablest judges, lawyers, and statesmen of

England, shows that it rests upon a scientific as well as practical

basis. It has been adopted, since the publication of this work,

by two additional American States, Colorado and Connecticut;

its adoption in substance by all is, in my opinion, a mere ques-

tion of time. There is, however, one grave defect in the legis-

lation of all our American commonwealths, — with the single

exception of Connecticut, — to which I would earnestly call the

attention of all judges and lawyers who are interested in the im-

provement of the law : a defect which is the immediate cause of

nearly all the uncertainties, discrepancies, and conflicts of judicial

unchanged. I have se en no uffici nt rea on to modify any of
it theoretical conclusion , and everal of its practi cal concl u ions
have been sustained by the courts; none , o far as I am awar e,
have been di:stinctly condemned. The new matter i , th erefor e,
chiefly confined to the notes; and it brings the di scus ions of t he
text, as illustrated by judicial opinion, lown to the present day.
The important decisions in each of the Code States and T erritories, ma:de since the publication of the first edition, have been
collected and arranged in the notes in connection with the doctrines and rules to which they relate. Some cases may have
been overlooked, but I believe the additions will enable the
reader to di1:icover the present condition of the law and of judicial authority upon all the important topics discussed in the text.
A new and much fuller Index has also been added. I had received complaints from several sources that the Index of the first
edition was too meagre for the wants of the practising lawyer;
I trust it will be found that this defect bas been cured. All
other substantial additions, and new materials or modes of treatment, are reserved for the supplemental work on the Civil Action,
by which I still hope to complete my original design.
The Reformed Procedure is no longer an experiment. It is
certain to become universal wherever th~ common law and equity
jurisprudence is found. The fact that it was accepted, in all of
its essentials, by the ablest judges, lawyers, and statesmen of
England, shows that it rests upon a scientific as well as practical
basis. It has been adopted, since the publication of this work,
by two additional American States, Colorado and Connecticut ;
its adoption in substance by all is, in my opinion, a mere question of time. There is, however, one grave defect in the legislation of all our American commonwealths, - with the singl e
exception of Connecticut, - to which I would earn estly call th e
attention of all judges and lawyers who are interest ed in the improvement of the law: a defe ct whi ch is t he imm ediate cause of
nearly all th e un certain ties, di crepancies, and conflicts of judicial
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opinion that have arisen under the system. By the union of

legal and equitable rights and remedies in the single civil action,

courtii were necessarily confronted with the direct opposition

between many doctrines and rules of the common law and of

equity, applicable to exactly the same condition of facts ; and

the question at once arose, How is this opposition to be dealt

with in the practical administration of justice ? Every lawyer

who has carefully considered this matter, and especially every

lawyer who has examined the course of judicial decision through

all the Code States, will agree with me that this conflict between

equitable and legal rules concerning the same state of facts has

been the source of all the real difficulty in interpreting and set-

tling the Reformed Procedure. Some courts have evaded the

difficulty by retaining the distinctions between legal and equita-

ble actions, and legal and equitable remedies, practically as broad

and well defined as under the former system ; but this method

jtlainly violates both the spirit and the letter of the codes. The

whole difficulty and its cause might be removed by a brief addi-

tion to the codes, which would cany out to its final results the
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clear intent of the reform. The same difficulty presented itself

to the advocates of the new procedure in England while the

measure was pending in Parliament ; it was obviated by insert-*

ing in the " Supreme Court of Judicature Act " the following

clause : " Generally in all matters in which there is any conflict

or variance between the rules of eciuity and the rules of the com-

mon law, witjj reference to the same matter, the rules of equity

shall pnvaiiy The State of Connecticut has incorporated the

clause into it,s recent reformatory legislation. If the provision,

or one substantially the same, were added to all the codes, the

l
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practical difficulty which it has encountered ; until such an

amendment is cfTected, it must remain somewhat crippled in

iU oi^erations, and imperfect in its results.
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PREFACE TO THE SECOND EDITION. XV

In conclusion, I desire to acknowledge the aid which I have

received, in preparing this edition, from my former students,

Mr. Charles W. Slack and Mr. Marcellus A. Dorn, members of

the San Francisco Bar.

JOHN NORTON POME ROY.

San Francisco, Feb. 17, 1S83.

Hastings College of the Law: University of California.

In conclusion, I desire to acknowledge the aid which I have
rnceived, in preparing thi edition, from my former students,
Mr. Charles W. Slack and l\Ir. Marcellu · A. Dorn, member of
the San Francisco Bar.
JOHN NORTON POMEROY.
SAN FRANCI co, Feh. 17, 1

3.
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llaslings College of the Law: University of California..

PREFACE TO THE FIRST EDITION.

The new procedure which was devised by the codifiers and

inaugurated by the Legislature of New York, in the year 1848,

now prevails in more than twenty other States and Territories of

this country, and may, therefore, be properly termed " The Re-

formed American System of Procedure." After a most careful

consideration, and the most cautious and deliberate examination

by a commission composed of the ablest judges and barristers, it

has finally been accepted in its essential features and elements by

the British Parliament, and has recently displaced the time-hon-

ored methods of the common-law. and the equity courts in Eng-

land. This fact alone may be regarded as decisive of its intrinsic

PREFACE TO THE FIRST EDITION.

excellence, as conclusively demonstrating that it is founded upon

natural and true principles ; that it embodies rational notions in

respect to the manner of conducting judicial controversies be-

tween private litigants ; and that, in its conception and design,

it is far superior to the artificial, technical, and arbitrary modes

which had so long been looked upon as perfect by generations

of English and American lawyers. It is shown in the Intro-

ductory Chapter of the present work that this whole course of
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reform is but a repetition, not simply in a general outline, but

even in the minute details, of what took place in the jurispru-

dence of Rome ; so that the modern legislation has, in this re-

spect, merely followed an inevitable law of progress, which

new procedure which was devised by the codifiers and
inaugurated by the Legislature of New York, in the year 1848,
now prevails in more than twenty other States and Territories of
this country, and may, therefore, be properly termed "The Reformed American System of Procedure." After a most ·c areful
consideration, and the most cautious and deliberate examination
by a commission composed of the able t judges and barrister , it
has finally been accepted in its essential features and elements by
the British Parliament, and has recently displaced the time-honored methods of the common-law .and the equity courts in England. This fact alone may be regarded as decisive of its intrinsic
excellence, as conclusively demonstrating that it is founded upon
natural and:' true principles ; that it embodies rational notions in
respect to the manner of conducting judicial controversies between private litigants ; and that, in it conception and design,
it is far superior to the artificial, technical, and arbitrary mode
which had so long been looked upon as perfect by generations
of English and American lawyers. It is shown in the Introductory Chapter of the present work that this whole course of
reform is but a repetition, not simply in a general outline, but
even in the minute details, of what took place in the jurisprudence of Rome; so that the modern legi lation has, in this respect, merely followed an inevitable law of progre s, which
THE
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xviii PREFACE TO THE FIRST EDITION.

always works out the same results under the same social con-

k

ditions and circumstances.

Althousrh the codes which have been enacted in the various

' l
States and Territories sometimes differ slightly from each other

in respect to the minor measures and steps of practice, and al-

l

u

the . : me r ·ult' under the ame ocial con-

·um t· DC .
th cud which have been enacted in the \ariou
' II'

1

though some of them, in reference to certain special matters, have

more freely carried out the original and underlying theory to its

logical results, and have by distinct provisions expressly abro-

rritu1 i
t tu th

min

tli:ffer ' li:::>htl from each other
p of ractice and al-

gated particular dogmas of the old law, which in other States

are only included in the general language of the statute, and are

thus left within the domain of judicial construction, yet in all its

essential notions and fundamental doctrines the reformed pro-

cedure is one and the same wherever it prevails, either in the

United States or in England. The " Civil Action " which it has

created and introduced as the single and sufficient instrument

for the trial of all judicial controversies between private suitors

and for the pursuit of all judicial remedies is the same in concep-

tion, in form, and in substance, possessing the same characteristic

features, governed by the same elementary rules, and embodying
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the same organic principles. How completely the reformed sys-

tem is severed from the ancient common-law modes, how entirely

it abandons all the arbitrary, formal, and technical notions which

were their very essence and life, and how firmly it rests upon

natural and necessary facts as its foundations, is shown in the

Introductory Chapter and in other portions of this work. It is

imjtossible, therefore, that its full benefits can be attained, and

that full scope can be given to its original purpose, until the

courts and the profession shall accept it in its simplicity, and

shall cease to obstruct its efficient operation and to interrupt its

free movements by antiquated dogmas and rejected doctrines

drawn from the system which it has thoroughly overthrown and

bupplanled.

The design of the author is to present the entire remedial

defiartment <jf the law — the remedies and remedial rights —
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according to the reformed procedure. The volume now sub-

mitted to the profession, although in itself a complete and inde-

pendent work, accomplishes' a part of this full purpose. It treats

of the " Civil Action," which is the central fact of the new pro-

cedure, and which, as has been said, is everywhere the same in

all its distinctive features and elements. It is not a treatise upon

" Practice ; " but it discusses in a thoroughly practical manner

those features and elements which constitute the Civil Action,

and which differentiate that judicial proceeding from the action

at law and the suit in equity. The discussions and conclusions

which it contains are not theoretical ; they are everywhere and

always based upon an exhaustive examination, analysis, and com-

parison of the decided cases : and the author has freely drawn

upon the judicial decisions of the States, and by this means

presents to the reader a body of authority which fully indicates

the action of the courts and their theories and modes of interpre-

tation throughout the commonwealths in which the system pre-

vails. Although it cannot be pretended that every case referring

to the Civil Action has been cited, — in fact, many of them are
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unworthy of citation, since they are the reflections of crude and

incorrect opinions long since rejected, while others are the mere

repetitions of points already well settled, — yet it is believed

that none are omitted which contain the statement of a new and

correct principle. The author has endeavored to collect all the

leading cases in every State, — all those which have been finally

accepted as authoritative, and which represent the mature

thought and convictions of the judiciary ; and in no other work

can be found such a mass of judicial opinion gathered from

courts of the various States, giving a construction to the statu-

tory provisions which describe the Civil Action, and building

up an harmonious and consistent system of procedure upon the

reform legislation. While the author has everywhere endeav-

ored to reach the true principles of interpretation, and to extract

from the cases a statement of universal doctrines which shall

according to th reform d roe clure. Th e volume n w u mitted to the prof ion, alth ug h in it lf a complete and incl pendent work, accompli hes· a par t of t hi · full purpo · . I t treat
of the " Civil A.ction, ' which is th e central fact of the n ew pr cedure, and which, a ha been aid, i everywhere t he same in
all it di tinctive features and elemen t . It i not a treati e upon
' Practice; " but it discusses in a thoroughly practical manner
tho e features and elem ents which constit ute the Civil A ction,
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at law and the suit in equity. The discussions and conclusions
which it contains are not theoretical; they are everywhere and
always based upon an exhaustive examination, analysis, and comparison of the decided cases: and the author has freely drawn
upon the judicial decisions of the States, and by this mean
pre ents to the reader a body of authority w4ich fully indicates
the action of the courts and their theories and modes of interpretation throughout the commonwealths in which the ystem prevails. Although it cannot be pretended that every case referring
to the Civil Action bas been cited, - in fact, many of them are
unworthy of citation, since they are the reflections of crude and
incorrect opinions long since rejected, while others are the mere
repetitions of points already well settled, - yet it is believed
that none are omitted which contain the statement of a new and
correct principle. The author has endeavored to collect all the
leading cases in every State, - all those which have been finally
accepted as authoritative, and which represent the mature
thought and convictions of the judiciary; and in no other work
can be found such a mass of judicial opinion gathered from
courts of the various States, giving a construction to the statutory provisions which describe the Civil Action, and building
up an harmonious and consistent system of procedure upon the
reform legislation. While the author has everywhere endeavored to r each the true principles of interpretation, and to xtract
from the cases a statement of universal doctrines which shall
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aid in the solution of all future questions, and has not scrupled

to express his own views and opinions, such speculations and

arguments are always plainly indicated and represented in their

real character, so that the reader need never confound them with

the results of actual judicial decision, and be thus led to accept

as settled law what is only a personal conviction or suggestion of

the author.

While the work is thus intended to be a practical handbook

for the lawyer, as an aid in the every-day duties of his profession,

it is hoped that its use may tend to bring the procedures of the

different States into closer relations, and may finally produce

the perfect identity of method and form which is possible from

the legislation itself, and which was, beyond doubt, the design

of the several legislatures in adopting the reform. Such an iden-

tity is entirely practicable, and the full beneficial results of the

change will not be attained until it is reached. In every State

there has accumulated a growing amount of judicial interpreta-

tion which would be of the greatest assistance to the Bench and

Bar of all the other States ; and in several of them certain spe-
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cial rules and methods have been wrought out and finally estab-

lished, which need only to be known in order to be universally

followed. Such a reform, founded on the nature of things, and

not upon artificial and arbitrary assumptions, never goes back-

ward : and the time will surely come when the system that

has already spread so widely will be introduced into every com-

monwealth, and when the distinction between legal and equita-

ble modes of pursuing remedies will disappear, and finally be

forgotten.

The central conception of the reformed procedure, and the one

from which all the elements of the Civil Action are developed, is

the abolition of the distinction between legal and equitable suits,

and the substitution of one judicial instrument, by which both

legal and equitable remedies may be obtained, either singly or in

combination. The full scope and effect of this grand principle
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are exhaustively discussed in the opening chapter, while the

necessary limitations upon its operation which inhere in our judi-

cial institutions are also carefully pointed out. Having thus laid

the foundation upon which the whole superstructure rests, the

remaining parts of the Civil Action are examined in turn, and

the practical rules which control their use are minutely explained

in the light of judicial authority. These general features are the

parties to the Civil Action, plaintiff and defendant, the presenta-

tion of the cause of action by the plaintiff, and of the defence or

claim of affirmative relief by the defendant. The two latter

divisions include, among other important particulars, the princi-

ples of the reformed pleading ; the scope and effect of the gen-

eral denial, with the defences which may be proved under it; the

nature and object of specific denials ; the answer of new matter,

and the defences which must be specially pleaded ; and the coun-

ter-claim. The discussion of these special topics, being of the

greatest practical importance, has been purposely made very full

and minute. An attempt has also been made to obtain, in a

general and complete form, the true meaning of certain phrases
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found in all the codes, upon which the interpretation of most

important provisions, and the practical rules resulting therefrom,

so closely depend. Among the statutory phrases are " the cause

of action," " the subject of action," " transaction," " causes of

action arising out of the same transaction," and the like. If the

author has succeeded in ascertaining the true meaning of these

and similar expressions, and the legislative intent in their use,

he is confident that he will have rendered a substantial aid to the

profession, and even to the courts, in the difficult work of statu-

tory interpretation. The treatise, as a whole, if its purpose has

been properly carried out, will be a practical handbook, adapted

to the use of the profession in every State and Territory where

the reformed procedure prevails. It is also designed as a text-

book for students, whether in offices or in law schools ; and to

that end frequent reference has been made to the common-law and
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equity systems of i:)rocedure, in explanation of their more general

doctrines and principles, and in comparing them with those which

have been substituted in theii- place.

JOHN NORTON POMEROY.

Rochester. X. Y., December, 1875.
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CIVIL REMEDIES,

INTRODUCTION.

§ 1. * 1. Necessity of Remedial Law. By far the greater

portion of any actual system of jurisprudence consists of com-

mands tlmt create and define those rights and corresponding

duties which control the normal relations of individuals with each

other and with the body politic of which they are members.^

Some of these rights and their corresponding duties govern the

relations alone of the state with individuals, and are properly

termed public; the others are confined to the relations of in-

dividuals with each other, and are called private. As these

CIVIL

rights and duties form the very substratum of the whole law, as

REMEDIES.

the law and all the machinery of administration exist solely to

declare and enforce them, as they are in fact the very end and

object of legislation and government, they may be and are by

most juridical writers appropriately styled primary rights and

duties. If mankind were absolutely perfect so that disobedience

would be impossible, if it were certain that every command

uttered by the Supreme Power would be voluntarily obeyed by

INTROD UC TION.

those to whom it was addressed, the law would contain nothing
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else than an enumeration of these primary rights and duties.

Since, however, disobedience is possible, and these primary rights

may be broken and duties unperformed, a supplemental branch

of the law becomes a matter of necessity, by which obedience

may be enforced. This secondary and supplementary department

is by some writers called the " sanctioning," because it deals with

1 [|For a discussion of the question, "What is Law? " see vol. 25, Reports Am.

Bar Ass'u, 1902, p. 445 et s"-/.]

1

§ 1.

* 1.

By far the greater
portion of any actual system of jurisprudence consist of commands that create and define tho e rights and corre ponding
duties which control the normal relations of individuals with each
-0ther and with the body politic of which they are member .1
Some of these rights and their corresponding duties govern the
relations alone of the state with individuals, and are properly
termed public; the others are confined to the relations of individuals with each other, and are called private. As the e
rights and duties fo.rm the very substratum of the whole law, a
the law and all the machinery of administration exi t olely to
declare and enforce them, as they are in fact the very end and
object of legislation and government, they may be and are by
most juridical writers appropriately styled primary right and
duties. If mankind were absolutely perfect so that di obedi nee
would be impossible, if it were certain that every command
uttered by the Supreme Power would be voluntarily ob ed by
those to whom it was addre sed, the law would contain nothing
else than an enumeration of th . . . se primary Tight and dutie .
Since, however, disobedience is po ible, and the 'e primary right
may be broken and duties unperformed, a uppl rn ntal bran h
of the law becomes a matter of neces ity, b ' hi 'h ob dience
may be enforced. This secondary and supplernentar d partm nt
is by some v.rriters called the "sanctioning,' because it deals with
Necessity

of Remedial

Law.

1 [For a discus ion of the question, "What is Law'?" see vol. 25, R eport
B ar Ass'n, 1902, p. 4-45 et seq.]

m.

2

CIYIL RE 1EDIES.

2 CIVIL REMEDIES.

the sanctions which give their compulsive efficacy to the com-

mands of the supreme power. I shall, however, use the term

remedial as descriptive of this department, since it more nearly

accords with the nomenclature customary among lawyers in

England and in America.

§ 2. * 2. Remedies and Remedial Rights and Duties. Definitions

and Illustrations. This secondary and supplementary or remedial

department of jm"isprudence has to do with remedies and with

remedial rights and duties. Remedies^ in their widest sense, are

either the final means by which to maintain and defend primaiy

rights and enforce primary duties, or they are the final equiva-

lents given to an injured person in the place of his original pri-

mary rights which have been broken, and of the original primary

duties towards him which have been unperformed. Remedial

rights, or rights of reined?/, are rights which an injured person

has to avail himself of some one or more of these final means, or

to obtain some one or more of these final equivalents. Remedial

duties are secondary duties, devolving upon the party who has

infringed upon the primary rights of another, and failed to per-
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form his own primary duties towards that other, to make the

reparation provided by some one or more of these final means, or

furnished in some one or more of these equivalents. One or two

familiar and simple examples will illustrate and explain these

abstract definitions. A. and B. have entered into a contract by

which the latter has agreed to sell and deliver to the former a

quantity of merchandise : analyze the results of this relation.

A. has the right that B. should transfer and deliver to him the

goods referred to, and a corresponding duty rests upon B. to

make the transfer and delivery. This right and this duty are

primary. B. fails to perform, and thereupon a new secondary

right in A. arises, and a new secondary duty of B. A.'s new

right is to have the remedy which tlie law permits in such a case,

and B.'s new duty is to grant this remedy ; this new right and

this new duty are remedial. The remedy given under such cir-

cumsttinces is a pecuniary compensation, a sum of money in the

place of the goods, which in our legal nomenclature is termed

damages. In this instance the remedy is plainly an equivalent.

A.'s primary riglit was to acquire the ownership and the posses-

sion of the corpus of the goods; B.'s primary duty was to trans-

fer the ownership and possession of that corpus. The remedy,
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however, is not the ownership and possession of the merchan-

dise, but the ownership and possession of a sum of money instead

thereof. It is a moral and indirect means of enforcing the pri-

mary right, because it may induce B. to perform his primary duty

and deliver the goods ; but, if it does not produce that effect, it

is an equivalent for the ownership and possession of the articles

themselves. In this instance we have a given primary right and

duty, a breacli thereof b}^ non- performance, a new remedial right

and duty in the place of the primary ones, and a remedy differ-

ent from, but equivalent to, those originals. This familiar ex-

ample illustrates every case of remedy by a pecuniary compensation

in the place of the primary right and duty which have been

broken. Another example will be sufificient. A. and B. have

entered into a contract by which the latter has -agreed to convey

a certain farm, and to execute and deliver a deed thereof to the

former. Here A.'s primarj'- right is to have B. convey the farm,

which is done by executing and delivering the deed and by sur-

rendering possession of the land. B.'s corresponding primary

duty is to perform these acts. Upon B.'s refusal, A. is at once
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clothed with a new and remedial right, and B. is subjected to a

new and remedial duty. Under these circumstances the law gives

a remedy which is the same as the end which was to be attained

by the primary right and duty themselves ; that is, the convey-

ance of the land. In other words, the law will compel B. to do

just what he in terms contracted to do, — execute and deliver

the deed and surrender the possession. Here the secondary

remedial right and duty are the same as the original primary

right and duty ; and the remedy itself is not an equivalent to,

but is identical with, the result to be reached by such primary

right and duty. The remedy, however, is plainly a means by

which A. maintains his primary right, and enforces the primary

duty which B. owes to him, for by it the self-same right is

upheld, and the self-same duty is performed.

§ 3. * 3. Distinction bet'ween Public and Private Remedies.

When the primary rights and duties are public, that is, Avhen

they govern the relations alone of the State with individuals,

the remedies for the violation thereof are public, and the larger

portion of them are criminal. Wlien tlie primary rights and

duties are private, that is, when they are confined to relations

of individuals with each other, the remedies are also private, or,
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as they are frequently termed, civil. This treatise will deal

with the latter class alone. The vast majority of public remedies

are designed to preserve the good order of society, and to enforce

those duties of individuals towards the State whose violations are

called crimes, and the remedies themselves are criminal: but

there are other public remedies which are not in any respect

criminal. The remedies to which I now refer may, at first

blush, appear to be private, and to be used to enforce some

rights that belong to an individual rather than to the body

politic ; yet, on closer examination of their elements and objects,

it Avill be plainly seen that they are strictly public, and serve to

uphold rights which inhere in the Commonwealth. The sub-

division which I am thus describing includes those judicial pro-

ceedings by which the regular organization and structure of the

government are preserved by determining the conflicting claims

of litigant parties to occupy and hold the powers and functions

of some particular public office. The individual who is, or who

claims to be, a portion of the governmental organism, by virtue

of an official position which he seeks to estaljlish, may be an
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actor in the judicial proceeding ; but the proceeding is not insti-

tuted, nor is the determination made, on his own personal ac-

count, nor for his own private benefit; the State is in theory and

in practice the party primarily interested, and the rights of the

State are maintained and established by the judicial decision.

On the other hand, certain remedies which have the outward

appearance of being public, which are required by some ancient

and arbitrary rule of form to be brought in the name of the

Commonwealth or of the people, are actuall}- private and civil.

The interj)osition of the State as a nominal actor is merel}'

formal, and the rights to l)e upheld belong to individuals in their

private cliaracters and ca[)acities. Remedies and remedial rights

of this last class, being strictly private and civil, fall within the

scope of the present work, while those of the preceding class are

not embraced within its design.
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CHAPTER FIRST.

ABOLITION OF THE DISTINCTIONS BETWEEN ACTIONS AT

LAW AND SUITS IN EQUITY, AND OF ALL THE COMMON-

LAW FORMS OF ACTION.

§ 4. * 44. statutory Provision. The following is the form of

the simple but most comprehensive provision found in the codes

of procedure and practice acts, embodying the fundamental prin-

ciple which is the subject-matter of the present chapter, and

which is the single source from which all the other portions of

the system flow as necessary consequences : " The distinction

between actions at law and suits in equity, and the forms of all

such actions and suits heretofore existing, are abolished; and

there shall be in this State hereafter but one form of action for

the enforcement or protection of private rights and the redress

of private wrongs, which shall be denominated a civil action."^

In a very few of the States the change from the former modes is

1 N. Y. § 69 (3.339) ; Cal. § 307 ; S. C.

§ 92; Nev. § 1 ; Nebr. § 2; Kans. § 10;

Ohio, § 3 ; Ind. § 1 ; N. C. § 12 ; [Con-

necticut, Gen. St., 1902, § 607 ; Minnesota,
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Gen. St., 1894, § 5131 ; Mi.ssouri, Kev. St.,

1899, § 539; Wisconsin, St., 1898, § 2600;

Idaho, Code Civ. Pro., 1901. § 3112;

Montana, § 460 ; North Dakota, Rev.

Codes, 1899, § 5181 ; Wyoming, Kev. St.,

1899, §3443; Colorado, § 1; Utah, Rev.

St., 1898, §2852; South Dakota, Ann.

St., 1901, § 6030; Oklahoma, St., 1893,

§ 3882 ; ^Vashing•ton. Bal. Code, § 4793.

In the citations of New York statutes,

the section numbers first given refer to

tlie old Code of Procedure, while the

numbers a])pearing in parentheses refer

to the new code of Civil Procedure.] The

provision in the California Code is as

follows: "§307 (§ 1). There is in this

State but one form of civil action for the

enforcement or protection of ])rivate

rights, and the redress or prevention of

private wrongs."

£The provision of the New York code.

quoted in the text, has been changed to

read as follows : " There is only one form

of civil action. The distinction between

actions at law and suits in equity, and the

forms of those actions and suits, have been

abolished." Code Civ. Pro., § 3339. The

various codes differ somewhat among

themselves in the wording of this pro-

vision, but in a general way they follow

either the New York or California form.

The New York form is found in Indiana,

Kansas, Nebraska, Minnesota, Wisconsin,

Nortli Dakota, Wyoming, Colorado. South

Dakota, and Oklahoma, while the Califor-

nia form is found in Missouri, Ohio, Con-

necticut, South Carolina, Nevada, Idaho,

Montana, Utah, and Washington.

Georgia, wliich in many respects has

followed the Code procedure, has adopted

statutes as follows : " Bills in equity and

all distinctions of actions into real, per-

sonal, and mixed, are abolished." " A

civil action is one founded on private

rights, arising eitlier from contract or

tort." Code, 1895, §§4931, 4932.]

CIVIL RE:.IEDIES.
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not SO complete, and a slight distinction is preserved between

suits brought to obtain legal and those brought to obtain equi-

table relief. All the common-law forms of action are abolished,

and one civil action is established for all remedial purposes: the

proceedings in this civil action, however, may be either (1)

ordinary or (2) equitable. The plaintiff may prosecute his

action by equitable proceedings in all cases where courts of

chancery, before the adoption of the code, had jurisdiction, and

must so proceed in all cases where such jurisdiction was exclu-

sive. In all other cases the plaintiff must prosecute his action by

ordinary proceedings. The plaintiff indicates by the formula,

"In ordinary proceedings," or "In equitable proceedings," at

an 1 a li~)1t di tin tion
pr rved between
o b , in 1 gal and tho brought t obtain equill th c mm n-law for
f a ti n are a lisb
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wh r c urts of
ban cer befor the ad pti n of the cod ' bad juri diction, and
r ceed in all cas s where u h juri diction wa exclu'1ve. In all other ca
the plaintiff must pros cute his a tion by
rdinary r ceeding . Th plaintiff indicate b. the formula
' In ordinary proceedings, ' or ' In equitable proceeding , " at
the commencement of hi ., petition or complaint, to which la
the a tion belong . The pro isions of the code regulating b
pro cution of action apply to b th kind of proceeding unl
the contrary expre sly appears . In fact, the only real di stiucti n
betw en th m i tha they are to be placed upon different dock t
f the c urt, o tba t the suit of the one cla will be trie b a
JUr whil tbo ·e of th other c]a will be tried by the jud
with u a jury, and the evidenc in equitable proceeding ma
b tak n by depo ition in tead of by oral examination in op
tat the difference k pt up
court. 1 It i vident that in the
etween legal and equitable actions is more nominal tl an r al
nd that th , principl of ab olute unity prevails a truly in their
d a in tho e f th other commonwealth . 2
not
uit
' bl

r

the commencement of his petition or complaint, to which class

the action belongs. The provisions of the code regulating the

prosecution of actions apply to both kinds of proceedings unless

the contrary expressly appears. In fact, the only real distinction

between them is that they are to be placed upon different dockets

of the court, so that the suits of the one class will be tried by a

jury, while those of the other class will be tried by the judge
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without a jury, and the evidence in equitable proceedings may

be taken by deposition instead of b}^ oral examination in open

court. ^ It is evident that in these States the difference kept up

between legal and equitable actions is more nominal than real,

and that the principle of absolute unity prevails as truly in their

codes as in those of the other commonwealths. ^

1 Ky. §§ 1-1.3 ; Iowa, §§ 2507, 2508,

251.3, 2514, 2520; Oregon, §§ 1, 376;

[[Arkansas, Sand. & Hill's Dig., §§ 5607-

5610, 5616-5622.]

'^ [[The question cannot be raised by

demurrer, but by motion to transfer from

one docket to the other. McClure v. Dee

(1902), 115 la. 546, 88 N. W. 1093; Mc-

Cormick, etc. Co. v. Markert (1899), 107

la. .340, 78 N. W. 33. See also the follow-

ing cases in whicii tliis distinction is di.s-

cu88ed: Hodowal v. Yearous (1897), 103

la. 32, 72 N. VV. 294 ; Kassiug i,-. Ordway

(1897), 100 la. 611, 69 N. W. 1013; Gatch

V. Garretson (1896), 100 la. 252, 69 N. W.

550; Evans v. McConnell (1896), 99 la.

326, 68 N. W. 790 ; Leach v. Kundsou

(1896), 97 la. 643, 66 N. W. 913 ; Hawley

V. Exchange Bank (189F), 97 la. 187. 6C.

N. W. 152; Reed v. Lane (1895), 96 la.

4.54, 65 N. \V. 380 ; Wilkinson v. Pritciiard

(1895). 93 la. 308. 61 N. W. 965 ; Rabb r.

Albright (1894), 93 la. 50, 61 N. W. 402;

Mechan v. Watson (1898), 65 Ark. 216,47

S. W. 109-3

l Ky. §§ 1-l.'3; fo,va, §§ 2507, 250,
2513, 2514, 2520;
regon,
§ l, 376;
[ rkan a , and. & Hill'
ig., §§ 56075610, 5616-5622.J
2 [The que tion cannot be rai ed by
d m urr r, but by m otion to tran fer fr m
n docket t the other. J\1 lure ~ . ee
( 1902), I 15 Ia. 546,
N. W. 1093; fcor 111ick, et . o. v. M rkert (I 99), l 7
Ja. 3.J.0, 7
. W . 33 .
e al o the followe in whi ch thi di ·tin t ion i · di s·u <l II dowal v . Y ar u (1 9i), 103
I·. 32, 72 . W . 294 ; Kas ing v. Ordway

(l 97), 100 Ia. 611 , 69 N. W. 1013; Gat h
. Garret on (1896), 100 Ia. 252, 69 . W.
550; Evan v. M Connell (1 96), 99 fa.
326, 6
. W . 790 ; L a h v. Kund on
(l 96), 97 Ia. 643, 66 . W. 913; lfawl e.\·
v. Exchange Bank (1 9F-), 97 Ia. l 7, 6H
J. W. 152; R e d v. Lan e (1895), 96 Ia.
45.J., 65 N. W. 3 ; Wilkins on v. Prit hard
( 1 95), 93 Ia. 30 , 61 ". W . 965; Rabb 1•.
Albright (1 4), 93 Ia. 50, 61 N. W. 402;
l\f han v. Wat on (1 9 ), 65 Ark. 216, 47
. w. 10 .]

GENERAL NATURE OF Till': CIVIL ACTION.

SECTION FIKST.

THE GENERAL PRINCIPLES AS TO A UNION OF LEGAL AND EQUI-

TABLE METHODS WHICH HAVE BEEN ADOPTED BY THE COURTS.

§ 5. * 65. Purpose of Section One, Chapter One. General Prin-

ciples of Construction. It is not my purpose in the present sec-

tion to discuss in order the particuhir practical questions that

have arisen in the construction of those provisions of the State

codes of procedure and practice acts wliich abolish the distinction

between legal and equitable actions; namely, the combining of

legal and equitable causes of action and defence in the same suit,

the interposing of equitable defences to legal causes of action,

the granting of legal remedies where the pleadings had con-

templated equitable ones, or of equitable remedies where the

pleadings had contemplated legal ones, and the like. I intend

rather to ascertain, if possible, and state the general principles

of construction which the courts have finally adopted and applied

in the settlement of these and all other similar questions which

have arisen from this most distinctive and important feature

of the reformed procedure. These principles are fundamental;
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they underlie the whole process of judicial interpretation ; they

shape the entire action of the courts in building up a system of

practical rules out of the broad and somewhat vague enactments

of the statute. A knowledge of these controlling motives and

opinions which have guided the judges in their work of con-

struction is of the highest importance; with it we may attain a

systematic and harmonious result; without it we shall certainly

be left in a chaos of conflicting decisions.

§ 6. * Q6. Narro-wr Interpretation by Some Judges. This Inter-

pretation Overruled. The adoption of the Code of Procedure by

the Legislature of New York in 1848 was undoubtedly a shock

to the opinions and prejudices of lawyers who had been accus-

tomed to regard the former system as perfect in principle, and

while it met with a strenuous opposition from many members of

the bar, it is not surprising that some of the judges also for a

time found it difficult, if not impossible, to yield obedience to the

letter even of the statutory requirement, much less to accept its

spirit with zealous approval. Opinions are to be found, deliv-

8 CIVIL REMEDIES.
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ered at an early day by very eminent and able judges, sometimes

sitting in the court of last resort, which, if taken as correct

expositions of the statute, would have reduced the great reform

to the empty change in a few words; the ancient names would

have been abolished, but all the substance, all that Avas repre-

sented by those names, would have remained in full force and

effect. According to this view there had been no union of

methods into one common mode of proceeding, no abolition of

any real distinctions between legal and equitable actions, because

such a result is simply impossible of attainment.^ Since the

New York Constitution provides that the Supreme Court of that

State shall have general jurisdiction in law and equity, and

speaks in one or two other places of "equity," it has been said

from the bench that a statute abolishing the distinctive features

of equity would be unconstitutional, and that the New York

code, so far as it purports to produce that effect, is void.^ The

system which this school of judges has constructed out of the

reformatory legislation is the following. ^ The distinctions be-

tween law and equity inhere in tlie very nature of the subject,
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and cannot be abolished. The legislature may, unless restrained

by the constitution, abrogate the law or equity, but cannot

destroy the distinctions between them. The language of the

statute, however, is not broad enough to effect such a change;

^ See Reubens r. .Joel, 13 N. Y. 488, in which it is held error to permit the jury

493, and Voorhis 7-. Child's Ex., 17 N. Y. to find a cause of action ex contractu under

354, 357-362, per S. L. Seldeu J. pleadin^js showing that the cause of action

2 Selden J., in Reubens v. Joel, 13 was founded in tort. See also to the same

N. Y. 494, 495. effect State ex rel. v. Helms (1898), 101

8 Selden J., in Reul)ens v. Joel and Wis. 280, 77 N. W. 194. See further

Voorhis v. Child's Ex., uhi supra. Joseph Dessert Lumber Co. v. Wadleigh

QSee Anderson i-.Chilson (1895), 8 S.D. (1899), 103 Wis. 318, 79 N. W. 237, affirm-

64, where it is stated in the syllabus that ing Kewaunee Cy. Sup. r. Decker, 30 Wis.

" AltiioHKli the common law forms have 624, and in which it is said : " It is just as

been abolished, an e(|uitable action under necessary to-day as it ever was that a

the code system is clearly distingui.shable suitor should so state his cause of action

from one at law," quoting from Dalton v. that the court may determine whether it

Vanderveer (Sup.), 29 N. Y. Su])p. .342, be ex contractu or ex delicto." In Fran-

that a " distinction between equitable and Cisco v. Hatch (1903), 117 Wis. 242, 93

legal actions still exists, tliough tiic forms N. W. 1118, the court said: "Having

have been abolished." In Ca.sgrain v. brought this action in tort, neither the

Hamilton (1890), 92 Wis. 179, 60 N. W. plaintiff nor the court could change it

1 18, it is shown that whether the action is into an action upon contract upon the

one in tort or in contract is still a practical trial against the defendants' objections.

question under the code. See also Rood This principle is well settled in this.

V. Taft (1890), 94 Wis. 380, 09 N. W. 183, State."J
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and cannot be aboli h d. The legi lature may, unless re trained
y th c n titution, abrogate the law or equity, but cannot
de tr y the di tinctions between them. The language of th
tatute, h wever, i n t broad enough to effect uch a change·
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it is confined to external acts and forms, to tlie metliods of ob-

taining remedies, to the incidents of actions, and not to their

substance. Even when thus restrained, tliere are necessary

elements in tlie subject-matter which cannot be affected l)y

legislation, and which limit, therefore, the general phrases of

the code. Assuming that primary legal and equitable rights

and duties remain unaltered, essential differences must exist in

the actions brought to enforce the legal and the equitable classes

of rights, and also the various species of legal rights. For this

reason the substantial features and characteristics of the various

actions at law must and do subsist, and the rules which are

based upon these facts must and do continue in operation. The

names "covenant," "debt," "trespass," "assumpsit," "bill in

equity," and the like, have been abandoned, but all the things

which these names represented are left in their essentials exactly

as before the attempted reforms. This theory of interpretation

reduces the Code of Procedure from its position as the embodi-

ment of a new system for the administration of justice to the

level of a mere amendatory act regulating the minor details of
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practice. The explanation here made of it is now useful only as

a matter of history;^ it never became controlling; the opinions

^ ^See, however, the case of Draper r. between actions at law and in equity, to

Brown, decided in 1902 by the Supreme abolish which is beyond the power of

Court of Wisconsin, 115 Wis. 361, 91 legislative enactment. The legislature

N. W. 1001, from which we quote as fol- may abolish the old forms of action and

lows : " It iH.ay seem somewhat anomalous has done so ; but the essential principle*

that, under a Code, any distinction should of equitable actions and equitable relief,

exist between legal and equitable actions, as distinguished from legal actions and

That such distinction does exist is recog- remedies, are as vital now, and as clearly

nized in almost every Code State. It is a marked and defined, as before the en-

distinction inherent in the very nature of actment of the Code. They are inde-

it is confined to external act and f rm , t th m
f
taining reme li s, t the in id nt f acti n aud n t t tb 1r
substance.
Ev n when thu r 'train <l, th r ar
elements in the ubj ct-matter whi h , nn t b
legislation, and which limit, ther for , th
of
the c.ocle. As urnin g that primary 1 gal
and duties remain unalt r d,
ential diff r n · mu 't xist in
the actions brought to enforce th l gal an l th quitabl la
of right , and also the variou pe i of 1 gal right .
or thi
Teason the sub tantial f ature and hara t ri tic of th var10u
actions at law must and do sub i t, and the rules which are
based upon these facts must and do continue in op ration. The
names "covenant," "debt," "trespa s, " "ass um psi t, ' ' bill in
equity, " and the like, have been abandoned, but all the thing
which these names represented are left in their essentials exactly
as before the attempted reforms. This theory of in terpretation
reduces the Code of Procedure from its position as the embodiment of a new system for the administration of justice to the
level of a mere amendatory act regulating the minor detail of
practice. The explanation here made of it is now u eful only a
a matter of history; 1 it never became controlling; the opinion

things, and must be recognized .so long as structible elements in our system of

both legal and equitable remedies are jurisprudence, and the courts are con-

permitted. A ra.nn has both legal and stantly required to recognize and apply

equitalde rights. In the vindication of them.' The courts of New York an-

his legal rights he can call upon the in- nounced the same doctrine early in the

dividual or individuals who have invaded history of the Code. Reubens v. Joel, 13

such rights for reparation In the en- N. Y. 488 ; Goulet f. As.seler, 22 N. Y. 225 ;

forcement of his equitable rights he has the Gould ?'. Rank, 86 N. Y. 75-83. So pro-

power, and it is Ids duty, to call in every nounced and well preserved is this distiuc-

person necessary to a complete determina- tion that this court sustained a demurrer

tion or settlement of the question involved, to a complaint in an equitable action,

Such is the statute. Section 2603, Ilev. St. notwithstanding it contained allegations

1898. In treating this question, Mr. Jus- which, if standing by themselves, would

tice Lvon, in Bonesteel r. Bonesteel, 28 constitute an action at law. Denner v.

Wis. 245. wrote as follows: 'There are Railroad Co., 57 Wis. 218, 15 N. W.

certain essential and inherent distinctions 158."]

1 [See, however, the case of Draper t'.
Brown, decid ed in 1902 by the Supreme
Court of \\' ist:onsin, 115 Wis. 361, 91
N. W. 1001 , from which we quote as follows: "It may seem somewhat anomalou
that, under a Code, any <li tinction should
exi t between legal and eq uitabl e action .
That such distinctioll does exist is r ecognized in alm ost every Code State. It is a
distinction inherent in the very nature of
things, and must be recognized so long a
both legal and equitable remedie are
permitted. A man has both legal and
equitable rights. In th e vin dication of
his I gal rig hts he can call npon the individual or individual who ha"e iuvaded
such ri ghts for r epar ation . I n the enforcement of his equ itable ri g hts he has the
power, and it is his du ty, to call in every
person necessary to a co mpl ete determinat ion or settlement of the que. tion involved.
Such is the statute. ection 2603, Rev. t.
1898. In treatin g- th i. que t iou, Mr. Ju. ti ce L yon, in Bon esteel ,._ Bon E>~teel, 2
Wis. 245 . wrote as foll ows : 'Thne are
certain e ·~e n ti al an<l inh rent <li tinction

between actions at law and in equity, to
abolish which i beyo nd the power of
legislative enactment. The 1 gi lature
may aboli h the old form of action and
has done o; but the es ential principl
of equitable action. and eq uitable relief,
as di ting ui hed from legal action and
remedies, are a vital now, and a. clearly
marked and defin <l, a before the enactment of the
<le. They are indestructible elements iu our .y t m of
juri prudence, aud the onrt are constantl.Y r qu ired to recogniz an l apply
them.' The ·ourt of N w York announced the ame doctrine early in the
hi. tor.r of th
o le. R ub n v. Joel, 13
N. Y. 4 8; Goulet v. A~. ler, 22 . Y. 225;
G ulcl 1. Bank, 86 .i: • Y. 75- .
o pronounc d ancl well pre erv d i thi di tinction that thi court u tain d a demurrer
t a complaint in an efJuitabl action,
notwithstanding it contain d all gation
which, if standing by th m. elv . , would
c n. ti tut an acti n at law. Denn r v.
Hailroa,d
., 57 Wi . 21 , 15 N. W.
15 ."]
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which it represents were tliosc of individual judges rather than

nt
th

of courts, and they have been repeatedly and completely over-

ruled by tribunals of the highest authority. ^

^ 7. * Cn . How^ Interpreted in Most of the States. Criticism of

Interpretation in these States. This protest against the changes

in the time-honored modes of judicial procedure, this antagonism

to the principle of the new system, which was at the outset con-

fined to a small though very able portion of the bench, was long

since abandoned;^ and the courts have in most of the States not

only conformed to the letter of the reformatory legislation, but

have to a considerable extent, but not, as I think, to the full

extent, accepted and carried out its evident spirit and meaning.

I speak advisedly in this statement. While the courts on the

whole, and in all the States, do not show a disposition to defeat

the reform by a hostile construction, but rather seem desirous of

promoting it, and establishing it upon a secure basis, there are

yet marked differences in this respect among the States, and also

strange inconsistencies in the application of general principles to

particular instances. The acceptance of the reformed procedure
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is much more constrained and reluctant in certain of the States

than in the remaining and by far the larger portion of them.

Again, a lack of uniformity will be discovered in applying the

most general and comprehensive principles of interpretation to

the various elements and features of judicial procedure. All

these inconsistencies, when they exist, have arisen from the

incapacity of the judicial mind to apprehend the fact that legal

actions and equitable actions have been abolished, and a "civil

action " has been substituted in their place. Conceding this

truth in general, courts have sometimes failed to act upon it in

reference to some subordinate particulars; the result has been,

not a perfect harmonious structure built up by judicial labor, but

a structure, although following on the whole a comprehensive and

symmetrical plan, yet marred by many breaks and unfinished

parts and misshapen additions. In short, the true fundamental

principles of construction have been generally adopted as guides,

the true spirit and design of the reform system have been gener-

' Sec the comments upon Mr. Justice ^ See, however, cases cited in note 1,

Selden'H o[)inion in I{euben.s v. Joel, made p. 9.

by Com.stock J., in N. Y. Ice Co. v. N. W.

Ins. Co., 2.3 N. Y. 330, 360.
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ally apprehended; but in descending to the details, and in pre-

scribing the practical rules of procedure, this principle and this

spirit have been sometimes forgotten or intentionally disregarded.

§8. * 68. No Change in Rights, Duties, or Liabilities. It has

been abundantly settled, in perfect accordance with the theory

developed in the preceding section, and in strict conformity with

the language and design of all the State codes and practice acts,

that the new system has not produced, and was not intended to

produce, any alteration of, nor direct effect upon, the primary

rights, duties, and liabilities of persons created by either depart-

ment of the municipal law.^ Whatever may have been the

nature or extent of these primary rights and duties, from what-

ever causes, facts, acts, or omissions they took their rise, whether

they were denominated legal or equitable, they remain exactly

the same as before. The codes do not assume to abolish the

distinctions between " law " and " equity, " regarded as two com-

plementary departments of the municipal law ; not a clause is to

be found which suggests such a revolution in the essential nature

of the jurisprudence which we have inherited from England.
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The principles by which the courts determine the primary rights

and duties of litigant parties remain unaltered; upon the acts or

1 Peck V. Newton, 46 Barb. 173, 174, 104, 73 N. W. 776, where the court says:

per Parker J. ; Cole v. Reynolds, 18 N. Y. " The framers of the code clearly intende<l

74, 76, per Harris J. ; Lattin v. McCarty, to abolish all distinctions between actions

41 N. Y. 107, 110, per Hunt C.J. ; Meyers at law and suits in equity, to abolish the

V. Field, 37 Mo. 434, 441, per Holmes J. ; forms of all .such actions, and to provide

Richardson v. Means, 22 Mo. 495, 498, per that in this State there .shall be but one

Leonard J. ; Maguire i'. Vice, 20 Mo. 429 ; form of action for the enforcement or pro-

Matlock V. Todd, 2.5 Ind. 128, 130, per tection of private rights and the redress or

Elliot J. ; Woodford v. Leavenworth, 14 prevention of private wrongs, which is de-

Ind. 311, 314, per Worden J.; Emmons nominated a civil action." See especially

ally appr hended; but in le c nding t th
tail, and in pr cribing the practical rul s f pr ce<lur thi prin ipl and L11 i8
pirit have been som tim forcrott n or int ntion, Uy di r gard •cl.
8. * 6 . No Change in Rights, Duties, or Liabilities.
It, ha.·
been abundantly s ttl d, in I rf ct a cor<lan
wi h he h ory
developed in the preceding s ction, an in trict nf rmity with
the language and design of all the tate code and Ira ti e a t ,
that the new system has not prod u d, and was n t int n<l cl t
produce, any alterati on of, nor dir ct eff t upon, the primary
rights, duties, and liabilities of p rsons er ated by ither d partment of the municipal la'"'"- 1 Whatever may have h n t h
nature or extent of these primary right and dutie from whatever causes, facts, acts, or omi ions they took th ir ri , whe h r
they were denominated legal or equitable, th y remain exactly
the same as before. The code do not assume to ah li h th
distinctions between "law" and "equity," r garded a two c mplementary depart ments of the municipal law; not a clau e i to
be found which suggests such a revolution i11 the ess nbal natur
of the jurisprudence which we have inherited from England.
The principles by which the courts determine the primary right
and duties of li tigant parties remain unaltered; upon the acts or

V. Kiger, 23 Ind. 483, 487; De Witt r- Draper r. Brown (1902), 11.5 Wis. 361, 91

Hays, 2 Cal. 463, 468, per Murray C. J. ; N. W. 1001, citing and quoting from Hone-

Grain t'. Aldrich, 38 Cal. 514; Cropsey r. steel v. Bouesteel, supra. Hopkins v.

Sweeney, 27 Barb. 310; Klonne v. Brad- Washington County (1898), 56 Neb. 596,

street, 7 Ohio St. 322, 325, per Bowen, J. ; 77 N. W. 53 : " The distinction between

Garret v. Gault, 13 B. Mon. 378, 380, per law and equity is not abolished in this

Hise J. ; Bonesteel v. Bonesteel, 28 Wis. State. Section 2 of the Code of Civil

245, 250, per Lyon J. ; Dickson r. Cole, Procedure, however, provides that there

.34 Wis. 621, 625 ; Martin v. Mobile & O. shall be but one form of action, called a

R. R., 7 Bush, 116, 124; Richmond & L. ' civil action,' in which rules of law or doc-

Turnp. Co. v. Rogers, 7 Bush, .532, 535 ; trines of equity may, under proper plead-

Lanison i\ Pfaff, 1 Handy, 449, 452 ; ing and proper states of facts, either or

Clau.ssen v. La Frenz, 4 Greene (la.), 224; both be enforced.''] See Mowry t'. Hill,

Smith -•. Rowe, 4 Cal. 6. 11 Wis. 146, 149.

[^See Kollock v. Scribuer (1897), 98 Wis.

1 Peck v. Newton, 46 Barb. l'i'.3, 174,
per Parker .J.; Cole v. R eynolds , 18 N. Y.
74, 76, pe r Harri s J .; Lattin v. McCarty,
41N.Y . 107 , 110,per Hunt C.J.; Meyers
v. Field , 37 Mo. 434, 441, per H olmes J.;
Richardson v. M eans , 22 Mo. 495, 498, per
Leonard J.; Mag uire v. Vice, 20 Mo . 429;
Matlock v. Todd, 25 In d. 128, 130, per
Elliot .J. ; Woodford v. L eaYen worth, 14
Ind. 311 , 314, per Worden J .; Emmon
v. Kiger, 23 Ind . 483, 4 7; D e Witt V·
Hay , 2 Cal. 463, 468, per Murray C. J.;
Grain v. Al d rich, 38 Cal. 514; ropsey v.
Sweeney, 27 Barb. 310 ; Klon ne v . Bradstreet, 7 Ohio St. 322, 325, per Bowen, J.;
Garret v. Gault, 13 B. Mon. 378, 3 0, per
Hi e J . ; B onesteel v. Bone tee.I, 2 Wi .
245, 250, p er Lyon ,J. ; Dick on v. ol ,
34 Wic. 621, 625; Martin v. Mobile & 0.
R.R. , 7 Bu. h, 11 6, 124 ; Richmond & L.
Turn p. 'o. v. Rogers, 7 Bu h, 5.32, 535;
Lamson v. Pfaff, 1 H andy, 449, 452;
Clau sen v. La Frenz, 4 Greene (Ia.), 224-;
Smith 11. Howe, 4 Cal. 6.
[See Kollock v . S cribuer (1897), 98 Wis.

104, 73 N. W. 77 6, where the court say :
"The framers of the code cl arly intended
to aboli h all distinction betw en act.ions
at law and suits in equ ity, to aboli ·h the
forms of all such action , and to provide
that in th i State there hall be but ouc
fo rm of a ction fo r the enforc ment or pro
tection of private rights and the redre or
prevention of private wrongs, which i · d nominated a civil action."
pecially
Draper v. Brown (1902) , 115 Wi . 36 1, 91
N. W. 1001 , cit ing and quoting from Bon teel v. B onesteel, supra. Hopkins v.
Wa hingtou County ( 1 9 ) , 56 1 b. 596,
77 N. vV. 53: " The di tin t ion between
law and equity i not ab li hed in this
tate. , cction 2 of the ode of i vil
l rocedure, however, provide that th re
. hall be but on form of a ction, call d a
• ri1·il action,' in which rule of law or d ctrines of equity may, under proper pleading and pr per tate of fa ts, either or
both be enforced."] See Mowry ti. Hill,
11 Wis. 1-!6, 149.
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omissions which were fhe occasion of a right called equitable the

same right is still based, and is still properly termed equitable;

from the acts or omissions which were the occasions of a right

called legal the same right still arises, and is still with propriety

termed legal. ^ I remark, in passing, that much of the confusion

and uncertainty which now exists would at once disappear, if the

bar and the bench should adopt a nomenclature in conformity

with the settled principle of interpretation, and should speak of

legal and equitable rights, legal and equitable remedies, but not

of legal and equitable actions. To term an action "legal" or

" equitable " is a misnomer, and one which involves a wrong

conception and a false doctrine, since the statute has removed

all distinction between legal and equitable actions, and has su"b-

stituted in place of both a single " civil action ; " and the courts

have decided that the legislature intended exactly what it has

said. 2 But as the legislature did not say, nor mean to say, that

the distinctions between legal and equitable rights or remedies

are abolished, those terms may be used with propriety and cor-

rectness.^ The reformed American system, in short, has given
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no new causes of action. Primary rights and duties are un-

changed ; the delicts or wrongs which are the violations of these

rights and duties are still committed in the same manner as

before ; and as these primary rights and duties, and the wrongs

which violate them, constitute the causes of action over which

the courts exercise their remedial jurisdiction, it is plain that no

statute relating solely to procedure can increase, diminish, or

modify the causes of action which exist independently of pro-

cedure. In some instances particular parties are permitted to

maintain an action who could not have maintained it under the

old practice; but in no instance can this now be done where

upon the same facts and circumstances a similar action could not

have been maintained by some person. A familiar illustration of

this statement is found in the change made in the common-law

' QAnderson v. War Eagle Min. Co. reference to the form of action. Skinner

(1903), Idaho, 72 I'ac. 671, quoting the i-. Sliinner (1894), 38 Neb. 756, 57 N. W.

text.] 534. But see Draper r. Brown (1902),

'^ Qlt is not material by what name, or 115 Wis. 361, 91 N. W. 1001. 3

whetlier by any, an action under the code ^ [^Anderson v. War Eagle Min. Co.

JH designated. The pleader .sliould state (1903), Idaho, 72 Pac. 671, quoting the

the facts, and if they constitute a cause of text.]
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rule prohibiting an action by the assignee of a non-negotiable

thing in action, and requiring the suit to be prosecuted in the

name of the assignor, although for the benefit, and, as it was

finally settled, under the complete control, of the assignee. The

codes have abrogated this technical dogma, and thus permit an

action to be brought by a party who formerly had no such power;

but this does not create nor constitute any new cause of action.

The assignee now sues where the assignor sued ; the same facts

must be proved, the same rights asserted, and the same relief

given ; the only change is in permitting the assignee to accom-

plish directl}^ and in his own name, what he before accomplished

indirectly and by the use of another's name.

§ 9. *69. No Change in Remedies or Remedial Rights. The

doctrine thus uniformly established in reference to the effect of

the reform legislation upon primary rights and duties, and causes

of action, is also as clearly settled in reference to its effect upon

remedies and remedial rights, when the term is used — as it

properly should be — to denote the reliefs which are conferred

upon parties, and not tlie means of procuring these reliefs. The
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word "remedies" is sometimes used in two different technical

senses, and from this dual meaning there arises — as in all such

cases — doubt and confusion. The secondary and in strictness

improper signification renders the word equivalent to the mere

judicial instruments and their incidents, the actions at law, suits

in equity, special proceedings, and the like, — the various steps

in a forensic controversy which fall within the proper domain of

practice. The primary and strictly accurate signification makes

it synonymous with the judgments which are pronounced by the

court, and which established the remedial rights and prescribe

the manner in which and the means by which they are to be

satisfied. Or "remedies " may denote those judgments executed

and performed by which the party has received the very benefit

to which he was entitled, — the sum of money, the possession of

the land or of the chattels, the execution and delivery of the

deed, the cancellation of the agreement, the removal of the ob-

struction, or whatever else was ordered to be done by the opposite

party. In either of these two latter senses, the remedies which

were in use under the former system, and which were awarded

by the courts upon proper occasions, are absolutely unaffected

in any of their essential features by the reformatory legislu-
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in tbe
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The
c d have abrogated this t chni al d gma, an thu p rrnit an
action to be .brought by a party who form rly h no u h pow r;
but thi does not er at nor on titut an n w au
f action.
The as ignee now sues wher the a ign r u d · the am fa ts
mu t be proved, the ame right a rt d, and th
ame reli f
given; the only change is in p rmitting the a · i n
to a complisb directly, and in his own nam , what he before accompli bed
indirectly and by the u e of anoth r' name.
§ 9. *69. No Change in Remedies or Remedial Rights. The
doctrine thus uniformly establi hed in ref rence to the effect of
the reform legislation upon primary rights and du tie , and cau s
of action, is also as clearly settled in reference to it ff ct ur n
remedies and remedial rights, when the term i u d - a it
properly should be - to denote the reliefs which ar conferred
upon parties, and not the means of procuring these r lief . The
word "remedies" is sometimes u ed in two differ nt technical
senses, and from this dual meaning there arises - a in all such
ca es -doubt and confusion. The secondary and in trictn
improper signification renders the word equivalent to the mere
judicial instruments and their incidents, the actions at law, suits
in equity, special proceedings, and the like, - the vari u tep
in a forensic controversy which fall within the prop r domain of
practice. The primary and strictly accurate signification make ·
it synonymous with the judgments which are pronoun d by th
court, and which established the remedial right and pre. cribe
the manner in which and the means by which th
are to b
satisfied. Or "remedies" may denote tho e judgm nt
and performed by which the party bas rec ived th
to which he was entitl d, - the sum of money, the
the land or of the chattels, the execution and d li r
deed, the cancellation of the agreem nt, th
al of
struction, or whatever else was ordered to b
party. In either of these two latt r n
were in use under the former y tern, and wbi h ' r awar d
by the courts upon proper occasions, ar ab olut ly unaff ct d
in any of their es ntial featur
by th reformator 1 gi la-
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tion.^ The general and sweeping language so often quoted abol-

ishes the distinction between actions at law and suits in equity ; and

other provisions and clauses recognize all the forms of judgment

known to the common-law courts, namely, for payment of money,

for the possession of land and of chattels, and also the specific

kinds of relief which courts of equity embodied in their decrees.

Strictly speaking, the remedy given is no part of the action, but

is the result thereof; it is the object for which the action is

prosecuted, the end at wdiich all the litigation is directed. A

modification of the action, a change in its forms, incidents,

names, modes of procedure, including the process, the pleadings,

the parties, the manner of trial, and all other steps preparatory

to the judgment, does not involve any alteration in this result;

the general language of the codes does not, therefore, include

and apply to the substance of the judgments, that is, of the

remedies. Without, however, relying exclusively upon an

interpretation which may seem to be too refined and verbal, the

practical construction given by the courts, and as illustrated by

the citations contained in the preceding foot-note, fully sustains
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the conclusions which are reached by an analysis of the language.

Abolition of the distinction between legal and equitable actions,

and of the forms of legal actions, does not abolish the distinc-

tions between remedies. If from the nature of the primary right,

and of the wrong by which it is invaded, the injured party would

under the old system have been entitled to an equitable remedy,

he is still entitled to the same relief, and it may well be teimed

equitable; if from the like causes he would have been entitled to

a legal remedy, he is still entitled to the same relief, and it may

properly be described as legal.

§ 10. * 70. The Differences that have been Abolished. What is

Established? It having been thus determined that no effect has

been wrought upon the primary lights and duties which consti-

' See ca.<es last citeil under § 8 ; also, actions at law and suits in equity, yet the

Carrico I'. Toinlinson, 17 Mo. 499 ; Butler legislature has not intended tliereby to

r. Lee, .33 How. I'r. K. 251 (Ct. of App.). change the nature of the remedies wliieh

[[See Uord c. Bradbury (1900), 156 Ind. generally obtain in those jurisdictions

30, S;* N. IC. 31, where the court says: where courts of law and chancery are

" .Judgments at law and decrees inequity separate, nor could they do so if they

are all 'judgments' under the code." wished, as it would be in most instances

Olson c. Thompson (1897), 6 Okla. 74, 48 impos.sible to obtain relief in an action at

Pac. 184: " Notwitlistanding the legisla- law wiiere such relief must come through

turc hat abolisiied the distinction between the equitable powers of the court. "J

in le n0 uag
of ten q u t d bolti n at law and ' uit in quity · and
onize ull th form of judgw n
wn t tb common-law c urt uam ly for payment f mon ·
p cifi
' , ion of land and f b tt 1 and 1 o th
kin I · fr li f whi b curt f quit· mbodi l in third er
akin th r m dy iY n i no part of tl , ti n, but
hereof· it i th
bj c f r whi h th action i
nd at whi h all th li tiga ion i Er t <l. A
h a.ction a cha.no· in it form , in id nt ,
h pleadino '
ro uur in lucling the pr ce
arti
the mann r of trial and all oth r t p pr paratory
ju<l m nt doe not involY an.· altera ion in thi r ·ult;
n ral language of th
ode doe n t h r for , in 1ude
an<l a1 ply t th
ubstanc of the ju<l m nt.. that i of the
remedi .
"\Vithout, h w
r 1 ·ing xclu 'iY ly up n
n
int r r tation which ma
m to b too r fined and v rbal, th
pr cti al con ,truction giv n by th court an l a illu trat 1 b
h citation contained in th pr c ling foot-n t fully u tain"
th on ·lu ion whi h ar rea h d by an analy i of th lan ·ua
b liti n of the di tin tion b tw n le al and quit ble action
f th form of legal action d
not aboli l he di tincti n · u tw n r medie . If from th nature of th primary right,
< n l 0£ th wr ng b
which i i. invad 1 the injur cl party would
uncl r th ol l . t m have be n ntitle l t
n quitabl r m J
h i
ill ntitled to th same r li f and it may w 11 b t im d
q uitabl · if from the like au e h would have b n ntitled to
, 1 al r 10 cly he i till ntitled t th ame reli f and it may
pr p rl b d crib d a 1 gal.
The

neral and

.

The Differences that have been Abolished.

What is

It having b n thu l t rmin
that n
ct ha
l e ·n wr u ht up nth
nmar ri ht and du i "hi h on i -

Established?

1
•e ca •. 1. t ·it •I un<ler § · aLo,
('arru•o r•. 'l'o111Ji11. ou, 17 :\Jo. 499 ; Bu t ) •r
'· L "· aa Ifow. l'r. H ~ 5 1 ( t. of App.).
[ •c• Jlrml 1•. Bradbury ( 900) , I 5G Ind .
~IJ, !'1fl • •. J-,. 31, "line the l'O nrt say :
· .Jud'"• 11 al law and d •1· r1· • in qnit.y
nr•· nil 'j11d!{111 111 ·' 11111l<'r thP cod ."
1JI111 t' 'I Ii 1111p cin ( I !.II), 6 Okla. I~, 4
l',1 ·. 1 I : " 'ut\\ itli:tawlillg tli 1 ~i ' ]a.
tur • ha alJoli Ire I tl 1 di tiuctivn uetw u
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tute the great body of the municipal hiw, nor upon tlie final

remedies granted to the litigant parties, the courts have, with

general though not with absolute unanimity, agreed upon the

interpretation to be given to the pi'ovision under consideration.

The broad principle of construction may be regarded as estab-

lished in most if not all the States, that the clauses of the stat-

utes abolishing the distinction between actions at law and suits

in equity were intended to mean exactly what they say, without

reservation or equivocation. All the differences which belonged

to the external machinery by which a judicial controversy was

conducted up to the judgment itself, all the rules respecting

forms of action, all the peculiar characteristics of a legal or of an

equitable action, or of the various kinds of legal actions, except

the constitutional requirement as to the jury trial, have been

swept away. One action, governed in all instances by the same

principles as to form and methods, suffices for the maintaining

of all classes of primary riglits, and for the pursuit of all kinds

of civil remedies.^ 1 say, governed by the same pynnciples us to
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form and method; but this does not assume that exactly the

1 Dobson u. Pearce, 12 N. Y. 156, 165;

Crary v. Goodman, 12 N. Y. 266, 268;

N. Y. Ceut. Ins. Co. v. Nat. Protection

Ins. Co., 14 N. Y. 85, 90; Cole v. Reynolds,

18 N. Y. 74, 76 ; Bidwell r. Astor In.s. Co.,

16 N. Y. 263, 267 ; Phillips r. Gorham, 17

N. Y. 270, 273, 275 ; Laub v. Buckniiller,

17 N. Y. 620, 626 ; N. Y. Ice Co. v. N. W.

tute the great body f th muni ipal law, n r ur n th final
r medi granted to the litigant I arti
th
urt hav ' ith
n
ral
though
not
with
ab
olut
unanimi
·
agr
cl up n th
6
interpr t ation to be giv n to the pro i i n un<l r ' n id rati n.
The broad principl of con ru ti n ma· b r gard l a . tabli h d in mo t if not all the tat
tha th lau
f the tatut aboli bing the di tincti n u tw n acti n at la\
in quity were in tended to m an x,wtly what
r ervation or eq uivo a ti on. All th
to th e external machin ry by which a judi ial
onduct d up to the judgm nt it· lf all the
r ·p cting
form of action, all the p culiar c rnracteri tic of a 1 gal or f an
equitable action, or of the variou · kimL of 1 gal a ·ti n
pt
the con tit utional requirement a to the jury trial hav
n
wept a\Vay. One action, governed in all in tanc s by th am
principles as t o form and method·, uf-fice for the maintaining
of all classes of primary rights, and for the pursuit f all kin l
of civil remedies. 1 I say, governed by the same p1·inciples a to
form and meth od ; but this does not as ume that xactly the

Ins. Co., 23 N. Y. 357, 359 ; Brown v.

1-irown, 4 Robt. 688, 701 ; Grinnell v.

Buchanan, 1 Daly, 538 ; Crosier v. Mc-

r>aughlin, 1 Nevada, 348 ; Rogers v. Pen-

niston, 16 Mo. 432; Troost v. Davis, 31

Ind. 34, 39; Scott v. Crawford, 12 Lid.

411 ; Kramer v. Rebman, 9 Iowa, 114;

De Witt V. Hays, 2 Cal. 463 ; Wiggins r.

McDonald, 18 Cal. 126 ; Bowen v. Aubrey.

22 Cal. 566, 569 ; Ireland v. Nichols, 1

Sweeney, 208; Garret v. Gault, 13 B.

Mon. 378, 380 ; Wright v. Wright, 54

N. Y. 437, 442 ; White v. Lyons, 42 Cal.

279 ; Giles v. Lyon, 4 N. Y. 600 ; Getty

V. Hudson River R. R., 6 How. Pr. 269 ;

Mowry v. Hill, 11 Wis. 146, 149; Chiiin

V. Trustees, 32 Ohio St. 236 ; Gress v.

Evans, 1 Dak. 387 ; Williams v. Slote, 70

N. Y. 601 ; Stevens v. The Mayor, etc, 84

N. Y. 296, 304, 305; Anderson v. Hunn,

5 Hun, 79 ; McPlierson i-. Weston, 64

Cal. 275 ; Sykes v. First Nat. Bk. (S. D.),

49 N. W. 1058.

[South Bend Chilled Plow Co. v. Geo.

C. Cribb Co (1900), 105 Wis. 443, 81

N. W. 675 ; Dickerson v. Spokane (1901),

26 Wash. 292, 66 Pac. 381 : " Under the

system of code procedure whereby the

distinction between actions at law and

suits in equity is abolislied, an action at

law is maintainable upon an ecjuitable as-

signment." Morehouse v. Throckmorton

(1899), 72 Conn. 449, 44 Atl. 747 ; Hahl v.

Sugu (1901), 169 N. Y. 109, 62 N. E. 135.

In Rogers v. Duhart (1893), 97 Cal. 500,

32 Pac. 570, it is said : " With us, mere

forms of action are cast aside. Every

action is now, in effect, a special action on

the case." Merriman i\ Walton (1895),

105 Cal. 403, 38 Pac. 1108; Whitehead v.

Sweet (1899), 126 Cal. 67, 58 Pac. 376 :

1 Dobson v. Pear ce, 12 :N . Y. 156, 165;
Crary v. Good man, 12 N. Y. 266, 26 ;
N . Y. Cen t. Ins. Co. v. Nat. Protection
In . Co., 14 N . Y. 85, 90 ; Cole v. Reynold ,
18 N. Y. 74-, 76 ; Bidwell v. A tor In .. Co.,
16 N. Y. 263, 267; Ph illips v. Gorham , 17
. Y. 270, 273, 275 ; L aub v. Buckmiller,
17 N. Y. 620, 626 ; "· Y. ke Co. v. r . W .
In s. Co., 23 N. Y . 357, 359; Brown v.
Brown, 4 R obt . 688, 701 ; Grinnell v.
Buchanan, l D aly, 538; Cro ier v. McLaughlin, 1 evada, 348; Hoger v. Penniston, 16 Mo. 432 ; T roost v. ] )a1·i , 31
lncl. 34, 39 ; S cott v. Cr awford, 12 Ind .
411; Kram er v. R e bman, 9 Iowa. 11 4;
De Witt v. H ay s, 2 Cal. 463; W iggin v.
McDonald, 18 Cal. 126; B owen v. Aubrny,
22 Cal. 566, 569 ; I reland v. Nichol.~, 1
Sweeney, 20 · Gar ret v. Gault, 13 13.
Mon . 37 ' 3 0 ; '' right v. vVright. 54
N. Y. -!37, 442; W hite v . Lyon . 42 Cal.
279 ; Gil e v. L you, 4 N . Y . 600; . ett.1·
v . Hudson Ri ver R. R., 6 How. Pr. 2fi9 ;
Mowrv v. Hill, l l Wis. 146, 149; Chi1.11
v. Tr~ tees, 32 Oh io St. 236; Gre. '"
E van , 1 Dak. 3 7; ·w miam r. Slote, 70
N. Y . 601 ; teven v. The Mayor, etc, +
N. Y. 296, 304, 305; Anderson v. Buun,

5 Hun, 79; McPherson v. We ton, 64
Cal. 275; yke r. Fir t Nat. Bk. ( . D.),
49 N. W. 105 .
[ outh Bend Chill d Plow Co. v. Geo.
C. Cribb Co (1900), 105 Wi . 443, l
~ . W. 675; Dicker on v.
pokane (1901 ),
26 ' Va h. 292, 66 Pac. 3 1 : " ' ncler the
y tern of code proce<lur wh reby the
distinction between action at law and
uit in equity i · aboli ·h d, an action at
law i maintainable u pon an equitable a si~nment."
forehou e v. Throckmorton
{l 99), 72 C'onn. 449, 44 A tl. 747; Hahl v.
ug {190 1), 169 N. Y. 109, 62 X. E. 135.
In Roger· v. Duhar t (1 93),97 al.500,
32 Pac. 570, it i aid: "With u , mere
form of action are ca t a ide. Ev ry
action i now, in effect, asp cial a tiou on
the ca. e." Merriman r . Walton (1 95),
105 al. 403, 3 Pac. 110 ; \ hitehead L•.
.'weet {l 99), 126 C'al. 7, 5 Pac. 3i6:
"Und r our cocle thcr i but one form
of action, and if th complaint tat fact
.w!Jich eutitle th plain iff to r Ji f ith r
legal or qnitable, it. i ' not d murrahle
upon the ground that it doe not tate
facts suftieient to ou titute a cau e of
a<.:tion."J
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same form or method is to be or can be used in all actions for

whatever purposes brought. The common principle as to form

and method is not that all actions shall assume absolutely the

same form, nor is it that they shall be governed by any technical

rules which separate them into arbitrary classes ; it is that they

shall all conform to and follow the facts and circumstances which

constitute the cause of action, and entitle the parties to relief.

It is established, therefore, that a single judicial action, based

upon and conforming to the facts and circumstances of each par-

ticular case, whatever be the nature of the primary right which

they create, must be used for the pursuit of all remedies, legal

or equitable.^ The authorities referred to in the notes show that

this doctrine is now adopted in all the States where the reformed

procedure prevails, and that there is little variation in the lan-

guage by which it is expressed. When, however, we shall

pass from this statement of the doctrine in the abstract to the

application of it in particular instances, — as, for example, in

questions as to parties, pleading, judgments, — the perfect uni-

formity of jq,dicial opinion and action disappears ; but still in
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the great majority of the States the courts have fairly followed

the true intent of the legislation and the correct principle of

interpretation.

§11. *71. Rule Settled herein. Familiar Rule in Old System.

Thus it may be regarded as a settled rule, resulting from the

' []See cases cited in last preceding note, ferred to, clearly evince the legislative

Zurfluh V. Smith (1902), 135 Cal. 644, 67 intent to strip our modern procedure of

Pac. 1089. This was an action for ac- the cumbrous forms and distinctions which

counting against the administrator of a made tlie jiractice under the common law

deceased guardian and for judgment fur and tiie earlier statutes so burdensome iu

the amount found due against the sureties its details and so uncertain in its results.

on the guardian's bond. Appellants, tlie I'pon exaniiiiiiig that portion of the Code

sureties, claimed that an equitaljlc action which deals with actions to recover real

must first be brought to ascertain the property (Ch. 14, tit. 1, art. 1) we find that

amount due and then a second action to the old term 'ejectment' has been dis-

obtiiin a judgment against tlie sureties for carded in the title and it is now eutitled

m f rm r m bod i t be or can be u ed in ail actions for
ur o
brought. The ommon principle a to form
not that all acti n ball a um ab lutely the
am f rm
h, ll b g vern d by any technical
r 1 · ' hich eparate them in o arbitrary la e ; it i th t they
h 11 all c nform
and f ll w th fa t and cir um tan
which
ntitle th parti to relief.
c n titu th cau e of a tion an
tabli h d ther fore that a in le judicial a ti n, ba ed
f each paron nd conforming to th fa t an circum tan
ti
whate er be the nature f th primary right which
th y reat mu t be u ed for the pur uit of all remedie , legal
or quitabl . 1 The authorities referred to in the notes show that
thi d ctrine i now adopted in all the tates where the reformed
pr ce ur pr ail and that there i little variati n in the lancl. When, howe er, we shall
u ge by which it i expr
pa fr m thi tatement of the doctrine in the abstract to the
li ation of it in particular in tance , - a , for example, in
que tion a to parti , pl ading, judgment , - the perfect uniformi y of j diciaJ opinion and ac tion di appear ; but till in
the gr at maj rity of the
at the courts have fairly followed
the tru intent of the legi lation and the correct principle of
int rpr tati n.
11. * 71. Rule Settled herein.
Familiar R ule in O l d S ystem.
hu it may b r ·arded a a ettl d rul re ultina from the

that amount. But the court held it proper ' Actions to recover real property.' This

to bring one action to decide the entire change of name was obviously a part of

controversy, saying that it mattered not the plan of the codifiers to reduce our

that part of the relief was eiiuitable and practice to a simple and composite scheme

part legal.] under which all of the rights of litigants,

Qln Hahl u. Sugo (1901), 169 X. Y. 109, both legal and e()uitable, so far as they

62 .N. E. 135, the court, referring to sec- are consistent with each otlier and affect

tions 3339,481, and others of the code, the same ])arties, can he tried in one actioa

said: "These sections of the Code, and and be merged iu one juiiguieut."]

others, which ueed not Ije sjiecifically re-

i

[

ee ca e cit din 1 t preceding note.
mith ( 1902), 135 Cal. 644, 6i
Thi wa an action for a .

Zurfluh v.
Pac. l 9.
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statutory provision in question, that if a plaintiff lias set forth

facts constituting a cause of action, and entitling him to some

relief, either legal or equitable, his action shall not be dismissed

because he has misconceived the nature of his remedial right, and

has asked for a legal remedy when it should have been equitable,

or for an equitable remedy when it should have been legal. ^

1 [[Damou v. Leque (1896), 14 Wash.

253, 44 Pac. 261, quotiug the text; Wat-

statutory provision in qu tion, th, t if a i lainLiff ha
facts constituting a au e f a ion, and n iLlin
some
reli f, eith r legal or quitabl hi · a tion ·hall no b i mi
b cause he has mi conceivecl the natur f hi' l"m clial right, ancl
ha a 'k d for a 1 gal r medy wh n it h ulcl ha ~ b
qui abl ,
n 1 gal.1
or for an equitable rem cly wh n it h ulcl ha.v

son !'. Glover (1899), 21 Wash. 677, 59

Pac. 516; Dreyer v. Hart (1896), 147 lud.

€04, 47 N. E. 174; Gartuer v. Corwine

(1897), 57 O. St. 246, 48 N. E. 945 ; Auder-

son V. War Eas^le Miu. Co. (1903), Idaho,

72 Pac. 671, quoting the te.xt] ; Crary

V. Goodraau, 12 N. Y. 266, 268; N. Y.

Cent. Ins. Co. v. National Protec. Ins. Co.,

14 N. Y. 85, 90 ; Emery v. Pease, 20 N. Y.

€2, 64 ; Bidwell v. Astor Ins. Co., 16 N. Y.
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263, 267; Phillips i'. Gorham, 17 N. Y.

270, 273, 275; Laub v. Buckniiller, 17

N. Y. 620, 626 ; N. Y. Ice Co. v. N. W.

Ins. Co., 23 N. Y. 357, 359 ; Farlow v.

Scott, 24 N. Y. 40, 45 ; Marquat v. Mar-

quat, 12 N. Y. 336 ; Troost v. Davis, 31

lud. .34, 39 ; Grain v. Aldrich, 38 Cal. 514,

520 ; Leonard v. Rogau, 20 Wis. 540, 542.

In Emery v. Pease, 20 N. Y. 62, the com-

plaint set out facts entitling the plaintiff

to an accounting, but did not ask one ; it

did not aver any settlement, nor ascer-

tained balauce due, and demanded judg-

ment for a sum certain. On the trial the

complaint was dismissed, on the ground

that it did not set forth facts sufficient to

constitute a cause of action. Comstock J.,

after stating the old rule by which the

action would liave been properly dis-

missed, proceeds (p. 64): "In determin-

ing whether an action will lie, the courts

are to liave no regard to the old distinc-

tions between legal and equitable reme-

dies. Those distinctions are c.\])ressly

abolished. A suit does not, as formerly,

fail because the plaintiff has made a mis-

take as to the form of the remedy. If the

case which he states entitles him to any

remedy, either legal or equitable, his com-

plaint is not to be dismissed because he

has prayed for a judgment to which he is

not entitled." Bidwell v. Astor Ins. Co.,

16 N. Y. 263, was an action on a policy of

insurance. The complaint asked thiit tlie

policy be reformed, and that the defendant

pay $7,000 as the sum insured by the re-

formed policy. Without a reformation

the plaintiif was not entitled to a judg-

ment for any amount. On the trial a

mistake in the instrument was prqved,

and the court directed a judgment for

$7,000. The defendant insisted that a

judgment for damages, instead of one for

a reformation, was imj)roper. The court

say : " There was nothing in the objection

that the court should have stopped with

reforming tlie policy, and turned the plain-

tiff over to a new action to recover dam-

ages." The N. Y. Ice Co. v. N. W. Ins.

Co., 23 N. Y. 357, is an important and

1 [Damon v. L eque ( 1896), U W a h.
253, 44 Pac. 261, quotin g the text; \ Vatou v. Glover (1899) , 21 Wah. 677, 59
Pac. 516; Dreyer v. Hart (1896), 147 Io d.
QQ4, 47 N. E . 174 ; Gartner v. C rwine
(1897), 57 0. St. 246, 48 N. E. 9.J.5; Ande ron v. War Eag le Miu. Co. (1903), Idaho,
72 Pac. 6il, quoting the text];
rary
v. Goodman, 12 N. Y. 266, 26 ; N. Y.
Cent. In . Co. v. National Protec. Ins. Co.,
14 N. Y. 85, 90; Emery v. Pea e, 20 N. Y.
£2, 64; Bidwell v. A tor Ins. Co., 16 N . Y.
263, 267; Phillips v. Gorham, 17 N. Y.
270, 273, 275 ; Laub v. Buckmiller, I 7
N. Y. 620, 626; N. Y. Ice Co. v. N. W.
In . Co., 23 N. Y. 357, 359; Farlow v .
Scott, 24 N. Y. 40, 45; Marquat v. Marquat, 12 N. Y. 336; Troos t v. D av is, 3 1
Ind. 34, 39; Grain v. Aldrich, 3 Cal. 5 14,
~520 ; Leonard v. Rogan, 20 Wi ·. 540, 542.
In Emery v. Pease, 20 N. Y . 62, t he com pla int et out fact entitling th e plaintiff
to au accounting, but did not a k one; it
did n ot ave r any settlement, n or ascertained balance du e, and demanded judg m ent for a sum certain. On the trial th e
complaint wa dii,:missed, on the gro un d
that it cl id n ot set for th facts u ffic ieut to
constitu te a cause of action . Comstock J.,
a f ter stating the old rule by whi ch the
,a. ·tion would have been prope rly di mi ·sed, proceeds (p. 64) : " In determining wh ether an action will lie, the co urts
are to have n o r egard to the ol d di ·tinctions between legal and equitable reme<lie . Those distin ctions a re expre sly
abolish ed. A suit does not, a. formerly,
fail becau e the plaintiff has made a mi take a to th e form of the remedy. If the
case which he ·tates entitle' him to any
remedy, either legal or equitable, hi complaint i not to be dismissed becau e he
ha prayed for a judgment to which he i:?
not entitl ed." Bidwell v. A tor In . Co.,
l 6 N. Y. 263, was an action on a pol i y of
in uran ce. Th e complaint ask rl that the
policy be reformed, and that the <lefeudaut
2

pay $7,00 a th . um in ur cl by th reformed poli y . \ Vithout a r eformation
th plaintiff wa. not entitled to a judgment fo r any amount.
n tli trial a
mi take in the in trumeut wa prQv d,
and the court dir tecl a judgment for
$7,000. The def ndant in i' t d that a
judgment fur damao- , in t ad of one for
a reformati on, was improp r. The court
ay: "There wa n othing in the objection
that the court hould have topped with
r eformiug the poli ·y, and turned the plaintiff over to a new action to recover damages." The N. Y. Ice Co. v. N. W. In .
Co., 23 N. Y. 35 7, i ' au imp ortant and
sugge tirn ca!'e. The action was on au
insurance policy. Th e plaintiff cla im ed a
money judg ment for a lo , and also a
r eformati on of the poli y which, if m ade,
would e ntitle him to a further recovery of
money. H e failed to make out a ca ·e for
a reformation; whereupon the tria l court
di mi'sed the a tion, holding that the oth r
i ue could n t be tried. Com tock J. aid
( p. 359) : " I am of opin ion that it was
erroneou to turn the plaintiff out of co urt
on the mere ground t hat he h ad not entitled him elf to the etiuitable relief
granted, if there wa enough left of hi
ca e to en ti tle him to r cov r the um in
which he was insur d. N ugg tion wa
made that the complaint lid not h w a
good ause of action for thi mon y, e'·en
afte r striking out all the a ll gation and
the prayer on th ubj ect of the equ itable
relief." The ~ame doctrine i again ap1 li ed in Barlow r. cott, 24 N. Y. 40, 45,
Lott J. ay ing : " -nder our pre ent
arrangemeut, th am court h both I gal
and equitable juri clictiou ; and if th fact
tated by a party in hi
omplaint are
uffieient Lo entitl him to any of th
r Ii f a ked, anti an an w r i put in
putting the e fa t iu i ' u , it would be
erroneou to di mi , th romplaiut on the
trial m r ely b cau e improp r relief i
p rimari ly clemaudell." The true principle

18 CIVIL REMEDIES.

IVIL R g~IE IE .

l

Nothing was a more familiar rule in the old system than the one

which turned a plaintiff out of court if he had misconceived tlie

nature or form of his action. If he brought an action at law,

and on the trial proved a case for equitable relief, or if he filed a

bill in equity, and at the hearing showed himself entitled to a

judgment at law, he must absolutely fail in that proceeding. It

- ling w, a more familiar rul in th old y tern ban h one
wl i ·l urn tl a plaintiff ut of ourt if h ha l mi c nc i tl tl
n l tur or f rm f hi ~ action. If h
rnl n th trial pr vecl a a f r
liill in i uity and at the b arin
I
u t ab ln
d
l

is very plain that this arbitrary and most unjust rule rested

wholly upon the ancient notions as to distinctions between legal

and equitiible actions, and did not rest upon any notions as to the

jirimary rights which the litigant parties sought to maintain.

Wherever, therefore, the letter and spirit of the reformed system

are followed by the courts, this harsh rule is swept away. A

suit does not now fail because the plaintiff has erred as to the

form or kind or extent of the remedy he demands.^ A party

ought to main ain.
f h r f rm cl
A
the

cannot be sent out of court merely because the facts alleged do

not entitle him to relief at law, or merely because they do not

entitle him to relief in equity. If the case which he states shows

him entitled to any relief, either legal or equitable, his complaint

is not to be dismissed because he has prayed for a judgment that is
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not embraced by the facts. The only inconvenience which a

plaintiff can suffer from such an error is, that the trial may, per-

haps, be suspended, and the cause sent to another brancli of tlie

court, or, as in Kentucky, Iowa, and Oregon, to another docket.^

If a plaintiff had brought his action on the theory that it M'as

based upon an equitable right, and sought an equitable relief,

and it turns out to be in effect legal, so that the defendant is

entitled to a jury trial, the trial must be had before a jury, and

was tersely and most accurately stated by ^ McCrory v. Parks, 18 Ohio St. 1;

Sanderson J. in Grain r. Aldrich, 38 Cal. Ellithorpe r. Buck, 17 Ohio St. 72. See

.014, 520 : " Legal and equitable relief are Dickson v. Cole, 34 Wis. 621, 62.5.

adnninistered in the same forum and ac- ^See p. 6, note 1. Ming Yue i'. Coos

cording to the same general plan. A party Bay U. R. Co (1893), 24 Ore. 392, 33 Pac.

cannot be sent out of court merely because 641: "The distinction between actions

liis facts do not entitle him to relief at and suits is not al)olished by our code,

law, or merely because he is not entitled . . . When, therefore, the }ilaintiffs, being

to relief in equity, as the case may be. in equity, failed to statu in their complaint

He can be sent out of court only when a cause of suit, notwithstanding they may

upon his facts he is entitled to no relief have stated a cause of action, the court

either at law or in eciuity." Hamill v bad no jurisdiction to retain and try such

Thompson, 3 Colo. 518, 523 ; Schilling v. action, but was bound to dismi.'^s the suit,

caun
n
nti le him to relief at law, r mer 1
n itle him to relief in quity. If th a e whi h h
him entitled to any relief, ither 1 gal or equitable, hi com pl in
i n t be di mi ed because he ha pra ·eel for a jud ment hat i
n t embraced by the fac . The only in onvenien e whi h a
laintiff can uffer from such an error is, that the trial ma , erhap · b u pended, and the cau e nt to another branch of h
urt, or, a· in Kentucky, Iowa, and r g n, to anotb r c1 ke .2
If a plain iff had brought hi action on the theory th t it "a
a d upon an equitable right, and ought an equitabl r lief
, ncl it turns out t be in eff ct legal so that the def udant i
to a jury trial, the trial mu t be had before a jury, and

Kominger, 4 Colo. 100; Whiting i' Hoot, and leave the ])laintiffs to prosecute their

52 Iowa, 292 ; Herring r. Neely, 43 Iowa, action, if they have one .at law." See

157. also Small v. Lutz (1899), 34 Ore. 131, 55

» See notes 2 and 3, p. 005. Pac. 529.]

wa t r. ely and m o t accurately stated by
. an<ler on J. in rain ,., Aldri ch, 3
al.
!J 1-t , 520 : " L gal au<l equitable reli f are
ndmio i t r d in the i;ame forum an<i ac<·11rdiug to the am g neral plan . A party
<':rnuot b . ent o ut of c urt m r ely hecau e
hi fa t · <l<l not ntitl e him to r li ef a

hi' fact b I
it!IC'r at Jaw o r Ill <1uity." H amill t'
'l
Oil, 3
(J)O. 51 '523; 'chilling- 1' .
l« 111i11 •er. 4 :0111. I 00; Wl1itin g 1 J o<Jt,
['2 Jr \\a,~'~; I1 ·rriug 1•. ~ ely, 43 I owa,

Ufl'JJI
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not before a single judge sitting us a chancellor ; and, when the

trial had taken place before the wrong tribunal, the judgment

would be reversed, and the cause sent for a new trial in the

■proper place.^

§ 12. * 72. Struggle in Establishing Rule. Missouri Doctrine.

The rule discussed in the foregoing paragraph as to the relation

between the facts alleged and the relief asketl and granted was

not established without a struggle, and has not at all times,

and in all the States, prevailed without exception, and perhaps is

not even now universally accepted. Many early cases in New

York were decided under the influence of the former practice

and the ancient notions ; and although the Court of Appeals

has completely repudiated the doctrine of those adjudications,

yet the principles announced by it have not always been fol-

lowed by the inferior tribunals of the same State.^ In one or

not before a single judge sitting a a ·han · ll r · an l wh n th
trial had taken place b f re the wrong tribunal, th judgm nt,
would be r versed, and h
au 'C . 'll f r a, n w triaJ in tli
1
pr per place.
§ 1 2 . * 72. Struggle in Es tablishing Rule. Missouri Doct rine.
The rule discussed in the for going parabra1 h a to th r lati u
between the facts alleged and the r lief a k d an l grant cl wa ·
not established without a struggl , and has not at all tim
and in all the State , pre ailed ·w ithout exc pti n, and p rhap , i
not even now imiversally accepted. l\fany arly ca. s in . .
York were decided under the influence of th form r pra tic
and the ancient notions; and although the ourt of App al
has completely repudiated the doctrine of those adjudications,
yet the principles announced by it have not alway be n f 1lowed by t he inferior tribunaJs of the same tate. 2 In one or
two of the States, and especially in Missouri, the ancient rul s
an l doctrines in reference to this subject-matter hav been r peatedly asserted, ancl, until a very recent p riod, prevail cl in
the cour ts, notwithstanding the adoption of the reform cl proc d ure. I n Missouri, the judiciary, stan ling alone in this r pect,
preserved for a long time the real distinctions between legal ancl
equitable actions as strongly marked as under the form r srtem,
and, in fac t, insisted upon a rule more trict than that enforc d
by the English Court of Chancery.3 The following exampl
will illustrate this peculiar interpretation of their code by th
Missouri courts. I n those cases where the plaintiff hold tl e
equitable title to land, while the legal title is in the defendant by
T

two of the States, and especially in Missouri, the ancient rules

and doctrines in reference to this subject-matter have been re-

peatedly asserted, and, until a very recent period, prevailed in

the courts, notwithstanding the adoption of the reformed proce-
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dure. In Missouri, the judiciary, standing alone in this respect,

preserved for a long time the real distinctions between legal and

equitable actions as strongly marked as under the former system,

and, in fact, insisted upon a rule more strict than that enforced

by the English Court of Chancery.^ The following examples

will illustrate this peculiar interpretation of their code by the

Missouri courts. In those cases where the plaintiff holds the

equitable title to land, while the legal title is in the defendant by

1 Davis V. Morris, 36 N. Y. 569, 571, jury cause. Parker v. Laney, 58 N. Y.

5"2, per Grover J. In this case the New 469 ; Richmoud v. Dubuque, etc. R. Co.,

York Court of Appeals laid down, in a 33 Iowa, 422, 489-491.

formal manner, the rule as to the trial of 2 gee Peck v. Newton, 46 Barb. 173,

legal and e(|uitable issues. If the plead- 174.

iugs present both legal and equitable '* fSoe also Draper v. Brown (1902),

issues, the parties are entitled to a jury, 115 Wis. 361, 91 N. W. 1001, in which the

and all the issues must be tried together ; court, in speaking of the distinction be-

tliat is, there should not be a partial tween legal and eqnital)le actions, said :

trial before a jury and the residue before " So pronounced and well preserved is

another tribunal. If, however, the plain- this distinction that this court sustained

tiff insists upon a trial before the court, and a demurrer to a complaint in an equitable

his claim is acceded to, upon the discov- action, notwithstanding it contained alle-

,

ery that the action presents issues which gations which, if standing by themselves,

must be decided by a jury, the complaint would constitute an action at law. Deuuer

should not be dismissed, but the cause v. Railroad Co., 57 Wis. 218, 15 N. W.

should be seut to the circuit for trial ai a 158. "3

Davis v. Morris, 36 N. Y. 569, 5il,
In this ca e the ew
York Court of Appeals laid down, in a
formal m anner , the rule as to t he trial of
legal an d eq ui table i sues. If the pl eadings presen t both legal and equitable
i ues. th e par ties are entitled to a jury,
a nd all the iss ues mnst be tr ied togeth r ;
that is, t here should not be a partial
t rial before a jury and the residu e b fore
another tribunal. If, however, th plaint iff in ists upon a trial before the court, arnl
his claim is acceded to, upon the di cov.
ery that the action presents issues which
mu t be decided by a jury, the complaint
shoul d not be dismi s ed, but the cause
should be sent to the circuit for trial as a
1

5? 2, per Grover J.

jury cause. Parker v. Laney, 5 N. Y .
469; Hichmond v. Dubuque, etc. R. o.,
33 Iowa, 422, 489-491.
2
ee P ck v. ewtou, 46 Bar b. 173,
li4.

a [ ~"e als Drap r v. Brown ( 1902),
115 Wi . 361, 9 1 N. W . 1001 , in whi ch th
co urt, in peaking of th di tiuction b tw en legal aud eqnitabl actiou., aid :
" o prono un cd and well pr en d is
thi di tinctiou that thi. ·ourt u. tainetl
ad ruurrer to a c mµlaint in an e4nitabl
a ·tion, notwith tandiug it toutaiu d all gation · which, if tandiug by them lY ,
would con titute au action at law. l) nu r
v. Railroad o., 57 Wi . 21 , 15 N. W .
15 ."]

:,,Q
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mciius of a fraudulent conveyance, it has been frequently held

tluit the former must first obtain a decree in equity, cancelling

the outstanding deed, and must then resort to a separate action

of ejectment to recover possession of the land. A vendee of

land has also been required to proceed in two distinct actions, —

the first equitable, to compel a specific performance, and the

second legal, to obtain possession. The plaintiff was turned

over to a second legal action in order to complete his remedy,

because, as the court repeatedly insisted, possession of land can

never be awarded by a decree in equity.^ The Missouri court ha.s

recently receded, in part at least, from tliis extreme position, and

is plainly tending towards a complete harmony with the doctrines

which are accepted in other Stfites.^ A simple criterion has been

suggested by which to determine the nature of the action. If

the facts alleged in the complaint or petition would entitle the

plaintiff to both legal and equitable relief, the prayer for judg-

ment — that is, the nature of the remedy demanded — might

be a certain test by which the character of the suit should be
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known.'^ This suggestion has not, however, been followed in

other cases.

1 Meyers v. Field, 37 Mo. 434, 441 ;

Maguire c. Vice, 20 Mo. 429; Curd v

Lackland, 43 Mo. 199; Wyuu i-. Cory,

43 Mo. 301 ; Gray i: Payne, 43 Mo. 203 ;

Bobb 1-. Woodward, 42 Mo. 482, 487 ;

Peyton i: Rose, 41 Mo. 257, 262 ; Gott v.

Powell, 41 Mo. 416 ; Moreau v. Detche-

mendy, 41 Mo. 431; Walker's Adm. /•.

Walker, 2.') Mo. 367 ; Reed v. Robert.son,

f a fraudul nt on ·an
it h
that h for m r mu t fir ·t btair a de r
cl <l and mu t th u r
a
th
p e i n of the lan L
f
11 r qmr l to proc
cl in t \ di tin t
quita.ble to c mpel a I cific perform n
a
urn d
e n l legal, to obtain po e i n. The plain iff
- r to a econd le al action in or ler o compl te hi r m dy,
ecau a th court repeatedly in ~i tecl po e ion of land can
never be awarded b ad ree in qui y. 1 The Mi ouri court ha
r centl · rec d d in part at least, from thi extreme p iti n, aud
i plainl tending to" ard a compl te harmony wi h h doctrine·
which are accepted in o her tate .2 A imple criterion ha been
u e ted by which to determine the nature of the ac i n. If
th fc c ~ alleged in he complaint or petition would en i le th
plaintiff o both legal and equitable relief, the prayer f r jud ment- that i , the nature of the remedy demanded- might
be a certain te t by which the character of the uit hould b
known.a This sugge tion has not, however, been followe m
other ca
m an

4.T Mo. 580 ; Rutherford v. Williams, 42

Mo. 18, 23; Fithiau v. Monks, 43 Mo.

502, 517 ; Magwire v. Tyler, 47 Mo. 115,

127.

2 Henderson f. Dickey, .50 Mo. 161,

165, per Wagner J. Followed in numer-

ous recent ca-ses; see Paddock v. Somes,

102 Mo. 226.

QSee Holli.ster t-. Bell (1900), 107 Wis.

198, 83 N. W. 297, in which it is said:

"The idea that a plain action at law, as

to whicii there is an entire failure of proof,

can be turned into an action in equity and

l Meyer. v. Field , 37 Mo. 434, 441;
faguire v. Vice, 20 Mo. 429 ; urd v
L cklan<l, 43 Mo. 199; W yn u v. Cory,
43 l\fo. 301; Gray v. Payne, 43 Mo. 203;
obb v. W oodward , 42 Mo. 4 2 4 7;
Peyton 1•. Ro e, 41 1o. 257, 262; Gott v.
I owell, 41 Mo. 416 ; forea u v. D etchemend y, 41 Mo. 431 · ' alker' ~ elm. v.
·walk er, 2:i Mo. 367; Reed v. oben on,
4:l • lo. 5 0 ; Rutherford v. 'Villiam , 42
)tio. 1 , 23 · Fithiau v. fon k , 43 '.lo.
5 2, 51 ; ~Iagwire v. Ty ler, 4 7 lo. 115,

tainable a i afforded on the fa ct in that
fo rm of action ."
eal v. Augu ta Ry. o.
(1 9 ), 102 Ga. 8li, 29 . E. 116; Hamiltou u. fon dle (1 9 ), 103 a . 7 ,
. E. 65 ; Fi eld v. Brown {l 96), 146
Ind. 293, 45 . E. 464 : " There may prop·
rly b joined cause or d fence , on of
whi h i triable by the ·ourt and the other
bv a jury. "]
3
ill tt v. Tr ganza, 13 Wi . 4 2, 475,
. J. F oll wed in
wber .

a recovery be had such as that jurisdiction

L'i.

in any event can aff(jrd on the facts, does

not find supjjort in the decisions of this

court. If an nction be brought an<l tried

*n an action at law, such relief only is ob-

tainable as is afforded on the facts in that

form of action." Seals v. Augusta Ry. Co.

(1898), 102 Ga. 817,29 S. E. 116; Ham-

ilton V. Mandle (1898), 103 Ga. 788, 30

S. E. 658 ; Field v. Brown (1896), 146

Ind. 293, 45 N. E. 464 : " There may prop-

erly be joined causes or defences, one of

which is triable by the court and the other

by a jury. "J

3 Giliett V. Treganza, 13 Wis. 472, 475,

per Dixon C. J. Followed in Lowber v.

Connil, 36 Wis. 176; liarrall i'. Gray, 10

Neb. 186.

[[Topping t'. Parish (1897), 96 Wis. 378,

71 N. W. 367. But in Stephens v. Hard-

ing (1896), 48 Neb. 6.^)9, 67 N. W. 746,

the court said : " Under our system of

pleading the nature of an action is deter-

mined not alone by the j>rayer for relief,

but also from the character of the facts

alleged." So, also, Lett v. Hammond

2 IIenderi\On v. I ick y !'iO
Io. 161,
165, per 'Yagner J . F llowed in numer-

on. r ·rent cru
10~ .Iv 226.

; ee Paddock v .

ome ,

Holli. ter t'. B 11 ( 1900) 107 Wi.
3 ~·. W. ~.7, in which it i: aid:
"Th· irl a that a plain a ti on a l al'i', as
> which th re i.· an ntir failure of pr of,
r 11J b• turne l into au a ·tiou in equity and
:t re O\'ery hr- h 11 • uc h a that j n ri. <l i ·tiou
i 11 a11y "'" 11t cau afforrl n t.h f ct , cl0 .
1111t fiud . uppor
in tlil"l d ci ·io11 of thi:
r111rt. If an nr·ticm be liroug-ht and tri d
. au. i1111 a bw, ;ud1 relief uuly i oL[

'1·
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§ 13. * 73. Summary of Foregoing Discussion. Fundamental

Principle Stated. To recapitulate the results ol' the foregoing

(Uscussion: The courts have, with few exceptions, accepted the

§ 13. * 73.

Summary

of

Foregoing Discussion.

Fundamental

To recapitulate th r u1 of t11 fon goi 11g
li cu 'ion: The courts ha , witl f w
ption ', ac · pted th
languat;e of th cotle in it · im 1 li i y an 1 lrn
i n tu 1t a
reasonable meaning; th y have aclrnowl lg 1 tha th I gi 'l ture
int nded to abolish, and ha .. aboli h d, all the f a ur whi 11
distinguish legal and equitabl a.cti n from a h th r antl 1 a,
established a single action for the ur ui t f all r m die ; th y
have settled the doctrine that by the u e of this ingle action
neither the primary rights nor the remedial righ s of li igant
parties are affected or in any manner modified, since th y do
not depend upon matters onnected with the form or ex rnal
features of the action, and that among the matt r whi h are
thus connected with the form are the etting forth or tatem nt
of the cause of action or defence in the pleading , and the
demand of relief or prayer for judgment. A mi take or mi conception in respect to the action being called legal or equitable
does not defeat the plaintiff, but at most may require a trial
before a properly constituted court. One fundamental principle
controls the administration of justice by mean of thi common
civil action, and this principle may be formulated in the follow ing manner : The object of every action is to obtain a judgrn nt
of the court sustaining or protecting some primary right or
enforcing some primary duty; every such primary right and
duty results from the operation of the law upon certain fact ,
in the experience of the person holding tbe right or subject c1 to
the duty ; every wrong or violation of this primary right or duty
consists in certain facts, either acts or omis ions of the per on
committin g the wrong. A statement, therefore, of he fa ts
from which the primary right or duty a.rises, and al o of the
facts which constitute the wrong or violation of uch primary
right or duty, shows, arnl must of nece ity how, at on
a
complete cause of action; that i , the conrt b fore ' hich thi
tatement is made can perceive from it the ntir cau
f a tion,
the remedial right flowing ther from, and i.h rem d or r m dies which should be awarded to tbe injured party. All ac ion
can be and should be constructed in the mann r thu d cribed ·
mmon prinand, if so, they would conform to the singl and
ciple announced by the reformed m th cl of r c dure. Whether
the rights and duties are legal or equitable, wh ther the remedies
Principle Stated.

language of the code in its simplicity, and have given to it a

reasonable meaning; they have acknowledged that the legislature

intended to abolish, and has abolished, all the features which

distinguish legal and equitable actions from each other, and has

established a single action for the pursuit of all remedies; they

have settled the doctrine that by the use of this single action

neither the primary rights nor the remedial rights of litigant

parties are affected or in any manner modified, since they do

not depend upon matters connected with the form or external

features of the action, and that among the matters which are

thus connected with the form are the setting forth or statement

of the cause of action or defence in the pleadings, and the

demand of relief or prayer for judgment. A mistake or mis-

conception in respect to the action being called legal or equitable

does not defeat the plaintiff, but at most may require a trial

before a properly constituted court. One fundamental principle

Generated for facpubupdates (University of Michigan) on 2014-06-17 15:30 GMT / http://hdl.handle.net/2027/uc2.ark:/13960/t02z1c23b
Public Domain / http://www.hathitrust.org/access_use#pd

controls the administration of justice by means of this common

civil action, and this principle may be formulated in the follow-

ing manner: The object of every action is to obtain a judgment

of the court sustaining or protecting some primary right or

enforcing some primary duty; every such primary right and

duty results from the operation of the law upon certain facts,

in the experience of the person holding the right or subjected to

the duty ; every wrong or violation of this primary right or duty

consists in certain facts, either acts or omissions of the person

committing the wrong. A statement, therefore, of the facts

from which the primary right or duty arises, and also of the

facts which constitute the wrong or violation of such primary

right or duty, shows, and must of necessity show, at once a

complete cause of action; that is, the court before which this

statement is made can perceive from it the entire cause of action,

the remedial right flowing therefrom, and the remedy or reme-

dies which should be awarded to the injured party. All actions

can be and should be constructed in the manner thus described ;

and, if so, they would conform to the single and common prin-

ciple announced by the reformed method of procedure. Whether

the rights and duties are legal or equitable, whether the remedies

1
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appropriate are legal or equitable, whether the facts are simple

and few or complex and numerous, does not in the sliglitest

degree affect the application and universality of this principle;

it is the central conception of the new system, the corner-stone

upon which the whole structure is erected.

§ 14. * 74. Pleading at Common Law and in Equity. It is not

my purpose in the present section to follow this general principle

in its application to the various features and phases of an action;

to do so would be to anticipate the matter contained in several

subsequent chapters. A brief allusion must be made, however,

to one of these topics, or else the theory of construction finally

accepted by the courts will be but partially explained, — I refer

to the subject of pleading. No single element of difference

more sharply marked the contrast between the action at law and

the suit in equity under the former system than the manner in

which the litigant parties in each stated their causes of action

and their defences. Although it was said that in each kind of

judicial proceeding the /ac^s constituting the cause of action or

defence should alone be alleged, this rule was not followed in
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actual practice. In a common-law action the "issuable facts"

only were spread upon the record. The plaintiff never narrated

the exact transaction between himself and the defendant from

which the rights and duties of the parties arose ; he stated what

he coiiceivid to he the legal effect of these facts. Thus, if the trans-

action was a simple arrangement respecting the sale and purchase

of goods, instead of disclosing exactly what the parties had

actually done, the pleader used certain formulas expressing the

supposed legal effect of what had been done, as that he had "sold

and delivered " or had " bargained and sold " tlie chattels ; and,

if a mistake was made in properly conceiving of this legal effect,

— that is, if the real facts of the transaction, as disclosed by the

evidence, did not correspond with this conception of their legal

effect taken by the pleader, — the plaintiff might be, and, unless

permitted to amend, would be, turned out of court. On the

equity side the facts as they occurred, rather than the legal

aspect of or conclusions from these facts, were set forth, accord-

ing to the original theory of equitable pleading. In practice this

narrative was always accompanied b}^ a detail of mere evidentiary

matter, which was inserted, not because it was necessary to the

statement of the cause of action, but because it was a means of

apr r pri te ar le 1 or equitable wh th r he fa t are irn le
n few or c mplex and numerou , d
n t in th
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obtaining admissions from the defendant, and of thus making

him a witness in the cause against himself. A l)ill in equity

had, therefore, two entirely distinct uses and olTices; it was a

narrative of the facts from which the plaintiff's rights to relief

arose, and it was an instrument for obtaining evidence from the

opposite party. This latter purpose, which was known as "dis-

covery," the codes have expressly abolished, and have substituted

in its stead the more direct method of an oral examination of one

party by the other, if desired, either on the trial or preliminary

thereto.

§ 15. * 75. Tw^o Schools of Interpretation respecting Modes of

Pleading under the Code. Upon the adoption of the reformed

system in New York there arose at once in that State, and sub-

sequently in other commonwealths, two schools of interpretation

in reference to the modes of pleading prescribed by the new

procedure. One school maintained that all the distinctive fea-

tures and elements of the common law and of the equity modes

of pleading remained in full force, and that the legislature had

simply abolished certain names and certain technical rules of
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mere form. This particular theory was a necessary and evident

corollary of the broader principle advocated by the same school,

and already explained in the present section, that the division of

actions into legal and equitable still existed, in all that pertained

to their substantial nature ; if actions were now, as before, legal

or equitable, the most characteristic features of the two classes,

that which marked their difference in the most emphatic manner,

— the peculiar modes of pleading appropriate to each, — were of

course preserved. In a common-law cause the pleader was to

follow the common-law rules of pleading, and in an equity suit

the equity rules. This doctrine was asserted and was sustained

with great ability and earnestness by several judges in the in-

fancy of the system. It would be useless to cite all the reported

decisions in which it was advocated ; and I shall only refer to a

few which have always been regarded as leading.^ The other

1 Rochester City Bank v. Suydam, "Tlie rules of pleading at common law

5 How. Pr. 216; Wooden r. Waffle, have not heen abrogated. The essential

6 How. Pr. 145. principles still remain, and have only been

I^But see the following cases: Lassiter inoiiified as to technicalities and matters

V. Roper (1894), 114 N. C. 17, 18 S. E. of form." Kilpatrick-Kocli Dry-Goods Co.

946; quoting with approval Parsley v. r. Box (1896), 13 Utah, 494, 4.5 Pac. 629 :

Nicholson, 65 N. C. 210, the court said: " Section 3219, Comp. Laws of Utah, 1'<SS,

obtaining admission from the cl f nclan , an l [ thu · making
him a witness in the cause again ·t bin . lf. A hill in
uity
lrnd, therefore, two ntir 1 di tincl n.
ancl ffi, ; it ' a a
narrati v of the fact' fr m which th plaintiff right. to r li f
ar s and it was an instrument for btaining e id nc fr m th
ppo ite party. This latter purpo e, which wa kn wn a " liscovery," the codes have ex pres ' ly a.boli h cl, ncl hav uL titut d
in its stead the more direct method of an ral xaminati n f one
party by the other, if desired, either on the trial r preliminary
thereto.
§ 15. * 75. T wo Schools of Interpretation respecting Modes of
Pleading u n d er the Code.
Upon the adoption of the reformed
'ystem in New York there arose at one in that tate, and ubseq uently in other commonwealths, two schools of int rpretation
in reference to the modes of pleading prescrib d by the new
procedure. One school maintained that all the distinctive features and elements of the common law and of th equity modes
of pleading remaine<l in full force, and that the 1 gi lature had
imply abolished certain names and certain techni al rules of
mere form. This particular theory was a necessary and evident
corollary of the broa<ler principle a<lvocated by the ame school,
and already explained in the present section, that the divi ion of
actions into legal and equitable still existed, in all that pertain d
to th ir substantial nature; if action were now, a before, 1 gal
or equitable, the most chara.cteri~tic features of the two clas e
that which marked their difference in the most emphatic mann r
-the peculiar modes of pleading appropriate to ach, - were of
course preserved. In a common-law cause the pl ad r wa to
follow the common-law rules of pleading, and in an quity uit
the equity rules. ThiH doctrine was a s rted and wa u ~ tain l
with great ability and earnestness by several judg s in the infancy of the system. It would be usel
to cit all the report d
decisions in which it was advocated; ancl I hall only r fer to a
few which have always been regarded a leading. 1 The oth r
1 Rochester City Bank v. Suydam,
5 H ow. Pr. 216; Wooden v. Waffle,
6 H ow. Pr. 145.
[ But see the following cases: Lassiter
. Roper {I 94), 114 N . C. 17, 18 . E.
946; quoting with approval Parsley v.
N ichol on, 65 N. C . 210, the court said:

"The rule of pl ading at common law
have not been abrogated. The e sential
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" ection 3219, omp. Laws of l tnh, l •t ~ ,
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school asserted that all the distinctions between the common-law

and the equity modes of pleading had been embraced within the

sweeping language of the statute, and had been discarded ; that

one general principle of pleading was applicable to the civil

action in all cases, whatever might be the nature of tlie primary

right it sought to maintain, or of the remedy it sought to pro-

cure. This principle, which was stated in a preceding para-

graph, is simple, universal, and natural. It is merely that the

pleader must narrate in a plain and concise manner the actual

facts from which the right and duties of the parties arise, and

not his conception of their legal effect, nor, on the other hand,

the mere detail of evidence which substantiates the existence of

those facts. This comprehensive principle applies to all kinds of

actions, to one founded upon a legal right and seeking a legal

remedy, and to one founded on an equitable right and seeking

an equitable remedy; and it avoids all questions and difficulties

as to the " issuableness " of the matters alleged. Undoubtedly,

from the very nature of the primary rights invaded and of the

remedies demanded, the narrative of facts will generally be much
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more minute, detailed, and circumstantial in actions brought to

declares the rule for stating the cause of and must remain the same, whether under

action as follows: 'The complaint must code or at common law; that is to say, a

contain ... a statement of the facts con- pleading must be so drawn as to tender a

stituting the cause of action, in ordinary definite issue or issues, and not leave the

and concise language.' The al)Ove is, in adversary to grope in the dark as to what

substance, the common-law rule. ' Plead- the meaning of the pleading is ; ' this is

ing is the statement in a logical and legal no more allowable now than formerly.' "

form of the facts which constitute the Citizens' Bank v. Tiger Tail Mill Co.

plaintiff's cause of action, or the defend- (1899), 152 Mo. 14.5, 53 S. W. 902 : " While

chool a erted that all the i tinction between the common-law
n th e ui m d of pl ading ha l be n mbrac d within the
w ping langua0 e of the tatute and had b en di card d; that
n g neral principl of pleading ' as ap licabl t the civil
action in all ca e , whatever might be the nature of the primary
right it ought t maintain, or of the remedy it ought to procure. Thi principle, which wa stated in a pr ce ing paragraph, is imple, univer al, and natural. It is m rely that the
pleader mu t narrate in a plain and concise mann r th actual
facts from which the right and duties of the par ie ari e, and
not his conception of their legal effect, nor, on the other band,
the mere detail of evidence which substantiate the exi t nee f
tho e fact . This comprehen ive principle appli s to all kin of
actions, to one founded upon a legal right and s eking a legal
remedy and to one founded on an equitable right and eking
an equitable remedy; and it avoids all question and difficultie
a to the "issuableness" of the matt rs alleged. Undoubted! ,
from the very nature of the primary right invaded and of the
reme~ie demanded, the narrative of fact will generally b much
more minute, detailed, and circumstantial in actions brought to

ant's ground of defence. . . . Facts only the use of formal aud technical averments,

are to be stated, and not arguments or which were necessary at common law to

inferences, or matters of law.' 1 Chitty the statement of a cause of action, have

PI. pp. 21.3, 214." Casey i'. Mason (1899), been dispensed with by our code aud are

8 Okla. 665, 59 Pac. 252 : " The statute no longer necessary, the same material

did not abolish common-law causes of ac- allegations are necessary under it that

tion — it only abolished their forms and were necessary at common law; and it is

grouped them under one head — aud there clear, we think, that at common law, in

is no difference between trespass at com- order to state a cause of action in trover,

mon law and under the .statutes. A plain- the petition should .«tate that the plaintiff

tiff, under the statute, must allege and liad possession, or the right to the po.sses-

prove every fact that he was required to sion, of the property sued for at the time

allege and prove at common law " Phelps, of the conversion." Merriman i\ McCor-

etc. Co. V. Halsell (1901), 11 Okla. 1, 65 mick Harve.sting M. Co. (1893), 86 Wi.s.

Pac.340; Huston y. Tyler (1897), 140 Mo. 142, 56 N. AV. 743 ; Sell i-. Missi.ssippi

252, 36 S. W. 654: "The above cases River Logging Co. (1894), 88 Wis. 581,

recognize the doctrine that the 'funda- 60 N. W. 1065.3

mental requirements ' of good pleading are

declare the rule for tating the can e of and mu t remain the same, whether under
action as follow : 'The complaint must code or at common law; that i to ay, a
contain .. . a tatement of the fact con- pleading mu t be so drawn a to tender a
stituting the cau e of action, in ordinary definite i · ue or i ue , and not leave the
and conci e language.' The above i , in adver ary to grope in the dark a to wha~
ubstanc , the common-law rule. 'Plead- the meaning of the pleadin is; 'thi ·
ing i the tatement in a logical and legal no m re allowable now than formerly.'"
form of the facts which on titute the Citizen ' Bank v. Tiger Tail Mill Co.
plaintiff' cau. e of acti n, or the defend- (1 99), 152 Mo. 145, fl3 . W. 9 2: "While
ant' ground of defence. . . . Fact only the u e of formal and t chni al averment ,
are to be tated, and not argument or which were ue s. ary at comm n law to
in fer ence , or matter of law.' l
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pr<Jv
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kla. J, 5
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maintain equitable rights and to recover equitable relief than in

those based upon legal rights and pursuing legal relief, but this

incident does not alter or affect the j)rinciple which governs all

cases; the pleader in both cases sets out the facts which entitle

him to the remedy asked, and no niore;^ it simply liappens that

legal remedies usually depend upon a few positive facts, while

equitable remedies often arise from a multitude of circumstances,

events, and acts, neitlier of which, taken by itself, would have

created any right or imposed any duty. It would be useless to

incumber the page by a reference to all the reported cases in

which this doctrine has been approved; and I shall merely cite

one or two which are leading in point of time, and which may be

regarded as examples of the class, ^ Without entering upon any

discussion of these two theories, it is enough to say that the

latter one has been accepted as expressing the true intent and

[^^ " The spirit of our civil code is that

a party shall state in his pleadings the

real facts of iiis case and not falsehoods
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or fictions ; and when each party states

what he believes to be true and the real

facts of his case, the court may know pre-

cisely where the parties differ : " Ken-

nett I'. Peters (1894), 54 Ken. 123, 37 Pac.

999. " Under the reformed procedure it

is unnecessary, in a pleading, to state legal

fictions. The pleader should state the

facts which constitute his cause of action

in ordinary and concise hmguage " : Ball

V. Beaumont (1900), 59 Neb. 631, 81 N. W.

858.]

2 Millikin V. Gary, 5 How. Pr. 272;

Williams v. Hayes, 5 How. Pr. 470;

People !;. Ryder, 12 N. Y. 433, 437. The

doctrine of the text was very clearly and

accurately stated by Crocker J. in Bowen

V. Aubrey, 22 Cal. 566, 569.

[See also Botsford v. Wallace (1899),

72 Conn. 195, 44 Atl. 10, where the court

says: "Aiming at simplicity, the Practice

Act has discarded the technical formali-

ties of common-law pleading, and has fol-

lowed in the main the practice in equity."

Also Dun nett v. Thornton (1900), 73 Conn.

1, 46 Atl. 158; Cone v. Ivinson (1893), 4

Wyo. 226, 33 Pac. 31 ; Skinner (•. Skinner

(1894), 38 Neb. 756, 57 N. W. 534; Moore

V. Spurrier (1899), 55 S. C. 292, 33 S. E.

352; Hawkins v. Overstreet (1898), 7 Okla.

277, 54 Pac. 472: "We have no action

of trover. . . . The distinction between

actions at law and suits in equity, and the

forms of all such actions and suits hereto-

fore existing, are abolished. ... It is not

necessary that the facts should be stated

in such manner as would iiave entitled

the plaintiff to a recovery under any par-

ticular form of action. It is sufficient if

facts are alleged which show a right to

recovery by the plaintiff against the de-

fendant under the general principles of

law determining the rights of parties, and

without regartl to what may or may not

liave been the rules of pleading or stating

a cause of action before the adoption of

our code."]

See contra, the remarks of Holmes J. in

Meyers r. Field, 37 Mo. 434, 441. It will

be seen in the sequel that the Supreme

. maintain quitabl right an d to r
r qnita.bl r li ,£ than in
those bas d upon legal right and pm ·uin r l g< 1 r li f but thi ·
incident do s not alt r r aff · th prin ·ipl whi ·h · "I'll· all
ase; the pl ad r in both cas · t' ut tb fa·t· whi h r i 1
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[l "The spirit of our civil code is that
a party shall state in his pleadings the
real facts of hi ca e ancl not falsehood .
or fictions; and when each party state.
what he believe to be true and the real
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spirit of the new procedure, and the former has left scarcely any

traces in the practical administration of justice in the great

majority of the States. The forms contained in the most popular

and approved text-books upon practice and pleading furnish a

sure test; and, without exception, these are all based upon the

method of interpreting the codes last described. And yet with

great inconsistency, as it seems to me, the courts have generally

held that the ancient forms of common-law pleading in assumpsit

viay be used in actions upon contract, especially where the con-

tract is implied ; that they sufficiently meet the requirements of

the codes, although they do not set out the actual facts of the

transaction from which the legal right arises. Thus, it has been

decided that the count in indebitatus assumpsit for goods sold

and delivered is a sufficient complaint or petition in an action

to recover the price. ^ The difference between this ruling of the

courts and the theory first above stated is, that according to the

latter theory the common-law mode of stating a legal cause of

action or defence must be followed in substance, while by the

decisions referred to it may be followed in the particular classes
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of actions described. But even this ruling, although, as I think,

a plain departure from the essential spirit of the new system, is

of little practical importance ; the bar have, with almost absolute

unanimity, adopted the method of stating the facts as they

occurred, and do not attempt to aver in their stead the legal

fictions of promises which are never made, or conclusions of law

which are in no sense of the term actual facts. There are other

important features of an action — the parties, the union of dif-

ferent causes of action or defence, affirmative relief to the de-

fendant, the form of the judgments, and the like — which have

been greatly affected by the general provision of the statute

abolishing the distinctions between legal and equitable methods,

and the judicial interpretation given thereto; but it is impossible

to discuss them in any general manner, and their particular treat-

ment is reserved for subsequent chapters.

1 Allen V. Patterson, 7 N. Y. 476, 478. or ])etitions being sanctioned which are

Some of the State legislatures have by a identical with the ancient common counts,

statutory enactment set forth forms of and therefore allege fiction instead of facts,

pleading under the code, and tlius made See, for example, statutes of Indiana,

them regular and valid. It is strange that ^Weston v. Brown (1899), 158 N. Y. 360,

in some of these the spirit of the code 53 N. E. 36.3

is dii'ectly violated, forms of complaints

irit of
tra.

w procedur , and th former bas left carcely any

ractical admini tra ion of justice in the great
tates . The form ontained in be most popular
a proY
text-book upon practice and pleading fumi b a
"t · an<l without ex ption these are all bas d u n the
od f interpreting the code last de cribed. And et with
gre t inc n i tency, a it em to m , the courts have gen rally
l el that the ancient form of common-law pl ading in a umpsit
1nay b u ed in actions upon contract, especially wb re the conract i impli d; that they suffici ntly meet the requirements of
th
od , al hough they do not s t out the actual facts of the
tran < ction from which the legal right arises. Tl:u , it ha been
decided that the count in indebitatir,s assurnpsit for goods sold
an d livered i a suffici ent complaint or petition in an action
o recover the price. 1 The difference between this ruling of the
court and the theory first above tated is, that according to the
1 tter theory the common-law mode of stating a legal au e of
action or defence '11iust be followed in substance, while by the
deci ion referred to it may be followed in the particular cla ses
of acti ns d scribed. But even this ruling, although, a I think,
a plain departure from the essential spirit of the n w system, is
of little practical irpportance; the bar have, with almo tab. olute
unar imity, adopted the method of stating the fact a they
occurr , and do not attempt to aver in their stead the legal
fiction of promi e which are never made, or conclusion of law
which are in n sense of the term actual facts. Ther
re other
important features of an action - the parties the union of different cau ·e of action or d f nc , affirmative relief t
he defendant the form of the judgments, and the like - which have
een greatly affected by the g n ral provision of th statut
ab li bing th distinctions betw n 1 gal and eq uitabl m thods,
and tl e judi ial interpr etation gi n thereto; but it i impo sible
di cu th m in any g n ral manner and their particular treatm n i r erv d for sub qu nt rn er .

, e, for examp1 , tatutes f Indiana.
[W too u. Br wn (1899), 158 N. Y. 360,
53 N. • . 36.J
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SECTION SECOND.

THE COMBINATION BY THE PLAINTIFF OF LEGAL AND EQUITABLE

PRIMARY RIGHTS AND OF LEGAL AND EQUITABLE RKMEDIES

IN ONE ACTION.

§ 16. * 76. Principles of Unity Applied to Particular Cases. The

general principles of unity developed in the preceding section

will now be applied to the several cases which are constantly

arising in the practical administration of justice, for the purpose

of ascertaining how far the abolition of all distinctions between

actions at law and suits in equity has affected the process of

stating causes of action, and praying for and obtaining remedies

by the plaintiff. It was in this very feature of the judicial process

— the stating of causes of action, and the obtaining of relief

thereon — that the distinction spoken of was exhibited in the

most marked manner ; and it is in this feature, therefore, that the

change must be the most sweeping and radical, if the distinction

has in truth been abolished. Under the former system a legal

primary right, when invaded, could only be redressed by an

action at law, and a legal judgment alone was possible ; while
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an equitable primary right must be redressed or protected in an

equity suit and by an equitable remedy. A union or combina-

tion of the two classes, either wholly or partially, in one action

was unknown, unless permitted by some express statute, and was

utterly opposed to the theory whicli separated the two depart-

ments of the municipal law. The new system not only permits

but encourages — and in its spirit, I believe, requires — such a

union and combination; for one of its elementary notions is that

all the possible disputes or controversies arising out of, or con-

nected with, the same subject-matter or transaction should be

settled in a single judicial action.^

1 The code does not require legal and a jireviou.s recovery of legal relief bars

equitable causes of action and reliefs to tlie subsequent recovery of equitable relief

be united in the same action, even when based on the same cause of action. In

growing out of the same transaction or tiiis case the facts were as follows : Plain-

subject-matter ; a previous decree award- tiffs and defendant were the respective

ing equitable relief does not, it is held, bar owners of adjoining lots in the city of

the subsequent recovery of legal relief. Buffalo. Defendant in erecting a brick

Bruce v. Kelly, 5 Hun, 229, 232. house on her lot encroached on plaintiff.-;'

[See Hahl r. Sugo (1901), 169 N. Y. lot. In 1896 plaintiffs brouglit an action

109, 62 N. E. 135, in which it is held that to recover the land thus encroached upon.

2
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§ 17. *78. Both Equitable and Legal Relief Awarded. Illustra-

tious. When the plaintiff is ch)thed with primary rights, both

legal and equitable, growing out of the same cause of action or

the same transaction, and is entitled to an equitable remedy, and

also to a further legal remedy, based upon the supposition that

the equitable relief is granted, and he sets forth in his complaint

or petition the facts which support each class of rights, and which

show that he is entitled to each kind of remedy, and demands a

judgment awarding both species of relief, the action will be sus-

Plaintiffs recovered in this action and

upon a second trial recovered again, and

in 1898 judgment was entered in their

7 . Both Equitable and L egal Re lief A war de d . I llus t r ations.
\ h n h plaintiff l
1 th d with primary ri h , both
uitable gr win
ut f the ame ca.u of action or
rn tran a tion, and i enti 1 to an equita le r m dy, and
al
o a furth r 1 gal r rn d ba d u n the upp i i n that
th equi abl r lief is grante , and he et forth in hi complaint
r tition the facts which support ach cla of right , and which
show that he i entitled to ach kind of rem d , an demands a
judgment awarding both pec1es of relief, the action will be us17.

favor establishing their title in fee to the

land in dispute. The execution issued on

the judgment was returned " by the sheriff

with an endorsement thereon .stating in

substance that the strip of land described

therein was occupied by a portion of the
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stone foundation and brick wall of defend-

ant's house, and that it was impracticable

for him to remove the same." A motion

by plaintiffs at "a Special Term for an

order directing the defendant to remove

that portion of the wall of her house

which encroaches upon the plaintiffs'

land " having been denied, plaintiffs there-

upon brought an " action in equity to

compel the defendant to remove said en-

croaching wall from their land." The

judgment recovered by plaintiffs in the

former action was pleaded in bar. The

Supreme Court sustained the action and

granted the relief prayed for, and this

judgment " was unanimously affirmed by

the Appellate Division." The Court of

Appeals, in its opinion reversing the judg-

ment, among other things, said : " Let us

now see whether the plaintiffs have more

than one cause of action arising out of

the wrong of the defendant, and if not,

what that cause of action is. The plain-

tiffs are the owners of a strip of land

upon which the defendant has wrongfully

entered and erected a wall which is a

portion of her house. The facts alleged

show one y)rimary right of the plaintiffs

and one wrong done by the defendant

which involves that right. Therefore the

plaintiffs have stated but a single cause of

action, no matter how many forms and

kinds of relief they may be entitled to. . . .

The plaintiffs' right is to recover pousession

of their land. The defendant's wrong

consists in the entry upon and use of the

land without the plaintiffs' consent. The

particular nature of that wrong may re-

quire the application of different remedies

for the enforcement of the right. But

that does not change the nature of the

cause of action, nor entitle the plaintiffs

to split it into several causes of action.

The complaint in the first action stated

tlie facts upon which the plaintiffs based

their claim of title and right to possession.

Under its allegations tlie title as well as

the right to possession could be tested.

(Cagger v. Lansing, 64 N. Y. 417.) The

right to possession involved the removal

Plaintiff recovered in this a tion and
upon a econd trial recovered again, and
in l 98 judgment was entered in th ir
favor e tabli hing their title in fee to the
land in di pute. The execution i sued on
the judgment wa r turned "by the heriff
' ith an ndor ement thereo n . tating in
ub tance that the trip of land de crib d
therein wa occupied by a portion of the
tone foundation and brick wall of defendant' hou e, aucl that it wa impracticable
for him to r emove the ame." A motion
by plaintiff at "a , 'pecial Term for an
order directing the defendant to remove
that portion of the wall of her bou e
which encroache upon the plaintiff '
land" havin g be n denied, plaintiff thereup n br ught au " action in equi ty to
c mp 1 th defendant to remove ·aid enr oa hing wall from th ir land." The
judgm nt recovered by plaintiff: in the
form er action w pleaded in bar. The
upr me
nrt u tained the action and
g rant d the r li ef prayed fo r, and thi
judgment "wa unanimou ly affi rm d by
the Appellate
ivi ion." The ourt of
Appeal , in it opinion rever ing th e jud ment, among other thing , aid : "L t us
now e wh eth r the plaintiff have more
t han one cau
of action ari ·iog out of
Ii wrong of th e defendant, and if n t,
what that cau e of a ction i . The plainwne r of a . t rip of land
tiff a re th
np 11 whi ch the clef ndaot ha ' r ngfully
uter rl and rect d a wall whi h i a
portion of h r hou. . The fa t all e; d
IHJ\ cme primary r igh t of ti
plain iff
a.nil Qll wm11g elem hy th cl f nd a nt
wliirh in\'<,Jv that ri g ht. Th r for th
plain iff hav . tat d but a in gl an of
~l.l· t inn, n•i matt r how manv form
kin rl ,,f rPl i •f th y may b 11. Ill d t
Th plain tiff ' rig ht i to recov r poo

The d fendant's wrong
c n i t in the entry up n and u e of the
land without th plaiutiff ' n ent. The
parti ular nature of that wron may require the application of different remedie
for the enforcement of th e ri O'ht. But
that doe not chanO'e the natur of the
au e of action nor entitle the plaintiff
to plit it into e'' ral au e of a tion.
The complaint in the fir t action tat d
the fa t upon which th plaintiff ba etl
their claim f title and ri ht to po · ion.
nd er it allegation the title a w 11 as
the right to po · s. ion ould be t ted .
(Cagger v. Lau ing, 64 N. Y. 417 .) The
right to po e. ion inv lv d the removal
of the encroach in g wall, for without u h
rem oval th ere could be n real tran f r of
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tained to its full extent in the form thus adopted. He may, on

the trial, prove all the facts averred, and the court will in its

judgment formally grant both the equitable and the legal relief.^

It will be noticed that this proposition embraces only those cases

in which the legal relief demanded rests upon and flows as a

consequence from the prior equitable relief, but the principle of

the rule is not confined to such cases ; it extends also to those in

which the two remedies, although connected witli the same trans-

action or subject-matter, are not connected as cause and effect.^

This is the most complete union of legal and equitable primary

rights and remedies in one action which can be made ; but it is

limited and restricted to those cases in which these rights and

remedies arise from the same transaction or subject.-matter. It is

not generally possible to join one legal cause of action with

another entirely independent equitable cause of action, there

being no antecedent connection between the two. In the cases

described above, where the union is permitted, there is, in fact,

no joinder of different causes of action ; ^ there is only the union
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1 Laub V. Buckmiller, 17 N. Y. 620,

€26 ; Lattin v. McCartv, 41 N. Y. 107, 109,

110; Davis v. Lamberton, 56 Barb. 480,

483 ; Brown v. Brown, 4 Robt. 688, 700,

701 ; Walker v. Sedgwick, 8 Cal. 398 ;

Welles r. Yates, 44 N. Y. 52.5 ; Henderson

r. Dickey, 50 Mo. 161,165; Guernsey u.

Am. Ins. Co., 17 Minn. 104, 108; Mont-

tained to it full xtent in h form hu · a
II may, n
the trial, prov all th fa t' av IT J, and
urL ' ill in ib
judgm nt formally grant b h th q uitaule < ntl the 1 al r li f.l
It will be noticed that thi: Ir 1 i i n mbra
uly th
in which the legal reli f d mantled r t u1 n and fl w a a
con equence from the prior quitabl r li £, but the I rinci11 f
the rule i' not confin cl t u h ca e ; it ext ncls al o t th
in
which the two remedie , although connect l with the am transaction or subject-matter, ar not onnect d as cau and ff ct. 2
This is the most complete union of legal and quit< ble primary
rights and remedies in one. a tion whi ·h can b ma.cl ; but it is
limited and restricted to tho ·e ca e in which th 'e rightB and
remedies arise from the am tran action or ubj ct.-matt r. It is
not generally possible to join one legal cau
of action with
another entirely independent equitable cau
of a tion, there
being no antecedent connection between the two. In the ca es
described above, where the union i permitted, there is, in fact,
no joinder of different cause of action; 3 there is only the union

gomery V. McEwen, 7 Minn. 351. See,

however, Hudson i\ Caryl, 44 N. Y. 553,

which holds that, in an action brought to

remove a nuisance, damages can only be

awarded by the verdict of a jury, sed qn.

See also Kewaunee Cy. Sup. v. Decker,

30 Wis. 624, 626-630, per Dixon C. J., for

a very elaborate opinion in opposition to

the doctrine of the text and of the cases

cited above in this note. Further illustra-

tions of the text are Stewart v. Carter,

4 Neb. 564 ; Turner v. Althaus, 6 Nel>.

.54; Weinland v. Cochran, 9 Neb. 480;

Wa Ching ?•. Constantine, 1 Idaho, 266 ;

Young r. Young, 81 N. C. 91 ; Kahn v.

Kahn, 15 Fla. 400; Leidersdorf v. Flint,

50 Wis. 401 ; Anderson r. Hunn, 5 Hun,

79 ; Stevens v. The Mayor, etc., 84 N. Y.

296, 305 ; Wheelock v. Lee, 74 N. Y. 495,

500 ; Margraf v. Muir, 57 N. Y. 159 ; Hale

V. Omaha Nat. Bank, 49 N. Y. 626 ; Madi-

son Av. Bap. Ch. V. Oliver St. Bap. Ch.

73 N. Y. 83 ; Cone v. Niagara Fire Ins.

Co., 60 N. Y. 619.

[;Hahl V. Sugo (1901), 169 N. Y. 109, 62

N. E. 135; Vaughn v. Georgia Land Co.

(1896), 98 Ga. 288, 25 S. E. 441 ; Harp i-.

Abbeville Investment Co. (1899), 108 Ga.

168, 33 S. E. 998; Brown v. Latham

(1893), 92 Ga. 280, 18 S. E. 421.] Butler

1-. Barnes, 61 Conn. 399 ; Bowen v. State,

121 Ind. 235; Jaseph v. People's Sav. Bk.

(Ind. Sup. 1889), 22 N. E. 980; Jennings

V. Reeves, 101 N. C. 447 ; Paddock v.

Somes, 102 Mo. 226. But see La we v.

Hvde, 39 Wis. 345.

' 2 See N. Y. Ice Co. v. N. W. Ins. Co.,

23 N. Y. 357, 359; Cahoon v. Bank of

Utica, 7 N. Y. 486 ; Broiestedt i-. South

Side R. Co., 55 N. Y. 220, 222 ; Turner v.

Pierce, 34 Wis. 658, 665, ])er Dixon C. J. ;

Linden v. Hepburn, 3 Sandf. 668, 671 ;

l Laub v. Buckmiller, 17 N. Y. 620,
'626; Lattin v. McCarty, 41 N. Y. 107, 109,
110 ; Davis v. Lamberton, 56 Barb. 4 0,
483 ; Brown v. Brown, 4 Robt. 6 8, 700,
701; Walker v. Sedgwick, 8 Cal. 398;
Welles l'. Yates, 44 N. Y. 525; Henderson
v. Dickey, 50 Mo. 161, 165 ; Guern ey v.
Am. Ins. Co., 17 Minn. 104, 108; Montgomery v. McEwen, 7 Minn. 351.
ee,
howe,·er, Rud on v. Caryl, 44 :N. Y. 553,
whi ch holds that, in an action brought to
r emove a nuisance, damages can only be
awarded by the verdict of a jury, sed qu.
See al ·o Kewaunee Cy. Sup. v. Decker,
ao Wis. 624, 626-630, per Dixon C. J., for
a very elaborate opinion in opposition to
the doctrine of the text and of the cases
cited above in this note. Further illustrations of the text are tewart v. art r,
4 Xeb. 564; Turner v. Althaus, 6 N h.
.54; Weinland " · Cochran, 9 Neb . 4 c 0;
\Va Chino- v. Constantine, l I daho, 266;
Young ii. Young, 81 . C. 91; Kahn l'.
l\ahn, 15 Fla. 400; L eidersclorf v. li'Jint,
50 \Vi . -W l ; Anderson 1·. Hunn, 5 ITnn,
79; , teven. v. The Ma.rnr, etc., 84 . Y.
296, ~05; Wheeloc k u. Lee, i4 ~. Y. 49 5,
500; Margraf v. Muir, 57 N. Y. L)9; Hale
v. Omaha Nat. Bank, 49 N. Y . 626; Madi-

son Av. Bap. Ch. v. Oliver t. Bap. Ch.
i3 N. Y. 83; Cone v. Niagara Fire Ins.
Co., 60 N. Y. 619 .
[Hahl v. ugo (190 1), 169 N. Y. 109, 62
N. E. 135; Vaughn u. Georgia Land Co.
(1 96), 9 Ga. 2 8, 25 . E. 441; Harp v.
Abbeville Investment Co. (1 99), 10 Ga.
168, 33
. E. 99 ; Brown v. Latham
(1 93), 92 Ga. 280, I
. E. 421.] Butl r
v. Barne , 61 Conn. 399 ; Bowen u. ' tate,
121 Ind. 2.35; Jaseph 1 . People'
av. Bk.
(Ind. up. l 9), 22 N . E. 9 0; .Jenning
v. Reeve , 101 N.
447; Paddock '"
Somes, 102 Mo. 226. But ee Lawe t'.
Hyde, 39 Wi . 34-5.
2
ee N. Y. Ice Co. ii. N. W. In . o.,
2.1 N. Y. 35i, 359;
ahoon t'. Bank of
Tti a, 7 _ .. Y. 4 6; Broiest cit t'. outh
id l . o., 55 T. Y. 220, 222; Turn r ti.
Ii rce, 34 Wis. C5 , 665, per Dixon C'. J. ;
Linden l'- II pbnru, 3 , anrlf. 66 , 67 I ;
rar r. Doug-h rty, 25 al. 266. Th
legal and equitable au es nf ction h uld
1at
1" I i ff, 7
b . cparately tatecl.
al. 124; Magwire u. Tyl r, 47 Mo. 11 5,
127.

a [The foll owing a es. upport the doctrin e of the text, hut th y all a um that
there are two di tiuct cau es of action,
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of remedial rights flowing from one cause of action, as -wall be

seen from the judgments of the court in several of the cases cited

in the note, and as will be more fully shown in a subsequent

/-€hapter. This rule, which has been lirraly established by the ^

/ court of last resort in New York, and which is adopted in all the

States with one or two exceptions, has been applied in the follow-

ing cases among others : ^ in an action by the holder of the legal

title to correct his title deed, to recover possession of the land

according to the correction thus made, and to recover damages

for withholding such possession ; - in an action by one holding the

equitable title to procure defendant's deed to be cancelled, and a

conveyance by defendant to himself, to recover possession and

damages, and to restrain defendant from conveying away the

land ; 3 in an action by the grantor of land to correct his deed by

the insertion of an exception of the growing timber, and to recover

damages for trees embraced in* the exception, wrongfully cut by

the grantee ; * in an action to abate a nuisance, to restrain its

further commission, and to recover damages therefor ; ^ in an

action by a widow to establish her right of dower, to procure it
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to be assigned, to recover possession and damages ; ^ and in an

action by the vendor of land to recover a money judgment on

notes given him for the price, and to foreclose his lien on the

land itself."

§ 18. * 79. Doctrine in Missouri and "Wisconsin. In Missouri,

however, the judiciary for a long time denied the correctness of

this rule, and rejected it under all circumstances in which it

could possibly be applied. The doctrine was asserted and main-

tained in a long series of adjudications that the holder of an

equitable title, or the possessor of an equitable primary right,

can obtain none but an equitable remedy prosecuted in an equi-

table form of action. The Supreme Court of that State even

one legal and the other equitable. Brown recover thereon, as reformed, against joint

V.Wilson (1895), 21 Colo. 309, 40 Pac. iusurersj

fi88; Mulock r. Wilson (1893), 19 Colo. " Lattin v. McCarty, 41 N. Y. 107;

296. 3.T Pac. 532; Stock-Growers' Bank Henderson r. Dickey, 50 Mo. 161.

!•. Newton (1889), 13 Colo. 245, 22 Pac. * Welles i-. Yates, 44 N. Y. 525.

444.] ^ Davis c. Laniberton, 5'6 Barb. 4S0.

' For additional instances, see jiost, But see Hudson r. Caryl, 44 N. Y. 553,

§§ *452-*462. that a jury trial is necessary to the re-

^ Laub V. Buckmiller, 17 N. Y. 620. covery of daniage>. Parker r. Laney, 58

(^Imperial Shale Brick Co. r. Jewett (1901), N. Y. 469.

169 N. v. 143, 62 N. E. 167, in an aition o Brown v. Brown, 4 Kobt. 688.

to reform a contract of insurance and to '' Walker v. Sedgwick, 8 Cal. 398.

f r m dial ri h ' fl win 0 from ne cau '
f action a will be
: n from be 3udament f the cour in e ra1 f th ca e · cit d
in th n , and a
ill b mor fully l '"n in a subsequent
·ha ter. 1 hi · r 11 wb.i h ha been firmly ·tabli ·h cl b · 1 e
cour of la t r ort in
w Y rk and which i' a<l vtecl in all the
'tate. with on or tw excepti n ha · he n applied in the followh r ' : 1 in an action by th h ld i· f the 1 gal
c rrect hi · ti le J eed, t reco er p ' e i n of the land
according t the corre tion thu made and to rec
r dama e.
2
f r withholding uch pos ' e 'ion · in an acti n by one h lding th
zq uitable title to procur defendant deed t be cancelled, and
c n eyance by defendant to him elf, to rec ver o
sion and
damage , and to re train defendant from conveying away the
1 nd · 3 in an action by he granter of land to correct l i deed y
the in ertion of an exception of the growin tim her ancl to recoYer
damage for tree' embraced in· the exception, wrongfully ut by
he grantee; 4 in an action to abate a n ui ance, to restrain it
further commi sion, and to recover damage therefor · 5 in an
action by a widow to stabli h her right of dower to procure it
to be as igned, to recover po se i n and damage · 6 and in n
a.ction by the vendor f land to r ecover a money judgmen t on
n te gi v n him for he price, and to foreclose his lien on the
bn it elf.7
18. * 7 . Doctrine in Missouri and Wisconsin.
In Mi ouri,
ho ever the judiciary for a long time deni d the c rrectn ss of
tbi · rule and reject d it u nd r all circum tanc in whi ch it
c ul po ibly be applied. T he d octrine wa a r t and maintain
in a long s ries f adjudi cations t hat the h lder of an
quit le titl , or he po e r of an equitable primary ri ht
can tain none but an quita le r medy r
ut l in an quile form f action. Th
ourt f bat tate
n
ou legal and the other equitable. Brown
v W il. 011 { 1 95), 21
olo ..'3 9, ·10 Pac.
' ; . :fulo<'k t'. \Vil on (1 3 ), 19 olo.
·!JG, 3:; P ac. 5.12 ; • tock- ' r o il' r ' Bank
•.
·wton ( 1 !J), 13 olo. 245, 22 P a .
4

4.J
1

F•1r arlditioual in. tance ,

7w t,

1:;2-· 4G:!.
~ Lauli i;, Buckmiller, 17 N. Y . 620.
[fmpni· I. hal BriC'k ('o. 1-. .J w tt (l!JO l ),
I ' •. Y. 143, G2
. E. 167, iu an ar·tion
t.o r form a contract of in urance and to

G
7

Brown u. Brown 4 Robt. 6 .
Walker v. · clgwick,
al. 39 .
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went SO far as to reject the familiar principle of equity jurispru-

dence, which permitted the Court of Cliancery, liaviiiy ac(iuired

jurisdiction by means of some equitable rig] it, to go on and

administer full legal relief in order that the party should not be

put to the trouble and expense of a second action at law. In

accordance with this narrow view of equity and this narrow

construction of the reformed legislation, it was settled that ths

holder of an equitable title who seeks to enforce his right and to

acquire a legal title by means of a specific performance, a can-

cellation, or a reformation of deeds, must, after obtaining that

relief, bring a second action at law to recover the possession. If

he unite his equitable cltiim for cancellation and the like with

the legal claim for possession, he was actually to be turned out

of court. This remarkable interpretation pvit upon the language

of the statute, and so completely defeating its plain intent, was

resorted to in the following, among other instances, which are

selected as illustrations merely: in actions brought to set aside

and cancel deeds of conveyance made to the defendant, alleged

to be fraudulent, and to vest the legal title in the plaintiff, and
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to recover possession of the premises in question; ^ in an acticm

of partition, where defendant was in possession of the whole

land, claiming title therein, it being held that the plaintiff must

first establish his legal right by ejectment, and then bring an

equity action of partition.^ The Supreme Court of Missouri

has, however, in a very recent decision, receded from this very

extreme position, and has partly, at least, overruled the authorit}'

of the cases referred to in this and the subsequent paragraph.

Although the single judgment does not in its reasoning and

conclusions accept the liberal views of the New York Court of

Appeals in their full scope and extent, yet it plainly tends in

that direction, conferring the reliefs of reformation or correction

of a deed of conveyance and recovery of possession of the land

included in such deed as corj^ected.^ The judiciary of Wiscon-

1 Curd i'. Lackland, 43 Mo. 139 ; Wynn ^ Gott r. Powell, 41 Mo. 416 ; Moreau

V. Cory, 43 Mo. 301 ; Gray v. Payne, 43 v. Detchemendy, 41 Mo. 431.

Mo. 203; Bobb v. Woodward, 42 Mo. * Henderson v. Dickey, 50 Mo. 161,

482 ; Peyton !,\ Hose, 41 Mo. 257 ; Walker's 16.5, per Wagner J. The judgment in

Adm'r v. Walker, 2.5 Mo. 367 ; Magwire this case comments on and condemns the

?'. Tvler, 47 Mo. 115, 127; Rutherford v. leading decisions referred to in the two

Williams, 42 Mo. 18, 23; Fithian v. preceding notes; and, although it deals

Monks, 43 Mo. 502, 517. too leniently with the gross mistakes int»

went so far a to r j ct th familiar I rin i pl of qnit. ]UrL pruden e, which p rmitt d th \mrt of ,han ry lttn i11g a quired
juri diction by mean of om
qnital1l rigl1 t io go on and
admini:t r full legal reli £ in mler that th part r :lioul<l n t b
put to the trouble an<l xpen ·e f a
ml aeticm at law. In
accordance with tbi narrow vi w of qui y and thi narrow
con truction of the reformed 1 rdation it \Va ettl 1 that the
holder of an qui table title who 'e k to nfor ·e l1is ri ght and to
acquire a legal title by rn an of a p ific p rforman · a ·ancellation, or a reformation £ de cl mu t, a.fl r 0Ltai11ing } at
relief, bring a second action at law to r cover th po · ·e ·ion . If
he unite his eq uitahle cl~im for cane Ila ti on and th lik with
the legal claim for po se i n, he wa actually to b turn d ut
of court. This remarkable interpr tation put ur n th language
of the statute, and so cornplet ly cl feating it plain int nt. "a ·
resorted to in the following, among oth r in ·ta,n , whi h ar
selected as illu trations merely: in action br u.ght to et a ·id
and cancel deeds of conveyance made to the cl f nclant, allcg d
to be fraudulent, and to vest the legal titl in the plaintiff ancl
to recover possession of the pr mi e in q u ti on; 1 in an a ti on
of partition, where defendant was in pos · ·si n of the whol
land, claiming title therein, it being held that the plaintiff mu t
first establish his legal right by ejectrnent, an<l then bring an
equity action of partition. 2 The Supreme Court of l\li · ouri
has, however, in a very recent decision, reced d from this very
extreme po ition, and has partly, at lea t, ov rrnl d th authority
of the cases referred to in thi and the sub qu nt paragraph.
Although the single judgm nt does not in its r a nin 0 and
conclusions accept the liberal view of the N w Y rk ourt of
Appeals in their full scope and extent, y t it plainly te11d in
that direction, conferring the reliefs of reformation or orr tion
of a deed of conveyance and recovery of po
i n of th land
included in such deed as cori"'"tecl.3 The judi iar f \iVi c n1

Curd v. Lackland, 43 Mo. 139; Wynn

v. Cory, 43 Mo. 301 ; Gray v. Payne, 43

Mo. 203; Bobb v. Woodward, 42 Mo.
482 ; Peyton v. Ho e, 41 Mo. 257 ; Walker's
Adm'r v. Walker, 25 Mo. 367; Magwire
1•. Tyler, 47 Mo. 115, 127 · Hutherford t'.
Williams, 42 Mo. 18, 23; Fithian v.
Monks. 43 :\10. 502, 517.

2 Gott 11. Pow ll 41 :\Io. 416; Mor au
v. Detchemendy, 41 !\Io. 431.
s H ender on t'. Dicky, 50 M. 161,
165, per 'Vacrn r J. The judgm n t in
thi ca.e comm nt · on and cond 11111. t he
leadin g d ci. ion r ferr cl to in th t" o
preceding not • ; and, although it ti al.
too Jeni ntly with the gro mi take int
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sin seem now alone, among the tribunals of the several States,

to reject this liberal theory of interpretation, and to require

separate actions for the assertion of legal and equitable rights,

and the procurement of legal and equitable remedies. The

principle of unity approved and adopted b}- the highest tribunal

of New York has been deliberately rejected after a most thor-

ough examination, and the opposite principle, which distin-

guishes between the two classes of action, and retains their

separate use, and prohibits the recovery of legal and equitable

remedies in one suit, is avowedly accepted as being the correct

construction of the legislative provisions.^

which Holmes J. had fallen in announcing

the doctrine of those prior cases, yet it

squarely overrules their central principle,

and destroys their authority. Henderson

m

em n '
he tribunal
be s v re1 tates,
a.n l t r qmre
thi
of int rpr ta i
ction for
rtion f 1 gal and equit, bl right ,
procurement of 1 al and eq uitabl r
li
The
of unity appr Y d and ad pt d y the high ·t tribunal
Y rk ha b n <l liberat ly r j ed aft r a m t th r ough xamination and the o po i
rinci le, whi h d~ tingui he b twe n the tw
la e of action and r tain their
eparate u
and prohibit the recovery f legal and equitable
remedi in one uit, is avowedly ac epted as being the correct
con tru tio11 of the legislative rovi ion . 1
t

V. Dickey has been followed in numerous

cases in Missouri. See Paddock v. Somes,

102 Mo. 226.
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[^The view now entertained by the Su-

preme Court of Missouri respecting some

of the matters referred to in the te.xt is

shown by the following recent cases : Nalle

V. Thompson (1903), 173 Mo. 595, 73 S. W.

599; Nalle i;. Parks (1903), 173- Mo. GI6,

73 S. W. 596 ; Martin v. Turnbaugh

(1899), 153 Mo. 172, 54 S. W. 515 ; Lewis

V. Rhodes (1899), 150 Mo. 498, 52 S. W.

11 ; Dunn v. McCoy (1899), 150 Mo. 548,

52 S. W. 21 ; Springfield, etc. Co. v.

Donovan (1899), 147 Mo. G22, 49 S. W.

500; Kingman i'. Sievers (1898), 143 Mo.

519, 45 S. W. 266; O'Day v. Conn (1895),

131 Mo. 321, 32 S. W. 1109; Kerstner v.

Vorweg (1895), 130 Mo. 196, 32 S. W.

298; Sampson v. Mitchell (1894), 125 Mo.

217, 28 S. \V. 768 ; Crawford v. Whitmore

(1803), 120 Mo. 144, 25 S. W. 365 ; Morri-

son V. Ilerrington (1894), 120 Mo. 665, 25

S. W. 568. In these cases a greater de-

gree of liberality is shown than the author

ascribes to the court. In Martin c Turn-

baugh it is said that " every one admits

that it is elementary law that when a court

of efjuity obtains jurisdiction of a cause it

has power to retain jurisdiction until it

does complete justice between the parties,"

and further that "the petition may now

have a count at law and a count iu ecpiity,

which Holmes J. had fallen in announcing
the doctrin
f tho e prior c e , yet it
squarel_v overrule" thei r ceutral principle,
and de t roy their authority. Hender n
v. ickev ha been followed in numerous
case in ~Ii ouri.
ee Paddock v. ' me ,
102 :\Io. 226.
[The view now eutertained by t he upreme our t of l\li · ouri re pecting , ome
of the matter referred to in the text is
hown by the following recent ca e : Nalle
v. Thomp on (1903), L73 Mo. 595, 73 . W.
599; Nalle v. Pa rk ( 1903), 173' Mo. 616,
73 '. W. 596; .Martin v. Turnbaugh
(1 9), 153 Mo. 172, 54 ' . W. 5 15; L wis
v. Rhode (1 99), 150 Mo. 49 , 52 . W .
11; Dunn v. M oy (1 99), 150 Io. 54 ,
52 , . W. 21 ; 'p ri ngfield, etc .
. v.
Donovan ( l 99), 147 [ . 622, 49 . W.
500; Kingman 1. iever (1 9 , 143 Mo.
519, 45 . W . :l66;
'Day v. onn (1 95),
131 Io. 321, 32 . W . 1109; K r tn r v.
Y orw
(l 95), 100 :\Io. 196, 32 . W.
2
amp on v. !itch 11 (l 94), 125 '.\fo.
2 1i , 2
. \V. 76 ; 'rawf rd v. Whitm or e
(l . 3 ), 120 :\lo. 144, 25, . W.365; Morrin 11. Herrin tnn (1 94), 12 :.\1 . 65 , r
, . \V . 56 . In th e ·a
a g r at r cl gr of li b rali y i. h wn han th au t hor
a .. r ibe t th court. In ~far t in t '. Turn-

. . . the answer may contain a legal

defence, an eijuitable defence, and an

equital)le cross bill or counterclaim, . . .

and the reply may set up legal or equitable

defences to the new matter set up in the

answer. . . . The object of all of which is

to simplify proceedings, and to settle the

whole controversy between the parties in

one action.]

[|In Morrison v. Herrington, an action

of ejectment, the court said : " Here the

causes of action, one legal and the other

equitable, arose out of transactions con-

nected with the same subject of action.

The parties being the same also, there was

no misjoinder. Though the court could

have granted full and complete relief on

the equity cause of action, euen to awarding

a ivrit of possession, still it is quite common

practice to join an ejectment count with

an action brought t

UNION OF LE AL AN

EQUITABLE 1rnmrnIE.'.
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§ 19. * 80. Legal Relief only actually Awarded. lUustratioas.

The next case to be considered is tlie same in principle, and

nearly so in all its features, with the one just discussed. Tiie

plaintiff, as in the last instance, possesses primary rights, both

legal and equitable, arising from the same subject-matter or

transaction, and is entitled to some equitable relief, reformation,

cancellation, specific performance, and the like, and to legal relief

based upon the assumption that the former relief is awarded ; he

avers all the necessary facts in his pleading, and demands both

the remedies to which he is entitled. The court, instead of

formally conferring the special equitable remedy and then pro-

ceeding to grant the ultimate legal remedy, may treat the former

as though accomplished, and render a simple common-law judg-

ment embracing the final legal relief which was the real object

of the action.^ This proceeding is plainly the same in princi[)le

with the one stated in the foregoing paragraph; but it is a more

complete amalgamation of remedies, a more decided departure

from the notions which prevailed under the former system. By

the omission of the intermediate step, the actual result is reached
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of a legal remedy based upon an equitable primary right or title.

No doubt this omission of the intermediate step is often as

advantageous to the plaintiff as though it had been taken in the

most formal manner; but, on the contrary, it will sometimes

happen that the formal change of his equitable title into a legal

one by a decree of cancellation, or of specific performance or

reformation, will be necessary to secure and protect his rights in

the future. As a matter of safety and prudence, the particular

form of judgment just described should only be used in actions

performauce of an agreement to give a tions wliicli are in direct conflict with tlio

lease. The complaint also alleged a breach letter as well as the spirit of tiic codes,

of a covenant which was to liave been See also Lawe v. Hyde, 39 Wis. 345 ;

contained in the lease, and demanded a Williams v. Lowe, 4 Neb. 382 ; Paxton r.

judgment for the damages arising tliere- Wood, 77 N. C. 11 ; Mattair v. Payne, 15

from as well as for the specific perform- Fla. 682.

ance. Held, that the two could not be [[But see Draper r. Brown (1902), 115

combined; that the plaintiff must first Wis. 361, 91 N. W. 1001, in which the

obtain the lease, and then bring his action Wisconsin court cites the New York cases

for a breach of tlie covenant in it. The of Keubens c Joel, (ioulet v. A.sseler, and

judgment of Dixon C. .J. in Supervisors?-. Gould v. Bank, to sustain it in the distinc-

Becker is an exhaustive discussion of this tion whicli it makes between legal and

§ 19. * 80. Legal Relief only actually Awarded. Illustrations.
The next ca e to be consid r d i the am in prin ipl and
nearly so in all its f atures, with th
ju t 1i u · d. Th
plaintiff, as in the la t in tan , p
· I rirnary ricrht , b th
legal and equitable, ari ing from th sam
ul>j t -matt r or
trnn action, and is entitl d to om equitable r lief, r formati n,
cancellation, specific performance, and the lik , antl to legal r li f
based upon the assumption that the form r r li f i a' ar l d; h
avers all the necessary facts in his pleading, and demands both
the remedies to which he is entitl d. The court, in t a
f
formally conferring the special equitabl remedy and th n r eeeding to grant the ultimate legal rem dy, may tr at th f rm r
as though accomplished, and render a simple common-law judgment embracing the final legal relief which wa the real l>j t
of the action. 1 This proceeding is plainly the sarn in prin ipl
with the one stated in the foregoing paragraph; but it is a mor
complete amalgamation of remedies, a more d cided cl parture
from the notions which prevailed under the former system. By
the omission of the intermediate step, the actual result is r ached
of a legal remedy based upon an equitable primary right or title.
No doubt this omission of the intermediate st p is often a,
advantageous to the plaintiff as though it had been taken in the
most formal manner; but, on the contrary, it will sometimes
happen that the formal change of his equitable title into a legal
one by a decree of cancellation, or of specific performance or
reformation, will be necessary to secure and protect his rights in
the future. As a matter of safety and prudence, the particular
form of judgment just described should only be u eel in acti n

subject, with a review of the leading equitable actions.]

authorities. Although there is much in i Bidwell v. Astor In.s. Co., 16 N. Y.

his opinion that is correct and admirable, 263, 2G7 ; riiillijjs v. Gorham, 17 N. Y.

he reaches, as his main conclusions, posi- 270 ; Caswell v. West, 3 N. Y. Sup. Ct. 3S3.

3

performance of an agreemen t to give a
lease. The complaint also alleged a breach
-0f a covenant which was to have been
-contained in the lease, and demand ed a
judgment fo r the damages a ri sin g- therefrom as well as for t he specific perform.ance. Held, that the two could not be
combined ; that the plaintiff mu. t fir:.;t
obtain the lease, a ntl then bring hi s action
for a breach of the covenant in it. The
judg ment of D ixon C. J. in uperYisors 1·.
D ecker is an exhau ~ tive di cu ion of thi
subj ect, with a review of the leadin g
authoriti es. Although there i mu ch in
his opinion that is correct and admirable,
he reaches, as his main conclu ion , po i-

tions which are in direct conflict with the
letter n.· well as th ·pirit of th
odes.
ee al o Lawe v. Hyd , 39 Wi . 345;
William. 1•. Lowe, 4 LT eb. 3 2 ; ax ton i-.
vVood, 77 N. . 11 ; Mattair v. l ayne, 15
Fla. 68:2 .
[But ee Draper v. Brown (1902), 11 5
Wi -. 36 1, 91 N. W . 1001, in which the
Wiscon in court cit the Kew York ca es
of R euben 1-. Joel , OonJet 1-. A 1 r, and
Gould v. Bank, to . 11 . lain it in the distin c·tion which it make. be ween legal aucl
quitahlc aC"tion .]
1 Ridw II v . . \ tor Ins. Co., 16 N. Y.
263, 267; Phillips v. lorham, 17 N . Y.
270; Caswell v. We t, 3 N. Y . up. t. 3 3.
3
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upon executory contracts where a pecuniary payment exhausts

their efficiency; in actions involving titles to land, the full judg-

ment — embracing the equitable relief as well as the legal remedy

of possession — would generally be far preferable. The rule

permitting such a single legal remedy has been applied in the

following among other instances: in an action upon an insurance

policy which by mistake was so drawn that the plaintiff — the

assured — had no claim for damages, he demanded judgment (1)

reforming the instrument, (2) recovering $7,000 for a loss em-

braced within its terms as thus reformed, and the court ordered

a judgment merely for the amount of the loss as claimed;^ in an

action to recover lands of which the plaintiff had the equitable

title only, the legal title being in the defendant by means of a

deed of conveyance from the plaintiff"'s ancestor, the former

owner, regular on its face, but alleged to have been obtained by

fraudulent representations, instead of directing a cancellation of

this deed and a reconveyance to the plaintiff, the court granted

a judgment for the recovery of possession directly ; ^ in an action

upon a contract for the building of a house according to certain
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specifications, the complaint alleging a mistake in the specifica-

tions as set out in the written instrument, and averring a per-

formance according to the specifications actually agreed on by the

parties, and demanding judgment for the amount due for such

services without praying for any reformation of the contract, the

action in this form was sustained, and it was expressly held that

no prayer for a correction was necessary.^ The rule here stated,

and the decisions which sustain it, are plainly in direct opposition

to the doctrine which originally prevailed in the Missouri courts,

and which still receives the approval of the Wisconsin judges.

§ 20. * 81. Legal Relief A'warded, but Equitable Relief Denied.

Illustrations. Another case, varying in souh^ of its cii'cumstanees

from the two which have been described, and yet depending

upon the same principle, remains to be considered. If the

plaintiff possesses, or supposes liimself to possess, primary rights,

Ijoth legal and equitable, arising from the same subject-matter or

transaction, and avers the necessary facts in his pleading, and

1 Bidwell V. Astor Ins. Co., 16 N. Y. Williams v. Slote, 70 N. Y. 681 ; Whiting

263. See also Cone v. Niagara Fire Ins. v. Root, .52 Iowa, 292.

Co., 60 N. Y. 619, 3 T. & C. 33; Maher 2 phJUips v. (iorham, 17 N.Y. 270.

t'. Ilibeniia Ins. Co., 67 N.Y. 283, 291; « Caswell u. West, 3 N. Y. Sup. Ct. 383.

u on executory contract where a pecuniary payment exhaust"
heir efficienc · in action in 1 ing ti 1 t land the full ju g ment - embracing the equi able relief a w 11 · the legal remed
f
ion - would generall be far pr f rable. The rule
rmitting uch a single 1 gal remedy ha b n applied in the
f 11 win 0 among other in tanc : in an action up n an insurance
licy hi h by mi "take wa so dnt\ n that th plaintiff-the
a ur d - ha l no laim for damag
he d mand d judgment (1)
reformin the in trumen , (2 recov tin $7, 0 0 for a lo
mbraced within it term a thu r fo rmed, and th court order d
a judgm nt mer ly for the amount of th lo .. a claimed; 1 in an
ac ion t recoYer land of which the plaintiff bad the equitabl
title only the legal ti le being in the defendant by mean of a
deed of onveyance from the plaintiff
ance tor, the form r
own r r ular on it face , but alleged to have been obtained b
fraudulent representation , instead of directing a cancellation of
thi dee l and a reconveyance o the plaintiff, the c urt rant d
a judgm nt for the recovery of pos e ion directly; 2 in an ac ion
upon a contract for the building of a hou e according to certain
pecificati ns, the complaint aJleging a mi take in the pecification a set out in the written instrument, ·and averring a erformance according to the pecifications actually agr ed on by the
parti , and demanding judgment for the amount due for such
ser ic without praying for any reformation of the c ntract th
action in tbi form wa u tained, and it was xpre ly h ld that
no pra er f r a correction wa n ece~ ary. 3 Th rule here tat d
and he d ci ion which sustain it, ar plainly in <lir ct oppo ition
to th doctrin which originally prevailed in the Mi ouri comt
n whi h till recei es he appro al of the Wi nsin judge .
20. * 1. L egal Relief Awar d e d , b u t E quitab le R e lie f Denied .
Illustrations.
Anoth r ca
varying in m , fit
fr m the tw
hi h ha e b n d crib ]
u p n th
t
b
1 intiff I ossfl~~sf~s
ri ary rigb
h th 1 gal and quitabl , ari ing fr m th
ubj ct-matter or
tran cti n aud a er
bi pleading, and
I Bidw 11 v.
tor Jn .
., I
. Y.
263. , Pe al.'' 'one i: • • 'iagara Fir~ In .
'o .. fiO • '. Y. GEi, 3 T. & . 33; fah er
1
Jlih rnia Jn-. o., 67 ..: . Y. 2 3, 291 ;

William . lote, 'i
. Y. 6 1; Whiting
v. R ot , 52 Iowa, 292.
2 Phillip v.
orham , 17 . Y. 270.
s a well v. W e t, 3 N.Y. up.Ct.3 3.
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prays for both the remedies corresponding to the two different

rights, but on the trial fails to establisli his e(|uitable cause of

action and his consequent right to the equitable remedy, his

action should not be therefore dismissed ; he should recover the

legal judgment which the legal cause of action demands. ^

Thus, in an action on a policy of insurance, all the necessary

facts being alleged, the complaint demanded a money judgment

on account of a loss, and also that the instrument should be

reformed by reason of an alleged mistake, which reformation, if

made, would increase the sum insured, and enable the plaintiff

to recover a larger amount. On the trial he failed to prove the

averments respecting the mistake, and was not, therefore, en-

titled to any equitable relief. The New York Court of Appeals

held that judgment should have been recovered on the legal

cause of action for the sum which was actually insured, and

1 McNeady v. Hyde, 47 Cal. 481, 483,—

action to recover possession of laud, and

for an injunction; Sternberger v. Mc-
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Govern, 56 N. Y. 12, 21, 15 Abb. Pr.

N. s. 257, 271, — specific performance and

damages.

[^Micliener y. Springfield, etc. Co. (1895),

prays
tl e wo lifT r nt
ri 5 hts, but on th trial fails to
l1is ~(1uitaLl
a.u · f
a tion and his cons quent right t th
qui abl r rn c1 ·, his
acti n should not be ther for di mi
h houlcl re
r the
legal judgment which the legal aus of a ·tion c1 mand: .1
Thus, in an action on a policy of insuranc , all t he ne
ary
facts being all g d, the complaint d ma.nded a mon judgm nt
on account of a l os~, and also that the in trum nt houl 1 b
reformed by reason of an alleged mi ~ak , ' hich r formation, if
made, would increase the sum in ured, and nable the plaintiff
to recover a larger amount. On th trial he failed to prove the
averments respecting the mistake, and was not ther fore, ntitled to any equitable relief. Th New York Court of Appeals
held that judgment should have been r covered on th 1 gal
cause of action for the sum which wa actually in ured, and

142 lud. 130, 40 N. E. 679: "Not only

does the same judge under [our reformed]

system exercise both law and ecjuity pow-

ers, but he exercises botli legal and equita-

ble jurisdiction aud administers both legal

and equitable relief in each case, when

the facts pleaded and proved warrant it.

How, then, can the cause be dismissed

for want of jurisdiction merely because the

plaintiff asks for equitable relief wliile

the facts show that he is entitled to legal

relief? Tiie court being clothed by the

code with power and jurisdiction to ad-

minister botli, or either legal or equitable

relief in the same case, its jurisdiction is

not and cannot be defeated by it appearing

from the facts stated that tlie eijuitable

relief sought cannot be awarded because

such facts show that the only relief the

plaintiff is entitled to is purely legal re-

lief, or vice versa ; nor is the jurisdiction

defeated because the facts stated in the

complaint are not sufficient to entitle the

plaintiff to either legal or equitable relief.

The remedy in such a case is a demurrer

for want of sufficient facts." Latham v.

Harby (1897), 50 S. C. 428, 27 R. E. 862:

Where a complaint filed as a bill in equity

does not entitle plaintiff to equitable re-

lief, but does show a legal cause of action,

it is error to dismiss it. Tlie cause should

be transferred to the law calendar. Mor-

decai i: Seignious (1898), 53 S. C. 95, 30

S. E. 717: When a complaint states a

good cause of action, either at law or in

equity, it should not be dismissed. Simon

V. Sabb (1899), 56 S. C. 38, 33 S. E. 799:

A complaint entitling plaintiff to relief

either on the law or equity side of the court

is not subject to demurrer on the ground

that it does not state facts sufficient to con-

stitute a cause of action. Ferst's Sons v.

Powers (1902), 64 S. C. 221, 41 S. E. 974;

Gillis I'. Hilton & Dodge Co. (1901), 113

Ga 622, 38 S. E. 940 : Where a legal and

an equitable cause of action is alleged, aud

1 McNeady v. H yde, 47 Cal. 481, 483,action to r ecoYer possession of land, and
for an injunction; Stern berger v. MC·
Govern, 56 N. Y. 12, 21, 15 Ahb. Pr.
1' . s. 257, 271,- specific performance and
damages.
[Mich ener v. Sprin gfield, etc. Co. (1895),
l.+2 Ind. 130, 40 N. E. 679: "Not only
cloes the same jud ge un der [onr r eformed)
y tern exercise both law aud equity pow·
ers, but he exercises both legal and eq uitable jnrisdiction and a dministers both legal
anu equitable reli ef iu each case, when
the facts pleaded and proved warrant it.
How, then, can the cause be dismis ed
for want of jurisdiction merely because the
plaintiff asks for equi table reli ef while
the facts sh ow that h e is entitled to legal
relief 'I The court being cloth ed by the
code with p ower and jurisdiction to ad·
m inister both, or either legal or equitabl e
relief in the same case , its juri s<licti on is
not and cann ot be defeated by it appearing
from the fact stated that the eriuitable
reli ef sought cannot be awarded because
such facts show that the onl y relief th
pl aintiff is entitled to is purely J eg~tl reli ef, or vice versa; n or is the juri diction
defeated because the facts tated in the
complaint ar e not sufficient to entitle the
plain tiff to either legal or equ itable relief.
Th e remed y in such a case is a demurrer
for waut of sufficient facts." Latham v.

H arby (1897), 50 S. C. 428, 27 S. E. 862:
Where a complaint filed a:> a uill in equity
doe not entitle plaintiff to equitable reli ef, uut does , how a legal cau. e of action,
it i error to dism i s it. The cau e shou l u
l>e transferred. to the law calendar. Mordecai v. Seigniou. (189 ), 53 . C. 95, 30
S. E. 717: When a c mplaint tates a.
good cause of action, either at law or in
equity, it should not be dismi ed. Simon
v. Sabb (1899), 56 . C. 38, 33 . E. 799 :
A complaint entitling plaintiff to relief
either on the law or equity icle of the c urt
is not subject to de murrer on the ground
that it doe not state fa<'ts sufficient to onstitute a can e of action. Ferst' Son t'.
Power. (1902 ), 64 . C. 221, 41 . E. 974 ;
Gilli v. Hilton & Dodge o. (190 1), 113
Ga 622, 3 , . I!,. 940: Where a legal anu
an equ itable cau$e of action i ~leged, and
ev id ence establi he only the l gal au e
of a ·tion, jc: c!g m nt hou ld be giveu on
that. Alteri-. l3ank of ~tockham (1 9i),
53 Neb. 223, i3 N. W. 66i: "To maintai n
a ci,·il action under our cod . it i not
essential that the action be deuomiuated
either an action at law or in quity, n r
that it he gi\' 11 any particular name. If
the litigaut plead: the fact ' , and they c n, t1 tute a cau~e of action ur def nee, the
court" are bound to award the r elief du ."
i\leyer ''· 'mith (1 99), 59 N b. 30, 80
N. W. 2i3.]
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reversed the ruling below which had dismissed the action.^ As

w whi h ha
in n ac i n b
id th d l f
ur l b - fals an l
hi h

another illustration: in an action by the grantor of land against

the grantee to set aside the deed of conveyance on the ground

that it was procured by false and fraudulent representations,

after setting out all the facts which constituted the transaction,

the complaint prayed for two remedies in the alternative, — (1)

damages for the deceit, (2) cancellation and a reconveyance. A

reconveyance was found to be impossible on the trial, because

di mi
th ac ion. 1 As
th grc n r f land again t
con\' yan e n th ground
frau lul nt repr en ation
con titut l the transacti n

the defendant had conveyed the premises to hona fide purchasers.

A simple legal judgment for the damages caused by the deceit

was granted, and was held to be proper by the general term of

the New York Supreme Court. ^ This rule is now established,

except in the one or two States which retain the distinctions

between legal and equitable actions ; but there are some earlier

dicta, and even decisions opposed to it,^ which, however, must

be considered as overruled.*

§ 21. * 82. Where Equitable Remedy only is demanded and

Legal Remedy only is granted. Doctrine in Missouri and "Wiscon-

sin. In each of the foregoing instances the complaint has suited
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all the necessary facts constituting both grounds for relief, and

has actually demanded both remedies in the prayer for judgment.

Another case presents itself with a change of features. The

averments of fact are the same, but the plaintiff demands only

the special equitable remedy to which he deems himself entitled.

upr me ourt. 2
x pt in the one or two tat
which retain th di tinction
e w en le al and e uitable action ; but th re ar som earlier
dicta an e en deci i ns oppo d to it 3 which how ' r mu t
on ider
o rruled . 4

On tlie trial he fails to prove the alleged grounds for equitable

Remedy

relief, bat does establish a case for the legal relief which was not

only

is demanded and

Doctrine in Missouri and Wiscon-

demanded in the prayer for judgment, although all the necessary

facts, from which the remedial right arose, were averred. It is

he compt int he.

now, after some hesitation, settled that even in this case the

plaintiff is not to be dismissed from court, but should be per-

mitted to recover the legal remedy supported by the allegations

of fact contained in the complaint or petition.^ There are dicta

1 N. V. Ice Co. V. N. W. Ins. Co., 23 even this dirium is not so broad as the

N. Y. 357, 359. head-note.

2 Graves v. Spier, 58 Barb. 349, 383, * See Davis v. Morris, 36 N. Y. 569.

384; and sec Sternberger r. McGovern, 15 ^ QSouth Carolina, etc. R. R. Co. v.

Abb. Pr. N. 8. 257, 271, .56 N. Y. 12. Aujrusta R. R. Co. (1900). Ill Ga. 420,36

* See Penn. Coal Co. v. Del. & Hudson S. E. 593 : A petition mainly in the form

Canal Co., 1 Keyes, 72. The reporter's of an equitable petition is maintainable as

rv
It i.
h

head-note is not sustained by the decision an action at law if it sets forth a letral

of this case. A dictum of Mr. J. Emott, cause of action. 3 Marquat i-. Marquat, 12

at p. 76, is the sole ground for it ; and N. Y. 336 ; Barlow i-. Scott, 24 N. Y. 40,

mi t tl t r
f f, ct ·on t 1in tl in

l

. W . In .

nal (J., I r
hl':ttl-no i ur,
of hi , . A
a p. 76, i th

o., 23

ye .. i2. ThP r port r':
u t: iued !11· he cl<·('i. ion
dirt11m of ~ I r. ,J. F.mott,
ole grouutl for i ; and

ev n thi d irt 11m i
head-note.

not

o broad

th
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in opposition to this rule,^ but they are all overruled oy the

subsequent and more authoritative decisions in the same States.

In Missouri this liberal doctrine lias not been adopted, since, as

has been already seen, the principle of uniting legal and equitable

causes of action and remedies in one suit has been rejected in all

its phases. The moditication of its earlier notions, which the

Supreme Court of that State has made in its latest decisions,

does not necessarily extend to the case under consideration. ^

The Supreme Court of Wisconsin seems, also, to have aban-

doned the position which it originally occupied in reference to

the particular subject in question, and now refuses to award a

legal remedy to a plaintiff who has only demanded equitable

relief.^

§ 22. * 83. Where Allegations and Proof entitle to Equitable

Relief only, but only Legal Relief is prayed for, Equitable Relief ■will

be awarded. Rule in Missouri. The phases and combinations

to which the liberal principle has thus far been applied have

resembled each other in this, that in all of them the plaintiff

was clothed with a double remedial right and both a legal and
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an equitable cause of action; in those which are now to be

examined, the plaintiff claims but one remedial right, and sets

in opp sition to this rul , 1 but th y are c 11 v rr 1 cl y he
subsequent and mor authoritatiYe d ci ion in th sam
tat s.
In Mis ouri this liberal d ctrin ha n t b 1 ad pt <l me as
has been alr ady seen, the principl f unitin 0 1 g 1 and uita le
causes of action and r medi in on ui t ha
en r j ct d in all
its phases. The modifi ation f its arli r n ti n ' hich the
~ upreme
ourt of t hat tat ha made in its lat st d ci . . ions
does not nece sarily ext nd to th
un r
nsi<l rati n. 2
The Supreme Court of 'Viscon in
ems, al o, to have a andoned the position which it originally oc upied in r ference t o
the particular subject in que tion, and now r fu 'e to awar a
legal remedy to a plaintiff who has only demand d equitable
relief. 3
§ 22. * 83. Where Allegat ions a n d Proof ent it le to Equitable
1

up but one cause of action. When the complaint or petition

45; Cuff y. Dorlaucl,55 Barb. 481 ; Graves Henderson v. Dickey, .50 Mo. 161; (fol-

i'. Spier, 58 Barb. .349; Tenney v. State lowed in numerous subsequent cases;

Bank, 20 Wis. 152 ; Foster v. \Vatson, 16 Paildock v. Somes, 102 Mo. 226.)

B. Mon. 377, 387 ; Leonard ;;. Rojian, 20 ^ Horn v. Luddington, 32 Wis. 73. The

Wis. 540 ; White v. Lyons, 42 Cal. 279. complaint alleged moneys advanced and

In Leonard v. Rogan, Dixon C J. said services rendered by plaintiff to defendant

(p. .542): "If the plaintiff demands relief under an oral agreement that the latter

in equity when upon the facts stated he is would convey certain lauds, and demanded

only entitled to a judgment at law, or vice judgment for a specific performance. De-

versa, liis action does not as formerly fail ciding that no case was made out for a

because of the mistake. He may still specific performance, the court also held

Relief only, but only Legal Relief is prayed fo r, Equitable Relief will
be awarded.
Rule in Missouri.
The phases and combinations
to which the liberal principle h as thus far b en ap lied have
resembled each other in thi , that in all of them the plaintiff
was cloth ed wit h a double remedial right and both a legal and
an equitable cause of action; in thm;e which are now to be
examined, the plaintiff claim' Lut one remedial right, and ets
up but one cause of action. When the complaint or petition

have the judgment appropriate to the case that tlic jdaintiff could not recover for the

made by the complaint." See also Hamill moneys advanced and the services ren-

V. Thompson, 3 Colo. 518, 523; Harrall r. dered ; and that in such an equitable ac-

Gray, 10 Neb. 186 ; Herrington v. Robert- tion a legal remedy could not be obtained,

son, 71 N. Y. 280; 7 Hun, 368; Williams relying upon the authority of Kewaunee

r. Slote, 70 N. Y. 601 ; Lewis -v. Soule, Cy. Sup. )'. Decker, 30 Wis. 624, 626. The

52 Iowa, 11; Whiting v. Root, 52 Iowa, conflict between this ruling and that of the

292. same court in Leonard v. Rogan, 20 Wis.

1 See, for example, Mann v. Fairchild, .540, 542, is direct. T make no attempt to

2 Keyes, 106, 111; Heywood i-. Buffalo, reconcile them. See Dickson r. Cole, 34 id.

14 N." Y. 534, .540. 621 , 625 ; Turner r. Pierce. 34 id. 658. 665 ;

2 Myers v. Field, 37 Mo. 434. As to Deery r. McPlintock. 31 id. 195; Wrig-

the extent of the recent modification, see glcsworth r. Wii^rglesworth, 45 id. 255.

45 ; Cuff v. Dorla nd, 55 Ba r b. 48 1 ; Grave. Henderson v. D ickey, 50 Mo. 161 ; (folv. Spier, 58 Ba rb. 349 ; Ten ney v. State lowed in nn mero n
ub equent ca es;
Bank, 20 Wi s. 152; Fo ter v. Watson, 16 Paddock v. Somes, I 02 Mo. 226.)
a Horn v. Luddington, 32 Wi . 73. The
B. Mon. 377 , 387 ; L eonard v. Rogan, 20
Wis. 540 ; White v. L yons, 42 Cal. 279. complaint alleged money advanced and
ervice rendered by plaintiff to defendant
Io Leon ard v. Rogan, Dixon C J. said
( p. 542) : " If the plaintiff demamls relief u nder an oral agr em nt that th latter
in equity wh en upon the facts stated he i- would convey rtain land , and demaud d
only entitled to a judgment at law, or i•ice judgment for a p cific p rformau e. Deversa, his action does riot a formerly fail ciding that no ca wa made out for a
because of t he m istake. He may til l specific performance, the ourt al o h Id
have th e judgment appropriate to the case that the plaintiff could n t r cover for the
ervic
renma de by the co mplain t." See also Hamill mon-y · advanc cl and t,h
v. Th ompson, 3 Colo. 518, 523; Harral1 i-. uerecl ; and that in u h au equitabl acGr ay, 10 Neb. I 86; Her rington i:. Robert- tion a 1 p;al r mecly could not be btained,
r elyin g upon the authority f K waunee
on, 71 N. Y. 280 ; 7 H un, 36 ; William
y. , up . v. D k r, 30 Wi . 624, 626. The
r . lote, 70 N. Y. 601 ; Lewi. 1'. , ulc,
52 Iowa, 11 ; Whiting v. Root, 52 Iowa, confli t b twe n thi ruling and that of the
same c urt in Leonard v.
gan, 2 Wis.
292.
1 See, for exam ple, Mann 1•. Fairchilcl,
540, 542, i. d irect. 1 mak no attempt to
2 Key es, 106, 111 ; H eywood v. Buffal , recon il th m. , e Di k on l'. Col e, 34 id.
621 , 625; Tn rnf'r 1•. Pier e, 34 id . 65 , 665 ;
14 N. Y. 534, 540 .
2 My ers 1•. Field, 37 Mo. 434.
As to Deery 1· . l\ I C'lintoC'k, :n i<I . 195; Wrigthe extent of the recent modification, ee gle. worth i·. Wri;,!'gl . w rth , 45 id. 255.
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alleges a case which entitles the plaintiff to equitable relief, but

no basis for legal relief is stated, and prays a common-law judg-

ment, but no equitable remedy of any kind, if the case as alleged

is proved upon the trial the equitable remedy which is appro-

priate to it should be awarded. Disregarding tlie prayer or

demand of judgment, the court will rely upon the facts alleged

and proved as the basis of its remedial action. This application

of the general principle has been made in a case wliere the

complaint or petition stated facts entitling the plaintiff to an

accounting as against the defendant in respect of a joint under-

taking, but not to a judgment for a sum certain. The prayer,

however, was for the ordinary money judgment. The New York

Court of Appeals held that this action should not have been dis-

missed, but that a judgment for an accounting should have been

granted.^ The rule in Missouri seems to have been settled in an

entirely different sense."

§ 23. * 84. 'Where Allegations entitle to Equitable Relief and

not to Legal Relief, and Equitable Relief alone is asked, and Proof

fails to establish Case Alleged, but does establish Legal Cause of
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Action, Suit must be dismissed. Converse of this Rule. Principle

herein. If, however, the complaint or petition contains a case

entirely for equitable relief, stating no facts upon which a legal

remedial right arises, and prays a judgment awarding the equi-

table relief alone, but on the trial the plaintiff fails to prove the

case as thus alleged, but does establish a legal cause of action

not averred in his pleading, his suit must be dismissed; he

cannot recover the legal remedy appropriate to the facts which

all
ca which entitle th
laintiff t quitable reli £, ut
no
f r le;al relief i tat d and Ir
a c mmon-law judga alleg d
m nt but n quitabl r m 1 ' f any l.,. ind if th
i pr v d upon the trial he quitabl r rued whi h i appropri te to it h uld b award d.
i r garding th pray r r
d mand f judgment th ourt will r ly upon tl facts all g d
and prov d as the ba i of it rem di 1 a tion . Thi· applicati n
f th gen ral principl ha been mad in a ca e wh re th
complaint or petition stat d fact entitling the plain tiff to an
<iccounting a against the defendant in resr ct of a joint und rtaking but n t to a judgment for a um certain. The prayer,
however wa for the ordinary money judgment. The New York
Court of Appeal held that this action hould not ha -.;•e been di mi sed but that a judgment f ran accounting bould ha e b n
granted.1 The rule in Mis ouri seem to have been settled in an
entirely different sen e. 2

§ 23.

* 8±.

W he r e A llegatio n s entitl e

to

E qui table Relief and

not to L egal Relief, a nd E quitable Relief al o n e is as ked, and Proof

he succeeds in proving.^ There is no conflict between this and

fails to establish Case Alleged , b ut d oes e stab lish L egal Caus e of

1 Emery y. Pease, 20 N.Y. 62, 64. See, Aucr, 8 Ilun, 180; Hurlbutt i: N. W.

however, Russell i;. Ford, 2 Cal. 86 ; Biuk- Spaiildiiig Saw Co., 93 Cal. 55, rule stated

ley V. Carlisle, 2 Cal. 420 ; Stone i-. Fouse, in the text followed.

3 Cal. 292; Barnstead y. Empire Miu. Co., - Maguire r. Vice, 20 Mo. 429; Rich-

5 Cal. 299. In all these cases, the court, ardson r. Means, 22 Mo. 495 ; Mevers r.

while lioldini; tl'at the plaintiff could not Field, 37 Mo. 434.

recover a judgment for a certain sum, did ' Bradley '-•. Aldrich,40 X. Y. 504. This

no/ give judgment for au accounting. The case is Important, as it lays down the

question, however, was not raised. Blood proper limitations upon tlie doctrine of

V. Fairbanks, 48 id. 171, 174. See also some prior decisions which I liave cited.

Schilling I'. Rominger, 4 Colo. 100; Ilamill See al.^o Stevens v. The Mayor, etc., 84

f. Thomp.son, 3 id. 518, 523; Harrall v. N. V. 296, 305; Arnold r. Angdl, 62 id.

Gray, 10 Neb. 186; Parker v. Jacobs, 14 .508; People's Bank i-. Mitchell, 73 iil 406,

S. C. 112 ; Smith i;. Bodine. 74 N. Y. 30; 415 ; Bokes /'. Lansing, 74 id. 437 ; Win-

Action, Suit must be dismissed.

Convers e of t h is Rul e .

Principle

If however, the complaint or petition contain a ca e
entirely for equitable relief, stating no facts upon which a legal
remedial right arise , and prays a judgment awarding the equitable relief alone, but on the trial the plaintiff fail to prove the
ca e as thus alleged, but doe establish a 1 gal cau e of acti n
not averred in his pleading, hi
uit must be di mi
l; he
cannot recover the legal remedy appr priate to the fa t which
he ucceeds in proving. 3 There i no conflict betwe n thi and
he r ein.

WiUiams i;. Slote, 70 id. 601 ; Mackey v. termute v. Cooke, 73 id. 107; Smith v.

1 Emery v. P ea e, 20 N. Y. 62, 64. See,
however, Ru ell u. Ford, 2 al. 6; 13u ·kley u. arli le, 2 al. 420 ; tone v. <ou e,
3 al. 292; am tead v. Empire Mio. o. ,
5 al. 299. Iu all the e ca e , the c urt,
while holding that the plaintiff ·ou ld not
recover a ju<lo-ment for a certain um, did
notgivejurlrm ntforaoaccounting. The
que.-tion, howevc•r, wa not rni;-e.l. Blood
. I•airbank., 4 id. lil, 174-. • ·
al o
.'cliilliug t'. H.01runger, 4 C:ol . 100; Hamill
'" Tliomp. on, 3 i1l. 51 , 523; Jiarrall 1.:.
nra' 10 • 'eb. l 6; Parker 1• • .Jacoh , 14
11:!; ,'mith z,i. Bodin . 74 .T. Y. 3 ;
\Villiaui_ "'- .'lote, 70 id. GOl ; llfack y t.'.

Au r, 8 Hun, 180; Hurlbutt •. J. W.
pnulding aw o., 93 Cal. 55, rule ta d
in the t xt followed.

,
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any of the preceding propositions; in fact, the one principle

governs them all. This principle is that the court looks to the

faicts alleged and proved, and not to the prayer for relief.' If

the facts •entitling a party to a remedy, legal or equitable, are

averred and proved, he shall o])tain that remedy, notwithstanding

his omission to ask for it in his demand of judgment; and, if the

facts were not averred, he shall not obtain the remedy, although

he demanded it in the most formal manner. The reform legisla-

tion has not dispensed with the allegations of fact constituting a

cause of action; on the contrary, it has made them, if possible,

more necessary than under the old system. The converse of the

rule above stated is also true. If the plaintiff sets forth a case

entirely for legal relief, and prays a legal judgment alone, and

at the trial fails to prove the averments actually made, he cannot

establish an equitable cause of action not pleaded, and recover

an equitable remedy thereon. ^

§ 24. * 85. May invoke Equitable Right in Aid of Legal Action.

The principle may be applied in still another form or combination
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of circumstances. In a purely legal action, or, to speak more

Bodiiie, 74 id. 30 ; Lawe v. Hyde, 39 Wis.

34.5 ; Meyer v. Dubuque County, 43 Iowa,

592; Schilling v. Rominger, 4 Colo. 100;

Hamill v. Thompson, 3 id. 518, 523. [[See

to the same effect Ander.son v. Chilson

any of the preceding propositions; in fact h
m
gov rn them all. Thi principl i: th< t th
facts alleged and proved and not to th
th fact ntitling a party t a r m 1 ·
are
averred and proved, h hall obtain that r m <ly n twiih tan<ling
his omi ion to a k for it in hi d man l of ju<l 0 m n · an l if th
fa ct were not averred, he hall not obtain th r m dy alLl ough
h e demanded it in the mo 't formal mann r. Tb r f rm 1 gi 'lation ha not dispensed wi th th all O"ati n f fa t c n tituting a
cau e of action ; on the contrary, it ha mad th m if pos ibl
more necessary than under th old y. tern. Th onv r e of the
rule above stated i al o true . If th plaintiff , t forth a case
entirely for legal relief, and prays a 1 gal judgm nt alon and
a t the trial fails to prove th averment · actually mad , h cannot
e tablish an equitable cau e of action not pl a<l cl, ancl r cover
a n equitable remedy thereon. 2

§ 24. * 85.

May i n voke E quitable R igh t in Aid o f L egal A ctio n.

(1895), 8 S. D. 64, 65 N. W. 435, where

the court said : '' When a complaint is

framed for equitable relief, and it appears

The principle may be applied in still another form or combination
of circumstances . I n a purely legal action, or, to p ak more

upon the trial that the pleader is not en-

titled thereto, judgment at law inconsis-

tent with the allegations of the complaint,

for damages upon a breach of contract to

pay a stipulated amount of money, cannot

be entered, and the complaint must be

dismissed."]

1 [[Metropolis Mfg. Co. v. Lynch (1896),

€8 Conn. 459, 36 Atl. 832. But see Steed

V. Savage (1902), 115 Ga. 97, 41 S. E.

272, where it seems to be held that

" whether a petition is based upon an

equitable or a legal cause of action de-

pends upon the character of the relief

sought, as shown by the prayers, which

indicate whether the alleged cause of ac-

tion is intended by the pleader as founded

upon legal or equitable principles ; and

upon general demurrer it will be deter-

mined whether the averments of the peti-

tion are such as to authorize the relief

called for by the prayers. When a peti-

tion contains some averments which are

appropriate to a legal cause of action and

the prayers of the same call for equitable

relief only, the court upon general de-

murrer will decide whether the j)etition as

a whole authorizes the equitable relief

prayed for ; and if it does not, the de-

murrer will be sustained, notwithstanding

there may be averments in the petition

which as against a general demurrer

might constitute a legal cause of action."]

2 Drew V. Person, 22 Wis. 651. This

case resembles Emery v. Pease, 20 N. Y. 62,

and might be confounded with it. The

distinction, however, is plain upon exami-

nation, and at once removes any appear-

ance of conflict. In Emmery v. Pease, the

complaint stated facts showing that the

plaintiff was entitled to an accounting,

B od ine, 74 id. 30; Lawe v. Hyde, 39 W i . called for by the prayer . When a peti·
345; Meyer v. Dubuque County, 43 Iowa, tion contain ome aYerment which are
592; Schilli ng v. Rominger, 4 Colo. 100; appropriate to a legal cau e of action and
H a mill v. T hompson, 3 id. 518, 523. [ See the prayer· of the ame call for equitable
t o the ame effect Ander. on v. Chilson relief only, the court upon general de(1 895), 8 . D . 64, 65 N. W. 435, where murrer will decide whether th petition a
the co urt aid : " ' Vhen a complaint is a whole authorize the quitable relief
fram ed fo r equ itable relief, and it appears prayed fo r ; and if it doe uot, the deupon t he tri al that the pleader i not en- murrer will be su tained, notwith rauding
titled t hereto, judgment at law incon is- there may be a''erment in the petition
tent with the allegation of the complaint, which a again t a general demurrer
for dam ages upon a breach of contract to might constitute a legal cau·e of action."]
2 D rew i•. Ferson, 22 Wi . 651. Thi
pay a stipulated amount of money, cannot
be entered, and the complaint must be case resembles Emery v. Pea. e, 20 . Y. 62,
and might be confound d with it. The
dismi sed."J
di tinction, however, i plain upon e.i.ami1 [Metropolis Mfg. Co. v. Ly nch ( 1896 ),
68 Conn . 459, 36 At!. 832 . But see fiteetl nation, and at once remo,·e any appearv. Savage {1902), 11 5 Ga. 9i , 41 S. E. a.11 ·e of onfli t . In Erner v. ea e, the
272, where it seems to be held that complaiut tated fa ts huwing that the
''whether a petiLion is based upon an plaintiff wa. entitl d to an accounting,
equi table or a legal cause of action de- although it prayed for a moo y judgment.
pends upon the character of the relief Ju Drew i·. :Fer on, the pleading t out
so ug ht, as shown by the prayers, which ·imply a ca. e to recover mou y laid out
in dicate whether the alleged cau e of ac- and expend d; it did not contain auy allet ion is intended by the pleader as founded gation upon which t ba · a judgment for
u pon legal or equitable principle ; and accounting. In the former cas , th rC'upon general dem urrer it will be deter- fore, it wn proper t grant th Pqnitable
mined whether the averment. of the peti- rem edy, and in the latter it was proper
t ion are such as to authorize the relief to di ·mi ·s the uit; there i · no conflict.
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action wh re th

correctly, in an action where the plaintiif sets forth and mainly

relies upon a legal primary right or title, and asks a remedy

which is purely legal, he may still invoke the aid of an equitable

right or title which he holds, or of which he may avail himself, in

order to maintain his contention, and obtain the legal relief which

he seeks. This is a more indirect union of legal and equitable

n nti n, and
a m r in lir t u
of a ti n than exi
ut it i none

rights and causes of action tlian exists in any of the instances

heretofore discussed; but it is none the less such a union, ^

§ 25. *86. Mode of Trial when both Legal and Equitable Causes

of Action are alleged, Ho-wr w^aive Right to Jury Trial. As tO

the mode of trial when the complaint or petition sets forth an

t forth

nd mainly
arm y
aid f an quitable
ma; a ail him lf, in
btain the 1 gal r li f whi h
ion of 1 gal and qui ta 1
m an f the in tan
th 1 s u h a union . 1

equitable and a legal cause of action, there is some diversity in

the practice of the several States.''^ The constitutions protecting

' Sheehan v. Ilamiltou, 2 Keyes, 304 ;

25.

Mode of T rial when both Legal and Equitable Causes

of Action ar e alleged.

How waive Right to Jury Trial.

A

t

3 Abb. Pr. n. s. 197. This was an action

to recover possession of laud. Living-

ston, the original owner, had demi.sed tlie

land to one Tavlor by a perpetual lease,
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reserving a rent-charge with a clause of

the mode f trial wh n the complaint r p titi n
t forth an
quitable an a legal au
f action, th r i
r ity in
2
the practice of th ev ral tate
The con titution protecting

re-entry. L. assi^rned this rent-charge and

all his rights to Dr. Clarke, who died

in 18-16, and the plaintiff is his heir-at-

law. The action is brought to recover

the land on account of failure to pay the

rent. The defence was as follows : Tay-

lor had given a mortgage on the land

whicli had been foreclosed, and the land

was bought by Dr. Clarke in 1831, and

was by him conveyed to one Risley and

from him by mesne conve3"ances to the

defendant. The defendant's contention

was that Dr. Clarke in 1831 being owner

both of the land and of the rent-charge,

the latter merged and was extinguished.

In reply, the plaintiff ])roved that Dr.

Clarke did not intend that the rent-charge

should merge, but that it should be kept

alive. The General Term of the Supreme

Court held that this doctrine of non-

merger was purely equitable, and could

not be invoked by the plaintiff in this

legal action, and that the plaintiff should

have first established the rent-charge in

an e(|uitabh' action, and then brought this

action of ejectment. The Court of Ap-

peals reversed this decision, and laid

down the doctrine of the text. See, al.'JO,

Arthur r. Homestead Ins. Co., 78 N. Y.

462, 467. [Home Ins. Co. v. Railroad

Co. (1893), I'J Colo. 4G, 34 Pac. 281.]

2 ^United Coal Co. t". Canon City Coal

Co. (1897), 24 Colo. 116, 48 Pac.'lO-l5:

" The question whether an issue of fact

can be tried by a jury or by the court is

not to be determined from the nature of

the issue, but from the character of the

4 ,2, 4

action in which such issue is joined."

Kuhl r. Pierce County (1895), 44 Neb.

584, 62 N. W. 1066;" Angus v. Craven

(1901), 132 Cal. 691, 64 Pac. 1091: Per

Henshaw J. (concurring). " Under onr

system, equitable and legal rights are

determined in the same forum. It is

within the discretion of the court to con-

trol the order of proof upon the issues

joined. In the natural order, before de-

fendant was entitled to a hearing upon the

legal issues tendered, she nmst defeat

o. {I

UNION OF LEGAL AND EQUITABLE KKMEDIES. 41

UNION OF LEGAL AND EQ !TABLE RE)IE IES.

41

the jury trial in common-law cases in which it had been custom-

arily used, the defendant may, of course, insist that the legal

issues shall be passed upon by a jury. He may waive this right

by a stipulation in writing, by an oral stipulation made in open

court, by failing to appear on the trial, and perhaps by permitting

the trial to be actually entered upon without objection. If tlie

litigant parties, or either of them, assert their rights as thus

stated, it is settled in New York that the legal issues must be

tried at a circuit court, or at a trial term of the court in which

the action is pending; ^ and it seems that all the issues, legal and

equitable, must thereupon be tried together in the same manner,

for it is said that "no provision is made for two trials of the

issues joined in the same action." If a cause is brought on to

trial before the court sitting without a jury — in New York, the

special term — as an equity cause, and the trial is commenced

under that supposition, the defendant not waiving his right by

acquiescence, and the court, in the course of the investigation,

discovers that it involves separate legal issues, the complaint

should not be dismissed on that account; the trial should be
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suspended, and the case sent to the Circuit or other court pos-

sessing a jury. 2 The same rule prevails generally in other

defendant answered by a cross complaint out recourse to a court of equity. But

in the nature of ejectment. See also where defendant lias performed liis part

Hidgeway y. Herbert (1899), 150 Mo. 606, of the contract of release pleaded, and

51 S. W. 1040, quoted at length in note interposed it as a bar to the action, and

2, p. 47, and other cases cited in the plaintiffs admit its execution, knowing

same note. Thomas i\ Wallver (1902), at the time thereof its legal effect, they

115 Ga. 11,41 S. E. 269: "It has always cannot escape the legal bar created tliereby.

been the practice, especially since the To get rid of such an instrument resort

passage of tlie procedure act of 1887, must be had to a court of equity. Han-

when both legal and equitable rights are cock v. Blackwell (1897). 1.'39 Mo. 440,41

the jury trial in common-law ca
in whi h it h L n u marily use 1, th l f ndant may,
m
in ·i ·t that 11
1
issue shall be pa ed upon b a jur ·. II m<I ' a1v thi · right
by a tipulation in wrifa1g Ly an oral tipula ion ma. l m p n
court, by failing t app ar on th trial, and I rh I
rmitLing
the trial to be actually nt r d up n withou Lj ion. If he
litigant partie , or ith r of th m, a'· rt th ir ri ht a thu
stated, it i settled in New York hat th 1 <Yal . u · mu t be
tried at a circuit court, or at a trial term of
urt in whi h
1
the action is pending; and it , eem that all th i
, 1 gal and
equitable, must thereupon be tried tog th r in th am mann r,
for it is said that ' no provi ion is mad for two trial of h
issues joined in the same action." If a cau i br ught n to
trial before the court itting without a jury - in N w York, the
special term - as an equity cause, and the trial i comm need
unde:r that supposition, the defendant not waiving hi right by
acquiescence, and the court, in the course of the inv igation,
discovers that it involves separate legal i ue , the omplaint
should not be dismissed on that account; the trial hould be
suspended, and the case sent to the Circuit or other ourt po sessing a jury. 2
The same rule prevails gen rally in other

united in one petition, for tlie court to S. W. 205 : Defendant was charged with

apply legal principles to the legal rights having uttered slanderous words res])ect-

and equitable principles to the equitable iiig plaintiff. For a valuable considera-

rights." Ford v. Holloway (1900), 112 tion plaintiff executed to defendant her

Ga. 851, 38 S. E. 373.] release in full satisfaction of all claims

1 Davis w. Morris, 36 N. Y. 569; Peojjle against defendant. Subsequently the con-

V. Albany, etc. R. Co., 57 N. Y. 161, 174. sideration was tendered back and the

2 [^Hahl ('. Sugo (1901), 169 N. Y. 109, jire.<cnt action was brought for the same

62 N. E. 135. Homuth v. Metropolitan slander, and defendant pleaded the release

St. Ry. Co (1895), 129 Mo. 629, 31 S. W. in bar. Plaintiff replied alleging fraud in

903 : It is the general rule in this State procuring the release. Held that the re-

and elsewhere that the issues raised by a lease must first lie set aside by an action

reply impeaching the integrity of a re- in e(]uity or jtlaintiff must a:ld a count to

lease pleaded by way of answer in an her petition to have the release set aside,

action at law, may be tried at law with- Parker v. Beasley (1895), 116 N. C. 1, 21

defendant an swered by a cross complai nt
in the nature of ejectmeut. See a1so
Ridgeway v. Herbert (1899), 150 Mo. 606,
51 S. W. I 040, quoted at length in note
2, p. 47, and other cases cited in the
. ame note. Thomas v. Walker ( 1902),
115 Ga. 11 , 41 S. E . 269: " It ha alway
been the practi ce, especially since the
pas age of th e proced ure act of I 7,
when both legal and equitabl e right are
united in on e petition, for the court to
apply legal principl es to th e legal right
and equitable prin ciples to th e quitable
right ." Ford v. Holloway ( 1900), 112
Ga. 851, 38 S. E. 373.J
I Davis v. M orri s, 36 N. Y. 569; People
v. Alban y, etc. R. Co., 57 . Y. 161, 174.
2 [Hahl v.
ugo (1 901), 169 . Y . 109,
62 N. E. 135. Homu t h v. Metropolitau
t. Ry. Co (1 95), 129 l\fo. 629, 31 S. \V .
90.'3: It is the gener al rule in this tate
and elsewher e th at the i sue rai ed by a
rerly impeaching the integrity of a r lease pleaded by way of an wer in an
action at law, may be tried at law with-

out recour e to a co urt of eq ui ty . But
where defendant ha performed hi part
of the contract of r lea
pl ad d, and
iuterpo ed it a a bar to the action and
plaintiffs admit it execution, knowing
at th tim th reof it.' legal effect, th y
cannot e~cap the Jecral bar created the r by.
T o get rid of uch an iu ·trument r ort
mu t be had to a court of equity. llanc k v. Blackwell (1 91). 139 l\10. 44, -ll
205 : D fendant wa · charg tl "'ith
having utt r d . laud r ou w nl r p cting plaintiff. F r a Yaluabl COll.i<lerati on jJlaiutiff x ut d to d f udaut h r
r 1 a e in full ati fa •tion of all laim
agai n t d I nclallt. ~ub. qu ntly th oni<leration \\a: tendered ba ·k and the
pres nt action wa: brouo·ht for the . ame
. land er, and defendant pl ad cl th r leat"e
ill liar. Plaintiff r pli cl all ging fraud in
pr ('Uring th r 1 a e. Il eld that th r le>a m n. t first ],
t a ide hy ~n act ion

,."r·

42 CIVIL REMEDIES.

States. A mistake in bringing on the cause for trial is to be

corrected by simply sending it to the proper court or placing it

upon tlie proper docket.^ In some of the States provision is

made for the trial of the issues separately and at different times.

The equitable issues may be tried first and the legal issues after-

wards, or the order may be reversed as the nature of the case and

the relations of the issues seem to require.^

SECTION THIRD.

EQUITABLE DEFENCES TO ACTIONS BROUGHT TO ENFORCE LEGAL

RIGHTS AND TO OBTAIN LEGAL REMEDIES.

S 26. * 87. Former System. Illustration. Criticism. Subject

Matter of Section Third. Another practical effect of removing the

distinction between actions at law and suits in equity is shown in

the emplo\inent of equitable defences to actions bi-ought to en-

force legal rights and to obtain legal remedies. The ancient

system knew of no such union, and a thorough-paced lawyer

of the old school would have deemed it incestuous. Legal

rights set up by the plaintiff must be met in the same action

by legal rights set up by the defendant. If the defendant,
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when prosecuted in an action at law, had an equity which, if

S. E. 9.5.5 : " The moment either party by ^ Massie v. Stradford, 17 Ohio St. .596 ;

his pleadings sets out and asks equitable Petty v. Malier, 15 B. Mon. 591, 604;

relief, the court of equity acquires juris- Smith i'. Moberly, 15 B. Mon. 70, 7-3 ; Ben-

diction, cleaM the deck, and adjusts all nett v. Titherington, 6 Bush, 192. Sec

equities between the parties."] Guernsey v. Am. Ins. Co., 17 Minn. 104,

^ I^banon Trs. r. t'orrest, 15 B. Mon. 108; Harrison i\ Juneau Bank, 17 Wis.

168; Foster >: Watson, 16 B. Mon. .377, 340; Du Pont r. Davis, .35 Wis. 631, 639 ;

387 ; Sale v. Crutchfield, 8 Bush, 636, 644. and see Richmond r. Dubuque, etc. R.

If an action is wrongly transferred to the Co., 33 Iowa, 422, 489-491. [|See p. 6,

equity docket when no valid equitable note 1.] On the mode of trial, .see also

issues are presented by the pleadings, McPherson v. Featherstoiie, 37 Wis. 632

this is error which requires a new trial, (equitalde issue may be tried by the court

Creager i'. Walker, 7 Bush, 1, 3. QCarder "J^i'r the legal i.ssue is determined in favor

V. Weisenburgh (1893), 95 Ky. 135, 23 of the plaintiff by the jury) ; Lewis r.

S. W. 964: "If the equitalde right de- Sonic, 52 Iowa, 11; Davison r. Associates

pends upon the decision of legal issues, of the Jersey Co., 71 N. Y. 333 ; Wheelock

concerning which the party is entitled to a r. Lee, 74 id. 495, 500, and cases cited ;

jury trial, the case, on motion, should be Hughes v. Dunlap. 91 Cal 385 ; Donahue

tran.sferred as matter of right to the com- v. Meister, 88 Cal. 121; Downing i: Le

mon law docket to be tried by jury." Du, 82 C,a.l. 471. An equitalde defence

Where an equitable defence is interposed, set up does not change the nature of the

the cau.se is transferreil to the ecpiity action. Wisner v. Ocumpaugh, 71 N. Y.

docket: Peel v. January, 35 Ark. 331; 113,117.

Sandel & Hill Dig. § 5804.3
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NATURE OF EQUITABLE DEFENCES. 43

43

worked out, would defeat the recovery, his only mode ot redress

was to commence an independent suit in chancery by which he

might enforce his equitable right, and in the mean time en-

join his adversary from the furtlier prosecution of the action

at law. A single familiar example Avill illustrate the situation.

A. has entered into a contract with B. to convey to the latter a

farm on payment of the price, and lets him into possession. The

price is paid in full, 'so that the vendee is fully entitled to liis

deed. A., in this position of affairs, commences an action of

ejectment to recover possession of the land. By tiie common-law

system B. would have no defence whatever to that action ; tiie

legal title is in the plaintiff, and his own title and right to a deed,

being equitable, were not recognized by courts of law as any

defence. Of course a municipal law which did not furnish some

means of enforcing B.'s right and defeating A.'s action would be

incomplete, and unfitted for a civilized people. The common law

provided a means, but it was cumbrous, dilatory, and expensive.

B. commences a suit in the Court of Chancery, sets forth the

agreement to convey and all the other facts from which his
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equitable title arises, alleges the pending ejectment brought by

the vendor, and prays for the proper relief. It is important to

notice the extent and nature of this relief, because it throws

light upon questions which now arise concerning the doctrine

of equitable defences. The vendee might content liimself witli

asking and obtaining an injunction which would stay the pend-

ing ejectment, and leave him in possession undisturbed by

that action, but would plainly not be a perfect and lasting pro-

tection in the future. To end the matter and to secure himself

absolutely, he must ask and obtain the affirmative remed}' of a

specific performance and a conveyance from A. to himself. This

being done, he is armed with the legal title, and can defend any

legal action brought against him by the vendor or his heirs or

grantees. Nothing could be devised more cumbrous than this

double litigation to enforce one right and to end one controversy.'

1 [[South Portland Land Co. i'. Munger equity. Each action, that at law and that

(1900), 36 Ore. 457, 60 Pac. 5 : In an in ecjuity, was a distinct proceeding l)c-

actiou of ejectment defendant filed a cross- longing to a different . forum, and th(>

bill in equity, and it was held that plain- jirupcr practice w.as to try out the action

tiff was entitled to have the bill stricken at law and tlien institute a se])arate suit

out on motion, since the action at law in wjuity to obtain the relief sought in the

should be tried out before the cross suit in cross-bill.]

worked out, would d f at th r · v ry hi: onl • m cl 01 r <lr ·s!-1
wa o commence an ind I nd nt ·uit in ha.1H; ry hy wlii ·lt Ji·
m ight nforce hi· equitabl ricrht, aml in th • m ·a11 t.im • ·11join his adver ar,v from th furtli r pr ,· ·u tion of the a Lion
at law. A ingle familiar xampl will illu: rat th si u. tic n.
nv y to th latt "r a.
A . ha' enter ed into a contra t with B. t
far m n payment of the pri · , and 1 t him int p
Tb
price is pail in full, ·so that the v n l e i full
Iii
deed. A ., in this positjon of affairs, commcn · an acti n )f
ejec tmen t t o recover po s s ,j n of th land. By th c mm n-law
y tern B. would hav no d £ n e whatev r to that a ti n; th
legal tit le i8 in the plaintiff, ancl hi wn title an l ri ht
a c1 d,
being equitable, were not r c 0 niz d by c tuts of law a · any
d fence . Of course a muni ipal law which dicl not furni h some
mean of enforcing B .' · right and defeating A .'8 aetion 'vould b
incomplete, and unfitted for a civilized p opl . The ommon law
provided a means, but it wa · cumbrous, dilatory, and xpen . . iv .
B . commences a suit in the Court of Chane ry,
t · forth the
agreement to convey and all the other fact from which hi:-3
equitable title arises, allege the pending ejectm nt bron 0 ht by
t he v ndor, and prays for the proper relief. It i important to
n otice the extent and ·nature of this relief, becau ·e i throw
light upon questions whieh now ari
nc ming the cl trin
of equitable defences. The ven lee might cont nt him elf wi h
a k ing and obtaining an injunction which would . tay t.he l nding ejectment, and leav him in po e · ·ion umli turb d by
that action, but would plainly not be a p rfect and la ting prohim 1£
t ection in the future. To end th matter and t
absolutely, he must ask and obtain the affirmativ r m dy f a
specific performance and a conv yance from A. to him 1£. Thi.
being don e, he is armed with th l gal titl , and an ef nd any
legal action brought again t him by the v nclor r hi h ir · or
<Yrantees . Nothing could b clevi ed mor
umbr u than this
d ouble litigation to enforce one right an<l to nd n contr
1

[ South Portland Land Co. v. Munger

( 1900), 36 Ore. 457, 60 Pac. 5: In au
action of cjectment defendant filerl a cro. s-

bill in qni ty, and it wa held that plaint iff wa entitled to have the bill . trick n
out ou motion, since the acti on at law
should be tried out before the cro suit in

quity. Ea h a tion, that at law and that
in quity , wa a <li tin ·t pr ce di11g Ii lon,g ino- to a d iff r nt fornm, aud tlw
proper pract ice W:l'> to t ry out th acti on
at law and th en in tit ut a eparat su it
in equity to obtain th reli I ·ought iu tbe
cros -bill.]
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NothinfT could be more simple, natural, and necessarj' than the

l in

reforni which permits the equitable right to be pleaded and

proved in the action at law ; and yet, when the change was made

ull b
hi h

l'

by the legislature, experienced and learned lawyers and judges

denounced it, and strove to render it merely nominal. Even at

the present day, and in States Avhere the liberal doctrine has been

accepted and has received the sanction of the highest tribunals,

individual members of the bench wdll occasionally raise their

voices in strenuous opposition ; and in one or two of the States

n

an interpretation has been placed upon the statute which confines

its beneficial operation within the narrowest limits. The subject-

matter of the present section naturally separates itself into three

divisions, and the discussion will follow that order : (1) What is

an equitable defence? (2) When may an equitable defence be

interposed in an action purely legal, which will include the

joinder of equitable and legal defences in the same suit? and

(3) When can affirmative relief against the plaintiff be granted

to the defendant upon the equitable defence which he sets up ?

§ 27. * 88, Meaning of the Terms " Equitable " and '' Defence."
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Restriction Imposed by some Courts herein. What is an equitable

defence? It is to be observed that this term contains two distinct

words, and that the separate meaning of each is essential to the

complete and accurate conception of the whole, — " equitable "

and " defence." Equitable is used in its technical sense as con-

trasted with legal ; that is, the right which gives it its efficacy is

an equitable right, — a right formerly recognized and enforced

in lividual m rub r
b nch will o a i nally rai
ice in tr nu u oppo ition; and in ne or two of h
in rpretation ha b n la
up n the statute which c nfines
it hen ficial operation within the na1rowe t limi . The ubj .ctmatter of th present e tion na urall eparate it elf int hree
divi ion and the di cu sion will f 11 w that order: 1) What i
an
uitable defence? (2) \Vhen ma an equitable cl f nee be
interp eel in an action pur 1 1 gal
bi h will in lu
the
j in r f equitable and 1 gal d fen e in the . ame ui ? and
(3) Wh n can affirmative relief again t he plaintiff be grant
th d f ndant upon the quitable d f n e which he t up?

only in courts of equity, and not in courts of law. The notion

involved in the word " defence " is, however, the most important

to observe. In its judicial signification, a defence is sometliing

which simply prevents or defeats the recovery of a remedy in an

action or suit, and not something by means of which the party

27. *
Restriction Imposed by some Courts herein.

f nee.

who interposes it can obtain relief for himself. If the codes had

It i t be ob rv cl that this t rm ontai
of , h i

merely in express language authorized the defendant to set up

equitable defences, but had not enacted any further provisions in

reference to the subject-matter, the granting of affirmative equi-

table remedies to the defendant could not have been inferred

from such permission. A "defence" is essentially negative, and

not afllirmative. The facts from which the defensive right arises,

may [)erhaps, in a proper occasion and when employed for that

pur{)Ose, be made the basis of aifinnative relief; but, when so

111a. '

l

1 u rp<J .

·1 l1ap.

,

l • macl

Defence."
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employed, they would not be a defence. In sliort, a defence is

not to be conceived of as the means of acquiring positive relief

or any remedy, legal or equitable. When, therefore, the statute

permits an equitable defence to be interposed in a legal action, it

merely contemplates the fact that the equitable right averred

shall prevent the plaintiff from recovering the legal remedy he is

pursuing by his action. If to this negative effect is added the

privilege of obtaining an affirmative judgment against the

plaintiff, based upon the same equitable right, the latter so far

ceases to be a "defence," and becomes in turn a cause of action.

The action itself thus assumes a double aspect; each litigant

party in this respect becomes an actor, and each a defendant.

This analysis may appear to be, and certainly is, elementary and

familiar ; but it is needed to clear up some confusion and dif-

ficulties into which certain courts have fallen in reference to the

subject under consideration. Tliese courts, as will be seen in the

sequel, would restrict the operation of the reform to those cases

in which the defendant asks and obtains some specific aifirmative

equitable relief against the plaintiff ; in other words, to those
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cases in which the equitable right relied upon by the defendant

is not used as a defence at all^ but is averred as a true cause of

action. This construction is, as it seems to me, a palpable error,

and it deprives the legislative provision of half its efficacy.

§ 28. * 90. Meaning of Equitable Defence. Definition by Ne-vr

York Court of Appeals. A defence is a right possessed by the

defendant, arising from the facts alleged in his pleadings A\hich

defeats the plaintiff's claim for the remedy which he demands by

his action. An equitable defence is such a right wliich was

originally recognized by courts of equity alone. A concise and

accurate definition was given by one of the members of the New

York Court of Appeals in an early case. " Under the head of

equitable defences are included all matters which would before

have authorized an application to the Court of Chancery for

relief against a legal liability, but which at law could not be

pleaded at bar. The facts alleged by way of defence in this action

would have been good cause for relief against the judgment in a

court of chancery, and under our present system are, therefore,

proper matters of defence.'* ^ Another judge said in the same

1 Dobson V. Pearce, 12 N. Y. 15('), 166, IIuii, 437 ; Wisiier r. Ocuinpaugh, 71 N. Y.

per Allen J. See Webster v. Bond, 9 113, 117; Wa Cliuug v. Constautiue, I

employed, they would n t b n. lef r
In h r
not to be conceived of a th mean · f a
or any remedy, legal or e uitabl . Wh n
permit an equitable d fenc t b int r·
m rely contemplate the fact that th
quit bl ri ht av rr, l
'hall prevent the plaintiff fr m r v ring th 1 o-, l r m d h i:
pursuing by his a tion. If to thi n gati
ff ·t i.· added th
privilege of obtaining an affirmative judgm nt a ai
plaintiff, based upon the ame equitable right, th latt r
far
ceases to be a "defence," and becomes in turn a
£ a ti n.
The action itself thu a sume a double a::;p
ach litigant
party in this respect becomes an actor and a h a <l f ndant.
This analysis may appear to be, and certainly i , 1 m ntary and
familiar; but it is needed to clear up ome confu i n and difficulties into which certain courts have fallen in ref r n to the
subject under consideration. The ·e ourt , a ' will b
n in the
·equel, would restrict the operation of the ref rm to th
a s
in which the defendant asks and obtains some specific affirmative
equitable relief against the plaintiff; in other word , to tho .. e
<;ases in which the eq uit.able right relied upon by the d fendant
is not used as a defence at all, but i averred a a true cau e of
.action. This construction i , as it seems to me, a pal1 able error,
.and it deprives the legislative provision of half it efficacy.
§ 28. * 90. Meaning of Equitable Defence. Definition by New
York Court of Appeals. A defence is a right I o.
d by he
defendant, arising from the facts alleg cl in his pl ading which
defeats the plaintiff's claim for the remedy whi h he d mand~ by
11is action. An equitable defence is such a right which wa ·
· originally recognized by court· of equity alone. A ·on i e and
.accurate definition was given by one of the m mber f th
ew
York Court of Appeals in an early case. " nd r th head of
Bquita.ble defences are included all matter which would b .fore
have ~uthoriz ed an application to the ourt f
relief against a legal liability, hut which at Jaw
pleaded at bar. The facts alleg d h way of l f nc in thi a tion
would have been good cause for r lief again t th jnd0 m n in c
court of chancery, and under our pre n t y t m ar
h r f r ,
proper matters of defence." 1 A11oth r judge aid in th "amc
1 Dobson v. Pearce, 12 N. Y. 156, 166,
:per Allen J. See W ebster i« Bonu, 9

Ilun,43i; Wi nerr.
umpaugh , 71 N. Y.
113, 117 ; \\'a
iluug v. ou tantine, l
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~\_n

case : " An equitable defence to a civil action is now as available

as a legal defence. The question now is, Ought the plaintiff

to recover? and anything which shows that he ought not is

available to the defendant, whether it was formerly of equitable

<1

a

.quitable d f
Th

cl f n

t

or of legal cognizance."' ^ I nee^ not pursue this analysis fur-

ther ; the instances in which equitable defences have been sus-

tained, as given in the cases hereafter cited, will explain and

ha.Y
U will xplain nml
1 arl th n an ab tract d fmiti n r

illustrate their nature more clearly than any abstract definition or

description.

§ 29. * 91. Cases holding that Facts entitling to Equitable Re-

lief against Legal Cause of Action can be interposed only upon the

Condition that AfiBrmative Relief is demanded. Criticism. Express

as is the language of the statutes, and well established as is the

juridical nature of " defence '' in general, the doctrine has been

ripti n.
91.

29.

Cases holding that Facts entitling to Equitable Re-

strenuously maintained, and is supported by the decisions of

respectable courts, that a defendant cannot avail himself, as a

defence, of facts entitling him to equitable relief against the

plaintiff's legal cause of action, unless he does it by demanding

and obtaining that specific remedy which, when granted, destroys
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the cause of action ; in other words, he cannot invoke the right

as long as he treats it and relies upon it as a defence. If he does

not institute a separate action based upon his equitable right, and

recover the specific relief therein, and restrain the pending action

at law, he must, at least, in the answer pleaded to that action at

law, affirmatively demand the equitable remedy, and this remedy

must be conferred upon him. If he simply avers the facts as a

negative defence, he will not be j)ermitted to rely upon them and

to defeat the plaintiff's recovery by that means. Certain of the

cases which announce this doctrine, will be found in the foot-

note.^ The error of this doctrine has already been demonstrated.

Idaho, 266; rennover c. Allen, 51 Wis. - Follett !•. Heath, 15 Wis. GOl ; Conger

360; 50 Wis. 308;" Holland v. Johnson, r. Parker, 29 Ind. 380; Hicks v. Shep-

51 Ind. 346. As to whether an equitable pard, 4 Lans. 335, 337 ; Cramer r. Ben-

defence must or only mm/ he .set up, see ton, 60 Barb. 216. See also Keuyou i'.

Erie II. Co. r. Uamsay, 45 N. Y. 637, per Quinn.41 Cal. 325 ; Lombard/;. Cowham,

FolgerJ. ; Giles i>. Austin, 62 id. 486 (such 34 Wis. 486, 492; Dewey ;-. Hoag, 15

defence need not be set up when tiie de- Barb. 365; Cadiz r. Majors, 33 Cal. 288;

fondant's ripht is not absolute, and when Clark >: Lockwood, 21 Cal. 220; Bruck y.

it rests in the discretion of the court to Tucker, 42 Cal. 352 ; Miller v. Fulton, 47

grant the relief or not) ; Ricker v. Pratt, Cal. 146. Kent v. Agard, 24 Wis. 378,

48 Ind. 73. does not conflict with this doctrine. See

' Dubson ?'. Pcarce, 12 N. Y. 150, 168, Du Pont v. Davis, 35 Wis. 634, 639; Hills

per Johnson J. v. Sherwood, 48 Cal. 386, 392 ; McClane v.

lief against Legal Ca use o f Action can be i nterposed only u pon the
Conditio n that A ffirmative R e lie f is d e mand e d.

Crit icism.

_~

xpr , _

a ' i , th lano-ua e f th ta u e and w 11
abli h l a. i.' the
juri li al nature f defence' in g n ral th doctrin ha b n
' tr nu u 'ly maintained and i
upp rt d by th d i · 1 n
f
le our , hat a tl f nd, n t cann t avail him lf, a a
of fact ent itling him t
quita bl r li f a ·, in t th
lain iff legal cau e f action, unl s h e d e it by l m, nclin 0
and btaining that 'pecific r m dy which, wh n gran t cl tl ·tr . '
t h cau e of action ; in oth er word , h annot invoke th ri 0 h
a · long as he treat it and re lie upon it a a d J ene . If h cl
n t in titut a parate action ba d upon hi quitabl right an
r v r t he pecific relief th rein, an l restrain l p ndin a ti n
at law, h mu t at 1 a in the an wer pl ad d to that a i n
la1w affirma iv ly demand the quitabl r m d an l hi r m dy
mu t be conf rr cl upon him. If h im ly a er h fa t a a
• tiv cl fenc he will n t be p rmi t c1
r 1 upon th m , nd
ef at h 1 laintiff r covery by h t mean .
ertain f he
hi loctrin 'i ill b f und in th f t1 ctrine ha alr ad b n d m n trated.
I1lah o, 266 ; P enn y r v. All n , 51 Wi
:3Go ; 50 \V i . 30 ; H olland v. J ohu on,
:ii Ind. 34 6.
to whethe r a n qui tab l
rlefe ru·p must or ouly 11w11 he . t u p, s:e e
E rin I
o. ,. ){am a~, 45 •. Y . 6:37, p r
F0l •1•r .J. ; c;iJe· 1·. ,\u . Lin , 2 itl 4 ~ 6 (. urh
def nc · 11 ·•·rl 1111 h .:<• up wh e n th cl f 111l1111L' ri.,ht i: not ab. olu t , autl wh 11
i r
iu thr- di. er ·Lion o f th e court t o
i.;r111t thr• rr·li f 01 uot); li ck r t'. P ratt,
[ II(}. ; .1.
1
I >oh 011 ?•. l'carc , 12 ~ . Y . 15 , 16 ,

p · r .Jvl111

11u

,J.
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A defence is a negative resistance, an obstacle, a something which

prevents a recovery, whether it be equitable or legal. If every

equitable defence, in order to be available, must consist in an

affirmative recovery of specific relief against the plaintiff, or at'

least in the right to recover such relief if the defendant choose

to enforce it, for exactly the same reasons, and with exactly the

same force, it might be said that every legal defence, in order

to be available, must consist of an off-set or counter-claim. In

fact, the codes, without exception recognize the correctness of

the rule stated in the text. The sections which prescribe the

form and contents of the answer enumerate " defences," legal and

equitable, and counter-claims. A recovery of equitable relief by

defendant is as truly a counter-claim as the recovery of pecuniary

damages ; ^ and the statute thus expressly distinguishes between

equitable defences as such and the recoveries of affirmative equi-

table relief. The cases which will be referred to in subsequent

paragraphs show that the overwhelming weight of authority sus-

tains the doctrine which I have stated as the correct construction

of the codes.
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§ 30. * 92. Correct Construction. Limitation upon the Interposi-

tion of Equitable Defences to Legal Causes of Action. 1 now pasS

to the consideration of the cases in which equitable defences have

been admitted. ^ It will be impossible to state any exhaustive

White, 5 Minn. 178, 190. See Webster in the same forum, a party who is brought

V. Eoud, 9 Hun, 437 ; Ten Broeck v. into court to respond to a promise con-

Orchard, 74 N. C. 409 ; Quebec Bank v. tained in a note may defend successfully

Weyand, 30 Ohio St. 126 ; Hatcher v. by showing that its consideration has

Briggs, 6 Ore. 31; Fennoyer v. Allen, failed because of facts creating the equita-

51 Wis. 360; 50 id. 308; Lawe i'. Hyde, ble barrier to its enforcement just stated."

39 id. 345 ; Henkle v. Margerum, 50 Ind. The liarrier stated was misrepresentation.

240; Winslow v. Winslow, 52 id. 8; Wendover n. Baker (1893), 121 Mo. 273,

Thompson I'. Fall, 64 id. 382; Kentfield 25 S. W. 918: An answer setting up e(|ui-

V. Hayes, 57 Cal. 409 ; Scott v. Norris table defences and praying for affirmative

A defenr·e i, a negative r i tan
m
prevent a r ov ry, wh ther it b
quitabl cl f nc , in or<l r t b
affirmativ r cov ry of p cifi
1 a t in t he right to r cov r u
t nforce it, for exactly the . am
am force, it might be aid that
,m r
to b available, must con i t of an
r ount r- laim.
fac t, the code , without xc ption r cogniz th
tn R
the rule stateJ in the text. The c tion which I r 8 rib th
form and contents of the an w r numerat 'cl f n :, '1 gal and
equitabl , and counter-claims. A r covery of quitabl reli f l> •
lefendant is as truly a count r-claim a th r covery £ pecuniary
damages ; 1 and the statute thus expr ly di tingui h b tw n
quitable defe n ces as such and the r coveri of affirmatiY
uitable relief. The ca es which will b ref rred to in ub equent
paragraphs show that the overwhelming w ight of auth rit u tain the doctrine which I have stated as the corre t construction
of the codes.
§ 30. * 92. Correct Constructio n. L i mitation upon the I n terpos ition of E quitable Defences t o Lega l Caus es of Action. I now pa
to the consideration of the cases in which equitable d f n e hav
been admitted. 2 It will be impossible to ·tate an
xbau tiv

(Ind. App. 1892), 32 N. E. 332; Mason v. ecjuitable relief, converts the case into a

Mason, 102 Ind. 38. [|Weld v. Tlie John- proceeding in ecjuity to be governed by

son Mfg. Co. (1893), 86 Wis. 549, 57 N. W. prmciples and rules of procedure applicar

378.3 ble to such cases. Swon y. Stevens (1897),

1 Affirmative relief will of course be 143 .Mo. 384, 45 S. W. 270; Kostuba i-.

given in proper cases. As an illustration. Miller (1896), 137 Mo. 161, 38 S. W. 946 :

see Blake v. Buffalo Creek R. B., 56 N. Y. An equitable defence will not convert an

485, 493, 494 ; Bailey v. Bergen, 4 N. Y. action at law into one in eciuity where no

Sup. Ct. 642. afhrmative relief is asked. Kidgeway v.

' [^Sachleben v. Heintze (1893), 117 Herbert (1899), 150 Mo. 606, 51 S. W.

Mo. 520, 24 S. W. 54 : " Under our i^ystem 1040: "When an answer in a law suit

of law, in which legal and equitable rights admits the j)laintiffs cause of action, and

and remedies are recognized an ! ai)plied sets up purely an e(iuitable defence, it con-

Wh ite, 5 Minn. 17 8, 190 .

See W ebster

v. B ond , 9 Hun , 437 ; Ten B r oeck v.
Orchard, 74 N . C. 409; Quebec Bank v.
W eyand, 30 Ohio St. 126; Hatcher v.
Briggs, 6 Ore. 3 1 ; Pennoyer v. A llen,
51 Wis. 360 ; 50 id. 30 ; Lawe v. Hyde,
39 id. 345 ; H enkl e v. Ma rgerum , 50 Ind.
240 ; Win slow v. Winslow, 52 ill. 8;
Thompson v. Fall, 64 id. 3 2; Kentfield
v. Hayes, 57 Cal. 409; cott v. Norris
(Ind. App. 1892) , 32 N. E. 332; Ma on v.
Mason , 102 Ind. 38. [ Welti v. T he Joh nson Mfg. Co. ( 1893) , 86 W is. 549, 57 N. W.
378.J
1 A ffirmati ve relief will of cour e be
given i n proper cases. As an ill u tratiou,
·ee Bla ke v. Buffalo Creek H.. R, 56 N . Y.
485 , 493, 494 ; Bailey v. Bergen, 4 . Y.
, 'up. C t . 642 .
2 [ ach leben v. Heintz
(L93), 117
Mu. 520, 24 S. W. 54: "Under our .y t m
of law, in which legal anJ equitable ri g hts
and remedies a re recognizeu au'. applied

in the same forum, a party who i brought
into court to rec;:pond to a promi. e contained in a note may defend ucc fully
by hawing that it
on id ration ha.
failed becau of facts er at inµ; the equitabl barrier to it enforcem nt ju t tated."
The harrier tated was mi ·r pre entati n.
Wendover v. Baker (1 93), 121 I . 2i3,
25 '. W. 91 : An answ r ttiug np quitable def nee aud praying for affirmative
equitable relief, convert· the ca e i11to a
proceeding in equity to be govern d by
principle and rul of pro <lure applicable to uch ca
won v. Rt ,·en ( 1 9i),
143 :\1o. 3 4, 45 .._. \ . 2i0; Ko tuba i·.
Iiller (I 96), 137 Mo. 16 1, 3
. W. 946:
Au equitabl d fence will not com· rt an
action at law into ou in quity wher no
affirmatiYe r lief i a ked. I idgeway t'.
Herbert (1 , 09), 150 i\Io. 6 6, 51 . W .
uit
10-W: " \Yh en an an w r in a la\
admit: the plaintiff' can e of action, aud
RCL " up purely au quitabl tlcfonce, it con-
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rule derived from the decisions thus far made by the courts ; for

it cannot be supposed that they have exhausted the instances in

Avliich this species of defence is proper. There does not seem

to be any limit to the use of such defences other than is found

in the very nature of equity jurisprudence itself. Whenever

equity confei-s a right, and the right avails to defeat a legal cause

of action, — that is, shows that the pkintiff ought not to recover

in his legal action, — then the facts from which such right arises

may be set up as an equitable defence in bar. There can be no

other limitation, unless we would defeat the plain intent of the

statute, and return to the old method of granting to the defendant

a decree in equity from which a le(jal defence may arise. The

following cases are intended as illustrations and examples rather

than as a full enumeration of the possible instances in which the

defence may be interposed.

§ 31. * 93. Illustrations and Examples. In an action brought

to recover damages for the breach of covenants contained in a

deed of conveyance, the defendant may set up, as an equitable

defence, a mistake in the instrument which should be corrected ;
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as, for example, in such an action on a covenant against incum-

brances, the alleged breach being an outstanding mortgage, the

defendant may show the original agreement to except such mort-

gage from the operation of the covenant, and that by mistake the

exception was omitted.^ In an action upon a judgment recovered

against the defendant, the latter pleaded that the judgment was

verts the whole case into a suit in equity tory substitute for the relief formerly

triable by the chancellor. A plaintiff is afforded l)y courts of law and courts of

not thereby deprived of his rigiit of trial equity collectively." Hainill v. Bank of

by jury, because the defendant by his Clear Creek County (1896), 22 Colo. 384,

answer concedes the plaintiff'.s right to re- 45 Pac. 411: In an action of forcible

cover unless the equity defence prevails." detainer, equitable defences may be inter-

But where in such an action defendant posed which show that, while the title to

presents two defences, one legal ami the the property is in the plaintiff, the de-

other equitable, the legal issues are triable fendant has a better right to possessiou.

by a jury and the equitable issues are for Neal r. Widcman (1894), 59 Ark. 5, 26

ule

ri ed from he deci i ns thu f r made by the court ; for
uppo ed that the h Ye exhau ted the in ances in
' hi h hi
ies of def n
pr per. There does n
seem
of s l h def n e other than i foun
n limit t th u
of equitJ juris1 rud nc itself. Whenev r
h righ
ail to def at a 1 gal cau e
hat h plaintiff ought not to recov r
of
in hi 1 D"al ac ion - th n he fact from which such right aris ·
t up a an quitaible d fence in bar. There can be no
o h r limitation, unle we w uld defeat the plain iut nt of the
t~Ltut , and return to the old method of granting to the defendant
a decree in equity from which a legal defence may arise. The
£ llo\ ·n cases are intended a ill u trations and examples rather
than
a full enumera ion of the po sible instances in which the
defenc may be in erposed.
§ 31. * . Illustrations and Examples. In an action brought
to r c ver dama,ge for the breach of covenant contained in a
de d of conveyance, the defencfant may ·et up, as an equitable
d f nc , am' take in the instrument which should be orrect d;
for example in such an acti n n a covenant again t incumr n , the alleged breach being an out tanding mortgage, the
d f ndant may how the oriO'inal agreement to except uch mortfr m the operation of the ov nant, and that by mi take the
ex p ion wa mitted.1 In an action upor a judgmen recovere
against the d f ndant, the latter pl ad d that tb · jud ment wa
i

the chancellor. Martin v. Turnbaugii S. W. 16: Defendant in an action to recover

(1899), 153 Mo. 172, 54 S. W. 515: "If possession of land was allowed to take

the action is one at law, and the answer advantage of fraud by answer and cross-

seeks atlirmative e(|uitable relief or pleads complaint.]

a legal defence and the reply rai.scs an ^ llaire v. Baker, 5 N. Y. 357. The

equitable defence to the affirmative legal New York Court of Appeals held in this

defence set up in the answer, the equitable case that the defendant could set up this

claim or defence must be tried by the matter as a de/lnce, but could not hare any

court, sitting in equity, before the actiou atfirmative relief. This latter po.sition has

at law can be tried ; and this is the statu- been since abandoned by the court.

tory ub titute £ r the relief formerly
afforded by ourt of la\ and ourt of
equity
llectively." H mill v. Bank of
l a r r ek County (1 96), 22
lo. 4,
45 Pac. 4 l l : In an a ti n £ £ r ibl
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originally obtained by fraud, and that he had instituted a suit in

equity against the judgment creditor in the State of Connecticut,

in which the judgment had been decreed to be void, and its en-

forcement had been enjoined. These facts constituted a perfect

equitable defence and complete bar to the action.^ In an action

to recover damages for the non-performance of an executory con-

tract to run a steamboat on a certain route for the plaintiff, the

answer alleged a mistake in drawing the contract by which a

proviso was omitted that would have excused the defendant's

failure to perform, and prayed a reformation. The New York

Court of Appeals sustained the defence, saying: "The court

below clearly erred in holding that the equitable defence could

not be tried in this action. That it could be is too thoroughly

settled to admit of further dispute." ^ The defence may arise

from facts occurring subsequent to tlie joinder of issue, and

require to be interposed in a supplemental answer. On the day

of trial of an action for work and labor, the parties met, had a

negotiation, and settled the controversy, by the terms of which

settlement the suit was to be abandoned. The plaintiff after-
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wards repudiating the compromise and proceeding with the trial

■of the cause, the defendant, after tendering performance, was

permitted to set up the facts in a supplemental answer ; and it

"was held that they constituted a perfect equitable bar.^

§ 32. * 94. In Actions to recover Land. Three Classes of Cases.

Illustrations. The action to recover possession of land — analogous

to ejectment — is the one in which the equitable defence is the

most frequent; and here, of course, it assumes a great variety of

shapes.* Those, however, which are the most common are the

1 Dobson V. Pearce, 12 N. Y. 156, 165 ; 60 N. Y. 430 ; Rpect v. Spect, 88 Cal.

Pennoyer v. Allen, 51 Wis. 360; 50 id. 437.

308. ^The following cases hold that an equi-

2 Pitcher v. Hennessey, 48 N. Y. 415, table defence may be interposed in an

422. In this case the defendant asked action of ejectment : Wanser v. Lucas

and obtained the reformation. (1895), 44 Neb. 759, 62 N. W. 1108; Sut-

3 Kelly V. Dee, 2 N. Y. vSup. Ct. 286. ton v. Sutton (1900), 60 Neb. 400, 83

4 Harrin<rtoni'.Fortner,58Mo.468,474; N. W. 200; Davis v. Holbrook (1898), 25

Hubble V. Vaughau, 42 Mo. 138; Max- Colo. 493, 55 Pac. 730; Cheney f. Crandell

-well V. Campbell, 45 Ind. 360, 363 ; Ham- (1901), 28 Colo. 383, 65 Pac. 56 ; Power v.

mond V. Perry, 38 Iowa, 217. See also Sla (1900), 24 Mont. 243, 61 Pac. 468;

Collins V. Rogers, 63 Mo. 515; Ten Goldberg w. Kidd (1894), 5 S. 1). 169, 58

Broeck v. Orchard, 74 N. C. 409 ; Heer- N. W. 574; Freeman r. Brewster (1897), 70

'Originally obtained by fraud, an
111
equity , gain t th ju lgm n
r u
in which t he judgm nt ha
n
fore ment had been enjoin cl.
equitable defenc a.ncl complet bar t th
t re over damag for th non-1 rforman
f an x
t ract to run a ·teamboat on a r ain r ut f r th
answer alleged a mistake in drawing the c ntm t
proviso was omitted that would have xcu ed th
failure to perform, and prayed a reformation. Th
w York
Court of Appeals sustained the d fence, a ing: ' Th
urt
below clearly erred in holding that the quitable d fen
ul
n ot be tried in this action . That it ould b is t
th r ughly
settled to admit of further dispute." 2 The d f n e may ari e
fi;om fac ts occurring subsequent to the joinder of is ·u , and
require to be interposed in a supplemental answer.
n the day
-0£ trial of an action for work and labor, the parii m t, had a
n egotiation, and settled the controversy, by the terms f which
settlement the suit was to be abandoned. The plaintiff afterw ards repudiating the compromise and proceeding with the trial
·of the cause, the defendant, after tendering p rformance, wa
_permitted t o set up the facts in a supplemental answer· and it
was held t hat they con::;tituted a perfect equitable bar. 3
§ 32. • 94. In Action s to r ecove r Land. Thre e Clas ses of C ases .
.Illustrations. T he action to recover possession of land -analogous
t o ejectmen t - is the one in which the equitable defence is th
most frequent ; and here, of course, it assume a r at variety of
s hapes.4 T hose, however, which are the most common are the

mans v. Robertson, 64 N. Y. .332; Mc- Minn. 203, 72 N. W. 1068. In Freeman f.

Manus v. Smith, 53 Ind. 211 ; Thomp.son Brewster the court holds that in such ca.se

V. Fall, 64 id. 382 ; Hoppough v. Struble, the defendant must set up and allege his

4

1 D obson v. Pearce, 12 N. Y . 156, 165;
Pennoyer v . A llen, 51 Wis. 360; 50 id.
.308.
2 Pi tcher v. Henne ey, 48 N . Y. 415,
422. In t his case the defendant askeu
.and obtain ed t he r eformation.
s Kelly v. Dee, 2 N. Y. Sup. Ct. 286 .
4 H arriu g-tonv.For tner,58Mo.468,474;
Hubble v. Vaughan, 42 Mo. 138; Maxw ell v. Ca mpbell, 45 Intl. 360, 3ti3; Ham·
m ond v. Pe rry, 38 Iowa, 217. See al:o
Collin s v. R og-ers, 63 Mo. !'il5; Ten
Broeck v. O rcha ru, 74 N. C. 409; Heerm ans v. Rober tson, 64 N. Y. 332; M cMa nus u. mi th, 53 Iud. 21 1 ; Thompson
v. Fall, 64 id . 382 ; H oppough v. truble,

60 N. Y. 430;
pect v. Spect, 8 Cal.
437 .
[ The following ca s hold that an equitable defence may be interpo d in an
action of eje ·tm nt : "YVan r v. Luca
(1895) , 44 Neb. 759, 62 . W . 110 ; utton v. utt n ( 1900), 60 ~ b. 400, 3
N. W . 200; Davi v. H ]brook {l 98), 25
Colo. 493, 55 Pac. 730; heney v. rand ll
(1901), 28 ol . 3 3, 65 Pa . 56; Power 1-.
Sla (1900), 24 Mont. 243, 61 Pac. 46 ;
Golclb rg v. Kidd (1 94), 5 . D. 169, 5
N. W. 574; Fr man v. Brew t r (l 97), iO
Minn. 203, 72 N. \ . 106 . In Fr eman t ' .
rewi::ter the urt hold that in uch rue
the defendant must set up and allege hi
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right to a connection of either the plaintiff's or the defendant's

muniments of title because of mistakes therein ; the riglit to a

specific performance by the plaintiff of his contract to convey the

land; and tlie right to a cancellation of a conveyance on the

ground of fmud. These three classes of defences are found in

numerous forms according to the different circumstances wliich

may arise in the transactions of life and the affairs of business ;

but they may all be reduced to the same general principle. In

i some instances the equitable rights have been admitted in a

purely defensive character, and in others the judgment has

awarded affirmative relief to the defendant. In one case, the

plaintiff having proved title in himself by means of a deed from

the conceded original owner, the defendant, by way of an equi-

table bar, alleged that, prior to the plaintiff's conveyance, he had

purchased of the said owner several parcels of land, including

the one in question, that the deed from such original owner

should have contained a description of the premises claimed by

the plaintiff, but by mistake it was omitted. This defence was

sustained as an equitable bar without an actual reformation of

Generated for facpubupdates (University of Michigan) on 2014-06-17 15:30 GMT / http://hdl.handle.net/2027/uc2.ark:/13960/t02z1c23b
Public Domain / http://www.hathitrust.org/access_use#pd

defendant's deed ; ^ and in the same manner a mistake in a deed

from the plaintiff to the defendant, by which the land in suit was

omitted, may be made the basis of an equitable defence without

any actual reformation asked or granted.^ The title of the plain-

tiff in another similar action being claimed under a sheriff's deed

given in pursuance of a sale on execution against the original

owner, the defence was that at the sale the sheriff expressly ex-

cepted the parcel of hmd in question therefrom, that his certificate

and deed omitted such exception and included a description of

the premises by mistake, and that the owner subsequently con-

veyed to the defendant. The court, on the defendant's demand,

reformed the plaintiff's deed, and admitted the defence.^ In a

equities in his answer so fully and com- Griffith (1894), 9 Utah, 469, 35 Pac. 512,

j)letely that a court of equity would, under it is held that the defendant in ejectment

the old yiractice, have granted him ade- may set up iu his answer and prove any

quale relief and have confirmed his right facts constituting an equitable estoppel.]

of possessiou aa against the holder of the ^ Crary v. Goodman, 12 N. Y. 266,268.

adverse title, citing Williams v. Murphy, See also Guedici v. Boots, 42 Cal. 452,

21 Minn. .5.34. In the Montana case it 456.

is said : " In such cases, however, the - Iloppough v. Struble, 2 N. Y. Sup.

answer is in the nature of an original hill Ct. 604, 60 N. Y. 430 ; Glacken t\ Brown,

in equity, and must contain all the allcga- 39 Hun, 294; Rogers v. Castle (Minu.

tions necessary to constitute the defence or 1892), 53 N. W. 651.

warrant the relief sought. In Duke v. •' Bartlett v. Judd, 21 N. Y. 200, 203.
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similar action, where the plaintiff's title was through a sheriff's

deed, executed to him as purchaser at an execution sale against

the person who was the admitted source of title, the defendant

pleaded, as an equitable defence, an equitable mortgage arising

prior to the inception of tlie judgment lien, and liis own posses-

sion under the same. These facts were held to constitute a jrood

defence without affirmative relief asked or ffranted.^

§ 33. * 95. In Actions by Vendors against Vendees to recover

Possession of Lands. Illustrations, Equitable defences are very

frequent in actions brought to recover possession of lands by the

vendors against the vendees, when an agreement to convey

the land in question has been entered into.^ As illustrations,

the following have been upheld : when the complaint alleged the

non-payment of the purchase price at the stipulated time, and a

consequent forfeiture, the defence that the time of payment had

been extended by an oral agreement, and that a tender had been

duly made in compliance with such agreement;^ in an action in

all respects the same on the part of the plaintiff, the defence that

a tender had been made and kept good, the court expressly refus-
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ing to grant the affirmative relief of specific performance to the

defendant.^ The vendee's right to possession under a contract to

convey is a very familiar species of equitable defence to actions

brought to recover the land by the vendor.^ In an action by the

1 Chase v. Peck, 21 N. Y. 581. The may set up, as an equitable defence, the

court having first decided that the facts same equitable rights which he could have

alleged constituted the defendant an equi- enforced had he brought an action for a

table mortgagee, so that his possession specific performance. Duffy i'. O'Donovan,

under it would be a good e(iuitable defence, 46 N. Y. 227 ; Leaird r. Smith, 44 id. 619 ;

stated the rule in a very accurate and con- Hubbell v. Von Schoening, 49 id. 330, 331 ;

densed manner, per Denio J. (p. 586) : Giles v. Austin, 62 id. 486; Ingles v. I'at-

" But, since the blending of legal and terson, 36 Wis. 373 ; Morton v. Dickson,

equitable remedies, a different rule must (Ky. 1890), 14 S. W. 905 ; Hyde r. Man-

be applied. The defendant can defeat the gan, 88 Cal. 319 ; Southern Pac. R. Co. r.

action upon equitable principles ; and if, Terry, 70 Cal. 484.

imilar acti n, where the plaintiffs title mt.· throngh a ,·h ·riff':
d .ed, xecuted to him a:-> purchaser at an ·.·ecutio11 sal, ;wain:t
the per n wh wa' the admitted , nrc of title, tli • <l ·fewla11t
pleaded, a an equitable clef 'He ·, an ·qui talJle rnmtgage ari:ing
prior to the in ption of the jml rme nt lie n ancl his own 1 o:.·es·ion under the sam . These fa ·t , w re held to c.:nn:litut • a good
cl fence without affirmative r lief a ·keel or grantcd.1
§ 33. * 95. In Actions by Vendors against Vendees to recover
Possession of Lands.
Illustrations.
Equi taLl clef en s are '"'r
frequent in actions brought to r cover poss s ion of l< n l · lJy tli
vendors against the vendee , when an agr rnent to con v ·y
the land in question has been entered into. 2 As illu tration ,
the following have been uphel<l: when the omplaint alleged the
non -payment of the purchase price at th tipulat d tim ancl a
consequent forfeiture, the defence that the time of payment had
been extended by an oral agreement, and that a tend r had Le n
duly made in compliance with uch agreem nt; 3 in an action in
all respects the same on the part of the plaintiff, the def nc that
a tender had been made and kept good, the court expr ssly r fu 'ing to grant the affirmative relief of specific performanc to the
defendant. 4 The vendee 's right to pos es ion under a contract to
convey is a very familiar species of equitable d fen e to action
bro ught to recover the land by the vendor. 5 In an action by th

upon the application of these principles, ^ Cythe t-. La Fontain, 51 Barb. 186,

the plaintiff ought not to be put into posfies- 188.

sion of the premises, he cannot recover in the * Harris v. Vinyard, 42 Mo. 568.

action." The principle so concisely and » Petty v. Malier, 15 B. Mon. 604;

clearly enunciated is a complete answer Onson v. Cown, 22 Wis. 329 ; Creager v.

to the reasoning of Mr. Justice Talcott, Walker, 7 Bn.sh, 1,3. Possession of de-

in Cramer r. Benton, cited supra, note 2, fendant under an oral contract to convey

p. 46. See McClane v. White. 5 Minn, by plaintiff or his vendor: Chandler v.

178; Ptichardson r. Bates, 8 Ohio St. 257, Neil. 46 Kan. 67 ; Newkirk c. Marshall.

264. 35 Kan. 77 ; Ingles v. Patterson, 36 Wis.

- In Cavalli ?;. Allen, 57 N. Y. 508, 514, 373; Kenyon v. Youlen, 53 Hun. 591;

it was held that the vendee in possession Ford v. Steele, 31 Neb. 521 (parol gift).

1 Chase v. Peck, 21 .i: • Y. 5 1.
The
court havin g first decided th at the facts
alleged con tituted the defendaut an equitable mortgagee, so that his pos ession
unde r it would be a good equ itable defence,
tateu the rule iu a very accurate and condensed mann er, per Denio J. (p. 586):
" But, sin ce the blendin g of legal and
quitable remed ie , a different rnle must
be applied. The defendant ran defeat the
action npon equitable principle. ; and if,
upon the application of the e principles,
the plaintiff 0119ht 11ot to be p11t into possession f!f th e p,.emises, he r:unnot reco1;er in the
action." The principle o conci.ely aud
clearl y enunciated is a complete an wer
to the reasoning of Mr. Justice Talcott,
in Cramer t'. B enton, cited supra, note 2,
p . 46. See McClane v. White, 5 Iirm
17 ; Richardson v. Bates, 0 hio t. 25 i,
264.
2 In Cavalli v. Allen, 57 N. Y. 508, 514,
it was held that the vendee in pos e ion

may set up, a an equitable d fence , th
same equitable rio-ht which he could hav
enforced had he brought an action for a
specific performance. Duffy v. O'Donovan,
46 N. Y. 22i ; Leaird '" mith, 44 id. 6 l 9 ;
Hu bbell v. Von choening, 49 id. 330, 33 1 ;
Giles v. Au tin, 62 id. 4 6; Ingle 1-. Patterson, 36 Wis. 373 ; Morton v. Dick on,
(Ky. 1 90), 14 . W. 905; Hyde L Mangan, 8 ('al. 319; outhern Pa . R. o. 1.
Terrv, iO ('al. 4 4.
a ·Cythe v. La Foutain, 5 1 Barb. l ,
18 .

Harri v. Vinvard, 42 Mo. 56 .
Pettv v. M~lier, 15 B. Mon . 604;
On on 1.:.' Cown, 2:2 \Yi . 329; reager v.
Walker, 7 Bn. h, 1. .'l. Po , ion of d fenrlant under an oral contratt to com y
hy plaintiff or hi ' nclor: han dler '"
Neil. 46 Kan . 6i; ... ewkirk t'. l\Iar hall,
35 Kan i i ; Ingl , i -. Patter. n, :JG ' i .
3i3 · K enyon r . Youlen. 5:l Bun . ::i9 1;
Fortl v. St~ele, 31 Neb. 521 (parol gift).
4
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grantee of the vendor, who took with constructive notice of the

defendant's interest, the right of the vendee's assignee to pos-

session and to a deed of conveyance is a good equitable defence

in bar.^ To an action for the foreclosure of a mortgage executed

by the defendant to the plaintiff's assignor, the answer alleged a

mistake in the instrument in relation to the terms and times of

payment, claiming that, when corrected, nothing would be due,

and demanded the affirmative relief of a reformation. This

remedy was granted by the court, although the mortgagee was

not a party to the action. ^ In pleading an equitable defence, all

the facts should be averred which are necessary to the existence

of the equitable right. In many instances this right is, from the

nature of the case, a right to affirmative remedy; and, whether

this remedy is demanded or not, the answer should contain all

the substantial facts that would be found in a cross-bill in

chancery. 3

§34. *96. Other Actions to -which such Defences are Appli-

cable. Tliese defences are not, however, confined to actions

involving the title to lands, or those brought upon contracts
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relating to land; they are proper in actions based upon mercan-

tile agreements, and in all others where an equity may arise and

affect the rights of the parties. The complaint in an action

upon a promissory note demanded judgment for a certain balance

unpaid. A defence that the note was given upon a settlement,

and that by mistake the amount was made too large by a certain

sum which was more than the unpaid balance claimed by the

plaintiff, was held a good equitable bar to the action, without

any specific relief demanded or awarded ; ^ and in an action upon

a policy of reinsurance the recovery was defeated by the fact, set

up in defence, that the same person acted as agent for both the

parties in procuring the policy to be issued, and that his agency

1 Talbcrt I-. Singleton, 42 Cal. 390,395, Arguello r. E(linp:pr, 10 Cal. 150; Clark

396 ; Cavalli v. Allen, 57 N. Y. 508. ?\ Huher, 25 Cal. 593, 597. See also Hiii-

2 Andrews (•. Gillespie, 47 N. Y. 487, ton r. Pritchanl, 102 N. C. 94; Dorris v.

490; Cox V. Ratcliffe, 105 Ind. 374; Sullivan, 90 Cal. 279 ; Swasey r. Adair, 88

Dobbs v. Kellogg. 53 Wis. 448. Cal. 179; Dale r. Hunnenian, 12 Neb. 221.

8 See Hruck c. Tucker, 42 Cal. 346, * Seeley i-. Engell, 13 N. Y. 542, re-

352; Kstrada v. Murphy, 19 Cal. 272; versing s. c. 17 Barb. 530. See Becker

Leatrado v. iJarth, 19 Cal. 660; Weber v. r. Sandusky City Bk., 1 Minn. 311. Also

Marshall, 19 Cal. 447 ; Ilium v. Kobinson, in actions on notes, see Holland tv John-

24 Cal. 127; Downer v. Smith, 24 Cal. son, 51 lud. 346; Ueukle v. Margerum,

114. See Hughes r. Davis. 40 Cal. 117; 50 id. 240.
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in bar.1 T an ac ion f r th
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this reme y is d mantled or not, the answer hould contain all
the sub tantial facts that would be found in a cros -bill in
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§ 34. * 9 . O t he r Act ions t o which such Defences are Applicable.
Th se defences are not, however, c nfined to action.
involving the title to lands, or those brought . upon contract
relating to land; they are proper in action::, based upon mercan tile agreement , and in all others w~ere an equity may arise and
affect the right of the parties. The complaint in an action
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for the plaintiff was unknown to the defendant at tiie tinio.^

Here, also, no affirmative relief was granted; nor could any have

been given except cancellation of the policy, which would cer-

tainly have been entirely useless. The assignee of a leiise

bringing an action for the rent, the defendant averred that ihe

assignment to the plaintiff, although absolute in form, was in

fact given as collateral security for the payment of a note, that

the note had been paid, and that the interest of the plaintiff had

thereby ended. This defence was sustained, and here, also, no

affirmative relief could have been essential to the defendant's

security or protection under any circumstances; the judgment

in his favor was a bar to all possible further action on the lease

by the plaintiff or his assigns. ^ In all the foregoing instances

the single equitable defence has been spoken of as though it

stood alone, unconnected with any others. An equitable de-

fence, however, may be joined with any other defences, legal or

equitable, which may possibly arise in the action. In many of

the cases referred to in the text and cited in the notes, other

defences were spread upon the record. Thus, in the action upon
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a policy of insurance, any of the customary legal defences of

misrepresentations, breach of warranties, non-compliance with

provisions of the policy in regard to proofs, and the like, might

have been pleaded and proved in connection with the equitable

defence which was interposed.^

§ 35. * 97. Affirmative Relief upon Facts Alleged in Answer.

C^-oss-Complaints. Different Positions Contrasted. Tlie remain-

ing question to be considered is. When will affirmative equitable

relief be granted to the defendant upon the facts which he

alleges in his answer as constituting an equitable bar to the

plaintiff's recovery? The New York Court of Appeals, in an

early case, expressly held that in an action upon a covenant

against incumbrances in a deed of lands, brought to recover

damages for a breach thereof by means of an outstanding mort-

gage, the defendant may show, by way of equitable defence in

bar, a mistake in the deed by which an exception of that very

^ N. Y. Central Ins. Co. v. Nat. Pro- to an equitable cause of action : Ilanna r.

tection Ins. Co., UN. Y. 85 ; 20 Barb. 468. Keeves (1900), 22 Wash. 6, 60 Pac. 62]

'^ Despard v. Walbridge, 15 N. Y. .374, See Bennett r. Titherington, 6 Bush,

378; Struman 17. Robb, 37 Iowa, 311,313; 192; Dorsey v. Reese, 14 B. Mon. 157;

Hablitzel i'. Latham, 35 id. 550. Smith v. Moberly, 15 B. Mon. 70, 73 ;

^ C^ legal defence may be interposed Bosley v. Mattingly, 14 B. Mon. 89, 91.

for the plaintiff was unkn wn 1. h (1 ·f nd ant a ti1
jm . 1
H re, al o, no affirmati r li f wa g ran t l · n ol' ·oul l a11 · l1 ave
be n given except a.nc llati n of th I oli y whi h " unld · •r Th a.· ·1gn
of a lc•n. ·
tainly have be n ntir ly u 1
bringing an action for the r nt, th d f nclan a
a signm ent to the plaintiff, although ab olu
in f rm, wa. jn
fact given as collateral ecurity for th pay m nt f a n t tl at
the note had been paid, and that th int r t of th plaintiff h
thereby ended. This defence wa u taine<l and her , al , n
ttffirmative relief could have been e ntial t th d i ndant'
security or protection und r any ircumstan · ; th judgm nt
in bis favor was a bar to all possibl forth r action on th l a
by the plaintiff or his a signs. 2 In all the foregoing in tan :s
the single equitable defence has be n poken of a though i
tood alone, unconnected with any other . An quitaLl d fence, however, may Le joined with any oth r <lefen e , ] gal r
equitable, which may possibly arise in the action. In many of
the ca es referred to in the text and cited in the not
th r
defences were spread upon the record. Thus, in the action upon
a policy of insurance, any of the cu tomary legal d f nc
f
miRrepresentations, breach oi warrantie , non-compliance with
provisions of the policy in regard to proofs, and the like might
have been pleaded and proved in connection with the quitable
defence which was interposed. 3
§ 35. * 97. A .f firmative Relief upon Facts Alleged in Answer.
Cross-Complaints.
Different Positions Contrasted.
Th r ma.ming question to be considered is, When will affirmative quitabl
relief be granted to the defendant upon the fact wbi b he
alleges in bis answer as constituting an equitable bar to the
plaintiff's recovery? The New York ourt f Appeal in an
early case, expressly held that in an action upon a
v nant
against incumbrances in a deed of land", br ught to r cov r
damages for a breach thereof by means of an out tanding mortgage, the defendant may show, by way f quitabl d f nc in
bar, a mistake in the deed by which an xc ption f that v ry
1 N. Y. Central Ins. Co. v. Nat. Protection Ins. Co., 14 N. Y. 85; 20 Barb. 46 .
2 Despard v. Walbridge. 15 N. Y. 374,
378; Struman v. Robb, 37 Iowa, 311, 313;
Hablitzel v. Latham, 35 id. 550.
3 [A iegal defence may be interposed

to an equitable cau e of a tion: Hanna v.
Ree \•e ( 1900), 22 W a h. 6, 60 Pac. 62.J
, e Benn tt r . Tith rin g ton, 6 Bu h,
192 ; D or y v. Ree e, 14 B. Mon. 157 ;
mith v. foberly , 15 B. Mon. 70, 73 ;
Bo ley v. Mattingly, 14 B. Mon. 9, 91.
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mortofasfe was omitted from the covenant,, but that he could not

have, in that action and upon an answer setting up all these

facts, the affirmative relief of reformation. The case was de-

cided, and the judgment sustained, expressly upon this distinc-

tion.^ This decision, however, cannot be regarded as correct in

the light of other subsequent adjudications made b}' the same

court and referred to in the foregoing paragraphs. Affirmative

relief may certainly be given to the defendant upon his answer

in all cases where, from the nature of the subject-matter and

from the relations of the parties, a specific remedy in his favor is

possible according to the doctrines of equity jurisprudence, cer-

tainly iu all cases where the answer can be considered as setting

up a counter-claim. There are undoubtedly instances in which

no such relief is possible.^ Where, however, the nature of the

subject-matter and of the relations between himself and the

plaintiff are such that he could have maintained an independent

suit in equity against the plaintiff and procured specific relief

thereby, or could have filed a cross-bill under the old practice,

he may now obtain the same remedy upon his answer, at all
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events, as was before remarked, if the demand alleged in the

answer constitutes a valid counter-claim. This is undoubtedly

the general rule. In a very few States, however, cross-com-

plaints or petitions are expressly recognized by the codes in

addition to counter-claims;^ and the rule in those States may be

that, if the demand for equitable relief do not constitute a proper

counter-claim, it must be made in a cross-complaint or cross-

petition, and not in an answer. Subsequently to the decision of

Haire v. Baker,* in New York, the Court of Appeals held, by

way of dictum in Dobson v. Pearce,^ that the defendant miiij

obtain affirmative relief upon the answer which he pleads to the

J Haire v. Baker, 5 N. Y. 357 (1851). 3 [^Crosby v. Clark (1001), 132 Cal. 1,

2 The case of Despard v. Walbridge, 63 Tac. 1022: In an action of ejectment

cited supra, seems to be such a one. for land purchased by plaintiff, the defen-

The defendant had a rigiit to prevent a dant in po-ssession may by cross-complaint

recovery against himself by one whri had enforce a trn.st ajjain.^t the plaintiff, fur

DO interest in the lease; but he certainly fraud in j)rocurinp; the title. Board of

could not have enforced a rea.s.signment of School Commissioners t\ Center Town-

the lea.se from the plaintiff to his a.ssignor, ship (1895), 143 Iiid. 391, 42 N. E. 808 ;

nor a cancellation of that a.«signment, be- Cocke v. Clausen (1900), 67 Ark. 455, 55

cause he had no interest in or povk-er over S. W. 846. See also §682 et seq.]

the instrument in question ; much less * Haire v. Baker, 5 N. Y. 357.

could he have obtained any relief against ^ Dobson i;. Pearce, 12 N. Y. 156, 105.

the lease. Ilia right was purely defensive, per Allen J.

mor 0
wa omitt l from the co nan bu th t h c uld not
ba e in th t ction an l up n an an wer
tin · u all tb e
f t
h e affirma iv r li f f reformati n. Tb ca e wa 1 id ct an th judgm nt u tain cl xi r ly up n tl i li tincti n. 1
hi leci i n however cannot b r garl d a orr ct in
the ligh f th r ub equent adjudication· mad by the
me
c urt and referred to in the for going paragraph .
ffirm t ive
relief ma certainly be given to he defendant upon hi an w r
in all a e, wh re from the nature of the - ubject -matter and
fr m the relat.ion f the p rtie , a peci:fic rem dy in hi fav r i
p ible accordin t the doctrines f quity juri pru ence, c r tainly in all ca e where he answer can b con idered a e ting
up a ounter-claim. There are und ubtedly in tanc ... in whi h
no uch relief i po ible. 2 Where, howe-\ er, the nature of the
subject-matter and of the relations betw en him lf and tl e
plaintiff are uch hat he could have maintained an independent
uit in equity again t the plaintiff and procured p ci:fic relief
thereby, or could have filed a cro s-bill under the old pra t i ,
he may now obtain the same remedy upon hi a11 wer at all
vent , a was oefore remarked, if the d .mand all g d in the
answer constitu e a valid counter-claim. This i undoub 11
the g neral rule. In a very few State bow ver
plaint or petition are expres ly recognized by th
addi tion to counter-claim ; 3 and the rule in tho e tat
e
that if the demand for equitabl relief do not con titut a prop r
counter-claim, it must be made in a ro -c mpJaint or r ..,peti tion, and not in an an wer.
ub equ ntly t the d i ion of
I ai re v. Baker 4 in New York, he Court of pp al h 11 h ,
way of dictitm in
ob ·on v. P ar 5 that th def ndc n ?n f{ !f
tain affirma tive r lief u n the answer hi h h ple d t he
H aire v. Baker, 5
. Y . 357 ( 1 51).
The case of De ·pard v. Walbrid ge,
ited s1ipra, eem to be uch a ne .
T he defendant had a. right t pr vent a
r ecovery agai n t hi m.elf by on who had
no intere t in the lea ; hut he ertainly
coul1l not have n f rce<l a rea .. ignm nt of
the lea e frQm the plaintiff to hi a :ig nor ,
n r a cane lla tio n o f that ru . igum n , bee u It liar! n int re. t in or p w r v r
Lh in t ru rn .nt i11 riu e t ion ; mu ·h le
o u lcl h ha v obtain ed a ny r li ef again t
he lea . llis rig ht was I ur ly defensive.
l
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plaintiff's cause of action. Finally, the doctrine was expressly

established as the basis of the decision. In an action to recover

possession of land, where the plaintiff held his title by a sheriff's

deed given upon a sale under execution against the original

owner, the defendant not only defeated the recovery by proving

a mistake in the sheriff's deed, but obtained a judgment reform-

ing that deed by correcting the mistake.^ While in some States

the answer may be turned into a cross-petition, and affirmative

relief obtained,^ yet this proceeding does not seem to be neces-

sary, even in those States where the practice provides for such

cross-petition or cross-complaint; the defendant may have the

proper affirmative relief to which he is entitled upon his answer.-^

In Missouri, however, it would seem that affirmative equitable

relief can never be granted to the defendant upon his mere

answer.* In extreme contrast with this position is the doctrine,

already discussed, which refuses to the defendant the benefit of

an equitable defence as a bar to a legal cause of action, unless

the facts relied upon are such that he would be awarded an

affirmative remedy if he elected to demand a judgment confer-
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ring it.^ The general subject of affirmative relief to defendants

will be treated more at large in the subsequent sections upon

"Counter-claim " and "Union of Defences in One Answer."

SECTION FOURTH.

A LEGAL REMEDY OBTAINED UPON AN EQUITABLE OWNERSHIP

OR EQUITABLE PRIMARY RIGHT.

§ 36. * 98. Statement of Question Discussed herein. Ejectment

at Common Law. A special case, arising from the general union

of legal and equitable forms produced by the new system,

1 Bartlett v. Judd, 21 N. Y. 200, 203. Nippel v. Hammond, 4 id. 211 ; Reed r.

2 Massie v. Stradford, 17 Ohio .St. .596; Newton, 22 Minn. 541 ; Quebec Bank v.

Hablitzel L'. Latham, 35 Iowa, 550 ; Ham- Weyand, 30 Ohio St. 126; I)o.ugIas v.

mond r. Perry, 38 id. 217. Haberstro, 25 Hun, 262. Relief on a cro.=9-

3 Klonne v. Bradstreet, 7 Ohio St. .322. complaint or cross petition. Marre Lewi.s,

Defendant can have no alBrmative relief 31 Ark. 203 ; Abbott r. Monti, 3 Colo. 561 :

upon an answer by way of defence merely; Hatcher ;■. Briggs, 1 Ore. 31 ; Kellogg v.

it must be demanded by a cross-complaint, Aherin, 48 Iowa, 299. QSee discussion of

or by a counter-claim'. Earle's Adni. v. cross-complaints, §§ *806-*808.]

Hale, 31 Ark. 473; Tucker v. McCoy, 3 * Harris v. Vinyard, 42 Mo. 568. See

Colo. 284 ; Abbott v. Monti, 3 id. 561 ; State v. Meagher, 44 Mo. 356.

Monti V. Bishop, 3 id. 605 ; Sisty v. Bebee, ^ See supra, § 29.

4 id. 52; Mills v. Buttrick, 4 id. 53, 123 ;
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requires a particular examination. It may be properly presented

under the form of the question whether the holder or possessor

of a purely equitable primary right, or the owner of a purely

equitable estate or interest, can maintain an action to recover a

remedy which, before the change in procedure, was purely legal;

or, to express the same thought in terms not entirely accurate,

but which are, nevertheless, in constant use, whether STich

holder of a purely equitable primary right, or owner of a purely

equitable estate or interest, can maintain upon it an action at

law to recover an ordinary legal judgment, either for possession

or for damages ; to put the same question in a concrete form by

limiting it to a particular class of rights and remedies, whether

the owner of an equitable estate in land can maintain an action

analogous to ejectment ? The action of ejectment was originally

invented to enable a tenant for years to recover possession of the

demised premises during the term, the ancient real action being

confined to freehold estates. It was, during its existence and

use as a strict common-law instrument, a possessory action ; and

a judgment rendered in it never determined the question of title.
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Its use in trying titles was wholly a matter of convenience : no

rule of the common law made it a means of settling a disputed

controversy as to title. Nothing but the voluntary acquiescence

of the defeated party enabled it to produce even the semblance

of such a result. Action after action might be brought, and the

common law placed no obstacle in the way of such a succession of

attacks. Equity alone devised the cumbrous method of an injunc-

tion suit to restrain the further prosecution, and to quiet the title

of the party who had succeeded in several trials at law. Since

the common law paid the most rigid adherence to external forms,

it is true that the action of ejectment, until changed by statute,

was never used except for the recovery of demised premises; and

this form was preserved in the absurd fiction of making John

Doe, as tenant of the real claimant, the plaintiff on the record.

As the estate for years, to protect which the action was origi-

nally invented, was a legal estate, the rule grew up, and was

followed witliout exception, and from the very necessities of

its form, that the action of ejectment could only be employed

as a means of recovering possession of a legal estate. The

common law undoubtedly knew no such thing as ejectment

by the owner of an equitable estat(.', or tlie holder of an equi-

r uire a particular xamination. It may be properly pr ented
und r the form of he qu tion wh ther the holder r po es or
f
pur ly equitable primary righ , or the owner f a pur ly
quit ble e tate or intere t, can m intain an action to recover a
remedy ' hich before the change in rocedure, wa ur l leg· l ·
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table title; such estate or title could only be protected by a court

of equity.

§ 37. * 99. Arbitrary and Technical Character of Old Rule. Dis-

tinction Abolished by Code. View still Entertained by some Courts.

Criticism. This rule, however, was always a matter of mere

ul nl · u
table title; such estate or titl
of equity.
§ 37. * 99. Arbitrary and Technical Character

Ly a om
of Old Rule.

Dis-

external form; it was one of the formal incidents of the action,

as arbitrary and technical as the fiction of the plaintiff being a

lessee. When the statute abolished all the distinctions between

actions at law and suits in equity and between the forms of such

actions, one might naturally have supposed that the formal rule

thus described would have been at once abandoned. On the

contrary, the courts of certain States, in which the new pro-

cedure has been adopted, continue to speak of actions of eject-

ment as though they were existing and fully recognized judicial

instruments, with all their ancient and arbitrary incidents and

requirements ; as though, in fact, there had been no great change

sweeping away the very foundations of the ancient system. It

is true, this reform legislation has not altered any primary rights

nor final remedies; an equitable right or estate is not turned into
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a legal right or estate ; and the remedies of pecuniary compensa-

tion and of possession of lands or chattels whicli were called

legal because they could only be obtained by actions at law, and the

other specific kinds of relief which were called equitable because

they could only be obtained by suits in equity, are left unaffected.

One great change, however, has taken place which some courts

seem at times to have forgotten; all these remedies are now to be

obtained by a single civil action, which it is neither appropriate

to call legal nor equitable, because the distinctions between legal

and equitable actions have been destroyed. It may be well

enough, in order to avoid circumlocution, to describe one class

of remedies as legal and another as equitable, if it be constantly

remembered that this nomenclature no longer depends upon the

kind of action used in the pursuit of these remedies, and that

they are all pursued and obtained by means of one action which

has no distinctive and peculiar features depending upon the

species of remedy granted through its instrumentality.

§38. *100. Question Stated in Paragraph Thirty-six Answered

upon Principle. Argument. Assuming these elementary doctrines

of the new systerri of procedure, I am enabled, by applying them,

to answer tha proposed question upon principle ; I shall then com-

tinction Abolished by Code.

View still Entertained by some Courts.

Criticism.
T hi rul , bow v r, \ a' al wa · a m, t r f
re
external form ; i t was one of th f rm, 1 in i l n t f tl
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legal because they could only be obtained by action at law, and the
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pare the results thus obtained with the rules laid down by judicial

decision. It must be conceded at the outset that every primary

right, whether legal or equitable, when invaded, should have a

remedy or remedies appropriate to its nature and extent. When

the right is possessory, there should be a remedy which restores

possession ; when the right involves the ownership or title, there

should be a remedy which establishes the ownership or title, or

which restores the owner to his full dominion by removing

obstructions to or clouds upon his title. The law gives these

classes of remedies; and the confusion into which some of the

courts have fallen in reference to this subject results from a

failure to distinguish between these two kinds of primary rights,

and the two corresponding kinds of remedies; from an utter

confounding of possessory rights with rights of ownership, and

possessory remedies with remedies going to the ownership.

Now, it cannot be doubted that where the question is concerning

ownership, where the primary right invaded is one of ownership

or title, and the remedy sought is correlative thereto, the equi-

table right must have an equitable remedy. If a person is clothed
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with an equitable title or ownership, from the very nature of the

case his remedy must be equitable, because the positive relief

which he needs in almost all cases is the conversion of this

equitable ownership or title into a legal one, which can only be

done by a remedy within the competency of equity tribunals, —

by a specific performance, a reformation, a re-execution, a can-

cellation, and the like. The only exception to the kind of relief

described — the turning the equitable title into a legal one — is

the remedy of injunction, which is often necessary, and which

does not change the nature of the title, but leaves it as it was.

When, therefore, the object of the action and of the remedy

demanded relates to ownership or title, unquestionably the equi-

table title must be judiciall}' protected and aided by a remedy

that is purely equitable, and cannot be thus protected and aided

by a remedy which is in form legal.

§39. *101. Conclusion. This, liowever, is not true when

the right is possessory, and the remedy demanded is a mere

transfer or restoration of possession. There are equitable pri-

mary rights, titles, and ownerships which entitle the holder

thereof to the undisturbed possession of the land which is the

subject-matter of the right or title. This proposition cannot be

l are h r ult' tLu obtained \\ith the rule laid down by judicial
a ci ' i n. It mu t b onceded at th out t that -v r rimary
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denied. A large part of the remedies once given by the Court

of Chancery alone, and the whole range of equitable defences

now allowed in legal actions, are based upon the conception that

the equitable owner is entitled to possession as a part of his

right. To deny this is to turn many of the familiar rules of the

law into absurdity, and to render much of the relief given by

the courts self-contradictory. When the vendor under a land

contract sues the vendee in possession to recover the premises,

and the latter interposes his equitable right as a defence, and

succeeds in defeating the action brought against him, that suc-

cess is entirely due to the fact that he is entitled to the possession

by virtue of his equitable title. Now, what the law permits to

be done defensively^ for the same reason, and by the application

of the same principle, it should permit to be done affi.rmatively .

There is no distinction in principle between the two cases. It

is simply absurd to say that a person in possession under an

equitable title may defend and be kept in his possession by

exhibiting that title in a legal action, but that, if he is out of

possession, he shall not be allowed to recover his rightful pos-
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session by exhibiting his title in the same kind of action. In

fact, when the courts, with almost perfect unanimity, decided

that the equitable owner may rely on his title as an absolute l)ar

— a merely negative defence — to the so-called action of eject-

ment brought against him, they decided in principle that he may

obtain possession in the like action. Whenever, therefore, a

person clothed with an equitable title or ownership Avhich by its

nature entitles him to the immediate possession of the land as

against the party actually in possession, and he desires simply

to obtain the possession, there is nothing in principle which can

forbid him to maintain an action for that purpose, and recover

the possession. To call such an action "legal " is no answer; for

the rule which forbade an equitable right or title to be enforced

or even recognized in a court of law was a mere arbitrary matter

of form, and has been expressly abolished. To call the action

"ejectment" is no answer, because there is no such action, and

all the technical rules which prevailed in respect to it at the

common law have been swept away by the legislative command.

The courts which now speak of "ejectment" as an existing

species of action, and which apply its rules to an action now

brought to recover possession of land, are so far disregarding the

A large part of the r m clie on · giv n hy th
hancery alone, and th wl ol ~ nu g of r1uitalJl l
now allowed iu legal action', ar ha: cl u jJ n th
on · ption hat
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express terms of the statute and thwarting its plainest design.

It is true that all equitable ownerships and titles do not carry

with them the right of immediate possession of the land, and

this argument is carefully limited to those which do involve this

element in their proper nature. It might seldom happen that

the equitable owner would be satisfied with a mere possessory

remedy, but there are circumstances and situations in which, and

parties .against whom, such remedy may be very important, and

may perhaps be the only one practicable. To illustrate by the

most familiar and plain example, that of a vendee under a con-

tract to convey land. Assume such an agreement completely

fulfilled by the vendee. He is the equitable owner, and entitled

to possession as against the vendor, and therefore as against all

the world. Beyond a doubt as against the vendor, this equi-

table owner would prefer to bring an action to obtain a specific

performance, and thus at one blow to consummate his title and

remove all obstacles to the full enjoyment of his ownership; but

if he chooses to ask for a part iiistead of the whole, upon what

grounds of principle, upon what reasons of policy, shall the
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courts refuse to award him the possession by compelling the

vendor, who wrongfully withholds, to surrender it up? To say

that the vendor has the legal title is no answer, and is a mere

arguing in a circle, because the action and the remedy do not

concern the title, and by the conceded rules of the law his legal

title does not enable the vendor to retain possession from the

vendee. If, however, a third person without color of right, and

not the vendor, withholds the possession, the reasons in favor

of the vendee's maintaining the action are still stronger. Is it

answered that in ejectment the defendant may succeed by prov-

ing legal title out of the plaintiff, because the plaintiff must

recover upon the strength of his own title, and not upon the

weakness of the defendant's ? This, again, is a mere formula of

words without any real meaning. There is no action of eject-

ment. The action supposed to have been brought is simply one

to recover the possession to which the plaintiff is entitled from a

defendant who has no right or color thereof; and at best the rule

invoked is the arbitrary result of external and technical forms

clustered about the common-law action, all of which have been

swept out of existence with the action itself. Unless, therefore,

it is established that the common-law form of action called

x r
term f th
tatute and thwarting it plain t de ign.
It i true hat all qui table wner hip an titl
do not carry
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to po session a against the vendor, and therefore as against all
the world. Beyond a doubt a against the vendor, thi equitable owner would prefer to bring an action to obtain a pecific
performance, and thus at one blow to con ummate hi title and
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vendor, who wrongfully wi bhold , to surrender it up? To ay
that the vendor ha the legal title i no answer, and i a mere
arg iing in a cir le, becau e the ac ion and the remed do n t
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ion from the
vende . If, however, a third per on without color f ri ht, nd
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i n, the reasons in favor
f the nde
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"ejectment," with all of its incidents, still remains in full force

and effect, notwithstanding the peremptoiy provisions of the

statute which have in terms abrogated them, I have demonstrated

that there is no reason or ground in principle for refusing to

permit the owner of an equitable estate, which entitles him

to immediate possession, to maintain an action for the purpose

of recovering that possession. We maj' call the action legal or

equitable, and it makes no difference. The sum of the whole

matter is, a person is clothed with a right over land which by

its essential nature confers upon him the right of immediate

possession; he should be, and 6n principle is, permitted to en-

force that right and obtain possession, if that remedy is all he

demands, even though he might, if he chose, avail himself of a

higher and more efficient remedy. The same course of argument

applies with equal force to rights over chattels as well as over

lands, wherever there can be an equitable ownership of chattels.

§ 40. * 102. Result of Discussion upon Principle Compared •writh

Doctrine of Decisions. Concession by Author. Rule in Missouri,

"Wisconsin, Indiana, California, and Iowa. I have now to compare

Generated for facpubupdates (University of Michigan) on 2014-06-17 15:30 GMT / http://hdl.handle.net/2027/uc2.ark:/13960/t02z1c23b
Public Domain / http://www.hathitrust.org/access_use#pd

the result of a discussion of the question upon principle with the

doctrine which is established upon the authority of decisions thus

far made ; and I concede at the outset that in numbers the judi-

cial decisions are decidedly opposed to my conclusions. In ac-

cordance with its general theory, that a distinction between legal

and equitable actions is still preserved, the Supreme Court of

Missouri has held, in a long series of cases, that the owner of an

equitable title can under no circumstances obtain legal relief, but

shall be driven to two actions, — the first to turn the equitable

into a legal estate, and the second to obtain possession.^ The

1 Reed v. Robertson, 45 Mo. 580, and [[See Martin v. Turnbaugh (1899), l.").-}

cases cited in the notes to § *79. See, how- Mo. 172, 54 S. W. 515. This was an

ever, Henderson v. Dickey, 50 Mo 161. action of ejectment, the petition being

In Reed v. Robertson the defendant was in the u.sual form. The answer was a

a trnstee, and held the legal title in trust general denial, and an equitable defence

to convey the same to the plaintiff. It and cross action. The reply raised equi-

was adjudged that the plaintiff could not table defences to the claim for equitable

maintain a simple action for possession, — relief asked by defendant in his answer,

called by the court ejectment, — but must The court below heard defendant's equi-

resort to a suit in equity to compel a per- table defence, but held that the equi-

formance of his trust by the defendant, table reply thereto of the plaintiff could

The other case cited shows that the court of not be heard in this action, and that

Mis.souri has modified its views in relation plaintiffs "must he reverted to a separate

to relief of possession accompanying other bill in equity." In reversing the case the

specific equitable relief , but goes no farther. Supreme Court said: "This case is a

62
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same doctrine lias been estoblished in Wisconsin, and has been

am loc rine l a b en tabli h <l in \Yi ~con 111 and h· been
x en led t vn t on th ground that the a.c ions f j ctm nt

extended to waste, on the ground that the actions of ejectment

strong illustration of the difference be-

tween ptoceedings at common la\\' and

under our code. It is a plain suit in

ejectment. When it was begun, the title

was in the plaintiffs and the defendant

was in possession, without any right of

record. But by his answer the defendant

asks the court, on its chancery side, to

raise up or restore an equitable right to

the possession, by cancelling the entry of

satisfaction of the deeds of trust, and re-

instating them. Unless and until the

court does so, which it can only do after a

trial, the defendant has shown no defence

to the plaintiffs' right to the possession of

the lanil. At common law the defendant
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could not have interposed such a defence

or asked such relief in the ejectment

suit. The defendant would have been

compelled to ask the aid of a court of

equity, and the proceedings in the eject-

ment suit would have been stayed until

the determination of the equity suit.

When the defendant went into a court

of equity and asked to have the entry of

satisfaction annulled and tlie deeds of

trust reinstated, tlie plaintiff could have

defended on the grounds stated in his

reply ; that is, that the defendant had

lost his right to have the relief asked be-

cause of his fraud, by virtue of the merger

or by reason of the payment of the debt

secured by the deeds of trust. If the

plaintiffs herein (who would, of course, be

the defendants in such a suit in equity)

establislied any of these defences, the de-

fendant herein (the plaintiff in such an

equity suit) would be denied the relief

sought, the equity suit would be ended,

and the defendant W(juld have no further

defence in the ejectment suit, and lience

the judgment would be for tlie plaintiffs.

" No one denies that in such a suit in

equity the plaintiffs could interi)use the

defences named. No one will contend

that if this defendant had commenced a

suit in eijuity to have liis entry of satis-

faction annulled and his deeds of trust

reinstated, as soon as the warranty deed

from Wells to him was set aside, that the

plaintiffs herein (wlio would be tlie neces-

sary defendants in such an action) could

plead the defences here set up or could

ask for an accounting and for leave to re-

deem. Every one admits that it is ele-

mentary law tliat wlien a court of equity-

obtains jurisdiction of a cause it has the

power to retain jurisdiction until it does

complete justice between the parties.

" It was the very purpose of the code,

when the common law and ecjuity powers

were centred in the same court, to abolish

this circumlocution, and hence the petition

may now have a count at law and a count

in equity { R. S. 1889, sec. 2040), the answer

may contain a legal defence, an equitable

trong illu tration of the difference ben proceedina at common la \\' anti
uu<ler our cod e. It i a pla.in uit in
ej tment. Wh n it wa begun the title
wa , in the plaintiff· and the def udant
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ough t, the equity uit would be ended,
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and waste must be brought by one having the legal ownership,

and that he must recover on the strength of his own title. ^ It

would seem th;it the same rule has been adopted in Indiana,

although tliis is by no means certain. A series of cases have held

that a plaintiff, alleijing a legal ownership and right of possession,

cannot recover upon proof of an equitable ownership ; that an

action to recover possession of lands, where the pleading contiuns

such averments, is analogous to the connnon-law ejectment, and

the plaintiff " must recover on a legal title, and not on an equita-

ble title." ^ In California, the doctrine is established in the most

general form, that the holder of an equitable title cannot maintain

an action to recover the possession, because, in the language of

the courts, " in ejectment the legal title must prevail ; " ^ and a

like rule seems to prevail in Iowa."*

§ 41. * 103. Conflict in New York. Phillips v. Gorham. Rule

in Kansas. In New York there is a conflict of opinion, as slunvn

by the reported cases. The Supreme Court has held, in accord-

ance with the doctrine laid down in Missouri, Wisconsin, and
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and denied the plaintiff any kind of relief

either legal or equitable. Thus a suit at

law is converted into a suit in equity so

far as the defendant is concerned, but the

plaintiffs are reverted to another proceed-

ing in equity to undo what the court sit-

ting in equity has done in this case; and

if they succeed, then they must come

again into a court of law.

" The error of the trial court was in

not dealing with the whole controversy

when it tried the case as one in equity.

If it was a case in equity so far as the de-

fendant was concerned, it was the duty of

the court, in trying defendant's claim in

equity, to hear and determine all the

equitable defences which a court of equity

would or could hear if it had been an

original proceeding by Estes to have his

entry of satisfaction annulled and his

deeds of trust reinstated. In other words,

the court did equity for Estes, but refused

to do it for Martin, and told iiini to go

into a court of equity to get relief, not-

withstanding he was already in a court of

equity. This is more circumlocution than

existed before the code. For this error

the judgment cannot stand."

It is stiU the rule in Missouri that

"to support an action of ejectment the

plaintiff must be vested with the legal

title to the land in question at the time

of the commencement of the action, and

that he cannot recover uptm a merely

equitable title." See Nalle v. Thompson

(1902), 173 Mo. 595, 73 S. W. 599 ; Xalle r.

Parks (1902), 173 Mo. 616, 73 S. W. 596;

Kingman v. Sievers (1898), 143 Mo. 519,

45 S. W. 266; Clay i'. Mayr (1898), 144

Mo. 376, 46 S. W. 157 ; Crawford i-. Whit-

more (1893), 120 Mo. 144, 25 S. W. 365.

A similar rule prevails in Kentucky. See

Howard v. Singleton (1893), 94 Ky. 336,

22 S. W. 337.]

1 Eaton V. Smith, 19 Wis. 537; Gillett

v. Treganza, 13 Wis. 472,475; Hammer

V. Hammer, 39 Wis. 182.

2 Groves v. Maiks, 32 Ind. 319; Kowe

V. Beckett, 30 Ind. 154; Stehman i-. Crull,

26 Ind. 436.
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California, that the holder of an equitable title cannot recover

possession, even against a mere intruder, but that he must first

procure liis equitable to be changed into a legal ownership by the

judgment rendered in an equity action, and thus put himself in a

condition to maintain ejectment.^ The Court of Appeals in New-

York has reached a conclusion directly the contrary in a case

where the facts and the form of the proceeding made the decision

necessary and final. The ruling was, therefore, not a dictum^ but

was the very ratio decidendi, and involved a principle which fully

sustains the reasoning and doctrine of the text, although the case

did not in form present the naked question under discussion. A

plaintiff who had only an equitable title was permitted to recover

a judgment for possession, based upon a verdict, where no other

relief was granted, against a defendant who held the legal title

under a deed regular on its face. This decision goes to the full

length of the doctrine which I have advocated ; for, although the

complaint demanded the specific equitable reUef of cancellation

and reconveyance as well as possession, yet on the trial, which

was had before a jury, and was conducted in all respects like the
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trial of a legal action, these demands for relief were entii-ely

ignored ; the single question of the plaintiff's right to possession

was submitted to the jury, and upon their verdict a judgment for

possession was rendered, which was affirmed by the tribunal of

last resort.2 In Kansas, under an express provision of the code,

the holder of an equitable title may maintain an action to recover

possession of the land.^

§ 42. * 104. Another Class of Actions herein. Partner ageiinst

Copartner. Familiar Rule herein. Holding in Indiana. In Missouri.

In Most of the States. Case herein Referred to Contrasted with one

previously Discussed. Argument. Conclusion Reached. There is

another class of actions which have been admitted by some courts

as a consequence of the reform legislation, which could not have

1 Peck (;. Newton, 46 Barb. 173. table title was .sufficient to maintain eject-

2 Phillips V. Gorham, 17 N. Y. 270. nient. In WestfeJt v. Adams (1902), 131

Also, Murray v. Blackledge, 71 N. C. 492. N. C. 379, 42 S. E. 823, it is said: "It

* Kanssis Pac. K. v. McBratuey, 12 seems to be settled by the decisions of

Kan. 9. our court that a jilaintiff may recover in

p'<jpe I'. Nichols (1899), 61 Kan. 230, ejectment upon an »'i|uitalile title." Citing

59 I'ac. 2.")7. The Kansas statute was Taylor v. Katman, 92 N. C. 601 ; Condry

adopted in Oklahoma, and under it the v. Cheshire, 88 N. C. 375; Geer v. Geer,

lif
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been maintained prior to the change. It was a faniihar doc-

trine that one partner could not maintain an action at law

against a copartner to recover any sum which was a portion of

the firm assets, or to recover any sum claimed to be due by virtue

of their common partnership dealing or joint undertakings, unless

there had been prior to the suit an account stated and a balance

agreed upon between them, or unless the defendant had expressly

promised to pay the sum sought to be recovered. In other words,

the plaintiff in his declaration was obliged to aver either the

accounting together and the balance struck, or the express

promise. If he did not, he would be either nonsuited at the

trial or his pleading would be held insuificient on demurrer. If

there had been no such account stated or express promise, his

only remedy was by an action in equity for an accounting ; and,

having obtained jurisdiction of the matter, the Court of Chancery

would decree pajanent of the amount due. This doctrine is too

familiar to require the citation of authorities in its support. The

Supreme Court of Indiana has held that this rule is abrogated by

the code of procedure, and that a partner may maintain an action
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to recover a sum due from his copartner, by reason of their joint

business, without averring or proving any settlement or express

promise.^ The same doctrine has been applied in Missouri to

owners in common generally who are not partners.^ The old rule

is retained, however, in most of the States ; and an action by a part-

ner to recover a sum of money from his copartner, alleged to have

become due by reason of their joint undertakings, is not permitted,

unless based upon a mutual settlement or an express promise.^

1 Heavilon v. Heavilon, 29 Ind. 509; ^ QFor a thorough discussion of this

Shalter f. Caldwell, 27 Iiid. 376 ; Duck r. principle, see Miller v. Freeman (1900),

Abbott, 24 Ind. 349. See also Jamison y. Ill Ga. 6.')4, 36 S. E. 961: It is a well

Walsh, 30 Ind. 167. But, per contra, "recognized rule that one partner cannot,

Briggs V. Daughertv, 48 Ind. 247, 249, before a final winding up of the partner-

seems to abandon this position. See also ship, maintain against his copartner an

Crossley v. Taylor, 83 Ind. 337 ; Lang v. action at law based upon partnership

Oppenheimer, 96 Ind. 47; both cases con- transactions." To this rule there is the

forming to the general rule. exception thus stated by Judge Story :

■^ Rogers I'. Pennistou, 16 Mo. 432, 43."). " V/hencver there is an express stipula-

QBut see Bambrick v. Simms (1895), 132 tion in the partnership articles which is

Mo. 48, 33 S. W. 445, where the court violated i)y any partner, an action at law,

been maintained prior o th
hang . I t wa c famili· r clo ·trine that one partner could not maintain an a· i n at l,
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the code of procedure, and that a partner may maintain an a tion
to recover a sun1 due from his copartner, by rea on of their joint
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said: "It is well settled that one partner either assumpsit or covenant as the case

may sue another in an action at law where may require, will ordinarily lie to recover

the transaction relates to but one single damages for the breach thereof. ... A

unadju.sted matter growing out of the careful consideration of the statement and

partnership transactions."] of the authorities cited to sustain it will
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2 Rogers v. Penuiston, I 6 l\lo. 4.32, 435.
[But ee Bambri ck v. imm s (1 95), 1:32
Mo. 48, 33 S. W . 4-15, where th e court
said: " It is well settled that one µartn r
may sue another in an artiou at Jaw wh ere
the transaction r elates to but one . iugle
unadjusted matter growing out of the
partnership transactions."]

5
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It is SO held in California, ^ and in New York,^ and in other

States ; ^ and this is beyond doubt the correct interpretation of

the codes. The contrast between this case and the one previ-

ously discussed is plain ; and an analysis of these contrasting

features will do much toward elucidating the general principles

which regulate the union of legal and equitable actions and

remedies. When a person has an equitable ownership of land of

a kind which entitles him to immediate possession, his remedial

right to possession is in exact conformity with his primary right

of ownership. The denial of this remedy of simple possession

under the former system was based solely upon technical and

arbitrary notions incidental to the mere external forms of actions

and modes of adjudication which prevailed in the two classes of

courts ; and when these external forms, with their incidents, were

removed, a way was opened for redressing the primary equitable

right in a manner exactly conforming with its own nature and

extent; that is, a primary equitable right or interest calling for

sell V. Grimes, 46Mo. 410; Buckner v. Ries,
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34 Mo. 357 ; Jepsen v. Beck, 78 Cal 540.

I^The rule iu Ohio is stated in Kuiineke

V. Mapel (1899), 60 O. St. 1, 53 N. E. 259.

It was here held that it was a " well estab-

lishe<l rule that one partner cannot, in the

o h ld in alif rnia, 1 and in
w York 2 and m other
an l thi is b y n l l ubt h corr t in rpr tation of
Th con ra t betw en hi a e an i the one pr ii u cl i " 1 lain · nd an nal i of th e contras ing
' ill do mu h t ard elucidating the g n ral principles
whi h r gulat th um n f 1 ·al nd equitable acti ns and
r r di
YV h n a p r n ha an q uitable own r hip of land of
a kind ' hich ntitl him o imm liat po e i n hi remedial
right o p
ion i in exact c nf rmity with hi· primary right
f own r hip. The denial of this remedy of impl po
10n
under t he f rmer y tem wa based 1 ly upon t hnical and
arbi rar notions incid ntal to t he mere external f rms f action
and mode of adjudication which prevailed in the two cla · e of
court · and when the e external form , wi h heir incidents w re
removed, a way wa opened for reclres ing the primary quitable
ri ght in a manner exactly conforming with its O\ n nature and
xtent · that is, a primary quitable right or int r t calling f r
I

absence of a showing that, by some special

agreement, the particular matter has been

withdrawn from the partnership account,

maintain an action at law against another

to recover an amount claimed by him by

reason of partnership transactions, until

there has been a final settlement of the

business of the partnership."

Nebraska, also, follows the general rule.

Lord V. Peaks (1894). 41 Neb. 891, 60

N. W. 353. But a partner may sue his

copartner where the cause of action is not

connected with the partnership accounts :

Ilalleck V. Streeter (1897). 52 Neb. 827,

73 N. W. 219. And in Glade v. White

(1894), 42 Neb. 336, 60 N. W. 556, it was

said that " where a partnership has been

dissolved and in tlie settlement of the

])artnprship affairs one partner lias become

owner of the accounts and debts payable

to the partnership, such partner may

maintain an action at law against the

other for money collected on such ac-

count by such other partner and with-

held by him without the knowledge of

the plaintiff."]

show that the cases falling within this

exception are of three classes: (1) those

in which the partnership is inchoate and

has never been launched ; (2) those in

which the partnership is at an end , and

(3) tho.se in which the stipulation whicli

is violated, and for the breach of which

the action is brought, i.s one between the'

partners individually and ' the damages

from which belong exclusively to the

other partner and can be assessed without

an accounting.' "J

1 Russell V. Byron, 2 Cal. 86 ; Buckley

V. Carlisle, 2 Cal. 420 ; Stone v. Fouse, 3

Cal. 292 ; Barnstead v. Empire Mining

Co., 5 Cal. 299 ; Ross v. Cornell, 45 Cal.

133; Pico V. Cuyas, 47 Cal. 174, 179;

Fisher v. Sweet, 67 Cal. 228.

2 Emery v. Pease, 20 N. Y. 62.

ho w that the ca e falling within thi
except ion are of three cla . e : ( l ) tho e
in whi ch th e partner hip i inchoate aud
ha never been launch ed ; (2) tho e in
whi h th e part ner hip i at an end, and
(3) th o e in whi ch the tipulation which
j~ vi olated, and for the br ea ch of which
the a ction i brou o-h t, i · one betwee n the·
partn er indi vidua lly and 'th e damage
from which belong exclu ively to the
oLher partner and an be a e · ed wi~hout
an accoun t ing .'"]
1 Ru ell v. Byron, 2 Cal. 6; Buckley
. Carli le, 2 Cal. 420; tone v. F ou e, 3
al. 292 ; Barnst ead v. Empire Mining
o., 5 al. 299 ; Ro v. ornell, 45 Cal.
133; Pi e v. uya , 47 al. 174, 179;
Fi her v. weet, 67 Cal. 22 .
2 1. mery v. P ea e, 20 N. Y. 62.
a W ood !'. Cull en. 13 Minn . 394, 397;
L ow r v. D enton , 9 \Vi . 26 ; , hield · l'.
F uller, 4 Wi . 102 ; mi tb v . mit·h, 33
. Io. 55 7 ; :\[' Kni ht t '. M ' utch n, 27 M .
416: 'pringer i•. a.bell , 1 :'lfo. 640;
an
1· nregg. i
'olt>. 4g9; Bi :hup t'. Bi h p,
5.J. ('onu 232;
'Bri n r. , m i h , 42 Kan.
4' , . tone 1· Mattingly ( Vy. 1 92} 19
• '. \ . 402; :\ fcDrmalrl 1• fl olm . , 22 r .
~12, . 'tevc:n 1 Bak r, 1 \ a h . 3 15. But
c·c» for xainpl wh re an a ti n mav lie
111aintai11 ·<I, \Vhit •hill 11 • • ' J11ckl , 43 · Io.
r,:;; ;. 'r·a 1nan ,..John on, 4 M '. 111 ; J u

11 v. Grime, 46Mo. 410; Buckner v. Rie,
34.Mo. 357; J ep env.B k, 7
al. 54.
[The rul e in Ohio i tated in l{unneke
v. Mapel (I 99), 60 . t . l , 53 N. E. 259.
It was here held that it wa. a "well tabli h d rule that one partn r cann ot, in the
ab ence of a h wing that, by om pecial
agreement, the parti uJar matter ha be n
withdrawn from the partner hip account,
maintain an action at law again t another
to recov ran amount ]a im d by him b '
r a on of partner hip ran action , until
th r e ha b en a final
ttl ment of the

cou nt by . u h other partn r and withh <'ld by him without the kn wl dge of
i h plaintiff."]
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possession can be redressed by granting possession. In other

words, the ancient rule denying to an ecpii table owner tlie remedy

of bare possession in the cases described was one of the "distinc-

tions " and " forms " in express terras abolished by the legislature

in enacting tlie new procedure. Courts which continue the denial

because "ejectment could not be brought by a holder of an equi-

tiible title," or because " the legal title must prevail," overlook the

real nature botli of the right to be redressed and of the remedy to

be conferred, and pay a regard only to the technical notions of

form which hampered the common-law courts in all their move-

ments, and which became at last so grievous a restraint upon the

administration of justice that the legislature was compelled to

intervene. In the other case, however, the reasons of the rule

were very different, and were founded upon the nature of the

primary right itself, and not upon any formal incidents of

the judicial proceeding by which it was redressed. A partner

is not suffered to maintain the action in question because his

primary right, flowing from the fact of partnership, is not of such

a nature as to call for a remedy of that kind ; that is, a judgment
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for the payment of a certain sum. The right to the recovery of

a certain sura of money, unless arising from tort, must, according

to the common-law, be based upon a promise express or implied.

It does not affect this principle to say that the common-law doc-

trine of implied promises was itself largely founded upon a fiction.

Granting this to be true, as it undoubtedly was, still the theory

was firmly established that the liability spoken of arose either

from an express promise or from acts, events, or relations which

created a duty to pay, and which duty the law conceived of as

springing from an implied promise. If we discard the notion of

an implied promise, therefore, as fictitious, there must still be a

relation existing between the parties, from which the duty takes

its origin ; and without tlie existence of such a relation there was

no duty on the one side, and no primary right on the other. Now,

it was an elementary doctrine of tlie law pertaining to partnership

that, resulting from their mutual dealings with their joint assets,

no promise is ever implied that one partner shall pay to the other

any definite sum as the amount due from the proceeds of the

undertaking, or as his share of the joint assets. No promise is

ever implied from the existence of this relation, from the mere

fact of there being a joint business, joint profits, or joint property.

po s

ion c:.m be r c1r . eel b grantincr po:., s: i n. In oth •r
word , t h an i n~ rul clenyin 6 to an <1uita.bl' w1 r th r m •cl
of bare I S" 'i n in th a e. cl , rib cl w< • n [ tli
<1i~lin <'
tion
an l "f rms" in xpre · term: aboli h cl b th 1 gislatur •
in enacting the new proc clnre.
ourt: whi h ntinu the cl uial
because "ejectment ould not b brought by a hold r of an quitable titl ,"or b cause "ihe 1 gal tit.1 mu t pr ail ov ·rlook h
r al nature both of ihe right to be r clre · e l an l of ih r m cl
be conferred, and pay a r garcl only to the t lmi al n ion
f
form which hampered the common-law courts in all their mov ments, and which became at la t so gri vou a re tmint upon h
administration of justice that the legi lature wa comp lled to
intervene. In the other ca e, however, the rea on of the rule
were very different, and were founded upon the nature of the
primary right itself, and not upon any formal incident of
the judicial proceeding by which it wa redr s ed.
partn r
is not suffered to maintain the action in que tion becau e his
primary right, flowing from the fact of partnership, i not of such
a nature as to call for a remedy of that kind; that i , a judgment
for the payment of a certain um . The right to the re overy of
a certain sum of money, unless arising from tort, must, according
to the common-law, be based upon a promi e expre or implied.
It does not affect this principle to say that the common-law doctrine of implied promises was itself largely founded upon a fiction.
Granting this to be true, as it undoubtedly was, till the theory
was firmly established that the liability poken of aro e either
from an express pro mi e or from acts, event', or relation which
created a duty to pay, and which duty the law concei ed of as
springing from an implied promise. If we di card the notion of
an implied promise, therefore, a fi ctitiou , there mu ·t till be a
relation existing between the parti ', from whi h the du tak s
its origin; and without the ex istence of uch a relati n h re wa
no duty on the one side, and no primary right on th o h r.
ow,
it was an elementary doctrine of th law l ertaining t pc rtner hip
that, resulting from th eir mutual cl aling, with th ir j int a
no promise is ever implied that one partn r ball pay to h
any definite sum a the amount du fr m th pr ed
undertaking, or as his share of the joint a.. ,
promi
ever implied from the existenc of this r lation, from th
fact of there being a joint busin ss, joint profi ' or j int r p rty.
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Or, to express the same doctrine -without the use of fictitious

terms, from the relation of partnership and the joint undertakings

and assets thereof, the law imposed no duty upon one partner to

pay to tlie other any definite sum in respect of his share therein,

and gave no corresponding primary right to that other to demand

such payment. If, however, there has been an accounting, so

that a balance in favor of one is ascertained, a promise is implied

on the part of the other — or a duty arises on his part — to pay

that sum. The right to maintain the action by one partner

against another, and to recover a definite sum, depended therefore,

and still depends, not upon anything connected with the form of

the action, or upon the distinctions between legal and equitable

actions, but upon the very nature of the primary right. Those

courts which have held that, under the new procedure, a partner

may recover a definite sum from a copartner without an account-

ing and without an express promise, have in effect decided that

the new procedure has materially changerl the primary rights of

parties, has, in this instance, created a primary right which did

not before exist at all, which is a conclusion in direct antagonism

Generated for facpubupdates (University of Michigan) on 2014-06-17 15:30 GMT / http://hdl.handle.net/2027/uc2.ark:/13960/t02z1c23b
Public Domain / http://www.hathitrust.org/access_use#pd

with the plainest and best-settled principles of interpretation. In

fact, this primary right of a partner against his fellow has not been

modified by the reform in the modes of procedure ; and under the

new system, as under the old, there should be no recovery of a

definite sum in any action, unless the facts which create the

primary right have occurred, — unless there has been or is an ac-

counting and balance ascertaine 1, or an express promise to pay the

sum. It is not the case of an equitable })rimary right being sup-

ported by a legal remedy, because the equitable primary right of

the partner does not involve the payment of a certain sum ; its

only remedy is an accounting, and this is preserved in full force

and effect. The analysis above given may not be very important

in itself ; but it will aid in distinguishing primary from remedial

rights, and the substances of rights which have not been changed

from the foniial incidents which have been abolished ; it will

enable us to determine the exact limits of the modifications made

by the reform legislation.

§43. *105. Additional Instances. A few instances of other

actions will bring this inquiry to an end.^ It has been held in

* Tli.1t an action brought to recover a and ha.seil upon purely equitable rights,

money judgment alone may be equitable see Hindge c. Baker, .57 N. Y. 209, 219.

r o expre
h ame d ctrine without the u e of fictitiou
t rms from h r lati n f p rtnersbip nd tl j int undertaking
an l a
.. her f, he law im o d no duty upon ne P' rtner t
a to th oth r an definite um in re p t of hi hare therein,
n l ga e no orr p nding primary right to that other to demand
u ·h p ment. If, how ver, there ha "' b en an accounting, o
ha a balance in favor of one i ascertained, a promise i impli l
n th part f he ther - or a duty arise on his part - to pay
h t um. The right to maintain the action by one partner
a0 ain, t anoth r, and to r cov r ad finite um, dep nded therefore,
and ill p n , n t upon anything onne t l with the f rm of
the action, or upon the distinctions between legal and equitable
action but upon the very nature of he primary right. Tho e
court which have held that, under the new I rocedure, a partn r
ma· recover a definite sum from a copartner without an a counting an l without an ex pres "' promise, have in effect deci e th t
the new proc dure has materially chang cl t he primary right £
partie , ha , in this instance, crea ed a prilU' ry ri ht whi h did
not b fore exi t at all, which is a onclu ion in direct ant
nism
wi h the plaine ·t and b t-settled principle of interpretation. In
fact, thi J rimary ri ht of a partner against hi fellow ha not b n
mo lifi cl by he reform in the modes of proc dure · and und r tl e
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um. It i, n t the a of an quitable prim r rigl t b ing su orted Ly a 1 .O', 1 rem dy h a us tl
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right ,
. Y. 209, 219.
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Nevada that a person claiming to be tenant in common with others

of land may maintain an action for partition, whether his title be

legal or equitable.^ On the other hand, the Supreme Court of

Missouri has decided tliat the owner of chattels by an equitable

title cannot recover damages for their conversion in an action

analogous to trover.^

§ 44. * lOG. Importance of Subject-Matter Dwelt upon in Sec-

tion Fifth. Final Object of Reformed System. Author's Predic-

tion. I have thus dwelt at length upon the particular case of

combining legal and equitable rights and remedies which forms

the subject of the present section, because more than any other

it involves and expresses the true intent and design of the new

system ; it is the crucial test of the manner in which the spirit of

the reform' is accepted by the courts. Probably nothing con-

nected with the practical administration of justice could be more

startling to the lawyer of the old school than the suggestion that

the owner of a purely equitable estate in lands should be able to

bring an action of ejectment to recover possession of the premises ;

it would be opposed to all his conceptions of law and of equity
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and of the uses of actions and courts. And yet these conceptions

were plainly artificial and arbitrary, and the familiar rules as to

the employment of actions as plainly had no foundation in the

nature of things, but rested upon words alone. The final object

of the reformed American system was to sweep away all of these

technicalities, and to allow every primary right to be maintained

and every remedial right enforced in the same manner and by a

single judicial instrument, untrammelled by the restrictions and

limitations which made the practical administration of justice in

England and in the United States seem so absurd to the culti-

vated jurists of Europe. That the numerical weight of authority

is at present opposed to my views in relation to the particular

matter in question, I fully concede. 1 believe, however, that in

time the influence of an education in the technicalities of the

common-law system will cease to be felt on the bench and among

the members of the bar, and that the practical rules of procedure

in all the States will be brought into a perfect harmony with the

letter and the spirit of the reformatory legislation.

1 Crosier i'. McLauc^hlin, 1 Nev. .348. .367; S. P. .Jolianuesson v. Borschenius,

2 Walker's Adm. v. Walker, 25 Mo. 35 Wis. 131, 134.

Nevada that a person laiming to b
nan inc mmon with other
of land may maintain an acti n f r I artition, wh ther hi titl be
legal r quitable. 1
n the oth r hand th
urt f
Missouri ha , decided that the ' n r of
an quitable
title cannot recover damage f r th ir c nver i n in an action
analogou to trover. 2

§ 44. * 106.
tion Fifth.

Im portance of Subject-Matter Dwelt upon in Sec-

Fin al O bject of Reformed System.

Author's Predic-

tion. I have thus dwelt at length upon the particular ca e of
combining legal and equitable rights and remedi which f rms
t he subject of the present section, because more than any other
it involves and expresses the true intent and d ign of the new
ystem; it is the crucial test of the manner in which the spirit of
t he reform· is accepted by the courts. Probably nothing connected wit h the practical administration of justice could be more
startling to the lawyer of the old school than the sugge tion that
the owner of a purely equitable estate in lands hould be able to
bring an action of ejectment to recover posses ion of the premi es;
it would be opposed to all hi s conceptions of law and of equity
and of t he uses of actions and courts. And yet these conception
were plainly artificial and :ubitrary, and the familiar rules as to
the employment of action as plainly had no foundation in the
natu re of t hings, but rested upon words alone. The final object
of the reformed American system was to sweep away a~l of these
technicalities, and to allow every primary right to be maintained
and every remedial right enforced in the same manner and by a
single judicial instrument, untrammelled by the restri tion and
limitations which made the practical administration of ju tice in
E ngland and in the United States seem so ab 'urd to the cultivated jurists of Europe. That the numerical weight of authority
is at present opposed to my views in relation to the ar i ular
matter in question, I fully concede. l believe, however, hat in
time the influence of an education in the technicalitie
f the
common-law system will cease to be felt on the bench and among
the members of the bar, and that the practical rule of procedure
in all the States will be brought into a perfect harmony with the
letter and the spirit of the reformatory legi lation.
1
2

Crosier v. McLaughlin , 1 Nev. 3-l8.
Walker's Adm. v. ·w alker, 25 Mo.

367;
. P . Johanne son v. Bor cheniu
35 Wis. 131, 134.

1
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SECTION FIFTH.

THE NATURE OF CIVIL ACTIONS AND THE ESSENTIAL

DIFFERENCES BETWEEN THEM.

E TION FIFTH.

§ 45. * 107. Features of Civil Actions that are really Different

and which the New System does not change. iSotwithstanding

the sweeping language of the codes and practice acts, which

abolishes all distinctions between the forms of actions heretofore

THE

existing, many judges, in construing the provisions, have declared

ATURE OF CI IL ACTI N A D THE E SENTIAL
DIFFERE~ E
BETWEE THEM.

in most emphatic terms that the change is confined to the external

forms alone of actions at law, and that in their essential features

45.

* 1o-.

Features of Civil Actions that are really Different

certain distinctions and peculiar elements remain which cannot

be removed by legislation. This statement is to a certain extent

true, if It be con lined to what is really the substance of each

action, and is not extended so as to include many incidents which,

although appearing to be substantial, are really the results of

arbitrary conceptions relating to the form ; for example, the old

rule discussed in the preceding section, which confined the action

of ejectment to the recovery of possession of lands in which the

plaintiff had a legal estate. If this doctrine, however, is carefully
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examined, and the examples and authorities in its support are

closely analyzed, it will be found that all the unchangeable feat-

ures and elements which are said to inhere in different actions,

and which cannot be reduced to an identity, pertain to the primary

rights sought to be maintained by their means, to the delicts or

wrongs by wiiich these rights are invaded, to the remedial rights

which thereupon accrue to the injured party, and to the remedies

themselves which are the final objects of the judicial proceeding.

These features and elements in actions are indeed different, and

the difference between them the new system does not propose t(.

abolish nor change. The doctrine itself is, therefore, no more

than the statement in another form of the conceded fact that the

reformed procedure has not affected the primary rights or the

remedies which the municipal law creates and confers.

§ 46. * 108. Actions still differ in Substance. Statement of this

Doctrine by the Courts. As all actions are l)iought to maintain

some primary right invaded by a wrong, and as they result in

some one of the many kinds of remedies prescribed by the law, and

N otwith tanding
the w eping languaO'e of the code· and practice act , whi h
abol' he all di tinctions between the f rm f actions hereto£ r
xi ting, m, ny judge , in con truing th provision , have eclar d
in mo t emphatic term that the change i onfined to the ext rn·tl
form alone of action at law and that in h ir e sential featur
certain di tinction and peculiar elem nt r main which ann t
be remov d by 1 gi lation. This statement i to a certain xtent
true if it be confined to what i really he ubstance of a l
ction an i not extended so as to includ many in iden whi h
lthou h appearin to bv ub tantial, ar really the re ults f
rbitrar
nceptions relating to the form; for example, th ld
rule di cu ed in the preceding section, which confined the a ti n
f ejectment to the recovery of pos ession of land in which th
plaintiff h d a legal e tate. If thi. doctrine, how ver, is carefully
xamined and the example and authoriti s in its upp rt ar
losel analyzed, it will b foun that all the unchangeabl featre and 1 m nt w bich are aid t inhere in different a ti n.
n whi h cannot be reduced t an identity, rtain to the primar
righ
ought to be maintained by their mean , t the deli
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wrong by which the e right are invade , to the remedial righ t.
which thereupon accrue t the injured party, an to the rem di
them. elv which are the final bject of th judi ial pr
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46. · 10 . Actions still differ in Substance. Statement of this
Doctrine by the Courts.
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as in each action the facts from wliich the primary riglit arises,

and the facts which constitute the wrong, must be stated, and as

the plaintiff must demand and seek to obtain some remedy appro-

priate to the right and the delict, it follows, as a necessary conse-

quence, that the actions, although constructed and carried on

according to the one uniform principle of alleging the facts as

they actually are and praying for the relief legally proper, must

differ in their substance, because the rights, the delicts, and the

remedies differ. This necessary feature of civil actions under the

codes has been dwelt upon and explained in numerous cases,

some of which are cited in the note.^ This doctrine was very

clearly stated in a recent case as follows : " Although all forms

of action were abolished by the code, the principles by which the

different forms of action were governed still remain, and now, as

much as formerly, control in determining the rights of the parties.

In pleading, a party is now to state the facts on w^liich he relies

to sustain a recovery ; and, if issue l)e tak^^n thereon, lie will be

entitled to just such a judgment as the facts established will by,

the rules of the law warrant, without regard to the name or the
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form of his action." ^ This judge would, however, have ex-

pressed his meaning more accurately if he had said, " The princi-

ples by which the different actions were governed still control,"

instead of " The principles by whi(;h the different forms of action

were governed still control." The true effect of the reform w^as

well stated by the Court of Appeals of Kentucky in the follow-

ing extract : " The code makes no change in the law w^iich deter-

mines what facts constitute a cause of action, except that, by

reducing all forms of action to the single one by petition, it

changes the question whether the plaintiff's statement of his

cause shows facts constituting a cause of action in ' trespass,' or

* assumpsit,' or other particular form, into the more general

question whether it shows facts which constitute a cause of action

at all ; that is, whether the facts stated are sufficient to show a

1 Goulet V. Asseler, 22 N. Y. 225, 227, Cortes, 17 Cal. 487, 497, per Cope J. ;

228, per Selden J., Eldridge v. Adams, Sampson ?'. Shaeffer, 3 Cal. 196, 205, per

54 Barb. 417, 419, per James J.; Herd v. Wells J.; Miller v. Van Tassel, 24 Cal.

Chandler, 13 B. Mon. 403 ; Hill v. Barrett, 458, 4f>3, per Rhodes .J. ; Richnioud & L.

14 B. Men. 83, 85, per Marshall J.; Payne Turnp. Co. v. Rogers, 7 Bush, 532. 535;

V. Treadwell, 16 Cal. 220, 243, per Field Ilowland v. Needham, 10 Wis. 495.

C. J.; Liibert v. Chauviteau, 3 Cal. 458, - Eldridge v. Adams, 54 Barb. 417, 419,

462, per Wells J. ; Jones v. Steamship per James J.

as in each action the fac ts fr 111 whj h th I rimary right ari. es,
and the facts which corn;titute the wr ng, mu ·L be tat , and a:
the plaintiff mu t demand and t:J k to LL in om• r m dy a.1 propriate to the right and the lelict, it follcnv a.: a n 'C · ary on · q uence, that t he action , although on ·trn tc ancl arri d n
according to the one uniform principle f all ing th fact a·
they actually are and praying for the r li f 1 gall r pr
r, mu ·t
differ in their suh tance, L cau e the right , th 1 li t , and the
remedies differ. This nece ary feature of civil action ' under the
codes has been dwelt upon and xplain d in numerou ca e ,
some of which are cited in the note. 1 This d ctrin was v ry
clearly stated in a recent case as follow : " Although all forms
of action were abolished by the cod , the principles by which the
different for ms of action were governed still remain, and now a
much as formerly, control in determining the rights of the partie .
I n pleading, a party is now to state the facts on which he relie
to sustain a recovery; and, if issue he taki:-m thereon, he will be
entitled t o just such a judgment as the facts established will by,
the rules of the law warrant, without regard to the name or the
form of his action ." 2 This judge would, however, have expressed his meaning more accurately if he had said, "The principles by which the different actions were governed still control,.,
in tead of "The principles by which the different forms of action
were governed still control." The true effect of the reform wa
well stated by the Court of Appeals of Kentucky in the following extract: ''The code makes no change in the law which determines what facts constitute a cause of action, except that, by
reducing all for ms of action to the single one by petition, it
changes the qu estion wheth r the plaintiff's statem nt of hi·
cause shows facts constltuting a cause of action in 'tre pa s, or
'assumpsit,' or other particular form, into the :q.10re general
question whether it shows facts which constitu te a cau e of action
at all; that is, whetheT the facts stated are suffici n to show a
l Goulet v. Asseler, 22 N. Y. 225, 227,
228, per Selden J .; Eld ridge v . Adam ,
54 Ba rb . 417 , 419, per J a mes J.; Hord v.
Chand ler, 13 B. Mon. 403 ; Hill v. Barrett,
14 B. Mon. 83, 85, per Marshall J. ; Payne
v. T readwell, 16 Cal. 220, 243, per Fi eld
C. J.; L nbert v . Chauviteau, 3 al. 45 ,
462, per W ells J . ; J ones v. Steamship

Corte , 17 Cal. 4 7, 497, per ope J . ;
.. amp ·on t . haeffer, 3 al. l 96, 205, per
W ell J .; ::\liller v. Van Ta. l 24 al.
45 , 463, per R hode ,J.; Ri hmond & L.
Turnp. Co. v. Roge r , 7 Bn. h, 532, 535;
H owland v. Needham, 10 Wi •. 495
2 E ldridge i:. A dam ,54 Barb.417,419,
per James J.
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right in the plaintiff, an injury to that right by the defendant,

and consequent damage. What facts do in this sense estabhsh a

cause of action is determined by the general rules or principles

of law respecting rights and wrongs, and by a long course of

adjudication and practice applying these rules to particular actions

under the long-established rule of pleading, that the declaration

must state the facts which constitute the plaintiff's cause of

action. . . . The code does not authorize a recovery upon a

statement of facts which did not constitute a cause of action in

some form before the code was adopted. And therefore the

former precedents and rules and adjudications may now be re-

sorted to as authoritative, except so far as they relate to the dis-

tinctions between the different forms of action, or to merely

formal or technical allegations." ^ To this clear and accurate

exposition I can add nothing which will increase its efficacy as

the enunciation of the general principle. The final effect pro-

duced by the reform legislation in abolishing all distinctions

between actions may be expressed in the following manner: No

inquiry is now to be made whether the action is " trespass," or
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" trover," or " assumpsit," or any other of the ancient common-

law forms, nor, except for the single purpose of determining the

proper tribunal for its trial, whether it is legal or equitable ; all

these forms and classes are utterly abrogated.^ For this reason,

the various rules which pertain to each of these common-law

forms of action, which distinguished one from the other, which

determined the peculiar nature and object of each, and which

regulated the proceedings in each, are no longer to be invoked.

1 Hill (-•. Barrett, U B. Mon. 83, 85. tained. See also Bates v. Drake (1902),

See Johaniiessuii v. Borschenius, 35 Wis. 28 Wash. 447, 68 Pac. 961. in which tlie

131, 135 ; Haughton v. Newberry, 69 N. C. court refers to tlie " form " of the action

456, 459-461. in a different sense than that suggesteil in

2 QIntheca.se of Draper r. Brown (1902), the text. Seals r. Augusta By. Co. (1897),

115 Wis. 361,91 N. W. 1001, whether a 102 Ga. 817, 29 S. E. 116; Hamilton r.

demurrer should he sustained was held to Handle (1898), 103 Ga. 788, 30 S. E. 658.

depenil up(Jii the answer to the inr|uiry But see Casgrain r. Hamilton (1896), 92

whether the action was legal or equitable. Wis. 179,66 N. W. 118; Hood v. Taft

The ground urged for sustaining the de- (1896), 94 Wis. 380, 69 N. W. 183; State,

murrer in this case was that "two or more e.r rel. v. Helms (1898), 101 Wis. 280, 77

that right y h defendant
righ rn the plaintiff an injury
an on qu nt rn g . ·wh at f t o in hi en
tabli h a
d t rmin d b h
en ra.1 rule r rinci 1 s
and l y a long our e of
parti ular actions
a pl ing h e rul
rul
f pl a.ding, that the d larati n
mu
which con titute the plaintiffs au e of
c ion . . . . The co e does not authorize a reco ery upon a
ta ment of fa t whi h did not c n titute a cau e f action in
ome form
fore the code wa adopted. And therefore the
former prece en ~ and rule and adjudication may now be reorted to as authoritati e except so far as they relate to the diSinction between the different forms of action, or to merely
formal or technical allegations. ' 1 To this clear and accurate
expo ition I can add nothing which will increa e its effi acy a
the enunciation of the general principle. The final effect produc
b the reform legislation in aboli hing all di tinctions
tween action may be xpres, ed in the following manner: No
now to b made whether the acti n i ' tr pa ' or
or a ·ump 'i , ' or any other of the ancient commonlaw form , n r, x ept f r the single purpo e of determining the
proper tribun 1 for it trial, whether it i legal or equitable· all
he e f rm. an l la e are utterly abrogate .2 For this r a on,
the ar10u rul s whi h pertain to each of these common-law
form f a ion which di tingui hed one from the oth r, which
t rmin d the peculiar natur and object f each and which
regulat d h
rocee ing in ea h, are no long r o e in ok

causes of action have been improperly N. W. 194; .Joseith Dessert Lumber Co.

united in the complaint." It was overruled v. Wadleigh (1899), 103 Wis. 318, 79 N. W.

by the court l)elov/, and this was affirmed 237; Francisco v. Hatch (1903), 117 Wis.

l

Bill u. Barr tt.

14

B.

fon.

by the Supreme Court; but the r)pini()n 242, 93 N. W. 1118. See also note 1,

showH thai if the action had been a legal ji. 9, sn/ira.'J

one, the demurrer would have been sus-

I'· 9, . 11prc1.J
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It is simply an abuse of language to say that the ancient forms

of action liave been abolished, and tliat any of the rules which

were based upon the existence of these forms, and had no rele-

vancy except in connection therewith, are retained. The only

question is, Would the facts stated have enabled the plaintiff to

maintahi any of the common-law actions or a suit in equity?

This is, however, identical with the rule already given, that the

primary rights created by the law, and the wrongs committed

against them, and the remedial rights resulting from such wi-ongs,

are unaffected by the legislation which only aims at a reform in

the procedure.

§ 47. *109. Illustrative Examples of Doctrine Reached. Differ-

ence in Form of Discussion under the Old System and the New.

Danger herein. The general doctrine thus reached may be prop-

erly illustrated by one or two examples which will serve to fix its

exact meaning and application. Under the former system, the

person who had the actual possession, or the immediate right to

the possession, of a chattel which had been taken and carried

away or destroyed by the wrong-doer, might recover his compen-

It is simply an abu e of languaO' to c tha th n i nt form
of action hav
en ab li h cl, and that
{ th rul ' hi ·h
f th ,
were ba ed up n the xi 't n
vancy ex ept in connecti n h r ' ith, a1 r ain cl.
nly
que tion i ', W uld th
tated hav nc bled he plain iff to
r a ·uit in q uity.
maintain any of the common-law c ti n
Thi is, however, identical " itl the rul alr ly iven, th t the
primary rig ht created by the law, ancl th "Tong
mmit
against them, and the rem dial right re ulting from u h wr n 0 ,
are unaffected by the 1 gislation which only aim a a r f rm in
the procedure.
§ 47. *109. Illustrative Examp les of D oct rine R eached. Diffe r ence in Form of Discussion u n d er t h e Old Syste m and the N ew .
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satory damages in the action of " trespass." To maintain it, the

possession or immediate right thereof was an essential element,

and the plaintiff recovered the value of the article as the measure

of his damages. If, however, the plaintiff had merely a contin-

gent or prospective interest, without right of immediate posses-

sion, in a chattel which was at the time the general property of

another. Ids appropriate action for the taking, destruction, or con-

version of the chattel by a wrong-doer, was " case," and his dam-

ages were a compensation for the pecuniary loss actually sustained.

The distinctions between these two actions have been abolished ;

but the distinctions between the primary rights and the wrongs

which constitute the two causes of action cannot be removed.

Now, as before, if the owner in possession sues for the taking

or destruction of his chattel, he will recover its value as his

damages, while if the holder of a contingent future interest,

unaccompanied "by possession, sues for the taking or destruction,

he will recover the value of his interest. In the one case the

plaintiff must establish his possessory right if he seeks to obtain

the value of the chattel as his compensation ; in the other case

the value of liis contingent interest will be proved and fixed

by the jury. These elements and features, however, do not belong

The general do trine thu reached may b properly illustrated by one or two examples which will rve to fix its
exact meaning and application. Under the form r s st m, the
person who had the actual possession, or the immediate right to
the possession, of a chattel which had been taken and carried
away or destroyed by the wrong-doer, might re over hi comp nsatory damages in the action of "tre pa ." To maintain it, the
possession or immediate right thereof was an e ential lement
and the plaintiff recovered the value of th article a the me ure
of his damages . If, however, the plaintiff had merely a ontingent or prospective intere t, without right of immediate po
sion, in a chattel which wa at the time th general property of
another, his appropriate action for the taking, d tru tion, or onversion of the chattel by a wrong-doer, wa "ca e " and hi damages we re a compensation for the pecuniary lo a tuall u tained.
The distinctions between the e two action ha e b n ab li"h d ·
but t he distinctions between the primary right and th
which constitute the two cau e of act1 n annot b r mo <L
Now, as before, if the owner in pos ' ~ i n su
f r th taking
or destruction of hi chattel, he will recov r it valu a hi
damages, while if the holder of a ·ontino- nt futur int r t,
unaccompanied by po ses ion sue for th taki1w r d
he will recover the value of his inter , t.
plaintiff must establish his pos es ory ri 0 ht if h
ob <in
the value of the chattel a hi compen ation · in th
h r a'
the value of his contingent intere t will b Ir v l and fi <l
by the jury. These elements and f atnr
how v r do not belong
Danger herein.
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to the action as a judicial instrument for establishing a right; they

belong to the primary and remedial rights themselves, which are

unchanged by the codes. In the former system of procedure, in

the works of text-writers, and in the judgments of courts, the

discussion and determination of these unchangeable primar5' and

remedial rights was always intimately connected with, and made

an essential part of, the discussion and determination of the rules

as to external form in the action itself, so that it was difficult, if

not impossible, to distinguish them. From the very nature of the

common-law system of procedure, as well as from tlie judicial

habit of mind wliich it produced, the courts seldom, if ever, p;ussed

upon the existence of the primary or the remedial right in the

abstract ; they decided rather whether tlie action was of the

proper form, or the averments of tlie pleadings were of the proper

nature, to maintain the primary riglit asserted, and to enforce the

remedial right claimed to have arisen. The result was that, in the

standard treatises and digests, primary and remedial rights were

classified and arranged under the various forms of action known

to the common-law procedure. These forms, with all their inci-
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dents, have been swept away ; but there is danger lest the tecli-

nical rules which have been abrogated should be confounded

with the principles relating to rights and remedies which remain

unaffected b}' the reform. •

§ 48. *110. Distinction between Actions ex contractu and those

ex delicto Preserved. Election. This Distinction relates to Cause

of Action. A particular feature of distinction between actions —

or rather between the rights upon which actions are based — which

existed under the common-law s^'stem has been preserved under

the new procedure. The general classification being made of

actions ex contractu and those ex delicto, there were many cases in

wliicli a party who had suffered a wrong by the conversion or the

taking and carrying away of his chattels might waive the tort,

and bring an action of assumpsit upon the wrong-doer's implied

to the action a a judicial ir trument f r

tabli hino- a right; they
th primary c nd re me lial ri ·ht th m el v , whi h r
uncht 11 ed b · the c e~ . In the f rm r
tern f pr ceclur , m
f ext-writer and in h, jmlgm nt~ of c urt
i cu ·i n an l determination f the e unchan ·e· ble rim r
r meuiill rigl t \ra .. alway intimat ly onnectecl wi h and lil'
n e ntial 1. rt of h di cu ion an determination f he r 11
a o external form in the a tion it ·elf o that it ' a· cliffi ult, if
not imp · ibl
di tino-ui h hem . From the ver r na ur f h
c mrnon-law y tern of procedure, a· well a from th judi i 1
habit of mind which it pro u d the c urt eldom, if \! r p< · eel
upon the ex· enc of tl e primary or the remedial rio-ht in th
ab tract · they decided rathe r whether the ac ion ' a of th
proper form r the averment of the pleadings were f the pr e r
nature to maintain the prim r right a erted, and t nf rce lie
remedial right laimed o ht Y ari en. The re ult wa hat, in he
tandar l tr ati es and clige t , primary and remedial ri h w :
cla "ified and arranged under the variou form of action known
t the common-law procedure. The e form , with all heir in ident haY be n wept away; but there i danger l t the clinical rule which hav been abrogated should b c nf uncle l
witl the prin i1 les rela in t right and remeclie which r ma,in
unaff cted by tl e reform .1

promise to pay the price of the articles taken. The same elec-

110.

48.

Distin ction between Actions ex contractu and those

tion still exists. Wherever the plaintiff who could sue in "tres-

pass" or "trover" might, if he chose, bring "assumpsit," he may

now waive the tort, and nraintain an action upon an implied prom-

ise and recover the price of the goods as though there had been

a sale. This choice, however, does not relate to the external form

' See Clark v Bates, 1 Dak. 42; Frout i-. Hardin, 56 lud. 165.
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of an action ; it relates to the very cause of action itself, — to the

unchangeable rights which are to be protected and enforced by

the judicial proceeding. In one instance, the plaintiff is permitted

to view the transaction as an injury to his property by which he

has sustained damages which amount to the entire value of that

property. In the other, he views the transaction as a sale, by

which the title to the property has passed to the defendant, and a

duty to pay the price rests upon him. For reasons of public

policy, the law allows the injured party to make his choice be-

tween these two quite different versions of the same transaction ;

and, although one of them may be a fictitious view, substantial

justice is done thereby. It is plain, however, that this rule has

no connection with the external forms of action ; it has reference

only to the rights and delicts which lie back of all actions.^

§ 49. *111. Conclusion. Criticism of the Author. Difference

in the Two Systems of Procedure. In conclusion, as the distinc-

tions between the common-law forms of action are abolished, the

practice since the codes, sometimes indulged in even by courts in

their solemn judgments, of retaining the ancient nomenclature,
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and of describing a given cause as "trespass," " trover," "assump-

sit," and the like, is productive of confusion, and of confusion

alone. No practical rules or doctrines in the administration of

justice according to the reformed system of procedure result from

these old forms ; no practical aid in the decision of a cause is

to be obtained from regarding it as "trespass," or "trover," or

" assumpsit," or from the giving it any other name ; no difficul-

ties are removed nor doubts cleared up by a resort to this method

of description. On the other hand, there is a constant tendency

to associate with these names the rules and doctrines which were

once inseparable from them, but which have been in the most

positive manner abrogated by the legislature ; in fact, much of

the doubt and confusion which even yet accompany the adminis-

tration of justice in those States which iiave adopted the reformed

1 As to actions ex contractu aud ax de- Sparman v Keim, 83 id. 245, 249 ; Lock-

Ucto, see Goss v. Board of Commissioners, wood i\ Quackenbush, 83 id. 607 ; Co-

4 Colo. 468, Pierce v. Carey, 37 Wis. 232 ; naughty c Nichols, 42 id. 83 ; Ledwich v.

Front V. Hardin, 56 Ind. 165: Greeutree c McKini, 53 id. 307. 316; Ross v. Mather,

Kosenstock, 61 N. Y. 583, 588-590, Fields 51 id 108; Matthews v. Gady, 61 id. G51 ;

I'. Bland, 81 id. 239 ; Neudecker v. Kohl- Graves v. Waite, 59 id. 156; Lataillade '•.

berg, 81 id. 296; Neftel v. Lightstone, 77 Oreua, 91 Cal. 565; and post, §§ *554-

id. 96; Harrington i-. Bruce, 84 id. 103; *564, *567-*573.

f an action; it r late t the Yery au: [ acti n it: lf, - t th
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no connection with the external form. of action; it ha r f rence
only to the rights and delicts which lie back f all action.'. 1
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in the Two Systems of Procedure.
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1 As to actions ex contractu and ex d elicto, ee Go s v. Board of Commissioner,
4 Colo. 468, Pierce v. Carey, 37 \Vis . 2.'3:2 ;
Frout v. H a rd in, 56 In d . 165 ; Greeutree 1•

Ro enstock, 61 ~. Y. 5 3, 5 -5 90, Fi eld ·
v. Bland , 8 1 id. 239; Neudec ker v. Kohlber , 81 id. 296; eftel v. Light tone, 77
id. 96; H arrington v . Bruce, 4 id . 103;

parman 11 Keim, :3 id . 245, 2-19; Lockwood ,., Quack nbu h, 3 id. 607; Conaugh ty 1• Ni hol , 42 id . 3; Ledwich l'.
TcKim , 5.'3 icl 307 . 316; Ro 1'. Math r ,
51 1d 10 , Matth w v. Cady, 61 id . G51 ,
7rave v \Y ait e, 59 id. 156 ; Lataillade 1• .
Orena, 91 Cal. 565; and po t, §§ · 554*564, ·56i-*573.
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system of procedure, is due to a retention of these names by the

bench and the bar ; and 1 beheve that the reform itself will never

produce its full results in simplicity and scientific accuracy until

the ancient nomenclature is utterly forgotten or banished from

the courts. The two systems of procedure are so entirely differ-

ent, they are based upon notions so absolutely unlike, that any

intermingling of their elements is impossible ; the one which has

been introduced by the legislative will must be left to be de-

veloped according to its own distinctive principles, without any
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interference from that which has been abandoned and discarded.

m of pr cedure is due to a retention of the e names by the
ar · an l believe that the reform itself will never
ro uce i full r ults in simpli ity and ci ntific accuracy until
the n ient n menclature is utterly forgotten or bani hed from
the ur . The two y tern of pro edure ar
entirely differen hey are a ed upon notions so abs lutely unlike that any
intermingling of their lements is impossibl · the one which has
been introduced b
he legi lative will mu t be left to be developed according to its own distinctive principles, without any
interference from that which has been abandoned and discarded.
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CHAPTER SECOND.

THE PARTIES TO THE CIVIL ACTION.

SECTION FIRST.

THE STATUTORY PROVISIONS AND THEIR GENERAL PRINCIPLES.

§ 50. * 112. Introductory. Fundamental Difference between Legal

and Equitable Actions in respect to Parties. Intention Shown in

the Codes to adopt Equitable Theory. The second of the distinc-

tive features which belong to and characterize the single civil

action of the American system consists of the principles and rules

adopted in respect of the parties thereto. Under the old procedure

the rules which governed the parties to actions at law, and those

which regulated the parties to suits in equity, stood in marked

contrast with each other ; in fact, the fundamental conception of

these two judicial instruments w^as radically unlike. It will be

sufficient to mention one of these essential differences. In an

action at law the plaintiff must be a person in whom is vested

the whole legal right or title ; and, if there were more than

one, they must all be equally entitled to the recovery. So far as

the mere recovery is concerned, the right must dwell in them all
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as a unit, and the judgment must be in their favor equall3\ The

defendants, on the other hand, must be equally subject to the

common liability, so that, even if it were possible for the jury to

find a separate verdict against each, the same and single judgment

must be rendered against them all in a body. In other words,

whatever might be the nature of the antecedent right or liability,

whatever antecedent power there might be of electing to sue by

one or all and against one or all, after the election is made to

sue by or against all, the recovery is necessarily joint, and the

burden of the remedy is necessarily joint. The suit in equity

was hampered by no such arbitrary requirements. Two general

and natural principles controlled its form : first, that it should be

prosecuted by the party really in interest, although with him

might be joined all others who had an interest in the subject-
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matter and in obtaining the relief demanded ; and, secondly, that

all persons \vhose presence is necessary to a complete determi-

nation and settlement of the questions involved shall be made

parties, so that in one decree their various rights, claims, interests,

and liabilities, however varying in importance and extent, may be

detei-mined and adjudicated upon by the court. As the methods

adopted by the chancellor did not require him to pronounce a

judgment in favor of all the plaintiffs, nor indeed in favor of

plaintiffs alone, and against all the defendants, nor indeed against

defendants alone, it was not a matter of vital importance whether

a particular person wlio was made a party should be a plaintiff

or a defendant. It was possible to give relief to defendants as

against each other or against plaintiffs. It must not be under-

stood that no order or method was observed in the disposition of

parties ; but, without discussing the various rules in detail, it is

sufficient for my present purpose to point out this fundamental

difference in conception between legal and equitable actions. The

intention plainly shown in the various State codes of procedure

is to adopt the general equity theory of parties, rather than the
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legal theory, and to apply it to the single civil action in all cases,

whatever be the nature of the primary riglit to be protected or

of the remedy to be obtained. How far this intention has been

expressed, how comj^letely it has been carried out in the legisla-

tion of the several States, will be seen from the provisions them-

selves to be immediately quoted. After making these extracts

and grouping them properly, I shall very briefly point out their

general similarity and their special divergencies from the common

type, and shall then proceed in the succeeding sections of the

present chapter ^vith a careful discussion of each separate provi-

sion. It will be seen that there is an almost complete identity

in many of these statutory rules as they are expressed in the va-

rious codes, although in some of them the equitable theory has

been more fully carried out in detail.

§51. *113. General Code Provisions. " Every action must be

prosecuted in the name of the real party in interest except as

otherwise provided . . . ., but this section shall not be deemed to

autliori/.e the assignment of a thing in action not arising out of

contract." ^ The same appears slightly varied in a few States,

' [Iii.liana, Burns' St., 1901, §251.] §4; [Kentucky, § 18 ; Washington, Bal.

Kansas, § 20 ; (Jregou, §§ 27, 37'J ; Nevada, Code, § 4824 ; Oklahoma, St., 1893, § 3898 ;

STATUTORY PKOVJSIONS IN RELATION TO PARTIES. 79

as follows: " Every action must be prosecuted in the name of

the real party in interest, except as is otherwise provided by

law."' In some codes the form is that first given above, but

to it is added the following clause : " But an action may

be maintained by the grantee of land in the name of the

grantor, or his or her heirs or legal representatives, when the

grant or grants are void by reason of the actual possession of a

person claiming under a title adverse to that of the grantor at the

time of the delivery of the grant, and the plaintiff shall be allowed

to prove the facts to bring the case within this provision." ^ In

Nebraska the following provision is added : " The assignee of a

thing in action may maintain an action thereon in his own name

and behalf without the name of the assisfnor." ^

§ 52. *114. Same Subject. "In the case of an assignment of

a thing in action, the action by the assignee is without preju-

dice to any set-off or other defence existing at the time of or

before notice of the assignment ; but this section does not apply

to a negotiable promissory note or bill of exchange transferred

in good faith and upon good consideration before maturity." *
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" When the action is brought by the assignee of a claim arising

out of contract not assigned by indorsement in writing, the

assignor shall be made a defendant to answer as to the assign-

Wisconsin, St., 1898, §2605; Minnesota, but he sliall, in his complaint, allege that

•St., 1894, § 5156 ; Missouri, Rev. St., 1899, lie is the actual, bo»a Jide owner thereof,

§ 540.] and set forth when and how he acquired

1 Ohio, § 25 ; Cal. § 367 ; Iowa, § 2543 ; title thereto."]

I^Utah, Rev. St., 1898, § 2902; North * New York, § 112 (502, 1909, 1910);

Dakota, Rev. Codes, 1899, §5221; Mon- Ohio, § 26; Kansas, § 27; California,

tana, § 570; Washington, Bal. Code, § 368; South Carolina, § 135; Oregon,

§4824; Idaho, Code Civ. Fro., 1901, §3155; §§ 28,382; Nevada, § 5; Iowa, § 2546,

Wyoming, Rev. St., 1899, § 3467; Col- somewhat different in form from the text ;

orado, § 3 ; Arkansas, Sand. & Hill 's Dig., N. C. § 55 ; [^Utah, Rev. St., 1898, § 2903 ;

§ 5623; Nebraska, § 29; New York, Code North Dakota, Rev. Codes, 1899, § 5222;

Civ. Tro., § 449, but see provisions cited South Dakota, Ann. St., 1901, § 6071;

in following note. Arizona, Rev. St., 1901, Arizona, Rev. St., 1901, § 1301 ; Okla-

§ 1299. homa, St., 1893, § 3899 ; Washington, Bal.

•■^ New York, § 111 (1501, 449, 1909, Code, § 4835; Montana, § 571; Idaho,

1910) ; South Carolina, § 134; N. C. § 55. Code Civ. Pro., 1901, § 3156; Wyoming,

[South Dakota, Ann. St, 1901, §6070.] Rev. St., 1899, § 3467; Colorado, § 4;

3 [Nebraska, §30; Connecticut, Gen. St., Connecticut, Gen. St., 1902, § 650. in a

1902, § 631, where the following is the form somewhat different from that given

entire statute on the subject, without tiie in the te.\t; Indiana, Burns' St., 1901,

jirovision as to the real party in interest ; § 277; Nebraska, § 31; Wisconsin, St.,

" Tlie assignee and equitable and bona Jide 1 898, § 2606 ; Minnesota, St., 1894, § 5157 ;

owner of any chose in action, not nego- Kentucky, § 19.]

tiable, may sue thereon in his own name ;
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raent or his interest in the subject of the action ; " and this is

followed by the provision in reference to set-off or other defences

contained in the last citation.^

§ 53. * 115. Same Subject. " An executor, an administrator,

a trustee of an express trust, or a person expressly authorized by

statute, may sue without joining with him the person for whose

benefit the action is prosecuted. A trustee of an express trust

within the meaning of this section shall be construed to include a

person with whom, or in whose name, a contract is made for the

benefit of another." '^ The same as slightly varied : " An ex-

ecutor, administrator, trustee of an express trust, a person with

whom or in whose name a contract is made for the benefit of

another, or a person expressly authorized by statute, may bring

an action without joining with him the person for whose benefit

it is prosecuted. Officers may sue and be sued in such name as

is authorized by law, and official bonds may be sued upon in the

same way.'" ^

§54. *116. Same Subject. "All persons having an interest

in the subject of the action, and in obtaining the relief demanded,
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may be joined as plaintiffs, except as otherwise provided in this

title." ^ "Any person may be made a defendant who has or

claims an interest in the controversy, adverse to the plaintiff, or

who is a necessary party to a complete determination or settle-

ment of the questions involved therein."^ In a few codes the

1 [Indiana, Burns' St., 1901, § 277.] * New York. § 117 (446) ; Ohio, § 34

2 New York, § 113 (449); California, Kansas, § 35; California, §§ 378, 381

§369; South Carolina, § 136, Oregon, Iowa, § 2545; South Carolina, § 140

§ 29 ; Nevada, § 6 ; North Carolina, § 57 ; Oregon, § 380, but limited to equitable

CUtah, Rev. St., 1898, § 2902 , North Da actions; Nevada, § 12; N. C. § 60; [[Utah,

kota, Rev. Codes, 1899, § 5223; South Rev. St., 1898, § 2913; North Dakota,

Dakota, Ann. St., 1901, § 6072; Arizona. Rev. Codes, 1899, § 5229 ; South Dakota.

Rev. St., 1901, §§ 1299, 1300; Washing- Ann. St., 1901. § 6077; Oklahoma. St.,

ton. Bal. Code, § 4825; Montana, § 570 . 1893. § 3907; Washington, Bal. Code,

Idaho, Code Civ. Pro., 1901, § 3157 ; Colo- § 4833, in somewhat different form ; Mon-

rado, § 5; Arkansas, Sand. & Mill's Dig., tana, § 580 ; Idaho, Code Civ Pro., 1901,

§ 5626 ; Connecticut, Gen. St., 1902, § 620, § 3166 , Wyoming, Rev. St., 1899, § 3479 ;

where only the first sentence quoted in Colorado, § 10; Arkau.sas. Sand. & Hill's

the text appears; Wisconsin, St., 1898, Dig .§ 5629 ; Connecticut, Gen. St., 1902,

§ 2607; Missouri. Rev. St., 1899, §541; § 617; Indiana, Burns' St., 1901, §263;

Minnesota, St., 1894, § 5158, Indiana, Nebraska. § 40; Wisconsin, St., 1898,

Burns' St., 1901, § 252.] § 2602; Mis,souri, Rev. St., 1899, § 542;

* Ohio, § 27; Kansas, § 28; Iowa, Kentucky, § 22 ]

§ 2544, [Oklahoma, St., 1893, § 3900; * Ohio, § 35; Kansas, § 3fi ; Iowa.

Wyoming, Rev. .St., 1899, § 3469; Ken- § 2547; Nebraska, § 3S ; Nevada, § 13;

turky. § 21, in a somewhat different form ; Oregon, § .iSO. limited to equitable ac-

^'ebraska, § 32 ] tions ; QOklahunia, St., 1893, § 3908;

J
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same provision appears, but added to it is the following clause:

" And in an action to recover possession of real estate the land-

lord and tenant thereof may be joined as defendants ; and any

person claiming title or a right of possession to real estate may

be made a party plaintiff or defendant as the case may require to

any such action." ^

§55. *117. Same Subject. "Of the parties to the action

those who are united in interest must be joined as plaintiffs or

■defendants; but, if the consent of any one who should have l^een

joined as plaintiff cannot be obtained, he may be made a defend-

a,nt, the reason thereof being stated in the complaint.

" When the question is one of a common or general in-

terest of many persons, or when the parties are very numerous,

and it may be impracticable to bring them all before the court,

one or more may sue or defend for the benefit of the whole. "^

§ 56. *118. Same Subject. "Persons severally liable upon

the same obligation or instrument, including the parties to bills

of exchange and promissory notes, may all or any of them be
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included in the same action at the option of the plaintiff. "^ The

Washington, Bal. Code, § 4833, in some-

■what different form ; Wyoming, Rev. St.,

1899, § 3480; Colorado, § 11 ; Arkansas,

Sand. & Hill's Dig., § 5630 ; Connecticut,

Gen. St., 1902, § 618 ; Wisconsin, St., 1898,

§ 2603 ; Indiana, Burns' St., 1901, § 269 ;

Kentucky, § 23.]

1 New York, § 118 (447, 1503, 1598);

ame provision appears, but ad
to it is th foll wing clau
"And in an action to recover pos
i n f r al tat the landlord and tenant thereof may be join as
fenda t ; and any
person claiming title or a right of p ss ssion t real estate may
be made a party plaintiff or defendant as the case may require to
any such action." 1
§ 55. * 117. Same Subject. "Of th parties to the action
those who are united in interest mu t be joined a plaintiffs or
defendants; but, if the consent of any one who should have been
joined as plaintiff cannot be obtained, he may e made a defend.ant, the reason thereof being stated in the complaint.
"When the question is one of a common or general interest of many persons, or when the parties ar very numerous,
and it may be impracticable to bring them all b fore the court,
one or more may sue or defend for the benefit of the whole.'' 2
§ 56. * 118. Same Subject. "Persons severally liable upon
the same obligation or instrument, including the parti s to bills
of exchange and promissory notes, may all or any of them be
included in the same action at the option of the plaintiff." 3 The

California, §§ 379, 380; South Carolina,

§ 141 ; N. C. § 61 ; QUtah, Rev. St., 1898,

§ 2914; North Dakota, Rev. Codes, 1899,

§ 5230; South Dakota, Ann. St., 1901,

§ 6078 ; Moutana, § 581 ; Idaho, Code Civ.

Pro., 1901, § 3167; Missouri, Rev. St.,

1899, § .543.]

'•i This provision is thus given in one

section in New York, § 119 (448); Cali-

fornia, § 382; S. C. § 142; N. C. § 62 ;

Oregon, §381, limited to ecjuitahle actions;

Nevada, § 14, adding, however, to the

section as given in the text the following

clause : " Tenants iu common, joint ten-

ants, and copartners, or any number less

than all, may jointly or severally bring, or

defend, or continue, the prosecution or

defence of any action for the enforcement

of the rights of such person or per-

sons." The same provision is found in the

California code, § 384, except that " copar-

ceners " is substituted in place of " co-

partners." QUtah, Rev. St., 1898, § 2917 ;

North Dakota, Rev. Codes, 1899, §5232;

South Dakota, Ann. St., 1901, § 6079;

Arizona, Rev. St., 1901, § 1313 ; Moutana,

§584, Idaho, Code Civ. Pro., 1901, §3170;

Colorado, § 12; Indiana, Burns' St., 1901,

§ 270, Wisconsin, St., 1898, § 2604.] In

the following States it is separated into

two sections corresponding to the two para-

graphs of the text : Ohio, §§ 36, 37 ; Kan-

sas, §§ 37, 38; Iowa, §S 2548, 2549;

([Kentucky, §§ 24, 25; Oklahoma, St., 1893,

§§ 3909, 3910; Washington, Bal. Code,

§§ 4833, 4834, Wyoming, Rev. St., 1899,

§§3481. 3482, Arkansas, Sand. & Hill's

Dig., §§ .'■)631, 56.32 ; Connecticut, Gen. St.,

1902, §§ 617, 619, with a .separate pro-

vision, § 589, allowing several actions by

joint tenants and tenants in common ;

California code, § 384, except that " coparceners" i::i substituted in place of "copartn ers." [ Utah, Rev. t., 1898, § 2917 ;
North Dakota, Rev. odes, l 99, § 5232;
South Dakota, Ann. St., 190 l , § 6079;
Arizona, Rev. St., 1901 , § 1313; Montana,
§58-! , ldaho,CodeCiv. Pro., 190l , §3li0 ;
Colorado, § 12 ; Indi ana, Burn ' , t., 1901 ,
§ 270; Wiscon in, t., l 98, § 2604.J In
the following States it i eparated into
two ections co rresponding to the two parag ra phs of the text: Ohio, § 36, 37 ; Kansas, §§ 37 , 38; Iowa, §§ 254 , 2549 ;
[Kentucky,§§ 24, 25; kl ah ma, t., l 93,
§§ .3909, 3910; Wahington, Bal.
ode,
§§ 483.'3, 4834; Wy ming, Rev .• t., 1899,
§§ 3481. 34 2, Arkan a , and. & Hill's
Dig., §§ 563 1, 5632; . n necti ut, Gen. t.,
1902, §§ 617, 619, with a .eparate pr v1 · iou, § 589, allowiug . v ra l action by
)Olllt tenant and t na1Jt in common ;
Nebraska,§ 42, 43. Jn Mi ou ri , th fir t
paragraph on ly i enacted and i Rev. t.,
1 99, § 544 .]
a NewYork,§ 120(454); Kanas,§39;
Ohio, § 3 ;
alifornia, § 3 3, adding,
"and uretie on t he ame or eparate instrument," after the words "promissory

Washington, Bal. Code, § 4833, in somewhat different form; Wyoming, Hev. St.,
1899, § 3480; Colorado, § l l; Arkansas,
Sand. & Hill's Dig. , § 5630 ; Connecticut,
Gen. St., 1902, § 618; Wisconsin, St., 1898,
§ 2603 ; Indiana, Burns' St., 1901, § 269 ;
Kentucky, § 23.]
I New York,§ 118 (447, 1503, 1598) ;
California, §§ 379, 380; S outh Carolina,
§ 141; N. C. § 61; [ Utah, Rev. St., 1898,
§ 2914 ; North Dakota, Rev. Codes, 1899,
:§ 5230; South Dakota, Ann. St., 190 1,
:§ 6078 ; Montana,§ 581; I daho, Code Civ.
Pro., 1901, § 3167 ; Missouri, Rev. St.,
1899, § 543 .]
'.! This provision is thus given in one
.section in New 'York, § 119 (4-t 8); California, § 382; S. C. § 142; N. C. § 62 ;
-Oregon,§ 381, limited to eq ui table actious;
Nevada, § 14, adding. however, to the
.section as given in the text the fo llowing
dause : " Tenants iu common, joint tenants, and copartners, or any number less
than all, may jointly or severally bring, or
defend , or continue, the prosecution or
defen ce of any action for the enforcement
of the rights of such per on or persons." The same provision is found in the
6
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corresponding provision in some of the States is much more full,

and more explicitly alters the common law rules in respect to

joint debtors. " Persons severally liable on the same contract,

including the parties to bills of exchange and promissory notes,

common orders and checks, and sureties on the same or separate

instruments, may all or any of them, or the representatives of

such as may have died, be sued in the same action at the plain-

tiff's option.''^ "Every person who shall have a cause of action

against several parties, including parties to bills of exchange and

promissory notes, and be entitled by law to a satisfaction there-

for, may bring suit thereon jointly against all, or as many of the

persons liable as he may think proper; [and he may, at his

option, join any executor or administrator or other person liable

in a representative character, with others originally liable. "J^

"When two or more persons are bound by contract or by judg-

ment, decree, or statute, whether jointly only, or jointly and

severally, or severally only, including the parties to negotiable

paper, common orders or checks, and sureties on the same or

separate instruments, or by any liability growing out of the
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same, the action thereon may at the plaintiff's option be brought

against all or any of them. When any of those so bound are

dead, the action may be brought against any or all of the sur-

vivors, with any or all of the representatives of the decedents

or against any or all of such representatives. An action or judg-

ment against any one or more of several persons jointly bound

shall not be a bar to proceedings against the others."^

notes;" S. C. § 143; N. C. § 63; Oregon, » Qlowa, Code, 1897, § 3465; Ken-

§ 36, 382 ; Nevada, § 15; [^Minnesota, St., tucky, § 27, in slightly different form ; Ar-

1894, § 5166, "and sureties on the same kausas. Sand. & Ilill's Dig., § 5034, same

instrument ;" Utah, Rev. St., 1898, § 2918 ; as Kentucky.] In Kansas all ioiut cou-

North Dakota, Kev. Codes, 1899, § 5223, in tracts are declared to he joint and several ;

somewhat different form; South Dakota, on the death of one or more of the joint

Ann. St., 1901, § 6080, same form as in promisors or obligors, the right of action

North Dakota; Arizona, Rev. St., 1901, exists against the representatives of the

§ 1306, in somewhat different form ; deceased and against the survivors ; when

Oklalioma, St., 1893, § 3911 ; Washington, all die the right of action e.xists against

IJal. Code, § 4836 ; .Montana, § 585; Idaho, the representatives of nil the decea.sed

Code Civ. Pro., 1901, § 3171 ; Wyoming, debtors in all cases of joint obligations

Rev. St., 1899, § 3483; Colorado, §13; or joint " ;i.«sumptions " of partners or

Indiana. Hums' St . 1901, § 271 ; Nebraska, others, the action may be prosecuted

§44; Wisconsin, St., 1898, § 2609.3 against any one or more of those who

1 [Kentucky, § 26; Arkansa-s Sand. & are so liable. [Gen. St., 1901, §§ 1190-

Ilill's Dig , 5; .0633.] 11 94 J

2 [.Miss>,uri, Rev. St., 1899, §515]
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§57. *119. Same Subject. "(1) The court nmy determine

any controversy between the parties before it, when it can be

done without prejudice to the rights of others, or by saving their

rights; but when a complete determination of the controversy

cannot be liad without the presence of other parties, the court

must cause them to be brougiit in.

" (2) Wlien, in an action for tlie recovery of real or personal

property, a person not a party to the action, but having an inter-

est in the subject thereof, makes application to the court to be

made a party, it may order him to be brought in by the proper

amendment.

" (3) A defendant against whom an action is pending upon a

contract, or for specific real or personal property, may at any

time before answer upon affidavit that a person not a party to

the action, and without collusion with him, makes against him a

demand for the same debt or property, upon due notice to such

person and the adverse party, apply to the court for an order to

.substitute such person in his place and discharge him from lia-

bility to either party, on his depositing in court the amount of
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the debt, or delivering the property or its value to such person

as the court may direct, and the court may in its discretion make

the order."!

§58. *120. Special Code Provisions. The following special

provisions, found in several of the States, are quoted, not because

they are necessarily involved in the general theory of the re-

' In the followinjr States these provi- first and third subdivisions of tlie text,

sions form a single section, as in the text : QSo in North Dakota, Rev. Codes, 1899,

South Carolina, § 145, N. C, §65; Ne- §§ 5238, 5240; South Dakota, Ann. St.,

vada, § 17 ; [Wisconsin, St., 1898, §2610.3 '^01, §§ 6085, 6087; Washington. Bal.

In these others they are separated into Code, §§ 4840, 4842.^ In the others there

three sections, corresponding to the three is but one section identical with the first

subdivisions of the text : (^hio, §§ 40, 41, subdivision of the text: Oregon, §§ 40,

42: Kansas, §§41, 42, 4.S ; ^Oklahoma, .382; Iowa, § 2551. [^Missouri, Kev. St.,

St., 189.3, §§391.3-3915; Wyoming, Hev. 1899, § 0^19 In Arizona, Rev. St., 1901.

St., 1899, §§ 3487, 3488, 3490; Arkansas, § 1308, the provision is : " Additional par-

Sand. & Hill's Dig., §§ 5635-5637 , Ne- ties may be brought in l>y proper process

liraska, §§ 46-48.] In others still they either by plaintiff or ilefendant upon such

form two sections, embracing respectively terms as the court may prescribe; Con-

tbe first and second subdivisions and the necticut. Gen. St., 1902, § 621 ; Minnesota,

third (^Kentucky, §§ 28, 29; Utah. Rev. Gen. St.. 1894, § 5178, in different form.]

St., 1898, §§ 2921, 2926 ; Montana, §§ 588, The provisions of the Iowa and California

591 ; Idaho, Code Civ. Pro., 1901, §§3175, codes in relation to " intervening," which

3178; Indiana, Burns' St., 1901, §§ 273, are very special and unlike that in the

274, New York, §§452, 820.] In Cali- text, are quoted in a subsequent section of

fornia, §§ 389, 386, correspond to the this chajiter.
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formed system, but because they will serve to explain a number

of cases which will be cited hereafter, and because they show

the tendency of the modern legislation away from the arbitrary

notions of the common law in respect of parties. " A father, or,

in case of his death or desertion of his family, the mother, may

prosecute as plaintiff for tlie seduction of the daughter, and the

guardian for the seduction of the ward, though the daughter or

ward is not living wnth or in the service of the plaintiff at the

time of the seduction or afterwards, and there is no loss of ser-

vice.''^ "When a husband has deserted his family the wife may

prosecute or defend in his name any action that he might have

prosecuted or defended, and shall have the same powers and

rights therein as he might have had."^ "A father, or, in case

of his death or desertion of his family, the mother, may main-

tain an action for the injury of the child and the guardian for

the injury, of the ward." ^ "An unmarried female may prose-

cute as plaintiff an action for her own seduction, and recover

such damages as may be found in her favor."*

§ 59. * 121. Same Subject. In several of the States a part-
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nership may sue or be sued by its firm-name alone, the judgment

being enforceable against the property of the firm and of such

members as are personally served, provision being made for

extending its effect to the other members by some subsequent

proceeding. The following is the type of these provisions, and

they are all substantially the same:' "An action may be brought

by or against a partnership, as such, or against all or either of

the individual members thereof; and a judgment against the

firm, as such, may be enforced against the partnership property,

or that of such members as have appeared or been served with

notice. And a new action may be brought against the other

' ^Minnesota, St., 1894, § 5163] ; Call- clause, as to tlie guarfiian and ward, is not

fornia, § 375 ; Orep^on, § 34 ; Qldaho, Code found in the Iowa code: Oregon, § 33;

Civ. Pro., 1901, § 3163; Montana, § 577; [Idaho, Code Civ. Pro., 1901, § 3164;

Utah, Rev. St., 1898, § 2910; Washington, Montana, § 578; Colorado, § 9; Utah,

Bal. Code. § 4830; Indiana, Burns' St., Hev. St., 1898, § 2911 ; Arizona, Kev. St.,

1901, §265.] 1901, § 1305; Wa.shington, Bal. Code,

•■' [Minnesota, St., 1894, § 5165] ; Iowa, § 4829 ; Indiana, Burns' St., 1901, § 267].

§ 2564 ; QArkansaB, Sand. & Hill's Dig., ♦ Iowa, § 2555 ; California, § 374; Ore-

§ .5643; I'tah, Rev. St., 1898, § 2906; gon, § 35 ; [Idaho. Code Civ. Pro.. 1901,

Indiana. Burns' St. 1901. § 266.] § 3162; Montana. § 576 ; Utah. liev. St.,

' [Minne.sota, St.. 1894. § 5164] ; Cali- 1898. §2909; Wasliington. Bal. Code,

fornia. § 376 ; I.«wa, § 2.')56 But the last § 4S31 : Indiana, Biirn.s' St., 1901, § 264.]
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members on tlie original cause of action." ^ Certain other special

provisions in relation to parties will be quoted in substMjuent

sections, and especially the legislation of the various States con-

cerning suits by and against married women. This legislation in

several instances does not form a part of the codes of procedure,

but is contained in separate statutes having particular reference

to the status of marriage.

§60. *122. Statutory Provisions. Interpretation. Two Vie'ws.

The foregoing are all the provisions relative to parties in general.

It is plain, upon the most cursory reading, that the language of

these sections is so comprehensive, and without exception or

limitation, that it appears to include all actions, legal and equi-

table, and to apply the equitable doctrines alike to both classes.

It should be observed, however, in this connection, that in a vast

number of actions strictly legal the equitable theory of parties,

as stated in these clauses, would determine the proper parties

thereto in exactly the same manner as the common-law theorj%

and there could arise, then, no conflict. The possible conflict

which could arise in other cases would result either (1) from the
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old notion that in a common-law action all the plaintiffs must be

equally interested in the recovery, and all the defendants equally

liable to the judgment, so that no person could be a plaintiff who

did not allege for himself this community of interest, or be made

a defendant against whom this community of liability was not

charged, or (2) from the com.mon-law doctrine of joint, joint

and several, or several rights and liabilities which control to

a very great extent the rules as to parties in legal actions.

One school of judges, applying to this particular topic the

theory of interpretation described in the preceding chapter, have

been unable to concede that the general statutory provisions

quoted above did repeal and abrogate these long and firmly

established rules and doctrines of the common law, and have

therefore wished to confine their operation and effect to equitable

1 Iowa, § 2553 ; ^Minnesota, St., 1894, known ; and in such case it shall not be

§ 51772; California, § 388; Nebraska, necessary to allege or prove the uames

§§ 24, 27. Qn Wyoming, Rev. St., 1899, of the individual members thereof " The

§ 3485, the provision is as follows; "A Colorado statute, § 14, is similar in sub-

partnership formed for the purpose of stance, but differs in form. So in Utah,

carrying on trade or business in this state. Rev St.. 1898, § 2927 ; Connecticut, Geu.

or holding property therein, may .sue or St., 1902, § 588; Ohio, R. S., 1900,

be sued by the usual or ordinary name § 5011/]

which it has assumed, or by which it ie

members nth
r <in th r .· pecial
pr vi ·ions in r
l ar i
t u in .·ub ' <IU • 11L
c i n , and e p iall th
i L i r
c ming ui t by ancl ag in t marri l w
v ral in t n
d
n t f
ut is contain d in parat tatut
to the status of marriag .
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actions.' Another school of judges, regarding the codes as

h
f judor
tut . haY b n inclin
gi v th ir 1 11
th full
" n t
th
b li h d an 1

highl}' remedial statutes, have been inclined to follow out their

spirit, and to give their language the fullest meaning of wliich

hi

it is capable, even to the extent of liolding that its general

expressions abolished and swept away the legal distinctions

between joint, joint and several, and several rights and liabili-

ties. The influence and effect of these different systems of

interpretation will be shown in the succeeding sections of this

the

d

a

i
me i u ·
and liabili-

chapter.

f

§ 61. *128. More Radical Statutes in a Few States. Outline

of Treatment of Parties. In a few of the States the legislation has

h wn in th

left no room for any such conflict of opinion, and has pushed the

u

equitable theory to its final results by express enactments which

leave nothing to implication. The codes of these States provide

61.

for bringing in parties to certain legal actions under some cir-

cumstances merely because they have an interest in the event of

the suit, although they have no share in the relief, and bear no

part of the liability; and they utterly abrogate the common-law

rules relative to joint, joint and several, or several liabilities.
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In these States, therefore, there can be no doubt as to the con-

struction which should be put upon the general statutory provi-

sions quoted; and they are treated as establishing the equity

doctrine and applying it to actions of all kinds. In the suc-

ceeding sections of this chapter I shall pursue the order of the

legislation whicli is the same in all the States, and shall sepa-

rately discuss the following subjects: The Real Party in In-

terest to be made Plaintiff; The Effect of an Assignment of

a Thing in Action upon the Defences to it; A Trustee of

an Express Trust, etc., to sue alone; Who maybe joined as

Plaintiffs ; Who may be joined as Defendants ; When One or

More may sue or be sued for All; Parties severally liable on

the same Instrument; Bringing in New Parties; Intervening;

and Interpleader.

> As an illustration of these views, see the opinion of S. L. Selden J. in Voorhis

V. Child's Ex., 17 N. Y. 354.

12 .

More Radic a l Statutes in a Few

Outline
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SECTION SECOND.

THE REAL TARTY IN INTEREST TD BE MADE PLAINTIFF.

§ 62. *124. Statutory Provision as to Real Party in Interest.

*' Every action must be prosecuted in the name of the real party

in interest/ except when otherwise provided . . .," is the sen-

sible and comprehensive form used in Ohio, California, Iowa,

Nebraska, Wyoming, Idaho. ^ To this is added: "But this sec-

tion shall not be deemed to authorize the assignment of a thing

in action not arising out of contract," in Indiana, Kansas, Mis-

souri, Wisconsin, South Carolina, Kentucky, Oregon, Nevada,

North Carolina, Washington. ^ It was sometimes said that at

the common law a thing in action, not negotiable, could not be

assigned; but the true meaning of the rule was merely this, that

the assignee could not bring an action upon it in his own name.

Courts of law had long recognized the essential validity of such

assignment in a large class of cases, by permitting the assignee,

who sued in the name of his assignor, to have entire control of

the action, and by treating him as the only person immediately

interested in the recovery. Indeed, the assignment gave to the
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assignee every element and right of property in the demand trans-

ferred, except the single one of suing upon it in his own name ;

it was regarded as assets in his hands and in those of his personal

representatives ; his rights were completely protected against the

interference of the assignor with an action brought in the latter's

name. It is true, the property derived from the assignment was

said to be equitable, and not legal ; but this distinction did not

lessen the intrinsic, essential nature of the ownership. It would

seem that the property of the assignee is now strictly legale

although the question does not require any solution in this work.

1 [^Sheridan v. Nation (1900), 159 Mo. under section 29 of tlie code of Civil Tro-

27, 59 S. W. 972 : The code requirement cedure, is the person entitled to the avails

that the suit be brought in the name of of the suit : " Kinsella v. Sharp (1896i.

the real party in interest does not mean 47 Neb. 664, 66 N. W. 634.]

that it must be brouglit in the real name ^ QAlso in New York, Utali, Nortli

of the party in interest. A party may do Dakota, Montana, Washington, Colorado,

business in any name he wishes, and suit and Arkansas.]

may be brought in that name. ^ [|Also in Soutli Dakota and Arizona.]

Definition : " The real party in interest

I\'lL
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§ 63. * 125. Principal Effect of Statutory Provision. One effect

— and perhaps the principal effect of this statutory provision —

is, that all assignees of things iti action which are assignable may

sue upon them in their own names, and are no longer obliged to

sue in the names of the original assignors.^ It is not strictly

correct to say that the provision itself renders any thing in action

assignable, that it creates any attribute of assignability ; but, for

the purpose of defeating such possible interpretation, the second

clause was added in many of the codes. This limiting clause,

however, is only negative in its form and meaning. It merely

forbids a certain construction to be placed upon the preceding

language. It does not say that no thing in action is assignable

unless it arises out of contract. The rules governing this quality

of things in action are found in other provisions of the law, and

not in this section.

§ 64. *126. Legal Assignment. Action in Name of Assignee,

niustratious. The immediate and in some respects the most

important consequence of the rule that "every action must be

prosecuted in the name of the real party in interest," is this:
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wherever a thing in action is assignable, the assignee thereof

must sue upon it in his own name.^ I shall therefore, in the

first place, discuss this result, and ascertain the extent to which

it has been carried, and the cases to which it has been applied.

It is abundantly settled that when a thing in action, transferable

by the law, is absolutely assigned, so that the entire ow^nership

1 This provision only applies to " ac- 542; Carpenter r. Tatro, 3C id. 297; Har-

tious " as defined in the code, and not to din v. Hilton, .50 Ind. 319 ; State v. John-

special proceedings. The proceeding to son, ,52 Ind. 197; Mitchell v. Dickson, 53

enforce a mechanic's lien, in pursuance of Ind. 110; Shane v. Francis, 30 Ind. 92;

certain special statutes in New York, is Gallagher v. Nichols, GO N. Y. 438, 448.

not an action ; and the original liulder of - [^I'hcEiiix Ins. Co. w. Carualian (1900),

the lien who had assigned it is the proper 63 0. St. 258, 58 N. E. 805 : Where the

party to institute the proceeding for tlie owners of a chose in action assign the

henefit of his assignee. Hallahan v. Her- same ahsolutely to a third party, the as-

hert, 57 N. Y. 409. As to actions by the signee muM sue on it, even though the

assignee, see Devlin »;. The Mayor, etc., contract of assignment contains the further

63 N. Y. 8, 14-20; Sheridan i'. The provision that the assignors are to pro-

Mayor, etc., 68 id. 30 ; Fitch v. Rathhun, ceed to collect the moneys due on said

61 id. 579 ; Morris c. Tuthill, 72 id. 575 ; chose in action in their own names and

Merchants' Bank v. Union II. & T. Co., 69 pay over the same to the assignee. The

id. 373, 380; Green v. Niagara Ins. Co., 6 code is imperative that the action must he

Hun, 128; Jackson v. Daggett, 24 Hun, brought in the name of the real party in

204; lirowning i^ Marvin, 22 Hun, 547; interest.]

Archibald i;. Mut. Life Ins. Co., 38 Wis.

63. · 12
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It i abundantly ettled that wb n a thing in action, tran f rable
y the law, is ab olutely a igned, ' O that the entir owner hip
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passes to the assignee witliout condition or reservation, and the

legal title is fully vested in him, he is the real party in interest,

and may sue upon it in his own name, and is, in fact, the onl}--

proper party to bring the action,' — as in the case of a claim for

the use and occupation of land thus assigned ;2 a partnership

demand transferred by the other partners to one member of the

firm;^ a delivery bond taken by a constable for the delivering up

of property which he had seized on execution and transferred to

the plaintiff:' in the action ; * the right of action to recover dam-

ages for a' breach of a covenant of seisin in a deed of conveyance

assigned by the grantee;^ a claim for borrowed money. ^ It was

held in Missouri that the assignee of a thing in action arising

out of contract must sue in his own name, although there was

DO specific statutory provision in that State permitting such a

demand to be assigned, and the statutory provision to that effect

formerly existing had been omitted from the revision of the laws

then in force. The clause of the Practice Act was enough to

authorize the action because he was the real jjart}- in interest.'
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§65. *127. Equitable Assignment. Same Rule. Illustrations.

Not only does the rule prevail when the assignment is absolute

and complete, and the assignee is the legal owner of the demand ;

1 CCrum i\ Stanley (1898), 55 Neb. 351,

75 N. W. 851 : The assignee of a chose in

action is the proper and only party who

can maintain an action thereon. Wood

V. Carter (1903), — Neb. — , 93 N. W.

158 ; Gunderson v. Thomas (1894), 87 Wis.

406, 58 N. W. 750 : The assignor of a

chose in action is not a necessary party.

But, as was held in Philip v. Durkce

(1895), 108 Cal. 300, 41 Pac. 407, the

averment that the plaintiff, who is an

assignee of a contract, was damaged in a

certain sum by its breach, is immaterial

and cainiot aid a failure to aver how much

the assignors were damaged thereby.]

2 Mills V. Murry, 1 Neb. 327, and a

claim of damages for waste against a

tenant or subtenant in favor of the rever-

sioner, and by him assigned to the plain-

tiff. Rutherford v. Aiken, 3 N. Y. Sup.

Ct. 60.

3 Canefox v. Anderson, 22 Mo. 347 ;

Stuckey v. Fritsche, 77 Wis. 329 ; Walker

V. Steele, 9 Colo. 388. A non-negotiable

note payable in work, Schnier v. Fay, 12

Kan. 184; Williams v. Norton, 3 Kan.

295. [jBaxter v. Hart (1894). 104 Cal.

344, 37 Pac. 941 : Where two partners

jointly entered into a contract with defend-

ant, and then, by an agreement between

themselves, .stipulated that plaintiff should

be the recijiieut of the entire benefit

thereof, this constitutes plaintiff the real

party in interest and he is the proper and

only party plaintiff. All the facts show-

ing it, however, should be alleged. ]

* Waterman v. Frank, 21 Mo. 108;

and see Moorman v. Collier, 32 Iowa, 138.

Where a bond is taken in an action by an

officer for the security of any particular

person, that person is the real party in

interest.

5 Van Doren v. Relfe, 20 Mo. 455 ;

Utley r. Foy, 70 N. C. 303 (a land

contract). See also Bartholomew Cy.

Comni'rs r. Jameson, 86 Ind. 154.

« Smith V. Schibel, 19 Mo. 140; Knad-

.0
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it prevails with equal force in cases where the assignment is

simply equitable in its character, and the assignee's title would

not have been recognized in any form by a court of law under

the old system, but would have been purely equitable. Such

assignee, being the real party in interest, must bring an action

in his own name; for, in respect to this provision of the statute,

the equit}^ doctrine which it embodies is, beyond a question, to

be applied to all actions.^ As illustrations: the person to whom

an order is given by a creditor upon his debtor for the whole

amount of the demand, although the debtor has not accepted nor

promised to pay, is an equitable assignee, and nnist sue in his

own name ; ^ also, where a creditor assigns part of his claim to

the plaintiff, of which the debtor has notice ; ^ and when a bond

was verbally assigned, and was delivered by the obligee to the

plaintiff;* and when the assignment, though absolute on the

face, was, in fact, partial, the assignee agreeing to account for

the remaining portion to the assignor. In this case the assignor

might be brought in to protect his own interests, and, in some
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States, would be an indispensable party. ^ The rule deduced

1 See Cottle v. Cole, 20 Iowa, 481, 485 ;

Lytle V. Lytle, 2 Mete. (Ky.) 127. In the

fi-f-st of these cases Mr. Justice Dillon

said : " The course of decision in this

State establishes this rule ; viz., that the

party hoMing tlie le()a/ title of a note or

instrument may sue upon it, though he be

it preYt il wi h equal force in ca
wh re the a ignment i
titl w uld
imply ui , le in it char cter and the a ign
n
hnxe b n recogniz d in any form b3 a court of law under
th
y t m, but w uld have b en purely equit ble. Such
n
b in 0 the r l party in intere t, mu t bring an action
in hi own m me · for, in r pe t t o this r 1 1 n f th tatute
the e uit d ctrine which it embodie is, beyond a que tion, to
illu ·tration : the per on t whom
be applied t all acti n . 1
n.n order i given by a creditor up n bis debt r for the whole
amount of the demand, although the debt r has not accepted no1'
promi d t o pay i an equitable assigne , and mu t ue in hi "
wn name ; 2 al 'o, where a creditor assign part of hi claim to
the plaintiff of whi h the d btor ba notice ; 3 and wb n a bond
wa' v rbally assigned, i:tnd wa delivered by the obligee to the
plaintiff ; 4 and when the a ign ment, though ab lute on the
face, was, in fact, partial, th8 assign e ag reeing t account for
the remaining portion to the a ignor. In this ca e the a ignor
might be brought in t o pr otect his own interest , and m some
tate , would be an indispen able party . 5 The rule deduced

a-i agent or trustee, and be liable to ac-

count to another for the proceeds of the

recovery ; but he is open in such case

to any defence which exists again-st the

party beneficially interested. Or the

party beneficially interested, though he

may not have the legal title, may sue in

his own name. This may not j)rccisely

accord with the line of decisions under

other codes, but we think it liberal and

right, and conducive to the practical at-

tainment of justice." [^Hartzell v. Mc-

Chirg (1898), .54 Neb. .316, 74 N. W. r,2fi :

" The equitable owner of a negotiable

promissory note in his po.ssession may

maintain an action there(jn in liis own

name. "3

- VVheatley v. Strobe, 12 Cal. 92. 98;

Walker v. Mauro, 18 Mo. 564. Upon

facts as stated in the text. Gamble J. says

in the last case : " The effect of our new

code of practice, in abolishing the distinc-

tions between law and ecjnity, is to allow

the assignee of a chose in action to bring

a suit in his own name in ca.scs where, by

the common law, no assignment would be

recognized. In this respect, the rules of

equity are to prevail, and the assignee

may sue in his own name." He goes on

to show that this is an equitable though

not a legal assignment.

3 Grain v. Ahlrich,,38 Cal. 514 ; Childs

V. Alexander, 22 S. C. 169. vSee Shaver

V. West. Un. Tel. Co., 57 N. Y. 459, 464.

* Conyngham v. Smith, 16 Iowa, 471,

475 ; Barthol v. Blakin, 34 Iowa, 452,

and Moore v. Lowry, 25 Iowa, 336. Same

decision in case of mortgages vcrl)ally

a.ssigned. S. P. Green v. Marble, 37 Iowa,

95; Andrews r. Mc Daniel, 68 N. C. 385

(an unindorsed note).

5 Gradwohl v. Harris, 29 Cal. 150.

1
ee Cottle v. Cole, 20 Iowa, 4 1, -! 5;
I ... ytle i•. Lytle, 2 Mete. (Ky.) 127. In the
fir ·t of the e a e · Mr. Ju. tice Dillon
said: "The cour e of deci ion in thi
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hi own name. Thi ma.v n t pr ci. ly
accorrl with th line of d ·i ion. under
de , hue w think it lib ral and
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),fi4 Teb. 316, 74 . W. 626:
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tr be, l 2 al. 92, 9 ;
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from these iiutliorities is plain and imperative: The assigntH;

need not he the legal owner of the tiling in action; if the legal

owner, he must of course bring the action; hut, if the assignee's

right or ownership is for any reason or in any manner equitaVile,

he is still the proper plaintiff, in most of tlie States the only

plaintiff, although, in a few, the assignor should be joined as a

plaintiff or as a defendant.^ The plain intent of the statute is to

extend the equity doctrine and rule to all cases. '-^

§ 66. * 128. Effect of Statute in Case of Negotiable Instruments.

Conflict in Opinion. As the Statutory provision declares that

"every action must be prosecuted in the name of the real party

in interest," the defence that the plaintiff is not such real party

in interest is, in general, a bar to the suit.^ This is certainly so

when the plaintiff is the assignee of anything in action not

negotiable, and the issue raised by an answer setting up such

defence would be simply whether the plaintiff was, upon the

proof, the real party in interest. If, however, the thing in action

of the recovery. The court held that the
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action was properly brought, but also that

the interveutiou was proper, and gave a

judgnieut that the plaintiff recover one-

fourth and W. & B. three-fourths of the

demand. Such au intervention and judg-

ment would doubtless shock a lawyer bred

iu the old school ; but it is convenient,

sensible, and every way worthy of univer-

sal adoption. The common-law objection

that a divided judgment is impossible is

simply absurd; the thing is done, and is

therefore possible. See also Allen v.

Brown, 44 N. Y. 228, 2.31 ; Uurgin v. Ire-

land, 14 N. Y. 322; Williams v. Brown,

2 Keyes, 486 ; Paddon v. Williams, 1

Robt. 340 ; Meeker v. Claghorn, 44 N. Y.

349, 353 ; Wetmore r. San Francisco, 44

Cal. 294, 300 ; Lapping i-. Duffy, 47 Ind.

51; Boyle v. Bobbins, 71 N. C. 130;

Bartholomew Cy. Comm'rs i'. Jameson,

8<) Ind. 154 (where A receives money of

B, and in consideration tliereof agrees to

assign to B any judgment lie, A, may re-

cover on a claim held by him against C,

there is an equitable a.ssignment of the

claim, and C alone can sue thereon);

Childs V. Alexander, 22 S. C. 169.

1 ^Reynolds v. Louisville, etc. R. R. Co.

(1895), 143 Ind. 579, 40 N. E. 410, quoting

the text.]

2 McDonald v. Knecland, 5 Minn. 352,

365.

* [^lowa and Cal. Land Co. v. Iloag

(1901), 132 Cal. 627,64 Pac. 1073: "As

was said by this court in Philbrook v.

Superior Court, 111 Cal. 31, a defendant's

right is to have a cause of action prose-

cuted against him by the real party in in-

terest, but, as has been elsewhere pointed

out (Giselmau v. Starr, 106 Cal. 651), liis

concern ends when a judgment for or

again.st the nominal plaintiff would protect

him from any action upon the same de-

mand by another, and when, as against the

nominal plaintiff, he may assert all de-

fences and counterclaims available to

him, were the claim prosecuted by the real

owner."

So in Sturgis v. Baker (1903), — Ore.

— , 72 Piiiv 744, and Lodge v. Lewis
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is an instrument negotiable in its nature, the subject is compli-

cated by the special doctrines and rules of the law which relate

to the quality of negotiability. It is elementary that possession

of negotiable paper, payable to bearer, is at least prima facie

evidence of ownership; and it is also settled that when such

paper, payable to order, is indorsed and delivered to the in-

dorsee, the legal title passes to him, and he may maintain an

action thereon; while the maker, acceptor, or indorsers cannot

question his title, at least in any manner short of impeaching its

good faith. This legal title carried with it the right to sue, no

matter what arrangements might be made between him and his

immediate indorser concerning the use of the proceeds. The

question then arises. Has the rule introduced by the code changed

these established doctrines ? Does the apparent and formal legal

ownership resulting from the possession of a negotiable instru-

ment payable to bearer, or from the indorsement and possession

of similar paper payable to order, constitute the plaintiff the real

party in interest within the meaning of the code ? Or ma}^ the

defendant go behind this formal title, and show that some other

Generated for facpubupdates (University of Michigan) on 2014-06-17 15:31 GMT / http://hdl.handle.net/2027/uc2.ark:/13960/t02z1c23b
Public Domain / http://www.hathitrust.org/access_use#pd

person is the real party in interest, and thus defeat the action?

If the latter query must be answered affirmatively, it is evident

that the statutory provision under consideration has made an

important change in the law of negotiable paper. The question

thus proposed has given rise to some conflict in opinion, and is

not entirely free from doubt. On the one side it has been urged

that the language of the section in all the State codes is most

general and comprehensive, containing no exception in terms nor

by implication, and that it is, in its highest degree imperative,

''''must be prosecuted in the name of the real party in interest,"

except in the single case of "the trustee of an express trust,"

and that the real party in interest is the person for whose immedi-

ate benefit the action is prosecuted, who controls the recovery,

and not the person in whom the mere naked apparent legal title

is vested. On the other side it is urged that the rule permitting

such a holder or indorsee to prosecute the action is one of the

elementary doctrines of the law relating to negotiable paper, — a

rule not of practice or procedure, but of the mercantile and com-

mercial law, — and that the legislature cannot liave intended, by

such a general clause of a statute concerning procedure, to abro-

gate well-settled principles of the law merchant. I will examine

rum nt negotiable in it na ure th ubj ct i complipecial doctrin s and rule of the 1 w which r late
es ion
t
of n go iability. It is elementary that
pap r pa; able to bearer is at lea t prima facie
i ence f owner,hip · and it is al o ettled that wh n uch
able to rd r i ind r ed and delivered to the inthe 1 gal title pa e to him and he ma maintain an
action thereon· while the maker, accep or or in or er cannot
qu tion hi title at lea t in any manner short of imp aching its
good faith . Thi legal title carried with it the right to ::1ue, no
matter what arrangements might be made between him and his
immediate indorser concern ing the use of the proc d . The
que tion then ari e Ha the rule introduced by th code changed
the e tabli h d doctrine ? Doe the apparent and formal legal
owner hip re ulting from th po e ion of a negotiable in trument pa able t bearer or from the indorsement an
o e ion
f imilar paper pa able to order constitute the plaintiff tl r al
rty in interest within th meaning of the code? Or ma r the
fondant go behind this formal title, and sh w that ome other
per on i the real party in interest, and thu defeat th action?
If the latt r query mu t be answered affirmati ely, it i vident
th t the statn tory provi ion under con ideration has made an
ii
rtant change in the law of negotiable paper. The qu tion
thu propo ed ha given ri e to ome conflict in pini n and i
not entir ly free from doubt. On the one side it ha been urged
that the language of the ection in c 11 the tate cod i mo t
general nd comprehensive, containing n exception in t rm nor
y implication and that it i in it highest d gree im rati
"must be rosecuted in the name of the real party in intere t,
xcept in the singl case f "the tru tee £ an xpr
and that the real party in intere ti h p r on for wh
t
enefit th action i pro cu d " h ontrol t
r
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n t th p r on in wh m the m r n k d a par n t l gal i tl
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i tting
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f h
1
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n

THE REAL P RTY IN INTERE T TO BE THE PL I . TIFF.

93

THE REAL PARTY IN INTEREST TO BE THE PLAINTIFF. 93

and compare some of the cases in which the question has been

discussed.

§ 67. *129. New York Decisions. In Edwards V. Camp-

bell,^ which WHS an action upon a note payable to bearer, the

plaintiff had the note in his passession ; but a judgment in his

favor was reversed on the ground tliat he was not the real party

in interest. Killmore v. Culver ^ was an action upon a promis-

sory note payable to Tanner or bearer. The answer denied the

plaintiff's ownership, and alleged that Tanner was the real

owner. It was sufficiently established by the evidence that the

plaintiff was acting simply as agent for Tanner, and would be

immediately accountable to the latter for all the money recov-

ered. These facts were held to constitute a complete defence on

the ground that Tanner was the real party in interest, and should

have been the plaintiff. In James v. Chalmers,-'^ it was said by

one of the judges of the New York Court of Appeals, in refer-

ence to actions upon negotiable paper: "Under the code of

procedure, if it appears that the plaintiff is not the real party

in interest, it is a bar to the action, and no further defence is
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necessary." The question was very elaborately discussed by the

courts of New York in Eaton v. Alger,'* which was an action by

the indorsee of a note. The Supreme Court held that the de-

fendants! might prove that the plaintiff had no interest in the

note, but was a mere agent of the payee, and was bound to

account to him, on demand, for the proceeds, and that these facts

would constitute a complete defence to the action.

§ 68. * 130. The Rule in New York. Cases of higher au-

thority, because decided by the New York Court of Appeals,

have established the other rule for that State. In City Bank of

New Haven v. Perkins,^ the rule which prevailed prior to the

code was reaffirmed and applied to the facts before the court,

^ Edwards v. Campbell, 23 Barb. 423. bills in question, or their proceeds, from

"^ Killmore v. Culver, 24 Barb. 6.50, 6.57. tlie plaintiff." The doctrine of City Bank

' James v. Chalmers, 6 N. Y. 209,215, v. Perivius is declared to be the settled

per Welles J. general rule, but its operation explained

• * Eaton V. Alger, 57 Barb. 179, 189. and limited in Hays v. Hathorne, 74 N. Y.

* City Bank of New Haven v. Perkins, 486. As sustaining the general rule, see

29 N. Y. 554, 568, per Johnson J. The also Devol v. Barnes, 7 Hun, 342 ; Green

learned judge also said: " It will be time v. Niagara Ins. Co., 6 Hun, 128; Davis i'.

enough to determine whether any other Rowlands, 5 Hun, 651. But see Iselin v.

person has a better title when such person Reynolds, 30 Hun, 488.

shall come before the court to claim the

and compare ome of the ca
in which th q
ti n h ' been
di cu d.
67.
1"" ' New York Decisions. In Edward· v.
amp1
bell, which wa an action upon a note pa ya 1 to b ar r, the
plaintiff had the note in his
''e i n · but a ju<lgm nt in hi
favor was rev r d on the ground that h wa n t h r al party
in intere t. Killmore v. Culver 2 wa an acti n up n a pr mi ni d the
ory note payable to Tanner or bear r. The an w r
plaintiff owner hip, and alleged that Tann r wa th real
owner. It wa ufficiently establi hed by th evid nee that the
plaintiff was acting imply as agent for Tanner, and would be
immediately accountable to the latter for all th money r covered. These facts were held to con titute a complete d fence on
the ground that Tanner was the real party in interest, and should
have been the plaintiff. In Jame v. Chalmers, 3 it wa aid by
one of the judges of the New York Court of Appeal , in reference to actions upon negotiable paper: ' Under th code of
procedure, if it appears that the plaintiff is not the real party
in interest, it is a bar to the action, and no further defence is
necessary." The question was very elaborately discu ed by the
court of New York in Eaton v. Alger, 4 which wa an action by
the indorsee of a note. The Supreme Court held that the defendan ~ might prove that the plaintiff had no intere t in the
note, but was a mere agent of the payee, and was bound to
account to him, on demand, for the proceeds, and that these facts
would constitute a complete defence to the action.
§ 68. * 130. The Rule in New York. Ca 'e of higher auppeal ,
thority, because decided by the New York ourt of
have established the other rule for that tate. In ity Bank of
New Haven v. Perkins, 5 the rule which prevailed prior to th
code was reaffirmed and applied to the facts before the c urt,
1 Edwards v. Campbell, 23 Barb. 423.
2

Killmore v. Culver, 24 Barb. 656, 657.
s James v. Chalmers, 6 N. Y. 209, 215,
per W elles J.
4 Eaton v. Alger, 57 Barb. 179, I 9.
•
5 City Bank of New Haven v. Perkin ,
29 N. Y. 554, 56 , per J ohn on J . The
learned judge also said: "It will be time
enough to rletermine whether any other
per on has a better title when su h per on
shall come before the court to claim the

bill in qu tion, or their pro ed , from
the plaiutiff." The d trin of ity Bank
v. Perkin i declar d to be th
ttlecl
general rul , but it
p ration explainerl
and limited in Hay v. Hathorne, 74 . Y.
4 6. As u taining th g neral rule, ee
al o Devol v. Barne~ 7 Hun, 342 ; reen
v. Xiagara Ins. Co., 6 Hun, 12 ; Davi u.
Rowland , 5 Hun , 651. But ee Iaelin v.
Reynolds, 30 Hun, 4- •
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although no allusion was made in its opinion to the provisions

of § 111 (1501, -149, 1909, 1910). The doctrine was stated as

follows : " Nothing short of inahi fides or notice thereof will

enable a maker or indorser of such paper to defeat an action

brought upon it by one who is apparently a regular indorsee or

holder, especially when there is no defence to the indebtedness.

As to anything beyond the bona fides of the holder, the defend-

ant, who owes the debt, has no interest." The same rule was

repeated in Brown v. Penfield;^ but in this case also there was

no reference made to the provision of the code relating to the real

party in interest. It might be considered doubtful whether the

question had been put to rest by these two decisions, but all

doubt has been removed. The case of Eaton v. Alger was

carried to the Court of Appeals; the opinion of the Supreme

Court was overruled ; and the original rule of the law in refer-

ence to suits upon negotiable paper was expressly held not to

have been changed by the code.'-^ In this conflict among the.

decisions, the judgment of the court of last resort of course pre-

vails; and the question is thus settled in New York by the force
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of authority, whatever may be thought of the comparative weight

of the argument in support of either rule.

§69. *131. Rule in Other states. The doctrine which prevails

in Iowa seems to be the same as that now established in New

York.'^ The same doctrine appears to be established in Min-

nesota ; * in Missouri ; ^ in Nebraska ; ^ in Washington ; " in

California.^ The construction given to the statutory provision

1 Brown r. Peiifiel(l,36 N. Y. 473. The Ileipler (Minn.), 52 N. AV. 33; Elraquist

remarks of Davies C. J., in which this doc- r. Markoe, 4,5 Minn. 305; Van.streani v.

trine was reasserted, were, however, mere Liljengren, 37 Minn. 191 ; QStruckmeyer

vbiter dicta. c. Lam)) (1896), 64 Minn. 57, 65 N.W. 930.3

2 Eaton (•. Alger, 47 N. Y. 345; s. c. '^ Young v. Iluilson, 99 Mo. 102.

2 Keyes, 41. '• Ilerron r. Cole,25 Neb. 692; [^Meeker

8 Cottle r. Cole, 20 Iowa, 481, 485, per v. Waldron (1901), 62 Neh. 689, 87 N. W.

Dillon J. followed in Abell Note, etc. Co. 539 : Commercial State Bank r. Rowley

r. Hurd (Iowa, 1892), 52 N. W. 488 : (1902), Neh., 89 N. W. 765.]

" The course of decision in tliis State ^ McDaniel v. Pressler, 3 Wasli. 636 ;

establishes this rule; viz., that the party Davis r. Erickson, 3 Wash. 654; QKidilell

holding the legal title of a note or instru- ;•. Trichard (1895), 12 Wash. 601,41 Pac.

ment may sue on it, though he he an 905.]
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agent or trustee, and liable to account to * McPherson v. We.ston, 64 (^al. 275 ;

another for the proceeds of the recovery; Curtis ?•. Sprague, 51 Cal. 239; ^Oortel-

but he is oj)en in sucli case to any defence you r. .lones (1901), 132 Cal. 131, 64 I'ac.

wliich may exist ajjainst the person bene- 119; Toby v. r)regon Pac. Ry. Co. (1893),

ficially interested." 98 Cal. 490, 33 Pac. 550.

* Minnesota Thresher Manuf. Co. p. Tlie same doctrine prevails in North

. Y. 34-5 ; . .

THE REAL rA^rrY Ix\ INrEHL;8T TO BE THE PLAINTIFF. 95

by the court of Indiana is entirely different, as it is held to

include the indorsee and holder of negotiable paper as well as

the assignee of any other thing in action. Such indorsee or

holder, although possessed of the naked legal title, is not the real

party in interest, and is not authorized to sue, if the beneficial

interest and the whole right to the proceeds of the recovery are

in another party. ^ It is, however, a settled rule of pleading in

Indiana, that an answer merely averring that the plaintiff is not

the real party in interest, but that some other person named is

the real party, without alleging any facts from which these con-

clusions would arise, presents no issue. ^ In Kentucky, also, the

defence that the plaintiff is not the real party in interest may be

set up in an action upon a promissory note or other negotiable

instrument, brought by the person who is the apparent holder, or

who has the naked legal title, although in that State, by virtue

of an express provision of the code, the person having the legal

title must also be made a party, either plaintiff or defendant.^

In an action by the assignee of a note against the maker thereof,

it is no defence to show that the assignment was made with
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intent to defraud certain creditors of the assignor. This does

not make the plaintiff any the less the real party in interest. As

the assignor participates in the fraud, he could not repudiate his

transfer, and has parted with all possible interest in the note.*

Whenever the defence that the plaintiff is not the real party in

interest is allowable, it must be pleaded in the answer; if not, it

will be regarded as waived.^

Dakota. Seybokl v. Bank (1896), 5 N. D. Bank (Ky. 1892), 18 S. W. 234. [^See

460, 67 N. W. 682; Commercial Bank v. Power i\ Hambrick (1903), Ky., 74 S. W.

Red River Bank (1899), 8 N. D. 382, 79 660, where it was held that the assignee of

N. W. 859. Also in Montana. Meadow- a note may sue upon it in his own name,

craft V. Walsh (189.5), 15 Mont. 544, 39 whether the assignment was absolute or

Pac. 914.] merely as collateral security.]

1 Swift V. Ellsworth, 10 Ind. 205. See * Rohrer v. Turrill, 4 Minn. 407.

also Gillispie y. Fort Wayne & So. R. Co., ^ Savage v. Corn Exch. Ins. Co., 4

12 Ind. 398 ; Deuel v. Newlin (Ind. Sup. Bosw. 2; Giraldin i\ Howard, 103 Mo. 40 ;

1892), 30 N. E. 795; Bartholomew Cy. see also ;ws^ § *711, and cases cited in note.

Comm'rs f. Jameson, 86 Ind. 154. [^Lesh r. Meyer (1901), 63 Kan. 524, 66

'■' Lamson v. Enlls, 6 Ind. 309 ; Me- Pac. 245 ; Bank of Stockhara v. Alter

wherter v. Price, 11 Ind. 199 ; Garrison v. (1901), 61 Neb. 359, 85 N. W. 300. An

Clark, 11 Ind. 369; Swift v. Ellsworth, averment in an answer that the plaintiff

10 Ind. 205 ; Hereth v. Smith, 33 Ind. 514, is not the real party in intere.st i.s a mere

and cases cited; Hardin v. Helt(jn, 50 conclusion of law, and insufficient: Esch

Ind. 319. V. White (1901), 82 Minn. 462, 85 N. W.

^ Carpenter v. Miles, 17 B. Mon. 598, 238, 718. But an allegation that prior to

602. See Palmer v. Mt. Sterling Nat. tlie commencement of tlie suit the plaintiff

9
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70.

jj 70. *lo2. Absolute Assignment made Conditional or Partiad

by Contemporaneous and Collateral Agreement. Analogous to

the subject discussed in the preceding paragraph is the question

whether an assignee, to whom a thing in action has been trans-

ferred by an assignment which is absolute in its terms, so as to

vest in him the entire legal title, but which, by means of a

contemporaneous and collateral agreement, is, in fact, rendered

conditional or partial, is the real party in interest. It is now

settled by a great preponderance of authorit}', although there is

some conflict, that if the assignment, whether written or verbal,

of an3-thing in action is absolute in its terms, so that by virtue

thereof the entire apparent legal title vests in the assignee, any

contemporaneous collateral agreement by virtue of which he is

to receive a part onh' of the proceeds, " and is to account to the

assignor or other person for the residue, or even is to thus account

for the whole proceeds, or by virtue of which the absolute trans-

fer is made conditional upon the fact of recovery, or by which his

title is in any other similar manner partial or conditional," does

not render him any the less the real party in interest:^ he is
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entitled to sue in his own name, whatever collateral arrangements

have been made between him and the assignor respecting the pro-

ceeds. ^ The debtor is completely protected by the assignment,

and cannot be exposed to a second action brought by any of the

sold the note sued on, is a good defence : owner, has no interest in the property

Van Hoasen v. Broehl (1899), 59 Neb. 48, injured, may be allowed: Kansas City f.

80 N. W. 260. See also National Distil- Kin<,' (1902). 6,5 Kan. 64,68 Pac. 1093.

ling Co. L". Cream City Importing Co. I5ut see Service v. Baniv (1900), 62 Kan.

(1893), 86 Wis. 3.i2, .56 N. W. 864.] 857, 62 Pac. 670, and Hudson v. Barratt

QThe defence that the plaintiff is not (1901), 62 Kan. 137, 61 Pac. 737, where

the real party in interest may be raised sucli amendments were allowed,

by answer or demurrer: Meyer r. Barth Bowser c. Mattler (1893), 137 Ind. 649,

(1897), 97 Wis. .•?52, 72 N. W. 748; J. I. 35 N. E. 701 : A question as to the real

Case Threshing Co. r. Pedersou (1894), 6 party in interest, and as to the consecpient

S- 1) 140, 60 N. W. 747. right to sue, cannot be r.aised for the first

Where the defect appears on tlie face time in the Supreme Court, but such a

of the complaint, a general demurrer defence must be specially pleaded in bar.]

properly raises the objection: Smith r. ^ QBohart >'. Buckingham (1901), 62

Security Co. (1899), 8 N. D.451, 79 N. W. Kan. 658, 64 Pac. 627, quoting the text.]

981. See also note, p. 714, on Issues -^ [[Wines c. Hio (Jrande Ily. Co. (1893),

Raised by Demurrers. 9 Utah, 228, .33 P.ac. 1042, (juoting the

An amcnilment substituting the real text; Anderfson r. Yoscmite Mining Co.

j>arty in interest is not iillowal)le: Wilson (189+), 9 Utah, 420.35 Pac. 502 ; Guerney

«•. Kiesel (1894). 9 Utah. 397. 35 Pac. 488. r. Moore (1895), 131 Mo. 650, 32 S. W.

Hut an amendniont alleging that one of 1 132, (luoting the text.]

the plaintifTs, originally alleged to be an
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hav b en mad betw en him and the a ignor re pectin the pr ee 2 Th d btor i c mpl tel prot ct d by the a ignment
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parties, either the assignor or other, to whom the assignee is

bound to account. This is the settled doctrine in most of the

States.^ Notwithstanding the general unanimity of the court«

in sustaining this doctrine, there are still some indications of a

different opinion, although it can hardly be said that this differ-

ence has been embodied in an adjudication as the ratio decidendi.

The opinion to which I refer will be found at large in the note.

1 Allen 1-. Brown, 44 N. Y. 228, 231

•(assignmeut without consideration, and

assignee to be accountable to the assignor

partie ', ither the a ' 1gnor r th r t wh m th a· ign e is
bound t account. Thi i th ettled octrin in m st of the
tat
N otwith tan ing th g n ral unanirnit3 f th courts
rn u taining this do trin , th re are till ome indi ati n f a
diff r nt opinion, alth ugh it can hardly be aid that thi differ~nc h
been embodied in an adjudication a the ratio decidendi.
Th opinion to which I refer will be found at large in the not ,

for all the proceeds) ; Meeker y. Claghorn,

44 N. Y. 349, 353 (facts similar to the

1
last) ; Wetmore v. San Francisco, 44 Cal.

294 (assignment made as collateral secu-

rity) ; Durgin v. Ireland, 14 N. Y. 322

{assignment in writing absolute, but by a

contemporaneous agreement the assignors

were to have one half the proceeds) ;
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Castner i". Sumner, 2 Minn. 44; Williams

V. Norton, 3 Kans. 295 ; Cottle v. Cole, 20

Iowa, 481 ; Curtis v. Mohr, 18 Wis. 615;

Hilton V. Waring, 7 Wis. 492 (assignment

as collateral security) ; Wilson ),-. Clark,

11 Ind. 385; Gradwohl v. Harris, 29 Cal.

150 ; Saulsbury v. Corwiu, 40 Mo. App.

373 (assignment of note for collection) ;

Jackson i'. Hamm, 14 Colo. 58 ; Brumbaek

V. Oldliain, 1 Idaiio, 709 (assignment of

account for collection) ; Young v. Hudson,

99 Mo. 102 (assignment of account for

collection) ; Haysler v. Dawson, 28 Mo.

App. 5.31 (same); Sheridan r. The Mayor,

etc., 68 N. Y. 30 ; Gates v. No. Pac. R. Co.,

64 Wis. 64 (assignee to pay certain debts

of the assignor from the proceeds of the

suit, and account to the assignor for the

remainder) ; Vimont i'. Chicago & N. W.

R. Co., 64 Iowa, 513; Ginocchio v. Ama-

dor Canal & Min. Co., 67 Cal. 493; Ervin

V. Oregon Ry. & N. Co., 35 Hun, 544;

Walburn v. Chenault, 43 Kan. 352. In

Castner v. Sumner the notes m suit, wliicli

were for $3,100, were assigned as security

for $1,500, owing by the payee to the

plaintiff, the latter giving ])ack a bond to

pay over the balance after satisfying his

own demand. Upon these facts the court,

per Atwater J., said : " There may be a

question as to whether the assignment of

the notes was absolute, or whether a con-

tingent interest remained in tlie assignor.

But in either case tlie action is properly

brought in the name of the plaintiff." . . .

In Williams v. Norton a note payable to

the order of the payee had been verbally

transferred and delivered to the jjlaintiff

without endorsement. The action by such

Allen v. Rrown, 44 N. Y. 22 , 231

brought in the name of the plaintiff." . . .
In Williams v. Norton a note payable to
the orJer of the payee had been verbally
tran ferred aud delivered to the plaintiff
without endorsement. The action by such
assignee was held to be properly brought,
e\'eu though he may not be entitled to
apply to his own use the whole pro ed ..
"A deli,·ery by the payee to his surety or
indemuitor, with authority to recei,·e the
money aud pay the principal debt, will
enable the surety to sue in his own name.
He will, within the meaning of the code,
be the real party in intere · t."
[In Laurence i·. Congregational Church
( 1900), 164 N. Y. 11 5, 5 N. E. 24-, it was
held that "the a. ignee of a claim under a
written a ignment which Ye ts the legal
title in him, though as. ecnrity for a deb ,
i not bound, in an action against the
debtor, to prove the existence of a debt
from the as ignor to himself, as the state
of the accounts between the a, signor and
assignee does not concern the defendant,
or, if it does, the burden i upon him to
prove such a state of fact as would render
the a signment inoperative or rein Ye t the
a ignor in equity with the beneficial
ownership of the claim " (, yllabu ). In
Falconio v. Larsen {l 9i), 31 Ore. 137, 4
Pac. 703, it was helu that th e c ·ignee of
a claim for wages, as igned for collection
only, could sue in his own name. In
Toby v. Oregon etc. H. R. Co. {1893), 9
Cal. 490, 33 Pac. 550, the court aid: "A
trustee to whom a chose in action has
been transferred for collection is, in contemplation of law, o far the owner that
he may . ue on it in hi own name." R affinned in Cortelyou v. Jone {1901), 132
Cal. 131, 6-! Pac. 119.
ee al. o Pratchett
v. Marh (1 95), 52 Ohio t. 4-94, 40 N. E.
200; McBrayer v. Dean (1 97), 100 Ky.

(a. ignment without consideration, and

iguee to be accountable to the assignor
for all the proceeds); Meeker v. Claghorn,
44 N. Y. 349, 353 (fact . imilar to the
last) ; \Y etmore v. an Fran ci ·co, 44 Cal.
294 (a si<Ynment made a, collateral ecurity); Durgin v. Ireland, 14 N: Y. 322
(assignment in writing ab olute, but b.v a
contemporaueou: agreement the a signors
were to have one-half th e proceeds);
Castner v. umner, 2 Minn. 44; Williams
v. Norton, 3 Kans. 295 ; Cottle v. Cole, 20
Iowa, 481; Curtis v. Mohr, 18 Wis. 615;
Hilton v. Waring, i Wis. 492 (a ·signment
as collateral ecurity); Wilson 1;. Clark,
11 Ind . 3 5; Gradwohl v. Hanis, 29 Cal.
150;
aul bury i. Corwin, 40 l\fo. App.
'373 (a signment of note for collection) ;
Jack on v. Hamm, l-! Colo. 58; Brumback
v. Oldham, l Iuaho, 709 (a ·ignmeut of
account for collectio11) ; Young v. Hud on,
99 Mo. 102 (assignment of account for
collection); Haysler v. Daw on, 28 Mo.
App. 5.3 l ( ame); heridan v. The Mayor,
etc., 6 N. Y. 30; Gates i" No. Pac. R. Co.,
64 Wi . 64 (assignee to pay certain debts
of the as ·ignor from the proceeds of the
suit, and account to the assignor for the
remainder); Vimont v. Chicago & N. W .
R. Co., 64 Iowa, 513; Ginocchio v. Amador Canal & Min. Co., 67 Cal. 493; Ervin
v. Oregon Ry. & N. Co., 35 Hun, 544;
Walburn v. Chenault, 43 Kan. 352. In
Castner v. Sumner the notes in suit, "·hich
were for $3,100, were as igned a security
for $1,500, owing by the payee to the
plaintiff, the latter giving back a bond to
pay over the balance after ati fying hi
own demand. Upon these facts the court,
per Atwater J., said: "There may be a
question as to whether the assignment of
the notes wa absolute, or whether a contingent interest remained in the as · ignor.
But in either case the action i properly

398, 38

assignee was held to be properly brought,

even though he may not be entitled to

apply to his own use the whole proceeds.

" A delivery bj- the payee to his surety or

indemnitor, with authority to receive the

money and pay the principal debt, will

enable the surety to sue in his own name.

He will, within the meaning of the code,

be the real party in interest."

[]In Laurence v. Congregational Church

(1900), 164 N. Y. 115, 58 N. E. 24, it was

i

s. w.

50 .]
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as it is an able argument upon that side of the question. ^ Em-

braced within the same principle, and governed by the same rule,

a it is an a le argument upon that ide of the question . 1 Embraced within the same princi le, and governed by the same rule

1 Robbins v. Deverill, 20 Wis. 142.

The plaintiff sues an assignee of Peet

& Williams. Dixon C. J. gave the fol-

lowing opinion (p. 148) : " The statute is

imperative that every action must be

prosecuted in the name of the real party

in interest, except as therein otherwise

provided. The proof is that the plaintiff

is not the owner of the demand sued upon.

It belongs to the firm of R. & L., com-

posed of the plaintiff, his brother, and one

Lewis. The demand was transferred to

the plaintiff alone by words of absolute

assignment, no trust being expressed, but,

as the plaintiff himself testifies, he holds

it nevertheless in trust for his firm. It
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was received on account of a debt due the

firm of R. & L. from P. &, W. Upon these

facts it seems to me the plaintiff cannot

maintain the action. He is not the real

party in interest, nor the trustee of an

express trust within the meaning of the

statute. His brotlier and Lewis should

have been joined as plaintiffs."

pn Crowns !■. Forest Land Co. (1898),

99 Wis. 10.3, 74 N. W. 546, the court

seems to have departed somewhat from

the doctrine of Robbins v. Deverill. This

was a suit to foreclose a mortgage, and

the defendant attempted to defend on the

ground that the plaintiff was not the real

party in interest. The court said : " That

portion of tlie answer which alleges that

respondent gave no consideration for the

note and mortgage presents no issuable

fact. It tends in no way to defeat the

action. It is a matter of no moment to

appellant whether any consideration was

paid for the note and mortgage or not.

Under subsequent allegations in the an-

swer it appears that respondent became

vested with and held the legal owncrsliip

of the demand sued upon. The appellant

had no legal interest to inquire whether

the respondent's interest was actual or

colorable, or whether consideration was

paid therefor or not." And in Chase v.

Dodge (1901), 111 Wis. 70, 86 N. W. 548,

which was an action by the assignees of a

bill of merchandise, the court said : " The

assignee of a claim, holding the legal title

by a transfer valirl as against his assignor,

is the ' real party in interest,' and th*

proper party to sue thereon . . . ; and the

fact that such transfer is colorable only is

immaterial unless the rights of creditors

are involved or the right to interpose some

defence or counterclaim supposed to be

cut off by the assignment." See also An-

derson V. Johnson (1900), 106 Wis. 218,82

N. W. 177; Brossard v. Williams (1902),

114 Wis. 89, 89 N. W. 832-3

See also cases cited ante, under § *130;

and Bostwick v. Bryant, 113 Ind. 448

(assignee for collection merely of a note

cannot sue thereon in his own name) ;

1 Robbin
v. De>erill, 20 Wi . 142.
The plaintiff sue an a signee of Peet
- William . Dixou C. J. gave the followin opiuion (p. 14 ) : "The tatute i
imperative that every action mu ~ t be
pro ·ecuted in the name of the r eal party
in intere t, except a therein otherwi e
p ro ided. Th e proof i that the plaintiff
is not the owner of the demand ued upon.
It belong to the firm of R. & L., compo ed of the plaintiff, hi brother, and one
Lewi . The demand wa ran ferred t o
the plaintiff alone by words of absolute
a ignment, no tru t being expr e ed, but,
as the plaintiff him elf te tifi e J1e bold
it neverthele in tru t for hi · firm. It
was received on account of a debt due the
firm of R. & L . from P. & W.
pon thee
fact it seem to me th e plaintiff cannot
maintain the act ion. R e i not the real
party in intere t, nor the trustee of an
express t ru t withi n the meaning of the
tatute. Hi brother and Lewis should
have been joined as plaintiffs."
[In Crowns v. Fore t Land Co. (189 ),
99 Wi . 103, 74. J. W. 546, the court
seem to have departed somewhat from
the doctrine of Robbin v. D everill. Thi
wa a su it to foreclose a mortgage, and
the defendant attempted to defend on the
ground that the plaintiff wa not the r eal
party in interest. Th e ourt said : "That
portion of the answer which allege that
re pondent gave no con ideration fo r the
note and mortgage pre ·ent no i uable
fact. It ten d in no way to defeat the
action. I t i a matter of no moment to
appellant wh th r any con ideration wa
paid for the note and mortgage or not.
nd r sub. equeot all gation in th anwer it appear that re pond nt bec::i.me
ve ted with and h lcl the legal owner hip
of t he d mand ued up n . The app Jla.nt
had no 1 g::i.l intere t to inquire whether
the re pond nt' inte re t wa a tual or
c-olorabl , or wh · t her c n id rati n wa
paid therefor or n t ." And in ha
Dodg (19 l ), l 11 Wi . i , 6 .... W. 54 ,
which wa a u action by th a • ig n e. of a
Lill of mer<'handi. e, th, <'O nrt . aid: "The
a ign,.c r1f a. claim, holdin g he 1 gal title
L a tran fe r vali<l as agai n t bi a ignor,

i the 'real party in interest,' and the
proper party to sue thereon . . . ; and the
fa t t hat ucb tran fer i colora.ble only i
immaterial unle the right of creditor
are involved or the right to interpo e ome
defence or ounterclaim upposed to Le
cut off by t he a ignment."
ee al o Ander on v. Jobnson (1900} 106 Wi . 2 1 , 2
N. W.177; Bro ard v. Williams (190 ),
114 Wi . 9, 89
. W. 32.J
See al o case cited ante, under § *130;
and Bostwick v. Bryant, 113 Ind. H
(as ignee for collection merely f a note
cannot u e th er on in hi own name) ;
H oagland v. Van Etten, 22 Neb. 6 I ;
s. c. 23 eb. 462 (where th e pro ee<l of
the uit are to be paid t o the a ign or,
and the a ignee ha no beneficial intere~t
in them, the latter cannot ue on the
as ign d claim).
[In Kan a the . upreme court hru
wavered in i t deci ion . In the ase of
, tewart . Price (1902) 64 Kan. 191, 6i
Pa . 553, in a carefully rea oned op iniou .
a divid d cou r
xp1·e · l~· overrul cl the
ca e of Knapp v. Eldridge, 33 Kan. 106,
an d held that "one holding by writt n
a ignmeu a verified itemized a ouut i ·
not th real party in int re t, and anuot
maintain au a ·tion thereon in hi own
name wh ere it i
howu that, by a contemp raneou oral agr m nt, he ha:
agreed t pay t he full amount tb reoi.
when collect d, to hi a ign r ; and th1.
i true JJ tw itb tanding th a ignor testifie that t he d fendan in th a ti JJ does
not ow her an\'thin , that th whole
amount i due h ~· from the plaintiff, aJ11l
that h i to pay her pr Yid d he r ·
cover in the a tion.' But only two ear
lat r, t war t v. Pri e wa it lf expre ly
overrul d by th Cc e of Manley 1·.
Park {1904), - Kan . - , 75 Pa . 557,
the court unanimou ly appr ving the doctrin of tbe minority opinion in tewart
v. Price.
The ame rule obtain in hio. Brown v.
inn 1902} , '6 hio t. 316 , 64 . <. 123
In thi a e th ourt aid : "Wear aware
t hat th tend n v of ome urt ha be1·n
t uph ld action. hr ught upon n gotiab)P.
in ·trum nt
tran !erred for ·ollectiuu
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is the case of an assignee of a thing in action, who, by the terms

of the transfer, is not bound to pay the consideration thereof

until the debt has been collected ; he is the real party in interest,

and is fully authorized to sue in his own name.^

§ 71. * 133. Instances of Action by Assignee as Real Party in

Interest. The following are particular cases in which the as-

signee was held by the courts to be the real party in interest

within the meaning of the codes, and entitled as such to sue in

his own name: Where a bond or a mortgage was assigned

verbally;^ the assignment of a receipt and delivery order, which

was in the following words: "1,000 bushels of com. Received

in store, on account of S. F. A., 1,000 bushels of corn, to be

delivered to his order at, etc., etc. (signed) W. H. H.;"^

assignment of a promissory note payable to order without any

indorsement;* the assignment of a debt evidenced by a lost

note ; ^ where the assignment of a bond or note was by means of

a separate instrument in writing;*^ the assignment of a claim

arising from an agreement to pay the defendant in a certain

pending suit a stipulated sum of money if he would withdraw
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his defence;' the assignment of a claim for damages resulting

from the wrongful conversions of chattels ; ^ the assignment by a

widow of her right of dower after the death of her husband, but

before the dower had been set apart to her.^ The mere parting

only, on the ground that the plaintiff is 3 Merchants & Mech. Bank v. Hewitt,

the real party in interest, and that there 3 Iowa, 93.

are some authorities which point to that 4 Carpenter v. Miles, 17 B. Mon. 598 ;

conclusion. Indeed it may lie admitted White v. Phelps, 14 Minu. 27; Pease v.

that the trend in some of the Code States Rush, 2 Minn. 107 ; Pearson v. Cummings,

is in that direction. But we have found no 28 Iowa, 344 ; Hancock v. Ritchie, 11 Ind.

case which goes to the extent of holding 48 ; Rogge v. Cassidy (Ky. 1890), 1.3 S. W.

that an assignment of an open account 716; Caldwell v. Meshew, 44 Ark. 564;

for the mere purpose of collection, one Heartman v. Franks, 36 Ark. 501 ; Kiff v.

which gives the assignee a contingent Weaver, 94 N. C. 274.

interest only, constitutes him the real 6 Long r Constant, 19 Mo. 320.

i th a e of an a ign e of a hing in action, who, by th terms
of th tran f r, is not bound to pay th con id ration th r of
until the d bt has b n coll ct d; h i th r al arty in inter t
an i fully authorized to sue in hi wn name.1
71. * 133. Instances of Action by Assignee as Real P arty in
Interest.
The following ar particular ca
in which the a signee wa held by the courts to be the r al party in interest
within the meaning of the co le , an l entitled a uch to sue in
hi own name: "'W here a bond ·or a mortgage was a igned
erbally; 2 the assignment of a receipt and d livery order, which
was in the following words: "1, 000 bu hel of corn. Receiv d
in store, on account of S. F . A ., 1, 000 bushel of corn, to b
c1 livered to his order at, etc., etc. (signed) W. H. H.; ' 3
a ignment of a promi sory note payable to order without any
indorsement; 4 the a:s ignment of a debt viclenced by a lo t
note; 5 where the assignment of a bond or note was by mean of
a eparate instrument in writing; 6 the a ignment of a claim
arising from an agreement to pay the defendant in a certain
penJing suit a stipulated sum of money if he would withdraw
hi defence; 7 the assignment of a claim for damages resulting
from the wrongful conversions of chattels; 8 the assignment by a
widow of her right of dower after the death of her husband, but
before the dower had been set apart to her. 9 The mere parting

party in interest within the meaning of 6 Thornton v. Crowther, 24 Mo. 164;

the statute." Peters v. St. Louis, &c. R. R., 24 Mo. 586.

See cases cited in note 3, p. 91, and " Gray v. Garrison, 9 Cal. 325.

note 1, p. 87. 8 Smith v. Kennett, 18 Mo. 154; Laz-

1 Cummings v. Morris, 25 N. Y. 625 ; ard v. Wheeler, 22 Cal. 139. lu this la.«t

s. c. 3 Bosw. 560. case an action by the assignee to recover

2 Conyngham v. Smith, 16 Iowa, 471 ; possession of tlie chattels was sustained.

Barthol v. Blakin, 34 Iowa, 452; Green 9 Strong c. Clem, 12 Ind. 37 ; ([Dobber-

V. Marble, 37 Iowa, 95; Andrews v. stein v. Murphy (1896), 64 Minn. 127, 66

McDaniel, 68 X. C. 385; Kiff v. Weaver, N. W. 204-3

94 N. C. 274.

only, on the g round that the plaintiff is
the real party in interest, and that there
are ome authoritie which point to that
conclusion. Indeed it may be admitted
that the trend in . ome of the ode States
i in that direction. But we haYe found no
ca e which goes to the extent of holdin g
that an a signment of an open account
for the mere purpose of collection, one
which give. th e a sign ee a conti ngent
intere t only, con titutes him the r eal
party in intere t within the meaning of
the ·tatute."
ee ca es cited in note 3, p. 91, and
note 1, p. 87 .
I Cummings v.
forri , 25 N. Y. 625 ;
. c . 3 Bosw. 560.
2 Conyng ham v . Smith, 16 Iowa, 4i1 ;
Barthol v. Blakin, 34 Iowa, 452; Green
v. Marble, 37 Iowa, 95; Andrew v.
McDaniel, 68 N. C. 3 5; Kiff ~- W aver,
9-l Ir. . 274.

3 Merchants & Mech. Bank v. Hewitt,
3 Iowa, 93.
4 Car penter v. Miles, 17 B. Mon. 59 ;
White v. Phelps, 14 Minn. 27; Pea e v.
Rush, 2 Minn. 107; Pearson v. Cummings,
28 Iowa, 344 ; Hancock v. Ritchie, 11 Ind .
48; Rogge v. Cassiuy (Ky. 1890), 13 . W .
716; Caldwell v. Meshew, 44 Ark. 564;
Heartman i-. Franks, 36 Ark. 501 ; Riff v.
Weaver, 94 N. C. 274.
5 L ong i . Con tant, 19 Mo. 320.
6 Thornton v.
rowther, 24 Mo. 164 ;
Peters v. St. Loui , &c. R. R., 24 Mo. 5 6.
7 Gray u. Garri on, 9
al. 325.
8
mith v. K 1111 tt, 1 Mo. 15-4-; Lazard v. Wheeler, 22 al. 139. In thi la. t
case an action by the as· ignee to recov r
po se ion of the chattel was u tainecl.
9 , tron g i· . lem, 12 Ind. 37 ; [Dobberstein v. i\lurpby (1 96), 64 Minn. 127, 66
N. W. 204.J
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with the possession of a note does not, however, constitute an

assignment thereof, and the owner is the proper party to sue,

although the instrument is in the hands of another person with

whom it has been deposited.^ The assignee of a foreign executor

or administrator may maintain an action in his own name to

recover a debt due to the estate from a person residing within

the State in which the suit is brought.^ Upon the same prin-

ciple, when a demand not arising within the State, in favor of

one foreign corporation against another foreign corporation, is

assigned to a resident of the State, such assignee may maintain

an action upon it against the debtor corporation, although the

original creditor is expressly forbidden by statute to sue under

such circumstances. The prohibition of an action between the

foreign corporations does not affect the assignability of the

claim. ^

§ 72. * 134. Same Subject. The assignee of a judgment re-

covered by the defendant in an action brought to recover the

possession of chattels may sue in his own name upon a bond

given by the plaintiff upon the requisition made for a delivery
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of tlie goods to him. The assignment of the judgment carries

with it all demands arising upon this bond or undertaking, and

the assignee is the real party in interest.* In like manner, the

assignee of a judgment recovered against a sheriff for official

misconduct in seizing the plaintiff's property may bring an action

in his own name upon the sherift''s bond." The principle may be

stated more broadly. The assignee of any claim or demand may,

in general, sue in his own name upon any incidental or collateral

security connected with the demand, and l)y means of which its

payment or satisfaction can be enforced. Thus, the assignee of

a judgment obtained in a garnishee process may maintain an

action in his own name against the garnishees;^ the assignee of

the cause of action in a pending litigation may sue on an appeal

bond given to the j)laintiff, the assignor, in the course of the

' Seidell r. Prin;^le, 17 Barb. 4')8 : revive a judfrinent hy the assignee thereof ;

[^Bohart >■. Buckingham (1901), 62 Kan Gerner v. Cliurch (1895), 43 Nel>. 690, G 2

658, 64 Pac. 627, f)u<jliiig the text.] N. W. 51 (assignee of subscription).]

2 Petersen r. Cliemical Bank, 32 N. Y. * Bowdoin v. Coleman, 3 Al.b. Pr. 431.

21. 6 Charles r. Haakins, 11 Iowa, 329.

=> .McBridf; /• FiirintTs' Bank, 26 N. Y. « Whitman r. Keith, 18 Ohio St. 134.

450. 457. In tliis case, Mr. .Justice Scott give.s a very

(^Further instances: Haupt r Biirtun full ami clear exposition of the statutory

(1898), 21 Mont. 572, 55 I'ac. 110 (suit to provision under consideration.

f a n te do · not, however, con titut , n
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the hantl f an th r
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me t
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the tate in which th
uit i brou ht. 2
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one for ign corp rati n again anotb r for ign corp ration, i
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an action upon it again t the d b or corp ration although th
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uch circum tances . The prohibiti n f an action between h
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claim . 3
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proceedings.^ The assignee of a reversion and also of the cove-

nants contained in the lease is the proper party to bring an action

to recover damages arising from a breach of such covenants. ^

When a surviving partner assigns things in action which belonged

to the firm, the assignee succeeds to his rights, and must sue in

his own name to collect the same."*

§ 73. * 185. Joinder of Assignor in Some States. In Ken-

tucky, if the assignment is equitable, which is defined to be

an assignment not expressly authorized by statute to be made,

although the assignee must sue in his own name, the assignor

must also be joined as a party plaintiff or defendant;* as, for

example, when an execution is assigned,^ or a lease. ^ In certain

States, where the thing in action is not negotiable, or assignable

by indorsement, the assignor may be joined as a defendant to

answer to his interest and to the assignment." In other States,

however, where similar provisions are not found in the codes or

practice acts, the rule is entirely different, and the assignor is

not a proper party either plaintiff or defendant. Thus, in Ohio,

an assignor having been made a defendant under the general
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provisions of the code relating to the joinder of parties plaintiff

and defendant, it was held that he neither had an interest in the

controversy adverse to the plaintiff, nor was he a necessary party

to a complete determination or settlement of the questions in-

volved therein, and therefore he had been improperly made a

defendant.^ This is undoubtedly the rule in all the States

whose codes do not contain the special provision permitting or

requiring the joinder of assignors in order to answer to the as-

signment. And even though he may retain some residuary,

contingent, or equitable interest, the assignor is not the proper

party to sue; the legal title is not only in the assignee, but he is

1 Bennett v. McGrade, 15 Minn. 1.32. R. S. ch. 22, § C, "all bonds, Itills, or notes

Same as to assignment of a conti-act, for money or property shall he assignable

Gallagher v. Nichols, 60 N. Y. 438, 448, so as to vest the right of action in the

449; liolen r. Crosby, 49 id. 183. assignee."

•^ Masury v. Southworth, 9 Ohio St. "^ ^Indiana, Burns' St., 1901, § 277.]

340. s Allen v. Miller, 11 Ohio St. 374.

3 Roys V. Vilas, 18 Wis 169. [^Held in Shambaugh v. Current (1900),

* Dean v. English, 18 B. Men. 132; 111 Iowa, 121,82 N. W. 497, that the de-

Gill V. Johnson's Adni., 1 Mete. (Ky.) fendant cannot require the assignor to be

649; Lytle v. Lytle, 2 Mete. (Ky.) 127. made a party, since any defence as against

^ Watson r. Gabby, 18 B. Mon. 658, the assignor could be made against the

665. assignee.]

** Hicks V. Dotv, 4 Bush, 420. Bv 1
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entitled to receive all the proceeds of the recovery, and whatever

n i le

ibiliti

possibilities the assignor may have, he is not the real party in

l

interest.^

^ 74. * IfSG. Assignment Pendente Lite. Substitution of As-

74 .

signee. The thing in action may even be assigned while a

snit upon it is pending, and, by the express provisions of the

statute, the assignee may either be substituted as plaintiff, or

the suit may be carried on to its termination in the name of the

original party. ^ Such substitution, when made, is not the bring-

ing of a new action, and does not require a supplemental coni-

1 Smith V. Cliicago & N. W. R. Co., 2.3

Wis. 267, where it apjjeared that in pro-

ceedings supplementary to execution, be-

of th r
pr
v ry and 'vl te r
l
ma· ha
n t the r 1 I arty m

t

*1

.

Assignment Pendente L ite.

S ubstitution of A s-

The th in m a ti n ma
ven b a ' igned while a
uit up n it i p ndin · and by th exp re I r i ion · f the
tatu
h a
ith r b ub titut d a plaintiff, r
th ui t may be carri d n
i t t rmination in the name of th .
2
riginal party. Such ub ti t ution, when made, i no t the brin ·ing of a new action, and do s not req uire a uppl mental c rn signee .

fore instituted against the plaintiff in

another State, the demand in suit had

heen assigned to a receiver ; tiiis was held

a complete defence. See also Gates i'.

No. Pac. R. Co., 64 Wis. 64 ; Vimont v.
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Chicago N. W. Ry. Co., 64 Iowa, 513 ;

Smith r. Felton, 85 Ind. 223 (note assigned

as collateral security); Michael v St. Louis

Mut. F. Ins. Co., 17 Mo. App. 23 (the

assignor of an insurance policy should not

be joined as plaintiff with the assignee, to

wiiom the whole policy has been trans-

ferred as collateral security) ; Cable v. St.

Louis Marine Ry. Co., 21 Mo. 133; and

see insurance cases, post, § *226, note.

2 QMcCuUough V. Dovey (1901), 61

Neb. 675, 85 N. W. 893 ; Parker v. Taylor

(1902), Neb., 91 N W. 537; City' of

Springfield v. Weaver (1896), 137 Mo.

650, 37 S. W. 509 ; TufPree v. Stearns

Ranches Co. (1899), 124 Cal. 306, 57 Pac.

69.

Whethci the assignee siiall be sub.sti-

tuted or the action shall proceed in the

name of the original party, is a matter

within the discretion of the court : Brown

V. Kohout (1895). 61 Minn 113, 63 N W.

248; Fay " Steubenrauch (1903), 138

Cal. 656, 72 Pac. 156 , Sears ». Ackerman

(1903). 138 Cal. 583, 72 Pac. 171.

1

mit h v.

397, 35 Pac. 488, it was held that where

an action is prosecuterj to judgment in the

name of the assignor, after an assignment

pmdpulf lite, no action can thereaftor be

brought on such judgment in the name of

tlie assignor ; and where an action is Desun

Ml hw name it must be dismissed, an

amendment substituting the real party in

interest not being allowable. See, how-

ever, Service ;;. Bank (1900), 62 Kan. 857,

62 Pac. 670, and Hudson v. Barratt (1901),

62 Kan. 137, 61 Pac. 737, where such

The statute furnishes no authority for

the continuation of the action by the

plaintiff where his assignee has settled

the claim and demands that the action

be discontinued. Hirsheld v. Fitzgerald

(1898), 157 N.Y. 166, 51 N. E. 997,

In McKiiiglit V. Bertram Heating, etc.

Co. (1902), 65 Kan. 859, 70 Pac. 345, a

part of the claim was assigned pending

the action, and it was held that the plain-

tiff, who sued on a quantum meruit, could

. W . R.

o., 23

ceeding uppl mentary to exe ·ut ion, befor e in tituted again t the plaint iff in
another tate, t h de mand in uit had
been a igoed to a rec irnr ; t hi wa held
ee al o Gate v.
a complete defence.
o. P ac. R. Co., 64 W i . 64 ; Vim nt v.
hicago
. W . Ry. Co., 64 Io wa, 5 13;
mith v. F Jto n, 5 Iud. 223 (note a. ig ned
as collateral ecurity); Mi hael . S t . Loui
pp 23 (t he
Mut. F. I n . Co., 17 Mo.
a ig nor of a n in ·uran e poli cy hould not
be joined a plaintiff wit h the a ignee, to
whom th e whol policy ha b en tran fe rred a , collateral ecu rity) ; abl v. t.
L oui Marin
y. Co ., 21 1\!To. 133; and
see in uran e ca es, post, § *226, note .
2 [ f
ull9ugh v. Do vey (190 1), 6 1
b. 67 5, 5 N. W . 93 ; Parker v. Taylor
( 1902 ),
e b., 9 1
W . 537 ; City of
pring field v. Weaver (1 96), 137 Mo.
650, 3 i
. W . 509 ; Tuffree v. tearn
R ancho
o. ( 1899), l 24 Cal. 306, 5 7 Pac.
69.
W heth t
t uted or th
f th

But in Wilson v. Kiesel (1894), 9 Utah

amendments were allowed.

hi cago &

Wi . 26- , where it a ppeared hat in pro-

uam

amendment ub. titu t ing t he real party in
inte re t not b iuo- allowable.
e, howeY r , er Yice v. ank {190 ) 62 I an. Si,
62 P ac. 6i0, and Hud on v. B arratt {1901),
62 K a n . 137, 61 Pac. 73 7, wtere uch
am endment were allo' ed.
The tatute furni he, no autho rity for
th e cont inuation of the action by the
plain t iff where his a io-nee ha
ettle<l
the laim and demand t hat t he a tiou
be di c nti o ued. Hir held v. itzgeral<l
(189 ), 157 . Y . 166 , 51 . E . 997.
In McKnig ht v. B ertram H eating, etc.
Co. (1902 ), 65 Kan . 859, 70 Pac. 345, a
part of the lai m wa a igned pend111g
the a cti n, and it was held t hat th plaintiff, who sued on a quantum meruit, could
recover in hi own name t he a mouut
a igne<l.
In fatthew
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pliiint.^ If an assignee carries on a suit in, the name of tlie

assignor, he must show affirmatively that the transfer was made

·arri · on a uit in . th nam, of tli
pl· int.1 If an a ign
as::.;ian r, he mu t how affirmativ ly that th tran f r wa made
pendente lite. 2

■pendente lite.'^

· 75.

^ 75. * 137. Assignment of Part of Demand. Action by Grantee

on Covenants. It has been decided in some cases that the

assignment of part of an entire claim does not enable the as-

signee to sue in his own name, but that the assignor must still

sue for the whole demand.^ This rule is based upon the old

doctrine of the indivisibility in law of an entire thing in action.

Other cases hold that such an assignment conveys an equitable

interest, and makes the assignee an equitable owner, so that he

may sustain an action brought in his own name, although the

or other disability of a party, or by the

transfer of any interest therein, if the

cause of action survive or continue. In

103

* 1. 7.

Assignment of Part of Demand.

Action by Grantee

It ha b en decid d in om
a es that th
a· ibnm nt f part f an ntir claim doe n t nable the a·"ign e to ue in hi own name, but that the a :ignor mu t till
ue f r the whole demand. 3 Thi rul i based upon the old
cl ctrin of the inclivi ibility in law of an ntire thing in action.
th r a e hold that such an as ignment conv y an quitabl
intere ·t, and makes the a ·ignee an equitable owner, so that he
may u tain an· action brought in hi own name, although th
on

Covenants.

case of death, marriage or other disability

of a party, the court, on motion, at any

time within one year tliereafter, or after-
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wards on a supplemental complaint, may

allow the action to be continued by or

against his representative or successor in

interest. In case of any other transfer of

interest, the action sliall be continued in

the name of the original party, or the

Court may allow the person to whom

the transfer is made to be substituted in

the action." The court held that the words

" any other transfer of interest," under

which it was sought to defeat the abate-

ment of the action, meant " such a transfer

of interest in the action as would enable

the transferee to claim under the original

parly." And .since in the case at bar the

transferee claimed not under the original

party, the plaintiffs, but under B., this

statute did not save the action, and it

must abate under the provision of sec-

tion 1.32, requiring all actions to be

prosecuted in tlie name of the real party

in interest.]

' [Fish V. Smith (1900), 7.3 Conn. .377,

47 Atl. 711 : "An assignment of a claim

pending suit thereon calls for no altera-

tion or amendment in the complaint, but

only for an application for a change of

parties." And in Campbell r. Irvine

(1895), 17 Mont. 476, 43 Pac. 626, it was

held that the substituted plaintiff might

prove the assignment by which he became

entitled to the subject of the suit, although

the assignment was not pleaded in the

complaint.

The Supreme Court of Washington,

however, has held, in Powell v. Nolan

(1902), 27 Wash. 318, 67 Pac. 712, that a

supplemental complaint must be filed, and

that a judgment obtained witiiout the

filing of such supplemental complaint is

invalid, where the defendant was not

present or represented in court at the

time the substitution was made.]

2 St. Anthony Mill Co. v. Vandall,

1 Minn. 246 ; Virgin v. Brubaker, 4 Nev.

31; Warner I'. Turner, 18 B. Mon. 758.

See also McGean v. Metrop. Elev. Ky.

Co., 133 N. Y. 9 ; Asher v. St. Louis, &c.

K. Co., 89 Mo. 116; Lowell v. Parkinson,

4 Utah, 64 ; Todd v. Crutsinger, 30 Mo.

or other di ability of a party, or by the the a, signment wa not pleacled in the
tran fer of any intere t therein, if the complaint.
cau·e of action survive or continue. Iu
The Supreme Court of 'Va hingtou,
olan
ca ·e of death, marriage or othe r di ·abi lity howe,·er, ha held, in Powell i•.
of a party, the court, on motion, at any (1902), 27 Wah. 31 , 67 Pac. 712, that a
time within one year thereafter, or afterupplemental complaint must be filed, autl
ward. on a supplemental complaint, may that a judgment obtained without the
allow the action to be continued by or filing of such suppl ement.al complaint i
again t hi repre entative or ucces or in invalirl, where the defendant was not
intere t. In ca e of any ot her tran fer of present or represented in co urt at the
intere·t, the action shall be continued in time the substitution was made.]
the name of the original party, or the
2 St. Anthony Mill Co. v. Vandall,
ourt may allow the per on to whom l Minn. 246; Virgin v. Brubaker, 4 Kev.
the tran fer is made to be sub tituted in 3 1 ; Warner v. Turner, l B. Mon. i 5 .
the action." The court held that the words See al o McGean v. Metrop. Elev. Hy.
"any other tran fer of intere t," u11d er Co., 133 N. Y. 9; Asher v. t. Loui , &c.
which it was sought to defeat the abate- R. Co., 89 Mo. 116 ; Lowell v. Parkinson.
ment of the action, meant " uch a tra11. fer ' 4 Utah, 64; Todd v. Crutsinger, 30 Mo.
of interest in the action a would enable App. 145; Hamilton v. Lamphear, 54
the tran feree to claim under the original Conn. 237; tewart v. paulding, 72 Cal.
Jlarty." And since in the ca e at bar the 264; .Nichol v. Chicago, etc. Ry. Co., 36
tran feree claimed not under the original l\Iinn . 452 ; nyder v. Phillip , 66 Ia. 4 l ;
party, the plaintiff ', but uncler B., this Perkins v. Marrs, l 5 Colo. 262.
statute did not aYe the act iou , and it
3 Cable v. St. Louis l\1arine Railway
mu t abate under the proYisi on of sec- Co., 21 Mo. 133; Lee e v. berwoo<l, 21
tion 132, requiring all action - to be Cal. 151 ; Burnett v. Crandall, 63 Mo.
pro ecuted in the name of th e real party 410; Beard lee v. Morgner, 73 Mo. 22;
in interest.]
Loomis v. Robin . on, 76 Io. 4
But
1 [Fi h v. Smith (1900), 73 Conn. 377,
this rule does not preYent one of two
47 Atl. 711: "An a ignment of a claim joint payees from transferring the whol e
pending suit thereon calls for -no altera- of hi intere t, o that hi a· ignee (in thi~
tion or amendment in the complaint, but ca e the other pay e) may u in hi own
only for an application for a change of name; McLeod v. ny<l r (M . l 92 ), I ()
partie ." And in Campbell i•. Irvine S. W. 494.
ee Lappin o- v. Duffy, -17 Ind .
C. 130 ;
( l 95), 17 Mont. 4 76 , 43 Pac. 626, it was 51; B oyle v. Robbin., 71 ...
olo. 25;,,
h ld that the sub tituted plaintiff might [ mith v. Atkin, on (l 93), l
proYe th a ignment by which he became 3:2 Pac. 425, holding that the common-law
eutitled to the ubject of the suit, although rule has not been changed .]
T .

104
104 CIVIL REMEDIES.

assignors may, upon their own application, be allowed to inter-

vene, in order to protect their interests.^ The grantee of land

cannot sue in his own name to recover damages for the breach of

covenants in the deed to liis grantor which do not run with the

land, unless the covenants themselves have also been assigned,

but the grantor is the proper party ; as, for example, the grantee

cannot sue upon a covenant of seisin in the deed to his grantor,

in those States where that covenant is regarded as broken immedi-

ately, if at all, upon the execution of the deed, and as not running

with the land. 2

§ 76. * 138. Suing " to the Use of"' Another. Beneficiaries

under Express Trusts. It is no longer, consistently with the

!VIL RE.:ilEDIE .

may u on their own ap li a ion be allowed to interr to pr ct heir inter
The grantee f land
o n nam to r co er damaa f r the breach of
m
hi grantor whi h l n t run wi b. the
unl
°' nan them el ha e a o be n a ign d,
but th grant r i th
r p r party; a for example, tl e grant
< nn t ue u on a c v nant of
i in in th de d to bi grantor
enau i regard d a brok n imme icution of the deed, and a not running
in
'~ nn t u

provisions of the codes, possible for one person to sue "to the

use of " another, as was common in some States. The parties

beneficially interested must themselves bring the action.^ There

are cases which hold that when there is a trustee of an express,

trust, he must bring the action, and that the beneficiary can in

no such case sue in his own name, at least alone.* The correct-

ness of this ruling may well be doubted. The section relative
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to the real party in interest is, in all the codes, imperative;

1 Grain r. Aldrich, 38 Cal. 514; Wig- Relfe, 20 Mo. 45.5; Wilkes v. Morehead,

gins V. McDonald, 18 Cal. 126. See, also, Stanton's Code (Ky.), p. 31 (n ) ; Lytle v.

Childs (,■. Alexander, 22 S. C. 169; Sin- Lytic, 2 Mete. (Ky.) 127, 128. ' Also,

gleton y. O'Blenis, 125 Ind. 151 (partial State v. Johnson, 52 Ind. 197; Shane c.

assignee and a.<siguor may join). Qlt was Francis, 30 id. 92. j^HoUister v. Hubbard

held in Schilling r. Mullen (1893), 55 (1899), 11 S. D. 461, 78 N. W. 949. An

Minn. 122, 56 N. W. .')86, and in Dean v. action for breach of a sheriff's bond, pay-

St. Paul, etc. Ry. Co. (1893), .53 Minn. 504, able to the county, must be brought in the

.

Suing " to the U se of "

A n other.

Ben eficiaries.

It i n long r
on is ten tl with th
i 10n
f the cod
po i bl for one per on to ue ' to th
u ""e f" another, a
ommon in ome tat
The partie
b n ficiall intere te mu them elve bring he action . 3 There
are ca e which hold that when there i a tru tee of an xpre
tru t he mu t bring the a tion, and that the beneficiar can in
no uch ca e u in hi o' n name, at lea ' t alone. 4 The correctne ' f thi rulina may well be doubt d. The section r lative
to the real party in intere t i , in all the code , i perati e;
under Express

T rusts.

55 N. W. 628, that an action to recover a name of the party in interest, and not in

duly assigned portion of a demand cannot the name of the county for the use of such

be maintained by the assignee where the ))arty. To the same effect is Guernsey v.

a.<signor is not made a party, the debtor Tuthill (1900), 12 S. D. 584, 82 N. W.

refusing to recognize the assignment. 190. See. however. City of Bethany v.

And in Cook v. City of Menasha (1899). Howard (1899), 149 Mo. 504, 51 S. W. 94,

103 Wis. 6, 79 N. W. 26, it was held that where the contrary is held in respect to a

the plaintiff was not aggrieved by an contractor's bond.j

order of the court making the a.ssignor a * Reed v. Harris, 7 Robt. 151. A Spe-

party. The same court held, in Skobis r. cial Term deci.«ion, and not entitled to much

Ferge (1899). 102 Wis. 122, 78 N. W. 426, weight. See Western R. Co. v. Nolan, 48

that the assignment by a creditor of a N. Y. 513; Davis v. Erickson, 3 Wash,

Relfe, 20 Mo. 455; Wilke ii. Morehead,
tanton' 'od (Ky.), p. 31 {n); L tie u.
Lytl , 2 Mete. (Ky.) 12 , 128. Al o
tate v. John on, 52 Ind. 197 ; hane v.
Franci , 30 id. 92. [Holli ter v. Hubbard
(1 99), 11 . D. 461, 78 N. W. 949. An
a tioo for breach of a heriff' bond, payable to the county mu 't b brought in the
nam f the party in intere t, and not in
the name of he county for the u e of uch
J arty. To the am

portion of a claim is not binding on the 654 ; Kelley v. Thuey. 102 Mo. 522 ; Hen-

debtor uidcss he consents thereto.] ricus ;•. Englert (N. Y. App. 1893), 33

2 Elall V. Plaine, 14 Ohio St. 417; N. E. 5.50 (obligees on a bond, who signed

Sinker r. Floy.l, 104 Ind. 291. as "agents " of others, are the onlv proper

3 Weise v. (ierner, 42 Mo. 527 : Hutch- plaintiffs to a suit on the bond, though a

ingB V. Weems. 35 Mo. 285; Brady v. different rnle would applv had the instru-

Ciiandler, 31 Mo. 28; Van Doren i'. ment not been under seal).

Tuthill (190 ),12
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while that in rehition to the trustee of an express trust is

permissive.

§ 77. * 139. Actions by Third Persons for whose Benefit Con-

tracts have been made. The cases thus far considered in this

section are all connected with the assignment of a thing in action

by the original creditor, and they involve the question, When

may the assignee, under such circumstances, be the party plain-

tiff in an action to enforce the assigned demand? The rule of

the statute, that every action must be brought in the name of the

real party in interest, applies also to numerous cases which have

no connection whatever with assignments and assignees; and I

propose, in the remainder of this section, to review and examine

these other illustrations of the principle. It is now the settled

doctrine in so many of the States, that it may be called the

American doctrine,^ — although the contrary rule has been estab-

lished in England and in some States, and notably in Massachu-

setts,^ where it has been very recently reaffirmed with emphasis,

— that, where an express promise was made by A. to B., upon a

consideration moving from B., whereby the promisor engages to

Generated for facpubupdates (University of Michigan) on 2014-06-17 15:31 GMT / http://hdl.handle.net/2027/uc2.ark:/13960/t02z1c23b
Public Domain / http://www.hathitrust.org/access_use#pd

do something for the benefit of C, as, for example, to pay him

a sum of money, although C. is both a stranger to the considera-

tion and not an immediate party to the contract, yet he may

maintain an action upon the promise in his own name against

the promisor, without in any manner joining as a party the one

to whom the promise was directly made.^ This rule was origi-

nally adopted prior to the reformed procedure, and was based

partly upon considerations of convenience, and partly upon a

liberal construction of the nature of the contract. [The provision

1 Ileiulrick v. Lindsay, 93 U. S. 143. Iowa, 187; Allen r. Thomas, 3 Mete. (Ky.)

For an interesting discussion of the ra- 198; Wiggins i\ McDonald, 18 Cal. 126;

tionale. of the doctrine, see an article by Miller v. Florer, 15 Ohio St. 148, 1.51, per

Henry O. Taylor, 15 Amer. Law Rev. White J. ; Rogers i'. Gosnell, 58 Mo. 589,

231. ' ■ 590 ; 51 Mo. 466 ; Coster v. Mayor of

2 l^The same doctrine prevails in Con- Albany, 43 N. Y. 399, 411 ; Van Schaick

necticut. See Baxter v. Camp (1898), 71 v. Tiiird Avenue R. Co., 38 N. Y. 346^

Conn. 245, 41 Atl. 803, and Morgan v. Ricard i;. Sanderson, 41 N. Y. 179 ; Barker

Randolph, etc. Co. (1900), 73 Conn. 396, ,-. Bradley, 42 N. Y. 316,319; Secor v.

47 Atl. 658.] Lord, 3 Keyes, 525; Claflin v. O-strom, 54

3 Kimball V. Noyes, 17 Wis. 695; San- N. Y. 581, 584; Cooley v. Howe Machine

ders V. Clason, 13 "Minn. 379; Meyer v. Co., 53 N. Y. 620 ; Glen y. Hope Mnt. Life

while that in relation to the tru tee of an expre , tru t i
permi siv .

§ 77. * 13~.

Actions by Third Persons for whose Benefit Con -

The a
thu far con ider d in thi
ection are all c nn ct cl with the a ·ignm nt of a thing in a ti n
by the original er litor, and th y involve the qu tion, vVh n
may the a ignee, uncl r u h ircum tanc ', b th party plaintiff in an action to enforce the as ign d demand? The rul
f
the statute, that every action must be brought in the name of the
r al party in interest, applies al o to numerous case which have
no connection whatever with assignments and assignees; and I
propose, in the remainder of this ection, to review and examine
the e other illu trations of the principle. It is now the settled
doctrine in so many of the tates, that it may be called the
American doctrine, 1 - although the contrary rule bas been establish cl in England and in some States, and notably in Ma acbusetts, 2 where it bas been very recently reaffirmed with emphasi ,
-that, where an expre s promise was made by A. to B., upon a
consideration moving from B., whereby the promisor engages to
do :something for the benefit of C., as, for example, to pay him
a um of money, although C. is both a stranger to the consideration and not an immediate party to the contract, yet he may
maintain an action upon the promise in hi own name again t
the promisor, without in any manner joining as a party the one
to whom the promise was directly made. 3 This rule was originally adopted prior to the reformed procedure, and was ba ed
partly upon considerations of convenience, and partly upon a
liberal on ' truction of the nature of the contract. [The provi ion
tracts have been made.

Lowell, 44 Mo. 328: Cross r. Truesdale, Ins. Co., 56 N. Y. 379, 381; Barlow v.

28 Ind. 44; Devol v. McInto.sh, 23 Ind. Meyers, 6 X. Y. Sup. Ct. 183; Johnson

529; Day r. Patterson, 18 Ind. 114 : Rice v. Knapp, 36 Iowa, 616; Jordan v. White,

V. Savery, 22 Iowa, 470; Scott v. Gill, 19 20 Minn. 91.

1 rienurick v. Lindsay, 93 U.
. 143.
For an int resting cliscu ·.ion of the rationalP of the doctrine, i-:ee an article by
H enry 0. Taylor, 15 Amer. Law Rev.

231.
2 [T!te i-:ame doctrine preYails in Connecticut. See Baxter v. Camp (1 9 ), 71
Conn. 245 , 41 Atl. 803, and Morgan v.
Randolph, tc. Co. (1900), 73 Conn. 396,
47 Atl. 658.J
a Kimball v. Noye , 17 Wi . 695; Sanders 11. Clason, 13 Minn. 379 ; Meyer v.
Lowell, 44 Mo . 32 : Cro. v. Truesdale,
28 Ind . 44; De v l v. Mclnto h, 2.3 In l.
529; Day v. Patter on, 18 Ind . 114: Rice
v. Sav ry, 22 Iowa, 470; , cott v. Gill, 19

Iowa, l 7; Allen v. Thoma , 3 Mete. (Ky .)
19 ; Wigg ins i•. M D onald, l
al. 126 ;
:'vliller v• .Florer, 15 Ohio , t. 148, Fi 1, per
White J.; Roger v. Go~nell, 58 Mo. 5 9,
590 ; 51 !\Io. 466 ;
o ter v. Mayor of
All.Jany, .t-3 N. Y. 399, 411; Van , ·hai ck
v. Third Avenue R. Co. 3 N. Y. 346;
Ricard v. Sander on, 41 .r . Y. 179 ; Bark r
11. Bradley, .t-2
. Y. 316, 319; ecor v.
Lord, 3 KeYes, 525; Claflin v. 0 trom, 54
N. Y. 5 l 5 .t-; ooley v. Howe fachine
Co., 53 N. Y. 620; Glen v. Hope Mut. Life
In . Co., 56 . Y. 379, 3 1; Barlow v.
Meyer , 6 :N'. Y. up . t. 1 3 ; John on
1" Kn app, 36 Iowa, 616; Jordan v. \Vhite~
20 Iiun . 91.

'
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of the codes under review does not place the matter beyond all

doubt ; although the person for whose benetit the promise is thus

made is certainly the real party in interest.]^ The following are

f h co
und r r ,.i w
not plac the matter b y ncl all
cl uL ; alth u ·h be I r on fo r who e ben fit th pr mi e i thw.;
m <le i , c rtainly tl~e r c 1 I rty in inter t. ]1 The f 11 wing ar

1 po late :i.s 1903, tlie Supreme Court

of Wisconsin, in the case of Tweeddale v.

Tweeildale, inj'ni, declared that '" there is

as raucii confusion, prohahly, in the judi-

cial holdings in respect to the matter, as

on any question of law that can be men-

tioned."

The conflict centres about tlie two req-

uisites laid down in tiie leading case of

Vrooman v. Turner, 69 N. V. 280. These

are as follows : there must be, in order to

allow suit by a third person on such a

contract, ( 1 ) an intention on the part of

the promisee to secure some benefit to the.

third party, (2) some privity l)etweeu the
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promisee and the party to be benefited,

and some duty or obligation owing from

the promisee to the third person which

would give the latter a legal or equita'.)le

claim to the benefit of the promise. Most

of the cases turn on one or the other of

these points, and they may l)e grouped

accordingly.

In Morgan u. Randolph, etc. Co. (1900),

73 Conn. 396, 47 Atl. 6.58, the defendant

purchased the property of a ])artnership,

and in part consideration agreed to pay

the partnersiiip deltts. Held tiiat the

intention was primarily to secure a benefit

to the partnersiiip and not to the creditors,

hence the latter could not recover on the

agreement. This is an extreme case, and

the court itself admits that it is out of

accord with the current of American

authority.

There are numerous cases of actions

l [ o late a 1903, the • upreme Court
of Wi
nsin in th a e of Twee !dale i• .
Twee<ldale, il![l·a, d cla r <l that · there i
as mu h cou fu "ion, probably, i11 the judicial holding io r e pect to th rn t t r , a
o any que ·tio n of law that ca n be mentioned."
The conflict entre abou t the two r equi ite laid down in the 1 ading ·a ·e of
r ooman v. Turn r, 69 ?\. Y . 2 0. Th
are
follow : there mu "t be, iu order to
allow uit by a third per on on uch a
contract, ( l) an intention n the part of
the p romi ·ee to ecure ome b uefit to th •
third party, (2) orne privit,v b tween the
promi ee and the party to Le benefited,
and ome duty or obligati n owing from
the pr om i ee to the thir<l per ou which
would girn the latter a legal or equitabl
claim to the benefit of the pr mi ~ e. Mo t
of the ca e turn on one or the ther f
the e point~, and they may he groupeu
a cordingly.
In Io rgan v. Randolph, etc.
. ( 1900),
i 3 Conn. 396, 4 7 A tl. 65 , the def ndant
purch . ed the property of a partner hip,
and in 1 art con id ration agreed to pay
the partn r hip deut · .
H eld that the
intention wa · primarily to ecure a benefit
t the partner hip and n ot LO th ·reditor.,
hence the latter
uld U•) t r over on th
agr ment. Thi i an extreme ca e, and
the court it. elf a<lmit t hat it i out f
Ameri can

by materialmen and laborers upon con-

tractors' bonds, which have usually turned

H ow mon v. Trenton Wat r o. (1 9:3),
11 Mo. 304, 24 ·. \IV. i +, J effer · 11 i•.
A h (1 93), 5:3 1iun . 446, 55-'- . W. 6U-t.
The coo truct ion of th e contractors'
b nd , a indi ative of intention, ha µiv a
rise to ome d iffi ulty. In Pi kl Marul
& rauite o. v. M.c lay ( l 9 ), 54 l'\ >b .
661 74 N. W. 1 62 , the b nd provitle<l
that the co ntracto r hould pr vide all th
labor and mat rial ue e ary fo r th
u·tructiou of the uuildincr, and that th r
houl<l not be any lawful laim agaiu. t
him for labo r and material . Thi wa
h eld to · be a b nd f r th l.Jenefit of th
materialm n and labore r .

fi t of materialmen au<l laborer . In
M ·D nald . Davey {1900), 22 Wah . 366,
60 Pac. 1116, a bond conditi ued that th•
le ee of a mine hould pay all debt ontra ted for labor and mat rial u ed in
and about the mine, wa h ld t be a
b nd for the benefit of th labor r , v rruling the ca e f. ear v. William ( l 94-),
9 W ash. 42
37 Pa c. 665 in whi h th

upon the question of intention. Such a

case was Parker v. Jeffery (1894), 26 Ore.

186, 37 Pac. 712, where the court held

that to entitle a third person to recover

upon a contract made Initween other

persona, tiiere must not only be an intent

in
b.

to secure some benefit to such third person,

but the contract must have been made and

entered into directly and primarily for

his l>enefit. The same rule was adopted

in Montgomery v. Uief (1897), 15 Utali

495, 50 I'ac. 623; Brower Lumber Co. i-.

Mill.;r (1896), 28 Ore. 565, 43 Pac. 659;

Howsmon i-. Trenton Water Co. (1893),

119 Mo. 304, 24 S. W. 784, Jefferson v.

Asch (1893), 53 Minn. 446, 55 N. VV. 604.

The construction of tliese contractors'

bonds, as indicative of intention, has niveii

rise to some ditticulty. In Pickle Marble

& Granite Co. v. McClay (1898), 54 Neb.

661, 74 N. W. 1062, the bond provided

that the contractor should provide ail the

labor and materials necessary for the con-

struction of the building, and that tiiere

should not be any lawful claims against

him for labor and materials. Tliis w;is

held to be a bond for tiie benefit of the

ntc·rPd iuto dire tlv and
hi 1, uPlit. The . a~ rul
i 11 ;\fo11ti.t•1mn.v 1;. T i f ( l
4 ' 5, ,Jo l'ae. r.2:3; Browe r
um r
. I illcr (I %), :! lJre. 565, 43 lac.

. E. i 7, wh r on
a towuship
lmil<l a . h
a111l
gavP a l.HJll
wou Id
JH'll' id th labor au<l mater ial at hi. wn
co t, au<l that the town hi E hould n t ue
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some examples and illustrations of this rule: Where a part-

nership assigns its assets, and, in consideration thereof, the

om examr 1 and illu tration
f thi rul : \Vhere a partn r hip a signs its a e , and, m con i<l ration ther f, the

answerable therefor, it was held that this

was not a covenant for tlie benefit of the

luaterialmeu. See also Reynolds v. Louis-

ville, etc. R. H. Co. (1895), 143 Ind. 579,

40 N. E. 410. So in Parker v. Jeffery

(supra) a coveaaut by the contractor to

pay all sums of money due for material

and labor, was held not to be a covenant

for the benefit of the laborers and material-

men. Same holding in Brcjwer Lumber

Co. V. Miller {sujun), and in Jefferson v.

Asch {snpra). See also Fidelity & Deposit

Co. V. Parkinson (1903), — Neb. — , 94

N. W. 120.

In State v. St. Louis, etc. Ry. Co. (1894),

125 Mo. 596, 28 S. W. 1074, it was held
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that where a railroad company covenants

to pay the debts of another company, the

creditors of the latter may sue on the

covenant, but where the agreement is

merely to " save harmless " another against

the claims of third persons, the latter can-

not sue on the agreement, as it is not

made for their benefit.

The Iowa cases on this point are based

upon a statute, and hence are not of gen-

eral authority. See (jreeu Bay Lumber

Co. V. School Dist. (1902), — la. — ,;

90 N W. 504, citing the earlier Iowa

decisions.

Upon the question whether privity be-

tween the promisee and a third person, or

some duty or obligation owing from the

former to the latter, is necessary to support

an action by such third person, there is

wide divergence of judicial opinion. The

New York cases have continued to adhere

to Vrooman r. Turner. See Townsend v.

Rackham (1894), 143 N. Y. 516, 38 N. E.

731. In the more recent case of Bu-

chanan V. Tilden (1899), 158 N. Y. 109, 52

N. E. 724, the duty owing from the prom-

isee to the third person was largely a

moral one, but was held sufficient. The

promise was made to a husband by another

for the benefit of his wife, and this rela-

tion, taken in connection with the peculiar

equities of the case, was held to he a suf-

ficient consideration to support a promise

in favor of his wife. The court is careful

to state that the case is decided upon its

peculiar facts. i

The New York doctrine is followed in

Jefferson v. Asch (1893), 53 Minn. 446,55

N. VV. 604; Union Storage Co. v. Mc-

Dermott (1893), .53 Minn. 407, 55 N. W.

606 ; School District ex rel. v. Livers

(1899), 147 Mo. 580,49 S. W. 507; Mc-

Donald V. American Nat. Bank (1901), 25

Mont. 456, 65 Pac. 896. In Howsmon v.

Trenton Water Co. (1893), 119 Mo. 304,

24 S. W. 784, and Kansas City Sewer

Pipe Co. y.Thomp.son (1893), 120 Mo. 218,

25 S. W. 522, the court held that inasmuch

as there was no liability of the promisee

to the third person, no recovery could be

an werable therefor, it wa held t41at thi
was not a covenant for the b nefit of the
mat rialmeu.
'eeal o Rey nolds v. Louisville, etc. R. R. o. ( 1 95), 143 Ind. 579,
40 N. E. 410. • o in Parker v. Jeffery
( !lpra) a covenant by the contractor to
pay all um of mon ey due for material
and labor, wa held n ot to be a coveuaut
f r the benefit of the laborers and materialame holding in Brower Lumber
men.
o. v. :Yliller (supra), and in Jefferson v.
ch (s11pra).
eealso Fidelity & D eposit
Co. v. Parkinson (1903), - Neb. - , 94
N. W.120 .
In tate v. t. Loni , etc. Ry. Co. (1894),
125 Mo. 596, 28 S. W. I 074, it was held
that where a railroad company covenants
t pay the debts of another company, the
credi to rs of the latte r may sue on the
cove nant, bt1t where the agreement is
merely to" saYe harmle " another against
the claims of third per ·on , the latter cannot ue on the agreement, a it is not
made for their benefit.
The Iowa cases 0 11 thi point are ba ed
upon a tatute, and hence are not of general authority.
'ee Green Bay Lumbe r
Co. v. School . Di t. (1902), - Ia. -,90 r
W. 504, citing the earlier Iowa:
deci.ions.
Upon the question wh ether privity between the promi ee and a third per on, or
ome duty or obligation owing from the
former to the latter, is nece ary to support
an action by such third person, there is
wide divergence of judicial opinion. The
,_ ew York ca es have continued to adhere
to rooman v. Turner. See Town end v.
Rackham (1894), 143 . Y. 516, 3 N. E.
7 31. In the more recent case of Buchanan i•. Tilden (1899), 15 N. Y. 109, 52
. E. 724, the duty owing from the prom:i 'ee to the third person wa largely a
moral one, but wa held uffici e nt. The
promi e was made to a husbaud by another
for the benefit of his wife, and thi relation, taken in connection with the peculiar
equitie. of the case, wa he1<l to he a suffi<.:ieut consitl ration to support a promi e
in favor of hi - wife. The court i
areful
to tate that the case is decided upon its
peculiar facts.

The New York doctrine i f !lowed in
Jeffer on v. A h (1 9.3), 53 Minn. 446, 55
N. W. 604; Union ' torage
o. v. McD ermott (1893), 53 Minu. 407, 55 N. W.
606;
chool Di tri t ex r I. v. Liver
(1 99), 147 Mo. 5 0, 49 . W. 507; McDouald v. American Nat. Bank (1901), 25
Mont. 456, 65 Pae. 96. In H ow mon v .
Trenton Water Co. (1893), 119 M . 304,
24 . \V. 784, and Kansa · City ewer
Pipe Co. v.Thompson (1 93), 120 Mo. 21 ,
25 . Vv. 522, the court held that in asm u h
as there was no liability of the promi ee
to the third person, no re ·overy cou ld be
had against the promi or.
In the following ca, e the promi ee
was under contractual obligation to the
third party, au<l the promisor, for a cons id e ration, as umed the debt. In eac h
ca e a r ecove ry was allowed. Barnett v.
Pratt ( 18n3), 37 Neb. 3-t9, 55 N. W. 1050;
L ovejoy v. Howe ( 1 93), 55 Minn. 353 , 5 i'
N. W. 57; Meyer v. Shamp (1897}, 51
N eb. 42-!, 71 N. W . 57; Porter v. Wood ·
(1896), 138 l\1o. 539, 09 S. \V. 794 ; i\Taxcy
v. New Hampshire Fire In . Co. (1893),
54 Minn. 272, 55 N . W . 1130 ; B arne v.
Hekla Fire Ins. Co. ( 1893), 56 Minn 3 ,
57
. W. 314; Dickinson Co. v. Fitterling (1898), 72 Mino. 4 3, 75 N. W. 731 ;
Feldman v. McGuire (l 99), 3-t Ore. 309,
55 Pac. 872; Hawley v. Bank (1 96), 97
Ia. 187, 66 N. W: 152.
In a number of ~tate , however, the
limitation of the New York doctrine hav
been abandoned, and neither privity n or
duty, as between the promisee and th
third person is required to support a suit
by the latter. Thus in Ferri v. Am .
Brewing Co. (1900), 155 Ind. 539, 58
N. E. 701 , a lease wa executed by a le ee
wh ereby h e covenanted to sell no beer
upon the lea eel premise
except that
manufactur cl by the plaintiff, and the
plaintiff wa allowed to enforce this covenant by injunction against the le ee.
As stated in the text, one. of the mo~t
strikiug in tance of the application of
thi liberal view' appear in the ca e of th
a umption, on the part of a grantee of
land , of a mortgag debt. It i held in a
number of tate ' that an action will lie
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the member to pay all the firm debts,
ar ner bjp may ue him u n thi under-
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purchaser agrees with the members to pay all the firm debts,

any creditor of the partnership may sue him upon this under-

under such circumstances liy the mort-

gagee against the grautee, even though

the in)niediate grantor is not personally

liable therefor. Hare v. Murphy (1895),

45 Neb. 809, 64 N. W. 211 ; McKay i\

Ward (1899), 20 Utah, 149, 57 Pac. 1024;

1.
Euos V. Sanger (1897), 96 Wis. 150, 70

N. W. 1069. In Hicks v. Hamilton (1898),

144 Mo. 495, 46 S. W. 432, the Supreme

Court of Missouri held that such an action

could not be maintained by the mortgagee,

in the absence of a liability on the part of

the immediate grantor. But two years

later, in Crone v. Stinde (1900), 156 Mo.

262, 55 S. W. 863, the Hicks case was ex-

pressly overruled, and it was held that the
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liability of the grantor for the debt was

not a condition precedent to the right of

the mortgagee to sue the grantee. In

Starbird v. Cranston (1897), 24 Colo. 20,

48 Pac. 650, the mortgagee was allowed

to sue the grantee, but it does not appear

whether or not the grantor was liable for

the debt. i)u the contrary, the Supreme

Court of Minnesota, in Brown v. Stillman,

43 .Minn. 126, 45 N. W. 2, has refused to

allow such an action except where tlie

grantor was liable.

An action by the mortgagee against

the grantee, at least under the rule of

Brown v. Stillmau {supra), is expressly

provided for by statute in Connecticut.

th

Gen. St. 1902, § 587.

The Supreme Court of Wisconsin

seems to have gone to the extreme limit

of liberality in permitting third parties to

sue, as appears in two very recent cases.

In Ktsclieid v. liaker (1901), 112 Wis. 129,

83 N. W. 52, the parents of defendant's

wife conveyed a farm to iiim for a recited

consideration of -$5,000, and lie gave back

a mortgage securing a bond running to

them in tliat amount, conditioned on his

paying to them .§4,000, in designateil in-

stalments, and the remaining Si, 000 to

their daughter fdefendant's sister-in-law)

within on«* year after the decease of both

of the obligees. Tiie daughter's adminis-

tratijf brougiit an action on the b(jnd more

than a year after the decea.se of both the

parents, and was allowed to recover, al-

tbougii the last surviving obligee had

executed a receipt in full satisfaction of

the mortgage and l>ond, and had dis-

charged the mortgage of record, the

court calling attention to the fact that

the daughter had known of the provision

of the bond and liad assented thereto. lu

Tweeddale v. Tweeddale (1903), — Wi.s.

— , 93 N. W. 440, the court went still

farther. The facts in this case, so far as

they concern tliis question, were almost

identical with those in Etscheid r. Baker,

except that the beneficiary, who was the

brother of the defendant, knew nothing

about the provision for his benefit until

llad

exe uted a r ecei pt in full ati faction of
th mortgage and bond, and had disharge<l the 111 rtgage of record, the
court calli11g atteoti n to the fact that
the daughter had kn wn f the provi ion
of the b nd and had · · nte<l t h reto. 1u
Tweed<lale v. Tw e<l<lale ( 1903 ), - Wi ..
- , 93
. W . 44 , the ou rt went . till
farther . The fa t iu tbi cru e, o far ~
they concern thi · que tion, were almost
identi ·al wi th th e in Et cheid v. Baker,
except that the beneficiary, who wa the
brother of the defendant, knew nothing
about the provi ·ion for hi benefit until
aft r the di charge of the mortgage by
hi mother, who w
the mortgagee and
obligee of the bond. But th e court held
that tbi · made no diff rence, and aid:
" Without further di u ion of the matter
we adhere t the doctrine that where one
per on, for a con ·ide rati n moving to him
from another, promise to pay to a third
per. on a um f money, the law immed iately operate upon the act of the partie ,
establ i bing th e: ential f privity between the promisor and the third per on
ntractual relation
requi ite to bindin
b tween them, re ul ting in th e immediate
e tabli hment of a new relation of debtor
and reditor, regarcll
f the relation of
the third per on to the immed iate promi. e in the tran action ; that the liabili
i a bindino- between t he pr mi or and the
third per on a. it w uld b if the on id ration for the pr mi e ro v d from the latte r
to the form r, and uch promi r mad
the promi
dir tly to th third peron,
r o-ardle of wh th r the latt r h
know! d e f th
of it
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taking, and recover the amount of the indebtedness due to the

phiintiff thus suing, ^ and may even sue him and the sureties wlio

united with him in his undertaking to the assigning parties ;2

and where man}' subscribers contributed different sums of money

to the defendant for a specified purpose, and he entered into

a written contract with three persons, whereby, among other

things, he promised to repay the sums so loaned, it was held

that any subscriber might sue on the agreement to recover the

amount which he advanced,^ and where B. placed a sum of

money in the hands of A., which the latter promised to pay over

to C, C. may prosecute an action against A. on his promise.^

Where the defendant was indebted to B., who was in turn

indebted to C. in a less amount, and the two former parties

agreed that defendant should pay to C. the amount of the latter's

demand, which should be 2Jro tanto a payment on his own debt to

B., C was permitted to recover on this promise.^ If in a policy

of insurance it is stipulated that the loss, if any, shall be paid to

«nable a third person to enforce a con-
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tract, there must be both "an intent on

the part of the promisor [should read

promisee] to benefit him, and some duty

or obligation to carry out such promise."

If tliis means an obligation other than

that arising from the promise itself, it is

taking, and recover the amount of th indebte ne due to th
lain tiff thus suing, 1 and may ven u him and th ·ureties who
unit d with him in hi undertaking to the as igning parties; 2
( nd where many subscriber contributed different um f money
to th defendant for a specified pur o e, and he nter d into
a writt n contract with three p r on , wherehy, among other
thin
h promised to repa3 the um o loaned, it wa held
th t any ubscriber might sue on the agreement to recov r the
.am unt which he advanced, 3 and where B. plac d a um of
money in the hands of A., which the latter promised to pay ov r
to \, C. may prosecute an action against A. on hi promise. 4
Vhere the defendant was indebted to B., who was in turn
jndebted to C. in a less amount, and the two former parties
agreed that defendant should pay to C. the amount of the latter's
lemand, which should be pro tanto a payment on his own debt to
B. C. was permitted to recover on this promise. 5 If in a policy
of insurance it is stipulated that the loss, if any, shall be paid to

inconsistent with the later case of Tweed-

dale V. Tweeddale, and must be deemed

overruled by the latter.

Utah, also, seems committed to this

liberal doctrine. In Brown v. Markland

(1898), 16 Utah, 360, 52 Pac. 597, the

■court said ; " Where a promise or con-

tract has been made between two parties

for the benefit of a third, an action will

lie thereon at the instance and in the

name of the party to be benefited, although

the promise or contract was made without

his knowledge, and without any considera-

tion moving from him."

Kentucky, also, has approved a liberal

interpretation of the statute. In Blakeley

V. Adams (1902), — Ky. — , 68 S. W. 39.3,

it was held that a deed conveying land,

which provides that a certain surety of the

grantee shall have a lien on the land to

indemnify him, creates a lien in favor of

the surety, which may be enforced by

him, though he is a stranger to the deed.

This is a curious case, and it does not

clearly appear how the doctrine of an

action by a third party applies. But tlie

court considered it and decided it on that

basis, and in the course of the opinion

said: "The generally recognized doctrine

in American courts is that a tliird party,

for whose benefit a contract was made

between others, may maintain an action

on the contract against the promisor.

And in no State has this doctrine been

carried farther than in Kentucky."

The rule stated in the Tweeddale ca.se

{supra), is provided against by statute in

some States. See McArthur v. Drydea

(1897), 6 N. D. 438, 71 N. W. 125, w'hich

construes the statute of that State, Kev.

Codes, § 3840, declaring that " a contract

made expressly for the l)enefit of a third

person may be enforced liy him at any time

before the parties thereto rescind it.'']

~mab le

a third person to enforce a contract, there must be both "an intent on
the part of the promisor [should read
promisee] to benefit him , and some duty
or obligation to carry out such promise."
If thi means au obligation other than
that ar· ing from the promise itself, it is
inconsi tent with the later case of Tweed<lale v. Tweeddale, and must be deemed
overruled by the latter.
tah, also, seems committed to this
liberal doctrine. In Brown v . .Markland
(189 ), 16 Utah, 360, 52 Pac. 597, the
eourt said : "Where a promise or contract has been made between two parties
for the benefit of a third, an action will
lie thereon at the instance and in the
name of the party to be benefited, although
the promise or contract was made without
his knowledge, and without any consideration moving from him."
Kentucky, also, has approved a liberal
interpretation of the statute. In Blakeley
v. Adam ( 1902), - Ky. - , 68 S. W . 393,
it wa held that a deed conveying land,
which proviues that a certain surety of the
grantee hall have a li en on the land t0
indemnify him, creates a li en in favor of
the surety, which may be enforced by
him, though he is a tranger to the deed .
This is a curi ous case, and it doe' not

clearly appear how the doctrin e of an
action by a third party applies. But the
court considered it aud decided it on that
basis, and in the course of the opinion
said: "The generally recognized doctrine
in American courts is that a third party,
for whose benefit a contract wa · made
between others, may maintain an actiou
on the contract against the promi or.
And in no State has this doctrine been
carried farth er than in Kentu cky."
The rule stated in the Tweeddale case
(supra), is provided again t by tatute in
some States. See McArthur v. Dryden
(189i), 6 N. D. 438 , 71 N. W. 125, which
construes the statute of that State, Rev.
Code , § 3840, declaring that ' a contract
made expres~ ly for the benefit of a third
person may be en forced hy him at any time
before the parties thereto re ciud it."]
l Sanders v. Clason, 13 Min11
379 ;
Meyer i• . L owell, 44 Mo. 32 , and ca..
cited; Barlow v . .Myer , 6 N. Y. ' up. t.
183; 64 N Y. 41.
2 Kimball v. Noyes, Ii Wi . 695; DeYol
v. Mcioto h, 23 Iud . 525 ; lafiin v. Ostrom, 5'1 N. Y . 5 1, 5
3 Ri ce v.
avery, 22 Iowa, 470, 4i7.

'* ·

Dillon J. peaks of the rul e a well ettled.
~ Allen v. Thoma , 3 , fotc. (Ky .) 198.
5 Wiggin u. McDonald, 1 Cal. 126.
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a person named, not the assured, such person may sue in his own

name on the policy.^ B. sold and delivered goods to A., and in

consideration thereof A. promised to pay a certain sum to C,

which was, in fact, the amount of a debt due from B. to C. ; it

was lield that C. could recover upon the promise so made by A.

in his behalf. 2 Perhaps the most striking illustration of this

doctrine, and of the extent to which it has been carried, is found

in a class of cases where, upon a conveyance of land, the grantee

assumes and promises to pay a debt which is secured by mortgage

on the land so conveyed. If the grantee of land encumbered by

a mortgage assumes the mortgage debt by a clause in his deed,

and promises to pay the same, the creditor-mortgagee may main-

tain an action against this grantee upon the bond or other evi-

dence of the indebtedness, and recover the amount thereof, and

is not restricted to the remedy by foreclosure of the mortgage ; ^

and the creditor may thus sue the grantee upon the bond, even

though that instrument had expressly provided that the mort-

gagee should first have recourse on the land, and the obligor

should only be liable for the deficiency which might arise after
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the foreclosure; this stipulation, it was held, protected the

obligor personally, and could not })e taken advantage of by the

grantee who had promised to pay the debt.* The result of these

and other decisions is, that the third person, for whose benefit an

undertaking is entered into between other parties, may sue upon

it, although such undertaking is an instrument in writing and

under seal.^ This doctrine is plainly a departure from the tech-

1 Cone V. Niagara Fire Ins. Co., 3 N. Y. see Sacramento Lumber Co. v. Wagner,

Sup. Ct. 33, 39, 60 N. Y. G19 (lo.s.s made 67 Cal. 293.

payable to an encumbrancer of the jirop- ^ Lawrence v. Fox, 20 N. Y. 268 ; Burr

erty in.sured ; encumbrancer can sue alone, v. Beers, 24 N. Y. 178; Brewer v. Maurer,

even thougli his debt lias been fully paid, 38 Ohio St. 550; Pope r. Porter, 33 Fed.

so tliat he will hold the amouut recovered Rep. 7 ; Stevens r. F]anna_u;an (Ind. 1892),

as a tru.-<tee for the owner ; to the same 30 N. E. 898 ; and see the subject fully

effect, Bartlett v. Iowa State Ins. Co., 77 discussed in 3 Pom. Eq. Jur., §§ 1206-

lowa, 80; Newman v. Sjtringfield Ins. 1208, and notes. [See also note 1, p. 106,

Co., 17 Minn. 123, 126; (^Phccnix Ins. su/irn.]

Co. V. Omaha Loan & Trust Co. (1894), * Thorp v. Keokuk Coal Co., 48 N. Y.

41 Neb. 834, 60 N. W. 1.33. On the con- 2.53.

not the a ured ucb person may sue in hi own
n m n 1.h poli 1 B . ld and d livered good
A ., and in
n id rati n th rnof · . promi d to pa a c rtain um t
.,
, hi h wa in fa t, the am un f a 1 bt due from . to . , it
w held that . could r o er up n the promi e o mad b
in bi, b half. 2
er hap the m t triking illu tr ti n of thi
d trine an l of the xt 11 o whi h i ha b n carri d i found
in a cl
of a
wb r up n a m ·~me of land, l grant e
a ·um and promi e o pa a l bt whi hi· ecure lb; m r .0 age
n he land ·o c n eyed . If th grantee -f land ncumb r d by
a m rtgage a umes the mortgag d bt by a clau in hi d ed,
and pr mi
to pay the sam , the r ditor-m rt a
ma mamtain an action against thi, grant e ur on the b nd r h r
i1 n e of the indebtedne .., and r co r the amoun th r of an l
i n t re rict J to the rem rly by fore lo ure of th mortgag · 3
and th creditor may thu ue tlie grant
upon th b nd v n
th u h that in truruent had expre ly provid d that h mar bould fir t hav reconr on the land, and tl
bligor
nly be liable for the defici ncy whi h might ari
aft r
r clo ure; this stipu lation, it wa h ld
r t t cl tlie
bligor p r onally, and could not be taken advanta
of by he
rantee who had promised to pay the debt. 4 The r llt of h e
and ther l i ion · i that h third per on, f i· wb
b n fit an
uncl rtaking i entered in o betw n other par i
it al hough uch undertaking i an in trum nt in writing and
und r eal. 5 This doctrine i plainly a departure fr ·m he t ch-

trary, in Williamson v. Michiiran Fire & '' Coster v. Mayor of Albany, 43 N. Y.

Marine Ins. Co. (1893), 86 Wis. 393, 57 399,411; Van Schaick r. Third Avenue

N. W. 46, it was held that the action must R. R., 38 N. Y. 346 ; Ricard v. Sanderson,

be broujjht in the name of the assured, 41 N. Y. 179; Lawrence i'. Fox, 20 N. Y.

though the mortgagee, to whom the loss 268; Burr r. Beers, 24 N. Y. 178; Thorp

was payable, might be joined.] v. Keokuk Coal Co., 48 N. Y. 253 ; Kim-

2 Hall (•. Roberts, 61 Barb. 33; and ball v. Noyes, 17 Wis. 695; Devol v.

1 Cone v. Niagara Fire In . o. 3
. Y.
'up. t. 33, 39, 60 N . Y. 619 (J
made
payalJ1e t an encumbrancer of th I roperty in.·ured; en ·umbrancer cau ue 1 n ,
veu though hi debt ha. b n fully paid,
" that he will h Jd th amount r c vered

7

o. v. Wagner,

acramento Lumb r
al. 293.

kuk

oal

v.

., 4

.

Y.

ox, 20 N. Y .

. Y. I 78 ; Thorp
\'OI
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nical notions of the common law, which did not permit a person

to sue upon a contract unless he was a party to it, or unless the

consideration moved from him, and wliicli especially forbade an

action upon a sealed undertaking by a stranger. The courts of

some States adhere strictly to this old notion, and utterly repu-

diate the innovation.^ The new rule, however, is as convenient

as it is just. The objections to it are every way technical and

arbitrary, — a repetition of verbal formulas without any convinc-

ing reasons. It certainly avoids a circuity of actions, and it

enables the only person beneficially interested in the promise —

the real party in interest — to come into court in the first instance

and establish his rights, without being driven to enforce them in

a roundabout manner through the intervention of a third person,

who, if successful, must account to him for the proceeds of the

litigation. The true extent and application of the doctrine, and

the proper limitations upon it, have been discussed and fixed by

the New York Court of Appeals in very recent cases. ^

Mclntoph, 23 Ind. 529 ; Barker v. Brad-
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ley, 42 N. Y. 316, 319; Secor v. Lord, 3

Keyes, 525; Claflin v. Ostrom, 54 N. Y.

581, 584; Glen v. Hope Mut. L. Ins. Co.,

56 N. Y. 379, 381 ; McDowell v. Law, 35

Wis. 171. The principle applies to con-

tracts nnder seal : Em mitt u. Brophy, 42

ni al notion f th ommon law, whi h did not rmit a p r n
t u upon a c ntra t unl
he wa a party to it, r unl
tl1e
nsideration m v d fr m him, ancl which p cially forbade an
a tion u on a s al l un lertaking by a trang r. Th c urt of
om t t a lhere tri tly to this old n tion, and utterly r udiate the innovation. 1 Th n w rul , h wev r, i a conv ni nt
as it is just. The obj ction · to it are ev ry way technical and
arbitrary, - a repetition of verbal formula without any convincing rea ons. It certainly avoids a circuity f action , and it
enables the only per ·on beneficially inter sted in the promi e the real party in int rest - to come into court in the first iu tance
and tabli h his rights, without being driven to enforce th m in
a. roundabout manner through the intervention of a third p r on,
who, if ucce sful, must account to him for the proceeds of the
litigation. The true extent and application of the doctrin , and
the proper limitation upon it, have been di cu 'sed and fixed by
the New York Court of Appeals in very recent ca es. 2

Ohio St. 82 ; co)itra, Woodbury Sav. Bk.

V. Charter Oak Ins. Co., 29 Conn. 374.

1 Exchange Bank v. Rice, 107 Mass.

37, per Gray J.

2 Garnsey v. Rogers, 47 N. Y. 233, 240,

per Kapallo J. ; Merrill v. Green, 55 N. Y.

270, 273; Turk v. Ridge, 41 N. Y. 201,

206. See also Hinman v. Bowen, 5 N. Y.

Sup. Ct. 234, which holds that a defence,

good as against the immediate promisee,

is also available against the beneficiary,

(s. c. 3 Hun, 192.) Phillips v. Van Schaick,

37 Iowa, 229. See also Green v. Richard-

son, 4 Colo. 584 ; McKinnon v. McKinnon,

81 N. C. 201 ; Cone v. Niagara Ins. Co.,

60 N. Y. 619; Barlow v. Meyers, 64 id.

41 ; Arnold v. Nichols, 64 id. 117 ; Simson

V. Brown, 68 id. 355 ; Lake Ontario Shore

R. Co. V. Curtiss, 80 id. 219; Dunning v.

Leavitt, 85 id. 301 ; Root v. Wright, 84

id. 72, 74, 75 ; Pardee r. Treat, 82 id. 385 ;

Vroomau r. Turner, 69 id. 280; Rowe v.

Parsons, 6 Hun, 338; Bean v. Edge, 84

N. Y. 514; Todd v. Weber, 95 N. Y. 181,

194; Wheat v. Rice, 97 N. Y. 296; Sew-

ard V. Huntington, 94 N. Y. 116; Litch-

field V. Flint, 104 N. Y. 543 ; Vilas v. Page,

106 N. Y. 439; Berry v. Brown, 107 N. Y.

659; St. Mark's Church v. Teed, 120

N. Y. 583; Lorillard v. Clyde, 122 N. Y.

498. The principal limitations upon the

doctrine, as determined by the New York

cases, may be stated as follows. In order

that the third person may sue upon the

promise, it must be designed to be pri-

marily for his benefit, and not primarily

for the exoneration of the promisee. Ar-

nold V. Nichols, 64 N. Y. 117. There must

have been some obligation or duty owing

from the promisee to the third person

which would give the third per.son a legal

or equitable claim to the benefit of the

promise, or an equivalent from him per-

sonally ; a mere stranger to the contract

Mclntosh, 23 Ind. 529; Barker v. Bracllev, 42 N. Y. 316, 319; , ecor v. Lord, 3
K~ye , 525; Claflin v. 0 trom, 54 N. Y.
581, 5 4; Glen v. Hope Mut. L. Ins. Co.,
56 N. Y. 379, 3 l; McDowell v. Law, 35
Wis. 171. The principle applies to contracts nnder seal: Emmitt v. Brophy, 42
Ohio t. 2; contra, Wooclbury Sav. Bk.
v. Charter Oak Ins. Co., 29 Conn. 374.
1 Exchange Bank v. Rice, 107 Mass.
37, per Gray J .
2 Garnsey v. Rogers, 47 N. Y. 233, 240,
per Hapallo J.; Merrill v. Greeu, 55 N. Y.
270, 273; Turk r. Ridge, 41 N. Y. 201,
ee al o Hinman v. Bowen , 5 N. Y.
206.
up. t. 234, which hold that a defence,
ood a again t the immediate promisee,
i also available again t the benefi ciary.
(.. c. 3 Hun, 192.) Phillips v. Van Schaick,
37 Iowa, 229.
ee al o Green v. Ri<'hardon, 4 Colo. 584; McKinnon v. :McKinnon,
81 N. C. 201; Cone v. Niagara In . Co.,
60 N. Y. 619; Barlow v. M eyer , 64 id.
41; Arnol l v. Jichol ,.64 id. 117; , im on
v. Brown, 6 id. 355; Lake Ontario hore
R. o. v. Curti s, 0 id. 219; Dunning t.
Leavitt, 5 id. 301; Root v. Wright, -!
id . 72, i 4, 75; Parclee v. Treat, 82 icl . 3
Vrooman v. Turner, 69 id. 2 0; Row v.
Par on , 6 Hun, 33 ; Bean l'. Ellge, 4
N. Y. 514; Todd v. W eb r, 95 ~. Y. 1

194; Wheat v. Rice, 97 N. Y. 296; Seward v. Huntington, 94 N . Y. 116; Litchfield v. Flint, 104 N. Y. 543; Vila v. Pag ,
106 N. Y. 439; Berry v. Brown, 107 N. Y.
659; St. Mark's Church v. Teed, 120
Y.
N . Y. 5 3; Lorillard v. Clyde, 122
49 . The principal limitation upon the
doctrine, as determined b_v the New Y ork
cases, may be stated as follows. In orller
that the third ]Jerson may sue upon the
promise, it must be de igned to be primarily for his benefit, and not primarily
for the exoneration of the promisee. Arnold v. ich ol , 64 N. Y. I Ii. Th ere mu:t
have been some obligation or duty owing
from the promi ee to the thfrd per ·on
which would give the third per ·on a legal
or equitaule cla im to the ben .fit of th•e
promise, or an equivalent from him perso nally; a mere tranger to the contract
cannot sue.
imp on v. Brown, 6 N. Y.
355; Vrooman v. Turner, 69 N. Y. 2 O;
Litchfield v . .Flint, IO-! N. Y. 543; Lorillard v. lycle, 122 . Y. 49 ; Pulver t'.
kinner, 42 Hun, 322; Duruherr v. Rau
( . Y.), 32 N. E. 491. While it i immaterial wheth r or not the third per on
i cle. ignated by name (, im ~ on v. Brown,
6 l . Y . .'355 ), it i. nece ·ary that he be
so indi cat cl that h may be a c rtain ed.
Wh :it i- . Hie , 97
. Y. 296 ( rcllitor
T.
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§ 78. *140. Commercial Paper. Action by Legal Promisee.

Upon the same principle, the equitoble owner of a promissory

note is the real party in interest within the statute, and is the

proper person to sue upon it, although there may be no indorse-

ment, and possession of tlie instrument is prima facie evidence of

of a firm have no legal interest in a con-

* 14

. Commercial Paper .
Action by Legal Promisee.
n tlie ame prm ipl
h e uiu bl owner of a promis ory
i '
h
1 ar r in int r
wiL}fin the ta.tut , an i the
r er per n
upon it al h ugh h r m y be no in or emen and p
f th in trumen t i prim a f acie vi de nee of
78.

tract with the firm hv which the promisor

agrees to pay a specified portion of the

firm's debts, as it rests entirely with the

promisor to designate what creditors shall

have the benefit of the promise) ; see also

Edick V. Green, 38 Hun, 202; Weller v-

Goble, 66 Iowa, 113. Some acceptance of

the promise by the creditor, by word or

act, must be shown. Wlieat v. Kice, 97

N. Y. 296. On the other liand, the rule

as stated in more general terms seems

to be recognized in Todd u: Weber, 95
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N. Y. 181 (the j)romise of the father of

a bastard child, made to certain persons,

ou consideration that these persons pro-

vide for tlie child's education and support,

to " make it up to them " in his will, may

be sued upon by the child, as being the

party beneficially interested). See also

vSt. Mark's Church v. Teed, 120 N. Y. 583.

Tlie question of the acceptance of the

promise by C, the third person, has been

much discussed iu Indiana. Until accepted

by C, the contract may, of course, be re-

scinded by A. and B. Davis ?;. Calloway,

30 Ind. 112. But where the obligation or

sum is specific, and is due at a known or

certain time, a demand by C. is not neces-

sary before suit. Rodenbarger r. Bram-

blett, 78 Ind. 213; distinguishing Durham

V. Bischof, 47 Ind. 211 (wliere A. had made

no absolute and specific promise, being

assignee of a stock of goods under an

agreement "to compromise or otherwise

to settle all debts owing by the assignors,"

it is manifestly just and proper tliat a ile-

niand by C., a creditor, should be required

before suit). Bringing the action by C.

is usually sufficient evidence of his ac-

ceptance of the contract ; no averment

of acceptance is necessary. Carnahau i'.

Tousey, 93 Ind. 561, Elliott J. dis.senting;

Kisk V. Hoffman, 69 Ind. 137. Many ca.ses,

in addition to those cite<l from New York,

bold tiiat the promise must have been in-

tended to be primarily for C.'s benefit, in

enter that he may sue ui)on it. See Dun-

dee Mortgage, etc. ('o. i\ Hughes, 20 Fed.

Hep. 39; Burton v. Larkin, 36 Ivans. 246;

Johnson r. Bamberger (Ark. 1892), 19

S. W. 920 (agreement among creditors

not to sue debtor without concurrence of

a majority of the creditors is not intended

for his benefit) ; Civil Code of California,

§ 1559; Chung Kee v. Davidson, 73 Cal.

522 : " It must appear from the direct

terms of the contract that it was made

for the benefit of third parties. It can-

not be implied from the fact that the

contract would, if carried out between

the parties to it, operate incidentally to

their benefit." P'or further ilhistratious,

e uote 1,
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such ownership.^ In fact, wherever the spirit of the reformed

system is carried out, — and tliis is now very generally, if not

universally, the case, — the equity rule as to parties is freely

applied to all legal actions, and this one principle will easily

solve aU particular cases of difficulty or doubt.^ But, as has

been shown in preceding paragraphs, the law as to commercial

paper has not been changed in several of the States by this pro-

vision of the statute in reference to the parties plaintiff ; and in

those States, therefore, the indorsee, and, a fortiori, the payee of

a negotiable note or bill may maintain an action upon it, even

though there may be relations between himself and third persons

which give them a right of action over against him for the pro-

ceeds. As, for example, if A., having in his hands money be-

longing to B., should loan it, and take a note from the borrower

payable to himself, he could sue upon it ; however much B. might

have been interested in the original money, and however valid a

demand he may have against A., he is not a party to the note nor

the holder of it.^ In the class of cases already mentioned, where

an express contract is made with one for the benefit of another,
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and the person thus beneficially interested is permitted to sue in

his own name, the one to whom the promise was expressly given

may, in general, also maintain an action.^ The promise being

actually made to him, and the consideration moving from him, he

is legally/ the contracting party, and is clothed with the legal

right; indeed, he falls under the definition of trustee of an ex-

press trust given in another section of the codes.^

1 Garner ?■. Cook, 30 Ind. 331 ; Comp- against the purcliaser for the value of the

ton r. Davidson, 31 Ind. 62. In the latter property.]

case, the answer denied that the plaintiff ^ See Kice v. Savery, 22 lovt^a, 470,

was "the legal owner of the note in 477; Cottle i'. Cole, 20 Iowa, 481,485. In

suit." This was held no defence, as it the former of these cases Dillon J. said :

was sufficient if he was the equitable " If the promise is made for the benefit of

owner. another, who is the real jiarty in interest,

'^ Conyngham v. Smith, IG Iowa, 471 ; the latter may sue, though the contract

Tate y. Ohio & Miss. K. Co., 10 Ind. 174; was made to an agent or trustee; or

Swift V. Ellsworth, 10 Ind. 20.5. the agent or trustee, or person in whose

8 Robbins v. Cheek, 32 Ind. 328 ; Rob- name a contract is made for the beue-

bins V. Dishon, 19 Ind. 20.5. fit of another, may sue without joining the

uch wnership. 1 In fact, wh r v r the pirit f th r f rm <l_
y 't m i cani d out, - an thi · i now v ry g n rally, if not
univ r ·ally, the ca e, -th
quity rule a to parti
is freely
applied to all 1 gal a tion , and this one principle will ea ily
1ve all particular case, of difficulty or doubt.2 But, as has
be n hown in preceding paragraph , the law a t commer ial
pap r ha not been chang d in everal of the tate by this provi i n of the statute in refer n e to the parti
plaintiff; and in
tho e tate , therefore, the indorsee, and, a fortiori, the payee of
a ne 0 otiable note or bill may maintain an action upon it, even
thoucrh there may be relation between him 'elf and thir per ns
' hi h give them a right of action over against him for the pr eed . A , for example, if A., having in his hand money b longing to B., should loan it, an 1 tn,k e a note from the borrower
payable to him elf, he could sue upon it; however much B. might
have been interested in the original money, and however valid a
d mand he may have against A., he is not a party to the note nor
the holder of it.3 In the class of cases already mentioned, where
an express contract is made with one for the benefit of another,
and the person thus beneficially interested is permitted to sue in
hi own name, the one to whom the promise was expressly given
may, in general, also maintain an action. 4 The promise being
ctually made to him, and the consideration moving from him, he
i ' legally the contracting party, and is clothed with the legal
right · indeed, he falls under the definition of tru tee of an expre s trust given in another section of the codes. 5

* fHeld in Dorr Cattle Co. v. Jewett party for wliose benefit the suit is prose-

<1902), 116 la. 93, 89 N. W. 109, that one cuted." This subject is treated at large

who sells property to another under an in a subsequent section. See also Tinkler

ngreement that its value shall be credited v. Swaynie, 71 Ind. .562 ; Ward v. Cow-

on the note of a third person, may, drey, 5 N. Y. S. 282, affirmed 119 N. Y.

on failure of the purcliaser to make 614; and Albere r. Kingsland, 13 N. Y. S.

the credit as agreed, maintain an action 794; Lev v. Miller, 28 Neb. 822.

l Garn er 1·. Cook, 30 Ind . 331; Compton v. Davidson, 31 Ind. 62. In the latter
ea. , th a11 ·wer denied that the plaintiff
was "the legal owuer of the note in
uit." Thi was held 11 0 defence, a it
wa . ufficient if he wa the equitable
own r .
ony1wham v. Smith, 16 Iowa, 4i l ;
Tate v. Ohio & Miss. R. Co., 10 Ind. 174;
wift . Ell ·worth, 10 Ind. 205.
a Robbin v. Cheek, 32 Ind. 32 ; Robbin v. Di hon, 19 Ind. 205 .
4 [Held in Dorr Cattle Co. v. Jewett
(1902), 116 Ia. 93, 89 N. W. 109, that one
who . 11 ' property to another uuder an
agreement that its value sha11 he credited
on the r. ote of a third perso n, may,
on failure of th e purc hase r to mak e
the credit as agreed, maintain an a ·tivn

ao-ain t the purchaser for the value of the
property.]
5 See Hice v. Savery, 22 Iowa, 470,
477; C'ottle v. Cole, 20 Iowa, 4 I, 4 5. In
the former of these rases Dillon J. aid :
"If th e promi ·e is ma le for the benefit of
another, wh o is the real I arty in intere t,
the latte r rnn.y sue, th oug h the contra t
was macle to an agent or tru tee; or
the agent or trn t e, or per. on in who ·e
11am a contract i made f r the benefit of another, may sue with ut j ining the
party for who e l>en fi t the suit is pro.euted ." This ubj ct i tr ated at larg
in a ~ ub equent ecLio n.
f
al o Tinkl r
i·. , wayn ie, 71 Incl. 562 ; 'V ard v.
owdrey, 5 . Y. . 2 2, affirmed 119 N. Y.
614; and Albere v . Kin g land, 13 N. Y . S.
794; Ley v . • 1iller, 28 Neb. 822.
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^ 79. * 141. Instances of Real Party in Interest. Actions on

79.
Bonds. Actions by Principals and Agents, etc. The following are

additional examples of actions maintained by the real party in

interest, and in which the equity doctrine on this subject has

been freely applied, although the rights to be protected and the

remedies to be obtained ■were legal. After a judgment had been

obtiiined in an action of ejectment prosecuted according to the

old form b}- John Doe as the fictitious plaintiff, the succeeding

action to recover the mesne profits of the land should be brought

in the name of the actual owner of the fee, — the lessors of the

plaintiff in the ejectment, — they being the real parties in interest.^

An undertaking given to the sheriff by the defendant in an action

for the recovery of chattels, in order to procure a return of the

goods, should be prosecuted by the plaintiff in that action, since

he is the real party in interest ;2 and it is said to be a general

rule in Iowa that when a bond or undertaking is- given to an

ofl&cer, in the course of some judicial proceeding, for the security

of any particular person, such person may sue upon it in his own

name without the formality of an assignment.^ If a levy by virtue
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of an execution is made upon chattels by a deputy sheriff, and the

goods are wrongfully taken from his possession, an action against

the wrong-doer should be brought by the sheriff ; he is the real

party in interest, since the deputy sheriff acted simply as his

agent.'* An injunction bond having been given to two obligees,

defendants in the action, one of thera only w^as injuriously affected

by the injunction and suffered any damage therefrom ; he alone,

it was held, could maintain an action on the undertaking, as he

was the only party in interest, and a suit in the names of both

united as plaintiffs was declared to be improperly brought under

the code.^ A plaintiff in a pending suit having moved for the

1 Mastertoii v. Hagan, 17 B. Mon. 325. 3 Moormiui r. Collier, 32 Iowa, 138.

It must be understood that tlie new sys- * Terwilliger *•. Wheeler, 35 Barb. 620.

tern had gone into effect after the com- ^ Siunniers c. Parish, 10 Cal. 347.

mencement of the ejectment, and before QA contrary conclusion was readied by

that of tlie second action for mesne profits, the Supreme Conrt of Montana in Mon-

- McBetii V. Van Sickle, 6 Nev. 134. tana Mining Co. r. St. Louis Co. (1897), 19

See also, a.s to actions on ntlfichment honds, Mont. 313, 48 I'ac. 305, where it was hfld

National Park Bank y. Goddard, 131 N. V. that in an action on an injunction bond.

494 (the person at whose instance an all of the obligees are nece.ssary parties to

oflRcfT levies an attachment is the proper the action, and the fact that .some of tlie

plaintiff) ; Munzesheimer i'. BjTue (Ark., obligees have no interest in tlie subject of

1892), 19 .'<. W. 320 (action on attachment the suit, does not change thf rule. The

bond for witness fees). court said, " But, sav counsel, the code

* 141.

Instances of Real Party in Interest.

Action s on

Th followin ar
a kliti nal ~ ample of ae;ti n main ain cl b ' th r al party in
int r
and in whi ·h the equity lo trin
n hi. 'ubje ha.
b en freel ~ a1 plied, altl ugh h righ t L Ir tee l and 11
r m li to b obtair cl ·w r legal. Aft r a jud men had L ·n
f j m nt pro 'ecut cl a rclin t tli
ld form by John Do a the fictitiou plain tiff, th ucce cling
a ti n to recover the me ne pr fit· of the land hould be brou h
in he name of the a tual wner of the fee - th le or of th
plaintiff in the jectment, - they being the real I · rti in int r st.1
An un lertaking gi en to tl e heri:ff by th defendant in an. action
for th re ver of hatt 1 , in order to rocure a return of th
good , hould be pro ecuted by the plaintiff in that action inc
h i the r al party in intere t · 2 and it i aid t be a general
rule in Iowa that when a bond or und rtaking i given to an
officer, in the cour e f ome judi ial proce ding for the ecurit ·
of any particular per on, uch per on ma u upon i in hi wn
name without the formality f an a ignment.3 If a le by ir ue
of an execution is made upon chatt l by a deput h riff, an 1 th
goo are wr ngfully taken from his po e ion, · n acti n a ain
the wrong-doer houlcl be brought by the heriff · he i the re 1
party in intere ·t ince the d put heriff acted imply a hi
a n .4 An injuncti n bond having been gi en t tw oblig
fondant in the action one f hem onl w injuri u 1 aff cte
by the injun tion and u:ff red an clama e ther fr m · he al n
it w h ld, ould maintain an a tion on th und rraking, a he
wa the onl party in inter t, and a uit i. th nam of b h
unit a
laintiff wa declar d t be i properly br ugh und r
the cl .5 A plain iff in a
nding uit h ving mo d for the
Bonds Actions by Principals and Agents, etc.
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n,

appointment of a receiver, the application was denied on condition

that the defendant give a bond or undertaking to account liiniself

as though he \A^ere a receiver for all assets which might come into

his hands, and in pursuance of tins order he gave a bond in form

running to the State ; the plaintiff having recovered judgment,

and the defendant failing to account, the action on tlie under-

taking was propeily brought at once by the plaintiff in his own

name, without any assignment to him by the State. ^ A person,

in whose name a business was secretly carried on by the defend-

ant and others in order to conceal their property and interest from

their creditors, was permitted to recover the value of assets re-

ceived in the course of the business, which had been taken by the

defendant and converted to his own use.^ Where several persons

were owners of a chattel, but for purposes of convenience the title

stood in the name of one of them alone, and he executed a bill of

sale of it in his own name to a purchaser who supposed that his

immediate vendor was solely interested, it was held that all the

owners might join as plaintiffs to recover the price ; they were
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the real parties in interest under the provision of the code.^

This case is a particular instance of a general rule. It is now

provision that the suit shall be brought

in the name of the real party in interest

has changed the common-law rule, and

any party shown to have no interest in

a recovery sought would be improperly

joined. This is true ; but, considering

what we have said, is the argument cor-

rectly invoked in this instance ? The ac-

tion sho\ild be brought in the name of the

real party in interest, but as the bond, on

its face, declared them to be the real

])arties in interest, in order to ascertain

the truth of the matter alleged, that one

obligee alone was damaged, it was neces-

sary to join all the obligees as plaintiffs,

or make them defendants " Iti support

of the text: Pilger r. Harder (1898), 55

Xeb. 113, 75 N. W. 559, where the action

was on a replevin bond.

In Gyger v. Tourtnev (1900), 59 Neb.

555. 81 N. W. 437, it was held that " a

trustee of an express trust, who was re-

strained with respect to matters concern-

ing the trust estate, may maintain an

action on the bond given in the injunction

suit in which he is named as obligee."]

1 Baker v. Bartol, 7 Cal. 551. Qn

Curry v. Gila County (1898), Ariz., 53

Pac 4, it was held that a county for whose

use and benefit a bond is executed, may

sue upon it, although the bond is executed

to the Territory of Arizona. But in Myers

V. Baughman (1901), 61 Neb. 818, 86

N. W. 507, it was held that the prosecu-

trix in a bastardy proceeding could not

sue on the bastardy bond in her own name,

but the action could be brought only in

the name of the State, which was named

as obligee, for the use of the pro.secutrix

as her interest might appear, the State

being in fact a beneficiary under the bond

as well as the prosecutrix.]

2 Paddon r. W^illiams, 2 Abb. Pr. n. S.

88.

^ Silliman ?•. Tuttle, 45 Barb. 171.

nin Chamberlain v. Woolsey (1903), —

Xeb. — , 95 N. W. 38, it was held that

"one having legal title and the right of

116 CIVIL REMEDIKS.

settk'd that wlieu a simple contract, whether verbal or written,

is entered into by an agent in his own name, but really acting

on behalf of an undisclosed principal, and tiie fact of the agency

is unknown at the time, but the parties suppose that they are

dealing with lum on his own individual account, the principal

may bring an action and recover upon it as tliough he had been

the party expressly contracting.^ In these cases, however, the

agent may also bring the action ; he being one of the contracting

parties, the agreement being in express terms made with him, he

is a proper party to enforce its observance ; ^ the agent may also

sue, even where tlie principal was disclosed, and it was shown

that he was acting in behalf of such principal, if the contract is

of such a form that the promise is in express terms made to the

agent himself.^ Where the promise in favor of a principal is

implied, the agent cannot in general sue upon it in his own name,

but the action must be brought by the principal himself. Thus,

where a person making a bet in his own name deposited S3,000,

the amount thereof, ^^ith the stakeholder, but of this sum only

S600 was his own money, and the rest had been furnished by
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other parties — not as a loan — who united with him in the wager,

and he brought an action under the statute against the stakeholder

to recover back the wliole amount of the money so deposited by

him, it was held by the New York Court of Appeals that he could

only recover the $600 which he had actually furnished of his own

funds ; that he was simply an agent for the owners of the remain-

ing portion of the moneys advanced, and the implied promise to

refund arose in their favor alone; and they must therefore sue in

their own names to recover their respective shares.*

1 St. .John V. Griffith. 2 Abb. Pr. 198 ; .Toneis, 6 Iowa, 169; Usparicha v. Noble,

Hall V. Plaine, 14 Ohio St. 417 ; Hisg'm.s 13 I':a.<!t,3.32 ; Buffiim r. Cliadwick, 8 Mass.

V. Senior, 8 Mees. & W. 834 ; Sims r. 103; Fairfield r. Adams, 16 Pick. 381.

Bond, .5 B. & Ad. 389, 393, per Ld. ])eu- Qln Ward r. Rylia (1897), .58 Kan. 741.

man ; Bastalde v. Poole, 1 Cromp. M. &, R. 51 Pac. 223, an agent took a hill of .sale of

410, fier Parke B. ; Hicks r. Whitmore, personal property in liis own name, in pay-

12 Wend. 548; Taintor v. I'reudergast, 3 mcnt of a debt due to his principal, and

Hill, 72. See /Jos<, § * 177. u])on taking j)os.session of the property

^ See cases cited in last note. Tyler r. was dispo.^isessed of it by a third person.

Freeman, 3 Cush. 261 ; QHernian v. City It w:us held that the agent could not main-

of Oconto (1898), 100 Wis. 391, 76 N. W. tain replevin for it under a general alle-

364 I Barhani (• Bell (1893), 112 N. C. 131, gation of ownership in himself, without

16S. K. 903; Brown i\ Siiarkey (1894), 93 stating facts in respect to his special

la. 157, 61 X. W. 364 ; Brannon v. White interest and rigiit of possession.]

Lake Tp. (1903),— la. —,95 N. W. 284.] * Huckman r. Pitcher, 20 N. Y. 9.

* Ca.ses citeil in last notes. Fear v. For furtiier examples of the real party in
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§ 80. * 142. Particular Injury to Plaintiff Essential in Certain

Cases. People cannot maintain Action to redress Private Wrong.

§ 80. * 142.
Cas es.

P articular Injury to Plaintiff Essential in Certain

P e ople cannot maintain Action to redress Private V'ilrong.

It is the established doctiiiie in sevenil States, and l)y many

cases, that an action cannot be maintained by a private person,

citizen, freeholder, or tax-payer, either suing alone or on behalf

of all others similarly situated, to restrain or remove or redress

any public wrong, or nuisance, or unlawful act done under color

of legal authority by the officers of a county, town, city, or other

municii)ality, unless the plaintiff has suffered some special wrong,

unless some particular injury is done to him which is not sus-

tained by all others in the community alike. As a result of this

rule, no citizen or tax-payer or freeholder can prosecute an action

interest, see Winona & St. Peter R. Co.

r. St. Paul & S. C. R. Co., 23 Minn. 359 ;

Lafayette Cy. v. Hixon, 69 Mo. 581 :

Quilien r. Arnold, 12 Nev. 234 ; Kahn-

weiler v. Anderson, 78 N. C. 133; Maun

l i ' th e ' tabli ·h cl cl trin in . . Y ml 'tat :, ancl hy many
·a , that an action <l.llll t b maintain cl by a. priv, t p !'t-;On,
itizen, fr h l ler, r tax-pay r, either uing alon
r n b half
f all others imilarly i uated, to re tr, in or r m v r r dr . ·
an publi wrong, or nui ance, or unlawful act cl n uncler col r
of legal author ity by th officers of a unty, town, ity, r other
muni ipality, unless the plaintiff ha suffered ome p cial wrong,
unle s some particular injury is done to him which i not u ·tained by all others in the community alike. A a re ult of thi
rule, no citizen or tax-payer or freeholder can pro::; ute an action

I'. ^<;tua Fire Ins. Co., 38 Wis. 114; Kel-
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loj^g V. Adams, 51 id. 138; Sigel Sch.

Dir. r. Coe, 40 id. 103, action on the official

bond of a school district treasurer by the

official successors of the obligee ; Terri-

tory r. Co.x, 3 Mont. 197; Dunning v.

Ocean Nat. Bk., 61 N. Y. 497 ; Olrastead

V. Keys, 85 id. 593 ; Greene r. Republic

F. Ins. Co., 84 id. 572; Conn. F. Ins. Co.

V. Erie R. Co., 73 id. 399, 405 ; Rowe v.

Parsons, 6 Hun, 338, action on adminis-

trator's bond running to the people, by

j)cr.<ons interested in the estate ; Dodson

V. Lomax (Mo., 1893), 21 S. W. 25.

QFor other instances of actions main-

tained by tiie real party in interest, see

Rogers v. Galloway (1898), 64 Ark. 627,

44 S. W. 454 (college suing on subscrip-

tions made to secure its estahli-shuient) ;

State ex rel y. S.andford (1894), 127 .Mo.

368,30 S. W. 112 (State on relation of

county tax-collector) ; Hodges r. 2salty

(1899), 104 Wis. 464, 80 N. W. 726 (per-

sons who paid for building a church su-

ing on unpaid .subscriptions) ; Railway

Co. I'. Taylor (1893), 57 Ark. 136, 20 S. W.

1083 (one who lias a special jjroperty in

an animal killed by a railway train);

Ettlinger i-. P. R. & C. Co. (1894), 142

N. Y. 189, 36 N. E. 1055 (holder of bonds

secured by trust mortgage, suing for fore-

closure) ; Kiusella v. Sharp (1896), 47 Neb.

664, 66 N. W. 634 (suit for conversion,

by donee or nominal vendee) ; German

Savings Bank i\ Citizens Nat. Bank

(1897), 101 Iowa, .530, 70 N. W. 769 (in-

tervention by bank wliich paid a check on

a forged indorsement, in suit between

drawer of check and tlie drawee bank,

not allowed) ; City of Des Moines v. Polk

County (1899), 107 Iowa, 525, 78 N. W.

249 (suit by city for fees earned by city

officers); Cabe v. Vanhook (1900), 127

N. C. 424, 37 S. E. 464 (suit ])y trustees

of a cemetery to compel an executor to

erect a fence according to the terms of a

will); Alexander v. Overton (1893), 36

Neb. 503, 54 N. W. 825 (suit for wrongful

sale of land brought by nominal vendee) ;

Union Nat. Bank v. llill (1899), 148 Mo.

380,49 S. W. 1012 (suit by stockholders

interest, see Winona & St. Peter R. Co.
r. t. Paul & . C. R. Co., 23 Minn. 359;
Lafayette Cy. v . Hixon, 69 Mo. 581;
Quillen v. Arn old, 12 Nev. 234; K ahnweiler v. Anderson, 78 . C. 13.3; Mann
v. .Mtna Fire ln . o., 3 Wis. 114 ; Kellogg v. Adam , 51 id. 13 ; Sigel Sch.
Dir. v. Coe, 40 id. l 03, action on th e official
bond of a chool district trea urer by the
official succe or of the obligee; Territory v. Cox, 3 Mont. 197; Dunning v.
Ocean at. Bk., 61 . Y. 497; Olm tead
v. Key , 85 id. 593 ; Greene v. Republic
F. In" Co., 84 i<l . !'ii2; Conn. F. Iu s. Co.
t'. Erie R. Co., 73 iJ. 399, 405; Rowe v.
Par. ons, 6 Hun, 33 , action on administrator' bond running to the people, by
per:oon. intere. ted iu the estate ; I loJson
v. Lomax (M o., l 93), 21 , . W . 25.
[For other in ta nce of actions maintained by the real party in i11ter e t, see
R oger v. allowa_v ( 189 ), 64 Ark. 627,
44 ~ . W. 454 (college suing on ub cription mad to e ·ure its e ·tahlisltment);
tate ex rel. v . • andford (1 894), 127 -'l o.
36 , 30 . W . 112 ( . _ tate on relation of
county tax-collector); H odge v. .:'\alty
(1 99), 104 Wi . +64 80 N. \V. 72G (peron who paid for building a church suing on unpaid , ub cri pt ion ) ; Railway
o. v. Taylor (l 93), 57 Ark. 136, 20 S. W .
1083 (one who ha a special property in
an animal killed by a railway train);
Ettlinger v. P . R. & C. o. (1894), 142
N. Y. 189, 36 N. E. 1055 (holder of bonds
secured by trust mortgage, suing for foreclosure); Ki usellav.Sharp (196),47Neb.
664, 66 N. " ·· 634 (s uit for conver sicn ,

by donee or nominal vendee); German
Savings Bank v. Citizen
Tat. Bank
(1 897), 101 Iowa, 530, 70 N. W. 769 (interv ntion by bank which paid a check on
a forged indorsement, in uit bet.ween
drawer of check and the dr awee bank,
n ot allowed) ; City of De l\Ioines v. Polk
County (1 99), 107 Iowa, 525, 78 N. W.
249 (suit by city for fees earned by city
officers); Cabe v. Vanhook (1 900), 12i
N. C. 424, 37 S. E. 464 ( ui t by tru tees
of a cemetery to compel an executor to
erect a fence according to the terms of a
will); Alexander v. Overton (1893), 36
Neb. 503, 54- N. W. 825 (snit for wrongful
sale of la ud brought by nomiual vendee);
Union Nat. Bank v. llill (1 99), 148 ~l o.
380, .i9 S. W . 1012 (suit by tockholder
of an in solvent bank again t director for
negligent management, where as · ignee
r efuse to ne).
It was h eld in United States ex rel. v.
Hailroad Co. (1895 ), 3 Okla. 404, 41 Pac.
7:2 9, that where private partie , as r elator., ar e a nthor ized to u e the name ancl
authority of the United tates for the
prote'·tio11 of their inter ·t , the exemptiou
from payment of or · ecurity for co t,
enjoy cl h_v the ni te<l tate , doe n t i u
any way attach to them. They are th'
r eal parti e in inter t and are ubject to
th same liabilitie for co ·t a other li tigant . Illinois ent. R.R. o. 1•. Matthew '
( 1903), - Ky.-, 72 ". W. 302: ne not
th owner of baggage which he check ,
hut who i li able to the owner, may ue
th e carri er for damage to it.]

11
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to restrain official acts which would create a municipal indebted

ness ; or to set aside and annul such public acts when done,

although the indebtedness must sometime be paid b}- means of

increased taxation, and the plaintiff's property would be liable

for his proportionate share of the tax when levied.^ On the

ffi ial act "Whi h w ul

at a municir al ind bted
11 ~
r to ' t a"i l an l amml u h I ubli t t wh n cl n
al h u h th inclebt un ' mu. t
im b p, il · m an
f
in r . ' l t:: xati n ancl h plain iff: pr p rt w ulcl b liabl .
£ r hi
·l ar
£ th tax wh n 1 vi cl 1
n h·
the na ure c ml £ r th purp · d rib cl
r u ht by a citizen tax-1 ay
r freehold r ar
t d in
man and perhap · in a majori
f th . tate
£ rm ' of judicial I r ceedina t r rain th abu ·
ti
an a lmini tra iv power by municip 1
m
h
rem clial proce e ar ac i n b · a itizen, tax-p y r r
fr h ldcr
r train or t a ide tax pro eecling ·, the le m
f
ment for lo cal impro' em nt the i ·ue f boncl by munirporation in aid of rail wa
and imilar act £ a publi ·
2
i public nature.
n t1
ther h nd the pe ple cannot
c1

r

other hand, actions of the nature and for the purposes described,

brought by a citizen, tax-payer, or freeholder, are permitted in

many and perhaps in a majority of the States, and are common

forms of judicial proceeding to restrain the abuse of local legisla-

tive and administrative power by municipal officials. Among

these remedial processes are actions l)y a citizen, tax-payer, or

freeholder to restrain or set aside tax proceedings, the levying of

assessments for local improvements, the issue of bonds by muni-

cipal corporations in aid of railways, and similar acts of a public

or quasi public nature.^ On the other hand, the people cannot

1 Doolittle V. Broome Cy. Supervisors,

18 N.Y. 15 j ; Roosevelt v. Draper, 23

N. Y. 318; People r. Mayor, 32 Barb. 102 ;
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Sargeut v. Ohio & Miss. R. Co., 1 Hamly,

52; Carpenter v. Maiiu, 17 Wis. 155;

Kittle V. Fremont, 1 Keb. 329 ; Craft v.

Jackson Cy. Com'rs, 5 Kau. 518; Kirk-

jiatrick v. State, 5 Kan. 673 ; Tift r. Buf-

falo, 1 N. Y. Sup. Ct. 150; Comins r.

Jefferson Cy. Sup., 3 id. 296; Ayres

V. Lawrence, 63 Barb. 454 ; Dcmarest v.

Wickiiani, 63 N. Y. 320 ; Kilbourn c. St.

John, 50 ill. 21 ; Lutes v. Briggs, 64 id.

404; Wood v. Bangs, 1 Dak. 179.

-' [Kirchery. Pederson (1903), 117 Wis.

68, 93 N. W. 813 ; Zuelly v. Casper (1903),

— Ind. — , 67 N. E. 103. j Rice i-. Smith,

9 Iowa, 570; State v. Bailoy, 7 id. 390;

State (.■. Marshall Cy. Judge, 7 id. 186;

Litchfield v. Polk Cy., 18 id. 70; 01m-

stead c. Henry Cy. Sup., 24 id. 33 ; Wil-

liams V. Peinny, 25 id. 436; Stokes v.

Scott Cy., 10 id. 166; McMillan v. Boyles,

14 id. 107; Rock v. Wallace, 14 id. 593;

Ten Kyck v. The Mayor, 15 id. 486;

Chamberlain v. Burlington, 19 id. 395;

IlanHon v. Vernon, 27 id. 28 ; Hubbard

V. John.son Cy. Sup, 23 id. 130; Harney

V. Cliarles, 45 Mo. 157; Scrihner ti. Allen,

12 Minn. 148; Howes i\ Racine. 21 Wis.

514 ; Mitchell r. Milwaukee, 18 id. 92. 97;

Bond >-. Kenosha, 17 id. 2^4,287 ; Veeder

V. Lima, 19 id. 2«0, 295-299; Rochester

«•. .Mfrc 1 r,:uik, 13 id. 432, 439; Sauer-

hering v. Iron Ridge & M. R. Co., 25 id.

447 ; Warden v. Fond du Lac Cy. Sup.,

14 id. 618; Kellogg v. Oshkosh, 14 id.

623; Nill v. Jenkinson, 15 Ind. 425;

Lewis I'. Henley, 2 iil. 332 ; La Fayette r.

Fowler, 34 id. 140; Harney v. Indianapo-

lis, C. & D. R. Co., 32 id. 244 ; Coffman r.

Keightley, 24 id. 509 ; Oliver r. Keiglitley,

24 id. 514; Nave v. King, 27 id. 356 ; Har-

rison Cy. Com'rs v. McCarty, 27 id. 475 ;

Madison Cy. Com'rs v. Brown, 28 id. 161 ;

Andrews v. Pratt, 44 Cal. 309 ; Bncknall

V. Story, 36 Cal. 67 ; Douglass v. Placer-

ville, 18 Cal. 643 ; Vanover v. Justices,

etc., 27 Ga. 354 ; Brodnax v. Groom, 64

N. C. 244; Galloway r. Jenkins, 63 N. C.

147; Worth v. Fayettevilie, 1 Wins. (No.

2 Eq. N. C.) 70; Mobile v. Waring, 41

Ala. 139 ; Gilmer r. Hill, 22 La. An. 465 ;

1 oolittle v. Broome Cy. upervi or ,
Y. 155 ; Roo ernlt v. Draper, 23
.. r. Y. 31 ; Peoplev. ~[ayor,32 Barb. 102 ;
, argeut u. Ohio & Mi .". R. o., l Haurly,
52;
arpenter v. Maua, 17 \\ i. 155 ;
'it le v. Fremont, l .1..Teb. 329; Cr af t v.
Jacksou y. om'r. , 5 Kan. 51 ; Kirk1•atrick v . •'ta.te, 5 Kan. 673; Tift v. Buffalo, 1 ~·. Y. 'up. Ct. 150;
omin i:.
Jeffer'ou
y.
up., 3 id. 296; Ayre
v. Lawrence, 63 Barb. 454; Demare t v.
\Vickham, 63 "" . Y. 320; Kilbourn c. t .
•John, 5 i l. 2 l; Lute v. B rigg", 64 id.
404; \ ootl L'. Baug , l Dak. 179.
2 [ Kircher v. Pederson {1903) , 117 Wi.
6, 3 ••. W . 13; Zuellyu. asper (L903),
-Iu<l. - , 67 .r. E . 103.J Rice v . .'mith,
I uw,, 570; , 'tate v. Bail y, 7 id. 390;
.'tate '" :\lar · hall y. Judge, 7 id.
Lit<"l1fi lil v. Polk ..;y., l id. 70 ;
~tea•l r. Henry ~y .
up., 24 id. 33;
Jiam v. Peiuny, 25 id. 436; , 'to ke v .
.'cott 'y., I 0 id. 166; McMillan v. Boyle ,
U i 107;
ck v. Wallace, 14 id. 593;
'f n Eyck o. The Mayor, 15 id. 4 6;
hamberlain v. Burlington, 1 id. 395;
Ilan on v.
eruo11 1 27 id. 2 ; Hu bbard
.•J hn.•111 'r· ,'up., 23 id. 1:3 ; Tl ~nn y
,.
har!P .• .i:; :\fo. 157; , criu11 r v. All n,
l:! \1i1111. I ; Howe. u.
a in . 21 \Vi .
fJI-! ~1it<'hell 1•. Milwauk e, l irl. 92, 97;
l on I ,. KPI10. ha, 17 id. 2 4, 2 7 ; eed r
u. L ima, l 'J id ~ 0, 2 5-2 9 ; Ro h .-t r
.\lfr I l::i.uk, l:J id. -t32, _.3 ;
1
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maintiiin a civil action for the redress of mere private wrongs.

An action can be brought in their name only to iiphohl and en-

force a distinct right on their part in respect to the subject-

matter of the controversy.^

§ 81. * 143. Special Provision iu New York respecting Action

by Grantee of Land held by Disseisor at Time of Conveyance.

Partnerships. The last clause of § 111 (1501, 449, 1909, 1910) in

the New York Code was added as an amendment merely for

purposes of certainty, and to remove all possible doubts as to the

true meaning of the section. As it was originally enacted with-

out this clause, a doubt had sometimes been suggested whether

any action at all could be brought under the circumstances men-

tioned in the amendment, that is, when land had been conveyed

by an owner which at the time was held by a disseisor adversely

to such true owner. If brought by the grantee, he could show

no title, because the conveyance to him would, by virtue of other

rules of the law, be deemed a nullity. If brought in the name of

the grantor, it might be said that he was not the real party in

interest, and, under the requirements of this section, was for-
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bidden to sue. The code was therefore amended so as to exclude

the latter construction, by adding the final provision as it now

stands. The purpose of this amendment is really to limit and

restrict the operation and effect of the section as originally

enacted, and not to create any new authority or right as between

the grantor and the grantee for the use of the former's name by

the latter, nor to create any new title to the land in the grantee

liimself.^ An express provision exists in the codes of certain

ham, 27 id. 474 ; Perkius v. Lewis, 24 id. v. Port Washington, 37 Wis. 168 ; Benton

208; Robertson v. Rockford, 21 id. 4.51; Cy. Com'rs v. Templeton, 51 Ind. 266;

J'rettyman v. Tazewell Cy. Sup., 19 id. Delaware Cy. Com'rs v. McClintock, bl

406 ; Drake v. Phillips, 40 id. 388 ; Colton Ind. 325 ; Turpin v. Eagle Creek, etc. Co.,

V. Hanchett, 13 id. 615 ; Dews i'. Chicago, 48 Ind. 45; Ayers v. Lawrence, 59 N. Y.

] 1 Wall. 108. See Dillon on Munic. Corp. 192 ; Metzger v. Attica & A- Arc R. Co.,

§§906, 914-924 (4th ed.) ; Allison f. Louis- 79 id. 171 ; Kewton v. Keech, 9 Hun, 355.

ville, etc. R. Co., 9 Bush, 247. See also See also, on this subject, 1 Pomeroy's

later ca.ses, Longley v. City of Hudson. 4 Equity, §§ 258, 259, 260, 265, 266.

N. Y. Sup. Ct. 353 ; Marsh r. City of i People v. Albany & Su.'iq. R. R., 57

Brooklyn, id. 413; Clay Cy. Com'r.s v. N. Y. 161; People v. Ingersoll, 58 N. Y.

Markle, 46 Ind. 96, 103-105; Zorger r. 1; People v. Fields, 58 N. Y. 491. See

f m ·re p1·i Yale wrong: .
maintain a civil action for h ~ r clr
nly to u1 h )kl ancl " ll•\n action a.n be brough in th ir nam
fore a li tinct rigl t on th ir part in r p ct t the ·ubj ctmatter of the controver y. 1
81. * 143. Spe cia l Prov ision in New Y o rk respecting Action
by Gr antee

o f L an d

held by Disseisor at Time of Conveyance.

The last lau e f & 111 (1501, 449, 1 on, 1910) in
th N w York Code wa added as an amendment mer ly for
urpo es of c rtainty, and to r m v all po ible doubt a t the
true meaning of the section. A it was originally nacted without thi clau e, a doubt h ad ometimes been sugge ·t cl wheth r
any action at all could be brought under the circum tances mentioned in the amendment, that i , when land had been onveyed
by an owner which at the time was held by a di eisor adver ·ely
to uch true owner. If brought by the grantee, h e ould how
no title, becau e the conveyance to him would, by virtue of other
rule· of the law, be deemed a nullity. If brought in the name of
the granter, it might be said that he was not the r eal party in
intere t, and, under the requirements of this ection, was forbiclden to sue. The code was therefore amended so a to xclude
the la,tter construction, by adding the final provi ion a it now
tand . The purpose of this ame ndment is really to limit ancl
Te trict the operation and effect of the section a· originally
enacted, and not to create any new authority or right a b tw n
the granter and the grantee for the u se of the former'-· name by
the la.tte r, nor to create any new title to the land in th grantee
him lf.2 An expre · provi ion exi ts in the cod " of c rtai1

Partnerships.

Rapids Tp., 36 Iowa, 175; Minnesota Oil People v. Sherwin, 2 N. Y. Sup. Ct. 59R ;

Co. y. Palmer, 20 Minn. 468; Hodgman and Wood v. The Mayor, etc., 7.1 N. Y.

V. Chicago & St. P. R. Co., 28 Minn. 48; 556.

Moses V. Kearney, 31 Ark. 261 ; Normand - Hamilton v. Wright, 37 N. Y. 505,

V. Otoe Cy. Com'rs, 8 Neb. 18; Noesen 507, per Woodruff J.; Steeple y. Down-

ham, 27 id. 474; P erkin v. L ewi , 24 id.
20 ; Robertson v. Rockfo rd, 21 id. 451;
J>rettyman v. Tazewell Cy .. up., 19 id.
406; Drake v. Phillip., 40 id. 3 8; Colto n
v. Hanch tt, 13 id. 615; Dow v. Chicago,
1 l Wall. JO .
ee Dillon on Munic. Corp.
. § 906, 914-924 (4th ed.); Allison v. L ouisville, tc. R. Co., 9 Bush, 247 . $ee al o
latn ca e", Longley v. City of Rud on, 4

'N'. Y. ._up. t. 353 ; Marsh i " City of
Brookly n, id . 413 · Clay Cy. Com'r v.
:Markle, 46 Ind. 96, 103-105 ; Zorger v.
Rapid Tp ., 36 Iowa, 17 5 ; Minn e, ota Oil
Co. o. Palmer, 20 Minn. 46 ; H odgman
v. Chicago & t . P. R. Co ., 28 Minn. 4 ;
M se v. K earney, 3 1 Ark. 261 ; Normand
v . Otoe Cy. Com'r , 8 Neb. 18; Noe en

v. Port W ashing ton, 37 vVis. 168; Benton
Cy. Com'rs v. T empl eton, 51 In d. 266 ·
D elaware Cy. Com'rs v. Mc lintock , 51
Ind. 325 ; Turpin v. Eagle reek, tc.
.,
4 Ind . 45; Ayers v. La,vrence, 59 J. Y.
192 ; 1etzger v. Attica & A . re R. o.,
i 9 id. l 71 ; Newton v. K ech, 9 Hun , 355 .
Ree al o, on th i
ubject, 1 P omeroy'
Equity,§§ 25 , 259, 260 265, 266.
1 People v. Albany & •' u. q. R. R. , 5i
N. Y. 161; People v. In p;er oll, 5 N.
l ; People v. Field , 5
. Y. 491. Sr<>
P eoplfl v. • herwin, 2 ·. Y. , np . t. !'i ~";
and W ood v. T he Ma.vor, t ., /:1 , •. Y
556.
2 Hamil ton v. Wri crht, :n N. Y . !'i02.
507, per Woodruff J.; "'teepl v. Do" nT.
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States, authorizing partnerships to sue and to be sued by and in

their firm names, without making the individual members by

name parties to the action.^ This provision is merely permissive,

and not at all compulsory ; it is not a substitute for, but an

addition to, the former existing methods of conducting suits.^

SECTION THIRD.

THE EFFECT OF AN ASSIGNMENT OF A THING IN ACTION UPON

THE DEFENCES THERETO.

5 82. * 154. statutory Provisions respecting the Effect of As-

signment upon Defences. The statutory provision found in the

various State codes which relates to the subject-matter of this

section is the following: "In the case of an assignment of a thing

in action, the action by the assignee is without prejudice to any

set-off or other defence existing at the time of or before notice

of the assignment; but this section does not apply to a negoti-

able promissory note or bill of exchange, transferred in good

faith and upon good consideration, before maturity."^ In Ohio,

Kansas, and Nebraska, the phraseology is slightly different. It

reads: "The action of the assignee shall be without prejudice to
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any set-off or other defence now allowed."* The consideration

of the topics embraced in this provision should, in a strictly

scientific method, form a part of the general subject of Defences,

and might properly be postponed until this portion of the work

is reached ; but I have chosen to pursue the order of the codes

themselves, which is the same in all the States, rather than to

ing, 60 Ind. 478; Voorhis v. Kelly, 31 §6071; Arizoua, Rev. St., 1901, § 1301;

Hun, 293; Smith v. Loug, 12 Abb. N. Oklahoma, St., 1893, § 3899; Montana,

Cas. 113. §571; Idaho, Code Civ. Pro., 1901, § 3156 ;

' See statutory provisions cited in note Wyoming, Rev. St., 1899, § 3467; Colo-

to ^ *\2\, ante. rado. § 4; Connecticut, (Jen. St., 1902,

^ Whitman v. Keith, 18 Ohio St. 134. § 650, in a somewhat different form from

» New York, § 112 (502, 1909, 1910); that given in the text; Indiaua, Burns'

(^Minnesota, St., 1894, § 5157;;] Califor- St., 1901, § 277; Wisconsin, St., 1898,

nia, § 368; Kentucky, § 31 ; South Caro- § 2606.]

lina, § 135; Oregon, §§ 28. 382; Nevada, ^ QOhio, Bates' Ann. St., § 4993;]

§ 5 ; Iowa, § 2546 (slightly altered) ; North Kansas, § 27 ; [^Nebraska, § 31 ; Washing-

Carolina, § 55; [;Utah, Rev. St., 1898, ton, Bal. Code, § 4835, in a quite different

§ 2903; North Dakota, Rev. Codes, 1«99, form.]

§ 5222; South Dakota, Ann. St., 1901,
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adopt one more theoretically correct, yet perhaps not more prac-

tically advantageous.

§ 83. * 155. Defences and Counter-Claims Distinguished. It is

important that the defences which this clause admits should be

carefully distinguished from the counter-claim subsequently pro-

vided for by the statute. This section, speaks of defences which,

as they ask no affirmative relief, and simply prevent the plaintiff

from succeeding, may be made available against an assignee as

well as against the original creditor. The counter-claim is more

than a defence: it assumes a right of action against and demands

a recovery of affirmative relief from the plaintiff in the suit, and

is, therefore, impossible as against an assignee suing, if it existed

against the assignor. The proposition here stated is very simple

and plain, and yet the defences permitted against the assignee

by this section have been sometimes confounded with counter-

claims, and that even by judges and courts.^

§ 84. * 156. Interpretation of the Statute. The section quoted

above, and which is substantially the same in all the States, does

not change the then existing law as to defences under the cir-
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cumstances mentioned in it. It was not intended to alter the

substantial rights of the parties, but only to introduce such

modifications into the modes of protecting them as were rendered

necessary by the provisions of the preceding section requiring

the real party in interest in most cases to be the plaintiff. Tak-

ing the two sections together, the plain interpretation of them is r

The assignee of a thing in action must sue upon it in his own

name, but this change in the practice shall not work any altera-

tion of the actual rights of the parties ; the defendants are still

entitled to the same defences against the assignee who sues which

they would have had if the former rule had continued to prevail,

and the action had been brought in the name of the assignor, but

to no other or different defences. In other words, the section

must be interpreted as though it read as follows : " In the case

of the assignment of a thing in action, the action of the assignee

shall be without prejudice to any set-off or other defence existing

at the time of or before notice of the assignment, which would

1 Qu Iowa, Washington, and Wyoming ton, Bal. Code, §483.5; Wyoming, Rev.

the statute expres,sly names both counter- St., 1899, § 34G7 ; Iowa, Code, 1897,

claim and set-off as being unprejudiced § 34C1.3

by the action of the assignee. Wasliiug-

t l rha not mor pra ad t ne more th r ti ally c rr ct,
ti ally advantageou .
§ 83. • 155. D efences and Counter-Claims Distinguished. It is
important that the d f nc which thi lau · a mit ·h uld be
car fully di tingui bed from the count r-claim ub
uently rovid d for by t he statute. This section, speaks of defences which,
as they a k no affirmative relief, and simply prevent the plaintiff
from ucceeding, may be made available against an as ign e a
well a against the original creditor. The counter-claim is more
than a d fence: it assumes a right of action against and demands
a recovery of affirmative relief from the plaintiff in the uit, and
is, therefore, impossible as against an assignee suing, if it exi ted
again t the assignor. The proposition here stated i very simple
and plain, and yet the defences permitted against the assignee
by this section have been sometimes confounded with counterclaim , and that even by judges and courts. 1
& 8 4. * 156. I nterpretation of the Statute.
The section quoted
above, and which is substantially the same in all the States, do s
not change the then existing law as to defences under the circumstances mentioned in it. It was not intended to alter the
ub tantial rights of the parties, but only to introduce such
modifications into the modes of protecting them as were rendered
necessary by the provisions of the preceding section requiring
the real party in interest in most cases to be the plaintiff. Taking the two sections together, the plain interpretation of them is:
The a signee of a thing in action must sue upon it in his own
name, but this change in the practice shall not work any alteration of the actual rights of the parties; the defendants are still
entitled to the same defences against the assignee who sues which
they would have had if the former rule had continued to prevail,
and the action had been brought in the name of the as ignor, but
to no other or different defences . In other words, th s c ion
must be interpreted as though it read as follows: "In the a
of the assignment of a thing in action, the action of the assign e
shall be without prejudice to any set-off or other def nee exis ing
at the time of or before notice of the a signm nt, which would
I [ Ju Iowa, Wahington, and Wyoming
the statute expr ~sl.v 11ames both counterclaim and set-off a being unprejndi ed
by the action of the assignee. Washing-

ton, Bal. Cod , § 4835; Wyoming, ReY.
St., 1899,
3467 ; Iowa,
ode, l 97,
§ 3461.J
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have been available to the defendant had the action been brought

in the name of the assignor." This construction is now firmly

and universally established.^

J^ 85. * 157. The Rule, as Existing Prior to the Codes, Stated.

Assignee takes Subject to Equities and Legal Defences. As the

pre-existing rule is thus reaffirmed, a full discussion of the stat-

utory provision requires an examination and statement of that

rule itself. In the first place, the general doctrine is elementar}'

that the purchaser of any thing in action, not negotiable, takes

the* interest purchased subject to all the defences legal and

equitable of the debtor v:ho issued the ohliyation or security. That

is, when the original debtor, the obligor on the bond, or the

promisor, in whatever form his promise is made, if it is not

negotiable, is sued by the assignee, the defences legal and equi-

table which he had at the time of the assignment, or at the time

when notice of it was given, against the original creditor, avail

to him asrainst the substituted creditor.^ This doctrine has been

applied to all kinds of defences as well as to set-off, and to all

forms of contract not negotiable: as, for example, in an action
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on a bond and mortgage by the assignee, the defence that the

bond and the mortgage collateral thereto were given on con-

sideration that the obligee should perform certain covenants

contained in an agreement between the parties, which was set

out, and that he had wholly failed to perform the same, was held

good; 3 in an action brought on a warehouseman's receipt, the

same being held not negotiable;^ in an action by an assignee for

the benefit of creditors ; ^ and in an action to compel a specific

performance, brought by the assignee of the vendee, under a con-

tract for the sale of lands, although the vendee was in possession.^

1 Beckwith »•. Union Bank, 9 X. Y. given of it, when there is an interval be-

211, 212, per Johnson J. ; Myers v. Davis, tween the execution of the transfer and

22 N. Y. 489, 490, per Denio .1. the notice." Commercial Hauk v. Colt,

- Ingrahamr. Dishrough, 47 N. Y.42I : 15 Barh. .506; Ainslie v. Bovnton, 2 Barb.

Anlrcw.s v. Gilk-spie, 47 N. Y. 487; Biisli 058; Wood c. Perry, 1 Barb. 114 ; We.st-

r. Lathrop, 22 N. Y. ."j.l.i, .538, per Denio em Bank /•. Sherwood, 29 Barb. 383 ;

•T. ; Blydenburgh f. Thayer, 3 Keyes, 293 ; Reeve.<» >•. Kimball, 40 X. Y. 299.

("allanan c Kdwanls, 32 X. Y. 483, 486, » Western Bank i-. Sherwood, 29 Barb,

per Wriglit J., who thus states the rule : 383.

" An jwsif^nee of a ^/lox*' iti anion not ne- * Commercial Bank r. Colt, 15 Barb. 506.

gotiable takes the thing assigned subject 6 Maas v. Goodman, 2 Hilt. 275 ; Ma-

te all the rights which the debtor had rine & F. Ins. Bk. of Ga. v. Jauncey, 1

acquired in respect thereto prior to the Barb. 4S6.

ht Y b e a« ilable t th d f ndant ha th ac 10n been br ugbt
in th n me of th a i n r.' Thi
ns rue ion i now firml ·
and uni Yer ·ally 'tabli 'h d . 1
85.
1 -7. T h e R ule, as Existing Prior to the Codes, Stated.
Assignee takes S ubject to Equities an d Legal Defences .
the
pr -exi ting rule i thu reaffirmed a full i cu i n f he tatut r pr
i n r quir an xamination and tat ment of that
Tul it elf. In the fir t pla
the g n ral
trin i 1 m ntary
that the purcha r f an thing in a tion, n t neg tiabl , take
the· int re t pur ha ed ubj ct t all tl
defenc
leg 1 and
equitable of the debtor u-lio i su cl the obligation or security . That
i wh n the original d bt r the obligor n the bond , or the
romi or in "hate er form bi promi e i made, if it i not
ne<Yotiable, i ued by the a ignee th defence le al and equitabl which h had at the time of b
ignment, r at the time
when notice of it wa given, again t he original r ditor, avail
to him a ·ain t he ub i ute l creditor. 2 Thi doctrine ha b n
ap li d to all kind of defence a ' 11 a to . et- ff and o all
form of contract not negotiable: a f r xarnple, in an a tion
on a b nd and mortgage by the a ignee, the def nee ] at th
bond n the mort age collateral there o were gi v n
id ra ion that th obligee bould p rform certain c
contain d in an agreement betw n h partie whi h wa
ut and that he b ad wholly failed to p rform th am "a h 11
croo l; 3 in an action brought on a w r l ou eman · recei
h
·a.me I> in 0 h ld not neg tiable ; 4 in ar
i n b an a i.gn , f r
the b n fit of r di tor ; 5 an 1 in an a ti n t comp 1
p ifi
p rformance r u ht b th a ign
f he endee un l r a c ntract f r th , le of land al h ugh ti v nd wa in prn)Sel)S

assignment, or to the time notice was « Reeves v. Kimball, 40 N. Y. 299.

t'.

Kimball, 40

. Y. 299.
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§ 86. * 158. Doctrine applies also to Second and Subsequent

Assignees. The doctrine is not coiilined, however, in its operation

to the case of the debtor — the promisor in the thing in action —

setting up a defence to an action brought by an assignee upon the

demand itself to enforce the collection or performance thereof ; it

applies also to the second and subsequent assignees of a non-

negotiable thing in action, although transferred to the purchaser

and holder for full value, and without notice, if there were

equities subsisting between the original assignor and his imme-

diate assignee in favor of the former. If the owner and holder

of a thing in action not negotiable transfers it to an assignee

upon condition, or subject to any reservations or claims in favor

of the transferrer, although the instrument of assignment be

absolute on its face, this immediate assignee, holding in it a

qualified and limited property and interest, cannot convey a

greater property and interest than he himself holds; and if he

assumes to convey it to a second assignee by a transfer absolute

in form, and for a full consideration, and without any notice on

the part of such purchaser of a defect in the title, this second
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assignee nevertheless takes it subject to all the equities, claims,

and rights of the original owner and first assignor. The doctrine

of so-called ^'' latent equities," which has received some judicial

support, — that is, the doctrine that the equities of the original

assignor, under the circumstances thus stated, are latent and

cannot prevail against the title of the second assignee, — is

unsound; it is an attempt to extend the peculiar qualities of

negotiable paper to things in action not negotiable, and destroys

the fundamental distinction between the two classes of negotiable

and non -negotiable demands.^

§ 87. * 159. Illustrations. A few illustrations of this rule

will serve to show its true meaning, and the extent of its

1 Bushy. Lathrop, 22 N. Y. 53.5; Au- v. Equitable Life Ins. Soc, 59 id. 587;

derson v. Nicholas, 28 N. Y. 600, approved Greene v. Warwick, 64 id. 220 ; Loomis w

by Woodruff J. iu Reeves v. Kimball, 40 Ruck, 56 id. 620; Davis v. Bechstein, 69

N. Y. 311 ; Mason r. Lord, 40 N. Y. 476, id. 440, 442; Matthews v. Sheehan, 69 id.

487, per Daniels J. ; Williams r. Thorn, 585 ; Cutts v. Guild, 57 id. 229, 232, 233 ;

1 1 Paige, 459 ; McNeil v. Tenth Nat. Bank, Reid v. Sprague, 72 id. 457, 462 ; Crane r.

55 Barb. 59, 68; s. c. 46 N. Y. 325; Turner, 67 id. 437, 440 ; Combes y. Chand-

Schafer v. Reilly, 50 N. Y. 67; Mangles let, 33 Ohio St., 178, 181-185; Farmers'

I'. Di.Kon. 3 H. of L. Cas. 702. See also, Nat. Bk. v. Fletcher, 44 Iowa, 252 ; and

on the subject discussed in this and the see in Pomeroy's Equity, §§ 707-715,

succeeding paragraphs, Union Coll. v. where this subject is fully discussed.

Wheeler, 61 N. Y. 88, 104, 112; Barry

§ 86. * 15 .

Doctrine applies also to Second and Subsequent

The doctrine i:s not confinell, how v r, in it ' op rati n
t the as of the debt r - th promi or in the thing in action , ting up a def nee to an action brought by an a igne upon th
demand itself to enforce the collection or p rforman e th reof; it
appli also to the second and subsequent a signee of a nonnegotiable thing in action, although tran £erred to the pure ha r
aml holler for full value, and without notice, if there w re
equitie subsi ting between the original assignor and hi· imm <liate a ignee in favor of the former. If the owner ancl holder
of a thing in action not negotiable tran fers it to an a sign
upon condition, or subject to any reservations or claims in favor
of the transferrer, although the instrument of a ·signrnent be
absolute on its face, this immediate assignee, holding in it a
qualified and limited property and interest, cannot convey a
greater property and interest than h e himself hold ; and if he
a umes to convey it to a second assign e by a transfer absolute
in form, and for a full consideration, and without any notice on
the part of such purchaser of a defect in the title, this second
a , ignee nevertheless takes it subject to all the equitie , claims,
and rights of the original owner and first assignor. The doctrin e
of o-called "latent equities, " which has received some judicial
upport, - that is, the doctrine that the equities of the original
a ignor, under the circumstances thus stated, are latent an<l
cannot prevail again t the title of the second assignee, - i
mround; it is an attempt to extend the peculiar q ualitie of
negotiable paper to things in action not negotiable, and destroy
the fundamental distinction between the two classe::; of negotiable
and non-negotiable d emands. 1
§ 87. * 159. Illustrations. A few illustration · of this rule
will serve to show its true meaning, and the extent of its
Assignees .

l Bu h v. Lathrop, 22 N. Y . 535; Ander on v. icholas, 28 N. Y. 600, approved
by Woodruff J. in Reeve v. Kimball, 40
N. Y. 311 ; Maso n 1. Lord, 40 N . Y . 476,
4 7, per D aniels J. ; Williams v. Thorn,
11 Pai ge, 459 ; McNei l v. T enth Nat. Bank,
55 Barb. 59, 68; s. c. 46 N. Y. 325;
Schafer v. Reilly, 50 N . Y . 67; Mangles
v. Dixon, 3 H. of L. Ca . 702 . See al o,
on the ubject di cu ed in thi and the
ucceeding paragrap h , Union Coll . v .
Wheeler, 61 N. Y. 8 , 104, 112; Barry

l'- Equitable Life In s. Soc., 59 id . 587;
Greene v. Warwick, 64 id . 220; Loomi v.
Ruck, 56 id. 620; D av i v. Bech tein , 69
id. 440, 442; Matthew v. Sheehan, 69 id.
585 ; C utt v. Guild, 57 id . 229, 232, 233 ;
R eid v. prague, 72 id. 457, 462 ; Crane t·.
Turn er , 67 id . 437, 440; Combes v. C handler , 33 Ohio t., 17 , 1 1-185; F armer '
Nat. Bk. v. Fletcher, 44 Iowa, 252; an d
ee in P omeroy's Equity, §§ 707-71 5,
where this ubject i fully di cu ,;ed.
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application. The holder of a bond and mortgage for $1,400

assigned and delivered them to secure an indebtedness of !?-T(\

the assignee giving back a written undertaking to return the same

upon being paid that amount. This assignee afterwards trans-

ferred the securities to a second, and he to a third assignee, the

latter paying full value, and having no notice of any outstanding

claims or defects in the title. The original owner tendered to

this assignee the $270 and interest thereon, and demanded a

return of the bond and mortgage. Upon refusal he brought an

action to compel such return ; and it was held by the New York

Court of Appeals, after a most exhaustive discussion, that he

should recover.^ Certificates of stock being wrongfully taken

from the owner and sold to the defendant, it was held that the

latter acquired no better or higher title than that held by his

immediate transferrer, — the one who wrongfully converted the

stock, — and that the original owner could recover the value of

the securities with interest; but the decision was partly placed

upon the special circumstances of the transfer, which deprived

the defendant of the character and position of a bona fide pur-
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chaser.2 The lessee of premises assigned the lease by an instru-

ment valid on the face, but the transfer was in fact given as

security for a usurious loan made to him by the assignee. This

lease was afterwards transferred by the assignee, passed through

divers hands, and was finally purchased by the defendant, who

knew that the first transfer was intended as a security for a loan,

but who had no knowledge nor notice of the usurious taint which

affected the loan, and who paid full value as the consideration

of the transfer to himself. Su])sequent to the original assign-

ment by the lessee, but before the tiansfer to the defendant, the

plaintiffs recovered a judgment against such lessee, which was

regularly entered and docketed, and the lessee's interest in the

premises leased and in the lease itself was sold on execution,

> IJush c. Lathrop, 22 N. Y. 535. The doctrine. See Ballard r. Burgett, 40 N. Y.

opinion of Deuio J. is a mo.st able review 314, and the cases cited.

of all the autlioritie.s which seem to su.s- '■^ Anderson v. Nicholas, 28 N. \' . 600.

tain the doctrine that certain so-called On account of the peculiar facts referred

" latent e(/uities " a.TG uot protected afjainst to in the text, which prevented the de-

an assignment. He shows that all the fendant from relying upon the defence of

expressions of judicial opinion to that ^/ona/ic/e.s, this case cannot he regarded a.s

effect are oliltf-r dicta, while a large iium- a direct autiiority for the doctrine of the

l>er of direct decisions necessarily involv- text,

ing the (juestiou are opposed to the
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bought in by the phiintiffs, and a .sheriff's deed of such interest

was delivered to them, which deed, however, was executed after

the assignment to the defendant. The plaintiff's thereupon com-

menced an action to recover possession of the leased premises,

and to avoid the transfer of the lease to the defendant on account

of the usury which affected and nullified the first assignment

made by the lessee to his immediate assignee. The New York

Court of Appeals, following the doctrine of the decisions quoted

above, held that the action could be maintained ; that the lessee

might have set aside the transfer from himself on account of the

usury which tainted it; that the subsequent assignees, including

the defendant, succeeded to all the rights, and were subjected to

all the disabilities, possessed by and imposed upon the person

who transferred the security to them, — the first assignee; and,

finally, that the judgment creditors of the lessee were clothed

with his rights and powers in the matter.^

v^ 88. * 160. Doctrine of Estoppel Applied against the Assignor

in Case of Quasi-Negotiable Demands. The principle thus settled,

and the cases which support it, are entirely consistent with
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another doctrine that has lately been approved and established

by the same distinguished court, namely, the doctrine of estoppel

as applied to the transfer of certain species of things in action

which, in the customary practice of business men, have acquired

a qiiasi-negotiahle character. The doctrine as thus invoked by

the court may be stated as follows : The owner of certain kinds

of things in action not technically negotiable, but which, in the

course of business customs, have acquired a semi-negotiable

character as a matter of fact, may assign or part with them for

a special purpose, and at the same time may clothe the assignee

or person to whom they have been delivered with such apparent

indiciu of title, and instruments of complete ownership over

them, and power to dispose of them, as to estop himself from

setting up against a second assignee, to whom the securities have

been transferred in good faith and for value, the fact that the

^ Mason v. Lord, 40 N. Y. 476, 487. v. Lathrop is reaffirmed, and its ])rinciple

The doctrine is directly sustained in the pronounced to be " well settled." The

following more recent cases : Schafer v. result of these authorities is to limit the

Reilly, .50 N. Y. 61, 67 ; Reeves v. Kim- decision in Moore v. Metrop. Nat. Bank,

ball, 40 N. Y. 399 ; Ingraham v. l)is- infra, and to confine it to the doctrine as

borough, 47 N. Y. 421 ; Cutts v. Guild, 57 laid down in McNeil v. Tenth Nat. Bank,

N. Y. 229, 232, 233. In the last case Bush inft-a.

b ugh in by the plaintiff ' ancl a sh riff's clee<l of sucl iuterebt
wa · d liver d to th m, which cl cl, h w ver, wa xecuted aft r
th a 'ignm 11t to the cl f ndan . The plaintiff · thereupou on m nce<l an a tion to re ov r Io· es ion of the lea <l pr mi· ·,
and to avoid the tran f r of h 1 a t the defendant on account
of th u ury which affe ·tecl and nullified th fir t a ·ignment
mad by the les ee to hi imm di te a signee. The New Yark
ourt of Appeals, following the doctrine of the decision quoted
above, held that the action could be maintained; that the 1 ee
might have set aside the transfer from himself on account of the
u ury which tainted it; that the ubsequent assignees, in luding
the def ndant, succeeded to all the rights, and were subjected to
all the disabili ties, pas 'essed by and imposed upon the per on
who transferred the security to them, - the first assignee; and,
finally, that the judgment creditors of the les ee were clothed
with hi rights and powers in the matter. 1
88. * 160. Doctrine of Estoppel Applied against the Assignor
in Case of Quasi-Negotiable Demands. The principle thus settled,
and the ca es which support it, are entirely consistent with
another doctrine that has lately been approved and established
by the ame distinguished court, namely, the doctrine of estoppel
as applied to the transfer of certain species of things in action
which, in the customary practice of business men, have acquired
a quasi-negotiable character. The doctrine as thus invoked by
the court may be stated as follow : The owner of certain kind·
of thing in action not technically negotiable, but which, in the
conr e of business customs, have acquired a semi-negotiable
character as a matter of fact, may assign or part with them for
a pecial purpose, and at the same time may clothe the assignee
or person to whom they have been delivered with such apparent
indicirt of title, and instruments of complete owner hip over
them, and power to dispose of them, a to estop himself from
etting up against a second assigne , to whom the ecurities have
been tran ferred in good faith and for value, the fact that the
1 Ma on i•. Lord, 40
. Y. 476, 487.
Th e doctrine i directly sustain ed in the
following more recent cases : chafer v.
Reilly , 50 . Y. 61, 67; Reeves v. Kimball, 40 J. • Y. ~99 ; In gr aham v. Disborough, 47 N. Y. 421 ; Cutt v. Guild , 57
N. Y. 229, 232, 233. In the la ·t ca ·e Bu h

Lathrop i reaffirmed, and it principle
pr nounced to be "well ettled." The
r suit of the e autheritie i to limit the
de ·i ion in Moore v. Metrop. Nat. Bank,
infra, and to confine it to the d ctrine a
laid down in McNeil v. Tenth Nat. Bank,
infra.
1·.
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title of the first assignee or holder was not absolute and perfect.

After some conflict of opinion in the lower courts, the New York

Court of Appeals has recently applied the foregoing doctrine to

the customary mode of dealing with certificates of stock. It

holds that if the owner of such stock certificates assigns them as

collateral security, or pledges them, or puts them into the hands

of another for any purpose, and accompaiiies the deliver}^ by a

blank assignment and power of attorney to transfer the same in

the usual form, signed by himself, and this assignee or pledgee

wrongfully sells them to an innocent purchaser for value in the

regular course of business, such original owner is estopped from

asserting, as against this purchaser in good faith, his own higher

title and the want of actual title and authority in his own imme-

diate assignee or pledgee. This principle, thus applied to the

peculiar state of facts described, and to the particular kind of

securities, is in no respect necessarily antagonistic to the general

doctrine in relation to things in action before stated in the text.

The court rested its decision exclusively upon the form of the

blank assignment and power of attorney executed by the assignor
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and delivered to the assignee, which clothed him with all the

apparent rights of ownership which are recognized by business

men in their usual course of dealing with like securities, as suffi-

cient to confer a complete title and power of disposition upon the

assignee. The decision was nothing more than the application

of the doctrine of estoppel in circumstances to which it had not

before been applied.^

1 McNeil V. Tenth Nat. Bank, 46 N. Y. particular species of securit}' then before

325, reversing s. c. 55 Barb. 59. The the court, — certificates of stock in stock

Supreme Court held (1) that certificates corporations; and, while he does not claim

of stock were in no respect negotiable, for them absolute negotiability, he does

and (2) the rule as laid down by Denio J. in fact render them indirectly negotiable

in Bush v. Lathrop. The law of estoppel by means of the estoppel which arises

w;ts not invoked nor alluded to. In the upon ilealing with them in the manner

Court (jf Appeals the doctrine of latent described, which is the mode universally

eijuities was discussed ; the dcci.sion of the j)revalent among business men. Ballard

court in Bush c. Lathrop, and the reason- ;•. Burgett, 40 N. Y. ."{14. In Ilolbrook

ing of Mr. Justice Denio, were expressly r. N. .1. Zinc Co., 57 N. Y. 616, 622, 623,

recognized as correct, and as applicable to the doctrine of estoppel was applied to

itl of th
f r om
urt f
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tock. It
wr r of uch tock c rtifi a
a ign th m a.'
curity, r pl lg them, or put th m int the hand ·
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The d ci ion was nothing more than the a pli ation
a ign
of th loctrine f estoppel in circum tances to which it had not
before b n ap lied. 1

all cases in which the facts do not warrant the corporation itself, whose stock had

the application of the princijde of e.s- been transferred in good faith, and in the

hen before

toppfl. Mr. Justice Kapallo, in his al)le usual manner, to the jdaintiff. McNeil

judgment, does not discuss the rule in c Tenth Nat. Bank, snpta, and Leitch r.

relation to things in action of all kinds; Wells, 48 N. Y. 5S5, were held to be

he confines himself exclusively to the controlling; and Leilwicb v. McKim, 53
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^ 89. *161. Extension of Doctrine of Estoppel to all Things in

Action, making them all practically Negotiable. This clecisioil,

and the rule which it establishes in reference to certificates of

stock, are doubtless in the interests of modern business methods.

For several years these certificates of stock, with an assignment

in blank and a blank power of attorney to effect their surrender

and transfer, have been practically regarded by business men as

negotiable instruments; they have been used, transferred from

hand to hand, and assigned by delivery, in exactly the same

manner as bills and notes payable to bearer, and millions of

property are constantly ventured upon their use. It was a

matter of absolute necessity that the courts should pronounce

these securities practically negotiable ; a contrary ruling would

have interrupted and jeoparded the whole financial system of

the country. It would have been well if the court had boldly

met the question face to face, and liad expressly held these

securities to be negotiable to all intents and purposes. This

course of decision would have produced no unexpected interfer-

ence with other general doctrines, and it has a precedent in the
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acts of the American courts holding that municipal and corpora-

tion coupon bonds of the ordinary form are negotiable. As the

court did not pursue this course, it accomplished the same pur-

pose by resorting to the doctrine of estoppel ; and I repeat, that.

when confined to these peculiar forms of securities wdiich had

been made practically negotiable by the course of business, the

judgment and its ratio decidendi do not affect the general prin-

ciple in relation to the transfer of things in action which has

been stated and illustrated in preceding paragraphs. But the

same court has, in a still later case, gone far beyond both the

conclusions and the reasoning of its judgment in McNeil v. Tenth

National Bank, and has virtually obliterated the distinction

between negotiable and non-negotiable things in action, at least

so far as the relations between assignors and assignees of them

are concerned. The doctrine of estoppel, which had been used

to protect the customary modes of transacting business with

certificates of stock, is now extended to all species of things in

N. Y. 307, was said not to conflict in stolen and transferred in the customary

any manner. It is decided in Nevada manner to a /^ona^c/e purchaser for value,

that certificates of stock in the ordinary the latter acquired no title as against the

form are not negotiable instruments, so owner. Bercich v. Marye, 9 Nev. 312.

that when such certificates had been

~ 89.

* 161.

Extension of Doctrine of Estoppel to all Things in

Thi d ·ision,
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matter of absolute necef::sity that the courb' should pronounc
these ecurities practically negotiable; a contrary ruling would
have interrupted and jeoparded the whole financial system of
the country. It would have been well if the court. had boldly
met the que tion face to face: and had expressly held these
ecurities to be negotiable to all intents and purposes. Thi
course of decision would have produced no unexpected interference with other general doctrines, and it has a precedent in the
acts of the American courts holding that municipal and corporation coupon bonds of the ordinary form are negotiable. As the
court did not pursue this course, it accomplished the same purpose by resorting to the doctrine of estoppel; and I repeat, that.
when confined to these peculiar forms of securities which had
been made practically negotiable by the course of business, the
judgment a.nd its ratio decidendi do not affect the general principle in relation to the transfer of things in action which has
been stated and illustrated in preceding paragraphs. But the
same court has, in a still later case, gone far beyond both the
conclusions and the reasoning of its judgment in McNeil v. Tenth
National Bank, and has virtually obliterated the distinction
between negotiable and non-negotiable things in action, at least
so far as the relations between a ignors and assignee of them
are concerned. The doctrine of estoppel, which had been used
to protect the customary modes of transacting business with
certificates of stock, is now extended to all speci s of thing in
Action, making them all practically Negotiable.

N. Y. 307 , was said not to conflict in
any manner. It i decided in Nevada
that certificates of stock in the ordinary
form are not negotiable instruments, o
that when such certificates had been

stolen and transferred in the cu tomary
manner to a bona fide purchaser f r value ,
the latter acquired no title as again t th
owner. Bercich v. Marye, 9 rev. 312.
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action, and the effect of an estoppel is declared to be produced

from (( mere assignment of the securiti/, absolute on its face, executed

bi/ the original owner, (ind delivered to his assignee. In short,

whenever the owner of a non-negotiable thing in action delivers

the same to another person, and accompanies the delivery by an

assignment thereof, absolute on its face, and this person transfers

the same to a purchaser for value who relies upon the apparent

ownerehip created by the written assignment, and has no notice

of anything limiting that apparent title, the original owner is

estopped from asserting as against such purchaser any equities

existing between himself and his immediate assignee, and any

interest or property in the security which he may have, notwith-

standing the written transfer. The Court of Appeals, in reach-

ing this conclusion, expressly overrules the decision made upon

the facts involved in Bush v. Lathrop, but at the same time

declares that ic does not intend to shake the general doctrine

controlling the transfer of non-negotiable things in action upon

whiuh that decision is based. It is plain, however, that the

ancient and, as it was supposed, well-settled doctrine is sub-
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stantially abrogated by this last application of the principle of

estoppel. The estoppel is made to arise from a mere naked

transfer in writing, absolute in form; the rationale of the deci-

sion is the apparent ownership thus bestowed upon the assignee ;

and these elements of the judgment will clearly apply to so many

cases that things in action are practically rendered negotiable in

their nature as between the series of successive holders, — the

assignors and assignees. This point being attained, it will be a

short and easy step to apply the doctrine of estoppel to the debtor

himself, — the obligor or promisor who utters the security. If

negotiability is produced by means of estoppel between the

assignor and assignee, arising from the fact and form of a trans-

fer from one to another, by parity of reasoning the debtor may

be regarded as estopped l)y the fact and form of his issuing the

undertaking and delivering it to the tirst holder, and thus creat-

ing an apparent liability against himself. In short, there is

exactly the same reason for holding the debtor estopped from

denying his liability upon a written instrument which ai)parently

creates an absolute liability, when that instrument lias passed

into the hands of a purchaser wlio has no notice of tlie actual

relations Ijctween the original parties, as for holding an assign )r

. c ion an
f an e topp 1 i d la.re t be produced
fr m a m re assigmnent of the seci1,rity, absolute on i t fa ce, executed
by t te original ou;ner, and deli e?·ed to hi a ignee . In short,
r h wn r f a n n-neg tiable bin in action d liver
an th r p r n and ace mpani
th deli r ·by an
a "ignmen h r of ab lut n i fac and thi
r on ran 'fer
the am t a pur ha · r for 'alue wl o r lie upon the apparent
wner hip r at d by be writte . . a i 0 nm nt, and has no notice
of an · bing limiting hat apparent itl ? the original wner i
e 'tOpf ed from a rtin 0 a again t uch purc~a er any qui tie
exi ·tin bet\ een him elf and bi~ imm diate a ign e, and any
in er t or property in he curi ty which h e may h ve, 11 twith, anding the written transfer. Th
ourt f App al , in reaching thi conclu ion xpre ly overrule the deci ion made upon
invol ved in Bu ·h v . L athr p but at the
me time
· he f~
<leclare th t it do
not intend to hak the general doctrine
contr lling the tran fer of non -negotiable things in action upon
which that l ci ion i. ba d. It i plain, however, hat the
ancient and, as it a suppo 'ed, well- ttled doctrine i subtan ially a r gated by thi la t application of the principle of
e topp 1. The e to pel i made to . ari e from a mere naked
tran f r in writing, ab olute in form; the r ationale of the d iion i he apf arent i; ner hip thu be to d upon the a igne ;
and th e element of the judgment will cl arly apply to o many
ca e b t biogs in action are pra t icall r nder d negotiable in
their natur a b tween th
eri s f succe sive h Ider , - be
a ignor and as ign e . Thi point bein a ain , it will be
h rt and a 'Y tep t a 1 the d o tri1 e f e topp 1 t th d btor
him lf - he oblig r r pr mi r bo utter th
e urity. If
n g ti uili y i pr du l by m an of
topp 1 between th
a ~ . iO"t r and a ·igr
, · ri in fr m h fa t and f rm of a tran ·
fer fr m OI to an h r b pari
f r a ning he debt r ma y
l
top
h fc: an f rm of hi i uing th
n
li r·ng it to h fir h ld r, and thu er atuncl rtakin
m an ap1 arent li bili y
ain t him elf. In
. uclly l
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l nying 11i lia.bilit up n
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rn c
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estopped from denying the completeness of a transfer made by

liim absolute on the face. This result, if reached, would render

all things in action practically negotiable.^

§ 90. * 162. Recapitulation of Rules Established independently

of the Codes. As the result of adjudications of which the fore-

going are examples, the rules of the law as established independ-

ently of the codes may be summed up in the following manner:

(1) All defences, either legal or equitable, which existed in favor

of the debtor himself against the original creditor at the time of

the assignment, or of notice to him of the assignment, of a non-

negotiable thing in action, avail to him against the assignee who

seeks to enforce the demand against such debtor; (2) When the

owner and holder of a non-negotiable thing in action transfers it

to an assignee for a special purpose — such as security for a loan,

and the like — by an assignment absolute on its face, but as

between himself and his assignee retains an interest in or claim

upon the demand, and this assignee assumes to transfer the same

absolutely to a second assignee who purchases in good faith

without notice and for value, the first assignee in fact transfers
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no higher title than he possesses, and the second assignee takes

the thing in action subject to the equities and claims of the

original assignor; but (3) in the State of New York a modification

of this second rule has been introduced in very recent decisions,

and in pursuance thereof, if the original owner accompanies the

delivery of the thing in action with a written assignment thereof

absolute in form, and therefore apparently vesting the complete

ownership in his immediate assignee, an innocent purchaser for

value from the latter is protected against any claims, demands,

or equities existing in favor of the first assignor; the latter is

estopped from asserting his true right and property in the secur-

ity. This modification, which was at first confined to certificates

of stock transferred by means of the customary blank assignment

and power of attorney, has been extended to all things in action.

§ 91. * 163. Effect of Code Provision upon Defence of Set-off.

No Substantial Change. What construction has been put by the

courts upon the provision of the codes embodying and reaffirming

these general rules ? I shall consider in the first place the effect

of this provision upon the defence of set-off. No substantial

change has been made in the rights of the several parties. The

1 Moore v. Metropolitan Nat. Bank, 55 N. Y. 41.

9

e topped fr m denying the compl t ne of a ran ·f r made by
him absolut on the fac . Thi r ult, if r ach d, w uld render
.all thing in action pra ti ally n gotiabl . 1
§ 90. * 162. Recapitulation of Rules Established independently
o f t he Codes . A the r ult f adjudication of whi h the foregoing are examples, the rul
f the law as establi h d in<lep ndently of the codes may b umm d up in the following mann r:
(1) All defence , either legal or equitable, which exit din favor
of th debtor himself again t the original creditor at the time of
the a ignment, or of notice to him of the a ·signm nt, of a nonn gotiable thing in action, avail to him against the a signee who
eek to enforce the demand against such debtor; (2) "\Vhen the
owner and holder of a non-n egotiable thing in action transfers it
to an a signee for a speci~l purpose - such as security for a loan,
and the like - by an as ignment absolute on its face, but a
between hirnself and hi ' a ·ignee retains an intere t in or claim
upon the demand, and this assignee assumes to transfer the same
ab olutely to a second assignee who purchases in good faith
without notice and for value, the first assignee in fact trausfers
no higher title than he possesses, and the second assignee takes
the thing in action subject to the equities and claims of the
-0riginal a ignor; but (3) in the tate of New York a modification
of this second rule has been introduced in very recent decisions,
and in pur uance thereof, if the original owner accompanies the
delivery of the thing in action with a written a signment th reof
ab olute in form, and therefore apparently vesting the complete
ownership in his immediate a · ignee, an innocent purchaser for
alu from the latter is protected against any claims, demands,
or equities existiug in favor of the fir t assignor; the latter i
e topped from asserting hi. true right ancl property in the ecurity. This modification, which was at fir t confined to ertifi ates
of tock transferred by mean· of the cu tornary blank as ignment
and power of attorney, ha been xtended to all things in action.
91. * 163. Effect o f C ode Provision u pon Defence of Set-off.
No Sub stantial Change.
What construction has been put by the
courts upon the provision of the codes embodying and reaffirming
these general rules ? I hall consi ler in the fir t place th eff t
of this provision upon the defen e of et-off. No sub tantial
change has been made in the rights of the everal parti
The
1
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Metropolitan Nat. Bank, 55 N. Y. 41.
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assignee takes the demand assigned subject to all the rights

which the debtor had acquired prior to the assignment, or prior

to the time when notice was given, if there was an interval

between the execution of the transfer and the notice; but he

cannot be prejudiced by any new dealings between the original

parties after notice of the assignment has been given to the

debtor. When two opposing debts exist in a perfect condition

at the same time, either party may insist upon a set-off. If,

therefore, the holder of sucli a claim already due and payable

assign the same, and the debtor at the time of tliis transfer holds

a similar claim against the assignor, which is also then due and

payable, he may set off his debt against the demand in the hands

of the assigrnee. If, however, the assignment is made before the

opposing demand becomes mature, and the latter does not thus

become actually due and payable until after the transfer, the

debtor's right of set-off is destroyed by the mere fact of the

assignment, and no notice thereof to him is necessary to produce

that effect.^ The following special rule also exists under the

peculiar circumstances mentioned. If an insolvent holder of a
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claim not yet matured assigns the same before maturity, and the

debtor at the time of this transfer holds a similar claim against

the assignor, which is then due and payable, his right of set-off

against the assignee, when the latter's cause of action arises, is

preserved and protected. ^ This latter doctrine is based upon

1 [[ This is not the rule in California, against D. as a valid set-off. The statute

In St. Louis Nat. Bank v. Gay (1894), provided that " In the case of an assign-

101 Cal. 286, 35 I'ac. 876, the facts were meiit of a thing in action, the action hy

as follows: On Feb. 4, 1891, defendant the a.ssignee is without prejudice to any

made and delivered to D. two non-nego- set-off or other defence existing at the

tiahle notes payable one year from date, time of or before notice of tiie assigu-

which 1). assigned on Feb. 24, 1891, to nient," Code of Civ. Pro, § .'?68 ; and it

plaintiff. On Feb. 12, 1891, D. made and was contended by plaintiff that at the

delivered his negotiable note, payable one time of the notice of jussignment defend-

year from date, to C, which was regularly ant's demand against 1). was not an exist-

assigned to defendant on Oct. 21, 1891. ing set-off, becau.se it was not then due.

Wlien defendant purchased D.'s note he But the court held that the thing itself —

liad no notice that his note to 1). had been the note, the chose in action — was then

assigned, and was not notified thereof until existing, which satisfied tiie statute.]

Feb. 1, 1892. Thus, neither at the time {jrac § * 797, infra, and notes.]

of the assignment by D. of defendant's '- {_h\ the case of Storts v. George

notes nor at the time when notice of such (1899), 1.50 Mo. 1, ."jl S. \V. 489, the court

assignment was given to defendant, were said : " It has been often ruled in the

any of the demands due and payable. State of New York, and is now the law

But it was held that in a suit by plaintiff in this State, that, if tlie claim against the

on defendant's notes, commenced Aug. 1, assignee was due at the date of the as-

1892, defendant might plead his demand eigunicnt, then there is an equity because

th d mand a
to all be rights
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any new d aling b tw en th original
be prejudice
aft r noti e
he a ignm nt ha b en given t the
vVh n h\ o oppo ing debt xi in a perf ct ondi i n
a
ame time itb r par y a in i t upon a et- :ff. If,
th r for
he hold r f u h a laim already du and pa rabl
a ign h am an l th cl b or at the time of thi tran f r hold
a imilar claim again t th a ignor which i al o th n due and
pa Ta le be may et off hi debt again t th
f th a 1 n
If bowev r th a i o-n men t i m l
po ing d man l becom rnatur and ~he latt r d
b com actuall due and payabl until aft r be tran f r
d btor right of et- ff i de troy d b; the rn re f t f
a i nm nt and no notice h reof to him i nece ar to prod l
:ff ct.1
he following p ial rul al o xi t und r th
pe uliar ircum tanc s m nti n d. If an in olv nth ld r of a
1 i no yet matur d a ign th ame before maturit , and the
d b or at the time f thi tran fer h ld a imilar laim again t
b a i nor, which i then due and pa able, hi ri ht of
- :ff
in t be a ignee, when the lat r cau e of a ti n ari
r er ed and protec ed. 2 Thi ] tter doctrine i ' ba ' d upon

EQ ITIE

EQUITIES r.ETWEEN ASSIGNOR AND ASSIGNEE.

BETWEEN A .. IG

T

R AN

A. I ,NEE.

131

131

considerations of equity, and is intended to prevent one party

from losing his own demand on account of the insolvency of Ins

immediate debtor, an.d from being at the same time compelled

to pay the debt originally due from himself to that insolvent.

These three rules existed prior to the codes, and have not been

changed by the provisions of the statute under consideration.^

of the insolvency of the assignor, and the

debt so due may he set off against the

claim in favor of the assignee, though

on id ration of quity, and i ' inten l cl
fr m l 'ing hi own leman l n a
unt of
irnm diat debtor, a1 d from b inb at th
to pay th e debt originally due fr m him
Th e thr e rul exi t d rior to the c cl
hanged by th provi ion of the tatut un

nL n party
th in olv n y of his
am tim
mp 11 cl
lf to that insolv nt.
, an 1 have not b n
ler consid ration. 1

the claim held by the assignee was not

due at the date of the assignment. . . .

But the claim against the assignee must

be due at tlie date of the assignment, and

if it is not then due, there is no equitable

set-off." See also Homer v. Bank of

Commerce (1897), 140 Mo. 225, 41 S. W.

790.

But in St. Paul, etc. Trust Co. v. Leek
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(1894), 57 Minn. 87, 58 N. W. 826, the

court held that this equitable right of set-

off was available against an assignee wlien

the opposing claim held by the defendant

was not only unmatured at the time of

the assignment, but was not due at the

time the set-off was pleaded. Same rule

affirmed in Stolze i'. Bank of Minnesota

(1897), 67 Minn. 172, G9 N. W. 172. In

Lay bourn v. Seymour (189.3), 53 Minn.

105, 54 N. W. 941, defendants were in-

debted to a corporation on account. They

also held the express contract oliligation

of the corporation to deliver a certain

amount, in value, of manufactured goods.

In an action on the account brought by

the general assignee of the corporation,

the defendants properly set off their claim

again.st the corporation, though no demand

had been made for the goods, the insol-

vency and assignment making the demand

unnecessarv.

The einiitable riglit of set-off cannot be

used to obtain an unjust preference by a

creditor of an insolvent debtor. Thus, in

Northern Trust Co. v. Healy (1895), 61

Minn. 230, 6.3 N. W. 625, where the

debtor of an insolvent purchased a claim

held by a third person against tlie insol-

vent, for the purpose of using tlie same

as a set-off, having reasonable cause to

believe, when he purcliased it, that his

creditor was insolvent it was held that he

could not use the claim as a set-off.]

i [Stadler v. First Nat. Bank (1899),

22 Mont. 190, 56 I'ac. Ill, quoting § *163

of the text with approval.] Beckwith v.

Union Bank, 9 N. Y. 211; Myers v.

Davis, 22 N. Y. 489 ; .Martin ?'. Kunzmul-

ler,37 N. Y. 396 ; Blydenburgh v. Thayer,

3 Keyes, 293; 34 How. Pr. 88; Watt v.

Mayor, etc., 1 Sandf. 23; Wells r.

Stewart, 3 Barb. 40 ; Ogden v. Prentice,

33 Barb. 160; Adams r. Rodarmel, 19

lud. 339; Morrow's Assignees c. Bright,

20 Mo. 298'; Walker v. McKay, 2 Mete.

(Ky.) 294; Roberts v. Carter,' 38 N. Y.

1U7; Williams ?:. Brown, 2 Keyes, 486;

Piobinson o. Howes, 20 N. Y. 84 ; ]\Iaas v.

Goodman, 2 Hilt, 275 ; Merrill v. Green,

of th in lvency of the a i rrnor, and the
debt o <lu may be et off a gainst the
claim in favor of the a ignee, t houg h
the claim held by the assignee wa not
due at the <late of the a signm at . . . .
But the 1aim again t the a ign ee must
he due at the date of th e a signment, aud
if it i not th n due, there i · no equitable
. et-off. '
ee al o H omer v. Bank of
ommerce (1 97), 140 ~Io. 225 , 41 S. W.
790.

But in t . P a ul, etc. Trust Co. v. L eck
{l 94) , 57 1inn. i, 58 . W . 826, the
l'ourt held that th i;:; eq ui table righ·t of setoff wa aYailable agaiust an as ignee when
the opposing cla im hel<l by the defendant
wa. not only unmaturecl at the time of
the a ·igume nt, bu t wa not due at the
time the set-off wa · plead ed. Same rqle
aftirmed iu Stolze v. B ank of l\ lin nesota
( l 97 ), 67 Miun. 172, 69 ~. W. 172. In
Laybourn v. ey mour (1893), 53 Minn.
105, 5-t N. W. 941, defendants were indebted to a corporation on a cco un t. Th ey
also held the exp ress contract obl igation
of the corporation to deliver a cer tain
, mount, in Yalue, of manufactured goods.
In an action on the account brought by
the general as ign e of the corporation,
the defendants properly et off their claim
again t the corporation, th ough n o demand
l1ad been made for the goods, the insolYency a nd a ignment making the demand
nnnec ,ary.
The equitable right of et-off cannot be
used to ohtai n an unj u t preference by a
r re<litor of an in ol vent debtor. Thus, in
orthern Tru t Co. v. H ealy (1895). 6 1
Minn . 230, 63 N. W. 62 5, where the
debtor of an in olvent purchased a claim
held by a th ird person again t the in olvent, for the purpo e of u i n~ the ame
as a et-off, ha1·ing rea onable cause to
beli eve, when hi> purchased it, that hi .
CJ'erlit r wa in solvent. it wa held that he
could not use the claim a a et-off.]

l [. ta<ller v. Fir t Nat. Bank (1 99),
22 font. 190, 56 Pac. 111 , quoting § *163

of the text with approval.] Beckwith v.
Union Bank, 9 N. Y. 211; My r c.
Dnxi , 22 N. Y. 4 9; l\Iartin v. Kunzmul1er, 3i N. Y. 396 ; Blyden burgh v. Thay r,
3 Keye, 293; 34 ll ow. Pr.
; \Yatt r.
M ayo r, etc., l
andf. 23; Well · i-.
tewart, 3 Barb. 40; Ogden v. Preutic: ,
33 Barb. 160; Adam. r. Hudarmel, l!J
Ind. 339; Iorrow s Assignee v. Bright,
20 ~fo . 298 '; Walker v . McKay, 2 1etc .
(Ky.) 294; Robert v. Carter, 38 . . Y.
10/ ; William s v. Brown, 2 Keye , 4 6;
Robin. on t'. Howes, 20 N. Y. 4; Maas t'.
Goodman, 2 Hilt, 275; Merrill v. Green,
55 ' . Y . 270, 27-!; Lathrop v. Godfrey, 6
N. Y. Sup. Ct. 96; Frick v. White, 5i
N. Y. 103; Gildersleeve v. Burro\\' , 2-t
Ohio t. 204. When negotiable paper i
tran £erred after maturity, the maker has
the ~ ame right to avail him elf of a claim
again t the a ignor as a set-off that he
would ha1·e if th e demand assigned was
not negotiable. Norton v. Foster, 12 Kan.
44, 4i, 48; L eavenson v Lafon tane, 3
Kan. 523, 526. As further illustration o f
the text, ee Martin v. Pilsbury, 23 l\Iinn.
17 5; Davis v. Sutton, 23 id. 307; Davi v.
Neligh, 7 ' b. 8-t; Downing v.
ib on,
53 Iowa, 517;
hapman v. Plumer, 36
Wi . 262 ; Harte t'. Houchin, 50 Ind . 32i;
H ea;enridge v. Mondy, 49 Ind . 434 ; Turner v. Camphell, 59 Ind . 279; Barlow v .
My er., 64 N . Y. 4 1 , rever ing 3 Hun , 720;
6 T. & C. L3;
hipman v. Lan ing, :l5
Hun , 290; e.vmour i-. Dunham, 24 id.
93; Taylor v. The Mayor, etc., 20 id. 29:2;
Hu e t'. Ame , 104 Mo. 91 ; I ayburn r.
Hurd . 20 Or. 229; Fuller v.
iglitz, 2i
Ohio , t. 355. The defendant, it ha been
hrlcl, in pleading hi
t-off r countcrdaim mu t alle§;e that it matured befor
th e a ignment of the claim on which he
i. ue rl. Fra11ci · v. Leak (Ind. App., l 9:3),
33 :N". E . Oi. In . uppurt of the t i ird
T.
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§ 92. * 164. Illustrations. The true extent and limitiitions

of the doctrine will best he seen in its application to the facts

of decided cases. On the 24th of August, 1850, the firm of

W. C. & A. A. Hunter, having on deposit in the Union Bank

the sum of S3, 000, made a general assignment to one Beck with.

At the time the bank was holder of a bill of exchange, which

was indorsed by the firm and had been discounted by the bank

for them. This bill fell due on the 27th of August, and, not

being paid, the amount of it was charged against the firm in their

account by the bank. On the next day, the 28th, the assignee

for the first time notified the bank of the assignment, and de-

manded payment of the sum on deposit to the firm's credit,

which was refused. The assignee brought a suit to recover the

debt, and the bank set up the amount due on the bill of exchange

as an offset. It was held by the Superior Court of New York

City, and by the Court of Appeals, that the demand in favor of

the bank could not be set off, as it was not an existing demand

payable when the assignment was made ; and that no notice was

necessary by the assignee to protect himself against such a
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defence. Notice is only necessary against subsequent acts and

dealings of the debtor with an assignor, which might prejudice

the rights of the assignee, such as payment.^ In March, 1855,

(special) rule stated in the text, see Smith .indebtedness to him of the assignor, wlio

V. Sj)ingler, 83 Mo. 408; Green v. Conrad was the orii^inal judgment creditor, ex-

(Mo. Suj), 1893), 21 S. \V. 839 ; Armstrong isting at the time of the assignment of

V. Warner (Mhio, 1892), 31 N. E. 877; tlie judgment.

Fera v. Wickham, 61 Mun, 343 ; Layhourn Wolf r. Slielton (1902), 1.59 lud. 531, G.")

*•. Seymour (Minn., 1893), 54 N. \V. 941, N. E. 582: A purchaser of real estate

and cases cited; Vardley r. Clothier, .51 under a warranty deed has the right to set

Fed. Kep. 508, and cases cited ; Louis off against his warrantor's assignee of a

Snyder's Sons Co. i'. Armstrong, 37 Fed. nnn-negotiable note, given for the unpaid

Rep. 18; Balbach »». Frelinghuysen, 15 purchase money, a sum that the purchaser

Fed. Kep. 685; Jones v. Pieuing (Wis., has been coni])elled to pay to relieve Ins
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The true

.ind btedae

18;t3), 55 N. \V. 413. jmrcha.'ie from a ])re-existing debt.]

Qln Wyman v. Hobbins (1894), 51 O. i Beckwith f. Union Hank, 9 N. Y. 211.

St. 98, 37 N. E. 264, it was held that wiiere 212. QSce, as to necessity of notice, Stadler

an indorsee of a promijjsory note brings r. Fir.-^t Nat. Bank (1899), 22 Mont. 190, 56

an action on it against the maker, the latter Pac. 111.] See, however. Smith v. Fox,

may set off an indebtedness due him from 48 N. Y. 674, which was an action by an

a previ(jus ind<jrsee, wlien sucli indebted- assignee for the benefit of the creditors of

ness existed wliile sucli indor.see held the one R., a private banker, brought on a note

note and botli note and indebtedness were given by defendant to R., and transferred

then past due. to the plaintiff. At the time of the assigu-

Way V. Colyer (1893), 54 Minn. 14, 55 ment <lefendant had an amount of money

N. W. 744: In an action by aa assignee on deposit with R., — more tlian sufficient

of a judgment, the defendant may plead to pay the note ; and this demand was hcM

aa a set-off against tiie judgment an to be a good setoff against the note, on

n

1wL• a111l both 11otc and ind bl du
th •n pa t r!uP..
Way ''· c·,,1y r (I ~3), 3-l :\Ii rm . 14, 55
. ·. \ ·. i 14 : 111 au actiou i,,. an :L i<TD
juJ •111 11t, tlr d ·fcud:;11t m, y pl ad
. -Off again t the judgment a.11
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the firm of Watrous & Lawrence made a general assignment to

one Meyers, having before that time sold goods to the defendants

on credit, the price of which did not become due and payable

until September, 1855. In February of the same year, W. & L.

had ordered from the defendants a (piantity of articles — patent

churns — to be manufactured and delivered at a certain agreed

price. There had been such mutual dealings between the parties

before. In May, 1855, the defendants completed the churns,

and tendered them to the assignee, who declined to receive them.

The assignee brought an action foi- the price of the goods when

it became due in September, and the defendants insisted upon

the value of the churns as an offset. The defence of offset was

rejected. The court held that the situation of the parties at the

date of the assignment must determine the question, and unless

a right of offset existed then, it could not arise afterwards. It

did not exist then, because neither of the demands had matured;

but it was enough that the defendant's claim was not yet pay-

able, even if the one assigned was presently due.^ If the

defendant's demand had become mature at the time of the assign-
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ment, it could undoubtedly have been set off under the equitable

rule before stated, on account of the insolvency of W. & L. A

tirm made a general assignment, having at the time a claim due

and payable against the defendants. The assignee brings an

action upon the demand, and the defendants set up a note of the

assignors which they held at the time of the assignment, but

which did not fall due until after that date. The attempted set-

off was rejected. "An allowance to a party by way of set-off is

always founded on an existing demand in priesenti, and not on

one that may be claimed in futuro.^'"^ In an action bv an as-

the authority of Smith v. Felton, 43 N. Y. See also Fera r. Wiciihani, 135 N. Y. 223,

419. The claim made against the defend- reversing s. c. 61 Hnn, 343, and over-

ant, and the demand set up by him, ruling llothschild v. Mack, 42 Hun, 73.

must both affect him iu the same capac- In Kentucky, however, the assignor's insol-

ity ; thus, when the defendant is sued for vcncy is a sufficient ground for allowing the

a personal debt, he cannot interpose as a set-off of a claim not due at the time of

set-off a demand due him as au executor, the assignment. Kentucky Flour Co.'s

Barlow v. Myers, 6 N. Y. Sup. Ct. 183. As.signee r. Merchants' Bank (Ky., 1890),

5 Myers v. Davis, 22 N. Y. 489, 490, 13 S. W. 910. |[Samc rule in Minnesota:

citing Chance v. Isaacs, 5 Paige, 592; St. Paul, etc. Trust Co. c Leek (1894), 57

Bradley v. Angell, 3 N. Y. 475, 493. Minn. 87, 58 N. W. 826.]

[|This case, Myers v. Davis, was quoted '^ Martin v. Kunzmuller, 37 N. Y. 396 ;

and approved in Stadler v. First Nat. Watt v. The Mayor, etc., 1 Sandf. 23 ;

the firm of Watrous & Lawr nee made a general assignment to
one Mey r , having before that tim ·ol<l g ods to the d fendant
on er it, the price of which did not become due an<l ayable
until eptember, 1855. In F bruary of the am y ar vV. & L.
had ord red from the defendant a quantity of arti les - atent
hums - to be ruanufactur d and d livered at a certain agr ed
pn
There had been such mutual dealings between the parties
b fore. In May, 1855, the defendants completed the ehurn~,
and tendered them to the assignee, who declined to receive them.
Th assignee brought an action for the price of the goods wh n
it became due in September, and the defendants insist d upon
the value of the churns as an offset. The defence of offset was
rejected. The .court held that the situation of the parties at the
elate of the assignment must determine the question, and unless
a right of offset existed then, it could not arise afterwards. It
lid not exist then, because neither of the demands had matured;
but it was enough that the defendant's claim was not yet payable, even if the one assigned was presently due. 1 If the
defendant;s demand had become mature at the time of the assignment, it could undoubtedly have been set off under the equitable
rule before stated, on account of the insolvency of W. & L. A
firm made a general assignment, having at the time a claim due
and payable against the defen<lants. The assignee brings an
action upon the demand, and the defendants set up a note of the
a signors which they held at the time of the aR ignment, but
which did not fall due until after that date. The attempted etoff was reject d. "An allowance to a party by way of set-off is
always founded on an ex1:sting demand in prcesenti, and not on
one that may be claimed in fiduro." 2 In an action by an a -

Bank (1899), 22 Mont. 190, 56 Pac. 111] Wells r. Stewart, 3 Barb. 40.

the authority of Smith v. Felton, 43 K Y.
419. Th e claim made again st the defe11clant, and the demand !'let up by him,
mu t buth affrct him in the same capacity; thui:;, when the defendant is sued for
a per onal debt, he cannot interpose a a
et-off a demand clue him as an executor.
Barlow v. My er , 6 J. Y. Sup. Ct. 183.
1 Myers v. Davis, 22 N. Y. 4 9, 490,
citing Chance v. I saacs, 5 Paige, 592 ;
Bradley v. Angell, 3 N. Y . 475, 493.
[This ca e, Myers v. Davis, was quoted
and approved in Stadler v. Fir t Nat.
Bank (1899) , 22 Mont. 190, 56 Pac. 11 l.]

See also Fera v. Wickham, 135 N. Y. 223,
r ever ing s. . 61 I-Inn, 343, ancl verruling Tiuth chi ld v. Mack, 42 Hun , i3 .
In K entucky, however, th e as ig nor' in olvenc.v i::; a sufficient groun<l for allowing the
et-off of a claim n t clue at th time of
the af::signment. Kentucky Flour
o.'
Assignee 1·. l\I erchants' Bank (Ky., l 90),
13 S . W. 910. [Same rule in Minn sota:
St. Paul, tc. Trust Co. v. Leck (1 94 ), 57
Minn. 87, 5 N. W. 26.J
2 Martin 1:. Kunzmuller, 37 .r . Y. 396;
Watt v. Th e Mayor, etc., 1 anclf. 23 ;
Wells i:. Stcwn.rt, 3 Ba.rb. 40.
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signee for the benefit of creditors, the defendant relied upon a

n for the benefit of er ditor th def ndant relied upon a
j 1 10 ment for co ts r cov red bJ him lf again t the a i6 n r
aft r th m king of the trans£ r .
hi set-off wa n t admi t <l
and it w " decided that no notice f he a ignm I ' a nee s, ry t cut o
uch a defence. 1
nd when th d f ndant in
an action brought up n an a signed demand all ged pa m nt
which the h
mad , sub equent to the a ignm n a ur ti ·
for the a ignor upon a liabilit existing prior to and at the tim
thereof, thi et -off a o errul d on the same principle; f r,
although th re was a liability whi h might re ult in a debt, ther
wa no exi ting debt until the payment had actually b en mad . 2
In another action by an a ignee the defendant i11 i ·ted that a
imilar et-off arising from hi paymen a suret for th a ign r
made under the ame circum tanc a the la t, h ul be all w cl
a within the equitable rule on a count of the a ignor in ·olvenc} . The et-off wa rejected, howe er b cau there wa · no
exi ·tinO' indebtedne _in fa or of the d fondant again t the a. io·n r at th date of th as ignment.
u h a pre nt in ebte 1ne i iudi pen able, whether the ca e is to b g vern d by tli
rdinary rule, or whether the equitable doctrine ba d up n tlt
a ignor in ol vency 3 i relied upon. 4 Wh n a n go iable pr m'l

judgment for costs recovered by himself against the assignor

after the making of the transfer. This set-off was not admitted,

and it was decided that no notice of the assignment was neces-

sary to cut off such a defence.^ And when the defendants, in

an action brought upon an assigned demand, alleged payments

which they had made, subsequent to the assignment, as sureties

for the assignor upon a liability existing prior to and at the time

thereof, this set-off was overruled on the same principle ; for,

although there was a liability which might result in a debt, there

was no existing debt until the payment had actually been made.^

In another action by an assignee the defendant insisted that a

similar set-off arising from his payment as surety for the assignor,

made under the same circumstances as the last, should be allowed

as within the equitable rule on account of the assignor's insol-

vency. The set-off was rejected, however, because there was no

existing indebtedness in favor of the defendant against the as-

signor at the date of the assignment. Such a present indebted-

ness is indispensable, whether the case is to be governed by the
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ordinary rule, or whether the equitable doctrine based upon the

assignor's insolvency ^ is relied upon.* When a negotiable proni-

1 Ogden y. Prentice, 33 Barb. 160. See tomers ; and that it does not become so

also Lucas v. East Stroudsburg Glass Co., until, at the least, it commits an act of in-

38 Hun, 581. solvency, and probably not until it sus^pends

- Adams v. Rrjdarmel, 19 Ind. 339. payment or is closed by the governme'nt."]

3 QThe meaning of the word " insol- '« Walker y. McKay, 2 Mete. (Ky.) 294.

vency, " as used in this connection, was [^And in Merchants' Nat. Bank y. Robinson

con.sidered by the supreme court of Mon- (1895), 97 Ky. 552, 31 S. W. 136, the

tana in Stadler v. First Nat. Bank (1899), court said : "An unmatured debt cannot

22 Mont. 190, 56 Pac. 111. The court, be set off against a /wHayj(/e assignee for

after quoting the above portion of tbe value of a demand due from the defend-

text, said : " Insolvency has two mean- ant to the assignor." See also Stadler v.

ings. In its popular sense, it signifies First Nat. Bank (1899), 22 Mont. 190,56

the condition of a person whose entire Pac. Ill, quoting the te.xt. See, to the

assets are insufficient to pay his debts contrary, Stolze v. Bank of Minnesota

in full. The terra is, however, used (1897), 67 Minn. 172,69 N. W. 172; St.

in a restricted sense to express the Paul, etc., Trust Co. v. Leek (1894), 57

present ability of a trader to pay his Minn. 87, 58 N. W. 826 ; St. Louis Nat.

current obligations as they mature, in tbe Bank v. Gay (1894), 101 Cal. 286, 35 Pac.

usual course of business. . . . Tlie Na- 870.] See," however, Morrow's Assignees

tional Bank Act seems strongly to imply r. Hriglit, 20 Mo. 298, in whidi the set-off

that, so long as an jissociation is carrying was allowed, the court plainly mistaking

on Its business and meeting its obligations or misconceiving the extent and limita-

as they mature, whatever its actual condi- tions of the equitable doctrine flowing

tion as to future ability may be, it is, in from the insolvency of the assignor. See

the absence of fraud, not to be deemed in- also the decision iii Chenault v. Bush, 84

solvent, as betweeu itself and its cu.s- Kv. 528, which is similar to that iu

ee
Co.,

tomer ; and that it doe not become ,o
un til, at the lea t, it commit an act of inolvency, and probably not until it u ,P ud.
pay ment or i clo ed by the governm ut."]
! Walker u. McKay, 2 Mete. (Ky.) 29~.
[A nd in l\[erchant ·Nat. ank v . R bin ou
( l 95} 97 K y. 552, 3 1 . W. 136, th
ourt aid: " An unmatured debt cannot
be t off aga in t a bona.fide a ign f<>r
value of a demand due fr m the d f nd ·
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issory note is assigned before it becomes due, the maker thereof

cannot offset against the assignee a claim existing against the

original payee and assignor of the note, although the assignee

liave notice of such claim at and before the time of the transfer

to him ; there is no case for the set-off between the original

parties at the date of the assignment, because the demands are

not then matured, and the notice given to the assignee is not of

any existing legal defence.^ There being no possibility of setting

off a claim of damages arising from a tort or fraud against a

demand growing out of contract, if two such opposing claims

exist and are in suit, and the creditor in the contract assigns his

cause of action, which is afterwards merged in a judgment in

favor of the assignee, and subsequently to that assignment the

opposing party — the debtor in the contract — obtains a judgment

for the damages in his action on the tort, the latter is not entitled

to set off this judgment against the one recovered against himself

by the assignee. No rights of set-off existed at the date of the

transfer, and none could spring up after that time.^

§ 93. * 165. Right of Set-off may be Available although once
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Suspended. Illustration. It is possible that a right of set-otf

may be available at the time an action is brought, although at

some prior period it was suspended, as is well illustrated by the

following case: On the 29th of August the Hollister Bank dis-

counted for one Monteath a sight draft on New York drawn by

him, and passed the proceeds to his credit as a deposit. He did

not draw them out. This draft was dishonored on presentment.

Morrow's Assignees r. Bright. The latter same riglits of set-off also when the note

case has recently been overruled by Huse is assigned before maturity, but not iu

V. Ames, 104 Mo. 91, and the rule in good faith and for a valuable consid-

Walker v. McKay, stated in the text, now eration. Bone v. Tharp, 63 Iowa, 223.

prevails in Missouri. See also, in support In Richards v. Union Village, 48 Hun, 263,

of the text, Kinsey v. Ring (Wis., 1892), and in Richards v. La Tourette, .53 Ilun,

53 N. W. 842. 623, claims iu the hands of the defendants

1 Williamsr. Brown, 2 Keyes,486. See were not allowed to be offset against de-

also Barlow v. Myers, 6 N. Y. Sup. Ct. 183 ; mauds sued upon by assignees not due at

s. c. reversed on appeal, 64 N. Y. 41. But, the time of the assignment; in the first

where negotiable paper is assigned after case, against an order for the payment of

maturity, the maker's rights of set-off money; in the second case, against a bond

i ory note i assigned before it b com due, th maker ther of
cannot ffset against the as ign e a claim exi ing again t the
rie,inal payee and a ign r of th n t , alth ugb th a ignee
have notice of such claim at an l befor the ime f the tran f r
to him; there is no ca
for the set-off between th original
parti at the date of th a ignment, b cause the d mand · are
not then matured, and th n tice given to the a ignee is not of
any xisting legal defence. 1 There being no pas ibility of setting
off a claim of damage arising from a tort or fraud again~t a
demand growing out of contract, if two such opposing claims
exist and are in suit,. and the creditor in the contract as igns his
cau e of action, which is afterwards merged in a judgm nt in
favor of the a signee, and ub equently to that as ignment the
oppo ing party-the debtor in the contract - obtains a judgm nt
for the damages in his action on the tort, the latter i not entitled
to set off this judgment against the one recovered against himself
by the assignee. · No rights of set-off existed at the date of the
transfer, and none could spring up after that time. 2
§ 93. * 165. Right of Set-off may be Available although once
Suspended. Illustration. Tt is possible that a right of s t-off
may be available at the time an action is brought, although at
ome prior period it was suspended, as is well illustrated by the
following ca e : On the 29th of August the Hollister Bank discounted for one Mon tea th a sight draft on New York drawn by
him, and passed the proceeds to his credit as a deposit. He did
not draw them out. This draft was dishonored 011 presentment.

are the same as though the demand and mortgage. It is fair to say, however,

assigned was not negotiable. Norton v. that in neither of these cases was Barlow

Foster, 12 Kan. 44, 47, 48; Leavenson r. v. Myers mentioned.

Lafontane, 3 Kan. 523 ; Harris v. Burwell, 2 Roberts v. Carter, 38 N. Y. 107. See

65 N. C. 584 ; contra, Richards r. Darly, Martin v. Richardson, 68 N. C. 255.

34 Iowa, 427, 429. The maker has the

Morrow's Assignees v. Bright. The latter
ease has recently been overruled by Huse
v. Ame , 104 Mo. 91, and the rule in
Walker v. McKay, stated in the text, now
prevail in Missouri. See also , in upport
of the text, Kinsey v. Ring (Wis., 1892),
53 . w. 842.
1 Williams v. Brown, 2 Keye , 486. See
al o Barlow v. Myer~, 6 N. Y. Sup. Ct. l 3;
. . rever ed on appeal, 64 N. Y. 41. But,
where negotiable paper is a signed after
maturity, the maker' rights of et-off
ar the same as though the demand
as igned was not negotiable. Norton v.
Fo. ter, 12 Kan. 44, 4i, 48; Leaven on v.
Lafoutane, 3 Kan. 523; Harris v. Burwell,
£5 N. C. 584; contra, Richards v. Darly,
34 Iowa, 42i, 429. The maker has the

ame rights of et-off al o when the note
is assigned before maturity, but not in
good faith and for a valuable con ideration. Bone v. Tharp, 63 Iowa, 223.
In Richards v. Union VillaO'e, 48 Hun, 263,
and in Richards v. La Tourette, 53 Hun,
623, claims in th e hands of the defendant
wei·e not allowed to be off et again t demands ued upon by a ignee not due at
the time of the a ignment; in the fir t
ca e, against au order for the payment of
money; in the eco nd ca e, again ·t a bond
and mortgaO'e. It i, fair to ay, howe,·er,
that in neither of these a e wa Barlow
v. Myers mentioned.
2 Roberts v. Carter, 3 N. Y. 107. , ee
Martin v. Richard on, 68 r. C. 255.
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f time Robin on
t mb r Mon eath
a in t tb e bar k f r th
um on
d of the said

On the 31st the bank failed, and in the course of time Robinson

was appointed its receiver. On the 21st of September ISIonteath

assigned to the Howes liis chiim against the bank for the sum on

deposit, the same being partly or wholly the proceeds of the said

draft. At the time of the assignment the draft in question was.

held by parties in New York, to whom the bank had transferred

it as collateral security; and, of course, during the interval in

which the draft was thus held, the bank could have had no pos-

sible set-off by means of it against the demand of Monteath for

his deposit, either made by him or by his assignee. But before

any action was brought, the bank again became owner of the

draft. An action was afterwards commenced by the receiver ta

recover an indebtedness due to the bank from the Howes; they

set up the claim of Monteath for his deposit assigned to them,

as above stated ; and the receiver in fact opposed the demand of

the bank against Monteath upon the dishonored draft as a set-off

to the defendants' set-off.^ Although the New York Court of

Appeals held that the debt against the bank assigned to the

defendants by ^Monteath should be disallowed, yet their entire
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reasoning shows that it was disallowed, not because it w^ould not

in itself have been a valid set-off, but because its effect was

entirely destroyed by the counter set-off of the draft in the

hands of the bank. If the bank had retained the continuous

ownership of the draft, as soon as it was dishonored it would

have been a good claim against Monteath, and w^ould have ex-

tinguished, in whole or in part, his claim for the money due on

deposit; this set-off existing at the date of the assignment to the

defendants would have been equally available against them ; and

as the bank became owner of the draft before the action was

brought, its original right revived with the same force and to

the same extent as though the draft had never been out of its

control. 2

§ 94. * 166. California Rule. Set-off of Demand Accruing after

Assignment but before Notice. It is held, ill California, that a

demand against an assignor, which was obtained by the debtor

or accrued in his favor before notice of the assignment, although

in fact subsequent to tlie assignment itself, may be set off against

our e during the jnter al in
be 1:> nk could ha e had no po et- ff b mean f it again. he demand of l\lonteath f r
hi dep si , either made b him r b hi assignee. But fore
ny ac i n wa brought the bank again became owner of the
dr ft.
n a tion wa aft rward comm need b the recei er o
recov r an indebtedn
due
the bank from he Ho e ; th
up be claim of Mon ea h for bi depo it a ign d to th m,
abo e tat d; and the recei er in fa t oppo ed the de man o
the bank again t Monteath up n he di honored draft a a " off
to the d fondants et-off. 1 Altb ugh the ew York ourt of
pp a
held that the debt again t the bank a ign cl o the
def ndant b
Ionteatb , bould
di 'allowed, et their ntire
r a onin , b w tha t it wa li allow 1, not becau e it w uld n t
in i lf ha
b en a alid et-off, but becau e i
ffe t was
entirel d roy d by the
unter
t-off of h draft in the
hand of h e bank. If the ba1 k had retained the on innou
f th
n a it wa di hon re i would
. . 1 nteath and w uld ha ·
xlaim for b

3 Qln Ilaminer v. Downing (1901 ), 39 stitutes a departure in pleading. See,

Ore. 504, G4 I'ac. 051, it was 1ip1<1 that a however, oases cited in note to § *748.]

a ailabl again t th m · and
\ n r
ha f b fore tl1
it.· rj ginal right r i
wi l th
am
xt nt a though th iraf t h d n v r b n

B€t-off to a plea of set-off is had, anil con- ^ Kohiusuu r. Howes, 20 X. Y. 84.
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the cause of action in the hands of the assignee. ^ This ruling,

however, is clearly opposed to the doctrine of the New York

cases already quoted, and to the theory of set-off generally

adopted. Notice may be required in order to cut off other

defences ; but a set-off, according to the accepted rule, must exist

in the form of a debt then due and payable to the debtor at the

date of the transfer. A note, payable on demand, with or with-

out interest, transferred at a considerable interval of time after

its date, is taken and held by the assignee, subject to all defences-

existing in favor of the maker against the payee at the time of

the transfer; in other words, such a note is transferred after

maturity.^

§ 95. * 167. Nature of Notice Necessary to protect Assignee.

Defendant's Rights as against Assignee purely Defensive. When

notice to the debtor is necessary to a complete protection of the

assignee against subsequent transactions between the assignor

and the debtor, such as payment, release, and the like, an actual

notice is not indispensable. Such information or knowledge as

would be sufficient to put any reasonable man upon the inquiry,
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when an inquiry reasonably followed up would have led to an

ascertaining of the truth, is equally effective to protect the

assignee; in short, the equitable rule in reference to purchasers

of land applies to the assignees of things in action.^ In Ohio, a

set-off against the person beneficially interested, for whose benefit

the suit is prosecuted, may be interposed when the action is

brought by one who is, within the meaning of the code, a trustee

of an express trust, and there has been no assignment at all.

Thus, where a promise is made to A. for the benefit of B., and

1 xMcCabe v. Grey, 20 Cal. 509. [|The after the as.sipiiment, when the certificate

case of McCabe c Grey was atiirmed in of deposit became due before he had notice

St. Louis Nat. Bank '.-. Gay (1894), 101 Cal. of the assignment.]] See also Martin v.

286, 3.5 I'ac. 876, the court saying: " Ap- Well.*, Fargo, & Co.'s Exp. (Ariz., 1892),

pellant refers to the fact that in Pomeroy 28 Pac. 958.

on Remedies and Remedial Rights, § *166, " Herrick v. Woolverton, 41 N. Y. 581,

McC'abe y. Grey, 20 Cal. 510, was hostilely reversing s. c. 42 Barb. 50. This case

criticised; but in tliis instance, at least, <U'cides notliing new in the law of set-off ;

the opinion of the text-writer has not it simply ends a long controversy in the

overruled the decision of the court." New York courts upon the question

The same rule seems to obtain in Ken- whether notes on demand with intnest

tucky. In Huber i\ Egner (1901), Ky., are continuing securities, or whether, like

61 S. W. 353, it was held that the maker such notes without interest, they become

of a note is entitled, in an action by the due at once.

assignee, to plead as a set-off the amount '' Wilkius v Batterman, 4 Barb. 47 ;

of a time deposit he made with the payee Williamson r. Brown, 15 N. Y. 354.

138
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the former, in pursuance of the express permission of the code,

brings the action in his own name, a set-off existing against B.,

who is the real party in interest, the beneficiary for whose behalf

the contract Avas made and the suit is maintained, may be pleaded,

and, if proved, will be allowed in total or partial "bar of the

recovery.^ While in actions prosecuted by assignees the defend-

ant can always avail himself of any existing valid set-off, and

sometimes counter-claim, as a defence, he cannot recover a judg-

ment against the assignee for the excess of any of his claim over

the amount of debt established by the plaintiff; as against the

th f rmer in pur uanc of h
rmg he a ti n in b] own nam
h i , h real party in int re
th con tract 'rn mad and the ui i · m intain
an l i J..>rOY 1
b allow <l in t tal or
rn very. 1 \\ bil in ac ion pr
u ted by a
ant an alwa · aYaii him lf f an

''ill

assignee, a set-off and a counter-claim of the same nature — that

is, a right of action which would be a counter-claim if prosecuted

against the original assignor — can only be used defensively', and

can do no more than defeat the action entirely.^

§ 96. * 168. Actions to -wind up Insolvent Corporations. Doc-

trine of Set-off Complicated by other Considerations. Many diffi-

culties have arisen, and many cases have been decided, growing

out of proceedings to wind up insolvent corporations, and espe-

cially insolvent insurance companies ; but, as the questions
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generally turned upon particular provisions of charters, or of
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statutes regulating such proceedings, little or no aid can be

96.

obtained from these decisions in construing the section of the

code under consideration. A portion of these companies were

mutual, in which every person assured became at once a corpo-

rator, so that in any business transaction between himself and

the company he would necessarily occupy both the position of

creditor and of debtor. This double relation is destructive to

any power on his part of invoking the doctrine of set-off. Other

companies were stock corporations, and, in addition to the rules

as to set-off common to all creditors and debtors, there are special

statutory provisions in many States regulating the winding up of

these bodies, which greatly enlarge the scope of set-off. The

adjudications made in the settlement of such corporations, and

the particular rules applicable to them adopted by the courts,

have, therefore, little or no connection with the subject-matter

of the present discussion. In the case of a mutual company there

is no room for any set-off, as has been expressly determined.

> Miller & Co. v. Florcr, 1.") Ohio St. 525; Looinis v. Eagle Bank, 10 Ohio St.

148, 151. .327 ; Casad v. Hughes, 27 lud. 141.

2 Leavenson v. Lafontaue, 3 Kaiis. 523,

16 .
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A marine insurance company having become insolvent, and a

receiver of its affairs appointed, he brought an action on certain

notes given by tlie maker thereof for the premium of several

policies of insurance. A loss had occurred on one of these

policies which became due and payable before any of the notes

fell due, and before the appointment of the receiver and the

assignment to him. There was an interval of time, tlien, both

before the appointment of the receiver and afterwards, during

which the company first and the receiver subsequently were

holders of a claim against the defendant not yet matured, while

the defendant was holder of a claim against the company which

was due and payable. Upon the general doctrine as heretofore

stated in the text, the maker of these premium notes could not

have had an available set-off against the assignee, because at the

date of the transfer both demands had not matured ; but, as his

own claim was then due and payable, the equitable rule founded

upon the insolvency of the assignor would have relieved him.

The set-off was entirely rejected, however, on the ground that

the compan}' was mutual, the defendant being a corporator, and
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both a debtoi- and a creditor. ^ In other cases brought by the

receiver of an insolvent insurance company, not mutual, upon

premium notes, claims by the makers of the notes on account of

losses which occurred previous to the appointment of the re-

ceiver, but not adjusted so as to become actually payable until

after the transfer to him, have been allowed as offsets, not, how-

ever, by virtue of the general law as to offsets, — it being held

that they did not fall within the settled rules, — but by virtue of

certain provisions contained in the statute relating to insolvent

corporations which describe such claims as "mutual credits," and

direct them to be set off.^

§ 97. * 169. Right of Set-off in Actions by Personal Representa-

tives. Rule in New York. When an executor or administrator sues

individually on a note given, or a promise made to him as such

personal representative for a debt owing to the deceased at the

time of his death, it is the rule in New York that the defendant

cannot set off claims due to himself from such decedent, although

1 Lawrence v. Nelson, 21 N. Y. 158. - Osgood v. De Groot, 36 N. Y. 348.

It was conceded, liy way of a dictum, that See, however, Osgood v. Ogden, 4 Keyes,

if the corporation had not been mutual, 70.

the set-off would have been allowed as

stated in the text.

A marine in urance comr any having b come insolvent, and
receiv r of its affairs appoi1it d, h brought an action on certain
note gi en by the maker hereof for the pr mium of everal
polici of insurance. A loss had occurr d n on of the
polici which became due and payable b fore any of th note
fell du , and before the appointment of th r eiver and th
a ~ignm nt to him . Ther was an interval of time, then both
b fore t he appointment of the receiver and afterward , during
whi h the company first and the receiver sub equently were
holder of a claim against t he defendant not yet matured, while
the defendant was holder of a claim again t the company which
was due and pay11ble. Upon the general doctrine a heretofore
tated in the text, the maker of these premium notes could not
ha' e ha l an available set-off against the assignee, becau e at the
date of the transfer both demands had not matured; but, a hi
own claim was then due and payable, the equitable rule founded
upon the insolvency of the assignor would have relieved him.
The et-off was entirely rejected, howeYer, on the ground that
the company was mutual, the defendant being a corporator, and
both a debtor and a creditor. 1 In other cases Lrought hy the
receiver of an in olvent insurance company, not mutual, upon
premium notes, claims by the maker of the note on account f
lo es which occurred previous to the appointment of the receh er, but not adj usted so as to become actually payable until
after the t ransfer t o him, have been allowed as off~ets, not, howe er, by virtue of th e general law as to offsets, - it being held
that they did not fall within the settled rules, - but by virtue of
certain provi ions contained in the statute relating to in olvent
corporations which describe such claims as ;, mutual credits," and
direct them to be set off. 2
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individually on a note given, or a promise made to him as uch
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time of his death it is the rule in New York that the defendant
cannot et off claims due to himself from such decedent, although
1 Lawrence v.
~elson, 21 N. Y. 158.
It wa, conceded, by way of a dictu11L, that
if the corporation had not been mutual,
the et-off would have been allowed as
stated in the text.

2 0 good v. De Groot, 36 N. Y. 34 .
. _ ee, however, 0 good v. Ogden, 4 Keyes ,
70.

140

I TL

EMEDIE ' .

140 CIVIL REMEDIES.

accruing prior to the death, " on the ground that the plaintiff's

ea h
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notwi hst:anding it exist d at he time
a ed. 1

demand arose after the death of the testator ; and in such a case,

no set-off can be received, notwithstanding it existed at the time

of the death of the deceased." ^

S 98. * 170. Rules as to Set-off apply to other Defences, except

that it is Notice, not Assignment, -which cuts off Availability. The

17 .

foregoing cases and statements relate to the special defence of

Rules as to Set-off apply to other Defences, except

set-off as against the assignee. Exactly the same rules apply

to every other species of defence, with the single modification that,

The
p cial defen e of
ame rule appl.,
m dincati n that

that it is Notice not Assignment, which cuts off Availability .

and

in respect of many such defences, the point of time which limits

't m nt rela

the effect or cuts off the availability of the defence is not the

date of the assignment, but the date of the notice thereof, actual

or implied, which is given to the debtor. If the debtor is not

o he
h

notified actually or impliedly of the assignment, it is possible

that many transactions between himself and the assignor, done

in good faith on his part, may have the same effect in discharg-

ing his indebtedness as if the demand had not been assigned, —

such as payment to or release by the original creditor, the as-

signor.^ But no transaction can have tliis effect if entered into
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subsequently to a notice of the assignment given to the debtor,

or to such information received by him as in law amounts to

the same thing as actual notice. Thus, if after a notice to the

debtor that the demand against him is assigned, he make a pay-

ment to the assignor, he cannot rely upon it as a defence par-

tial or total to an action brought by the assignee to enforce the

claim.^

The scope of this work does not require nor even permit that

1 should discuss the defence of set-off, or any other particular

defence, in an exhaustive manner. The sole purpose of this sec-

tion is to construe and interpret the provision, found in almost

the same language in all the State codes of j)rocedure, and to

ascertain what change, if any, that provision had wrought in tlie

pre-existing rules of the law in relation primarily to parties, and

incidentally to the availability of defences where the party plain-

tiff is an assignee of a thing in action.

1 Mf-rrittr. Seaman, G N. Y. 168. citing • Hogan v. Black, 6G Cal. 41 ; Randall

Root V. Taylor, 20 .lolins. 137 ; Fry v. v. Roynold.s, 20 J. & S. 145.

Evans, 8 Wend. 5.J0 ; Mercein v. Smith, ' Field v. The Mayor, etc. of N. Y.. 6

2 Mill, 210; 2 U. S. 279. N. Y. 179; McClo,skey v. San Franciaco,

66 Cal. 104.
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SECTION FOUKTH.

WHEN A PERSON OTHER THAN THE REAL PARTY IN INTEREST

MAY SUE.

§ 99. *1T1. Statutory Provisions. There are two forms of the

statutory provision, which differ, however, very slightly. The

first is : " An executor, an administrator, a trustee of an express

trust, or a person expressly authorized by statute, may sue with-

out joining with him the person for whose benefit the action is

prosecuted.^ A trustee of an express trust, within the meaning

of this section, shall be construed to include a person with whom

or in whose name a contract is made for the benefit of another." ^

The second form is a little more special : " An executor, adminis-

trator, trustee of an express trust, a person with whom or in

whose name a contract is made for the benefit of another, or a

person expressly authorized by statute, may bring an action with-

out joining with him the person for whose benefit it is prosecuted.

Officers may sue and be sued in such name as is authorized by

law, and official bonds may be sued upon in the same way." ^

The only difficulties of interpretation presented by this section
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are the determining with exactness what persons are embraced

within the three classes, described as " trustees of an express

1 [[The use of the word " may " in- cieut ground for the abatement of the

stead of " must " allows the action to he action.]

brought either by the trustee or the bene- '^ N. Y. § 1 1.3 (449) ; Cal. § 369 ; South

ficiary. In Hutchison v. Myers (1893), Carolina, § 136; Oregon, § •!% ; Nevada,

5-i Kan. 290, 34 Pac. 742, the court said : § 6; North Carolina, § .57 ; [^Utah, Rev,

"But granting that Holmes, who is St., 1898, ij 2902; North Dalcota, Rev.

named as trustee in the instrument, is Codes, 1899, 4} 5223 ; South Dakota, Ann.

the trustee of an express trust, we see St., 1901, § 6072 ; Arizona, Uev. St., 1901,

no reason wiiy the beneficiary may not §§ 1299, 1300; Wasliington, Bal. Code,

properly bring the action. ... As will § 482.5; Montana, § .570; Idalio, Code

be observed, the provision authorizing Civ. Pro. 1901, § 3157; Colorado, § 5;

the trustee to bring an action is per- Arkansas, Sand. & Hill's Dig. § 5626;

missive rather than mandatory in its Connecticut, Gen. St., 1902, § 620; Wis-

terms, and hence will not preclude the cousin, St., 1898, § 2607; Indiana, Burns'

maintenance of an action in the name St., 1901, § 252; Minnesota, St., 1894,

of the real party in interest." And in § 5158; Mi.ssouri, Rev. St., 1899, § 541.]

Snell V. Harrison (1895), 131 Mo. 495, 3 Ohio, § 27; Kansas, § 28; Iowa,

32 S. W. 37, it was held that where a § 2544; ^Oklahoma, St.. 1893, § 3900;

trustee of an express trust holding the Wyoming, Rev. St , 1899, § 3469, Ken-

legal title to land institutes a partition tucky, § 21, in a somewhat different form;

proceeding 3i,nA.\omsthQ cestaisipietrnfitent, Nebraska, § 32.]

who are minors, such joinder is not suffi-
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«

trust," *' persons with whom or in whose name a contract is made

for the benefit of another,"" and " persons expressly authorized by

ru
f r

statute to sue." It is phiin that there are substantially three

classes. The second and better form of the provision actually

separates them, and does not represent one as a subdivision of tlie

other. The first form in terms speaks of "the person with whom

or in whose name a contract is made for the benefit of another,"

as an instance or individual of the wider and more inclusive

group, " trustees of an express trust."' It should be carefully

noticed, however, that these two expressions are not stated to be

synonymous ; the former is not given as a definition of the latter.

The section does not read, "a trustee of an express trust shall be

construed to mean a person with M'hum or in whose name a con-

tract is made for the benefit of another ; " but simply that the

latter shall be regarded as one species of the genus. There is

liere no limitation, but rather an extension, of the meaning, and

the clause of course recognizes other kinds of trustees besides the

party to the special fonn of contract, who is not very happily
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termed a " trustee. "' The section of the New York code, when

originally passed, contained but the first sentence as it now

stands. Some doubt arose as to its meaning, and a judicial

decision having held that the pln-ase embraced, among others,

a person with whom or in \\hose name a contract is made for

the benefit of another, the legislature, to remove all possibility

ru t.·
' o xpr ·ion ar not
form r i · 11 t gi' n a a l finiti n f th lat r.
not r al ' a tru t e f an xpr . tru
hall be
n trued t m an a per 11 with wh m or in who · nam a ura t i made f r th ben fit of n th r · ' but impl · that the
la t r hall be r garded a on pe i
f the genu . Ther i
her no limitation, but r· th r an xt 1 i n, f h m nin and
th lau e of
o her kinds of tru tee b ·ide th

of doubt, added this judicial language as an explanatory clause.

The two forms of the provision, although their phraseology differs

somewhat, mean exactly the same thing, and establish exactly

the same rule. As these two phrases, whether they be regarded

as separated, or one as partially explanatory of the other, are the

most comprehensive ones in the section, and present the main

difficulties of construction, I shall discuss them first in order, and

shall endeavor to ascertain what particular classes of persons

were intended to be described by them. This discussion will

consist in discovering, if possible, some general principle of

interpretation by which to test each particular case, and in stating

the instances which have been definitely passed upon by the

coui'ts.

§ 100. *172. Meaning of Term, "Trustee of an Expreaa Trust."

Theoretical View. What is a "trustee of an express trust"?

The section uses the term in its most general sense without limi-

Ill

pa
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tation, so that when its full legal signification is ascertained, tliat

must be its meaning in this connection. If the legislature has

said, as in New York and other States, that, in addition to its

generally accepted technical import, it shall also include certain

persons who are not usually, nor perhaps with strict accuracy,

denominated "trustees," this exercise of the legislative power

within the domain of definition does not change, certainly does

not lessen, its signification, as it stands without the explanatory

comment. In Ohio, and in several of the States, the phrase is

used alone, but accompanied by the clause which is descriptive

of another class, and is not a mere partial explanation. We must

find the true legal definition of "trustees of an express trust,"

and add to this the "persons with whom or in whose name con-

tracts are made for the benefit of others ; " the combined result

will be the entire class intended by the legislature. ^ It is obvi-

ous that the trust must be "express," in contradistinction to

implied. In the large number of instances where a trust is

raised by implication of law from the acts, circumstances, or

relations of the parties, the trustee is certainly not embraced
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within the language of the provision. An express trust assumes

an intention of the parties to create that relation or position, and

a direct act of the parties by which it is created in accordance

with such intention, outside of the mere operation of the law.

In the case of an implied trust, the law, for the purpose of doing

justice, and usually for the purpose of working out some equi-

table remedy, lays hold of the prior situation, acts, or circum-

stances of the parties, declares that a trust arises therefrom, and

imposes the quality of trustee upon one, and of beneficiary upon

another, in a manner and with a result that are often the furthest

possible from their actual design. In an express trust the parties

intend such a relation between themselves, carry out their inten-

tion by suitable words, and the law confirms and accomplishes

the object which they had in view. An express trust primarily

assumes three parties : the one who by proper language, creates,

grants, confers, or declares the trust; the second who is the

recipient of the authority thus conferred; and the third for

^ QThe statute authorizing the trustee the suit is to give the trustee powers not

of an express trust to sue in his own name conferred upon him by the instrument

without joining the beneficiary, has no creating the trust: Sampson v. Mitchell

application to a case where the object of (1894), 125 Mo. 217, 28 S. W. 768j
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implied. In the large number of instances where a trust i
rai ed by implication of law from the acts, circumstances, or
relations of the parties, the tru tee is certainly not embraced
within the language of the provision. An express trust as ume
an intention of the partie to create that relation or position, and
a direct act of the parties by which it i created in accordance
with such intention, outside of the mere operation of the law.
In the ca e of an implied trust, the law, for the purpose of doing
ju tice, and usually for the purpose of working out some equitable remedy, lays hold of the prior situation, acts, or circumstances of the parties, declares that a trust arises therefrom, and
imposes the quality of trustee upon one, and of beneficiary upon
another, in a manner and with a result that are often the forth t
po ible from their actual design. In an expres tru t the parti s
intend such a relation between themselves, carry out th ir intention by suitable words, and the law confirm and accornpli h s
the object which they had in view. An expre s tru t primarily
assumes three parties: the one who by proper languag , er at ,
grants, confers, or declare the trust; the econd who i the
recipient of the authority thus conferred; and the third for
....

[The statute authorizing the trustee
of an expre trust to ue in his own name
without joining the beneficiary , ha no
application to a case where the object of
1

the ui t i to give the tru tee
conf rr d upon him by the
creating th trust: .. a mp on
(1 94), 125 ~ro. 21 ; , 2 . W.

powers not
in trum ent
v. ;\!i tc hell
'i 6u .]
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whose benefit the authority is received and held. It is true that

in many instances the first-named parties are actually but one

person ; that is, the same individual declares, confers, receives,

and holds the authority for the benefit of another; but the theory

of the transaction is preserved unaltered, for the single person

who creates and holds the authority acts in a double capacity,

and thus takes tlie place of two persons. It is impossible, how-

ever, to conceive of an express trust as a legal transaction or

condition, without assuming the prior intention, and the express

language by which this intention is effected, and the trust created

resting upon one as the trustee for the benefit of a second as the

beneficiary; and, except as every grant, transfer, or delegation

of authority and power is in a certain broad sense a contract, the

notion of a contract is not essential to our conception of an

express trust. The authority may be conferred by the public

acting through governmental machinery, as in the case of officers,

or by the intervention of courts, as in the cases of administrators,

executors, receivers, and the like ; or by private persons, as in

innumerable instances of trusts relating to real or personal prop-
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erty ; but there must be the intent to accomplish that very result,

and this intent must be expressed by language or by some process

of delegation which the law regards as an equivalent. Further-

more, in its accurate legal signification, a trust implies something

which is the subject thereof. Although the word may have a

more extensive meaning in its popular use, so that a trust may

be spoken of where the trustee is simply clothed with a power to

do some personal act unconnected with any property in which he

has an interest or over which he has a control, yet this is not its

legal import. An illustration of this legal notion of a trustee

may be seen in the case of a guardian over the j)erson alone of

his ward, without any interest in or power over his estate, or

the committee of the person of a lunatic. Such a guardian or

committee, althougli [)(>.ssessing a power to be exercised for the

benefit of another, is not a trustee; and the term, when applied

to him, could be used only in a popular and not a legal sense.

Su(.h a guardian or connuittee would not therefore, by virtue

merely of the permission granted in the provision of the statute

under examination, be entitled to sue in his own name as a

trustee of an express trust. In the light of this analysis of the

expression as a term of legal import, it is plain that "a person

h

enefit th authority i r ceived and h ld. It i true that
he fi t-nam d
rti ar actually but one
i the
me iudi i ual d lar
c nf r re eives,
p r n · th
n h 1
h authority f r th benefit fan ther; but the theory
of he tr n cti n i pr r
unalt r d f r the ingl per on
wh creat and h ld the auth rity c in a double capacity,
a n thu t k
be plac f b per on . It i imp ibl , howev r t
n i e of an expr
tru t a a 1 gal tr n a tion r
c nditi n \ itbout a umin the prior int ntion, an the expre
l 110 uag b which thi intenti n i eff cted, and th trust r ated
r
ing u on n a th tru tee f r he benefit of a cond a the
ben fi iary; and , x e t a ev ry grant, tran fer, or del gation
of utbority nd ow r i in a ertain broa
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ntial t our con eption of an
e xpr
tru t. Th
uthorit m
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acting tbrou h o ernmental ma bin ry, a in the a e f fficer
or b the int rvention f court , a in th ca s of admini trato ,
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i ver
and h lik ; or by pri ate
r on a in
innumer bl in tanc of tru t r la ing t r eal or per onal proper ' · but th r mu t b the int nt t a
mpli h that ry re ult,
xpr ed by lanO'ung or by ome proc
law r ard a an qui alen t. Furth rm r in it a urat 1 ·al ignification a tm t im li
ometbin
whi h i tl
ubj
b reof.
1 l ou 0 h h
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with whom or in whose name a contract is made for the benefit

of another," is not necessarily a trustee. He may be; and

whether he is or is not must depend entirely upon the nature and

subject-matter of the contract itself. The contract may be of

such a kind, stipulating concerning property in such a manner,

that the contracting party will be made a trustee. On the other

hand, it may be of such a kind, having no reference perhaps to

property, or stipulating for personal acts alone, that the con-

tracting party will not be a trustee in any proper sense of the

word, but will be at most an agent of the person beneficially

interested. There are numerous instances, therefore, in which

an agent, w4io enters into an agreement for either a known or

for an unknown principal, is permitted, in accordance with the

particular clause under consideration, to sue in his own name.

§101. *173. Judicial View. I shall proceed to show, in

the first place, how far the foregoing description is sustained

by judicial authority. Few cases have attempted to define the

phrase, "trustee of an express trust," in any comprehensive

manner, for the courts have in most cases been content with
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determining whether the particular instance before them fell

within the term. The following definitions or descriptions,

however, have been given : " An express trust is simply a trust

created by the direct and positive acts of the parties, by some

writing, or deed, or will. And it is to be observed, in reference

to § 4 of the code [of Indiana], that it does not assume to define

the meaning of the term ' trustee of an express trust ' in its

general sense; it simply declares that these words, within the

meaning of the section, ' shall be construed to include a person

with whom, or in whose name, a contract is made for the benefit

of another. ' Evidently this provision was not intended to limit

the meaning of the general term, 'express trust,' or to confine

the operation of the statute to the particular class of cases re-

ferred to, but rather to enlarge its sense b}- including also that

class within it."^ In another case it was said: "In order to

constitute a trustee of an express trust, as I understand the

statute, there must be some express agreement to that effect, or

something which in law is equivalent to such an agreement.

The case of factors and mercantile agents may or may not con-

stitute an exception under the custom and usage of merchants.

1 Weaver v. Wabash, etc. Canal Co. Trs., 28 Ind. 112, 119,

10

with whom or in who e nam a contra ti mad for the b n fi t
of an ther," i not nece arily a tru t e. He may e; and
whether he is or i not mu t d p nd ntirely u1 n th natur and
ubject-matter of the contract i lf. The
ntract may be of
uch a kind, stipulating concerning rop rty in such a mann r,
that the contracting party will be made a tru tee. On the other
hand, it may be of such a kind, having no reference erhap to
pr perty, or stipulating for p rsonal acts alon , that the contracting party will not be a tru tee in any proper sense of the
word, but will be at most an agent of the per on b neficially
intere ted. There are numerous in tances, therefore, in which
an agent, who enters into an agreement for either a known or
for an unknown principal, is permitted, in accordance with the
particular clau e under consideration, to sue in hi own name.
· 101. * 173. Judic ial V iew.
I shall proceed to how, in
the fir t place, how far the foregoing description is su tained
by judicial authority. Few cases have attempted to define the
phrase, "trustee of an express trust," in any comprehensive
manner, for the courts have in most cases been content with
determining whether the particular instance before them fell
within the term . The following definitions or descriptions,
however, have been given: ''An express trust is simply a trust
~reated by the direct and positive acts of the partie , by some
writing, or deed, or will. And it is to be observed, in reference
to § 4 of the code [of Indiana], that it does not assume to define
the meaning of the term ' trustee of an express trust' in its
general sense; it simply declares that these words, within the
meaning of the section, ' shall be construed to include a person
with whom, or in whose name. a contract is made for the benefit
<>f another.' Evidently this provision was not intended to limit
the meaning of the general term, ' express trust,' or to confine
the operation of the statute to the particular cla . . of ca e referred to, but rather to enlarge its ense by including al o that
cla within it." 1 In another ca e it was said: ' In order to
c nstitute a trustee of an expre
tru t, as I under tand he
tatute, there must be some expre agre rnent to that effect, or
something which in law is equivalent to such an a r em nt.
The case of factors and mercantile agent may or may not ontitute an exception under the cu tom and u age of merchan
1

Weaver v. Wabash, etc. Canal Co. Trs., 28 Ind. 112, 119.
10

1-! ~

CIYIL RE'.\IEDIE .

14G CIVIL KEMEDIES.

Bat in every other case the trust must, I think, be expressed by

some agreement of the parties, not necessarily, perhaps, in writ-

ing, but either written or verbal, according to the nature of tlie

transaction. In this case no agreement is shown that the plaintiff

was to take or hold as trustee, and that he is a trustee results

merely from other circumstances. It is implied from the fact

of partnership, and from the fact that the plaintiff received the

assignment on account of a debt due the firm. If it is not a case

purely of implied trust, as distinguished from an express trust,

then I am at loss to conceive of one ; and to hold the plaintiff to

be a trustee of an express trust would, in my judgment, be a

palpable disregard of the statute, and a violation of the intent of

the legislature."^ In a case where a contract in the nature of a

lease was effected by a person describing himself in the instru-

ment as agent of the owners, but who had no interest whatever

in the premises leased, and did not execute the instrument, and

to whom no promise was made as the lessor, it was held that he

could not maintain an action for the rent or for possession of the

land forfeited by non-payment of the rent. He could not sue as
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the "person with whom, or in whose name, a contract is made

for the benefit of another,"' because no promise at all was made

to him, and he was not a "trustee of an express trust."' The

court said: "One who contracts merely as the agent of another,

and has no personal interest in the contract, is not the trustee of

an express trust within the meaning of the statute, and cannot,

under the code, sue upon such contract in his own name." Of

course this last expression must be taken in connection with the

facts of the case; namely, that no promise was made to the

plaintiff individually.^

1 Robbins r. Deverill, 20 Wis. 142, per nor the trustee of an express trust, witliiu

Dixon C.J. This was an action by the the moanin<r of the statute. He is not a

pi lintiff as assignee of V. & W. The trustee of an express trust, because no

a-isigninent was in writing, but was taken such trust appears from the assignment,

on account of a debt due from P. & and none is shown to exist between him-

W. to the firm of K. &, L., which con- self and his copartners by virtue of any

sisted of the plaintiff and the two others, other instrument." lie then adds the

with an understanding that P. & W. were remark quoted in the text.

nut to be credited on their debt to R. & L. 2 Kawlings r. Fuller, 31 Ind. 255. Qln

imtil the money was collected. Dixon Mitchell i. St. Mary (1897), 148 Ind. Ill,

C. J. sai 1 : "The demand was transferred 47 N. E. 224, the court said: "There

to the plaintiff alone by words of absolute must be .something in the nature of the

a.««ignment, no trust beincr erprfssed. . . . contract, appearing upon its face or from

ITp'in these facts the plaintiff cannot re- alUgations in the pleadings, disclosing

cover. He is not the real party in interest, that a trust relation exists and is sought
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§ 102. *174. Same Subject. New York Cases. The nature uf

an express trust, and tlie elasses of persons embraced within the

statutory phrases in question, were determined, upon great con-

sideration, by the New York Court of Appeals, in the leading

case of Considerant v. Brisbane.^ ''The term 'trustee of an

express trust ' had acquired a technical and statutory meaning.

Express trusts, at least after the time of the adoption of the

§ 102. * 17 4.

The nature uf
an x1 r ss trust, and the la ·s of per ·on mbrac <l within the
statutory phra..:es in que. tion, w re determin d, upon great consid rati n, by he New York ourt of A pp als, in th leading
·a, of Con id rant v. Brisbane. 1
The term ' trn ·t e of an
.rpr s trust' bad acquir cl a technical and tatutory meaning.
Expr ss tru t , at least aft r the time of the adoption of th
[. . wYork] R vised Stcttute, were de:finecl to b tru ts er ated
by the direct and positive acts of the partie , by some writing or
l d, or will; and the ?evise<l Statutes had aboli led all expre s
tru s except those therein enumerated which related to land.
If thi ection (§ 113 [449]) of the code was to b re tricted and
limit d to those enumerated expre s tru ts, the practical inconYenience arising from making the beneficial intere t the sole te ·t
of the right to sue, and which that section (§ 113) was intended
to ob iate, would continue to exist in a large class of formal and
informal trusts. Accordingly, in 1851, the section wa amended
by adding the provision that ' a trustee of an express trust,
within the meaning of this section, shall be construed to include
a per on with whom, or in whose name, a contract is made for
the benefit of another.' It is to be observed that there is no
attempt to define the meaning of the term ' trustee of an express
tru t' in its general sense; but the statutory declaration is that
h e words 'shall be construed to include a person,' etc. The
ounsel for the respondent insists that the sole intention of the
legislature in amending the section was to remove a doubt that
had been expressed, whether a factor or other agent, who had at
common law a right of action on a contract made · for the benefit
Same Subject.

New York Cases.

H

[New York] Revised Statutes, were defined to be trusts created

Ijy the direct and positive acts of the parties, by some writing or

deed, or will; and the Revised Statutes had abolished all express

trusts except those therein enumerated which related to land.

If this section (§ 113 [449j) of the code was to be restricted and

limited to those enumerated express trusts, the practical incon-

venience arising from making the beneficial interest the sole test

of tlie right to sue, and Avhich that section (§ 113) was intended

to obviate, would continue to exist in a large class of formal and

informal trusts. Accordingly, in 1851, the section was amended

by adding the provision that ' a trustee of an express trust,

within the meaning of this section, shall be construed to include
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a person with whom, or in whose name, a contract is made for

the benefit of another.' It is to be observed that there is no

attempt to define the meaning of the term ' trustee of an express

trust' in its general sense; but the statutory declaration is that

these words ' shall be construed to include a person,' etc. The

counsel for the respondent insists that the sole intention of the

legislature in amending the section was to remove a doubt that

had been expressed, whether a factor or other agent, wdio had at

common law a right of action on a contract made for the benefit

to be enforced for the benefit of the cestui Hun^ 644 ; Heavenridge v. Mondv, 49

ijue trust. It is not enough that an agent Ind. 434 ; 34 id. 28 : when a jndgnient

who exceeds his authority in suing in his lias been obtained by a trustee of an

own name upon a demand due his j)rinci- express trust, defendant may set off a

pal is an agent and may intend to account judguient in his favor against the bene-

for the recovery. He cannot bind his ficiary, and plaintiff is estopped from

j)rincipal without authority expressed or setting up that he is the real party in

implied, and it is only when the ]irincipal interest; North W. Conf. of Univ. r.

may be deemed to be in court and bound Myers, 36 id. 375 ; Brooks v. Harris, 42

by tlie proceeding that sec. 251 [allowing id. 177; Wiley v. Starbuck, 44 id. 298 ;

.suit by a trustee of an express trust] is Washington Tp. v. Bonney, 45 id. 77.

intended to apply."] For further examples, see Wetmore r.

1 Considerant v. Brisbane, 22 N. Y. Hegeman, 88 N. Y. 69 ; White v. Allatt,

389, 395, per Wright J. As to action by 87 Cal. 245 ; Cassidy v. Woodward, 77

trustees of an express trust, see also Iowa, 354 ; and i«/}-a, § * 178.

I'resb. Soc. of Kuoxboro v. Beach, 8

to be enforced for the benefit of the cestui
11ue trust. It is not enough that an agent
who exceeds his authority in suing in his
own name upon a demand due his prinC'ipal i an agent and may intend to account
for the recovery. He cannot bin<l liis
pri11cipal without authority expressell or
implied, and it i only when the principal
rnay be deemed to be in court and bound
hy the proceeding that sec. 251 (all wino:::uit by a trustee of an express tru ·t] is
intended to apply."]
1 Con iderant v. Bri bane, 22 N. Y.
~ 9, 395, per \Vright J. As to action by
trn ~tee
of an expres tru t, .ee also
l're b. Soc. of Knoxboro i:. Beach, 8

Hun._ 644; Heavenridge v. Mondy, 49
Ind. 434; 34 id. 28: when a judgment
has been obtained by a trustee of an
express trust, defendant may et off a
judgi!1ent in his favor again ·t the beneficiary, and plaintiff i estopped from
setting up that he i th real party in
intere t: . . orth \V. onf. of ~ niY . v.
Myers, 36 id. 3i5; Brook L'. Barri . 42
id . 177; Wil ey v.
tarbnck, 44 id. 29 ;
Washington Tp. v. Bonney, 45 id. ii .
For further xample , ee Wetm ore v.
Hegeman,
i . Y. 69; White v. Allatt.
Bi Cal. 245; Ca idy v. Woodward, 77
Iowa, 354; and infra, § · l 78.
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of his principal b}' reason of liis legal interest in the contract,

was by the code deprived of that right. But no such limited

intention can be inferred from the words of the statute. Indeed,

it is only by a liberal construction of the section that the case of

u contract by a factor (an individual contract) can be brought

within it at all. It is intended manifestly to embrace, not only

formal trusts declared by deed inter pra^tes, but all cases in which

a person acting in behalf of a third party enters into a written

express contract with another, either in his individual name,

without description, or in his own name expressly, in trust for,

or on behalf of, or for the benefit of, another, by whatever form

of expression such trust may be declared. It includes not only

a person with whom, but one in whose name, a contract is made

for the benefit of another." These definitions and descriptions

of the term fully sustain the conclusions reached in the preceding

paragraph as to the legal meaning of the phrase " trustee of an

express trust." It is abundantly settled that an agent cannot sue

in his own name to enforce an implied liability to his principal;

if by any possibility he should be a trustee under such circum-
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stances, he would not be the trustee of an express trust. ^

§ 103. * 175. Statute includes an Agent ■with ■whom an Express

Contract is made. Illustrations. Having thus attempted to arrive

at a general definition of the term, I shall proceed to consider the

cases which are embraced within it, and shall take at first those

in which a "person with whom, or in whose name, a contract is

made for the benefit of another" has sued in his own name. It

is fully established by numerous decisions that when a contract

is entered into expressly with an agent in his own name, the

[)romise being made directly to him, although it is known that

he is acting for a principal, and even although the principal and

liis beneficial interest in the agreement are fully disclosed and

stipulated for in the very instrument itself, the agent in such

' Palmer r. Fort Plain, etn. I'lk. K. Co., name of, the town." Ruckman v. Pitcher.

11 N. Y. 37(), 390, i)er SeMeii .1. : "There 20 N. Y. 9: "The aj^ent may, in many

is no covenant or agreement miming to ca.ses, sue upon express contracts, made

these officers in terms. Tiiey, as agents with him.self by name. . . . Hnt this im-

of the town, convey the riglit to use the plied duty or assiun/isit arises only in

highway upon a certain condition. It is favor of those to whom the money in fact

virtually the act of the town through belonged, and therefore caimot be en-

thein. If an implied covenant arises upon forced in the name of another person to

the instrument, it is a covenant with the whom the obligation is not due."

town, and must ho cnfiirced liv, and in the

ipal by r a on f l i
al int r t in tl c ntract,
c de d I ri tl f tha.t ri 0 ht. But no u h limited
i1 t nti n an b inf IT d fr m h ' r 1 f th ta tut . Inde d,
it i nly by a liberal
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ntract by a fac r (c n in li i lu 1 c ntract) can be brought
a
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mbrac , n t onl;
f rmal tru ·t declar d by l l inter p r tes, but c. ll a
in which
r · n a in 0 in b half f a third p rty nt r · in a written
xpr
ntract wi h an th r, ith r in bi indi i lual name,
' ith ut d ription, r in hi own name expr 1 , in tru t f r,
r n b half f, or for the b n fit f, an th r, by what ver form
of xpr ion such tru t may b d clar d. It includ n t only
a r on with whom, but one in who ' name, a c ntra t i m l
f r th b n fit of anoth r." Th e d finition and e ri tion ·
of th t rm fully u tain the con lu ions reached in the prec ding
paragra I h a to the legal m aning of the phra e ' tru t e f an
tru t." It i abundan ly · ttl d that an ag nt cannot~ ue
ex:pr
in hi wn name to enforce an implied liability t hi principal;
if by any po ibility h hould be a tru tee under irnch circumtan e , h would not be th tru te of an 'express trust. 1
f li

. 103.

* 175.

Statute includes an Agent with whom an Express

Having thu attempte t arri e
t a g n re1 d finition of the t rm, I hall procee to c n id r the
ca
whi hare mbrac d wi hin it, and hall take at £rt th
in whi h a p r on with wh m, r in wh e nam , a c ntract i
10 cl f r th b ne:fi t
f an th r ' ha u d in hi own n me. It
i fully
abli h d by num r u d i i n that wl n a
ntract
nt r l int expr ly ' ith an a0 nt in hi own nam th
b ing ma le <lir c 1 t him, al th u0 h it i kn wn that
h i cting f r a princir al, and Y n 1th ugh h rin ipal an 1
gr m nt are fully di 1 d n l
hi ' b n fi i 1 int r t i1 th
g nt in such
: ipula
in. trum nt it lf, th
Contract is made.

Illustration!?.
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case is described by the language of the statute, and may main-

tain an action upon the contract in his own name without join-

ing the person thus beneficially interested.^ The following are

1 [Leach v. Hill (1898), 100 Iowa, 171, 76

ca i de cri bed by th lang nage f the tatut ancl ma , mamtain an acti n upon th contra t in his own nam without joining th per n thus b n ficia.lly interest tl. 1 Th foll wing ar

N. W. 667 : A bank fashier, who cashes a

check upon the uiidcrtaking of a third

person that the check will he honored by

tlie drawee, may sue, as trustee of an ex-

press trust, u])ou the check and the third

person's agreement, without joining the

bank for which he was acting. In

Mitchell V. St. Mary (1897), 148 Ind. Ill,

47 N. E. 224, on the other hand, where a

note was endorsed in blank and given to

the treasurer of a corporation as a mere

custodian of the corporation, with no

intention to make him a trustee, such

treasurer, it was held, could not sue upon
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it in his own name as the trustee of an

express trust. See also Hudson c. Archer

(1893), 4 S. D. 128, .55 N. W. 1099, quot-

ing the text. See also Herman v. City of

Oconto (1898), 100 Wis. 391, 76 N. W.

364; Ward r. Tlyba (1897), 58 Kan. 741,

51 Pac. 223; Brown /•. Sharkey (1894), 93

low. I, 157,61 N. W.3G4.] Considerant v.

Hrisbanc, 22 N. Y. 389, reversing s. c. 2

Mosw. 471. The plaintiff was agent for a

foreign corporation wliich did business

under the name of " Bureau, Guillon,

Goden, & Co." The defendant applied to

the plaintiff for stock in said corporation,

and authorized the plaintiff to subscribe

in his name for such stock to the amount

of $10,000, and, in payment of the sub-

scription, gave plaintiff two notes, each in

the following form : " New York, March 1,

1855. On the first day of July, 1855, I

promise to pay V. Considerant, executive

agent of the company Bureau, Guillon,

Goiien, &Co., the sum of $5,000, for which

I am to receive st(3ck of said companv

known as premium stock, to the amount

of .^5,000, value received. A. Brisbane."

The plaintiff alleged that he had entered

defendant's name as a subscriber; averred

a tender of the stock and a refusal to

accept the same ; and sued in his own

name on the notes. The Court of Ap-

l)eals held that he could maintain the

action. The judgment of Wright J. is an

exhaustive discussion of the whole sub-

ject. Denio J. dissented, but not from the

general reasoning as to the true interpre-

tation of the code. His dissent was basO(l

entirely upon a construction of the notes

sued upon. He insisted that the promise

in these notes was, in fact, made to the

company, and not to the agent; and so

the case did not fall within the terms of

the statutory provision. Rowland v.

Phalen, 1 Bosw. 43 ; Cheltenham Fire-

brick Co. V. Cook, 44 Mo. 29 ; Wright v.

Tinsley, 30 Mo. 389 ; Weaver r. Wabash,

etc. Canal Co. Trs., 28 Ind. 112; Hice r.

Savery, 22 Iowa, 470, in which it was held

that either the agent or the beneficiary

might sue. See supra, § *140. Winters

l [Leachv.Ilill(J 9),106Towa,17l,76
N. W. 66i: A bauk c;a hier, who ·a hes a
h ck upon th e und crtakiug of a third
person that th che k will be hono red by
the drawee , may ·u , a trustee of a11 expr · tru. t, upou the check and the third
p r on agreement, without joining the
bank for whi ·h he wa a cting.
In
Mitchell v. St. Mary (189i), 148 Ind. 111,
47 N. E. 224, on the other hand , wh ere a
note was ndor. ed in blank and gi,·en to
the tr a ·urcr of a corporatiou as a m ere
cu ·todian of the corporation, with no
intention to make him a tru tee, such
trea ur r, it wa. held, ·ould 11ot ue upon
it in hi own uame as the trnstee of au
ex pres tru t . • ee also 11 ud ou 11. Arch er
(I 93), 4, . D. 12 , 55 N . W . 1099, quoting the text.
ee also H e rman v. City of
Oconto (1 9 ), 100 Wis. 39 1, i6 N. W.
364; Ward v. Ryba (L89i), 58 Kan. 741,
51 Pac. 223; Rrown c. Sharkey (1894) , 93
Iow.i, J 5 7, 6 l N. \V . 364.] Con s iderant v.
Bri. bane, 22 N. Y . 389, rever ing s. c. 2
Bo w. 471. The plaintiff was agent for a
foreign corporation which did bu ines
under tlie name of " Bureau, Guillan,
.:xoden & Co." The defendant applied to
the plaintiff for tock iu said corporation,
and authorized the plaintiff to subscribe
in his name for s uch stock to the amount
f $10,000, and, iu payment of the subription, gave plaintiff two notes, each in
the following form: " ' w York, March I ,
l 55. On the fir t day of .July, 1 55, I
promi.e to pay V . Con iderant, executive
alYent of the company Burea u, Guillou,
Goden, & Co., the. um f $5, 000, for which
I am to receive !'; t ock of a id compan.v
known a premium stock, to the amount
f $5,000, value receiv c.I. A. Brisha 11 e."
The plain tiff alleged that he hacl e nter ed
defeuclant', name a· a nb criber ; averred
a tende r of the tock and a r efu al to
accept the same; and sued in his own
name on the note . Th e ourt of A ppeal held that he could maintain t he
acti n. The judgment of Wright J. i an
xhau tive di ·c u s ion of the whole subjec·t. )) nio .J. Lli ented, but not from the
g noral r ea. ou in g a to the true interpre-

di ent Wll ua~C'il
entir ly up n a ·o n tru ·tiou of the 110L s
u d upun. II insi t d that the promise
in th s not • was in fa t, made to the
C•Jmpa11y, and not to the ag nt; aud o
the ca ·c c.li<l uot fall withiu t.he t rrns of
the tatuto ry provi. ion.
Rowland v.
Phalen, I B o w. 43;
heltenham Firebrick o. v. Cook, 44 }.lo. 29; Wright v.
Tiu. ley, 30 Mo . 3 9; Wea\'er 1•. ·w ahash ,
etc. Canal Co. Tr., 2 Ind. 112; Rice v.
avery, 22 Iowa, 470, in which it wa held
that eith er the agent or the beueficiary
mi g ht . ue.
ee Sttprn, § *140. Winter
v. Ru h, 34 Cal. 136 ; Ord v. McKee, 5 al.
515; can tliu v. Alli on, 12 K an. 85, 88;
NoP l'. Chri tie, 51 N. Y. 2i0, 274. In
Hubbell v . Medbury, 5.3 N. Y. 9 , the
prov ision of the code was held to be permissive o nly, au'<! not to prohibit au action
by the beneficiary, even without the
trustee. (Compareanle, § * 138.) And see
Presb. oc. of Knoxboro v. Beach, 8 Hun ,
644; People v. Slocum, l Idah o, 62. lt
is held in New York that an action again t
a common carri er for a breach of his
contract, or of hi duty to cany, must be
brought in the nam e of the owner of the
goods, although the contrart may have
been made or the goud i; hipped b.v
anoth er. Green v. Clarke, I 2 N. Y. 343;
Kruld er v. Elli. on, 47 N. Y. :rn; Thompon v. Fargo, 63 N. Y. 4i9; 49 N. Y. 18 .
But when the con ig nor, although not the
general owne r , ha a li n upon or a pecial
iute re t in the good , and make the contract and pays the con. iclerat.ion for th ir
carriage, he may briuO' an action for the
breach of the contract in 11i own name, in
orcler that he may prot.ect hi s right .
o., 106 N. Y.
'-'wift. 11 . Pacific :'11ail
206. The usual ml , however, ee m, to
be that the per. on with wh m the omm on
carri r c ntract-, althou rh for another's
benefit, may . u , wb th r r not he ha a
special iut re t in the good .
nider 1: .
Adam Exp. o., i7 Io. 533; W olfe v.
lo. Pac. Ry. o., 9i Io. 473; Hooper v.
hicaO'o &
W . Ry. Co., 27 Wi . 91;
Waterman n. C. M. & , t. P. Rv. Co.,
61 Wi . 464. For furtlier in ta~ce · of

0
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particular instances, or examples of particular classes of cases, in

Avliieh an agent has been permitted to sue, or may always sue, in

liis own name, because the contract is made with him directly,

although on behalf of a known principal: on. a sealed lease

between the plaintiff, as agent for the owner, of the first part,

and the defendant as the lessee;^ on a sealed contract between

])laintiff and defendant, the plaintiff describing himself as agent

for his sisters, and stipulating that they should act in defendant's

theatre at specified wages, wdiich the latter covenanted to pay,

the action being brought for such wages ;2 where the plaintiff,

being the holder of the legal title to certain land, which he held,

however, merely for the benefit of a married woman, was in-

duced, by false representations, to execute a mortgage thereon,

supposing it to be for her benefit and at her request, but in fact

without any consideration paid to himself or to her, brought an

action in his own name to restrain a foreclosure of the mortgage ; ^

in an action on a policy of marine insurance "for the account of

whom it may concern," and in case of loss the amount insured to

be paid to the plaintiff or order ; ^ where a promise was made to
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the administrator of an estate, and he afterwards resigned, and

another was appointed in his place, it being held that he was the

proper party to sue;^ where a grantee in a deed of land was

simply acting as agent for another, and the purchase price was

paid with that other's money, the grantee is the proper party to

sue for the breach of a covenant which was broken immediately

suits by agents on contracts made witli Rockwell r. Holconib (Colo. 1892), 31 I'ac.

tliein expressly iu their own names, see 944; Beck v. Haas, 31 Mo. App. 180.

McLaughlin i-. Deadwood First Nat. Bk., ^ Morgan r. Reid, 7 Abb. Pr. 21.5.

6 Dak. 406 ; Consol. Barb- Wire Co. v. " Nelson i: Ni.xon, 13 Abb. Pr. 104.

Purcell, 48 Kan. 267 ; Cremer v. Winmier, ■' Brown c. Cherry, 38 How. Pr. 3.")2.

40 Minn. 511 (contract by agent for sale * Walsh v. Wash. Mar. Ins. Co., 3

of land); Close v. Hodges, 44 Minn. 204 Robt. 202; Greenfield v. Mass. Mut. L.

(njortgage to agent) ; Lake v. Albert, 37 Ins. Co., 47 N. Y. 430. See also Sturm v.

Minn. 453; Stoll r. Sheldon, 13 Neb. 207 ; Atlantic Mut. Ins. Co., 63 N. Y. 77;

Seymour ". Smith, 114 N. Y. 481 ; Coffin Waring v. ludem. F. Ins. Co., 45 id. 606;

?•. Grand Rapids Hydr. Co. (1892), 18 N. Y. Strolm r. Hartford F. lus. Co., 37 Wis.

r 1 ular in t< n
r xampl
f I articular cla
·whi ·h an a 0 ent has b
t d t u , or m, y
u , in
hi , wn narn b cau
ntra t i ' ma le with him dir c ly
, 1 h u h n b half of a kn wn principal: n .
al d 1 a
n th plaintiff a < o· nt f r th
wn r f th fir t part,
an 1 th cl f ndant a th 1
n a
ntract b t\ n
plain iff t nd d fendan , th i laintiff d ·ribin 0 him lf a agent
f r hi· i ~ r , and ti1 ulating that th y should a t in
th atr at p ifi d age , which the latt r o
to pa ',
b a ion b ing brought f r u h wag ; 2 where th
lain iff
b in o- he h ld r of the legal ti 1 to certain land, whi h he held
h \Y
r m rely for the b n fit of a marri d woman, w inluc d, by foJ e repre entati n , to x cute a m rto-a e thereon
uppo ing it to be for h r ben fit and at her r qu t, but in fa
with ut any con iderati< n laid to him ' Elf or to h r, br ught an
ac -ion in bi own name to re rain a for clo ure of the mor ·ag ; 3
in an acti n n a policy of marine in urance ' for the ac unt of
whom it may cone rn, 'and in ca e of lo the am unt in ur cl to
wa mad o
b paid to the plaintiff or order; 4 ' here a promi
th administrator of an e ta , and h afterward r i n d, and
an ther wa' appointed in hi pla , it being h ld that h w· th
pr p r party
u ; 5 wh re a grantee in a deed of land wa '
imply a ting a agent for another and the pur hase pri
wa
pai with that others m n y, th grantee is tl e pr per l r y to
ne for the breach of a covenant which was broken irnm dia el '

Suppl. 782 ; HoUingswortb r. Moulton, .53 625 ; Protection Ins. Co. v. WiLson, 6 Ohio

Hun, 91 ; Albatiy & R. Iron, etc. Co. v. St. 553. [^Insurance taken out by an em-

Lundberg, 121 U. S. 451; Merchaiits' plover for the benefit of his employees

Bank i-. .McClelland, 9 Colo. 608 (cashier may be .lued for by tiie employer without

of bank) ; Holmes r. Boyd, 90 Ind. 332 joining the beneficiaries, becau.^e he is a

(same). Further illustrations of the text : trustee of an expre.><s trust: Fidelity &

Coffin r. Grand Rapids Hydraulic Co. Casualty Co. ;•. Ballard (1899), 105 Ky.

(N. Y. App. 1893), 32 N. E.1076; Lewis 253, 48 "s. W. 1074.]

r. Whittcri (.Mo. Sup. 1892), 20 S. W. 617 ; ^ Harney v. Dutcher, 15 Mo. 89.

uit- b.v agent on contra ct· made with
th rn expre ly iu their own name , ee
~ [cLanghliu v. D ad wood
ir~t Nat. Bk.,
ak. 406;
011 ·ol. B arb-W ire
6
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upon the execution of the deed, c. ^., a covenant iigainst incum-

brances;^ a guest at an inn who had property of another in liis

possession, which was lost, was held to he the projjcr party to

sue for its value ; ^ an auctioneer may sue for the price of goods

sold by him, whether lie have any interest in the price or not,^

iind a sheriff, for the price of property sold by him on execution ; *

the master of a ship or other vessel may maintain an action iov

freight, or on any contract concerning the ship, entered into on

behalf of tlie owners," or for the taking and carrying away, con-

version of, or injury to, the cargo. ^

§ 104. * 176. Actions on Bonds given to protect other Persons.

Obligee may sue. Various kinds of bonds and undertakings

generally required by statute, and given to some designated

obligee, although showing on the face that they are designed to

protect, secure, or indemnify other persons, are also contracts

made "with, or in the name of, one person for the benefit of

another; " and although the party immediately interested may in

general sue in his own name,'' yet the obligee or person to whom

the promise is made may always, unless forbidden by statute,
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maintain the action, and in some States is the only one who is

permitted to do so.^ Among these are bonds in great variety

given to the "people" or to the "State," conditioned upon the

faithful discharge of their duties by public, local, or municipal

officers, actions on which, except when otherwise directed bv

statute, may be brought by the people or the State ; ^ bonds

running to the people or to the State, conditioned upon the

faithful discharge of duties by various private or semi-private

trustees, or by persons appointed in judicial proceedings and the

1 Hall V. Plaine, 14 Ohio St. 417, 423. contractor with labor ami materials, is a

2 Kellogg V. Sweeney, 1 Lans. 397. trustee of au express trust. The same

8 Minturn v. Main, 7 N. Y. 220, 224 ; question was raised in United States r.

Bogart V. O'Regan, 1 E. I). Smith, 590. Kundle (1901), 27 Wash. 7, 67 Pac. 395;

* Armstrong I'. Vroman, 11 Minn. 220; and the United States, as obligee of tbo

McKee v. Lineberger, 69 N. C. 217, 239. bond, was held a proper plaintiff, as trustee

5 Kennedy v. Eilau, 17 Abb. Pr. 73; of an express trust, j

Braithwaite i\ Power, 1 N. Dak. 455. ^ Hunter v. Mercer Cy. Com'rs of, etc.,

•* Houghton v. Lynch, 13 Minn. 85. 10 Ohio St. 515 (countv treasurer's bond

* See supra, §§ *139, *141. running to the State) ; State r. Moore, 19

* [^United States >\ McCann (1901), 40 Mo. 369 (sheriff's bond) ; Meier r. Lester,

Ore. 13, 66 Pac. 274, quoting the text, 21 Mo. 112 (constable's bond); Shelby

upon the xecution of the d d, e.g., a v nant again t in umbrance ; 1 a guest at an inn who had proper y f an th r in his
p · s i n, whjch wa lo t, wa h Id to be th pr p r party to
u f r it value; 2 an auction er may , u for the pri of g ocls
old by him, whether h have any int r t in th pric or n l 3
an 1 a sheriff, for the price f pr p rty old by him on xecuti n · 4
th master of a hip or other v el may maintain an action for
fr i 0 ·ht, or on any contract concerning the ship, ntered into n
b half of t he owners, 5 or for the taking and carrying away, con. r ion of, or in jury to, the cargo. 6
§ 104. * 176. Actio n s o n B onds given to protect other Persons.
O bligee may s u e.
Various kinds of bonds and undertaking
g n rally required by statute, and given to some designated
bligee, although showing on the face that they are de igned to
prot ct, secure, or indemnify other persons, are al o contracts
made ''with, or in the name of, one person for the benefit of
another;" and although the party immediately intere ted may in
g eneral sue in his own name, 7 yet the obligee or person to whom
the promise is made may always, unless forbidden by statute,
maintain the action, and in some States is the only one who is
permitted to do so.s Among these are bonds in great variety
given to the "people" or to the "State," conditioned upon the
faithful discharge of their duties by public, local, or municipal
officer , actions on which, except when otherwise directed by
tatute, may be brought by the people or the State; 9 bonds
running to the people or to th e State, conditioned upon the
faithful discharge of duties by various private or semi-private
trustees, or by persons appointed in judicial proceedings and the

where it was hehl that a person to whom Cy. v. Simmonds, 33 Iowa, 345 (county

a contractor's bond is executed condi- treasurer's bond running to the county),

tioned to pay all persons supplying the

Hall v. Plaine, 14 Ohio St. 41 i, 423.
K ellogg v. Sweeney, l Lans. 39i.
a Minturn v. Main, 7 N. Y. 220, 224;
:Bogart v. O'Regan, l E. D. mith , 590.
4 Arm trong v. Vroman, 11 Minn. 220;
McKee v. Lineberger, 69 N. C. 217 , 239.
5 Keunedy v. Eilau, 17 A bb. Pr. 73 ;
Braithwaite v . Power, l N. Dak. 455.
6 Houghton v. Lynch, 13 Minn . 85.
7
ee upra, §§ * 139, * 141.
s [ Tnited tate 1. McCann (1901), 40
Ore. 13, 66 Pac. 2i 4 , qnoti ng the text,
wh ere it wa held that a per on to whom
a contra tor' honrl i. executed conditioned to pay all per. ons supplying the
1

2

contractor with labor and material , i · a
tru tee of an express tru. t. The sarnc
question was rai L·ed in nited 'tate v.
Rundle (1901), 27 Wash. 7, 67 Pac. 395;
and the T niteu
tate , as obligee of th<'
bond, was held a proper plaintiff, a tru ·1 e
of an exp re trust.]
il Hunter v. Mercer Cy. Com'r of, etc.,
10 Ohio 't. 515 (county trea urer' b nd
runni nO' to the tate) · tate v. Moore l!)
fo. 369 ( heriff' · bond); _ r ier 1'. Le ter,
21 fo. 112 lcontable' bond ) ; hlby
Cv. v. Simmond , 33 Iowa, 345 (county
tr.easurer's bond running to the county).
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like, such as those given by administrators, executors, or re-

ceivers ; ^ those given by the trustees of an estate, although

entirely for the benefit of the persons having an interest in the

estate; 2 bastardy bonds ^ and the like; bonds given directly to a

sheriff or other superior officer to indemnify a deputy sheriff or

other subordinate officer against the consequences of acts done in

the discharge of the latter's official duties ; * a bond given by a

town superintendent of common schools to the supervisor of the

town, an action on which must be brought by the supervisor or

his successor in office.^

§ 105. * 177. Actions on Contracts Made for Undisclosed Prin-

cipals. Agent may sue. In all the instances heretofore men-

tioned, the contract has been made with an agent in his own

name, and the promise given to him, although the principal or

such a tho e given by admini trator , executors, or re. i tho e g i en by the trustees of an e ate, although
1 for th b n fit of th I er on ha ing an interest in the
; 2 ba tardy bond 3 and the like; bond gi en directly to a
h riff or tber su rior officer to indemnify a d puty ..,heri:ff or
ther subordinate officer against tb consequence of acts done in
h <li charge of the latter official duties; 4 a bond given y a
to wn uperintendent of common school to the super i or f the
tow n an action on which must be brought by the upervi or or
h i ucces or in office. 5

beneficiary was known, and even expressly designated and pro-

vided for by the terms of the agreement. The rule is the same,,

and even more emphatically so, if the principal or beneficiary is,

at the time of the contract, unknown or undisclosed, or not men-

tioned in the instrument. When a contract, even in writing,
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is made with and by an agent, and no mention is made of any

principal or beneficiary, but the other contracting party supposes

he is dealing with the former on his own private account, but in

fact such person is an agent for an undisclosed principal and

enters into the agreement in the course of his agency, actually

effecting the contract on behalf of that superior behind him, the

rule is Avell settled that the one who was thus a direct party to

the agreement — the actual agent — may bring an action upon it

in his own name, or the principal may sue in his name.^

1 People V. Laws, 3 Abb. Pr. 450 ; prosecutrix as her interest might appear,

Annett v. Kerr, 28 How. Pr. 324 ; People the State being in fact a beneficiary under

V. Townsend, 37 Barb. 520. Tiie re- the bond as well a.'* the jirosecutri.x.]

porter's head-note reads .should be sued by •• Stiiwell i-. llurlbert, 18 X. Y. 374,

the people ; this is more than was decided. 375.

Haggott V. Boulger, 2 Duer, 160. The ^ Fuller v. Fullerton, 14 Barb. 59.

bond may also be pro.secuted by the per- '^ QStewart v. Gregory, Carter & Co.

son interested and benefited. See, how- (1900), 9 N. D. 618,84 N. W. 553; Carter

ever, Carmichael i;. Moore, 88 X. C. 29. v. Southern Ry. Co. (1900), 111 Ga. 38,

^ People V. Norton, 9 N. Y. 176, 179. 36 S. E. 308; Tustin Fruit Assn. f. Earl

3 People V. Clark, 21 Barb. 214. QSee Fruit Co. (1898), Cal., 53 Pac. 693.]

Myers i;. Baughman (1901), 61 Neb. 818, Erickson v. Compton, 6 How. Pr. 471;

· 105.

* 177.

Actions on Contracts Made for Undisclosed Prin -

cipals. Agent may sue.
In all the in tances heretofore mentioned, the contract has been made with an agent in bi own
name and the promi e given to him, although the principal or
beneficiary wa known, and even expres ly designated and provided for by the terms of the agreement. The rule i the ame
and even more emphatically so, if the principal or ben ficiary i ·
at the time of the contract unknown or undisclosed, or not m nioned in he instrument. When a contract, even in writing,
i made with and by an agent, and no mention is made of any
prin i pal or beneficiary, but the other contracting party su po e
be i dealing with t he former on hi own private account, but in
fact such per on is an agent for an undi clo ed principal and
nter into t he agreement in the course of his agenc , actually
eff ec ing the contract on behalf of that uperior behind 1 im th
rule i well settled that the one who was thu a direct part to
he agreement -the a,ctual agent-may bring an acti n upon it
in his own name, or the principal may ue in his name. 6

80 N. W. 507, where it was held that an Grinnell v. Schmidt, 2 Sandf. 706 ; Union

action on a bastardy bond could be lirought India Rubber Co. f. Tomlin.son, 1 E. D.

only in the name of the State, which was Smith, 364; Van Lien v. Byrnes, 1 Hilt,

named as obligee, for the use of the 13!; Iliggius v. Senior, 8 Mees. & W.

l People v. L aws, 3 A bb. Pr. 4 50;
Annett v. Kerr 2 H ow. Pr. 324 ; People
''· T own eu cl, 37 B arb . 52 . Th e r epor ter ' h atl- n t r eal lwuld be trncl by
the p o ple ; thi i. more than w decid d .
Bag ott v. Bo ulger, 2 Duer, 160. The
li•m d rnay al o b p ro. c ut d by the per<Jll iut r
ted a nd !, oefi ted. , , h ow..
29 .
·v ·r ,
r m icha 1 v. M oorc,
2
P eople u. '"Tor ton, 9 ..... Y . 17 6, 1 i 9.
a l' pl . 1'. la rk , 21 B a rb. 214-. [ .
f y r . v. Baughman {1901), 61 Tb. I ,
G . ' . \V. 5 i, wh re it wa · held that an
action on a ha. ta rdy hcrncl co uld h brou g ht
fln{y in the uarne o f the ' tate, which wa
narn <l a oLJig e, for th u , of the
T.

•

pro· ecut rix a h r in te re. t mi g ht appear,
t h tate being in fact a beo fi ciary under
the bond a well
th pro ec utrix .J
4
tilw 11 v. Hurlbert, l
. Y. 314,
3 75 .
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§ 106. * 178. other Classes of Trustees. I liave tliUS far con-

sidered oiily the particular class of trustees of an express trust

specially described in some of the codes as "persons with whom

or in whose name a contract is made for the benefit of others."

There are numerous other and more properly designated classes

of such trustees ; and whatever be their nature, or the object of

the trust, they may, by virtue of this section of the statute,

maintain an action in their own names. They are generally

created or appointed by some instrument in the nature of a grant

or conveyance, or they may be appointed in judicial proceedings

by a court. Although the rule is simple and peremptory that

these trustees may sue without joining the beneficiaries, the

following instances in which the rule has been applied may be

enumerated: assignees, general or special, in trust, to pay

creditors ; ^ the assignees of a contract in trust to reimburse out

of the proceeds thereof third persons for advances made;^

trustees appointed to take and collect subscriptions for colleges

and other similar purposes;^ a receiver appointed in another

State ; * the grantee of lands in trust for the use and benefit of
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another is the proper party to sue for possession or for damages

by trespass or other injury ; ^ a person who agreed to hold notes

834; Sims r. Bond, 5 B. & Ad. 389, 161; Simonton i'. First Nat. Bk. of Min-

393. per Lord Deunian. Ludwig v. neapolis, 24 Minu. 216 ; Witter i". Little,

Gille.spie, 10.5 N. Y. 653; McLaughlin v. 66 Iowa, 431. Compare Wynne v. Heck,

Great Western In.s. Co., 20 N. Y. Suppl. 92 N. C. 414.

(Com. PI. 1892), 536 ; ' Manette ?7. Simp- ^ Cummiii.s t-. Barkalow, 4 Keyes, 514.

son, 15 N. Y. Suppl. (Supreme Ct. 1891), [^Aud in Bates v. Richards Lumber Co.

448 ; Snider v. Adams Exp. Co., 77 Mo. (1893), 56 Minn. 14, 57 N. W. 218, it was

523 ; Keown ?-. Voirel, 25 Mo. App. 35. As held that a beneficial interest in a con-

against right of undisclosed princi})al to tract for work and labor may be a.ssigned

sue, see Kelley c. Thuey, 102 Mo. 522. In by a party who engages therein to per-

ordiuary contracts made by agents for form the same, so as to entitle the assignee

tiieir principals, the latter are the real to recover the contract jjrice upon tlie ful-

parties in interest, and inn.st sue. Swift filmeut of the contract by tlie assignor,

V. Swift, 46 Cal. 266, 269 ; Chin Kem and that the assignee in such a case is a

You ?;. Ah Joan, 75 Cal. 124; Ferguson trustee of an express trust, as he is obliged

I'. McMahon, 52 Ark. 433. See, also, to account for the jiroceeds.]

ante, § *141. ^ Slocum v. Barry, 34 How. Pr. 320;

» Lewis r. Graham, 4 Abb. Tr. 106; Dix v. Akers, 30 Ind. 431 ; Musselman v.

St. Anthony's Mill Co. v. Vandall, 1 Minn. Cravens, 47 Ind. 4. See Lathrop v. Knapp,

246. See Foster v. Brown, 65 Ind. 234. 37 Wis. 307.

Assignee to pay creditors distinguished * Runk v. St. John, 29 Barb. 585 ; per

from a mere agent to collect claims and contra, Hope Life Ins. Co. v. Taylor, 2

pay <iebts: Sandmeyer v. Dak. F. & M. Robt. 278. See Lathrop v. Knapp, 37

Ins. Co. (S. Dak. 1891), 50 N. W. 353; Wis. 307 ; Garver r. Kent, 70 Ind. 428.

citing Brockmeyer v. Wash. Nat. Bk., 40 •■> Goodrich v. Milwaukee, 24 Wis. 422;

Kan. 376; Cornley u. Dazian, 114 N. Y. Boardmau r. Beckwith, 18 Iowa, 292,

15-1

CI :'11

IlE~IEDi l.::

.

lo-i cmL hemedil;s.

aud a mortgage for the benefit of another, and to apply the pro-

ceeds thereof when collected in payment of a debt owned by

himself to that other, may sue to enforce the securities ; ^ the

assignee of a stock subscription, who holds it for the benefit of

a bank, is the proper party to bring an action upon it;^ a person

to whom chattels had been transferred for the benefit of a married

woman in trust, to permit her to have exclusive use and posses-

sion, and to dispose of them by her direction, is the proper party

to briuff an action to restrain interference with or disturbance of

her possession. 3 It has been held in Kentucky that where a

railroad company issued bonds which were held by many dif-

ferent persons, and executed a mortgage to a trustee for the

purpose of securing such bonds, this trustee, who was the sole

mortgagee named in the instrument, could not maintain an action

in his own name alone to foreclose the mortgage on account of the

non-payment of the money due on the bonds, but he must join

the bond-holders as parties plaintiff with himself.* The correct-

ness of this decision may well be doubted in the light of the other

cases above cited, which uniformly proceed upon a different
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doctrine.

§ 107. *179. Actions Brought by Public Officers. Many public

officers are authorized by law to bring actions in their own names,

and by virtue of their official character, in respect of matters

falling within the scope of their official functions. As this

subject is entirely regulated by special statutes, which greatly

vary in different States, and as it is not in fact a portion of the

general civil procedure, but rather a matter exceptional and

collateral thereto, I shall not attempt any discussion of the cases

in which such officers may sue, but shall simply mention a few

295. See Holden r. N. Y. & Erie Bank, lected anything, was held to be a trustee

72 N. Y. 280, 297 ; Tyler v. Gran<;eT, 48 of an express trust, aud could therefore

Cal. 259 ; McKiunon v. McKinnon, 81 N. C. maintain the action in his own name/]

201; [^Lewis v. ,St. Paul, etc. IJy. Co. - Kimball'!;. Spicer, 12 Wis. 668.

(189+), 5 S. D. 148, 53 X. W. 580.] ^ j^egj j._ Harris, 7 Robt. 151. A

1 Gardinier r. Kellogg, 14 Wis. 605. trustee under separation articles, by the

See Davidson v. Kims, 67 N. C. 228 ; terms of which lie was to receive au-

Thompson v. Toland, 48 Cal. 99, 114; uual payments from the husband and

Moorehead v. Hyde, 38 Iowa, 382. Qln for the support of the wife, may sue

Strucicmeyer v. Lamb (1896), 64 Minn, for the recovery of such sums without

57, 65 N. W. 930, the assignee of certain joining the wife. Clark v. Fosdick, 118

notes and chattel mortgages, who was to N. Y. 7.

bring suit against the maker and account * Bardstown & L. R. Co. v. Metcalfe,

aud
for th b nefit f ano h r and o apply he pro·e d · h 'r "'O' vd1 n oll ct d in paym 1 t f a d b
wn d by
hi1 i elf i..o
at o her, ma
u to nforce the ecmi i ; 1 th
a i0 nee of a tock sub crip ion wh h olds it for th b nefit of
· b nk i the pr per p r y t brin an ac ion upon it; 2 a per on
t whom ch tels had b en tran f rr d f r the benefit of am rri l
w man in tru t to p rmit her to ha Ye exclu i e u ' e an po
si n nd to i po e f th em by her dir ction, i the prop r party
to bring an acti n to r train interference with r disturuance of
her po. e ion. a It ha been held in Kentucky that where a
r ilroad company i ued bond , which were held by many different person , and executed a mortgage to a tru tee for the
purp e of ._ecuring such bonds, this trustee, who was the ole
mortgagee named in the instrument, could not maintain an action
in hi own name alone to foreclo e the mortgage on account of the
non-payment of the money due on the bond but he must join
the bond-holder a partie plaintiff with him elf. 4 Th correctne of this deci ion may well be doubted in the light of the other
ca e above cited, which uniformly proceed upon a different
doctrine.
107. * 179. Actions Brought b y P ublic O ffice rs. Many pu lie
officer:s are authorized by law to bring action in their own nam
an b virtue of their official chara t r, in re pect of matter
fallin wi bin the scope of their offi ial functions . A thi
ubject is entirely regulated by pecial statute , which greatl
vary in different tat , and as it is not in fact a porti n of the
g eneral ivil procedure, but rather a matter excepti nal and
colla er l theret , I hall n t attempt any di cu , ion of the ca
in which such offi cer ma} ue, but ball simply mention a few

to hi.s as.-ignor fur the proceeds if he col- 4 Mete. (Ky.) 199.

lected anything, was held to be a tru t e
of an xpre ·. ru t, and ould th r fore
maintain the cti on in hi own name.]
z Kim 1Jal1'u. p icer, 12 Wi . 66 .
s R d v. Harri, 7 Robt. 15 1. A
tru tee und er eparation article , hy the
term of whi h he wa to re ive annual payruent from the hu ' band autl
for the upport of the wife, may ue
for the r co ery of such sum without
joining th wife. Clark v. F sdi k, 11
N. Y. 7.
4 Bard to wn & L. R. Co. v. Metcalf ,
4 Mete. (Ky.) 199.
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decisions which may have some general interest.^ Actions by

pubhc officers suing as such shoukl be brought in their individual

names, but with their official titles added ;2 but the mere use of

the official title will not be enough, without the proper averments

of the official character in the pleadings ; in the absence of such

averments, the title will be regarded as only a description of the

person.' In New York, counties cannot sue nor be sued. All

actions and judicial proceedings in favor of or against counties,

except those which some county officer is expressly authorized to

maintain in his own name for the benefit of the county, must be

brought by or against the "Board of Supervisors" of the county

named, as an organized unit, and by that designation, and not

against the supervisors individually ; * but when the action is by

or against the supervisors, not as the immediate representatives

and in the place of the county, it must be brought by or against

them individually, with their title of office added. ^ The rule in

respect to towns in New York is different. They are municipal

corporations, and inust sue and be sued by their corporate name,'

except in the few cases where town officers are expressly author-
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ized by statute to sue in their name of office for the benefit of the

town.^ In accordance with this rule, where the supervisor and

commissioner of highwaj'S had entered into a contract on behalf

of the town, which contained no promise to or undertaking with

themselves, as such officers, it was held that they could not

maintain an action upon it in their joint names, but the action

should have been by the town, as the real party in interest."

^ QA county judge, suing on a trustee's fayette Cy. i\ Ilixon, 69 Mo. 581 ; Vanars-

bond under R. S. § 4015, is the trustee of dall v. The State, 65 lud. 176; Garver v.

an express trust : Ilichter i;. Leiby (1898), Kent, 70 id. 428; Jefferson Cy. Com'rs

99 Wis. 512, 75 N. \V. 82.3 v. Lineberger, 3 Mont. 31 ; San Benito

2 Paige V. Fazackerly, 36 Barb. 392. Cy. v. Whitesides, 51 Cal. 416.

As to actions by towns, counties, super- ^ Gould v. Glass, 19 Barb. 179. [It

visors, and similar officers, see Hathaway was held in Atkinson v. Cawley (1900),

V. Cincinnatus, 62 N. Y. 434; Lewis i-. 112 Ga. 485,37 S. E. 715, that where an

Marshall, 56 N. Y. 663 ; Guilford v. Cooley, action is instituted by " W. Y. Atkinson,

58 id. 116 ; Chautauqua t'. Gifford, 8 Ilun, Governor, etc.," the words "Governor,

152; Sutherland v Carr, 85 N. Y. 104; etc.," pltb merely descriptio persoiue, and do

Hagadorn v. Raux, 72 id. 583 ; Cairns v. not designate the capacity in which the

deei ion wliich may have
me g n ral int re t. 1 Acti n · by
puhlic officer suing as such houlc.l be brought in th ir individual
name ' hut with their official title added; 2 but th mere u e of
the official title will not be enough, with ut the proper averm nts
of th fficial character in the pleading ; in the ab ence of uch
averment , the title will be r gard d a only a de cription of the
per·on.~ In New York, countie cannot sue n r be ued.
All
acti n and judicial proceedings in favor of or against counti
except tho e which some county officer i expres ·ly authorized to
maintain in his own name for the benefit of the county, must be
brought by or against the "Board of Supervi ·or " of the county
named, as an organized unit, and by that de ignation, and not
again t the supervisors individual1y; 4 but when the action is by
or again t the supervisors, not as the imm ediate repre entati ves
and in the place of the county, it must be brought by or against
them individually, with their title of office added. 5 The rule in
re pect to towns in New Yark is different. They are municipal
corporations, and rnust sue and be sued by their corporate name;
except in the few cases where town officers are expressly authorized by statute to sue in their name of office for the benefit of the
town. 6 In accordance with this rule, where the supervisor and
com mi sioner of high ways had entered into a contract on behalf
of the town, which contained no promise to or undertaking with
them elves, as such officers, it was held that they could not
maintain an action upon it in their joint names, but the action
should have been by the town, as the real party in intere t.i

O'Bleness, 40 Wis. 469 : Beaver Dam suit is brought.]

t'. FriuL's, 17 id. 398 ; Franklin T. Sup. v. * Hill r. Livingston Cy. Sup , 12 N. Y.

Kirby, 25 id. 498 ; Dutcher v. Butcher, 52 ; Magee v. Cutler, 43 Barb. 239.

39 id. 651 ; Pine Valley v. Unity, 40 id. » Wild v. Columbia Cy. Sup., 9 How.

682: La Cro.sse v. Melrose. 22 id. 459; Pr. 315, per Harris J.

School Dir. of Sigel !?. Coe, 40 id. 103; ^ Duanesburgh i-. Jenkins, 46 Barb. 294.

Oconto Cy. Sup. v. Hall, 42 id. 59 ; La- ^ Palmer v. Fort Plain & C. Plk. R.

l [A county judge, uing on a trustee'
bond under R. S. § 4015, is the tru tee of
an expre-s tru::;t : Richter v. Leiby ( 1898),
99 Wis. 512, i5 N. W. 82.J
2 Paige v. Fazackerly, 36 Ba.rb. 392.
As to action by town s, counties, uper·
visor , and imilar offi cers, see Hathaway
v. Cincinnatus, 62 N . Y. 434; L ewi · v.
Marshall, 56 N. Y. 663; Guilford v. Cooley,
5 id. 116; Chautauqua v. Gifford , 8 IIun,
152; Sutherland v Carr, 85 N. Y. 104;
Hagad orn v. Raux, 72 id. 5 3; Cairns v.
O'Bleness, 40 Wis. 469 ; Beaver Dam
v. Frin!? , 17 id. 39 ; Franklin T. up. v.
Kirby, 25 id. 49 ; Dutcher 11. Dutcher,
39 id. 651 ; Pine Valler v. Unity, 40 id.
682 : La Crosse v. Melrose, 22 id. 459 ;
• chool Dir. of igel v . Coe, 40 id. 103;
Oconto Cy. up. v. Hall, 42 id. 59; La-

fayette Cy. v. Hixon, 69 Mo. 5 I ; Vanarsdall v. The State, 65 Iud. 176; Garver v.
Kent, 70 id. 42 ; J efferson Cy. Com'rs
v. Lineberger, 3 Mont. 31 ; San Benito
Cy. v . Whi te. itle , 51 Cal. 416.
3 Gould v. Gla, s, 19 Ba rb. 179. [It
was held in Atkinson r. Cawley (1900),
112 Ga. 485, 37 S. E. 715, that wh ere an
action i in tituted by "W. Y. Atkin on,
Gov ern or, etc.," the word "Govern or ,
etc.," are merely descriptio perso11re, an cl do
not de ignate the capacity in which the
suit i brought.]
4 Hill r. Living ton Cy.
up, 12 N. Y .
52; Magee v. Cutler, 43 Barb. 239.
5 Wild v. Columbia Cy.
up., 9 How.
Pr. 315, per Harri J.
6 Duane burgh v. J enkin , 46 Barb. 294-.
7 P11lmer v. Fort Plain & C. Plk. R.
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The Secretary of State for the War Department of Great Britain

was permitted to sue in his individual name to recover pubUc

moneys which had been embezzled by a subordinate official, it

beincr shown tliat by the British statute the property was vested

in him as such secretary.^ The "Metropolitan Fire Depart-

ment," a commission created by statute for the city of New

York, is declared to be a qiLasi corporation, capable of suing and

being sued, and not a mere official agency of the municipality. "-^

§ 108. * 180. Meaning of Phrase, "Persons expressly Author-

ized by Statute " to sue. Classes of Persons Included. Hardly

any attempt lias been made by the courts to determine in a

general manner the classes of persons who fall within the desig-

nation of "expressly authorized by statute" to sue. The Su-

preme Court of Indiana in one case made an approach towards

such an interpretation. In an action upon a promissory note by

the assignee thereof, his right to sue was denied by the defend-

ant. The evidence tended to show that he was not the real

party in interest. To meet this objection, he invoked a prior

general statute, which expressly provides that indorsees and
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assignees of bills and notes may sue in their own names, and

urged that he was thus brought directly within the class of

"persons expressly authorized by statute" mentioned in the

section of the code under consideration. The court, however,

refused to adopt this construction of the code. It said: "Is the

assignee of a note who holds it as such, without any real interest,

one of that class of persons here referred to as being ' expressly

authorized by statute to sue ' ? or does the provision have refer-

ence to another class of persons, such as the guardians of an

idiot, etc. ? We are of the opinion that the clause of the section

above quoted does not have reference to the rights of an assignee

of a promissory note, but to such persons as may be authorized

to sue in their own names because of holding some official posi-

tion, as the president of a bank, the trustees of a civil township,

and the like."^ There have been held embraced within the same

class, not only the presidents and other managing officers of

joint-stock associations for business purposes, but also similar

Co., II N. Y. 376, 390, per Selden J. "A - Clarissy v. Metropolitan Fire Dep.,

town is a political corporation, and suits 7 Abb. Pr. n. s. 352.

in Its behalf must be prosecuted in the ^ Swift v. Ellsworth, 10 Ind 205, per

name of the town." See su/<ra, § • 174. Hanoa J.

» reel V. Elliott, 7 Abb. Pr. 433.
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officers of some voluntary societies organized for purposes not

connected with business, when the action is brought on behalf

of, or in relation to matters belonging to, the society, and among

other instances the following; ^ a suit brought by the president of

a voluntary unincorporated religious and missionary association

to recover a legacy bequeathed to it;^ by the treasurer of a divi-

sion of 'the Sons of Temperance, a voluntary social organization ; ^

by the president of a bank of which he was the nominal pro-

prietor, all the contracts and transactions being in his name as

such proprietor ; ^ by the trustee of the " Pittsburg Trust Com-

pany," an unincorporated business association, in an action

brought to recover damages for negligence in not protesting a

bill of exchange belonging to such association, by which the

amount thereof was lost.^ An officer of the Bank of England

was permitted to sue in New York upon a bill of exchange

belonging to the bank, by showing that the statutes of England

authorized him to bring an action. ^^ On the other hand, it has

been held in the same State that an action brought by a person

as foreman of a certain named fire company — unincorporated —
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could not be maintained ; that the provisions of the code and of

other statutes authorizing suits in the name of officers of unin-

corporated bodies do not apply to such societies as fire com-

panies.' If the doctrine stated by the Indiana court cited above

be taken as the correct interpretation of the clause, it follows

that the whole section provides for three classes of persons who

may sue in their own name, although not the real parties in

interest; namely, fird, those with whom, or in whose name, a

contract is made for the benefit of another, to whom the promise

is directly given, and who sue because they are the actual

promisees; secondly, trustees proper of an express trust, who,

by virtue of being trustees, have an interest in or title to some

1 QThe president of an unincorporated ^ Tibbetts v. Blood, 21 Barb. 650; ex-

ussociatiou was allowed, under § 1919 of pressly hokliug that these statutes are not

the Code of Civil Procedure, to bring an confined to business associations.

iiction to recover the property belonging ■» Burbank v. Beach, l.'j Barb. 326.

to all the members of the same : Ostrom ^ Lau<;hlin v. Greene, 14 Iowa, 92, 94.

V. Greene (1900), 161 N. Y. 353, 55 N. E. The plaintiff was said to be a trustee of

■919.3 ^" express trust.

2 De Witt V. Chandler, 11 Abb. Pr. « Myers v. Machado, 6 Abb. Pr. 198.

459 (General Term). It was held that ' Mastersou v. Botts, 4 Abb. Pr. 130

the action might be maintained under (Sp. T.),

statutes of 1848, 1849, citing Tibbetts v.

Blood, 21 Barb. 650.

offi ers of some voluntary oci ti · organiz d f r purpo
n t
c nn cte<l with business, when th acti n i brou ht on b half
f, or in relation to matters belonging t , th oci ty, and among
other in tances the following; 1 a uit brought by th r
a voluntary unincorporated religi u and mi ionary a ciation
tu recover a legacy bequ allied to it; 2 by the trea ur r f a di vi'ion of ·the Sons of Temperan e, a voluntary social organization; 3
b the pre ident of a bank of which he was th n minal proprietor, all the contracts and tran actions being in his name as
uch proprietor; 4 by the trustee of the "Pittsburg Trust Company, ' an unincorporated bu iness association, in an action
brought to recover damages for negligence in not protesting a
bill of exchange belonging to snch a sociation, by which the
amount thereof was lost. 5 An officer of the Bank of England
wa permitted to sue in New York upon a bill of exchange
belonging to the bank, by showing that the statutes of England
authorized him to bring an action. 6 On the other hand, it has
been held in the same State that an action brought by a person
as foreman of a certain named fire company- unincorporatedcould not be maintained; that the provisions of the code and of
other statutes authorizing suits in the name of officers of unincorporated bodies do not apply to such societies as fire com-.
pauie . 7 If the doctrine stated by the Indiana court cited above
be taken as the correct interpretation of the clause, it follows
that the whole section provides for three classes of persons who
may sue in their own name, although not the real partie in
interest; namely, first, those with whom, or in whose name, a
contract is made for the benefit of another, to whom the promise
is directly given, and who su e because they are the actual
promisees; secondly, trustees proper of an expres tru t, who,
by virtue of being trustees, have an interest in or titl , to some
1 [The president of an unincorporated
.associatiou was allowed, und er § 1919 of
the Code of ivil Procedure, to brin g an
action t o recover the property belonging
to all the mern bers of the same : Ostrom
v. Greene (1900) , 161 N. Y. 353, 55 N. E.
'919 .J
2 De Witt v. Chandler, 11 Abb. Pr.
459 (General Term). It was held that
the action might be maintain ed und er
.statutes of 1848, 1849 ; citi ng Tibbetts v.
Blood, 21 Barb. 650.

a Tihbetts v. Blood, 21 Barb. 650; expressly holding that these statute are not
confin ed to hu ine s association .
4 Burban k v. Beach, 15 Barb. 326.
& Lau crhlin v. Greene, l~ Iowa, 92, 94.
The plaintiff was said to be a tru tee of
an express trust.
6 Myers v. Machado, 6
bb. Pr. 198 .
7 Masterson v. Botts, 4 Abb. Pr. 130

(Sp . T.) .
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property which is the subject-matter of the trust; and, thirdly^

certain persons clothed with authority to do various acts for, or

in behalf of, others, but who are not vested with any interest in

or title to property, so as to render them trustees in the strict

meaning of that term, and who are authorized by various statutes

to maintain actions in the exercise of their personal authority,

such as officers of voluntary societies, guardians, or committees

of the person, and the like.

^ 109. * 181. Actions by Executors and Administrators. That

executors and administrators can maintain actions relating to the

estate in their own names alone, is a proposition too familiar and

elementary to require discussion or the citation of authority. ^

Although in general a foreign executor or administrator cannot

sue as such in the courts of another State or country than that in

wiiich he was appointed, yet, if the objection is not raised by

1 [In Bern v. Shoemaker (1898), 10

S. D. 453, 74 N. W. 239, it was held

that on the refusal of the administrator to
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hriug an action for the recovery of lands

alle<!;ed to belong to the estate, the heirs

may bring such action, on the broad

tl e subj ct-m tt r f the tru · and thirdly,
clothed with auth ritytod Ya.ri u act · f r, or
but who re not
ted with any in ere t in
r t1tl
proper y, o a to ren ler them tri1,stee in th
rict
m , nin of that term, and wh are authorized by ariou tatut ·
t maintain actions in the exer i e of their per onal auth rity
uch a officer of voluntar ocietie , guardian , or committees
of th per on and the like.
109. * 1 1. Act io n s by Executors and Administrators.
That
xecut r and admini trators can maintain act.ion relating to he
e tc te in their own names alone, is a propositi n too familiar and
elementary to requir_e di cu ion or the citation of authority. 1
lthough in general a foreign executor or admini trat r cannot
sue a uch in the courts of another State or country than that in
which l wa appointed, yet, if the objection i not re i d by

ground that when one whose duty it is to

protect the estate refuses to do so, the

))arties beneficially interested may take

steps to do so. See also Tecumseh Nat.

Bank r. McGee (1901), 61 Neb. 709,85

N. W. 949, where the court said that

"while the general rule is that an admin-

istrator or personal representative of a

decedent's estate must prosecute actions

for recovery of debts due the estate, tliere

are exceptions to the rule ; and in the

present case held that the order of the

trial court, substituting an heir at law and

jtermitting her to prosecute the action for

her interest in the claim in controversy

in her own name, the other heir.s having

.•■■ettled and compromised theirs, was not

erroneous."

Ives V. Mutual Life Ins. Co. (1901), 129

N. C. 28, 39 S. E. 631 : Only the personal

representative, and not the heirs, of a

deceased beneficiary can bring an action

on a life insurance policy. Burrell v.

Kern (1899), 34 Ore. 501, 56 Pac. 809:

" When the cause of suit or action,

whether in contract or in tort, accrues

after the death of the testator or intestate,

the money, if recovered, will bo assets of

the estate, and the executor or adminis-

trator may sue, at his option, in either his

representative or individual capacity."

Hook r. Garfield Coal Co. (1900), 112

la. 210, 83 N. W. 963: An administrator

cannot maintain trespass for injuries to

the real estate of his intestate. In this

case the court held that where adminis-

trators sue for trespass to real estate of

their intestate under an assignment from

the heirs, and request that the heirs, who

assigned simply to avoid a multiplicity

of suits, be substituted as parties plaintiff,

sucli request, while discretionary with the

court, should ordinarily be granted.

Bunker v. Taylor (1900), 13 S. D. 433,

83 N. W. 555 : Where an executrix of au

estate dies pending a suit, and adminis-

trators are appointed to continue the

1 [In Bern v. Shoemaker (1 9 ), 10
, ·. D . 453, 74 N . W. 239, it wa held
that on the refu al of t he ad mini trator to

hriog an action fo r t he r ecover y of land
alleged to belong to t he e tate, t he heirs
may brin O" uch action, on th e br oad
ground that wh en one who e du ty it i ~ t o
protect the e tate r efu es to do o, th e
par tie uenefi cially in ter e ted may t ake
. t p to do o.
ee al o Tecum eh at.
Ban k 1-. McGee (1901) , 61 Neb. 709, 5
.e. W . 949, where the court aid that
" whil e t h g eneral rule i that au admini . tr ator or per onal repre entative of a
deceden t' e. tate mu t pro ecute action
for recovery of debt due the e tate, th ere
are exception to t he rule ; and in the
pr nt ca lield that the ord er of the
tr ial court, ub tituting an heir at law and
permi ttinO" her to pro e ute th e a cti on f r
her int re t in the ·laim in cont rover y
in her own name, th e ther heir · having
: Ltl e<l and compromi ed their , wa not
' rt'Oneou -."
I ve. ,,., :\futual Life I n . o. ( 190 1)
• '. . 2 , 39 •. E. 3 1 : Only th p r onal
r<· pre. utati\' , a11<l not the heir , of a
<l c a.; cl benefi ciary can br ing a n a ti n
::i a lif
in urau ce policy. B ur rell v.
l' ru ( J 99) , 34 re. 50 1, ·6 P ac. 09:
' Wh en the cau. e of uit
4

the e tate, and the executor or a dmini trat r may sue, at hi opti n, in ithar hi
repr .en tati ve or in dividual capa ity.'
H oo k v. Garfi eld oal o. (1 900), 112
Ia. 210, 3 . W . 963: An a lmini trator
am1ot maintain tre pa ~ r injuri to
the r al estate of hi iut tate. In thi
ase the court held that where 'admini to r eal e tat of
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answer or deniurrer, it is waived under the codes of procedure ;

that is, the objection goes simply to the parties' capacity to sue,

and not to the cause of action set up in the complaint or petition.^

In California, lands owned in fee by the deceased do not descend

at once to his heirs or pass to his devisees, but go with the

personalty into the estate in the hands of his administrator or

executor as a part of the assets to be administered upon. Any

action, therefore, relating to such land, — to recover its posses-

sion, or damages for injuries done to it, or rents, or the like, —

brought at any time before a final settlement of the estate and

distribution thereof, must be prosecuted by the administrator or

executor alone. ^ In an action by the administrator of a mort-

gagee, brought to foreclose the mortgage, the heir of the mort-

gagee is not a proper party to be joined as a co-plaintiff. In

California, as in New York, the mortgage is a mere security,

incident and collateral to the debt, and belongs wholly to the

j)ersonalty.^

§ 110. * 182. Actions by General Guardians. How far general

guardians of infants, testamentary or appointed by the probate
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courts, are authorized to maintain actions in their own names,

relating to the personal property of their wards, depends rather

upon the provisions of the statutes which define their powers and

duties than upon those of the codes.* The codes in general can

1 l\obbius V. Wells, 18 Abb. Pr. 191. from the complaint that the plaintiff had

^Held in Gregory v. McCorniick (1893), capacity to sue as admiuistratrix, but it

120 Mo. 6.57, 25 S. W. 565, that the ob- must appear from the complaint that she

jection that plaintiff is a foreign executor did not have capacity. The former objec-

or administrator, if it appears on the face tion can be taken only by answer.]

of the petition, if not raised by special As to foreign administrator, see Con-

demurrer on the ground that plaintiff has nor's Adm. v. Paul, 12 Bush, 144; as

not le^^al capacity to sue, is waived. To to executors and administrators generally,

the same effect see Wilson v. Wilson see Duncan v. Whedbee, 4 Colo. 1 43 ;

(1894), 26 Ore. 251, 38 Pac. 185, citing the MuUin's Appeal, 40 Wis. 154; Harte v.

answer or lemurrer, it i waived un ler th
o l ' of proc <lure;
that i , the obj ction go s imply to th par i .
a1 a ity to ue,
and not to th cau e of action et up in th
mplaint or peti ion.1
In alifornia, land owne l in fee by the d c a l 1 not de cend
at once to hi heirs or pas to his cl vi
, but go with the
p r" nalt into the estate in the hand of his admini trator or
e.- utor a a part of the a ::; t to be administ r cl upon. An
action, therefor , relating to such land, - to rec Yer it po e ion, or damages for injurie done to it, or rent , or the like, brought at any time before a :final settlement of the state and
1i 'tribution thereof, mu t be prosecuted by the ad mini trator or
exe utor alone. 2 In an action by the ad mini 'trat r of a mortag e brought to foreclose the mortgage, the heir of the mortga e i not a proper party to be joined as a co-plaintiff. In
California, as in New York, the mortgage i a mere securit ,
incident and collateral to the debt, an l belongs wholly to the
personalty. 3
§ 110. * 182. Actions by General Guardians. How far general
guardians of infants, testamentary or appointed by the probate
courts, are authorized to maintain actions in their own nam es,
r lating to the personal property of their wards, depends rather
upon the provisions of the statutes which define their powers and
duties than upon those of the codes. 4 The codes in general can

text. Houchin, 50 Ind. 327 ; Wright's Adm. v.

But see Louisville & Nashville R. R. Wriglit, 72 Ind. 149 (A. as administrator

Co. V. Brantley's Adm'r (1894), 96 Ky. of B.'s e.state can sue A. as administrator

297, 28 S. W. 477, where it was held that of C.'s estate) ; Ham v. Henderson, 50

where a foreign administrator attemjits to Cal. 367 ; Cashman v. Wood, 6 Hun, 520.

bring suit, defendant may demur gener- - Curtis i". Herrick, 14 Cal. 117; Meeks

ally on the ground that the petition does v. Ilahn, 20 Cal. 620; Grattan v. Wiggins,

not state a cause of action. It is not a 23 Cal. 16; Emeric v. Peuuiman, 26 Cal.

case of want of legal capacity to sue. 119.

And it was held iu Locke v. Klunker ^ Grattan r. Wiggins, 23 Cal. 16.

(1898), 123 Cal. 231, 55 Pac. 993, that a * [In an action brought in behalf of

demurrer for want of 'facts will not be minors by a guardian, it is necessary for

Bustained where it merely does not appear the guardian to allege issuable facts show-

1 H.obhins v. Wells, 18 Abb. Pr. 191.
[Held in Gregory v. McCormick (1893),
120 Mo. 6rl7, 25 . W. 565, that the obj ction that plaintiff i a foreign executor
or administrator, if it appears on the face
of the petition, if not rai ed by pecial
demurrer on the ground that plaintiff has
not legal capacity to ue, is waived. To
the same effect see Wilson v. Wilson
(1894), 26 Ore. 25 1, 38 Pac. 185, citing the
text.
But see Louisville & Nashville R. R.
o. v. Brantley' Adm'r (1894), 96 Ky.
297, 28 S. W. 477, where it wa held that
where a foreign administrator attempt· to
bring uit, defendant may demur generally on the ground that the petition doe
not tate a cau e of action. It i not a
ca e of want of legal capacity to ue.
And it wa held in Locke v. Klunker
(1 9 ), 123 Cal. 231, 55 Pac. 993, that a
demurrer for want of fact will not be
sustained where it merely does not appear

from the complaint that the plaintiff bad
capacity to sue as administratrix, but it
must appear from the complaint that he
did not have capacity. The former objection can be taken only by an wer.J
As to foreign administrator, see Connor's Adm. v. Paul, 12 Bu. h, 144; as
to executor and admini trator generally,
see Duncan v. Whedbee, 4 Colo. 143 ;
Mullin's Appeal, 40 Wi .. 154; Harte ?'.
Houchin, 50 Ind. 327; Wright's Adm. v.
Wright, 72 Ind. 149 (A. a admini trator
of B.' e. tate can ue . a admini trator
of C.'s e tate) ; Ham v. Hender on, 50
Cal. 367; a hman v. Wood, 6 Hun , 520.
2 Curti v. Herrick, 14
al. 117; i\1 k
v. Hahn, 20 Cal. 620; rattan v. W iggin ,
23 Cal. 16; Emeric v. Peuniman, 26 al.
119.

Grattan v. ·wiggin ·, 23 Cal. 16.
[In an action brought in behal£ of
minors by a O'Uanlian, it i neces ary for
the guardian to allege i uable facts show8

4

1 0

CffIL RE 1EDIE .

160

CIVIL REMEDIES.

luirdly be deemed to have enlarged their powers in this respect.

In a few States, the guardian is specitically mentioned and

coupled with the executor and administrator in the section of

the statute under consideration ; and this language may be inter-

preted as authorizing him to sue in respect of all property which

is under his control by virtue of his office.^ In New York, it

has been determined by the Supreme Court in a very carefully

considered case, the decision, however, being rested upon a con-

struction of the Revised Statutes, and not of the code, that the

general guardian may ])ring all actions in his own name respect-

ing the personal property of the ward and the rents and profits

of his real estate.^ This same power is expressly conferred upon

him by the statutes of certain States.'^ On the^ other hand, it is

held in Kentucky that, while the guardian, who has taken a note

expressly made to himself as payee for moneys belonging to the

ward, may prosecute an action thereon, because the promise is

given directly to him, he cannot sue in respect of his ward's

property in general, since he has no estate or interest therein ;
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such actions must be brought in the name of the infant.^ The

int^ his representative capacity, and if he

does not do so the complaint is demurrable

upon the ground of want of capacitv to

*ue, but unless so made the ol)jection is

waived : Dalrymple v. Security Loau Co.

(11)00), 9 X. b. 306, 83 N. w". 245. The

objection that the parties to an action are

b·1r
In

t ha
enl rg
heir wer in thi re pect.
a s, th guardian is pecific 11 y m n tion d and
ith he execu tor and admini trat r in th
ecti n of
tut under con iderati n; and thi languag
ay be interu in re pect of all prop rty which
r t d a authorizing him t
l
un 1 r hi c ntrol b irt ue of hi offi e. 1 In New York, it
ha b n e ermin d b3 he upreme C urt in a ery carefully
upon a concon i l red case, the d ci ion, howe ver, being re t
tructi n of the Revi d tat ute , and no of he
e, that the
en ral guardian ma; 1 ring all acti ons in hi own name re pectin the per nal prop rty of th wu d anc1 the r nt nd profits
·f hi real e tate.2 Thi ' ame power i expre ly conf rred upon
h im by th e ta tntes of certain tate ' . 3 On the other band, it i
h eld in K ent ucky tlrn,t, while the guardian, who ha tak n a note
expr 1 made to him lf a payee for mone belonging to the
war , may pro ecute an action thereon, becau e the promise i
iven directly to him, h canr ot sue in respect of his ward'
prop rty in general, ~ in ce h has no e tate or interest therein;
uch action must be br ught in the name of the infant. 4 The

minors who appear without guardians ad

lllpiii is waiveil by pleading to the merits :

Blumauer v. Clock (1901), 24 Wash. 590,

€4 Pac. 844. A father may su(! as guar-

dian (til litem for services of his minor

child rendered to a third party : Grosov-

sky (.'. Goldenberg (1902), 86 Minn. 378,

90 N. W. 282.3

1 This interpretation is given to the

language of the code by the Supreme

Court of Indiana in Shepherd v. Evans,

9 Ind. 200, which holds that, by virtue of

the provision, the guardian is empowered

to bring such actions in his own name.

See Wilson v. Houston, 70 X. C. 37.5 (when

wards arc necessary plaintiffs) ; Crawford

I'. Xeal. 50 Cal. 321 (necessary al-iegationa

in suit by infant by a guardian nd litem).

A ceneral guardian may sue, Hanonstein

V. Knll. 59 Flow. Vr. 24: Fox '•, Kcrpor,

61 Ind. 14-<; and see Carrillo ,• Mcl'hil-

lips, 55 Cal. 130 ; per contra he cannot sue

in his own name, Vincent v. Starks, 45

Wis. 458.

^ Thomas v. Bennett, 56 Barb. 197;

Seaton i'. Davis, 1 N. Y. Sup. Ct. 91 ; and

see White r Parker, 8 Barb. 48, 52;

Mebane v. Mebane, 66 N. C. 334 ; Biggs

r. Williams, 66 N. C. 427.

■^ See [[Wisconsin, St., 1898, § 3982.]

* Anderson v. Watson, 3 Mete. (Ky.)

509. [[So, also, in Missouri, in Webb v.

lI.^ydon (1901), 166 Mo. 39, 65 S. W. 760,

it was held tliat a suit to recover property

belonging to a ward .slioiild be brought in

the name of tlie ward by tlie curator, and

not in the name of the curator, since the

title is in the ward. McLean '■. Dean

(1890). 60 Minn. 369, 69 N. W. 140:

Where a note is purchased by a guardian,

payable to himself, but witli the funds of

his ward and for the ward's benefit, the

ing hi repre entative capacity , an d if be
doe not d o t he co mplai nt is de murrable
upon the g round f want of capacity to
·ue, b ut unl e
o made the obj ctiou is
waiv d: Dalrymple v. , ecurity Loan Co.
{1900) , 9 :r. . 30S, 3 N. W. 245 . The
objecti n that the parti e to an act ion are
mi uor who appear without g uard ian ad
/ite m i waived by pleading to the m rits:
Blumauer v. loc k (190 1), 24 I as h. 596,
£4 P a" 44. A fat her may u a g ua rd ian arl /item for erv ices of h i min or
child rendered to a th ird party : Gro oYky u. ol d nberg (1 902 ). 86 i\I inn. 3i ,
90

lip , 55 Cal. 130; per contra he cannot sue
in hi s own name, Vincent v. tark , 45
Wi . 45.
2 Th oma
v. B nn ett, 5S Barb . 197;
eaton v. Dari , l N. Y. , up. t. 91; and
e IV"hi te v Parker,
Barb. 48, 52;
Mcbane v. Mebane, SS N. . 334; Biggs
v. William 66 N. . 42i .

. W . 2 2.]

Thi int rpretation i
iven to t he
I nguag of the code by th , upr me
ourt f In diana in ' hephe rd v. Evan ,
In d. 26 , which hold. that b1· virtu f
th prov i ·ion, th
uardian i ~mpowe r d
10 hri11g uc:h ac ion in hi
wn nam .
. · e Wit. ou v. II u to n, 76 • .... . 375 (wh en
ward. <\r n<> e ary pla in tiff. ) ; rawf rd
r••• ~ al. 56
I. 32 1 (n c ary H g ations
i 11 . ni by infant hy a g nardian ad lit m).
J\ gl'll ra) f.{llar <lian ffiil. V. ll , fT au nst in
· 1\1111. fl'l ITnw. 'Pr. 2.i : F nx 1•. K r pe r,
!'JI 111.t l ; and ee ;irri l!.1 ,. ITc Phi l1

own
nam .
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statutes which provide for the appointment of guardians or com-

mittees over the property of lunatics, confirmed drunkards, and

other such persons not sui juris, generally confer uj)on them the

same powers that are given to the general guardians of infants,

and a similar rule should therefore prevail in reference to their

prosecution of actions. Although there is some conflict in the

decided cases, yet, as these guardians or committees do not

acquire any estate or interest in the property subjected to their

control, but only a power of possession and management, the

correct doctrine upon principle would seem to be that they can-

not maintain actions concerning it in their own names, unless

expressly authorized to do so by statute ; other actions may be

brought by them.^

SECTION FIFTH.

WHO MAY BE JOINED AS PLAINTIFFS.

§111. *183. Statutory Provisions. The following are the

provisions relating to the joinder of parties plaintiff in one action

found in the various State codes, and it will be seen that there

tat utes which provide for the app intm nt of guardian r committ e over the property of lunatic , nfirrn
drunkard , and
other such per on not sui juris, g n rally nf r u1 n th rn the
ame p wers that are giv n to th g n ral guardian of i1 fant ,
.an a similar rul should therefor pr vail in r f r n e t their
pro cution of action . Although th re i
me confii t in th
<leci le ca~e , y t, as th
guardian or committe
<lo not
acquire any e tate or int r t in the prop rty ubject d to their
-control, but only a power of po ' s ion and manag ment, the
c rrect doctrine upon principle would em to b that th y cannot maintain actions concerning it in their own names, unless
expressly authorized to do o by statute; other actions may be
brought by them. I

is an absolute identity of language in all the legislation upon
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this subject. " All persons having an interest in the subject of

the action, and in obtaining the relief demanded, may be joined

SECTION FIFTH.

error, as the suit should have been prose- with another, the ward is not a necessary

cuted in the name of the original plaintiff, party.]

by J. D.. his guardian. Dennison v. Will- i Kingr. Cutts, 24 Wis. 625; McKillip

WHO MAY BE JOINED AS PLAINTIFFS.

cut (1894), Idaho, 35 Pac. 698: "The r. McKillip, 8 Barb. 552. Bnt, per contra,

guardian of a minor is not permitted to see Person v. Warren, 1 4 Barl). 488, which

bring suit in his own name for money or expressly holds that the cominittoe is a

property belonging to the ward, and wliich "trustee of an express tru.-<t" within the

he has a right to the possession of as meaning of tiie code. The whole subject

such guardian, but mu.st bring suit as was discussed and determined in the very

guardian." late case of Fields v. Fowler, 4 N. Y. Sup.

Plympton v. Hall (1893), 55 Minn. 22, Ct. 598. The action was brought by the

56 N. W. 351 : The suit instituted in be- committee of the person and estate of a

half of a lunatic should be in the name of lunatic to set aside the sale of a farm

§ 111. * 183.

The following are the
provisions relating to the joinder of parties plaintiff in one action
found in the various State codes, and it will be seen that there
i an absolute identity of language in all the legislation upon
thi , ubject. "All per ons having an interest in the subject of
the action, and in obtaining the relief demanded, may be joined
Statutory Provisions .

the lunatic, but brought by his guardian made by defendant to tlie lunatic, to

or next friend. Row v. Kow (1895), 53 cancel tlie satisfaction of a mortgage

O.St. 249, 41 N. E. 239: An action to which had been executed by him, and

recover property belonging to an imbe- also a check which he had given on such

•cile must be brought by guardian and sale. The action was held to be properly

not by next friend. R. S. § 4998. How- brought by the committee. E. Darwin

ard V. Singleton (1893), 94 Ky. 336, 22 Smith J., in giving the opinion of the

S. W. 337 : In an action by a guardian to court, says : "'J'he rule undoubtedly wa-;,

sell his ward's real estate owned j(;intly and still is, at law, where the action is

with another, the ward i not a n ce sary
party.]
1 King v. Cutt , 24 Wi . 625; McKillip
v. McKillip, Barb. 552. But, per contra,
·ee Per.on v. Warren, 14 B arb. 4 , which
expres. ly hold that the c mmitt e i a
"trustee of an ex pre s trust" within the
m aninp; of the code. Th whol , ubj ect
was discus ed and determined in the very
late ease of Field v. Fowl r, 4 . Y . up.
t. 5!l . The action wa brought by the
committee of the per ·on and e tate of a
lunatic to et a ·i<le the al
f a farm
m~v1e by defendant to th
lunatic, to
cancel the ati faction of a mortgage
whi ·h had b n x cut d hy him, and
al o a check whi h he had gi,·en n such
ale. The action wa held to be prop rl.r
brought by th
ommittee. E. Darwin
, mith .J., in givi ng the pinion of tho
court, , ay : ' Th rule uu<loub dly W:I'-',
and till is, at law, where the actiou i:i

-er ror, as the suit hould haYe been proseeuted in the name of the original plaintiff,
by J. D .. his guardian. Dennison v. Willeut {1 94), Idaho, 35 Pac. 698: "The
guardian of a minor i not permitted to
bring uit in his own name for money or
property bel ongin g to the ward, and which
he ha · a right to the posse sion of as
u h guardian, but mu t bring suit as
guardian."
Plympton v. Hall (1 93), 55 Minn . 22,
56 N. W ..351: The suit instirute<l in behalf of a lunatic s hould be in the name of
the lunatic, but brought by hi g uard ian
or next friend. Row v. How (1 95), 5.'3
0. t. 2+9, 41 N. E . 239: An action to
recov r property belonging to an imbedle must be brought b.v guardian and
not by next friend . R. ·. § 499 . Ilow:ard v. ingleton ( 1 93}, 94 l\f 336, 22
. W. 337: In an a ti n t.,y a guardian to
ell hi ward' real e tate owned jointly
11
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as plaintiffs, except as otherwise provided in this title." ^ This

is the important section; but the following one somewhat en-

larges its scope and effect in certain cases: "Of the parties to

the action, those who are united in interest must be joined as

plaintiffs or defendants; but, if the consent of any one who

should have been joined as plaintiff' cannot be obtained, he may-

be made a defendant, tlie reason thereof being stated in the com-

plaint."- The particular statutory rules relating to married

women as parties, and prescribing Avhen wives may sue alone

or when husbands must be joined, will be stated in a subsequent

portion of this section. Many of these special enactments are

not found in the codes of procedure, but in separate and inde-

pendent legislation.

§ 112. * 195. Scope of Statutory Provisions. The Provisions

respecting Plaintiffs Compared -with those respecting Defendants.

Apply to Legal as well as Equitable Actions. It must be con-

ceded at once that there is no repeal or modification of the

except a otherwi e provided in this ti tl . 1 This
imp rtant ec i n · ut th f llowing one s m what enand eff ct in rtain cases: ' f the parties to
unit d in interest must b joined a
r d f ndan ·;
if the consent of any one who
n j in l a plc intiff cannot be obtain d he may
b mad a. d f ndant the rea on her f eing tat d in the complaint.' 2 The particular tatut ry rules rela ing to marri d
worn n a partie , and pr cribing wh n wi es may u alone
or wb n hu b nd mu t be j in d will be stat d in a u equent
p rti n f thi ection. Many of the e pe ial enactm nt ar
n t f und in the code of procedure, but in eparate and ind p n l nt 1 gi lati9n.

brouf>;ht to assert the title of the lunatic
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to real and personal property, it must be

brought in his name, as held in Mclvillip

112.

* 1 -.

Scope of Statutory Provisions.

respecting Plaintiffs

V. Mclvillip, 8 Barb. 552." He cites the

It mu t b conno rep al or modification f th

Apply to Legal as well as Equitable Actions.

laws of 1845, ch. 112, which authorize the

committee to sue for any debt, claim, or

The Provisions

Compared with those respecting Defendants.

e <led at once that ther

i

demand transferred to them, or to the

possession and control of which they are

entitled ; also Gorliam v. Gorham, 3 Barb.

Ch. 32; Ortley v. Messere, 7 Johns. Ch.

139, and § 111 of the code, and reaches

the conclusion that the equity rule as to

parties is controlling in actions of this

kind. The decision in Person c. Warren,

U Barb. 488, is expressly approved and

followed. S. P. Bearss c. Montgomery,

40 Ind. 544.

1 New York, § 117 (446) ; Ohio, § 34 ;

Kansas, § 35 ; California. §§ 378, 381 ;

Iowa, § 2545; South Carolina, § 140; Ne-

vada, § 12; Oregon, § 380, but limited to.

e()iiitable actions; North Carolina, § 60;

QVVi.scoiisin, St., 1898, § 2602 ; Utah. Uev.

St., 1898, § 2913; North Dakota, Rev.

Codes, 1899, § 5229; South Dakota, Ann.

St., 1901, § 6077; Oklahoma, St., 1893,

§ 3907 ; WjLshingion, Bal. Code, § 48.33,

in somewhat different form ; Montana,

§ 580 ; Idaho, Code Civ. Pro., 1 901 , § 3 1 66 ;

Wyominj;, Ilev. St., 1899, § 3479; Colo-

rado, § 10; Arkansa.s, Sand. & Hill's Dig.,

§ 5G29 ; Connecticut, Gen. St., 1902, §617;

Indiana, Burns' St., 1901, § 263; Ken-

tucky, § 22; Missouri, Rev. St., 1899,

§ 542; Nebraska, § 40.]

2 New York, § 119 (448); California,

§ 382; South Carolina, § 142; Oregon,

§ 381, but limited to equity actions; Ne-

vada, § 14; Ohio, § 36; Kansas, § 37;

Iowa, § 2548; North Carolina, § 62;

QUtah, Rev. St., 1898, § 2917; North

Dakota, Rev. Codes, 1899, § 5232; South

Dakota, Ann. St., 1901, § 6079; Arizona,

Rev. St., 1901, § 1313; Montana, § 584;

Idaho, Code Civ. Pro., 1901, § 3170;

Colorado, § 12; Indiana, Burns' St., 1901,

270; Wisconsin, St., 1898, § 2G04 ; Okla-

homa, St., 1893, § 3909; Wa.shington,

Bal. Code, § 4833; Wyoniin-i, Kcv. St,

1899. §3481 : Connecticut, Gen. St., 1902,

§ 617; Nebraska, § 42; Arkansas, Sand.

n. t., 1902 § 617;
263; K nt., 1 99,
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GENERAL THEORY AND INTENT OF THE CODES. iG.'j

common-law rules in detail; the requirements of the old law as

to joint and several rights, and the union or severance of the

parties holding such rights, are not in any express manner

referred to. It should also be carefully observed — and the fact

is one of great practical importance — that the provisions in the

various codes relating to parties plaintiff are not so full, minute,

and express as those relating to parties defendant. Even in

those State codes where the common-law distinctions between

joint, joint and several, and several liabilities are utterly abol-

ished, and the practical requirements as to the union or severance

of parties defendant based upon them are wholly swept away,

there is no corresponding express legislation as to the distinctions

between joint and several rights and the union or severance of

plaintiffs. This difference in the mode of treatment may be

made the ground — and has been by many judges — of inferring

that the legislature intended to leave the ancient legal doctrines

as to plaintiffs untouched, and to confine its work of reform to

the case of defendants. The legislative intent, therefore, what-

ever it may be, must be found in the few general provisions
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quoted at the commencement of the present section, and in the

subsequent provisions which regulate the rendition of judgments,

so far as the same depends upon or is connected with the parties

to an action. Referring to these provisions, it is plain that their

language is general, inclusive, without exception, and applying

alike to all kinds and classes of actions. Whatever doctrines in

reference to parties plaintiff the legislature has adopted, what-

ever regulations it has established, its intention, as shown by the

language of all the codes but one or two, is to apply them equally

to legal and to equitable actions. No exception being made nor

even suggested, the courts cannot, unless by an act of positive

legislation, by an act of direct usurpation, create an exception,

and say that these general terms were intended to apply to

equitable suits alone, while legal actions were intended to be

left outside of their scope and effect.

§ 113. * 196. The Statute in Effect an Enactment of the Equity

Doctrine. Practical Question herein. These statutory provisions

themselves are confessedly an enactment, with hardly a verbal

change, of the general principles long ago established by courts

of equity for the regulation of the parties plaintiff in suits pend-

ing before them. The legislature has, therefore, in a very brief

c mmon-law rul sin cl tail· th r quir 111 nt· f th ld lawn.
to joint an l ev ral right', an l h uni n r
of th
parti
h le.ling u h right , ar n t in any
mann r
ar fully ob rv
th . fa t
r •fc•rr <l t . It should al 1J
i · n f gr at practical importanc - that th provi .. i n in th
vn,ri u co 1 r la.ting to parti plaintiff ar not o full, minute,
and xpr
a those relating to parti ' l f ndant.
Ev n in
tho· 'tate cod s wher the c mm n-la.w <li tinction 1J t\ n
joint, j int and several, an l s v ral liabilities are utt rly ab 1i.'11 cl, a11d the practical requirement a t the union or CY ranc
of parti . defendant based upon th m are wholly w pt away
th re i , no corresponding express legislation as to the listinctions
h tw n joint and several rights and the union or sev ranee of
jJlaintiffs. This diff rence in the mode of treatment may t
Ille le the ground - and has been by many judges - of inf rring
that the legi lature intended to leave the ancient legal doctrines
a.· t plaintiff u11-touched, and to confine its work of r form to
Ll1 ca e of defendants. The legislative intent, therefor , whatever it may be, must be found in the few general provi ions
'l i.10tecl at the commencement of the present section, and in t.he
'"lU equent provisions which r egulate the rendition of judgment ,
.·o far a the same depends upon or is connected with th parti s
tl) an action. Referring to these provi ions, it is plain that their
htt\:.uage is general, inc1u ive, without exception, and applying
alik to all kinds and classes of actions. Whatever doctrine in
referen ·e to parties plaintiff the legislature has adopted what<'V r r gulations it has established, its intention, a , hovm by th
language of all the codes but one or two, is to apply them equally
to 1 gal and to equitable actions . No exception being mad nor
<' v n . ngge te<l, the courts cannot, unles
by an act of po i ti v
10.gi:httion, by an act of direct usurpation, create an x eption
and :-my that these general t erm were intend ed to appl to
quitable nit alone, while legal action were intend cl to b
left outside of their scope and ffect.
113.
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change, of the general principl Iona ago stabli hed by court
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but comprehensive form, adopted the equitable doctrine, and has

applied it to tiie civil action rec^uired to be used in the enforce-

ment of all rights and the pursuit of all remedies, whether legal

or equitable. This proposition cannot be denied, without deny-

ing to the language of the statute its plain meaning and ordinary

significance and force. The practical question, then, arises at

once. How far is this equitable doctrine inconsistent with the

positive rules as to parties plaintiff in legal actions, long estab-

lished as a part of the common-law procedure? To what extent

does it, as thus generally stated, necessarily abrogate or modify

these special rules? That some change is wrought, if we adhere

to the simple language, is very manifest. For example, the

common law required that all partners, or other joint contractors,

should unite as plaintiffs, and admitted no ordinary exception or

excuse for the non-joinder. The new procedure, after requiring,

as did the common law, that all those parties " united in interest

must be joined as plaintiffs," adds, "but if the consent of any

one who should have been joined as plaintiff cannot be obtained,

he may be made a defendant, the reasons being stated in the
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complaint or petition." The practice permitted by this clause

was familiar to courts of equity, but was utterly unknown in

courts of law. Here, however, it is applied to all actions; no

exception is suggested; and if we follow the plain language of

the codes, this important alteration is made in the ancient legal

rules regulating the parties plaintiff.

§ 114. * l'.>7. Statutory Provisions confirm Common-Law^ Rules

to a Certain Extent. Assuming that the provisions in relation

to plaint! ifs are an enactment in a statutory form of the general

equitable doctrine in regard to the same subject, and that, as

they stand in the codes, they equally embrace within their scope

actions of all kinds, legal and equitable, and giving full force to

their language, they do not abrogate but rather confirm a large

portion of the common-law rules, those, I mean, which require

all persons jointly interested to l^e united as plaintiffs. The

general requirements, "all persons having an interest in the

subject of the action, and in obtaining the relief demanded, may

be joined as plaintiffs," and "those who are united in interest

must be joined as plaintiffs," plainly include the case of persons

"having an interest in the subject-matter," or "united in in-

to a Certain Exteu t.

terest " by virtue of their being joint obligees, covenantees, or

t

ral

tu

nfirm , l, fJ«'

in i u-

<·r :L ' l y virtu •

n nL s, or
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promisees at law, as well as the case of persons having some

connnon equitable interest. The two sections of the codes from

which I have quoted do not contemplate nor permit a severance

among parties plaintiff when the old law requires a joinder;^ the

changes introduced by them rather tend in the opposite direction,

and, talking their language simply as it stands, they would seem

to allow the uniting of parties plaintiff in many cases where such

union was forbidden in legal actions; as, for example, the unit-

ing of survivors of joint promisees and the personal representa-

tives of those deceased. In fact, the practical rule of equity in

regard to suits by persons jointly interested, or having a joint

right, was the same as that which prevailed at law, with the

single exception or addition which provided for the case of a

refusal by one or more of the joint holders of the right to unite

with their fellows as plaintiffs. In equity, as well as in law, the

joint owners of property, and the joint obligees, or covenantees,

were in general required to be all made co-plaintiffs, but if one

or more refused to join, he or they could be made defendants. ^

This equitable doctrine is now, if we accept the express language
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of the codes, and not the glosses put upon it by some of the

courts, extended to all actions alike.

§ 115. * 198. Code allows a Freer Union of Parties Plaintiff

than under the Common Law. As already Stated, these sections

of the codes, if full force be given to their plain and simple term?,

look to a more free union of parties as plaintiffs in the same

action than was allowed by the courts of law under the former

system. In order to be a proper plaintiff, according to the

ancient theory, the person must be interested in the whole of

the recovery, so that one judgment could be rendered for all the

plaintiffs in solido ; that a judgment should be given to one

plaintiff for a certain sum of money, or for certain lands or

^ Qln Burkett v. Lehmen-Higginson shouW have been joined as plaintiff can-

Co. (1899), 8 Okla. 81, 56 Pac. 856, the not be obtained, he may be made a defend-

oourt said : '■ The provisions of our Code ant, and the respective rights of the several

do not contemplate or permit a severance parties, plaintiffs or defendants, whether

among parties plaintiff when the old law equitable or legal, may be determined and

reijuired a joinder. . . . Our Code, by adjudicated in the one action, although in

abolishing distinctions in forms of action, the case of joint plaintiffs or joint defend-

)ias preserveil all the rights of litigants ants their rights and liabilities may not in

that are equitable or legal, without cliaug- all particulars be the .>jame." ] '

ing the common-law rules relating to the ^ ^ee 1 Daniel's Chan. PI. (4th Am.

joinder of parties to actions, except in the ed.), pp. 192, 206, 207, 208, 21 1, 216.

particular that, if tiie consent of one who

m
at law, a ' 11 a th
f
e mm n quitable int re t. Th
ti
from
whi h I ha quoted d n
ont mplate n r ermit
am ng partie laintiff wh n th ol l la.w r quir
han 0 intr luc d b 'th m rath rt nd in h
imply a it ~tantl
an 1 ta.l{:in th ir langua0
t.n allo\
be uni tiug f pn.rti ' plaintiff in many a
' her
rnu n ' a· f rbidden in 1 gal action ; a for exarnpl th unitrn f ur i orn of joint pr mi ee and the p r onal r pr ntati
f th ·e decea d. In fact, th practical rule of equity in
r 0 n.rd to uits by per::>on jointly interested, or having a j int
ri 0 ht ' a' the ame a that which prevailed at law, with the
·ingle exc ption or addition "bich provided for the a e of a
r fu al by ne or more of the joint holder of the right to unite
with their fellow as plaintiff . In equity, a well as in law, the
joint owner of property and the joint obligee
r covenantee ,
were in general required to be all made co-plaintiffs, but if one
r i:nore refu ed to join, he or they could b made defendants. 2
This equitable doctrine i now, if we accept the express language
f the codes, and not the glo es put upon it by ome of the
cour+ , extended to all actions alike.

§ 115.

* 19

.

Code allows a

Freer Union of Parties Plainti11

As already stated, these section~
of the code , if full force be given to their plain and 'imple term~,
look to a more free union of parti s a plaintiffs in the ame
action than wn allowecl b the court of law under the f rm r
:y ·t m. In order to be a pr per plaintiff, ac ording t the
an ·i nt theor the per on mu ·t be intere 'ted in the wh le of
the reco r , o tha.t one judgment could be rend red for all the
r 1aintiff in solido; that a judgment hould be gi en' to one
plaintiff for a certain um of mon y, or f r c rtain land
r
than under the Common Law.

1 [In Burkett v. Lebm en-Higgioson
o. (1 99),
Okla. 1, 56 Pac. 56, the

r urt aid : '- The provi ion

of our ode
do not ontemplate or permit a everance
am ng partie plaintiff when the old law
r quired a joiuder. . . . Our
ode, by
aboli.hing di tincti n ·in form of action,
ha pre erved all the right of litigant
that are equitable or legal, withont changing the comm n-law rule. r 111.ting to the
joinder of p~rties to action. , ex· pt ill thf'
particular thnt, if the con. cnt of oue who

shoulrl have been joined as plaintiff ann t be obtained, he may be mad ad f ndant, and the re. p ctive righ of the everal
partie , plaintiff or defendant , whether
equitable or legal, may be determined and
adjudicated in th on artion, although in
the ca e of joint plnintiff or joint d f ndant their right and liabilitie may not in
all parti ular b th am ." J '
2
ee 1 Dnui l'.
han. Pl. (4th Am.
d.). pp. 192, 206, 207, 20 ' 211, 216.
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chattels, and a judgment for a different sum, or other lands or

chattels, be awarded to another plaintiff, was regarded as the

sheerest impossibility. The legal notion of survivorship forbade

the union of the personal representatives of a deceased joint

contractor with the others who were living, and even the union

of the representatives of all, if all were dead. The text of the

codes is broad enough, and explicit enough, if it is taken

literally, to abolish these legal restrictions upon the freedom of

joining parties as plaintiffs. The clauses, "All persons having

an interest in the subject of the action, and in obtaining the

relief demanded," and "those who are united in interest," do

not necessarily require that the interest of all those who are to

be united as plaintiffs should be equal or the same, and they do

require the union of all those having such an interest without

any restriction as to its nature, whether it be legal or equitable.

The interest of the survivors of joint obligees, covenantees, or

promisees, was, under the ancient system, strictly legal. The

interest of the executors or administrators of the deceased joint

obligee or promisee was equitable, but was none the less a full

Generated for facpubupdates (University of Michigan) on 2014-06-17 15:31 GMT / http://hdl.handle.net/2027/uc2.ark:/13960/t02z1c23b
Public Domain / http://www.hathitrust.org/access_use#pd

interest, for it enabled the estate to obtain its entire portion of

the benefit flowing from the contract. The unequivocal language

of the codes declares that persons holding this common interest

in the subject-matter of the action, or in obtaining the relief

demanded, may be united as plaintiffs.

§ 116. * 199. Joinder of Holders of Interests •wrhich are Several.

In one otlier class of cases these provisions of the reform legis-

lation would seem to have modified the former practice in legal

actions, if their meaning is to be found in their exact terms.

At the common law, the different holders of several rights

must sue separately, although tlie rights were created by a

single instrument, and although there might be some kind of a

common interest; no election was given to bring a joint action

by all, or a separate action by each. This rule is directly within

the modifying effect of the sections under consideration. "All

persons having an interest in the subject of the action, and in

ch t tel and a judgment f r a different sum, or other lands or
hattel be a arded to an ther plaintiff, wa r ard d a the
beer st impo ibility. The 1 gal notion of sur ivor hip forbade
the uni n f the p r on 1 rer res n ative of a dee a d joint
contr ctor with th
th r who were living, and ev n the uni n
of the r pre utati\es of all, if all were dead . The t xt of the
code i broad enough, and explicit enough, if it is taken
litera11y, to abolish these legal restrictions upon the freedom of
joining partie as plaintiff . The clau es, "All person having
a n in terest in the subject of the action, and in obtaining the
relief demanded, ' and "tho e who are united in intere t," do
not nece arily require that the interest of all those who are to
be united a pl intiffs hould be equal or the same, and they do
require the union of all those having such an int rest without
any re triction a to it natur , whether it be 1 gal or quitable.
The interest of the survivors of joint obligee , c venantee , or
promi ee , was, under the ancient sy tern stric ly 1 gal. The
intere t of the execut r or admini trator of the dee a d joint
obligee or promi ·ee was equitable, but wa none he 1 s a foll
intere t, for it enable 1 the e tate to obtain its entire p rti n f
the benefit flowiI g from the contract. The unequi cal language
of the c de declares that · persons holding thi common int r t
in th ubject-matter of the action, or in obtaining the r lief
demanded, may be united as plaintiff .
1 16.

obtaining the relief demanded, may be joined as plaintiffs." The

extent of the interest is not the criterion, nor its source nor

origin. If the persons have anij interest, whether complete or

partial, whether absolute or contingent, whether resulting from

a common share in the proceeds of the suit, or arising from the

* 1 9.
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stipulations of the agreement, the language applies without any

limitation or exception, and without any distinction suggested

between actions which are equitable and those which are legal. ^

This was the established equity doctrine which in many cases

permitted parties to be united as plaintiffs whose rights were,

in a legal aspect, not joint, but several. It is possible, indeed it

frequently happens, that several rights may be held by two or

more persons, who nevertheless have ''an interest in the subject

of the action and in the relief demanded;" audit would seem

that these persons, according to the interpretation given above,

may now, if they so elect, join as plaintiffs in bringing a legal

action as well as in maintaining an equitable suit.

§ 117. * 200. Recapitulation of Foregoing Theoretical Analysis.

I have thus far intentionally examined the sections of the various

State codes which relate to the joinder of ])arties plaintiff in the

civil action, without any reference to judicial authority and con-

struction ; I have endeavored to ascertain and to state the object

and design of the legislature as the same could be gathered with

reasonable certainty from the very words which it has employed.
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This legislative intent, when the field of investigation is thus

limited, depends upon the prior rules controlling the choice of

parties plaintiff both in legal and in equitable actions and upon

the exact text of the statute itself. I recapitulate the results

reached by this analysis : (1) The common-law doctrines defining

joint and several rights, and the special rules relating to joint

and several actions, are not specifically abrogated or modified;

whatever changes have been made are the result of very general

and comprehensive language used by the legislature. (2) There

is a striking difference between the general character of the pro-

visions having reference to plaintiffs and that of the provisions

referring to defendants ; the latter are more special in their

nature, and in many of the States much more reformatory. (3)

The new system has, in a very comprehensive form, established

the doctrine of equity in regard to the choice and joinder of

plaintiffs, and, by making no exceptions or limitations, has

applied this doctrine to all actions, whether legal or equitable.

(4) The effect of extending this doctrine of equity to legal actions

is not to prevent the union of parties as co-plaintiffs in cases

where, on account of the joint right, the common law required

1 First Nat. Bk. of Central City v. Hummel, 14 Colo. 250.

tipulations of the agreem nt, the language appli without any
limitation or xc ption, and witb. ut any di tin ·tion sugg st d
bet\ en action which are equitabl ancl tho e which ar 1 gal.1
Thi wa the tablish d quity clo Lrine whi h in many ca s
permitt d parties to be united a plaintiffs wh e right were,
in a legal aspect, n t joint, but everal. It i po ible, indeed it
fr qu ntly happens, that s veral right may b held Ly two or
more persons, who nevertheless have ·'an int re t in th subject
f the action ancl in the relief demanded;" ancl it w uld seem
that these person ', according to the interpretation gi en above,
may now, if they. o elect, join a plaintiffs in bringing a 1 gal
action as well as in maintaining an equitable suit.
§ 117. * 200. Recapitulation of Foregoing Theoretical Analysis.
I have thus far intentionally examined the sections of the various
tate codes which relate to the joinder of parties plaintiff in the
civil action, without any reference to judicial authority and contruction; I have endeavored to ascertain and to state the object
and design of the 1 gislature as the same could be gathered with
reasonable certainty from the very words which it has employed.
This legi lative intent, when the field of investigation is thus
limited, depends upon the prior rules controlling the choice of
parties plaintiff b th in legal and in equitable actions and upon
the exact text of the statute itself. I recapitulate the results
reached by this analysis: (1) The common-law doctrines defining
joint and several rights, and the special rules relating to joint
and everal actions, are not specifically abrogated or modified;
whatever changes have been made are the result of very general
and comprehensive language used by the legislature. (2) There
is a striking difference betw en the general character of the provisions having reference to plaintiffs and that of the provisions
referring to defendants; the latter are more special in th ir
nature, and in many of the States much more reformatory. (3)
The new system bas, in a very comprehensive form, e tablished
the doctrine of equity in regard to the choice and joind r of
plaintiffs, and, by making no exceptions or limitati n , ha
applied this doctrine to all action , whether 1 gal or equitabl .
(4) The effect of extending this doctrine of equity to legal actions
is not to prevent the union of partie as co-plaintiff in ca
where, on account of the joint right, the common law r quired
l
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such union; the common-law rule making the joinder of all such

persons necessary is left unaffected, with the single exception

that if one who should regularly be made a plaintiff, in pursuance

of such rules, refuses to permit his name to be thus used, he may

be made a defendant instead; and this exceptional provision

being without limitation or restriction in the text, applies as

well to legal as to equitable actions. (5) Persons having an

interest in the subject of the action, and in obtaining the relief

demanded, may be joined as plaintiffs in all actions, whatever

be their nature, although the rights of such persons are legally

several, and although at the common law they would be required,

to institute separate actions ; or, in other words, the plain import

of the legislation — its language not being confined to any class

of suits — is to enlarge the number of cases in which persons may

be joined as co-plaintiffs, and to place legal actions in this respect

upon exactly the same footing as those which are equitable in

their nature. (6) The special rules of the common law as to-

husband and wife have been entirely abolished in some States by

provisions contained in their codes of procedure, and in other
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States by separate statutes relating exclusively to the status of

marriage.

§ 118. *201. General Theory of Judicial Interpretation. Intro-

ductory. The foregoing results were obtained from an examina-

tion of the language alone which the legislatures have used ; I

shall now proceed to compare them with the general conclusions

which have been reached by the courts in their interpretation of

the same provisions, and shall thus test their correctness and

their value as practical guides in the administration of justice.

In pursuing this investigation, the inquiry will at present be

confined to those judicial decisions which have dealt with the

subject of parties plaintiff, those which discuss the analogous

topic of parties defendant being reserved to the succeeding sec-

tion of this chapter. This course will necessarily produce some

repetition of general principles ; but as the questions relating ta

plaintiffs and those relating to defendants arise from provisions-

of the codes quite different in their scope and import, a separate

consideration of them will prevent confusion and uncertainty. I

shall /r.s< ascertain, if possible, and formulate the general theory

of construction upon which the courts have proceeded in their

decision of special cases ; and, secondhj^ shall classify :ind arrange

such union· the common-law rule making the joinder of all uch
p r ons nece ary is 1 ft unaff ted, with the ingle exception
that if one who hould r gularly
made a laintiff in pursuance
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be joined as co-plaintiff ' , and to lace legal action in thi re pect
upon exactly the same footing a tho e whi h are
uitable in
their nature. (6) The pecial rule of the c mmon law as to
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provi ions contained in their codes of procedure, and in other
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marriage.
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these cases, and deduce therefrom the particular rules as to the

joinder of plaintiffs in the civil action which have been judicially

settled as a part of the reformed system of procedure. The

number of instances in which the courts have laid down a broad

and comprehensive principle of interpretation, v/hich might be

the guide in whole classes of adjudications, is very few, and

such a principle must rather be gathered by a process of induc-

tion from an analysis and comparison of particular cases. The

few attempts at the statement of a general theory which have

been made, I shall quote somewhat at length.

§ 119. * 202. Interpretation Given by the Courts of New York

and Ohio. Liberal Construction. In an early case, — an action

brought by the three obligees in an injunction bond, — the objec-

tion was raised that the rights of the plaintiffs were not joint,

and that they had been improperly united. Their interests,

which had been interfered with by the injunction, were in fact

distinct and separate, and it was assumed throughout the judg-

ment that, under the former system, each should have brought

a several action on the undertaking. The court, after stating

Generated for facpubupdates (University of Michigan) on 2014-06-17 15:31 GMT / http://hdl.handle.net/2027/uc2.ark:/13960/t02z1c23b
Public Domain / http://www.hathitrust.org/access_use#pd

the old rule applicable to the circumstances, proceeded as fol-

lows: "We are now to determine this question as it arises under

the code of procedure. With the view of embracing all cases,

whether of law or equit3% and of making them conform to one

general rule, the code provides, in § 117, that ' all persons hav-

ing an interest in the subject of the action and in relief demanded

maybe joined as plaintiffs.' This is now the rule in all cases,

whether such as were formerly the subjects of suits in equity or

of actions at law, and we are to administer it according to its

spirit and true intent, however the practice may differ from the

rule that has heretofore prevailed in actions at law. ... It will

be perceived that this case falls within the precise words of the

section before cited. All have an interest in the subject of the

action and in the relief demanded — that is, in the damages

arising out of the operations of the injunction. It is not said to

be a joint or an equal or even a common interest, but simply an

interest in the subject of the action with the view of doing full

justice and settling the rights of all the parties in interest in one

suit." 1 The Supreme Court of Ohio has adopted the same prin-

1 Loomis V. Brov/n, 16 Barb. 325, 330, Telly v. Bowyer, 7 Bush, 513, the Court

332, per Gridley .1. lu tlie recent case of of Appeals of Kentucky gave a very dif-

these cases, and deduce therefrom th particular rul s as t the
joinder of plaintiffs in the civil a tion which have been judi ially
se led as a part of the ref rm d y. t m of proc <lure. The
nm ber of in tances in whi h th • ur have laid d wn a broad
and comprehen i ve pl'inciple f interpretation, whi h might be
the guide in whole classe of adjudication , i v ry f w, and
uch a principle mu t rather b gathered by a proce
£ induction from an analysis and compari on of particular ca
The
few attempts at the stat ment of a general theory which have
been made, I shall quote sornewl at at length.
§ 119. * 202. Interpretation Given by the Courts of New York
and Ohio. Liberal Construction.
In an early case, - an action
btought by the three obligees in an injunction bond, - the objection was raised that the rights of the plaintiffs were not joint,
an l that they had been improperly united. Their interests,
which had been interfered with by the injunction, were in fact
distinct and separate, and it was assumed throughout the judgment that, under the former sy tern, each should have brought
a several action on the undertaking. The court, after stating
the old r-:.ile applicable to the circumstances, proceeded as follows: "vVe are now to determine this question as it arises under
the code of procedure. With the view of embracing all cases,
whether of law or equity, and of making them conform to one
general rule, the code provides, in § 117, that' all persons having an interest in the subject of the action and in relief demanded
may be joined as plaintiffs.' This is now the rule in all ca es,
whether such as were form erly the subjects of suits in equity or
of actions at law, and we are to administer it according to its
~ pirit and true intent, however the practice may differ from the
rule that has heretofore prevailed in actions at law . . . . It will
b perceived that this case fall within the precise words of the
ection before ci_ted. All have an inter .Rt in the ubj ct of the
action and in the relief demanded - that i , in the damag
ari ing out of the operation of the injunction. It i not aid to
be a joi tor an equal or even a common interest, but imply an
interest in the subject of the action with the view of doing full
justice and settling the rights of all the parti s in intere t in one
suit." 1 The Supreme Court of Ohio ha adopted the ame prin1 Loomis v. Brown, 16 Barb. 325, 3:l0,
332, per Gridley J. In the recent case of

Pelly v. Bowyer, 7 Bu h, 513, the Cou rt
of A pp al of Kentucky gave a very dif-
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ciple of interpretation, and has given a construction to important

terms of the statutory provision. An action was brought upon

an undertaking called a forthcoming bond, executed by the

defendant and sureties in attachment proceedings. Certain

creditors had commenced suit, and had attached the property of

their common debtor. The latter gave the bond in question to

the sheriff running to all these plaintiffs, the condition of which

was that the property attached, or its equivalent in money,

should be forthcoming to answer the judgments which might

be obtained. Subsequently other creditors issued attachments

against the same debtor, which were delivered to the same

sheriff, and he returned on each that he had levied upon the

same goods before mentioned. All these creditors united in an

action upon the bond, and the objection was taken that there

was a misjoinder of parties plaintiff. The court, after examining

the clauses of the code relative to attachments, and showing that

the bond enured to the benefit of all the creditors, disposed of

the objection as to parties in the following manner: "The first

question presented for our consideration is the right of joinder of
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the plaintiffs in the action. The provisions of the code are as

follows [citing the sections]. In order to correctly determine

this question, it is only necessar}^ to ascertain what was the

subject of the action, and how the parties stood related to it.

The subject of the action is the attachment undertaking." The

court proceeds to hold that all the plaintiffs had a beneficial

interest in this undertaking, although not named as parties in

it, and concludes: "It follows, therefore, that the subsequent

attaching creditors had an interest in the subject of the action

and in obtaining the relief deman<le(l by the action upon the

undertaking, and might properly ])C joined as plaintiffs."^ It

should be observed that the court here gave a very broad inter-

pretation to the phrase " the subject of the action " and to the

fereut construction to the statutory pro- the settlement of estates several distribu-

vision. The action was brought by tees may unite as jtlaintiffs. But, except

several distributees to recover from the iu a j)articular class of ciises, not embrac-

ailniiuistrator the shares found to be due ing this, we know of no authority for unit-

each on a settlement of the estate, and it ing as co-plaintiiTs several parties having

resulted in a joint judgment for the aggre- separate and independent rights of action

gate amount of such shares. The action, against the same defendant, or for a joint

it was held, was entirely irregular. Quot- recovery thereon."

ing § 'Ml of the code, in relation to the ^ Ilutledge i: Corliin, 10 Ohio St. 478,

joinder of i)liiintiffs, the court said : ''There 484, per Sutliff J.
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term "interest." The "subject of the action" was said to be

the contract upon which the suit was brought, and not the mere

individual rights arising from that contract, nor the breach of

those rights by the defendant. The "interest" required is

equally general, and the huiguage of the clause is satisfied by a

beneticial interest created by operation of law, even though the

person in whom it resides is not named in the contract, and could

not possibly have had any interest at the time the instrument

was executed. Again, the rights of the plaintiffs were clearly

several; the undertaking of the defendants was for different

amounts due to separate individuals, and payable upon the hap-

pening of different events having no legal connection and no

common element. It was, in its legal effect, a collection of

independent promises to pay distinct sums of money to separate

persons contained in one written instrument.

§ 120. ' 203. Same Liberal View Adopted in Indiana. The

Supreme Court of Indiana has stated the same general principles

of interpretation in a clear manner, and with the evident desire

to comply with the spirit of the new system which characterizes
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all the decisions of that able tribunal. An action was brought

by three plaintiffs upon a peculiar contract, entered into between

themselves and the two defendants, in which each of the five

stipulated for indemnity against a certain contingent liability to

be given by the four others, and in which the rights and liabili-

ties were clearly several according to the common-law conception.

The court say : " The code itself is not exactly definite as to who

may be joined as plaintiffs. It provides, however, that judgment

may be given for or against one or more of several plaintiff's,

which was the practice in equity, though it was otherwise at law.

It also provides that all persons having an interest in the subject

of the action, and in the relief demanded may be joined as plain-

tiffs. Indeed, the code seems to have re-enacted the rules which

had prevailed in courts of equity as to who iiuist join as plaintiffs,

and may be joined as defendants. But as to those cases in which

in equity plaintiffs might or might not have joined at their

option, the code does not expressly speak, for the reason, prob-

ably that the general rule in equity was not founded upon any

uniform principle, and could not be expounded by any universal

theorem as a test.^ And it may have been thought safe, there-

1 Story Ivi- PI. § 539.
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amounts due to separate individual , and payable upon the happ ning of different eyent having no legal connection and no
common element. It wa , in it legal effect, a collection of
independent promise to pay di ·tinct sums of money to eparate
per n contained in one written in trument.
. 120. '" 203. Same Liberal View Adopted in Indiana.
The
upreme Court of Indiana has tated the same g neral principle8
of interpretation in a dear manner, and with the evident de ire
to comply with the spirit of the new system which charact rize
all the deci ions of that able tribunal. An action was brought
by thr e plaintiffs upon a peculiar contract, entered into between
them elves and the two defendant., in which each of the five
tipulated for indemnity again ta certain contingent liability to
be given by the four other , and in which the right and liabilities were clearly several according to the common-law concepti n.
The court ay: "The code it elf i not exactly definite a to who
may be joined as plaintiffs. It provides, however, that judgment
may be given for or against one or more of several plaintiff ,
which wa the practice in equity, though it was otherwise at law.
It al o provides that all persons having an interest in the ubject
of the action, and in the relief demanded may be joined as plaintiffs. Indeed, the code seems to have re-Gnacted the rule whi h
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fore, to leave each case to be decided by the courts upon authority

and analogy. That it was intended the rules of pleading in

courts of equity should govern the subject, is quite evident from

tliose provisions of the code which prescribe the relief that may

be granted, and to whom; in this respect conforming entirely to

the established practice of those courts, — a mode of administra-

tion quite imj^racticable in a great many cases, unless the parties

might be as in chancery. The present inquiry is, then, in view

of the considerations above stated, reduced to this: Could these

plaintiffs have formerly been joined in chancery?" The opinion

proceeds to examine the provisions of the contract, and, holding

that the rights as well as the liabilities of all the parties were

entirely several, and would have been so regarded in equity,

concludes as follows: "In the case before us there is in the

plaintiffs no community of interest in any matter involved in the

suit; no right common to all is claimed; everj'thing is separate,

save only that the right asserted by each is founded in a contract

which, for convenience, happens to be on the same sheet of paper.

We have failed to find any warrant in the adjudged cases for a
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joinder of plaintiffs under such circumstances."^ The equitable

interpretation of the sections relating to the union of parties

plaintiff is here fully admitted, and it is declared that the estab-

lished rule of the equity courts is to be taken as the criterion by

which to determine all questions as to the proper joinder of

plaintiffs now arising, even in legal actions. The attempt to

maintain this particular suit by the three co-plaintiffs was con-

demned, not because their rights were several according to the

legal notion, but because they were so unconnected that they

could not have Ijeen enforced by a single action in equity. The

same court reiterated this principle of interpretation in another

well-considered case, and it may be regarded as the settled doc-

trine of that State. " The code requires all persons having an

interest in the subject of the action, and in the relief demanded,

except as otherwise provided, to be joined as plaintiffs. It also

requires those who are united in interest to be joined as plaintiffs

or defendants. And it then declares that, when the question is

one of common or general interest to many persons, or when the

parties are numerous and it is impracticable to bring them all

' Goodnifrht »•. Goar, .'iO Ind. 418, 419, Iiid. .51, 59; Hume lus. Co. v. Oilman,

jKir Frazer J. See Maple c Beacli, 4.'3 112 Ind. 7.
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before tlie court, one or more may sue or defend for the benefit

of the whole. ^ These provisions substantially re-enact the old

equity rules on the subject of parties. All who are united in

interest must join in tlie suit, unless they are so numerous us to

render it impracticable to bring them all before the court; while

tliose who have only a common or general interest in the contro-

versy may one or more of them institute an action. This, how-

ever, must not be understood as allowing, in all cases, two or

more persons having separate causes of action against the same

defendant, though arising out of the same transaction, to unite

and pursue their remedies in one action. Several plaintiffs, by

one complaint, cannot demand several matters of relief which are

plainly distinct and unconnected. But where one general right

is claimed, where there is one common interest among all the

plaintiffs centering in the point in issue in the cause, the objec-

tion of improper parties cannot be maintained. "^

§ 121. * 204. In Missouri and California. Statute Held to

apply only to Equitable Actions. Notwithstanding the common

principle which lies at the bottom of the foregoing opinions, and
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which has undoubtedly been adopted by a great majority of, the

various State courts in their construction of these statutory pro-

visions, there has not been an absolute unanimity of decision.

By som.e individual judges, and even by some courts, the opera-

tion of the sections under consideration has been confined exclu-

sively to equitable actions, while the ancient common-law rules

as to parties have been declared controlling in all legal actions.

A reference to two or three cases in which this ancient distinc-

tion has been still preserved will be sufficient for my purpose.

1 pndiana, Burns' St., 1901 , §§ 263, 270.]] [[In the recent case of Trompen v. Yates

-Tate ?;. Ohio & Mi.ss. R. Co., 10 Ind. (1902), — Neb. — , 92 N. W. 647, the

174; citing McKeuzie v. L'Amoureux, 11 court said, affirming the liberal interjire-

Barb. 516; Bouton v. Brooklyn, 15 Barb, tation indir-ated in the text: "We think,

375; Murray v. Hay, 1 Barb. Ch. 59. The under the holding of this court in Karle r.

following cases, among others, assert the Burch, 21 Neb. 710, and in the earlier

general doctrine that the provisions of case of Kaufman r. Wessel, 14 Neb. 162,

the code apply to legal and equitable and the approval that has been often

actions alike. Cummings v. Morris, 25 given to both those cases, that this court

N. Y. 625 ; Grinnell v. Schmidt, 2 Sandf. is committed to the applying in law ac-

706 ; Cole v. Reynolds, 18 N. Y. 74. tions of tlu; equity doctrine that interest'

Earle r. Burch, 21 Neb. 702 ; Schiffer in the subject of the action gives a right

before the court, one or more may ue or
f n f r the
n fit
of the whole. 1 The e provi ion u tantially r - na t th old
equity rules on the ubj ct of partie .
ll wh ar unit <l in
int r t mu t join in the uit, unle:ss th y are
numer u a to
r n l r it impracticable to bring them all bef r th court; while
th ' who have only a common or general intere t in the ontrove1"y may one or mor of them institute an action. Thi , however must not be under tood a allowing, in all ca es, two or
m re persons having eparate cause of action against the same
d f ndant, though arising out of the same transaction, t unite
and pur ue their remedies in one action.
everal plaintiffs, by
one compla,int, cannot demand several matters of relief which are
plainly distinct and unconnected. But where one general right
is claimed, where there is one common interest among all the
plaintiffs centeri~g in the point in issue in the cause, the objection of improper parties cannot be maintain ed." 2
§ 121. * 204. In Missouri and California. Statute Held to
apply only to Equitable Actions.
Notwithstanding the common
principle which lies at the bottom of the foregoing opinions, and
which has undoubtedly been adopted by a great majority of. the
various State courts in their construction of these statutory provi ions, there has not been an absolute unanimity of decision.
By some individual judges, and even by some courts, the operation of the sections under consideration has been confined excluively to equitable actions, while the ancient common-law rules.
as to parties have been declared controlling in all legal action .
A reference to two or three cases in which this ancient distinction has been still preserved will be sufficient for my purpo e.

V. Eau Claire, 51 Wis. 385; Home Ins. to join as plaintiff."]

Co. V. Oilman, 112 Ind. 7; Hughes v.

Boone, 81 N. C. 204. '

[ Indiana, Burn 'St., 1901, §§ 263, 270.J
Tate v. Ohio & Mi. s. R. Co., 10 Ind.
174 ; citing McKenzie v. L'Amoureux, l l
Barb. 5 16; Bouton v. Brooklyn, 15 Barb.
375; Murray v. Hay, 1 Barb. Ch. 59 . The
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th code apply to legal and equitable
umming v. Morri , 25
action alike.
N. Y. 625 ; Grinnell v. Schmidt, 2 , andf.
706; Cole v. Reynold , l
N. Y. i4.
Earle v. Burch, 21 Neb. 702 ; Schiff r
v. Eau Claire, 51 Wi s. 3 5 ; Home In .
Co. v. Gilman, 112 In d. 7 ; Hug hes v.
B oone, 81 N. C. 204. ·
1
2

[In the recent case of Trompen v . Yates
(1902), - Neb. - , 92 N. W . 647, the
cou rt said, affirming the liberal int rpretatiou inrl icated in the text: "We thiuk,
und er th e h lding of this c urt in Earl i•.
Burch, 21 •1 eb. 710, and in th
arlier
ca.e of Ka ufman 11. ' Ve. 1, 14
b. 162,
an d the approval that ha b en ofte n
given to b th tho e ca e , that thi court
i · ommi tted to the applyin« in law action of th equity doctrine that intere t'
in th e ubj ct of the action gives a right
to join a , plaintiff."]

1

4
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Two persons, A. and B., entered into a written contract with a

third. C, for the performance of certain work and labor at a

stij)uhited price. The work having been completed, and C.

refusing to pay the price agreed upon, A. brought an action

upon the contract; demanding judgment for one half of said

sum, and making B., his co-contractor, a defendant, allegiog

that he had refused to be a party plaintiff, and had confederated

with C. to hinder and delay the plaintiff from obtaining his

demand. The Supreme Court of ^Missouri, in affirming a nonsuit

which had been ordered at the trial, said : " If C. has violated his

contract, he is liable to an action; but that action could only l)e

brought in the joint names of A. and B., the contractors. That

provision of the Practice Act which allows a party to be made a

defendant when he will not join as a plaintiff, has nothing to do

with this question. That was a rule of equity practice which

was necessarily incorporated into a system which abolished all

distinction of actions. In adopting it, it was not designed that it

should have any operation but in cases where it was applicable

under the former system of practice. It was never intended that
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it should affect the rights of parties arising out of written con-

tracts. Nothing is better settled than the rule tliat, on an

undertaking to two, both must join in an action on it, otherwise

there is no cause of action. It is a part of the contract that both

sliall sue, otherwise no action shall be brought. If one will say

that he had no right of action, and will not sue, why should he

not have as much right as the other who says there is a cause of

action?"^ The same general doctrine was accepted as the basis

of interpretation, and the same restriction of the statutory provi-

sions to suits in equity was announced by the Supreme Court of

California in an early case arising upon similar facts. '' The

simple question presented for our consideration is, whether there

was a non-joinder of parties plaintiff or not; it being contended

that § 14 of the Practice Act has introduced a new rule, and that

one of several parties may maintain an action on a joint contract,

in his own name, by simpl}^ suggesting the impossibility of ob-

taining the consent of the others to join in the action. Upon

examination of this section, we are satisfied that it was intended

1 Kainey v. Smizer, 28 Mo. 310, per Scott J. Sec, per contra, Ilill i'. Marsh,

46 Ind. 216.
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to apply to suits in equity, and not to actions at law." ^ I have

placed in a foot-note a number of cases which contain expressions

of opinion by individual judges, that the sections and clauses of

the codes and practice acts regulating the choice and joinder of

parties are confined in their scope and operation to equitable

actions alone, and were not intended by the legislature to inter-

fere with the former rules applicable to legal actions. ^

§ 122. * 205. Recapitulation of Judicial Views. Cases in ■which

there is an Election. The citations given in the foregoing para-

graplis confirm the conclusions which were reached by a mere

analysis of the language. That these provisions as to the parties

plaintiff do enact the general doctrines which had prevailed in

courts of equity, is admitted by both schools of interpretation ;

and that these equitable rules, thus embodied in a statutory

form, do apply to all actions, and are not by any implied limita-

tion restricted to equitable actions, is now, I think, declared

by the courts in most of the States which have adopted the re-

formed procedure. Assuming these facts as premises, all the

other propositions stated in my preliminar}^ analysis follow as a
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necessary consequence. In this immediate connection it should

be remarked that individual judges will give greater or less scope

to the liberty granted by the legislative rule, according to their

personal notions of expediency. There was a numerous class of

cases, under the former system, in which courts of equity recog-

nized an election on the part of claimants either to join in one

proceeding or to sue separately. This power of choice, then

confined of course to suits in equity, still remains in similar

instances, and may even be extended to certain controversies in

which the cause of action is legal. Thus, where the right is

strictly several, and would be regarded as such by the common

law, equity might have allowed them an election to sue sepa-

rately or jointly. This power of choice, contained in the equity

doctrine, is introduced into the new procedure, and is of course

not confined to suits equitable in their nature. We must there-

fore expect to find, within certain narrow bounds, some conflict

1 Andrews v. Mokelumne Hill Co., 7 to preserve a distinction between actions

Cal. 330, 333. The same court lias, in at law and suits in equity,

later cases, pursued a course of decision - Voorhis v. Child's Ex., 17 N. Y. 3.54,

more in accordance with the spirit of the per Seldcn J.; Habicht v. Pembertou,

code, and has, as completely perhaps as 4 Sandf. 6.57; Van Home v. Everson, 13

any other tribunal, abandoned all attempt Barb. 526.

t ap ly to uit in equity and not t acti n at 1 w. ' 1 I ha e
plc cl in a foot-note a numb r of a · which contain xpre i ns
f pini n by individual judge , that th
tion and 1 u e' of
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de. and practice act r gula ing the choice and j ind r of
par i ' ar onfined in th ir cop and pera ion t
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acti n alone and were not inten l cl hj the legi 1, ture to inter£ r with the former rule applicabl to 1 gal action . 2
122. * . . . 0 . Recapitulation of Judicial Views.
Cases in which
there is an Election.
The citation given in the foregoing parao-raph" confirm the conclu ions which were reached by a mere
analy i of the language. That th e provi ion a to he parti
plain iff do enact the general doctrine which had prevailed in
ur of equity, is admitted by both chool of int rpr tation;
and hat the e equitable rule , thu embodied in a tatutory
form, do apply to all action and are not by any implied limitation re tricted to equitable actions, is now, I think, declared
by the courts in most of the States which have adopted the ref rm d procedure. Assuming these facts as premises, all the
other propositions stated in my preliminary analysis follow as a
nece ary consequence. In thiR immediate connection it hould
e remarked that individual judge will give greater or less cope
to the liberty granted by the legi8hltive rule, according to their
per nal notions of expediency. There wa a numerous cla of
ca e , under the former system, in which courts of equity recognized an election on the part of claimants either to join in one
proceeding or to sue eparately. Thi power of choice, then
confined oE course to suits in equity s ill remains in imilar
in tance , and may even be extended to certain controver ·ie in
which the cause of action i::; legal. Thu , where the right is
strictly several, and would be regarded as such by the common
law, equity might have allowed them an election to sue eparately or jointly. This power of choice, contained in the equity
doctrine, i introduced into the ne-\ proc <lure, and i f course
not confin d to suits equitable in their nature. We mu t th refore expect to find, within certain narrow bound , ome conflict
1 Andrew v. Mokelumne Rill Co., 7
Cal. 330, 333. The ame court ha , in
later ca es, pur ued a course of deci ion
more in accordance with the pirit of the
code, and ha , a completely perhap a
any oth r tribunal, abandoned all attempt

to pre en-e a di tinction between acti on
at law and nit ~ in equity.
2 Voorhi
v. Child' Ex., 17 J.'Y. 35-1-,
per el<len J .; Habicht v. P mberton,
4 andf. 657; Van Ilorne v. Ever on, 13
Barb. 526.
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of decision from judges who accept and heartily approve the

general principles of interpretation vehich have been developed

in the foregoing discussion.

§ 123. * 206. Manner of Raising Question as to Proper Parties

PlaintiflF. Defect of Parties means too Few. Before proceeding to

the discussion of particular cases and special rules, a preliminary

question may he here properly answered : How can the objection

that an action has not been brought by the proper plaintiff or

plaintiffs be raised and regularly presented to the court for its

decision? The codes of procedure all agree in prescribing,

among other grounds of demurrer to the complaint or petition,

the following: "When it shall appear on the face of the com-

plaint or petition ; 2, that the plaintiff has not legal capacity to

sue; or, -4, that there is a defect of parties plaintiff or defendant;

or, 6, that the complaint or petition does not state facts sufficient

to constitute a cause of action ; " ^ and also that, " when any of

the matters enumerated in section [the foregoing] do not appear

on the face of the complaint or petition, the objection may be

taken by answer; "' ^ and, finally, "if no objection be taken, either
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by demurrer or answer, the defendant shall be deemed to have

waived the same, excepting only the objection to the jurisdiction

1 New York, § 144(488) ; Kansas, § 89 ; In the following codes it is made a

Nebraska, § 94 ; Ohio, § 87 ; Oregon, § G6 ; special cause of demurrer that there is a

California, § 430; N. C. § 95 ; S. C. § 167. misjoinder of ])laintiffs or defendants.

[^Arizona, Uev. St., 1901, § 13.51 ; Arkan- Cal. § 430; Nevada, § 40; Colorado, § ."JO.

sas, Sand. & Hill's Dig., § 5717; Idaho, Misjoinder of plaintiffs is now a ground

Code Civ. Pro., 1901, §3206 (including of demurrer in New York, § 488.

misjoinder as a ground); Iowa, Code, - New York, § 147 (498) ; Kansas, § 91 ;

1897, § 3561 ; Indiana, Burns' St., 1901, Nebraska, § 96 ; Ohio, § 89 ; Oregon, §69;

§342; Kentucky, Codes, 1895, §§ 92,93; Cal. § 433; N. C. § 98; S. C. § 170.

Montana, § 680 (including misjoinder as [^Arizona, Rev. St., 1901, § 1353, in re-

a ground); Missouri, Kev. St., 1899, §598 spect only to the ground numbered 4 in

(including misjoinder as a ground) ; Min- the text; Arkansas, Sand. & Hill's Dig.,

nesota, (ien. St., 1894, §5232; North § 5720 ; Colorado, § 54 ; Idaho, Code Civ.

Dakota, Kev. Codes, 1899, §5268; Okla- Pro, 1901, § 3209; Iowa, Code, 1897,

homa, St., 1893, § 3967 ; Utah, Rev. St., § 3563; Indiana, Burns' St.. 1901, § 346;

1898, §2962 (including misjoinder as a Montana. § 684 ; Missouri, Rev. St., 1899,

ground); South Dakota, Ann. St., 1901, §602: Minnesota, Gen. St., 1894, § 5234;

§0115; Washington, Bal. Code. § 4907 ; Nevada. § 44 ; North Dakota, Rev. CodeB,

Wyoming, Rev. St., 1899, § 3535 (includ- 1899. § .5271 ; Oklahoma, St., 1893. § 3969 ;

mg misjoinder as a ground); Wisconsin. Utah, Rev. St.. 1898. §2966: South Da-

St., 1898, § 2649.] kota. Ann. St., 1901, §6118; Washington,

Cln Connecticut the statute provides B.al. Code, §4909; Wyoming, Rev. St.,

merely that" all demurrers shall distinctly 1899. § 3537; Wisconsin, St., 1898,

specify the reasons why the pleading <le- § 2653.]

mnrred to is insufficient " Gen. St., 1902,

§ 60S.]

DEFECT OF PARTIES PLAINTIFF.
DEFECT OF TAKTIES PLAINTIFF.

117

177

of the court, and the objection that the complaint or petition

does not state facts sulhcient to constitute a cause of action." ^

The construction to be placed upon these clauses, and the result-

ing rules prescribing the methods by which an objection as to

proper parties must be interposed, in order to present a question

for judicial decision, have been settled in the various States

with almost complete uniformity. In regard to defect of parties

-plaintiffs the interpretation is now established, that "defect of

parties," given as one ground of demurrer, means too few, and

not too many. A demurrer alleging this particular objection

€an only be interposed, therefore, in case of a ?io?i-joinder of

necessary plaintiffs or defendants, and never in case of a mi&-

joinder. The word "defect" is taken in its literal sense of

"deficiency," and not in a broader sense as meaning any error in

the selection of parties. Upon this point the courts are nearly

unanimous. 2 It has been held, however, in Wisconsin, that

this is the proper form of demurrer where the objection is to a

misjoinder.^
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1 New York, § 148 (499) ; Kansas, § 91 ;

Nebraska, § 96 ; Ohio, § 89 ; Oregon, § 70 ;

€al. §434;N. C. § 99; S. C. § 171. QAri-

zona. Rev. St., 1901, § 1353; Arkansas,

Sand. & Hill's Dig., § 5720; Colorado,

§ 55 ; Idaho, Code Civ. Pro., 1901, § 3210 ;

Iowa, Code, 1897, §§ 3563, 3564 (substan-

tially different from the provision given

-0£ the court, and the objection that the complaint or petiti n
d
not tate facts sufficient to cons ti tu te a caus of action. ' 1
The construction to be placed upon th " cl u
an the r sulting rule prescribing the m thod by whi h an obj cti n as t
pr p r parti s must be interpo <l, in ord r to pr nt a qu sti n
f r judicial deci ion, have been s ttl d in the various tates
with almost complete uniformity. I n regard to defect of parties
plaintiff, the interpretation is now established, that "defect of
partie , " given as one ground of demurrer, means too few, and
not too 11iany. A demurrer alleging this particular objection
<: n only be interposed, therefore, in ca e of a non-joinder of
nece ary plaintiffs or defendant , and never in ca of a m?.·sjoinder. The word "defect" is taken in its literal sen e of
' d ficiency," and not in a broader sense as meaning any error in
the election of parties. Upon this point the court are nearly
unanimous. 2 It has been held, however, in Wisconsin, that
this is the proper form of demurrer where the objection is to a
misjoinder. 3

in the text); Indiana, Burns' St., 1901,

§ 346; Kentucky, Codes, 1895, §§ 92, 93;

Montana, § 685 ; xVIissouri, Rev. St., 1899,

§ 602; Minnesota, Gen. St., 1894, § 5235;

Nevada, § 45 ; North Dakota, Rev. Codes,

1 899, § 5272 ; ( /klahoma, St., 1 893, § 3969 ;

Utah, Rev. St., 1898, § 2967 ; South Da-

Tcota, Ann. St., 1901, § 6119; Washing-

ton, Bal. Code, § 4911; Wyoming, Rev.

St, 1899, § 3537; Wiscon.sin, St., 1898,

§ 26.54.]

- [Union Pac. Ry Co. v. Smitli (1898),

■59 Kan. 80. 52 Pac. 102; Weber r. Dillon

(1898), 7 Okla. 568, .54 Pac. 894; Allen v.

Cooley (1898), 53 S. C. 414, 31 S. E. 6.34 ;

Dolan 1-. Hubinger (1899), 109 Iowa, 408,

^0 N. W. 514 ; Cedar Rapids Nat. Bank v.

Lavery (1900), 110 Iowa, 575, 81 N. W.

775.] " Palmer v. Davis, 28 N. Y. 242 ; Ca.so

1 New York,§ 148 (499); Kansas,§ 91;
Nebra ka, § 96; Ohio,§ 89; Oregon,§ 70;
Cal. § 434; N. C. § 99; S. C. § 17 l. [Ari-zona, Rev. St., 1901, § 1353; Arkansa ,
... and. & Hill's Dig., § 5720; Colorado,
§ 55; Idaho, Code Civ. Pro., 1901, § 3210;
Iowa, Code, 1897, §§ 3563, 3564 (substantially different from the provision given
in the text); Indiana, Burns' St., 1901,
§ 346; Kentucky, Codes, 1895, §§ 92, 93;
Montana, § 6 5 ; Missouri, Re''· St., 1899,
§ 602; Minne ·ota, Gen. St., 1894, § 5235;
Nevada,§ 45; }forth Dakota, Hev. Codes,
l 99, § !>272; Oklahoma, St., 1893, § 3969;
Utah, Rev. St., 1 98, § 296i; South Da'kota, Ann. t., 1901, § 6119; Wahington, Bal. Code,§ 491 l; Wyoming, R ev.
t, 1899, § 3537; Wisconsin, St., 189 ,

r Carroll, 35 N. Y. 385; Richtmyer r.

Richtmver, 50 Barb. 55 ; Powers r. Bum-

cratz, 12 O. St. 273 ; Berkshire v. Shultz,

25 Ind. 523; Bennett v. Preston, 17 Ind.

291 ; Mornan v. Carroll, 35 Iowa, 22 ;

Hill V. Marsh, 46 Ind. 218. As the .same

is true of defendants, — the section in-

cluding both parties in a single formula,

— the decisions in reference to them are

in point. See Peabody v. Washington,

iSbc. Ins. Co., 20 Barb. 339; Voorhis v.

Baxter, 18 Barb. 592 ; s. c. 17 N. Y. 354 ;

Bank of Havana v. Magee, 20 N. Y. 355.

See al.so We.stern, etc. Co. v. ^"tna Ins.

Co., 40 Wis. 373 ; Marsh v. Board of

Supervisors, 38 id. 250; Willard v. Reas,

26 id. 540 (settling the rule as given in the

text, and limiting Read v. Sang, 21 id.

678) ; Schiffer v. Iviu Claire, 51 Wis. 385;

Lowry V. .Tackson, 27 S. C. 318 ; McKee

V. Eaton, 26 Kan. 226; White v. Scott,

26 Kan. 476 ; Boldt r. Budwig, 19 Neb.

739 ; Clark v. Crawfordsville Coffin Co ,

·§ 2654.J
2 [

nion Pac. Ry. Co. v. Smith (189 ),
.59 Kan . 0 52 Pac. I 02; W eber i·. Dillon
(1 9 ), 7 Okla. 568, 5-t. Par. 89-t.: Allen r.
o ley (1898), 53 S. C. 414, 31 S. E. 634;
D lan v. Hubinger (1899), 109 Iowa, 408,
0 N. W. 514; Cedar Rapids Nat. Bank 1.: .
Lavery (1900), 110 Iowa, 575 , 81 N. W .
775 .J Palmerv. Davis, 2 N. Y. 242; Ca
1·
Carroll, 35 N. Y. 385; Richtmyer v.
Ri ·htmyer, 50 Barb. 55; Powers v. Bum-

cratz, 12 0. St. 273; Berkshire v . Shultz,
25 Ind. 523; Bennett v. Preston, 17 Ind .
291; Moman 1:. Carroll, 35 Iowa, 22;
Hill v. Marsh, 46 Ind. 218. As the same
is true of defendant , - the section ineluding both parties in a ingle formula,
- the decisions in reference to th em are
in point. See Peabody v. Wa hington,
&c. Ins. Co., 20 Barb. 339; Voorhi v.
Baxter, 18 Barb. 592; . c. 17 N. Y. 354;
Bank of Havana v. Magee, 20 N. Y. 355.
See also W estern, etc. Co. v. JEtna Ins.
Co., 40 Wi . 373; Marsh v. Board of
Supervisors, 38 id. 2'50; Willard v. R as,
26 id. 540 (settling the rule a. given in the
text, and limiting Read v. ang, 21 id .
678); Schiffer v. Eau laire, 51 WL . 3 5;
L owrv v . •Jackson, 27
. 31 ; M Kee
v. Eaton, 26 Kan . 226; ' hite v . cott,
26 Kan . 476; Boldt 1•. Bud wig, 19 N b.
739 ; Clark v. Crawford ville
ffin o ,
125 Ind . 2i7; Evan v. chafer, l I 9 Ind .
49 ; Murray v. McGarigle, 9 Wi~. 4 3.
s Head 1'. ang, 21 Wi . 6i . The
demurr r wa held prop r llJ on th authorit.\' of an early 'ew Y rk cl i ion, Dund nlale v. Gryme, 16 l w. Pr. 19 5,
whi ch has ioce been many times overruled
in that State.

12
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§ 124. ^ 207. Question of Defect of Parties must be raised by

Demurrer or Answer. When u defect of piU'ties plaintiff — that

is, a non-joinder — appears on the face of tlie coni[)laint or peti-

tion, the defendant must raise the question by denuirrer, and

not by answer.^ If he neglects to interpose a denuirrer upon

this specific ground, he waives the objection entirely, even

though he sets up the defence in his answer. The reason given

for this somewhat technical rule is the following: The mere

defence of a defect of parties, not going to the real merits of the

controversy, and not denying the cause of action existing in

some persons, is not favored by the courts ; it is regarded as a

"dilatory defence," because it does nothing more than postpone

the decision of the substantial issues ; and, although the defend-

ant is permitted to avail himself of it, he must follow exactly the

modes prescribed by the rules of practice, or by the statute for

its interposition.^ If the defect does not appear upon the face of

the complaint or petition, the defendant must set up the defence

specially in his answer, or, failing this, he waives the objection.*
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1 [^Foster v. Lyon County (1901), 63

Kau. 43, 64 Pac. 1037 ; Masoii i-. St. Paul

Fire Ins. Co. (1901 ), 8-2 Minn. 336, 8b N. W.

13; Cooper v. Thomason (1896), 30 Ore.

161, 45 Pac. 295; Carskaddon v. Pine

(1899), 154 Ind. 410, 56 N. E. 844 ; Castile

r. Ford (1897), 53 Neb. 507, 73 N W.945;

124.

.....07.

Question of D efec t of Parties must

be raised by

a cl f t f 1 ar i S
th fac of th om la.int or p ii n
h que ti n b. l murr r and
n
an ' w
to int rpo a
thi
wa1v
h obj ction
v u
e
an'w r . Th r a on g1v n
om
i th foll \Ying : Th
nc of a defec of par i , n t going to he r al m rit
c ntr v r y, and not d n ing th cause of ac i n
i in 0 in
som p r. on , i not fa or d by th courts ; it i r garded a· a
dilat r defence '' b au e it d
nothing m re than o tp n
the leci ion of the ubstantial i" u e ; and, alth ugh th d £ ndant i ' permitted to avail him elf of it he mu t foll w xac ly the
mode pr cribed by th rule of practice, or by th
ta ut for
2
its interpo ition. If he def ct do ' not app ar upon th fac of
th complaint or petiti n, th d f ndant mu · t
t up the d fenc
p cially in hi an w r, or, failing thi , he wai
the bj .ti n. 3
Demurrer or Answer.

\\,

h

11

.lolmsou I'. Gooch (1894), 114 N. C. 62, 19

S. E. 62 ; Radant v. Werheim Mfg. Co.

(1900), 106 Wis. 600, 82 N. W. 562; Os-

horn V. Logus (1895), 28 Ore. 300, 42 Pac.

997. But a demurrer will not lie where

tiie complaint does not sh(jw that the party

for whose non-joiyder tlie demurrer is

interposed was living when the suit was

<-ommenced : Deegau v. Deegan (1894),

22 Xev. 185, 37 Pac. 360]

•^ Zabriskie v. Smith, 13 N. Y. 322;

l)e Puy V. Strong, 37 N. Y. 372, 3 Keyes,

003 ; Patchip r. Peck, 38 N. Y. 39 ; Fi.shor

r. Hall, 41 N. Y. 416; Wells v. Cone, .55

Barh. 585 ; Hees v. Ncllis, 1 N. Y. Sup.

Ct. 118; Alexander v. Gaar, 15 Ind. 89;

Ju.stice u. Phillips, 3 Bush, 200 ; Andrews

r. .Mokelumne Hill Co., 7 Cal. 330 ; 'len-

nant v. Pfister, 45 Cal. 270; Dailey v.

Houston, 58 Mo. 361, 366; Mcliobcrts v.

So. Minn. R. R., 18 Minn. 108, 110; Me-

clianics' Bank v. Gilpin, 105 Mo. 17. As

the same rule ajiplies in case of defect in

parties defendant, see Dillaye v. Parks,

31 Barb. 132; Wright v. Storrs, 32 N. Y.

691 ; s. c. 6 Bos. 600 ; Abbe v. Clarke, 31

Barl). 238. See also Biakeley r. Le Due,

22 Minn. 476 ; Baldwin v. Canfield, 26 id.

43; Gimbel v. Pignero, 62 Mo. 240; Kel-

logg V. Maliu, id. 429 ; McConuell v.

Braynor, 63 id. 461 ; Dunn r. Hannibal &

St. J. R. Co., 68 id. 268 ; State v. Saffiug-

ton, id. 454 ; Donnan r. Intelligencer Co.,

70 id. 168 ; Parchin c. Peck, 2 Mont. 567 ;

Ross V. Linder, 12 S. C. 592; Lillie v.

Case, 54 Iowa, 177 ; Bouton v. Orr, 51 id.

473 ; Ryan r. MuUin, 45 id. 631 ; Taylor

r. Collins, 51 Wis. 123 ; Thomas v. Wood,

61 Ind. 132 ; Cox v. Bird, 65 id. 277 ; Bar-

nett V. Leonard, 66 id. 422 ; Davis i'.

Beciistein, 69 N. Y. 440 ; Risley v. Wight-

man, 13 Hun, 163 ; Porter r. Fletcher, 25

Minn. 493 ; Mackenzie v. Edinburg Sch.

parties defendant. see Dillaye v. Parks
31 Barb . 132; Wright v. torr , 32 . Y.
691 ; . . 6 Bo . 600; Abb v. lark , 31
Barb. 23 . • ee a l o Blakel y r. L Due.
22 Minn. 4i6; Balclwiu v. anfi ld, 26 id.
43; Gimb I v. Pigner , 62 l\fo. _40 ; I ellogg v. Malin, id. 429 ; M 'onn 11 v.
Bray n r, 63 id. 461;
unn v. H ann ibal &
t. J. R. Co., 6 id. 26 ; tat v. affington, id. 454 ; D nnan v. I ntellig n r o.
70 i<l. 16 · Parchin v.
ck, 2 Mont. 567 ;
Ro
. 592 · Lilli e !'.
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To sum up: if a defect of parties plaintiff appears in the plead-

ing, the mode of raising the defence is by demurrer alone; if it

does not appear in the pleading, by answer alone; and, unless

the defendant complies with these requirements as to method, he

waives all objection.^ It has been expressly decided in Ohio,

142 Ind. 555, 41 N. E. 599. Held in

Mason v. St. Paul Fire Ins. Co. (1901), 82

T um up: if a defect of pa.rti 8 plaintiff ap ar in th pl ( <li1w the m cl of raising th cl £ nc is by cl muu r al n ; if jL
<l
not appear in the pleading, by answ r alone· and, unl ·s
th def ndant complie with the e r quirem nt a· t method h
waiv all bjection. 1 It ha b n xpre 'ly cl i<l cl in Ohio

Minn. .'536, 85 N. W. 13, that a defect

of parties plaintiff, when the question is

raised bv answer, does not entitle the de-

fendant to a verdict on the merits, but

only to a dismissal ; but if, in such a case, a

motion to dismiss is not made uyion proof of

the defect of parties plaintiff, the objection

is waived. And in Atcheson, Topeka, etc.

|}y. Co. V. Hucklebridge (1901), 62 Kan.

506, 64 Pac. 58, it was held that the Code

provision requiring defects in petitions
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other than those appearing on face of

same to be set up by answer, does not

apply to a petition by a partner who con-

ceals the fact of partnership and wrong-

fully brings suit in his own name for an

injury to partnership property. In such

case defendant, if ignorant of partnership

until disclosed upon the trial, may then

raise the question without amending

answer. See dissenting opinions herein.

A demurrer to a petition, stating in

general terms that " there are no proper

parties," i.s too vague and general. It

should point out who would be proper

parties : Dawson !•. Equitable Mortgage

Co. (1899), 109 Ga. 389, 34 S. E. 668;

Parker r. Cochran (1895), 97 Ga. 249, 22

S. E. 961-3 Also Merritt v. Walsh, 32

N. Y. 685 ; Donnell v. Walsh, 33 N. Y.

43; s. c 6 Bosw. 621 ; Gock r. Keneda,

29 Barb. 120; Umsted v. Buskirk, 17

Ohio St. 113; Dickinson v. Vauderpoel,

5 N. Y. Sup. Ct. 168. See also Trenor

V. Cent. Pac. R. R., 50 Cal. 222 ; Maxwell

r. I'ratt, 24 Hun, 448 (an answer setting

up a defect of parties must give the names

of tlic plaintiffs to be joined).

1 [Kngel V. Dado (1902), — Neb.

— , 92 N. W. 629; Hannegan v. Roth

(1896), 12 Wash. 695,44 Pac. 256; Stephens

V. Harding (1896), 48 Neb. 659, 67 N. W.

746 ; Bridge Co. v. Fowler (1895), 55 Kan.

17, 39 Pac. 727 ; Gilland v. Union Pac. Ry.

Co. (1895), 6 Wyo. 185, 43 Pac. 508;

Moore v. Bevier (1895), 60 Minn. 240, 62

N. W. 281 ; Bell v. Mendcnhall (1898). 71

Minn. 331, 71 N. W. 1086; Allen v.

Cooley (1898), 53 S. C. 77, 30 S. E. 721 ;

Howe" I'. Harper (1900), 127 N. C. 356, 37

S. E. 505 ; Medano Ditch Co. v. Adams

(1902), 29 Colo. 317, 68 Pac. 431 ; Prich-

ard's Executrix v. Peace (1895), 98 Ky.

99, 32 S. W. 296; Rittenhouse v. Clark

(1901), 110 Ky. 149, 61 S. W. 33; Radant

V. Werheim Mfg. Co. (1900), 106 Wis.

600, 82 N. *W. 562 ; Osborn r. Logus

(1895), 28 Ore. 306, 42 Pac. 997; Ross

V. Page (1902), 11 N. D. 458, 92 N. W.

822; Bates-Smith Inv. Co. v. Scott (1898),

56 Neb. 475, 76 N. W. 1063 ; Coe v. An-

142 lnd. 555, 41 N. R 599. II Id in
.Ma on v. t. Paul Fire Ins. Co. (1901), fl2
.i\liun. :336, 85 N. W. 1:3, that a <l fed
1>f partic plaintiff, when the quest ion. is
rai d by answer, does not entitle the clefrntlant to a verdict on the merits, Lut
only to a di missal ; but if, in such a case, a
motion to di ' mi sis not m ade upon proof of
the d feet of parties plaintiff, the objection
i: waived. And in Atcheson, Topeka, etc.
Hy. o. v. Hucklcbridge (1 901), 62 J\:an .
:506, 64 Pac. 58, it was held that the C'od e
provi ion requiring <lefects in p etitions
oth r than tho e appearing on face of
ame to be set up by an wer, does not
npply to a petition by a partner who conteal · the fact of partnership and wrongfully bring suit in his ovvu name for an
injury t partnership property. In such
ca defendant, if ignorant of partnership
until di clo ed upon the trial, may then
rai, e the question without amending
an wer. See dissenting opinions herein.
A demurrer to a petitiou, stating in
general term that " there are no proper
partie ," is too vague and general. It
hould point out who would be proper
partie, : Daw on v. Equitable Mortgage
o. (1899), l 09 Ga. 389, 34 S. E. 668 ;
Parker v. ochran ( 1895), 97 Ga. 249, 22
. E . 961.] Also Merritt v. Walsh, 32
J. Y. 685; D onnell v. Walsh, 33 N. Y.
43; s. c 6 Bosw. 621 ; Gock v. Keneda,
29 Barb. 120 ; U msted v. Buskirk, l 7
Ohio . t. 113; Dickinson v. Vanderpoel,
5 N. Y. Sup. Ct. 168. See also Trenor
v. Cent. Pac. R. R, 50 Cal. 222; Maxwell
r. Pratt, 24 Hun, 448 (an answer settin g
up a def ct of parties must give the name~
f the plaintiff. to be joined).
1 [Engel v. Dado (1902 ), Keb.
-, 92 N. W. 629; Hannegan v. Jfoth
(1 96},12Wash.695, 44Pac.256; tepbens
v. Harding (1 96), 4 Neb. 659, 67 N. W.
746; Bridge Co. v. Fowler (1895), 55 Kan.
l 7, 39 Pac. 727; Gilland v. Union Pac. Hy.
. (1895), 6 Wyo. 185, 43 Pac. 508;
Moore v. Bevier (1895) , 60 Minn. 2..J.O, 62

N. W. 2 l ; Bcll v. ~endenhall (1 9 ). 71
Minn. 331, 71 N. W. 1086; Allen v .
'ooley (l 9 ), 53
. 77, 30 . ·. E. 721 ;
Howe v. Harper (1900}, 127 J.C. 356, 37
S. E. 505; Medano Ditch Co. v. Adams
(1902), 29 Colo. 317, 6 Pac. 431; Pri hard' Executrix v. Peace (1 95), 98 Ky.
99, 32 ~- W. 296; Rittenhou e v. Clark
(1901), 110 Ky. 149, 61 . W. 33; Radant
v. W erheim ~Hg. Co. (1900), 106 Wi.
600, 2 N. \V. 562; 0 born c. Logu
( 1, 95). 2 Ore. 306, 42 Pac. 997; Ros
v. Page (1902), 11 N. D. 45, 92 . W.
822; Bate -Sm ith Inv. o. i·. Scott (1 98),
56 Neb. 475, 76 N. 'vV. 106.'3; Coe 1;. Anderson (1894), 92 Iowa, 515, 61 N. W.
177; Hellams v. Prior (1902) , 64 S. C.
296, 43 S. E . 25; Wvrna11 v. Herard
(1899), 9 Okla. 35, 59 Pac. 1009.
A plea in abatement for defect of
parties must show affirmatively the names
of the parties omitted, that they are alive,
and that they are within the juri sdiction
of the c urt: Cone v. Cone (1901) , 61 S. C.
512, 39 S. E. 748. A demurrer or plea on
the ground of defect of parties hould
show in what the defect consist and
should name the party not joined : Emerson v. Schwindt (1900), 108 Wi . 167, 84
N. W. 186; Johnson v. Gooch (1 94),
114 N. C. 62, 19 S. E. 62; Bo eker v .
Chamberlain (1903}, - Incl.-, 66 N. E.
448.
The objection of defect of parti
annot be rai ·eel for the fir t time ou appeal: Thompson t'. Ru h (1902), - Neb.
- , 92 N. W. 1060; nor by an instruction: Loomis v. Hollister (1902), 75
Couu. 2i5, 53 Atl. 579; 0 born v . Logu
(1 95), 2
re. 306, 42 P: ~. 995 ; nor
by oral demurrer at th trial : hnll v.
Caughman (l 9 ), 5-! , . C. 203, 3~ ~- E.
301 ; nor is it ground for di:mi , ing th
complaint on the trial upon the merit :
Hadaut r. Werheim Mfg. o. (1900), lOG
Wi . 600, 2 T. \V. 562; nor au it b
rais d by motion .for a new trial: [ath r
v. Dunn (189 ), 11 . D. 196, i 6 J, W.
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and this is plainly the correct rule, that a demurrer for want of

sufficient facts does not raise the question of a defect — non-

joinder — of plaintiffs or defendants.^

§ 125. * 208. Meaning of "Want of Legal Capacity to Sue. A

demurrer or defence for this cause must relate exclusively to

some legal disabilit}^ of the plaintiff, — such as infancy, cover-

ture, idiocy, and the like, — and not to the absence of facts

sufficient to constitute a cause of action. ^ The facts constituting

a cause of action may be sufficiently averred, and yet the plaintiff

may not have a legal capacity to sue. The objection that the

plaintiff has not legal capacity cannot, therefore, be raised and

922-2 See, however, post, § * 287, to the

effect that the objection of *the defect of

indispensable parties is not so waived in

equitable suits.

an

thi i lainly the orr
l t a d murr r for want of
uffi i nt £d e not r i 'e the u tion of a defect - nonjoind r - of plaintiff r d f ndo nt 1
125. * .., . Meaning o f W ant of L egal C a pacity to Sue. A
denrnrr r or defenc for thi cau
ruu t relate ex lu i el to
om l al di abili ) f h plaintiff ich a infanc
ert ur idjo y and he lik
nd n t to b ab nc of facts
uffi ient t con titut a cau
f action. 2 The fact con, titutiug
£ acti n may be uffici ntly a err d, and yet the laintiff
a cau
may not h
a legal capacity to ' ue. The objection that the
plain iff ha not legal capa ity canno , therefore, be rai ed and

1 Umsted v. Buskirk, 17 Ohio St. 113.

Nevil V. Clifford, 55 Wis. 161 ; Whipper-

man v. Dunn, 124 lud. 349. QTo the

922.]
ee, however, po t, § * 2 7, to the
effe t t hat the bjection of the defect of
indi ·pen ·a ble piuties i not o waived in
equitable uit .
1
m. ted 1:. Bu kirk, 17 hio St. 113.
Nevil v. lifford, 55 Wi . 161; Whipperman v. Dunn, 124 Ind. 349. [To the
same eff ect are Walton v. Wa hburu
(1901 ), Ky., 64 . W. 634; Bell v. 1endenhall ( l 9 ), 71 Minn. 331, 73 N. W .
IO 6; Car kaddon v. Pine (1 99}, 154
Ind. 410 , 56 . E. 44 · Ro ek r v. hamberlain ( 1903), - Iml. - , 66 N. E. 44 ;
Beyer i·. Town of Cran don (1 98), 9
Wi, . 306, 73 . W. 771; Ho v. Page
(1902) , 11 . D . 45 , 92 . W. 22; vaubur v. F een (I 9 ), 75 Minn . 350, 78
N. W.4.]
2 [When the pl intiff', in capacity to ue
appear n he fa e of the omplaint th
o bjection mu t be taken by demurrer or it
i wai"ecl: Bia kw ell v. Briti: h- m ri ·an
Co. (1902), 65
. 105, 43 . .,. 395;
Cooper . The P ople (HI ), 2
' l . 7,
63 P ac. 3 1-1 ; M y r v. B r th ( 1 97 }, 97
\V-i . 352, i
. \ . -4 ;
. v hi te
l iv r Lu mber
. l 5) ,
65 ..,.. W . 174. Whnitd
0
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same effect are Walton v. Washburn

(1901). Ky, 64 S. W. 634; Bell v. Men-

denhall (1898), 71 Minn. 331, 73 N. W.

1086; Carskaddon t;. Pine (1899), 154

lud. 410. 56 N. E. 844i Boseker r. Cham-

berlain (1903), — Ind. — , 66 N. E. 448;

Beyer r. Town ui Crandon (1898), 98

Wis. 306, 73 N. W. 771 ; Ross v. Page

(1902), 11 N. D. 458, 92 X. W. 822 ; Svan-

burg V. Fosseen (1899), 75 Minn. 350, 78

N. W. 4.3

- [ Wlien the plaintiff's incapacity to sue

appears on tlie face of the complaint tlie

objection must be taken by denmrrer or it

is waived : Blackwell v. Britisii-American

Co. (1902), 65 S. C. 105, 43 S. E. 395;

Cooper c. The People (1900), 28 Colo. 87,

63 Pac. 314; Meyer v. Barth (1897), 97

Wis. 352, 72 N. W. 748 ; Swing r. White

Kiver Lumber Co. (1895), 91 Wis. 517,

65 N. W. 174. When it does not appear

on the face of the pleading, the remedy is

by answer : Clark v. Carey ( 1 894), 41 Ncl).

780. 60 N. W. 78 ; Blackwell >: British-

American Co. (1902), 65 S. C. 105, 43 S. E.

395; Hankinson i-. Charlotte, etc. R. R. Co.

(1893), 41 S. C. 1, 19 S. E. 206. In either

case the grounds of the objection must be

specified : Blackwell c. British-American

Co. (1902), 65 S. C. 105, 43 S. E. 305, and

they cannrjt be shown under a goneral

denial: llicks v. Beam (I89.5), 112 N. C.

642, 17 S. E. 490; Hankinson r. Charlotte,

etc. R. R. Co. (1893), 41 S. C. 1, 19 S. K.

206. Held in State v. Ohio Oil Co. (1897).

150 Ind. 21,49 N. E.809, that the capacity

of the State to sue should be questioned

by demurrer under the second statutory

ground, — want of legal capacity to sue.

Gager v. Marsden (1899), 101 Wis. 598,

77 N. W. 922 : Mere error of the trial

court in making substitution of plaintiffs

does not go to the legal capacity of the

substituted plaintiffs to sue, and on a

demurrer for want of such capacity the

complaint stands as if the action were

originally commenced by tJie substituted

plaintiffs. Rogers r. Levy (1893), 36 Nei>.

601, 54 N. W. 1080: A judgment of di.s-

missal on the ground of want of legal

. E. 490; Hankin on v. Charlotte,
. 1, 19 . K
etc. R.R. o. (1893), 41
206. Held in tate v. hio ii o. (L 97),
150 Ind. 21, 49 N. E. 80 , that the capacity
of the tate to ue houl l be que. tioned
by demurrer nnder the cond tatutory
ground, - want of legal apacity to ue.
Gager v. far den (1 99), 101 Wi . 59 ,
77
. W. 922 : Mere rror of the trial

642, 1 i
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relied upon under a demurrer for want of sufficient facts, nor the

ohjcetion of a want of facts under a demurrer alleging an absence

of legal capacity. 1

§ 126. * 201*. Efifect of Misjoinder of Parties Plaintiff. Common

Law and Equity Rules. .\ misjoinder of parties plaintiff is not

made a specific ground of demurrer, or mentioned as a defence,

except [in a few of the codes]. ^ At the common law two or

more persons could not be joined as plaintiffs in an action upon

contract, unless they possessed a joint right; and if, on the trial.

1 [|State ex rel. v. Moores (1899), ."JS

Neb. 28.5, 78 N. W. 529 ; Berkin o. Marsh

(1896), 18 Mont. 152, 44 Pac. 528, where

r li d upon under a d muner f r want f uffici nt fact nor th
obj i n fa want of fa t un] rad murr r all gin 0 :m ab· n
of 1 0 al a acity. 1
126. * 209. Effect of Misjoinder of PC\rties Plaintiff.
Common
Law and Equity Rules.
\. mi ·join 1 r of partie plaintiff i no
mad a pe ific ground of d murr r, or 111 nti n <l as a def n
x pt [in a few of the cod ]. 2 At the comm n law tw or
m re p r ons could not be joined as plaintiffs in an acti n up n
ntract, unless they poss sed a joint right; and if, on the trial,

it was held that legal di.sability to sue

pertains to the person desiring to sue, and

not to the cause of action, and the fact

tiiat the cause of action has not accrued

does not give rise to the objection of dis-

ability to sue. To the same effect .«ee
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Weirich v. Dodge (1899), 101 Wis. 621,

77 N. \V. 906. See also Zinn v. Baxter

(1901), 65 Ohio St, 341, 62 N. E. 327,

where it was lield that the fact of an as-

signment of the cause of .action, upon

which plaintiff sues, before the commenee-

ment of the action, goes not to plain-

tiff's capacity to sue but to the right of

action.

The following cases support the rule

stated in the text : ^tua Life Ins. Co.

V. Sellers (1899), 154 Ind. 370, 56 N. E.

97; Bern v. Shoemaker (1895), 7 S. D.

510, 64 N. W. 544 ; Coddington v. Canaday

(1901), 1.57 Ind. 243, 61 K E. 567; Rada-

baugh V. Silvers (1893), 135 Ind. 605,35

N. E. 694; Knight v. Le Bea (1897), 19

Mont. 223, 47 Pac. 952 ; Birmingham v.

Cheetham (1898), 19 Wash. 657, 54 Pac.

37.

But the question of the right of plain-

tiff to maintain the action may be raised

by general demurrer : Kinsley v. Kinslcv

(1897), 150 Ind. 67, 49 N. E. 819 ; Ameri-

can Trust, etc. Bank y. McGettigan (1899),

152 Ind. 532, 52 N. E. 793.]

De Bolt V. Carter, 31 Ind. 355; Berk-

shire V. Shultz, 25 Ind. 523; People v.

Crooks, 53 N. Y. 648 ; Haire r. Baker, 5

N. Y.357 ; Fulton F. Ins. Co. r. Baldwin,

37 N. Y. 648; Allen v. Buffalo, 38 N. Y.

280 ; Palmer v Davis, 28 N. Y. 242 ; Bank

of Lowville V. Edwards, 11 How. Pr. 216 ;

Viburt V. Frost, 3 Abb. Pr. 120; Myers v.

Machado, 6 Abb. Pr. 198, 14 How. Pr. 149 ;

Hobart v. Frost, 5 Duer, 672; Saxton v.

Seiberling, 48 Ohio St. 5.54. In New

York, a corporation is not required to

aver tlie acts creating its corjjorate char-

acter; and, in an action by a bank where

the complaint omitted any such allega-

tion, a demurrer on the ground of a want

of legal capacity was overruled. Phoenix

Bk. of N. Y. V. Donnell, 40 N. Y. 410,

41 Barb. 571. As to legal capacity to

sue, see Excelsior Petroleum Co. v. Lacey,

63 N. Y. 422 ; Beers v. Shannon, 73 iii.

292, 297 ; Minneapolis Harvester Works

)-. Libby, 24 Minn. 327 ; White ( )ak Dist.

Tp. V. Oskaloosa Dist. Tp., 44 Iowa, 512;

1 [ tate ex rel. v . Moore
(1 99), 58
Neb. 2 5, 78 N. W. 529 ; Berkin v. l\lar ·h
(1 96}, l
font. 152, 4-1- Pac. 52 , where
it w
held that legal disability to ue
pertains to the per 011 de irillg to ue, and
not to the cause of action, auJ the fact
that the ·aus~ of action has not accrued
doe not P-iYe rise to the objection of disa.bilit. to ue. To the same effect . ee
W iri ch v. D odge ( 1 99}, 101 Wi ._ 621,
77 N . W . 906. See also Zinn v. Baxter
(1901 ), 65 Ohio St. 3.J.l, 62 . E. 327,
where it w a held that the fact of an asigument of the cause of action, upon
which plaintiff ue , before the commencem nt of the action, goe not to plaintiff'· capacity to ue but to the right of
action.
The following cases support the rule
tated in the text : JEtna Life Ins. Co.
v. eller (1 99), 15-t. Ind . 370, 56 N. E .
97; Bern v. Shoemaker (1 895 ), i S. D .
510,64N. W .544 ; Coddingtonv.Canaday
(1901), 157 Ind. 243, 61 N. E. 567; Radabaugh v. il ver (1893), 135 Ind. 605, 35
N. E. 694; Knight v. Le Bea (1 97 ), 19
Mont. 223, 4i Pac. 952; Birming ham v.
Cheetham (1898), 19 Wash. 657, 54 Pac.
37.
But the question of the right of plaintiff to maintain the action may be rai ed
by gen ral demurrer: Kinsley v. Kiu sl y
{I 97}, 150 Ind. 67, 49 N. E. 819; Ameriau Tru t, etc. Bank v. McGettigan {l 99),
152 Ind . 5 2, 52 . E. 793 .J
De Bolt v. Carter, 31 Ind. 355 ; B erkhire v. Shultz, 25 Ind. 523; People v.
Crook , 53 N. Y. 648; Haire v. Baker, 5
N. Y. 357; Fulton F. Ins. Co. r. Baldwin,
37 N. Y. 648; Allen v. Buffalo, 38 N. Y.
2 0; Palmer v . Davis, 28 N. Y. 242; Bank
of Lowville v. Edwards, 11 How. Pr. 216;

Viburt v. Fro t, 3 Abb. Pr. 120; Myer v.
Machado, 6 A bb. Pr. 19 , 14 How. Pr. 149;
Hobart v. Frost, 5 Duer, 672; 'axton v.
eiberling, 4 Ohio t. 554. lll New
York, a corporation i not required to
aver the act creating it corporate chara ter; and, in au actiou by a bank where
the complaint omitted any such allegation, a demurrer on the ground of a want
of legal capacity was overruled. Phcenix
Bk. of N. Y. v. Dounell, 40 N. Y. 410,
41 Barb. 57 1. As to legal capacity to
sue, see Excelsior Petroleum Co. v. Lacey,
6.3 .1. • Y. 422; Beers v. hann on, 73 id .
292, 297; Minn eapoli Harve ter Work
1·. Li bby, 24 Minn. 327 ; White Oak Di t.
Tp. v. 0 kaloosa Di t. Tp., 44 Iowa, 512;
Rmith v. Peckham, 39 Wis. 414; Roger
v. Lafayette Agr. Work , 52 Ind. 296 ;
D e Bolt v. Carter. 31 id . 355; Langsdale
i:. Girton , 51 id. 99; Perkins v.
timmel,
114 N. Y. 359; Bray v. Black, 57 Ind.
417; Wilh oit v. Cunn ingham, 87 Cal.
453; Beville v. Cox, 109 N. C. 265;
Brookmire v. Rosa (Neb. 1 92), 51 N. W.
40; F arrell v. Cook, 16 Nebr. 4 3; Pence
v. Aug he, l 01 Ind. 317; Campbell v. ampbell, 12! id. I i 8; Murray v. McGarigle, 69
Wis. 4 3. The demurrer must be overrul d
if any one of several plaintiffs has capacity
to ne. O'Callaghan v. Bode, 84 Cal. 6 9.
[The que tion of plaintiff's rapacity to
ue cannot be rai ed by an intervenor :
Pitt Agricultural Work v. Baker {l 9 ),
11 . D. 342, 77 N. W. 5 6.J
2 [This i
made a pecific g round f
demurrer in the following code : olorado, § 50 ; Nevada, § 40; New York,
§ 488; Idaho, Code Ci v. Pro. (1901 ), 3206;
Montana, § 680; Utah, Rev . t . {1 98),
§ 2962; W yoming, Rev. St. {1899) ,
§ 3535 ; Mi souri, Rev. St., 1899, s 598.]
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they failed to establish such right as alleged residing in all, a

tabli ·h

nonsuit was inevitable. If two or more persons were united as

plaintiffs in a legal action based upon their right of property in

1
lands or chattels, they must necessarily have been either joint

owners or owners in common, and a failure to prove the joint

a·

itahl .
al n, ti

right of action was followed ])y the same consequence, — a defeat

of all the plaintiffs. In equity, no such doctrine prevailed?

because when two or more persons were made plaintiffs in the

same action it by no means followed that they held and alleged

a joint light residing in themselves. When, therefore, there was

an improper or unnecessary union of co-plaintiffs in an equity

action, the suit did not necessarily fail as to all; the bill might

be dismissed at the hearing as to certain of the plaintiffs, and a

decree rendered for the others; or some might be struck off,

upon motion, at any stage of the proceedings, and the cause go

on in the name of the residue.

§ 127. '' 210. Same Subject. Under the Codes. Preliminary

Analysis. Has any change in these conceptions, and in the prac-

tical rules derived from them, been wrought by the codes of pro-
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cedure? If the old distinction between joint legal rights and

several legal rights is maintained; if the ancient notion of the

common law," that two or more parties plaintiff in a legal action,

brought upon a contract or upon the ownership of land or chattels,

must hold a joint cause of action, is still preserved, with all of

its teL;hnical incidents; if it be considered that the reform

legislation has confined its equitable doctrine as to parties to

equitable actions alone, while it has left the doctrines regulat-

ing legal actions untouched, — then no change has been wrouglit

in the practical rules which determine the effect of a misjoinder

trine pr vail d 1
plaintiff in th
h l and all g l
Wh n, th ref re, ther ' a
< n 1m1 rop r or unn
uni n f
- laintiff in an
uit
acti n the ui t i not n c aril fail a t all; th bill might
e di mi e at th h aring a to c rtain f th plainti , an l a
d r
r nd red for th other ; r
mi ht be truck ff
u n motion at any tag f th pro e ding , and the au g
n in the nam of th r ·idu .
127. -· 210.
Same Subject.
Preliminary
an in the pra Analysis.
Ha any han e in th
t i al rule
riv d fr m them be
od
dur ? If th

of plaintiffs, as stated in the foregoing paragraph. Under this

assumption, a misjoinder of plaintiffs in a legal action, brought

upon a contract or upon property in lands or chattels, must

now, a.s formerly, entail the consequence of a complete failure;

while now, as formerly, a misjoinder of plaintiffs in an equity

suit does not entail such a consofjuence; a judgment can be

recovered by a portion of the plaintiffs, and the action be

r f rm

dismissed as to the residue. If, on the other hand, the system

a t parti to
do trin r gulat-

is to l)e accepted and acted upon in the spirit which (lesigii('(l

it, — if its requirements as to parties, which, as is nnivcu'sally

conceded, enact the established doctrines of tlie ec^uity courts,

8lll
l'l' l' ()\'l'I"'

l

cli ·mi: · •cl

' h · ac
req nu· m n · a
i ' - if i
c· c 11 ; •cl cl
11acl lt

i:

. y. lr111
"hi h <l . i llC'rl
hi h, ,
11nivc·r~ .tl! ·
f tb
uity 'Otll'l ·,
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extend the one principle to all actions, legal as well as equi-

table, — then there is a single rule governing all actions, and,

so far as the dogmas of the common law are inconsistent there-

with, they are necessarily abrogated, and form no part of the

reformed American procedure. The most conspicuous and char-

acteristic of these dogmas are the notions as to joint rights,

and as to the impossibility of severing in the judgment when

such rights have been averred as the causes of action; and

these notions must be abandoned, if full force and effect are

to be given to the language used by the legislature. The

whole discussion is thus reduced to a single question: Are

these provisions of the code to be accepted in their entirety,

with all their legitimate and necessary consequences, or are

they to be limited and restricted by some exception grafted

upon them by the courts, and are their consequences to be

abridged and their operation to be confined to those actions

which, under the former system, would have been called equi-

table? I have already, in the former portion of this section,

stated, as the guiding principle of interpretation adopted b}'
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most of the courts, the doctrine that the equitable rules of the

codes were to be applied in all actions, whatever be their nature.

This is certainly the inference to be drawn from the judicial

decisions when a general theory of interpretation vjas the subject of

discussion; and one theory, when accepted, ought, beyond a

doubt, to be carried out in all the minor details, in the work of

creating all the practical rules for administering justice, if any

consistent and symmetrical result is desired.^ But unfortunately,

in comparing the decided cases, and in endeavoring to deduce

from them a body of pi-actical rules, we shall find so much in-

consistency and vacillation in the judgments of even the same

tribunals, that we are sometimes forced to doubt whether any

general principle of construction was ever intended to be adopted

by the courts, whether they ever accepted any theory of intei'-

pretation, and proceeded to work from it as a foundation in

constructing a system of procedure. In regard to the particular

matter now under consideration, if we collect and compare the

^ ^The Supreme Court of Wisconsin, in dealing with the subject is set out in full

the very recent case of Castle >•. Madison as follows : " Under the technical rules of

(1902), 113 Wis. 346, 89 N. W. 156, so the common law it was not considered

fully and clearly supports the author's possible for two or more persons to be

views, that the portion of the opinion united as plaintiffs in the same action

-extend the on principle to all action , 1 gal as well a qmt< bl , - then there is a ingle rul governing all action , and,
o far a the dogma of the common law are in on i t nt therewith, they are neces arily abrogat d, and f rm no part of th
ref rme American procedur . The most con picuous and chara t ristic of these dogmas are the n tions as to joint right ,
and a to the impossibility of s v ring in the judgment wh n
'U h rights have been averred as the cau e of action; and
th
notions must be abandoned, if full force and effect ar
to be given to the language used by the legislature. The
whole discussion is thus reduced to a single question: Are
the e provisions of the code to be accepted in their entirety,
with all their legitimate and necessary consequences, or ar
th y to be limited and restricted by some exception grafted
up n them by the courts, and are their consequences to be
abridged and their operation to be confined to those actions
which, under the former system, would have been called equitable? I have already, in the former portion of this section,
tated, as the guiding principle of interpretation adopted by
mo t of the courts, the doctrine that the equitable rules of the
cod were to be applied in all actions, whatever be their nature.
Thi is certainly the inference to be drawn from the judicial
deci ions when a general theory of interpretation was the subfect of
discussion; and one theory, when accepted, ought, beyond a
doubt, to b!3 carried out in all the minor details, in the work of
creating all the practical rules for administering justice, if any
~onsi tent and symmetrical result is desired. 1 But unfortunately,
in comparing the decided ca8es, and in endeavoring to deduce
fr m them a body of practical rules, we shall find so much incon i tency and vacillation in the judgments of even the ame
tribunals, that we are sometimes forced to doubt whether any
general principle of construction was ever intend d to be adopted
by the courts, whether they ever accepted any theory of interpretation, and proceeded to work from it a a foundation in
con tructing a system of procedure. In regard to the particular
matter now under consideration, if we collect and compare the
1 [The upreme Court of Wiscon in. in
the very recent case of Castle v. Madi on
(1902), 113 Wis. 346, 89 N. W. 156, so
fully and clearly support the author's
views, that the portion of the opinion

dealing with the ubject i et ont in foll
as follow : "Under the technical rule of
the common law it was not con idered
po, ible for two or more person to he
united a plaintiff in the ,ame a<:tiou
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decisions which have been made in the different States, it ^^'ill be

difficult, if not impossible, to say, upon their authority, that any

definite rule has been established determining the effect of a

n mad in h differ nt ta e , it ill be
, t
upon their authority, th t any
tabli h d d termining the effect of a

misjoinder of plaintiffs.

§ 128. *211. Misjoinder of Plaintiffs no Defence in an Equi-

table Action. It is certainly settled beyond a doubt that, in

all equitable actions, and in all actions where, upon equitable

principles, a co-plaintiff may sometimes be added, not because he

is jointly interested with the other, but because his presence as a

party is considered necessary to a complete determination of the

issues, — as where a husband is sometimes added in an action

brought by a wife touching her separate property, — the equitable

rule applies in its full force, and a misjoinder of plaintiffs is not

a defence to the suit; it is neither a ground of demurrer, nor can

it be set up in the answer as a bar to the relief demanded in the

upon a contract unless they were, for all

the purposes of that action, equally united

in interest, unless the benefit of the con-
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tract belonged to them as a unit, and un-

less the right in them was created at the

same time and by the same act. And the

same rule was applied to the joinder of

defendants. The common law knew noth-

ing of defendants against whom a judg-

ment for the entire amount of debt and

damages was not to be rendered, nor of

defendants who become liable at different

times, and u|)on separate instruments. . . .

The revolution contemplated by the code

has been, in a measure, defeated by at-

tempting to interpret it according to com-

mon-law principles. It was deemed that

it had not abolished the ancient legal con-

ceptions as to parties and joint rights and

liabilities, and hence the code was fenced

around by a series of decisions on this sub-

ject renderinj; it much less revolutionary

than its framers evidently designed. It

has been said — and the statement appeals

to us with considerable force — that these

ancient rules of the common law ouglit to

have but meagre weight as against the

plain and obvious purpose of the code to

simplify and remove the difficulties of the

former practice. The rules of practice

under the regime of etjuity were in every

way different from these legal doctrines.

The legal notion of a necessary unity in

the rights of the plaintiffs or in the liabili-

ties of defendants was not known or rec-

ognized in equity. The great range of

precedents on this subject may be found

in any text-book on equity jurisprudence.

It is plain from a cursory reading of the

sections of our statute mentioned that they

are broad and comprehensive enough to

cover the entire field of ancient equity

rules. They are without exception or

limitation, and usually have been con-

strued as being of equal breadth and scope

with the rules of equity as administered in

England when applied to suits in equity.

It is, perhnps, to be regretted that the

early expositors of the code should have

found it necessary to apply its language

in one way as to legal actions, and the

same language in another way as to suits

in equity. The natural and fundamental

upon a contrac unle they were, for all
the purpo e f that action, equally united
in iotere t, unle the benefit of the contra t belonged to them a a unit, and uule the right in them was created at the
. ame time and by the ame act. And the
ame rul was applied to the joioder of
d f nclant . The comm n law knew nothin of defendant again t whom a judgment for the entire amount of debt an d
damage was not to b rendered, nor of
defendant who become liable at different

r in the liabili-
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complaint or jjetition.^ The name of the unnecessary plaintiff

may be struck out b}' the court, upon motion ; or, if the cause

proceeds to trial, a judgment may be rendered in favor of the

plaintiff entitled thereto, and the action dismissed as against the

others. 2 The changes made b}^ the codes themselves, and also

by special statutes relating to the property rights of married

women, have certainly extended this rule to many cases not

1 [^Misjoinder was held by the Supreme

Court of Indiana to constitute a defence in

0mplaint r p tition. 1 Th name of th unn
ary plaintiff
m~ y be stru k out by the court, upon m ti n; r, if the cause
proceed to trial, a judgm nt may b rend r l in favor of the
plainhff entitled ther to, and th action di 'miss d a against the
th rs. 2 The changes made by the cod s them elve , an l also
by pe ial statllte relating to th pr perty right of married
women, have certainly extended thi rule to many ca e not

an action which, while not strictly equita-

ble, involved an equitable cause of action.

This was the case of Mcintosh v. Zaring

(1897), 150 lud. 301,49 N. E. 164. Three

firms of attorneys had executed a contract

with defendants, by the terms of which an

action was to be brought by the said at-

torneys to set aside the will of the father

of one of the defendants. Each firm was to
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receive one-third of the total fee, said total

to amount to a certain per cent of the sum

defendant should realize out of the estate

of her father, whether by suit or com-

promise. The attorneys fully performed

the contract on their part, but defendant

falsely and fraudulently represented to

them that she had received, as the result

of the compromise entered into, $50,000

from her father's estate, whereas in fact

she had received the sum of $250,000.

Relying on her representations plaintiffs

settled with her on the basis of §50,000.

When the fraud was di.scovered this action

was brought, the members of the three

firms joining as plaintiffs, demanding

judgment for tlie amount still due and

unpaid on the contract, and other proper

relief. One of the members of one of the

firms had previously died, and his admin-

istratrix juined as plaintiff. The com-

plaint alleged the contract, the settlement,

and the facts constituting the fraud. De-

fendants filed a general demurrer for want

of facts.

The court held that tlie contract was

several as to each firm of attorneys, and

hence did not create a joint right of action

in said attorneys. " But," said the court,

" there is an element in the complaint be-

yond the .scope of the mere written con-

tract that exerts an influence upon the

right of the several obligees or payees

therein to maintain a joint action thereon.

That element is the allegation of fraud

and misrepresentation of the defendants"

as to the amount Mrs. Mcintosh had re-

ceived from the estate of her father on

the compromise. . . . While neither one

of the firms of attorneys in the contract

mentioned were interested in either of the

other firms recovering thereon, so as to

enable them to join in a suit thereon, yet

they were all interested in the other

element which was essential to be estab-

lished, without which neither of them

could recover, namely, the fraud by which

they had been induced to .accept a smaller

sum in full settlement and discharge of

the contract than was really due them

1 [Misjoinder was held by the Supreme
Court of Indiana to constitute a defence in
an action which, while not strictly equitable, involved au equitable cause of acti on.
This wa the case of Mcintosh v. Zaring
(1897), 150 Ind. 301, 49 N. E. 164. Three
firm of attorneys had executed a con tract
with defendants, by the terms of whi ch au
action wa to be broug lit by the said attorneys to et a ide the will of the father
of one of the defendants. Each firm was to
receive one-third of the total fee, said total
to amou11t to a certain per cent of the sum
defendant shoulcl realize out of the estate
of her father, whether by suit or compromise. The attorn eys full y perform ed
the contract on their part, but defendant
falsely and fraudul ently represented to
them that she had rece ived, as the result
of the compromise entered into, $50,000
from her fath er's estate, whereas in fact
she had received the um of $250,000.
Relying on her representati ons plaintiffs
settled with her on the basis of $50,000.
When the fraud was discovered this action
was brought, the members of the three
firms joining as plaintiffs, demanding
judgment for the amount still due and
uupaitl on th e contract, and other proper
relief. One of the members of one of the
firm . had prev iou. ly died, and his admini ·tratrix joined a plaintiff. Th e com plaint alleged the contract, the settlement,
aud the facts con titutiug th e fraud. D efendants filed a general demurrer for want
of facts .
The court held that the contract was
several as t each firm of attorneys, and
hence did not create a joint right of action
in aid attorneys. " But," said th e co urt,
" there i an element in the complaint beyond the cope of the mere written contract that exerts an in ftuence upon the
right of the several ohligees or payees
therein to maintain n joint action thereon.

That element is the allegation of fraud
and mi srepresen tati on of the defendants
as to the amount Mrs. Mclnto b had received from the estate of her father on
the compromise . . . . While neither one
of the firm s of attorneys in the contract
mentioned were in tere ted in either of the
other firms r ecovering thereon, o as to
enable them to join in a suit thereon, yet
they were all in terested in the other
element which was essential to be established, wit hout which neither of them
coultl recover, namely, the fraud by which
they had bee n inducetl to aceept a smaller
sum in full settleme1:1t and discharge of
the contract than was really due them
In other words, they were all a lik e interested in avoiding the settlement." There
was no specific prayer to have the settlement et aside, but the facts showed plaintiff entitled to it, and the court held it
proper to grant such reli ef under the general prayer . A cco rding ly the court held
that in respect of this join de r the complaint was not bad for want of sufficient
facts.
But th e administratrix of one of the
attorneys had joined as plaintiff, although
un der the law the partnership assets went
to the survivor. H ence she bad no interest in the action. And on this account
the co urt held the complaint bad a again t
the demurrer, as to all the plaintiff , notwithstanding that the equ itable cau e of
action for sett ing a ide the ettleruent
had been deemed sufficient to warrant th e
joinder of the firms of attorn ey .
See also People, ex rel. v. District Court
(1893), 18 Colo. 293, 32 Pac. 819, which
is controlled hy the tatute making mi join der of plaintiffs a g round of demurrer.]
2 Ackley v. Tarbox, 31 N. Y. 564 ;
Allen v. Buffalo, 38 N. Y. 280; [ Ku cera t '.
Kucerajl893) , 86 Wis. 416, 57 N . W . 4i .]
0
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Strictly equitable, even to cases which could not have been

maintained at all Avliile the common law was in its integrity.

§ 129. * 212. Doctrine that Demurrer -will lie or Dismissal as to

Party improperly Joined. There is another class of decisions,

made in actions of a similar nature to those last mentioned, —

that is, actions strictly equitable, and those in which a plaintiff

is added in pursuance of a supposed positive rule of practice,

although no joint legal right is alleged, — in which it has been

held that, if the misjoinder of a plaintiff appears upon the face

of the complaint or petition, the defendant may demur as against

the party, thus improperly joined, on the ground that the plead-

ing does not state facts sufficient to constitute a cause of action

in his favor; or, if no demurrer is interposed, the same objection

may be raised at the trial, and the action dismissed as to him-.

If the misjoinder does not appear upon the face of the pleading,

the defence must be set up in the answer.^ The principle of this

class of decisions is the same as that involved in the cases

described in the preceding paragraph. The actions in which

this method of raising the objection of a misjoinder is permitted,
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may be equitable or may be legal; but, if the latter, they are

not based upon a joint legal right alleged to be held by all the

plaintiffs. In all of them the right of action is assumed to be

possessed by one or more of the plaintiffs, who are the real parties

in interest, and the other parties are added through some sup-

posed requirement of form or of policy.

§ 130. "^ 213. Misjoinder Fatal as to all the Plaintiffs in a Legal

Action. View of some Courts. We are finally brought to the

case of an action strictly legal in its nature, brought by two or

more plaintiffs in whose favor a joint riglit is averred as the

ground of recovery. The cotirts of some States have distinctly

asserted and applied the ancient common-law rule under these

circumstances, notwithstanding the provisions of the codes, and

notwithstanding even the liberal scheme of interpretation which

1 Palmer v. Davis, 28 N. Y. 242. hini, Imt uot as to both. No joint cause of

I'almer and wife sued on an award made action was liere alie^'cd, although, nomi-

in her favor. The Court of Apjx-als ]i<ld tuilli/, the action was joint. See also

that the husband was not a proper plain- Willard v. Keas, 26 Wis. 540, 544, which

tiff ; that, as this appeared on the face of holds that, in an action by two or more

tiie complaint, the defendant might have plaintiffs, a general demurrer Mgainst all

demurred generally as to him; and that these plaintiffs, on the ground of a want

the same objection could l)e raiser! on the of sufficient facts, is bad if a good cause

trial, and the complaint dismissed as to of action i» alleged in favor of one of them.

ri ·tl · equi aule Y n
whi h could not ha e b en
aintained at all while the ommon 1 w wa in it int grity.
129. * ... 12. Doctrine that Demurrer will lie or Dismissal as to
Par y improperly Joined.
Th r i an l r 1 s of d cision ,
ma l in ac i n of a ~ imilar nature to tho e la t m nti ned, that i , acti n tri tl q uitabl and tho e in which a plaintiff
i ~ lc.l d in pur uance of a UL po ed po ·itive rule of practice,
althou0 h n joint le al right i alleged , - in which it has been
h l<l hat, if the mi j inder of a plaintiff appears upon the face
of he complaint or p tition, the defendant may demur as against
the par y, thu impr perly joined, on the ground that the pleadin d
not tate facts ufficient to constitute a ca.u se of action
in hi favor; or, if no demurrer is interposed, the same bjection
may be rai ed at the trial, and the action dismissed as to him~
If the misj inder does not appear upon the face of the pleading
the defence mu t be et l-lP in the answ r. 1 The principle f this
cla '~ of decisions i the same a that involved in the cases
de cribed in the preceding paragraph. The action in which
thi m thod of raising the objecti n of a misjoinder i permitted,
may be equitable or may be legal; but, if the lat er, they are
not ba ed upon a joint legal rigl: t alleged to b h ld by all the
plaintiff . In all of th m the right of action i a sumed to be
p e ed by one or more of the plaintiff , who are the real artie
in intere t, an the other partie are added through ome uppo. ed requirem n of f rm or of policy.
130. ;:: 213. M isjoinder Fatal as to all the Plaintiffs in a Legal
Action.
View of some Courts.
We ar finally br ught to the
ca' of an action trictl3 legal in its natur br ught b tw or
joint right i a rr
th
m r plain iff in who fav r
gr un £ r c very.
he court of s me tat h ve di tin ly
a . rt
and appli l th ar i nt comm n-law rul und r th '
·ir u1 tan
n i.witb tandin tl pr v1 ' l ns f th
d
and
notwith ·ta1 ding ev n tl li ral ch m of rn rpr tation which
~· .
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had, as a general thcorij, been adopted by the same tribunals.

When, in such an action, a joint right is averred as arising from

contract or from tlie ownership of hind or chattels, while in fact

no joint right in all exists, but only a several right held by one

or a joint one held by some, this error, according to the con-

struction now stated, goes to the entire proceeding and defeats

the suit as against all the plaintiffs. If the error appears upon

the face of the complaint or petition, the objection may be raised

by a general demurrer interposed against all the plaintiffs, on

the ground that facts sufficient to constitute a cause of action are

not stated in the pleading; and, in the absence of a demurrer,

the same objection may be taken at the trial by a motion for a

nonsuit or for a dismissal of the action. Finally, if the error is

not apparent on the face of the pleading, the defence may be set

up in the answer, and is, perhaps, admissible under the general

denial. This is plainly the original common-law doctrine, un-

affected by the reform legislation, and it proceeds upon the

assumption that the cause of action is a joint one, that this

attribute of jointness is as essential to the maintenance of the

Generated for facpubupdates (University of Michigan) on 2014-06-17 15:31 GMT / http://hdl.handle.net/2027/uc2.ark:/13960/t02z1c23b
Public Domain / http://www.hathitrust.org/access_use#pd

alleged right as any other material fact, and that the inability to

establish the particular averment is not a mere variance, but is a

complete failure of proof. ^ As an illustration: if the complaint

1 Bartges v. O'Neil, 13 Ohio St. 72 ; jointly, as was averred, and that this de-

Masters V. Freemau, 17 Ohio St. 323; feet could be taken advantage of by a

])e Bolt v. Carter, 31 Ind. 355; Goodnight general demurrer for a want of sufficient

I'. Goar, 30 Ind. 418 ; Berkshire y. Schujtz, facts; and that the action should have

25 Ind. 523 ; Lipperd v. Edwards, 39 Ind. been dismissed on the trial for the same

165; Estabrook v. Messersmith, 18 Wis. reason. Compare this decision with that

545; Frans v. Young, 24 Iowa, 375; Gi- made by the New York Court of Appeals

raud V. Beach, 3 E. D. Smith, 337. Cer- in Simar v. Canaday, .53 N. Y. 298, which,

tain of these cases inferentiallij support to a certain extent, presented the same

the propositions contained in the text, by peculiar features. The Ohio court re-

ha l a' a general theory, been adopt cl by he ame tribunals.
\Vb n in uch an action, a joint right is a err cl a ari.'ing from
c ntract or from the owner 'hip £ lancl r hatLel , while in fa ·t
no j int ri 0 ht in all exi ·t ', but nly a, veral right h ld by on
or a j int one h ld by ome, thi' error, a cording t the
ntruction n w tated, goe to th ntire pr c ding and d f ats
he ·ui t a again tall th
laintiff . If the err r ap1 ar upon
the face of the complaint or petition, the obj ctiou may be rai · d
by a general demurrer interpo ed again t all the plaintiff , n
the ground that facts sufficient to con titute a cause of action are
not tated in the pleading; and, in the ab nee of a demurrer,
the ame objection may be taken at the trial by a motion for a
non uit or for a dismissal of the action. Finally, if the error i ·
not apparent on the face of the pleading, the defence may be et
up in the an wer, and is, perhaps, admis ible under the general
denial. This i plainly the original common-law doctrine, unaffected by the reform legi lation, and it proceeds upon the
a umption that the cause of action is a joint one, that this
attribute of y'ointness is as ess ntial to the maintenance of the
alleged right a any other material fact, and that the inability to
e taLli ·h the particular averment i not a mere variance, but i a
complete failure of proof. 1 As an illustration: if the complaint

holdiug that a misjoinder of plaintiffs in affirmed the doctrine in the subsequent

.sucli actions may be taken advantage of case of Masters v. Freemau, 17 Ohio St.

by a general demurrer, upon the ground 323. Estabrook v. Messersmith, 18 Wis.

tiiat sufficient facts are not alleged ; the 545, was an action by two partners,

others, however, sustain these propositions alleging their partnership, their joint

to their full extent. As the subject is one ownership of certain goods, and a wrong-

of great practical importance, I shall quote ful conversion thereof by the defendants,

from the.se decisions at .some length. Bart- It appeared on the trial that one of the

ges V. O'Neil, 13 Ohio St. 72, was an action plaintiffs had been guilty of a fraud upon

by a husband and wife to recover daniiiges his creditors in respect of the property in

for deceit in the .sale of lands purchased question, which, as the court hell, pre-

froin the defendant. The Supreme Court eluded him from recovery; and it was

of Ohio held that the petition <iisclo.sed no thereupon claimed by the defendants that,

cause of action belonging to the phiintiffs although the other plaintiff was innocent

1 Bartges v. O'Neil, 13 Ohio St. 72;
l\1a ter v. Freeman, 17 Ohio St. 323;
De Bolt v. Carter, 31Ind.355; Goodnight
i·. Goar, 30 Ind . 418; Berkshire v. chultz,
25 Ind. 523; Lipperd v. Edwards, 39 Ind.
165 ; Estabrook: v . .Mes.ersmith, 18 Wi.
5-t:l; Fran v. Youug, 24 Iowa, 375; Giraud v. Beach, 3 E. D . ._'mith, :337. Certain of the e cases inferentiall.11 upport
the propo itions contained in the text, by
holdiug that a misj oinder of plaintiffs in
,uch actions may be taken advantage of
by a general demurrer, upon the ground
that ufficient facts are not alleged ; the
other , however, su tain these propo itiou
to their full extent. A the ubj ect is one
of reat practical im portance, I hall quote
from the e deci ion at ome length. Bartge v. O'Neil, 13 Ohio, t. 72, wa$ an action
by a husbaud and wife to reco,·er damage
for deceit in the sale of laud purcha ed
from the defendant. Th e Supreme Court
of Ohio held that the petition cli-clo. ed no
cau ·e of action belonging to the plaintiffs

jointly, as was averred, and that this defect could be taken ad vantage of by a
general demurrer for a want of ufficient
facts; and that the action hould ha,·e
been dismi eel ou the trial for the ame
rea on.
ompare this decision with that
made by the New York Court of Appeal
in imar v. Canaday, 53 N. Y. 29 , which,
to a certain extent, pre ented the ame
peculiar feature . The Ohio court reaffirmed the doctrine in the ubsequ nt
ca e of Ma ter v. Freeman, 17 Ohio t.
323. Estabrook v. 1e ser mith, 18 Wi .
545, wa au action by two partner ,
alleging their partner hip, their joint
owner hip of certain go d . and a wrongful conver ion thereof by th defendant .
It appeared on the trial that one of the
plaintiff had been guilty of a fraud upon
hi creditors in re pect of the property in
que tion, which, a the ourt held, precluded him from recovery; and it was
thereupon claimed by the defendauts that,
althoug h the other plaintiff was inuocent
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should allege that the plaintiffs A. and B. were partners, and as

such had sold and delivered to the defendant certain goods, for a

'i ul l all

h t the plain iff
. and B. were partner , and as
u h l l ol l and deli red to he defendant certain 0 ood , for a

of the fniutl, there could be uo recovery

ill any form, — not by the plaintiffs jointly,

because one of them was unable to main-

tain the action ; and not by the innocent

partner, because the right averred in the

complaint was a joint one. The plaintiffs

were permitted, however, to recover the

value of the innocent partner's interest.

This judgment was reversed by the Su-

jireme Court, and the grounds of the

decision were thus stated by Dixon 0. J.

(p. .549): "The plaintiffs were partners,

and sued for the alleged wrongful conver-

sion of their partnership' property ; and

such is the nature of their legal right —

they are so iudissolubly blended — that

Generated for facpubupdates (University of Michigan) on 2014-06-17 15:31 GMT / http://hdl.handle.net/2027/uc2.ark:/13960/t02z1c23b
Public Domain / http://www.hathitrust.org/access_use#pd

they must not only join in an action at law,

but a right of action must be established

in both, or no recovery can be had. It is

a general principle, applicable to suits of

this nature, that all must be entitled to

judgment, or none ; and in cases where

either party is precluded on the ground of

fraud, the fraud binds not only the guilty

partner, but the innocent partner in that

suit. ... It would seem that, if the de-

frauded party [meaning the innocent jiart-

ner] lias any remedy, it is only by a suit

in ecjuity, in which the objection of joining

his guilty copartner as a party plaintiff is

e.xsily obviated." I must remark, in pass-

ing, that the last observation is certainly

a strange one, in the face of the statutory

provision contained in the Wisconsin code,

which purports to abolish all distinctions

between legal and ecjuitable actions. That

a plaintiff should be turned out of court in

one action called Ifg'il, and should be told

that he must bring another action called

equitable, for exactly the same demand,

and upon exactly the s.ame allegations of

fact, and that, in the latter suit, the par-

ticular and technical ground of his defeat

in the former one could not be objected

to his recovery, seems, to say the least, to

be a recognition of the "distinction "which

the law-making power had so expressly

abrogated.

I^.Xn interesting illustration of the evo-

lution of judicial opinion is afforded by

a comparison of this case of Estabrook

V. Messersmith with the recent case of

Castle V. Madison (1902), 113 Wis. 346,

89 N. W. 156, in which the court fully

supports the author in his view of the

unity of procedure. This case is quoted

at length in note to § *210.]

The Supreme Court of Indiana has ap-

proved the doctrine Qof Estabrook v.

Messersmith] in substance, although in a

form somewhat modified. Berkshire v.

Shultz, 25 Ind. 523. QSee the case of

Mcintosh V. Zaring (1897), 150 Ind. 301,

49 N. E. 164, in which the court said:

"It is tirmly settled in this State that

a complaint which does not state a good

f th fraud there ould be no r P, overy
iu any form - not b the plaintiff · j intly,
IJI.' ·au.·e on of the m wa una ble to maintain he ction ; and not by th inno ent
part ner , becan e t he right av rred in the
ornplaint wa a joint one. The plaintiff
were p rmi ted, however , to recover the
al u of the innocent partner intere t.
hi ju<l ment wa rever ed by th
up reme ourt and the grollnd of the
deci io n were thn. tated by Dix on C. J.
(p. 549) : " The plaintiff were partner ,
a ud ued for the alleged wrongful converion of their part ner hip property ; and
ucb i the nat ure of their legal right t hey are o in di 'olubly bl nd ed - that
the mu t not only join in an action at law,
but a rig ht of action mu t be e tabli hed
in both, or n o recovery can be had. It i
a general p rinciple, applicable to uit of
tbi nat ure, th at all mu t be entitled to
judgment, or n one ; and in case where
either party i precluded on the ground of
fraud , th e fraud bind not only the guilty
partu r, but tbe inn ocent pa rtner in that
uit. . . I t wollld
em that, if the defrau ded party [meaning the innocent partner] ha a ny r med.v, it i only by a uit
iu qui ty, in whi ch th e objection of joining
l1i g uilty opar tner
a partv plaintiff i
, ily obviate l." I mu t remark, in pa in , that the la t ob ervation i ertaiuly
a trang e one, i n th e face of the tat utory
provi ion outain ed in th e Wi con in ode,
whirh purport t aboli h a1l di tin ctiou
b t w en le I and eq uitahle action . That
a plain ti ff -h uld be turned out of court in
one action called legal, and hould be told
th at he mu t bring another action called
quitable, fo r exactly the ame demand,
a u<l upon exactly t he ame allegati n of
fa t, and that, in t he latter uit, the part icular an<l techu ical ground of hi d f at
io the form r one could not be obj ct d
to hi. recov ry, em , to ay the le t to
a r cognition of the " di tin ti on "which
t he 1 ' -making power bad o expre . l
IJrogated.
[ \ n int re ting illu tration of the oJo i n f judicial opini on i aff rded by
a · rnpari on of th i ase of E tabrook
. M e mi t h with the r cent ca e of

C tle v. Madi on ( l 902), 113 Wi . 346,
9 N. W. 156, in whi h the ·court folly
upport the author in hi view of the
unity of procedure. Thi a e i quoted
at length in note to § * 21 O.]
The upreme our of Indiana bas a~
proved the doctrine [ of Estabrook v.
Me er mi th] in ub tance, although in a
f rm
mewhat modified. Berkshire v.
hultz, l:!5 Incl. 523. [ ee the ca e of
1clnto. h v . Zaring (I 97), 150 Ind. 301,
49
. E. 164, in which the court said:
'It i firmly ettled in tbi
tate that
a cumplaint ' hi ·h doe n t tate a good
au e of action a t all, thourrh it doe
a to ome of the plaintiff , i bad as
to all, for want f • utfic:ient fact to contitute a cau e of action." The ourt in
thi. ca e quoted from the a e f Ni odemu v. imon (I 9), I 1 Ind. 564, as
follow : " If, therefore, two or more
per on bring a joint action, alleging a
j int cau e of action, and it turn out upon
the trial that upon the fa t all ged in the
c mplaint ome, but n t all, f the plaintiff are entitled to reco r the ourt or
jury, a the ca e may be, will o find, and
judgn1ent will be rend red accordingly .
. . . But, a we have alr ady held, the
·om plaint i. good, and the qu tion b fore
u i oue of evidence, and not of pleadina;
upon the evicien e before them, the jury
found for the female app 11 e and the
ourt rendered judgment in her favo r .
'Ihi , we thiuk, wa proper."
nd the
ourt, in icln h . Zaring, e;oe on toay : " It
cl ar that the e tion
qu t di
long lin
f a e
ited h ldiog that a
compla iut by plaintiff · will b bad for
want f uffi i n fa t if it do

id. 545,
ever ly
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stipulated price, and slioiild demand a judgment therefor, and on

the trial it should appear that A. and B. were not partners as

averred, and did not jointly sell and deliver the chattels to the

defendant, but that in fact the same were sold and delivered by

A. alone, B. having no interest in or connection with the trans-

action, in pursuance of the rule adopted in these decisions no

judgment could be rendered for A. separately; the action would

entirely fail as respects both the plaintiffs. It thus appears that,

in at least three States, the courts have, in the most explicit

manner, and in well considered opinions, reaffirmed the ancient

common-law doctrine in respect to legal actions brought by two

or more plaintiffs jointly; and have held that the joint right

must be proved as alleged, or the action must fail as to all the

plaintiffs. In other States, it is merely said that a misjoinder is

ground for a demurrer interposed to all the plaintiffs for the

cause that the complaint or petition does not state facts sufficient

to constitute a cause of action.

§ 131. * 214. New York Cases. Criticism. The question

has been presented to the New York Court of Appeals, but
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has not been passed upon in such an explicit manner as neces-

sarily to establish the rule for that State. In an action brought

by two plaintiffs, G. and C, to recover damages for an alleged

fraud, the action being in form joint, and the demand of judg-

ment being for damages due to the plaintiffs jointly, the com-

plaint was dismissed at the trial, because it appeared that the

right of action was held by one of the plaintiffs alone. In respect

to this ruling, the Commission of Appeal said: "Probably the

court had the power in this action, if the claim had been made,

to have awarded to C. his damages, giving judgment against the

other plaintiff. But the court was not bound to do this, and

committed no error in defeating the plaintiffs, because they did

doubted. Cole J. made, in fact, tlie same lyn, 5 Ilun, 149 ; Marie v. Garrison,

criticism which I have made in the fore- 83 N. Y. 14, 29 ; Loomis i-. Brown, 16

going note. See also Graham Tp. Indep. Barb. 331 ; Great W. Compound Co. v.

Sch. Dist. V. Indep. Sch. Dist. No. 2, .50 ^.tna Ins. Co , 40 Wis. 373. See also

Iowa, 322 (in an action to recover money, Ilellams v. Switzer, 24 S. C. 39; Sira v.

the objection to a misjoinder of plaintiffs Hurst, 44 Ind. 579 ; Yates v. State, 58

should be made by motion, not by de- Ind. 299 ; Hyatt v. Cochran, 85 Ind. 231 ;

murrer). As to proper or improper Dill v. Voss, 94 Ind. 590; Pixley v. Van

joinder of plaintiffs, see Bort v. Yaw, Nostern, 100 Ind. 34; Morningstar v.

46 Iowa, 323; Fuller v. Fuller, 5 Hun, Cunningham, 110 Ind. 328.

593 ; Brett v. First Univ. Soc. of Brook-

stipulat d price, and hould demand a judgm nt th refor, and on
th trial it hould app ar that A . an l B. were n t
rtn r a
av rr d, and did not jointly 11 and deliver th hatt l t the
defendant, but that in fa t the am were old and
by
. alone, B . having no intere t in or connection with th tran .action, in pursuance of the rule adopt d in th . d ci ion n
ju gment could be render d for A. eparately; the action would
entirely fail as respects both the plaintiffs. It thu appear that,
in at least three States, the courts have, in the mo t explicit
manner, and in well considered opinion , reaffirmed the anci nt
common-law doctrine in re pect to legal actions brought by two
or more plaintiffs jointly; and have held that the joint right
must be proved as alleged, or the action must fail a to all the
plaintiff . In other States, it is merely said that a mi joinder i
ground for a demurrer interposed to all the plaintiffs for the
cause that the complaint or petition does not state fact sufficient
to constitute a cause of action.
§ 131. * 214. N e w York C ases. Critic ism. The question
has been presented to the New York Court of Appeals, but
ha not been passed upon in such an explicit manner as necesarily to establish the rule for that State. In an action brought
by two plaintiffs, G. and C., to recover damages for an alleged
fraud, the action being in form joint, and the demand of judgment being for damages due to the plaintiffs jointly, the complaint was dismissed at the trial, because it appeared that the
right of action was held ·by one of the plaintiffs alone. In re pect
to this ruling, the Commission of Appeal said: "Probably the
<:ourt had the power in this action, if the claim had been made,
to have awarded to C. his damages, giving judgment again t the
other plaintiff. But the court was not bound to do thi , and
committed no error in defeating the plaintiffs, because they did
doubted. Cole J. made, in fact, the same
criti ci m which I have mad e in the foregoing note. See also Graham Tp. Jnd ep.
'ch. Di t. v. Indep. Sch . Dist. No. 2, 50
Iowa, 322 (in an action to recover money,
the ohjection to a mi joinder of plaintiffs
· hould be made by motion, not by demurrer).
A to proper or improper
joinder of plaintiffs, see B ort v. Yaw,
46 Iowa, 323; Fuller. 1•. Fuller, 5 Hun,
595; Brett v. First Univ. Soc. of Broo k-

lyn, 5 Hon, 149; Mari t•. Garri on,
83 N. Y. 14 , 29; Loorni · v. Brown , 16
Barb. 33 1 ; Great W . C'ompound Co. t•.
JEtna Ju . Co, 40 Wi . 3i3.
ee al o
H ellam v. witzer, 24 . . 39; im v.
Hurst, 44 Ind. 5i9 ; Yat . v. tate, 5
Ind . 299; Hyatt v. ochran, 5 Ind. 231;
Dill v. Voss, 94 Ind. 590 ; Pixley v. Van
No tern, I 00 Ind . 34; Morning tar v.
Cunningh am , 110 Ind. 32 .
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not establish a cause of action in which they were hoth inter-

ested."'' Tlii:i conchision is certainly very unsatisfactory. It

can hardly be possible that it is a matter of discretion with the

court, at the trial, whether it will permit a severance in the

no
ta li 1 a cau e f a tion in whi h they were both in rted.' 1 This conclu i n is c rtainl
un a ti fa tor . I t
an hardl ~
po ibl tha it i a matt r f di
ith th
rmit a
he
c r t. at he rial, h ther it will
judo-ment or will di mi
the c ion entir ly.
f
arying a cri erion
li igan par ie cann t d pend u.i.: on
opinion or whim of an individual jud e. In
ub e
nt ca
where th action wa br u ht by a hu band and wif t reco r
damn. e for a fraud alle ed to have be n don t th m jointly
and in whi h a joint right f acti n w
di tine 1 av rr d h
a me court announced the rule in th f llowing mann r, bu , ,
it wa entirely unn ce ary to th d ci ion of the a e th
xpre , ion of opinion cannot be reaarcl d a an bing m · than a
dictum: The defendant mo ed t di mi the complaint u1 on
everal ground , and, 1 t that the plaintiff could not aintain
a joint action, and that there wa thereby a mi "'j inder of parti
plaintiff. This point is not re ted upon the marital relati n f
the plaintiff , and the exi tence of that relation ma in c nidering it be put out of view. It i an objection which may
be taken on the trial. · But it i n t an objection which aff rd
good round for a m tion to di mi s the com laint of
th
plainti
if either of hem ha hown that he or he ha a good
cau e of ac ion. I n uch ca e the motion mu t be for a di mi al f the complaint f the plaintiff in whom no right of action
app ar . 2
¥'he her ither of the plaintiff ha shown a g od
caw e f action will be on ider d under the next t wo head . ' 3
132.
215 . True I n terpre t atio n of the C o d es a s to Consequences of M is joinder.
Al hough not enti led to t he weight of
authority a a decision, the l ctrin la -quot d from the opinion
f tl
ew York ) urt f p a1
in complete accordanc
wi h he rue pirit and evid nt inten f the r f rm 1 gi lati n.
r he
nclu i n. r a h l
th
ourt f bi Wi
n in and
her of r
lainly r ul fr m failure
ndi na in the a
v

judgment or will dismiss the action entirely. The rights of

litigant parties cannot depend upon so A^arying a criterion as the

opinion or whim of an individual judge. In a subsequent case,

where the action was brought by a husband, and wife to recover

damages for a fraud alleged to have been done to them jointly,

and in which a joint right of action was distinctly averred, the

same court announced the rule in the following manner, but, as

it was entirely unnecessary to the decision of the case, the ex-

pression of opinion cannot be regarded as anything mo e than a

dictum : " The defendant moved to dismiss the complaint upon

several grounds, and, 1st, that the plaintiffs could not maintain

a joint action, and that there was thereby a misjoinder of parties

plaintiff. This point is not rested upon the marital relation of

the plaintiffs, and the existence of that relation may, in con-

sidering it, be put out of view. It is an objection which may
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be taken on the trial. ' But it is not an objection which affords

good grounds for a motion to dismiss the complaint of both

plaintiffs, if either of them has shown that he or she has a good

cause of action. In such case the motion must be for a dis-

missal of the complaint of the plaintiff in whom no right of action

appears. 2 Whether either of the plaintiffs had shown a good

cause of action will be considered under the next two heads. "^

§ 132. * 215. True Interpretation of the Codes as to Conse-

quences of Misjoinder. Although not entitled to the weight of

authority as a decision^ the doctrine last-quoted from the opinion

of the New York Court of Appeals is in complete accordance

with the true spirit and evident intent of the reform legislation.

The conclusions reached by the courts of Ohio, Wisconsin, and

Indiana, in the cases heretofore cited, plainly result from a failure

' Calkins v. Smith, 48 N. Y. 61 1, G19, 191 ; Fry v. Street, 37 Ark. 39; Lancaster

per Karl J. Cy. v. Kush (Neb. 1892), 52 N. W. 837;

2 Citing rode, § 144 (6),§ 148; I'alnicr Wiesner v. Young (Minn. 1892), 52 N. W.

r. Davis, 28 N. Y. 242. 390 ; Hurd c. Simpson, 47 Kan. 372 ; Arts

•'* Simar v. Canady, 53 N. Y. 298, 301, r. Guthrie, 75 Iowa, 674; White Oak

per Folger J. S. 1'. Green v. Green, C9 Dist. Tp. v. Oskaloosa Di.st. Tp. 44 Iowa.

N. C. 294, 298; Burns v. Ashworth, 72 512. A preponderance of recent authority

N. C. 496; Warrcnton v. Arrington, 101 supports the opinion of the author and the

N. C. 109 ; Oliphint v. Mansfield, 3G Ark. dictum of Folgcr J.

a lki n t• . • mith, 4 N . Y. 61-i , 619,
per E arl J .
1 ('itiog <'ode.
144 ( 6), 14 ; l'alm r
''· D ad , 1. •. Y. 242 .
·imar ''· a oa<ly, ;) 3 • ". Y. 2 , 301 ,
p r FolgPr ,J.
. P. Grc n 1·. r n , 9
·
. 2 4, 2!) ; B u rn . v.
hw rtlt 72
4!16; W arrenton v.
rrington, l Ol
l O!J Ol'phiut i.: • .:\Ian fi el d, 3G .Ark.

i\11 JOINDlm OF rLAl .. ' TlFF ·.

1~ 1

MISJOINDKU UF PLAINTIFFS.

101

to grasp tlie central principle of interpretation which should be

applied in construing the codes of procedure, and to push it to

its legitimate consequences. That principle, which had been

fully recognized by the same tribunals under other circumstances,

is the purely equitable nature of the statutory provisions regulat-

ing the subject of parties, and the application of the equitable

theory to the civil action in all its phases, and under all its uses,

without exception or limitation. This is now conceded, almost

universally, to be the true interpretation of the clauses of the

codes under consideration, whenever the mode of interpretation

is to be stated in a general and comprehensive manner.* The

confusion and conflict of decision shown in the preceding para-

1 [_" A misjoinder or uniting of parties

who should not he joined cannot he taken

advantage of hy demurrer:" Dolan v.

Hubiuger (1899), 109 la. 408, 80 N. W.

514. To the same effect, Cedar Kapids

to gra p the central prin iple of int rpr tation which houl<l be
a.ppli d in construing th cod s 0£ pro c..lur and to pu"h it to
it 1 itimat
on qurn · s. That principl , which had been
full r bnized by th ame tribunal· under th r ircum tance ,
i · the pur ly quitabl nature f th tatut ry pr vi ion regulating th ubj t of P< rti , an l the application of th equitable
th ry to the civil action in all it pha es, and und r all its use ,
with ut exception or limitation. This i' now conceded, almo t
umv r ·ally, to be the true interpr tation of the clau
of the
code under con ideration, whenev r the mode of interpretation
i' to be state<l in a gen ral and comprehensive manner. 1 The
confu ion and conflict of decision shown in the pr ceding para-

Nat. Bank v. Lavery (1900J, 110 la.
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57.5, 81 N. W. 775. A motion is the proper

remedy : Lull v. Auamosa Nat. Bank

(1900), 110 la. 537, 81 N. W. 784;

Martin v. Clay (1899), 8 Okla. 46, 50 Pac.

715; Hornish v. Ringen Stove Co. (1902),

116 la. 1, 89 N. W. 95; Stiles v. City of

•Guthrie (1895), 3 Okla. 26, 41 Pac. 383 ;

Powell V. Banks (1898), 146 Mo. 620, 48

S. VV. 664 (even after judgment). The

question cannot be raised hy demurrer on

the ground of defect of parties or mis-

joinder of causes of action : Wunderlich

V. Chicago & N. W. R. R. Co. (1896), 93

Wis. 1.32, 66 N. W. 1144. Nor can it be

raised by a demurrer for want of juris-

diction or want of facts: Svanburg t-.

Fosseeii (1899), 75 Minn. 350, 78 N. W. 4.

" A misjoinder apparent upon the face

of the petition is waived if not objected to

before trial :" Goble v. Swobe (1902), 64

Neb. 838, 90 N. W. 919. The objection of

misjoinder cannot be made for tiie first

time on appeal: Brook i-. Rayless (1898),

6 Okla. 568. 52 Pac. 738; Breault v.

Merrill & Ring Lumber Co (1898), 72

Minn. 143, 75 N. W. 122. The objection

comes too late at the trial : Harrell v.

Davis (1899), 108 Ga. 789, 33 S. E. 8.52.

" There is no such reason for demurrer as

misjoinder of parties : " Cargar >•. Fee

(1894), 140 Ind. 572, 39 N. E. 93. In

North Carolina, on the other hand, mis-

joinder of parties must he taken advantage

of by demurrer and not by motion, but the

defect is considered a mere matter of sur-

plu.sage and not fatal : McMiHan v. Baxley

(1893), 112 N. C. 578, 16 S. E. 845; Tate

V. Douglas (1893), 113 N. C. 190, 18 S. E.

202; Sullivan v. Field (1896), 118 N. C.

358, 24 N. E. 735 ; Hocutt v. Wilmington

etc. R. R. Co. (1899), 124 N. C. 214, 32

S. E. 681. See contra, Wool v. Edeuton

(1893), 113 N. C. 33, 18 S. E. 76.

See in this connection the case of Hurd

V. Hotciikiss (1900), 72 Conn. 472, 45 Atl.

11, where the court said : " Plaintiffs may

ordinarily bring actions jointly or sev-

erally, as they consider their rights re-

(]uire; just as plaintiffs may claim the

relief to which they conceive themselves

l ["A mi joinder or uniting of parties
who hould not be joinctl cannot be taken
advantage of by demurrer:" Dolan v.
Hubiug r (1899), 109 Ia. 40 , ON. W.
514. To the same effect, C'edar Rapids
Nat. Bank v. Lavery (1900), 110 la.
575, l r . W. 775. A moti on is the proper
reme<ly: Lull v . Anamosa Nat. Bank

(1900),

110 Ia. 537,

81

N. W. 784;

l\1artin v. Clay (1899), 8 Okla. 46, 56 Pac.
715; Ilorni h v. Ringen Stove Co. (1902),
116 Ia. l , 89 N. W. 95; tiles v. City of
·Guthrie (1 95) , 3 Okla. 26, 41 Pac. 383;
Powell v. I3anks (1898), 146 Mo. 620, 48
. W. 664 (even after judgment). The
question cannot be raised by demurrer on
the g round of defect of parties or misjoin<ler of causes of action: Wund erli ch
v. Chicago & N. W.R. R Co. (1 896) , 93
Wis. 132, 66 N. W. 1144 . Nor can it be
rai e<l by a demurrer fo r want of jurisdiction or want of fact : vanbu rg v.
Fo een ( 1899 ), 75 Minn. 350, 7 N. W. 4.
'' A misj oinder apparent upon the face
of the petition is wai ved if not objected to
before trial : " Goble v. Swohe (1902) , 64
Neb. 38, 90 . W. 919. Th e objection of
mi joind er cannot be ma de for the fir. t
tim e on appeal : Brook 1" Bayless ( 1898),
6 Okla. 56 . 52 Pac. 7.'38; Breanlt v.
Merrill & R in ~ Lumber Co (1 98), 72
Minn . 143, i5 t . W. 122 . Th e objection
come t o la.te at the trial: Ha.rrell v.
Davi (1 99), 10 Ga. 789 ..'33 '. E. !>2.
"There i. no such rea on for demurrer as
mi joinder of parties:"
argar 1'. Fee
(1894), 140 Ind. 572, 39
. E. 93. In
North aro lin a, on the other hand, mi. joinder of parties must be taken advantage

of by demurrer and not by motion, but th
defect is considered a mer matter of urpl u. age and not fatal : Mc:\1illan v. Baxl y
(193),112 N. C. 5i, 16 . E. 45; Tate
v. Dougla ' (1 93), 113 N. C. 190, 18 R. E .
202; Sullivan v. Field ( l 96 ), 11 N. C.
35 , 24 N. E. 735; Hocutt v. Wilmington
etc. R. R. Co. (1899), 124 N. C. 214, 32
S. E . 681.
ee contra, ·w ool v. Edenton
(1893), 113 N. C. 33, 18 . E. i6.
ee in this connection the ca e of Hurd
v. Hotchki s (1900), 72 Conn. 4i2, 45 Atl.
11, where the court said: "Plaintiff may
ordinarily bring action jointly or eYerally, as they consider their rights requi re; ju t as plaintiffs may claim the
relief to which they conceive them elve
t o be entitled. If it turn out in the
progress of the trial that the plaintiff.
are not properly named, then the court
makes such order as the circum tanc
requi r e, or renders judgment again t them
all, or for only uch of them a may ha,·e
established a right to rec over. Thi i
authorized to be done by §
and 110
of the General Statute . The e ection
furn i h the only authority of which we
are aware, for a court to make an order
that oJJe or more of the p r on joined a
plaintiff.-; in a complaiut shall ue forbidd ll
to pro. ccnte." Citincr the t xt.
In (' lllrado, wh re mi joinder i a
statutory grounrl f <l emurr r, it i held
that the objection cannot be rai ed by
an wer, where th d f t appear upon
the fac of the c mplaint : am Car
Coupler o. r. L ague (1 9 ), 25 Colo.
129, 54 Pac. 642.J

192 CIVIL REMEDIES.

CIVIL REMEDIE ' ,

graphs arise from the fact that courts, in determining the special

rules applicable to particular classes of cases, have been unwilling

to carry out the principle which they have accepted in its most

general form, and to adopt the results which necessarily flow

from it; they have shrunk from the changes in the old and familiar

methods which sucli a course would produce. It is very plain,

however, that, if we are ever to have a uniform, consistent,

simple, and symmetrical system of procedure as the outcome of

the reform legislation, the courts must be willing to follow the

general principles of interpretation to their legitimate conclu-

sions. A system in which the equital)le doctrine as to parties

and judgments is permitted to work its effect upon legal actions

to a partial extent, while the ancient legal doctrine is applied

in other instances, would be more objectionable even than the

fr m th fa t h t

ur

p cial
,h
be n unwilling
ac
t
in it mo ·t
n c arily fl w
in th ol and f miliar
It i v ry plain,
c n i tent,
out m f
foll w the
t rmining th

former complete division between equitable and legal proceed-

ings. As the codes do not indicate any line where the equitable

doctrine is to stop and the legal to commence, in determining the

practical rules, the position of this line must depend upon the

views of individual judges and courts, and thus an element of
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uncertainty and confusion is introduced into tlie procedure,

which can never be removed; there being no 2^?T?iCijy/(? by which

to settle the respective limits of the two theories or doctrines as

to parties, no fixed system of practical rules would ever be estab-

lished. If, on the other hand, the equitable doctrine should l)e

not only stated as the correct general theory of interpretation,

but should be honestly followed out in its application to all cases,

the same practical rules would be deduced alike for legal and for

equitable actions, and the resulting system would l)e definite,

certain, and consistent, — the system beyond a doubt contem-

plated by the legislatures when they enacted the codes in the

several States. If this were done, tlie ancient rules of the

conniion law respectiiig the nature of joint rights when set up

as the basis of recovery, and the effect of alleging such a right

in favor of two or more plaintiffs, would disappear, and a sever-

ance in the judgment would be a? much a matter of course in

legal actions as in equitable suits.

§ 133. * 216. When Objection may be made by Demurrer or

Answ^er against Party improperly Joined. There is still another

case in respect of wliicli tliere seems to be a unanimity of deci-

sion. When an action is Ijrought by two or more plaintiffs, and

in the
f th.
t u 11
ri rht
in favor f tw rm r
v'r1 • in th
ju gm nt w
f
u · m
1 •<,ral ·tions s in qu itabl
i ..
133.
21 . When O bjection may be made by D emurrer or
Answer against Party improperly Joined.
Th r i. . till clllOlll r
a. · in r "'P t cf ' hieh h r . m · t l ~ a 1111, nimit · >f clc·C'i ·i
\Vh n r a ·ti n i · br ght by tw
r m r i I intiff ·, awl
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RULKS AS TO PLAINTIFFS. 193

the averments of the complaint or petition show that one or more

of them have been improperly joined as co-plaintitfs with the

rest, the defendant may interpose a demurrer as to such plaintiff

or plaintiffs, not because of a defect of parties, nor because of a

misjoinder, but because tlie complaint or petition does not state

facts sufficient to constitute a cause of action in respect to these

plaintiffs. The distinction between this case and the one last

considered is evident. In the latter, the demurrer is to all the

plaintiffs, and the objection extends to the entire action upon

the alleged ground that no joint claim or cause of action is

shown to exist in all the plaintiffs. In the present case, it is

conceded that a cause of action is shown in favor of one or more

of the plaintiffs, and the objection goes only to the others in

whose favor no cause of action appears. This mode of objecting

to a misjoinder of plaintiffs may be used in legal as well as in

equitable actions. Of course, if the objection does not appear

upon the face of the pleading, but exists as a matter of fact, it

may and should be set up as a defence in the answer.^

Rules as to Plaintiffs in Particular Classes of Cases.

Generated for facpubupdates (University of Michigan) on 2014-06-17 15:31 GMT / http://hdl.handle.net/2027/uc2.ark:/13960/t02z1c23b
Public Domain / http://www.hathitrust.org/access_use#pd

§ 134. * 217. Order of Proposed Treatment. I now pass from

this examination of the doctrine in its general scope to its appli-

cation in the various classes of cases which can arise in the ad-

ministration of justice. The further discussion will be pursued

in the following order: First., Parties plaintiff in legal actions;

Second., Actions by or between husband and wife ; Thirds Parties

plaintiff in equitable actions. The first of these divisions will

the av rment f the mplaint r I titi n h w that n or m r
of th m ha
b n impr p rly join
-plaintiff with the
rnurr r
t u h 1 laintiff
b d fondant m·1
or
£ parti ' n r b au
f a
mi joind r but b au
the om plaint r
ition
s n t tate
fa
uffici nt to
n titut a cau
£ a ti n in r
t to th
plaintiff . The di tin ti n Letw n thi · ca e an l h one la t
con ·itl r .
evident. In the latt r, th d murr r i t all the
plaintiff and tl
bj ti n ext nd t th entir a tion u on
th all ged groun that no joint laim or au e of a tion is
bown to exist in all th plaintiff . In th pr ent ca , it i
c nc d that a cau of a tion i h wn in favor of on or mor
of th
laintiff , and the objection goe · only to th oth r in
' ho favor no cause of a tion app ars . Thi mode of bj cting
to a mi join ler of plaintiff ma be u ed in legal a w 11 a in
equitable action .
f cour e, if th obj ion does n t appear
upon the face of the pl ading, but exi ts a a matter of fact, it
1ooy and hould be set up a a def nee in th answer. 1

be separated into: 1. Actions by owners in common and by joint

owners of land; 2. Actions by joint owners of chattels; 3.

Actions by persons having a joint right arising from contract; 4.

Actions by persons having several rights arising from contract;

5. Actions by persons having a joint right arising from tort;

^ The rule as stated iu the text is complaint must siiow a cause of action

either expressly approved, or is impliedly against all the defendants, or it is bad on

acknowlediied, in several of the cases cited a general demurrer for want of sufficient

under the preceding paragraph. See also facts, as against the plaintiff improperly

Willard r. Heas, 26 Wis. 540, 544; Peo- joined); People?-. Ilaggin, 57 Cal. 579 (if

pie V. Crooks, 53 N. Y. 648. In Missouri an action is brought by entirely wrong

and California the codes expressly stato, jtlaintiff or jilaintiffs, the objection can be

as one ground of demurrer, the misjoinder raised by such a general demurrer). See

of the parties, plaintiff or defendant, also Teunant v. Pfester, 51 Cal. 511;

See Parker v. Small, 58 lud. 349 (a Harris r. Harris, 61 Ind. 117.

13
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§ 134. * 217. Order of Proposed Treatment. I now pa from
thi xamination of the doctrine in its g n ral scop to it application in the variou cla e of ca e which can arise in the admini tration of ju tice. The further di cussion will b pur u d
in the following order: First, Parti s plaintiff in 1 gal action ;
cond, ction by or betw en husband and wif ; Thi1·d, l arti s
plaintiff in equitable actions. The fir t of th e di vi ions will
b
parated into: 1. ction b owner in ommon and b3 joint
owner of land; 2. A tion by joint own rs f hatt 1 ; 3 .
. . \ction b p r on having a joint riaht ari ·incr from n ra t; 4.
ti n by per on having · v ral right ari ·inO" fr m
ntract;
5. A ion by p rs n h~wing a joint right n.ri. ing fr m tort;
1 The rule as
tated in th text i ·
either expr , ly appnn·ed, or i impliedly
.a knowl edu cl, in everal f the ·a e · cited
nn<ler the pr c ding parao-raph . ~ee al o
Willard i-. ~{ ea , 26 Wi . 540, 544; Peopl v. rook , 53 N. Y. 648. In Mi ouri
and California the code expre ly tato,
a on ground of demurrer, th mi joinder
<>f the parti , plaiQtiff or defendant.
ee Parker v. ' mall, 5 Ind. 349 (a

complaint mu t how a cau e of a tion
ao-ain tall the defendant , r it i bad on
a g n ral d murrer for wa11t of uffici eut
fact. , a again t the plaintiff improp rl y
join ed)· Peopl 1·. Hao-gin, 5i al. 579 (if
au action i · br nght by ntir ly wroug
plaintiff or plaintiff , th obj ·ti n can u
rai d by u hag n ral d murr r) . ~
al ' O T nnaut v. Pf t r, 51
al. 511 ;
Harri " ii. Hanis, 61 Ind. 11 7.
13
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6. Actions by persons having several rights arising from torts.'

ction b p r on bavin
e eral right ari mg from torts.
The econd nd third of the general divisions do not admi of a
imilar ubdi i ion.
1

The second and third of the general divisions do not admit of a

similar subdivision.

First : Legal Actions.

§ 135. *218. I. Legal Actions by Joint Owners and Owners in

Common of Land. Modern Statutes. Common-Law^ Rules. The

First : Legal Actions.

change in the common law produced by statute throughout the

United States has practically abolished joint ownership in land,

except in the case of those holding alicni juris, as trustees. The

135.

statutory rule is, I believe, quite universal among the States, that

when two or more persons succeed by inheritance to the same

land, their ownership is common and not joint, and when land

is conveyed to several persons in tlieir own right, without any

express direction to the contrary, their ownership also is com-

mon.^ The exceptions to this rule are trustees who are generally

omitted from the operations of the statutes, so that a grant or

devise to several as trustees creates a joint ownership; and in

certain States, as in New York, the peculiar modification of joint

estates created by a conveyance to a husband and wife, is held to
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be unaffected by the statutes, and to exist as at the common law.

On the other hand, the legislation of some States has abolished

joint ownership, in an absolute manner, so that it cannot be

created even by the act of the parties. As a conclusion it is

enough to say that the common-law joint tenancy of land by per-

sons holding sui juris does not practically exist in this countr}-.''

At the common law all the joint owners were required to unite

in any action, whether real or personal, based upon their pro-

prietiiry riglit. With owners in common, the rule was not so

uniform. In personal actions for injuries done to the land, it

was proper for all the owners to unite; in actions to recover

possession, however, each sued for his individual interest, al-

though this particular doctrine was doubtless modified in many

States, as it was in New York. Finally, in actions for rent, if

the letting was joint, or if the reservation was of an entire rent

to all, all would unite as plaintiffs; but if the rent was reserved

to them separately in distinct parts, each must sue for his own

1 Wash, on Real Prop., vol. 1, p. 40'J - Wash, on Real Prop., vol. 1, p. 409

(uote). (note).
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I. Legal Actions by Joint Owners and Owners in

The
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share. ^ It should be remembered that, in the action of ejectment

at the common law, the plaintiff was the fictitious person called

John Doe, and the real claimant was his lessor. It was only in

the United States, where the fictions of the action had generally

been abolished by statute, that it was possible for joint owners or

owners in common to appear as the actual plaintiffs in ejectment.

I now pass to cases decided since the enactment of the codes in

the several States. ^

§ 136. * 219. Decisions under the Codes. Where the rent

is entire, owners in common of the demised land may unite

in an action to recover it from the lessee; and upon the same

principle they may join in an action to recover the rent from a

person to Avliom it had been paid for their use; for example,

devisees in fee in remainder, after a life estate, may join in a

suit against the executor of the deceased life-tenant to recover

the rent which he had collected from the lessee subsequent to

the death. 2 A joinder of all does not, however, seem to be abso-

lutely necessary. It seems that each may sue for his own share

of the rent, even though it accrue as an entire sum to all the
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owners in common.* The only possible alternative, however, is

a suit by all or a suit by each for his own portion separately; an

action cannot be maintained by a portion more than one and less

than all.^ When the lessor of land dies intestate, the term being

unexpired, his administrator is the only proper party to sue for

the unpaid rent which accrued prior to the death, while the heirs,

either jointly or separately, must sue for that accruing subse-

quently thereto.^ In actions brought to recover damages for

torts done to the land, such as trespasses, nuisances, and the

like, the common-law rule remains unchanged, and all the

owners in common must unite as plaintiffs;'^ even when they

1 See 1 Ch. I'l. (Springfield eil., 1840), i Jones v. Felch, 3 Bosw. 63; Porter

pp. 13, (;.-). " V. Hleiler, 17 Barb. 149.

- UMiuher v. Dunn (1898), 11 S. D. ^ Kiug r. Andersou, 20 Intl. 385.

196, 76 N. W. 922: Teuant.s in common "^ King y. Anderson, 20 Ind. 385 ; Craw-

are not " united in interest" within Comp. ford r. Gunn, 35 Iowa, 543.

Laws, § 4879, requiring all such persons '< De Puy v. Stronj,', 37 N. Y. 372 ; 3

to join in an action.] Keyes, 603; Hill r. Gibbs, 5 Hill, 56;

3 Marshall v. Moseley, 21 N. Y. 280, Parke v. Kilham, 8 Cal. 77 (diversion of

287. See Cruger r. McLaury, 41 N. Y. water) ; Sliepard v. Manhattan Hy. Co.,

219, which holds that one of the owners 117 N. Y. 442; Wausau Boom Co. r.

in common may sue for his share of an Plumer, 49 Wis. 112 (the persons in ac-

entire rent. See infra, § *220, n. tual possession may maintain trespass).

'har . 1 It 'lioukl be r m mber l that in the acti n f jectm nt
a the ommon law, th plaintiff was th fi titian· p r on all <l
o , and the real claimant wa hi le or. It wa · nly in
th
nited tates wher the fictions f the acti n hacl g n rally
b en aboli h cl by statute, that it wa o ible for joint wn I" or
o n r in common to app ar a the a tual plaintiffs in ej ctm n .
I now pa s to cases decided ince the enactment of th codes m
th e eral States. 2
136. * 219 . Decisions under the Codes.
Where th r nt
i, entir , owners in common of the demised land may unite
in an action to recover it from the les ee; and upon the am
principle they may join in an action to recover the rent from a
per on to whom it had been paid for their use; for example,
devi ees in fee in remainder, after a life estate, may join in a
, uit against the executor of the deceased life-tenant to recover
the rent which he had collected from the lessee subsequent to
the cl ath . 3 A joinder of all does not, however, seem to be absolutely necessary. It seems that each may sue for bis own share
cf the rent, even though it accrue as an entire sum to all th
owners in common. 4 The only possible alternative, however, is
a snit by all or a suit by each for his own portion separately; an
action cannot be maintained by a portion more than one and le s
tban all. 5 -when the les or of land dies intestate, tbe term being
unexpired, bis administrator is the only proper party to sue for
th unpaid rent which accrued prior to the death, while th heir ,
eith r jointly or separately, must sue for that accruing ubsequently thereto . 6 In actions brought to recover damages for
tort· lone to the land, such as trespas es, nuisance , and th
lik
the cummon-la w rule remain unchanged, and all the
wners in common must unite as plaintiffs; 7 even wh n th '
1 • ee 1 Ch. Pl. (Springfield ed., 1 40),
pp. 1:1. ';i.
'.l [i\Iather v. Dunn (1 98), 11 S. D.
196, i6 "N. W. 922: Tenants in common
are not" united in intere t" ·within Comp.
Law , § 487 9, requiring all such per on
to join in an action .]
3 Mar hall v. Moseley, 21 N. Y. 2 0,
2 7.
ee Cruger v. McLaury, 41 N. Y.
219, which hold that one of the owner
i11 common may sue for his share of an
ntirc rent. See infra, § *220, n.

1 Jones v. Felch, 3 Bo w. 63; Porter
v. Bleiler, 17 Barb. 149.
5 King 1: . Ander ou, 20 Ind. 3 5.
6 King v. Ander ou, 20 Ind. 3 5;
rawforcl r. Gunn, 35 Iowa, 543.
7 De Pny v.
tro.ng, 37 . Y. 372; 3
K ve , 603; Ilill r. Gibb., 5 Hill, 56;
Pa;ke t'. IGlham,
al. 77 (diY rsiou of
water); Shepard 1·. Manhattan Hy. o.,
117 .. . Y. 442; \Van au Boom C'o. t·
Plumer, 49 Wi . 112 (the per ou. in actual po · es. ion may maintain tre. pass).
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hold under different titles, they must still join, as, for example,

the heirs-at-la\v and devisees of the same land, in an action for

injuries done to the inheritance,^ or the owners in common of a

mill, who derive their rights under different conveyances, in a

suit for the diversion of water from their mill.^ The owners in

common must also join in an action to recover damages for fraud

practised in the sale of the land to them ; a separate suit cannot

be maintained.^ Administrators or executors cannot sue for

trespasses or other injuries done to the land after the death of

the owner whom they represent ; the heirs or the devisees, as the

case may be, are the only proper plaintiffs.*

§ 137. * 220. Same Subject. Owners in common need not

not unite in an action to recover possession ; ^ each may bring a

separate suit for his \individed share. ^ This is a very familiar

The remainder-man and life tenants may

join as co-plaintiffs in suit for a nuisance,

e. q. a dam. Schiffer v. Eau Claire, 51

Wis. 385; Seymour v. Carpenter, 51 id.
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The separate owners of separate lands

h 1 un r iff rent title , they mu t till join, a , for example,
h heir -a -law and devi' e of the ·:i.me 1 nd, in an action for
InJUrI
d ne to the inherit nc 1 or the wn r iu common of a
mill ' h d rive th ir righ s under diff r nt con e ance , in a
uit f r the di' er 1011 of wa r from their mill. 2 The owner in
c mmon mu t also j in in an ac i n o r over damage for fraud
p acti
in the ale of the land to them; a separat uit cann t
e maintained. 3 Admini trator r executor cannot ue for
tr pa es or other injurie done to the land after the death of
th owner whom they repr ent; the heir or the devi ee , a the
case may be are the only pr per plaintiffs. 4
§ 137 . * 220. Same Subject. Owners in common need n t
not unite in an action to recover possession; 5 each may bring a
eparate uit for his undivided share. 6 T his is a er familiar

each injured by the same nuisance, e. g.

a dam, or diversion of water, cannot

join as co-plaintiffs in an action for dam-

ages ; but they can join in an equitable

action to enjoin and remove the nuisance.

Palmer v. Waddell, 22 Kan. 352 ; QYouu-

kin V. Milwaukee, etc. Co. (1901), 112 Wis.

15, 87 N. W. 861 ; Linden Land Co. v.

Milwaukee, etc. Co. (1900), 107 Wis. 493,

83 N. W. 851 ; Strobel v. Kerr Salt Co.

(1900), 164 N. Y. 303. 58 N. E. 142;

Beacii V. Spokane Ranch Co. (1901), 25

Mont. 379, 65 Pac. Ill ; Brown v. Canal

and Reservoir Co. (1899), 26 Colo. 66, 56

Pac. 183; Rounow v. Delmue (1895), 23

Nev. 29, 41 Pac. 1074; McDonough ;•.

Carter (1896), 98 Ga 703, 25 S. E. 938 ;]

Foreman v. Boyle, 88 Cal. 290; Hellams

V. Switzer, 24 S. C. 39 ; Spanish Fork City

V. Hopper (Utah, 1891). 26 Pac. Rep. 293

(tenants in common of water). [^Rut

where a domestic animal breaks into a

pasture Held and injures live stock belong-

1 Van Deusen i-. Young, 29 Barb. 9.

2 Samuels v. Blanchard, 25 Wis. 329.

' Lawrence r. Montgomery, 37 Cal.

183, 188, per Crockett J. See Foster v.

Elliott. 33 Iowa, 216, 224.

< Aubuchon r. Lory, 33 Mo. 99 ; Hart

V. Metrop. Elev. Ry. Co., 15 Daly, 391. In

a suit by tenants in common, the personal

representative of a deceased co-tenant is

projx'rly joined to recover damages up to

the time of the death of the decedent ;

and the heirs to recover damages subse-

quent to that date : Shepard v. Manhattan

Ry. Co., 117 N. Y'. 442.

[^Indianapolis, etc. R. R. Co.. v. Price

(1899), 153 Ind. 31, 53 N. E. 1018: Where

a piece of real estate is appropriated by

defendant, while plaintiffs and |)laintiffs'

ancestor are tenants in common therein,

and plaintiffs' ancestor dies before suit is

brought, and suit is brought by plaintiffs

both for the damages to their own intere.st

.and .13 heirs of the deceased tenant, the

fact that they have no right to sue as

heirs for the injury sustained by decedent

The remainder-man and life tenants may
join a co-plaintiff in suit for a nuisance,
e.g. a dam.
chi ffer v. Eau Claire, 51
Wis . 3 5; eymour v. Car penter, 51 id.
413 .
The separate owners of separate lauds
each injured. by the same nuisance, e.g.
a dam, or diversion of wate r, cannot
join a co-plaintiff in an acti on for damage. ; hut they can join in an equitable
action to njoin and remove the nuisance.
Palmer v. Waddell 22 Kan. 352; [Yo unkin v . Milwaukee , etc. Co. (1901 ), 112 Wis.
15, 7 . W. 61; Linden Land Co. v.
Milwaukee, etc. Co. (1900), 107 Wis. 493,
. W . 51; trobel v. Kerr 'alt o.
3
E. 1-12 ;
{190 ), 164 )l . Y. 303, 5
Beach v . • pokane l anch
o. (190 1 ), 25
Mont. 379, 65 Pac. l 11; Brown . anal
and
eten ·oi r .u. ( l 99), 26 olo. 66, 56
Pac. l 3; Rounow v. Delmue ( 1895 ), 23
ev. 29 , 41 Pac. 1074; McDon ugh v.
arter {l 96 ) , 9
a -03 , 25 , . R. 93 ]
oreman u. B o.vie,
al. 290 ; Hellams
v . ' itzer, 24 '. '. 39; paui h <ork ity
v. H opµ r ( 't:lh, l 91), :26 Pac. J p. 293
(t nan t
in co mm on of water) . [But
wh er a d o m ic animal br ak into a
pa tu1·c ti P!tl :w cl iujur liv tock b loog iug l o ne of th t n:m t in omm ou f
th fi e ld , uch t.c n11 11t m;.iy maintain an
a ·tion :\gain t 11 own r of th animal
with out. joi nin g th other o-t l aut ; ~Jorn v Trud o ll ( 1 95) , 52
' t . 5!L, 4
. E. 71 G.J
· e als § *269, post, nd
cited.
T.

Van Deusen v. Young, 29 Barb. 9.
Samuels v. Blanchard, 25 ~ i . 329 .
a Lawrence v. fontgomery, 37
al.
183, 18 , per Crockett J.
ee Foster t•.
Elliott, 33 Iowa, 216, 224.
4. Aubu hon v. L ory, 33
fo. 99; Hart
v. Metrop. Elev. Ry. Co., 15 Daly, 391. In
a u it by tenants in ommon, the per ooal
rep re ·eutati Ye of a deceased co-teuaat i
properly joiuecl to r ecover damage up to
the time of the death of the decedent;
and the heir to r ecoYer Jaroag
uh eq uent to that date: hepard v. i\fanhattau
Ry. Co., 117 N. Y. 442.
[Indiauapolis, etc. l . R. o., v. Prier,
( l 99), 153 Ind. 31, 53 . E. 101 : ' herl!
a piece of real e tate i. appropriat d hy
defendant, whil plaintiff and plaintiff. '
ance tor a re teuant _ in common ther i11,
and plaintiffs' au e tor die - e~ re uit is
br ught, and . ui t i. hr nght by phintiffs
both f r the damao-e to th ir wn iuterc.-;l
am! a h ir of the d c as d tenaut, Lh ·
faC't that they hav n right to n a.
hei r f r th injury ustain d by de d nt
do
not r OU ' r th ir COlllJJlaiut IJ.i.d Oii
d murrer.J
5 [
ut where ll.O a tion i. j int, if it
app ar that b d fendant bav a good
d { nee again t one of the plaintiffs, the
a cti n mu t fail : ~ odiu,. v. Blant.on
(1900), 112 a. 509 37 . E. 720.J
s Br wn v. 'Varren, 16 ev . 22 ; Hart
v. R b rt. 11, l , 1. 3.i6; Ton ·hard '"
r ow, 2
al. 15 ; Tham
i . •Jours, !J7
. 121; Yau ey v. re ul , 90
1
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rule, and such actions are constantly brought by widows to

recover their dower before it has been set out to them or ad-

measured, and by individual heirs. Of course all the owners

viay join, and must join if the design is to recover possession of

the entire tract over which the common ownership extends, as a

separate parcel of land ; ^ when one sues, he can only demand and

obtain a judgment for his own undivided portion of the common

premises. 2 The election between modes of instituting the action

goes no further, however; it cannot be prosecuted by a portion

of the co-owners less than all ; it must be by all or by one.^ In

317; Weese v. Barker, 7 Colo. 178.

Cruger i'. McLaury, 41 N. Y. 219. Oue

Iv. had a given lease in fee of lands, re-

serving rent, with a clause of re-entry on

rule, and uch action ar con tantly brought by widows to
r ver th ir dower before it ha
n
t out to them or adm a ur d, and by indivi ual h ir .
f cour e all the owner.
rnay j in, and must join if the de ign is to recover p es ion of
the entire tract over which th
mmon ownership xt nd , a a
1
parate parcel of land; wh n one ' Ue , he can only d mand and
obtain a judgment for his own undivid d porti n of the ommon
premises. 2 The election bet we n modes of instituting the a ti n
g es no further, however; it cannot be prosecuted by a portion
of the co-owners less than all; it must be by all or by one. 3 In

non-payment. Oue of his six children

and heirs-at-law sues to recover an un-

divided sixth part of the ])remises, on

.iccount of the condition broken. The
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Court of Appeals held the action properly

brought ; that all the heirs need not be

joined ; and, also, that each of the heirs

might have maintained an action for tlie

rent. This last proposition settles the

doubt ex})ressed by Conistock J. in Mar-

shall II. Moseley, cited in note to § *219,

80 far as the law of New Y'ork is con-

cerned ; and in that State, although the

rent is entire, and accruing to all the

owners iu common, each may sue. See

Fisher v. Hall, 41 N. Y. 416, in which it

may seem to be intimated that all must

join in a suit to recover possession of the

land ; but there is actually no discrepancy

in the two decisions. In the case last

cited all the owners but one united in a

suit to recover possession of tlie entire

jinrcel of land ; and in such an action a

joinder of all the owners is, of course,

neces.sary. The court did not intimate

that one co-owner may not sue for his

undivided share. See also Hasbronck r.

Bunce,3 N. Y. Sup. Ct. 309, 311 ; 62 N. Y.

475. The above conclusions are sup-

ported bv Mattis v. Boggs, 19 Neb. 698;

(jray v. Givens, 26 Mo. 291.

[^It is held in North Carolina that a

tenant in common may maintain eject-

ment against his co-tenant : Kicks v. Pope

(1901 ), 129 N. C. 52, 39 S. E. 638. Same

doctrine obtains in Georgia: Thompson

V. Sanders (1901), 113 Ga. 1024, 39 S. E.

419. Under the North Carolina code,

§ 627, a tenant in common may bring an

action for waste against his co-tenant, and,

by analogy, he may bring an action to re-

strain waste: Morrison v. Morrison (1898),

122 N. C. 598, 29 S. E. 901.3

1 QBut see Winborne v. Lumber Co.

(1902), 130 N. C. 32, 40 S. E. 825, where

the court said : " One tenant in common

can recover the entire tract against a third

party, for each tenant is entitled to pos-

session of the whole, except against a co-

tenant." So in Shelton r. Wilson (1902),

131 N. C. 499, 42 S. E. 937.]

2 [[In Winborne v. Lumber Co. {supra),

it was held that the court erred in direct-

ing the jury to respond to the first issue

317; ·weese v. Barker, 7 Colo. 1i8.
Cruger v. McLaury, 41 . Y. 219. Oue
K. had a given lease in fee of lantl , re·erving rent, with a clause of re-entry on
non-payment. Une of his six children
and heir -at-law sues to recover an unui vided sixth part of the pre mi es, on
account of the condition broken. The
(' ourt of Appeals held the action properly
brought; that a!l the heirs need not l>e
joined ; and, also, that each of the heir
might have maintamed an action for the
rent. This last proposition settles the
doubt expressed by Comstock J. iu Marhall v. Moseley, cited in note to § *219,
o far as the law of Xew York is conerned ; and in that State, althou~h the
rent i entire, and accruing to all the
owners in common, each may sue.
ee
Fi her v. Hall, 41 N. Y. 416, in which it
may seem to be intimated that all must
join in a uit to recover pos es ion of the
land; but there L actually no discrepancy
in the two deci ions. In th e ca.;e la ·t
l'it d all the owners but one unite<l in a
·uit to recover po.· ·e sion of the entire
11n.rcel of land; and iu such an action a
joinder of all the owners is, of course,
neces. ary. The court diu not intimate
that one co-owner may not sue for his
undivided hare. See also Ha l>ronck v.
Bunce, 3 N. Y. up. Ct. 309, 311; 62 N. Y .
4 75.
The above conclusions are supported by Mattis v . Boggs, 19 Neb. 69
Gray v. Given , 26 Mo. 291.
[It is held in North Carolina that a
t nant in common may maintain ejectment again this co-tenant: Rick v. Pope
ame
(1901), 129 . C. 52, 39 . E. 638.
do ·trine ob~n.ins in Georgia: Thomp ou
v. anders (1901), 113 Ga. 102-!, 39 . E.

419. Under the North Carolina code,
§ 627, a tenant in common may bring an
action for wa te against his co-tenant, and,
hy analogy, he may bring an action to re·train waste: forrison v. Morrison (1 98),
122 N. C. 598, 29 S. E. 901.]
1 [But see Winborne v. Lumher Co.
(1902), 130 N. C. 32, 40 S. E. 825, where
the court said : " One tenant in common
can recover the entire tract against a third
party, for each tenant is entitleu to possession of the whole, except against a cotenant." So in Shelton v. Wilson (1902),
131 N. C. 499, 42 S. E. 937.J
2 [In Winborne v. Lumber Co. (supra),
it was held that the court erred in directing the jury to respond to the first i sue
" Yes, one-fifth of the land," if th ey believed the evidence ; wherea t.he defendant had no right to have the amount of
the plaintiff's right to po se ion determined , for, as again. t defendant, the
plaintiff was entitled to recover pos es ion
of the whole.]
a Fi her r. Hall, 41 N. Y. 416.
ee
Hubbell i'. Lerch, 58 N. Y. 2.'37, 241; Ila hrouck v. Bunce, 62 N. Y. 4i5. [The
doctrine ann oun ced in Hasbrou k v. Bun e
(s11pra) ha. been rend ered ob. olete in
ew York IJy tatute,Code iv. Pro .. 1500,
whi ch reads a follow : " \Vhere two or
more p rsons are entitled to the po se i n
of real property, as joint tenants or tenant · in common, one or more of them may
maintain such an action, to re over hi or•
their undivid ed bare in the property, in
any ca e where such an a tion might be
maintained by all."
ee Deering v.
Reilly (1901 ), 167 N. Y. 184, 60 N. E.
447,wherethis tatuteisconstrued.J One
co-tenant ma_,., in general, sue alone for
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piii-suance of this general principle, the same rule has been ex-

tended to actions brought to recover a fund, or a portion thereof,

when l)y reason of some judicial proceedings this fund stands in

the place of the land itself. Thus, where the land of two co-^

owners had been taken for public purposes, and the amoimt

awarded as compensation had not been paid over, because the

owners were at the time unknown, one of them was permitted to

recover his portion of the whole sum in a separate action, the

money representing the land, and the action itself being analo-

gous to one brought to recover an undivided share of that land.^

In certain States, the subject now under consideration is regu-

lated by express statute. ^ Thus, in California, joint owners and

owners in common may sue jointly or severally, or any number

his share, ilorenhaut v. Wilson, 52 Cal.

262. But in an action to recover land for

a breach of a condition subsequent, all the

grantors or their heirs must join ; ap

action cannot be maintained by one of the

pur uance of thi general princi11 the ame rul ha been ext nd cl t ac i n brou ht t r c ver a fund, or a p rtion th reof,
' h n lw r a "on of som judicial pr ceedings thi fund stands in
the pla of th land it lf. Thu , where the land £ two cown r~ had been ak n f r public purpo es and h amonnt
award d a compen ·a.ti.on had not been pai<l Yer, becau e h
wn r · w re at the tim unknown, one of th m w( p rmitt <l to
i· cover hi porti u of the whole
um in a eparate action, h
mon y repre enting he laud and the action itself bein analog u to one brought tor c ver an undivided bare of that land. 1
Inc rtain tate\ the subject now under con idera ion i regulat d b expre 'S statute. 2 Thu , in alifornia, j int wners and
wner in common may sue jointly or several! , or any number
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co-tenants for his share. Cook v. St. Paul's

Church, 5 Ilun, 293. It seems that in

South Carolina a joint action for recovery

of possession may be brought by a j)ortion

of the co-owners less than all to recover

their shares. See Bannister r. Bull, 16

S. C. 220. Two tenants in common joined

in an action to recover possession of land,

making the remaining tenants in common,

who refused to jom, defendants. It was

held that a verdict for the whole land was

improper, and should have been for the

undivided shares of the plaintiffs only.

The joinder as defendants of the uon-

con.senting co-tenants was unnecessary for

the recovery of the partial interest, and

ineffectual for the recovery of the whole.

QA joint grantee in a deed is not a nec-

essary party in a suit in ejectment by the

other: McNear v. Williamson (1902), 166

Mo. 358, 66 S. W. 160. Where tlie land

of a deceased person is sold for taxes and

one of his heirs is not made a party to tlie

suit, such heir may maintain an action for

the whole tract and recover his ali(]Uot

part: Walcott v. Hand (1894), 122 Mo

621, 27 S. W. .3.31.

Where an action for tlie recovery of

land is brought by three plaintiffs jointly,

and the evidence does not show title in all

of tlioni, none of tlicin are entitled to re-

cover: Towns V. Mathews (1893), 91 Ga.

546, 17 S. E. 955 ; McGlamory v. McCor-

mick (1896), 99 Ga. 148. 24 S. E. 941.]

1 Van Wart v. Price, 14 Abb. Pr. 4

(note).

^ [[California and Idaho have the fol-

lowing statute : " All persons holding as

tenants in common,' joint tenants, or co-

parceners, or any number less than all,

may jointly or severally commence or

defenci any civil action or proceeding for

the enforcement or protection of the rights

of such party." California, Code, § 384 ;

Idaho, Code Civ. Pro., 1901, § 3173.

Utah and Montana have the following

statute: "All persons holding as tenants

in common or as joint tenants, or any

number less than all, may jointly or

severally commence or defend any civil

hi

hare. :Morenhaut v. Wil. on 52 Cal.
262. But in an action to recover land for
a brea h of a condition sub equent, all the
grantors or their heirs mu t join; ap
action cannot be maintained by one of the
co-tenant for hi hare. Cook v. t. Paul's
hurch, 5 Hun, 293. I t seem that in
outh arolina a joint action fo r recovery
of pos e ion may be brought by a portion
f the c -owner les than all to recover
their , hares. 'ee Bannister v. Bull, 16
. 220. Two tenants in common joined
in an a tion to recover po e ion of land,
making the r emaiuing tenant in com mon,
wh refu ed to join, defendant . It wa
held that a verdict for the whole land was
improper, and hould have been for the
undi,·ided bar
of the plaintiffs only.
The joinder as defendants of the nonon nting co-tenants wa · u11nece. ar for
the recovery of the partial intere t, and
ineffectual for the recoverv of the whole.
[A joint grantee in a d~ed is not a nece ary party in a suit in ejectment by the
other: Ic ear v. William on {1902), 166
Mo. 35 , 66 •. W. 160. Where the land
of a d cea etl per n i old for taxe and
one of 11 i heir i ' not made a party t the
uit , uch heir m y maintain an action for
the whole tract and recover his aliquot
p. rt Walcott u. Hand {l 9.q, I 22 [o

W. 33l.
Wh re an a ·tion f r the r rov ry of

li21, 27 •.

land i. brought by thr e plaintiff j intly,
, nil Liu t'1·idence does not. hr)W tiLl in all
11f th 111, 11•m o ( them are e utitleu tu r e-

cover: Towns v. Mathew (1 93), 91 Ga.
546, 17 . E. 955 ; l\IcGlamory v. ~[c ormick (1896), 99 Ga. 14 • 24 . E. 941.]
1 \ an \V art v. Price, I+ Abb. Pr. 4
(note).
2 [California and Idaho have the following tatute: ' All p r on boldin a
t enants in common; joint tenant , or coparceners , or an:r number le
than all,
may jointly or eYerally omm nee or
d feud any ivil action or proceediug for
the enforcement or protection of the right
of uch party."
alifornia, Code, § 3 .i;
Idaho, Code Civ. Pro ., 1901, § 3173.
tah and Montana have the following
tatute: "AU per on holding a tenant
in common or a joint tenant , or any
numb r le
than all may jointly or
everally commence or d feud any ci1·il
acti a or pro eeding for the enforcement
or protection of the right of uch party.
In all case one tenant in ommon or joint
t nant an ue hi o-tenant." Utah, Rei·
St., 1 9 , § 2919 ; fontana, ode, 5 6.
Th
onoe ticut tatute read as follow : " Any j int tenant r tenant in
ommon of land may maintain an actiu11
iu hi
wn nam for auy injury ther to:
but the noo-j inder of th
tber tenaut.
may b h wn by the defendant in reduc
ti n of damag , and the plaintiff hall
only r coYer for the damag to his inter t."
11.
., 1902,
5 9.
cl , 494-1, pr vitle· that
"a tenaut in
mrnon n ti not join Iii.
co-tenant, but may ue parately f r hi
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of them may sue, and in like manner they may be sued.^ Under

this statute a portion of the co-owners of a mine were suffered

to unite in an action, and recover possession of their shares

from intruding wrong-doers. ^

^ 138. * 2-1. II. Legal Actions by Joint Owners of Chattels.

At Common Law. Under the Codes. The ownership of chattels

by two or more persons is quite dilt'erent in its incidents from

the similar ownership of lands, and it must be described rather

than defined. It is not a joint ownership in the pure common-

law signification of that term, since it does not involve the right

of survivorship; there is no survivorship among the co-owners

of chattels, whether partners or not, and at the death of one his

interest passes to his personal representatives. On the other

hand, this united interest of the co-proprietors is so close that it

cannot be separated except by mutual consent. The conmion

law provides no mode of partition. The right of either co-owner

may be transferred by any valid act 'biler vivos, and it may be

devolved at his death ; but it is impossible by any legal compul-

sory means for one to enforce a partition against his fellow-
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owners, even when such a division would be physically possible,

unless it be true, as said in one case, that such owner may manu-

ally separate, and afterwards hold for his own exclusive use,

when the chattels themselves are capable of being weighed or

measured, so that an accurate division can be easily made, — as

in the case of grain. ^ Even in the settlement of a partnership,

the only judicial mode of a final division is a sale of all the

assets, and their consequent conversion into money, which is

distributed among the partners. In this respect, the ownership

interest, and the jiulgineut in such case an action brought to recover damages,

affects only himself." being the value of the land which had

In Nevada the statute, which is the last been sold on a judgment obtained by the

part of § 3109, Coinp. Laws, 1900, reads as defendant, which judgment had been sub-

follows : " Tenants in common, joint ten- sennently reversed on appeal. If one of

ants, or copartners, or any number less the co-owners dies, his executor or ad-

than all, may jointly or severally bring or ministrator may be joined with the other

defend or continue the prosecution or co-owners in California,

defence of any action for the enforcement ^ Tri])p v. Kiley, 15 Barb. 333. See

of the rights of such person or persons "2 also Channon i;. Lusk, 2 Lans. 213 ; Stall

1 See last preceding note. v. "Wilbur, 77 N. Y. 158, 164 (a crop of

2 Goller V. Fett, 30 Cal. 481. See grain), Lobdell v. Stowell, 37 How. Tr.

of th m may ue, and in like manner th y may be su cl. 1
n<ler
thi tatute a portion of the co-owner of a mine w re suff i· cl
to uni e in an action, ancl r cov r possession of their shares
fr m intrudin 0 wrong-d oers. 2
138. * 221. I I. L egal Actions by Joint Owners of Chattels.
At Co mmon L a w . U nder the Codes.
The ownership of chattel
by tw or m re per on i ' quit different in it incidents from
th ' imilar ownerhip of lancls, ancl it must be de crib <l. rather
than d fined. It is not a faint ownership in the pure commonlaw i 0 nification of that term, ince it cloes not involve the right
of urYivorship; there is no survivorship among the co-owner
f chattel , whether I artners or not, and at the death of one hi
int re t passes to his personal representatives. On the otb r
hand, this united interest of the co-proprietors is so c]ose that it
cannot be separated except by mutual consent.
The common
law provides no mode of partition. The right of either co -own r
may b transferred by any vali<l act inter vivas, and it may be
devolYe<l at his death; but it is impossible by any l gal compul ory means for one to enforce a partition against his fe llowowner , even when such a division would be physically possible,
unless it be true, as said in one case, that such mvner may manually separate, and afterward hold for his own exclusive use,
when the chattels themselves are capable of being weighed or
measured, so that an accurate division can be easily made, - a
in the case of grain. 3 Even in the settlement of a partnership,
the only judicial mode of a final division is a sale of all th e
asset and their consequent conversion into money, which is
d i tribu ted among t he partners. I n this respect, the ownership

Touchard v. Keyes, 21 Cal. 202. See 88 (grain); and see Potter v. Xeal, 62

also Reynolds v. Hosmer, 45 Cal. 616, How. Tr. 158 (cattle).

631. The statute* was held to apply to

interest, an<l the judgment in such case
affects only him elf."
Io revada the statute, which is th e last
part of§ 3109, Comp. Laws, 1900, read · as
follow : "Tenant in common, joint tenant , or copartners, or any number less
than all, may jointly or se,·erally bring or
defend or continue th e prosecution or
defence uf any action for the enforcement
of the right of uch per on or persons."]
l
ee last preced ing note.
2
Goller v. Fett, 30 Cal. 4 I.
ee
Touchard v. Keyes, 21 Cal. 202.
ee
al o Reyn old v. H o, mer, 45 .al. 616,
63 l . The statute . was held to apply to

an act ion brought to recover damage ,
being the value of the land which had
been sold on a judgment obtained by the
defendant, which judgment had been ub serin en t!y re\'e r ed 011 appeal. If one of
the co-o wn er. die , hi executor or aclmini trator may be joi11 etl with the other
co-owners in Cal ifornia.
3 Tripp r. Riley, 15 Barb. 33.1.
ce
al o Channon v. Lu k, 2 Lan . 213 ; tall
v. Wilbur, 77 N. Y. 15 , 164 (a cr op of
grain), Lobdell v. towell, 37 H ow. Pr.
8 (grain); and ee P otte r v. Neal, 62
H ow. Pr. 158 (cattle).
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of chattels by two or more persons is more joint in its nature than

the joint ownership of lands. From this notion of the oneness of

the interest residing in the owners of things personal, it follows

that a joinder of all in any actions founded upon the property in

the chattels is even more necessary, and is less open to exception,

than in the case of an ownership of land, since one co-owner of

a chattel has no right to its exclusive possession as against the

others, and cannot recover its possession from them by action

analogous to replevin,^ or its value in actions like trover or tres-

pass;^ and since a direct judicial partition of the interests is

unknown, it follows by the clearest logic that such exclusive

possession, or such partition, cannot be permitted indirectly by

means of an action against a third person in the name of one co-

owner, the result of which, if successful, would be to give him

an exclusive, or an apparently exclusive, right. When the

object of the property is land, the interest of each co-owner is

regarded as separate fur all furjioses except possession ; and, in

strict accordance with this notion, he is permitted to sue alone,

Generated for facpubupdates (University of Michigan) on 2014-06-17 15:31 GMT / http://hdl.handle.net/2027/uc2.ark:/13960/t02z1c23b
Public Domain / http://www.hathitrust.org/access_use#pd

to recover his undivided part of the land, or his part of the rent

payable for the use of it; but when the object of the property is

^ Q" One tenant in common cannot

maintain replevin for the possession of

any of the common property against his

cotenant, nor against one in possession of

the property as the joint agent of the

tenants in common : " Smith-McCord Dry-

Goods Co. r. Burke (1901), 63 Kan. "40,

of ha tel
wo or more per on i 1nore joint in it nature than
the j int owner hip of land . Fr m thi notion of the oneness of
th· in re t re i ing in the wn r of hing per onal it follow
th t a j in r f all in any acti n f und d u n the pr p rty in
he cha tel i even more n c
i
le op n to exc ption
han in t he a e of an own r hi
rnce one c -owner of
cha tel ha no right to it
es ion a gain t the
the
and cannot reco r
from th m y action
an logou to replevin 1 or i
alue in action like tr er or tre ; 2 and
in e a dir ct ju i ial artition of th intere ts i
unknown, it follow b the cl ar ..,t logic that such exclu ive
po se sion, or such partiti n, cannot e permitt d indirect!
y
mean of an action again t a third person in the nam of one cowner, the result of which, if succe , ful, would e to gi
him
an exclusive, or an appar ntly ex lu i e, right.
When the
ject of the property is land, the intere t of each co-owner i
regarded as separate for all p u rposes except poss ssion ; and, in
strict accordance with this notion, he is permitt d to sue alone
to recover hi u ndivided part of the land, or hi
rt of the rent
payable for the u e of it; but when the object of the property is

06 Pac. 10-36/] Cross u. Hulett, 53 Mo.

397; Mills v. Malott, 43 Ind. 248, 251;

general the effect of a univer al rule.
There are but few of the former that are-

Davis V. Lottich, 46 N. Y. 393 ; Balch c.

.Jones, 61 Cal. 234; Bowen v. Roach, 78

Ind 361 ; Spooner v. Ross, 24 Mo. App.

599; Carle v. W^all (Ark. 1891). 16 S. W.

293. As to suits by one co-owner of chat-

tels against the other for a conversion,

see Hewlett v. Owens, 51 Cal 570; Stall

V. Wilbur, 77 N. Y. 158 in last note.

2 (^But see Sullivan v. Sherry (1901),

111 Wis. 476, 87 N. W. 471. where the

court said : " The general rule is that one

tenant in common cannot maintain tres-

pass or trover against his cotenant or the

lalter's licensee of the joint proj)erty in

respect thereto. The trial court, supposing

that such rule was controlling in this ca.se,

sustained the demurrer. It is not infre-

«jueut that courts are misled into giving a

general the effect of a universal rule.

There are but few of the former that are

not subject to exceptions as well estab-

lished and important as the general prin-

ciple ; and the rule in question does not

belong to that few. It is subject to sev-

eral exceptions, one being that if a co-

Bowl in g ,

tenant or his licensee destroys the common

property or converts it to his own use, he

may be sued in trespass or trover to re-

dress the wrong wherever such a remedy

would exist in the absence of the relation-

ship between cotenants . . . The author-

ities clearly indicate that the exception

we have stated to the general rule is not a

modern creation. It has been recognized,

by courts and law writers at least from

the time of the Year Books." So in Wood

V. Steina (1896), 9 S. I). 110, 68 N. W.

160, it was held that a tenant in common

of chattels may maintain trover against

g iving a
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a chattel or chattels, the interest of all the owners is conceived

of as a unit, both in respect to the right of proprietorship and to

the possession, and a single one cannot sue for his part of the

thing itself, nor for his share of the profits payable for its use, or

of its value if it be taken, converted, or sold, or of the damages

if it be injured; all must join so as to represent this unity of

interest.^ These general doctrines, which were fully settled in

the common law, are unchanged by the new procedure, as will

appear from the rules established by the following cases.

§ 139. * 222. Code Decisions. Part-Owners of Ships. The

part-owners of ships and other vessels are jointly interested,

80 far as concerns the maintaining of actions touching the prop-

erty in them or their use, and must all unite in such actions;

as, for example, in a suit to recover freight, whether from the

shipper or from a person to whom it has been paid by the shipper.^

It would seem, however, that a portion, one or more, of such

owners may sue when the residue refuse to join as plaintiffs, by

making such dissentients defendants, and inserting appropriate

averments in the complaint or petition ; this course is certainly
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proper if full effect is to be given to the provisions of the codes

regulating this particular subject, and they are not to be re-

stricted in their application to equitable actions.^ Under peculiar

circumstances, a portion of the part-owners have been suffered

to maintain an action of a similar general nature without even

making the others defendants, as stated in the foot-note.*

§ 140. * 223. Joint Owners of Chattels. It is clearly the rule,

established under the new system as well as under the old, that,

properly, all the owners of a chattel, whether partners or not,

must join in an action to recover damages for injuries done to

^ QCinfel r. Malena (1903), — Neb. — , the action without joining the other co-

93 N. W. 165.] owner. This reason given for the de-

^ Merritt v. Walsh, 32 N. Y. 685 ; Don- cisiou was clearly wrong. The decision

nell V. Walsh, 33 N. Y. 43, 6 Bosw. 621. would have been in exact conformity with

3 Coster V. New York & Erie 11. Co., the letter and the spirit of the code if

5 Duer, 677, 3 Abb. Pr. 332. McL. had been made a defendant, and the

* Bishop r. Kdmiston, 16 Abb. Pr. 466 facts in regard to him had been alleged.

(G. T.). The two plaintiffs and one McL. In Peck v. McLean, 36 Minn. 228, one of

owned a ship. It was insured and lost, the part-owners of a certain vessel was

and defendant collected the insurance allowed to sue alone, without joining her

money. He had settled with McL. for co-owners either as plaintiffs or defend-

the latter's share, and the plaintiffs sue ants; since they could not be joined as

for their shares. The court held that they defendants, being out of the jurisdiction,

a chattel or chattels, the inter t f all the owner i conceived
of as a unit, both in re pect to th right of proprietor hip and to
the po ession, and a single one cannot u f r hi
art of the
thing its lf, nor for his hare of the profits payabl for it u e, r
of it value if it be tak n, converted, or old, or f the damag
if it be in jured; all mu t join o a to r pr sent thi unity of
inter t. 1
These general doctrine , which were fully ettled in
th common law, are unchang d by the new proc dur , as will
appear from the rules established by the following ca
§ 139. * 222. Code D ecisio ns. Part-Owners of Ships. The
part-owners of ships and other vessels are jointly intere ted,
so far as concerns the maintaining of actions touching the proprty in them or their u...,e, and must all unite in uch action ;
a , for example, in a suit to recover freight, whether from the
shipper or from a person to whom it bas been paid by the shipper. 2
It would seem, however, that a portion, one or more, of such
owners may sue when the residue refuse to join as plaintiff , by
making such dissentients defendants, and inserting appropriate
averments in the complaint or petition; this course is certainly
proper if fu ll effect is to be given to the provisions of the codes
regulating this particular subject, and they are not to be retricted in their application to equitable actions. 3 Under peculiar
cir um, tances, a portion of the part -owners have been suffered
to maintain an action of a similar general nature without even
making the others defendants, as stated in the foot-note. 4
§ 140. * 223. Joint Own e rs o f Chat t e ls . J t is clearly the rule,
e tabli hed under the new system as we11 as under the old, that,
properly, all the owners of a chattel, whether partner or not,
mu t join in an action to recover damages
for injurie done to
I

were tenants in common, and could bring and refused to join as plaintiffs.

1 [Cinfel v. Malena (1903), 93 N. W. 165.J

Neb.-,

2 Merritt v. Walsh, 32 N. Y. 685; Donnell u. Wal h, 33 N. Y. 43, 6 Bo w. 621.
3
o ter v. New York & Erie R Co.,
5 Duer, 6i7, 3 Abb. Pr. 3:l2.
• Bishop t'. Edmiston, 16 Abb. Pr. 466
{G. T. ). The two plaintiffs and one McL.
owned a ship. I t was insured and lost,
a nd defendant collected the insurance
money. He had settled with McL. for
the latter's share, and the plaintiffs sue
for their shares. The court held that they
were tenant in common, and could bring

the action with ut joining the other coowner. Thi rea on given for th decision wa clearly wrong. The deci ion
would have been in exact conformity with
the letter and the pirit of the cod if
McL. had been made a defendant, and the
fact in regard to him had been all ged.
In Peck v. McL ean, 36 Minn. 22 , on f
tha part-owner of a ertain ve el wa
allowed to sue alone, without joining her
co-owners either as plaintiff or def ndants; ince they could not be joined a
defendant , being out of the juri diction,
and refus cl to j in a. plaintiff .

~O:...
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it,^ or for a wrongful taking or conversion of it,^ or to recover

its possession.^ This rule is so firmly settled that nothing less

than an express contract in reference to the chattel with one of

the co-owners in his own name, by which promises are made

directly to him, will suffice to permit a severance. In such a

case, while he may sue alone, in virtue of the express under-

taking to and with him,* 3'et all the others may, if they so elect,

join with him in an action on the contract: for example, a sale

of the chattel and a promise to pay the price. ^

1 Wells V. Cone, 55 Barb. 585 ; Hays v.

Crist, 4 Kan. 350. See also Swarthout

v. Chicago, &c. R. Co., 49 Wis. 625 ; Pratt

or £o a wr ngful aking or on er, ion of it, 2 or to r cover
it po.... ion. 3 Thi rul i o firmly settl d th notl ing le
tl an an expr
ontract in reference to th chat 1 with on of
the c - wner in hi' O\ n name by which promises are mad
direct! t him will uffic to permit a everance. In uch a
bile he may ue alone in virtu of the expre s uud rt kino- to an with him, 4 ye t all the other may if they so elect,
join with him in an action on the contract: for example, a ale
of .he chattel ~nd a pro mi e to pay the price. 5

i

1

i;. Radford, 52 id. 114. [[vSuininers v.

Heard (1899), 66 Ark. 5.50, .50 S. W. 78 :

Where partnership property is seized on

execution ajjaiust one of tlie partners, an

action for damages suffered by reason of

the loss of the equity to have the assets
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of the firm applied to tlie payment of the

joint debts contracted on account of the

partnership, should be brought by both

partners, but tliis" defect of parties is

waived by failure to take advantage of it

by demurrer or answer.]

2 Gock V. Keneda, 29 Barb. 120. See

also Fullerr. Fuller, 5 Hun, 595; Keeder

V. bayre, 70 N. Y. ISO, 181, 190; Spalding

i". Black, 22 Kan. 55 ; State v. True, 25

Mo. A pp. 451 ; Welch v. Sackett, 12 Wis.

24.3 ; but see Soule v. Mogg, 35 Ilun, 79 ;

as to action by one co-owner against an-

other for conversion, see Stall c. Wilbur,

77 N. Y. 158; Hewlett v. Owens, 51 Cal.

570; see ante, § *221, and cases cited.

In accordance with the principle of these

cases, it was held in Soule i\ Mogg,

35 Hun, 79, that an ownerin-commou of

property separable by weight or measure

— in that case, money — might maintain

a separate action for its conversion by a

third party, as well as for its conversion

by a co-owner.

^But see Balletine i-. Joplin (1898), 105

Ky. 70, 48 S. W. 417, where it was held

that where one mortgaged as his own a

marc which another owned jointly with

him, the mortgagee and the purchaser at

a sale whiili he procured to be made under

attachment are liable to tlie other joint

owner as for a conversion of his interest.

Aii'l Holey c. Allred (1903), 25 Utali, 402,

71 Pac. 869, where it was held that under

Rev. St., 1898, § 2919, the owner of an

undivided half interest in personal prop-

erty may maintain an actiun for con-

version without joining his co-owner as

either plaintiff or defendant, and the

complaint need not state who owns the

other lialf.

Holders of mortgage liens upon chattels,

created by different mortgages filed at

different times, have such a joint interest

in such chattels as to properly join in an

action against a sheriff for conversion,

such property being in their joint posses-

sion : Trompen v. Yates (1902), — Xeb.

— , 92 N. W. 647.]

' [[Vermont Loan & Trust Co v. Car-

l Well v. Cone, 55 Barb. 5 5 ; Hays t.
Cri t, 4 Kan. 350. ... ee al o war thout
v. Chicago, &c. R . o., 49 Wi . 625 ; Pratt
v. Radford, 52 id. l H . [ .. um mer v.
Heard (l 99), 66 Ark. 550, 50 . W. 78:
Where partner hip property i • eized on
execution again t one of the partn er , an
action for damage • uffered by rea on of
the los of the equity to have the a .. et
of the firm appli d to the payment of the
joirit debt contra ted ou account of the
partner hip, should be brought by both
partner., but thi defect f partie i
waiYed by failure to take advantage of it
by demurrer or an wer.J
2 Gock v . Ken da, 29 Barb. 120.
ee
al o Fuller v. Fuller, 5 Hun, 595; Reeder
t'. 'ayre, 70
. Y . l 0, 181, 190; palding
v. Black, 22 Kan. 55; 'tate v. True, 25
Mo. A pp. 45 l; \\ elch v. ackett, 12 \Vi .
24-3; bu t ee oul v. Mogg, 35 Hun, 79;
a to action by one co-owner again t an·
other fo r con ver·ion ee tall u. Wilbur,
77 N. Y. 15 ; Hewlett u. Owen , 5 1 al.
5 70 ; ee ante,
22 1, and ca. e ·ited.
In accordance with the prin ci ple of the e
case , it wa held in
oule v. Mogg,
35 Hun, 79, that an owner-in-common of
property eparable by w irrht or m arn r
- in that ca e, money- might maintain
a eparate action for it conver ion by n
third party, a well as fo r it con r ·ion
by a co-owner .
[But ee I3alletine L'. J oplin ( 1 9 ), 105
Ky. 70, 4
. ~W. 417, wh re it wa held
th, t wher one mortgag d a hi. own a
m· rP which an ther own d jointly with
liini, the rnortgag e and th purch e r at
a ale'' lti eh hP pr1Jcured t Ii mad un<I r
at ta ·h1n !JJt are Ji;dJ]P to the oth r joint
owner a for a corn r ion f hi inlere t.
11d Boley 1·. \llr<'d {1'03), 25 "t< h, 402,

71 Pac. 869, w here it was held that under
Rev. t., 1898, § 2919, the wner of an
undivi ded half intere t in per ooal property may maintain an action for conver ion wi thout joining bi co-owner a
either plaintiff or defendant, and the
complaint need not tate who own the
other ha.If.
H older of mortgage lien upon chattel.,
created by different rnortga e fil ti at
different t ime , have uch a j int iutere. t
in u ch hattel a to properly j in in an
action again t a heriff for on ver. ion ,
. uch property being in their joint po e ion: Trompen " Yate (1902), - . . 'eb.
- , 92 N. W. 647.J

z [ Vermont oan & Tru t Co u. ardin (1898), 19 Wash. 30-1, 53 Pac. 164;
Miller v. Crigler (I 99), 3 lo. J\ pp.
395.
ee al o Trompen v. Yate ( 190:2),
eb. - , 92 :r. vV. 647, where it wa
held that" Mortgagee holding mortgage:1
of various priority on the ame g ods wh
are jointly iu po e ion of th m, mar
join in an action again t the h riff for
depriving th em f po~ s ion and
nverting th e g od to hi own u e." ( yllabu by the ourt. J Bush v. Gr om,
9 Bu h, 675 , 67 ; Luke " Mar hall 5 .J. J.
far. h. 356.
e al o Ru ell v. Lenn n,
39 Wi . 5-0 .
ontra, t wart v. Br wu ,
37 :r. Y. 350; ei p ~. Til gh man, 23 Kan .
2 9; contra, j int own r 1i uld unit in
action to r ec vcr prop r ty x mpt fr m
exe uti on: he r , how ,. r, th n u· joind r
had b en wai \'eel.
4 .fo. i
v. hillip , .3 Dush, 200.
0 , illiman 1 • Tutt} , 45 Ba rb, 171. Action by all th
o- wn Pr. wh re a al
had h n mad e, a in th la t preceding
ca e, by one of them aloue.
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§ 141. * 224. Surviving Partners. The new procedure has

not, in general, changed the former rules as to the rights and

powers of surviving partners when one or more of the firm

Jiave died. Now, as before, the surviving partner or partners

have the exclusive possession of the firm assets, for the purpose

of paying its debts and settling its affairs. They alone can

prosecute all actions of a legal nature, to recover debts, or

the possession of property, or its value, or damages for its wrong-

ful conversion or misuse. The remedy on all rights of action

held by or due to the firm is to be pursued in their names, and

the personal representatives of the deceased member or members

cannot be joined in such actions by virtue of any interest which

they may have in the proceeds, and in the final winding up of

the partnership accounts. ^ This doctrine, however, does not

mean that every thing in action, belonging to the firm at the

time of the death of a member, must invariably be enforced by

the survivor, or not at all; he is simply the proper and only

person to sue, as long as the thing in action or other personal

property remains a part of the firm assets. ^ The survivor may
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assign such a firm asset, and the assignee would thereupon be

entitled to sue in his own name, as in the case of any other

assignment. When, therefore, a surviving partner had trans-

ferred a firm demand to the administrator of the deceased partner,

such administrator would be alone able to enforce the collection

by suit in his own name, not, however, by virtue of his original

representative capacity, but only in his character as assignee.''

§ 142. ' 225. Extreme Limits to which some Courts have

carried Doctrine as to Joint Rights. The rule that all the CO-

owners of a chattel must unite in any action founded upon the

property in it has been pushed by some of the courts to its

^ QSee Mcintosh i'. Zaring (1897), 150 only be maintained by the personal repre-

Ind. 301, 49 N. E. 164, set out at length iu sentative of the deceased partner.]

note to § *211, a»;e. But see, also, Hard- » Roys r. Vilas, 18 Wis. 169; Brown

wood Log Co. V. Coffin (1902), 130 N. C. v. Allen, 3.5 Iowa, 306, 311. See, also,

432, 41 S. E. 931, where it is said that the especially, Robinson i'. Hintrager (Iowa),

personal representative should be made a 36 Fed. Rep. 752, per Shiras J., p. 756

party. 3 Hargadine v. Gibbons, 45 Mo. App. 460,

■•^ [jK'obertson r. Burrell (1895), 110 Cal. per Thompson J., and numerous cases

568, 42 Pac. 1086: The heirs of a deceased cited; 8 C. (Mo. Sup. 1893), 21 S. W.

partner are not proper parties to bring an 726; Crook v. TuU (Mo. Sup. 1892), 20

action for an accounting iu respect to the S. W. 8 ; State v. Stratton (Mo. Sup.

partnership property, but such action can 1892), 19 S. W. 803.

~ 141.

"" 22-:1. Surviving Partners.
The new procedur ha
not, in g neral, hanged the former rul s a to the rights and
pow r of surviving partner when one or more of the firm
Juwe died. Now, a before, the surviving partner or partn r
have the exclusive po' e ion of the firm as et , for the purpo.
of paying it debts and settling its affairs. They alone an
pro ecute all actions of a legal nature, to recover debts, or
the po
ion of prop rty, or its value, or damages for its wrongful conv rsion or misuse. The rem dy on all rights of action
held by or due to the firm is to be pursued in their names, and
the p rsonal representatives of the deceased member or members
cannot be joined in such actions by virtue of any interest which
they may haYe in the proceeds, and in the final winding up of
the partnership accounts. 1 This doctrine, however, does not
mean that every thing in action, belonging to the firm at the
time of the death of a member, must invariably be enforced by
the survivor, or not at all; he is simply the proper and only
person to sue, as long as the thing in action or other personal
property remains a part of the firm assets. 2 The survivor may
a sign such a firm asset, and the assignee would thereupon be
entitled to sue in his own name, as in the case of any other
a ignment. When, therefore, a surviving partner had transferred a firm demand to the administrator of the deceased partner,
such administrator would be alone able to enforce the collection
by suit in his own name, n ot, however, by virtue of his original
rnpre entative capacity, but only in his character as assignee. 3
§ 142. "-' 225. Extreme Limits to whi ch some Courts have
carried Doctrine as to Joint Rights.
The rule that all the coowners of a chattel must unite in any action founded upon the
property in it has been pushed by some of the courts to it
1 [ ee Mclnto h u. Zaring (1897), 150
Incl. 301, 49 N. E. 164, set out at length in
note to§ *211, ante. B ut see, also, Hardwood Log Co. v. Coffin {1902), 130 N. C.
~.32, 41
. E . 931, where it i. said that the
per. onal representative should be made a
party.]
2
[I obert on u. Bu rrell (1895), 110 Cal.
!Hi . -t 2 Pac. l 086 : The heirs of a decea ed
partn r ar not proper parties t brin& an
action for an acco unting in respect to the
partner hip property, but such action can

only be maintained by the personal representative of the decea ed partner.]
s Roys v. Vilas, 18 Wi . 169; Brown
v. Allen, 35 Iowa, 306, 3 1l.
ee, al o,
especially, Robin on v. Hintrager (Iowa),
36 Fed. Hep. 752, per
hiras J., p. 756
Hargadine v . Gibbons, 45 Mo. App. 460
per Thompson J., and numerous ca. es
cited; s c. ( fo. up. 1 93), 21 . W.
726; rook v. Tull ( fo. up. l 92}, 20
, . vV. 8;
tate v. tratton (Mo. up.
1892), 19

.

w.
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extreme limits, — to the extent, as it seems to me, in fact, of

nullifying an express and very salutary provision of the reform

legislation. I have already discussed the general principle of

interpretation referred to with sufficient fulness,^ and shall

simply state the additional decisions, without further comment.

When, in the case of partners or other joint owners of personal

property, one of them is legally disabled, V)y means of some act

of his own, from asserting or maintaining any right in himself,

or, in other words, when he has put himself in such a condition

that, if he were the sole owner, he would not have a right of

action in reference to the property, it has been held that all the

partners or co-owners cannot prosecute an action in their joint

names, even in respect of the interest of those who have done no

acts impairing their individual rights. It is said that, as the

right of action is essentially and completely joint, and as there-

fore all the co-owners must be able to sue, this unity of interest

cannot be severed and a recovery permitted for that share of the

interest which, as between themselves, belongs to the innocent

rather than to the guilty owners. Upon the same principle, and
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applying in the like manner the rigid doctrine of an absolute

unity of right among the co-owners of chattels, the one who had

done no act affecting his individual interest cannot sue, in

respect of that interest, to recover the portion of the entire

demand due to himself by making the others defendants.^ It is

plain from the propositions contained in this subdivision, and

from the cases cited in their support, that the courts have made

no substantial changes, as results of the reformatory legislation,

in the rules concerning the parties plaintiff in actions by the co-

owners of personal property.

§ 143. * 226. m. Legal Actions by Persons having Joint Rights

arising from Contract. Tlie general effect of the provisions con-

tained in the codes upon the common-law doctrines respecting

joint rights of action has already been discussed with sufficient

1 See supra, §§ *221-»223, and cases Allen, 13 N. Y. 173; Tripp v. Riley. 15

cited. Barb. 333. See Hill v. Marsh, 46"lud.

^ Estabrook t;. Messersmith, 18 Wis. 218. The case of P^stabrook r. Messer-

545 ; Frans v. Young, 24 Iowa, 375 ; smith, cited above in ihi.s note, has been

Nightingale u. Scannell, 6 Cal. 506; and severely criticised, and its correctness

see Kainey v. Smizer, 28 Mo. 310; Clark que.'»tioned, in Viles v. Bangs, 36 Wis 131,

r. Cable, 21 Mo. 223 ; Andrews v. Moke- 139, 140, per Cole J.

lumiie Hill Co., 7 Cal. 330; Kussell v.

xtreme limits, - to the extent a it seems to me, in fact, of
nullifying an expre s and ery alu ary provision of the reform
legi ~ 1ation. I ha e already discu sed the general principle of
interpr tation referred t with ufficient fulue s, 1 and shall
te the additional decisions without further comment.
imply
When in the ca e of partners or other joint owners of personal
roperty one of them i legally di abled y mean· f ome act
f hi own from a erting or maintaining any right in himself
or in other words when he ha put him elf in uch a condition
that if he were the ole owner he would not have a right of
action in reference to the property, it has been held that all the
partners or co-owner cannot pro ecute an action in their joint
name even in respect of the intere t of those who have done no
acts impairing their individual rights. It is aid that, as the
right of action is essentially and completely joint, and as there£ re all the co-owners mu t be able to ue, thi unity of interest
cannot be severed and a recovery permitted for that hare of the
intere t which, as between themselves, belong to the innocent
rather than to the guilty owners. Upon the same principle and
applying in the like manner the rigid doctrine of an absolute
unity of right among the co-owners of chattel , the one who bad
one n act affecting his individual interest cannot sue in
re pect of that intere t, to recover the portion of the entire
deman due to himself by making the others defendants. 2 It is
plain from the pr po ition contained in this ubdivi ion, and
from the ca e cite in th ir upport that the courts have made
no ub tan i 1 change , a result.c of the reformatory legislation,
in the rule c ncerning the parties plaintiff in action by the coowner of p r onal pr perty.

§ 143. * 22 .

m.

Legal Actions by Persons having Joint Rights

The gen ral eff ct of the provi ion c ntain d in th
od upon he ommon-law d ctrin s re p cting
int righ
f acti n ha already een di cus e<l with suffici nt

arising from Contract.

1
ee supra, § *221-*223, and
cited.
E tabroo k v. Me ersmith, 1
545; Fran
v. Y oung, 24 Iowa,
ightingale v. cann 11 , 6 al. 506
e Raine . miz r , 2 M . 310 ·
r able, 21 Mo. 223; Andr w
Hill o., 7 a l. :l30 ;
luro

cases
Wi .
375;
· and
lark
f ke-

All n 13 N. Y . 17 3 ; Tripp v. ii , 15
Barb. 333 .
e Hill v. farsb, 46 Iud.
218. The a. e f E ta br ok v. 1\1 !I r-
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fulness, and I shall simply add to that discussion some examples

and illustrations furnished by the decided cases. It was shown

that the ancient rule, requiring all the joint obligees, covenantees,

and promisees to unite in actions brought upon their contracts,

had not been abrogated, and only modified perhaps in the single

particular of permitting parties to be made defendants who refuse

to join as plaintiffs. The doctrine of equity in this respect was

substantially the same as that of the law, and demanded a union

of all joint claimants to prosecute their joint right by a suit in

chancery. When the doctrine of equity was made statutory, and

was applied to all classes of actions, it therefore wrought no

change in the practical rules. Of course these provisions of the

codes as to parties have not of themselves altered in any manner

the principles which the common law had established for deter-

mining whether a right created by any contract is joint or

several. In actions ex contractu^ all the persons having a joint

interest must be made plaintiffs, and, when one of them dies,

the action must be brought or must proceed in the names of the

survivors, the personal representatives of the deceased obligee
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or promisee cannot be joined as co-plaintiffs; and in the same

manner, in actions ex delicto for injuries to personal property, all

the joint owners must unite, and, if one of them dies, the action

is to be prosecuted by the survivors alone. These common-law

rules remain in full force. ^ It has been held that two or more

' QMcIntosh V. Zaring (1897), 150 Ind. cannot maintain an action thereon in his

501, 49 N. E. 164, quoting the text.] In- own name witiiont joining the other

diana, B. & W. Ry. Co. v. Adam.son, 114 owner, though the note is payable to

Ind. 282 ; Bucknam v. Brett, 35 Barb, bearer and is in his possession). All per-

596; 13 Abb. Pr. 119; Daby r. Ericsson, sons entitled to shares in the same debt

45 N. Y. 786. The survivor was held to may join in an action to recover it, e. g.

be the proper party to sue, although, by assignees of different portions. Brett v.

an arrangement between him.self and the First Univ. Soc. of Brooiilyn, 5 Hun, 149.

representatives of the estate of the de- Where the wards should be joined as co-

ceased, the proceeds were to belong e.\- plaintiffs in a suit by a new guardian on

fulne , and I hall simply add to that di cu i n ome examples
and illnstrati n furni bed by the d cid
a e . It wa h w
that th ancient rule, requiring all the joint o ligee , covenante s,
nd r mi ee to unite in action brought upon th ir c ntracts,
had not been abrogated, and only modified p rhap in the ingle
particular of permitting parties to be made defen ants who refuse
to join as plaintiffs. The doctrine of equity in thi respect was
ub tantially the same as that of the law, and demanded a uni n
of all joint claimants to pro ecute their joint right by a suit in
chancery. When the doctrine of equity was made statutory, and
wa applied to all classes of actions, it therefore wrought no
~hange in the practical rules.
Of course these provisions of the
codes a to parties have not of themselves altered in any manner
the principles which the common law had established for determining whether a right created by any contract is joint or
everal. In actions ex contractu, all the persons having a joint
interest must be made plaintiffs, and, when one of them dies,
the action must be brought or must proceed in the names of the
urvivors, the personal representatives of the deceased obligee
or promisee cannot be joined as co-plaintiffs; and in the ame
manner, in actions e.-i; delicto for injuries to personal property, all
the joint owners must unite, and, if one of them dies, the action
i to be prosecuted by the survivors alone. These common-law
rule remain in full force. 1 It has been held that two or more

clusively to them, and he disclaimed all tlie former guardian's bond, see Wilson

interest therein. See also Carrere v. v. Houston, 76 N. C. 375.

Spofford, 15 Abb. Pr. n. s. 47, 48, 49. |[See, however, Hardwood Log Co. v.

That all joint creditors or promi.sees must Coffin (1902), 130 N. C. 432, 41 S. E. 931,

join as plaintiffs, see Porter v. Fletcher, in which it is held that where a firm is a

25 Minn. 493; McConnell v. Brayner, 63 party jdaintiff, and a member of the firm

Mo. 461 ; Marie v. Garrison, 83 X. Y. 14, dies, his personal representative should be

29; Tinkler v. Swaynie, 71 Ind. 562; made a. party. Jameson y. Bartlett (1902),

Henry c. Mt. Pleasant Tp., 70 Mo. 500; 63 Neb. 638, 88 N. W. 860: "Where

Lyford r. No. Pac. C. R Co., 92 Cal. 93 ; one of .several plaintiffs or defendants

McNamee v. Carpenter, 56 Iowa, 276 (one dies, in an action pending in this court on

of two joiut owners of a promis.-^ory note error, the right of arlion, if it survives ta

l [Mcintosh v. Zaring (1897), 150 Intl .
.301, 49 N. E. 164, quoting the text.] Indiana, B. & W. Rv. Co. v. Adamson, 114
Ind. 2 2; Buckn~m v. Brett, 35 Barb.
.596; 13 Abb. Pr. 119; Daby v. Ericsson,
45 N. Y. 786. The urvivor was held to

be the proper party to sue, although, by
.an arrangement between him elf auu the
repre entative of the estate of the decea,ed, the proceed were to belong exdu iv ly to them, and he discla imed all
inter t therein . See also Carrere v.
pofford , 1:1 Abb. Pr. N . s. 47, 48 , 49.
That all joi nt creditor or promisee must
join a plaintiff-, ee Porter v. Fletcher,
25 :Minn. -193; McConnell v. Bra.vner, 63
~fo 461; ~1arie i·. Garrison, 8.'3 N'. Y. 14,
29; Tinkler v.
wayui e, 71 Ind. 562;
Ilenry 1·. '.\It. Pl ea ant Tp., iO :\Io ..'iOO;
Lyford v. Jo. Pac. . R Co., 92 Cal. 9.'3;
McNamee v. Carpenter, 56 Iowa, 2i6 (one
()f two j int owners of a promis:-:ory note

cannot maintain an action thereon iu his
own name with out joiniug the other
owner, though the note i payable to
bearer and is in his po e ion). All persons entitled to share in the same debt
may join in an action to recover it, e.g.
a signees of different portion . Brett v.
First Univ. S o-. of Brooklyn, 5 Hun, 149 .
Where the ward shonl<l be joined a c plaintiffs in a suit by a new guardian on
the former o-nardiau's bonrl, see Wilson
v. Houston , 76 N. C. 3i5 .
[See, however, Hardwood L og
. t•.
Coffin (1902), 130 N. . 432, 41 . E. 9 l,
in which it i held that where a firm i a
party plaintiff, and a member of the fil'm
di s, hi per ·oual re pr utati,·e hould be
made a .party. Jame on v. B artlett (1902),
63

~eb.

63 ,

. vV.

60:

"°"'h r

one of s1weral plain tiff or defendants
die , in an a ti n p nding in thi court on
error, the right of a ction, if it surri,·es t
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obligees in an injunction undertaking, although their interests

were entirely separate, and no joint claim for damages existed,

may unite in an action upon it;^ but in another similar case,

where the action was joint in form, the recovery was limited to

the damages suffered by the plaintiffs jointly, and they were not

permitted to show what each had separately sustained. ^ In an

action on a penal bond running to several persons jointly, the

common-law rule required all the obligees to be made plaintiffs,

although the condition avus to perform distinct acts for the

benefit of the obligees severally.^ When a deed of conveyance

or against the remaining parties, may be

enforced without bringing tlie representa-

tive or successor of the deceased party into

an injunction undertakin al bough th Jr intere ts
1 eparat an no joint laim for damag exi t <l,
ma unite in an ac in ip n it; 1 but in ano her simil,r a
wh re he a tion w· j int inf rm the r co ry wa limited t
th lamag suff r d
th plaintiff jointl and the
er n t
2
p rmitt d to bow what a h ha<l parately ustain d. In an
acti n on a penal bon runnin to veral p ron jointly, tl1
common -law rule req ufred all tbe bli ee t be made lain tiff·
although the conditi n wa to p rform distinct ac
for the
3
benefit of the oblige
everally. When a dee l f conve anc
o

the case."]

1 Loomis V. Brown, 16 Barb. 325. See

opinion of Gridley J. The decision

was not placed upon the ground that

the plaintiffs' rights were joint. It was
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considered that the code permitted a union

of plaintiffs in legal actions, which was

not possible at the common law. Q" A

contract entered into and performed jointly

by two or more persons, the c'>mpen-

sation for the performance of wliich is

separate and distinct as to each of such

person.-?, may be sued upon separately by

each of them, to recover tlie amount due

to him or the damages sustained by

him:" Curry v. Railway Co. (1897), 58

Kan. 6, 48 Pac. 579. See, to the same

effect, Mcintosh v. Zaring (1897), 150 lud.

.301, 49 N. K. 164. In the enforcement of

a joint contract all mu.st jo<n : Slaughter

V. Davenport (1891)), 151 Mo 26, 51 S. W.

471,

Where a contract ig made by a carrier

with a funeral party juiuMy to hold a train

for them, each member of tlie party has a

separate cause of action for the breach of

the contract : Southern Ry. Co. v. Mar-

shall (1901), 1 1 1 Ky. 560, 64 S. W. 418, fol-

lowing Baughman v. Hailroad Co., 94 Ky.

150.

In a joint action by several plaintiffs,

if the evidence shows that at least part of

them cannot recover, a verdict for tlie

defendant must result: Medlock r. Merritt

or again t the re maining partie , may be
enforced without bringinu the repre entative or uccessor of the deceased party into
the case."]
I Loomis v. Brown, 16 Barb. 32fi.
ee
The deci ion
opinion of Gridley J.
wru not placed upon the ground that
the plaintiff" right were joint. It wa
con idered that the code permitted a 1.lllion
of plaintiff in legal actions, which wa
not po ible at the common law. [ " A
contract entered into and performed jointly
by two or more per on , the C'lmpensation for the performance f 'i"hich i
.eparate and di tinct a to ach of uch
per on , may be ued upon . eparntely by
each of them, to recoYer tl1e a1Pouut due
o him or the damage
u'>t.ain cJ by
him:" Curry v. Railway Co. (1 9i), 5
Kan. 6, 4 Pac. 579.
ee, t0 the ame
effect, M Into h v. Zaring ( l q;) 150 Ind.
301, 49 . E. 164. In the eufor meut of
a joint contract all mu t j \n: laughter
v. Davenport (1 99), 151 ~ (0 26, 51 . W .
471.

Where a ontract i, m'l<le hy a carrier
·with a fuuer.11 party joiurly to hold a t rain
for them, , ch member of the party ha a
separate cau. e of actio>J. for the brea h of
the coiltract: 'outheru Ry. o. v. l\Iarshall ( 1901), lll1\y. 560, 4 . \V.41 ,fllowing Baughm?.n v Hailroad o., 94 Ky.

(1897), 102 Ga. 212, 29 S. E. 185.]

laud, not jointly, nor in common, but each

possessing and cultivating a separate par-

cel of the whole. An action was brought

to recover the entire tract, and, by the

provisions of the California statute re-

ferred to in a preceding paragraph, all

these occupants were made defendants.

An injunction was granted restraining

them all from interfering, etc. with the

crops, and the ordinary undertaking was

given to them. The persons thus enjoined

bring this action on the undertaking ; and

the rule stated in the text was expressly

lai<l down by the court. It would be

difficult to reconcile these two cases.

3 Pearce v. Hitchcock, 2 N. Y. 388, per

Jewett C. J. See also Koeniger v. Creed,

58 lud. 554; Thomas v. Irwin, 90 Ind.

In a joint a<'tion by

which, ontrary t0 the c mm n-law rul1·
tat d, allow d :eparate actiou by
the oblig-ee., wa ba ed utir ly on tl.l·
tatut r latiag to attach 111 nt bone!. .
[\Yh r an atta hm ut bon<l i made t•1
two jointly, hoLh are nee . 'ar~- vartic lo
an a ti on for the full amount of th hone!:
I ing v. Kehoe (1 94), 91 Ia. 91, 5 N. W.
th r

150

^ Fowler v. Frisbie, 37 Cal. 34. A

number of persons were in possession of

po e ing and cultivating a eparate parcel of the whole. An action wa brought
to recover the entire tra t, and, br the
provi ion of the aliforoia tatute referred to in a preced ing paragraph, all
the e occupant were ma<le defendant..
An injunction wa granted re traininu
them all from interfering, etc. with the
crop , and the ordinary undertaking wa,
given to them. The person hu enjoin d
bring this action on the undertaking; and
the rule tated in the text wa expre ly
laid d wn by the court. It would be
diffi ·ult to reconcile these two ca
3 Pearce v. Hitchcock 2 T. Y. 3
p r
J e wett . J.
al o Koeniger i·. reed ,
5 Ind. 55-!- · Thoma v. Irwiu 90 Ind.
557; McLeod v. cott, 3
rk. 72. ."ee,
however, prague v. \\ ell. 4 7 :ili uu. 50+;
Alexander v. Jacoby, 23 hio t. 35 , 3 3.
Vand rruul en v. andermul n 10
. Y.

everal plaintiff.,

if the ' i1lence h w that at l a t part of
them canrJ1Jt r coy r, a Y rdi<'t for the
def wlant mu t result: fed lo ·k i• .• Ierritt
(I !J7) , 102 a. 212, 20 ' . E. 1 ".]
2 F1rn·ler 1•.
'ri bie, 37
1. 34. A
nurnlir.r vf p r on w re iu po . . ion of
laud, ll<Jt 'oiutly, nor in ·ommou, but each
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of land is given to two or more grantees, the implied covenants

of title, if there be any, are joint, and give only a joint right of

action, so that one of the grantees cannot sue alone for a breach.^

This is a reaffirmance of the rule applicable to the same circum-

stances under the common law.^

§ 144. * 227. Same Subject. Illustrations. It has been said,

in a decision made since the code, that in an action, whether

legal or equitable, by a firm, all the partners, even those (hat are

dormant, must unite as plaintiffs ; ^ but this case can hardly be

1 Lawrence v. Montgomery, 37 Cal.

183.

2 [[Proctor V. Georgia Ins. Co. (1899),

of land i given to two or m re grant
th impli cl ovenants
of titl , if th re b any, are join , and give only a joint right f
a tion, o t]rnt one of the grant s cann t sue alon f r a br ach.1
Thi i a reaffirmance of the rule applicable t th
ame circumtauc under the common law. 2
§ 144. * 227. S a me S ubject. Illustrations. It has been aicl,
in a deci ion made since the co<le, that in an action, wh ther
1 gal or equitable, by a firm, all the partner , even those that are
dormant, must unite as plaintiff ; 3 but this case can hardly be

124 N. C. 265, 32 S. E. 716 : A mortgagor

of realty took out a fire insurance policy,

1

Lawrence v. Montgomery, 37 Cal.

expressed to be paid to the plaintiff (the

l 3.
mortgagee) and assured, " as their inter-

[Proctor v. Georgia Ins. Co. ( 1899),
. 265, 32 . E. 716: A mortgagor
of realty took out a fire in uran ce policy,
xpre ed to be paid to the plaintiff (the
morto-ag e) anrl a sured, "a their intere t ma:i' appear." Held that the mortgagor i a nece ary party.
Ermeutront v. American Fire Ius. Co.
(1895), 60 l\linn. 418, 62 N. W. 543: The
owner of certain property took out a
policy of in . uran ce upon the same, t.he
lo to be paid to the a. ignee of the
mortgagee "a interest may appear," said
a ignee being named in the policy. After
the lo. the said a signee a igned all his
iutere t under the policy to a third party,
and it wa held that the third party and
the owner might properly be joined in an
action upon the policy.] The defendaut,
C., entered into a contract with the plaintiff, D., for the construction of a building
upon a lot belonging to them, u pon which
the other plaintiff, ., held a mortgage;
and for the faithful performance of the
ontract . gave hi bond to . for the
benefit of all the plaintiff ' ; in an action
for a breach of the bond it was held that
both mortgagor and mortgagee were
properly joined as plaintiffs. Daley v.
unningham, 60 al. 530. Where an iusurance policy i made payable to the
mortgagee of the property " to the extent
of hi, intere t," or "as hi intere t may
appear," the mortgagor and mortgagee
may join in uing on the poliC'y, as th y
have a common intere t in enforcing Lhe
contract: '\'\ inne r. J..'iagara F. In s. o.,
91 N. Y. l 5; Home In- . o. v.
ilman,
112 Ind. 7. When, in such a case, the
;nortgage debt, after the loss becomes pay2

ests may appear." Held that the mort-

124

gagor is a necessary party.

Generated for facpubupdates (University of Michigan) on 2014-06-17 15:31 GMT / http://hdl.handle.net/2027/uc2.ark:/13960/t02z1c23b
Public Domain / http://www.hathitrust.org/access_use#pd

Ermeutrout v. American Fire Ins. Co.

(1895), 60 Minn. 418, 62 N. W. 543 : The

owner of certain property took out a

policy of insurance upon the same, the

loss to be paid to the assignee of the

mortgagee " as interest may appear," said

assignee being named in the policy. After

the loss the said assignee assigned all his

interest under the policy to a third party,

and it was held that the third party and

the owner might properly be joined in an

action upon the policy.] The defendant,

C, entered into a contract with the plain-

tiff, D., for the construction of a building

upon a lot belonging to them, upon which

the other plaintiff, S., held a mortgage ;

and for the faithful performance of the

contract C. gave his bond to S. for the

benefit of all the plaintiffs; in an action

for a breach of the bond it was held that

both mortgagor and mortgagee were

properly joined as plaintiffs. Daley ;'.

Cunningham, 60 Cal. 530. Where an in-

surance policy is made payable to the

mortgagee of the property " to the extent

of his interest," or '' as his interest may

appear," the mortgagor and mortgagee

may join in suing on the policy, as they

have a common interest in enforcing the

contract : Winne r. Niagara F. Ins. Co.,

91 N. Y. 185 ; Home Ins. Co. v. Oilman,

112 Ind. 7. When, in such a case, the

mortgage debt, after the loss becomes pay-

able, is greater than the sum insured the

mortgagee may sue alone. Hammel v.

Queen Ins. Co., 50 Wis. 240; Travelers'

Ins. Co. V. Cal. Ins. Co., 1 N. D. 151.

Where, bowever, the interest of the mort-

gagee in the premises insured has ended,

be is no longer a proper party, either

plaintiff or defendant. So held in Great

W. Compound Co. v. JEtna Ins. Co., 40

Wis. 373. See, however, ante, § *139,

and cases cited. A policy having been

assigned by the assured to his mortgagees

as collateral security, the assured, it has

been held, was pro])erly joined as co-

plaintiff with the assignees, although

he had, by alienation of the property,

rendered the policy void except as to the

able, i. greater than the sum in ured the
mortgagee may ue alone. Hammel v.
Queen In . Co., 50 Wis. 240; Traveler '
In . Co. v. Cal. In.
o., l •. D. 151.
Where, however, the intere t of the mortgagee in the premise · in ured ha end d,
he is no longer a proper party, ither
plaintiff or defendant.
o held in Great
W. Compound Co. v . .lEtna In . Co., 40
Wis. 373. See, however, ante, § * 139,
and cases cited . A policy having been
as igned b.v the a .. ured to hi· mortgagee
as collateral . ecurity, the a ·sured, it ha
been held, was prop rly joiued a
oplaintiff wi th the a ignee , alth ough
he had, by alienation of the property,
rendered the policy void except as to the
intere t of his a ignee · ; to this extent
he was intere ted, a payment of the lo s
to them would iuure to his benefit: B oynton v. Clinton, etc. In . Co., 16 Barb. 254
(these plaintiffs, it was said, could not
have been joined at common law). Contra,
Michael v. St. Louis l\1ut. F. Ins. Co., 17
Mo. App. 23.
3
ecor v. Keller, 4 Duer, 416.
ee
Beudel v. H ettri ck, 45 How. Pr. 19 ;
Lewis v. Grei ler, 51 N. Y. 231; 49 Barb.
606.
That dormant partner need not
be joined, ee Platt v. Iron Exch. Bk.
(Wi . 1892), 53 N. W. 737.
[In Williams v. outh rn Pac. R.R. Co.
(I 9o), 110 Cal. 45i, 42 Pac. 974, plaintiff
brought an action to recover com pen. ation
for certain work whiC'h he alleged was
done by him at defendant' reque t. The
an wer c n i ted of denial . It wa. disclo ed by the e\·itlence that the contract
was made by the plaintiff in behalf of a
partner. hip of which he wa a member
and was executed at joint e.·p n e.
Thereupon cl fend wt moved for a non-
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regarded as correct, for it was well settled at the common law

that dormant partners need not be joined, and it does not seem

that anything in the code has changed the rule in this particular.

When eleven officers, harbor masters, all engaged in the same

duties, and each entitled to an equal share, one-eleventh of the

total fees, made an agreement by which one of them undertook

to collect all the fees, and to account for and pay over to the

other ten their portions of the same, it was held that all of the

ten must unite in an action brought against the eleventh to

recover from him the amounts due to them which he had re-

ceived; one could not sue alone. ^ Persons may sometimes be

united as plaintiffs in an action upon a written contract, even

though they are not parties thereto, and the terms of the agree-

ment make no direct reference to them, if they, notwithstanding,

have an actual interest jointly with the ostensible parties in the

subject-matter of the contract, and in the cause of action arising

upon it.'* The authorities of a county appropriated $117,600 to

procure volunteers to fill the quota of the county, and ordered

$300 to be paid as bounty to each volunteer out of this fund.
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Eighty-six persons, who had already enlisted in the military

service, agreed with the county officials that, in consideration

of being paid said bounty, they would form a part of its quota,

and they were thereupon actually enrolled in and credited to the

suit, on the ground that one partner could ship name, under § 5011, R. S., and one

not maintain an action to enforce a part- of the partners dies while it is pending,

nership demand, which motion was over- the action cannot go on in the name of

ruled. On appeal the ruling was ap- the partnership, even under order of the

proved. The court said : " We are of court, for it has ceased to exist, and the

opinion, following the incontestable trend action must be revived and proceed in

of authority, that the absence sus parties the name of the representative or successor

of some of the partners from a complaint of the firm, and the court held further, in

by one or more of them on a partnership the same case, that where a suit is brought

<lemaud does not, speaking strictly, affect in the partnership name, an averment as to

a correct, for it wa w 11 ettled at the common law
r m nt partners ne d not be joined, and it doe not eem
b t uy bing in th code ha chang the rule in thi p rticular.
h n ele n offic r , harbor ma t , all engaged in the same
nd ch nti 1 d to an
ual hare, one-ele enth of the
t 1 f e made an agreement by ' hi ch one of them undertook
c 11 ct all the fee an to account for an pay o r to the
her ten their portion of the ame it was held that all of the
t n mu unite in an action brought again t the le enth to
r e over from him the am unt due to them which he bad re-c i d; one could not sue alone. 1 Persons may sometimes be
unit
a plaintiffs in an action upon a written contract, even
though th y are not parties thereto, and the terms of the agreement make no direct ref rence to th m, if they, notwith tanding,
h a e an actual interest jointly wi h the o tensible parties in the
u j ct-matter of the contra t, an in the cau e of action arising
u n it. 2 The authorities of a county appropriated $117, 00 to
pr cure volunt r to fill the quota of the county, nd ordered
. 00 t be paid a boun y to each v lunteer out of hi fun .
Eighty- ix per on wh had already enli t d in the military
er ic agr e with the c unty fficial that, in con i erati n
-0£ b ing paid aid bounty, they would form a part of it quota
n th y were thereupon actually nr ll din an er dite to the

the merits, and in order to he considered who the partners are is mere surplusage,

must be pleaded by the defendant. The Citing Winters v. Means, 50 Neb. 209, and

motion for nonsuit was therefore properly D.imond v. Bank, 70 Minn. 298.]

denied." Cases are cited from New York, i Deau ;;. Cliamberlin, 6 Duer, 691.

Minnesota and Missouri. The complaint, stating these facts, and

As to actions between partners, see alleging tliat defendant had refused to

§ '104, ante. account for and pay over to the single

In some states the statute permits part- plaintiff his sliare, was held bad ou

nerships to sue in the firm name. See demurrer ; all should have joined as

§ •121, ntite. The Supreme Court of Ohio, plaintiffs.

in Ph(i-nix Ins. Co. v. Carnahan (1900), '■^ Kutledge v. Curhiii, 10 Ohio St. 478.

6.3 O. St. 25S, 58 N. E. 80"), lield that See the facts and opinion, su/>ia, § *202.

where a suit is cummeuced in the partner- Moore v. Jackson, 35 Ind. SCO.

ui t, on the ground tha t one part ner could
n ot mai ntain an action to enforre a par tner hip demand, which moti on was ov rr uled.
n appeal the rulin wa a ppr \•ed. The court aid : " \Ve ar of
opinion, foll owin,., the inconte· rnule t r nd
of aut hority, t hat the ab ence ru; pa rtie
of me of the pR rt n r from a co mpla int
by one or mo re of th m on a partn r hip
<lemaud doe not, . peaki ng t ri ctly, aff ct
th rnerit , and in rd r to b on id red
u t be pl aded by t he defendant. The
mu ion for non- uit wa t h r fo re prop rly
d ni d."
a . a re cit d from ...'ew York,
• lion ta and Mi .. ouri.
e

hip name, under§ 5011, R. .,and one
of the partner <li s while it i pending,
th a tion cannot go on in the name of
t he partn r hip , ev n under order of the
co urt. fo r it has ce ed to exi t, and the
a t ion mu t b re\'i\'ed and proceed in
the nam e of the repre enta i\'e or ucce r
of the firm, and the court held further, in
t he am
e, that wh re a uit i br ught
in t h partuer hip nam e, an averm nt as to
wh th partner are i m r urpln ag .
iting \ int r . M an , 50 eb. 209, aud
D.i mond v. B nk , iO ~lion. 29 .]
l Deau v.
ham berlin, 6
uer, 691.
The omplai nt, tatin th se fact , and
all gi ng th at d f 11 dan t had refu · cJ t
uut f r an d pay over to the iogle
a
plai ntiff hi . ba r , wa held bad 011
cl m urr r ; all hould h ve join d
plaintiff .
2 ] utl dg v.
orli in. 10 hi
t . 4i
h f ·t and piniou, sup1·u , § _02 .
M or t• . J ·k on, 35 In d. 36
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number of volunteers required from the county. The bounty

not being paid, the entire eighty-six united in an action demand-

ing judgment for the total amount of their bounties, $25,800,

and the action was held to be properly brought.^

§ 145. * 228. Criticism of Cases holding that a Joint Promisee

cannot be made a Defendant. The COmmon-law theory of joint

right, growing out of contract, equally with the joint right aris-

ing from the ownership of chattels, has been carried by certain

cases so far that manifest injustice has been done, and the en-

forcement of conceded rights has been defeated, in order that the

courts should not depart from an arbitrary and technical rule.

These cases have held that, where a contract is made by or with

two or more on the one part, so that a joint right of action is

held by them, the only possible action is one brought by all, if

living; that one -of them cannot sue on the contract making his

co-contractor a defendant, with proper averments in the pleading,

whether he seeks to recover the whole amount due, or only his

own individual interest therein, and though the co-contractor

refuses to join in the suit for any reason, even if the latter has
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been paid his share. ^ I have already discussed this topic at large,

and fully expressed my opinion upon it.^ The decisions last

mentioned, and the rule which they approve, are directly opposed

to the letter of the codes, which makes no restriction to equitable

1 Young V. Franklin Cy. Com'rs, 25 join in an action on the policy. Kausal v.

Ind. 295, 299. Each plaintiff was only Minn. Farm. Mat. F. Jus. Ass'n,31 Minn,

interested to the extent of $.300. There 17. Sureties who have paid money for

was no joint right in the whole fund, their principal may have a joint action

This case therefore illustrates, in a clear for the whole amount ; or each may, as

manner, the proposition heretofore made, before the code, bring a separate action

— that the code admits of a joinder of for the amount he has paid : Skiff v.

plairitiffs in instances where such join- Cross, 21 Iowa, 459. Two persons were

der was not permitted at the common allowed to join in suing a common carrier

law. for the value of a chest, their joint prop-

number of volunteers required from the county. The bounty
not being paid, the entire eighty- ix unit d in an acti n demanding judgment for the total amount of their bounti , $25, 00,
and the action was held to be properly brought. 1
§ 1 45. * 228. Criticism of Cases holding that a Joint Promisee
cannot be made a Defendant.
The common-law theory of joint
right, growing out of contract, equally with the joint right ari ing from the ownership of chattels, has been carried by certain
ca e o far that manifest injustice has been <lone, and the enforcement of conceded rights has been defeated, in order that the
-court. should not depart from an arbitrary and technical rule.
These ca es have held that, where a contract is made by or with
two or more on the one part, so that a joint right of action is
held by them, the only po sible action i one brought by all, if
living; that one·of them cannot sue on the contract making his
co-contractor a defendant, with proper averments in the pleading,
whether he seeks to recover the whole amount due, or only his
-0wn individual interest therein, and though the co-contractor
refuses to join in the suit for any reason, even if the latter has
been paid his share. 2 I have already discussed this topic at large,
and fully expressed my opinion upon it. 3 The decisions la t
mentioned, and the rule which they approve, are directly opposed
to the letter of the codes, which makes no restriction to equitable

For a single premium a joint policy erty, and of its contents, part of which

of insurance was issued to the owner of was the property of one plaintiff, part of

a building and to the owner of a stock of the other; a check having been issued

goods therein, neither having any interest to them jointly for the transportation of

in the property of the other, except as it the chest and its contents: Anderson i".

arose from their relation as husband and Wabash, etc. Ky. Co., 65 Iowa, 131.

wife, and his occupancy of her store build- '^ Kainey r. Smizer, 28 Mo. 310; Clark

ing. It was held, that they properly v. Cable, 21 Mo. 223 ; Andrews v. Moke-

joined as plaintiffs in an action on the lumiie Hill Co., 7 Cal. 330 ; Kyan v.

policy ; Graves v. Merchants' & B. Ins. Co., Kiddle, 78 Mo. 521 ; Hogendobler v. Lyon,

82 Iowa, 637. Property of a married man 12 Kans. 276.

on the land of his wife was insured in their ^ See supra, § *204, and notes, and Hill

joint names; it was held that they might v. Marsh, 46 Ind. 218.

14

1 Yeung v. Franklin Cy. Com'rs, 25
Ind. 295, 299. Each plaintiff was only
interested to the extent of $300. There
was no joint right in the whole fund.
This ca e therefore illustrates, in a clear
manner, the proposition heretofore made,
- that the code admits of a joinder of
plaintiff.~ in instances wh ere such joinder was not pe rmitted at the common
law.
For a single premium a joint policy
-0f in~urance was issueu to the owner of
a buildiug and to the owner of a sto ·k of
guods therein, neither having any intere t
in t he property of th e othflr, except as it
:arose from their relation as husband antl
wife, and hi occupancy of her store building. It was held, that they properly
joined as plaintiffs in an action on the
policy: Graves v. Merchants' & B . ln . Co.,
2 Iowa, 63i. Property of a married man
-On the land of his wife was insured in their
joint names; it was held that th ey might

join in an action on the policy. Kausal v.
Minn . Farm. Mut. F. Ius. Ass'n, 31 Minn.
17. Sureties who have paid money for
their principal may have a joint action
for the whole amount; or each may, as
before the code, bring a separat e action
for the amount he has paid:
kif£ v.
Cross, 21 Iowa, 459. Two persons were
allowed to join in suing a common carrier
for the value of a chest, their joint property, and of its contents, part of which
was the property of one plaintiff, part of
th e other; a check having been i ued
to them jointly for the transportation of
the chest and it contents: Ander on v.
Waba ·h, etc. Ry. Co., 65 Iowa, 131.
2 Hainey v.
mizer, 28 l\fo. 3 10 ; Clark
v. Cable, 21 Mo. 223 ; Andr w v. Mokelumne Hill Co., 7 Cal. 330; Ryan v.
Riddle, 78 Mo. 521 ; Hogend bler v. Lyon ,
12 Kans. 276.
3 See supra, § *204, and notes, and Hill
v. Marsh, 46 Ind. 218.
14

... 10

IV IL RE:'IIEDIES.

210 CIVIL REMEDIES.

evicl n inten

suits, and are in violent antagonism with the evident intent of

ll1
the reformed procedure. It was said hy the court, in one case,

that if an action by one of the creditors was permitted, under the

th

f
a. e

circumstances stated, the debtor would be exposed to subsequent

suits and recoveries from the other creditors. This remark shows

an entire misapprehension of the meaning and purpose of the

statutory provision. It requires the dissenting creditor or co-

contractor, who refuses to be a plaintiff, to be made a defendant,

for the very purpose of concluding liim, by the judgment, from

any subsequent prosecution on his own behalf. He is added as

a party, and "has his day in court," and tliis will be a complete

bar to a future attempt on his own part, if he sliould change his

mind. No possible injustice could therefore be done to the

defendant, and great injustice would necessarily be done to the

creditor who desires to enforce his lawful demand, if the utterly

arbitrary rule sustained by these and similar cases should be

generally approved as the correct interpretation of the codes.

The New York Court of Appeals has determined that an action

may be maintained by one firm against another firm to recover a
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sum ascertained to be due, although the two partnerships have a

common member who is made a defendant, with proper aver-

ments, in the complaint; and the action need not be brought for

the equitable relief of an accounting, but for the legal relief of

an ordinary money judgment.^

§ 146. * 229. IV. Legal Actions by Persons having Several

Rights Arising from Contract. As the principles have been already

stated in the preliminary discussions of this section, it is only

^ Cole y. Reyiioliis, 18 N. Y. 74. [^Willis it was deemed absurd to permit a party

V. Barron (1898), 143 Mo. 450, 4.') S. W. to be both a plaintiff and a defendant in

289. The court said : " At common law the same action, and for the further rea-

partnership contracts were construed to he son that until the jiartiier.'ship affair.s were

joint only, not joint and several. As a adjudged and tlic balance struck it could

consequence of this rule in actions by or not be said one partner was indebted to

afjainst partners it was nece-ssary that all another. . . . l^ut since the statute now

the p:\rtners should join as plaintiffs or makes the note the several contract of each

Lc joined as defendants. A further con- member of the firm, and makes each

sequence of this doctrine was tliat a part- partner liable in soliJo, the payee is no

ner could not sue a firm of which he was Ion<rer under the necessity of suing him-

a member on a note executed by the firm self, and hence so far as the question of

ir um tan
·nit and r
an entire mi ap rehen ion of th
prov1 1011 . It require the di entin
ntractor who refo
to b a plaintiff
for he very purp ., of oncluding him
any sub equent pr
ution oi;i hi
wn b half.
a party, and ha, hi day in onr
an l thi will be a mpl t
bar to a future at mpt 'n hi own part, if he b uld chang hi·
mind . No po "'ible injn tice could ther fore b don to th
defendant and gr at inju ·ti.ce would n c ' arily b d n to th
credit r who de ire to enforce hi lawful demand if th utt rl
arbitrary rule su tained by the e and imilar ca. e h ul l be
generally approved a;:; the correct interpretation of th
d
The ew York ourt of Appeal ha· d termin
that an a i n
r a
ma. be maintained by one firm again t another firm to r
um a certained to b due, al hough the two par ner hip ha\ a
c mmon m mb r who i ma le a def ndant, with prop r av rment , in the complaint · an l the action n cl not be br uo-ht f r
the equitable r lief f an accounting, but for the 1 gal reli f of
an rdinary money judgment. 1
146.
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IV.

L egal

Actio n s

by

Persons

having Several

A the principle ha e been alr ady
tated in the preliminary di cu
f this s ction, it i only

Righ ts Arising from Con tra ct.

to himself. . . . All the law writers and j)arties to pleadings is concerned, be can

all tlk- adjudged cases place the disability sue either or all of the other partners

of one partner to sue his firm upon its without infringing the common-law rule

note to him u[)on the ground that a man of pleading."]

cannot contract with himself, and because

ole v. Reynold , 18 ..... Y. 4. [Willi
r. Barron ( I 9 ), l-!3 Mo. 4-50 45 . W.
2 9. The court aid: "At common law
n tru d to b

a 111em !J,.r on a not

to him p)f. . . . 11 the law writ r and
all th· atljurl;.recl c·a" s pln.C'
of 01w partu"r t<J :11<' hi. firm upon it
11<1lf' 11 him npo11 th<' ground th. a man
cannot coutract \\ ith him.-elf, and L cau. e

it wa deem d ab nrd to permit a party
to be b th a plaintiff and a defendant in
the am a tion, and for the furth r renon that until the partn r hip affair were
adjudg tl a.ncl th balance tru k it ould
not be aid ne partner wa ind bted to
anoth r . . . But in e the tatut now
mak ~ th n te th
f arh
,ch

SEY E R AL A 'TIO

~
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necessary to add some further illustrations furnished by the

decided cases. The common-law doctrine in respect to several

rights and actions does not seem to have been changed, unless,

possibly, under the operation of the equitable rule embodied in

the codes, plaintiffs having stricth^ several rights may be allowed

to unite in legal actions, under circumstances which establish a

certain community of interest among them, although under the

same circumstances they would have had no such election at the

common law. There is at least a tendency shown by some of

the decisions towards such a m.odification of the rule which

formerly prevailed in reference to several rights and causes of

action.' The following examples will serve to illustrate the

nature of several rights, and the doctrine as to parties plaintiff

in suits brought to enforce them. Tenants in common of a tract

of land, who hold their titles by different conveyances from the

same grantor, each of which contains covenants relating to the

land and its use, cannot unite in an action brought against

the grantor to recover damages for the breach of such covenants;

their interests under the covenants and their rights of action are
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in every sense several.^ The obligees in an injunction bond,

M'here the interests interfered with by the injunction are separate,

and the injury done to each is distinct, cannot join in a suit to

recover damages for these several causes of action ; their recovery

in such proceeding must be limited to the damages that are

strictly joint. ^' Certain persons executed the following written

/agreement: "We, the undersigned, agree to guarantee the de-

positors of W. E. C. [a banker] in the payment in full of their

demands against said W. E. C. on account of money deposited

with him." Each depositor, it was held, must sue separately

upon this guaranty to recover the amount of his individual

claim; all the depositors could not join in a single action,

because their interests were entirely several, neither one having

1 See ante, § * 227 and note. whose firm property had been wrongfully

^ Samuels v. Blanchard, 25 Wis. 329. .seized under the attachment, was sus-

' Fowler v. Frisbie, 37 C'al. 34 ; but, tained. Alexander r. Jaeoby, 23 Ohio

per conira, see Loomis v. Brown, 16 Barb. St. 358, 383. See ante, § *2G6, and notes,

325. It is held in Ohio that the interests and Vandermulen v. VandermnleTi, 108

of the obligees in an attachment bond N. Y. 195, 204, there cited. For further

are several, although the undertaking is , ilhistrations see Great West. Compound

in terms joint. Where such a bond was Co. v. vEtna Ins. Co., 40 AVis. 373 ; Hub-

given to three persons, an action on it by bard v. Burrell, 41 id. 365 ; Eldridge v.

two of them, who were partners, and Putnam, 46 id. 205 ; Brett v. First Univ.

ary to add som forth ,r illu trations fnrnji::h d by 01
The ommon -lt w doctrine in r :-;p t to
Y ral
righ t and a tion do s n t em to ha e b en hang cl, unl . :;;,
po . ibly, und r the 01 ration £ the qui table ml
mbodi d in
th cod , lain tiff h aving tri tl v v ral right' m, y b allow d
to unite in legal a ti n , untl r circurn tanc s whi ·h i-;tabli:h a
r tain community of in tere t among t h m, although und r the
ame circumstance t hey would have had no such 1 tion at th
c mmon law. There is at 1 a.s t a t endency shown by om of
the deci ions towards such a n~odi fication of th rul whi h
f rm erly prevailed in reference to several rights and cau : f
action. 1 The following examples will erve to illn. tra e the
nature of several righ ts, and the doctrine as to partie plaintiff
iu suits brought to enforce t hem. Tenants in common of a tract
of land, who hold their t itles by different conveyances from the
·ame grantor, each of which contains covenants relating to tbe
land and its use, cannot u ni te in an action brought against
the grantor to recover damages for the breach of such covenants;
their interes ts under the covenants and their rights of action are
in every sense several. 2 The obli gees in an injunction bond,
where the interests interfe red with by t h e in juncti on are separate,
ancl the injury done to each is distinc t, cannot join in a suit to
recover damage for th ese several causes of action ; their recovery
in such proceeding must be limited t o th e damages that are
trictly joint. v Certain persons executed the following writt n
agreement : "We, the undersigned, agree to guarantee the d po itors of irV. E . C. [a banker] in the payment in fu ll of their
demands against said \V . E. C. on account of money deposited
with him." Each depositor, it was held, must sue separately
upon this guaranty to recover the amount of hi s individual
claim; all the depositors could not join in a single action
becau e their interests were entirely several, neither one havinO'
ee ante, § * 227 an d note.
amuel v. Bla n cha r ri, 25 Wi . . 329.
3 F owlP,r v. F ri sb ie, 37 <. 'al. 3-1; but,
pn con tra , see L oom is v. B row n , 16 B a r b.
325. I t i held in Ohi o t lrn.t the interests
of t he obli g es in a n attachment bond
are . everal, al t houg h t he undertaking i
in te rm join t . W her e such a bond wa
g iven to three persons, an action on i t by
two of t h em, who w er e par tners, and
1 ,

2

who!'e firm p roperty hacl b en wrongfully
untler the attachm nt, wa , • u taiued.
Alexander t'. Ja<'Ob_\·, 23 Ohio
t. 35 , 3 .3.
ee ante, § *266, and not ~.
and Vanclermulen r. Vanclermnlen, IO
N. Y. 195, 20-1. there cited. For furth r
illustrations .ee GrPat 'Ve t. ornponrnl
o. v. JEtna In . Co., 40 Wi . 373; Hubbard v. Burrell, 41 id. 365; Eldridg 1•.
Putnam, 46 id. 205; Brett v. Fi1.. t l Tn iY.
~eizcd
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any interest in the demand of another.^ A nnmLer of persons

having each subscribed different sums of money for a loan to a

certain party in aid of a proposed enterprise, and a committee of

three having been appointed to act as agents for the subscribers,

which committee entered into a written contract with him con-

taining various stipulations concerning the use of the money, and

also an undertaking on his part to repay the amounts advanced,

each of the subscribers was held entitled to maintain a separate

action against the borrower to recover the sum loaned by himself.^

Five persons entered into a written agreement stipulating that,

if either or any of them should be drafted during the late war,

the others would contrilnite equal sums to enable him or them

to hire substitutes. Three of the parties having been drafted

and procured substitutes, one at a cost of SI, 500, and the others

for SI, 100, each, it was held by the Supreme Court of Indiana

that each must sue the others in a separate action for the stipu-

lated indemnity, and a joint action by the three was dismissed.-'

A number of persons, being interested in opposing a certain

claim and in defending suits thereon, appointed a committee to
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employ counsel and to conduct the defence, and agreed to pay

the expenses incurred by such committee. The cost of the

defence not having been contributed, the committee paid the

same, and thereby became entitled to reimbursement. This

right, it was held, was a several one in each member thereof, and

a separate suit by each to recover the sum paid out by himself

was proper, rather than a joint action by all to recover the whole

amount which had been disbursed.* Under the general statutes

of New York, providing for the formation of corporations for

various purposes, and making the stockholders personally liable

under certain circumstances to the creditors of the corporation

for the debts thereof, this right of action in the creditors is a

several one, and a separate action may therefore be maintained

by each creditor. It is admitted, however, that a proper action

Soc. of Brooklyn, 5 Ilun, 149; Small c. - Rice v. Savery, 22 Iowa, 470. The

Kobinson, 9 id. 418; Koeiiip;er r. Creed, court held that the committee might al.'WJ

58 Ind. .'J54 ; Durham v. Hall, 67 iil 123; sue as trustees of an express trust, the

Graham Tp. Indep. Sch. Dist. v. Indep, promise having been made directly to

Sch. Dist. No. 2, 50 Iowa, .T22 ; Goldsmith them, and also that each creditor could

»•. Sachs, 8 Sawy. 110, 17 P'ed. IJep. 726. sue.

1 Stoadn)an r. Guthrie, 4 Met. (Ky.), » Goodnight r. Goar, 30 Ind. 418.

147, 1.'>1. ' * Fiunev v. Hrant, 19 Mo. 42.

r ' i ere t in he d m nd of an her. 1 A numb r f persons
b, in ach ub crib d diff r nt urns of m ney f r a 1 an to a
rtain art in aid of a r p
enterpri , an a cornmitt of
thr h ing been appoin eel to ac a agents f r the sub cribers,
hi h committee en ere into a wri ten contract wit him containing ariou stipulations cone ming th use of th m n
and
l o an undertaking on hi part to r ay the amount ad anc i
e ch of the ub criber wa h ld enti led o maintain a s parat
c ion a ain t the borrower to recov r the sum 1 an
y him elf. 2
Fi per ons entered into a written agre ment tipulating that,
if either or an of them h uld be raft d during the late war
the other would contribute equal sums to na le him or th Ill
to hire ub ·ti tutes. Thr e of the parties having
n draft <l
an
rocur d sub titut
one at a co t of $1 500, an he oth I "
for 1 100 each, it was held by the upreme ourt f Indid1a
that ach mu t sue the other in a eparate action f r the stipulated indemnity, and a joint action b the three wa di mi d.:3
A number of per ons, being int re ted in oppo ing a certain
claim and in def nding uit ~ thereon, appointed a committee to
empl y coun el and to conduct the defence, and agr ed to a '
th expens
incurred by such committee. The co t of th
d fence n ot having been con ributed, the committee paid tb
ame, and th r by became enti 1 d to reimbu ement. Thi
right, it was h eld, wa a
ral ne in each member th re f, antl
a eparate suit by each o r cov r the sum paid out b him lf
wa rop r, rather han a joint action by all to recover the wb le
am unt which had be n di bur d. 4
nder the g n ral tatut
of
w Y rk, pro iding f r the formation of corp rations f r
v ri us urpo e and making the s o kb ld r per nally liabl
und r er ain cir um tan e t
h er di tor f the c r1 orati n
f r the d
hereof, hi ri ht f a ion in the er dit r · i a
th r f r
maintain d
r p r action

sue.
14 7, 1:; I .

4

un i ht!'.
ar, 30 Tod . 41
Fiou y v. Brant, 19 M . 4-.
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may he brought against all the stockholders for the benefit of all

the creditors.^ A bond having been given for the j)aynient of a

certain sum to the heirs of A., eight in number, upon the death

of their mother, it was held by the Supreme Court in New York

that an action might be maintained by one heir against the

obligor, or, he being dead, against his administrator, to recover

one-eighth of the entire sum ; that the right of the obligees was

several and not joint.^ Where three towns were each liable for

a share of the cost of erecting a bridge, and the proper officers

of each — the highway commissioners — procured the same to be

erected, but the entire expense thereof was actually advanced

and paid out by two of these commissioners, their right of action

asrainst the third commissioner to recover the amount thus dis-

bursed for his use was declared to be several, and a joint action

against him, it was held, could not be maintained.^

1 Weeks v. Love, 50 N. Y. 568. It was

said that all the cases impliedly huld the

doctrine above stated ; and the following
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were cited : Briggs r. Penniman, 8 Cow.

387 ; Manu v. Pentz,3 N. Y. 415 ; Osgood

V. Laytin, 5 Abb. Pr. n. s. 1 ; Garrison v.

may e brought again t all th sto kh ld rs f r th b n fit of all
tl1
r <lit r . 1 A bond. having b
n fr th
·ertain um to the h irs f A.,
n
of th ir mother, it wa h ld b
upr me Court in
w York
that an action might b maintain d by one heir again t th
bligor, or, he being 1 ad, aaain t his admini trator, to r cov r
on -eighth of the entire sum; that the right of the oblig
wa
2
everal and not joint. Wh re thr e town were ach liabl f r
a hare of the cost of erecting a bridge, and the pr p r offic r
of each - the highway commis ion ers -procured the am to be
r ct d, but the entire exp nse thereof was actually ad anced
and paid out by two of these commissioners, their right of action
again t the third commi ioner to recover the amount thu disbursed for his use was declared to be several, and a joint action
against him, it was held, could not be maintained. 3

Howe, 17 N. Y. 458.

2 Hees I'. Nellis, 1 N. Y. Sup. Ct. 118.

' Corey v. Rice, 4 Lans. 141. There

■was no joint or common interest held by

the towns which the plaintiffs represented

in tlie sum which was thus advanced ; it

was not like an advance made by a part-

ncrshi]), or made out of a fund owned liy

the plaintiffs together. The implied prom-

ise of the defendant was, therefore, not to

the plaintiffs jointly.

Where a policy of insurance provided

for the ])ayment of different sums to

different parties, it was held improper

for the beneficiaries to join in one action

to recover the several sums due : Keary

V. Mutual Reserve Fuud L. A.ss'n, 30

Fed. Rep. 359. Two of three contracting

parties agree to perform certain services

for the third, and eacli of the two is to

receive t'lerefor a separate and distinct

compensation ; each may bring a separate

action, it being quite immaterial that in

the rendition of the services for which

they were to receive their several com-

pensation tlieir joint action may have

been necessary : Richey v. Branson, 33

AIo. A pp. 418; Bowman r. Branson (Mo.

1892), 19 S. W. 634. The plaintiff and

two others, H. and B., acting on behalf

of the S. Company, covenanted that the

plaintiff should perform certain work for

the defendants, in consideration of which

the defendants promised to pay the plain-

tiffs a stipulated sum. It was held that

tlie plaintiff could maintain an action to

recover a balance alleged to be due on the

contract price, without joining H., B., or

the S. Company : Craig i'. Fry, 68 Cal.

363. One of the sureties in an official

bond covenanted to indemnify his co-

sureties against liability on the bond, and

one of the latter was compelled to pay

part of a defalcation of the princip.al ; it

was held that he could sue alone upon the

covenant. Cross r. Williams, 72 Mo. 577 :

" If the consideration for the promise of

l Weeks v. Love, 50 N. Y. 568.
It was
said that all the cases impliedly hol<l the
uoctrine above stated; aud the following
were citeil: Briggs v. Penniman, 8 Cow.
3 7; Mann v. Pentz, 3 N. Y. 415; 0 ·good
v. J,aytin, 5 Abb. Pr. N. s. 1 ; Garrison v.
Howe, 17 N. Y. 458.
2 Rees v. Nellis, l N. Y . Sup. Ct. 118.
a Corey v. Rice, 4 Lans. 141. There
wa no joint or common interest held by
the towns which the plaintiffs repre entecl
in the sum which was thus advanced; it
was not like an advance made by a partner hip, or made out of a fun<l owne<l by
th plaintiffs together. The implied promi e of the defendant was, therefore, no~ to
the plaintiffs jointly.
Where a policy of insurance provided
for the payment of different sums to
different parties, it was held improper
for the beneficiaries to join in one action
to recover the several sums due: Keary
v. Mutual ReRerve Fuud L. Ass'n, 30
F ed. Hep. 359. Two of three contracting
parties agree to perform certain . ervice.s
for the third, and each of th e two i ' to
receive t'1erefor a separate and di tinct
com pen ation; each ma.v bring a ep:ira te
action, it being quite immaterial that in
the rendition of the servi ces for which
they were to receive their everal compensation their join t action may have
heen n ces ary: Richey i·. Bran on, 33
Mo. 1\pp . 418; Bowman v . Bransou (Mo.

1892), 19 S. W. 634. The plaintiff and
two others, H. and B., acting on behalf
of the S. Company, covl' nanted that the
plaintiff should perform certain work for
the defendants, in con ideration of which
the defendants promised to pay the plaintiffs a stipulated sum. It was held that
tl1e plaintiff could maintain an action to
recover a balance alleged to be due on the
contract price, without joining H., B ., or
the S. Company: Craig v. Fry, 68 Cal.
363. One of the sureties in an official
bond covennuted to indemnify his cosureties against liability on the bond, and
one of the latter was compelled to pay
part of a defalcation of the principal; it
was held that he could sue alone upon the
covenant. Cross v. Williams, 72 Mo. 5i7:
"If the consideration for the promise of
indemnification made by the defendant
was that the sureties should go on H.'s
bond, though it moved from many peron., yet it moved from each one everally ," C'iting ParsonR on Contracts, p. 1 .
, ee al so Bu h v . IIae u. sler , 26 1\Io. App.
265. In general, one , urety can ue alouc
at law to enforce contribution fr om a
co- urety, without joining hi ot:ier cosureties: V os v. Lew i , 126 Ind. 155 .
[Duucan v. Willis (1 94), 51 0. t. 433,
3 ::N". E . 13; D efendant, having kn owl·
edge that the plaintiff and hi brother
were <le. irous of pur ha ing, each for his
owu separate u e, a llumber of head of

en IL
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§ 147. * 230. V. Legal Actions by Persona having Joint Rights

Arising from Personal Torts. The COmmoil-law rule governing the

selection of parties plaintiff in such actions is entirely unchanged.

When the personal tort produces a common injury to all, and

thus creates a common damage, all the persons affected by the

wrong must join in an action to recover the damages. In pur-

suance of this principle, all the members of a partnership may

and must unite in an action for a libel or slander on the firm, by

which its business is injured. Undoubtedly, the instances in

which a common, as distinguished from a several injury, can be

done to a number of individuals by personal torts, must neces-

light feeding hogs, represented to them

that he had one hundred hogs to sell of

the kind and quality desired, which were

sound, healthy and free from disease, and

147.

* 230.

V.

Legal Actio n s by Pers ons having Joint R ights

The comm n-law rule governing h
n of ar ie plain iff in such ction i entir ly unch ng d.
h n the per onal tort r du e a common injury to all, and
thu er ate a common damag , all he per on aff cted by th
wr ng mu t join in an a.ction to r cov r th damages. In ursuance of thi principle, all the m mb r f a artnersbip may
and mu 't unite in an action f r a libel or land r on the firm, by
which it bu ine s i injured . 1J ndoubtedly, the in tances in
which a comm n, a di tingui hP-d from a several injury, can b
done t a n m r of in i vi dual by p r onal tort , must nece Arising from Pers o n al Tor ts .

for which he had paid $5.00 per hundred

pounds, but declined to sell in separate

lots; he would sell the Duncans the entire
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lot and they could divide them to suit

themselves. Relying upon these repre-

sentations the brothers purchased the one

liuudred hogs, jiaying $5.12^ per hundred

pounds, the plaintiff and his brother each

to have fifty head of the hogs as his sepa-

rate and individual j)roperty, and to feed

separately on their respective farms. On

the same day the hogs were divided in

accordance with the agreement, and plain-

tiff took his fifty at once to his own farm,

where some of them died on the same day

by reason of hog cholera. They had been

exposed to this disease and were infected

with it at the, time of the sale, all of which

was known to the defendant, who had in

fact purchased them as diseased hogs, and

for a much less sum than S^.OO i)er hun-

dred pounds. Not only did plaintiff lose

the diseased hogs which died, but the

diseAse was communicated to bis other

hogs, and he was greatly injnreil thereby.

Held, that this contract of purchase,

though joint in form, and based upon a

consideration moving jointly from the

two, wxs in spirit and essence, a separate

contract as to each, and that the rights

acquired under it by the purchasers were

separate and distinct. Citing many cases,

P^nKlish and American.

Union P. K. Co. u. Vincent (1899), 58

Neb. 171, 78 N. W. 457: "A railroad

company made with two persons a con-

tract, in form joint, for the transportation

of horses, a portion of which belonged to

one of the shippers and the remainder to

the other. None was owned in common.

The horses of one were injured, and he

sued, naming the other as a defendant

because he refused to join as plaintiff.

No objection was made for defect of

parties until the trial began. Held, with-

out deciding how an action in such case

should be brought, that the railroad com-

pany could not complain because one of

throe situations must exist. The suit was

sufficriently brought by the person whose

stock was injured, as the real party in

interest ; or else it was sufficient to make

the other a defendant alleging that he

light feeding hogs, represented to them
that he had one hundred hogs to ell of
the kind and quality de ired, whi ch were
ound, health y and fr e from disease, and
for which he had paid $5.00 per hundred
p und , but declined to ell in eparate
lot ; he would ell the Duncans t he e nti re
1 t an they could divide them to uit
them lrns. Relying upon the e repreeutations the brother· purcha ed the ue
hundred hogs, paying $5. l~} per hundred
pound , the plaintiff and his brother each
to ha\•e fifty head of the hog as hi separ te and indi,•idual property, and to feed
eparately on their re pective farms.
n
the ame day the hogs were divided in
accor ance with the agreemen t, and plaintiff took his fifty at once to his own farm,
where ome of them die on the ame day
by re• on of hog cholera. They had been
expo ed tu thi di.ea e and were infected
with it at the time of the ale, all of which
wa known to the defendant, who had in
fact purchased them
di e ed hog;, and
for a much le · um than $5.00 p r bundre pounrls.
'ot nly did plaintiff lose
the di e ed hog whi ·h died, hut the
d'.eit e wa. communicated t his ther
greatly iojur tl thereby.
ntra t
f purch e,
thongh joiut i11 f rm, and ba ed upon a
c n id<'rntion moving jointly from th
two, wa" in . pirit and i; nc· , n.. parate
c 11 r.l ·L a-, to ea ·h. aurl that the ri"'ht
:v·quir ··i nnd .r it by th purcha. r
. epara c- and di. tin .
iting many
Eugli hand Am riC' n.
I 11iu11 !'. 1 . ~<>. v. Vin nt ( I
), 5
.·eb. 171,
.:. \V . 45 : "A r ilroad

company made with two per ons a ontra t, in form joint, for th e tran portation
of hor e ·, a portiou of whi h bel oo-ed to
one of the hip per and the remain d r to
the o her. N one w
owned in c mmon.
The hor e of one were injured, and he
u d, naming the oth r as a defendant
becau e he refuse to join a plaintiff
No objection was made for defect of
partie until the t ri al egan. R eid, without deciding how an a tion in u ch ca e
hould be brought, that the railr ad ompany co uld not complain becau e one of
three ituations m u t exit. The uit was
. ufficiently brought by the per on who. e
stock wa inj ured, as the real party in
inter t; or el e it wa . ufficient t ma ke
the other a defendant all ging that he
would n t join a plaintiff; or if he mu t
ne e. arily have joined a plaintiff, the
defect appeared on the fa e of the petiti on
and wa waived by not demurring on that
g r und ."
Baughman u. L oui ville, etc. R R
(1 3) , 94 Ky. 150, 21 . W. 757 : Wh ere
a ontract fo r the hipm nt of h r s
owned by cliff ren t per on w
mad
with the carr i r b. one p r on a ting as
ag nt for them all, ea It owner had a
s parate acti n i r damag
uffer d by
him for br ach of the ontract f hipment, aud all ould n " unite in on
action.
Brown v. Farnham ( l 93), 55 Minn . 27.
56 ~. W. 352; In an a tion up n a mpo iti n acrr ement, any er di r liein~ a
party th r t m y bring a ev ral nction
for his dan1ag for he br a h th ere L]

ACTI ... .

AHISING FROM PER 0...

L TORT.'.

2F

ACTIONS ARISING FROM PERSONAL TORJS.

21,

saiily be rare; but wlien they do occur, tlie rule as stated must

be applied.^ A single illustration will sufiice. False and fraudu-

lent representations concerning the pecuniary responsibility of a

certain person having been made to a partnership, by which it

was induced to sell goods to him on credit, and the price of the

goods not being paid or recoverable by reason of the purchaser's

insolvency, it was decided by the New York Court of Appeals

that an action to recover damages for the deceit should be brought

by all the partners jointly. ^

§ 148. *231. VI. Legal Actions by Persons having Several

Rights Arising from Personal Torts. The Converse of the proposi-

tion stated in the preceding paragraph is also as true now as it

was prior to the new system of procedure. Where a personal

tort has been done to a number of individuals, but no joint injury

has been suffered and no joint damages sustained in consequence

thereof, the interest and right are necessarily several, and each

of the injured parties must maintain a separate action for his own

1 [^Mclutosh V. Zaring (1897), 150 Ind.
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301, 49 N. E. 164: Where several con-

tracts are made between defendant and

three firms of attorneys for legal services,

tlie fees to depend upon the amount of

recovery or the sum obtained through

·n.ril · be r, r ; but wh n th y clo occur, the rul a. slat cl mu. t
apph d. 1 A sin:) illu tration "·ill uffi
F als an l frauclunt r pr entations cone rninO' th pe uniary re p nRibility of a
certain per n having b n made to a partn r:hip by which it
wa induced to sell good to him on er clit, and th pnce f th
O'OO l" not b ing paid or recoverabl by rea on of th purch . r'
i1rolv ncy, it was decided by the New York ourt of Appeal
that an action to recover damages for the deceit hould be brought
by all the partners jointly. 2
§ 148. * 231. VI . L egal Ac tions by Persons having S everal
R ights Arising from Pers o nal Torts .
The conver'e of the propo iti n ·tated in the preceding paragraph is also as true now as j t
wa prior to the new sy tern of procedure. Where a personal
tort ha been done to a number of individual , but no joint injury
ha' b en suffered and no joint damages su tained in consequence
thereof the interest and right are neces~ arily several, and each
of the injured parties must maintain a separate action for his own

compromise, and defendant fraudulently

represents that as a result of compromise

a smaller sum was obtained than was in

I [~fcinto h v. Zaring (1897), 150 Ind.
301, 49 N. E. 164: ·w here several con-

fact the case, upon the basis of wjiich

representations the firms of attorneys

settle with defendant, a joint right of

action arises iu the firms of attorneys by

reason of such fraud, since all are alike

interested in avoiding the settlement.

Beetle v. Anderson (1897), 98 Wis. 5,

73 N. W. 560: "Where several persons

induced by false representations, purchased

a mortgage, each contributing one-fourth

of the money, held, that their interests in

the securities were joint ; and they might

properly sue jointly for the fraud."

Cohen v. Wolff (1893), 92 Gsi. 199, 17

S. E. 1029: Where different persons have

been induceil by fraud to sell goods to a

firm, and the firm executes mortgages

upon the goods so purchased, all the per-

sons so defrauded may ji)in in an action to

have the mortgages declared void.

Wunderlich v. Chicago & Northwestern

11. Co. (189G),93 Wis. 132,66 N. W. 1144:

An insurer who has paid the loss on

insured property to the assured, becomes

subrogated pro tanto to the latter's right

of action against the third person through

whose negligence the loss occurred, and

the insurer and assured should properly

join in an action for the negligent burning.

Elliott V. Pontius (1893), 136 Ind. 641,

35 N. E. 562 : Several plaintiffs who have

independent demands as creditors against

a defendant debtor, may sue jointly for

relief against a fraudulent scheme to

remove the debtor's property, but when the

fraud alleged is shown not to exist, the

joint right ceases and each must revert to

his several right against the debtor.]

^ Zabriskie v. Smith, 13 N. Y. 322.

See also Cochrane v. Quackenhush, 29

Minn. 376 (joint action by partners for a

malicious prosecution, to recover for in-

tra.ct are made between defendant and
three firm of attorney for legal services,
the fee· to depend upon the amount of
r CO\'ery or the sum obtained through
compromi e, and defendant fran<lnlently
repre. ent that as a result of compromi e
a maller um was obtained than wa in
fact th ca e, upon the basis of which
rrpre ·entatioJJ the firms of attorneys
ettle with defendant, a joint ri ght of
-action ari ·es in the firm of attorneys by
rea.s n of uch fraud, inre all are alike
intere ·ted in avoiding the settlement.
Beetle v. Anderson (189i), 98 Wi . 5,
i3 .1.. • W. 560: " Where . e,·eral per on
induced by fa! e repre entations, purchased
a mortgage, each contributing one-fourth
of the money, held, that their interest in
the ecurities were joint; and the)· might
properly ue jointly for the fraud ."
ohen u. Wolff (1 93), 92 Ga. 199 , 17
' E. 1029 : Where different per 011s have
heen induced by fraud to ell goods to a
firm, and the firm execute· mortgage
up n the go <l i;o purcha eel, all the per. on o defrau<led may join in an action to
hav the mortgage. declared void.
\ Vund rli ch v. Chicago & orthwe ·tern
R
o. (1 96), 93 Wi . 132, 66 '. \V. 1144 :

An in urer who ha paid the lo
on
iu ·ured property tu the a ·sured, become ·
subrogate<l pro tanto to the latter' right
of artion again. t the third person through
who e negligeute the loss occurred, and
the in ·urer and a sured. hould properly
join in au action for the negligent burning.
Elliott u. P ontius ( 1893) , 136 Ind. 641,
35 N. E. 562 : Several plaintiffs who have
independ ent demau<ls as creditors again. t
a defendant debtor, may ue jointly for
reli ef against a fraudulent cheme to
remove the debtor's property, but when the
fraud alleged is shown not to exi t, the
joint right cea ·es aud each mu t revert to
his everal right again t the debtor.]
2 Zahri kie r.
mith, 13 N. Y. 322.
See also Cochrane P. Quackenbu ·h, 29
Minn . 376 (joint aC'tion by partner for a
mali ciou pro ecut ion , to recover for injuries theu.:by cau. eel to th ir joint credit,
Lusine , and prop rty) ; Peake v. Grave-,
25 Neb. 235 (joint action by partners for
deceit). An action brought by member
of a firm t recover damage for an all g d
lander r lating t the redit of the firm
does not a.bate by the death of a m mber; the entir cau.e of artioo vest ·
in the urvirn1 . Shale v. chantz, 35
Hun, 622.

_1

CIYIL REMEDIES.

216 CIVIL KEMEDIES.

personal redress.^ It follows, therefore, that when a tort of a

personal nature, an assault and battery, a false imprisonment, a

libel, a slander, a malicious prosecution, or the like, is committed

upon two or more, the right of action must, except in a very few

special cases, be several. In order that a joint action may be

possible, there must be some prior bond of legal union between

the persons injured — such as a partnership relation — of such a

nature that the tort interferes with it, and hy virtue of that very

interference produces a wrong and consequent damage common to

all. It is not every prior existing legal relation between the

parties that will impress a joint character upon the injury and

damage. Thus, if a husband and wife be libelled or slandered,

or beaten, although there is a close legal relation between the

parties, it is not one which can be affected by such a wrong, and

no joint cause of action will arise. The doctrine above stated

has been fully recognized and asserted by the courts since the

codes were enacted. ^ Afire company — a voluntary association

— having been libelled, a joint action by its members to recover

damages against the libeller was held improper; not being part-
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ners, and not having any community of legal interest whereby

they could suffer a common w^rong, the right of action was sev-

eral, and each must sue alone. ^ The same rule has been applied

in the case of two or more persons, not partners, suing jointly to

recover damages for a malicious prosecution ; the action cannot

be maintained.*

§ 149. * 232. Vn, Actions iu Specisd Cases. Some special

cases which do not fall within the foregoing classification will

conclude this branch -of the discussion.^ A policy of fire insur-

1 ^See, however, Shall v. Barton (1899), not join in a suit against a telegraph com-

.•iS Neb. 741, 79 N. W. 732, where the court pany for mental anguish; each has a

8aid : " This court is committed to the separate cause of action, if any : Morton

doctrine that two parties having separate i;. Western Union Tel. Co. (1902), 130

and distinct claims to the possession of the N. C. 299, 41 S. E. 484.

same property may join in an action of 3 Qiraud v. Beach, 3 E. D. Smith, 337 ;

replevin therefor. "3 Hinkle v. Davenport, 38 Iowa, 355, 358;

2 Rhull V. Barton (1898), 56 Neb. 718, Stepank i-. Kula, 36 id. 563.

77 N. W. 132: "Two creditors who lost * Riioads v. Booth, 14 Iowa, 575.

their several claims and attachment liens, See Swales v. Grubbs (Ind. App. 1893),

because a coroner negligently approved a 33 N. E. 1 124, and see al.so, on the general

worthless replevin bond in a suit in which subject of tiiis paragraph, Ilellanis r.

1
r nal redr
It f llow , heref r , that when a tort of a
r n 1 na ur an a anlt an l bat ry, a fal e impri onment a
ution, or th like, i committed
lib 1 a lander a mali i u pr
n two or more, the right of acti n mu t, except in a v ry f w
ci 1 a es be ev ral. In order that a joint action may be
o ibl there must be ome prior bond of legal union bet een
the per ons injured - such a' a partner hip relation - of uch a
nature that the tort interfere with it, and by virtue of that very
interference produces a wrong and consequent damage common to
all. It is not every prior exi ting legal relation b tween the
parties that will ·impress a joint character upon the injury and
damage. Thu , if a bu band and wife be libelled or slander d,
or beaten, although there is a clo e legal relation between the
parties, it is not one which can be affected b; uch a wr ng and
no joint cau e of action will arise. The doctrine above tated
has been fully recognized and a erted by the courts since the
code were enacted. 2 A fire company- a voluntary as ociation
- having been libelled a joint action by its members to reco er
amage against the libeller was held improper; not being partner , and not having any community of legal interest whereby
hey could suffer a common wrong the right of action wa several, and each mu t sue alone . 3 The same rule has been a plied
in the ca e of two or more person ' , not partners, suing jointly to
recover damages for a malicious prosecution; the action cannot
be maintained. 4
§ 149. • 232. VII. A c t ions iu Special Cases. Some special
cases which do not fall within the foregoing classification will
conclude this branch .of the discus ion. 5 A policy of fire in ur-

the attached property was taken from tlie Switzor, 24 S. C. 39.

sheriff, cannot join as ])laintiffs in an * QA proceeding in mandamus is proji-

ac.tion for damages against the coroner for erly brongiit in tiie name of the State,

approving such bond." Two persons can- evLii though the application is made in

l [
ee however, hull v. B a rton (1 99),
!i8 eb. 741, 79 . W. 732, where the court
aid: "Thi court i
ommitted t the
doctrine that two partie havin
parate
and di tinct claim t the po e ion of the
ame property may join in an action of
replevin therefor."]
2
hull v. Barton (l 9 ), 56 eb. il ,
7
.
132: "Two reditor who lo t
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ance, containing the clause, "loss, if any, payable to E. B. G.,

mortgagee," the assured, it was held, could not maintain an

action without making E. B. G. a co-plaintiff, unless it was

alleged and proved that the mortgage to him had been paid off

so that his interest had ended. ^ In several of the States, by

virtue of special provisions contained in their codes, partnerships

may sue and be sued by the use of the firm name as the parties

plaintiff or defendant, in the same manner as though they were

corporations. The judgments recovered in such actions against

the partnership can only be enforced, in the first instance, against

the firm property, and can only be extended so as to bind the

individual property of the several partners by a subsequent direct

proceeding against them, or some of them, in the nature of a scire

facias."^ The Kentucky code contains a peculiar provision in

the interest of a private person : State v.

I'ac. Brewing Co. (1899), 21 Wash. 451,

58 Pac. 584.

lu a suit for a penalty the person suing
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and not the State is the proper party

an e, containing the clau e, "los , if any payaLl to E.
.,
mortgagee," the assured, it was held, c uld not maintain an
acti n without making E. B.
. a co-plaintiff, unl
it wa
alleged and proved that the mortgage to him had e n paid ff
o that his interest had end d. 1 In everal of the tat 8 , by
virtue of special provi ions contained in their code , partner hips
may ue and be sued by the u e of the firm name as the parties
plaintiff or defendant, in the ame manner as though they were
corporations. The judgments recovered in such actions again t
the partnership can only be enforced, in the first instance, again t
the firm property, and can only be extended so a to bind the
individual property of the several partnern by a sub equent dir ct
proceeding against them, or some of them, in the nature of a scire
jacias. 2 The Kentucky code contains a peculiar provi ion in

plaintiff, unless the statute otherwise

directs: Burrell v. Huglies (1895), 116

N. C. 430, 21 S. E. 971. In such a suit

several may sue jointly for their joint

use : Carter v. Wilmington, etc. R. R. Co.

(1900), 126 N. C. 437, 36 S. E. 14.

State ex rel. v. Bradley (1901 ), 10 N. D.

157, 86 N. W. 354: Under § 7605, Rev.

Codes, a citizen of a county in which a

liquor nuisance exists may maintain an

action in the name of the State without

authority from the State's attorney or the

attorney general.

Persons whose interests are separate

the intere t of a private person: tate v.
Pac. Br wing Co. (1899), 21 Wash. 451,
58 Pac. 584.
In a uit for a penalty the per on suing
and not the State is the proper party
plaintiff," unless the statute otherwise
directs: Burrell v. Hughes (1895), 116
N. . 430, 21 S. E . 9il. In such a suit
several may sue jointly for th eir joint
use: Carter v. Wilmington , etc. R. R. Co.
(1900), 126 N. C. 437 , 36 S. E . 14.
tate ex rel. v . Bradley (1901), 10 N . D.
157, 86 N. W. 354:
oder § 7ti0:) , Hev.

and independent cannot be joined as re-

lators iu mandamus : State ex rel. v.

Fraker (1901), 166 Mo. 130, 65 S. W. 720.

But where a board of election com-

missioners refuses to place the names of

a number of nominees for the office of

appellate judge upon the official ballot,

such nominees have sufficient common

interest in obtaining a unit of mandate

agair'st tlia board, to unite in an action

therefor: State ex rel. v. Mount (1898),

151 Ind. 679, 51 N. E. 417.;]

1 Ennis v. Harmony F. Ins. Co., 3

Bosw. 516. ^ Where an insurance policy is

ptiyable absolutely to a mortgagee, the

mortgagee is a necessary party plaintiff,

tliougli the assured may proj)erly Ijc made

a party also to protect his interest in the

policy : Burlington Ins. Co. r. Lowery

(1895), 61 Ark. 108, .32 S. W. 383. See

also § *226, infra, and notes.] And see

Hammell v. Queen Ins. Co., 50 Wis. 240 ;

Winne r. Niagara F. Ins. Co., 91 N. Y.

185; Connecticut F. Ins. Co. v. Erie Ry.

Co., 73 N. Y. 399. Where insured prop-

erty is destroyed by fire, caused by the

wrongful act or negligence of a third

party, if the value of the property ex-

ceeds the amount of insurance paid, the

insurer paying the loss acquires thereby

to the extent of the payment a joint in-

terest with the owner in the cause of

action against the wrongdoer, hence, in

prosecuting such cause of action the in-

surer must join the owner as co-plaintiff.

Code , a citizen of a county in which a
liquor nuisance exists may maintain an
action in the name of the State without
authority from the State's attorney or the
attorney general.
• Per. on whose interests are separate
and independent cannot be joined as relators in mandamu : State ex rel. v.
:Fraker (1901), 166 Mo. 130, 6fi S. W. 720.
But where a board of el ection commi ioners refu es to place the nam es of
a number of nomin ees for the offic e of
appellate judge upon th e offi cial ball ot,
uch 11ominee have uffi cient comm on
intere t in obtaining a unit of mand a te
agaiJ> t th-a board, to unite in an acti on
therefor: Rtate ex rel. v . Mount ( 1 9 ),
151 Ind. 6i9, 51 N. E. 4li.J
1
Enni v. Harmony F . Ins. Co., 3
Bo w. 516. [Wh ere an insurance policy is
payable ab olutel.v to a mortgagee, the
murtgagee is a necessary pa rty plaintiff,
though th e a~ sure d may properl y lie made

a party also t o protect hi s intere t in th e
pol icy : Burlingto n Jns. Co. v. L owery
(189 5), 61 Ark. 108, 32 S. W. 3 83.
ee
also § * 22 6, infm, and n otes.] Anrl ee
Hammell v. Qu ee n ln s. Co., 50 Wis . 240;
Winn e r . Niag ara F . Ins. Co ., 91 N. Y .
185; Connecti cut F . Jn . Co. v. Erie R y.
Co., 73 N. Y. 399 . Wh ere in. ured property is destroyed by fire , cau ed by t he
wrongful act or negli g en ce of a third
party, if th e value of the proper ty ex ceeds the amount of insurance pa id, t he
in surer paying the loss a cquires th ereby
to the extent of the paym ent a joint int erest with the owner in the cause of
acti on against the wrongd oer, h ence, in
prosecuting su ch cause of action the insurer mu st join the owner a co-pl a intiff.
Home Mut. Ins. Co. v. Oregon Ry . &
Nav. Co. , 20 Oreg. 569. That . nch joind er
is, at any rate, permi si ble, ee Crandall
v. Goodri ch Tran . p. Co., 16 F ed. R ep. 75 .
But where the iu ura nce co mpany has
pa.id the in sured th e full rnlue of t he
pro perty de troyed, it may ma intain t he
action in it own na me.
farin e Jn . o.
v. t. Lou is, etc. H y . o., 41 F ed. R p.
643; H ome l\fot. I n . o. v. Orego n Ry . &
Nav. o., 20 Oreg. 569.
ee s11pra, § * 12 1. Ryer ·on v. II ndr ie, 22 Iowa, 4 0.
e Will v. immond.,
Hun, I 9, 200 (l g al a ction b.'·
one of everal par tners again. t a nother
oue withou t joini ng t he r emaining copartner ).
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reference to actions brought by an assignee of a tiling in action

where the assignment is equitable, merely, — that is, where it is

not expressly authorized by statute ; in such a case the assignor

must be joined as a party either plaintiff or defendant, at the

option of the assignee who brings the suit.^ The code of the

same State expressly authorizes the owner of land to maintain

approriate actions to recover damages for any trespasses or other

injuries committed thereon, although he may not be in the actual

possession, or have the right to the immediate possession, at the

time when the trespass or other injury complained of was com-

mitted. ^ This is undoubtedly the true interpretation of the

codes of all the States without any express provision to that

effect. The common-law distinction between " trespass " and

"case" being abolished, the owner is entitled to maintain an

action and recover damages, by alleging the actual facts which

constitute the cause of action, although under the former proce-

dure he would, under certain circumstances, sue in "trespass,"

and under other circumstances in "case." The nature of the

rii/Jit of action has not been changed, nor has the amount of
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damages recoverable been affected, but the special and technical

rules which governed the use of the two common-law actions

mentioned have certainly been abrogated.^ A legatee or dis-

1 Dean v. English. 18 B. Mon. 135. tainly entitled to recover such damages

This provision is somewhat different from as he would have obtained if the action

that found in the code of Indiaua, which was the common-law " case," — that is,

requires the assignor, in all ca.«es, where damages for the injury to the inheritance,

the thing in action is not assigned by To nonsuit the plaintiff is to restore the

indorsement, — that is where it is not a old distinctions between these technical

negotiable instrument, — to be joined as actions. This doctrine is expressly sus-

a defendant, in order to answer to the tained by the Supreme Court of Mis-

assignment. [^Indiana, Burns' St., 1901, souri : Fitch i;. Gosser, 54 Mo. 267; and

§ 277.] by a very recent decision in New York:

r eference to ac ions brought by an a ignee of a thing in action
w 1 re he a ignment is equitable, merely, - that i , where it is
not xpressly authorized by tatute; in such a case the as ignor
mu t be joined as a party either plaintiff or defendant, at the
option of the a ignee who brings the sui t. 1 The code of the
, me tate expres, ly authorizes the owner of land to maintain
approriate actions to recover damages for any trespa ses or other
injnrie committed thereon, although be may not be in the actual
p o e ·ion, or have the right to the immediate pos e sion, at the
t ime when the tre pa s or other injury complained of was committed. 2 Thi is undoubtedly the true interpretation of the
codes of all the States without any express provision to that
effect. The common -law distinction between trespass" and
ca e , being abolished, the owner is entitled to maintain an
ac ion and recover damage , by alleging the actual facts which
con titute the cause of action, although under the former proced ure he would, under certain circumstances, sue in 'trespass,"
and under other circumstances in "case." The nature of the
r ight of action has not been changed, nor has the amount of
damages recoverable been affected, but the special and technical
rules which governed the use of the two common-law actions
mentioned have certainly been abrogated. 3 A legatee or di -

2 Bebee v. Hutchinson, 17 B. Mon. Adams i;. Farr, 5 N. Y. Sup. Ct., 59,

496. citing Robinson v. Wheeler, 25 N. Y. 252.

8 Brown V. Bridges, 31 Iowa, 138, 145. S. P. Foster v. Elliott, 33 Iowa, 216, 224 ;

A plaintiff suing, as owner of land, for Rogers i'. Duhart (Cal. 1893), 32 Pac. 570

injuries done by a wrongdoer, cannot, (an allegation, not sustained by the evi-

consisteutly with the plain import of the deuce, tiiat the plaintiff was in posses.sion

codes, be nonsuited, because lie was out may be treated as surplusage). But see

of possession, and not entitled to posses- Townscnd v. Bissell, 5 N. Y. Sup. Ct. 583,

Bion. Undoubtedly, he may not be able per Gilbert J., a contrary dictum, which,

to recover such damages a.s he would in the face of these authorities, and of the

have recovered if the action was the com- code itself, is clearly a mistake. The char-

mon-law "trespass," — that is, damages acter of the possession required to maintain

for the wrong done to his possession as " trespass " is illustrated in Alexander '•.

well as to the inheritance; but he is cer- Ilurd, 64 N. Y. 228. The plaintiff's wife

l D ean v. Engli h. 18 B . Mon. 135.
T hi provi ion is omewhat different from
t frnt found in the code of Indiana, which
r equire the a ign or, in all ca; es, where
the t hing in action i not as igned by
i udor ement, - that is where it i not a
n egotiable in trument, - to be joined a
a d~(e ndant, in order to answer to the
a ig nrnent. [Indiana, Burn ' t., 1901,
§ 2 i7 .J
2 Bebee ?J. Hutchin on, 1
B. Ion.

tainly entitled to recover

uch damages

as he would have obtained if the action

wa the common-law "case," - that is,
damage for the injury to the inheritance.
To non. uit the plaintiff is to re tore the
old di tinctions between the e technical
action . Thi doctri ne i expre ly ustained hy the
upreme ou rt of Iisou ri : Fitch v. o er 54 Mo. 267 ; and
by a very recent deci ion in ,.ew York:
Ad m v. Farr, 5 . Y.
up. t., 59,
4 96.
citing obin on v. Wheeler, 25 N. Y. 252.
8 B rown v. Bri dge., 31 Iowa, 13 , 145.
. P. Fo ter v. Elliott, 33 Iowa, 216, 224;
A plaintiff ui ug, a owner of lan d, for Rog r v. Duhart ( al. 1893). 32 Pac. 5i0
inju rie. done by a wrongdoer, caunot, (an allegation, not n tained by the evicon deutly' it h the plain import o( the den ce, that the plaintiff wa in po !:'- ·ion
code.', b non ui ted, becau e he wa out may b treated a nrplu ag ). But . c
of po ·e: ion, and uot ntitled to po e - T o wn. end v. i ell, 5 . . up. Ct. 5 3,
ion. T' ndo ubtedly , he may not be abl
per ilbert J ., a ontrary di t um, whi ch,
t recover uch damage as he would in th e face of the authoritie , and of the
hav rero>ered if the action wa the rom- cod it lf, i cl arly a mi take. The charm on-law " trespass," - that i , damage
tioo r quir d o maintain
act r f the p
f, r the wrong done to hi posse ion as
"tr pai " i illu t rated in Al xander ,._
well a to the inheritance; but he is cer- Hurd, 64 . Y. 22 . The plaintiff's wi fe
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tributee of an estate in the liands of an executor or administrator

may, under certain circumstances, maintain an action to recover

a debt or demand due to the deceased, if for any reason the

personal representative is legally disabled from suing. Thus,

for example, where B. in his lifetime was indebted to A., both

die, and the same person is made administrator or executor of

each estate, a legatee or distributee of A.'s estate may bring an

action in his own name against the one who is thus the adminis-

trator of B.'s estate, as well as executor or administrator of A.'s

estate. This person, as the representative of one estate, cannot

sue himself as representative of the other, and therefore the

beneficiaries of the creditor estate are permitted to prosecute the

action. It seems, also, that such action can be brought either by

one of the legatees or distributees, or by all of them jointly.^

§ 150. " 233. Actions by Parents or Guardians for the Seduction

of, or Injury to, their Children or "Wards. It is held in New York

owned the farm ; the plaintiff built tlie

house on it, in which he and his family had
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lived for years, and were still living ; he

worked the farm, owned the stock and

tools, and provided for his family. It was

held that he had such a possession of the

tributee of an tate in the hands f an xecutor or administrator
may, und r rtain circum tanc , maintain an action t r cover
a d bt or demand due to the d cea ed, if for any rea on the
per onal representative is legally di abletl from uing. Thu·,
for example, where B. in his lif time wa indebted to ~., both
die and the same person is made admini trator or ex cutor of
each estate, a legatee or distributee of A. 's e tate may bring an.
action in his own name against the one who is thus th adm inistrator of B. 's estate, as well as executor or administrator of A. 's
e tate. This person, as the representative of one estate, cannot
ue himself as representative of the other, and therefore th
beneficiaries of the creditor estate are permitted to pro ecute the
action. It seems, also, that such action can be brought either by
one of the legatees or distributees, or by all of them jointly. 1
§ 150. 233. Actions by Parents or Guardians for the Seduction
of, or Injury to, their Children or Wards.
It is held in New York

farm that he could maintain an action for

trespass upon it in breaking into and in-

juring it.

1 Fisher v. Hubbell, 65 Barb. 74 ; s. c.

1 N. Y. Sup. Ct. 97. It was also held that

Hubbell — the common trustee — should

be made a defendant, both as adminis-

trator of A.'s estate, and as executor of

B.'s estate ; of the latter, because he thus

represented the debtor; and of the for-

mer, because he was the regular plaintiff,

and should be made a party in order to

conclude the estate by the judgment. It

was said that, in order to bind the estate

of a deceased person, his administrator

or executor must be made a party /?; his

representative capacity; it is not sufficient

that he be made a party. See Haynes v.

Harris, 33 Iowa, 516. In Missouri, the

distributees of an estate in the hands of

an administrator may, before an order for

distribution is made, all unite in a joint

action on the administrator's bond against

him and his sureties. Whether such joint

action would be proper after the order for

a (listri!)ntion,7/((:E7-e. Kelley v. Thornton,

56 Mo. 325. In Kentucky it has been ex-

pressly decided that several distributees

cannot unite in a legal action against the

administrator to recover the shares found

due to each upon a settlement of the

estate. Felly v. Bowyer, 7 Bush, 5)3.

For various actions by administrators,

executors, legatees, and heirs, see Smith

V. Van Ostraud, 64 N. Y. 278; Tyson

)•. Blake, 22 N. Y. 558; Dunning r.

Ocean Nat. Bank, 61 id. 497 ; Cashman

V. Wood, 6 Hun, 520; Pendleton v. Dal-

ton, 77 N. C. 67 ; Filbey v. Carrier, 45 Wis.

4G9 ; Catlin v. Wheeler, 49 id. 507 ; Harris

f. Harris, 61 Ind. 117; Taylor v. Fickas,

64 id. 167 ; McDowell v. Hendrix, 67 id.

513 ; Colton v. Uuderdouk, 69 Cal. 155 (a

sole devisee in possession of the estate may

sue for trespass) ; Segelken v. Meyer, 94

N. Y. 473 (special circumstances under

owned the farm ; the plaintiff built the
hou e on it, in which he and his family had
lived for years, and were still livmg ; be
worked the farm, owned the stock and
tools, au<l provided for his family. It was
held that he had such a possession of the
farm that he could maintain an action for
tre'pass upon it in breaking into and injuriu,., it.
1 Fisher v. Hubbell, 65 Barb. 74; s . c.
1 N. Y., up . Ct. 97. It was also held that
Hubbell- the common trustee - should
be made a defendant, both as administrator of A.'s estate, and as executor of
B' e tate; of the latter, because he th us
repre ented the debtor: and of the former, because he was the regular plaintiff,
and hould be made a party in order to
conclude the estate by the judgment. It
was aid that, in order to bind the estate
of a d cea ed per on, his administrator
or executor must be made a party in his
1·Ppre.~e11tative capacity; it is not sufficient
that he be mad e a party. See Haynes v.
Harri , 33 Iowa, 516 . In Missouri, the
di tributees of an estate in th e hand of
an admiui trator ma:, befo re an order for
di tribution is made, all uni te in a joint
action on the administrator's boud against
him and hi suretie . Wh ether such joint
action w uld be proper after the order for
:1 rlistrilmti on, qurere. Kelley v . Thornton,

56 Mo. 325.

In Kentucky it has been expressly decided that several di tributees
cannot unite in a legal action again t the
administrator to recover the hares found
due to each upon a settlement of the
estate. Pelly v. Bowyer, 7 Bu h, 513.
For varion actious by ar! mini trator ,
executors, legatees, and heirs, see mith
v. Van Ostrand, 64 N. Y. 2i ; Ty on
1•. Blake, 22 N. Y. 558; Dunning c.
Ocean Nat. Bank, 61 id. 497; a hman
v. Wood, 6 Hun, 520; Pendleton v. Dalton, i7 N. C. 67; Filbey v. Carrier, 45 Wis.
469 ; Catlin v. Wheeler, 49 id . 507; Harri
v. Harris, 61 Ind. 117 ; Taylor v. Ficka,
64 id. Hi7 ; McDowell v. H ndrix, 67 id.
513 ; Culton v. Onderdonk, 69 al 155 (a
sole devi ee in posse . ion of thee. tate may
sue for tre. pas ) ; Segelken v. Meyer, 94N. Y. 473 (special circumstances under
whi ch plaint.if£ may recover per onal property of a d cca ed per on a next of kin,
without the intervention of an admiui trator ); Grubb i·. Lookabill, 100 . . 26i
(in an action by an admiui trator again t
hi decedent's Yendee to recover the purchase-mon ey due on a bond for title by
elliug the land , the vendor's heir -aL-law
are necessary partie ). A to ro-plainti ff
in action for contribution, see Hughes
v. Boone, 81 N. C. 204.
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that a mother may maintain an action for the seduction of her

infant daughter where the father is dead, and the daughter is

dependent upon the mother, although the latter has remarried.^

This rule has also been extended to the case where the father is

not dead, but has abandoned his wife, who lives separate and

apart from him, and maintains herself and family by carrying on

a business in which the daughter is actually employed as an

assistant, rendering substantial services. The action being

founded upon the relation of master and servant, and not upon

that of parent and child, and the mother carrying on a business

in which the daughter is employed as a servant, all the requisites

of the general doctrine relating to the action of seduction are

fully complied with.^ These decisions are based upon common-

law principles independently of any changes made by statute.'^

The codes of several States, however, contain special provisions

authorizing actions to be brought by fathers, or, in case of their

death or desertion of tlieir families, by mothers, and by guard-

ians, to recover damages for the seduction of, or for the death
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of, or injuries to, their children or wards.* A woman is per-

1 Lampman v. Hammond, 3 N. Y. Sap.

Ct. 293: Gray v. Durland, 50 Barb 100,

51 N. Y. 424 ; Furman v. Van Sise, 56

N. Y. 435; Badgley r. Decker, 44 Barb.

577.

■^ Badgley v. Decker, 44 Barb. 577. See

Certwell v Hoyt, 6 Hun. 575 (by a grand-

father). Action.s to recover earnings of an

hat a mother rnav maintain an action for the seduction of her
"
inf nt daughter where the father is dead, and the daughter is
d p nd nt upon the mother, although the latter bas remarried. 1
T hi rule has also been extended to the case where the father i"
not d ad but bas aband ned his wife, who lives separate and
ap rt from him, and maintains herself and family by carrying on
a bu iness in which the daughter is actually employed as an
a istant, rendering substantial services. The action being
founded upon the relation of m~ster and servant, and not upon
that of parent and child, and the mother carrying on a busine
in which the daughter is employed as a servant, all the requisites
of the general doctrine relating to the action of seduction are
fully complied witb. 2 The e decisions are based upon comrnonlaw principles independ ntly of any changes made by statute. 3
The code of several States, however, contain special provi.jon
authorizing actions to be brought by fa hers, or, in case of their
death or desertion of their families, by mothers, and by guardian , to recover damages for the seduction of, or f r the death
of, or injurie to, their children or wards. 4 A woman is per-

infant child ; see Hollingsworth r. Sweden-

burg, 49 Ind. 378 ; Monaghaii v. Randall

Sch. Dist., 38 Wis. 100; Matthew.s ;•. Mo.

Pac. Ry. Co., 26 Mo. App. 75 (action by

widow to recover for loss of services of her

minor child, su.stained, independently of

statute). QSenn v. Southern Ry. Co. (1894),

124 Mo. 621, 28 S. W. 66: Where the

mother dies pending an action brought by

both parents for the death of an unmarried

minor son, the father may continue the

action in his own name. Keller r. City of

St Louis (1899), 152 Mo. 596, 54 S.'w.

4-38: Where a wife secures a divorce from

her hu.^band, and the " care and custody "

of the cliild is awarded to the wife, but no

order is made respecting the " mainte-

nance " of the child, the duty of supporting

the cliild still devolves upon the husband,

and the wife caimot, during the husband's

life, maintain an action alone for damages

due to injuries to the minor child. Pierce

V. Conners (1894), 20 Colo. 178, 37 Pac.

721 : By statute the father and mother

have an equal interest in the judgment re-

covered for wrongfully causing the death

of a minor child. But suit may be brought

either by the father alone or by both to-

gether. Buechner v. Columbia Shoe Co.

(1895), 60 Minn. 477, 62 N. W. 817 : Under

G. S. 1894, § 5164, a father may maintain

an action in his own name to recover

damages for an injury to his minor child.

Same holding in Lathrop v. Schutte (1895),

61 Minn. 196, 63 N. W. 493.]

3 [^Mut .see Anthony v. Norton (1899), 60

Kan. 341,56 Pac. 529 and Snider v. Newell

(1903), 132 N. C. 614, 44 S. E. 3.54, where

it was held that, under the general code

provisions, without any special statute, a

parent might recover for the seduction of

l Lampman v. Hamm ond, 3 N . Y.
up.
t. 293 : Gray v. Durland, 50 Barb . 100,
51 N. Y. 424; Furman v. Van i e, 56
N. Y. 435; Badgley 1'. Decker, 44 Barb.

577.
2 Badgley v. Decker, 44 Barb. 577.
ee
ertwell v Hoyt, 6 Hun, 575 (by a grandfather). Action!:! to recover earning of an
infant child; ee Hollingsworth v. wedenborg, 49 Iud. 37 ; Monaghan v. Randall
ch. i t., 38 Wi .. 100; Matthew 1. Mo.
Pac. Ry . Co., 26 Mo. App. 75 (action by
widow to recover for los of ervice of her
minor child, su tained, independently of
a tute). [ enn v. outhern Ry. o. {1 94),
124 Mo. 621, 2
. W. 66: Where the
motber di pending an action br ught by
hoth parent fo r the death of an unmarri d
minor n, the father may
ntinue the
action in hi own name. K 11 r v. ity of
, t Loui {l
9), 152 Mo. 596, 54 , . \ .
41 : Where a w ·fe ecur adivor e from

life, maintain an action alone for damage.
due to injuries to the minor child. Pierce
v. Conners ( 1894), 20 Colo. 1i , 37 Pac.
721 : By statute the father and mother
have an equal interest in the judo-ment recovered for wrongfully cau ing the death
of a minor child. But uit may be brought
either by the father alone or by both tog ether . Bue hn er v. Columbia hoe o
(l 95 ), 60Minn.47i,62N.W. 17 : oder
G. . l 94, § 5164, a father ma· maintain
an action in hi own name to reco\'er
damages for an injury to hi minor hil<l.
ame holding in Lathrop v. chutte {l 95),
61 rinn. 196, 63 N . W. 493.J
a [ ut ·ee Anth ny . rton ( 1 99), 60
Kan. 341, 56 Pac. 529 and nid r u. ~· well
(1903), 132 N. . 614, 44 . E. 354, where
it 'v held that, und r th gen ral ode
provi ion , without any p ial tatut ,
par nt mi ht re over fo r th s du tion of
a daughter without bowing any lo. of
ervir .]
upra, § *LO, wh re th , tates
are num rated.
tatute whi ·h di.·
pen e "with any all ga ion or pro0f of
f rl'i e" d e not hange th rul e.:
l
of the law as to the partie ; the seduc cl
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raitted, in a few States, to maintain an action and recover

damages for her own seduction. ^

Second: Actions by and between Husband and Wife.

mitted, in a few tate , to maintain an action and recover
damage for her own seduction. 1

§ 151. * 234. Common Law and Equity Rules. The COmmon-

law rules as to the power of a wife to bring actions in her own

plaintiffs in all actions where she could be party at all, relating

to her property or to wrongs suffered by her, have been either

swept away or greatly modified in all the States which have

adopted the reformed system of procedure. These common-law

requisites were concisely stated in a former paragraph of this

section. 2 In equity, while as a general rule the husband was

joined as a co-plaintiff even in suits touching her equitable sepa-

rate estate, yet when their interests were at all antagonistic, and

especially Avhen the proceeding was in any manner adverse to

him, she was permitted to sue without uniting him with her,

and even to make him a defendant. Her action, however, was

prosecuted in her name by a next friend.^

[§ 152. statutory Provisions. There are two general types of
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the statutory provision as found in most of the codes. The

statutes of the first type abolish the necessity of joining the hus-

band and wife where such joinder would not be necessary aside

from the marriage relation. The Kansas statute is illustrative

of this type, and reads as follows : " A married woman may sue

and be sued in the same manner as if she were unmarried,"*

The statutes of Oklahoma and Utah are identically the same, and

those of Colorado, Montana, and Nebraska differ only slightly.^

woman cannot bring the action. Wood- action the complaint must allege that the

ward V. Anderson, 9 Bush, 624. plaintiff is unmarried.

[_ConJIict of lines. In Thorpe v. Union ^ ggg supra, § *19l.

Pacific Coal Co. (1902), 24 Utah, 475, 68 ^ Story, Eq. PI. §§ 61. 631 ; Daniell

Pac. 145, it was held that where the statute Chan. PI. (4th Am. ed.), pp. 109, 110.

of Wyoming requires an action for the * QGen. St., 1901, § 4457.]

negli'^ent death of a person to be brought * \_Oklahnma : St., 1893, § 3901. Utah :

by and in the name of the personal rcpre- Rev. St., 1898, § 2S04.

sentative of the deceased, and the statute Colorado: "A married woman may

of Utah allows such action to be brought sue, and be sued in all matters, the same as

by the heirs, the statutes of Wyoming must if she were sole." Code, § 6.

control where such an action is brought in ^fontana : '' A married woman mav

the courts of Utah for the death of a person sue and be sued in the same manner as i f

.

Second: Actions by and between Husband and Wife .

name, and as to the necessity of making husband and wife co-

§ 151. * 234.

The commonlaw rules as to the power of a wife to bring action in her own
name and as to the nece ity of making hu band an wife coplaintiffs in all actions where she could be party at all, relating
to her property or to wrongs suffered y her, have be n either
wept away or greatly modified in all the tates which have
adopted the reformed sy tern of procedure. The e common-law
requisites were concisely stated in a former paragraph of this
section. 2 In equity, while a a general rule the husband was
joined a a co-plaintiff even in suits tou ching her equitable separate estate, yet when their interests were at all antagoni tic, and
~specially when the proceeding was in any manner adverse to
him she was permitted to sue without uniting him with her,
and even to make him a defendant. Her action, however, was
prosecuted in her name by a next friend. 3
[§ 152. Statutory Provisions. There are two general types of
the tatutory provision as found in most of the codes. The
tatutes of the first type abolish the necessi ty of joining the husband and wife where such joinder would not be necessary aside
from the marriage relation. The Kansas statute is illustrative
of this type, and reads as follows: "A married woman may sue
and be sued in the same manner as if she were unmarried." 4
The statutes of Oklahoma and Utah are identically the same, and
those of Colorado, Montana, and Nebraska differ only slightly. 6
Common Law and Equity Rules .

negligently killed in Wyoming] she were sole." Code, § 572.

1 See .^i(/)ra, § *1 20. And see Thotnp- Nehrashi : "A woman may, while

son V. Young, 51 Ind. £99; in such an married, sue and be sued, in the same

wom an cannot bring the action. W oodward 11. Anderson, 9 Bush, 624.
[ Con.flJct qf lriws. In Th orpe v . Union
Pacific Coal Co. (1902), 24 Utah, 475, 68
Pac. 145, it was held that where th e statute
<>f Wyoming requires an actiou for the
neglirrent death of a person to be broug ht
Ly ancl in the name of the per onal rep resentative of the deceased, .and the statute
of 'tah allows such action to be brought
by the heir , the statutes of Wy om ing must
eontrol where such an a rtion is brought in
the rourts of Utah for the death of a person
negli ""ently killed in Wyoming.]
1 , ee suprn, § *120.
An d see Thompson t. Y ung, 51 Ind. !:()9; in su ch an

action the complaint must allege that the
plaintiff is unmarried .
2 See supra, § * 191.
a Story, Eq. Pl. §§ 61, 631 ; Daniell
Chan. Pl. (4th Am. ed. ), pp.109, 110.
4 [ Gen. St., 1901, § 4457.J
6 [ Oklahoma : St , 1893, § 390 I. Utah :
Rev. 't., l 9 , § 2S04.
Colorado : " A married woman may
sue, and be sued in all matter . the ame as
if she were sole." Code, § 6.
"!lfontana: " A married woman may
sue and be sued in the ame manner as if
she were sole." Cod e, § 5i2.
N ebraska: " A woman may, whil e
married, sue and be ue<.l , in the same
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Substantially the same provision, but expressed in different form,

is found in Iowa, Minnesota, North Dakota, Ohio, South Dakota^

and Wyoming. 1 The Missouri statute allows a married woman

to sue " with or without joining her husband " in the same

manner as though she were sole.^ The New York statute also

falls in this group, but in addition to the general provision

allowing a married woman to sue or defend "alone or joined

with other parties as if she were single," it specifies certain

classes of cases where the husband should not be joined.^ The

second type requires that the husband and wife be joined except

in certain enumerated cases. The Indiana statute is a good

example of this form. It reads as follows: "A married woman

may sue alone : First. When the action concerns her separate

property. Second. When the action is between herself and her

husband ; but in no case shall she be required to sue or defend by

guardian or next friend, except she be under the age of twenty-

manner as if she were unmarried." Comp.

St., 1901, § 3661.]

^ [_Ioira: "A married woman may in
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all cases sue and be sued without joining

her husband with her, and an attachment

or judgment in such action shall be en-

forced by or against her as if she were

ub tan iall the ame
ed in diff r nt form,
i fou nd in Io :va l\linn ot
hio ou b akota
1
and \Vyoming. The Mi ouri tatu e allo' s a married woman
o ue ~ with or, without joining_ her hu band ' in th
arne
2
manner as though h were sole. The ew York tatut al o
fall in this group but in addition to the g n ral ro i 1011
allowin a married worn n to ue or defend alone or joine<l
with ther partie a if ·he were ingle " it pecifie certain
clas s of cases where the bu band hou1d not be joined. 3 Th
econd y e requires that the bu band and wife be joined except
in certain enumerated cases. The Indiana statute is a good
example of this form . It reads a follow : A married woman
ma
ue alone : First . When the action concerns her
parate
property.
econd . When the action is between hers lf and her
husband; but in no case hall he be required to sue or d fend b.
guardian or next fri nd, except she be under the age of twenty-

single." Code, 1897, § 3477.

Minnesota : " A married woman may

sue or be sued as if unmarried, and with-

out joining her husband, in all cases where

the husband would not be a necessary

party aside from the marriage relation."

St., 1894, § 5159.

North Dakota : " When a married

woman is a party, her appearance, the

prosecution or defence of the action, and

the joinder with her of any other person or

party, must be governed by the same rules

as if she were single." Rev. Codes, 1899,

§ 5224.

Ohio : " A marrieil woman shall sue

and be sued as if she were unmarried, and

her husband shall lie joined with her only

when the cause of action is in favor of or

against both her and her husband." Bates'

St., § 4996.

South Dakota : Identical witli North

Dakota statute, supra. Ann. St., 1901,

§ 6073.

Wtjomin') : "In any civil action, suit

or proceeding, whenever any married

woman is a party, it shall not be necessary

to join her husband with her as a party

except in such cases where it would be

necessary to join such husband without

reference to the fact of his marriage to

such woman." Rev. St., 1899, § 3470.J

2 ][_Mis>iouri : " A married woman may,

in her own name, with or without joining

her husband as a party, sue and be sued

in any of the courts of this State having

jurisdiction, with the same force and effect

as if she was a feme sole, and any judg-

ment in the cause shall have the same

force and effect." Rev. St., 1899, § 546.]

8 Q.Ve?(; York : " In an action or special

proceeding a married woman appears,

prosecutes or defends alone or joined with

other parties as if she was single. It is

not necessary or proper to join her hus-

band with her as a party in any action or

special proceeding affecting her separate

mann er a i1 he were unmarried ." Comp.
t. , 1901 § 3661.J
l [lou·a: " A married woman may in
all case ue and be ued without joining
her hn ba nd with her, aud au attachment
or judg m ent in uch action . hall be en for ed b,- or again t her a if he were
ingle."
ode, 1897, § 34i7.
Jl inne ota: "A married woman may
sue or be ued a if unmarried, and without joining her hu band, in all case where
the hu band would not be a nece sary
party aside from the marriage relation."
St., I 94, § 5159.
01·th Dakota : " When a married
woman i a party, her appearance, the
pro. ecution or defence of the a tion, and
the joinder with her of any other p r on or
party, mu t be g overned by the ame rule
a if be were single." Rev. ode , l 99,
§ 5224.
Ohio: "A married woman hall ~ ne
and be u ed as if he wer unmarried and
her bu band hall be joi n d wi t h h er 0nly
w h n the a u e of a cti o1 i in favor of or
again:t both h er a nd h r hu ba nd ." Bates'
• t ., § 4996.
. 'outlt Da kota : Identical wi t h North
akota tatute, supra. Ann . t. , 190 ,
§ 073 .
IV.1J<Jming : " In any civil a cti on uit
or proceedin , whenever any m a rri ed
wornnn i a party, it hall n ot be nece ary

to join her husband with her as a party
excP.pt in u ch ca es where it would be
nece ary to join such hu band wi hout
reference to the fact of hi marriaue to
such woman." Rev. t., l 99
34i0.J
2 [ Ui . ouri: "A married woman mny,
in her own name, with or without joinin~
her hu. band as a party, ue and be ut>d
in any of the court of this 'tate havio
jurisdiction, with the same force and effect
a if he was a feme sole, and any judgment in the cause hall have the same
force and effect." Rev. t., 1 99, § 546.J
s [ 1ew York: "In an action or special
proceeding a married woman appear.,
pro ecute or defend alone or joined with
other partie as if he was ingle. It i
not nece a r or proper to join her hu~
band with her a a party in any action or
p ial proceedin!'" aff cting her eparate
property. The hu band i n ta nece ary
or proper party to an a t i n or pe ial
proceeding to recover damag to the peron, e t ate or charact r of hi wife, and aJI
um that may be r cov r d in u ha tion.
or sp ial pr ceedin
hall be th ~ pa rate
prope r y of the \Yife. Th e hu band i not
a n ce ary r proper par .v to an a tion or
ep ial proceeding to re over damage~ to
he er.on , ·tate or character of another
n a ccount of he wrong ful act of hi
wi f
o mmitted with out his in tigation."
o de iv . Pro. § 450.]
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one years." ^ This statute is found in substantially the same form

in Arizona, Arkansas, Nevada, Xorth Carolina, Oregon, South

Carolina, and Wisconsin. ^ In California a third class of excep-

tions is added, namely, where the husband has deserted the wife

or where there is an agreement in writing between them.^ Idaho

has adopted the California statute, and Washington has a statute

very similar to it.'* The statutes of Connecticut, Georgia, and

1 QBurns' St., 1901. § 2.55.]

2 ^Arizona : " When a married woman

on ear . " 1 T his tatute is found in ub tantially the ame fo rm
in Arizona, A rkan as, N eva<la, North Carolina,
r gon, • outh
2
'ar lina, an l 'Vise n in. In alifornia a third las of exc ptions i added, namely, wher the bu band ha de rted the wif,,,
r where there i an agreement in writing between th m. a Idaho
has adopted the Californ ia statute, and \Vashington has a tatute
very imilar to it. 4 The statutes of Connecticut, Georgia ancl

is a party, her husband shall be joined

with her, except that : First, When the

[Burn ' t. , l 901 , § 255 .J
[ Arizona: " When a married woman
i · a party, her husba nd shall be joined
with her, except t hat : F irst, W hen the
action concerns her separ ate pr operty, she
may ue alone. Second, W hen the acti on
i between herself and he r husband, he
may ue or be sued alone." R ev. St., 190 1,
. 1302.
A rkansas : " Where a mar r ied woman
i a par ty, her husband must be join ed
wi th her , except in t he following ca,;e :
Fir t , he may be ued alon e upon cont ract made by her in i·e pect to her sole
an d eparate p roper ty, or in respect to
any trade or busin ess carri ed on hy her
under any stat ute of this tate. Second,
, 'be may maintain an action in her ow n
nam e for or on account of her sole or
.eparate e tate or property, or fo r damage again st any person or body cor porate
for any injury to her person, character or
property. Third, Where t he action is between herself and her husba nd, sh e may
ue and 1'e sued alone." Sand. & Hill 's
Dig ., § 5641.
Nevada : Identical with the statute of
Arizona, supra . Comp. Laws, 1900, § 3102.
North Carolina : Identi cal with the
statute of Arizona. supra, adding "and in
no case need she prosecute or defend by a
guardian or next fri end." Code Civ. Pro.,
1883, § 56.
Oregon : " Where a marri ed woman is
a party, her hu band shall be join ed wi th
her, ex cept that, - l. Wh ere the action
affects her se parate proper ty, or where th e
a u e of action is fo r a wrong committed
against her per on or character, or is fo r
wag e due fo r her personal er vi ces, :;;he
may sue or be sued alone· 2. Wh ere the
action i between her elf and her hu band,
she may ue or be sned alone ; and in no
ca e need she pro,;ecute or defend by a
guardian or next friend." Hill's Code, §30.
I

action concerns her separate property, she

2

may sue alone. Second, When tlie action

is between herself and her husband, she

may sue or be sued alone." Rev. St., 1901,

§ 1302.

Arkansas : " Where a married woman

is a party, her husband must be joined
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with her, except in the following ca.ses:

First, She may be sued alone upon con-

tracts made by her in respect to her sole

and separate property, or in respect to

any trade or business carried on by her

under any statute of this state. Second,

She may maintain an action in her own

name for or on account of her sole or

separate estate or property, or for dam-

ages against any person or body corporate

for any injury to her person, character or

property. Third, Where the action is be-

tween herself and her husband, she may

sue and be sued alone." Sand. & Hill's

Dig., § .5641.

Nevada: Identical with the statute of

Arizona, s«/)ra. Comp. Laws, 1900, § 3102.

North Carolina : Identical with the

statute of Arizona, supra, adding " and in

no case need she prosecute or defend by a

guardian or next friend." Code Civ. Pro.,

1883, § .56.

Oregon : " Where a married woman is

a party, her husband shall be joined with

her, except that, — 1. Where the action

affects her separate property, or where the

cause of action is for a wrong committed

against her person or character, or is for

wages due for her personal services, she

may sue or be sued alone ; 2. Where the

action is between herself and her husband,

.she may sue or be sued alone ; and in no

case need she prosecute or defend by a

guardian or next friend." Hill's Code, § 30.

South Carolina: "Where a married

woman is a party her husband must be

joined with her, except that (1) Wlier©

the action concerns her separate property,

she may sue or be sued alone : Provided,

That neither her husband nor liis property

shall be liable for any recovery against

her in any such suit; but judgment mav

be enforced by execution against her sole

and separate estate in the same manner

as if she were sole. (2) Where the ac-

tion is between herself and her husband

she may sue or be sued alone ; and in no

case need she prosecute or defend by a

guardian or next friend." Rev. St., 1893,

Code Civ. Pro., § 135.

"'outh Carolina : " ' V here a marrie!l
woman is a party her hu baud m u t Le
joined wi th her, ex cept that ( l) W he re
the action concerns her sepa rate prope r t~· ,
she may sue or be su ed alone : P rovidNl ,
That neither her husband nor hi proper ty
shall be liabl e for au y recove ry again . t
her in any such . nit; b ut j udgm en t may
be enforced by execut ion again t her sole
and sepa rate esta te in the sam e man ner
as if she were sole. (2 ) Where t he action is bet ween .herself and her husband
she may sue or be sued alone; and in no
case need she prosecute or defen d by a.
guardian or next friend ." Rev . St. , 1 93,
Code Civ. Pro., § 135.
Wi sconsin : " W here a married woman
is a party her husband m ust be joined
with her , except t hat where t he act ion concerns her separate p roperty ur busine s or
alleged a ntenuptial debts, or is bet ween
herself an d her husband, she may sue or
be sued alone." St., 1898, § 2608.J
a [ Californ ia : " Where a marri d
woman is a party, her husband mu t ba
joined with her, ex cept: {l ) W here the action concerns her separate prope rty, or her
rig ht or claim to t he homestead property,
she may sue alon e ; {2) Where t he action
is between herself a nd her h usband, he
may sue or be sued alone ; {3 ) Wh ere ·he
is li vin g separate aml apart from her b u.band, by r eason of his de ertion of her , or
by ag reement in writing entered into uet ween th em , she may sue or be ued
alone."
ode, § 3i0.J
4 [ldnhn :
odeC iv.Pro., 1901 , § 315 .
lVasltin_qton : " \Vhere a marri ed woman i a party, her hu band mnst be
joined with her, except - I. Where the
act ion concern her separate pr ope r t~· . or
h er ri g ht or clai m to the home 'tead p roperty, she may ue alone; 2. ·w her the
action i bet ween her elf and her husband, she m ay sue or be sued alone
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Kentucky are peculiar and do not fall within either of these

groups. ] ^

§ 153. * 239. "Wife xnuBt sue Alone in Some States. The fol-

lowing are instances in which it has been held, under the special

provisions of the New York statutes, that the wife must sue

alone, although the joinder of the husband does not, as decided

by the Court of Appeals, defeat the action entirely. The doc-

trine which lies at the foundation of these decisions is also em-

bodied in the statutes of the other States which have followed

the example of New York by abrogating the common-law rules

concerning suits by husband and wife. The cases themselves

are therefore authoritative precedents in interpreting the corre-

sponding statutory provisions of those States. The wife should

sue alone on an award made in her favor ; ^ to recover damages

for the taking or the conversion of her personal property;^ in an

action on a lease executed in her name ; * to recover possession of

3. Where she is living separate and apart

from her hushand, she may sue or be sued
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alone." Bal. Code, § 4826-3

1 ^Connecticut : "Where a married

woman shall carry on any business, and

any riglit of action shall accrue to her

Kentucky are peculiar and do not fall within either of these
gr ups. J 1
153. * 239. Wife must sue Alone in Some States.
The following are instances jn which it has been h ld, under the special
pro i ion of the New York tatutes, that the wife must sue
alon although the joinder of the husband does not, as decided
by the ourt of App als, defeat the action entirely. The doctrine which lies at the foundation of th e deci ion i al o embodied in the statute of the other Stat which ha e follow d
the example of New York by abrogating tl e common-law rul s
~oncerning suits by bu band and wife.
The ca
th mselv
are therefore authori tati e precedents in interpreting the correponding statutory provisions of those States. The wife should
ue alone on an award made in her favor; 2 to recover damages
for the taking or the con version of her personal prop rty; 3 in an
action on a lease executed in her name; 4 to r cover po session of

therefrom, she may sue upon the same as

if she were unmarried.

" In any civil action by or against a

married woman, her husband may be

joined with her, as a co-plaintiff or co-

defendant, as the case may be ; and when

ao joined, if a cause of action is found to

exist in favor of or against one of them

only, a judgment or decree shall be ren-

dered accordingly ; and in such cases no

costs shall be taxed for such husband or

wife in favor of whom no cause of action

is found, nor against such husband or

wife against whom no cause of action is

found." Gen. St., 1902, §§ SQ."?, 594.

(jporqin : " If a tort be committed upon

the person or reputation of tlie wife, the

husband or wife may recover therefor ; if

the wife is living separate from her hus-

band, she may sue for such torts, and also

torts to her children, and recover the

flame to lier use. She may enforce con-

tracts made in reference to her own ac-

quisition." Code, 189.^), § 247.5.

Kentiirki/ : 1. "In actions between hus-

band and wife; in actions concerning her

separate property; and in actions con-

cerning her general property, and in ac-

tions for the personal suffering of or injury

to her person or character, in which he

refuses to unite, she may sue or be sued

alone. 2. In all other actions by or

against a wife, she and her husband may

join or be joined as plaintiffs or defend-

ants. 3. She may defend an action against

her and her husband for herself, and for

him also if he fails to defend. 4. If a

husband desert his wife she. may bring

or defend for him any action which he

might bring or defend, and shall have the

powers and riglits with reference thereto

which he would have had but for such

desertion. 5. If a female party to an

action marry, her husband may be made

a party by a motion, causing the fact to be

stated upon the record ; and the action

3 . Where t-he i living eparate and apart
fr o m her husband, ·he may ue or be sued
alone." Bal. Code, § 4826.J
l [ Connecticut:
" Where a married
woman shall carry on any bu ines , and
any right of a ction shall accrue to her
therefrom, she may sue upon the same as
if he were u n married.
" Io any civil action by or against a
married woman, her bu band may be
joined with h er, as a co-plaintiff or codefendant, as the case may be ; and when
so joined, if a cause of a ction i found to
exi t in favor of or against one of them
only, a judgment or decree hall be rend ered a ccordingly; and in such cases no
co ts shall he t axed for uch hu band or
wife in favor of whom no cau e of a ction
i fo und, nor against such hu band or
wife against whom no cau e of action i
fou nd.''
en. t., 1902, §§ 593, 594.
Georgia : "Ii a tort be mmitted upon
t h e per on or reputation of the wife, the
h n band or wife may recov er therefor ; if
the wife i Ii ving s par ate from her bu band, he may ue for uch tort , and also
to rt to he r children, an
re over the
am to her u e.
he may enforce
ntr L mad in referenc t h r own acqui ition."
ode , 1 95, § 2475.
K ent1tck.11: l . ' ' In a ction betw en bu a nd and wi( ; in a cti n on ming her
p rate proper ty · an d in a t ion con-

cerning her general property, and in actions for the personal suffering of or injur5•
to her person or character, in which he
refuses to unite, she may sue or be , ued
alone.
2. In all other actions by or
11.gainst a wife, she and her husband may
join or be joined a plaintiffs or def ndant . 3. She mav defend an action agairu t
her and her bu~ band for herself, and for
him al o if he fails to defend. 4. If a
nusband de ert his wife she. may bring
or defend for him any action which he
might bring or defend, and shall have the
powers and rights with reference theret.>
which he would have had but for uch
d ertion. 5. If a female party to an
a tion marry, her hu band may be made
a party by a motion, causing the fact to l.u'
tated upon the record; and the a Lion
hall not be delayed b reason of the
marriage. 6. But if a wife be of unsound
mind , or impri oned, the action mentioned
in ub ection one, thr e, and four of Lhi
ection mu t be pro e uted or def ndetl
by her committee or curator, if she have
one; and if h have none, mu t be pro ·
cuted by h r next friend, r de~ oded by
her guardian ad lilem."
odes, I 95,
§ 34.J
2
almer v. avi , 28 N .Y. 242.
8 A kley v . Tarbox, 31 N. Y. 564.
" Draper v. t uvenel, 35 N. Y. 507.
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her lands ; ^ to recover damages for trespasses upon her lands ; ^

to recover damages for an assault and battery upon herself ; ^ to

recover damages for the seduction of her own female servant,

when she carries on a business in which the servant is employed;*

to recover damages for tlie alienation of her husband's affection

and deprivation of his society ; ^ to recover damages for false and

fraudulent representations by which she was induced to convey

her lands ;'^ in an action against a common carrier to recover

the value of articles lost or destroyed, although gifts from her

husband;" to recover the price agreed to be paid for personal

services rendered to the defendant.^

§ 154. * 240. Result of New York Statutes. As the result of

the New York statutes modifying the legal relations between

the husband and wife, either may, under certain circumstances,

maintain actions of a legal nature ; that is, upon a legal cause of

action, and seeking to obtain legal relief, against the other. It

would seem, however, that such actions must be based upon

rights of property or of contract. When the husband, prior to

the marriage and in consideration thereof, gave his intended wife
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a promissory note, it is a valid demand in her hands, and she

may, subsequent to the marriage, maintain an action against him

upon it.^ The wife may bring an action in her own name against

her husband to recover the possession of land which is her sepa-

rate property. ^° She may also sue him to recover her personal

1 Darby v. Callaghan, 16 N. Y. 71; further, to the same effect, Wyandotte f.

Hillman v. Hillinan, U How. Pr. 456. Agan, 37 Kan. 528 ; Porter v. Dunn, 131

■■2 Fox I'. Duff, 1 Daly, 196. N. Y. 314. For further illustrations in

^ Maan v. Marsh, 35 Barb. 68. And suits on contracts, or concerning Iier own

also in Iowa for torts to her. Mewhirter property, see Bitter v. Rath man, 61 N. Y.

V. Hatteu, 42 Iowa, 288. 512 ; Curtis v. Del., L. & W. K. Co., 74 N. Y.

* Badgley i-. Decker, 44 Barb. 577. 116; Fitch y. Rathbun, 61 id. 579 ; Kava-

In this case, the wife, living separate nagh v. Barber, 131 N. Y. 211 (nuisance);

from her husband, kept a boarding-house, Hufnagel v. Mt. Vernon, 49 Huii, 286.

and her daughter aided her by personal ^ Wright v. Wright, 54 N. Y. 437, 59

services. Barb. 505.

her lands; 1 to recover damages f r tre pa s upon her lands; 2
to recover damages for an assault and batt ry upon h r elf; 3 to
rec ver damag s for the seduct~on of h r own f ma]
rvant,
when he carries on a busine s in whi h the ervant i emp1oyed; 4
to recoYer damages for the alienation of h r bu ·bancl' affection
and deprivation of his society; 5 to r cover damag f r fal e and
frau ulent repre entations by which he wa inclu ccl to convey
her lands; 6 in an action against a common carri r to i· cover
the value of articles lost or destroy d, although gifts from her
hu band; 7 to recover the price agreed to be paid for personal
ervices rendered to the defendant. 8
§ 154. * 240. Result of N e w Y ork Statutes. As the result of
the New York statutes modifying the legal relations between
the husband and wife, either may, under certain circumstances,
maintain actions of a legal nature; that is, upon a legal cause of
action, and seeking to obtain legal relief, against the other. It
would seem, however, that such actions must be based upon
rights of property or of contract. When the husband, prior to
the marriage and in consideration thereof, gave his intended wife
a promissory note, it is a valid demand in her hands, and she
may, subsequent to the marriage, maintain an action against him
upon it. 9 T he wife may bring an action in her own name against
her husband to recover the possession of land which is her separate property. 10 She may also sue him to recover her personal

5 Bennett y. Bennett, 116 N. Y. 584. lo Wood v. Wood, 83 N. Y. 575;

^ Newberry v. Garland, 31 Barb. 121. Minier v. Minier, 4 Lans. 421. The court

' Rawsou I'. Pennsylvania Railroad, 2 in the latter case draw a distinction be-

Abb. Pr. N. s. 220. tweeu a suit like this, affecting her sepa-

' Adams v. Honness, 62 Barb. 326 ; rate property, and one brought to recover

but see, per contra. Beau v. Kiah, 6 N. Y. damages for a tort, such as slander, or

Sup. Ct. 464. Brooksv. Schwerin, 54 X. Y'. assault and batterv. See, liowever, per

543; Sloan v. New York Central R. Co., contra, Gould v. Gould, 29 How. Pr. 441.

4 N. Y. Sup. Ct. 135. See also Reynolds Tliis decision is in plain opposition to tlio

V. Robiuson, 64 N. Y. 580, 593. See spirit and letter of the remedial statutes.

1.')

l Darby u. Callaghan, 16 N. Y. 71;
Hillman v. Hillman, 14 How. Pr. 456.
2 Fox u. Duff, 1 Daly, 196.
a Mann v. Marsh, 35 Barb. 68. And
.al o in Iowa for torts to her. Mcwhirter
v. Hatten, 42 Iowa, 288.
t Badgley u. Decker, 44 Barb. 577.
In this ca e, the wife, living separate
from her husband, kept a boarding-house,
and her daughter aided her by personal
services.
5 Bennett u. Bennett, 116 N. Y. 584.
6 Newberrv u. Garland, 31 Barb. 121.
7 Rawson ·v. Pennsylvania Railroad, 2
Abb. Pr. N. s. 220.
dams u. Honn es , 62 Barb. 326 ;
but ee, p r contra, Beau u. Kiah, 6 N. Y.
' up. Ct. 464. Brook. v. Schwerin, 5-1 N. Y.
~43; • loan v. New York Central R. Co.,
4 N. Y. Sup. Ct. 135. See also Heynolds
1:. Robinson, 64 N. Y . 589, 593.
See

further, to the same effect, Wyandotte u.
Agan, 37 Kan. 528; Porter u. Dunn, 131
N. Y. 314. For furth er illustration in
suits on contracts, or concerning her own
property, see Bitter v. Rathman, 61 N. Y .
512; Curtis v. Del., L. & W.R. Co., 74 N. Y.
116; Fitch v. Rathbun , 61 id. 579; Kavanagh u. Barber, 131 N. Y. 211 (nuisance);
Hufnagel v. Mt. Vernon , 49 Hun, 286.
9 Wright u. Wright, 54 N. Y. 437, 59
Barb . 505.
io Wood v. Wood, 83 N . Y. 575;
Minier v. Minier, 4 Lans. 421. The court
in the latter case draw a di tinction between a suit lik e thi , affecting her. eparate property, and one brought to recorer
damages for a tort, such a ' ·lander, or
as ault and battery.
ee, ho' e\'f~r, per
contra, Gould v. Gould, 29 How. Pr. 441.
This decision i in plain oppo. ition to tho
spirit and letter of the remeJial statutes.
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property ; or for money loaned to him ; qr to recover the value of

services rendered in his business under an express contract, or

under such circumstances that a promise to pay therefor would

be implied.^ When the husband and wife are owners in common

of land, she may maintain a suit against him for a partition. ^

The foregoing cases all involve and are based upon rights of

action growing oat of her ownership of property, or out of con-

tract in reference to such property, or to her services. No rights

of action arise from personal torts committed by the husband,

and she is not permitted to maintain actions against him to

recover damages for such torts, as an assault and battery, ^ or a

slander.^ A husband cannot recover in an action against his wife

for his services rendered to her in the oversight and management

of her separate property, there having been no express agreem.ent

for the payment of a compensation, and the circumstances being

such that no promise could be implied.^

§ 155. * 241. Actions for Personal Torts and for Fraud and

Deceit. At the common law the husband and wife were required

to join as plaintiffs in all actions for damages from the wife's
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personal suffering, either bodily or mental, while he sued alone

in all actions for damages suffered by himself exclusively, from

the loss of her society, and from expenses and the like occasioned

by her injuries. Except in New York, and the other States

1 Adams v. Curtis, 4 Lans. 164. The in Kaufman v. Schoeffel, 37 Hun, 140, thai

action was against a firm of which the husband and wife cannot legally enter

husband was a member. She may be into a business copartnership : to the con-

his creditor. Re Alexander, 37 Iowa, trary, Graflf v. Kinney, 1 How. Pr. N. 8.

4.54. He maj' sue her for conversion of 59 ; Zimmerman i-. Erhard, 58 How. Pr.

his property; Berdell f. Parkhurst, 19 11. See also, on the general subject of

Hun, 358. She may sue him for conver- the wife's mental disabilities, Bertles r.

sion ; Ryerson v. Ryerson, 55 Hun, 191, Nunan, 92 N. Y. 152; Coleman r. Burr,

38 N. Y. St. Rep. 375; to recover her 93 N. Y. 17.

personal property ; Howland r. Howland, 2 Moore v. Moore, 47 N. Y. 467. The

20 Hun, 472. She may sue her husband, husband and wife may .sue jointly for the

or be sued by him, on a contract made conversion of chattels which they own

for the benefit of her .separate estate; jointly. Chambovet i-. Cagney, 35 N. \-

Granger f. Granger (1886), 2 N. Y.St. Superior Ct. 474.

Rep. 211 (suit by husband on promissory * Longendyke v. Longendyke, 44 Barb,

note of wife) ; Benedict v. Driggs, 34 366 ; Schultz v. Schultz, 27 Hun, 26, 63

Hun, 94, and cases cited. Whether a How. Pr. 181, contra, was reversed with-

partnersliip agreement is such a contract out opinion by the Court of Appeals, 89

is a question on which the decisions are N. Y. 644.

at variance. It is held in Fairlee v. * Freethy r. Freethy, 42 Barb. 641.

Bloomingdale, 67 How. Pr. 292. in Noel ^ Perkins v. Perkins, 62 Barb. 531.

V. Kinney (1885), 31 Alb. Law J. 328, and Alward v. Ahvard (1888), 2 N. Y. Suppl.42.
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which have made the wife in all respects like the single woman

in regard to the capacity of instituting and prosecuting judicial

controversies, these ancient doctrines of the common law have

been preserved.^ The wife should certainly not be joined as a

plaintiff with her husband in any action for tort to his property,

or for fraud in relation thereto, unless she has some interest in

or ownership of the subject-matter which has also been affected

by the wrong.- Thus, where a husband is induced by the false

and fraudulent representations of the grantor to purchase land,

and the title is taken in his wife's name, but the consideration

is wholly paid by him, she having in fact no prior legal interest

in the land or in the price, an action for the deceit cannot prop-

erly be brought in their joint names ; he is the only person

interested, and should be the sole plaintiff.^ The same has been

decided in respect to an action for fraud practised upon a hus-

band and wife, by which a convej'ance of land was obtained from

them. The land thus conveyed was alleged to have been their

homestead, but in fact the wife had no legal interest in it, the

title having been exclusively in the husband. A joint action to
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recover damages for the deceit under these circumstances was

held to be improper.^ If, however, the wife has a legal interest

or ownership in the subject-matter which has been injured or lost

by the wrongful act or fraud of the defendant, a joint action in

the names of both husband and wife to recover damages is

proper. This doctrine has very recently been approved by the

New York Court of Appeals, and applied to the following state

of facts. The owner in fee of land in which his wife had no

interest except her inchoate right of dower, was induced by false

and fraudulent representations to sell and convey the premises

to the defendant by a deed in which the wife joined, and to

receive in consideration thereof certain mortgages which were

in fact worthless. A joint action by the husband and wife to

recover damages for the deceit was sustained, the husband, it

1 [|See notes, pp. 221, 222, an?e.] '^ Bartges v. O'Neil, 13 Ohio St. 72;

2 [|Edmisonw. Zborowski (1896),9S. D. Barrett y. Tewksbnry, 18 Cal. 334. See

40, 68 N. W. 288 : The court said : Stepank v. Kula, 36 Iowa, 563.

" A wife who joins in an acceptance of * Read v. Sang, 21 Wis. 678; and

an offer for her husband's property, and see Davies i'. Cole, 28 Kau. 259. But

in a deed tendered to the person making see Simar v. Canaday, 53 N. Y. 298.

the offer, is not a necessary party plaintiff

iu an action for specific performance."]

which hav made the wif in all re pee s lik the ingl woman
in r 0 arc.1 to the capacity of in tituting anc.1 prosecuting judicial
con tr " rie , the e ancient doctrin ~ of the comm n l: w lia Y
been pr served. 1 The wife hould certainly n t be join cl a· a
plaintiff with her hu band in any action for tort to his pr p rt. ·
or for fraud in relation thereto, unles sh has ome int r . t in
or owner hip of the subj ct-matt r which ha al o be n affect cl
by the wrong. 2 Thu , where a hu .. band i induc d by the fa] e
and fraudulent representations of the grantor to purcha, e land
and the title is taken in his wife' name, but the consideration
i wholly paid by him, she having in fact no prior legal intere
in the land or in the price, an action for the deceit caunot properly be brought in their joint names; he is the only per:on
interested, and should be the sole plaintiff. 3 The same ha, b n
d cided in respect to an action for fraud practised upon a. hu band and wife, by which a conveyance of land was obtained from
them. The land thus conveyed was alleged to have been their
h me tead, but in fact the wife had no legal interest in it, the
title having been exclusively in the husband. A joint action to
recover damages for the deceit under these circumstances wa
h ld to be improper. 4 If, however, the wife has a legal intere t
or ownership in the subject-matter which has been injured or lo t
by the wrongful act or fraud of the defendant, a joint action in
the names of both husband and wife to recover damages is
proper. This doctrine has very recently been approved by the
New York Court of Appeals, and applied to the following tate
of facts. The owner in fee of land in which his wife had no
interest except her inchoate right of dower, was induced by false
and fraudulent representation8 to sell and convey the premi e
to the defendant by a deed in which the wife joined, and to
receive in consideration thereof certain mortgage which wer
in fact worthlest;. A joint action by the hu band and wife t
recover damages for the decei.t wa su 'ta.i11ed, the bu band, it
1 [

ee note , pp. 221, 222, ante.]
[Edmi onv. Zborowski (1896),9S.D.
40 6 N. W. 28 : The court said:
"A wife who join in an acceptance of
an offer for her hu band's property, and
in a deed tenrlered to the person making
the offer. i not a nece .. ar.v party plaintiff
iu an action for pecific performance."]
2

a Bartges v. O'Neil, 13 Ohio St.
Barrett v. Tewksbury, 18 Cal. 334.
Stepank v. Kula, 36 Iowa, 563.
4 Rea.cl
v. Sang, 21 Wi . 6i ;
ee Davie v. Cole, 2 Kao. 259.
ee imar v. Canaday, 53 N. Y. 298.

i2 ;
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was said, being entitled to sue on account of his ownersliip of the

fee, and the wife on account of her inclioate (h)\vei' right. ^

§ 156. * 242. Actions for Personal Torts to Wife. When a

wife has suffered bodily injury, either by violence or by negli-

gent or unskilful acts of the wrong-doer, and the injury is of

such a nature as to disable her for a while and make medical or

other attendance necessary, a joint action is not the proper one

in which to recover the husband's damages for his loss of her

society and for the expenses caused by the wrong done to her;

such damages can only be recovered in an action brought by the

husband as the sole plaintiff.^ If, on the other hand, the com-

pensation sought is for the personal wrong done to her, both must

unite as plaintiffs [in all those States which follow the second

1 Simar v. Canadav, 53 N. Y. 298, 305.

This is certainly au extraordinary decision,

and introduces a rule before, I think, un-

thought of, — namely, that whenever the

owner in fee is induced liy fraud to con-

w

f

an

ing en itl d to ' Ue n ace unt f hi own r hip of the
wif n a count of b r in h a
~ r right. 1

* 24.J.

A ctio n s

for

Perso n al T o rts to Wife.

Wh n a.

wif
ith r b
n
r b n glig nt
r ng-d r, n th lilJUry i f
u h a n ture a
f r a while and ml ke m dical or
other a endanc nee ar a joint acti n i not the proper on
in which t
v r th hu band damag f r hi lo of her
ociety and for the expen
cau. e by the wro ng done t h r;
uch am g can only be r c v re i in n acti n brought by th
hu band a the ole plaintiff. 2 If, on he oth r hand the compen ation ought i for the personal wrong done to her, both mu t
unite as plaintiff' [in all tho e States which follow the econd
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vey his laud, and the wife joins in the

deed, the two may maintain a joint action

and recover a single judgment in solido

for tiieir joint damages. The decision

cannot be supported either on principle

or on authority ; the essential difference

between the husband's fixed, certain in-

terest, capable cf being ascertained, and

the wife's uncertain, contingent interest,

under all possible circumstances much

less than her husband's, seems to have

utterly escaped the attention of the court.

ByR. S. Ind., 1881, § 2506, a wife's

common-law right of dower Wius enlarged

into a contingent fee, which may become

vested, not only by the death of her

husband, but l)y a judicial sale where

her inchoate interest is not directed by

the judgment to be barred or sold. It

was held that by virtue of this statute

the wife was a proper party plaintiff

witli the husband in an action to com-

pel a railroad coin[)any to maintain a

crossing over its right of way, in accord-

ance with a condition in a deed by tiie

husband and wife of the land for the

right of way. Lake Erie & W. R. Co. v.

Priest (Ind. Sup. 1892), 31 N. E. Rep. 77.

For a nuisance to premises owned by

husband ami wife <as tenants by the en-

tirety, he may sue alone. Demby v. City

of Kingston, GO Ilun, 294.

2 Kavanaugh v. Janesville, 24 Wis.

618, action for injuries to wife from a

defective sidewalk ; Barnes v. iMartin, 15

imar v. Canaday, 53 . Y. 29 , 305.
Thi i ertainly an extraordinary deci ion,
and introduce a rule before, I think, unthonaht of, - nam ly, that whenever the
owner in fee i induced I y fraud to convey hi land, a11d the wife join in the
d ed the two may maintain a joint action
and r eCO \'e r a ingle judgment in olido
for their j int damages. The deci ion
cannot 9e upported either on principle
or on authority; the e ,ential differen e
be.tw en the h u band· fixed,
r tain intere t, capable f being ascertained, and
the wife' uncertain, contin gent intere t,
und r all po ible cir um tance much
le
than her hu. band' , eem, to have
utterly cap d the att ntion of the c urt.
By R. . Ind ., 1 1,
25 6, a wif '
common-law ri ght of d wer wa enlar d
into a co11tin<Tcnt f , , whi ·h may beco me
ve ted, n t
uly by th
d ath f her
bu band, but h.'· a judi ial ale where
her in hoate int re ' t i n t dir ted by
the judgrn nt 10 h barr d or old . It
wa held that by virtu of thi
tatute
the wife w
a pr p r party plainLiff
with the Ii u. band in an a ti on t
omp 1 a railroad omp, ny t maintain a
cro.· ing oPr it right f way, in a
rdance with a ·ondition in a d ed by the
bu IJ' ud and wife of th land for the
' \V .

o.

t ..

. E.

Wis. 240, assault and battery on wife ;

Smith V. St. Joseph, 55 Mo. 456, 458;

Dailey v. Houston, 58 Mo. 361, 366 ; Tell

V. Gibson. 66 Cal. 247. The joint action

mentioned in the text was allowed by

Laws of Wisconsin, 1873, ch. 96 ; II. S.

Wis. § 2680 ; Holmes v. Fond du Lac. 42

Wis. 282. But in construing ch. 91, Laws

of 1881, wliich allows the wife to sue

alone for a personal tort, it is lield that

the husband's cause of action for damages

special to himself cannot be so joined

with the wife's. Siiauahan v. Madison,

57 Wis. 276.

QMcKune r. Santa Clara, etc. Co. (1 895),

enity

2 Kavanaugh
. Jane ville, 24 Wi .
618, action for inju r ie to wife fr m a
defective iJewalk; Barne v. Martin, 15
Wi~. 240, a ault and battery on wife;
Smith v.
t. Jo eph, 55 Mo. 456, 45 ;
Dai ley i-. Hou:t0n, 5 fo. 361, 366; Tell
v.
ib on, 66 al. 247. The j int action
mentioned in the text wa allowed l>y
Law of W i con in, 1873, ch. 96; R. '
Wi . § 2G 0 ; Holme v. F nd du Lac. 42
Wis. 2 2. But in con truina ch. 91, Law.
of l l, which allow th wife to ue
alone for a p r nal tort, it i held that
the hu band' au e of a ti n fo r damage.
pecial to him elf cannot be
j in d
with th wife' .
hanahan v. fadi 011,
57 \\ i . 276.
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type;i] as, for example, in suing for a slander or libel upon the

wife, the husband and wife must sue jointly, unless he has suf-

fered some special damage, and the object of the proceeding is

to obtain compensation therefor.''^ The same rule applies to all

torts to the person of the wife; for the injuries to her, both

husband and wife must join ; for the injuries special to him, such

as loss of her society, expenses incurred, and the like, he must

sue alone. ^ It has even been held, in a State where the cause

of action for a personal tort survives, that, when a claim for

damages against a physician for malpractice existed in favor of a

wife, and she died, her husband must be joined as a co-plaintiff

with her administrator in prosecuting an action to enforce such

demand.* If the gravamen of the action is a tort to the wife's

{)erson, the general rule above stated applies, and the husband

by his wife by reasou of a defective side-

walk, and for expenses for medical attend-

ance. In City of Eskridge v. Lewis (1893),

.■jl Kan. 376, 32 Pac. 1104, " An action
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was brought by a married woman against

a city to recover for personal injuries re-

type ;l] as, for example, in uing for a lander or libel upon the
wif , the husband and wife mu t ue j intly, unlest) he ha suff red some special damage, and the obj ct of the pr c eding i
to btain com pen a~ion th r for. i The same rule applie to all
tort to the per on of the wif ; for the injurie · to her, both
bu and and wife must join; for the injuri sp cial to him, such
a 1
of her society, expenses incurred, and the like he mu t
,'ue alone. 3 It has even been held, /in a State where the au
of action for a personal tort survives, that, when a claim for
<lamages against a physician for malpractice exi t d in favor of a
wife, and she died, her husband mnst be joined as a co-plaintiff
with her administrator in prosecuting an action to enforce such
demand. 4 If the gravamen of the action is a tort to the wife's
person, the general rule above stated applies, and the husband

sulting from a defective sidewalk, and her

husband was joined with her as plaintiff,

who sought to recover for the loss of ser-

vices of tlie wife. Held, that the wife

suffered a loss from the injuries sustained

which was personal to herself, and th.at a

demurrer to the petition because of mis-

joinder wiis well taken ; but dismissing

ttie husband from the case before its sub-

mission cured the error committed in

overruling the demurrer."]

1 QGiffen v City of Lewiston (1898),

Idaho, .5.5 Pac. .545 : Where a husband and

wife sue for personal injuries received by

the wife, the judgment should run to both.

But the right of action for injuries re-

ceived by a single woman who, before

action commenced, married, is in the wo-

man alone, and her husband is not prop-

erly to be joined with her : Kippen v. Ollas-

.son (1902), 136 Cal. 640, 69 Pac. 293.]

•^ Johnson v. Dickcn, 25 Mo. 580; En-

ders V. Beck, 28 Iowa. 86. Tliis latter

decision was made under a .statute differ-

ent from that which is now in force in

Iowa. See also McFadden ;) Santa Ana,

etc. Ry. Co., 87 Cal. 464 ; Gibson v. Gib-

son, 43 Wis. 23 ; Barnett v. Leonard, 66

lud. 422. The wife mav now sue alone,

in Indiana, -for a personal tort. Ante,

p. 222. QSee also Lamb d. Harbaugh

(1895), 105 Cal. 680, 39 Pac. 56; Harper

V. Pinkstou (1893), 112 N. C. 293, 17 S. E.

161 : An action by a husband for slander

of his wife, the wife not being a party and

the complaint alleging no special damages

to the husband, states no cause of action.]

3 Long V. Morrison, 14 Ind. 595, 597 ;

McKinney i-. Western Stage Co., 4 Iowa,

420. See remark in last preceding note.

Dailey v. Houston, 58 Mo. 361, 366;

Smith V. St. Joseph, 55 Mo. 456, 458;

Rogers v. Smith, 17 Ind. 323 ; Ohio & M.

R. Co. V. Tindall, 13 Ind. 366; Boyd v.

Blaisdell, 15 Ind. 73. See also Hammond

V. Town of Muskwa, 40 Wis. 3.54 ; Beau-

dette V. Fond du Lac, 40 id. 44; Hunt v.

Town of Winfield. 36 id. 154; Oliver

by hi wife by reason of a defective side-

walk, and for expenses for medical attendance. In City of Eskridge v. Lewis (1893),
51 Kan. 376, 32 Pac. 1104, "An action
was brought by a married woman again t
a city to recover for personal injuries reulting from a defective sidewalk, aud her
hu band wa joined with her as plaintiff,
ho onght to recover for the loss of servi es of the wife. H eld, that the wife
uffered a loss from the injuries sustained
which wa persoual to herself, and that a
demurrer to the petition because of misjoinder was well taken; but dismissing
the hu band from the case before its submi ~ion cured the error committed in
overruling the demurrer."]
1 [Giffen v City of Lewiston {1898),
Idaho, 55 Pac. 545: Where a husband and
wife ue for personal iujuries received by
the wife, the judgment should run to both.
But the right of acti on for injuries received by a ingle woman who, before
action commen ced, married, is i11 the woman alone, and her husband is not proprly to be joined with her: Kippen v. Olla s u (1902), 136 al. 640, 69 Pac. 293.J
-i Johnson v. Dicken, 25 Mo. 580 ; End r · v. Beck, 28 Iowa, 86. Thi latter
d r:i i n wa made nnder a statute differe11t from that whi h is now in force in
I wa. See al o McFadden v. Santa An a,
1>t . Ry. Co., 87 Cal. 464; Gihson v . Gihon 43 Wi . 23; Barnett v. L e nard, 66
lud. 422. The wife may now ue alone,

in Indiana, .for a per onal tort. A nte,
p. 222 . [See also Lamb v. Harbaugh
( 1895), 105 Cal. 680, 39 Pac. 56 ; Harper
v . Pinkston (1893), 112 N. C. 293, l i S. E .
161 : An action by a hu band for slander
of his wife, the wife not being a party and
the complaint alleging no special damages
to the husband, states no cau. e of action.]
3 Long v. Morrison , 14 Ind. 595, 597;
McKinney v. Western 8tage Co., 4 Iowa,
420. See remark in last preceding note.
Dailey v. Houston, 58 Mo. 361, 366 ;
Smith v. St: Joseph, 55 Mo. 456 , 4 f>8 ;
Rogers v. Smith, 17 Ind. 323 ; Ohio & M.
R. Co. v. Tindall , 13 Ind . 3 66; Boyd v.
Blaisdell, 15 Ind . 73 . See also Hammond
v. Town of Muskwa, 40 Wi s. 354; Beaudette v. Fond du Lac, 40 id . 44 ; Hun t v.
Town of Winfield. 36 id. 154 ; Oliver
' 1·. Town of La Valle. 36 id. 59 2 ; Gibson v.
Gib on , 43 id . 23; .Mee e v. F on<i du Lac.
48 id. 323 ; Barn ett 1-. L eo na rd, 66 Ind.
422 ; Matth ew v. Cent. P ac. R. Co., 63
Cal. 450; •vfann v. H.ic h Hill , 2 Mo .
A pp. 4 97 (join t a ·tiou fo r injuri e to th e
wife 11 ta bar to acti on for inj urie pecial
t o th e hu sband ).
[Bal tim or e, etc. R. R.
Gl enn
( 1902 ), 66 0 . St. 67 2, 64 N. E. 43 : whil e
a wife has a right of action for iujurie
neg li gen tl.v in fl ict d, a husba nd al o ha a
ri g ht of a ti on fo r lu- · of h r rvice and
necessary expen ses iu healiu g h r injurie ,
and her rec very i 110 bar t o hi . .]
4 Long c. Morri on 14 Ind . 595.
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must be joined, although the action might be brought in form ex

contractu. As an example, if the wife has been injured by the

negligence or other wrongful act of a carrier, who was trans-

porting her as a passenger, although the action might be in form

based upon the contract of passage made with her, the injury

being proved in enhancement of damages, or might be in form

directly based upon the tort, yet in either case the very gist of

the claim would be the negligent or tortious act of the defendant,

and the husband and wife must therefore unite as co-plaintiffs

in order to recover the damages resulting from her personal

injuries.-'

§ 157. * 243. Actions for Tort3 to Wife's Person in New^ York

and States having Similar Statutes. In those States whose Stat-

utes have abrogated the ancient principles respecting the marriage

relation, the wife must sue alone in her own name in actions

based upon torts to her own person, as well as in actions concern-

ing her own property, or in those founded upon her contracts.

Cases illustrating this rule as it prevails in New York have

already been given. ^ Similar conclusions have been reached

Generated for facpubupdates (University of Michigan) on 2014-06-17 15:31 GMT / http://hdl.handle.net/2027/uc2.ark:/13960/t02z1c23b
Public Domain / http://www.hathitrust.org/access_use#pd

by the courts of the other States whose legislation is substantially

the same as that of New York.^ Thus it is held in Iowa, under

the existing statutory provisions, that a wife must be the sole

plaintiff in an action instituted to recover damages for a malicious

1 Sheldon v. Steamship " Uncle Sam," the courts of the State. Texas, etc. \\j.

18 Cal. 526; Warner v. The Same, 9 Cal. Co. v. Humble (1899), 97 Fed. (C. C. A.

697. 'Ark.), 837. In Brockett v. Fair Haven,

2 See supra, § *239. etc. K. K. Co. (1900), 73 Conn. 428, 47 Atl.

3 QWilliams I'. Williams (1894), 20 Colo. 763, it was held that the joinder of the

51, 37 Pac. 614: The common law doc- husband in an action for personal injury

trine that the wife, as an inferior, could to the wife, was permissive.

not briiif^ an action for damages against Bains v. Bullock (1895). 129 Mo. 117,

one who wrongfully induces her Imsband 31 S. W. 342 : A deed of land to a hui*-

to abandon iier, does not exist in Colorado, band and wife in fee creates an estate by

The wife has rights equal to her husband entirety and each is entitled to the posses-

mu t

inecl al hono-h the
ion mi 0 h be brought in form e:c
COtlft'actu.
an examr 1 if th wif ha b n injur cl b · tl1e
ne~)i 0 nc or oth r wr n ful act f a arrier
ho a r n.· p rting her a a p
althouo-h the ac ion mi 0 h b in f rm
ba e up n the con tr, t f p age m t de with h r, t he in jury
being pro d in enhancement f d mag
or mi ht b in form
directly b d upon the tort y t in ei h r ca e th v r gi · of
the claim would be the ne lig nt or or iou act of the defen lant
and the hu b nd and wife m u t herefor e u nite a co-plain iffs
in order to recover the damage r sulting fro m her ersonal
injurie . 1
157 . * 243 . Actio n s for Torts t o Wife's Person in New York
an d S t a tes h aving S imilar Statut es.
In tho e tate
ho e tatut ha e abrogated th ancient principl re pecting the marriarr
relation, he wife mu t ·ue alone in her own name in acti n ·
ba ed upon tort to h r own p ·r on as w 11 a in action cone m ing her own proper y or in ho e founded upon her contra ·t..
Ca e illu trating thi' rule a it pre ail m
w York harn
already been gi v n. 2
imilar conclu ion have been r a li ·d
by the court of the other tate
h
legi lation i ub tantially
the ame a that of N w York. 3 Thu it i b ld in I wa . und·r
the exi ti g statutory provi ions, that a wife mu t be th ol
plaintiff in an action in tituted to recover damage for a malici u

in this respect. Citing Foot r. Card, 58 siou of the entire premises as against

heldon v.

Conn. 1 ; Westlake v. Westlake, .34 0. St. third persons. The married women's att

621. Mayor /;. Smith (1900), 111 Ga. 870, has destroyed the legal unity between

36 S. E. 953 : " A married woman living husband and wife which gave rise to the

with her husband may bring an action in estate by entirety, but the estate has not

her own name for physical injuries sua- been abolished. And under this act al-

tained by her. Civil Code, § 2475." lowing a married woman to sue for the

A State statute giving a married wo- possession of her separate property in her

man a right to maintain an action for own name, she may bring ejectment for

personal injuries in her own name, is her estate by entirety without joining lier

applif-able to suits commenced in the fed- husband.]

eral courts as well as to suits brought in

team hip "

1 Cal. 526; Warner v. The

69 .

ncle am,"
ame, 9 Cal.

ee supra, § * 239 .
[ Williams v. William (1 94), 20 Colo.
51, 37 Pac. 614: The common law doctrine that the wife, as an inferi or , could
not bring an a ction for damaP" ' a P"ain t
one who wrongfully induce· h r hu band
to abandon her, do snot exi tin
The wife ha right equal to It r
itiog Fo t 1·. ard, 5
in tbi re pect.
ooo. I ; W ·tlake t•. W e:tlak , ,34
621. Ma_vor1 . mith(I900 ), 111 a. i ,
36 . E. 955: " A married woman ]i,·ing
with her ho ba nd may bri nP" an action in
her own name for phy ical injuri
tain cl by her
ivil ode, 24-7 5."
tatnte gi,·iog a marri tl woA • tat
man
right to maintain an a tion for
p r onal inju r ie in h r own nam . i
appli ahle ti) uit comm enrerl in h f cler l c urt
well a to ;uit bro ught in
3

the cou rt of the tate. Texas, etc. I y.
Co . v . Humble (1 99) 1 97 Fed. ( . C. A.
· A rk.), 37. In Brockett v. F a ir H aveu,
etc. R.R. o. (I 900), 73 onn. 42 , 47 At!.
763, it was held that the joiod r of th
hu band in an action fo r p r nal ~ojury
to the wife wa per mi · ive.
Bain v. Bullock ( 1 95), 129 lo. I Ii,
31 . W . 342 : A deed f la nd t a illl ·
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prosecution of herself; the joinder of her husband is iniprojKT,

since the damages when recovered are her own separate property-,

in which he has no interest or share ; ^ and, on the same prin-

ciple, a suit for a libel upon herself must be brought by the wife

alone. 2

§ 158. * 244. Actions for Torts to "Wife's Property. [In those

states where statutes of the second type exist, a married woman]

may sue alone to recover damages arising from torts and negli-

gences and other wrongs to her own property ; these actions fall

within the language of the codes, and plainly " concern her sepa-

rate property."^ Thus it has been held that the wife may main-

tain a suit in her own name to recover damages for a trespass

to land owned by her, "although her husband occupied the land

in the usual manner with her and their family, and cultivated it,

but had no legal or other rights in it."^ If she can prosecute

a suit for trespass, she can certainly do the same when the injury

is negligent instead of violent and intentional. On -the other

hand, there are circumstances under which an action should be
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maintained by the husband alone, although the wife may have or

seem to have some interest in the subject-matter of the contro-

versy. Thus, in California he must sue alone in actions relating

to the " common property " of the husband and wife, and in those

relating to "homesteads" as the same are defined and regulated

by the statutes of the State. ^ These subjects, however, depend

^ Musselman ;•. Gallif^her, 32 Iowa,

383. [See Williams v. Casebeer (1899),

126 Cal. 77, 58 Par.. 380.^

2 Pancoast v. Burnell, 32 Iowa, 394.

See Shuler v. Millsap's Ex'or, 71 N. C. 297.

In a suit by a married woman for per-

sonal injuries, .she cannot recover for the

loss of her services in the household ; the

husband alone can sue for these. Wyan-

prosecution of herself; the joinder of her hu band i improper,
ince the damages when recovered are her own separate property,
in which he has no interest or hare; 1 and, on the ame principle, a uit for a libel upon herself must be brought by the wife
alone. 2
§ 15 8 . * 2-!4. Actions for Torts to Wife's Property. [In tho e
tates where statute of the second type exist, a married woman J
may ue alone to recover damages arisjng from torts and negligence"' and other wrongs to her own property; these actions fall
within the language of the codes, and plainly "concern her separate property. " 3 Thus it has been held that the wife may maintain a ui t in her own name to recover damages for a trespas
to land owned by her, "although her husband occupied the land
in the usual manner with her and their family, and cultivated it,
but had no legal or other rights in it. ' 4 If she can prosecute
a uit for tre pass, she can certainly do the same when the injury
i negligent in tead of violent and intentional. On· the other
hand, there are circumstances under which an action should be
maintained by the husband alone, although the wife may have or
eem to have some in terest in the subject-matter of the controver y. Th u , in California he must sue alone in actions relating
to the ' common property" of the husband and "TI·ife, and in tho e
relating to "homesteads" as the same are defined and regulated
by the tatutes of the State. 5 These subjects, however, depend

dotte V. Agan, 37 Kan. 528.

3 [Hand v. Scodeletti (1900) 128 Cal.

674, 61 Pac. 373 ; where a married woman

sues for conversion of her separate

property, it is not necessary for her to al-

lege that it is her separate property where

she does not allege in the same count that

she is a married woman.]

* Boos V. Gomber, 24 Wis. 499. [T'rey

V. Stanley (1895) 110 Cal. 423, 42 Pac.

908 : A wife may bring an action to

quiet title in respect of her separate

property even though a homestead has

been declared upon the premises for the

joint benefit of herself and husband, with-

out joining her husband. A wife may sue

alone for the protection of any right she

may have in her separate property, even if

that right be merely that of a joint tenant.

But see Friburk v. Standard Oil Co. (1896),

66 Minn. 277, 68 N. W. 1090, where the

court said : " The fact that a wife is fur-

nishing the dwelling in which tlie family

resides does not change the common-law

rule that the husband is the head of the

family, nor will it give to the wife the

right to recover for damages resulting

from the maintenance of a nuisance."]

5 Barrett i;. Tewksbury, 18 Cal. 334 ;

Guiod V. Guiod, 14 Cal. 506 ; Cook v.

Klink, 8 Cal. 347 ; Poole v. Gerrard, 6 Cal.

71. [But see Anderson t-. Davis (1898), 18

Utah, 200, 55 Pac. 363 : when the legal

1 Musselman v. Gallig her, 32 Iowa,
383. [ ee Williams v. Casebeer {1899),
126 Cal. 77, 58 Pac. 380.J
2 Pancoast v. Burnell, 32 Iowa, 394.
See huler v. Millsap's Ex' or, 71 N. C. 297.
In a suit by a m arried woman fo r personal injurie , she cannot recover fo r the
loss of her services in the household ; the
husband alone can sue for the~e. Wyandotte v. Agan, 37 Kan . 528.
3 [Hand v. Scodeletti ( 1900) 128 Cal.
674, 61 Pac. 373 ; wh ere a married woman
sues for conver ion of her separate
property, it is not necessary fo r her to allege that it is her eparate property where
she does not allege in the same count that
she is a married woman .]
~ Boos v. Gomber, 24 Wis. 499 . [Prey
v. Stanley (1 95) l l O Cal. 423, 42 Pac.
908 : A wife may br in g an action to
quiet title in respect of her separate

property even though a homestead has
been declared upon the premises fo r the
joint benefit of herself and husband, without joining her husband. A wife may ue
alone for the protection of any right , he
may have in her separate property, even if
that rig ht be merely that of a joint tenant. '
But see Friburk v. tandard Oil Co. {I 96),
66 Minn. 277, 68 N. W. 1090, where the
cour t said : "The fact that a wife i furni hiug the dwelling in which the family
resides does not change the common-law
rule that the husbaud is the head of the
family, nor will it give to the wife the
right to recover for damages r esulting
from the maintenance of a nui ance."J
s Barrett v. Tewksbury, 18 Cal. 334;
Guiod v. Guiod, 14 Cal. 506; Cook i•.
Klink, 8 Cal. 347; Poole v. Gerrard, 6 Cal.
71. [But oeAndersoni:.Davis(l89 ),l
Utah, 200, 55 Pac. 363: when the legal
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entirely upon the special provisions of the statutes in the several

commonwealths, and have no proper connection with the general

system of procedure established by the various codes. It seems

that the husband alone can sue for a conversion or loss of or

injury to those articles of personal use belonging to the wife, —

her clothing and ornaments, — which at the common law consti-

tute her par apher7ialia.^

§ 159. * 245. Tort Actions between Husband and Wife. Whether,

under the legislation of the various States, actions for tort can be

maintained by the wife against the husband, or by the husband

against the wife, does not seem to have been definitively settled

by judicial decision. The departure from the ancient theory of

the marriage relation has been as great in New York as in any

other commonwealth, and yet, as has been shown, the courts of

that State have declared against the possibility of actions between

the spouses for any personal torts committed by one upon the

other, such as libels, assault and battery, and the like.^ The

same result would seem to be inevitable under the more restricted

legislation of other States, for their statutes which modify the
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common-law doctrines of marriage are confined in their terms

to her power over her separate property and over contracts.

Actions between husband and wife, based upon torts done to

property, have arisen, but their propriety has not been finally

determined.^ There does not, however, seem to be any real

title to a homestead is in a wife, but the her separate property, be held account-

larger portion of the purchase price was able, in a suitable case, for the violation

paid by the husband, their joint interest in of his trust, but that the mere possession

the preservation of the homestead gives of the property by the husband, uuex-

them the right to join as plaintiffs in an plained, was not such a breach of trust;

action to enjoin its sale.] and remarks : " It is hardly necessary to

^ McCormick »■. Penn. Cent. R. Co., 49 add that, if she had a riglit of action at

N. Y. 302, 317. See also Curtis v. Del., all against her husband, it could only

L. & W. R. Co., 74 N. Y. 116. have been asserted in equity ;" and that

2 See § *240, and notes. the only practical effect of § 49 of the

8 Owen V. Owen, 22 Iowa, 270; David- Kentucky code was to dispense with the

entirely upon the special provision of the statutes in the several
commonweal h , and have no proper connection with the general
y t m of procedur e tabli hed by the variou code . It eems
hat the husband alone can ue for a conver ion or lo s of or
injury to tho e articles of personal u e belonging to the wife, her clothing and ornament , - which at the common law con titute her paraphernalia. 1
§ 159. 2-!5. Tort Actions between Husband and Wife. Whether
under the legislation of the ari u tate , actions for tort can be
maintained by the wife again t the husband, or by the hu band
again t the wife, does not seem to have been definitively settl d
y judicial decision. The d parture from the ancient the r of
th marriage relation ha b n a great in New York as in an
other commonwealth, and yet, as ha been hown, the court of
that tate have declared against the possibility of action betwe n
the spouse · for any per onal torts committed by one upon the
other, such as libel , a .. a ult and battery, and the lik . 2 The
ame r ult would eem to be inevitable under the more re tricted
legi la ti n of other Stat , for their statutes which m dify th
c mmon-law doctrine of marriage are confined in their terms
parate property and over contracts.
to her pow r over her
Action b tween husband and wife, based upon torts done to
property, have arisen, but th ir propriety has not be n finallr
determin d. 3 There does n t, h wever, seem to be any r al

son V. Smith, 20 Iowa, 466. In Matson r. intervention of the next friend ; that it

Matson, 4 .Met. (Ky.) 262, the wife sued conferred no new right of action. See

the husl)and in an ordinary action to also Kalfus r. Kalfus (Ky. 1892), 18 S. W.

recover possession of slaves devised to Rep. 366 : and compare Manning i'. Man-

her as her separate property, which he ning, 79 N. C. 293.

refused to deliver to her, no other ground [^I5ut see Gillespie v. Gillespie (1896),

of relief, legal or eriuitable, being alleged. 64 Minn. 381, 67 N. W. 20, where it i»

In reversing a judgment rendered for the held that a wife may sue her husband in

ydaintiff, Duvall C. J. points out that the her own name, in any form of action, to

husband might, as trustee for the wife of enforce any right affecting her property.

her eparate propert , be held account-able, in a suitable ca e, for the violation
of hi tru t, but that the mere po e ion
of the property hy th hn band, unexplained, wa not uch a breach of tru, t;
and remark. : "It is hardly neces ary to
add that, if he had a right of a tion at
all a ainst her ho ·band it could only
have been a erted in equity;" and that
the on! practi al ffe t of § 49 of th
K ntucky ode wa to di pen with the
intervention of the n xt friend· that it
e

.w.
fan-

h r wn nam , in an f rm of action, tc>
nfor · any ri~ht aff ting h r proµ rty.
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difficulty in principle. If a wife is clothed with full authority

over her own property as though she was unmarried, and if, in

pursuance thereof, she is permitted to invoke the aid of judicial

proceedings in enforcing contracts against her husband, and in

recovering from him the possession of lands and chattels, there

can be no valid ground for refusing to her the power of main-

taining actions against hira for the wrongful taking, detention,

or conversion of her chattels, or for injuries done to her property

by violence or by negligence.^ Both classes of actions depend

upon the same fundamental rights, — the rights of property which

the statute fully confers upon her. If the owner may recover

from her husband the very thing itself — the land or chattel — in

a real action, it is not an enlargement of her power to suffer her

to recover the value of such things wholly or partially in a per-

sonal action. The notion that the proceeding must be equitable is

a remnant of the ancient system which has been abrogated, and

is conceived in forgetfulness of the radical changes made by the

statutes in the common-law theory of the marriage relation. If

the facts constituting the cause of action are stated in the plead-
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ing, it is both unnecessary and improper to call the action equi-

table, since the relief, if granted, is the ordinary pecuniary

judgment against the defendant personally, and not a judgment

in rem against his property.

§ 160. * 246. Desertion by Husband as Affecting "Wife's Capacity

to sue. The desertion of his wife and familj^ by the husband

does not increase her powers and capacities in reference to the

bringing and maintaining of judicial proceedings, unless provi-

sion is made for such an emergency by express statute. Thus,

the same as if she were a stranger. Also 21 S. W. 354 ; although contracts between

Grubbe v. Grubbe (1894), 26 Ore. 363, 38 husband and wife are void at law, thej

Pac. 182. Under Hill'.s Code, § 2870, pro- may be held valid in equity where they

vidiug that either husband or wife, as are fair and just. Snedager v. Kincaid

owner, may sue to recover ])roperty of (1901), Ky., 60 S. W. 522; under Civ.

which the other has secured possession or Code Prac. § 35, the action of an infant

control, either may sue the other at law married woman for divorce and alimony

not only f(-r property wroni^fullv obtained, need not be brought by guardian or next

but on contracts as well. I3ut under friend, but may be brought in her own

identically the same statute the Supreme name.]

Court of Iowa held, in Heacock y. Heacock ' In Wisconsin a husband may main-

(1899), 108 la 540, 79 N. W. 353, that tain " replevin " against his wife for cliat-

a wife cannot sue her husband on his per- tels claimed by her to be her separate

difficulty in principle. If a wife is clothed with full authority
over her own property a though sh wa unmarri d, and if, in
pur uance thereof, he is permitted to inv ke the aid f judi ial
pr ceedings in enforcing contract again t her hu band, and in
recovering from him the po session of land and hatt 1 , th re
can be no valid ground for refusing to her the pow r f maintaining actions against him for the wrongful taking, d tention,
or conver ion of her chattel , or for injuri don to h r prop rty
by violence or by negligence. 1 Both classe of acti n dep nd
upon the same fundamental rights,- the rights of property which
the tatute fully confers upon her. If the owner may recov r
from her husband the very thing itself - the land or chattel - in
a real action, it i not an enlargement of her power to suffer her
to recover the value of such things wholly or partially in a personal action. The notion that the proceeding mu t be equitable i
a remnant of the ancient system which bas been abrogated, and
i conceived in forgetfulness of the radical changes made by the
tatutes in the common-law theory of the marriage relation. If
the facts constituting the cause of action are stated in the pleading, it is both unnecessary and improper to call the action equitable, ince the relief, if granted, is the ordinary pecuniary
judgment against the defendant personally, and not a judgment
in rem against his property.
§ 160. * 2-±6. D esertion by Husband as Affecting Wife's Capacity
t o sue . The desertion of his wife and family by the husband
does not increase her powers and capacities in reference to the
bringing and maintaining of judicial proceeding , unle:ss provision is maJe for such an emergency by express tatute. Thus,

sonal contract Iowa code, § 2904. property ; Carney v. Gleissner, 62 Wis.

Bohannon v. Travis (1893), 94 Ky. 59, 493.

the same as if she were a stranger. Also
Grubbe v. Grubbe (1894) , 26 Ore. 363, 38
Pac. I 2. Under Hill's Code,§ 28i0, providing that either husband or wife, as
owner, may sue to rec.over property of
which the other has secured possession or
ontrol , ei th •r may sue tl1e ot he r at law
not only for property wrongfully obtained,
hnt on contractR as well. But under
identira.lly th same tatnte the , upreme
C'ourt of Iowa held, in Heacock v. Heacock
(I 99), 10 1:1 540, 79 N . W . 353 , that
a wif cannot ue her hm:l1ancl on his personal contract Iowa code, § 2'204 .
Bohannon v. Travis (1893) , 9-t. Ky . 59,

21 S . W . 354 : alth ough contracts between

husband and wife are void at law, they
may be held valid in equ ity where they
are fair antl jnst. Snedager v. Kincaid
{1901), Ky ., 60 S. W . 522; under iv.
Code Prac. § 35, the action of an infant
marri ed woman for divor e and alimony
need not be br ught by guardian or next
fri nd, but may be brought in her own
name.]
1 In Wi
on in a hu band may m aintain "r plevin " ag"ain t hi wife for ch attel claimed hy her to be h r
parat
property ; arn y v.
lei ner, 62 vVi •
-1 93.
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after such desertion, the wife cannot maintain an action in her

own name to set aside a conveyance of land alleged to have

been obtained from him by fraud. ^ In several States, however,

the codes contain express provisions, which, in case of desertion

by the husband, permit the wife to prosecute and defend such

actions as he might have done.^

Third : Eqititahle Actions.

§ 161. * 247. Grand Prfticiple Underlying Equity Doctrine.

Scope of Inquiry. The grand principle which underlies the

after uch le ertion he wife cannot maintain an action in h r
on·n name
t a ide a con e ance f Ian 1 all ged to he v
been 1 t~ in d fr m hiru by fraud. 1 In e ral tate , how ver,
the ode contain e:x:pre pr Yl 10n which in ca e of de erti n
by the hu band p rmi the wife t pro ecu e and defend such
action a he might have done . 2

doctrine of equity in relation to parties is, that every judicial

Third : Eqititable A ctio ns.

controversy should, if possible, be ended in one litigation; that

the decree pronounced in the single suit should determine all

rights, interests, and claims, should ascertain and define all

§ 161.

24 7.

Grand

Pdnciple

Underlying

Equity

Doctrine.

conflicting relations, and should forever settle all questions

pertaining to the subject-matter. Since the chancery judges

were not hampered by the legal dogma that one judgment must

be rendered alike for all the plaintiffs and against all the defend-

ants on the record, they were enabled to adopt and enforce such

practical rules as would render this principle operative and
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efficient. In disclosing these rules, and in explaining their

application, I am not confined to decisions made by courts pro-

fessedly' governed by the reformed procedure. The codes, as

has already been shown, have taken the most general doctrines

of equity in relation to parties, have put them into a statutory

form, and have made them applicable without exception to all

actions.^ Whether these doctrines have been entirely incorpo-

1 Green v. Lyndes, 12 Wis. 404. See Wis. 598, 77 N. W. 922, the court .said:

also Barnett i'. Leonard, 66 lud. 422. " It ^ttie Code] was designed to preserve

- See supra, § 152; Andrews v. Run- and make more perfect l)y new forms the

yon,65 Cal. 629 ; Baldwin r. Second Street method for the settlement in one action,

Cable Ry. Co , 77 Cal. 3'JO ; Tobin i'. denominated the civil action, of all the

Galvin, 49 Cal. 34 (the statute does not rights of a party plaintiff, or parties

apply where the wife is merely tenipora- plaintiff united in interest in the subject

rily absent from the husband). ^Browne, thereof, and the rights of adverse parties

Brown (1897), 121 N. C. 8, 27 S. K. 998: both as between them, and between them-

Under the constitution and section 1832 selves, not only as to the subject of the

of the Code, which declares that every action, but the subjects germane thereto,

woman whose husband shall abandon her . . . The system is complete, as said in

shall 1)6 deemed a free trader, a wife KoUoch i\ Scribner, 98 Wis. 104, enabling

Th grand principle which underlie th
doctrine of equity in r lation to parti i , that ev r judi ial
controver y hould, if po ible, be end
in one litigation; tLat
he decree pronoun ed in the ingle uit hould determine all
right
intere t , and claim , hould a certain and define all
and hould fore er settle all que ti 11 •
conflicting relation
pertaining to the ubj ct-matter. Since the chancery jud
were not hampered by the legal dogma that one judgm nt mu ·t
be rendered alike for all the plaintiffs and again t all the def mlant on the record they were enabled to adopt and enf re u ·h
practical rule a would render this principle op rative ancl
efficient. In di 'clo ing the e rules, and in explaining h ir
application I am not onfined to decisions made by cour profe edly governed by the reformed procedure. The cod , a'
ha already been h wn, have taken the most general doctrin ·
of equity in r lation to partie , have put them into a tatut ry
form, and have ma e them applicable without exception to all
action . 3 Whether the e doctrines have been entirely incorp Scope of Inquiry.

1

abandoned by her husband may maintain the court in a single action, by the presen-

an action in tort, in her own name, against tation of i.ssues made up by the complaint.

a third party. ] answer, and reply, to take within its jiiris-

* Qln Gager v. Marsden (1899), 101 diction a single subject or controver.sy,

1 Green v. Lyndes, 12 Wi . 404.
ee
also Barnett u. Leonard, 66 Ind. 422.
~ . ee supra, § 152; Andrew u. Runyon,65 al. 629; Baldwin L'. econd treet
able Ry. Co, 77 Cal. 3 0 ; Tobin u.
Galvin, 49 Cal. 34 (the tatut do
not
apply where the wif i m r ly temporarily ab ent from the hu band). [Br wn u.
Brown (I 97), 121 • . . , 27 . E. 99 :
Tod r th con titution and ection 1 32
of th
ode, which declare that very
woman who, e hu band hall ahaodon h r
hall Ii 1leem d a free tr de r, a wif
liandon 11 by h r hu hand m, y maintain
n a ·tion i 11 tort, iu her own uarn e, a inst
l ircl party.]
a [In ,ager u. Mar den (1 99), 101
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rated into the legal actions under the codes has sometimes been

doubted; it is universally admitted, however, that they are

operative with their full force and ejffect in all equitable actions

which may be brought in accordance with the new procedure.

For the purpose of ascertaining the existing rules which control

the selection of parties in equitable actions, we are not, there-

fore, restricted to those States which have accepted the reform ;

we nlay and must extend our inquiry to England and to other

States of this country wherever equity exists as a separate divi-

sion of the municipal law. 1 shall endeavor, in a very condensed

and summary manner, to give the doctrine of parties plaintiff,

which has been established by courts of equity and in equitable

actions, whether prior or subsequent to the great reform intro-

duced into so many of the States, and the result will express the

law as it now exists in those States.^

§ 162. * 248. Equity Rules more Explicit respecting Defendants

than Plaintiffs. Two Classes of Co-Plaintiffs in Equity. It is im-

possible to lay down with precision many rules in reference to

plaintiffs, because equity does not particularly concern itself
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with determining that such a person shall be a plaintiff, and

such another a defendant, but rather requires in a more general

form that the persons shall be parties, so as to be bound by the

and all parties interested tlierein adverse ested may be before the court, so that the

to the plaintiffs, and all necessary to be relief may be properly adjusted amonj^

before the court for their due protection those entitled, the liabilities properly ap-

and for the determination of the entire portioned, and the incidental or conse-

controversy, includin<^ such matters as quential claims or interests of all may be

may be germane to the primary subject of bound in respect thereto by the sinf^le

the action." decree." See also Castle v. Madison

And in Siever v. Union Pac. Ey. Co. (1902), 11.3 Wis. 346, 89 N. W. 15C,,

(1903), — Neb. — , 93 N. W. 943, the quoted at length in note to p. 183, anip.

court said: "Equitable doctrines with In Tobin v. Portland Mills Co. (!00'2),

rat into the legal action und r the cod ha ometim L en
doubt d; it i univer ally admitt d, howev r, that th y are
op rative with their full fore and eff ct in all quita I a tion ·
, hi h may be brought in accordance with the n w proc dur .
~ r the purpo e of a certaining the exi ting rul s whi h control
the election of parties in equitable action , we are not, therefore, re tricted to tho e tat which have accepted the reform;
we may and must extend our inquiry to England and to other
tate of this country wherever equity exists as a eparate diviion of the municipal law. I shall endeavor, in a very conden ed
and ummary manner, to give the doctrine of partie plaintiff,
which ha been establi hed by courts of equity and in equitable
action , whether prior or ubsequ ent to the great reform introduced into o many of the tate , and the result will_expre the
law a it now exist in those tate . 1
§ 162. * 248. Equity Rules more Explicit respecting Defendants
than Plaintiffs. Two Classes of Co-Plaintiffs in Equity.
It is im0 ·iule to lay do~n with precision many rules in reference to
plaintiff , because equity does not particularly concern it elf
with determining that such a person shall be a plaintiff, and
uch another a defendant, but rather requires in a more general
form that the persons shall be parties, so as to be bound by the

respect to parties and judgments are 41 Ore. 209, 68 Pac. 743, the court said :

•wholly unlike those which prevail at " Courts of law require no more parties t«

common law — different in their funda- an action than those immediately inter-

mental conception, in their practical op- ested in the subject-matter, but in equity

eration, in their adaptability to circum- all persons, including those remotely inter-

stances, and in their results upon the ested therein, may be joined, and are often

rights and duties of litigants. The gov- necessary parties."]

erning motive of equity in the admini.stra- ^ In this subdivision I have drawn very

tion of its remedial system is to grant full largely upon the fourth American edition

relief, and to adjust in one suit the rights of Dauiell's Chancery Pleadings, and the

and duties of all the parties which really learned notes of Mr. Perkins, the Ameri-

grow out of, or are connected with, the can editor, and have closely followed that

subject-matter of that suit. The primary most admirable work,

object is that all persons sufficiently inter-

and all parties interested therein ad verse
to the plaintiffs, and all necessary to be
before the court for their due protection
and for the determination of the entire
controver y, including such matters as
may be germane to the primary subject of
the action ."
And in Siever v. Union Pac. Ry. Co.
(1903), - Neb. - , 93 N. W. 943, the
court said: "Equitable doctrines with
respect to parties and judgment are
wholly unlike those which prevail at
com mon law - different in their fundamental conception, in thei r practical operation, in their adaptability to circumtan e , and in their results upon the
right aurl duties of litigants. The governing motive of equity in the admini t ration of its remed ial ystem i to grant full
relief, and to adjust in one suit the ri ghts
and dutie of all the parti e which reall y
grow out of, or are connected with, the
subj ert· matter of that ·uit. The primary
objec t i that all persons sufficiently inter-

ested may be before the court, o that the
relief may be properly adj11 ted among
those entitled, the liabilitie prope rly apportionerl, and th e in cidental or ro n. Pquential claims or in tere· t. of all mn.y J,,.
bound in re, pect th ereto by the i;ing 1e
decree." ..... ee al o Castle v. !\Iatl i,,01 1
(1902), 113

Wi.

346 , 89 N . W . l 51i,

quoted at len g th in note to p. l 3, a11I<'.
In Tobin i;. Portland 1ill C'o . ( 1902).
41 Ore. 269, 68 Pac. 743, the court aid:
"Court of law requ ire no more part ie. t''
an action than tho. e immediately interested in the ubject-matter, but in equity
all person , including tho e remotely in terested therein, may be joined, and are often
necessary parties."]
l In this subdivision I have drawn very
largely upon the fourth American edition
of Daniell' Chancery Pleading , and th e
learned notes of Mr. Perkins, tb e Ameri can editor, and have closely followed that
most admirable work.
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decree, and is in general satisfied if they are thus brought before

the court either as plaintiffs or as defendants. In other words,

the rules of equity seldom declare that a given person or class of

re an i in g neral . ati. fied if th y are thu brought before
plaintiff or a d f ndant . In other word ,
b c urt i h r

persons must be plaintiffs, but simply declare that such person

or class must he made parties, if not as plaintiffs, then as de-

fendants.^ The result is that the positive rules as announced by

courts and as gathered from a comparison of decisions, are much

more full and explicit in reference to defendants than they are in

reference to plaintiffs. In actual practice, all persons having an

interest in the subject-matter, and therefore either necessary or

proper parties, except the actual plaintiff who institutes and

prosecutes the suit, are generally made defendants, even though

their interests may be concurrent with those of this plaintiff.

Still, different individuals holding different rights may be united

as plaintiffs in equitable actions ; such a joinder is often provided

for by well-settled doctrines, and, although their requirement is

not peremptory, these doctrines must be discussed and fully

stated. The persons that can be made co-plaintiffs in an equity

suit may be roughly separated into two general classes: (1)
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Those whose rights, claims, and interests, as against the defend-

ant, are joint, — not necessarily joint in the strict, technical sense

of the common law, but in a broader and popular sense, — that

is, those whose interests, claims, and rights, whether legal or

equitable, are concurrent, arising out of the same events, having

the same general nature, and entitled to the same sort of relief.

All such persons must be brought before the court as parties, and

naturally they should be plaintiffs, and so the rules primarily

require ; but the requirement is by no means peremptory, and in

many and in even the great majority of instances, the equity

principle is satisfied if all but the one who actually sets the cause

in motion are placed among the defendants. (2) In the second

class are found all those persons who are collaterally interested

in the subject-matter of the controversy ; whose interests and

claims, although antagonistic to the defendant, and to that

extent, therefore, in harmony with those of the real plaintiff, are

still several and distinct in tlu-ir nature, arising from different

' See WilkiijB v. Frv, 1 M<-riv. 244, 262. fprnlants : but in equity the arrangement

f Keys ft al. v. McDermott (1903), — Wis. of parlies is of little importance, and can

— , 9^ N. W. 553, the rnnrt saying : "To \,e regulated by the court at any time, ia

tlii» <iid. they, as well — perhaps more its discretion. "j

properly — miglit h;ivc been made de-

f
uity 1 m declare that a given p ron or cla of
mu ' t b plain iff but simpl declare hat uch per on
partie if not as laintiff · then a deb m
he re ult is bat the po itive rule a announced by
g thered from a compari on of deci i n are much
expli it in referenc t d f ndan than they are in
laintiff . In actual practice all persous having an
ith r nece · ar or
u ject-matter and there£ r
excep the actual plaintiff who in titute and
uit are generally made d fendan , even though
th ir inter
ma be concurrent with tho e of this plaintiff.
till differen in 'viduals h lding different rights may be united
1 in iff in qui.table actions; uch a joinder i often provided
11- ttl d d ctrine , and, although th ir r quirement i
f r y
n t er mp or , th e doctrines mu t be di cussed and fully
ted. Th p r on that can be made c - laintiff in an equity
it m y
r ughly separated into two general classes: (1)
h e wh e right , claim , and intere ts, as against the defendant are j int - not n ce sarily joint in the strict, technical sen e
th
mm n law but in a broader and popular sense, -that
h e ' ho intere ts, claim , and rights, whether legal or
ui ta le are c ncurrent, ari ing out of the same event , ha ing
general nature, and entitled to the same sort f r li £.
r n mu t be br ught before the court a' par ie and
hey houl be plaintiff , and
the rules primarily
qu ir · u he requirement i by no mean peremptory, and in
d in ven t 1 great majority f in tance , the equity
ati fi if all ut th one who actually et the cau e
r pl ced am ng h d fen ant . (2 In the ec nd
f un all h
r n who are 11 rally int re t d
the contr er y · wh e int r
and
l ject - at r
l 1 u h nt
ni tic to the
f n nt, an
ha
r
wi h th
f th r al 1 inti.ff

th r l

importanc , and an
ourt at any time, io

PLAI TIFF

IN EQUITABLE A TWN .

237

PLAINTIFFS IN EQUITABLE ACTIONS. 237

facts and circumstances, and demanding perhaps a different re-

lief. Although the individuals or the class which have been

thus vaguely described may be joined as co-plaintiffs with the

one who is the chief actor in the suit, and although the rules

speak of such a joinder as possible, yet in actual practice they

are almost invariably placed among the defendants. With this

preliminary explanation, which modifies the entire doctrine of

equity in relation to plaintiffs, I shall proceed to state the gen-

eral principles which underlie the whole equitable system of

parties, and to illustrate the working of these principles in the

more important species and varieties of actions by which equitable

remedies are conferred.

§ 163. * 249. Statement of Fundamental Principle and •wrhat it

assumes. Special Subject of Inquiry Stated. The fundamental

principle maybe stated as follows : The plaintiff who institutes

an equitable action must bring before the court all those persons

who have such relations to the subject-matter of the controversy

that, in order to prevent further litigation by them, they must be

included in and bound by the present decree; in other words,
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all those persons who are so related to the controversy and its

subject-matter, that, unless thus concluded by the decree, they

might s"et up some future claim, and commence some future

litigation growing out of or connected with the same subject-

matter, against the defendant who is prosecuted in the present

suit, and from whom the relief therein is actually obtained. The

principle as thus expressed assumes, what is always true in prac-

tice, that in every equitable action there is some person, or group

of persons, like a firm or joint tenants, who primarily institutes

the proceeding, and demands the relief for his own benefit; and

him, or them, we may designate " the plaintiff ; " and there is

also some person or group of persons against whom all the real

demands are made, and from whom the substantial remedy sought

b}' the action is asked, — and him we denominate " the defend-

ant." In addition to these two contestants, there are the other

individuals described in the foregoing proposition, who must also

be brought before the court and made parties to the controversy

either as co-plaintiffs or as co-defendants. Equity is satisfied

in most instances by making them co-defendants, and they are

generally so treated in actual practice, unless their interests are

so identical with those of the plaintiff that they must participate

facts and circumstance , and demanding p rha a different r lief. Although the individuals or the cla' which hav b en
thus vaguely de cribed may be joined as co-plaintiff with the
one who is the chief actor in the suit, and although th rules
peak of such a joinder as possible, yet in actual practice they
are almost invariably placed among the defendant . With this
preliminary explanation, which modifies the entire doctrine of
equity in relation to plaintiffs, I shall proceed to state the general principles which underlie the whole equitable sy tern of
parties, and to illustrate the working of these principles in the
more important species and varieties of actions by which equitable
remedies are conferred.
§ 163. * 249. Statement of Fundamental Principle and what it
assumes.
Special Subject of Inquiry Stated.
The fundamental
principle may be stated- as follows: The plaintiff who institutes
an equitable action must bring before the court all those persons
who have such relations to the subject-matter of the controversy
that, in order to prevent further litigation by them, they must be
included in and bound by the present decree; in other words,
all those persons who are so related to the controversy and its
ubject-matter, that, unless thus concluded by the decree, they
might i:rnt up some future claim, an~ commence some future
litigation growing out of or connected with the same subjectmatter, against the defendant who is prosecuted in the present
suit, and from whom the relief therein is actually obtained. The
principle as thus express.e d assumes, what is always true in practice, that in every equitable action there is some person, or group
of persons, like a firm or joint tenants, who primarily institutes
the proceeding, and demands the relief for hi own benefit; and
him, or them, we may designate "the plaintiff;" and there is
also son1e person or group of persons against whom all the real
demands are made, and from whom the substantial remedy sought
by the action is asked, - and him we denominate "the defendant." In addition to these two contestants, there are the other
individuals described in the foregoing proposition, who must also
be brought before the court and made parties to the controversy
either · as co-plaintiff or as co-defendants. Equity is satisfied
in most instances by making them co-defendants, and they are
generally so treated in actual practice, unless their intere ts arc
so identical with those of the plaintiff that they must participate
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in the substantial relief awarded by the decree. The special

subject of our present inquiry- may therefore be stated thus: In

what cases and under what circumstances are such persons

primarily and naturally to be associated as co-plaintitfs rather

than as co-defendants ? The answer to this question embodies

the principle in its most general form which equity courts have

applied in all species of actions to determine the proper joinder

of plaintiffs. All those persons whose rights and interests in the

subject-matter, and in the relief demanded, are concurrent with

the plaintiffs, must be made parties, and naturally wall be made

co-plaintiffs, although it is sufficient in most instances if they

are brought into the cause as co-defendants. The principle in

this very general form is too vague to be of any value as a prac-

tical rule, and I shall therefore take up in order the most impor-

tant classes of cases in which it is applied.^

§ 164. * 250. Subordinate General Principles herein. Where

Actual Plaintiff holds only Equitable Right or Title, Holder of Legal

Right or Title should be made Co-Plaintiff. The lirst of the sub-
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ordinate general principles into which the foregoing vague

doctrine may be subdivided, is the following: When the actual

plaintiff, as above described, has only an equitable estate,

interest, or primary right in the subject-matter of the suit, the

person who holds the legal estate, interest, or right therein,

should be made a party, and primarily a co-plaintiff; for without

such joinder the defendant might be subjected to another litiga-

tion from this legal owner or holder of the legal title, a result

wliich equity strives in every way to prevent.^ One of the most

familiar as well as important illustrations of this general prin-

ciple is the rule which prevails in suits relating to trust property.

When property is held in trust, and an action concerning it is

brought by the beneficiary or person claiming under the trust,

the trustee, or one in whom the legal title is vested, must be

made a co-i)laintiff.^ As, for example, when a mortgage has

' See Jones v. Williams, 31 Ark. 175; Heirs, 9 Rush, 408. See also Weetjin i\

Pfohl v. Simpson, 74 N. Y. 137. Vihbard, 5 Hun, 205 ; Sandford i: Jodrell,

2 1 Dani.ll's, p. 192. 2 Sm. & G. 176; O'Brien v. O'Connell,

•■' 1 Danieirs, p. 193. See Western R. 7 Hun, 228; Holden v. N. Y. & Erie Bk ,

Co. r. Nolan. 48 N. Y. 513 ; Malin v Malin. 72 N. Y. 286, 297 ; Eldridge v. Putnam, 46

2. Johns. Ch. 238; Fish I'. Howand, 1 Paige, Wi.s. 205 ; Dewey c. Mover, 9 Hun, 473 ;

20; f'aasiday I. Mcl)aniel,8 B. Mon. 519; Fort Stan wix Hk. r. Leggctt, 51 N. Y.

Covington &. Lex. R. Co. v. Bowler's 552; Fox i. Mover, 54 id. 125; Bowdoin
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been given to a trustee in trust for certain beneficiaries, the

trustee and the beneficiaries must unite in a suit to foreclose.^

The principle applies to all cases where the legal title to sue

stands in one, and the beneficial interest in the subject and in

the result is held by another; both must unite as plaintiffs.^

Thus, if a covenant is made with a trustee for the benefit of a

cestui que trusty both must join in an action to compel a specific

performance.^ The case of a simple contract, made by an agent,

when the agency appears on the face of the agreement, or can be

easily established by extrinsic evidence, does not fall Avithin the

operation of this rule, for the principal can sue alone and prove

the agency if it is disputed. If, however, the agency does not

appear in the contract itself, and the principal or person for

whom the agreement is made cannot prove it with ease and cer-

tainty, then the agent may be made a party so as to bind his

interest.* When an agent acts in any transaction on his own

account as well as on account of his principal, so that he has a

beneficial interest in the subject-matter, he must be made a co-

plaintiff with his principal.^
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§ 165. * 251. Case of Suits by Assignees. Change Effected by-

Codes. The case of suits brought by the assignees of things in

action is another special example of this general principle.

College V. Merritt, 54 Fed. Rep. 55 (suit the terms of a trust, the party or parties

to remove cloud from title to trust prop- beneficially interested may maintain an

erty ; cestuis que trustent may bring suit action in their own right to enforce the

if the trustees neglect to sue, making the trust, and to obtain the benefit thereof."

latter defendants) ; Sawtelle v. Ripley Same rule announced in Zimmerman v.

(Wis. 1893), 55 N. W. 156 (action to con- Makepeace (1899), 152 Ind. 199, 52 N. E.

strue trust in a will ; the trustee named 992.]

therein is a necessary party). ^ story Eq. PI. § 209 ; Cope r. Parry,

1 Story Eq. PI. §§ 201, 209 ; Wood v. 2 Jac. & Walk. 53S. See McCotter v.

Williams, 4 Mad. 86 ; Ilichens v. Kelly, Lawrence, 6 N. Y. Sup. Ct. 392, 395.

been given to a trust in tru t for certain en ficiari
th
trustee an<l the b n ficiari mu t unit m a uit to for clo 1
The principle applie to all cases where th 1 gal title to sue
stands in one, and th beneficial interest in the uLject and in
the re ult is h eld by another; both must unite as plaintiff . 2
Thus, if a covenant is made with a tru tee f r the benefit of a
cestu,i q_ue trust, both mu. t join in an action to compel a pecific
performance.a The case of a simple contract, made by an agent,
when the agency appears on the face of the agreement, or can be
easily established by extrinsic evidence, does not fall within the
operation of this rule, for the principal can sue alone and prove
the agency if it is disputed. If, however, the agency doe8 not
appear in the con tract itself, and the principal or person for
whom the agreement is made cannot prove it with ease and certainty, then the agent may be made a party so as to bind his
interest. 4 When an agent acts in any transaction on his own
account as well as on account of his principal, so that he has a
beneficial interest in the subject-matter, he must be made a coplain tiff with his principal. 5
§ 165. * 251. Case of Suits by Assignees. Change Effected by
Codes.
The case of suits brought by the assignees of things in
action is another special example of this general principle.

2 Sm. & G. 264 ; Boyd v. Jones, 44 Ark. * 1 Daniell's, p. 196 ; Botsford v. Burr,

314 ; Tyson v. Applegate, 40 N. J. Eq. 305 ; 2 Johns. Ch. 409 ; Bartlett v. Pickersgill,

Applegate v. Tyson, 39 N. J. Ei] 365; 1 Cox, 15. It should be remembered that

Harlow v. Mister, 64 Miss. 23; Wolff u. when a contract- is made by an agent in

Ward, 104 Mo. 127. his own name expressly for the benefit of

2 [^But see Cape v. Plymouth Congre- another, he i.s, according to the codes, a

gational Church (1903), 117 Wis. 150, 93 trustee of an express trust, and may sue

N. W. 449, where it was held that a cestui upon it in his own name, without joining

que trust, entitled to pos.session of real the beneficiary as a party. To this extent

estate, may, witliout the trustees, maintain tlie new procedure has modified the rule

an action to enjoin interference witli its which prevailed in equity, and which

rights. And in Goble v. Swobe (1902), required tliat both persons should join

— Neb. — , 90 N. W. 919, the coui;t said : in bringing the action.

" Where a trustee refuses to carry out ^ Small v. Attwood, 1 Younge, 407.

College v. Merritt, 54 Fed. Rep. 55 (suit
to remove cloud from title to trust property; cestuis que trustent may bring suit
if the trustees neglect to sue, making the
latter defendants) ; Sawtelle v. Ripley
(Wis. 1893), 55 N. W. 156 (action to construe trust in a will; the trustee named
therein is a necessary party).
I Story' Eq. Pl. §§ 201, 209; Wood v.
Williams, 4 Mad. 86 ; Hichens v. Kelly,
2 Sm. & G. 264; Boyd v. Jones, 44 Ark.
314: Tyson v. Applegate, 40 N. J . Eq. 305;
Applegate v. Tyson, 39 N. J . Eq . 365 ;
Harlow v. Mister, 64 Miss. 25 ; Wolff v.
Ward, 104 l\fo. 127.
2 [But see Cape 1·. Plymouth Congregational Church ( 1903 ), 117 Wis. 150, 9.'3
N. W. 449, where it \vas held that a cestui
que trust, entitled to po se ion of real
estate, may, without the tru tees, maintain
an action to enjoin interference with its
rights. And in Goble v. wobe (1902),
- Neb. -, 90 N. W. 919, the coui;t said :
" Where a trustee refuses t o carry out

the terms of a trust, the party or parties
beneficially interested may maintain an
action in their own right to enforce the
trust, and to obtain the benefit thereof."
Same rule annonnced in Zimmerman v.
Makepeace (1899), 152 Ind. 199, 52 N. E.
992.J
3 Story Eq. Pl. § 209; Cope t•. Parry,
2 Jae. & Walk. 53 . See McCotter v.
Lawrence, 6 N. Y. Sup. Ct. 392, 395.
4 1 Daniell':>, p. 196 ; Bot ford v. Burr,
2 Johns. Ch. 409; Bartlett v. Pickersgill,
1 Cox, 15 . It should be remembered that
when a contract· is made by an agent in
his own name ex pres ly for the benefit of
another, he is, according to the code , a
tru stee of an expre trust, and may sue
upon it in his own name, without joining
the beneficiary as a party. To thi extent
th e new procedure ha modified the rule
whi ch prevailed in equity, and whi ch
required that both persons should join
in bringing the action.
5 Small v. Attwood, l Younge, 407.
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Where a legal thing in action had been assigned, the assignee

was permitted to sue in equity for its enforcement in his own

name, but the assignor, or his personal representative if he was

dead, was an indispensable party, if not as a co-plaintiff, then as

a defendant; otherwise the debtor might be subjected to a second

action at law in the name of the assignor.^ This particular rule,

however, as has been shown in the preceding sections of the

present chapter, has been entirely abrogated in most of the States

that have adopted the new procedure, since their codes expressly

permit the assignee to sue alone without joining the assignor

either as a co-plaintiff or as a defendant; but it is substantially

retained by the codes of Kentucky and of Indiana.

§ 166. * 252. Case of Suita for Administration of Decedents'

Estates. In ordinary suits for the administration of the estates of

deceased persons brought by creditors, legatees, or distributees,

a general personal representative of the estate — an administrator

or executor — is indispensable, and is a necessary party, and

should properly be made a co-plaintiff, although he may be

put with the defendants. ^ These ordinary administration suits,
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which are the common means in England of winding up and

settling the estates of decedents, are practically unknown in this

country. It is only under some exceptional circumstances that

the equity jurisdiction is with us invoked, not to supersede the

action of the probate courts, but to aid it, when if left to itself it

would fail to afford complete relief and to do complete justice.

Whenever such exceptional circumstances exist, and by reason

of fraud, collusion, or other similar cause on the part of the

executor or administrator, a creditor, or legatee, or distributee

of an estate, may and does bring an action on behalf of the estate,

even in such a case the personal representative — the adminis-

1 1 Daniell's, pp. 197-200, and cases 2 i Darnell's, p. 201; Penny v. Watts,

there citeil. Where an equitable thing in 2 Phil. 149, 153; Donald v. Bather, 16

action, or an equitable interest, was as- Beav. 26; Croft v. Waterton, 13 Sim.

signed, the nssignee could sue alone, since 653. For illustrations of suits -by ad-

there was no possible danger of an action raiui.strators, heirs, etc., see Marsh v.

at Uw by the assignor. Fad wick y. Piatt, Waupaca Cy. Sup., 38 Wis. 250 ; Jones

11 Beav. 503; Bagshaw r. Ertstern Union ,-. Billstein, 28 id. 221 ; Chipman v Mont-

R. Co, 7 Hare, lU; Blake r. Jones, 3 gomery, 63 N. Y. 221; Allison i-. Robin-

Anst. 651. There is no difference, under son, 78 N. C. 222 ; Harris v. Bryant, 83 id.

the codes generally, between the assign- 568.

ment of a legal and of an equitable thing

in action in re»[)ect to the parties.

h re

1 g 1 hing in action had been assigne , the assignee
t
ue in equity for it enforcement in his own
ignor, or hi per onal repre entative if he was
an indi n able part , if not a a co-plaintiff, then a
n · nt · th rwi e the debtor might be subje ted to a second
n t 1 win the name of the assignor. 1 This p rticular rule,
we er,
ha be n hown in the preceding ections of the
r ' ent ch pter, ha been entirely abrogated in mo t of the States
th· t
e ado ted the new procedure, since their codes expressly
permit he a ignee to sue alone without joining the assignor
i her a a co-pl in tiff or as a defendant; but it is substantially
ined y the codes of Kentucky an of Indiana.
166. * 252. Case of Suits for Administration of Decedents'
Est ates.
In ordinary suits for th administration of the estates of
decea ed per on brought by creditor , legatees, or distributees,
a general per anal repre entative of the estate - an administrator
r executor - is indispen able, and is a necessary party, and
hould properly be made a co-plaintiff, although he may be
u t with the efendant . 2 The e ordinary administration suits,
wl ich are the common means in Ez:iglaud of winding up and
·e tlinO' the e tate of decedents, are practically unknown in this
c untry. It i only under some exceptional circumstanc s that
t h equity juri iction is with us invoked, not to super de the
ction of the probate court , but to aid it, when if left to it elf it
would fail to affor complete relief and t do complete justice.
Whene er uch exceptional circum tances exi t, and by reason
of frau , collu ion, or other imilar cau e on the part of the
executor or adrnini trator, a creditor, or legatee, or di tributee
of a e t t , may an do
ring an a.cti n on b half f the e tate,
ev n in uch a ca th per onal r re ent tive - the admini 2

1 Dani ell', p. 201; Penny v. Watts,

2 Phil. 149, 153;
onald v. Bather, 16
Beav. 26; Croft v. Water ton, 13 im .
653 . F or illu tration of suit ·by adrnini trator. , 11eir , tc., ee Mar h 1:.
W a upa a y . up., 3 Wi . 250; Jones
r; .
ill t in , 2 irl. 221 ; hipman v Montgomery, 63 N. Y. 221 ; Alli n v. obin-

o, 7
56 .

. C. 222; Harris v. Bryant, 83 id.
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trator or executor — is a necessary part}- ; if he is not united as a

co-plaintiff, he must be added as a defendant. ^

§ 167. * 253. Rule Applicable to Persons Having Legal Demands

Arising out of Same Subject-Matter. In all the foregoing in-

stances the rule has been applied to the holders of a legal and of

an equitable estate or interest in the subject-matter; it extends

also to all persons having legal demands against the defendant

arising out of the same subject-matter or event. Thus, where a

lease has been assigned by the lessee, both the lessor and the

lessee may each sue the assignee at law for a breach by him of

the covenants. In equity, however, neither is permitted to sue

the assignee without joining the other also, so that the defendant

cannot be subjected to a double action and recovery.^

§ 168. * 254. All Holders of Concurrent Equitable Rights against

the Defendant should be made Co-Plaintiffs. Ill the class of caseS

thus far examined, either an equitable right existed in one person

and a legal right in another, or a legal right was held by all.

The same principle extends to the very numerous class of cases

in which the rights against the defendant arising from the same
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subject-matter or event are all equitable. Whenever, therefore,

in addition to the plaintiff who actually institutes the action,

there are other persons having concurrent equitable rights against

the defendant growing out of the same subject-matter, they should

in general be made parties to the action, primarily no doubt as

co-plaintiffs, but, if not, then as defendants.^ The doctrine thus

stated in general terms has a very wide application, and upon it

^ Attorney General v. Wynne, Mos. Hardy v. Miles, 91 N. C. 131. For a full

126; Wilson v. Moore, 1 My. & K. 126, discussion of the circumstances under

142; Saunders y. Druce, 3 Drew. 140. As which the equity jurisdiction maybe in-

«xamples of such actions, see Fisher v. voked in this country in aid of the probate

Hubbell, 7 Lans. 481, 65 Barb. 74, 1 N. Y. courts, see 3 Pom. Eq. Jur. §§ 1152-1154,

Sup. Ct. 97 ; in which the same person and extended note to § 1154.

was executor of the estates of A. and of ^ I Daniell's, pp. 206, 207 ; Sainstry v.

B., and the plaintiffs, legatees of A., had Grammer, 2 Eq. Cas. Abr. 165 ; London v.

claims which placed them in the position Richmond, 2 Vern 421 ; 1 Bro. P. C. 516.

of creditors to the estate of B. ; and Lan- ^ QSanborn v. People's Ice Co. (1900),

caster v. Gould, 46 Ind. 397, which was 82 Minn. 43, 84 N. W. 641 : In a suit to

trator or executor- is a necessary party; if he is not united as a
<:io-plaintiff, he must be added as a defendant. 1
§ 167. * 253. Rule Applicable to Persons Having Legal Demands
Arising out of Same Subject-Matter.
In all the foregoing instances the rule has been applied to the holder of a legal and of
.an equitable estate or interest in the subject-matter; it extends
also to all persons having legal demands against the defendant
arising out of the same subject-matter or event. Thus, where a
lease has been assigned by the lessee, both the lessor and the
lessee m~y each sue the assignee at law for a breach by him of
the covenants. In equity, however, neither is permitted to sue
the assignee without joining the other also, so that the defendant
cannot be subjected to a double action and recovery. 2
§ 168. * 254. All Holders of Concurrent Equitable Rights against
the Defendant should be made Co-Plaintiffs.
In the class of cases
thus far examined, either an equitable right existed in one person
and a legal right in another, or a legal right was held by all.
The same principle extends to the very numerous class of cases
in which the rights ag'ainst the defendant arising from the same
subject-matter or event are all equitable. Whenever, therefore,
in addition to the plaintiff who actually institutes the action,
there are other persons having concurrent equitable rights against
the defendant growing out of the same subject-matter, they should
in general be made parties to the acti9n, primarily no doubt as
,co-plaintiffs, but, if not, then as defendants. 3 The doctrine thus
.stated in general terms has a very wide application, and upon it

.an action by legatees and next of kin, restrain defendant from cutting and carry-

■against a creditor of the estate and the ing away ice from a lake on which plain-

executor, to set aside a fraudulent allow- tiff is a riparian owner, there is no defect

ance and payment of a claim made by the of parties plaintiff where the plaintiff

executor to the creditor; and Stronach shows himself specially affected by de-

V. Stronach, 20 Wis. 129, 133. See also fendant's acts, on account of his peculiar

Hills V. Sherwood. 48 Cal. 386, 392 ; relations to the water, not shared in com-

Haynes v. Harris, 33 Iowa, 516, 518-520 ; mon by other shore owners.]

IG

1

Attorney General v. Wynne, Mos.

126; Wilson v. Moore, ·1 My. & K. 126,

142; Saunders v. Druce, 3 Drew. 140. As
,examples of such actions, see Fisher v.
Hubbell, 7 Lans. 481, 65 Barb. 74, 1 N. Y.
Sup. Ct. 97 ; in which the same person
was executor of the estates of A. and of
B ., and the plaintiffs, legatees of A., had
claims which placed them in the position
of creditors to the estate of B.; and Lancaster v. Gould, 46 Ind. 397, which was
.an action by legatees and next of kin,
-against a creditor of the estate and the
,executor, to set aside a fraudulent allowance and payment of a claim made by the
executor to the creditor; and Stronach
v . Rtronach. 20 Wi . 129, 133. See also
Hills v. Sherwood. 48 Cal. 386, 392;
Hayues v. Ilarri::i, 33 Iowa, 516, 518-520;

Hardy v. Miles, 91 N. C. 131. For a full
discussion of the circumstances under
which the equity juri dictiou may be invoked in this country in aid of the probate
courts, see 3 Porn. Eq. Jur. §§ 1152-1154,
and extended note to § 1154.
2 I Daniell's, pp. 206, 207; Sainstry v.
Grammer, 2 Eq. Cas. Abr. 165; London v.
Richmond, 2 Vern . 421; I Bro. P. C. 516.
s [Sanborn v. People's Ice Co. ( 1900 ),
82 Minn. 43, 84 N. W. 641 : In a suit to
restrain defendant from cutting and carrying away ice from a lake on whirh plaintiff is a riparian owner, there is no defect
of parties plaintiff where the plaintiff
shows him8elf specially affected by defen<lant's acts , on account of his peculiar
relations to the water, not shared in common by other shore owners.]
16
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is based a very large portion of the special rules as to parties

which prevail in equity. It includes not only those who have

concurrent rights in the whole subject-matter of the suit, but

those also who have similar rights in a part of it, such as joint

tenants, who must all be parties in an action concerning the

property.^ In a suit by joint tenants or tenants in common for

a partition, all must be before the court; but it is not necessary

of course that all should be plaintiffs.^ There have been relaxa-

tions of this general rule. An action by three out of forty-seven

tenants in common, brought to restrain the defendants from

quarrying stone upon the land which was owned in common by

the whole number, has been sustained, notwithstanding an objec-

tion on the ground of the non- joinder was interposed. ^ And

where one tenant in common had leased his share for a long

period of years, the lessee was permitted to maintain a partition

against the other tenants in common, without making the rever-

sioner of his own share — the lessor— a party.* And generally

a tenant for life may institute a partition without bringing in the
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remainder-men.^ When land is held by tenants in common for

1 1 Daniell's, pp. 207, 208; Haycock

I'. Haycock, 2 Ch. Cas. 124; Weston (.-.

Keighley, Finch, 82 ; Stafford v. London,

1 P. Wms. 428 ; 1 Stra. 95. Where there

are two or more trustees, they must all

unite, since their interest is strictly joint,

riiatcher u. Candee, 33 How. Pr. 145

(N. Y. Ct. of App.). In a suit by tenants

CIYIL RDIE IE .
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r · large
rtion of the pecial rules as to parti s
L]' ity.
It inclu
not only tho e who hav
in th whole ubject-ma ter of th e suit, but
h
irnilar ri 0 hts in a part of i , uch a joint
wh mu t all b p rti s in an action concerning thv
I n a uit by joint tenants or tenants in common f
• par i i n 11 mu ~t be before the c ur ; but it i not nece iu·
ure tl at '"11 h uld be plaintiff . 2
h re have been r laxaf thi 0 n ral rule. An ac i n y hr e out of fortyn
in c mmon brought to r estrain th d f ndant fr m
u p n he 1 nd whi h wa · 'i ned in common by
u rr ·in
h "h 1 number ha be n u tain d notwi th tanding an obj cti n n the gr und of he n n-joind r wa interpo ed. 3
nd
wh re ne tenant in c mmon had 1 as cl his share for a Ion
eri of ·ear the les ee wa permitted to maintain a partition
ag in t he o her tenant in common, without making the rever1 r of bis o n hare - the 1
or - a party. 4 And gen rall
enant f r life may in titute a partition without bringin in the
r
ind r-m n. 5 \ h n land j ..., held by t nan ts in omm n for

in common to restrain a nuisance, the

widow of a deceased co-tenant is properly

joined as plaintiff, for the protection of

her dower interest. Shepard v. Man-

hattan Ky. Co., 117 N. Y. 442, 446, 447.

In Woodruff v. No. Bloonifield Gravel

Min. Co., 8 Sawy. 62S, s. c. 15 Fed.

Rep. 25, it was held that one tenant

in common mif^ht bring suit to enjoin

a nuisance affecting the property with-

out joining his co-tenants. And one heir

may bring an action to restrain the dese-

cration of his ancestor's grave, and for

damages, without joining the other heirs.

Mitchell r. Thorne, 57 Hun, 40.'). Where

tenants in cr)mmon of a tract have by

l Daniell' , pp. 207 , 208 ; Haycock
H aycock, 2 Ch. as. 124; W eston v.
eighley, Fin ch, 2; taffo rd v. L ondon,
. Wm . 42 ; l ,'tra. 95. Wh er e there
are two or more tru tee , they mu t all
nnite, ince their in tere t i strictly joint.
That ·her v.
andee, 33 How. P r. 145
( .. Y. Ct. of App.). In a suit by tenant
in ·ommon to re train a nui ance, the
widow of a deceased co-tenant i properly
joined a plaintiff, for the protecti on of
her dower inter t.
hepard v. Mani att n Ry. o., l 17 . Y. 442, 4.i6, 447 .
Io Woodruff v. No. Bloomfield Gravel
1io.
1

separate clccds and at separate times and

places conveyed their interests to a com-

mon vendee, they cannot join in a .suit to

i:iiiccl the deeds, as neither vendor has

an interest in the relief demanded by the

other. Jeffers v. Forbes, 28 Kan. 174,

179, per Brewer J. See ante, § *219, and

notes.

2 Anon., 3 Swanst. 139; Brashear v.

Macey, 3 J. J. Marsh. 93 ; B raker v. Dev-

ereaux, 8 Paige, 513; Borah v. Archers,

7 Dana, 176; Cornish v. Gest, 2 Cox, 27.

In j)artition by a tenant in common, his

wife is not a necessary co-jilaintiff ; she

should be made a party to the action, but

rather as a defendant than as a j)laintiff.

Rosekrans v. White, 7 Lans. 486. The ad-

ministrator of a deceased tenant in com-

mon may, under certain circumstances,

be a proper party, together with liis heirs,

in a partition. Scott v. Guernsey, 60 Barb.

163, 181. See Sullivan v. Sullivan. 4 Hun,

198 (partition).

=' Ackroyd v. Briggs, 14 W. R. 25.

[Hannegan v. Roth (1896), 12 Wash. 695,

uit to DJOIU
pr perty withAnd oue hei r
tr in the de

an interest in the relief demanded by the
oth er. J effer v . Forbe , 28 Kao . 174,
l i9, per Brewer J. S e ante, § *219, and
notes.
2 Anon ., 3 , wanst. 139; Bra hear v.
facey, 3 J. J. Mar h. 93; Braker v. evereaux, 8 Paige, 513; Borah v. Ar h r ,
7 Dana li6; orni h v. Get, 2 ox, 2i.
In partition by a tenant in common hi
wife i · not a neces ary o-plaintiff ; he
bould be made a party to the a iou, but
rath r as a defendant than a a plaiutiff.
Ro ekran lJ . \ bite, 7 Lan . 4 6. Th admini rat r of a decea. ed t naot in
m u m:iy, uud r
rtain ir ·um. t, n
be a proper party, tog ther with hi h ir '.
in a partition.
tt . u rn y,
arb.
163, 1 l.
' e ullivan v. ullivan 4 Ilun,
19 (partition).
3
kroyd v. Brigg , 14 \ . n. 25.
[£fanu g u i'- Roth ( l 96), 12
ah. 95,
4-1 1 ac. 256 : Any or a.Jl of th t nan t. in
ot11rno11 ma~· maintain au action to qui t
title, nud r od ~ 5_9 J
1 Bari11~ t•. Na ·h, J \'" • & B. 551,
IJ '<ton r J>earil n, lG Be:iv. 147.
0 \\'ill.· t
Siad , G ' . -1 '.I": Brn:. y
i-. 'ballll ·rR, 4 Dec;., .\I. & ~. 5:?~.
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life, or when there are future contingent interests which may

finally vest in persons not yet in being, a partition may l)e had

between those who possess the present estates; but it will only

be binding upon the parties who are before the court and those

who are virtually represented by such parties. ^ In an action

brought to determine boundaries, all persons interested, whether

their estates are present or future, remainder-men and rever-

sioners, must be parties, although of course all need not be

plaintiffs. 2 It is not necessary, as a general rule, to make the

actual occupying tenants or lessees parties in suits relating to

real property. They must, however, be parties in special cases

where they are directly interested and their concurrence is

necessary; 2 as, for example, in a partition suit where a tenant

in common has leased his share, and in a suit brought to restrain

an ejectment which was instituted against the tenants themselves

instead of against their lessor.* If, on the other hand, lessees,

or any persons holding limited interests, sue to establish some

general right, that is, some right belonging to or affecting the

whole estate and not merely their own temporary possession and
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user, the ultimate owners of the inheritance must also be made

parties, so that they may be bound by the decree, but the require-

ment will be satisfied by making them defendants.^ Thus, where

a lessee brought an action to establish a right of way against a

person who had erected an obstruction, it was held that his lessor

should have been joined as a party to the suit.^

1 Wotten V. Copeland, 7 Johns. Ch. fully extracting coal from the leased

140; Striker v. Mott, 2 Paige, 387,389; premises.]

Woodworth v. Campbell, 5 Paige, 518; ■♦ 1 Daniell's, p. 209; Story Eq. PL

Gaskell v. Gaskell, 6 Sim. 643; Gayle v. § 1.51 ; Lawley v. Walden, 3 Swanst. 142;

Johnston, 80 Ala. 395. Poole v. Marsh, 8 Sim. 528. See Saloy

2 1 Daniell's, p. 209; Story Eq. PL i;. Bloch, 136 U. S. 338.

§ 165; Bayley v. Best, 1 Uuss. & My. » 1 Daniell's, pp. 209, 210.

659; Miller v. Warmington, 1 Jac. & ^ Poore v. Clarke, 2 Atk. 515. [^Co-

Walk. 484; Speer v. Crawter, 2 Meriv. lumhia Water Power Co. v. Electric Co.

410; Attorney General v. Stephens, 1 K. (1894), 43 S. C. 154, 20 S. E. 1002: The

& J. 724; 6 De G., M. & G. Ill; Pope plaintiff was the purchaser of a canal from

V. Melone, 2 A. K. Marsh. 239. the State. Tiie defendant was lessee from

life, or when ~b re are future contingent interests whi h nu y
fmally ve t in p r on not yet in b jng, a parti ti n may be had
between those who po sess the present estat s · but it will only
b binding upon th parti s who ar b f r th court and tlws
who are virtually r pre nted by su h parti " 1 In an action
br ught to determin boundaries, all per onR int r sted, whether
their states are pre ~ent or future, remaind r-m n and rev rioners, must be parties, although of course all need not be
plaintiffs. 2 It is not necessary, as a gen ral rule, to make the
actual occupying tenants or lessees parties in uits relating to
real property. They must, however, be parti s in special cases
where they are directly interested and their concurr nee is
neces ary; 3 as, for example, in a partjtion suit where a tenant
in common has leased his share, and in a suit bronght to restrain
an ejectment which was instituted against the tenants thenrnelves
instead of against their le sor. 4 If, on the other hand, le sees,
or any persons holding limited interests, sue to establish some
general right, that is, some right belonging to or affecting the
whole estate and not merely their own temporary possession and
user, the ultimate owners of the inheritance must also be made
parties, so that they may be bound by the decree, but the requirement will be satisfied by making them defendants. 5 Thus, where
a lessee brought an action to establish a right of way against a
person who had erected an obstruction, it was held that his lessor
should have been joined as a party to the suit. 6

3 [[United Coal Co. v. Canon City Coal the State of 500 horse power of water

Co. (1397), 24 Calo. 116, 48 Pac. 1045: power in said canal, reserved by the State

Where a lessee coal company is under in the sale to plaintiff, the lease providing

contract to pay the lessor company a cer- that defendant should supply the State

tain royalty on every ton of coal mined, as penitentiary with 100 horse power, and

rental for the property, both the companies should have the remainder for its own

may join as plaintiffs in an injunction profit. Defendant erected a steam plant

suit against other parties who are wrong- on the banks of the canal as supplemental

1

Wotten v. Copeland, 7 John . Ch.

140; Striker v. Mott, 2 Paige, 387, 389;
Woodworth v. Campbell, 5 Paige, 518;
Gaskell v. Gaskell, 6 Sim. 643; Gayle v.
Johnston, 80 Ala. 395.
2 I Daniell's, p. 209; 8tory Eq. Pl.
§ 165; Bayley v. Best, 1 Russ. & My.
659; Miller v. Warmington, 1 Jae. &
Walk. 484; Speer v. Crawter, 2 l\1eriv.

410; Attorney General v. Stephens, l K.
& J. 724; 6 De G .. M. & G. 111 ; Pope
v. Melone, 2 A. IC. Marsh. 239.
3 [United Coal Co. v. Canon City Coal
Co. ( I 97), 24 Cu lo. 116, 4 Pac. 1045:
Where a lessee coal company is under
contract to pay the lessor company acertain royalty on every ton of coal mined, as
rental for the property, both the companies
may join as plaintiff in an injunction
suit against other parties who are wrong-

fully extracting coal from the leased
premises.]
4 1 Daniell's, p. 209 ; Story Eq. PL
§ 15 l ; Lawley v. Walden, 3 Swan st. 142;
Poole v. Marsh, 8 Sim. 528. See Saloy
v. Bloch, 136 U. S. 338.
5 I Daniell's, pp. 209, 210.
6 Poore 1'. Clarke, 2 Atk. 515.
[Colum hia Water Power Co. v. Electric Co.
(1894), 43 . C. 15-t, 20 S. E. 1002: The
plaintiff wa the purchaser of a canal from
the State. The defendant wa les ee from
the State of 500 hor e power of water
power in said canal, reserved by the f'tate
in the ale to plaintiff, the lease providing
that defendant hould supply the tate
penitentiar.v with 100 hor e power, antl
should hav the remainder for it. own
profit. Def ndant erected a steam plant
on the banks of the canal as supplemental
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^ 169. * 255. Doctrine extends to Actions relating to Personad

Property. lUuatrations. The doctrine that persons having or

169.

chiiinin>'- a joint interest or estate must unite, extends to actions

which relate to personal property as well as to those which relate

to real property. ^ The following particular instances will illus-

trate this application. If a legacy is given to two jointly, both

must sue for it; but if legacies are given separately, there being

no common interest in any particular one, each legatee may sue

for his own.- Where two or more persons are jointly interested

in the money secured by a mortgage, that is, according to the

law prevailing in this country, when they are joint mortgagees

or joint assignees of a mortgage, they must all unite in a fore-

closure. ^ And it is not even necessary that they should be joint

holders of the debt secured by the mortgage. All persons who

are entitled to share in the proceeds, whether their interest is

joint or in common, or several, must be made co-plaintiffs, or at

least must be brought into the action as defendants.* When,

to its use of the leased water power.
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Plaintiff brought a suit ia equity to en-

join defendant from using the water

power, and also asked for damages for

the erection of the steam plant on plain-

tiff's land. Held, that inasmuch as the

State, being owner of the penitentiary, is

· ~.-5.

Doctrine extends to Actions relating to Personal

Tl d ctrine ha per on having or
cl imi
j int in r t or e ·tate mu t unite ext nd to actions
wl i h rel te to I er anal pr per y a well a t tho e whi ·h relate
r 1 roperty . 1 The f 11 wing particular in ·tance will illu r te thi p lication . If a l ga y i given to two jointly both
mu t u f r it ; but if legaci are i n separat ly there eing
no comm n inter tin any particular one, ach 1 0 atee ma ue
f r hi own . 2 \,Vhere wo or m re p r on. are jointly intere ted
in he mon y cured by a mortgage that is, according to the
l w pre ailing in thi country, when they are joint mortgagee
or j int a i n es of a mortgage, th y mu t all unite in a foren it i not e n neces ary that they hould be joint
clo ure. 3
holder of the d bt ecured by the mortgage. All person who
are en itled to hare in the procee
whether th ir in tere t is
joint or in c mmon, or se eral, must be made co-plaintiffs, or at
least mu t be brought into the ac ion as defendants. 4 When,
Property .

Illustrations .

interested in the use of the water power,

the State is an indispensable party to the

injunction proceedings, but that in the law

action the State is not a necessary party.^

1 1 Daniell's. p 211.

2 Haycock i-. Haycock, 2 Ch. Cas. 124;

n e of the

v. Smith, 39 Wi . 492 (in an action by
a grantor to enforce the grantor's lien,
wh en a portion of the note given for
in talment of the fund have been a ·-

Haghsen v. Cookson, 3 Y. & C. 578.

« Story Eq. PI. § 201 : Stucker v.

Stucker, .3 J. J. Mursh. 301 ; Wing v.

Davis, 7 Greenl. 31 ; Noyes v. Sawyer, 3

Vt. 100 ; WiKxlward v. Wood, 19 Ala. 213 ;

Palmer v. Karl of Carlisle, 1 S. & S. 423 ;

Lort-e V. Morgan, 1 Bro. C. C. 368 ; Stans-

field f. Hobson, 16 Beav. 189. For an e.\-

ample of misjoinder, because there was

no community of interest, see Ferris v.

Dickerson, 47 Ind. 382. See also Thomp-

son V. Smith, 63 N. Y. 301 (a vendor's

lien); Simpson v. Satterlee, 64 id. 6.57,

6 Hun, 30.') (where the holder of a mort-

(^age lia.s a'<8iirned it as collateral security,

he may foreclose, but the assignee must

alw> be joined as a necessary party): see

also Cerf v. Ashley, 68 Cal. 419 ; Church

V. Smith, 39 Wis. 492 (in an action by

a grantor to enforce the grantor's lien,

when a portion of the notes given for

instalments of tlie fund have been as-

signed, the assignees are necessary par-

ties). Mesechaert v. Kennedy, 4 McCrary

C. Ct. 133 (joint owners of bonds must

join in a suit to declare them a lieu on

property). Contra, Swenson v. Moliiie

Plow Co., 14 Kan. 387 (wliere a mortgage

was given to secure two notes, and one of

the notes was assigned, the mortgagee,

and the assignee of the note cannot

maintain a joint action on the notes and

mortgage).

« Story Eq. PI. § 201 ; Goodall r.

Mopley, 45 Ind. 355, 358. In this case a

mortgage had been executed to several

different mortgagees. All but one joined

in a foreclosure, and he was afterwards

e a
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however, the mortgage has been assigned to trustees in trust for

the benefit of creditors, the trustees are the only necessary parties

plaintiff in a foreclosure suit, and the creditors, being represented

b}^ them, need not be joined.^ Actions to foreclose mortgages

upon land, and those to enforce and foreclose the vendor's lien

upon land for the purchase-price thereof, are in all respects

based upon the same principles. The equitable doctrine prevail-

ing in by far the greater part of the States, and which has entirel}^

displaced the legal notion, regards the debt as the essential fact,

and the mortgage as a mere incident thereto. The holder of the

mortgage has therefore no estate in the mortgaged premises.^

Whoever is interested in the debt as one of the creditors is

therefore interested in the mortgage or in the vendor's lien, and,

upon the well-settled rules of equity procedure, all must be made

parties in order to avoid a division of the claim and a multiplicity

of actions.^ In the Western States it is very common, on the

sale of land, for the vendor to take the vendee's notes payable at

successive dates for the price, and either to receive back a mort-

gage given to secure such notes, or to rely upon the equitable
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lien arising from the sale as the security. All the holders of

such notes must join as plaintiffs in an action to foreclose,

whether the security be a mortgage or the mere vendor's lien.*

A note and mortgage having been given to a husband and wife

as security for money of the wife loaned to the mortgagor, and

the husband dying, the wife was held to be the proper party to

sue in her own name, either as the surviving promisee and mort-

gagee, or because the contract concerned her separate estate.^

1 Morley v. Morley, 25 Beav. 253 ; ^ Pettibone v. Edwards, 15 Wis. 95 ;

Thomas v. Dunning, 5 De G. & S. 618; Jenkins v. Smith, 4 Mete. (Ky.) 380;

Knight V. Pocock, 24 Beav. 436. Merritt r. Wells, 18 Ind. 171; Goodall v.

- ^It was held in Sidney Stevens Imple- Mople\', 45 Ind. 355, 358. See, however,

ment Co. i\ South Ogden Laud Co. (1899), Rankin r. Major, 9 Iowa, 297. Upon the

20 Utah, 267, 58 Pac. 843, that since by death of a vendor, it is held, in Kentucky,

the law of Utah trustees in a deed of trust that his heirs must be joined as plaintiffs

are not vested with any title to the prop- in a suit to enforce the lien for purchase-

erty, legal or equitable, they are not money, that the administrator cannot

necessary parties in an action to foreclose maintain the action alone. Anderson v.

the deed of trust.] Sutton, 2 Duv. 480, 486 ; Smith (•. West's

s [[Held iu Casey V. Gibbons (1902), 136 Ex., 5 Litt. 48; Edwards v. Bohannon,

however, the mortgag ha been assigned to truste s in trust for •
the benefit of creditors, the tru tees are th only n c ary parties
plaintiff in a foreclosure suit and the creditor being repr s nted
by them, need n ot be j ined . 1
ctions to for close mortgages
upon land, and those to enforce and for clo ·e th vendor's lien
upon land for the purchase-price there f, ar in all respect ·
based upon the same principles. The equitable doctrine prevailing in by far the greater part of the States, and which has entirely
displaced the legal notion, regards the debt as the essential fact,
and the mortgage as a mere incident thereto. The holder of the
mortgage has therefore no estate in the mortgaged premises. 2
Whoever is interested in the debt as one of the creditors is
therefore interested in the mortgage or in the vendor's lien, and,
upon the well-settled rules of equity procedure, all must be made
parties in order to avoid a division of the claim and a multiplicity
of actions. 3 In the Western States it is very common, on the
sale of land, for the vendor t o take the vendee 's notes payable at
successive dates for the price, and eith er to receive back a mortgage given to secure such not es, or to rely upon the equitable
lien arising from the sale as the security. All the holders of
such notes must join as plaintiffs in an action to foreclose,
whether the security be a mortgage or the mere vendor's lien. 4
A note and mortgage having been giYen to a husband and wife
as security for money of the wife loaned to the mortgagor, and
the husband dying, the wife was held to be the proper party to
sue in her own name, either as the surviving promisee and mortgagee, or because the contract concerned her separate estate. 5

Cal. 368, 68 Pac. 1032, that the plaintiff, 2 Dana, 98; Thornton v. Knox's Execu-

in her individual capacity as distributee of tors, 6 B. Mon. 74 ; Etheridge v. Vernoy,

one half the mortgage, might join with 71 N. C. 184, 185, 187. [[See, however,

herself as executrix representing the other § *340, and cases cited in the note.]

half of the mortgage.] 5 Shockley v. Shockley, 20 Ind. 108.

l Morley v. Morley, 25 13eav. 253 ;
Thomas v. Dunning, 5 De G. & S. 618;
Kllight v. Pocock, 24 Beav. 436.
2 [It was held in Sidney Stevens Implement Co. v. South Ogden Land Co . (1899),
20 Utah, 267 , 58 Pac. 843, that since by
the law of Utah trustees in a deed of trust
are not vested with a ny title to the property, legal or equitable, they are not
necessary parties in an action to foreclo e
the deed of trust.]
s [Held iu Casey v. Gibbons {1902), 136
Cal. 368, 68 Pac. 1032, that the plaintiff,
in her individual capacity a distributee of
one half the mortgage, might join with
herself as executrix repre en ting the other
half of th e mortgage.]

4 Pettibone v. Ed wards, 15 Wis. 95 ;
J enkins v. Smith, 4 Mete. (Ky.) 380;
Merritt v. Wells, 18 Ind. 171 ; Goodall v.
Mopley; 45 In d. 355, 358. See, however,
Rankin t ". Major, 9 Iowa. 297. Upon the
death of a vendor, it i held, in Kentucky,
that hi heirs must he joined as plaintiff
in a uit to enforce the lien for purcha. emoney, that the admini trator cannot
maintain the action alone. Ander on v.
Sutton, 2 Duv. 480, 4 6; mith v. West's
Ex., 5 Litt. 48; Edward v. Bohannon,
2 Dana, 98; Thornton v. Knox's Executors, 6 B. Mon. 74; Etheridge v. Vernoy,
71 ~. C. 184, 1 5, 187 . [See, however,
§ * 340, and case citerl in the note.]
s Shockley v. hockley, 20 Ind. 108.
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§ 170. * 256. Suits to Redeem. The rule which regulates

actions to foreclose prevails also in those brought to redeem.

As all the persons entitled to share in the mortgage debt must

unite in the foreclosure suit, so in a suit to redeem, the mort-

o-atror, and all others who have a common right with him to

redeem, must be made parties; in strict theory they should be

co-plaintififs, but it is sufficient if the one who for his own pur-

poses institutes the action adds the others as defendants.^ Where

a judgment of foreclosure had been obtained on a mortgage, and,

with the authority or knowledge of the mortgagee, the sheriff

.sold the premises in the usual manner, but at a merely nominal

price, it was held, in Indiana, that the mortgagor and the niort-

jrasree micjht unite in an action to set the sale aside, and to

redeem the land from the purchaser, — the mortgagor by virtue

of his ownership, and the mortgagee by virtue of his interest in

having a price produced at the sale large enough to pay his

entire claim. ^ The general doctrine above stated is strictly

enforced in redemption suits of all varieties, the underlying

principle being that a redemption must be complete and total,
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that the creditor shall not be compelled to accept a partial pay-

ment of his claim, or to make a partial surrender of liis securities.

When two tracts of land are mortgaged to the same 'person to

secure the same debt, and they afterwards come into the hands

of different proprietors, one of them cannot be redeemed without

the other; the owners of both the parcels, and all persons in-

terested in them, must be parties to the action, if not all as

plaintiffs, then at least as defendants.^ This joinder of the

persons interested in the two estates is only necessary, however,

while the mortgages are held by the same mortgagee or other

holder. If one of them is assigned, or if by any other means

they come into the hands of different holders, they being on dis-

1 1 Daniell's, pp. 212, 2i;i; Story Kq. liii.[,'sworth, 27 lud. 115; Stringfield v.

V\. § 201 ; Chapman v. Hunt, 1 McCarter, Graff, 22 Iowa, 438.

149; Large v. Van Doren, 1 Mc-Carter. » Story Eq. PI., §§ 182, 287; Palk ?•.

208. See also Haggerson v. Phillii).<, 37 Lord Clinton, 12 Ves. 48; Lord Cliol-

\Vi«. 3C4 (widow of a decea-sed inort- raondeley v. Lord Clinton, 2 Jac. & W. 1,

gagor i.-i not a necessary party) ; Parker 134; Ireson v. Denn, 2 Cox, 42.'); Jones

r. Small, ."iS Ind. 349 (in a suit to redeem v. Smith, 2 Ves. 372. 6 Ves. 229 (n.);

by a griintee, the grantor is not a neces- Watts v. Symes, 1 De G., M. & G.

Bary party) ; Southard v. Sutton, 68 Me. 240; Tassell v. Smith, 2 De G. & J. 713;

57.V ' Vint IV P.adget, 2 De G. & .L 611 ; Sell.y

- Berkshire c.Shullz, 2.5 Ind.523. See i'. Poinfrf.t. 1 .1. & II. 336. 3 De G, F. &

also MeCuUoch's Administrator r. IIol- J. 59 J ; Bailey v. Myrick, 36 Me. 50.

170.
:..-G. Suits to Redeem.
he rule which r gulates
:. etion · to f r cl . prevail · al o i tho e br ught to redeem .
, 11 th person 11 i l <l to h, re ir he mart age debt mu t
l' d em, th
mar in the f r clo ·ure ' Ui t o in a uit
ha e a
mmon right with him to
r deem mu t be made · r i ; in trict theory th y shoul b
but it i sufficient if the one ' ho for his wn purl' 'e' in titut
h action add the th r a· defendants. 1 vVh re
ju CTLll nt of £ re lo ure had been bt ined on a m rtgage, and,
with t , authority or kn ' le lge of the mortgagee, the heriff
. 11 the premi e in the u ual mann r but at a merely n minal
I ric it ' a held in In iana hat the mar gagor and the morto.. 0 e mi 0 ht unite in an action to et the ale a ide, an<l to
re em the 1 nd fr m the purcha. er, - the mortgagor by virtue
of hi' owner hip and the m r ga ee by virtue of his intere in
h rn a price produced at the .:ale large enough to ay his
ntire claim. 2 The general doctrine abov
tated is
ri tl r
1 f rce
in redemption suits of all vari tie , the underlying
principle being that a redemption mu t be complete and total,
'lat th
reditor hall n t be compelled to ace pt a partial paylllPnt of hi ' claim or to make a par ial urr nd r of 1 i
curiti .
\Vhen w tr, ct f land are mor gaged to the ame "per n to
c r
me d bt and they after ard com into the hand
f diff r nt pr prietor , one f th m cannot b re leemed without
tl other; he owner of both he p reel , and 11 p r n. int r :t
in them, mu t be parti t the action if n t all a
I la.inti ' , th n at 1 a t , d fendants . 3 Thi j inder of th
p r · n. intere t in th two
tate i only nece ary h w ' r
whil t e mort a e ar h ld by the am mortgage
r oh r
hold r. If
of hem i · a i n cl r if b any other m an
h hand· f cliff r nt h ld r tl y b ing on di ·tringfi ld

aa

- H1 rk. liir • 1·.• hnllz, 25 Jud . 52.'J.
I C'ullocl1' Adrniui tratur t:. IIul-

t'.
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tinct parcels of land, all connection between them is severed,

and the actions to redeem must be separate.^ If the action to

redeem is brought by an incumbrancer, the same rule applies.

In a suit by an incumbrancer, who seeks to redeem from a prior

incumbrance, the mortgagor or owner of the land subject to the

incumbrances, whatever they may be, is an indispensable party,

although not necessarily a plaintiff. ^ While a second mortgagee,

in an action to redeem, must thus bring in the mortgagor or his

heir or other owner of the land, he may foreclose the mortgagor

and a third mortgagee without joining the first mortgagee as a

party, since his proceeding does not in the least affect the rights

of such first mortgagee, but its effect is merely to put himself in

the place of the mortgagor and of the third mortgagee.^ This

rule may be stated in a more general form. In suits brought to

enforce subsequent claims, intei-ests, or incumbrances, on prop-

erty subject to prior charges which are to be left unaffected, the

holders of such prior liens or interests need not be made parties.*

§ 171. * 257. Suits for Accounting. All Persons interested in

Jbaving an Account Taken, or in its Result, should be made Co-
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Plaintiffs. The general principle that all persons concurrently

interested in the subject-matter of the suit or in its result,

whether that relate to real or to personal property, must be

parties, is invoked and strictly enforced in all species of actions

which are brought to obtain an accounting against the defendant.

The remedy of accounting is multiform, and it is often made the

basis of some further and ulterior relief, such as rescission and

tinct parcel of land, all connection betw n them is severed,
and the actions to redeem must be separate. 1 If the action to
redeem is brought by an incumbrancer, tho same rule applies.
In a uit by an incumbrancer, who seeks to r cl m from a prior
incumbrance, the mortgagor or owner of the land subject to the
incumbrance , whatever they may be, is an indi pensable party,
although not nece sarily a plaintiff. 2 While a second mortgagee,
in an action to redeem, must thus bring in the mortgagor or his
heir or other owner of the land, he ma.y foreclose the mortgagor
and a third mortgagee without joining the first mortgagee as a
party, since his proceeding does not in the least affect the rights
of such first mortgagee, but its effec t is merely to put himself in
the place of the mortgagor and of the third mortgagee. a This
rule may be stated in a more general form. In suits brought to
enforce imbsequent claims, interests, or incumbrances, on property subject to prior charges which are to be left unaffected, the
holders of such prior liens or interests need not be made parties. 4
§ 171. * 257. Suits for Accounting. All Persons interested in

cancellation, redemption, and the like ; but wherever an account-

.having an Account Taken, or in its Result, should be made Co-

ing is sought, either for its own sake or as the preliminary step

to further judicial action, the rules as to parties are controlling.

When several persons are interested in having an account taken,

or in its result, one of them cannot be permitted to institute a

1 Willie V. Lugg, 2 Eden, 78. 371 ; Arnold v. Bainbrigge, 2 De G.,

2 1 Daniell's, p. 214; Story Eq. PI. F. & J. 92; Audsley v. Horn, 26 Beav.

§§84, 186, 195; Thomson v. BaskerviU, 195, I De G., F. & J. 226; Person v.

3 Ch. Rep. 215; Farmer v. Curtis, 2 Sim. Merrick, 5 Wis. 231 ; Wright v. Bundy,

466; Hunter r. Macklew, 5 Hare, 238; 11 Ind. 398. In England, if the plain-

Fell V. Brown, 2 Bro. C. C. 276 ; Palk v. tiff in such an action brings in the prior

Lord Clinton, 12 Ves. 48; Hallock i: mortgagee, he must offer to redeem liis

Smith, 4 Johns. Ch. 649. mortgage. Gordon v. Horsfall, 5 Moore,

s 1 Daniell's, p. 214; Story Eq. PI. 393.

§ 193; Rose v. Page, 2 Sim. 471; Bris- * 1 Daniell's, p. 214; Rose v. Page, 2

foe V. Kenrick, 1 Coop. temp. Cott. Sim. 471 ; Parker f. Fuller, 1 R. & M. C.'jG.

The general principle that all persons concurrently
interested in the subject-matter of the suit or in its result,
whether that relate to real or to personal property, must be
parties, is invoked and strictly enforced in all species of actions
which are brought to obtain an accounting against the defendant.
The remedy of accounting is multiform, and it is often made the
basis of some further and ulterior relief, such as rescission and
cancellation, redemption, and the like; but wherever an accounting is sought, either for its own sake or as the preliminary step
to further judicial action, the rules as to parties are controlling.
When several persons are interested in having an account taken,
or in its result, one of them cannot be permitted to institute a

-Plaintiffs.
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371; Arnold v. Bainbrigge, 2 De G.,
1 Daniell's, p. 2l.+; Story Eq. Pl. F . & J. 92 ; Aud.sley v. Horn, 26 BeaY.
§§ 84, 186, 195 ; Thomson v. Baskervill, 195 , 1 De G. , F. & J. 226: Person v.
3 C h . R ep. 215; Farmer v. Curtis, 2 im. Mer;-ick, 5 Wis. 231; Wright v. Bundy,
466; Hunter v. l\1acklew, 5 Hare, 23 ; l l In d. 398 . In England, if the plainF ell v . Brown, 2 Bro . C. C. 2i 6 ; P alk v. tiff in such an action bring in th e prior
Lord Clinton, 12 Ves. 48; Hallock v. mortgagee, he must offer to red eem his
mortgage. Gordo n v. Horsfall, 5 Moore,
Smith, 4 J ohns. Ch. 649.
s 1 Daniell's, p. 214; Story Eq . Pl. 393 .
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proceeding for that purpose by himself alone and without joining-

the othei-s in some manner, so that they shall be bound by the

decree, for otherwise the defendant would be exposed to as many

actions as theie are persons interested, each brought and main-

tained for the same purpose and upon substantially the same

proofs.^ The actions in which an accounting is necessary are

very numerous, and arise out of external circumstances very

unlike, but, in all of them, the rule as thus stated must be fol-

lowed in the selection of the parties. Thus in a partnership, or

any other like adventure where there is a sharing of profits or

losses, all the persons having shares must be made parties to a

suit brought for an accounting. ^ Under the proper circum-

stances one may sometimes sue on behalf of himself and all the

others interested, and it is not indispensable that the individuals

having concurrent rights should all be joined as plaintiffs in the

action. 2 If, however, one or more of the parties are non-resi-

dents, and beyond the jurisdiction of the court, the rule, under

such circumstances, is sometimes relaxed, and the action is

allowed to proceed with those parties who are within the reach
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of the court and its process. The admission of this exception,

or of similar ones, is not, however, a matter of absolute right; it

depends rather upon the sound discretion of the court regulated

by considerations of equity and justice.* The heirs of a deceased

partner must be parties in an action brought to sell real estate of

the firm in winding up the partnership and paying the firm debts ;

although the land is, for the purpose of paying firm debts, treated

in equity as a personal asset, yet the legal title of the heir must

be divested, and to that end he must be brought in as a party. ^

1 1 Daniell's, p. 216; Petrie r. Petrie, 7 Phila. 594; Wells r. Strange, 5 Ga. 22 ;

Laus. 90. See also Getty c Develin, 70, Mudgett c. Gager, 52 Me. 541.

N. Y. 504 (accounting) ; I'fohl /■. Simpson, * The following cases will show to

74 i<l. 1.37 (action against a fund or a class what extetit, and under what circum-

of persons) ; Eldridge i-. Putnam, 4G Wis. stances, the rule has been relaxed : Story

205 (all the cestuis que trustent must join Eq. PI. § 78; Darwent i\ Walton, 2 Atk.

in an action against the trustee for an ac- 510; Walley v. Walley, 1 Vern.487; Towle

counting) ; Hughes i-. Boone, 81 N. C. 204 v. Pierce, 12 Mete. 329 ; Vo.'se v. Philbrook,

(action for contribution); Hammond t-. 3 Story, 3.35 ; Lawrence r. Rokes, 53 Me.

Pennock, 61 N. Y. 145 (rescission on ac- 110, 116; Fuller y. Benjamin, 23 Me. 255 ;

count of fraud). Drage v. ILirtupp, 28 Ch. D. 414 ; Palmer

2 IreUiu V. Lewes, Finch, 96; MofTat v. Stevens, 100 Mass. 461. See Bowdoiu

V. Farquharson, 2 liro. C. C. 338. College v. Merritt, 54 Fed. Rep. 55.
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very numerou and ari e out of external circum tanc.e
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unlike bu in all of them be rule as thus stated must be follo e in the selection of the parties. Th us in a partner bi p or
ny other like adventure where there is a sharing of rofit or
lo e all the persons having shares must be made parties to a
uit brought for an accounting. 2
Under the proper circumtances one may ometimes sue on behalf of himself and all the
other intere ted and it is not indi pensable that the individuals
ha ing concurrent rights should all be joined as plaintiffs in the
a tion. 3 If, however, one or more of the parties are non-resid n
and beyond the juri die ion of the court, the rule, und r
uch circum tance i sometimes relaxed, and the action i
allo ed o proceed with those parties who are within the reach
f he court and it process. The admission of this exception,
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the firm in winding up the partner hip and paying the firm d bts;
although he land i , for the purpose of paying firm debts, treated
in equity a a per onal a set, yet the legal title of the heir must
e di ted and to that end he mu t be brought in as a party. 6

» Story Eq. PI. § 16C; Good f. Blewitt, '' Piigh v. Currie, 5 Ala. 446; Lnng r.

M Vm. 397 ; Cullen r. Duke of Queens- Waring. 25 Ala. 625; Andrews w. Brown,

bury, 1 Bro. C. C. 101 ; Hills v. Nash, 1 21 Ala. 437.
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On the death of a partner, his personal representative may at

once maintain an action against the survivors for an accounting;

and when there was no real estate held by the firm as a part of

its assets, so that no question can arise as to the title of any

lands, the heirs of. the deceased are neither necessary nor proper

parties to such action.^

§ 172. "' 258. Residuary Legatees, Distributees, and Next of Kin.

Statement of General Rule herein. Another example is found in

the action by a residuary legatee, brought to obtain an account

of his share of the residue ; he must make all persons interested

in the residue parties, even though their interest may be quite

remote and contingent.^ One residuary legatee may sometimes

sue on behalf of all others interested.^ Also in a suit by next of

kin or distributees against the administrator for an account, all

of the next of kin or distributees must be parties, naturally as

plaintiffs, but if not, then as defendants. This is the established

equity rule prior to or independent of any changes made by stat-

utes.* These instances of distributees and residuary legatees

thus given are in fact particular cases of a more general rule in
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reference to actions which have for their object, in whole or in

part, an accounting by the defendant, which may be stated as

follows: When the persons assert the claim to an account as a

portion of a class entitled under a general description, all the

members of that class, or all the individuals included under that

general description, must be before the court ; if not among the

original parties to the suit, they must be brought in before the

final hearing, so that the rights of the entire body can be deter-

1 Cheeseman v. Wiggins, 1 N. Y. Sup. ghan v. Smith, 2 Phil. 301 ; Smith v. Snow,

Ct. 595 3 Mad. 10; Hares v. Stringer, 15 Beav.

2 1 Daniell's, pp. 216, 217; Story Eq. 206; Grace v. Terrington, 1 Coll. 3.

PI. §§ 89, 203, 204; Parsons v. Neville, 3 » Kettle v. Crary, 1 Paige, 417, 419,

Bro. C.C. 365; Cockburn i\ Thompson, 16 420; Ross v. Crary, 1 Paige, 416; Hal-

Ves. 328; Brown v. Hicketts,3 Johns. Ch. lett v. Ilallett, 2 Paige, 15, 19 ; Egberts v.

553; Davoue i-. Fanning, 4 Johns Ch. Woods, 3 Paige, 517.

199; Pritchard v. Hicks, 1 Paige, 270; * 1 Daniell's, pp. 217,218; Story Eq.

Sheppard v. Starke, 3 Munf. 29 ; West v. PI. § 89 ; Hawkins r. Hawkins, 1 Hare, 543,

Randall, 2 Mason, 181, 190-199; Huson 546; Noland y. Turner. 5 J. J. Marsh. 179 ;

V. McKenzie, Dev. Eq. 463 ; Arendell v. West v. Randall, 2 Mason, 181, 190; Kel-

Blackwell, Dev. Eq. 354 ; Bethel v. Wil- lar v. Beelor, 5 Monr. 573 ; Oldham v. Col-

On the death f a partner, hi p r onal representative may a
once maintain an action again t the survivors for an accounting;
and when there was no real e tate held by the firm as a part of
its assets, so that no question can ari ·e as to the title of any
lands, the heirs of. the deceased are neither neces ary nor proper
parties to such action. 1
§ 172. >'ff 258. Residuary Legatees, Distributees, and Next of Kin .
Statement of General Rule herein.
Another example is found in
the action by a residuary legatee, brought t o obtain an account
of his share of the residue; he must make all persons interested
in the residue parties, even though their interest may be quite
remote and contingent. 2 One residuary legatee may sometimes
sue on behalf of all others interested. 3 Also in a suit by next of
kin or distributees against the administrator for an account, all
of the next of kin or distributees must be parties, naturally as
plaintiffs, but if not, then as defendants. This is the established
equity rule prior to or independent of any changes made by statutes. 4 These instances of distributees and resi duary legatees
thus given are in fact particular cases of a more general rule in
reference to actions which have for their object, in whole or in
part, an accounting by the defendant, which may be stated as
follows: When the persons assert the claim to an account as a
portion of a class entitled under a general description, all the
members of that class, or all the individuals included unde.r that
general description, must be before the court; if not among the
original parties to the suit, they must be brought in before the
final bearing, so that the rights of the entire body can be deter-

son, 1 Dev. & Bat. Eq. 610. See Mc- lius. 4 J. J. Mar^h, 50. See Petrie v. Pe-

Arthnr v. Scott, 113 U. S. 340, 395. As trie, 7 Lans. 90; McArthur v. Scott, 113

illustrations of such remote and contin- U.S. 340, 395; Bland y.Fleeman, 29 Fed.

gent interests, see Sherrit u. Birch, 3 Bro. Rep. 669; Richtmyer v. Richtmyer, 50

C C. 229 (Perkins's ed. note) ; Davies i: Barb. 55.

Davies, 11 Eng. L. &. Eq. R. 199; Lena-

1 Cheeseman v. Wigg ins, 1 N. Y . Sup.
Ct. 595.
2 1 Daniell's, pp . 216, 217; Story Eq .
Pl. §§ 89, 203, 20-1 ; Parsons v. Neville, 3
Bro . C. C. 365; Cockburn v. Th ompson, 16
Yes. 328; Brown v. Ri cketts,3 J ohns. Ch.
553; Davoue v. Fanning, 4 Johns. Ch .
199 ; Pritchard v. Hicks , 1 Paige, 270;
Sheppard v. Starke, 3 Munf. 29; West v.
Randall , 2 Mason, 181, 190- 199; Hu son
v. McKenzie, D ev. Eq. 463; .A.rendell v.
Blackwell, Dev. Eq. 354; B ethel v. Wil·
son, I Dev. & Bat. Eq. 610. See lcArthur v. Scott, 11 3 U . S. 340, 395. As
illustrations of ui.:h remote and continge nt interests. see , henit ..:. Birch, 3 Bro.
C C. 229 (Perkins's d. note) ; Davies i-.
D av ie" 11 Bug. L . & Eq. R. 199; Lena-

ghan v . Smith, 2 Phil. 301 ; Smith v. Snow,
3 Mad. IO ; Hares v. Stringer, 15 Beav.
206 ; Grace v. Terrington, l Coll. 3.
s K ettle l'. Crary, I Paige, 417, 419,
420 ; R oss v. Crary, l Paige, 416 ; Hallet t v. Hallett, 2 Paige, 15, 19; Egbert v.
Woods, 3 P aige, 51 7.
4 1 Dauiell 's, pp. 217, 218; Stor y Eq .
Pl.§ 89; Hawkins v. Hawkins, 1 Hare, 543,
546; Noland v. Turner, 5 J . J . Marsh. 179;
West v. Randall, 2 Ma on, 1 1, 190; Rella r v. B eelor, 5 Monr. 573; Oldham i:. Collins, 4 J. J. Mar.sh, 50. See Petri e v. Petrie, 7 Lans. ~O; McArthur v. Scott, 11 3
U. . 340, 395; Bland v. Fleeman, 29 Fed .
Rep. 669; Richtmyer v. Richtmyer, 5()
B arb. 55.
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mined in one decree, and the defendant relieved from the possi-

bility of a multiplicity of actions. Primarily, all these persons

being interested in the account adversely to the defendant, they

should all be made co-plaintiffs; but, as has often been observed,

the rules of equity do not demand this strict distinction between

plaintiffs and defendants, and they are satisfied if all the indi-

viduals, besides the one actually instituting the suit, are placed

among the defendants. It is also often possible, when the class

is numerous, that one should sue on behalf of all the others.

This general rule is most comprehensive in its practical applica-

tion, and must be invoked in a very large number of cases which

have little external resemblance; it was well established both in

England and in this country as a doctrine of equity procedure,

l)ut has of late years been much modified and relaxed in England

by statutes.^

§ 173. * 259. Same Subject. Exceptions. Statement of Dis-

tinction herein referred to. There are some exceptions, however,

to the foregoing rule which requires all persons interested in the

result of an accounting to be made parties. When some of the
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individuals who were originally interested have been abeady

separately accounted with and paid, they need not be made

parties to the suit.^ And when the accounts and shares of the

different persons have been kept entirely separate and distinct

from each other, so that neither one is interested in that of the

others, although all relate to the same adventure or undertaking,

there need be no joinder of all.^ And where persons are each

entitled to a certain fixed portion of an ascertained sum in the

hands of a trustee, each may sue for his own share without

joining his co-beneficiaries.^ The distinction here referred to is

important, and should be stated more fully, as follows: If a

trustee holds a fund which he is bound to distribute to different

beneficiaries in unequal proportions, and the proportionate share

of each has not yet been ascertained, all the persons who are

1 See 1 Daiiiell's, p. 217; Story Eq. PI. De Taatet, Jac. 28-4; Bray v: Fromont,

§ 90. See Lancaster Baptist Cliurch v. 6 Mad. 5.

Presb. Church, 18 B. Mon. 635; Ilutchin- ♦ 1 Daniell's, p. 219; Story Eq. PI.

8on r. Roberts, 67 N. C. 22.3. §§ 207 n, 212; Perry v. Knott, 5 Beav.

2 D'Wolf f. D'Wolf, 4 U. L4.'J0;Branch 2'J3 ; Smith v. Snow, 3 Mad. 10; Hares

V. Booker, 3 Munf. 43; Moore v. Beau- r. Stringor, 15 Beav. 206; Lenaghan v.

champ, 5 Dana, 70. Smith, 2 Phil. 301 ; Hunt v. Peacock,

* Weymouth v. Boyer, 1 Ves. 416; 6 Hare, 301.

Hills V. Na«li, 1 Phil. 5'J4, 597 ; Brown c.

mine in one d cree and be defen ant reli vecl from the po i'liry of · multiplicit · of action . PrimariJ all the person
bein 0 int re"ted in he account adver ely to the defendant, th y
h uld all be mad co-plaintiff ; but as ha of e been b r ed
he rule" of equit
not
m nd this trict i tinction between
plain iff and def ndant an they ar sati fi d if all the indiYi ual be ide th on a tu lly in titutjng the uit, are placed
~ rnong the defend nt . It i al o often po ible when the cla s
i · numerou that one houl sue on behalf of all the other .
Thi" g neral rule i mo t comprehen ive in its practical application a cl mu"t be in oked in a very large number of cases which
ha ·e little external re emblance; it was well establi bed both in
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ri, 212; Perry v. Knott, 5 Beav.
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interested in the distribution are necessary parties to an action

brought to enforce the trust; but where the proportionate share

of each beneficiary has been definitively ascertained by a proceed-

ing binding oh the trustee, each is entitled to demand payment

of the share belonging to himself, and when the payment is with-

held he may maintain a separate action for its recovery. The

liability of the trustee to each is then exactly the same as though

the sum ascertained to belong to him was the only sum which

the trustee had received and had been directed to pay.^ When

a person jointly interested in the account is out of the jurisdic-

tion, the cause has sometimes been allowed to go on without him

as a party. ^

§ 174. * 260. Special Applications of General Principles above

Stated. General Rule. Important Exceptions, I shall now briefly

describe some of the most important special applications of the

foregoing general principles in relation to community and con-

currence of interests. As a result of these principles, it is a

general rule, with but few well-defined exceptions, that trustees

cannot alone maintain actions relating to the trust property, but
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the beneficiaries must also be made parties to the suit in some

form, either as co-plaintiffs with the trustees or as defendants.^

1 Gen. Mut. Ins. Co. v. Benson, 5 Duer, Malin, 2 Johns. Ch. 238 ; Fish v. Howland,

168,176, per Duer J.; Walker v. Paul, 1 Paige, 20; Schenck v. Elliugwood,

Stanton's (Ky.). code, p. 37 ; Hubbard i\ 3 Edw. Ch. 175; Helm v. Hardin, 2 B.

Burrell, 41 Wis. 365. A fund had been Men. 232; Barney v. Spear, 17 Ga. 223;

devised to a trustee for the benefit of the Woodward v. Wood, 19 Ala. 213 ; Kirk v.

superannuated preachers of a certain Clark, Prec. Cha. 275 ; Phillipson v. Gatty,

" conference." It was held that the 6 Hare, 26 ; Brokaw v. Brokaw's Ex., 41

superannuated preachers of that body N. J. Eq. 215 ; Northampton First Nat.

might unite in an action to enforce the Bk. v. Crafts, 145 Mass.. 444 ; Boyd r.

trust for their own benefit and that of Jones, 44 Ark. 314. Where two or more

interested in the di tribution are necessary parties to an action
brought to enforce the tru ·t; but where the proportionate share
of each beneficiary has be n cl finitively ascertained by a proceeding binding Olll the tru tee, each is entitl cl to d mand payment
of the share belonging to himself, and when the payment is withheld he may maintain a separate action for its recovery. The
liability of the tru tee to each is then exactly the same as though
the um ascertained to belong to him was the only sum which
the trustee had received and had been directed to pay. 1 When
a person jointly interested in the account is out of the jurisdiction, the cause has sometimes been allowed to go on without him
as a party. 2
§ 174. * 260. Special Applications of General Principles above
Stated.
General Rule. Important Excepti ons . I shall now briefly
describe some of the most important special applications of the
foregoing general principles in relation to community and concurrence of interests. As a result of these principles, it is a
aeneral rule, with but few well-defined 6xceptions, that trustees
cannot alone maintain actions relating to the trust property, but
the beneficiaries must also be made parties to the sujt in some
form, either as co-plaintiffs with the trustees or as defendants. 3

future persons entitled under it. Lan- trustees have been appointed, they must

caster Bapt. Church v. Presb. Church, 18 all unite in actions brought by them, as

B. Mon. 635. their right is strictly joint ; and this rule

2 Story Eq. PI. §§ 78, 89 ; West ?•. Ran- applies, although some one of them may

dall, 2 Mason, 196 ; Vose r. Philbrook, have attempted, by assignment or other-

3 Story, 335 ; Lawrence v. Kokes, 53 Me. wise, to divest himself of tlie trust.

110; Mudgett r. Gager, 52 Me. 541; Thatcher v. Candee, 33 How. Pr. 145

Drage v. Hartopp, 28 Ch. D. 414 ; Palmer (N. Y. Ct. of App.). And see cases cited

V. Stevens, 100 Mass. 461. supra under § * 250.

3 1 Daniell's, pp. 220-224 ; Story Eq. \J.t was held in Bennett v. Bennett

PL §§ 207, 209; Covington & Lex. R. Co. (1902), — Neb. — , 91 N. W. 409, that in

V. Bowler's Heirs, 9 Bush, 468 ; Western an action by a guardian the ward need not

R. Co. V. Nolan, 48 N. Y. 513; Large u. be joined as plaintiff, under § 32 of the

Van Doren, l' McCarter. 208 ; Stilwell V. code. Becker r. Strooher (1902), 167

McNeely, 1 Green, Ch. 305; Van Doren Mo. 306, 66 S. W. 1083: The court said,

V. Robinson, 1 C. E. Green, 256 ; Malin v. " It is well settled in tliis state that the

1 Gen. M ut. Ins. Co. v. Benson, 5 Duer,
168, 176, per Dner J.; Walker 1:. Paul,
'tanton's (Ky.). code, p. 3i; Hubbard 11.
Burrell, 41 Wis. 365. A fund had been

devised to a trustee for the benefit of the
superannuated preachers of a certain
"conference." It wa held that the
superannuated preachers of that body
might unite in an action to enforce the
trust for their own benefit and that of
future persons entitled under it. Lancaster Bapt. Church v. Presb. Church, 18
B. Mon. 635.
2
tory Eq. Pl.§§ 78, 89; West, ,_ Randall, 2 Mason, 196 ; Vose v. Philbrook,
3 tory, 335; Lawrence v. Rokes, 53 Me.
110; Mudgett i:. Gager, f>2 Me. 541;
Drage v. Hartopp, 28 Ch. D . 414; Palmer
v. tevens, 100 i\1a s. 461.
3 l Daniell"., pp. 220-224; Story Eq.
Pl. §§ 20i, 209; CO\·inoton & Lex. R. Co.
v. Bowler·s Heirs, 9 Bush, 468; 'Vestern
R. Co v. Nolan, 48 N. Y. 513; Large v.
Van Doren, i' l\[cCarter. 20 ; tilwell v.
McNeel v, 1 Green, Ch. 305; Van Doren
v. Robi;son, l C. E. Green, 256; Malin v.

l\lalin, 2 Johns. Ch. 238; Fish v. Howland,
l Paige, 20; Schenck v. Ellingwood,
3 Edw. Ch. l i5 ; Helm v. Hardin, 2 B.
Mon. 232 ; Burney v. Spear, 1 7 Ga. 223 ;
Woodward v. Wood, 19 Ala. 213; Kirk v.
Clark, Pree. Cha. 2i5; Phillipson v. Gutty,
6 Hare, 26; Brokaw v . Brokaw's Ex., 41
N. J . Eq. 215; Northampton :F irst Nat.
Bk. v. Crafts, 145 Mass .. 444 ; Boyd t".
Jones, 44 Ark . 314. V\' here two or more
trustees ha\·e been appointed, they must
all unite in actions brought by them, as
their right is strictly joint; and this rule
applies, although some one of them may
have attemptecl, by a signment or otherwi e, to divest himself of the tru t.
Thatcher v. Candee, 33 How. Pr. 145
( . Y. Ct. of App .). And see ca es cited
supra under § * 250.
[It was held in Bennett v. Bennett
(1902), - Neb.-, 91
. W. 409, that in
an action by a guardian the ward need not
be joined a plaiutiff, under § 32 of the
rode. Becker 1·. Strocher (1902), 167
i\10. 306, 66 S. W. 10 3: The court said,
" It is well settled in this state that the
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The following are simple illustrations of this general doctrine.

Where trustees in trust to sell lands brought an action against

the purchaser at their sale to compel a specific performance of

their contract of purchase, it was held that the cestuis q^ce trustcnt

of the purchase-money must be made parties. ^ Again, where the

trustees of a numerous unincorporated society brought an action

to compel the specific performance of an agreement entered into

by themselves for the benefit of the association, it was held that

the members of the society should be joined, or, if they were too

numerous, then some of them ought to be made co-plaintiffs,

suing as representatives on behalf of the others. ^ There are,

however, as already stated, certain well-defined exceptions to

this general rule requiring trustees and cestuis que trustent to be

joined in suits concerning the trust property, of which the fol-

lowing are the most important: (1) When trustees appointed to

sell lands are expressly authorized by the deed of trust to sell in

their own names, and it is further expressly provided in such

deed that their own receipt of the price shall be a complete dis-

charge to the purchaser, it is settled that they may maintain a
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suit to compel a specific performance against the purchaser with-

out joining the cestuis que trustent with themselves as parties.^

(2) In some special instances, where the interest of the bene-

ficiaries was simply collateral to the rights of the trustee against

the defendant, the trustee has been permitted to sue alone.*

(3) And in suits between the trustees themselves, brought by

one to compel the other to account for and restore trust property

misappropriated by him, the beneficiaries need not be made

parties.^ But if the cestuis que trustent have concurred in the

beneficiary and trostee in a deed of trust selves and all other members of said

executed upon land the subject of parti- church."]

lion, prior to the institution of a suit for '^ See 1 Daniell's, pp. 221, 222, and

that purpose, are proper parties to such cases cited.

suit, but no such rule prevails with re- * As, for example, in Saville v. Tan-

spect to a beneficiary or trustee, in a crcd, I Ves. Sen. 101, 3 Swanst. 141,

mortgage or deed of trust executed after Story Eq. PI. § 221.

a partition suit has been instituted. "J ** Story Eq. I'l. § 21.3; Franco r.

> Calverley v. I'help, 6 Mad. 229. Franco, 3 Ves. 77 ; Bridget v. liames,

2 Douglas V. Ilorsfall, 2 S. & S. 184. 1 Col. 72; May ?•. Selby, 1 Y. & C. 235;

QHeld in Lilly v. Menke (1894). 126 Mo. Horsley v. Fawcett, 11 Beav. .565; Peake

190. 28 S. W.' 643, that where plaintiffs, v. Ledger, 8 Mare, 313, 4 De G. & S. 137 ;

iu behalf of an unincorporated church Baynard r. Woollcy. 20 Beav. 583 ; Allen

irnple illu tr tiou f thi general
ctrine.
tru t t
ell land br ught an action a ain t
t h ir ale t corn el a pe ific p rf rmanc of
it wa hel hat the cestuis que trust nt
made parti . 1 Again, where the
f a numer u unin r rat d soci ty brought an action
cific erforman e f an gr ement ent r d into
1 e f r the b nefit f he a
ia i n, it wa h ,ld that
f the ociet h uld b j ined or if hey w r to
me of th m ought to be made co-plaintiffs,
r entati e n b half f the tb rs. 2 There are,
Ire
tat d
rt in w 11-defined exc ptions to
rule r uiring tru tee and cestuis que trustent to be
j in <l in uit concerning the tru t pr perty of whi h the folare h m t important: 1) -when tru tee appoint
to
n are x r ly au horizecl by the deed of tru t to 11 in
eir \: n nam · and it i forth r expressly pro ided in uch
l that th ir own receipt of the price shall be a compl te disbar e t the purchaser, it is settl d that they may maintain a
uit t
m l a pecific performance against the purchaser withut j ining the cestuis que trustent with themselves as parti 3
In
ial in tances where the interest of the bene- ·
imply collateral to the rights of the trustee against
nt he tru tee has been errnitted to sue alon . 4b ween th tru t s th m lv , brought by
other to a c un t f r nd r tore tru t roperty
y him he b n fi i ri
n ed not b ma e
h cestuis que trustent have concurr d in h

a.ssoriation, bring a suit in partition, the v. Knight, 5 Hare, 272, 277 ; Cunningham

petition should allege th-it plaintiffs as v. Pell. 5 I'aige, C07. But see Chancel-

all other mem hers of

aid

trustees of the church "sue for theni- lor r. Morecrafl, 1 1 Beav. 262. Whcu the

aoi 11' , pp. 221, 222, and
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breach of trust, they must be joined in the suit brought by one

trustee against his co-trustee to repair the fault. ^

§ 175. * 261. Case of Suits by Executors and Administrators,

and Suits by Assignees in Insolvency. Important Exceptions Con-

tinued. (4) The most important exception by far, as well as the

most familiar one, is the case of executors and administrators;

they can always sue alone, without joining the legatees, dis-

tributees, creditors, or other persons interested in the estate, as

parties either plaintiff or defendant. The legal title to the

personalty is so completely vested in the executors and adminis-

trators, that, both in law and in equity, they are considered as

fully representing the rights and interests of all the other persons

who have ultimate claims upon such estate as legatees, distribu-

tees, or creditors. In all actions, therefore, relating to the

«state, they sue alone. This rule is fully established in equity

as well as at law.^ All the acting executors or administrators

must join ; ^ but if a portion only have proved, the others need

not be made parties, although they may not have formally

renounced.* It is not indispensable, however, that all the ex-
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ecutors or administrators should be plaintiffs ; for it is enough in

equity if all the parties are before the court, so that one executor

or administrator may sue as plaintiff, if he make his co-executor

suit by the trustee is merely to recover or though not at all necessary, is not im-

reduce to possession the trust property, proper. Richardson's Administrator v.

and is in no way intended to control the Spencer, 18 B. Mon. 450. An adminis-

administration or disposition of it, or to trator may maintain an action to set aside

affect the right or relation of the cestui que transfers of his intestate in fraud of cred-

trust, the latter is not a necessary party, itors, since he represents the creditors as

Horsley f . Fawcett, 11 Beav. .565; Carey well as the deceased. Cooley v. Brown,

V. Brown, 92 U. S. 172, and cases cited; 30 Iowa, 470, 47.3, 474. And see cases

Hickox V. Elliott, 10 Sawy. 415, s. c. 22 cited supra under § *252.

Ted. Rep. 13, 19, 20; Smith v. Portland. ^ 1 Daniell's, p. 226; Offley v. Jenney,

breach of trust, they must be join d in the suit brought by one
tru t against his co-truste to repair the fault. 1
§ 175. * 261. Case of Suits by Executors and Administrat ors,
and Suits by Assignees in Insolvency.

Important Exceptions Con -

(4) The most important exception by far, as well as th
most familiar one, is the case of executors and administrators;
they can always sue alon , without joining the legate s, distributees, creditors, or other persons interested in the estate, as
parties either plaintiff or defendant. The legal title to the
personalty is so completely vested in the executors and admi nistrators, that, both in law and in equity, they are considered as
fully representing the rights and interests of all the other persons
who have ultimate claims upon such estate as legatees, distributees, or creditors. In all actions, therefore, relating to the
estate, they sue alone. This rule is fully established in equity
as well as at law. 2 All the acting executors or administrators
must join; 3 but if a portion only have proved, the others need
not be made parties, although they may not have formally
renounced. 4 It is not indispensable, however, that all the ex·e cutors or administrators should be plaintiffs; for it is enough in
equity if all the parties are before the court, so that one executor
<>r administrator may sue as plaintiff, if he make his co-executor
tinued.

30 Fed. Rep. 734 (suit to protect the trust 3 Ch. Rep. 92 ; Cramer v. Morton, 2 Mol-

pnjperty by injunction) ; Re Straut's loy, 108.

Estate, 126 N. Y. 201 ; Western R. Co. * Davies ». Williams, I Sim. 5; Dyson

V. Nolan, 48 N. Y. 513. See also ante, v. Morris, I Hare, 413; Rinehart ?;. Rine-

§*178. hart, 2 McCarter, 44; Marsh v. Oliver,

1 Jesse V. Bennett, 6 De G., M. & G. 1 McCarter, 262. But an executor who

€09. has not proved the will n)ay, nevertheless,

2 1 Daniell's, p. 224 ; Jones v. Good- be a necessary defendant in a suit brought

child, 3 P. Wms. 33 ; Peake v. Ledger, to carry its trusts into effect. Ferguson

8 Hare, 313; Smith v. Bolden, 33 Beav. v. Ferguson, 1 Hayes & J. 300; Yates v.

262. It has been held that an adminis- Compton, 2 P. Wms. 308 ; Cramer v.

trator. suing in equity to recover assets of Morton, 2 Moll. 108; Thompson v. Gra-

the estate, may join the distributees as ham, 1 Paige, 384.

co-plaintiffs ; that such uniting of parties.

:suit by the trustee is merely to recover or
reduce to possession the trust property,
and is in no way intended to control the
:administration or disposition of it, or to
.affect the right or relation of the cestui que
t rust, the latter is not a necessary party.
Hor ley v. Fawcett, 11 Beav. 565 ; Carey
v . Brown , 92 U. S. 172, and caRes cited ;
Hickox v. Elliott, 10 Sawy. 415 , s. c. 22
Fed. R ep. 13, 19, 20 ; Smith v. P ortland,
30 Fed. Rep. i3+ (suit to protect the trust
property by injunction) ; R e Straut's
Estate, 126 N. Y. 201 ; Western R. Co.
t'. Nolan, 48 N. Y. 513. See also ante,
§ * ] 78.
1 Je e t". Bennett, 6 De G., M. & G.
~ 09 .

2 l Daniell's, p. 224 ; Jones v. Goodchild, 3 P. Wm s. 33; Peake v. Ledger,
8 Hare, 31.1; mith v. Bolden, 33 Beav.
262. It ha heen held that an atlmin istrat.or, suing in equity to recove r as ets of
the estate, may joi11 the d istributees as
co-plaintiffs; that such uuiting of parties,

though not at all necessary, is not improper. Richardson's Administrator v.
Spencer, 18 B. Mon. 450. An administrator may mainta in an action to set aside
transfers of his intestate in fraud of creditors, since he represents the creditors as
well as the deceased. Cooley 11. Brown,
30 Iowa, 470. 473, 474. And see cases
cited supra un der § * 252 .
~ 1 Dan iell's, p. 226 ; Offley v. J enney,
3 Ch. Rep . ~2; Cramer v. Morton, 2 Molloy, 108.
4 Davies 1J. Willia ms, l Sim. 5; Dyson
v. Morris, 1 Hare, 413; Rillehart v. Rinehart, 2 McCarter , 4+; Marsh v. Oliver,
1 McCarter, 262 . But an executor who
has not proYetl the will may, nevertheless,
be a necessary defendant in a ui t brought
to carry its trust into effect. Ferguson
v. Ferguson, 1 Hayes & J . 300; Yates v.
Compton, 2 P . Wm . 308; Cramer v.
Morton , 2 Moll . 108 ; Thompson v. Graham , 1 Paige, 384.
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or co-administrator a defendant. ^ When a residuary legatee

sues for his share of the residue, all the other residuary legatees

must be joined either as plaintiffs or defendants. ^ And in a

suit for distribution, all the distributees must be brought in as

parties, primarily as plaintiffs, but at all events as defendants.^

Where legacies are charged upon real estate, the executors alone

are not sufficient parties; but all the other legatees must be

brought in, so that the assets may be marshalled, and the re-

spective rights of all may be determined.* (5) Another impor-

tant exception to the rule requiring the union of beneficiaries

and trustees in suits' relating to the trust property is the case of

assignees in trust for creditors, and the assignees in bankruptcy

or insolvency. These particular trustees, as well as executors

and administrators, may always sue and defend alone in such

actions, without joining with themselves the creditors whom they

represent as cestuis que trustent.^ Nor need the assigning debtor,

bankrupt, or insolvent be made a party. ^

§ 176. * 262. General Principle Applicable to those Having

Future and Expectant Interests. Equity Doctrine. Illustrations.
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The principle which requires all persons claiming interests in the

subject-matter concurrent with the plaintiff who instituted the

suit to be made parties, is applicable in general to those having

future and expectant interests, as well as to those whose inter-

ests are present, and whether they are in possession, remainder,

or reversion. It is the established doctrine of equity that when

a person claims an estate, either under a will or a deed by which

or a d f ndant. 1 ..When a re iduary 1 gat e
h r r ~ i dua r l at
of the r idu all h
or d f nd ant . 2 An m a
mu t b brought in a
uit f r
p<trtie' primaril ' a plain iff " but at all ev n s a def ndan .3
here lebacie " are charged upon real e tate th e execu t r alone
ar n t
fficient a.rti · but all h oth r l gatee mu t be
Lr u bt in o that the as et ... ma be mar hall d and tb re·pec tive right of all ma be determin d. 4 ( ) Another important exception o the rule requiring the union of ben ficiarie
and tru tee in ui t rel ting to the tru t proper y i the ca of
a i nee in tru t for reditor , and th e a ignee in bankruptcy
r in ·oh ency. The e particular tru t
a well as executor
, ncl admini trator , may alway sue and d fen d alone in u h
born th
ac ion without joining ith them elve the creditor
5
r pr ent a cestuis que trustent. Nor ne d the a igning ebtor
bankrupt or in olvent be made a par ty. 6
176.

* 262.

G en era l

P rinci p le

A pplicable

to those

Havin g

successive estates or interests have been created, all the other

persons claiming under the same will or deed, down to the one

who is entitled to the first vested estate of inheritance, must be

> Wilkins v. Fry, 1 Meriv. 244, 262 ; v. llallett, 2 Paige, 15; Rowland v. Fish,

Blonnt i\ Burrow, 3 Bro. C. C. 90; Dare 1 Paige, 20; Toild v. Sterrett, 6 J. J.

i: Allen, 1 Green, Ch. 288. Marsh. 432. QIu Youngson i-. Bond

2 1 Daniell's. p. 22.'> ; Harvey v. Harvey, (1902), 64 Neb. 615, 90 N. W. 556, it was

4 Beav. 215, 220; Smart f. Bradstotk, held that an administrator could not bring

7 Beav. 500 ; Bateman v. Margerisou, an action to quiet title, since his right to

6 Hare, 496, 499 ; Doody v. Iliggins, the real estate was ))ossess(>ry only.]

9 Hare, Ap. 32, 38; Gould v. Hayes, 19 ^ 1 Daniell's, p. 224; Spragg r. Binkes,

Ala. 438. .'-, Vf.s. 587. See also .Jewett v. Tucker.

" HiiwkinB V. Craig, 1 B. Mon. 27; 139 Ma.ss. 566 ; Smith v. Jones, 18 Neb.

Osborne i: Taylor. 12 Gratt. 117. But .see 481 ; Warren v. Howard, 99 N. C. 190.

Kcfler 1-. Keeler, 3 Stockn. 458 ; Moore f. « I)e (iolls r. Ward, 3 P. Wms. 311

Gleaton, 23 Ga. 142. (n.) ; Kayc r. Fosbrooke, 8 Sim. 28; Dy-

F uture a n d

E xpectant I n teres ts .

E q ui t y Doct rin e.

Illustrations .

he rinciple which require all persons claiming intere t in the
u ject-matt r concurrent wit h the plaintiff who in tituted t he
ui t to be made par tie , i appli cable in general to tho. e having
future and expectant interest , as well as to tho e who e in tere t are pre ent , and whether they a.re in pos ession, remainder,_
or rever ion. It is the established doctrine of equity that wh n
a person claims an e tate either under a will or a deed by which
ucce ive e tate or intere ts have been created, all the other
person claiming under the same will or deed, down to the one
who is entitled to the fir t e ted e tate of inheritance, must be

* Morse '■. Sadler, 1 Co.\, 352 ; Hallett son c. Hornby, 7 l)e G., M. & G. 1.

1 W ilkin v. F ry, l Meri v. 244, 262 ;
Blount t.'. Burrow, 3 B ro. . C. 90 ; D are
t· Allen, l
reen, h. 2 .
1 Dan iell' . p. 225 ; Har vey v. H arv ey,
4 B , v 215, 220 ; , ·mar t v. Brad tock,
7 BP, " 500 ; Bat ma u 11. ~farg ri . ou,
ll are, -196, 49 ; 1 oo<l.v ''- H igg in ,
' li ar. Ap ..32, 3 ; oul <l v. Haye, 19

,\ 1.1. 43 .
3 I l.1w ·in 1·
raig, J B . :7\Iou . 27 ;
lhoruf'l!r Tnvl<>r, 12 7ratt. 117 . But
I" •1 I r 1. I'r·r·i r , :J, co ·kt.. 45 ; :7\Ioore l'.
lt!at1J11, 2a )a. I i 2.
4
Ior r: 1• •• 'arlle r, I ox, 352 ; Hall t t

v. H all t t 2 P ai ge, 15; H owland v. Fi h,
l I ai g , 20 ; Todd v. , terrett, 6 .T. J .
Mar h. 432. [In Youn <Y 0 11 v. Bond
( 190 2, 64 i b. 615, 90 N. W . 556, it was
beld that a n ad mi ni ·trator ould not brina
an a ti on to qui t itle, . inc hi:' ri ght to
th ' r al e. tate wa. .. po.
ory on J.,·.]
6 1 T an i II ' , p. 224; , pragcr v. Bi nk ,
al i;o .J w tt v. Tu k r,
5 V .. 5 7. ,
139 Mas. . 5G6; , mith i•. Jon , 1 • • b.
4 1 ; \V a rren v. Howard, 99 _' . . 190.
I c <..ioll R 1-. \Yard, 3 P. W m . . 3 11
(n .) ; Kay '" l,o: br oke,
,' im . 2
yon 1-. I1 or11hy, 7 De ., M. & . 1.
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joined in the .action as parties, either as co-plaintiffs or as de-

fendants. To illustrate by a simple example: If, by a deed,

land has been given to A. for years, with remainder to B. for

life, and remainder to C. in fee, and A. is in possession as the

tenant for years, B. cannot alone maintain an action against A.

to restrain tlie commission of waste; but C, the remainder-man

in fee, must also be brought in as a party, naturally as a co-

plaintiff, but if not, then as a defendant, so that he may be

before the court representing the ultimate ownership. All those

entitled to intermediate estates prior to the first vested inherit-

ance must also be joined, so that the entire ownership may be

brought before the court, and may be bound by its decree.^

§ 177. * 263. General Rule in Suits for Specific Performance.

Illustrations. In actions to compel the specific performance of

contracts, the immediate parties to the agreement are, as a

general rule, the only necessary parties to the suit; but this

Includes, of course, those who by substitution become clothed

with the rights or duties of the original contractors, as heirs,

devisees, or sometimes the personal representatives. ^ If a tract
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of land is sold in separate parcels to different purchasers, the

latter cannot unite in an action for a specific performance against

the vendor, since each sale is distinct, and depends upon its own

circumstances. But if there is only one contract of sale to several

persons covering the land in question, although it may have

stipulated for different shares, the purchasers may unite ; it is

not necessary that the vendees should be jointly interested in the

purchase, in the legal import of that term, it is enough if they

have common or concurrent interests in the subject-matter. ^ If

the vendee in a land contract dies, his heirs are the parties to

1 1 Daniell's, pp. 227-330; Story Eq. 5 Eq. 17; Aberaman Iron Works c. Wick-

Pl. § 144; Finch v. Finch, 2 Ves. Sen. ens, L. II. 4 Ch. App. 101; Feuwick v.

492; Molineux I'. Powell, 3 P. Wms. 268 Bulman, L. R. 9 Eq. 165; Daking v.

(n.) ; Herring v. Yoe, 1 Atk. 290; Pyn- Whimper, 26 Beav. 568; Morgan y. Mor-

cent V. Pyucent, 3 Atk. 571; Sohier v. gan, 2 Wheat. 290; Lord v. Underdunck,

Williams, 1 Curtis, 479. 1 Saudf. Ch. 46 ; Hoover v. Donally.

2 1 Daniell's, p. 230 ; Tasker y. Small, 3 Hen. & Man. 316. See McCotter v.

3 My. & Cr. 63, 69 ; Wood v. White, Lawrence, 6 N. Y. Sup. Ct. 392. 395,

4 My. & Cr. 460; Robertson v. Gr. West, and Maire v. Garrison, 83 N. Y. 14, 29.

Ry. Co., 10 Sim 314; Humphreys c. Hoi- \^¥or an interesting case concerning the

lis, Jac. 73 ; Patersoi^ v. Long, 5 Beav. 186 ; que.stiou of parties plaintiff in an actiou of

Peacock v. Peuson, 11 Beav. 355; Petre specific performance, see Daly v. Ruddell

V. Duucomhc, 7 Hare, 24; De Hoghton v. (1902), 137 Cal. 671, 20 Pac. 784.3

joined in the .action as parti , either as co-plaintiffs or as defendants. To illu trate by a simple example: If, by a deed,
land ha been giv n to A. for years, with remaind r to B. for
lif , and remainder to C. in fee, and A. is in pos e ion a the
tenant for years, B. cannot alone maintain an action against A.
to restrain the commission of waste; but C., the remainder-man
in fee, mm;t also be brought in as a party, naturally as a coplaintiff, but if not, then as a defendant, so that he may be
before the court representing the ultimate ownership. All those
entitled to intermediate estates prior to the first vested inheritance must also be joined, so tha.t the entire owner hip may be
brought before the court, and may be bound by its decree. 1
§ 177. * 263. General Rule in Suits for Specific Performance.
Illustrations.
In actions to compel the specific performance of
contracts, the immediate parties to the agreement are, as a
general rule, the only necessary parties to the suit; but this
includes, of course, thot:ie who by substitution become clothed
with the rights or duties of the original contractors, as heirs,
devisees, or sometimes the personal representatives. 2 If a tract
of land is~ sold in separate parcels to different purchasers, the
latter cannot unite in an action for a specific performance against
the vendor, since each sale is distinct, and depends upon its own
circumstances. But if there is only one contract of sale to several
persons covering the land in question, although it may have
stipulated for different shares, the purchasers may unite; it is
not necessary that the yendees should be jointly interested in the
purchase, in the legal import of that term, it is enough if they
have common or concurrent interests in the subject-matter. 3 If
the vendee in a land contract dies, his heirs are the parties to

Money, L. 11. 2 Ch. App. 164, 170; Bishop " Owen v. Frink, 24 CaL 171, 177.

of Winchester v. Mid. Hants Ry. Co., L. R.

I l Daniell's, pp. 227-330; Story Eq.
Pl. § 144; Finch v. Finch, 2 Ves. Sen.
492; Molineux v. Powell, 3 P. Wms. 268
(n.); Herring v. Yoe, 1 Atk. 290; Pyncent v. Pyncent, 3 Atk. Sil; Sohier v.
Williams, l Curtis, 479.
2 1 Daniell's, p. 230; Tasker v. Small,
3 My. & Cr. 63, 69; Wood v. White,
4 My. & Cr. 460; Robertson v. Gr. We t.
Ry. Co., 10 Sim 314; Humphreys v. Hollis, Jae. 73; PaterSOljl v. Long, 5 Beav. 186;
Peacock v. Penson, 11 Beav. 355; Petre
v. Duncombe, 7 Hare, 24; De Hoghton v.
Money, L. R. 2 Ch. App. 164, 170; Bishop
of Winchester v. Mid. Hants Ry. Co., L. R.

5 Eq. 17; Aberaman Iron Works v. Wickens, L. R. 4 Ch. App. 101; Fenwick v.
Bulman, L . R. 9 Eq. 165; Daking v.
Whimper, 26 Beav. 568; Morgan v. Morgan, 2 Wheat. 290; Lord v. Underdnnck,
1 Sandf. Ch. 46; Hoover v. Donallv,
3 Hen. & Mun. 316.
See McCotter ~.
Lawrence, 6 N. Y. Sup. Ct. 392. 395 ,
and Maire v . Garrison, 83 N. Y. 14, 29.
[For an interesting case concerning th e
question of parties plaintiff in an act ion of
specific performance, see Daly v. H uddell
(1902) , 137 Cal. 671, 20 Pac. 784.]
3 Owen v. Frink, 24 Cal. 171, 177.
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bring an action for a specific performance; but his. administrator,

when the suit is simply to recover damages.^ It follows, from

the general rule given above, that a mere stranger claiming an

interest or estate under an adverse title is neither a necessary nor

a proper party to the suit for a specific performance ; his rights

cannot be affected by the decree made therein, and must, in fact,

be determined in another and distinct proceeding. ^ But a person

claiming under a prior agreement is not such a mere stranger,

and he is a proper party in an action brought by the vendee to

compel a specific performance, and to determine the right to the

purchase-money.^ Another person than the vendor may also be

so interested in the subject-matter of the contract, that his pres-

ence or aid will be needed in order to make out a complete title ;

and, when this is the case, such person may also be joined as a

party to the suit for a specific performance, although not an

actual party to the contract sought to be enforced.* Also, when

a third person has, after the making of the contract, acquired some

interest in the subject-matter under the vendor, but with notice

of the vendee's rights, he may be brought in as a co-defendant
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■with the vendor in the suit for a specific performance.^

§ 178. * 264. Co-PIaintiffs in Suits to enforce the Trusts of a

"Will. It was a well-established doctrine of equitable procedure,

that, in suits to carry into effect and enforce the trusts of a will,

the heirs-at-law must be made parties. This rule has, however,

been greatly modified, if not actually abrogated, in England by

recent statutory legislation; and in the United States it is not

often invoked because such suits are comparatively infrequent.^

1 Webster v. Tibbitts. 19 Wis. 438; Lawrence, 6 N. Y. Sap. Ct. 392, 395;

Peters v. Jones, 35 Iowa, 512, 518. See Story Eq. PI. § 209.

Gardner v. Kelso, 80 Ala. 497 ; Hill v. ^ Spence v. Hogg, 1 Coll. 225 ; CoUett

Smith, 32 N. J. Eq. 473. The adminis- v. Hover, 1 Coll. 227 ; Cutts v. Thodey, 13

trator is not a proper plaintiff in a suit Sim. 206 ; Leuty v. Hilla.s, 2 De G. & .1.

for .specific performance when the pur- HO. See Carter v. Mills, 30 Mo. 432.

cha,se-money has been wholly paid: McKay This rule, given in the text, must be

f. Broad, 70 Ala. 377. applied under a great variety of external

- Ta.sker v. Small, 3 My. & Cr. 63, 69 ; circumstances, and is exceedingly com-

De Hoghtoa v. Money, L. R. 2 Ch. App. prehensive in its operation.

164, 170. 8 See, on the subject of the heirs being

* West Midland Ry. Co. i;. Nixon, 1 parties, and of the statutory changes in

brin 0 an c ion for a pecific performance; but his. administrator,
uit i simply t rec ver damag s. 1 It follows, from
n r· 1 rule gi en above, that a mere stranger claiming an
t or e tate under an a verse title is neither a neces ary nor
er party o the uit for a specific performance; his rights
c nn t be affected by the decree made therein, and must in fact,
termine in another and distinct proceeding. 2 But a person
cl- i in 0 under a prior agreement is not such a mere stranger,
an he i a proper party in an action brought by the vendee to
compel a specific performance, and to determine the right to the
purcha e-m ney. 3 Another person than the vendor may also be
o interested in the subject-matter of the contract, that his presence or aid will be needed in order to make out a complete title;
an , when this i the case, such person may also be joined as a
party to the suit for a specific performance, although not an
actual party to the contract sought to be enforced. 4 Also, when
a thir person has, after the making of the contract, acquired some
intere tin the subject-matter under the vendor, but with notice
of the vendee 's rights, he may be brought in as a co-defendant
with the vendor in the suit for a specific performance. 5
' 178. * 264.
Co-Plaintiffs in Suits to enforce the Trusts of a
Will.
It was a well-established doctrine of equitable procedure,
th t, in suit to carry into effect and enforce the trusts of a will,
the heirs-at-law mu t be made parties. This rule has, however
been greatly modified, if not actually abrogated, in England by
recent statutory legislation; and in the United States it is not
often invoked because such suit are comparatively infrequent. 6

Hem. & M. 176; Chadwick v. Maden, England,! Daniell's, pp. 231, 232 ; Story

<> Hare. 188. Eq. PI. § 163. As to actions for the con-

♦ Wood V. White, 4 M. & C. 460, 483; struction of wills, see Chipman v. Mont-

Chadwick v. Maden, 9 Hare, 18S; Cope gomery, 63 N. Y. 221, and 1 Pomeroy's

V. Parry, 2 Jac. & W. 538; McCotter v. Equity, § 352, n. (1).

1 Web ter v. Tibbitt , 19 Wis. 438;
Peter v. Jone , 35 Iowa , 512, 518. See
rdner v. Kel o, 0 Ala.. 497 ; Hill v.
, rnith , 32
. J . Eq . 473. The adminisra or is not a proper plaintiff in a uit
f r p cific performance when the purch
-money h been wholly paid: McKay
i· Broacl, 70 Ala.. 377 .
i T ·ker v. mall, 3 My. &
r . 63, 69;
D e £Io hton v. Money, L. R. 2 h. App.

1 4, l 0.
4

W t Midland y Co. v. Nixon, l
H em . & :'11 . 176; Chadwick v. Maden,
~ II r , I
.
W od v. White, 4 l\1. & . 460 , 4 3;
h wi v. Ma<l n,
II r , l ;
pa
l' rry, 2 J c. & W . 53 ; 1c 'otter v.

Lawrence, 6 N. Y . Snp. Ct. 392, 395 ;
Story Eq. Pl. § 209.
6
pence v. Hogg, l Coll. 225 ; Collett
v. Hover , 1 oll. 227 ; Cutts v. Thodey, 13
Sim. 206; L uty v. Hilla , 2 De G. & J .
110.
ee Carter v. Mill , 30 Mo. 432 .
Th is rule, g iven in th text, must be
appli ed und er a great Yariety of external
circumstances, and i e xceedingly compreheo ive in it op rati on.
6
ee, on t he u bje t of the heirs being
partie , and of the tatutory changes in
England, 1 Dani 11' , pp. 231 , 232 ; tory
Eq. Pl. § 163 . A to actions for the ontructi n f will , ee hipman v. M ntmery, 63 N. Y . 221 , and 1 Pomeroy's
Equity, § 352, o . (1 ).
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Where, on the other hand, an action is brought to set aside a

will, then all the devisees are necessary parties, and the executor,

unless he has renounced ; ' and all the legatees residuary and

other. 2

§ 179. * 265. Principle Underlying Special Rules. Connecting

Link. General Principle. The broad principle which underlies

most of the foregoing special rules is, that when an action is

instituted by some determinate individual for his own benefit,

whom we call the plaintiff, all persons having interests or claims

against the defendant, in relation to the subject-matter, concur-

rent with his, must be brought in as parties ; if they do not wish

to unite as co-plaintiffs, they must be added as defendants. The

connecting link is the concurrence of the interests. If this element

is wanting, the principle itself is not operative.^ It follows,

therefore, as a general principle, — the converse of that already

discussed, — that when a suit is instituted by some determinate

individual, whom we call the plaintiff', and there are other per-

sons asserting claims against the defendant, even in respect to

the same subject-matter, but such claims are set up under titles
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antagonistic to, or inconsistent with, that of the plaintiff, these

persons should not be made parties to the action either as plain-

tiffs or as defendants, since the indispensable element of concur-

rence in their interests is wanting, so that if they were joined as

parties, two distinct controversies at least would be carried on in

the single litigation.* Among the examples of such improper

1 Vancleave v. Beam, 2 Dana, 155; joined in an action to rescind the sale.

Hunt V. Acre. 28 Ala. 580; Vanderpoel The court said: "The complaint shows

w. Van Valkenburgh, 6 N. Y. 190. that, although these plaintiffs severally

'■2 McMaken v. McMaken. 18 Ala. 576. owned their quota of shares, they never-

' Qln an action to enjoin the threatened theless acted in concert respecting them

breach of a contract, there is a misjoinder and the interests represented by them,

of parties plaintiff when between some of and were by the same fraud of the de-

the plaintiffs and the defendant there is fendaut induced to act in concert in selling

no privity of contract and hence no in- their stock to him. The defendant baited

terest, on the part of such plaintiffs, in and set one trap for both and caught both

the outcome of the litigation : Atlantic, in it. The wrong of the defendant de-

Where, on the other hand, an action is brought to set aside a
will, then all the devisees are nece sary parties, and the executor,
unless he has renounced; 1 and all the legatees residuary and
-other. 2
§ 179. * 265. Prin?iple Underlying Special Rules. Connecting
.Link. General Principle.
The broad principle which underli
most of the foregoing special rules i , that when an action is
instituted by some determinate individual for his own benefit,
whom we call the plaintiff, all persons having interests or claims
.against the defendant, in relation to the subject-matter, concurrent with his, must be brought in as parties; if they do not wish
to unite as co-plaintiffs, they must be added as defendants. The
-connecting link is the concurrence of the interests. If this element
is wanting, the principle itself is not operative. 3 It follows,
therefore, as a general principle, - the converse of that already
discussed, - that when a suit is instituted by some determinate
individual, whom we call the plaintiff, and there are other persons asserting claims against the defendant, even in respect to
the same subject-matter, but such claims are set up under titles
antagonistic to, or inconsistent with, that of the plaintiff, these
persons should not be made parties to the action either as plaintiffs or as defendants, since the indispensable element of concurrence in their interests is wanting, so that if they were joined as
parties, two distinct controversies at least would be carried on in
the single litigation. 4 Among the examples of such improper

-etc. R. R. Co. V. Southern Pine Co. (1902), stroyed their unity of action as owners of

116 Ga. 224, 42 S. E. 500. the stock, and it is agreeable to equity

In Bradley V. Bradley (1900), 165 N.Y. that the plaintiffs should be extricated

183, 58 N. Vj. 887, the two plaintiffs, by together, and under the facts tliey allege

reason of false representations respecting be permitted to act together in rescinding

the value and condition of the property of the sale and in reinstating themselves iu

a corporation in which they were stock- their former position. "J

holders, sold their shares of .stock at a * See 1 Daniell's, pp. 229, 230-233.

price much below its actual value. They

17

1 Vancleave v. Beam, 2 Dana, 155 ;
Hunt v. Acre, 28 Ala. 580; Vanderpoel
v. Van Valkenburgh, 6 N . Y . 190.
2 McMaken ii. McMaken. I 8 Ala. 5ifi.
s [In an action to enjoin the threatened
breach of a contract, there is a misj oind er
of parties plaintiff when between some of
the plaintiffs and. the defendant there is
no privity of co ntract and hence no ii1terest, on the part of such plaintiff:>, in
the outcome of the litigation: Atlanti c,
-etc. R. R. Co. v. Southern Pine Co . ( 1902),
116 Ga. 224, 42 S. E. 500.
In Bradley v. Bradley ( 1900), 165 N. Y.
183, 58 N. E. 887, th e two plaintiffs, by
reason of false representations respe ct in~
the value and condition of the property of
a corporation in which they were stocknolders, sold their shares of stock at a
l ri ce mu ch below its actual value. They

joined in an action to rescind the sale.
The court said : "The complaint shows
that, although th e&e plaintiffs severally
owned their quota of shares, they uevertheless acted in concert respecting them
and the i1Jterests represented by th em,
and were by the same fraud. of the defendaut induced to act in concert in sellin g
th eir stock to him. The defendant baited
and set one trap for both and caught both
in it. The wrong of the defendant destroyed their unity of action a owners of
the sto~ k, and it is agreeable to equity
that the plaintiffs should be extri cated.
t ogether, and under the facts they allege
be permitted to art t ogether in rescinding
the sale and in reinstating themselves in
their former position ."]
4 See 1 Daniell 's, pp. 229, 230-23.'3 .
17
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union of persons whose interests are antagonistic is the case of an

action to redeem brought by an heir-at-law and a devisee under

a will ; the joinder is improper, since one or the other of these

parties has, of course, no right to redeem in the case supposed. ^

And a person liable to account to the other plaintiffs cannot be

joined as a co-plaintiff.''^ This objection, based upon the incon-

sistency of rights and interests, does not appl}', however, to

causes in which a single plaintiff unites in himself two or more

conflictinor claims or interests.^

^ 180. * 2G0. Distinct Claims not necessarily Inconsistent.

Conflicting Decisions. Because claims, titles, and interests are

distinct, and, in a certain sense, independent of each other, they

are not therefore necessarily antagonistic or inconsistent; and

persons having such distinct claims and interests, which are not

antagonistic or inconsistent, may often be united in an action of

which the object is their common benefit.'* In applying this

principle, there is some diversity of opinion, and even conflict

among the decided cases. In certain classes of actions the doc-

trine is well settled, and the joinder of such persons is a matter
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of common practice. In other classes of suits the courts have

not been so unanimous; sometimes they have yielded to the

general tendency of equity, which seeks to determine all disputes

concerning the same subject-matter in one litigation, and have

1 Lord Cholmondeley r. Lord Clinton, certain property. Thomas purchased the

2 Jac. & W. 1, 135, 4 Bligh, 1, s. c. T. property and jrave Troxel his note for

& R. 107, 11.5; Fiilham v. McCarthy, 1 §400, payable when Troxel should pay off

H. L. Cases, 703 ; Saumarez v. Saumarez, the •?400 due Freeze. Freeze foreclosed

4 M. & C. 336 ; Robertson v. Southgate, and took judgment against Miller and

6 Hare, 536 ; Bill i'. Cureton, 2 M. & K. Troxel for $560. Thomas, to protect his

503 ; Jopp V. Wood, 2 I)e G., J. & S. 323 ; interest in the property, purchased the

Griggs V. Staplee, 2 I)e G. & S. 572 ; New- judjrment. Miller was thus liable to

comb I'. Horton, 18 Wis. 566; Gates v. Thomas on the judgment, and hence

Boomer, 17 Wis. 455; Crocker i;. Craig, was interested in having the amount of

union of per on who intere t"' are antagoni ic i the ca e of an
action o redeem brou 0 h by an heir-at-law and a de i ee under
• will · the join ler i impr per inc one r the other of the e
partie ha
f c urse no right to redeem in the ca e uppo ed. 1
An<l a er on li bl to account to the other 1, intiff cannot be
joine
a co-pl intiff. 2 Thi objection ba ed upon th in on. i. tency of ri l t and intere t , d e not appl · howe-' er to
cau e in which a ,~ingl
laintiff unites in him elf two or more
confiictin 0 claims or int re t . 3
§ 180. * . . .
Distinct
Claims not necessarily I n consiste n t.
Co nflicting Decisions.
ecau e claim ti le and intere t are
di tinct and in a certain ense independ nt of each other they
are not therefore nece arily antagoni tic or incon i tent · and
per::son having uch di tinct claim and inter t which are not
an ta oni ,tic or incon i 'tent, may often be united in an action of
which the object i their common benefit. 4 In applying tbi
principle there i ome diver ·ity of oi>inion and e en conflict
among the decided ca e . In certain cla es of action th doctrin i well et led, and the joinder of such person i a ma ter
of common practice. In other cla ses of suit the court ha e
no been o unanimou ; sometime they have yielded to the
g neral tendency of equity, which seek to de ermine all di ute
concerning the o..: ame subject-matter in one litigation and have

46 Me. 327 ; Fletcher v. Holmes, 40 Me. Thomas's note to Troxel applied on the

364. judL'ment ; and Thomas, having himself

■^ .Jacob r. Lucas, 1 Beav. 436, 443 ; paid the judgment which Troxel was

Griffith r. Vanheythuysen. 9 Hare, 85. liable for. was interested to have the

' Miles r. Durnford, 2 De G., M. & G. amount of his note to Troxel applied on

641; Carter ;;. Sanders, 2 Drew, 248; the judgment and the note cancelled.

Foulkc* V. Davies. L R. 7 Eq, 42. /fold, that Miller and Thomas had suflB-

* QTroxel i: Thomjis (1900). 155 Ind. cient common interest to join in a suit to

519, 58 X. F 725: Miller and Troxel have the amount of the note held by

made a note to Freeze for S»00, which Troxel applied on the judgment and the

Troxel for a consideration agreed to pay, note cancelled.]

said note being secured by mortgage on

Lord

holmondele.v r. Lord

linton,

certain property. Thoma purcha ed the
property and l!:aYe Troxel his note for
• +O , payable when Troxel hould pay ff
H . L . a e~, 703; aumarez v. aumarez, the ... 400 due Freeze. Freeze furedo ed
4 :\1. & . 336 ·
ob rt on v . outhgate, and took judg ment again, t Iiller and
6 Hare, 536; Bill v. ureton, 2 :M. & K. Troxel for 560. Thomas, to protect hi
503; .Jopp r:. Wood, 2 De G., .J. & . 323; intere
in th property pur ha ed he
Grigg t'. • taplee, 2 De . & . 5i2; ew- judgment. Miller w
th u liabl to
ates v. Thoma on th judgmen t . and hence
com b v. Horton, I \Vi . 566 ;
Boomer, Ii Wi . -t.5-;
wa inter t d in having the amount of
4G Me. :l27; Fletcher v.
Th m 's u te t Trox el applied on the
36.t.
jud!!m nt; and Thoma . having him elf
~ .Jacob 1•. Luca , 1 Beav. 436, 443;
paid the judgment whi h Trox 1 was
,riffith ,.
anhe\ thm en. 9 I Jar , 5.
liahle for. wa intere. tPCI to have the
" . file. 1•. Du;nfor.I, 2 " ,.., M. & G. amount of hi. n te to Tr x 1 appli d on
, 4 I ; <'art er r 'ancle r
2 Dr w, 24- ; the jnd!tment and th
n te cancell d.
•onlke ,.. Darn~.· L H. i Eq 42.
!ldrl, that )Iiller and Th omn. had uffi4 [TroxPl ,., Thoma
( I CJOO) 155 Ind.
ient common int re t to j in in a uit to
!il'l,5 ••. B 72';: ,\ lilln anrl Troxl have th am ont of th n te h Jcl by
ma'l<' a nntc t0 FrPPz<' for 10 . whiC'h Trox 1 appl iecl on the judgm nt and th e
'Irr x I f 1r a <'Ill! itlf'ra ion agr rl tri pay, not can 11 d.J
. iii CJt lieing : c·ur •(I J,y mortgage on
1

2 Jae. & W. 1, 135, 4 Bligh, l , . c. T.
& R. 107, l 15; Fulham v. McCarthy, l
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therefore permitted the union; at other times they have been

controlled by the fact that there was no real legal community of

interest among the parties, and have refused to allow the at-

tempted joinder. As it will be impossible to deduce any general

rule covering all such instances, I shall first mention and illus-

trate those classes of causes in which the doctrine has been

established, and shall in the second place collect some examples

of other classes in which there is no such unanimity of judicial

decision. The most familiar and important case of persons

having distinct but not conflicting interests, and in respect of

whom the rule concerning their joinder as parties is well settled,

is that of creditors. There are several species of actions brought

by creditors, in which the various creditors of a single debtor

may all unite as co-plaintiffs. Thus, the creditors of a deceased

debtor m.ay all join in the same administration suit brought to

settle his estate, and to administer its assets ; but this species of

action is quite uncommon in the United States.^ Such union,

however, is not necessary; one may sue alone if he choose ;2 and

when the number is great, one may sue on behalf of all the
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others. ^

§ 181. * 267. Case of Creditors' Suits. The most common and

important action by creditors, to which the rule may be applied,

is the creditor's suit, or an action in the nature of a creditor's

suit.^ A single judgment creditor may alone maintain an action

to enforce the payment of his judgment, to reach equitable assets,

to set aside fraudulent transfers by his debtor and thus let in the

lien of his judgment, and for other similar relief; and the other

1 1 Dauiell's, p. 235; Cosby t-. Wick- v. Dickinson (1898), 100 Wis. 574, 76

liffe, 7 B. Mon. 120; Conro v. Port Henry N. W. 766.]

Iron Co., 12 Barb. 27; Cheshire Iron * [^Doherty v. Holliday (1893), 137

Works r. Gay, 3 Gray, 531, 534, 535. Ind. 282, 32 N. E. 315: While it is a

- Anon., 3 Atk. 572 ; Peacock v. Monk, general rule that if a complaint assumes

1 Ves. 127, 131. See Hills v. Sherwood, to state a cause of action in favor of two

48 Cal. 386, 392. or more parties, and states a cau.se of

^ [^Gianella v. Bigelow (1897), 96 Wis. action in favor of a part only of the par-

185, 71 N. W. Ill : In an action by credi- ties thus joined, it is bad on demurrer,

tors to enforce the liability of stockholders, this rule does not apply to a comjJaiut in

which must be a proceeding in equity, all the nature of a creditors' bill where tliere

the creditors should join or one or more is a statement of the respective claims

therefore permitted th union· at oth r times they have been
controlled by the fact that there was no real legal community f
interest among the partie , ancl hay rcf u ed t allow th attempted joind r. As it will b impo iblc to deduce any g neral
rule covering all su h in tanc , I shall fir t m ntion and illustrate tho e clas es of cau es in which the doctrine has been
established, and hall in the econd place collect ome examples
of other cla ses in which there i no uch unanimity of judicial
deci ion. The most familiar and important case of persons
having distinct but not conflicting interests, ~nd in re pect of
whom the rule concerning their joinder as pHties is well settled,
is that of creditors. There are several species of action brought
by creditors, in which the various creditors of a single debtor
may all unite as co-plaintiffs. Th us. the creditors of a deceased
debtor may all join in the same administration suit brought to
settle bi e tate, and to admini ~ ter its assets; but this species of
action is quite uncommon in the Unitecl States. 1 Such union,
however, is not necessary; one may sue alone if he choose; 2 and
when the number is great, one may sue on behalf of all the
others. 3
§ 181. * 267. Case of Credit ors' Suits . The most common and
important action by creditors, to whi ch the rule may be applie<l,
is the er ditor's suit, or an action in the nature of a creditor's
suit. 4 A single judgment creditor may alone maintain an action
to en force the payment of his judgment, to reach equitable assets,
to set aside fraudul ent transfers by bis debtor and thus let in the
lien of his judgment, and for other similar relief; and the other

should sue for the benefit of all, such lia- of creditors showing that each claim is

bilitv being, under the statute, a liability several and distinct and there is no at-

of all the stockholders to all the creditors, tempt to state a joint cause of action in

See to same effect. Van Pelt v. Gardner favor of those who are named iu the

(1898), 54 Neb. 701, 75 N. W. 874 ; Smith title.]

1 1 Daui ell' , p. 235; Co by v. Wickliffe, 7 B. Mon. 120; Conro v. Port H eury
Iron Co., 12 Barb. 27 ; Chesh ire Iron
Works i•. Gay, 3 Gray, 531, 534, 535.
2 Anon., 3 Atk. 572; Peacock v. Monk,
1 Ves. 127 , 13 1.
ee HiUs v. Sherwoocl,
48 Cal. 3 6, 392.
3 [Gian ella !". Bigelow (1 97), 96 Wis.
1 5, 71 N. W . 111 : In an action by cred itors to enforce th e liability of stockholders,
whi ch must be a proceeding in equity, all
the creditor sho uld join or one or more
sh ould ue fo r the benefit of all, ul' h liability being, und er the tatute, a liability
of all t he tockholders to all the creditors.
~ ee to same effect, Van P elt v. Gardn r
{1898), 54 Neb. 701, 75 N. W. 874; Sm ith

v. Dickinson (1898), 100 Wis. 5i4, i6
N . W. 766.J
4 [Doherty v. Holliday (1893), l.'H
Ind. 2 2, 32 J. E. 315: While it i a

general rule that if a complaint a umes
t o state a cause of action in favor of two
or more parties, and tate a cau e of
action in favor of a part only of the parties thus joined , it is bad on demurrer,
this rule doe not apply to a complain t in
th e nature of a creditor ' bill where there
i a statement of the r cspecti,·e claims
of creditors showi ng that each claim i
e,·eral and <li tinct and there is no attempt to tate a joint cause of action in
favor of those who are named in the
title.]
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judgment creditors need not necessarily be joined, either as co-

plaintiffs or as defendants,^ On the other hand, two or more

of the judgment creditors, or all of them together, may unite in

bringing such an action,^ or finally, one may sue on behalf of

himself, and all others who are in the same position. ^ Since all

the creditors have the same kind of interest in the common fund,

the assets of the debtor, and since a receiver is frequently ap-

pointed over that fund, the utmost latitude is permitted in

respect to the union of different creditors as co-plaintiffs. One

may maintain the action alone, or may sue on behalf of himself

and of all the others similarly situated, or all may join, or any

number less than all may at their election institute the action.

Such an action may also be brought by a receiver of the debtor's

property, appointed in proceedings supplementary to execution,

and he may either sue alone, or the judgment creditors, or some

of them, may join with him.'*

§ 182. * 268. All Beneficiaries under a Trust should join in a

Suit to enforce it. Different Rule in Suits to overthrow a Trust.

Where an assignment has been made in trust for creditors, one
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of the creditor beneficiaries cannot maintain an action to enforce

1 White's Bank of Buffalo i'. Farthing, citation of authorities. When the debtor

101 N. Y. 344, 348. i.s dead, a judgment creditor may bring

2 Gorrell v. Gates, 79 Iowa, 632 ; an action to set aside a fraudulent traus-

[^Ganiet i-. Simmons (1897), 103 la. 163, fer made by him. Hills v. Sherwood,

72 N. W. 444 : Several judgment credi- 48 Cal. 386, 392. An attaching creditor

re itor n e not nece aril be joined either as coor
def ndan t . 1
n th other han
wo or more
gm nt credi t r or all of them geth r, may unite in
uch an . . ti n 2 or fin ally, one m y ue on behalf of
th r w h are in the ame po i ion. 3
ince all
me kind of int re t in the common fund,
the
r, a1 d ince a re i er i frequ ntly apiut d ver tha t fund, the utmo t latitude is permitt d in
r pect to the union of differ nt creditor a co-plaintiff . On
ma maintain the action al n , or may ue n behalf of him ·elf
nd of all th other imil rly ituated, or all may join, or any
n u mber le' than all may at their el ction in ti tut the acti n.
uch an action may also be brought by a receiver of the debtor
pr p rty, appoint d in proceedings suppl mentary to ex cution,
and he may either ue alone, or the judgment creditor , or some
f them, may join with him. 4
182. * 2 . All Beneficiaries under a Trust should join in a

tors may join in an action to set aside a merely cannot maintain the action. Weil

fraudulent conveyance. Ferst's Sons v. r. Lankins, 3 Nel). 384, 386 ; but see, for

Powers (1902), 64 S. 0. 221, 41 S. E. 974 : numerous conflicting decisions on this last

Two or more creditors may join in an ac- point, 3 Pom. Kq .lur. § 1415.

tion to set aside a sale of a stock of goods * See cases cited in last preceding

Suit to enforce it.

Different Rule in Suits to overthrow a Trust .

Wb re an a si nment has been made in trust for creditors, on
of the creditor benefi ciaries cannot maintain an action to enforce

as a fraud upon creditors note; also Hamlin v. Wright, 23 Wis.

Ellis V. Pullman (1894), 95 Ga. 445, 22 491 ; Gates v. Boomer, 17 Wis. 455, 458;

S. E. 568: The creditors of a mercantile Uuffing r. Tilton, 12 Ind. 259; Burton v.

corporation may unite in an equitable peti- Anderson, Stanton's (Ky.) code, p. 34;

tion against the corporators wIkj have Baker v. Bartol, 6 Cal. 483. For further

misap[)r<)priated the assets.] illustrations see Ilann v. Van Voorhis, 5

« Bartlett v. Drew, 57 N. Y. 587, 588, Ilun, 425; Stewart v. Beale, 7 id. 405;

589 ; Clarkson i;. I)e Peyster, 3 Paige, Dewey v. Moyer, 9 id. 473 ; Fox v. Moyer,

320; Parmelee v. Egan, 7 Paige, 610; 54N. Y. 125; Fort Stanwix Bank ^'. Lcg-

Grosvenor v. Allen, 9 Paige, 74; Farn- gett, 51 id. 552; Haines v. HoUistcr, 64

ham V. Camyjbcll, 10 I'aige, 598 ; Way v. id. 1 ; Pierce v. Milwaukee Constr. Co., 38

Bra-raw, 1 C. E. Green, 213, 216; Egdell Wis. 2.53 ; Hardy v. Mitcliell, 67 Ind. 485 ;

r. Haywood, 5 Atk. 357 See, especially, Smith >•. Schulting, 14 Hun, .')2; Green r.

Conro c. Port Flenry Iron Co., 12 Barb. Walkill Nat. Bank, 7 id. 63; Enright -■.

27, 57-60, per Willard .1., for a full di.scus- Grant, 5 Utah, 334, 400.

sion of the subject, and an exhaustive

citation of au thori tie .

Wh en the debtor
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the trust, to compel an accounting by the assignee, and to pro-

cure a settlement and distribution of the trust estate. All the

creditors must unite in bringing such an action, either actually

or by representation; for where the number of such creditors is

great, one or more have been permitted to sue on behalf of them-

selves and all the others. ^ The rule thus stated in respect of

creditors is simply a special case of the general doctrine appli-

cable to every species of trust. In actions based upon the trust,

recognizing its existence and validity, and seeking to carry out

its terms and provisions, all the persons interested must be

parties; all the beneficiaries must therefore unite in an action

against the trustee brought to obtain an accounting, and a wind-

ing up and settlement of the estate, or, in technical phraseology,

an action brought to administer the trust. ^ While the bene-

ficiaries as a class must all unite, either actually or through a

representative plaintiff, in actions based upon the trust as exist-

ing, and brought to administer it, one person who would be a

beneficiary may, without joining any others, maintain a suit

which is based upon a denial of the trust and seeks to overthrow
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it, and to set aside the instruments which created it, and the acts

of the trustee done under it. Thus, for example, any judgment

creditor may bring an action in his own name to set aside an

assignment in trust for himself and the other creditors.^

' Story Eq. PI. §§ 150, 207; Bainbridge v. Garrard, 25 Ga. 557 ; High v. Worley,

V. Burton, 2 Beav. 539. In Harrison v. 32 Ala. 709 ; Gould r. Hayes, 19 Ala. 438;

Stewardson, 2 Hare, 530, twenty creditors Keeler v. Keeler, 3 Stockt. 458 ; Case v.

was held to be too small a number to Carroll, 35 N. Y. 385 ; Sortore v. Scott,

allow a suit by representation. After a 6 Lans. 271, 275; Munch v. Cockerell,

receiver of a national bank has been 8 Sim. 219, 231. See French v. Gifford,

appointed, a creditor may maintain an 30 Iowa, 148, 158, 159; O'Connor v.

action to establish liis demand, and the Irvine, 74 Cal. 435 ; Barrett v. Brown,

bank and the receiver may both be joined 86 N. E. 556.

as co-defendants ; the appointment of the ^ In Hubbell v. Medbury, 53 N. Y. 98,

receiver does not absolutely dissolve the where an assignment had been made for

the trust, to compel an accounting by the assignee, and to procure a settlement and distribution of the trust estate. All the
creditors must unite in bringing such an action, either actually
or by representation; for where the number of such creditors is
great, one or more hav been permitted to sue on behalf of themselves and all the others. 1 The rule thus stated in respect of
creditors is simply a special case of the general doctrjne applicable to every species of trust. In actions based upon the trust,
recognizing its existence and validity, and seeking to carry out
its terms and provisions, all the persons interested must be
parties; all the beneficiaries must therefore unite in an action
against the trustee brought to obtain an accounting, and a winding up and settlement of the estate, or, in technical phraseology,
an action brought to administer the trust. 2 While the beneficiaries as a class must all unite, either actually or through a
representative plaintiff, in actions based upon the trust as existing, and brought to administer it, one person who would be a
beneficiary may, without joining any others, maintain a suit
which is based upon a denial of the trust and seeks to overthrow
it, and to set aside the instruments which created it, and the acts
of the trustee done antler it. Thus, for example, any judgment
creditor may bring an action in his own name to set aside an
assignment in trust for himself and the other creditors. 3

corporation. Green u. Walkill Nat. Bank, the benefit of creditors, a cestui que trust

7 Hun, 63 ; Nat. Pahquioque Bk. c. First under it and the assignor brought an ac-

Nat. Bk. of Bethel, 36 Conn. 325, 14 Wall, tion to set aside a wrongful purchase of

283; Kennedy ?'. Gibson, 8 Wall. 506; Tur- the trust property by the assignee; the

ner y. Bank of Keokuk. 26 Iowa, 262. In action was sustained, and it was held that

Wilhelm c. Byles, 60 Mich. 561, however, a .substituted trustee as the plaintiff was

it was held tliat all the creditors are not unnecessary. When a trustee is guilty of

necessary parties to a bill brought by a misconduct in his tru.st, by misapplying

creditor to enforce the trust. the assets, or converting the same to his

'•2 De la Vergne v. Evertsoti, 1 Paige, own use, a single cestui que trust is per-

181; Greene v. Sisson, 2 Curtis, 171; milted by a special statute, in Minnesota.

Hawkins ;v Craig, 1 B. Mon. 27 ; Flam to maintain an action for an account, and

1 Story Eq. Pl. §§ 150, 207; Bainbridge
v. Burton, 2 Beav. 539. In Harrison v.
Stewardson, 2 Hare, 530, twenty creditors
was held to be too small a number to
allow a su it by repr e~e ntaii o n. After a
receiver of a national bau k has been
appointed, a cri>ditor may maintain an
action to ei;tablish his demand , and th e
bank and the receiver may both be joined
as co-defendants; the appointm ent of the
receiver does not absolutely dissolve the
corporation. Green v. Walkill Nat. Bank ,
7 Hun, 63; Nat. Pahquioque Ilk. v. First
:'\a.t. Bk. of Bethel, 36 Conn. 325. 14 Wall.
2S:l; Kennedy 1•. Gibson, 8 Wall. 50G; Turner v . Bank of Keokuk. 26 Iowa, 262. In
Wilhelm v. Byles, 60 Mi ch . 56i, howcYer,
it was held that all the creditors are not
1rncessary parties to a bill brought by a
crerlitor to enforce the trust.
2 De la Vergne v. E,·erti;on, 1 Paige,
18 1 ; Gree ne r. ~isson, 2 C'nrtis , 171;
Hawkins v. Craig, 1 B. Mon. 27; Elam

1-. Garrard, 25 Ga. 557; High v. Worley,
32 Ala. i09; Gould t•. Hayes, 19 Ala. 438;
Keeler v. Keeler, 3 Stockt. 458 ; Case v.
Carroll, 35 N. Y. 385 ; Sortore v. Scott,
6 Laus. 271, 2i5; Munch v. Cockerell,
8 Sim. 219, 231. See French v. Gifford,
30 Iowa, 148, 158, 159; O'Connor 1:.
Irvine, 74 Cal. 435; Barrett v. Brown,
86 N. E. 556.
a In Hubbell v. Medbury, 53 N. Y . 98,

where an assignment had been made for
the benefi t of creditors, a cestui que trust
under it and the assignor brought an acti on to set aside a wrongful purchase of
the trnst property by the as ignee; the
action was su stained, and it was held that
a substituted trustee a the plaintiff was
unnecessary. When a trustee is guilty of
misconduct in his trust, by misapplying
the assets, or converting the same to his
own use, a single cest11i que trnst is permitted by a special statute, in Minn esotl'l.,
to maintain an action fo r an a.ceo nnt, and
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§ 183. * 269. Joinder of Persons Owning Distinct Parcels of

Land. From the cases of creditors and cestuis que ti'ustciU, in

* 2o . Joinder of Persons Owning Distinct P arcels of
From h ca e of re itor and cestuis que trustent, in
re pect f wh m he rule i well settled, I now pa s to other
et ,~e., of per on h· vin distinct, th ugh not conflicting, internd cl im and I collect a number of deci ions whi h show
the tendenc of the court in dealing with them .
ners of
entire! · di inct and eparate parcel of land, although no communit r of right or interest e. i ted among them, ha e been permitted t uni te in equitable action ba ed upon their individual
pa.rate propert simply because the wrong to be remedied or
prevented wa a ingle act, and affected all of them and all of
their Ian
in the same manner. 1 ThuR, owner of separat
tenement have been allowed to join in an action brought to
re ·tr in and remove a nui ance which wa common to all. 2 T wo
or more owner· of epara.te lots a se ed for a local street impro\·ement when the asses ment is claimed for the same r a on
to be inntlicl as to all, may unite in an action to re train the
183.

Land .

respect of whom the rule is well settled, I now pass to other

classes of persons having distinct, though not conflicting, inter-

ests and claims, and I collect a number of decisions which show

the tendency of the courts in dealing with them. Owners of

entirely distinct and separate parcels of land, although no com-

munity of right or interest existed among them, have been per-

mitted to unite in equitable actions based upon their individual

separate property, simply because the wrong to be remedied or

prevented was a single act, and affected all of them and all of

their lands in the same manner. ^ Thus, owners of separate

tenements have been allowed to join in an action brought to

restrain and remove a nuisance which was common to all.^ Two

or more owners of separate lots assessed for a local street im-

provement, when the assessment is claimed for the same reason

to be invalid as to all, may unite in an action to restrain tiie

to enforce the trust, and to remove tlie
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trustee. This statute is general in its

terms, and applies to all trustees and

trusts. " Upon petition or bill of any

person interested in the execution of an

express trust, the Court of Chancery may

remove any trustee who shall have vio-

lated, or threatened to violate, his tru'^t."

Compiled Stat, of Minn., p. 38-t, § 26;

Goncelier v. Foret, 4 Minn. 13. See

French t: Gifford, 30 Iowa, 148, 1.58, 1.59.

In the case of a charitable trust, any

beneficiary having an interest in the use

or in the subject of the gift, has an un-

questionable right to institute a proceed-

ing in equity for the purpose of securing

a faithful execution of the beneficent ob-

ject of the founder of the charity. Bapt.

Church at Lancaster v. I'resb. Church,

18 B. Mon. 635, 641.

^ QDilTerent riparian owners of distinct

parcels of riparian land, who have a com-

mon grievance for an injury of the same

kind, inflicted at the .same time and by the

same act.s, though the injury differs in

(iegree as to each owner, may unite in a

common action to enjoin a higlier riparian

owner from diverting or ywlluting the

stream: Strobel v. Kerr Salt Co. (1900),

164 N. Y. .303, 58 N. E. 142. See, to the

Bame effect, Beach i\ Spokane Ranch Co.

(1901), 25 Mont. 379, 65 Pac. Ill ; Brown

I'. Canal and Reservoir Co. (1899), 26

Colo. 66, 56 Pac. 183 ; Ronnow v. Delmue

(1895), 23 Nev. 29, 41 Pac. 1074.]

■^ Peck V. Elder, 3 Sandf. 126. But

six owners of distinct tracts of laud

through which a stream ran were not

permitted to join in an action to restrain

another riparian owner from diverting

the water. Schultz v. Winter, 7 Nev. 130.

See, per contra, Foot v. Bronson, 4 Lans.

47, 52, in wliich such a union of different

owners wjis held proper; citing Reid r.

Gifford, Hopk. 416; Murray v. Hay, I

Barb. Ch. 59 ; Brady v. Weeks, 3 Barb.

157 ; and see Keyes v. Little York Gold,

&c. Co., 53 Cal. 724; Churchill r. Lauer,

84 Cal. 233. Such suit may be main-

tained by separate owners of distinct

parcels of land to restrain or remove a

to enforce the tru t, an<l to remove the
tru tee. Thi
ta tute i · general in it
terms, and applie to all t rustees and
tru. u . " po n petition r bill of any
per on in tere ·te<l in the execution of an
ex.pre tru. t, the Court of Chancery may
remove any tru. tee who ball ha,·e vio·
lated, or threatened to violate, hi trust:"'
'ompiled tat. of Minn., p. 3 4, § 26;
Goncelier u. Foret 4 Minn. 13.
ee
French i'. Gifford, 30 Iowa, 14 , 15 , 159.
J n the c e of a charitable tru t, any
beneficiary having an intere t in the u e
or in the nbj ect of the gift, has an unqu tion abl right to in titute a proceeding in equ ity for the purpo e of ecuring
a faithful execution of the beneficent objec of the f under of th charity. Bapt.
burch at Lauca ter v. Pre b. Church,
18 B .• Ion. 635, 641.
1 [Different riparian owner. of di tinct
par el· of rip rian lan d, who have a common gri ,·anc for an injur)' of the amo
Vi nd, inflictr>1l at the . am lime and by the
me at', tliou~h the injury riiffer in
rl gr c a: o •ad1 owner, may unite in a
r• 111111 n :ll'timt n njoin a higher riparian
cJ \ 11r>r fr(Jrn
<li,·erting or polluting th
~ r"tm · 'Lroh ·I I'. K rr , alt
u. (1900 ),
l •1 • • Y ..'30'3, 5 • • B 142. • • . o the
auch C .

( 1901), 25 Mont. 379, 65 Pac. 111; Brown
u. Canal and Re ervoir Co. (1899), 26
Colo. 66, 56 Pac. 183 ; Ronnow v. Delmue
(1 9:-), 23 Iev. 29, 41 Pac. 1074.]
2 P eck v. Elder, 3
and.£. 126. But
ix owner of di tinct tract of land
through which a tream ran were n t
permitted to join in an action to re train
another riparian owner from diverting
the water.
chnltz v. Winter, 7 Nev. 130.
, ee, per contra, Foot v. Bron ou, 4 L aos.
47, 52, in which such a union of different
owner wa held proper; citing eid l'.
Gifford, Bopk. 4 16; Murray u. Hay, l
Barb. Ch. 59; B rady u. Week , 3 Barb .
157; and ee Keye u. Little York old,
&c.
., 53 Cal. 724; Churchill '" Lauer,
4
al. 233.
uch uit may be mainf di tinct
tained by eparate owner
parcels f land to r e train r rem v a
nui auee. Pettebon v. Hamilton 40 \\ i:.
402 · William L'. mith, 22 id. 594 ; arn
v.
a.c ine, 4 id . 454-; Fir. t Tat . Bk. of
• ft. '\'"ernon 1: • • 'arll , 12 Ind . 20 1.
u ·h
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collection; and when the number of such owners is great, one

may sue as a representative for all the others.^ Also a number

of proprietors of adjacent and separate lots fronting on a street

through which a railroad was laid out, were permitted to join in

a suit for the purpose of preventing the company from construct-

ing its track in such a manner as to interfere with access to all

of their several lots alike. ^ The question as to the joinder of

plaintiffs who own distinct parcels of land, or who are clothed

with distinct primary rights of the same kind, which are all

interfered with and affected in the same manner by a common

wrong, has frequently arisen in actions brought by taxpayers and

freeholders to prevent or set aside some proceeding done under

the forms of public authority, and which is designed to create

and impose a public burden, such as a tax for special objects, an

assessment for some local improvement, a municipal bonding in

aid of some quasi public enterprise, and numerous other like

proceedings which create a public or municipal debt. Such

actions are permitted, and are freely used in most of the States,

although not allowed in New York and a few others. Where
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suits of this character are sustained by the courts, the question

has arisen, whether two or more taxpayers having distinct free-

holds, or distinct pieces of property subject to the burden, and

who have no connection except in the common wrong and in the

like relief demanded by all, may unite in the action, or whether

one may sue on behalf of all, or finally, whether each must bring

a separate suit to free his own property from the wrongful incum-

brance.^ It would seem, upon the principle of the decision last

1 Upingtoa v. Oviatt, 24 Ohio St. 232, owners of separate parcels of land were not

247 ; Glenn v. Waddell, 23 Ohio St. 605. allowed to join in a suit to quiet title.]

- Tate V. Ohio & Miss. R. Co., 10 Ind. 3 [^Street v. Town of Alden (1895), 62

174. [[Abutting land or lot owners may Minn. 160, 64 N. W. 157 : An action to set

unite as ])laintiffs to restrain the improper aside a judgment fraudulently obtained,

use of a street by a railroad company, and reversing an order of the town supervisors

to abate the nuisance, but cannot join in a vacating a road running through plain-

suit to recover damages : Youukin v. Mil- tiff's farm, is properly brought by plaintiff

waukee, etc. Co. (1901), 112 Wis. 15, 87 who is one of the legal voters who

N. W. 861. The same doctrine was stated petitioned for such vacating. See also

in Linden Land Co. v. Milwaukee Elec- McCaun v. City of Louisville (1901), —

trie, etc. Co. (1900), 107 Wis. 493, 83 Ky. — , 63 S. W. 446; Commonwealth

collection; and when the number of such owner
gr at, 011e
1
may ue a a re pre entative for all the oth r . AL o a numLer
of pr prietor of adjacent and eparate lot fronting on a street
through which a railroad wa laid out, were permitted t join in
a uit for the purpo e of preventing the company from constructing it track in such a manner as to int rfere with acce s to all
of their several lots alike. 2 The question as to the joinder of
plaintiffs who own distinct parcels of land, or who are clothed
with distinct primary rights of the same kind, which are all
interfered with and affected in the same manner by a common
wrong, has frequently arisen in actions brought by taxpayers and
freeholders to prevent or set aside some proceeding done under
the forms of public authority, and which is designed to create
and impo e a public burden, such as a. tax for special objects, an
assessment for some local improvement, a municipal bonding in
aid of some fJ.UCtsi public enterprise, and numerous other like
proceedings which create a public or municipal debt. Such
a~tions are permitted, and are freely used in most of the States,
although not allowed in New York and a few others. Where
suits of this character are sustained by the courts, the question
has arisen, whether two or more taxpayers having distinct freeholds, or distinct pieces of property subject to the burden, and
who have no connection except in the common wrong and in the
like relief demanded by all, may unite in the action, or whether
one may sue on behalf of all, or finally, whether each must bring
a separate suit to free his own property from the wrongful incumbrance.3 It would seem, upon the principle of the decision last

N. W. 851, where it was held, further, that v. Scott (1901), — Ky. — , 65 S. W. 596 ;

one could not sue for all, and an allega- Stiles v. City of Guthrie (1895), 3 OkLi.

tion in the complaint that plaintiff does 26, 41 Pac. 383. And see, generally, the

so is mere surplusage. In Utterback v. subject of one plaintiff suing on behalf of

Meeker (1896), 16 Wash. 185, 47 Pac. 423, others, *388 et ser/.]

1 Upington v. Oviatt, 24 Ohio St. 232,
247; Glenn v. Waddell, 23 Ohio St. 605.
2 Tate v. Ohio & Miss. R. Co., 10 Ind.
174. [Abutting land or lot owner may
unite as plaintiffs to restrain the improper
u e of a street by a railroad company, and
to abate the nuisance, but cannot join in a
suit to recover damages: Younkin v. Milwaukee, etc. Co. (1901), 112 Wis. 15, 87
N. W. 61. The same doctrine wa' stated
in Linden Land Co. v. Milwaukee Electric, etc. Co. (1900), l 07 Wis. 493, 83
N. W . 851, where it was held, further, that
one could not sue for all, and an allegation in the complaint that plaintiff does
so is mere surplusage. In Utterback v.
.Meeker (1896), 16 Wash . 185, 47 Pac.428,

owners of separate parcels of land were not
allowed to join in a suit to quiet title.]
3 [Street v. Town of Alden ( 1895), 62
.Minn. 160, 64- N. W. 157: An action to set
a:ide a judgment fraudulently obtained,
reversing an order of the town supervisors
vacating a road running through plaintiff's farm, is properly brought by plaintiff
who is one of the legal voters who
petitioned for such vacating. See also
Mc Cann v. City of Louisville ( 1901), Ky. -, 63 S. W. 446; Commonwealth
t'. Scott (1901), Ky.-, 65 S. W. 596;
Stiles v. City of Guthrie {189:1), 3 Okh
26, 41 Pac. 383. And see, genen1lly, the
subject of one plaintiff suing on behalf of
others, * 388 et seq.]

er
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quoted, that such a joinder was not only proper, but was in every-

way expedient ; but the cases have not been unanimous upon the

point, and some of them have distinctly pronounced against a

joint proceeding. In Wisconsin, where a number of freeholders,

owning distinct lots of land, and having no connection except

that they were all residents of the municipality, and whose per-

sonal property had been levied upon for the tax, and advertised

for sale, united in an action to set aside the entire proceedings

of the local authorities, and to procure the tax and all steps taken

in relation to it to be declared void, and to restrain the sale of

their property, it was held that these plaintiffs could not join in

a suit merely to prevent the sale of their property because their

interests were entirely several ; but that they could unite in an

action to avoid and set aside the proceedings of the municipal

authorities, and that the court, having thus acquired jurisdiction,.

could go on and administer complete relief.^ In another case,

two plaintiffs owning distinct lots in severalty, and suing on

behalf of all other taxpayers of the city, brought an action to set

aside a local assessment and tax made and levied by the city
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authorities, and to restrain the sale of their lots. It was held

that they could not maintain the joint action. The court said»

if the tax was illegal there was an apparent cloud upon each lot,

and each plaintiff was interested only in removing this cloud

from his own land; each and all might be interested in the legal

question involved in the suit; for if one had a right to remove

the cloud and to enjoin the assessment as illegal, for the same

reasons and upon the same evidence, each of the others might

obtain relief: but there was no such common pecuniar}' interest

as authorized them to unite in one suit and obtain the relief

demanded ; each could sue alone, and the others were not neces-

sary parties; this was not an action respecting a common fund,

nor to assert a common right, nor to restrain acts injurious to

property in which all the plaintiffs had a common interest.^ In

Ohio, two or more owners of separate lots assessed for a local

improvement may unite in an action to restrain the enforcement

' Peck I'. Beloit Sch. Dist. No. 4, 21 couclusions wliich they reach. See also

Wifl. 516. N>wtomb v. Horton, 18 Wis. 566, which

^ Harnes r. Beloit, 19 Wis. 93. 94, per maintains the same doctrine as Barnes v.

Downer J. It is impossilile to reconcile Beloit.

the reasoning in tliese two cases, or the

that uch a j inder was not only proper, but was in every
dient · but he cases have not been unanimou upon the
in t
some of them have di tinctl pronounc d against a.
j in pr ceeding. In \iVi consin, where a number of freeholders,
wning di tinct lots of land and ha iug n connection except
that they were all re idents of the municipality, and whose peron 1 proper y had been levied upon for the tax, and ad erti cl
f r ·al , unite in an action to set a ide the entire proceedings
of t e local authorities, and to procure the tax and all steps taken
in rel· tion to it t be declared void, and to restrain the sale of
their property, it was held that these plaintiffs could not join in
a uit merely to prevent the ale of their property because their
intere t were entirely several; but that they could unite in an
ction t avoid and set aside the proceedings of the municip 1
uthori.tie , and that the court, having thus acquired jurisdiction
could go n and administer complete relief. 1 In another case,
two laintiffs owning di tinct lots in severalty, and suing on
ehalf of all other taxpayers of the cit}r, brought an action to set
i e a local assessment and tax made and levied by the city
authori ti , an l to restrnin the sale of their lots. It was held
th t they could not maintain the joint action. The court said,
if the tax was illegal there was an apparent cloud upon each lot,
an each plaintiff was interested only in removing this cloud
fr m i wn land; each and all might be interested in the legal
q ue ion involved in the suit; for if one had a right to remove
t h clou and to enjoin the asse ment as illegal, for the ame
r ea on an upon the same evidence, each of the others migh
o tain relief: but there was n such common pecuniary inter t
a uth rized them to unite in one suit and obtain the relief
d mantle ; ea h could sue alone, and the others were not nee ry artie ; hi wa n t an action r p cting a common fun ,
r t a ert a; common rigbt, nor to re train acts injuriou to
r perty in which all the plaintiff had a c mm on intere t. 2 In
l i tw
r m re wn r f eparat 1 ts a
ed for a local
e nt m y um in an acti n t r train the enforcement
w y e

1 P •('k v. B loit
W i . 5 16.
2 Ba r n . i'.
J QW U r ,J Jt j

h.

i t . N o. 4, 21

ouclu. i n whi h th y r ach.
e al e>
P.w · mb v. lI rton , 1 Wi . 566, whi bi
m, intains the Ram e d trine a Barne v-.
1 j t.
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and collection, when the tax is claimed for the same reason to be

invalid as to all.^ In Kansas a distinction is made depending-

upon the nature of the tax itself. If the tax is wholly illegal,

that is, illegal as applied to all persons and property, — as, for

example, a tax to pay the interest on illegal bonds, — any number

of taxpayers may unite in the action. ^ If, however, the tax is

valid as a tax, — as, for example, the ordinary county or State

tax, — and becomes illegal for some cause only as it applies to

certain persons or property, then each person severally interested

as the owner of distinct and separate lots of land must sue alone ^

there can be no joinder by taxpayers who have no common prop-

erty.^ In Iowa it has been recently held that taxpayers owning

separate property cannot unite, nor can one sue on behalf of all

others similarly situated, in an action to restrain the enforcement

and collection of an illegal tax, but each must bring an action for

himself.*

§ 184. * 270. Miscellaneous Cases. Joinder of Holders of

Separate Liens, Creditors of Corporations. A few other miscel-

laneous cases of distinct interests may be mentioned. When
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several persons have simultaneous but entirely separate me-

chanic's liens upon the premises of the same person for work

done and materials furnished by them, they cannot all, nor can

any two or more of them, unite in an action brought to enforce

and foreclose such liens under the statute.^ Under the con-

struction given to statutes of Ohio, making the shareholders in

corporations liable in certain contingencies to the creditors of the

companies, it is held that a suit should be brought by or for all

the creditors who come within the conditions; that is, all these

1 Upiugton V. Oviatt, 24 Ohio St. 232, ^ Harsh v. Morgan, 1 Kan. 293, 298.

247 ; Glen v. VVaddell, 23 Ohio St. 60.5. The following are further illustrations of

2 Wyandotte, etc. Bridge Co. i\ Wyaii- the same general doctrine : actions by a

dotte, 10 Kan. 326 ; Gilmore y. Norton, 10 stockholder or the stockliolders against

Kan. 491 ; Gilinore v. Fox, 10 Kan. hOd. the corporation or its managing officers ;

•* Hudson V. Atchison Cy. Com'rs, 12 Osgood r. Maguire, 61 N. Y. 524; Youug

Kan. 140, 146, 147. v. Drake, 8 Huu, 61 ; Dousman v. Wis., etc.

* Fleming v. Mershon, 36 Iowa, 413, Miu. Co., 40 Wi.s. 418; Rogers r. Lafay-

416-420. The question was carefully ex- ette Agric. Works, 52 Ind. 296, and numer-

amined with a reference to numerous de- ous cases cited ; Tippecanoe Cy. Com'rs

cisions of equity courts. Cole .1. dissented r. Lafayette, etc. Tl. K., 50 Ind. 85 ; action

in a very able opinion containing a review to remove a cloud, Pier v. Fond du Lac,

of all the authorities, pp 421-427. For 38 Wis. 470 ; action by one firm against

and collection, when the tax ii:s claimed for the same reason to be
invalid as to all. 1 In Kan as a di tinction is made depending
upon the nature of the tax itself. If the tax i wholly illegal,
that is, illegal as applied to all persons and property, - as, for
example, a tax to pay the interest on illegal bonds,- any number
of taxpayers may unite in the action. 2 If, however, the tax i
valid as a tax, - as, for example, the ordinary county or tate
tax, - and becomes illegal for some cause only a it applies to
certain persons or property, then each person severally interested
as the owner of distinct and eparate lots of land must sue alone;
there can be no joinder by taxpayers who have no common property. 3 In Iowa it bas been recently held that taxpayers owning
separate property cannot unite, nor can one sue on behalf of all
others similarly situated, ju an action to restrain the enforcement
and collection of an illegal tax, but each must bring an action for
himself. 4
§ 184. * 270. Miscellaneous Cases. Joinder of Holders of
Separate Liens. Creditors of Corporations.
A few other miscellaneous cases of distinct interests may be mentioned. When
several persons have simultaneous but entirely separate mechanic's liens upon the premises of the same person for work
done and materials furnished by them, they cannot all, nor can
any two or mo1:e of them, unite in an action brought to enforce
and foreclose such liens under the statute. 5 Under the construction given to statutes of Ohio, making the shareholders in
corporations liable in certain contingencies to the creditors of the
companies, it is held that a suit should be brought by or for all
the creditors who come within the conditions; that is, all these

an extended discussion of tin's subject, another firm where there is a coinmoni

see 1 Pom. Kq. Jur. §§ 259, 260, 265, 266, partner, Ford v. Stuart Indep. Sch. Dist.,

270, and notes. 4u Iowa. 294.

1 Dpington v. Oviatt, 24 Ohio St. 232,
247; Glen v. Waddell, 23 Ohio St. 605.
2 Wyandotte, etc. Bridge Co. v. W yaudotte, 10 Kau. 326; Gilmore v. Norton, 10
Kan. 491 ; Gilmore v. Fox, 10 Ka.n. fiOJ.
a Hudson v. Atchison Cy. Cum'rs, 12
Kan . 140, 146, 147.
,,.

5 Harsh v. Morgan, l Kan . 293, 298 .
The fo llowing are further illu trations of
the same general doctrine: actions by a.
stockholder or the stockholders against
the corporation or its managing officers;
Osgood v. Maguire, 61 N. Y. 524; Young
v. Drake, 8 Huu, 61; Dousman v. Wis., etc.
4 Fleming v. Mershon, 36 Iowa, 413,
Min. Co., 40 \Vis. 418; Rogers v. Lafay416-420. The question was carefully ex- ette Agric. Work , 52 Ind. 296, and numeramined with a referen~e to nnmerou de- ous ca es cited; Tippecanoe Cy. Com'rs
cision· of equity courts. Cole ,J. dissented i·. Lafayette, etc. R. R, 50 Ind. 85; action.
in a vp,ry abl e opinion containing a review to remove a cloud, Pier v. Fond du Lac,
of all the authorities, pp 421-427 . For 38 Wi s. 470; action by one firm again , t:
au ext\'nded discussion of this subject, anoth er firm wh ere there i a common
see l Porn . T<:q. Jur. §§ 259, 260, 265, 266, partner, Ford v. Stuart In<lep. Seh. Dist .•
270, aucl uutes.
4 6 I uw:l., 294.
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creditors should actually be made plaintiffs, or the action should

be in the name of one for the benefit of all.^

SECTION SIXTH.

re litor houl actuall - be made plain iff , or the action hou1d
b in the name of one for the benefit of all. 1

WHO MAT BE JOINKD AS DEFENDANTS.

§ 185. * 271. Statutory Provisions. The Sections of the various

State codes and practice acts which prescribe rules for the proper

E 1 ON

selection of defendants are as follows ; one of them is found in

IXTH.

all the statutes, and expresses the doctrine in its general form :

WHO

*' Any person may be made a defendant who has or claims an

~IA Y

BE

JOI~SD

\..

DEFE DANTS.

interest in the controversy adverse to the plaintiff, or who is a

necessary party to a complete determination, or settlement of the

questions involved therein." ^ To this general declaration there

is added in a few States the following particular clause : " And

in an action to recover the possession of real estate, the landlord

and tenant thereof may be joined as defendants, and any person

claiming title or a right of possession to real estate may be made a

party plaintiff or defendant, as the case may require, to any such

■action." ^ The codes also all contain the following provisions,

either embraced in a single section or separated into two, namely :
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" Of the parties to the action, those who are united in interest

must be joined as plaintiffs or defendants ; but if the consent of

any one who should have been joined as plaintiff cannot* be

obtained, he may be made a defendant, the reason thereof being

stated in the complaint.* When the question is one of common

or general interest of many persons, or when the parties are very

1 Umsted v. Buskirk, 17 Ohio St. 113. » New York, § 118 (447, 1503, 1598) ;

One creditor may sue on behalf of all to South Carolina, § 141 ; North Carolina,

enforce .stockholders' liability for unpaid § 61 ; California, § 379; QUtah, Kev. St.,

8ub.scriptions in California : Baines v. Bab- 1898, §2914; North Dakota, Rev. Codes,

cock (Cal., Sept. 2.J, 1891), 27 Pac. 674. 1899, § 5230; South Dakota, Ann. St.,

2 (Jhio. § 35; Kansas, § 36; Iowa, 1901, § 6078; Montana, § 581; Idaho,

§ 2547; Nebraska, § 41; Nevada, § 13; Code Civ. Pro., 1901, §3167; Missouri,

iJregon, § 380; hut applied only to e(iuita- Rev. St. 1899, § 543.J

bleactioiiH; ^Oklahoma, St. 1893, § 3908; ■• Q" If such a defendant answers and

Wa-shington, Bal. Code, § 4833, in some- admits the aliej^ations of the complaint,

what different form ; Wyoinin;^, Rev. St., .ind asks the same relief as the jjhiintiff,

1899, §3480; Colorado, § 11; Arkansas*, he will be regarded as a plaintiff and given

Sand. & llilKs DIl'., § 5630; Connecticut, relief as such: Cole v. Getziuger (1897).

Gen. St., 1902, § 618 ; Wisconsin, St., 1898, 96 Wis. 559, 71 N. W. 75.]

§ 2G03; Indiana, Burns' St., 1901, § 269;

*2

~ory Provisions.

The secti ns of the variou
tate co e an practic act" which prescribe rule for the proper
election of defendant are a foll ws · one of them i found in
all the tatute and expr .' es the doctrine in its general form:
' · n r per on ma\. be made a defendant who ha or claim an
intere t in the controYer y adverse t the plaintiff or who i , a
nece ary party to a complete determina i n, or settlement of the
que tion involved therein. ' 2 To thi general declaration there
i. added in a few tate the following particular clause :
n
in an action to recover the po se sion of real e tate, the landlor
an tenant thereof ma,y be joine a defendant and any person
claiming title or a riD'ht of po se ion to real estate may be made a
part plaintiff or defendant, as the ca e may require, to any such
·artion. 3 The code als all contain the following provi ·ion ,
ei her embraced in a ingle section or separated into two, namely:
f the partie t he action, tho e who are united in intere t
mu t be joined a plaintiff or defendants; but if the con e t of
any one who hould ha e been joined as plaintiff ~&nn t· be
obtained he may be made a defendant, the rea on thereof being
sta.ted in the complaint. 4 \Vhen the ques ion i one of common
or general intere t of many I erson or when the par ie are very
185.

1. Sta ':

T

Kentucky, § :i3.]

1 Tm ted v. Bu kirk, 17 Ohio
t. 113.
One creditor may ne on behalf of all to
enforce stockholder ' liabi\ii;y for unpaid
u li. criptiJn · in California: Baine. v. Babcoc · ( al, .'ept. 2:3, 1 91 ), 2i Pac. 674.
2 IJhio, § 35; Kausa , § 36; Iowa,
2547 ; • ·ebra ka, • 41; Ne\•ada,
13;
cir ~o n , § 3 o; lint applied 011lx to qui ta·
LI a c tion · ; [< >k .ahoma, t. l ~ 9.'3 § 390 ;
:\'. hi 11gu:111, Bal. Cod , § 4 3:3, in ~orne
h.Lt cli ff •r ·nt form ; Wyoming, I e1· , t.,
3 4 0 ; ol1Jratlo, , 11 ; Arkan ·ru,
111 1 • • Jli ir Di!.!., § 5630;
.onn >cticut,
" n . • t, 190 2, §GI ; ·w i:con:i11,, t., I 9 ,
ro3 ; Ju Ii.1n- , Burn ' • t., 1901 , § 269 ;
!'en uc · ~-, · 23.]

ew York, § 11 {447, 1503, 159 ) ;
outh arolina, § 141; Torth arolioa,
§ 61 ; alifornia, 379; [Ctah, Rev. t.,
l 9, § 2914; ... 1 or th Dakota, I ev. ode,
1 9,
5230;
uth I akota, A nn. t.,
1901, § 60i8; :\Iontana
5 1 ; I<lah ,
ode Ch·. Pro., 1901 ,
316- ; Ii ouri,
R v. t. 1 9 , 543.J
4 [" If uch a <l f ndant ao. w r and
admit the allegations of the omplaint,
nud n ks the ame reli f a the plaintiff,
b will L regard cl
a plaintiff and giv n
relief a . uch : ol v. etzioger (I 897),
96 Wi . 559, 71 T. W. 75.J
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numerous, and it may be impracticable to bring them all before

the court, one or more may sue or defend for the benefit of the

■whole." ^ Finally, a section is found in every code particularly

referring to the case of persons severally liable on the same in-

strument, of which the ordinary form is as follows : " Persons

severally liable upon the same obligation or instrument, includ-

ing the parties to bills of exchange and promissory notes, may

all or any of them be included in the same action at the option

of the plaintiff." ^

§ 186. * 272. Subject-Matter and Plan of Treatment herein.

The subject-matter of the present section is the interpretation of

the general clauses of the statute quoted above, — the doctrine of

parties defendant in its general scope and import, — the general

rules which prescribe the choice and direct the joinder of defend-

ants in civil actions of all kinds, whether legal or equitable. The

special cases described in the other clauses of the statute, —

namely, that of one person suing or being sued as the repre-

^ These provisions are thus found as a
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single section in New York, § 119 (448) ;

California, § 382 ; South Carulina, § 142 ;

North Carolina, § 62 ; Nevada, § 14 (see

page 81, supra, note 2) ; Oregon. § 381 ;

£Utah, Rev. St., 1898, § 2917; North

Dakota, Rev. Codes, 1899, § 5232 ; South

numerou , and it may be impracticable to bring them all before
the court, one or more may sue or defend for the benefit of the
whole. ' 1 Finally, a section i found in every code particularly
referring to the ca of per 'On severally liable on the same intrument, of which the ordinary form i as follows: "Persons
severally liable upon the same obligation or instrument, including the partie to bills of exchange and promi ory notes, may
all or any of them be included in the same action at the option
of the plaintiff.' 2
§ 186. * 272. Subject-Matt er and Plan of Treatment herein.
The subject-matter of the present section is the interpretation of
the general clauses of the statute quoted above, - the doctrine of
parties defendant in its general scope and import, -the general
rules which pre cribe the choice and direct the joincler of defendants in civil actions of all kinds, whether legal or equitable. The
special cases described in the other clauses of the statute, namely, that of one person suing or being sued as the repre-

Dakota, Ann. St., 1901, § 6079; Arizona,

Rev. St., 1901, § 1313; Montana, § 584;

Idaho, Code Civ. Pro., 1901, § 3170; Colo-

rado, § 12; Indiana, Burns' St., 1901,

§270; Wisconsin, St., 1898, §2604.] In

the following States they are separated

into two sections, corresponding to the tv/o

paragraphs of the text : Ohio, §§ 36, 37

Kansas, §§ 37, 38 ; Iowa, §§ 2548, 2549

^Nebraska, §§ 42, 43; Kentucky, §§ 24

25; Oklahoma, St., 1893, §§ 3909, 3910

Washington, Bal. Code, §§ 4833, 4834

Wyomiug, Rev. St., 1899, §§ 3481, 3482

Arkansas Sand. & Hills Dig., §§ 5631

5632; Connecticut, Gen. St., 1902, §§ 617

619.] The Missouri code contains only

the first pjiragraph. Rev. St., 1899, § 544

2 New York, § 120 (454) ; Kansas, § 39

Nebraska, § 44 ; Ohio, § 38 ; Oregon, § 36

South Carolina, § 143; North Carolina

§ 63 ; Nevada, § 15 ; [^Minnesota, St., 1894

§ 5166, "and sureties on the same instru

meut;" Utah, Rev. St., 1898, § 2918

North Dakota, Rev. Codes, 1899, § 5223,

in somewhat different form ; South Da-

kota, Ann. St., 1901, § 6080, same form as

in North Dakota ; Arizona, Rev. St., 1901,

§ 1306, in somewhat different form ; Okla-

homa, St., 1893, § 3911 ; Washington, Bal.

Code, § 4836 ; Montana, § 585 ; Idaho,

Code Civ. Pro., 1901, §3171; Wyoming,

Rev. St., 1899, § 3483 ; Colorado, § 13 ; In-

diana, Burns' St., 1901, § 271 ; Wisconsin,

St., 1898, § 2609.] In California, § 383,

i.s the same, adding, " and sureties on the

same or separate instruments," after the

words " promissory notes." For tlie corre-

sponding sections in the codes of Kentucky,

Iowa, and Missouri, see infi-a, § * 403. In

these codes the change in the common-

law doctrine is carried to a much greater

length ; tlie distinctions between joint,

joint and several, and several liabilities

are utterly abrogated. The same radi-

1 These provisionl'I are thus found as a
sing le section in New York,§ 119 (448);
California, § 382; South Carolina, § 142;
North Carolina, § 62; Nevada, § U (see
page 81. supra , note 2) ; Oregon, § 381 ;
[Utah, Rev. St., 1898, § 2917; North
Dakota, Rev . Code , 1899, § 5232 ; South
Dakota, Ann. St., 190 1, § 6079; Arizona,
Rev. St., 1901 , § 13 13 ; Montana, § 584;
Idaho, Code Civ. Pro., 190 1, § 3170; Colorado, § 12 ; Indiana, Burns' t. , 190 1,
§ 270 ; Wisconsin , St., 1898, § 2604.J In
the following States they a re separated
into two sections, corresponding t o the n·;o
paragraphs of the text: Ohio, §§ 36, 37;
K ansas, §§ 3 7, 38; Iowa, §§ 2548, 2549;
[Nebra ka, §§ 42, 43; Kentucky, §§ 24,
25; Oklahoma. St., 1893, §§ 3909, 39 10 ;
Washington, Bal. Code, §§ 483.'3, 48.'34;
Wyoming, Hev. St., 1899, §§ 3481, 34 2;
Arkan as Sand. & Hill·s Dig., §§ 5631,
5632; Connecticut, Gen. St., 1902, §§ 617,
6 19.J The J. lissouri code contain ouly
the first pp.ragraph, Rev. St., 1899, § 5-!4 .
2 New York,§ 120 (454); Kansas,§ 39 ;
~ebraska, § 44; Ohio, § 38; Oregon,§ 36;
, outh Carolina, § 143 ; North Carolina,
§ 61; NeYalla. § 15; [Min neota, t., 1 94,
§ 5166, "and su retie - on the same instrument;" Utah, Rev. St., 1898, § 2918;
North Dakota, Rev. Codes, 189 9, § 5223,

in somewhat different form; South Dakota, Ann. St., 190 1, §GO 0, same form a
in North Dakota; Arizona, Rev. St., 1901,
§ 1306, in somewhat different form; Oklahoma, St., 1893, § 3!Hl; Washington, Bal.
Code, § 4836; Montana, § 585; Idaho,
Code Civ. Pro., 190 1, § 3171; Wyoming,
R ev. St., 1899, § 3483; Colorado, § 13 ; Indiana, Burn." St., 190 1, § 271; Wiscon in,
St., 1898, § 2609.J In California, § 383,
is the same, adding, "and suretie on th e
same or separate instruments," after the
wortls" promissory notes." For the corresponding sections in the codes of Kentucky,
Iowa, and Missouri, see infra, § * 403. In
these codes the change in the commonlaw doctrine is carried to a much greater
length; the distinctions between joint,
joint and several, and seYeral liabilit ie
are utterly abrogated. The same radical change is made in North Carolina.
" § 63 a. In all cases of joi nt contract of
co-partners in trade or others, ·uits may
be brought and pro ecuted on the same
against all or any number of the per 011
making uch contrar;t." Placing" co-partners" in the same position as "joint tenants" and "tenants in common," is a very
strange provision, and was doubtless an
oversight.
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sentative of others, and that of persons severally liable upon the

same instrument — will be separately discussed in the two

sections which follow the present one.

§ 187. * 286. Intent and Object of Legislation. Principle of Con-

struction. Conclusions Reached in Preceding Section Adopted and

Repeated here. Changes Made should apply to all Actions. Posi-

· e of o her and hat of persons severally liable upon the
<me in trument 'll be separa ely di ·cu ed in the two
ection ' hich follo t he re ent one.
187. • 286 . Intent and Object of Legislation. Principle of Con-

tion of Courts. What is the general intent and object of the

legislation in reference to parties defendant, taken as a whole ?

What principle of construction should be adopted in arriving at

the practical meaning and effect of the various provisions of the

State codes already quoted? These questions, which are cer-

tainly fundamental, were thoroughly discussed in the last section,

and a reiteration of the reasoning there presented would be en-

tirely useless. It cannot be doubted that the legislature proposed

to itself the same object, and was actuated by the same intent,

in the rules which it has prescribed for defendants as in those

which it has adopted for plaintiffs. I dwell upon the fact, which

is apparent upon the most cursory reading, that the clauses con-

cerning defendants are more full and detailed, and more clearly
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set forth the equitable doctrines, than those concerning plaintiffs.

This fact is very obvious when we refer to the subsequent sec-

tions of the codes defining the forms of judgments, and authoriz-

ing a severance among the parties in rendering judgment, and

also when we refer to the special provisions in many codes which

utterly abolish the ancient legal distinctions between joint, joint

and several, and several liabilities. The conclusions reached in

the preceding section, and repeated here, are the following : The

legislature does not seem to have intended to abandon the ancient

doctrine in respect to joint and several rights ; and, in fact, the

complete adoption of the equitable principles which regulate

the union of parties would not require such a change, for in

equity, as well as in law, all persons having a joint right must

in general unite in a suit to enforce that right. The legislature,

on the other hand, does seem to have intended to effect a change

more or less thorough in the common-law rules which determine

the differences between joint, joint and several, and several lia-

bilities, and which regulate the selection and union of defendants

in the case of one or the other of these habilities. This intent,

suflficiently indicated in all the codes, is placed beyond a doubt

by the express provisions of others. The general conclusions

s truc tio n.

Conclusions Reached in Preceding Section Adopted and

R e peate d here .

Changes Made should apply to all Actions.

Posi-

W ha is he general intent and object of the
1 gi lation in reference o par ·e defendan t aken as a whole 7
-W hat rinciple of con truction hould b adopted in arriving at
h practical meaning and effect of the variou provisions of the
tate codes already quo ted ? The e que ion , which are cera.inly fundamental we re thoroughly discussed in the last section,
and a reiteration of the reasoning there presented would be enirely useless. It cannot be doubted that the legislature proposed
o itself the same object, and was actuated by the same intent,
in t he rules which it has prescribed for defendants as in those
which it has adopted for plaintiffs. I dwell upon the fact, which
i apparen t u pon the most cursory reading, that the clauses conerning defendants are more full and detailed, and more clearly
et for h the equitable do ctrines, than those concerning plain tiffs.
Thi fact i very obvious when we refer to the subsequent section of the codes defining the forms of judgments, and authorizing a everance among the parties in rendering judgment and
al o when we refer t o the pecial provi ions in many cod whi h
tterly aboli h the ancien t leg al distincti n between join joi
nd e er 1 and everal liabilitie . The on lusi n reach d in
he preceding section and repeated her are h folio ing : The
1 gi lature doe not seem o ha e intend to ab ndon be ancient
octrin e in re ect to join and e eral right. ; an in fact he
mplete adoption of th equi able rincipl
t e un ion of parties woul n t requir u cb a chang f r in
uity a
ell
in law, ll person h ving a j int right m
in general unite in a u it to enforce that ri ht. The 1 · la ure,
n the other ban
em to hav in
to ff ct a hange
hi h deter ·
t io n of Courts.

ex pre

rovi ion

co
,
th r .

l

GENERAL DOCTRINES A

TO DEFENDANTS.

2 :;

GENERAL DOCTRINES AS TO DEFENDANTS. 26:)

of the discussion concerning plaintiffs, found in the last preced-

ing section, are equally true of parties defendant. Believing

them to be a correct interpretation of the codes, I adopt them

here without any unnecessary repetition of the reasoning by

which they were established.^ The rules which the legislatures

have put into a statutory form are confessedly the general doc-

trines of equity concerning defendants.^ They apply in terms

to the civil action appropriate for the pursuit of all remedies ;

no exceptions are made or suggested. The design of the legis-

lature is therefore plain, that these equitable doctrines and rules

should be controlling in all cases, and should not be confined

to actions which are equitable in their nature. It must be con-

fessed at once, however, that this conclusion has not been ac-

cepted by all the courts, nor in its full extent, perhaps, by any.

The general expressions of the codes, although their main design

is e^^ident enough, have not been regarded as sufficiently explicit,

detailed, and peremptory to abrogate and sweep away all of the

long-settled particular rules of the former system. In other

words, the change, as it has been wrought out by judicial de-
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cision, has been made partial and incomplete, and has been far

more radical and perfect in certain of the States than in others.

It is impossible to lay down in an explicit manner any more defi-

nite principle of interpretation than that here given. The actual

position of the courts must be learned from their decision of par-

ticular cases, and from the special rules concerning defendants in

various classes of actions which have been established by them,

and which will be detailed in the following portions of this

section.^

1 See supra, §§*196-*200. termine who is liable, and who is not,

2 Qn Demarest v. Holdeman (1901), except upon a full hearing in which all

157 Ind. 467, 62 N. E. 17, it was said that the persons in any way affected or inter-

the section of the code providing that any ested are before the court, equity permits

person may be made a defendant wlio has the joinder of all those so related to tiie

■or claims an interest in the controversy controversy, and who have a common

adverse to the plaintiff, or who is a neces- interest in some one or more branches

sary party to a complete determination or of it. "J

settlement of the questions involved, is ^ The general theory of the codes, ami

substantially a re-enactment of the rules the principles of the new procedure in

governing pleadings in chancery, and they respect of parties defendant, are discussed

apply to all suits at law as well as in with more or less fulness in the following

equity. And "where the subject of the cases: Wilson v. Castro, 31 Cal. 420;

of the discussion concerning plaintiff -, found in the last preceding ection, are equally true of partie def n ant. Believing
them to be a correct interpretation of the codes, I adopt them
h ere without any unnecessary repetition of the reasoning by
which they were established. 1 The rules which the legi latur s
have put into a tatutory form are confessedly th general do trines of equity concerning defendants.2 They apply in t rm
to the civil action appropriate for the pursuit of all remedie ;
no exceptions are made or suggested. The de ign of the legi lature is therefore plain, that these equitable doctrines and rul s
hould be controlling in all cases, and should not be confined
to actions which are equitable in their nature. It must be confe ed at once, however, that this conclusion has not been accepted by all the courts, nor in its full extent, perhaps, by any.
The general expressions of the codes, although their main design
is e-vident enough, have not been regarded as sufficiently explicit,
detailed, and peremptory to abrogate and sweep away all of the
long-settled particular rules of the former system. In other
words, the change, as it has been wrought out by judicial deci ion, has been made partial and incomplete, and has been far
more radical and perfect in certain of the States than in others.
It is impossible to lay down in an explicit manner any more definite principle of interpretation than that here given. The actu al
position of the courts must be learned from their decision of particular cases, and from the special rules concerning defendants in
various classes of actions which have been established by them,
and which will be detailed in the following portions of this
section. 3

action has become so complicated and en- Bowers v. Keesecher, 9 Iowa, 422; Nelson

tangled that the rights of the parties are v. Hart, 8 Ind. 293 ; Braxton v. State, 25

involved in doubt, and it is difficult to de- Ind. 82 ; Tinkum i'. O'Neale, 5 Nev. 93;

See supra, §§ * 196-* 200.
Qn Demarest v. H oldeman (1901),
157 Ind. 467, 62 N. E. 17, it was said that
th e section of the code providing that any
p er ·ou may be made a defendant who has
<> r claim an in tere t in th e controver y
adver e to the plaintiff, or who is a nece sary party to a co mplete determination or
ttlement of th e que tions invohed, i
substantially a re-e nactment of the rule
governing pleadings in cha ncer y, and they
.apply to all uits at la w as well a in
equity . And "where the , ulijert of the
action has become so compli cated and entangled that the rights of th e parties are
involved in doubt, an d it is difficu lt to de1

2

termine who is liable, and who is not,
ex cept upon a full hearing in which all
the persons in any way affected or intere, ted are before the court, equi ty permits
th e joinder of all tho e so related to the
controversy, and who have a com mon
interest in some one or more branches
of it."]
3 The general theory of the code , au<l
th e prin cipl es of the new procedu re in
re pect of parties defendant, are di cussed
with more or le s fulnes in the follow in g
cases: \Vil on v. Ca tro, 31
al. 420 ;
Bowers v. I\:eesecher, 9 Iowa, 422; ~elson
v. Hart, 8 Ind. 293 ; Braxton v. tate, 25
In d. 82 ; Tinkum v. O'Neale, 5 rev. 93;

_,
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Particular Rules and Doctrines.

Particular Rules and D octrines.

S 188. * 287. How take Advantage of Nonjoinder of Defendants.

"Waiver. Power of Cdurt herein. Before proceeding to the ex-

uniiiKition in detail of the particular rules and doctrines as to

defendants, which have been established by judicial decision, 1

sluill inquire how the questions may be raised in the progress of

an action; when the objection of a misjoinder or a nonjoinder is

waived; and what is the effect of such an error in the proceed-

ings, if properly brought before the court for adjudication. I

have already quoted and discussed the statutory provisions which

prescribe the modes of raising the questions in reference to

plaintiffs ; ^ and the same rules exist in the case of defendants,

for the language of the codes in defining these methods applies

alike to both parties.^ It was shown, in the paragraphs referred

to, that "defect" of parties refers solely to the now- joinder of the

proper plaintiffs or defendants, — to the fact of too feiv parties.

This construction is universal.^' It is settled by an overwhelm-

ing and unanimous array of authorities, (1) that if the defect of

parties defendant — as thus defined — appears on the face of the
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complaint or petition, the defendant who desires to raise the

question must demur upon that specific ground, an allegation of

the defect in the answer as a defence being nugatory; (2) when

the defect does not thus appear on the face of the plaintiff's

pleading, the defendant must raise the objection in his answer as

a defence; and, (3) if both of these methods are omitted, or if

one of them is employed when the other is proper, the defendant

waives all objection to the defect or nonjoinder.* In no case can

Smetters v. Rainey, 14 Ohio St. 287, 291 ; Dist. Tp. v. Pratt, 17 Iowa, 16; Byers v.

Union Banic v. Bell, U Ohio St. 200, 211. Kodabaugh, 17 Iowa, 53.

Where a demand exist.s in favor of a firm, ^ Ibid.; Truesdale v. Rhodes, 26 Wis.

and one partner refuses to join as a jjlain- 215, 219, 220. Read i'. Sang, 21 Wis 678,

liff, he may he m.ade a defendant in an laid down a different rule, but the Wis-

ordinary legal action brought by his co- consin court is now in harmony with those

partM<rs to recover the debt. Hill r. of all the other States. See also Marsh r.

Mar.xh. 40 Iiid. 218. This ruling, in my WaupacnCy. Sup.. 38 Wis. 250; Great W.

opinion, exhibits the true intent of the Compound Co. r. yEtna Ins. Co., 40 id. 373.

codes in the clearest possible manner. ♦ Bevier c. Dillingham. 18 Wis. 529;

1 See supra, §§ •200, «207. Burhop v. Milwaukee^ 18 Wis. 431 ; Cord

^ .See tlie citations from the codes, and i-. Hirsch, 17 Wis. 403 ; Carney v. LaCros.-^,

the cases collected supra, §§ * 200, *207 ; etc. R. Co., 15 Wis. 503 ; Lowry v. Harris,

188.

2 7.

How take Advantage of Nonjoinder of Defendants.

Waiver.
Power of Court herein.
Befor pr ce <ling to th
xa uin, tion in t1et· il of t] e particular rule and doctrine a t
l f n l. nt , which ha · been e.. tabli hed bY judicial deci ion I
·ball in uire how the q ue ti on ma · b rai eel in the progre of
. n :. ·tion · w 1 n the objection of a mi join l r or a nonjoind r i . .
waiY tl · and what i . . the effect of sue 1 an error in the proceedin r, if properly brought before he court for adjudication . I
h y already quoted and di cu sed the tatutory provisions hich
pre cribe the rn de of rai ·in 0 the que tion in referenc to
plaintiff ; 1 and the ame rule exi t in th ca e of defendant
for t 1 lanc:rua(J'e of the code in definin 0 the e method applie . .
alik to both partie .2 It was hown in th paragraphs referred
to, that defect of partie. refers solely to th non- joincler of t]
proper plaintiff or defendant , - to the fact f too few parLi
' hi con truction i univer al. 3 • It i ettl cl by an overwhelmin0 and unanimou array of authorities (1) that if the clefec of
I arti
defendant- a thus defined - app ar on the face of the
complaint or petition the defendant who de. ires to rai e the
que ti n mu t demur upon tha.t pecific gro ml an all o-ation of
the ef ct in th an wer a a. defence bein 0 nugatory · (2) wben
th d feet do
not tlrn appear on the face of the plaintiff
ple clinO' the defendant must raise tbe objecti n in hi an wer a
l fen ·e · and (3) if both of the e method are omitted or if
one of th m i. em lo ed when the other i' I rop r ~he defen nt
a1v
all uj ction to the defect or nonjoind r. 4 In no ca c n

Hill I'. Marsh, 40 Ind. 218; .Moruan v. 12 Minn. 255; Mitchell v. Bank of St.

Carroll, 35 Iowa, 22, 24, 25 ; Beckwith v. Paul, 7 Minn. 252 ; Carr v. Waldron, 44

Darg-rl.s, 13 lowa, 303; Sioux City Sch. Mo. 393; Makepeace v. Davis, 27 Ind.

"a, 303; • i iu.·

avi:, 2i lml
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this objection be raised by a demurrer on the ground that the

pleading does not state facts sul'ficient to constitute a cause of

action. 1 Although this rule is so firmly settled, yet if, on the

trial, or even on appeal, the court sees that other parties are

indispensable to a full determination of the questions at issue,

it may, on its own motion, even though the defect has not been

pointed out by answer or demurrer, order the additional parties

to be brought in.^ This power is expressly given by all the

352 ; Little v. Johnson, 26 Ind. 170 ; John-

son V. Britton, 23 Ind. 105 ; Shane v.

this objection be rai ed by a demurrer on the ground that the
pleading does not stat fact ufficient to con titute a cause of
action. 1 Although this rule is o firmly ettl d, yet if, on the
trial, or C\'en on appeal, the ourt sees that other parties are
inclispen able to a full determination of the que tions at i ue,
it may, on its own motion, even though the defect has not been
pointed out by answer or demurrer, order the additional parties
to be brought in . 2 This power is expressly given by all tb e

Lowry, 48 Ind. 205, 206 ; Strong v. Down-

ing, 34 Ind. 300 ; Turner v. First National

Bank, 26 Iowa, 5G2 ; Hosley v. lilack, 28

N. Y. 438 ; Kingsland v. Braisted, 2 Laus.

17 : Sager v. Nichols, 1 Daly, 1 ; Bridge v.

Payson, 5 Sandf. 210; Lewis v. Williams,

3 Minn. 151 ; Hier t: Staples, 51 N. Y.

136; Fort Stanwix Bank v. Leggett, 51
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N. Y. 552; Potter v. Ellice, 48 N. Y. 321 ;

Pavisich v. Bean, 48 Cal. 364 ; Kuteuberg

V. JMain, 47 Cal. 213; Gillam i'. Sigmau,

29 Cal. 637. See, however, Muir v. Gib-

son, 8 Ind. 187 ; Shaver v. Brainard, 29

Barb. 25. Also, Hardy v. Miller, 11 Neb.

395 ; Black v. Duncan, 60 Ind. 522 ; Gil-

bert V. Allen, 57 Ind. 524 ; Hardee v. Hall,

12 Bush, 327 ; Rossi'. Linder, 12 S. C. 592 ;

[^Beach v. Spokane Ranch Co. (1901), 25

Mont 379, 65 Pac. Ill; Coddington v.

Canaday (1901), 157 Ind. 243, 61 N. E.

567; Wyman v. Herard (1899), 9 Okla.

35, 59 Pac. 1009.

Unless the objection of defect of parties

defendant is made before trial, it is waived :

Thurston v. Thurston (1894), 58 Minn.

279, 59 N. W. 1017 ; Bignold v. Carr

(1901), 24 Wash.413,64 Pac. 519. Where

the case was tried without the objection

being made, it was waived : Lawrence v.

Congregational Church (1900), 164 N. Y.

115, 58 N". E. 24 ; Bowery. Cassels (1900),

59 Neb. 620, 81 N. W. 622. The objection

of defect of parties defendant must be

made by answer or demurrer or it is

waived : Henderson v. Turngren (1894), 9

Utah, 432, 35 Pac. 495 ; Ayres v. Duggan

(1899), 57 Neb. 750, 78 n' W. 296; Fitz-

gerald V. Fitzgerald, etc. Co. (1895), 44

Neb. 463, 62 N. W. 899. The question

cannot be raised by a motion for a non-

suit : Fourth Nat. Bank v. Mayer (1896),

100 Ga. 87, 26 S. E. 83 ; Shull'r. Caugh-

man (1898), 54 S. C. 203, 32 S. E. 301 ;

nor by objection to testimony at the trial :

Dickerson v. Spokane (1901), 26 Wash.

292, 66 Pac. 381 ; Greene v. Finnell (1900).

22 Wash. 186, 60 Pac. 144; nor by an af-

firmative defence setting up a novation :

Scott V. Hallock (1897), 16 Wash. 439, 47

Pac. 968.

In State ex rel. v. Metschan (1896), 32

Ore. 372, 46 Pac. 791, the court said : "At

common law a demurrer for want of neces-

sary parties defendant was required to

point out, either by name or in some other

definite way, from tlie facts stated in the

bill, those who should have been, and

were not, made parties to the suit, so as

352; Little v. Johnson, 26 Ind. 170; J ohQson v . Britton, 23 Ind. 105; Shane u.
Lowry, 48 Ind . 205, 206; Strong v. Downing, 34 Ind. 300; Turner v . First National
Bank, 26 Iowa, 562; H osley u. Black, 28
N. Y. 438; Kingsland v. Braisted, 2 Laos.
17 : Sager u. Nichol·, 1 Daly, 1 ; Bndge v.
.Payson, 5 Sandf. 2l0; Lewis v. Williams,
3 .Minn. 151; Hier u. Staples, 51 N. Y.
136; Fort Stanwix Bank u. Leggett, 51
N. Y. 552; Potter v. Ellice, 48 . Y. 321 ;
Pavisich v. Bean, 48 Cal. 364; Hutenberg
v. Main, 47 Cal. 213; Gillam v. Sigmau,
29 Cal. 637 . See, however, foir v. Gibson, 8 Jnd. 187; Shaver v. Brainard, 29
Barb. 25. A lso, Hardy v. Miller, 11 eb.
39:1; B lack v. Duncan, 60 Ind. 522 ; Gilbert v. Allen, 57 I nd . 524; Hardee v. Hall,
12 Bush, 327 : Ross v. L inder, 12 S. C. 592;
[ Beach v . Spokane Ranch Co. ( 1901 ), 25
Mont 379, 65 Pac. 111 ; Coddington v.
Canaday (1901 ), 157 In d. 243, 61 N. E.
567; Wyman v. Herard (1 99), 9 Okla .
35, 59 Pac. 1009.
Un less t he objection of defect of parties
defendan t is made before tri al, it is waived:
Thurston v. T hurston ( 1894), 58 M in n.
279, 59 N. W . 1017 ; B ig nold v. Carr
(1 901) , 24 W ash.41 3,64 P ac. 519. Where
the case was tried without t he oL jection
bein g made, it was waived: Law rence v.
Cong regational Church (1900), 164 N. Y.
11 5, 58 . E . 24; Bowerv. Ca sels (1900),
59 Neb . 620, 81 N. W . 622. T he objection
of defect of parties defendant must be
made by answer or demurrer or it is
wa ived: H enderson v. Tu r ngren ( I 94), 9
tah, 432, 35 Pac. 495: Ayre v. Duggan
(1899) , 57 ~eb. 750, 78 -. W . 296; Fitzge rald v. F itzgerald, etc. Co. (1895), 44
Neb. 463, 62 N. W. 899. T he question
cannot be raised by a motion for a nonsuit : Fourth Nat. Bank v . Mayer ( 1896),
100 Ga. 87, 26 S. E. 83; Shull i; . Cangh-

man ( 1 98), 54 . C. 203, 32 S. E. 301 ;
nor by objection to te timony at the trial:
Dickerson v. pokane (190 1) , 26 W ash.
292, 66 Pac. 381 ; Greene v. F inn ell (1 900).
22 Wash. 186, 60 l'ac. 144; nor by an affirm ative defence setting up a novatioll :
Scott v. Hallock (1897), 16 Wash. 439, 47
Pac. 968 .
In State ex rel. v. Met chan (1896), 32
Ore. 372, 46 Pac. 791, the court said: "At
common law a dem urrer for want of necessary parties defendant was required to
poiut out, either by name or in some other
definite way, from the facts state<l in the
bill, those who should have been, an d
were not, made parties to the suit, so as
to enable the plaiutiff to obviate the objection by bringing them in; and this rule
has not been abrogated by the provi ions
of the code." And in Jaeger v. Sunde
(1897), 70 Minn. 356, 73 N. W. 171 , the
court said: "Unde r the code, as under
the old chancery practice, a demurrer for
defect of parties defendant is bad if it
does not in some suitable manner point
out the persons who ought to be made
defendants."]
1 Leedy v. Nash, 67 Ind. 311.
2 [ An important case dealing with the
question of waiving defects of parties defe ndant, has very recently been decided
by the New York Court of Appeals. teinbach v. Prudential Ins. Co. (1902), 172
N. Y. 4il, 65 N. E. 2 1. One Fehrman
was indebted to the plaintiff, and to secure
the debt a policy of in urance was taken
out in the defend ant company upon the
life of said Fehrman, the plaintiff agreeing to pay th e premiums in considerati on of the policy being made payable to
her. Plaintiff pai<l the premiums under
th e allegecl r epre eu tations b.v defendant
ti at • he was the benefi cia ry of the policy,
aml she di<l not know until after the death

,..
JJ
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codes, and was a familiar doctrine of the equity procedure. The

language of the statutes is certainly broad enough to permit

the exercise of this power in legal as well as in equitable actions ;

of Fehrmau that said policy was not pay-

able to her by its terms. She therefore

brought action ajrainst the company to

have the policy reformed so as to substitute

iier in place of the estate of the lieceased

as beneficiary of the policy, and for judg-

ment on the policy as reformed. The

personal representatives of Fehrmau were

not joined as defendants. The company

did not raise the question of nonjoinder

by answer or demurrer, but at the close of

the evidence, on the trial, moved the court

to dismiss the complaint by reason of the

defect of parties defendant. The motion

was deuied and defendant excepted. After
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affirmance by the Appellate Division, two

of the justices dissenting, the defendant

came to the Court of Appeals.

The court, by Vaun, J., said : " By the

judgments below the names of the bene-

ficiaries in a policy of life insurance were

stricken out and the name of a stranger

substituted as sole beneficiary without

making the former parties to the action or

giving tliem an opportunity to be heard.

This has been done upon the ground that

the insurance company, whicli is tlie sole

defendant, waived the objection that there

was a defect of parties tiefendaiit by not

taking it either l)y demurrer or answer as

provided by section 499 of the Code of

Civil Procedure. That .section, however,

must be read in connection witli section

452, which provides that 'The court may

determine the controversy, as between the

parties before it, where it can do so with-

out prejudice to the rights of others, orhy

saving their rights ; imt where a comjdete

determination of the controversy cannot

be had without the presence of other par-

ties, the court must direct them to be

brought in.' The a])parent inconsistency

between these sections was tlie subject of

controversy before tlie courts for a long

time, but we think it w.ia dispelled by the

judgment in < tstcrlioudt r. Board of Super-

visors of the County of T'lster (98 N. Y.

239.24.3). . . . In reversing the judgment

in favor of tlie taxpayers we said : ' Con

struinK sections 4.'i2 and 499 together, their

m<;ining is that a defendant, by omitting

to take the objection tiiat there is a defect

of parties by demurrer or answer, waives

on his part any objection to the granting

of relief on that ground, but when the

granting of relief against him would preju-

dice the rights of others, and their rights

cannot be saved by the judgment and the

controversy cannot be completely deter-

mined without their presence, the court

must direct them to be made parties before

proceeding to judgment.' ... A com-

plete determination of a controversy can-

not 1)6 had where there are persons, not

parties, whose rights must be determined,

d , an

w

r

oc rine of the equity procedure. The
u
r a.inl broa enough to permit
r 111 0 al a well a· in equitable actions;
to take the objection that there is a defect
of partie by demurrer or answer, waives
on his part any objection to the granting
of relief on that gro und, but when the
granting of reli f agaiu t him would prejudi ·e the right of other , and their right
cannot be a,·erl by the judgment and the
contr ver y cannot be c mpletely determined without their pre euce, the court
mu t direct them to be made parties before
proceeding to judgment.' . . . A cornpl te d termiuati u of a controversy cann t he had where there are per ons, not
partie , who e ri ght mu t be determined,
in form at least, at the ame time that the
right of the par tie to the action are
determined a cording to the poli y under
con. ideration , a it was written, the personal repre ·entative of Mr. Fehrman are
entitled to the proceed , yet the judgment
bel w, rendered without notic to them,
take the policy away from them and
giv it to the plaintiff. They had a material iutere tin the subj ct-matter f the
action, yet they were deprived of it without
an opportunity to be heard and w r cast
in judcrment without being ued . While
they ar not bound by the judgment which
d e ·all thi in f rm, till the determination
of the controver y i n c arily incomthey are not bound . . . .
plet h cau
The p r onal repre ·entative of iehrman
were ne . ary partie and the ourt should
ha,· di mi ed th e complaint unle s within
a r
nahl time they were brought in,
no t n ce ari ly f r th protecti u of the
d fendant a it had neglected it right ,
bnt for th ir wn pr t ctiou, a well a
the e mly and rd rly admini tration of
ju ·ti· ."
A di
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but, practically, the courts confine its operation to the latter

class. 1 When the defendant sets up in his answer the defence

of nonjoinder, he must state the names and places of residence

of the other persons whom he alleges to be necessary defendants.

This old rule of the common-law pleading has not been altered

by the new legislation. ^

§ 189. * 288. Consequences of Nonjoinder of Defendants. The

foregoing being the methods of raising the questions as to a

•defect of parties defendant, the inquiry arises, What is the effect

•of such defect when established in either of these methods ? If,

upon demurrer, it is held that the plaintiff has failed to unite all

the necessary defendants, he will be permitted to amend, as a

matter of course, upon the terms as to costs prescribed by the

practice. When the defence is set up in the answer, the same

opportunity is given to the plaintiff to amend, and to reconstruct

his action. If the defect is not removed in this manner, it will

certainly defeat any legal action, although not necessarily, per-

haps, an equitable one. Undoubtedly, the codes, adopting the

doctrine of equity tribunals, and extending it to all cases, permit
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the court in its discretion to retain the cause, under such cir-

cumstances, until the other necessary parties are brought in,

instead of dismissing it altogether. It is plain that the language

of the statutes is general, and embraces all species of actions,

no exception being expressed or intimated ; and there can be no

pretence that it is not as practicable and as easy to deal with

legal actions in this manner as with equitable suits. Practically,

however, the authority thus given to the courts is restricted to

equitable actions, while legal actions are disposed of in the same

manner and by the same rules as before the reformed system was

1 As illustrations, see Mnir v. Gibson. N. Y. S. 861. Where such an answer was

S Ind. 187 ; Shaver v. Brainard, 29 Barb, defective in certain particulars, although

2.5; O'Connor v. Irvine, 74 Cal. 43.5, 443, it conveyed the information needed, and

where it was held that the failure of the all the requisites of the defence were

court on its own motion to order necessary proved on the trial, the defect was held

parties brought in, although the defend- cured. Wooster v. Chamberlin, 28 Barb,

antsomitted to raise an objection of defect 602. It has been held in Indiana that a

■of parties by demurrer or answer, was demurrer to the complaint, on the ground

fatal to the judgment. See also Osterhoudt of a nonjoinder of defendants, must also

V. Ulster Cy. Sup., 98 N. Y. 239 ; Pirsson show who ought to have been added as

»'. Gillespie (Supreme, 1889), 4 N.Y.Suppl. defendants, and that, failing to do so, it

«91 ; O'Fallon v. Clopton, 89 Mo. 284. will be overruled. Willett v. Porter, 42

2 Kingsland v. Braisted, 2 Lans. 17; Ind. 2.50, 2.54 ; Nicholson i;. Louisville, etc

but, practically, the courts confine its operation to the latter
dass. 1 When the defendant ets up in his answer the defence
-0f nonjoinder, he mu t state the names and places of residence
-0f the other persons whom he alleges to be nece ary defendants.
This old rule of the common-law pleading has not been altered
by the new legislation. 2
§ 189. * 288. Consequences of Nonjoinder of Defendants. The
foregoing being the methods of raising the que tions as to a
<lefect of parties defendant, the inquiry arises, What is the effect
·of such defect when est~blished in either of these methods? If,
upon demurrer, it is held that the plaintiff has failed to unite all
the necessary defendants, he will be permitted to amend, as a
matter of course, upon the terms as to costs prescribed by the
practice. When the defence is set up in the answer, the same
opportunity is given to the plaintiff to amend, and to reconstruct
his action. If the defect is not removed in this manner, it will
certainly defeat any legal action, although not necessarily, perhaps, an equitable one. Undoubtedly, the codes, adopting the
doctrine of equity tribunals, and extending it to all cases, permit
the court in its discretion to retain the cause, under such cir.cumstances, until the other necessary parties are brought in,
instead of dismissing it altogether. It is plain that the language
-0f the statutes is general, and embraces all species of actions,
no exception being expressed or intimated; and there can be no
pretence that it is not as practicable and as easy to deal with
legal actions in this manner as with equitable suits. Practically,
however, the authority thus given to the courts is restricted to
.equitable actions, while legal actions are disposed of in the same
manner and by the same rules as before the reformed system was

Schwartz v. Weehler (Com. PI. 1892), 20 Ry. Co., 55 Ind. 504.
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1

As illustrations, see Moir v. Gibson,

'8 Ind. 187 ; Shaver v. Brainard, 29 Barb.
25; O'Connor v. Irvine, 74 Cal. 435, 443,

where it waf' held that the failure of the
court on its own motion to order necessary
parties brought in, although the defend.ants omitted to raise au objection of defect
-0£ parties by demurrer or answer, was
f!l-tal to the judgment. See also Osterhoudt
v. Ulster Cy. Sup., 98 N. Y. 239; Pirsson
v. Gillespie (Supreme, 1889), 4 N.Y. Suppl.
.69 l ; O'Fallon v. Clopton, 89 Mo. 284.
2 Kingsland v. Rrai ted , 2 Lans. l 7;
chwartz u. Wechler (Com. Pl. 1892), 20

N. Y. S. 861. Where surh an answer was
defective in certain particulars, although
it conveyed the information needed, and
all the requis ites of the defence were
proved on the trial, the defect was held
cured. Wooster v. Chambe rlin, 28 Barb .
602. It has been held in Indiana that a
demurrer to the complaint, on the groun <l
of a nonjoinder of defendants, must also
show who ought to have been added as
defendants , and that, failing to do so, it
will be overruled. Willett v. Porter, 42
Ind. 250, 254; Nicholson v. Louisville, etc.
Ry. Co., 55 Ind. 504.
18
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adopted. — that is, the nonjoinder of a necessary defendant,

when not cured hy amendment, defeats that action, althongh it

does not destroy the cause of action. It may be instructiye to

compare these results with the provisions of the new English

procedure, whicli declare that under no circumstances shall a

cause be defeated or dismissed on account either of a nonjoinder

or of a misjoinder of parties.^

§ 190. * 289. Misjoinder of Defendants. T'wo Cases herein.

Two Aspects of True Case of Technical Misjoinder. I paSS now to

the misjoinder or imj^roper uniting of defendants. ^ Two cases

present themselyes which might perhaps be regarded as falling

under this head: naniel}', (1) Where all of the defendants are

improperl}' sued ; and, (2) AVhere one or more are properly sued,

and the others are improperly joined with them. The latter only

is a true case of technical "misjoinder." The first is the ordi-

nar}' case of an action entirely misconceived, and the complaint

or petition failing to disclose any ground for relief, so that all

the defendants jointly or each of them separately, according to

the circumstances, might either demur for want of sufficient
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facts, or move to dismiss the action on the trial. Such a case

does not fall within the special rules of procedure which relate

to 2^arties^ but is to be determined by the general doctrines of

the law defining rights and liabilities. The second of the two

cases just described does come within the subject-matter of

parties defendant, and is to be considered under two aspects,

which give rise to two very different classes of questions. These

two aspects are the following: It being supposed that one or more

defendants, whom I will call A., are properly sued, and that one

or more others, whom I will call B., are improperly joined in the

action, the matters for consideration Mdiich can possibly arise from

these facts are: (1) How shall the proper defendants. A., take

advantage of the error, and what effect (if any) will it have

1 The "Supreme Court of Judicature improperly united, tlic defendant sliall

Act'' of 1873; Sclie<luk', Mule 9. QSce have judgment against them for cu!<ts;

also Sreinhach v. I'rudcntial Ins. Co. if defendants, they may disclaim and have

(1902), 172 N. Y. 471, 65 N. E. 281 ; Ilan- their costs against the plaintiff. Tiiis is

ucgan V. Hoth (1896), 12 Wash. C9.j, 4i carrying out the true sjiirit of the reform ;

I'ac. 25G."] it fully su.staius the theoretical position

* The admirable rule is adopted in taken in the text, and might well he fol-

North Carolina that a wi/s-joinder of par- lowed in all the States. Green v. Green,

ties, either plaintiffs or defendants, shall 69 N. C. 294, 298.

never defeat any a<!tion. If plaintilfs are

atlopt c.1, - that is the nonjoind r of a nece ar · d f nd, nt
wh n not curetl by amendrn nt, c.1 feat· that action , althongl it
lo not de troy th can e f action . It may L in tructiY t
compa1 th se re ult with th provi. 1011
f the new Engli h
ro · tlure, whi h declar that under no circum tances hall a
cau:-; be lefeated or di mi ed on account either of a nonjoinder
r of a mi joim1er of I ar i .1
' 190. * __. 9. Misjoinder of Defendants.
Two Cases h erein .
Two Aspects of True Case of Technical Misjoinder.
I pa n w O
th mi join l r OT improper uniting of def ndant . 2 Two ca s
pre ent th m elve which might perhap be r 0 a.r ded a fa.Hing
under thi be, d : namely, (1) 'Vhere all of the defen lant' are
improp rJy ued · and (2) \ here one or more are properly ue 1
and the other are improperly joined with th m. The latter nly
i a ti:ue ca e of technical "misjoind r." The first is th or linary case of an action entirely mi conceh 1 and the complain
or petition failing to disclose any ground for relief, so that all
the defendants jointly or each of them eparately according o
the circum tance , might ither demur for want of suffi i nt
facts, or m ve to dismiss the action on the trial. Such a ca e
doe not fall within the specjal rules of pro edure which r late
to parties but is to be determined by the general doctrin of
he law defining rights an l h abilities. Th second of the two
ca e ju t de cribe<l does come within the subject-matt r f
parties defendant, and is to be con id red under wo a pect..
which gi e i·ise to two very different clas · of questions. The e
two aspect' are the fol] owing : It being upp sed that one or mor
defendant whom I will call ., are properly u d, and th'1t one
r more th r whom I will call B., are im r p rly join din th
a tion he matt r for con ideration which an po ibl ari e from
th e fact. arc : (1) How hall the pr p r defendant , . , take
al vrm , ge of he error ancl what eff t if any) will it hav
1 Th e ". ' upr me
ourt of Judi cature
Act., ,,f l i.'3; Schedule Rule 9. [ • ee
al. o . ' Pi1il1aeh u. l'rud ntial Jn.. 'o.
(I O:tJ, 172 ••. Y. 471, 65 ... •. E. 2 1 ; Il an1wgan L'. Hot.h (1 96), 12 ·w a. h. 6!J3, .u
'a. :t;>']
2 Thi• arlmiraltle rulP i adopted in
'or h < aro]ina that a nvs-joinder of pari , "ith r plnintiffs or <lcfenda11t:, ;ball
11 ., r d<' f P·1t rm~ a ·ti on.
Jf pl ai 11 Lin: are

improperl.Y united, the def ndant lrnll
h<v jutlO'm nt again t them f r cwt ;
if a fo ndan 'they may <li claim an<l h:n-e
th ir rof't :1gai11 t th plaintiff. Thi · i'
carryiug ouL the tru ·pirit of he reform;
it fully su;tains the theoretical po ·it.ion
tak n in the L xt, aml might well I,• folJo" e:d in all the 'tate . Green ti. Green,
69 • •.

. 2!)4, 298.
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■upon their rights? and, (2) How shall the improper defendants,

B., raise the objection, and what effect (if any) will the error

have upon their rights? It is plain that these two sets of de-

fendants occupy very dissimilar positions in the action; that their

rights are very different, and that while the latter are entitled to

full relief, the former may not be in the least injured or affected

by the misjoinder. Much confusion in practice has resulted from

the neglect to distinguish between these two cases.

§ 191. * 290. Situation of Defendants properly Sued. Change

in Common-Law Rule herein. Doctrine Established by the Cases.

Proceeding to the discussion of these two cases separately, I

shall state the rules established in respect to the first of them,

and shall illustrate by a stiiking example the extent to which

the common-law doctrines have been changed b}' the reformed

procedure. When a legal action is brought against two or more

defendants upon an alleged joint liability, even though based

upon a. joint contract, and one or more of them are, so far as they

are individually concerned, properly sued, but the others are

improperly united, the defendants properly sued have no cause
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of complaint whatsoever, in any form, on account of the misjoin-

der; they cannot demur or answer for defect of parties, because

there is no " defect ; " they cannot demur generally for want of

sufficient facts, because sufficient facts are averred as against

them; they cannot demur or answer on account of this 7nis-

joinder, because that particular ground of objection is not jn-o-

vided for by the codes. ^ If on the trial the cause of action is

^ An exception mnst, of course, be him as co-defendant. The provision au-

made of those codes which expressly thorizing a demurrer for the misjoinder

provide, as a distinct cause of demurrer of parties defendant is taken from the

or defence, the misjoinder of parties, — system of equity pleading wliich formerly

namely, Missouri, California, Qalso New prevailed. Under that system such de-

York, Nevada, Colorado, Idaho, Montana, murrer could be interposed only hy the

Utah, and Wyoming. Sec § *206, ante, party who was improperly made a de-

note. See O'Brien v. Fitzgerald (1894), fendant. The defendant against whom

143 N. Y. 143, 38 N. E. 371. there was a sufficient complaint could not

See, however, Gardner v. Samuels object that others who had no interest in

(1897), 116 Cal. 84, 47 Pac. 935, a case the subject-matter of this suit were made

decided under a code making misjoinder defendants, unless it also appeared that

upon their rights? aml, (2) How shall the improp r <l fondants,
B., rni e the objection, ancl what effect (if any) will the error
haYc t"!pon their rig11ts? It is plain that th s two ets of d feMlant' occupy Yery lissimilar po ·itions in the action; that their
l'jghts are Yery different, ancl that 'id1ile tli latter are ntitled to
full r lief, the former may not be in the lea:::L injured or affected
by the misjoincler. .l\luch confu ion in practic ha r ultecl from
the nt>glect to distingui h between these two cas s.
§ 191. * 290. Situation of Defendants properly Sued. Change
in Common-Law Rule he rein .

Doc tri n e E stablished by the C ases.

Procetlding to the discussion of these two cases separately, I
shall state the rules established in respect to the first of them,
ar..cl shall, illustrate by a striking example the extent to which
the common-law doctrin es have been changed by the reformed
procedure. \.Vhen a legal action is brought against two or more
defendants upon an alleged Joint liability, even though based
upon a Joint contract, and one or more of them are, so far as they
are individually concerned, properly sued, bnt the others are
improperly united, the defendants properly sued have no cause
of complaint ::vhatsoever, in any form, on account of the misjoincler; tbey cannot demur or answer for defect of partie , because
there is no "defect;" they cannot demur generally for want of
sufficient facts, because sujl]cient facts are averred as against
them; they cannot demur or answer on account of this misJ0oinder, because that particular ground of objection is not provided for by the codes. 1 If on the trial the cause of action js

of parties a cause for deumrrer. The his interests were affected therebv. This

court said: "The complaint sufRciently ground of demurrer is authorized by the

states a cause of action against the de- code of Missouri, and it is held in that

fendant Samuels. It is urged by the State that the former rule in equity is to

respondent, however, that the demurrer be followed. (Ashby v. Winston, 26 Mo.

of Samuels was properly sustained by 210.)" See also Euffatti v. Lexington

reason of the mi.sjoinder of Morris with Mining Co. (1894), 10 Utah, 386, 37 I'ac.

1 An exception mu t, of course, be
mad e of those codes which exp ressly
provid e, as a distinct cause 0£ demurrer
or defence, the misjoind r of parties, namely, Missouri, Cali fornia, [ a lso New
Y ork, Nevad a , Colorad o, Id a ho, Montana,
Utah, and W yomin g . Sec § *206, ante,
n ot e. See O'Brien v. F itzgerald (1 894),
143 N. Y. 143, 38 N. E. 371.
ee, however, Gardner 1•. Samuels
(1897), 11 6 Cal. 84-, 47 l>ac. 935, a case
rlceideLl under a cocle making mil:'joinder
of parties a cause for demurrer. The
court ::-aid: "The complaint sufficiently
states a cause of action a~ain t the defendant Samuels. It is urge<l by the
responden t, however, that the demurrer
of Samuels was properly sustained by
reaso n 0£ the misjoinder 0£ !orris with

him as co-defendant. The provi ion auth orizing a demurrer for the misjoinder
of parties defendant is taken from t he
system of equity pleading which fo rm er ly
prevailed.
Unde r that y tern uch demurrer could be interposed only hy the
party who was improperly made a defendant. The defendant against whom
t here was a sufficient complaint could not
ohjcet that others who had no intere t in
the subject-matter of thi uit were made
defendants, unle
it al~o appearecl that
bi interests were affecter[ thereby. This
ground of delllnrrer i- authorized by the
code of l\fi. Rotni. aml it i held in that
State that the former rule in equity is to
be followed. (Ashby v. Win, ton, 2G .. Io.
210.)" See also Ruffatti v Lexi11_gton
Mining Co. (189-t), 10 "Ctah, 3~6, 3i l'ac.
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proved against them.^ but none against them and the others^ still

the phiintiff will not be absolutely nonsuited; he will recover his

judgment against them according to the right of action estab-

lished by the proof; while as against the other defendants he will

fail, and will be nonsuited, or his complaint be dismissed. This

result of the reform legislation is a very great departure from the

former practice. At the common hnv, if a plaintiff alleged a

joint cause of action against two or more defendants, and failed

to prove the case as set out in his pleading, he was defeated as to

all ; he could not recover against a part and fail as to the others.

The interpretation of the codes, as thus stated, is based partly

upon the sections already quoted in relation to defendants, and

partly upon other sections — to be fully discussed hereafter — in

relation to the form and manner of recovery and entry of judg-

ments. By combining these various provisions, and by a con-

struction of them in accordance with their plain spirit and

meaning, the courts have deduced the rules here given. To

those defendants who are sued in a legal action, even though

upon an alleged joint liability, and who are actually liable upon
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the contract or other cause of action averred, the fact that other

persons are also added as co-defendants, however improperly, is

no defence, is no answer to the action in any manner or form.

This doctrine is fully established by the cases collected in the

foot-note, and in many others which it is unnecessary to cite.^

591, holding that one defendant cannot has run in favor of one of them, the

complain that another is joined who is action against the other two is not

not bound.] affected tliereby.] Mcintosh v. Ensign,

1 Qlacksonu. McAuley (1895), 13 Wash. 28 N. Y. 169, 172, — see also, per Km-

298, 43 Pac. 41; Lull r. Auamosa Nat. mott J., pp. 174, 175 ; Rrumskill y. James,

Bank (1900), 110 la. 537, 81 N. W. 784; 11 N. Y. 294; Marquat >•. Marquat, 12

Curran v. Stein (1901), — Ky. — , 60 N.Y. 336; Harrington y. Higham, 15 Barli.

S. \V. 8.39: Hassler r. Hefele (1898), 151 524; Parker v. Jackson, 16 Barb. 33;

Ind. 391, 50 N. K. 361 ; Huffatti v. Lex- N Y. & N. H. K. Co. v. Schuyler, 17

ington Mining Co. (1894), 10 Utah, 386, N. Y. 592 ; Coakley r. Chamberlain, 8 Abl).

37 Pac. 591 ; Bunnell r. Berlin Iron Bridge Pr. N. s. 37; Fort Staiuvix Bank v. T>eg-

Co. (1S95), 66 Conn. 24, 33 All. 533; gett, 51 N.Y. 552; Truesdell c. Rhodes,

Knatz V. Wise (1895), IG Mont. 555, 41 26 Wis. 215,219,220; McGonigal v. Col-

Pac. 710; North Hudson Bldg. & Loan ter, 32 Wis. 614 ; Willard i-. lieas, 26 Wis.

Assn. f. Childs (1893), 86 Wis. 292, 56 540, 544; Alnutt v. Leper, 48 Mo. 319 ;

N. W. 870; Empire Canal Co. v. Itio Brown c. Woods, 48 Mo. 330; Rutenberg

Grande County (1895), 21 Colo. 244, 40 v. Main, 47 Cal. 213, 221; Aucker i;.

Pac. 449; Harrison v. McCormick (1898), Adams, 23 Ohio St. 543, 548-550; Lamp-

122 Cal. 651, 55 Pac. 592: Where an kin i'. Chisom, 10 Ohio St. 450. See also

action is brought jointly against three cases cited, i'«/ra, under §* 291 of the text

partnr-rs, and tlio statute of limitations in reference to the remedy by those who

in them ut n ne a a.in t them and the other , still
th h intiff \Yill n t be ab olut ly n n uited · h will r c ver hi
ju<l.0 m nt a0 ainst them ac ordinO' to the ri 0 ht of acti n e tabli lied
th proof; while a ag, in t th oth r d f nd nt he will
fc_ il and will e n n uit
r hi compl -int be i mi e . Thi
r ·ult f the reform 1 gi 1 ti n i
v ry great departure from th
f r r practice.
t h
om m n 1 w, if a plain i:ff all
d a
/aint ca
of acti n again t two r ore def ndant and failed
t r Ye the ca a et ut in hi pl ading, he wa defeated a t
all· he coul not rec ver again ta part and fail a to the others.
Th interpretation of the code a. thu tated, i based partly
upon be ection already qu ted in relation to defendants, and
parl up nother ections-to be fully discuss d hereafter-in
relation t th form and manner of recovery and entry of judg·
ment.. . By combining the e various provi ions, and by a contruction of them in ace rdance with their plain spirit and
meaning, the court have deduced the rules here given. To
th e def ndant who are sued in a legal action, even though
upon an alleg d j int liabili t , and who are actually liable upon
th ontract or other cau8e of action averred, the fact that other
per n ar al o added a co-defendant , however improper! , i
n
efence i n a1rw r to the action in any manner or form.
Thi
ctrine i fully establi hed by the ca s collected in the
foot-n te, an in many other which it
unneces ry to cit . 1
r y
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The rule being thus established in the extreme case of legal

actions alleging a joint liability upon contract, it is of course

equally true in all other legal actions based upon a liability which

at the common law was several, and in which the misjoinder of

some defendants would have been no defence as to those properly

sued, — as, for example, in actions for torts. A fortiori does the

same doctrine apply in all equitable actions. Under the former

system, the improper uniting of co-defendants was never a suffi-

cient ground for preventing a decree against those who were

properly made parties if the suit was in equity.^

§ 192. * 291. How Question of Misjoinder may be raised by

Defendants improperly joined. Demurrer Interposed by "Whom.

"Waiver herein. The situation of those parties improperly joined

as co-defendants is, of course, very different from that just

described. The very statement of the case assumes that the

action is wrongly brought as against them; that, either as dis-

The rule bein 0 thus e tahli h cl in the xtr me a of legal
action· all ging a joint liability upon contract, it
of our
equally tru in all other 1 gal a ti m; based upon liabili ty which
at the common law was ev ral, and in which the mi joirn.l 'r f
s me defendants would ha.ve been no defence as to those properl y
sued, - as, for example, in actions for torts. A fvrtiori does th
same doctrine apply in all equitable actions. Under the form er
system, the improper uniting of co-defendants was never a sufficient ground for preventing a decree again t those who were
properly made parties if the suit was in equity.I

§ 192. * 291.

How Question of Misjoinder may be raised by

closed by the allegations of the plaintiff's pleading, or as dis-

covered by the evidence on the trial, no cause of action exists

against them, notwithstanding the one which exists against their
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co-defendants. If, therefore, in such a case, it appears on the

face of tlie complaint or petition that one or more persons have

been improperly made defendants, such persons may present the

objection by a demurrer, not on the ground of a "defect" of

parties, but on the ground that the plaintiff's pleading does not

state facts sufficient to constitute a cause of action against them.^

This demurrer must be interposed only by those defendants who

are wrongly sued, and not hy all the defetidants jointly^ since, if

two or more demur jointly, and as to a portion of them there is

are. improperly joined. See also Territory ^ See N. Y. & N. H. R. Co. v. Schuyler,

V. Hildebrand, 2 Mout. 426; White Oalc 17 N. Y. 592.

Dist. Tp. V. Oskaloosa Dist. Tp., 44 Iowa, 2 [^See Gardner v. Samuels (1897), 116

512 ; Littell v. Sayre, 7 Hun, 485 ; Stafford Cal. 84, 47 Pac. 9.35, where a demurrer for

w. Nutt, 51 Ind. 535; Murray w. Ebright, misjoinder was held proper, under the

50 id. 362 ; Erwin v. Scotten, 40 id. 389 ; statute. But it was said that a demurrer

Carmien v. Whitaker, 36 id. 509 ; Graham couched in the words of the statute wouhl

V. Henderson, 35 id, 195; Crews v. Lack- not be sufficient; "but a demurring party

land, 67 Mo. 619 ; Ryan v. State Bank, 10 by designating the defendants who were

Neb. 524 ; Hubbard v. Guriiey, 64 N. Y. improperly joined with him, sufficiently

457 ; Blackburn v. Sweet, 38 Wis. 578 ; calls the plaintiffs' attention to his objec-

Pierson v. Fuhrmann (Colo. App 1891), tion to the complaint." But see also

27 Pac. 1015; Emry v. Parker. Ill N. C. Plankinton v. Hildebrand (1895), 89 Wis.

Defendants improperly joined.

Demurrer Interposed by Whom.

Waiver herein.
The situation of those parties improperly joined
as co-defendants is, of course, very different from that just
described. The very statement of the case assumes that the
action is wrongly brought as against them; that, either as disclosed by the allegations of the plaintiff's pleading, or as discovered by the evidence on the trial, no cause of action exists
against them, notwithstanding the one which exists against their
co-defendants. If, therefore, in such a case, it appears on the
face of the complaint or petition that one or more persons have
been improperly made defendants, such persons may present the
objection by a demurrer, not on the ground of a "defect" of
parties, but on the ground that the plaintiff's pleading does not
state facts sufficient to constitute a cause of action against them. 2
This demurrer must be interposed only by those defendants who
are wrongly sued, and not by all the defendants Jointly, since, if
two or more demur jointly, and as to a portion of them there is

261. But see Curry v. Roundtree, 51 Cal. 209, 61 N. W. 839.]

181.

are improperly J oined. See also Territory
v. Hildebrand, 2 Mont. 426; White Oak
Dist. Tp. v. Oskaloosa Dist. 'l'p., 44 Iowa,
512 ; Littell v. Sayre, 7 Hun, 485; Stafford
11. Nutt, 51 Ind. 535; Murray v . Ebright,
50 id. 362; Erwin v. Scotten, 40 id. 3 9;
Carmien i-. Whitaker, 36 id. 509; Graham
v. Hender on , 35 i<l. 195 ; Crews v . Lackland, 67 Mo. 619; Ryan v. State Bank, 10
Neb. 524; Hubbard v . Gurn ey, 64 N. Y.
45i ; Blackburn v. Sweet , 38 Wis. 57 ;
P ier<:on v. Fuhrmann (Colo. App 1 91},
27 Pac. 1015; Emry v. Parker, 111 N . C .
2fi 1. But see Curry v. Roundtree, 51 Cal.
181.

l See N. Y. & N. H. R. Co. v. Schuyler,
17 N. Y. 592.
2 [See Gardner v. Samuels (1897) , 1I6
Cal. 84, 47 Pac. 935, wher e a demurrer for
mi sjoind er was held pruper, und er the
statute . But it was said that a demurrer
couched in th e words of th e statute woulcl
not be sufficient ; " but a de murrin g party
by de ignatin g the defendants who were
improperly joined with him , sufficie ntly
calls th e pl ain t iff -' atte nt ion to hi s objecti on to the co mpla int."
But see also
Plankinton 1-. Hildebrand ( l 95), 89 Wis.
209, 61 N. W. 839.J
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no cause for the demurrer, it must fail as to all.^ The safer

practice is, therefore, for each defendant who claims that he is

improperly joined, to demur separately and individually from

the others. This particular ground of objection is not waived by

a neglect to demur, as it is expressly provided in all the codes

that the defendant may at the trial interpose the same objection

to the plaintiff's recover3% even though he has failed to allege it

on the record. 2 If the absence of a cause of action does not

appear on the face of the plaintiff's pleading, the defence may

be set up in the separate answer or answers of the parties who

rely upon it. Finally, whatever be the completeness or defect of

the allegations made by the plaintiff and of the issues raised in

the answers of the defendants, if on the trial the evidence fails to

establish a cause of action against some portion of the defendants,

and it thus appears that they had been wrongfully proceeded

against in the action, the plaintiff will be nonsuited, or his com-

plaint or petition dismissed as to them, and his recovery will be

limited to the others against whom a cause of action is made out.

The foregoing rules are sustained by the cases with almost abso-
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lute unanimity.^ These are the more regular and formal modes

1 Lowry i-. Jackson, 27 S. C. 318. Co. v. Hall (1895), 110 Cal. 490, 42 Pac.

- QBut see Boland v. Ross (1893), 120 962] ; Youug v. N. Y., etc. Steamship Co.,

Mo. 20S, 2.") S. W. 524, where it was held 10 Abb. Pr. 229; Mitchell v. Bank of St.

that although the petition for an account- Paul, 7 Minn. 252, 256; Nichols v. Kan-

ing stated no grounds for equitable relief dall, 5 Minn. 304; Seagerr. Burns, 4 Minn,

against the defendant M, yet inasmuch as 141; Lewis v. Williams, 3 Minn. 151;

he failed to avail himself of that fact and Makepeace v. Davis, 27 Ind. 352, 355 ;

did not demur on the ground of misjoinder, McGonigal v. Colter, 32 Wis. 614; Web-

but answered to the merits after other ster v. Tibbitts, 19 Wis. 438; Truesdell

defendants had answered and filed tlieir v. Rhodes, 26 Wis. 215, 219, 220; Willard

e u ·e f r t he dem irrer it mu t fail a t o all. 1 The af r
r< c ice i ~ t herefore f r ach defendant who claim tha t h e i
im prop rly join u, t cl mur eparat ly and individually from
th oth r . Thi8 particular ground of bj ·tion i no waiv d b ·
a n ) ct t demur a it i expre ' ly pr ided in all the cod s
t h t the defendant ma at the rial interpo e the am o jection
t
he plaintiff recove ry even th ugh h e has faile t o allege it
on th record . 2 If the ab ence of a cau e of action doe not
a pear on the f ce of the plaintiff
leading, the defence may
be et up in the sepa;rate an wer or an wer of the partie who
rely u on it. Finally whatever be the completene or defect of
the alle 0 ations made by the plaint iff and of he i sues rai ed in
the an wer of the defendant , if on t he t rial the evidence fail to
e tabli h a cau e of action again t some por tion of the def ndan t
a d it thu appear that they had been wrongfully proc eded
aO'ain t in the action the plaintiff will be nonsuited or hi co mlain t or petition dismi ed as to them, and h i recovery will be
l imi te t o the other again t whom a cau e of action i made out.
The fo regoing rule' are u tained by the ca es with almost ab olute unanimit y. 3 The e are the more regu ar and formal m de
n

cro.ss-bills against him, the court did not v. Reas, 26 Wis. 540, 544; Rntenberg i'.

lose jurisdiction over him under the cro.ss- Main, 47 Cal. 213, 221. See also Grulin

bills by dismissing tiie complaint as to v. Stanley, 92 Cal. 83. See, however, per

him. He was deemed to have waiveil by contra, Wood r. Olney, 7 Nev. 109, which

his pleadings all questions as to jurisdic- holds that, when a joint demurrer by de-

tiou and to have voluntarily submitted his fendants is good as to some and bad as to

rights to the court] tlie others, it will not be overruled as to

** QDobbs V. Purington (1902), 136 Cal. all; it will be su.stained as to tiiose who

70, 68 Pac. 3j3; Bunce v. Pratt (1893), 56 had a good cause of demurrer, and over-

Jlinn. 8, 57 N. W. IGO; Sutherland v. ruled only as to the other.-;. In Missouri,

IloUiday ( 1902), — Neb. — , 90 N. W. 937 ; where a misjoinder is made a cause of de-

Kuffatti V. Lexington Mining Co (1894), niurrer, it is held the objection must be

10 Utah, 386, ."57 Pac. 591 ; Ilassler r. set up by those u-ho are thus improjurly

llefele (1898). 151 lii.i. 391, 50 N. E. 361 ; joined, and not by the others. If the

Currau c. Stein ( 1901), — Ky. — , 60 S. W. otlicrs unite in the demurrer, it will ba

839; Lull V. Ai.aniosa Nat. Bank (1900), overruleil as to them. Brown v. Woods.

J 10 la 537, 81 N. W. 784; Bailey Loan 48 Mo. a.JO ; Aluutt r. Leper, 43 .Mo. .H.i.

1 Lown t' • •Tack on, 2; , . C. 3 1 .
'.![But . ee Bolan.:1. t'. Ro s {I 93) , 120
, [o. 20 , 2:>
. 'V. 52-1, w he re it wa h ehl
that al h•rngh the petition fo r a n accountioa . tate1I u > gr ound· fo r e<1uitaule relief
agaiu t the <lefenda.ut • I, yet iua much a
be faile l to a,·ail him:elf of that fact and
di1! nut <lC'mur on the <rround of mi joinder,
but an were1l to the merit after other
defenda1 t lia<l an wered aud tiled thei r
cr<r -bills agaiu 't him, the court di<l not
lo:e jurisdiction o\·er him uwler the cro ·
uill.: liy rli:'mi. iug the complainr a' to
liim. !Ie \\'a· deemed to laa,·e wai,·ed hy
I i J.lea in.;s all qu<'. tion a· to juri. dicti rn a1 to hare ,·oluutarily submitted hi·

Co. v. H a ll ( 1895), 1 IO al. 490, 42 P ac.
962]; Y oung v. X. Y., etc. deam hip o.,
10 Abb . Pr. 229; Mi tc hell v. Bank of t.
Paul, i l\1 ion. 252, 256 ; Nichol v. Handall, 5 Minn. 304 ; eager t'. Burn , 4 1\liun.
1+1 ; L ew is v. Willi<\ID , 3 Minn . 151 ;
Make peace v. D a ri , 27 Ind. 352, 355;
McGouigal v. Colter, 3 2 Wi . 614 ; ' Yebibhi tt , 19 Wi . 43 ; True -d ell
ter 1;.
v. J ho<le, 26 \Y i . 21 5, 219, 220; Willa ril
i·. Rea ·, 26 \ 'i~. 540, 5.U; Ru tenber.!:;' 1· .
J\Iain, 4i Ca l. 21 3, 221. 'ee al.- Gruhn
t• •• tan lf'y, 92 al.
ee, how Yer , p er
contra, \\'oml r. Olne \' , 7 ~ ev . l 9, whi ch
hold that, when a j <.int de murr r L.' de-·
fewbnts i; guo1l a· to ome arnl bad a · to
the othrr.. it will uot he O\'e rrul 11 a to
all; it will lie u. t~inetl , · to th o who
lia1\ a g-ood c· u e of dem urrer, a nd O \ errulei\ only a to the other,-. Jn ~li · ouri,
where a misJo "wl1·r i. made a ·au. e of rlemnrr ·1-, it i · hehl the olijecti on mu,., lie
. et up J,~· 1/10. e u-lw a re tlm • i 111pm 11,,rly
joiw I, a nd not hy th ot h r.
If tl1
other" nniLe in the dem urrer, it will Ii··
ovr.rrulc1l :l. to the111 . Brow n '" \\ '""!."
4 ~ Io . ;J:JO; . .\ luuLt r. Leper, .i .• Io : I
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of raising the questions as to misjoinder by those defendants wlio

are thus wrongfully made parties to a suit; but there undoubtedly

may be cases in which the court w^ill proceed in a more summary

manner, and will strike off the name of a party on his mere

motion. Such cases must of necessity be somewhat exceptional,

for, as a general rule, the rights and liabilities of the parties to

the record will not be determined on motion or by any other

means except a formal trial of the issues.

§ 193. * 292. Recapitulation of Code Reforms respecting Mis-

joinder of Defendants. Criticism. If we SUm up the results

of the preceding discussion, the following conclusion may

be regarded as established beyond any doubt. In ascertaining

the effects of a misjoinder of parties, the courts, with great

unanimity, have accepted and carried out in practice the spirit

and true intent of the reform legislation: namely, that the

familiar doctrines of equity should be made controlling in all

kinds of actions legal and equitable. They have in this instance

entirely abandoned the technical common-law rules, and have

assimilated all actions in this respect to a suit in equity. Even
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in the case where the common-law doctrine of joint liability was

the most rigid, they have with perfect ease abandoned it, have

treated it as though abrogated by the general expressions of the

reform legislation, and have thus demonstrated that the judicial

reasoning by which that ancient dogma had been supported was

in fact nothing but a formula of words wdthout any real force

and meaning. They have shown that in a legal action upon

contract, no matter what may be the allegations as to the joint

nature of the liability, it is possible to sever the judgment and

to permit a recovery against some defendants and for the others,

and thus to bring all cases legal and equitable within the opera-

tion of the familiar principles of equity. I dwell upon this

special instance of liberal construction because it well illustrates

the position which I have theoretically maintained as to the

general mode of interpreting the codes. The courts of the dif-

See also, as to the effect of misjoinder, Ass'n, 74 N. C. 117; State v. J. P. & M. R.

Nave V. Hadley, 74 lud. 155; Meudenhall Co, 15 Fla. 201 ; Mahouey v. McLeau, 26

i\ Wilson, 54 Iowa. 589 ; Cogswell v. Minn. 415. In Barnes v. Blake, 59 Hun,

Miirpiiy, 46 id. 44; White Oak Dist. Tp. 371, it was held that a mi.'ijoinder of de-

V. Oskaloosa Dist. Tp., 44 id. 512. On feudants was not a cause for a demurrer

tl;e general doctrine as to the proper for want of sufficient facts In- tlic party

j linder of defendants, see Buie v. Mech. imjiroperly joined.

of raising the questions a to misjoinder by those defendants wl o
are thu wrongfully made parties to a uit; but there undoubtedly
may be ca e in which the court will proceed in a more summary
manner, and will strike ff the name of a party on his mere
motion. Such eases must of necessity be somewhat exceptional,
for a a general rule, the right and liabilities of the parties to
t he record will not be determined on motion or by any other
mean except a formal trial of the issues .
§ 193. * 292. Recapitulation of Code Reforms respecting Misjoinder of Defendants.
Criticism.
If we sum up the results
of the preceding discussion, th e following conclusion may
be regarded as established beyond any doubt. In ascertaining
the effects of a misjoinder of parties, the courts, with great
unanimity, have accepted and carried out in practice the spirit
and true intent of the reform legislation; namely, that the
familiar doctrin es of equity should be made controlling in all
kinds of actions legal and equitable. They have in this instance
entirely abandoned the technical common-law rules, and have
a similated all actions in this respect to a suit in equity. Even
in the case w here the common-law doctrine of joint liability was
the most rigid, they have with perfect ease abandoned it, have
treated it as though abrogated by the general expressions of the
reform legislation, and have thus demonstrated that the judicial
reasoning by which that ancien t dogma had been supported was
in fact nothing but a formula of words without any real force
and meaning. They have shown that in a legal action upon
contract, no matter what may be the allegations as to the Joint
nature of the liability, it is possible to sever the judgment and
to permit a recovery against some defendants and for the others,
and thus to bring all case legal and equitable within the operation of the familiar principles of equity. I dwell upon this
special instance of liberal construction because it well illustrates
the position which I 1 aye th eoretically maintained as to the
general mode of interpreting the codes. The courts of the difSee al ·o, as to the effect of misjoinder,
Na\·e 1•. H adley, 7+ In d 15 .'J; . fendenhall
r. Wil on, 54 Iowa. 589; C g well v.
>furphy, 46 id. H; White Oak Di ·t. Tp.
v Ost aloosa Dist. Tp., 44 id. 512. On
t': P general doctrine a to the proper
j iiu ·ler of defendant , . ee Buie v. ;\Iech.

As 'n , 74 N. C. 117; State v. J. P. & M. R.
Co, 15 Fla. 201; Mah oney v . .McLean, 26
l\Iinn. 415. fo Barnes v. Blake, 59 Hn11,
3il, it was held that a mi. joinder of elefencla.nts wa not a cause for a demurrer
for want of sufficient facts by th e pa rt y
improperly joined.
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ferent States have found no difficulty in adopting and applying-

the complete doctrine of equity in this case ; there is no greater

difficulty in adopting and applying the same to all the provisions-

of the codes relative to parties, and to the amalgamation of equi-

table and legal principles in the one civil action created by the

new procedure. If the rules which control equitable tribunals-

can be and ought to be introduced into the civil action in respect

to the single feature of a misjoinder of defendants, for the same

reason they can and ought to be introduced in respect to all the

parties and in respect to every other external feature of the judi-

cial proceeding. If the courts had been consistent in this matter,

and had not halted in their work of liberal construction, a com-

plete, harmonious, and symmetrical system would long since have

been constructed, and the confusion and conflict in principle

which now exists would have been avoided. Until this course

is freely and systematically adopted, until the courts shall follow

out to its legitimate results in all parts and elements of the action

the equitable notion which is made everywhere so prominent in

the statute, we can never expect to obtain all the simplicity and
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clearness, and subordination of external form to substantial facts,

promised by the new system of procedure.

§ 194. * 293. Same respecting Nonjoinder. Less Liberal Inter-

pretation here. Case of Nonjoinder and Misjoinder Compared.

Criticism and Recommendation. Even in determining the eifects

of a nonjoinder of proper defendants, the courts have failed

to interpret the provisions of the codes with the same free-

dom which they used in that of misjoinder ; they have hesi-

tated and stopped, when it would have been easy to have gone

forward, and to have given the clauses their full force and effect.

Undoubtedly the two cases stand upon a somewhat different

footing. When a person is himself properly sued, it does not

substantially affect his rights or liabilities that another person is

also improperly sued with him ; that fact does not essentially

und no difficul m adopting and appl ing
trin of quit in thi a ; h r i no greater
p ing and a lying be ame t ll the pro i i n
c de r lati t ar i . , an to the amalgamation of equind 1 g 1 principle in the ne civil action reated b the
ne procedure. If the rule which control e uitable tribunal
an be and ought
be introduced into the civil action in re pect
t o he single feature of a mi joinder of defendants, for the same
rea on they can and ought to be introduced in re pect to all the
partie and in re pect to every other external feature of the judiial proceeding. If the courts bad een consi tent in this matter,
an had not halted in their work of liberal con truction, a c mpl te, harmoniou , and symmetrical y tern would long ince have
been com;tructed, and the confusion and conflict in principle
which now exist would have been avoided. Until this course
i freely and stematically adopted, until the courts ball follow
out to it legitimate results in all parts and element of the action
be equitable notion which is made everywhere so prominent in
t he tatute we can never expect to obtain all the simplicity and
clearne s, and ubordina tion of external form to sub tantial facts,
promised by the new ystem of procedure.
194.
293. Same respecting Nonjoinder. Less Liberal Interpretation here.

Case of

Nonjoinder and Misjoinder Compared.

make his own liability greater or less. But when a person is

sued, he has, in many instances, — certainly in all those legal

actions where the lialnlity is joint, and in some equitable suits

where the rights and liabilities are complex, — a right that all

the others who are also liable with him, or against whom the

cause of action exists, or who are necessary parties to a complete

determination of the controversy, should be united with him as

Even in determining the effects
of a nonjoinder of proper defendants, the courts have failed
to interpret the provisions of the codes with the same freedom which they u d in that of misjoinder; they have hesitated and stopped, ' hen it would have been ea y to have gone
forward, and to have given the clauses their full force and effect.
n ubtedly the two ca
stan upon a somewhat different
footin g . When a er on is himself properly su , it doe not
.·ub · an tially affect hi right r liabilitie that another
· l improperly u
wi h him; that fact do n t
mak h1
wn lia ility gr t r or le
ut wh n a er n is
u
he ha , in man in tan
r inly in all th e 1 gal
action w ere t h li bilit i
quitable uit
' h r, he right
right hat all
th otb r wh
or a ain t "b orn the
of ac i n e i
arti t
m pl te
·rrni1 tio of tb
er·
unit ' ith him as
Criticism and Recommendation.
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co-defendants, and a neglect to join them is an error against

which he should be permitted to object, and from which he

should be suffered to obtain a relief. The former equitable

procedure, as well as the common-law practice, recognized this

right of the defendant. But it is a very different thing to say-

that such an error, when established, should in any class of cases

absolutely defeat the action. The error is not essentially fatal.

This is shown by the practice itself of the courts, which treats

the objection as dilatory, and requires it to be presented in a

certain technical manner, or else regards it as waived. There

is then no reason in the nature of the proceeding why the equity

doctrine should not have been applied under these circumstances

to all legal actions, so that, when an improper noyijoinder is

finally established by the decision of the court, the action should

never be defeated thereby, but should be retained by the court in

order that the plaintiff might add the necessary defendants, and

then the cause proceed to judgment on the merits. It is cer-

tainly as practicable and as easy to pursue this course with all

legal actions, as it is with those that are equitable; and the
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codes expressly permit, if not require it, in language which in

terms embraces every species of suit.

I shall now proceed to consider the particular cases which have

arisen, and the various specific rules as to parties defendant which

have been established by judicial decision. This examination

will show how the general principles of interpretation have been

applied by the courts, and will exhibit the system as a whole

which has been constructed in respect to the selection and

joinder of defendants. The discussion will be separated into

three general divisions : namely, legal actions generally ; actions

against husband and wife, or either of them, as affected by the

marriage relation; equitable actions generally.

FIRST: LEGAL ACTIONS.

§ 195. * 294. I. Actions against Owners or Occupants of Land.

Limitation herein. Distinguished from Common-Law Action of

Ejectment. This division does not include actions for trespass or

other torts to the land or its possession, which will be considered

under a subsequent subdivision relating to torts. The actions

here intended must be brought against joint owners, owners in

common, or occupants. The action to recover possession of

co-defendants, and a neglect to join them is an error agair.st
which he should be permitted to object, an<l from whi ch be
should be suffered to obtain a reli f. Th e former equitable
procedure, as well as the common-law prac tic , recognized this
right of the defendant. But it is a very di ffe rent thing to say
that such an error, when established, should in any class of cases
absolutely d ef eat the activn. The error is not essen ti ally fatal.
This is shown by the practice itself of the courts, which treats
the objection as dilatory, and requires it to be presented in a
certain technical manner, or else regards it as waived. There
is then no reason in the nature of the proceeding why the equity
doctrine should not have been applied under these circumstances
to all legal actions, so that, when an improper nonJ°oin der is
finally established by the decision of the court, the action should
never be defeated thereby, but should be retained by the court in
order that the plaintiff might add the necessary defendants, and
then the cause proceed to judgment on the merits. It is certainly as practicable and as easy to pursue this course with all
legal actions, as it is with those that are equitable; and the
codes expressly permit, if not require it, in language which in
terms em braces every species of suit.
I shall now proceed to consider the particular cases which have
arisen, and the various specific rules as to parties defendant which
have been established by judicial decision. This examination
will show how the general prin cipl es of interpretation have been
applied by the courts, and will exhibit the system as a whole
which has been construc;ted in respect to the selection and
joinder of defendants. The discussion will be separated into
three general divisions: namely, legal actions generally; actions
against husband and wife, or either of them, as affected by the
marriage relation; equitable actions generally.
FIRST : LEGAL ACTION S.

§ 195. * 294.
Limitation

I. Actions against Owners or Occupants of Land.

herein.

Distinguished from

Common-Law

Action

of

This division does not include actions for trespass or
other torts to the land or its possession, which will be considered
under a subsequent subdivision relating to torts. The actions
here intended must be brought against joint owners, owners in
common, or occupants. The acti on to recover possession of

Ejectment.

282 CIVIL KEMEDIES.

land, and to try the title thereto, is generally called by lawj-ers

and judges tlie action of ejectment. Yet wherever the new

procedure is adopted, it far more nearly resembles in all of its

essential features the ancient real actions which were displaced

in use by "ejectment," — in its essential features, 1 say, for of

course it has none of the technical peculiarities which marked

those old common-law forms of proceeding. One fact is certainly

true, namely, that it does not bear the slightest resemblance to

the action of " ejectment " as that was contrived by the old

judges and lawyers, and only confusion and misconception result

from applj'ing to it that name. Undoubtedly the courts have

continued to connect with it some of the special rules and doc-

trines which belong to the action of ejectment; but many of

them, I am sure, could never have been retained if the courts

had fully appreciated the completeness of the change wrought

by the reformed system of procedure in abolishing all the forms

of le<Tal actions, and had reflected that the technical rules result-

ing^ alone from the absurd fictions which characterized ejectment

have no legitimate connection with the simple action to recover
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possession of and try the title to land which has been introduced

by the codes in the place of the former modes. As in the "real

actions," the real party in interest, and that is the owner of the

estate entitling him to possession, — Avhatever be its nature, —

must be the plaintiff, and if the object be to establish a title, the

holder or claimant of the adverse title must be made the defend-

ant, while in respect of the claim to possession the occupant

must be made a defendant. These are the simple essentials of

the action, and they clearly have nothing in them akin to "eject-

ment." The codes of some States contain express provisions in

relation to parties defendant, and especially in relation to the

union of the landlord and tenant as co-defendants,^ but these are

rather inserted fi-om an excess of caution, and do not add any-

thing to the force of the more general clauses.

§ 196. * 295. Who should be joined. Illustrations. In an

action to recover possession of an entire tract or i)arccl of land,

when the claim of the plainLilT lo the whole rests upon and is

1 Cofle of New York, § 118 (447, l.')0.3, Dakota, Kcv. Codes, 1899, § .5230; Smitli

1.598); California, §§ 379, 380; SoiUli Dakota, Ann. St., 1901, § 6078 ; Montana,

Carolina, § 141; Xott!i Carolina, § 61; § .'iSl ; I.iaho, Code Civ. Pro., 1901, § 3107 ;

l^L'tali, Kc-v. St, 1898, §2914; North Missouri, Kev. St., 1899, § 543.]

ACTI OXS A.UAL ST
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derived through a single title, he may, and unless their occupa-

tion is distinct, should join all the actual occupants or tenants of

the tract, even though they may be in jjossession of separate and

distinct portions thereof, and may hold, possess, and claim under

separate and distinct titles.^ In addition to these he may join

the landlord or person holding the fee, or any person claiming

the ownership and right of possession, and ynuat join such person

if he desires to establish in that action his own ultimate owner-

ship against that claimant. ^ If the entire tract is in the posses-

sion of two or more persons who possess the same, not in separate

portions, but jointly or in common in undivided shares, they

should all be made defendants. If the plaintiff, however, claims

separate portions of an entire tract under distinct titles, and each

of these portions is possessed or occupied by a different person

holding under a separate right or title from the others, he cannot

join all these occupants in a single action ; a suit must be brought

1 [Lewis V. Hiuson ( 1 902), 64 S. C. 57 1 ,

43 S. E. 15, quoting tiie text. Andrews
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V. Carlile (1894), L'O Colo. 370, 38 Pac.

465: Wiiere several defendants are sued

jointly in ejectment, and each files a sepa-

rate answer, a joint judgment may be

deriv cl through a sinbl title, h may, and un]
their occupati l is distinct, should j in a,]l th a tna.l ccupant or tenants f
th tract, ev n though i.h y may b in po " .··ion of parate ancl
distinct portion' th r of, and may hold, po '.' · , , nd lairn und r
·eparat and di tinct titl s. 1 In addition to th · h may join
the landlord or per on h lding the fee, or any p r on claiming
th ownership and right of pos e ion, and rnu t j in uch p r. on
if he desir s to
tablish in that action his own ultimate own rhip against that claimant. 2 If the entire tract is in the posses·ion of two or more persons who possess the sam , not in separate
portions, but jointly or in common in undivid d share ·, they
hould all be made defendants. If the plaintiff, however, claim
eparate portions of an entire tract under distinct titles, and each
of these portion i posses ed or occupied by a different per. on
holding under a separate right or title from the others, he cannot
join all these occupants in a singl~ action; a suit must be brought

rendered against them unless they de-

mand separate trials and judgments

within a proper time.

In Kliuker v. Schmidt (1898), 106 la.

70, 75 N. W. 672, plaintiff alleged that

defendant was in wrongful possession of a

strip of land fourteen feet wide along the

westerly side of his lot. This, if true,

indicated tliat each lot owner in that tier

of lots was fourteen feet on his neighbor's

land to the east. Held, that this did not

show an interest in the suit which would

warrant the other lot owners being made

parties defendant, on defendant's motion.

There was merely a possibility of contro-

versies arising between the other lot

owners, and, besides, their defences might

not be the same.] See, however, Sutton

V. Casseleggi, 77 Mo. 397.

2 State V. Orwig, 34 Iowa, 112, 115.

As to proper defendants in actions to re-

cover possession of land, and to try the

title thereto, see also Jackson v. Allen, 30

Ark. 110; Rollins v. Rollins, 76 N. C.

264 ; Colgrove v. Koonce, 76 id. 363 ;

Lytle r. Burgin, 83 id. 301 ; Young v.

Greenlee, 82 id. 346 ; Cagger r. Lansing,

64N. y. 417; in Wisconsin, see Gray v.

Tyler, 40 Wis. 579 ; Pier v. Fond du Lac,

38 id. 470 (tlie Wisconsin statute provides

for an action of ejectment against a person

not in possession ; this person must be

one exercising some acts of ownersliip

over the land, "or claiming title tliereto

or some interest therein ; " and the com-

plaint must allege that the defendant

" unlawfully withholds the posses.sion from

the plaintiff ; " Iicid, that in such an ac-

tion the title claimed by the defendant

must be one which, if valid, would give

him a possessory right to the jiremises ;

and ejectment will not lie against one

not in possession who only claims a lien) ;

Wilson V. Henry, 40 id. 594; Piatt v.

Jante, 35 id. 629 ; Barclay v. Yeomans,

27 id. 682 ; Burchard v. Roberts, 70 Wis.

l [Lewis v. Hiuson ( 1902) , 64 S. C. 57 l ,
43 S . E. 15, quoting th e text. Andrews'
v . Carlile (1894), 20 Colo. 370, 38 Pac.

465 : Where several tl efe ndauts are sued
j ointly in ejectment , aucl each fil es a separn.t,e ans wer, a joint judg ment may be
r e ude red against them unless th ey demand separate trials aud judg ment
wi t hin a proper time.
lu Klink er ?J . Schmidt (1 89 8), 106 Ia.
70 , 75 N. W. 672, plaiutiff all eged that
d efendant was in wrongful possession of a
,trip of land fourteen feet wide al on o- th e
we. terly side of his lot. This, if true,
incl icated that each lot own er in that ti er
of lots was fourteen fe et on hi s neio-hbor's
land to t he ea ·t. H eld, that thi s did not
how an interest in the sui t which woul l
warrant th e other lot owners hei11 g made
parti es defe ndan t, on defend ant's moti on.
Th ere was merely a possibility of co11troversies arisin g bet ween t he othe r lot
o wners. and, besides, t heir defe nces mi g ht
not he t he ame.J See, however, , utto n
v Casseleggi, i7 :\Io. 39 i .
2 State 1'. Orwi g, 3-!- Iowa, 112 , 115 .
A to proper <lefe ndn nts in ac ti on to recover po ses ' ion of land, and to try the
ti tle t heret o, see also J ackso n l' . All en, 30
Ark . 110 ; R o11ius 1'. R olli ns. 76 . C.
264 ; Colg roYe v. K oonce, 76 id. 363;
Lytle 1'. Burg in , 83 id . 301 ; Youn g v.
Green l ee, 82 id. 346 ; Ca ggc r '" Lan ing,

64 N. Y. 417; in Wisconsin , ee G ray v.
Tyler, 40 Wis . 579; Pier v. Fond du Lac,
38 id. 470 (the Wisconsin statute provid es
for an action of ej ectm eut against a person
not in po. es ·io n ; thi s person must be
on e ex ercisiu g some acts of own e r .~ hip
over the la ncl, " or claimin g title thereto
or some in terest th erein; " au d th e co mplaint must allege that th e defend ant
"unlawfully wi th hold ' th e possession from
th e plain ti ff ;" hPfd , t lia t in such a n acti on the title claim ed by th e defendant
must be one w!ii ('. h, if valiu, wo nl d g ive
him a possessory rig ht to t he premises ;
and ejectment will not li e against one
not iu possession w ho on ly claims a lieu) ;
Wil on 1:. Henry, .JO i1l. 59 4; Pl att v.
J ante, 35 id. 629 ; Barclay 1·. Yeo ma ns,
27 id. 682 ; Burchanl ii. Hober t., 70 Wis.
111. Under th e 1\fo;so uri statute, req uiring th e action to be brought against the
perso n in posse;o;R ion , ~ h aw v. T racy, 95
Mo. 53 1 (pos ession of the te nant is not
uch possessio n o[ t he lancl lorcl as to ena ble t he pla in tiff to rcco ,·er against the
lan dlord as f'Olc defendant); Phillips v.
P hill ip., lOi' :\fo. 360 (occupancy of or
res idence upon the pro per ty i' uot a 11eccssu r.1' elemeut of po;;scs. iou) ; Bensice k v.
Cook (Mo. 1892 ) , 19 ~- W. 642; Callaha n
v. D a vi , 90 l\l o. 7 ; Charter Oa k L. lu s.
Co. v. Cummiugs, 90 Mo. 267.
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to recover each portion against the occupant thereof ; the mere

fact of propinquity would not produce any community of interest.

The foregoing propositions are sustained and illustrated in the

following instances. In an action brought by a widow to recover

dower (which had not been assigned) in a city lot of land and

block of stores, the occupant, holding under a lease for one year,

of a single floor of one store standing on a small portion of the

entire tract was held to be properly joined as a co-defendant.^

A similar action being brought to recover dower in a tract which

the husband had conveyed during his marriage to a single grantee

by one deed in which his wife did not join, and which land had

by subsequent deeds been conveyed, one-half to one separate

owner, and one-half to another, it w^as held that the widow,

being entitled to dower in the whole tract, might join both these

owners of the fee, who were also the occupants, as defendants in

the same action. ^ The rule is not confined to proceedings for

the recovery of dower. Where it was alleged that one defendant

claimed to be owner in fee of the whole premises, and that

the three other defendants were his tenants, and that they all
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"unjustly withheld from the plaintiff the possession of the said

premises," and it appeared on the trial that each of these four

defendants actually occupied a separate portion, it was held that

all these persons were properly united as co-defendants in the

action.^ When the land is in the actual possession of a tenant,

the landlord may be joined with him as a co-defendant, inde-

pendently of any express provision of the code authorizing such

a course, if the landlord has in any manner interfered to resist

the plaintiff's claim, or has aided and abetted the tenant in Mb

resistance, or has asserted the right of ownership to be in himself

as against the plaintiff.*

1 Ellicott I'. Hosier, 7 N. Y. 201. This since he is entitled to the possession,

was so lield under the 2 R. S. of New Bledsoe v. Simms, 53 Mo. 305. See also

York, p. 303, §§ 2 and 4, and p. 304, §§ 10 AVilson v. Garaghty, 70 Mo. 517 ; Rust v.

and 13, which provide that ejectment must Goff, 94 Mo. 511.

he brought against the person actually - Galbreath v. Gray, 20 Ind. 290. It

in occupation ; citing Sherwood v. Van- was lield that the respective liabilities of

denburgh, 2 Hill, 303. The defendant the two defendants could be arranged and

harl contended that the action, being for determined in the judgment.

dower, must be against the owner of the '^ Fosgate i\ Herkimer Man. Co., 12

freehold, as in the common law action of N. Y. 580. See Fisher v. Hepburn, 48

dower. In .Missouri, wiien an action is N. Y. 41, 55, per Earl J.

brouglit to recover lands claimed to be * Abeel v. Van Gelder, 36 N. Y. 513

owtK'd in fee by a wife, her husband is the Fosgate v. Herkimer Man. Co., supra

only proper j)arty to be made defendant, Fearce v. Ferriss K.\., 10 N. Y. 280

t re o · r , ch or ion ag in t the ccupant hereof· the mere
fa ·t f r inqui y' uld n t pr duce an commur it fin re, t.
h fur 0 ing pr o ition are u tain d and illu trated in the
f llowinO' in tan
In an acti n brought b a widow t reco er
l wer (which h
not b en a ign d) in a city 1 t of lan and
1 k f or
h
cupant, holding under a lea e for one year
f , ingle floor f one tore tanding on a small portion of the
n ire tr ct wa h 1 to be roperly joined as a co-defendant. 1
A imilar action being brought to r cover dower in a tract which
the bu nd had conveyed during hi marriage to a single grantee
y one deed in which bi wife did not join, and which land had
by ub equent deed been conveyed one-half to one separate
owner and one-half o another, it wa held that the widow,
being entitled to dower in the whole tract might join both these
owner of the fee, who were al o the occupant , a defendant in
the ame action. 2 The rule is not confined to proceeding for
the recovery of dower. Where it wa alleged that ne defendant
laimed to be owner in fee of the whole premi e , and that
the three oth r defendants were bi tenant and that they all
unju tly withheld from the plaintiff the po e ion of the aid
pr mi e ' and it appeared on the trial that each of the e four
lefendant actually occupied a ep rate porti n, it wa held that
11 the
per on were properly united a co-d f ndant in the
3
ti n.
\Vhen the land i in the actual po e i n of a tenant,
he l ndlord may be joined with him a a co-d fondant indep nden ly of any expre provi ion f the c d authorizing such
a cour , if the landlord has in any manner interfered to re i t
the plaintiff s laim, or has ai ed and abett the tenant in liis
r . i tance, or ha a rted the right f owner hip to
in him lf
a' again t the plaintiff}
1 Ellicott t•. fo ier, 7 N . Y. 201.
This
wa
( held und r the 2 R. . f N w
York, p. 3 3, . 2 a nd 4, an <l p. 304,
10
, nd 13, which provid e that je tm nt mu t
he lirou1rht arra in: t th e p r"on a tually
in occupation; iting ' h rwood v.
an<l<•nhnr~h, 2 Jfill, .103.
Th d f ndaut
lmrl contMHINI that th a ti n, lJ iu ~ for
1low •r, mu t he au in t th owner of the
fr hold, a in the: ommo n law c tion r
1]11H•r. Jn :\li .. ou ri , wit 11 an a·tion i
lir0u~h to rr·rn\'f'T laud · d, i m cl to lie
11 nwd in { '" liy a wifl', !IC'r Im lia11cl i.· th
c.iul.\• prop ·r 11ar1y tu li · made d f ·JH.I nt,

F" ·~ale v. Hnkim r ?I fan .
P earce 1:. F rri."

Ex., 1

ACTION

AGAINST OCCUPANT

OF L

D.
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§ 197. * 29G. Who should not be joined. Illustrations. Per-

sons, however, whose rights tuiiiiot he at all affected by a re-

covery against the party in actual possession, whose interest is

entirely distinct from his, and under or from whom he does not

derive any title, are neither necessary nor proper co-defendants

with him in an action brought to recover the possession as against

his special title; as, for example, the remainder-man in fee after

a life estate, when the action is merely for the purpose of re-

covering possession during the continuance of such life interest.

Thus, in an action against a husband, tenant by the curtesy in

actual possession, brought, not to establish an absolute title in

fee, but to recover the possession during the husband's life, the

heirs of the deceased wife — who are the reversioners in fee —

are neither necessary nor proper parties defendant.^ On the

same principle, an action by the grantee in a sheriff's deed of

lands given on an execution sale, the judgment debtor having

died, should be against the latter's heirs alone, and not against

them and his widow ; her dower right could not be affected by

the recover}', and being as yet unassigned, it did not entitle her
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to possession as against the j^laintiff.^ Lands having been given

to a tenant for life, with remainder in fee to another, the former

leased the premises for a term of years, with a covenant of quiet

enjoyment. The life tenant died before the expiration of the

term, and the remainder-man thereupon entered and took posses-

sion. The lessee brought an action upon the broken covenant

against both the executors of the life tenant and the remainder-

Fosgate v. Herkimer Man. Co., 12 Barb, railroad company which had acquired it

•352. See also Fiuuegan i'. Carraher, 47 by condemnation proceediug.s, the lessee

N. Y. 493, which was very similar to Abeel of such land is a neces.sary party: Roby

r. Van Gelder, SM/j/a, in all the facts. The v. N. Y. C. & H. K. R. R. Co. (1894), 142

landlord alone was sued. Court held the N. Y. 176, 36 N. E. 1053.

tenant was also a proper and perhaps a The tenant in possession is the only

necessary party, but objection to his non- necessary party to an action of ejectment,

joinder had been waived by not demurring even though he may set up that tliere are

or answering. See, further, Clason r. tenants in common with him : Raymond

Baldwin, 129 N. Y. 183; City of Napa c. v. Morrison (1894), 9 Wash. 156, 37 Pac.

Howland, 87 Cal. 84. In Iowa, it is held 318. See also Danihee v. Hyatt (1897),

that, when the defendant is only a tenant, 151 N. Y. 493; 45 N. E. 939.

§ 197. * 296. Who should not be joined. Illustrations. P rson ·, however, who e rights llc.t.nnot Le at 11 affected by a recovery against the party in actual pos ession, wh e intere t is
entirely distinct from hi , and under or from whom he do not
derive any title, are neither necessary nor proper co-defendants
with him in an action brought to recover the po se sion a again t
his pecial title; as, for example, the remainder-man in fee after
.a life estate, when the action is merely for the purpo e of recovering possession during the continuance of such life interest.
Thus, in an action against a husband, tenant by the curtesy in
actual possession, brought, not to establish an absolute title in
fee, but to recover tbe possession during the husband's life, the
heirs of the deceased wife - who are the reversioners in fee .are neither necessary nor proper parties defendant. 1 On the
same principle, an action by the grantee in .a sheriff'· deed of
lands given on an execution sale, the judgment debtor having
died, should be against the latter's heirs alone, and not against
them and his widow; her dower right 0ould not be affected by
the recovery, an.d being as yet unassigned, it did not entitle her
to pos ession as against the plaintiff. 2 Lands having been given
to a tenant for life, with remainder in fee to another, the former
lea ~ ed the premises for a term of years, with a covenant of quiet
enjoyment. The life tenant died before the expiration of the
term, and the remainder-man thereupon entered and took possesion. The lessee brought an action upon the broken covenant
against both the executors of the life tenant and the remainder1

the landlord mai/ be substituted; but this All the occupants of land need not be

is not necessary. If substituted or noti- joined ; one is sufficient : Hennessey v.

fied, he is bound by the judgment ; other- Paulsen (1895), 147 N. Y. 255, 41 N. E.

wise he is not. State v. Orwig, 34 Iowa, 516.]

112, 115. 1 Allen i-. Ranson, 44 Mo. 263.

[^Where an owner of land brings an ^ Cavender v. Smith, 8 Iowa, 360.

action to recover possession against a

Fosgate v. Herkimer Man. Co., 12 Barb.
See also Finnegan v. Carraher, 47
N. Y. 493, which was very imilar to Abeel
v. Van Gelder, supra, in all the facts. The
1andlortl alone was sued. Court held the
tenant was also a proper and perhaps a
necessary party, but objection to his nonjointler had been waived by not demurring
<>r answeriug. See, further, Clason 1·.
Baldwin, 129 N. Y. 183; City of Napa v.
Howland, 87 Cal. 84. In Iowa, it i held
t hat, when the defendant i. only a tenant,
the landlord may he sub tituted; but this
i not necessary. If sub tituted or notified , he is bound by the judgment; otherwise he is not. State v. Orwig, 34 Iowa,
-352.

railroad company which had acquired it
by condemnation proceedings, the les e6
of such land i a nece . ary party: Roby
v. N. Y. C. & H. R. RR. Co. (I 94), 142
N. Y. l 76, 36 N. E. 1053.

The tenant in possession is the only
necessary party to an action of ejectment,
even though he may set up that there are
tenants in common with him: Raymond
v. Morri;:on ( l 94), 9 Wa h. 156, 37 Pac.
318. S e also Dauihee v. Hyatt (1897),
151 N. Y . 493; 45 N . E. 939.

All the occupant of land need not b6
join ed; one i;; sufficient: Hennessey v.
PauL en (1895 ), 147 N. Y. 255, 41 N. E.
516.J

112, 115.

1

[Where an ownPr of land brings an
9.ction to recover vussession again t a

f.2

Allen v. Ranson, 44 Mo. 263.
Cavender v. mith, 8 Iowa, 360.

-
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man. The action in this form was plainl}' without any founda-

tion; the remainder-man was improperly joined, as he was in no

manner liahle on the covenant.^

^ 198. * 207. II. Actions against Ov^ners or Possessors of

Chattels. In Actions to recover Possession of Chattels. Common-

Law Rule not Changed. The actions whlch fall under this sub-

Th < tion in thi' form wa plainly with ut any foundation: th e r maiml r-man wa.' improper! - join l a' he was in no
mann "r lia l l on th coyenant .1
198. ··. :.. J i. II. Actions against Owners or Possessors of
man.

division, and which have any distinctive features, are very few

in number. Those brought to recover damages for a tortious

act, trespass, or negligence, committed by means of a chattel,

and those brought to recover damages for the conversion of a

chattel, properly belong to the subdivision which treats of actions

for torts in general. The common-law rules as to parties de-

fendant in an action to recover possession of chattels have not

been in an}^ manner affected by the new procedure. Such action

must be brought against the party or parties in actual possession

of the chattel demanded by the plaintiff.^ If this actual posses-

sion is in one, he must be the sole defendant; if in two or more

jointly, — as, for example, in a partnership, — they must all be

made defendants.^ There is a particular case in which the action
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may be maintained against one in eoyutriictive possession, as well

as against the party in actual possession.* If the original taking

of the goods was wrongful, and the wrong-doer has subsequently

parted with the possession by assignment, the action will still lie

against him, or it may be prosecuted against both himself and the

assignee whose possession is actual.^ Possession by the party,

however, and not the claim of ultimate ownership, is in general

1 Coakley v. Chamberlain, 8 Abb. Pr. 8 i Ch. PI. pp. 122, 12.3 (SpringfieM

N. K. .37. The complaiut wa.s dismissed as ed. 1840) ; Gassner v. Marquardt, 76 Wis.

to the remainder-mau, and judgment was 579 ; Washington v. Love, 34 Ark. 93 ;

rendered .igainst the executors. The Harkey v. Tillman, 40 Ark. 551 ; and

action was in every respect remarkable. Helman v. Withers (Ind. App. 1892), 30

Where a lessor assigns his term, the lessor N. K. 5, citing numerous cases ; Scott v.

may join the lessee and the assignee in a McGraw, 3 Wash. 675; Willis v. De Witt

suit for the rent. Tabue v. McAdams, (S. Dak. 1892), 52 N. W. 1090, and cases

8 Hush, 74. cited.

- []" One having custody of property ■• Nichols v. Michaels, 23 N. Y. 264,

in dispute is a proper defendant in re- 270,271. See liaughton r. Newberry, 69

plevin": Kngel >•. Dado (1902), — Neb. N. C. 456.

Chattels.

In Actions to r ecover Possession o f Chattels.

Common-

Th action' which fall under thi 'Ul><.li Yd on, , ntl ' hich has any di tinctiYe fe ture ·, are very f w
in numuer. Tho e brought to recover damage for a torti u '
ad. tre pa
or necrligence, committ cl by mean of a chattel,
aml tho e brought to recoYer lama 0 es for the con r ion of a
·hatteL pr perl - L long to the ubdivi ion which treat of action
for tort in g neml. The common -law rule a to par ies de f ndant in an action to recoY r po e ion of hattel ha
not
h en in any manner affect cl by the new procedure.
uch action
mtL' t be brought aO'ain t the pctrty or partie in actual po e ion
of the chattel cleman led by the plaintiff. 2 If thi actual po e"' :ion i in one he mu ·t be the sole defendant · if in two or mor
j11intly - a._ for example in a partner hip - they mu t all b
made defendant .3 There is a particular ca e in which the acti n
rna~· l maintained again tone in constructive po es'ion as '" 11
a: acrain. t the party in actual po e sion . 4 If th oriE,inal taking
of tli goo 1 \\a wrongful, and the wrong-doer ha ub quently
p<lrt cl with the po e ion by a signment the a tion wi11 ill li
again ·t 11im or it may be prosecuted against both him elf and h
a.' ·ignee who e po e ion i -· actual. 5 Po e ion b the party
h wev r~ and not the claim of ultimate owner hip i in gen ral
Law Rule not Changed .

— , 92 \. W. 629. Replevin sliould be ^ Nichols v. Michaels, 23 N. Y. 264,

brought against the party in pos.scssion, 268, 270, 271, per .James and Seldcn ,IJ.

and wliore such .iction is brouglit against See, liowever, Davis v. Van de Mark. 45

an oflicor acting under an execution, he Kan. 130; Feder v. Abrahams, 28 Mo.

may be .>ined either as an individual or Ajip. 454.

as an ofTicer: Irwin v. Walling (1896),

4 Okla. 128, 44 Pac. 219.]

oakley v. hamberlain , Abb. Pr.
. .
3i. The complaiut was <li ·mi ed a
tu the remainder-man and jnd~m nt wa
ren1lcred agai11. t the executor·. The
:wtion wa. in e,·ery re pPct remarkable.
\\There a le-. or a igu his L' rm, th le or
may j<Jin rl1e I : e an1l the a ·igne in a
nit fur the re11t. Tabue I'. ~le A clam.,

Buh, 7-1 .
.! [ '
11 e haYin~ cu.toily of prop rty
ir di pnl" i a propPr cl •fc•111l:uit in rep! ''iu ., : L11 !!l'l •·. 1Jad•i (I '102), - •• h.
- , !12
W. Ii:! .!. H1 plu in 111 11]1] hP.
l1r,1u •h n •ain t tl1 P. par Iy i11 JI'' •'··ion,
: 111 ' lwr • u h a tio11 i u ron'.!ht again:t
.m o w< r n • in~ 11 11dt>r an " ·'"l'll t i•m , he
ma_,. 111 11 l " i h •r a a11 i11rJi, i<lual or
a; a '! om1 r
Jr wi 11 I' , \ralli11g (I 96),
'I);
I!.., II l'ac·. 21!1 .J
T.

s 1 Ch. PL pp. 122, 123 ( pringfielil
ed. l 40); Gas ner i:. farquardt, 76 \Vi .
579; \Va hington v. Love, 34 Ark. 93;
H a rkey v . Tillman, 40 Ark. 55 l ; ancl
H Iman v. With r (I nd. A pp. 1 92), 30
~·. E. 5, citing num r ou
a -e ; , cott t '.
i\lcGraw 3 Wa h. 6i 5 · Willi v. D Wi t
( . Dak. l 92), 52
cited .
4
~ichol v.
li ch:tel., 23 N . Y. 264,
210, 2i I . , 'ee H aught n 1•. Jew berry,
C, -156.
5 • "ichols i-.
li<·ha I. , 2.3 .... Y . 2G4,
21) . , 270, 2il pt'r .Jame. and • elden .J.T.
, t'P, howernr, ]), vi. v.
an de ~lark . .i:Ka11. I :JO; Fe<ler 1:. Auraha.m. 2
Io
App. 434.
4T•
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tlie ground for making him a defendant. If the possessor is

sued, and a third person also sets up a claim of title, the con-

llicting demands may be determined by means of an interpleader

between the plaintiff and this claimant, ordered by the court at

the instance of the defendant, if he in fact admits that he himself

has no right in and to the goods. ^

§ 199. * 298. Ship-Owners. The liability of ship-owners for

supplies furnished or repairs made, or npon other contracts,

express or implied, in respect to the vessel itself, gives rise to

rules which properly fall under this subdivision. I do not now

stop to inquire when, how, or by whom the owners may be bound,

nor what are the powers of the master or other agent in managing

the vessel. It is assumed that the power exists and has been

properly exercised, and that a liability has arisen for the supplies,

repairs, or other aid to the ship; and the single question is. What

is the extent of the liability, upon whom does it rest, and against

whom should it be enforced? When a liability has been created

by the master or other agent for supplies furnished to the vessel,

the part-owners are responsible in soUdo, and should all be joined
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as defendants ; the noyijoinder of some is a defence by those sued ; ^

and the same is true in the case of repairs and of all other ex-

penses properly incurred in sailing her.^ An action to recover

compensation in the nature of salvage for services rendered in

saving and securing a disabled steamboat under circumstances

entitling the plaintiff to such compensation, was held to be prop-

erly brought against all the persons and corporations who owned

interests in the boat, even though their interests were distinct

and unequal, and even though some of them were separate

1 See code of New York, § 122 (452, 1901, § 6085 ; Utah, Rev. St., 1898, § 2924;

820) ; California, § 380 ; Nebraska, § 48 ; Washington, Bal. Code, § 4S42 ; Wiscou-

North Carolina, § 65; Nevada, § 17; sin, St., 1898, § 2610 ; Wyoming, Rev. St.,

[[Arizona, Rev. St., 1901, § 1.S08; Arkan- 1899, § 3490.J

sas, Sand. & Hill's St., §§ 5635-5637; '^ Sager i-. Nichols, 1 Daly, 1.

Colorado. § 18; Connecticut, Gen. St., ^ gaggg^t v. Crowell, 3 Robt. 72. Lia-

1902, § 1019; Georgia, Code, 1895, §4896; bility in solido means a joint liability,

Idaho, Code Civ. Pro., 1901, § 3176; In- where all must be proceeded against, and

diana, Burns' St., § 274 ; Iowa, Code, the judgment is recovered against all, but

1897. § 3487 ; Kansas, Gen. St., 1901, may be fully enforced against either, and

§ 4474 ; Kentucky, § 30 ; Missouri, Rev. , he left to his right of contribution, if anv,

St., 1899, §417: Montana, § 588; North against his fellows. In reference to the

Dakota, Rev. Codes, 1899, § 5240; Ohio, general doctrine stated iu the te.xt, con-

Bates' St., § 5016; Oklahoma. St., 1893, suit Smith's Mercantile Law, pp. 237, 2.3S

§ 3915 ; Oregon, Hills' Laws, § 40; South (Am. ed), and Abbott on Shipping,

Carolina, § 143 ; South Dakota, Ann. St., pp. 116-118 (marg. pag.).
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insurers of her by different policies, to whom an abandonment

had been made on account of a total loss. Altliough their inter-

ests and their liabilities were unequal, they might all be sued in

a single action, and a separate judgment could be rendered against

each in proportion to his or its liability.^

§ 200. * 299. III. Actions upon Contract ; Joint Liability.

Common-Law Bules Unchanged in Legal Actions. Exceptions.

Notwithstanding the general intent of the codes — ■ which, I

think, is very plain — to substitute the equitable in place of the

rn ·ur r
f h r
iff rent oli ie : to whom an a andonment
h< b n ma e n account f a total lo .
1th ugh th ir inter, ancl heir liabiliti w re un qual they migh all be sued in
( 'in 1 action, and a parat judgment could be render d again t
, h in pr portion to hi r it liability. 1
200. * :.9 . III. Actions upon Contract ; Joint Liability.

legal doctrines upon the subject of joint liability and of the

necessary defendants in actions brought thereon, this intent has

not guided the courts in the decision oi the particular cases as

they have arisen. The overwhelming weight of authority, in

passing upon the subordinate and practical questions, has deter-

mined that no such change has actually been made, and that the

common-law rules are left controlling in all legal actions. ^ The

only modification — and it is rather formal than real — seems to

be in the manner of raising the questions. In an action against

joint debtors, or to enforce a joint liability arising out of contract,
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all of the joint debtors or joint contractors that are living must

be united as co-defendants ; ^ and a neglect to make such union

of parties, if properly taken advantage of, will be fatal to the

action.'* In other words, the codes, in the absence of such ex-

1 Cloon !-. City Jus. Co., 1 Handy, 32, partnership described as the firm of A. &

per Gholson J., Superior Court of Cin- B., and alleged to be composed of the in-

cinuati. dividuals A. & B. is not amendable so as

2 This general statement does not, of to make the action one against a partner-

course, apply in those States whose codes ship described as the firm of C. & B., and

expressly cliange the common-law rules in composed of the individuals C. & B."

respect to joint debtors and joint liability All partners Tnust be joined : Jones v.

upon contract, and expressly permit any Langhorne (189.'5), 19 Colo. 206, 34 Pac.

number to be sued, and also the personal 99"; Cox u. Gille Hardware Co. (1899),

represi-ntatives of deceased joint debtors 8 Okla. 483, 58 I'ac. 045. Where a joint

to be united with the .survivors, etc. See liability l)ut not a partnership is alleged,

Common-Law

Rules

Unchanged in Legal

Actions.

Exceptions.

twitb tandin the g n ral intent of the codes - which, I
think i ery plain - to ub titute the equitabl in place of the
l g, 1 do rin
up n the ubject of joint liability and of the
, ar d f ndant in action brought thereon, this intent has
ui ed the court in the decision oi the particular ca s as
ha e ari en. The overwhelming weight of authority, in
p ing upon the subor linate and practical qne tion , ha determin d that no uch change has actually been made, and that the
common-law rule are left controlling in all legal action . 2 The
onl modification -and it i rather formal than real - seems to
b in th manner of rai ing the question . In an action against
j int d btor , r to enforce a joint liability arising out of contract,
ll f th j int debtors or joint contractors that are living mu t
united a co-defendants; 3 and a neglect to make such union
of arti , if properly taken advantage of, will be fatal to the
action. 4 In other word , the code , in the absence of such ex-

supra, § * 118. proof of the partnership is admissible to

3 QHut where all have not been served sliow the joint liability : First Nat. Bank

witli proce.ss, the action may proceed v. Hattenbach (1900), 13 S. D. 365, 83

against tliose served : Gyger v. Courtney N. W. 421.]

(1900), 59 Neb. 555, 81 N. W. 437; Per- * [^Montana, by statute, allows suit

kins County v. Miller (1898), 55 Neb. 141, against two or more persons transacting

75 N. W. 577 ; Clark v. Commercial Nat. business under a common name, to be

Bank (1903), — Neb. — , 94 N. VV. 958. brought against tiiem in such common

In Greer v. Waxeibaum (1902), 115 name, the summons to i)e served on one or

Oa. 866, 42 S. E. 206, the court said : " A more of the a.ssociates, § 590. Similar

petition in an action brought against a statute in Colorado, § 14; California,

loon v.
ity Io . Co., 1 Handy, 32,
p r
hol. on J., uperior Court of Cindnuati.
2 Thi general tatemeut does not, of
eour e, apply in tho. e tate who e odes
ex pre · ly change the common -law rul e in
r pe t to joint debto r and joint liability
upon contract, and expr ly permit any
number to b ued, and al o the per onal
r pr . e11tative of d c a ed joint debtor
to be unit d with the urvivor , etc.
ce
1l .

partner hip described as the firm of A. &
B., and all ged to be compo ed of the individual A. & B. i not am ndable so as

DEFE D NT

JOINTLY LIABLE ON

DEFENDANTS JOINTLY LIABLE ON CONTRACT.
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press provisions as are found in those of some States, Mia ve not

changed the nature of joint liability on contract, nor assimilated

it to a several or joint and several one.^ While this doctrine is

^ 388; Minnesota, St., 1894, § 5177;

press provisions as are found in tho..,e of some tat s, 1 have not
<Changed the nature of joint liability on contract, nor assimilated
it to a everal or joint and several one. 2 While thi doctrine is

Wyoming, Kev. St., 1899, §3485; Utah,

Rev. St., 1898, § 2927 ; Connecticut, Gen.

St., 1902, §588; Ohio, K. S., 1900, §5011.]

1 QIu Arkansas and Kentucky the

statute is as follows : " Where two or more

persons are jointly bound by contract, the

action thereon may be brought against all

or any of them, at the plaintiff's option."

Arkansas, Sand. & Hill's Dig. § 5634 ;

Kentucky, Code, 1895, § 27.

In Kansas and Missouri the statute is

as follows : " In all cases of joint obliga-

tions and joint assumptions of co-partners

or others, suits may be brought and pros-
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ecuted against any one or more of those

who are so liable." Kansas, Gen. St.,

1901, § 1193; Missouri, Rev. St., 1899,

§892.

The Iowa statute is somewhat more

comprehensive : " Where two or more

persons are bound by contract or by judg-

ment, decree or statute, whetlier jointly

only, or jointly and severally, or severally

only, including the parties to negotiable

paper, common orders and checks, and

sureties on the same or separate instru-

ments, or by any liability growing out of

the same, the action thereon may, at the

plaintiff's option, be brought against any

or all of them." Code 1897, § 3465.

The North Carolina statute is as fol-

lows : " In all cases of joint contracts of

•co-partners in trade or others, suit may be

brought and prosecuted on the same

against all, or any number of the persons

making such contracts." Code, 1883, § 187.

In 1897 Minnesota adopted a similar

statute. Laws 1897, chap. 303, reading as

follows : " A joint or separate or several

action may be brouglit against any one or

more or all of the ])arties liable upon such

joint obligation, and a joint or several

judgment niuy be entered against any one

or more or all of tiie parties liable upon

such joint obligation ; provided, however,

tlie court may, upon application by any

interested party, or upon its own motion,

require the ])Iaintiff to bring in as parties

defendant all of the parties jointly liable

on any such obligation. ""]

2 Bridge v. Payson, 5 Sandf. 210;

Wooster v. Chamberlain, 28 Barb. 602 ;

Tinkum v. O'Neale, 5 Nev. 93 ; Keller r.

2 Bridge v. Pay on, 5 Sand£. 210;
388; Minnesota, St., 1894, § 5177;
Wyoming, Rev. St., l 99, 3485; Utah, Wooster v. Chamberlain, 28 Barb. 602 ;
Rev. 't., 1898, § 2927 ; Con necticut, Gen. Tinkum v. O'N'eale, 5 Nev. 93; Keller i:.
St., 1902, § 588; Ohio, R. S., 1900, § 50 11.J Blasd el, l Nev. 491; Jenks v. Opp, 43
l [In Arkansas and
Kentucky the Ind. 108, 110; Kamm v. Harker, 3 Ore.
tatute i~ a follow ' : " Where two or more 208; Aylesworth v. Brown, 31 Ind. 270;
person are jointly bound by contract, the Bledsoe v. Inin , 35 Ind. 293; Ilardy v.
action thereon may be brought again t all Blazer, 29 Ind. 226 ; 92 Am. Dec. 34 i;
or any of them, at the plaintiff's option." Braxton v. State, 25 Ind. 82; Shafer v.
Arkansas, Sand. & Hill's Dig. § 5634; Moriarty, 46 Ind. 9, 13. See Lane L
Salter, 51 N. Y. 1. In Bledsoe v. Irvin,
Kentucky, Code, 1895, § 27.
In Kansas and Missouri the statute is the court said that the decision there
~s follows: " In all cases of joint obliga- ·made did not conflict with th e doctrine
tions and joint a:;sumptions of co-partners of Goodn ight v. Goar, 30 Ind. 418, which
or others, uits may be brought and pros- was that "t he code seems to have re-ecuted against any one or more of those enacted the rules which prevai led in
who are so liable." Kan as, Gen. St., eq uity as to who must join as pla intiff '
1901, § 1193; Missouri, Rev. St., 1899, and may be joined a defendants," l.Jeeause,
§ 892.
even in equity, such parties (joint debtor:::;)
The Iowa statute i somewhat more must all be made defendants, and th us
comprehensive : " Where two or more brought before the court; citing, in suppersons are bound by contract or by judg- port of th is equity rule, 1 Dan. Ch. Prac.
ment, decree or statute, whether jointly 329; Perry v. Turner, 55 Mo. 418. If one
on ly, or jointly and severally, or seve rally of two or more joint debtor · has been
·only, including the parties to negotiable discharged in bankruptcy, he is still a
paper, common orders and checks, and uecessary defendant, since his defence is
.sureties on the same or separate instru- per onal, and must be specially pleaded.
ments, or by any liability growing out of Jenks v . Opp, 43 Ind. 108, 110, 111. See
the ame, t.he action thereon may, at the also, retaining the common-law rule,
plaintiff's option, be brought against any People i•. Sloper, 1 I daho, 158; Ryau v.
-0r all of them." Code 1897, § 3465.
State Bk., 10 Neb. 524; Rider Life Raft
The orth Carolina statute is as fol- Co. v. Roach, 97 N. Y . 3i8 .
[Kansas and Mi souri have the followlows : "In all cases of joint contracts of
-co-partners in trade or others, suit may be ing statute: " All contracts which, by the
brought and prosecuted on the same common law, are joint only, shall be conagainst all, or any number of the persons strued to be joint and everal. '' Kansas,
making such contracts." Code, 1883, § 18i. Gen. St., 1901, § 1190; Missouri, Rev. St.,
In 1897 Minnesota adopted a simi lar 1899, § 889. Colorado has a statute
statute, Laws 1897, chap. 303, reading as almost identical, Mills' St.,§ 2528, quoted
follows : "A joint or seµarate or several in note to§ * 303. And a r ece nt Minnesota
a tion may be brought against any one or statute, Law 189i , chap. 303, provides
more or all of the parties li able upon such that "Parties to a joint obligation shall
joint obligation, and a joiut or seYe ral be jointly and seYernlly lial.Jl e thereon for
judgment may be entered a gainst any one the full amount thereof."
In Outcalt 1-. Collier (1899 ),
Ok la.
or more or all of tlte parties liable up n
uch joint obligat ion; provided, however, 473, 58 Pac. 642, t he ourt held tlrn.t und er
ection of the Oklahoma
the court may, upon application by any the Yariou
interested party, or upon its own motiu11,
tatutes, contract. which appear to be
Tequire the plaintiff to bring in a ' parties joint must be co11strue<l to be joint and
defendant all of the parties jointly liable several. See § ii' 2i6, nu t .
-0n any such obligation."]
Held, iu Davi ·on i•. Harmon (189G),

s

Blasdel, 1 Nev. 491; Jenks v. Opp, 43

Ind. 108, 110; Kamm i'. Harker, 3 Ore.

208; Aylesworth v. Brown, 31 Ind. 270;

Bledsoe v. Irvin, 35 Ind. 293; Hardy v.

Blazer, 29 Ind. 226 ; 92 Am. Dec. 347 ;

Braxton v. State, 25 Ind. 82 ; Shafer v.

Moriarty, 46 Ind. 9, 13. See Lane v.

Salter, 51 N. Y. 1. In Bledsoe v. Irvin,

the court said that the decision there

made did not conflict with the doctrine

of Goodnight v. Goar, 30 Ind. 418, which

19

290

290

CI\IL RK:'IIEDIE .

CIVIL EEMEDIES.

generally accepted in the States which have adopted the reform

language of the statute is much more specific, and this language,

it is held by the courts, substantially abolishes all joint debts and

contract liabilities, and reduces them to joint and several liabili-

ties; or, rather, it produces a still greater effect, for, as judicially

interpreted, it permits the creditor to sue one, all, or any number

ho pleases, of the debtors or persons liable on the contract.^

v^ 201. * 300. One of two or more Joint Contractors Incapacitated.

Retired Partners. If one of two or more joint contractors is in-

capable of entering into a valid agreement, but all are sued

jointly in one action, judgment may be recovered against those

alone who are capable of contracting and of binding themselves

thereby ; as, for example, where a note had been given in a firm

name, and the jDartners, who were husband and wife, were both

65 Minn. 402, 67 N. W. 101.5, that where

a plaintiff brings an action upua a joint

contract, and, upon default of one of the
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joint del>tor.s, takes a judgment bv default

against him, such judgment is a bar to a

subsequent action against the others. But

ner. lly < ccep el in tl e

ate which have adopted the reform
a ha b en aid the
L ngu. ge of the t< ute i much more ·p cific and thi lan ua
it i · lwlLl by th ourt · ub tantially ab li he all joint debt and
·ontn ct liabilitie..: and reduce hem to joint , nd e 'eral lit biliti
r, r< ther it I roduce a till greater effect, for a ju liciall
int rpreted it permit' be creditor to 'Ue one, all or any nu mber
lie plea e of the debtor or per on liable on the ontract. 1
· 201. * 30 . One of two or more Joint Co ntract o rs Incapacit ated .
Petired Partners. If one of two or more joint contractor i incapable of entering into a vali<l agreement, but all are sued
:ointly in one action jud ment ma be recoYered again t hose
alone "·ho are capable of c ntracting and of binding the1 eke
therel>, - ; a , for example where a note bad been giYen in a firm
name, and the partner who were hu band and wife wer both
0

system of procedure, in a few of them, as has been said, the

y tern of proc dure, in , f w of them

T

it was held in Pfefferkorn v. Haywood

(1896), 65 Minn. 429, 68 N. W. 68, that if

the debt is in fact joint and several,

though alleged to be joint, and judgment

by default is so entered, tlie court may

thereafter allow an amendment of the

complaint to conform it to the facts.]

' This is the nece.'isary effect of the

provision in the code of each State re-

ferred to in the text, and named in note

last preceding; namely, Kansas, Kose v.

Williams, 5 Kan. 483 ; .Jefferson County

Com'rs 1-. Swain, 5 Kan. 376 ; Crane v.

Ring, 48 Kan. 58 ; Whittcnhall v. Korber,

12 Kan. 618; Alvey v. Wilson, 9 Kan.

401. 405 ; Silver v. Foster, 9 Kan. 56, 59.

Iowa, llyerson v. Hendrie, 22 Iowa, 480,

an action sustained against one of the

])artners upon a firm note ; the opinion of

Cole J. is a very full discussion of tiie

doctrine and of the changes ninde by tiie

new system, — an exceedingly instructive

opinion, but too long for (|uotation. Ken

lucky, Gos.sora v. Badgett, 6 Bush, 97 ;

Nichols ir. Burton, 5 Bush, 320. This last

case holds thai a judgment against one

jiartner uii a firm debt extinguishes the

demand, and is a bar to any subsequent

action thereon against the other partners.

This result is expressly guarded against

by the codes of certain other States.

Bradford v. Toney, 30 Ark. 763 ; Williams

V. Rogers, 14 Bush, 776 (a judgment in

the suit against one or more is riot a bar

to an action against the others, overruling

Nichols r. Burton) ; Lingenfelser r. Simon,

49 Ind. 82 (fier contra, it is a bar ; but the

execution of a note by one joint debtor is

not a satisfaction of the joint liability,

unless taken under an express agreement

that it siiould be so). It is held in Mis-

souri that a judgment is not a contract

within the meaning of the statute, and

that therefore in a suit upon a joint judg-

ment all the judgment debtors must be

made defendants ; Sheehan & L. Transp.

Co. V. Sims, 28 Mo. App. 64; coH^ra, in-

5 :\linu. 402, 67 ..._:r. \'ir. 1015, that where

action thereon again. t the other partner .
Thi r e ult i expre ly guarded again t
coutra<:t, and, upon default of one of the by the code of certain oth r
tate-:.
joint delitor;;, take a judgment by default Bradford v. Toney, 30 ,\rk. 763; William
again. t him, uch judgment i a bar to a v. Roger , 14 Bu. h, 776 (a judgnient in
,..ulJ:;equent action again ·t the other . But the uit again ·t one or more i not a bar
it was held in Pfefferkorn v. Haywood to an action again t the other , overruling
(I 96), 65 :\linn. 429, 6 · .•: . ,V. 6 , that if :Nichol 1: . Burton); Lingenfel en. imon,
rhe debt i in fact joiut and ·e,·eral, 49 Ind. 2 (per contra it i a bar; but the
though alleged to be joiut, and judgment execution of a note by one joint cl btor i
by default i ~o entered, the court may not a ati faction of the joint liability,
thereafter allow an amendment of the unle s taken under an expre : arrreement
complaiut to conform it to the facts.]
that it houhl be o). I t i held in l\I i l Thi· i: the nece: ary effect of the
ouri that a judgment i n t a ontract
pro\·i.ion in the ·ode of each 'tate re- within the meanina f the ta ute, and
ferred to in the text, and named in note that th r fore in a uit upon a j int j udgla ·t preceding; namely, Kan a , Ro.e v. ment all the judgment d utors must be
William , 5 Kan. 4 3 ; .J ffer on ounty made d f ndant. ; heehan & L. Tran p.
)um'r. t. • wain, 5 Kao. 376;
rane v.
o. v. i m. , 2 :\fo. A pp. 64 ; co11tra, inJ '1 g, 4 Kan 5 ; \\Thitt nhall t'. Korb r, t rpreting the .ame tatute, Bell ''ille
12 J'a11. 61 ; Alrey t'. Wil:on, 9 E:an.
av. Bk. v. " in ·low, 30 Fed . Rep. 4 .
401, 405; ih·er v. Fo l r, 9 Kan. 56, 59. It i h lcl in
olorad that the laugunrre
Iowa, H.\ er ·on v. II udrie, 22 Iowa, 4 0,
1f th :tatute in that tale ( 11. tat.
an actiou . u ·taiu ·•l again. t oue of the § 1 34) " \11 joi11t obligation and c vepartu r upon a firm 11ot ; the opinion of uaut shall her after be tak n and held to
( ol · .f. i a n:ry full di cu:. ion of the ti joi11t a11cl .ev ral obligation and ov du triU£: aud 1Jf th eh:u1gl' 111ncl • hy the uauts." do 11ot rnlira or appl to oral
111 w y t •m, - a11 P.;.:c· ·ed111"!) in. truct1,·e c:ontract.. Exth< u:i:e Bauk t'. Ford,
111 i11iu11, but t111J lung for qnc,talion.
Ken·
olo. :Jl4; [K lJ.w.,. '"Window (l 97),
• uc :. !;o uni '" Badgf'lr, G Bu h, fli; 100 fa. 552, 9 J. W. i5; ouncil l3111ffs
• '1 · rnl c Burton,;, l~n. h, :::w
'l hi: la t },auk'" Griswold (1 97), 5 •• b. 7.):1, 70
}, Id
ha a j111l~rt1Pll ag-airr. t uue . •. ,V. :17G, c·on. truinu tlre Iowa. • tatnt :
firru cl1•bL r· i11g11i lu·" tlie l "111 le in '" .Tohn on (1 93}, 112 . . 253,
1 a u r L, an: . ul,:;equc:ut
l; :. L. 15.> J
a }Jlaintiff bring

an action upon a joint
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sued, judgment would be given against the husband alone. ^

^\'hen a contract is made by a iirm, all the persons who were then

members of the partnership continue liable upon it, even though

some of them may have retired fi'om the firm before the contract

was broken. No arrangement among the partners tliemselve.s

can change their liability to their common creditor, unless he is a

party thereto, and in some manner discharges an outgoing mem-

ber from his responsibility. A suit, therefore, where there has

been no such discharge, should be brought against all the persons

who were partners at the time when the agreement was entered

into or the indebtedness was incurred.^

§ 202. * 301. Case of Implied Contracts. Illustrations. The

rule which requires that all joint debtors must be made defend-

ants applies to the cases wliere the contract is implied, as well as

to those in which it is express. Thus, when two or more ad-

ministrators, or an administrator and an administratrix, have been

appointed over an estate, and upon their retainer services are

rendered by a person for their benefit, — • as, for example, by a

lawyer retained to conduct legal proceedings affecting the estate,
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— they are jointly liable to him for his compensation, and should

be sued jointly in an action to recover it; their different and

even hostile interests in the final distribution do not alter the

nature of their liability upon the contract, express or implied,

made with the person thus employed.^ The case of persons

liable to repay money which had been paid by mistake, is

another familiar example of liability arising from implied con-

tract ; all the parties upon whom such duty rests should be

joined in the suit to recover the .money.* The members of a

joint-stock association, not being a corporation, are jointly liable

as partners for the debts and contracts of such association.^

1 Bramskill v. James, 11 N. Y. 294. Kentucky, by statute, a surety who has

See Groat v. I'hillips, 6 N. Y. Sup. Ct. 42, paid the debt or a part thereof may sue

where a wife who had joined in a contract the principal debtor and the co-surety in

was omitted in the action. one action, and recover from the former

" Briggs V. Briggs & A^ose, 15 N. Y. the whole amount, and from the latter his

471. See also Bowen r. Crow, 16 Neb. contributory share. llobiusou v. Jen-

5.56 (an action to recover taxes levied nings, 7 Bush, 6.30 ; 2 R. S. 398, ch. 97, § 7.

upon property OM'ned by a partnership, ^ j^So, in Thurmond v. Cedar Spring

which had been dissolved at the time the Baptist Church (1900), 110 Ga. 816, .36

action was brought: all the members of S. E. 221, it was held tliat tlie members

the late firm must be joined). of an unincorporated religious society are

•* Mygatt V. Wilcox, 1 Lans. 55. liable as joint promisors on its contracts.

* Duncan v. Berlin, 5 Robt. 457. In If such society luis duly appointed trustees

sued, jud0 ment wouhl be giYen again ·t the Im band alon .1
"\\Then a contract i · made by a firm, all the persons who " ' re then
m mber of the I artner ·hip continue liable upon it, e'I en though
some of them may have retired from the firm Lefore the contral't
was broken. No arrangement among the partners them el v ':~
can change their liability to their common creditor, unle. s he is a
party thereto, and in some manner discharges an outgoing member from his responsibjlity. A suit, therefore, where there ha:::;
been no such di charge, should be brought against all the per ·on
who were partners at the time when the agreement was entered
into or the indebtedness was incurrecl. 2
§ 202. * 301. Case of Implied Contracts. Illustrations. The
rule which requires that all joint debtors must be made defendants applies to the cases where the contract is implied, as well <ts
to those in which it is express. Thus, when two or more ad ministrators, or an administrator and an admini tratrix, haYe be~n
appointed over an estate, and upon their retainer services are
rendered by a per.son for their benefit, - as, for example, by a
lawyer retained to conduct legal proceedings affecting the e tate,
- they are jointly liable to him for his compensation, aml should
be sued jointly in an action to recover it; their different and
even hostile interests in the final distribution do not alter the
nature of their liability upon the contract, express or implieJ,
made with the person thus employec.l.3 The case of persons
liable to repay money which had been paid by mistake is
another familiar example of liability arising from implied contract; all the parties upon whom such duty rests should b~
joined in the suit to recover the .money. 4 The members of a
joint-stock association, not being a corporation, are jointly liable
as partners for the debts and contracts of such association. 5
1 Bn1mskill v. James, 11 N. Y. 294.
See Groat v. Phillips, 6 N. Y. Sup. Ct. 42,
where a wife who l1ad joined in a contract
was omitted iu the action .
2 Briggs v. Briggs & \ ose, 15 N. Y.
471. See also Bowen 1·. Crow, 16 Neb.
556 (an action to recoYer taxes levied
upon property owned by a partnership,
which had been dissohed at the ti me the
action was bi·ought: all the members of
the late firm must be join ed).
~ Mygatt i>. ·W ilcox, l Laus. 55.
4 Duncan v. Berlin, 5 Robt. 457. In

Kentucky, by statute, a surety who has
paid the debt or a part thereof may sue
the principal debtor and the CO· urety in
one action, and r ecover from the former
th e wh ole amount, and from the latter his
contributory share. Hobin on v. Jeullings, 7 Bush, 6.30; 2 R. S. 398. ch. 97, § 7.
" [ ...,o, in Thurmond v. Cedar ...,prin g
Baptist Church ( 1900), 110 Ga. 16, 36
S. K 221, it wa. held that the mcm bers
of an nuine1>rporated religions . ocicty are
liable as joint promisors on it contracts.
If uch ociety has duly appointed trustees
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Although the statute permits a creditor to sue the president

or otlier managing officer, tlie judgment thus obtained can onl}'

be enforced out of the common property. If he desires to enforce

his chiim against the members individually, he must unite all of

them as defendants, no matter how numerous, as in an action

a'T-ainst an ordinary tirm.^ The apparent exception, which existed

at the common law, to the general rule requiring all joint debtors

to be sued, remains in full force under the new system, so that a

dormant partner need not necessarily be included as a defendant

in an action against tiie firm, although of course he may be so

joined, if the plaintiff elect.^

S 203. *302. Survivorship. In States containing no Special Stat-

utory Provisions respecting Joint Liability, Common-Law Rule Un-

changed. Practical Result herein. I am finally brought to the

case where one or more of several joint debtors dies. The com-

mon-law rule had been settled from the earliest period that only the

survivors could be sued. Equity had modified this legal doctrine,

and permitted an action against the personal representatives of

the deceased debtor or contractor. Has an}^ change in this
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respect been introduced by the new procedure ? It is now es-

tablished by a great preponderance of authority, in those States

whose codes do not contain the special provisions concerning

joint liability already referred to,^ that these rules, as they existed

immediately prior to the reform legislation, have not been in any

manner modified, but remain in active o[)eration as a part of the

present system. The practical result is, upon the death of one

or moi-e joint debtors, obligors, or promisors, a legal action, can

be maintained against the survivors alone, and in such action

the personal representatives of the deceased cannot be made

defendants for any purpose. An equitable action, however, can

be maintained ajjainst the administrators or executors of the

to huld and manage its property, the 498 ; Farwell r. Davis, 66 Barb. 7,3 ; Leslie

trustees are the. only necessary parties in v. Wiley, 47 N. Y. 648. Compare Marvin

an action for money furnisheil to the use v. Wilber, 52 N. Y. 270. Even when the

of the ehnrcli : .losey v. Union Loan & dormant partner is the husband of the

Trust Co. (1898), 106 (ia. 608, .32 S. E. ostensible one. Scott c Conway, .58 N. Y.

028.] 619; Woodbouse v. Duncan, 106 N. Y.

' King.sland /•. Hraisteil, 2 Lans. 17. r)27.

2 North f. Hlo.'is, .30 N. Y. .374 : Cuok- ■* See these j)rovisions in the codes of

ingham v. [.lu^her, 2 K<>ves, 4.")4 ; liiirllint Missouri. Kentucky, Iowa. Kaiis;is, Nortii

'•. I'ost, 1 Hosw 28; Brown r. Birdsall, ( 'arolina. QMiniiesota and Arkansas, a«^e,

29 Bar!). .')4') ; Arnold *. .Morris, 7 Daly, p. 289, note 1.]
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deceased when, and only when, either the legal remedy against'

the survivors has been exhausted, or such remedy would be

absolutely useless. In such equitable action, therefore, the plain-

tiff must either aver and prove the recovery of a judgment and

the issue and the return of an execution thereon unsatisfied,

against the survivors, or else that the survivors are utterly

insolvent.^ This rule differs from that prevailing in England

in a single particular. ^ The English Court of Chancery permits

1 [^Dishneau y. Newton (1895), 91 Wis.

199, 64 N. W. 879.J Voorhis v. Child's

Ex., 17 N. Y. 3.54; Richter v. Poppen-

deceased when, and only when, either the legal r medy against'
the survivors has been exhausted, or such r medy would be
ab olutely useless. In such equitable action, th r f re, th plaintiff mu t either aver and prove the recovery of a judgment and
the is ue and the return of an exec ution ther on un ati fie<l,
again t the survivors, or 1 e that the urvivor are utt rly
insolvent. 1 This rule differ from that prevailing in England
in a single particular. 2 The English Court of Chancery permits

liauseii, 42 N. Y. 373 ; Pope v. Cole, 55

N. Y. 124; Lane v. Doty, 4 Barb. 534;

Voorhis v. Baxter, I Ahb. Pr. 43 ; Moore-

liouse V. Ballon, 16 Barb. 289; Bentz v.

Thurber, 1 N. Y. Sup. Ct. 645 ; Maples

r. Geller, 1 Nev. 233, 237, 239 ; Fowler v.

Houston, 1 Nev. 469, 472 ; Kimball v. Whit-
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ney, 15 Ind. 280, 283; Barlow (•. Scott's

Adni., 12 Iowa, 63 ; Pecker v. Cannon, 1 1

Iowa, 20; Marsh v. Goodrell, 11 luwa,

474; Williams y. Scott's Adm., 11 Iowa,

475. The last four cases were all on joint

and several notes, and it was lield that tlie

rule applied to them as well as to ohliffa-

tions purely joint. It should be observed

that all these Iowa cases were decided

jirior to the "revision " of the statutes

made in 1860. County of Wapello r.

Bigham, 10 Iowa, 39 ; Childs r. Hyde, 10

Iowa, 294; People v. Jenkins, 17 Cal. 500;

Humphreys v. Crane, 5 Cal. 173; May

V. Han.son, 6 Cal. 642. But in Bank of

Stockton r. Howland, 42 Cal. 129, an ac-

tion against the survivors and the admin-

istrator of a deceased joint debtor was

held to be properly brought ; the judg-

ment, however, should be severed, and

against the survivors should be de bonis

jiropriis, and against the administrator de

honis testatoris. See also Bostwick v. Mc-

Evoy, 62 Cal. 496 ; Lawrence v. Doolan,

68 Cal. 309. It was decided in Parker r

Jack.son, 16 Barb. 33, per Gridley J., that

ail action could be maintained against

llie survivor and the personal represent-

ative of a deceased maker of a Joinf aiid

s'-iy nd note, without alleging or proving

til", in.solvency of the survivor. For the

]iroceedings when the cause of action is

for a tort, and survives upon the death of

one of the wrongdoers, see Bond v. Smith,

6 N. Y. Sup. Ct. 239 ; and when the prom-

ise is joint and several, see Speyers v.

Fisk, 6 N. Y. Sup.Ct. 197, and cases cited.

When an execution against the survivors

of joint debtors has been returned unsat-

isfied, the action against the personal rep-

resentatives of the deceased debtor will

lie, although it may turn out that the

survivors were not insolvent. Pope r.

Cole, 55 N. Y. 124, and .see Yates v. Hoff-

man, 5 Hun, 113. See also Livermore

V. Bushnell, 5 Hun, 285 (in an action

against defendants jointly liable on a

contract, if one or more die the action

does not abate ; the death should be sug-

gested on the record, and the action pro-

1 [Dishneau v. Newton (1895 ), 91 Wis.
199, 64- N. W. 879.J Voorhis v. Child',,,
Ex., 17 N. Y. 354; Richter i·. Poppenhauseu , 42 N. Y. 373; Pope v. Cole, 55
N. Y. 124; Lane v. Doty, 4 Barb. 534;
Voorhis t•. Baxter, 1 Abb. Pr. 4.3; Moorehouse v. Ballou, 16 Barb. 289; Bentz v.
Thurber, l N. Y. 8up. Ct. 645; i\1aµl es
i· . Geller, 1 Nev. 233, 237 , 239 ; Fowler v.
Hou -ton, l ev. 469, 472; .Kimball v. Whitney, 15 Ind. 280, 283; Barlow v. Scott's
Aum ., 12 Iowa, 63; Pecker v. Cannon, 11
Iowa, 20; Marsh 1·. Goodrell, 11 lowa,
474; Williams v. Scott's Adm., 11 Iowa,
475. The last four caRes were all on joint

and se,'eral notes, and it wa helu that the
rule applied to them as well as to obligations purely joint. lt sl1ould be ouserved
that all these Iowa cases wne decid ed
prior to the "reviRiou " of th e statutes
made in 1860. County of Wapello r .
Bigham , 10 Iowa., 39; Childs r. Hyd e, 10
Iowa, 294; People v. Jenkin , 17 Cal. 500;
Humphreys v. Crane, 5 Cal. 173 ; lVIn.y
v. Hanson , 6 Cal. 6-12. But in Bank of
tockto11 1·. Howland, 42 Cal. 129, an action agaiust the survivors and the admini trator of a deceased joint debtor was
held to be properly brought; th e judgment, howev er, should be severed, aud
against the survivors should be de bonis
propriis, and against the administrator de
bonis testatoris. See also Bo twick v. McEvoy, 62 Cal. 496; Lawren ce v. Doolan ,
68 Cal. 309. It was decided in PRrker v .
.Jackson, 16 Barb. 33, per Gridley J., that
a.n action could be maintain ed against
the urvivor and the per onal represent;;itive of a decea ed maker of a join t ond
. "'"-ro l note, without alleging or pro,·ing
11~ insolvency of the sunivoi·. For the
pro<·eedings when the cause of action is
for a tort, and survives upon th e 1 ath of
one of the wrongdoers, see Bond t>. mith,

6 N. Y. Sup. Ct. 239; and when the promi e is joint and several, see Speyers v.
Fisk, 6 N. Y. Sup. Ct. 197 , and case cited.
When an execution against the survivors
of joint debtor has been returned unsatisfied, the action again t the personal representative of the decea ed debtor will
lie, although it may turn out that the
s urvivors were not insolvent. Pope 1•.
Cole, 55 N. Y. 124, and see Yates v. Hoffman , 5 Hun, 113. See also Livermore
v. Bushnell, 5 Hun, 285 (in an action
against defendants jointly liable on a
contract, if oue or m ore die the action
does not abate ; the death should be suggested on the record, and the action proceed against the survivors; th e personal
representative. of the deceased cannot be
joined) ; Cairnes v. O' Bleness, 40 Wis.
469 (same); Jones v. Keep, 23 Wis. 45;
Masten v. Blackwell, 8 Hun, 313; Lani er
v. Irvine, 24 Minn. 116, pending an action
on a joint and several bond, if one of the
defendant dies it may be continued against
th e survivors, without j oining the representatives of tl 1e decea ·ed defendant;
• Scholey v. Halsey, i2 N. Y. 5i8; Mattison v. ChildR, 5 Colo. 78 (followi ng the
commou-la.w rul e): Seaman v. Slater, 18
:F eel . R. 485. Wh en the joint debtor who
dies is a mPre surety, hi s estate i absolutely di charged from all liability at law
or iri equit.v, - that is, liauili ty to the
creditor. W oorl i•. Fi ke, 63 N. Y. 2-15;
Getty i: . Binsse, 49 id. 385, and cases
cited; Da.Yis v. Van Bur n, 72 id. 587,
58 , 589, and cRses cited; Picker g ill v.
La.hens, 15 Wall. 140.
2 [The very recent case of Potts v.
Dounce (1903), 173 N. Y. 335, 66 J.E.
4, affirmiug Potts 1·. Baldwin, 67 App.
Div. 434, states a tliffere nt rule in t11at
. tate from the rule g-iven in the text. It
was an action upon a promissory note,
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a suit ao-ainst the personal representatives of tlie deceased at

once, without attempting, much less exhausting, any remedy

at law against the survivor. In other woixis, the creditor lias his

option at all times to sue the survivors at law, or the representa-

tives of the deceased in equity, whether the survivors are solvent

or not ; and this doctrine has been adopted in several American

States.^

^ 204. * 303. States whose Codes contain Provisions Changing

Common-Law Rule. Result. These doctrines and modes of pro-

twain ·t the peronal repr entative of the d ceased at
on ce. ·w ith u att mptin0 ·, much le
xh, u. tin0 ,
ly
hi
a it w a ·ain~t the tuv1 Y r. In h r words the r
ption at all time to ue the urYiv r at law or th r pr
ti,·e of h decea d in equit
l r the
r are
er< 1 Am ncan
r n t ; an l thi doctrine ha
' Ul

at ,

1

cedure in reference to the enforcing a joint demand when one

debtor dies, have not, however, been accepted in all the States

which have adopted the new system. In Indiana it is declared

to be the true meaning and intent of the provisions of the code

abolishing the distinctions between legal and equitable actions,

and introducing the equitable principles concerning parties, and

proN'iding for a severance in the judgment, that upon the death

of one or more joint, or joint and several debtors or obligors, an

action will lie at once against the survivors and the administra-
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tors or executors of the deceased.^ In certiiin States, special pro-

brought against three surviving joint

promisors and tiie executor of the fourth.

The question presented to the court was

whether tiie executor of the deceased

maker was properly joined. Section 758

of the Code of Civil Procedure, as amended

in 1877, provides that in case of the death

of one of two or more plaintiffs, or defend-

204.

* 303.

S tate s whose Codes contain P rovisions Changing

The e d trine and m de of pr ce 1ur m r f rence to the enfor ing a joint cl man 1 when one
ta s
d bt r di
have not, howev r b en a cep eel in all th
' hich ha e adopted the n w ystem. In Indiana it i d clar cl
o be he true meaning and intent of the pro i ion of the od
c.tboli ·hin h di tinction bet een 1 gal and equitabl a ti n.·
and. introdu ing the equitable principle oncerning partie and
pro\·ic.ling fo r a everance in the judgment, that ur on the cleat}
f ne or more joint, or joint and s veral debtors or blig r , an
action will lie at once again t th ur i vars and th admini trat r
r executor of the d ceased.2 In certain tat , I ecial proCommon-Law Rule.

Result.

ants, if the entire cause of action survives

to, or against, the others, the ac-tion may

proceed in favor of, or against, the sur-

vivors ; " but the estate of a person or

])arty, jointly liable upon contract with

u rought again t three urd,·iug joint
p r mi ·o r and the executor of th e fourth.
Tli e qne tion pr ented to the court wa
whether the executor of the deceased

others, shall not be discharged by his

death, and tlie court may make an order

to bring in the proper representative of

the decedent, when it is necessary so

to do for the proper disposition of the

matter." The court, by (Jray J., says :

" While this section, by its place in the

code, is applical)le to the case of the

death of a party pending tlie action, it

must, nevertliejess, be reganled as making

a material alteration in the law and as

imjiosing a liability wiicre none existed

before. ... At common law, her death

would have terminated her liability; but,

while no action at law could have been

brouglit against her estate, as she was a

joint debtor, equity, if an inability to

collect from the survivors were sliowii,

would have allowed a recovery against the

estate. Section 758 of the code, now, by

continuing the liability of the estate of

the deceased, enables that liability to be

enforced iu an actiou at law. It effects,

directly, what, formerly, equity intervened

to accomidisli. But, while tlie legal rule

of liability has beeu changed, the rule of

procedure is not, and when the personal

representatives of the deceased joint debtor

are directly ])roceeded against at law, the

plaintiff should, still, allege the in.solvency,

or inat)ility to ])ay, of the survivors. "^

1 Wilkinson r. Henderson, 1 My. & K.

582; Braithwaite r. Britain, 1 Keen, 219;

Brown r. Weatherby, 12 Sim. 6, 11. The

survivors, however, should be made co-

defendants.

i11qw i11g a li:diility wh re 11 01H' xi.t ·d
hcfnrr. . . . . ,\ t eo rn m on ln.w, Ii •r d a.L h
\\1 nit! 1111\'P te rrninat d h r lialJiJi v; Im ,
\!i ii · 110 arti o1t at law erml1l h: ,; , h n
br l\lgl aga in t. he r ·La te, a · . !tc wa · a

joint d btor, equ ity , if an inability to
collect from th
urvivor w re hown,
would hav allowed a recov ry :-igaiu t the
estate.
ctiou 75 of th
de, now, b,r:
·ontinuing the liability of th
. tate of
th decen el, enabl
that liability to be
nforced in an action at law. It effect-,
dire tly, what, formerly, quity in rven d
to accomplish. But, whil the 1 gal rule
of liability ha been hang i, the rule of
pro· clu re i n t, and wh u the per onal
r pr
nta iv of th dee a d j iut debtor
a re dire tly pr eeded again t at law, the
plaintiff , h uld till, a ll ege t h in lv n ry,
or in abil ity t pa,, f th urvi r •. "J
l V1i ilkin. on 1•. Bend r on, l My. & K.
5 2; Brnithwaite v. Britain, l I een, 2 19;
Rrown v. \\' ah rby, 12 im. 6 l l. Th e
urvirnr., h w v r, hould b made ·
d f ndants.
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visions of the codes, or of other statutes, expressly authorize an

action to be brought in the first instance against the survivors

and the personal representatives of the deceased joint debtor,

or even against some, any, or one of them, at the option of the

plaintiff.^

of a deceased joint debtor as a co-defendant

v1s10ns f the code', or of th r . tatutes, . pr ssly authorize an
action to be brnught in th iirl')t instane against the survivorn
and the per ·onal re pr sen ta ti ve8 of the deceas d joint d btor,
or even a 0 am t some, any, or one of them, at the option of the
plaintiff. 1

with the survivor was declared not to

be necessary. When a bond had been

executed by a guardian and his surety,

and the surety had died, tlie action on tiie

bond may be brouglit iu Indiana against

the surviving principal and the heirs nf

the deceased obligor, the latter being

liable of course to the extent of the lands

descended to them. Voris v. State, ex

re/. Davis, 47 Ind. 345, 349, 350 ; and nn

action may be maintained on an ad-

ministrator's bond against the surviving

Generated for facpubupdates (University of Michigan) on 2014-06-17 15:32 GMT / http://hdl.handle.net/2027/uc2.ark:/13960/t02z1c23b
Public Domain / http://www.hathitrust.org/access_use#pd

principal — the administrator — and tb.e

executor of a deceased surety. Tlie bond

was assumed to be joint, and the judg-

ment was against both defendants in solido

for the full amount. Myers v. State, ex

rel. McCray, 47 Ind. 293, 297 ; citing and

following Braxton l-. State, supra, and

Owen V. State, 25 Ind. 107. See also

Hays V. Crutcher, 54 Ind. 260. The

courts of South Carolina have put the

same interpretation upon the code pro-

visions. See Trinimier v. Thomson, 10

Rich. L. 164; Susoug r. Vaiden, 10 Rich.

L. 247 ; Wiesenfeld v. Byrd, 17 S. C. 106.

[^The Indiana doctrine was approved by

the Supreme Court of Wyoming in the

case of Chadwick v. Hopkins (1893), 4

Wyo. 379, 34 Pac. 899. In the course of

the opinion the court says : " The one

sufficient reason for the rule of the com-

mon law, that the surviving joint obligor

and the representatives of the estate of

the deceased could not be joined as defend-

ants in an action at law, was the inal)ility

of a court of law to render separate and

different judgments in a single action —

against the survivor to be satisfied de bonis

propriis, and against the administrators of

the estate of the deceased to l)e satisfied

from such estate in due course of adminis-

tration. From the same reason it followed

that the survivor alone was liable in an

action at law, and that if he were solvent

and the action tlius available for the col-

lection of the debt the plaintiff need go

no further, and he was not permitted to

do so. In the code States this, the only

reason for the rules of the common law

upon the subject, has entirely disappeared.

. . . With all due respect for the o])inions

of some eminent courts wliich seem to

liold differently, we are of the opinion

that codes such as ours, doing away with

the reason of the common-law rule under

consideration as to joinder of parties de-

fendant, also furnish, iu terms sufficiently

clear, a new rule to be followed in its

stead." Citing the text, and cases from

Ohio, v'>outh Carolina, and Indiana. J

1 QThe statutes upon this subject are

of a decea ed joint debtor a a co-defendant no further, and he was not permitted to
with the survi\'Or was declared not to do o. In the code ' tates thi , the nly
be neres ar,1;. 'W hen a bond had been reason for the rules of the common law
executell hy a guardian and hi. surE't.1·, npon the ubject, has eutirely <li appeared.
aud the s urety hacl died, the actiou 011 Llle . . . ·with all due respect for the opinion
bond may be brought in Indiaua :::g;tiu::;t of some emi11ent courts which se: m to
the su rvivin g principal and the heirs of hold differently, we are of t.he opinion
the decea. ed obligor, the latt.er beiug that codes such as ours, doincr away with
liabl of course to the extent of the lands the reason of the common-law rule under
descended to them. Vori v. State, ex consideration as to joinder of parties derel. Da\'i , 47 Ind. 345, 349, 350; and nu fendant, al o furni ·h, in term:; suffieiently
action may be maintained on an ad- clear. a new rnle to be followed in its
mini trator's boucl against the surviviug stead." Citing the te:xt, and ca es from
principal - the admiui:-trator - ancl t he Ohio, South Carolina, and Indiana.]
l [ The statutes upon this
ubject are
executor of a deceased surety. The bond
was assumetl to be joint, ::t11tl the judg- as follows:
Ohio: " \Vhere two or more per. ons
ment was agai nst both defendants in solido
for the full amount. Myers 1·. :;tate, ex shall be indebted in any joint contract, or
rel. McCray, 47 Iutl. 293, 29i; citiug and upon a judgment founded upon any such
following Braxton v. State, su11m, and contract, aud either of the111 hall die, his
Owen v. 'tate, 25 Ind. 107.
ee also estate haill he liable therefor, a if the
Hays i•. Crutcher, 54 Ind. 260. The contract ha<l. bee11 joint and several, or a
courts of South Carolina have put the if the jutlgment had been against him elf
same interpretation upon the code pro- alone." Bate St., § 6102.
v1 ·ions. See Trimmier v. Thomson, IO
I owa: " When any of those so bound
Rich. L. 164; Su. oug 1·. Vaideu, 10 Hich. [jointly J are dead, the action may be
L. 247; Wi esenfeld v. Byrd, 17 S. C. 106. brought against any or all of the sur[The Indiana doctrine was approved by vivors, with any or all of the representathe Supreme Coui·t of Wyoming- in the tives of the decedent·, or against any or
ca e of Chadwick v. Hopkins (1893), 4 all such representatives. "
Code, 1897,
Wyo. 3i9, 34 Pac. 899. In the cour ·e of § 3465.
the opinion the court says: " The one
K entucky: "If any of the per ons o
sufficient reason for the rule of the com- bound [juintly] be dead, the action may
mon law, that the surviving joint obligor be brought against any or all of the surand the repre entatives of the estate of virnrs with the representatives of all or
the deceased could not be joiuecl as defend- any of the decedents, or against the latter
ants iu an action at law, was the inability or any of them." Colle, 1895, § 27.
1llissouri: "In ca e of the death of one
of a court of law to render eparate allll
different judgments in a single action or more of the joint ouligors or promi or ,
again t the urvivor to be satisfied de bonis the joint debt or contn:w t hall and may
propriis, and against the admiui:,trator of survive against the heirs, executors, and
th e estate of the decea ed to be atisfied admini ·trators of the decea ed obligor or
from such estate in due cour e of admini - promisor, as well a again t the urtration. From the same reason it fo llowed vi1·ors." Rev. t., 1 99, § 90.
that the urvivor alone was liable in an
Kansas: Sarne as l\Ii souri. Gen. t.,
action at law, and that if he were solvent 1901, § 1191.
alHl the action thus available for the colIndiana: "When two or more per on
lection of the debt the plaintiff need go shall be jointly liable on a contract or
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§ 205, * 304. Criticism of General Rule, Although the inter-

pretation put upon the cotles in reference to tliis particular sub-

304. Criticism
u up n he c

of General Rule.

e in ref r n

Although the interto this articular . u b-

judgment, and either of them shall die,

his estate, executors, and administrators

or one of two or more
shall be liable for the failure to perform

the contract ami for the payment of the

judgment, to the same extent and in the

same maimer as if such contract or judg-

ment were joint and several." Burns St.,

1901, § 6.36.

Arlcansas : " Where any of the persons

so bound [jointly] are dead, the action

may be brought against any or all of the

survivors, with the representatives of all

or anv of the decedents." Sand. & Hills'

01',

Dig.,"§ 5634.

brouaht in a a party, eith r plaintitT
r defendant, wh enever it ap ] ar prop r
t do o, up n hi own appli ation or
upon the appl i ation of an y party to the
action, and ii nece ary , that upplemental pl ading be put in." Ann. t,.
1901, § 60 .i.J
Burgoyne v. Ohio L. Ins. & T. o.,
5 hio t. 5 6, 5 7. Thi was an action

Minnesota : " When two or more persons

are indebted on any joint contract, or upon
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a judgment founded on a joint contract,

and either of them die, his estate is liable

therefor, and the amount thereof may be

allowed by the probate court, as if the

contract had been joint and several, or

as if the judgment had been against him

alone." St., 1894, § 4521.

iVisconsin : " When two or more per-

sons shall be indebted ou any joint con-

tract or upon a judgment founded upon

a contract, and either of them shall die,

his estate shall be liable tlierefor, and the

claim may be allowed by the court as if

the contract had been joint and several

or as if the judgment had been against

him alone, and the other parties to such

joint contract may be compelled to con-

tribute or to pay the same if they would

liave been liable to do so upon payment

thereof by the deceased." St., 1 898, § 3848.

Colorado : " All joint obligations and

covenants shall hereafter be taken and

held to be joint and several obligations

and covenants." Mills St., § 2528.

New York : " The estate of a person or

party, jointly liable upon contract with

otliers, shall not i)e discharged by his

death, and the court may make an order

to bring in the proper representative of

the decedent, when it is necessary so to do

for the proper disposition of the matter."

Code ('iv. Pro. § 758. See Potts v. Dounce

(1903), 173 N. Y. 335, O X. E. 4. quoted

at length in nuto to § ».3()2, for a judicial

interpretation of this statute.

South Dakota: " Where one of two or

more plaintiffs, or one of two or more

defendaats, in an action, dies, and only

part of the cause of action, or of several

distinct causes of action, survives to or

against the others, the action may proceed

without bringing in the person who haa

succeeded to the rights of the deceased

party ; and the judgment shall not affect

him, or his interest in the subject of the

action. But the court may order such

successor of a deceased party, or any

person who claims to be such successor,

to be brought in as a party, either plaintiff

or defendant, whenever it appears proper

f tw
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ject by the courts of New York and of many other States is

clearly established by an overwhelming weight of authority, I

do not hesitate to say that it is as plainly opposed to the obvious

intent, and even to the very letter, of the reform legislation.

When the statute has in express terms abolished all distinctions

between actions at law and suits in equity, has declared that in

all cases any person may be made a defendant, who has or claims

an interest in the controvers}^ adverse to the plaintiff, or who is a

necessary party to a complete determination and settlement of the

questions involved, and has finally authorized a several judgment

to be rendered in any action, it is simpl}" a palpable violation of

these positive provisions to say that a creditor shall not maintain

a legal action against the personal representatives of a deceased

joint debtor, but shall be driven to an equitable suit, and that

only in a certain contingency ; it is a useless sacrifice to the merest

form. I would not be understood by this criticism as denying

the existence of the rule, for it is too well settled to be doubted.

If, however, the courts shall at any time accept the intent of the

legislatures, as it is plainly shown in their statutory work, and
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shall adopt a general equitable theory of interpretation, which

shall be applied in all cases to all actions without reservation or

exception, so that there shall result one single and uniform system

of procedure, then without doubt the rule that I am criticising

will be abandoned, and the conclusions reached by the Indiana

courts will be accepted in all the States.

§ 206. * 305. IV. Actions upon Contract; Joint and Several Lia-

bility. No Change by General Language in most Codes. Illustrations.

The former doctrine of the common law concerning joint and sev-

eral contracts and suits thereon has not been affected by the new

procedure, except in those few States, already referred to,^ whose

codes or statutes permit the creditor in all cases to sue all, or any,

or one of the debtors or co-contractors. The general language

found in most of the codes has wrought no change in the practical

quire. In the opinion of the court, tliese against each according to the nature of

sections permit the joinder of tlie sur- their respective liabihties." The con-

vivor or survivors and the personal rep- struction here put upon the Ohio statute

resentatives of the deceased obligor in is certainly far more equitable, and in ac-

the same action, whether the contract is cordaiice with their intent, than that put

in terms j((int and several, or is made so ujion the code of New York. See also

ject by the
urts of New Y rk an l f many other State i
clearly e tabli heel by an ov rwhelming w ight of authority, I
do not hesitat to say that it · i a plainly oppo ed to the obviou
intent, and even to the very letter, of the reform legi lation.
When th tatute has in expre ' term abolished all di tinction
between actions at law and suits in equity, ha d lared that in
all ca ·es any p rson may be made a defendant, who ha or claims
an inter ' t in the controversy adverse to the pb.intiff, or who is a
nece 'sary party to a complete determination and ettlement of the
questions involved, and has finally authorized a everal judgment
to be rendered in any action, it is simply a lJalpable violation of
these positive provisions to say that a creditor shall not maintain
a legal action against the personal representatives of a deceased
joint debtor, but shall be d riven to an equitable suit, and that
only in a certain contingency; it is a usel03s sacrifice to the merest
form . I would not be understood by this criticism as denying
the existence of the rule, for it is too well settled to be doubted.
If, however, the courts shall at any time accept the intent of the
legislatures, as it is plainly shown in their statutory work, and
shall adopt a general equitable theory of interpretation, which
shall be applied in all ca es to all actions without reservation or
exception, o that there shall result one single and uniform system
of procedure, then without doubt the rule that I am criticising
will be abandoned, and the conclusions reached by the Indiana,
coUTts will be accepted in all the States.
§ 206. * 305. IV. Actions upo n Contract; Joint and Several L i ability .

No Chan ge by General Language in most Codes .

I llustrat i o n s .

by the 90th section of the administration Sellon r. Braden, 13 Iowa, 365.

Statute upon the death of the joint oldi- ^ Ante, p. 289, note,

gor, and authorize a separate jiidgnieiit

T he former doctrine of the common law concerning joint and several contracts and suits thereon has not been affected by the new
procedure, except in t hose few States, already referred to, 1 whose
codes or statutes permit the creditor in all case to sue all, or any,
or one of the debtors or co-contractors. The general language
fo und in most of the codes has wrought n o change in the practical
qu ire. I n the op inion of the court, these
sections permit the joiud er of the nrvivor or surviv rs ancl th e personal rep·
resentative of t he rl ec·ea e1 l obligor in
the same action, whether the contract is
in ta ms joint and several, or is mad e so
by the 90th section of th e adminif'tration
statute upon the death f the joint oliligor, arn.l a uthorize a separate j udgmeu t

ngainst each accord in g to the 11ature of
their r espectiv liabilitie .. "
Th e construction here put upon the Ohio statute
is certainl y far more eq uitable, and in accordance with their intent, than that put
upon the corlc of . w York .
ee al o
, ell on v. Braden, 13 Iowa, 365 .
1 Ante, p. 2 9, note.
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rules.^ This proposiuon is sustained b}' many of the cases in

reference to joint liability, cited under the foregoing paragraphs ;

it is also recognized or distinctly affirmed in many particular in-

stances, among wliich I mention a few.^ Two insurance com-

panies had insured a building by separate policies, each of which

contained the usual rebuilding clause. Upon the occurrence of a

fire, they united in a joint notice of their election to rebuild, and

partly completed the work under such notice. Default being-

made by them, the owner brought an action against one of them

to recover damages for the non-performance of the contract to

rebuild. It was held that by the election the companies had

turned their policies into building contracts, and weie liable ac-

cording to the terms thereof, and that the owner might sue both-

in a joint action, or either in a separate action ; in other word.;,

that their liability was joint and several.^ Premises were leased

with covenants against under-letting, and against using the build-

ing for certain purposes. The lessee sub-let portions to different

under-tenants, Avho violated the covenants by using them in the

prohibited manner. An action against all, — the lessee and the
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sul>tenants, — to recover damages for the breach of the covenants,

was held proper, although it was said the plaintiff must have a

separate judgment against each defendant for the special injury

and wrong done by him. A separate action might also have been

brought agaiiLSt the original lessee and each of the under-tenants.*

When an ex[»ress joint and several note is made by a firm, and is

signed by the firm mime, it retains its joint and several charac-

ter ; an action may be brought either against all the })artners, or

against each or one of them.^ In certain States, as has already been

mentioned,^ the express language of the codes permits an action

1 [^Certain statutory presumptions exist 1206, 821, 822) of the New York odle.

in some States. See notes to §§ * 27.t, The entire ileci.sion is in closer hannuny

*276, where the statutes of California, with tlie plain intent of the coile than

Montana, Oklahoma, ami North ami South many others whicli have been cited. See

Dakota are set out.^ Trai)ae r. McAdams, 8 Hush, 74.

- QStatc V. McD.inalil (189.5), Idaho. 40 -^ Snow v. Howard, 35 Barb. 5.'). See

Pac. .-Jl'i; Council Bluffs Savings Hank r. D'Gonnaii r. Lindeke, 20 Minn. 9.3 (a joint

Griswold (1897), 50 Xeb. 7.W, TO X. W. and several bond). A covenant to in-

S'C] deninify persons against liability on a

•'' .Morrell r. Irving F. Ins. Co., 3.3 N Y. bond wherein they arc jointly and sev-

429. erally bound,' is also joint and several.

♦ Gillilan r. Norton, Kobt. 546. The Hughes v. Oreg. Hy. & Nav. Co., 11 Ore.

ruling of tlie court in respect toasepar.ate 437.

rul ~ I Thi , propo ition i ~u tained by many of the cas in
i· f ren e t
j int liability ited under th for · in · r ara Taph ;
i i · al
rec •·niz d r di , tin tl · affirm d in many particular int< nee ' , amon; whi ·h I rnenti n a few .2 Tw insura.nc compani had in ·ur cl a lmil lir b
parate poli i , ach of whi h
nt. in cl th u ual rebuil 'ng clau e. Upon h occurr n
f a
fir they unit l in a joint notice of h ir le tion to I builcl and
partly compl t ll the work under uch noti e. D faul b ing
ma le b,· th m the ' ner bl'ought an a ti n gainst n of them
t recoYer iamao· ' for the non-performance of h
ntra. ·t t
rebuild. It wa h lcl that by the el ction he compani had
turned their p licie . int buildin ' contra ·t anu w l' lie le cccording to h term · ther of and that the owner mii:.;ht ue b th·
in a joint a tion or either in a . eparate ac ion · in th r worc1 .;,
tl at theil' liability '\va:; joint and seYeral.3 Premise were 1 ·eJ
'vith · Yernrnt a a.in t under-letting, and against usino- the builtlino· for certain I urpo: e ' . The le ·see sub-let portion t diff rent
uncler-t iunt ·, who vi lated the covenants by u ing hem in the
i r hibited manner. An action against all, - the les e ,~ml he
ub- enant: - to recov er damag for the breach of the cov n, nts,
w ·t , h kl pr I r alth uo-h it W!l.S , ~id the plaintiff mu t lrn
a.
pa.rat judgment ao·ainst each defendant fo r the pecial injur
<.mcl wr iw do1L by l im . A eparat actior might al hav be n
brouo·ht agai1 t he riginal le ee and each of the under-te nant .4
Vh n an xpr
joint and everal not i · made by a firm, a nd i'
iO'n d b • th firm name it retain· its j int and 'e ra.l hara t er ; an a tion ma ' be brou ht ither a ain t all t h I artn r , or
aO'c m
ne f them.5 In rtain ' tate , a ha alr ady b n
menti
exr re language of tb.e cod permit · an a ti n

judgment was ba.sed u]>ou § 274 (1205, « J/j/e, p. 280, note.

rtain ~ tatutory pre. umption~ exist

1 [

~om e

• tace .
ee not
to . .' · 215,
276, whne th .· tatut : of
alifornia,
• f 1 inta 11 a, ()klahoma, an•! .""orth and. 'outh
I hk 1 a are . et out.]
- [ 't;i tr· !'. )frD•malcl (1 97>), Idaho. 40
l'ae ; I :2 • f '11 u1wil Bluff · , 'avin~. Bauk 1"
<. ri wol l (1 97) , 50 .·eh. 75:3 , i O • •. \\·.

iu

:m~

J

I 1r r •II 1·. Irvi ng F. Iii .. 'o, 3.'3 • • Y.
.i :.! ' ·
4 (iillil.111 ' " • ·o r' r111 . r, Hol1t. 5~6 . The
r uliu~ of lh •· t•1111rt i11 1·" ·pr>1·t t1J a ·c pnr:t t. r
j111l rm •11L \\ a lia t•<l 11po11 • 2i4 (l:.!O~,

1206, 21, 22) of the Xew Y ork c d .
The entire d ci ion i in ·l e r lrn r mouy
wi t h th plain int nt of the
1l than
ma11_,. ot her. whic h ha\" ii en itcd.
Trabu 1". i\rc: chim, , Bu. h, i-l.
5 ' now I'. ll oward, 35 nn.rb. 55.
c
O'<.ormn.111" Lind ke, 2G ;\ Jinn . 93 (a, j oi nt
arid e \·era l bond). A e ''"11a11t to ind" m iify J c>L'.1Jn,· ncraiu~t Ji , ltilit_v on a
ho11d wh crc>in I he." , rf' jc i11L l,v , ncl ::;eYPrally l1ouncl ; j,.; al.
joint a11d
" rnJ .
J lu 0 h '" )r o-. I ."'· • .. 'av. o., 11 Ore.
-!:37.
u Ante, I . 2 9, note.
L
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against any number of joint and several debtors at the plaintiff's

option, as well as against any number of joint debtors.^ ' If

several defendants are sued jointly upon an alleged joint and

several contract, the plaintiff may sever in the recovery, and take

judgment against a portion only, if the evidence shows sucli a

liability ; ^ and when one of two or more persons jointly and sever-

ally liable dies, the creditor may at once sue the personal repre-

sentatives of the deceased in a separate action, or may sue the

survivors.^

§ 207. * 306. V. Actions upon Contract; Several Liability. No

Change in Common-Law Doctrines — Except. No change has been

made in the common-law doctrines and rules concerning several

liability arising from contract, except that produced by the pro-

vision found in all the codes in substance as follows. Persons

severally liable on the same obligation or instrument, including

the parties to bills of exchange, promissory notes, and negotiable

bonds, — and in some States sureties, — may all, or any of tliem,

be included in the same action at the option of the plaintiff.

This clause certainly effects a very important change in the
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ancient rule, in all cases where the liability flows from an instru-

ment or contract in writing, in that it permits a creditor to sue

all the several promisors, or any number of them, instead of re-

stricting him to a separate action against each.'* The effect of

this clause, and the extent of the change wrought by it will be

discussed at large in Section VIII. of the present chapter. With

this exception, the common-law doctrine is unaltered. In many

States it is settled by a decided preponderance of authority, that

a principal debtor and a guarantor thereof cannot be joined as

co-defendants in the same action. Even wlien the principal debt

is evidenced by a written instrument, and the guaranty is in-

1 Rose V. Williams, 5 Kau. 483 ; Jeffer- 2 [^Black Hills Bank v. Kellogg (1893),

son County Com'rs v. Swain, 5 Kau. 376; 4 S. D. 312, 56 N. W. 107 L]

Kupfer V. Sponhorst, 1 Kau. 75 ; Rose i-. ^ gpeyers v. Fisk, 6 N. Y. Sup. Ct.

Madden,] Kan. 445 ; Sellou r. Bradeu, 13 197; Parker r. Jackson, 16 Barb. 33;

Iowa, 365; Ryerson v. Hendrie, 22 Iowa, Mcintosh v. En.^ign, 28 N. Y. 169; Har-

480 ; Clapp v. Preston, 15 Wis. 543. This rington v. Higham, 15 Barb. 524.

last case arose under a provision identical * See Powell v. Powell, 48 Cal. 234.

with § 120 (454) of the New York code as Persons severally liable for different items

to parties severally liable on the same in- of a general demand cannot be joiued as

fitrument ; and see Powell v. Powell, 48 Cal. defendants iu one action. Miller v. Curry,

234. In Kansas a personal money judgment 53 Cal. 665.

against two or more is a joint and several

obligation. Read v. Jeffries, 16 Kan. 534.

(gain. t any numb r of joint and s vcral debtor at the plaintiff':-;
01 tion, a well as again t any number f joint debtors. 1 1f
seYeral defendants are sued jointly upon an alleged joint an(l
·ey ral contract, th plain iff may ·ever in th recov ry and take
judgment agaiu t a portion only, if the evidence ·hows .·uch a
liabili~y · 2 and when one of two or more person · jointly and
vcrally liable dies, the creditor may at once sue the personal repr entative of the deceased in a, eparate action, or may ue th
urvivor.'.3
§ 207 . * 306. V. Actions upo n Contract ; S e ver a l L iab ility . N o
C hang e in Common-Law Doctr in es - E x cept.
N 0 change has been
made in the common-law doctrine and rules concerning several
liability arising from contract, except that produced by the provi ion found in all the codes in substance as follows. Person
s everally liable on the same obligation or in trument, inclucling
the parties to bills of exchange, promissory notes, and negotiable
bond , - and in some States sureties, - may all, or any of them,
be included in the same action at the option of the plaintiff.
This clause certainly effects a, very important change in the
ancient rule, in all cases where the liability flow::; from an instrument or contra.ct in writing, in that it permits a creditor to sue
all the several prorni ·or', or any number of them, in tead of restricting him to a eparate action against each.4 The effect of
this clause, and the extent of t he change wrought by it will be
di'scussed at large in Section V III. of the present chapter. With
this exceptiol), the common-law doctrine is unaltered. In many
tates it is settled by a decided p reponderance of authority, that
a principal debtor and a guaran tor thereof cannot be joined as
co-Oefendants in t he same action. Eve n when the principal debt
is evidenced by a written instrument, and the guaranty is in1 Ro e v. W illiams, 5 K an. 483; J efferon County Com' rs v . Swain, 5 Kan . 376;
Kupfer v. Sponhors t, 1 Kan. 75; Ro e v.
Madden , 1 Kan . 445; Sellon ii. Braden, 13
Iowa, 365; Ryerson v. Hendrie , 22 Iowa,
-t80 ; Clapp i· . P re t on, 15 Wi . 5-t-3. This
last case arose un der a provision identical
with§ 120 (454) of the rew York code as
to parties se1·erall.v li abl e on the same in::;trument; and see Powell 11. Powell, 48 Cal.
234. InKan asapersonal mou eyjudgment
against two or more is a joint and several
obligation. Read v. J effries, 16 Kan. 53 4.

2

[Black Hill Bank v. K ellogg (1893) ,

4 S. D. 3 12, 56 N. W. 1071.J
3

Speyers v. Fisk, 6 N. Y. Sup. Ct.

197; Parker r . Jack on, 16 Barb. 33;
Mci ntos h 1-. Ensign, 28 N . Y. 169 ; Harringt on u. Hig ham , 15 Barb. 524.
'1 See Powell v. P owell, 48
al. 2.3·L

Per ons everally liable for different item,;
of a general demand cannot be joiueJ as
defendant in one action. Miller v. Curry,
53 Cal. 665.
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dorsed upon the same paper, the parties are not " severally liable

part

on the same obligation or instrument," and do not fall within the

provision last above quoted. A separate action must be brought

against the principal debtor and against the individual guarantor.^

ar n " , erally liable
an 1 d n t f. 11 within he

This doctrine does not prevail in all the States. It is held in

some, by very able courts, that where the payee or owner of a

promissory note transfers the same, and writes a guaranty upon

it, he may be sued as a guarantor, together with the maker there-

of, in one action ; and the same doctrine has b'cn applied to a

similar transfer and guaranty of a contract to pay money not

negotiable in form.^ In an ordinary action to recover upon a

debt due by an insolvent corpomtion, over which a receiver has

been appointed, he is not a necessary, nor even proper co-defend-

ant when no cause of action is stated, and no relief is praj^ed

against him.^

§ 208. * 307. VI. Liability in Actions for Tort. Common-Law

Doctrines Unchanged. General Rule as to Parties Defendant herein.

Illustrations. The common-law doctrines concerning the liability

of tort-feasors, and as to the joinder or separation of them in ac-
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tions brought to recover damages for the wrong, are entirely un-

changed by the new SN'stem of procedure. It is unnecessary to

repeat these ancient rules ; that they are still in operation with

their full force and effect is sufficiently shown b}' the following

particular instances. In general, those who have united in the

commission of a tort to the person or to property, whether the

injury be done by force or be the result of negligence or want of

ail in all th
I t i ' hl m
' here th P<
r owner f a
ran
me, and writ
i
h may
u d a a guarant r together with h. ma.k r tl: ere£ in on a ion· and tl
ame doctrine ha b.., n appli
·imilar ran fer and guaranty of a c ntra t t pa mon · n t
n o iabl in f rm. 2 In n rdinary a tion to re v r up n a
d b u by an in · lv nt
rporati n, ov r whi h a r ·ei r h 8
n app in d he is not a nece ary, nor even proper co-d f nda n when n c u
of a ti n i
t ted and n r lief i prayed
3
a a.in t hiru.
· 208. * 307. VI. Liability in Actions for Tort. Common-Law
Doctrines Unchanged.
Illustrations.

skill, or of fraud and deceit, are liable to the injured party with-

f tort-£

out any restriction or limit upon his choice of defendants against

whom he may proceed. He may, at his option, sue all the wrong-

' QSims i". Clark (1892), 91 Ga. 302, that in each one of these cases the guar-

18 S. E. 158 ] Le Roy r. Shaw, 2 Dner, aiitor was the original ]jayee or promisee,

626; De Hidder r. Schcrmerhorn. 10 Barh. and also the assignor; but it must be said

6.38; Alien v. Fosgate, II How. Pr. 218; that the court does not lay any stress upon

I'halen i'. Dingee, 4 K. D. Smitli, .379 ; tliis fact as a ground for its decision.

Honduront v. Bladen, 19 Ind. 100; Virden » Arnold v. Suff()ll< Bank, 27 Bar!). 424.

V. KlJsworth, 1.5 Ind. 144. See Stout In an action against two or more as for

V. Noteman, 30 Iowa, 414, 415 ; Tucker c. money had and received, a comjjlriint is

Shiner. 24 Iowa, .334. Also Graham v. domurraldo which sliows that the money

Hingo, 67 Mo. .324; Barton r. Speis, 5 was received otlicrwise than jointly; .al-

l l Jill'

'kill

llun, 60 tliough the joinder miglit have lioen

- Marvin /•. Adamson, 11 Iowa, 371 ; pr()|)er if the action had sounded in tort:

Mix /'. Kairchild, 12 Iowa, ^r>\ ; Tucker Simmons r. Spencer, 9 Fed. H. 5*^1; 3

V. Shiner. 24 Iowa, .334: I'eddicord r. McCrary. 48. [|[.<)nstal<>t i: Calkins

General Rule as to Parties Defendant herein.

The ommon-law doctrin con rnina the liabilit
a o the j inder or eparation of them in a.er cover d m'.1ge f r the wr ng, are entirel unnew y tem f procedure. It i unne
ar to
i nt rul · that they are ill in op ration with
effect i · uffi iently hown lJy the foll win
In
n ral, th ' e wh hav uni cl in th
pr pert , wh h r he
n glig n
r w· nt f
l injur d p rty wi hare liabl
f d fendant a ain t
up n hi
I ma at hi.
11 h wron 0 -

Whiltam, 9 Iowa,471. It is to lie noticed (180S), 120 Cal. (,SS, 53 I'ac. 25!ii.3

:? ,

Ian

i11

, ._

A darn.

C111,

1 1 I wa, 3i l ;

~ ! ix ' · Fairrhild, I~ low. , .1;; 1 : T u k r

hi11<·r, :.!-I I•rna, ::1.1-1: l'c·cldieord 1·.
\ 'hi1La111, !! fo a,471. It i. to li· 11oti · ·d

11.
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doers in a single action, or may sue any one, or may sue each

in a separate action, or may sue any number he pleases less than

all ; the fullest liberty is given him in this respect.^ The only

exceptions are those few instances in which the tort from its

very nature must be a separate act impossible to be committed

by two or more jointly .^ A sheriff and his de[)uty may be sued

jointly for the trespasses and other wrongful acts done by the

'- QBut where a joint issue is presented

on the pleadings against a number of

tort-feasors, plaintiff has no right to any

doer in a ·ingle action, or may u any on , r may ·ue each
in a 'el arate action, or may ue any numb r he pl a es 1 s · than
all; the fulle t liberty i giv n him in thi r '1 e
Tl only
x' pti ns are those f w in tanc s in whi h th tort fr m it
very nature must be a parate act impos ibl to
committ d
2
by two or more jointly.
A heriff and hi d puty may be su d
jointly for the trespa ses and other wrongful acts don by the

other than a joint recovery, unless the

action has failed as to all but one of

the defendants, or unless the joint issue

has been modified by a severance in

the answers: Ashkraft v. Knoblock (1896),

146 Ind. 169, 45 N. E. 69. But see Ilass-

ler V. Ilefele (1898), 151 Ind. 391, 50 N. E.

361, where the court says, quoting from au
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earlier case : " It was held in terms that

this provision of the code (Burns' R. S., §

579) applies to all actions indiscriminately,

■whether founded upon contract or upon

tort ; that it is immaterial whether the

complaint alleges a joint or a joint and

-several liability ; that the right of recovery

is, in this respect, to be regulated by the

proof and not by the allegations of the

complaint ; that, in other words, every

complaint is, in the respect stated, to be

treated as both joint and several where

there are two or more defendants. "J

2 Creed v. Hartman, 29 N. Y. 591, 592,

597 ; Roberts v. Johnson, 58 N. Y. 613,

616, an action against one partner only

where the entire firm had been guilty

of negligence ; Chester v. Dickerson, 52

Barb. 349, 358 ; Phelps v. Wait, 30 N. Y.

78, an action against principal and agent

for negligence of the agent; Kasson v.

People, 44 Parb, 347 ; Wood v. Luscomb,

23 Wis. 287, an action against one part-

ner for negligence by the firm ; Fay v.

Davidson, 13 Minn. 523; Mandlebaum v.

Russell, 4 Nev. 551 ; McReady v. Rogers,

1 Neb. 124; Murphy v. Wilson, 44 Mo.

313; Allred y. Bray, 41 Mo. 484; Brady

V. Hall, 14 Ind. 317, action for injury done

by trespassing animals which belonged to

several persons jointly ; Turner c. Hitcli-

cock, 20 Iowa, 310, a very elaborate and

instructive judgment ; Buckles v. Lam-

bert, 4 Mete. (Ky.) 330; Ilubbell v. Meigs,

50 N. Y. 480, 489; Mcintosh v. Ensign.

28 N. Y. 169; Buliis v. Montgomery, 50

N. Y. 352. Where a right of action for

tort exists against several, and is of sucli

a character tliat it survives upon the death

of the wrong-doer, if one of the persons

liable dies, the action may be brought or

continued against his personal representa-

tives ; but it is the settled rule in New

York that the action in such case must

be divided, and one suit be broutj;ht or

continued against the survivors, and one

against the representatives of the deceased.

Bond V. Smith, 6 N. Y. Sup. Ct. 239;

4 Hun, 48; HeinmuUer v. Gray, 13 Abl).

Pr. N.s. 299 ; Union Bank v. Mott, 27 N. Y.

1 [But where a joint issue is presented
on the pleadings against a number of
tort-fe::isors, plaintiff has no ri g ht to any
other than a joiut recovery, unl ess the
action ha failed as to all but one of
the defe ndants or unless the joint i ue
has been modified by a se vera nce in
the answe rs: Ash kraft v . Knoblock (1 96),
146 Ind. 169, 45 N. E. 69. :But see Ha ler v. ll efele (1 98), 151 Ind. 3 91 , 50 N. E.
36 1, wh ere t he court says, q notin g from an
e arlier case : "It was held in terms that
this provision of the code (Burns' R. S., §
579) applie to all actions indiscriminately,
wh et he1· fo und ed upon contract or upon
tort; that it is immaterial wh eth er the
co mplaint alleges a joint or a joint and
several li ability ; that the right of recover.v
is, in this r espect, to be reg ulated by the
proof and not by the allegations of the
com plaint; that, in other words, every
co mplaint is, in the respec t stated, to he
treated a both joint and several wh ere
there are two or more defendants."]
2 Creed v. Hartman, 29 N. Y. 591, 592,
597; Roberts v. Johnson, 58 N. Y. 613,
616, an action against one partner on ly
where t he entire firm had been g uilty
of negligence; Chester v. Dickerson, 52
Barb. 349, 358; Phelp · v. W a it, 30 N. Y.
78, an action against principal anti agent
for negligence of the agent; Ka son v.
People, 44 Barb. 347; Wood v. Lusco mb,
23 Wis. 287, an action against one partner for negligence by the firm ; Fay v.
D;t\'idson, 13 Minn. 523; Mandlebaurn v.
Ru sell, 4 Nev. 551 ; McReady v. Roger ,
l t\ eb. 12-t.; Murphy v. Wil on, 4-t. Mo.
·i L.3 ; Allred v. Bray, 41 Mo. 484 ; Brady
,._ Ball, 1-t. Ind. 317, action fo r injnry done
by trespassing animals which belouged to
several persons jointly; Turner c. Ili tch<:ock, 20 Iowa, 310, a ye ry elabor ate a.nd
i nstruct i\' judgment; Buckle l'. Lambert, 4 .Mete. (Ky.) 330; llubbell v . ;\1eigs,

50 N. Y. 480, 489; Mclnto h v. En ip;n,
28 N . Y. 169 ; Bullis v. Montgomery, 50
N. Y. 352. Where a right of actio n for

t ort ex i ts again t everal, and i of ucl1
a character that it survives upon the d ath
of t he wrong-doer, if one of the persous
liable dies, the action may be brought or
co ntinued against his personal representati ves; but it is the settled rule in ' ew
Yor k that the action in uch case mu ·t
be divided, and one suit be brought or
continued again. t the survivors, and one
against the representatives of the deceased .
Bond v. Smith, 6 . Y. Sup. Ct. 239;
4 Hun, 48; Heinmuller t>. Gray, 13 Abb.
Pr. N.s. 299; Unio n Bank v. Mott, 27 N. Y.
633 ; Gardner v. Walker, 22 How. Pr. 405;
McVean v. cott, 46 Barb. 379. As furth er illu trations; - negligence: Vary v.
B. C. R. & M. R Co., 42 Iowa, 246 (joint
employers) ; \ r au W agenen v . Kemp , 7
Hun, 32R, a joint action allowed agaiust
the own er of a lot for a negligent excavation of the sidewalk, and the city fo 1·
negligently suffering the same; cf. infrci,
§ * 308 note; Mitchell '" Allen, 25 id.
543 (a rel ease of one of the per ous
join tly negligent release· all) ; Gudg r I'.
W estern
. C. R. Co., 21 Fed. R. l ;
trespass : \V ehle v. Butler, 61 ~. Y. 245;
Fleming v. l\IcDona.ld, 50 Ind. 2i8; fraud :
Bond v. Smith, 4 Hun, 4 (one of the 'cl fe11dants di es); Hun v. Cary, 82 N. Y. 65
(t rustees guilty of a tortious breach of
tru t, a por tion of them may be sued all need 11ot be j ined); nuisance : Cobb
v. Smith, 3 \Vi . 21, a mill-dam cam. d
plaintiff's lands to be verflowe<l; l1eld,
th e persons who had acqui red title to tl1c
land on which the dum tands, and by
whose authority it ha beeu ma intained,
are proper co-def nda nts; Greene 11, Nun nemacher, 36 Wi . 50; Lohmiller v. Indian
Water Co., 51 id. 6 3; Hillman v. Newington, 5 7 Cal. 56.
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latter in his official capacity; the deputy, because he actually

commits tlie tort, and tlie sheriff because he is the princi-

pal.^ A passenger in the cars of one company was injured by a

collision with a train of another compajiy which used the same

track. The servants of both companies were in fault, and as the

wrong was caused by the negligence of each corporation, an action

brought against them jointly was sustained.-

1 Waterbury v. Westcrvelt, 9 N. Y.

598; King v. Urser, 4 Diier, 431 ; contra,

Moultou r. Norton, 5 Barb. 286, 296, per

1. t r m hi, official capacit T; th l pu y becau h actually
·mmnic the tort antl th :heriff b cau e he
the principal.1 _\_ pa._._ ~ nger m the car f one c mpa1n- \Ya injured Ly a.
c 1lli jun wi lh a tn in of an ther c rnpany which u.se l th «U l
trud-. Tl
errn it u both omp::uu " \Yer in fault , nd a" the
wrong "-a ·au ell by th n o·lig nee of each r ration, an ac ·on
Lrongbt a crain t th m jointl · wa · u t<.1in cl.2

Pratt J. This dictum is clearly errone-

ous. So, too, an executiou or an at-

tachment creditor, under whose direction

property is tortiously taiien by the sheriff,

is properly joined with the slieriff in an

a('tion for the trespass : Elder i-. Frevert,

18 Nev. 446; Marsh c. Backus, 16 Barb.

483.
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•i Colegrove v. X. Y. & N. H. R. Co.,

20 N. Y. 492; Moouey v. Hudson River

R. Co , 5 Robt. 548.

QA railroad company and its receiver

may be joined in an action for tort to

recover damages caused by flooding plain-

tiff's land : St. Louis, etc. U. II. Co. v.

Trigg (1897), 63 Ark. .5 $6, 40 S. W. 579.

An engineer and fireman tiirough whose

negligence plaintiff's intestate was killed,

may be sued jointly with tlie master, the

railroad corporati<>n : Winston's Adm'r

V. 111. Cent. R. li. Co. |190l), Ky.. 05

S. W. 13. A master and servant, gen-

erally, may be jointly sued for tiie ser-

vant's negligence : Central of Georgia Ky.

Co. V. Brown (1901), 113 Ga. 414, .38 S E.

989; Greenberg iv VVhitcomI) Lumber Co.

(1895), 90 Wis. 225. 63 N. W. 93. A fire-

man injured in a collision properly joined

as defendants the railroad company, the

division superintendent, and the train de-

spatcher ; Howe v. Northern Pac. Ry. Co.

(1902), .30 Wash. 569, 70 Pac. 1100.

Where a tort is committeil by the .soj)-

arate liut concurrent negligence of a town

marshal and a board of town trustees,

suit may be lirought against them jointly,

together with the bondsmen on the mar-

hhal'rt bond: Doeg r. Cook (1899), 126

Cal. 213, 58 Pac. 707. All who participate

in a fraud are jointly liable therefor :

Spaulding i>. North Milwaukee Town Site

Co. (1900), 106 Wis. 481, 81 N. W. 1064 ;

Austin r. Murdock (1900), 127 N. C. 454,

37 S. E. 478 ; — including those whose

gains or losses are attriliutable to the

fraud : Stevens v. South ( )gdeu Land Co.

(1896), 14 Utah, 2.32, 47 Pac. 81.

It was held in Page v. Citizens Bank-

ing Co. (1900), 111 Ga. 73, 36 S. E. 418,

that an action for malicious prosecution

may he brouglit jointly against a partuer-

sliip, the individual meml)ers tiiereol". and

a person not a member, if such prosecu-

tion was begun and carrietl on as a result

of a conspiracy among tliem.

The plaintiff may sue any one or more

of joint tort-feasors as he may elect :

Coddingtou v. Canaday (1901), 157 Ind.

I

\Yaterbury v. We. ten lt, 9 ... Y .

59 · Kiua v. Or ·er, 4 Duer, 431; contra,
)loultou t'. • • orton, 5 Baru. 2 6, 296, lJer

Pratt ,J. Thi · dictum i c1 arly errc neou.. . o, too, an execution or an attachment creditor under who.-e directi•m
property i· wrtiou ly taken by the sheriff,
i . . properly joined with the . heriff in an
ar>tion f r th tre pas : Elder z:. Fre,·ert,
J • 'e\ . .u6; )far:h i:. Ba.cku
16 Barb.
4 3.
., oleo-rove l, . .._·. Y. & i:. II. R. Co.,
2
'. Y. 492; i\looney v. Ilud·on River
1 . C'o , 5 Robt. 54 .
[.\ railroad company and it recei,·er
may be juin 1l iu an a ·tion for tort t
recover clam 1ge caused by flooding plaintiff's land: , "t. Loui , etc. H. R. 'o. 1; .
Trigg (1 9i), 63
rk . 5'36, 4-0 , . W. 579.
,\u U"iueer an.J firer·nan through who:se
ncgli;!e1H·e plaintiff's intc,.t:ite was killed,
rnny be »ne<l jointly wi h the ma ter, the
railrua<l corporation : \Vin ·tou's Adm'r
v. Ill. ( -nt. H. H. C'o. I 1901 ),
(,5
. \\T. 13. A m;i,.ter nn<l :< n:111t, gl'11c:rally, rnay be jointly . u d fur the :-ervaut'. ne rligence: entral of Georgia Hy .

ry ..

('1J.v.Bruwn{l901),ll3 a.414-,3. E.
9 9: Greenbn~ i· ' ' hitcon Ii Lumber o.
(J 95), !JO Wis 225. 6:3 , '. \Y. !):3.
\.fire111au i11jtuPtl iu a colli,:;iuu prop rl_v join cl

a defcudaut . the railroad company, the
cli\'i:io11 :npniut n1le11t, and the train d patchn : llowe t'. 'orth ru Pac. Ry. 'o.
(I' 112 ), :rn \Vash. 5G9, iO Par. 1100.
\Vherc a tort is committ 11 lry th , cp: ratr- liut "'"H't1rrcut ne"'li"'enc: of a tO\\ 11
mar Ii ii awl a l.oartl ~Jf town tru tP ·,
ui t 1m .\· h · ltro11~ht acrai11:t them j"iutly,
•orr ·tlwr wi Ii tltr• lio111lsrn n 011 thP in, ri.il' L n I: J>or-!! 1•.
•J11k (I 9~J), 126
< J._1 :1, ;, l'ae iOi. Allwho)'artic:ipatP
111 a fr. nrl ar • jui 11t 1v Iia I1l1· thr·r<'for :
jl 111lrli11' 1. , orth illil.wa.nkN~ TCJ\\ 11 , 'it
< •J. (I OOJ, IOG Wi. 4 I, I . \V. IOG-!-;
4

Austin !'- :\forelock (1900), 127 N. C. -l:.i·I,
3 i "" E. 4i ; - inclu<ling those who e
gain or lns·e are attributable to the
frantl: .'teYe1 · r .• outh ()ad n Lan<l o.
( l %), 1-!. "tah, 2.'32, 4-7 P ac. 1.
It \\'cs held in Pa.;e 1.:. itizeu Dauking Co. {1900\, 111 Ga. 7:3, 36 ' . E. -ll,
that au actiou for malicious prosecuti n
may be brou ht jointly ao-ain. t a purtuerhip, the in<liYi<lt al member.· thereo •. a11<l.
a per:on not a memher, if . uch pru:ec ution was begun at d rarrie1l on a · a re:-ult
of a cou ·1 iracy among them.
The plaintiff may . ue any one or more
of joint tort-fPnsor · a· he 111 ·1y lect :
Co1ldiuo-tou i-. auaclay (1901), 15i InJ.
243, Gl N. E. !>6i; Pugh r. he<;apeake
& Ohio Ry . o. (l 97), 101 Ky. ii, 39
'. W. 695; Don gla.
r. J ailway Co.
(I 94-), 9 1 Ia. 94, 5 X. ' ' . 1010; Brown
c. Cit,Y of Web tcr C'it~· (1902), l l.5 Ia.
fl 11,
:N. ". 1OiO; u mberland T el.
Co. i -. "are Adm'r ( 1903), - ry. -,
7.+ .'. "" 2 9 ;
hapiu i-. Babcock ( 1 96 ),
6i C'onn. 255, .'34 .'\tl. 103 .
Ou jnint wrong doer cannot complain
that other equally guil ty ar not j in d
with him: Berkson v . Ka nsa. Cit~· Ry.
C. (19),144 Mo. 211 45 .. W.1119;
' ' hit111an nr .• Tamara Tobacco ~o. 1:.
W urm 1902), Ky., 66 . W. 609; cot t v.
Flower (1900). 6 'eb. 675, 4 .i.r. W. I.
The plaintiff may cli mi · < to . ome
at any tao-e of t.he proc <ling , without
affecting the m er it. a to the oth r :
Berkson t'. Ka11 a
it.v
C'o (1, 9 ),
lH J.\fo. 211, 45 .' . \ . ll1 9; .f•) oil I.
Th1Jrntoo ( 1!1 01 ) 1 J.'3 <\. 99, 3 •.. E.3-!2.
It i. h lrl in
ounectknt,
'"
Pt>ck (I 9 ), iO l ou11 439 :1:1 .\tl "o:l,
that the per. u11 • joi11tl.1· cruilty of ; trc pa-. · 11'' "1'" rl<111.·11111 fr<'9it . hon ld Ii• .'llt•d
joi11tl.\". allfl if ."C\'l?rnl action-. are in. titr1tc-1l
withunt d1w l':l ll ~
uch actiuu shoultl Joe
cvu. ulid· red .]
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§ 209. * 308. Joint Liability must rest upon Community in Wrong-

doing. In order, liowever, that the geneial rule thus stated

should apply, and a union of wrong-doers in one action should

be possible, there must be some commmiity in the wrong-doing

among the parties who are to be united as co-defendants ; the in-

jury must in some sense be their ^om^ work.^ It is not enougli

that the injured party has on certain grounds a cause of action

against one, for the physical tort done to himself or liis property,

and has, on entirely different grounds, a cause of action against

another for the same physical tort ; there must be something

more than the existence of two separate causes of action for the

same act or default, to enable him to join the two parties liable

in the single action. This principle is of universal application.^

1 ^But in the case of a joint assault,

malice ou the part of one will be attributed

to all, and each will be held liable for all

tlie damages, both actual and exemplary:

Reizeustein v. Clark (1897), 104 la. 287,

f::. 209.

* 308.

Joint Liability must rest upon Community in Wrong-

doing.
In or ler however, that the g neral ml tlrn stated
. hould apply, and a union of wrong-doer.· in one action should
Le pos. iblc, there mu t be some communit!J in th wrong-doing
among the parties who ar to be united as co-defendant· ; the injury mu t in some sen. e Le their J'oint work. 1 It i.- not enough
hat the injured party ha ' on certain grounds a ·au e of action
against one, for the physical tort clone to himself or hi· property
and ha , on entirely different grounds, a cause of action again ·t
another for the same physical tort; there mu t be som ething
more than the existence of two separate causes of action for the
same net or default, to enable him to join the two parties liable
in the single action. This principle is of uni ver al application. 2
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73 N. W. ,588. So a master and servant are

l)oth liable for the servant's wilful tort,

if within the scope of his employment :

Gardner v. Southern Ry. Co. (1903), 6.5

S. C. 341,43 S. E. 816.

■^ Trowbridge v. Forepaugh, 14 Minn.

133. F., owning a lot in St. Paul abut-

ting on a street, dug and left open a dan-

gerous hole in the street, into which the

plaintiff fell. He sues the city and F.

jointly, basing his claim upon the above

acts of F., and upon the general duty of

the city in respect of its streets. The

court held that such a joint action could

not be maintained. " The liability of the

city depends on a state of facts not affect-

ing its co-defendant, and tlie converse is

equally true. Neither is, in fact nor in

law, chargeable with, nor liable for, the

matter set up as a cause of action against

the other. They did not jointly conduce

to the uijnry." Contra, in Van Wage-

nen v. Kemp, 7 Hun, 328, a similar case,

the joinder was alloAved. See also Long

r. Swindell, 77 N. C. 176; Cogswell v.

Murphy, 46 Iowa, 44 ; Keyes ?•. Little

York Gold, etc. Co., 53 Cal. 724 ; Mitchell

r. Allen, 25 Hun, 543 (a release of one

of several joint tort-feasors releases all ;

Cooper V. Blair, 14 Oreg. 255 ; Dahms v.

Sears, 13 Oreg. 47 ; \yi. K. & T. Ry. Co.

I'. Haber (1896), 56 Kan. 694, 44 Pac. 632.]

^Where parents wrongfully cause hus-

band and wife to separate, they are jointly

liable, though each does not participate

in all the acts of the other : Price r.

Price (1894), 91 la. 693, 60 N. W. 202.

And in an action by a wife for damages

resulting from a particular intoxication of

her husband, all the parties who con-

tributed to the particular intoxication may

be joined, although they were conducting

separate places of business when the liquor

was sold to the husband and did not act

in concert : Faivre v. Mandirschied (1902),

117 la. 724. 90 N. W. 76.

It was held in City of Kansas City v.

File (1899), 60 Kan. 157, 55 Pac. 877, that

a city and an electric light company are

jointly liable for injuries sustained by

1 [But in the case of a joint as ault,
malice ou th e part of one will be attributed
to all, and each will be helu liable for all
the damages, both actual and exemplary:
R izen tein v. Clark (1897), 10+ Ia. 2 7,
73 ~. \V . 588. So a master ancl ervant are
both liable for the senant'" wilful tort,
if with iu the :;cope of his employment:
Gardner v. 8out hern Ry. Co. (1903), 65
S. C. 341, 43 S. E. 16.
2 Trowbridge v. Forepaugh, 14 Minn.
133. F., owning a lot iu St. Paul al..mtting on a treet, dug anrl left open a d:1ngerous hol e in the street, iuto which the
plaintiff fell. He ues the city aud F.
jointly, basing his claim upon the aborn
act of F., and upon the general dut.v of
th e city in r espect of its streets. The
court held that such a joint action could
not be maintained. "The liability of the
city depends on a state of facts not affecting its co-defendant, and the conv erse is
equally true.
either is, in fact nor in
hw, chargeable with, nor liable for, the
matter set up as a cause of action against
the other. They did not joint(!/ conduce
to the injury." Contra, in Van \Vngenen v. Kemp, 7 Hun, 328, a simihr case,
the joincler was allowed. See also Long
1'.
winclell, i7 X. C . 176 ; Cogswell v.
J\furphy, 46 Iowa, 44 · Keyes 1-. Littl e
York Gold, etc. Co., 53 Cal. 724; ).Jitchell
1• . Allen, 25 Hun, 543 (a releaRe of one
nf . e,-eral joint tor t-feasors release. all ;
C'ooper if. Blair, 14 Oreg. 255 ; Dahm v.
Sears, 13 Oreg. 4i; [M. K. & T. H.v. Co.
v. Haber (1 9fi}, 56 Kan . 694, 44 Pac. 63:2 .J

[ Where parents wrongfully can e hu band and wife to eparate, they are jointly
liable, though each does not participate
in all the acts of the other: Pri ce r.
Price (189-!), 9l Ia. 693, 60 X \Y. 202.
And in an aetion hy a wife fo r damages
resulting from a particular intoxication of
her husba nd, all the parties who contributed to the particular intoxication may
be join ed, although they were comluding
separate pl aces of business when the liqnor
was sold to the hu:,;band and did not act
in conce rt: Faine 1>. ..Ylantlirsch.ied (1902),
11 i Ia. 72-l, 90 :N. w. 76.
It was held in City of Kansa City v.
File (1 \l9), 60 Kan. 157, 55 Pac. 877, that
a city and an electric light company are
joi utly liable for iujuries su tained by
plaintiff by reason of a broken wire whi ch
rem ained in the street for three week ,
coustituting a dangerous ob truction to
travel. A dissenting opinion wa rendered citing t he text, and the ca e of
Trowbridge v. F orepaugh (i11fra).
ee,
al o, Street Ry. Co. v. Stone (189+), 54
Kan. 8.3, 37 Pac. 1012, where a city and
a. treet railway were held jointly liable
for a daugerously constructed track.
In . mith v. Day (l901), ,39 Ore. 531,
G5 Pac. 10.) 5, the co urt aid: "Two or
more tort-fea.. or may be ued jointly
when t_hey h:we all concurred by joint
de ign or <.:ornmon act or negl igence to
produce the injury complained of; lmt
where the partie have acted separatcl.'an<l irnlepentlentl)' of each other, n·ithout
concert, or by common purpo ·e, ,although
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§ 210. * 309, Case of Joint Conversion of Chattels. The general

doctrine under examination embraces as well the case of a joint

conversion of chattels, as any other instance of joint tort to

property or person. When two or more have united in the act

which amounts to a conversion, or have so interfered with the

chattel as to constitute a conversion within the legal , meaning of

the term, the owner or person having the special property may

sue all, or one, or any, as in the case of any other tort.^ But

there must be a community in the wrong-doing ; the wrongful

act must constitute a conversion on the part of all, and in that

act all must have engaged. When such is the case, the law

does not apportion the responsibility, but holds each liable for

the whole amount.' If there is no such community, a joint action

for the conversion will not lie, and a fortiori, it will not lie when

the defendants have not each been guilty of an act which 18 a

■wrongful conversion. '^

§ 211. * 310. Case of Replevin and Detinue. The same general

doctrine, under the same limitations, controls the action of

replevin, or detinue, — or to recover possession of chattels, which
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at the common law was regarded as a personal action based upon

the tortious act of the defendant, in his wrongful detention or

taking of the goods. If, therefore, there is a joint wrongful

taking or detention of the goods, the action will lie against the

wrong-doers jointly, although one of them may have parted with

his actual possession. Thus, where goods had been sold and

delivered to a fraudulent vendee, so that the vendor might

rescind and retake the chattels, and this vendee had afterwards

assigned them to an assignee in trust for creditors, and the

the injury may be a common result to them joint tort-feasors and jointly liable

which the acts of each contributed, their for the wrongful attachments.]

liability i.s not joint, and a joint recovery ^ See Simmons c. Spencer, 9 Fed. 11.

cannot be had." 581 ; 3 McCrary, 48.

Stuart V. Bank of Staplehurst (1899), - ([E.s9 1; (iriffith (1894), 128 Mo. ."JO, 30

:>: Neb. 569, 78 N. VV. 298: " The jietition S. W. 343: "The purcluiser, with knowl-

cliarged joint actions of the defendants, edj^e of the conversion, is jointly liable

and the acts were such as might be done with the wrongful seller. ... It does not

in combination; hence it w;u* not open matter that the parties acted in good faith

to .ittack by demurrer for an iniproper and believed they had a right to take and

joinder of |)artics." dispose of the property."]

Miller >: Ik-ck (1899), 108 la. 575, 79 ■' Manning c. Monaghan, 23 N. Y. 539.

N. W. :J44 : Whore two creditors with See s. c. 28 N. Y. 585. Further instances of

The gen ral
d
rin un 1 r
· mina i 11 mbra
a w 11 th a of a j int
£ h tt
a an
th r in tan e f j int t rt to
"' h 11 t\ o or more ha e unit d in the act
o inter£ re vvith the
1 gal ,m aning f
ial prop rty may
u
n
th r t rt. 1 But
her
mmunit in the wrong-<l ing · he wrongful
, c mu t
a c nv r i n on the part of all, and in that
et all mu,
ngag d. \Vh n u h · th
a
the law
d e. n t app rti n the r pon ibilit. , but hol
a h liable for
h wh 1 am uut. 2 If th re i no su h ommunit , a joint action
f r he n r ion will not lie, and a fortio ri, it will not li when
d f ,ndant have not ach been uilty of an a t which is a
wron ful
n er i n. 3
* 810. Case of Replevin and Detinue. The ame general
under the ame limitation ,
ntrol the acti n f
r
in r detinu - or t rec v r po
ion f chattel , whi h
at th c mm n L w wa ' regar l d a a er onal acti n base upon
th
rti u act f the d fendant, in hi ' wr ngful detention or
h
If, ther fore, ther i a joint wrongful
en i n f th g d · the acti n \ ill lie again t the
r jointly, althou h n of th m may hav part
with
hi · ac ual po
'i n. Thu .. , wher
d · h l b en
ld and
d liv r
a fraudulent v nd e,
nd r might
r cin and retake he chatt ls, and hi v nd
had af rw r
' ign d hem to an a ign e m tru t for r it r , an the
210 .

Case of Joint Conversion of Chattels.

Hf;|)aratc danns put them in the hands of joint conversion : Hearty f. Klinkiianimcr,

th

the same attorney, and attachments were 39 Minn. 438. All the wrongdoers n(tcd not

sued out on eacii, this does not make be joined : Carroll v. Fcthers, 82 Wis. G7.

Pl:Uln" put tlie 111 i11 t h ha11 cl. of
aLLoriwy,a11d 1tllal'li 11w11L· \\•J"'
u ·I! out 011 l':t<'h, thi. ilv• 0<1L 111 ake

P.('

lir·

tra

r>

:LUI!

joint c·o 11\ •r. i 11 : II a rt. '" Kliukha111111 r,
:$!l \l i11 11-l . . i\lltli c ,\rongd rs11c··duol
be joi u J: ( n rrvll u. F th r, 2 \Vii;. 67.
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possession had actually been transferred to such tmstee, an

action by the vendor to recover the possession of the goods was

held to be properly brought against both jointly, the assignee

not being a purchaser for value.^

§ 212. * 311. Common Carriers. The common-law doctrines re-

lating to suits against common carriers are unaltered. Although

an action may be brought upon their contract express or implied

to cany the goods safely, yet the ultimate ground of their liability

is their general duty, the violation of which is a tort. The usual

form of the action under the old system was Case, and not

Assumpsit. The owner of goods that have been lost or damaged

in the carriage may therefore treat the default as a tort, and sue

all or any of the parties at his election.^

I 213. * 312. Lessor and Lessee. Principal and Agent. A joint

liability for an injury may arise from the ownership and occupancy

of real property.^ As an example, where the owner of a house

had constructed a coal-hole in the sidewalk in such a manner and

position as to be dangerous to passers, and had leased the premises

to a tenant who used the coal-hole, and a person passing on the
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-sidewalk had fallen into it and been injured, both the owner and

the tenant were held liable, and a joint action against them was

sustained.* In general, the principal and his agent may be sued

1 Nichols V. Michaels, 2.3 N. Y. 264. illustrations : nuisance : Cobb v. Smith,

See, especially, the opinions of James J., 38 Wis. 21 ; supra, § * .307 (n.) ; Greene

p. 268 et seq., and of Selden J., pp. 270, v. Nunuemacher, 36 Wis. 50 ; Lohmiller

271, where the nature of the action before i\ Indian Water Co., 51 id. 683.

•and since the code is discussed at length. [^Waterhouse v. Schlitz Brewing Co.

See also OH^e, §* 297. (1900), 12 S. D. 397, 81 N. W. 725:

2 Mcintosh V. Ensign, 28 N. Y. 169. A tenant is not a necessary party in an

3 [^Where the sole ground of liability action against the owner of a building for

for a negligent injury is the ownership of injuries caused by its collapse, where the

•certain laud, the persons who are joint complaint alleges that tlie collapse oc-

posse sion had actually b n transferred to such trustee, an
action by the vendor to recover the pos es ion of th good was
held to be properly brought again t both jointly, the as ignee
not being a purcha er for value. 1
§ 212. * 311. Common Carriers. The common-law doctrines relating to uits again ·t c mmon carriers are unaltered. Although
.an action may be brought upon their contract expr s or implied
to carry the goods safely, yet the ultimate ground of their liability
i their general duty, the violation of which is a tort. The mmal
form of the action under the old system was Case, and not
Assmnpsit. The owner of goods that have been lost or damaged
in the carriage may therefore treat the default as a tort, and sue
all or any of the parties at his election. 2
§ 213. * 312. Lessor and Lessee . Principal and Agent. A joint
liability for an injury may arise from the ownership and occupancy
{)f real property. 3 As an example, where the owner of a house
bad constructed a coal-hole in the sidewalk in such a manner and
_position as to be dangerous to passers, and had leased the premises
to a tenant who used the coal-hole, and a person passing on the
idewalk had fallen into it and been injured, both the owner and
the tenant were held liable, and a joint action against them was
.sustained. 4 In general, the principal and his agent may be sued

vowners should be joined : Printup v. curred because of negligent construction,

Patton (1893). 91 Ga. 422, 18 S. E. 311. but did not allege decay or want of repairs.

But in an action by mandamus against a It was hell in Atcheson, Topeka, etc.

lessee of a railroad to compel the restora- Ry. Co. v. Anderson (1902), 65 Kan.

tion of a highway, the lessor is not a 202, 69 Pac. 158, that the lessee could

necessary party : People ex reJ. v. Rail- not be sued without the lessor. The court

way Co. (1900), 164 N. Y. 289, 58 N. E. said, in the syllabus: "In an action

138.] against a railroad company for damages

* Irvin V. Wood, 4 Robt. 138, 5 Robt. in laying a track in a public street and

482; s. c. on appeal, 51 N. Y. 224, 230; obstructing the ingress and egress of a

10 Am. Rep. 603. But see Trowbridge lot owner to and from his property, it

V. Forepaugh, 14 Minn. 133, supra, §*308 appeared that the company sued was not

{n ) ; and compare Van Wagener r. the owner of the track when it was built,

Kemp, 7 Hun, 328, there cited. Farther nor at the time the action was commenced,

20

1 Nichols v. Michaels, 23 N. Y. 264.
See, especially, the opinions of James J.,
p. 268 et seq., and of Selden J., pp. 270,
271, where the nature of the action before
:and since the code is discussed at length.
See also ante, § * 297.
2 Mcintosh v. Ensign, 28 N. Y. 169.
s [Where the sole ground of liability
for a negligent injury is th e ownership of
-certain laud, the persons who are joint
-0wuers hould be joined : Printup v.
Patton {1893), 91 Ga. 422, 18 S. E. 311.
But in an action by mandamu against a
lessee of a railroad to compel the restoration of a highway, the lessor is not a
necessary party : People ex rel. v. Railway Co. (1900), 164 N. Y. 289, 58 N. E.

13 .]
4 Irvin v. \Vood, 4 Robt. 13 , 5 Robt.
482; s. c. on appeal, 51 N. Y. 224, 2.'30;
10 Am. Rep. 603. But see Trowbridge
v. Forepaugh, 14 Minn. 133, supm, § * 308
{n .); and compare Van Wagener 1·.
.Kemp, 7 Hun, 328, there cited. Farther

illustrations : nuisance: Cobb v. Smith,

*

38 Wis. 21; supru, § 307 (n.); Greene
v. Nunnemacher, 36 Wis. 50; Lohmiller
v. Indian Water Co., 5 1 id. 683.
[Waterhouse v. 'chlitz Brewing Co.
(1900), 12 S. D. 397, 81 N . W. 725 :

A tenant is not a necessary party in an
action against the owner of a building for
injuries caused by its collapse, where the
complaint alleges that the collapse occurred because of negligent co11struction,
but <lid uot allege decay or want of repairs.
It was held in Atcheson, Topeka, etc.
Ry. Co. v. A11d erso n (1902), 65 Kan .
202, 69 Pac. 158 , that the le ee could
not be sued without the le , or. The court
aid, iu the syllabus: "In an action
against a railro1-1d company for damages
in laying a track iu a public street a11ct
ob true ting the ingre ·s and egre. of a
lot owner to an~ from his property, it
appeared that the company ued wa not
the owner of the tra k wh en it wa built,
11or at the time the action wa commenced,
20
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jointly for an}' trespass or other wrongful act done by the agent

while acting within the scope of his employment. The agent is

personally responsible, because his employment will not shield

him from the consequences of his torts, and the principal is liable

upon the familiar doctrine of agency. The injured party may of

course sue either separately.^

§ 214. *313. Cases ■where Joint Liability is Impossible. It has

already been said that the general doctrine of the joint and several

nature of the liability springing from torts does not obtain in

those cases where the injury is essentially a several one, or where,

in other words, from its intrinsic character, it can only be com-

mitted by one person. The most imijortant of this class of torts

is slander. No joint action for slander is possible ; but such an

action can be maintained for the publication of a libel, as in the

very familiar and frequent instance of a newspaper, which con-

tains defamatory matter, being owned and published by a partner-

ship.2 In the same manner a joint action to recover damages for

a malicious prosecution, which is an injury to character, may be-

yond doubt be brought against two or more persons who united
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in promoting the judicial proceeding complained of.

§ 215. *314. Joint Tort may give Rise to many Actions, but only

one Satisfaction. ^Vltliongli in eases of joint torts t!ie law gives

the injured party a wide choice to sue all the \\Tong-doers, or any

num])er, in a single action, or to sue each of them separately, thus

bringing as many actions as there are persons, yet it does not per-

mit him thereby to multiply his damages. He can have but one

Imt was a lessee only. Held, that the erly joined. Zeller r. Martin (Wis. 1893),

le.«sur compauy, which laid the track, and 54 N. W. 3.30. When damage is caused

caused the obstructi(jn, was a necessary by the negligence of a servant of a firm,

party. "3 all or any number of the partners may

1 Plielps I'. Wait, 30 N. Y. 78; Wright be sued. Roberts r. Johu.son, 58 N. Y.

r. Wilcox, 19 Wend. 343; 32 Am. Dec- 613,016.

.')07 ; Montfort v. Hughes, 3 E. I). Smith, -^ Forsyth c Kdmiston, 2 Abb. Pr. 430.

591, 594 ; Suydam v. Moore, 8 Barb. 358 ; A quiere is suggesteil, whether au action

Hewett V. Swift, 3 Allen, 420; Shearer for slander may not be maintained against

r. Kvans, 89 Ind. 400. An e.xecution or several persons it' the defamatory words

attachment creditor under whose direc- are uttered in jiursuance and as the result

tion a levy is unlawfully made, held to I)e of a conspiracy among them. This, per-

j intl · for an - tr pa ~ or o h r wrongful a t done by the agent
\\·hile ac in · \Vitl in he . cop f hi' mplo ·ment.
nt i '
hi 11
p r nall • r ·pon ib1e b cau e his empl rm nt will n
him from he c n ·eq uei e Gf his tort , an l the princip< 1 i liable
np n the familiar doctrin of agen y .
he injur cl part ma - o
1
c ur 'e u ei h r ' pt rately.
" 214. * 13.
Cases where Joint Liability is Impossible. It ha
alrea ly b n ail that he ener 1 doctrine of the join and e ral
nature of the liabili y 'pringin0 fr m torts doe" not btain in
h e a e wher the injury is e. entially a several ne, r where
in tber worw, fr rn it intrin ic cl racter, it can nly be committe l by one per. on. Th m t im Jortant f this cla of tort '
i ·lander.
o j int acticn f r slan ler is l o ' ibl · bu uch an
ac ion ca.n be maintained for the publi ation f a libel a in he
Yery familiar and frequent in tance of a ne~ paper which contain" defamatory ma,tter being wned and publi hed by a I artn rhir .2 In the .. ame mn.nner a joint action t recover damage· f r
a maliciou pr cution which i an injury t charact 1' may b ·ond doubt bv brnught agttin t two or more pe1"on \Yh uni ted
in promoting the judicial procee ling complained of.
· 215. *3l:L Joint Tort may give Rise to many Actions, but only
one Satisfaction.
\.1th ugl in a es of joint tor the law gi
the injure l arty a wide hoice to ue all the WT ng- loer , or any
number in a in le a tion, or to ue ea h of them epara.tel. , bu'
brin ing a many acti01 a there are per on' y t it do not permit him thereby t multiply hi dama e ·.
e can ha bu ne

properly joined witii tlie sheriff in an ac- haps, may be possible,

lion for the trespa.ss ; Elder r. Frevert, 18 QMouson v. Lathrop (1897), 96 Wis.

Nev. 446; Marsh r. Backus, 16 Barb. 483; 380, 71 N. W. 590: Where a libellous

and in an action of false imprisonment ttdegram is sent, the sender and the tele-

the sheriff who made the arrest and the grapli company may be jointly liable.]

judge who issued the process were proji-

lmt wa a l ee nly. H eld, that the
le,.: ·ur company which laid the track, antl
cau ·cd the ob truction, wa a nece ary
party.'']
1 Ph elp v. Wait, 30 ,". Y . 7
i·. \ 'ilcox, 19 \\ end. 343; 32
rn.
C·
507 ; :\[ ntfurt v. Hug he , 3 E. D . mith
!>91, 594 ; . 'uydam v. ;.,roore,
arb. 35 ;
Hew tt i· . .'wift, 3 All n, 420; . hear r
<'. E\'an~,
In<! . .JOO.
n xe ·ution or
att:wh111e11t C'r ditor uu<ler wl10:-c <lirecti HJ a I ·vy i: 1111]awfully made lwlcl to h
]11«1pnly joi11Nl with h h riff iu an acti1111 fcir tlic trr·i<Jia s; Elder 1:. Frcn:~rt, I
'•'\. 446; ;\Iar"'h 1·. Bac-ku , l Barb. 4 3;
a11<l i11 an :u·tion of fal:e impri :ourn •nt
tit" hr•riff ''ho marl the arr . t a11rl th
ju!lm; who i. :uc<l the procc ·s w ·r · }JI' p·

erly joined. Zeller v. [artin (Wi .. l 93),
54 . W . 330. Wh n uamag i. cau cl
by th ue lig n e of a ervant of a nrlll,
all or any number f the partn l" ma
be u d. I uert v. John on, • N. Y.
613, 616.
2 For yth 1·. Edmi t n 2
bb. Pr. 43 .
q1u r i . ugge t cl, wh th r au acti n
for ~I· uder may not h maintain cl a, aiu t
se,·eraJ per· u · if ti d •£a matory wont
are nttered in purnanc and a the r :ult
of ~ con. piracy among th rn. Thi ·, p rhaps. 111ay Le pt•s:ibl .
[.\fuu:ou r. Lath rup (1 9i ), 96 Wi ·.
3 6, 71 ,r. W. 596: \ h re a lili llou,
telegram i eut, th
nd r and th telegraph company ma L jointly liable.]
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satisfaction.^ In short, he can collect but one amount of damages

out of the many that may have been awarded him in separate

actions, although he is entitled to the costs in each suit.^ If he

has prosecuted two or more jointly, and the jury has assessed a

different sum as damages against each defendant, the plaintiff

nuiy enter the judgment against all for either of these amounts

which he elects, and of course he would naturally choose the

largest. This rule is based upon the notion that the injury is a

unit, that one award of damages is a compensation for that in-

jury, and that the defendants are equally responsible as among

themselves. A satisfaction of one is therefore operative as to all.

Imprisonment under a body execution is regarded by the law as

pro tanto a satisfaction ; ^ and if one such judgment debtor, being

in imprisonment, is voluntarily discharged therefrom by the

creditor, the judgment or judgments against all the others are

ipso facto satisfied, even though rendered in separate actions, as

fully as though the discharge had been by payment.*

1 [^Butler V. Ashworth (1895), 110 Cal.
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614, 43 Pac. 386; Holliiigsworth v. How-

ard (1901), 113 Ga. 1099, 39 S. E. 465;

Ashcraft c Knoljlock (1896), 146 Iiul. 169,

45 N. E. 69. Satisfaction as to one joint

tort-feasor is a bar to au action as to the

others: Dnlauey v. Buffum (1903), 173

atisfaction.1 I n short, he can collect but one amount of <lamages
ut of the many that may have been awa,rded him in · para.Le
actions. altho ugh h i · entitled to the o ts in ea h i-mit. 2 If he
ha pros cu ted two or more jointly, and the jury ha,· as ·e secl a,
different sum as damages against eac.:h defendant, the I laintiff
may enter the juclgm nt again ·t all for ither f these amo mts
which he elects, an d of course he would naturally choose the
largest. Thi rule is based upon the notion that the injury is '"
unit, that one award of damages is a compensation for that injury, and that the defenClants are equally responsible as am ng
themselves. A satisfaction of one is therefore operative as to all.
Imprisonment under a body execution is regarded by the law as
pro tanto a satisfaction; 3 and if one such judgment debtor, being
in imprisonment, is voluntarily discharged therefrom by tho
creditor, th e judgment or judgments against all the others are
·ipso fltcto satisfied, even though rendered in separate actions, as
fully as tho ugh the discharge had been by payment. 4

Mo. 1, 73 S. W. 125]

2 This doctrine is not confined to cases

of tort ; it applies in all instances where

there have been .separate suits or recov-

eries against persons who are jointly and

severally liable on the same obligation ;

satisfaction of one is satisfaction of all,

except as to costs ; and if some of the

actions are pending, payment of one may

be pleaded in bar of such pending suits.

First Nat. Bk. of Indianapolis v. Indi-

anapolis Piano Man. Co., 45 Ind. 5. See

also Lord v. Tiffany, 98 N. Y. 412. In au

action for assault and battery committed

by the defendant and one P. G., the an-

swer set up that plaintiff had recovered

judgment against P. G. for the same tort,

and issued execution thereon, whicli had

been levied on the property of P. G.

Held, a good defence. The injured party

may sue each or any of several joint tres-

pas.sers separately, and prosecute each

action to final judgment, but must then

elect against which one he will have exe-

cution. A final judgment and execution

or an order for execution, against one is

a discharge of all the others. Fleming

V. McDonald, 50 Ind. 278. The English

rule is that final judgment alone without

any execution is a discharge of all the

others. Brinsmead v. Harrison, L. R. 7

C. P. 547.

3 Koenig v. Steckel, 58 N. Y. 475.

4 Kasson v. The People, 44 Barb. 347.

The plaintiff had obtained a judgment

against G. and one against R, in a sepa-

rate action against each for a joint tres-

pass. G. was taken on body execution,

and, while in custody, was voluntarily set

at liberty by the judgment creditor. The

plaintiff afterwards took the other de-

fendant, R., on a body execution in his

action. R. applied to a judge by Itabeas

corpus, and was discharged. The General

1 [ Butler v. Ash worth ( 1895), 110 Cal.
614, 43 Pac. 386; Hollingsworth v. Howard {1901), 113 Ga. 1099, 3() S. E. 465;
Ashcraft ,._Knoblock ( 1896), 1-!G Incl. 169,
45 :N. E. 69. Sati. faction as to one joint

tort-feasor is a bar to au action as to the
ot hers: Dulaney v. Buffum ( 1903), 173
Mo. 1, 73 S . W . 125 .J
2 T hi s doct ri ne is 11 ot con fine d to cases
of tort; it app lies in all in stances where
there have been se pa rate sn its or r ecoveries a.gain st persons wh o a re jointly and
everally li able on the sa me obligat ion ;
sn.tisfact iou of one i at isfaction of all ,
exce pt as to cos ts ; and if so me of the
actions are pendi ng, pa.y ment of one may
be pleaded in bar of such pending uits.
F irst Nat. Bk. of In dianapolis v. I ndianapolis Piano Man . Co., 45 Intl . 5. See
also Lord v. Tiffany, 98 N. Y. 412 . In a u
act ion for as ·ault a nd battery committed
by the defendant and one P. G. , the answer set u p that plaintiff had recovered
judgment against P . G. for the same to rt,
a.n(l issued execution thereon, which had
been levied on the property of P. G.
fleld, a good defence. The injured party
may ue each or auy of se\·eral joint trespassers separately, and pro. ecnte each
action to fi nal judgment, but must then
elect against which one he will haYe exe-

cutiou. A fiual judgment and execution
or an order for execution, against one is
a discharge of all the others. Fleming
v. McDonald, 50 Ind. 278. The Eugli h
ru le is that final judgment alone without
any executiou is a discharge of all the
others. Brinsmead v. Harrison, L. R 7
C. P. 547 .
3 K oen ig v. Steckel, 58
. Y. 475.
4 K as on v. The People, 44 Barb. 34 i .
T he plaintiff had obtained a judgment
against G. an d one against R. in a separate acti on again t each for a joint trespass. G. was taken on body execution,
and, while in custody, was voluntarily et
at liberty by t he judgment creditor. The
plaiutiff afterwards took the other d fondant, R. , on a body execution in his
action . R. applied to a judge by habeas
corpus, and was di charged. The General
Term, on appeal, held this di . charge regular, and laid clown the doctrine. tated in
the text.
ee al o l\1cHeady v. Rogors,
I Neb. 124; Turner t'. Hitchcock, 20
Iowa, .310. The latter C<l e was very extraordinary. The action was for a trespass, and was again ·t ix women au<l.
their h usbau<ls ; and one John on wa · a,
defendant. The petition allegerl that a
party of women, of whom the £ male rlefendauts were a portion, made a raid upon
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^216. * 315. VII. Statutory Actions in the Settlement of Dece-

dents' Estates. In many, if not all States, actions are autliorized

by statute, in the matter of settling the estates of deceased per-

sons, which were unknown at the common law, as, for example,

an action by a legatee to recover his legacy. It is not within my

purpose to inquire when such actions may be brought, but simply

to ascertain what special rules, if any, have been laid doAvn in

reference to the proper parties therein.^ A statute of New York

requires the heirs of an intestate who have inherited lands under

certain specified circumstances, to be sued jointly and not sepa-

rately for a debt due from the deceased, the land in their hands

being regarded as a fund upon which the debt is chargeable and

out of which it is to be paid. It has been held that this statute

does not make the heirs jointly liable as joint debtors, but that it

merel}' prescribes a mode of enforcing the demand out of assets

which have descended to them.^ In an action by a residuary

legatee against the executor to recover the amount claimed to

have been given by the will, all persons interested in the residue
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the plaintiffs saloon, destroying property

therein. The defendants, except Johnson,

answered, among other defences, that

since the action was l)rought tlie plaintiff

Jiad released tiie defendant Johnson ;. also

that one Almira C. was one of the joint

trespassers ; and, hefore the action was

brought, the plaintiff and she had inter-

1 -. VII . Statutory Actions in the Settlement of Decedents' Estates.
In man;, if n t all tate , acti ns are authorized
h - ' ta u
111
h matt r of ettling tl e tat
f decea ed pern wl i h w r unknown a th
ommon law, a for xampl ,
n a ti n by a l gat e to r ov r hi 1 gac . It i not within my
l urp
t inquir wh n u h a ti n may b br ubht, but imply
rtain what p cial rul , if any, have b n laid down in
t th r
rparti therein. 1 A tatuteof
wYork
r
f an int tate who have inh rited land under
ifi
ircumstanc s, to be ued j intly and not sepad bt du from the dee a d, the land in their hand
b ing r g r d a a fund upon whi h the debt i cbargea le and
out of whi h it i to be paid. It ha been held that thi statute
d e n t make the heirs jointly liable as Joint debtors, but that it
ruerel ' r crib a mode of enforcing the demand out of a et
, hi ch have de c nded to them . 2 In an action by a residuar;
1 ga.t again t the executor to recover the amount claimed t
ha e b n given by the will, all per ons interested in the residue
216.

' ,

married, and were then husband and wife.

On the trial, it was proved that plaintiff

had released Johnson, but that she had

divided; but they were agreed upon 1111
the other propo itions of Judge Dillon'11
op inion. The case, as a whole, is v ry
instructive, and ontains a full di cu ion
of the doctrine concerning joint tort",
and a review of all the leading authorities.
ee also Mit hell v. All u, 25 Hun,
543 (a discharge by the plaintiff of oue
f the person jointly liable release all
the other )1 [In a proceeding to e tabli h a lo t
will, the legat , devi ee and heir at
law are all nece ary partie : In re Val 11 tine' \Viii (1 96), 93 Wi . 45, 67 N. \ .
12. In a onte t of a will it i not nece a ry to bring in all per on
t he tate if all the devi ee
br ug ht in : Ki hman v.
166 Mo. 21-J., 65 . W . 1031.

he plaintiff
herein. Th

taken no part in the tres])asses, and was

not liable tiierefor. The other defence

»vas proved exactly as alleged. Upon

these facts, the court held that the re-

lease of Johnson did not discharge the

other defendants, because she was not

in fact a joint trespa.sser. On the second

defence, Dillon J., after stating tlie coin-

inou-law rules concerning joint tresp;isscrs,

reached the follow! nir conclusions : That

the code had not changed these former

rules ; that separate actions may be

<)njught, separate verdicts given, and

judgments rendered, liut only one satis-

faction, that the release of one joint

wrong-doer discharges all ; and, finally,

that the marriuge of one with the plain-

tiff operated as a release and discliarge.

On this laHt point the court were equally

divided ; but they were agreed upon all

the other propositions of Judge Dillon's

opinion. The case, as a whole, is very

instructive, and contains a full discussion

of the doctrines concerning joint torts,

and a review of all the leading authori-

ties. See also Mitchell r. Allen, 25 Hun,

543 (a discharge by the plaintiff of one

plninli a rg .

of the persons jointly liable releases all

the others).

1 |[In a proceeding to establish a lost

will, the legatees, devisees and heirs at

law are all necessary parties : In re Valen-

tine's Will (1896), 93 Wis. 45, 67 N. W.

12. In a contest of a will it is not neces-

sary to bring in all persons interested in

the estate, if all the devisees are properly

brought in: Kischman ('. Scott (1901),

166 Mo. 214, 65 S. W. 1031. In a suit to

set aside a will, a judgment will be re-

qu Uy

7.
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must be joined as co-defendants with the executor, and if a

legacy is charged upon lands, the devisees must also be made

parties.^ When a creditor seeks to recover his demand against

the estate, his suit should be prosecuted against the executor or

administrator alone; the widow, heirs, legatees, next of kin, and

creditors, are neither necessary nor proper parties defendant.

This was the universal rule under the former system; and al-

though the code has enacted the equitable doctrines concerning

parties, and has made no exception in their application to differ-

ent actions, it has not changed the procedure in this particular.

The administrator or executor represents the estate; is a trustee

for all the parties who are interested in its distribution ; and his

defence is their defence. He is bound to interpose all necessary

and available answers to demands made upon the estate, and the

law presumes that he will faithfully perform this duty. The

general language of the codes certainly does not require a greater

latitude in the admission of parties defendant who are interested

in the event of the suit than was demanded by the practice of

the equity courts. It has not therefore been so construed as to
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make the widow, heirs, legatees, and others necessary or proper

defendants, although they may seem to be interested in the result

of the controversy. 2 The same is true even when the testator

has bequeathed all his property, real and personal, to a single

legatee; the creditor must pursue his claim against the executor,

and not against the legatee.^ Although, in general, an action to

recover a debt or demand due to the estate must be brought by

the administrator or executor alone, yet in some exceptional

1 Tonnelle v. Hall, 3 Abb. Pr. 205. tee would be a proper, but is not an

Such an action, although it may be au- essential, party."]

thorized by statute, is in all its features ^ kelson v. Hart, 8 Ind. 293, 295. See

equitable ; and the equity rules as to also Stanford v. Stanford, 42 Ind. 485, 488,

parties must control it. See Towner v. 489. In an action against the sureties on

Tooley, 38 Barb. 598, as to the neces.sary an administrator's bond, he himself being

defendants in an action upon an adminis- dead, his administrator is not a necessary

tration bond by lef;atees whose legacies are defendant, and the next of kin of tlie '

charged upon the lands of the deceased, original decedent are not proper defeud-

nilarrell v. Warren (1898), 105 Ga. 476, ants. Flack v. Dawson, 69 N. C. 42. If

•30 S. E. 426, tlie court said : " When a one of two executors dies, and an action

legatee under a will cites au administra- is brought against his personal represent-

tor de bonis non cum testxinicnio unnexo to a ative to recover a demand against the

must be join d as co-defendants wi th the exe u tor, and if a
1 gacy is charged upon lands, the devisees mu t also be ma<le
parties. 1 vVhen a creditor seeks to recover hi demand against
the estate, his suit should be prosecuted again t the ex ecutor r
administrator alone; the widow, heirs, legatees, next of kin, and
creditors, are neither necessary nor proper parties defendant.
This was the universal rule under the former system; and although the code has enacted the equitable doctrines concerning
parties, and has made no exception in their application to different actions, it has not changed the procedure in this particular.
The administrator or executor represents the estate ; is a trustee
for all the parties who are intere ted in its distribution; and his
defence i:::i their defence. · He is bound to interpose all necessary
and available answers to demands made upon the estate, and the
law presumes that he will faithfully perform this duty. The
general language of the codes certainly does not require a greater
latitude in the admission of parti es defendant who are interested
in the event of the suit than was demanded by the practice of
the equity courts. It has not th erefore been so construed as to
make the widow, heirs, legatees, and others necessary or proper
defendants, although they may seem to be interested in the result
of the controversy. 2 The same is true even when the testator
has bequeathed all his property, real and personal, to a single
legatee; the creditor must pursue his claim against the executor,
and not against the legatee. 3 Although, in general, an action to
recover a debt or demand due to the estate must be brought by
the administrator or executor alone, yet in some exceptional

settlement, the defendant is not, as a mat- original estate, the surviving executor

ter of right, entitled to have another, who must be made a co-defendant. McDowell

is the sole remaining legal ee, made a c. Clark, 68 N. C 118, 120.

party to the proceeding. Such other lega- ^ Perry v. Seitz, 2 Duv. (Ky.) 122.

l Tonnelle v. Hall, 3 Abh. Pr. 205.
Such an action, although it may be authorized by statute, is in all its features
equitable ; and the equity rules as to
parties must control it. See Town er v .
Tooley, 38 Barb. 598, as to the necessary
dcfe udants in an a ·tion upon an administrati on Loud by legatee wh ose legacies are
charged upon th e la nds of th e deceased.
[Harrell v. Warre11 (1 898), 105 Ga . ..J.76,
30 S. E. 42 6, the co urt sa iu : " vVhen a
legat ee und er a will ·ites a u administ rator de bonis non cu m lesta mrnlo a nnexo to a
settle ment, th e defendant ii' not, as a matter of right, enti tled to have anot her , wh o
is the sole rernainiu g legatee, m:1.de a
party to th e pr oceedin g . S uch other le;;a-

tee would be a proper, but is n ot an
essential, party."]
2 Nelson v. Hart, 8 Ind . 293, 295.
See
al o Stanford v. Stanford, 42 Ind. 485, 488,
489. In n.n action against th e sureties on
a n administrator 's boud , he him self bei11 g
dead, his administrator is not a necessar y
clef od ant, and the next of kin of tit~
or ig i11 al decedent are 11ot proper defe uclauts. Flack v . Dawson, 69 N. C. 42. Jf
one of two executors dies a nd an actio11
i · bro ug ht again t his perso ual represeuta ti\·e to recover a de rn a ncl against t he
orig i na.l e. tate, the survi \'i ug ex ec utor
mu st be made a co-defendant. Mc Dowell
c . Clar k, 68 . C'. 11 8, 120.
3 Pe rry v. Seitz, 2 D uv. (Ky. ) 122.
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instancps sncli suit may be instituted and prosecuted by a legatee

or distributee, when the administrator or executor is incapaci-

tated from suing. ^

^ 217. * 310. VIII. Some Special Actions. In New York, an

action against a county sliould be brought against "The Board

of Supervisoi-s " of the specified count)', and not against the

f^upervisors individually or by name.^ A suit may be maintained

between two firms having a common partner, he being made a

defendant, and suitable averments being inserted in the com-

jjlaint or petition. ^ Where a particular religious society or

individual church is incorporated, an action to recover a debt or

damages for the breach of a contract due from it must be brought

against this corporation, and not against the bisliop or priest,

whatever may be the ecclesiastical powers and authority of such

clerical officers.* In certain States the assignor of a non-nego-

tiable thing in action, or where the a.ssignment is not expressly

authorized by statute, is a necessary defendant in an action

brought by the assignee.^
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1 See Fisher v. Ilubbell, 1 N. Y. Sup.

Ct. 97; s. 0. 65 Barb. 74; 7 Lans. 481;

Lancaster v. Gould, 46 Ind. 397 ; Shove v.

Shove, 69 Wis. 425. QBut see Sheppard

f. Green (1896), 48 S. 0. 165, 26 S. E.

224, where it was held that the persoual

representatives of the deceased, the volun-

tary grantees and persons holding liens

in" a 1c " . nC'lt uit ma:v b in titut land Ir ecute l by a 1 gatee
r di tribut
when th administra or or executor i · incar acitated from 'uing. 1
.' 217.
': lG . VIII. Some Special Actions.
In ew York, an
a ti on again -t a coun
houl l be brou ·ht against 'The
ard
.1f Sup r i 'or " f he I cified county, and n o again t the
~.. 1pervi or individually r by nam . 2 A nit may be m intainecl
l 1et\ ·een two firm"· haYin.; a common partn r, he being made a
Llefendant and . uitable averm n ' being inserted in the com plaint or p ti ion. 3 \Vhere a particular religiou
ociety or
i icliYidnal church i incorporat cl, an action to recoYer a debt or
damages f r the breach of , contract due from it mu t be brought
< ain t thi
corr oration, and not against the bis.hop or prie t,
what ver ma · be the eccle ia tical power and authority of such
·leri al offi er . 4 Inc rtain States the as ignor of a non-n ·otiable bin 0 in action OT where the assignment i not expres 1 '
authorized by tatute, is a necessary defendant in an a tion
Lrought by the a signee. 5

executed by them are all necessary par-

ties in au action to establish creditors'

claims on the a.ssets of a decedent's estate,

aud to set aside certain conveyances as

fraudulent ]]

2 Hill V. Livingston Cy. Sup., 12 N. Y.

52. See al.so Sims v. McClure, 52 Ind. 267

(against common-school trustees) ; Ilawley

I'. Fayetteville, 82 N. 0. 22 (against towns);

Hamilton v. Fond du Lac, 40 Wis. 47

(against municipal corporations for inten-

tional trespa.sses) ; Wliite '■. Miller, 7 Hun,

427 (again.st the "Shakers") ; La France

V. Krayer, 42 Iowa, 14.3 (in actions under

the "civil damage act").

' Cole I'. IJeynolds, 18 N. Y. 74; En-

gliM t\ Furni.-is, 4 E. I). Smith, 587. See

al.xo Ford v. Ind. Dist. of Stuart, 46 Iowa,

294; Crosby i-. 'i'imolat (Minn. 1892),

52 N. W. 526. The balance of account

between the two firms may be struck, and

asHigned to a third jierson to sue upon

the same ; Beacannon v. Liebe, 1 1 Ore.

44.3. As to actions between two of sev-

eral partners without joining the others,

see Wells v. Simmonds, 8 Hun, 189, 209;

A'eudecker c. Kohlberg, 81 N. Y. 296.

■* Charboneau v. Henni, 24 Wis. 250.

A peculiar case. The action was against

a Roman Catholic bishop, to recover the

cost of building a church edifice belong-

ing to a religious society.

5 Harvey v. Wilson, 44 Ind. 231, 234;

Allen V. Jerauld, 31 Ind. 372; Indiana

& Illinois Cent. R. Co. v. McKernan, 24

Ind. 62; Iloldridge v. Sweet, 23 Ind. 118;

French r. Turner, 15 Ind. 59; Gowcr v.

Howe, 20 Ind. 396 ; Breeding v. Tobin

(Ky. 1892), 18 S. W. 773; Hood v. Cal.

Wine Co., 4 Wash. 88 : St. Louis, I. M.

& S. Ry. r. Camden Bk., 47 Ark. 541 ;

Sykes v. First Nat. Bk. of Canton (S Dak.

Fi her v. IInbbell, 1 N'. Y. Sup.
. c. 65 l3arb . 74; i Lan . 4 1;
J,auca te r v. ould, 46 Ind. 397; ' hove 1:.
ho,·e, 69 ''ri . 425. [But ee heppard
r. Green (1 96), 4 S. C. 165, 26 . E.
224-, where it wa held that the personal
rPpre· ·utative of the dee a. ed, the voluntary grantee and per on holding li en
execu ted uy the m are all nece ary partie· in an action to establi h creditor '
claim on the asset of a decedent'· tate,
and to . ct
ide certain onveyance a
frauilulc11t.J
2 Hill v. Liviug ton Cy. , up., 12 N. Y.
52 . ee al: , irn: 1•. McClure, 52 Ind. 267
(agaiu t co111mo11- chool I'll te ) ; Hawley
1· Faye tcville, 82 ~.
. 22 (again t town:);
II. milt1Jn v. •ond clu La<', 40 Wi . 47
(aoraiu ·t 111u11icipal orporations for int nt ioual re pru :e:); White'" ;\lillcr, i Hun,
-127 (again:t the". ' hak r. "); La. France
1•. Krayer, 4 2 fowa, l .J-3 ( i 11 actions un der
the'· d\·il d:una!{P :tl't '').
ll Col<• •·. l:<'y11•1ld ·• I
~ '. Y. i-l; En~li t• Furni ·.-, .+ E I> .. 'lllith, :, i.
, <'e
:ll '' h1rd 1. Intl l> i. t. of . tuart, 46 Jo",,,
2 ll;
r<> liy 1• Timolat (~Ii1111 . I !J2),
:>2 •. \\'. :-126. The haJ,uwe of at"·1m11t
h·tw "II th· twri fir111 11a.· hP ·'ruck, and
ii ig11 cl to a third l' · r 011 t
ue upon
i

• 'ee

t. 91;

ame; Beacannou v. Liebe, 11 Ore.
A to action between two of e,·_
eral partner without joiniu the other ,
ee Wdl- v. ... immoncl ·, Hun, l 9, 20 ·
N'euuecker i-. Kohlberg, l N. Y. 296.
4 Charboneau v. Henni, 24 Wi . 250.
A peculiar ca~ e. The action wa again t
a Roman Catholic bi hop, to recover the
co t of b11ildin a church edifice belonging to a religi ou ocietr.
s Harve.v t·. WiLon, 44 Ind. 2.'31, 234;
Allen v. J erauld, 3 1 Ind. 372; Indiana
& lllinoi C nt. R. ,..,o. v. 1 K rnan , 24
Ind. 62; Holdridge t'. weet, 23 Ind. 11 ;
Freuch v. Turn r, 15 Ind. 59;
w r v.
Howe, 20 Incl. 396; Br eding v. Tohin
(Ky . l 92), l , . W. i73; Hood ?:. al.
'Yine o., 4 W ai h .
t. Loui , I.".\[.
& . Ry. t'. amdeu Bk . 47
rk . 541;
,'yke t. Fir ·t 'at. BI-. of anto n ( Dak.
l 91), 49 .... W. 105 ; Kelle r L'. William ,
4 Iu<l. 504; lough v. Thoma , 53 In<l.
24; He d I'. Garr, 59 Ind. 299; R ed ,.,
Fi11t1J11, 63 Ind . 2 ; L ed_v v. ash, 67
In1l 311 ; Yortlon v. ar t r, 79 Ind . :3 G;
('l)tnpa r l ii y l'.. cha wack r, 50 Iud . sn2 ;
the

443.

\Vat:on 1•. 'onw ll (Incl. App ., l8.l2). :1 0
E. 5: B rwdnrant •. Blad en, l n T111!.
l l i ; , •I u L'. John. on, I ~ Incl. 3:2;
liuubell v. 'kile , 16 Iuu. 138; H opkin

i •.
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§ 218. * 317. Joinder in Case of Substituted Debtor. Ill tlie

case of a substitution of one party for another as a debtor, —

that is, when, a debt being due from one person, another for a

valuable consideration assumes such indebtedness and promises

to pay the same, — it has been decided in Indiana that the cred-

itor may maintain an action against the substituted debtor, Imt

must join with him the original debtor as a co-defendant, under

the general provision of the code requiring or permitting all

persons to be made defendants who are necessary parties to a

complete, determination and settlement of the questions involved. ^

In this decision the court has accepted to its full extent the

equitable theory of parties, and has applied it unreservedly to a

purely legal action ; for since the creditor had surrendered all

claim upon the original debtor, he could recover no judgment in

the action against such debtor, and the latter's presence could

only be necessary for his own protection and that of the other

defendant. It is probable that this ruling would not be followed

by those courts which have partially or wholly confined the

operation of the statutory provisions in question to equitable
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actions. When the stockholders of a corporation are by statute

made personally responsible for an amount equal to the amount

of stock held by them, the liability is not joint, and each must

be sued separately.^

SECOND. ACTIONS AGAINST HUSBAND AND WIFE OR EITHER OF

THEM: PARTIES DEFENDANT AS AFFECTED BY THE MARRIAGE

RELATION.

§ 219. * 318. General Extent of Statutory Modification of Com-

mon-Law Rules. No Change in Suits against Wife for her Torts,

Frauds, and other Wrongful Acts. Tlie provisions of the Codes,

and of other statutes, in relation to actions in which married

women are parties, were quoted in full in the last preceding-

section, and need not be repeated here.^ There is a marked

r. Org.-in, 15 lud. 188; Perry v. Seitz, 2 v. PLanly, 76 Ind. 272; McGill v. Gunn,

Duv. (Ky.) 122; Lytle v. Lytle, 2 Mete. 43 lud. 315.

(Ky.) 127; Gill v. Johnson's Adni., 1 2 Perry ?■. Turner, 55 Mo. 418. But

Mete. (Ky.) 649. See Shane v. Lowry, see ante, %* 299, note; /ws^ § *417.

48 Ind. 205, 206 ; Strong v. Downing, 34 ^ gg© supra, § 152, where the statutory

Ind 300 ; Durham !'. Bischof, 47 lud. 21 1 ; provisions embracing the cases of ])lain-

S. P. Hardy v. Blazer, 29 Ind. 226. tiffs and of defendants will be found iu

1 Hardy i\ Blazer, 29 Ind. 226 ; Davis full.

1
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difference in the extent of the alterations made in the former law

by the legislation of the various Stiites. The changes in New

York are complete and radical, the wife being in almost eveiy

respect assimilated to the unmarried woman. The example of

New York is followed by many States. In many otliers, how-

ever, the modifications do not go to any such extent, and are

confined to the cases in which married women are sued or sue in

respect of their separate property, and those in wliich the action

is directly between the husband and wife, leaving all others to

be controlled by the prior law. We saw in the preceding section

that in this group of States where a right of action exists on

account of a tort committed to the person of a married woman,

the common-law rules are unchanged, and the action must be

either in the name of the husband alone, or of the husband and

wife jointly; while in New York, and in the States which have

copied its legislation, the wife is permitted to sue in her own

name in respect of any cause of action accruing to herself.

There is even less modification of the ancient doctrines which

regulate the form of suits against the wife for her torts, frauds,
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and other wrongful acts.^

§ 220. * 319. Result. The result is that, in actions whicli

concern her separate property, the wife may or must be sued

alone. In those States which permit her to enter into contracts

having reference to her separate property, or connected with a

business or trade which she may carry on, suits upon such con-

tracts may or must be brought against her individually ; ^ while

1 Qln Taylor v. PuUeu (1899), 152 Mo. 2 Qln HoUister v. Bell (1900), 107 Wis.

434, 53 S. W. 1086, the court said: 198, 83 N. W. 297, the court said: "A

" While it is true tliat one of the sup- married woman ha.s not capacity to bind

posed rea.sons for the rule which required herself at law by contract, except as regards

a husband to be joined with his wife in an her separate property or business. It fol-

action for her torts has ceased because he lows, as has often been decided by this

no longer acc^uires her property by virtue court, that a married woman's note, given

of the marriage in tiiis state, all lawyers solely for the purpose of securing or pa\--

must admit that so far no writer or court iug the debt of a third person, is void at

has as yet furnished satisfactorily all the law and not enforceable in equity against

reasons which may have influenced the her separate property in the absence of

adoption of the rule at common law, and some ecjuitable considerations rendering

until they are produced, certainly the such enforcement under the circumstances

courts cannot declare that all tlie ren.sons just." The signing of a promissory note

have ceaseil and thus abolish the rule by by a married woman raises no presump-

judicial decision." See also Nichols v. tion that slie intended to charge her sepa-

Nicluds (1898), 147 Mo. 407, 48 S. W. rate estate: State Nat. Bank v. Smith

947.2 (1898), 53 Neb. 54, 75 N. W. 51. See al.-<o

h

f th al

w
111

w
ry
of

' oman.
In man
r , h wman
any u h xt nt, a11d ar
l women c r '" u d r su in
r ,
r p rt , and th e in which th a ti n
i
and wife, le ving all tber to
n
W aw in th r ding s
tat . where a right of a ti n xist n
grou
woman
a count of a tort c mmi t d to the per on of a marri
h
mm n-law rule are unchanged, and the acti n mu ·t be
ither in th name f th bu band alon ' or of the bu ban
nd
wif j intl · whil in ew York, and in the tate whi h have
d it 1 gi lati n the wife i permitted t
ue in her wn
ect f any cause of action accruing to her 1f.
nam in r
r b re i
n 1
modi:fi ation of the ancient doctrin
wbi h
r ulate tb form f uit against the wife for her tort , frau
and o her wr ngful acts .1
220. * 1 . Result.
The re ult i that, in action which
n rn h r para e property, the wife may or mu t be ued
1 ne. In tho e tate whi h p rmit her to enter into contract&
h vin r ferenc to her parate property, or connected with a
r tra which h may carry on, uits upon u b conmay r mu t be brought against her individually; 2 while
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actions to recover damages for personal torts committed Lv her

must be instituted against her and her husband jointly, or, in

certain exceptional cases, solely against the husband. These

propositions, which are the general summing up of the statutory

2)rovisions, and of the judicial interpretation thereof, I shall now

illustrate by particular instances which will embrace all the

important questions that arise.

§ 221. * 320. The Settled Rule. Tort Committed in Presence or

by Compulsion of Husband. It is the settled rule in the States

which have adopted the second form of statute,^ that, in actions

to recover damages for all torts whether with or without vio-

lence, negligences, frauds, deceits, and other such wrongs done

by the wife personally, and not done merely by, or by the use of,

her separate property, the common-law principle is unaltered,

and the husband and wife must be joined as co-defendants.^

The principle thus stated assumes that the wife acted voluntarily.

If, however, the tort is committed by the wife in the presence

and under the compulsion or direction of lier husband, he alone

is liable, and should be sued without making her a co-defendant.
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In applying the latter rule, it is settled that if the tort is done by

the wife in the presence of her husband, 3, prima facie j^resumption

is raised that it was done by his direction and under his compul-

sion. This presumption may be overcome, and if it be shown

that she acted voluntarily, although in his presence, she must be

Gallagher I'. Mjelde (1898), 98 Wis. 509, the wife; Turner v. Hitchcock, 20 Iowa,

74 N. W. 340, holding that a married 310, trespass on plaintiffs premises and

woman without property and not in busi- destroying personal property thereon ;

ness cannot make a binding contract to Musselman v. Galligher, 32 Iowa, 383 ;

repay money loaned to enable herself and McEIfresh v. Kirkendall, 36 Iowa, 224 ;

husband to go into business ] Luse v. Oaks, 36 Iowa, 562, slander by the

^ [^That form which requires a joinder wife ; Curd v. Dodds, 6 Bush, 66l, action

except in actions concerning tlie wife's for fraud of wife in selling certain property

separate property and in actions between of hers. Held, that she was not liable for

husband and wife. See § 152, «rt/e.] a fraud in entering into a contract, the

^ QHenley v. Wilson (1902), 137 Cal. law of Kentucky not permitting her to

mmitterl by her
action to recover damaa for p r onal torts
must b in tituted again t h r and her hu band j intly, or, in
certain exceptional ca , solely again t th hu. band. The e
propo itions, which are the g neral umming up of th tatutory
provisions, and of the judi ial interpretation th r f, I hall now
illustrate py particular in tances which will embrace all the
important questions that ari e.
§ 221. * 320. The Settled Rule. Tort Committed in Presence or
by Compulsion of Husband. It is the settled rule in the States
which have adopted the second form of statute, 1 that, in actions
to recover damages for all torts whether with or without violence, negligences, frauds, deceits, and other such wrongs done
by the wife personally, and not done merely by, or by the use of,
her separate property, the common-law principle i unaltered,
and the husband and wife must be joined as co-defendants. 2
The principle thus stated as um es that the wife ac ted voluntarily.
If, however, the tort is committed by the wife in the presence
and under the compulsion or direction of her husband, he alone
is liable, and should be sued without making her a co-defendant.
In applying the latter rule, it is settled that if the tort is done by
the wife in the presence of her husband, a prirnafacie presumption
is raised that it was done by his direction and under his compulsion. This presumption may be overcome, and if it be shown
that she acted voluntarily, although in his presence, she must be

273,70 Pac. 21, citing the text ;] Andei- make a binding contract; the doctrine of

son (.'. Hill, 53 Barb. 238, assault and battery the text is fully recognized in the opin-

by the wife; Peak v. Lemon, 1 Lans. 295, ion. Coolidge v. Parris, 8 Ohio St. 594,

conversion ; Tait v. Culbertson, 57 Barb. as,sault and battery by the wife. In

9, lil)el by the wife; Rowing v. Manly, Rowing v. Manly, 49 N. Y., Rapiillo J.

57 Barb. 479, 483 ; s. C. 49 N. Y. 192, 198, discusses the subject [^of the joinder of

fraud and forgery by the wife; Brazil v. the husband and wife under the coinmon-

Moran, 8 Minn 236, assault and battery law rule, as it existed in New Y'ork prior

by tlie wife ; Ball r. Bennett, 21 Ind. 427, to the recent legislation. The opinion is

action for setting fire to ])laintiff's mill b}^ a learned and exhaustive one.] See also

Gallagher v. Mjelde (1898), 98 Wis. 509,
74 N. W. 340, holding that a married
woman without property and not in busi·
n ess cannot make a bindiug contratt to
r epay mon ey loaned to enable herself and
husband to go into busines J
1 [Th at for m whi ch requires a joinder
except in actions concern in g th e wife's
separate property and in act ions between
husband and wife . See§ 152 , ante. ]
2 [H enl ey v. Wilson (1902), 13 7 Cal.
273, 70 Pac. 21, citing th~ text;] A n<leron v. Hill, 53 Baro. 238, aR ault a nrl bat re ry
liy t he wife; Peak v. L emon, 1 Lam;. :295,
·onversion · Tait u. CullJe rLo n, 57 Barb.
9, li bel by the wife; K ow iug v. Nla11l.1·,
57 Barb. 479, 483; . c. 49 ..L • Y. 192, 19 ,
fraud and forgery by the wife; Brazil v.
Moran, 8 Minn 236, as~au lt and battery
by the wife; Ball v. Bennett, 2 1 In d. 427,
action for setting fire to plai nt iff' mill hy

t he wife; Turner v. Hitchcock, 20 Iowa,
3 10, trespass on plaintifrs premi es and
destroying personal property thereon ;
Mus,;elm an v. Galligher, 32 Iowa, 383;
McElfresh v. Kirkendall, 36 Iowa, 224 ;
Luse v. Oaks, 36 Iowa, 562, slander by the
wife; Curd v. Dodds, G Bush, 68 1, action
fo r fraud of wife in selling certain property
of hers. H eld, that she was not li able fo r
a fraud in enterin g into a contract, th e
Jaw of 1\entucky not permitting her to
make a binding contract; the doctrine of
the text is fully rec gnized in the opinion. Coolidge v. Parri , 8 Ohio St. 594 ,
a,-sault and battery hy the wife. I n
Kowing r . Manly, 49 N. Y., Hapnllo J.
di -cu se. th e subject [of the joind er f
th e hu. hand and wife under the co mm o11law rule, as it ex isted in New York pri or
to the recent legislatin n. Th e opinion is
a learned and ex haustive one. ] Sec al o
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made a defendant. These common-hnv rules liave not been in

any respect changed by the codes. ^

J§ 222. * 321. 'Where Tort is committed by "Wife in the Use or

by Means of her Separate Property. If, however, the tort is not

committed by the wife personally, but is done by means of her

separate property, or in the use thereof, or under color or claim

of ownership of her separate property, the action should be

brought against her individually, without joining the husband as

co-defendant, in all those States whose statutes permit a married

Avoman to be sued alone in respect of all matters which concern

her se^mrate estate.^ In other woi'ds, actions whicli concern or

liave relation to her separate property are not contined to those

upon contract or those involving the ownership of the property,

but extend to suits based upon torts and wrongs done by means

or in the use of or claim to the propert}'.

Clark 1-. Boyer, 32 Ohio St. 299 ; Suuman

V. Brewin, 52 Ind. 140 (if the husiiaud

dies afier verdict, the wife is liable to
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have judgment entered against lierself

aloue). Fitzgerald i'. Quann, 109 N. Y.

441 ; 33 Hun, Go2 (slander by wife) ;

Austin f. Bacon, 49 Huu, 386 (same);

Quilty r. Battie, 61 Hun, 164 (harboring

a vicious dog); Wirt i-. Dinan, 44 Mo.

App. 583 (for deceit of wife). [|But see,

also, Thomas r. Cooksey (1002), 130 N. C.

148, 41 S. E. 2, where a suit for po.<sessiou

of personal property was held properly

brought against the wife alone. Tiie court

said that if tlie fact tiuit she had ahu.shand

living would protect her, "all tliat a mar-

ried woman would liave to do would be to

get ])0!<session of some one else's property,

and tiie owner would be witliout remedy

and helpless. Heath i'. Morgan, 117 N. C.

504." Also, Pender v. Mallett (1898), 123

N. C. 57, 31 S. E. 331, where suit was

brougiit by a receiver again.st a wife to

wliom her husband liad conveyed pro])erty

i;i fraud of creditor.s, the husband being

joined as a defendant ]

' Brazil v. Moran, 8 Minn. 236 ; Ball c.

Bennett, 21 Ind. 427 ; Curd v. Dodd.s G

Busli, 081, 685; Cassiu r. Delaney, 38

N. Y. 178, per Hunt C. .J. : " An offence

by lii.-j direction, but not in liis presence,

does not exeinj»t her from lialnlity ; nor

«bjes liic presence, if unaccomjianied by liis

direction. Tlie presence furnishes evidence

and affords a {jresumption of liis direction.

but it is not conclusive, and the truth may

be established by comjjetent evidence."

Flanagan v. Tiuen, 53 Barb. 587. The

rule is settled in Missouri, that if husband

and wife both unite in committing a tort,

as, for examide, an assault and battery, a

joint action against them will not lie, but

the husband alone must be sued. Dailey

V. Ilou.ston, 58 Mo. 361, 366, 367 ; Meegan

V. Gunsollis, 19 Mo. 417; see, however.

Flesh V. Lindsay (Mo Sup. 1893), 21 S. W.

907. But in an action against husband

and wife for tltcir joint fraud, it was held

in New York that she would not be liable

unless she actively participated in the

wrong. Vanneman v. Powers, 56 N. Y.

39, 41.

2 Peak V. Lemon, 1 Lans. 295; Eagle

nw.l1 a lef ndant. The"
ommon -law rul haYe no b en m
any r pect changed b' b
cl
222. * . 21. Where Tort is committed by Wife in the Use or
by M eans of her Separate Property.
If how " r th t rt i 11 t
· mmi t l 1: th " ·if p l " nall · but i don b
f h r
~cparat pr p rty or ir th us
her f
of \Yll r hip f h1:. r er ara.t pr p rt r
brou ht a ain t 1 r in ljvidua.lly with ut joining th bu b< nd a,
co -defend; 11 in all tho e tate \d10 ·e atute p rmit a marri 1
woman
be ued al ne in r pec t of all matt r which
n rn
2
her epar, t e tate . In oth r "' rds action which concern r
have rel ti n t her epa rat" pr 1 erty are n t confined t th e
up n contract or ho ' involvin the wner hir of the propert ·
but xtend o uit ba. 'eel upon tort. an<l wrongs done b mean
or in he u of or claim to the J roperty.
Clark 1·. B oyer, 32 Ohio t. 29 ; • unman
l'. Brewin, 52 Ind. 1-!0 (if t he hus baud
die· after Yerdi ct, th wife is liabl e to
ha Ye judgment entere1l agaiu. t her ·elf
alone). Fitzgerald v. Quann, 109 N. Y.
4-!l ; 33 Hun, 652 ( lau der by wife);
Au tin u. Bacon, 49 llun, 3 6 ( ame} ;
Quilt_,. r. B attie, 61 Hun , 16.+ (harbori11g
a Yiciou. dog); Wirt v. Dinan, --l4 Mo.
App. 5 :3 (for deceit of wife). [But ee,
ah) , Thoma 1• . Cooksey (1902}, 130 X
.
l+ , 41 .·. E . :-..., where a uit for pos e iou
of peronal proper ty wa: held properly
bro a-ht again t the wife alone. Th e tourt
. aid that if th e fact that he had a hu. band
Ji,·i11g would protect her, "all tliat a married woman would ha,·e to do would he t
get pos e ·ion of ome one el. '· property,
aud the o wn er would be without r medy
:tnd helple . H ea th v. l\1organ, 11 i T. C.
504- " A I ·o, Pender v. :\-Iallett ( l 9 ) , 123
_ . C. 5i, 31 , . E. 351, wh re uit wa
liruu;;ht 11.v a r ecei 1· r aa-ainst a wif t
whom her h n.-bant! hail conv •yerl prop ·rty
11 frau l 1Jf cr•i\itor, the hu ·IJaud L iug
Joiued a a def u<laut J
I Braiil 1•. ~l•J ran,
:\Ii1111 . -36; Ball i·.
Br•111ic:tt, 21 Ind. -l-2i; ('tml v. D01hl., 6
l~u Ii. G I, G 3;
'a:siu t'. ]) el:\l1e.1·, 3
- . Y. Ii , prr Jiunt '. ,J.: " u CJffClll'<'
b\' .i. din: .. tion, but 110 in hi pr· en<' ,
•Iv" ll•>t PX<!lll( t her fr•Jlll lial1ility; nor
•I •1 hi pre. euc , if un:HT•11tq1a11ie•l hy hi.
dire ·ti<Jll. Th· pm. "'H"" fnrni,.h
,·idcnc
a11d afford ' pr :umptiun of hi: dir •ction,

but it i. not co n lu. i,·e, and the truth ma1•
he e ·tab\ i hed by competent cvidenc _;,
Flanagau v. Tin en, 53 Barb. 5 7. Tl e
rul e i ettled in :i\li our i, that if hu baud
and wife both unite in ·ommitting a t rt,
a , for xampl , an a ault and batt ry, •
j int action agai1rt them will 110t lie, uut
the hu band al ne mu t be u d. Daile,·
v. Hou ·ton, 5 M . 361, 366, 67; M eO'a~
v. Gun lli , J 9 Mo. 417; ee, howe,· r,
Fle h !'. Lind ay (Mo . up. l 93), 21 , . W.
90 i. But in an acti n again t hu band
and wife for tltei r joint fraud, it wa It Id
iu New York that he would o t be li ab l
unle
he a tively participat d in the
wrong . Vannem a n v. Power., 56 T . Y.
39, 41.
2 Peak v . L em n, 1 Lan . 295; Eagle
v. wayze, 2 Dal.'' , 140 ; R owe v. ~mi t h ,
3 H ow. Pr. 3i,
. on app al, 45 N. Y.
230; Baum v. Iullen, 47
. Y. 5ii.
.Action aO'ain t a married woman alone o
f
r e ov r damag for fraud in the al
land whi h he owned, the hu band a ting
a h r agent in the ., 1 and maki 11g Lil
frau1lul 111. r pr :cutati n.. Th fact. that
h r hu:hand ll.C'tcrl a her aa- nt in t.h ~al
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§ 223. * 322. Under New York Statutes. Under the Statutes

of New York, a married .woman may be sued alone upon any

contract which she has made in a trade or business carried on by

herself, or in her name by her agent, and the complaint should

be in the ordinary form as though the action was brought against

an unmarried woman. ^ She must also be sued in the same

manner upon any contract made in relation to, or uj)on any lia-

bility growing out of her separate property. Finally, if she

enters into any contract and therein charges the paj'^ment thereof

upon her separate property, she is in like manner personally-

liable, and must be sued witliout making her husband a co-

defendant. The charge thus made does not create an equitable

lien upon any particular property, nor even a general lien to be

enforced by an equitable action. It simply creates a personal

liability upon herself, to be enforced in an ordinary legal action,

and by the recovery of any ordinary judgment for debt or dam-

ages. Such charge may even be verbal, and when made creates

a personal liability which may be enforced against anj^ property

which she may have at the time, or any which she may after-
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wards acquire. In all these cases it is not necessary to allege in

the complaint the special facts from which such liability arises ;

the complaint should be in the ordinary form, and all the special

facts relating to her coverture should be averred in the answer. ^

1 Hier i-. Staples, 51 N. Y. 136. She 116; Perkius (;. Perkins, 62 Barb. 531;

has not the full power to contract ; the Baken v. Harder, 6 N. Y. Sup. Ct. 440 ;

contract must either he made in some Weir r. Groat, 6 N. Y. Sup. Ct. 444 ;

trade or business which she carries on, or Blauke v. Bryant, 55 N. Y. 649; Loomis

be for her personal services, or have a v. Ruck, 56 N. Y. 462 ; Corn Exch. Ins.

connection with her separate property. Co. v. Babcock, 42 N. Y. 613; Yale v.

See the following cases: Manchester v. Dederer, 18 N. Y. 265, 22 N. Y. 450, which

Sahler, 47 Barb. 155; Smith v. Allen, 1 is superseded by subsequent decisions;

Lans. 101 ; Hart v. Young, 1 Lans. 417; Owen i'. Cawley, 36 N. Y. 600; Carpenter

Lennox v. Eldred, 1 N. Y. Sup. Ct. 140; v. O'Dougherty, 50 N. Y. 660; Garret.son

22. U nder New York Statutes.
ml r the . tatut ,
of ~ew York, a mn,rri cl .w man may be su d alon upon any
contract which h ha' mad in a trade or bu ·in s arried on by
herself, or in h r narne by her (I gent, an l the omplaint ·hould
be in the ordinary form a though the action wa' br ught again ·t
an unmarri d woman. 1
he mu t al. o b su cl in th same
mann r upon any contract made in relation to, or upon any liability growing out of her eparate property. Fine lly, j£ he
Bnter' into any contract and therein charges the payment th reof
upon her separate property, she is in like manner p 1"onaJly.
liable, and must be sued without making her husband a code£ nclant. The charge thus made does not create an equita1le
lien upon any particular property, nor even a generaJ lien to be
en for d by an equitable action. It simply creates a personal
liability upon herself, to be enforced in an ordinary legal actjon,
and by the recovery of any ordinary judgment for debt or damage . Such charge may even be verbal, and when made creates
a per ·onal liability which may be enforced against any property
which she may have at the time, or any which she may afterwards acquire . In all these cases it is not necessary to allege in
the complaint the special facts from which such liability arises;
the complaint should be in the ordinary form, and all the special
facts relating to her coverture should be averred in the answer. 2
223.

;:· ,

Shorter v. Nelson, 4 Lans. 114; Hallock v. Seaman, 54 N. Y. 652; Newell v. Rob-

V. De Munu, 2 N. Y. Sup. Ct. 350 ; Bodiue arts, 54 N. Y. 677 ; Fowler v. Seaman, 40

V. Killeen, 53 N. Y. 93 ; Adams v. Honness, N. Y. 592 ; Quassaic Nat. Bk. v. Waddell,

62 Barb. 326. 3 N. Y. Sup. Ct. 680 ; Miller v. Hunt, 3

2 These ])ropositions are the final results N. Y. Sup. Ct. 762 ; Kelty v. Long, 4 N. Y.

at which the New York courts have ar- Sup. Ct. 183; Bogert v. Gulick, 65 Barb,

rived through a long and progressive 322 ; Warner v. Warren, 46 N. Y. 228 :

series of decisions. Maxou v. Scott, 55 Manhattan Brass & M. Co. v. Thomp.son,

N. Y. 247 ; Hier v. Staples, 51 N. Y. 136 ; 58 N. Y. 80. — Contracts between tlie wife

Hinckley v. Smith, 51 N. Y. 21 ; Frecking and husband ; see also anie, § *240, and

V. Rolland, 53 N. Y. 422, 426 ; Smith v. notes. Slie may become his credit.ir, and

Dunning, 61 N. Y. 249 ; Fo.ster v. Conger, maintain an action to recover tlie debt:

61 Barb. 145, 147; Ainsley r. Mead,3Lans. Woodworth v. Sweet, 44 Barb. 268, 51

1 Hier v. Staples, 51
. Y. 136. She
ha not the full power to con tract ; the
contract mu t either be made in some
trade or bu iness which she carrie · on, or
be for her per onal sen- ices, or ham a
connection with her separate property.
See the follo wing cases: Manchester v.
Sahler, 47 Barb. 155; Smith r. Allen, 1
Lans. lOL; Hart v. Young, 1 Lans. 41 i;
Lennox v. E ldred, 1 N. Y. Sup. Ct. 140;
Shorter v. Ne! on, 4 Lan . 11 4; Hallock
v. De Munn, 2 . Y. Sup. Ct. 350; Bodi ne
v . Killeen, 53 X. Y. 93; Adams v. Honn es ,
62 Barb . 326.
2 These prnposition are the final re ults
at which the New York courts have arrived through a long and progressive
erie. of cleci ions. Maxon v . Scott, 55
X Y. 2H; Hier v. Staples, 51 N. Y. 136;
Hinckley v. Smith, 51 . Y. 21; Free king
v. Rolland, 53 N. Y. 422, 426; Smith v.
Dunning, 61 N. Y. 249 ; Foster v. Conger,
61Barb. 145, 147; Ainsley v. Mead, 3 Lans .

116; Perkius v. Perkins, 62 Barb. 5'31;
Baken v. Harder, 6 N. Y. Sup. Ct. 4+0;
Weir !..'. Groat, 6
. Y. Sup. Ct. 444;
Blanke v. Bryant, 55 N. Y. 6+9; Loomis
v. Ruck, 56 N. Y . 462; Corn Exch. Ins.
Co. v. Babcock, 42 N. Y. 613; Yale v.
Dederer, 18 N. Y. 265, 22 . Y. +50, which
is superseded by subsequent deci ·ions;
Owen v. Cawley, 36 N. Y. 600; Carpenter
i>. O'Dougherty, 50
. Y. 660 ; Ganetson
v. Seaman, 54 . Y. 652; Newell v. Robert , 54 N. Y. 677 ; Fowler v. Seaman, 40
. Y. 592; Qua saic Nat. Bk. u. Wadd ell,
3 N. Y. up . Ct. 6 0; l\Iiller v. Hunt, 3
N. Y. Sup. Ct. 762; Kelty v. Loug, 4 X. Y.
Sup. Ct. 18.3; Bogert v. Gulick , 65 Barb .
322; \Varner v. \Varren, 46 N. Y. 22 :
Manhattan Bra & M. Co.
Thompsou ,
5 I . Y. 80. - Contract between thl) wife
and hu band; . ee al o a11te, § * 2+0, and
notes.
he may b come his er dit r, a1Jd
maintain an action to recover the deut .
W oodworth v. Sweet, 44 Barb. 268, 51

v.
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Wife as Party in Actions
^ 224. * 325. Wife as Party in Actions concerning the Home-

f man
tat
hat th wif ha
hat he i alwa a pr
r an
r
l f n ant with her bu band in all
titl th r to, r the right to the po e ion thereof.
n her intere t will not
cut off unle
he is made
E en wh n the hu band him elf ring an action in
ale of the home t ad, or eeking in any other
right, the defendant , for their own security,
bould, require the wife to be brought in as a

stead. Under the stiitutes of many States respecting liomesteads,

it is the established rule that the wife has such a vested interest

in the homestead that she is always a proper, and generally a

necessar}', party defendant with her husband in all actions which

may affect the title thereto, or the right to the possession thereof.

At all events, her interest will not be cut off unless she is made

a party. Even when the husband himself brings an action in

order to enjoin a sale of the homestead, or seeking in any other

way to protect his right, the defendants, for their own security^

may, and perhaps should, require the wife to be brought in as a

co-plaintiff.^

§ 225. * 328. Defence by Wife when both are sued together.

The codes of several States contain a provision that, " if the hus-

band and wife be sued together, she may defend for her own

right, and if the husband neglect to defend, she may defend for

N. Y. 8 ; McCartney v. Welch, 44 Barb.

27 1 ; Savage v. O'Neil, 44 N. Y. 298 ; Jay-
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cox r. Caldwell, 51 N. Y. 395. If the hus-

bami ffires a note to his wife during the

marriage, no action can be maintained on

it by her against him or his representa-

tives after his death, simply because there

is no consideration : Whitaker i\ Whita-

ker, 52 X. Y. 368 ; but if there is a con-

sideration for the note, or if it is given by

him in contemplation of marriage, she can

enforce it by suit : Wright i\ Wright,

54 N. Y. 437 ;' Banfield i-. Rumsey, 4 N. Y.

Sup. Ct. 322. The following are the most

important among the recent N. Y. decis-

ions : William.son ;•. Dodge, 5 Hun, 479 ;

Covert V. Hughes, 8 id. 305 (a married

woman is liable for the price of goods

bought by her as agent of her husband

which were necessary for and were used

for the support of herself and her chil-

dren. Laws of 1860, ch. 90, § 1); Goss-

man v. Cruger, 7 id. 60; Hill v. Rosselle,

G id. 631 ; McVey v. Cantrell, 6 id. 528 ;

70 N. Y. 295; Conlin v. Cantrell, 64 N. Y.

217 (tiie liability of a married woman who

ha.s a separate estate, and iier intention to

charge such estate, may be inferred from

the circumstances of the contract; it is

not necessary that there should be a

t<jj<;ci(ic agreement to charge her separate

cHtate) ; Smith v. Dunning, Gl i<l. 249;

Cushman v. Henry, 75 id. 103; Tiemeyer

V. Turnginst, 85 id. 516 (very important

case ; she is liable on any contract of

purchase although she had no separate

property at the time she entered into the

contract) ; Woolsey v. Brown, 74 id. 82

(liable as a surety) ; Nash v. Mitchell, 71

id. 199. In California, under the Civil

Code, the liability of a married woman on

her contracts is substantially the same as

in New York and Iowa, except that her

husband must be joined as a co-defendant

in suits upon them. See Wood v. Orford,

52 Cal. 412; Varry v. Kelly, 52 id. 334;

Marlow v. Barlew, 53 id. 456 ; Tobin v.

Galvin, 49 id. 34.

QThe present New York statute reads

as follows : " A husband who acquires

property of his wife by ante-nuptial con-

tract or otherwise, is liable for her debts

* 32

. Defence by Wife when both are sued together.
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his right also. " The former clause of this section at least applies

only to equitable suits in which separate rights of the wife are

involved, as, for example, those relating to her separate property ;

it has no application to ordinary legal actions in which both are

sued jointly, and over which the husband has still, as under the

former practice, the entire control.^ It was a settled rule of the

equity procedure that, in an action against husband and wife,

not affecting her separate estate and seeking no relief against her

property, service of process upon the husband was a good and

sufficient service upon the wife, and he could appear on her

behalf, so that she would be bound by the decree made upon

such service and appearance. This rule, it is said in some cases,

still subsists under like circumstances. Of course, if the wife's

separate property is involved, or if any relief is demanded against

her directly, she must be personally served, and has a right to

appear independently of her husband. This right, although

expressly secured by statute in some States, exists independently

of any such statutory permission. ^

THIRD: EQUITABLE ACTIONS.
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§ 226. * 329. I. General Principles. Distinction between Neces-

sary and Proper Parties. In all equitable actions, a broad and

most important distinction must be made between two classes of

parties defendant; namely, (1) those who are " necessary, " and

{2) those who are "proper." Necessary parties, when the term

is accurately used, are those without whom no decree at all can

be effectively made determining the principal issues in the cause.

1 Coolidge V. Parris, 8 Ohio St. ,594; Franklin, 15 Ohio St. 485; s. c. 16 Ohio

his right al·
The former claus of thi
ction at ·least applies
only to equitable suits in which eparat rights of the wife ar
involved, a , for example, tho e relating to her separate property;
it ha:s no application to ordinary legal actions in which both are
ued jointly, and over which the husband has still, as under the
former practice, the entire control. 1 It was a settled rule of the
equity procedure that, in an action against husband and wife,
not affecting her separate estate and seeking no relief against her
property, service of process upon · the husband was a good and
sufficient service upon the wife, and he could appear on her
behalf, so that she would be bound by the decree made upon
such service and appearance. This rule, it is said in some cases,
still subsists under like circumstances. Of course, if the wife's
separate property is involved, or if any relief is demanded against
her directly, she must be personally served, and has a right to
appear independently of her husband. This right, although
expressly secured by statute in some States, exists independently
of any such statutory permission. 2

Wolf V. Banning, 3 Minn. 202. See also St. 193. This case was similar in all its

Holliday v. Brown, 33 Neb. 657 (rehearing features to Foote v. Lathrop, supra. Both

THIRD: EQUITABLE ACTIONS.

denied, March 16, 1892, 51 N. W. 839). were parties, but service was made on the

Such legal actions as those for torts done husband alone. Held, that the wife was

by the wife, or debts due by her dum uot concluded, and her dower right was

sola, and others, in which the law still not cut off. The cases are diametrically

requires both spouses to be made de- opposed to each otiier.

fendants, are not affected by the statutory ^As to Communit// Properti/ : The wife

provision. is a proper party defendant in an action

2 Foote V. Lathrop, 53 Barb. 183; La- against the husband on a note executed

throp V. Heacock, 4 Laus. 1. This was a by himself alone, in order to determine

foreclosure suit, the mortgage being upon whether the judgment can be executed a-s

lands of the husband, so that the wife's one for a community debt : Clark v. El-

§ 226.

* 329.

I. General Principles.

Distinction between Neces-

In all equitable actions, a broad and
most important distinction must be made between two classes of
parties defendant; namely, (1) those who are "necessary," and
(2) those who are "proper." Necessary parties, when the term
is accurately used, are those without whom no decree at all can
be effectively made determining the principal issues in the cause.
sary and Proper Parties.

only possible interest was to protect her tinge (1902), 29 Wash. 215, 69 Pac. 736;

inchoate right of dower. Wolf r. Banning, McDonough v. Craig (1894), 10 Wash.

3 Minn. 202, 204. Contra. McArthur i'. 239, 38 Pac. 1034.]

1 Coolidge v. Parris, 8 Ohio St. 594;
Wolf v. Banning, 3 Minn. 202. See also
Holliday v. Brown, 33 Neb. 657 (rehearing
<lenied, March 16, 1892, 51 N. W. 839).
uch legal actions as those for torts done
by the wife, or dehts due by her dum
.sola, and others, in which the law still
Tequires both spouses to be made defendants, are not affected by the statutory
provision.
2 Foote v. Lathrop, 53 Barb. 183; Lath rop v. Heacock, 4 Lans. I . This was a
fo reclosure suit, the mortgage being upon
]ands of the husband, o that the wife's
-0nly possible interest was to protect her
i nchoate right of dower. 'Volf v. Banning,
.3 Minn. 202, 204. Contra, McArthur v.

Franklin, 15 Ohio St. 485; s. c. 16 Ohio
St. 193. This case was similar in all its
features to Foote v. Lathrop, supra. Both
were parties, but service was made on the
husband alone. Held, that the wife was
not concluded, and her dower right was
not cut off. The cases are diametrically
opposed to each other.
[ As to Community Property : The wife
is a proper party defendant in an action
against the hu band on a note executed
by himself alone, in order to determine
whether the judgment can be executed as
one for a community debt: Clark v. Eltinge (1902) , 29 Wa>1h. 215, 69 Pac. 736 ;
McDonough v. Craig {1894), IO Wash.
239, 38 Pac. 103-t.J
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Proper parties are those Avithout whom a substantial decree may

he made, but not a decree which sliall completely settle all the

questions which may be involved in the controversy, and con-

clude the rights of all the persons who have any interest in the

subject-matter of the litigation. ^ Confusion has frequently arisen

from a neglect by text-writers, and even judges, to observe this

plain distinction. Parties are sometimes spoken of as necessary

when they are merely proper. Thus, because a decree cannot be

rendered which shall determine the rights of certain classes of

individuals without making tliem defendants in the action, they

are not unfrequently called necessary parties ; or, in other words,

because they must be joined as defendants in a particular suit,

in order that the judgment therein may bind tlieni^ they are

denominated "necessary" parties absolutely. Such persons are

"necessary" sub modo — that is, they must be brought in if it

is expected to conclude them by the decree; but to call them

" necessary " absolutely is to ignore the familiar and fundamental

distinction between the two classes of parties which has just been

mentioned. This inaccurate use of language would make every
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person a necessary party who should actually be joined as a co-

defendant in an equitable action.

§ 227. * 330. Distinction betw^een Necessary and Proper Parties

Illustrated. Practical Test. I will illustrate these positions by

a familiar example. In an action to foreclose a mortgage, the

owner of the land covered by it is a necessary defendant, because

without his presence no decree can be made for the sale of the

land; in other words, no effective decree at all, and the suit

would be an empty show of litigation. The holders of subse-

quent mortgages, judgments, and other liens upon the same land

are not necessary parties in order to the rendition of an effective

judgment, because the land can be sold without their presence

and without cutting off their liens. If, however, the plaintiff

desires to settle all the questions involved in one controversy,

and to determine the rights of all the persons who have any

interest in the land, he must bring in all these holders of subse-

quent liens, so that a judgment may be given which shall fore-

1 [Reiser v. Gigricli (1S94), 59 Minn. — , 93 N. W. 813, quoting California v.

.•568,01 N. W. 30, <|uotinp: the text; Uudil Sontliern Tae. Ry. Co., 157 IT. S. 229;

V. Fosseen (1900), S2 Minn. 41, 84 N. W. Steinliacii (•. Prudential Ins. Co. (1902),

496; Kircher c. I'eder.son (1903), 117 Wi.s. 172 N. Y. 471, 05 N. E. 281. J

Proper partie" ar tho e ·with ut wh m a ub antial le r e ma .,.
li mac.1 but not a deer
which ·hall comp! t ly ettl all th
11ne·tiun· whi h may b inv lved in th
n rover
an
n·lntl th right of all th per on who hav any int re tin h
.·uhje ·t-matter f th liti 0 a ion. 1
nfu ·ion ha frequ ntl ari n
fr m a n I ct b t xt-wri er , and v n ju lge t ol e1·v thi ·
plL in li incti n.
arti ar om time pok n of a
' hen h are m r 1 proper. Thu b au a decree
r nd r l whi h hall det rmine th right f c rtain cla
individual with ut making them d fondants in the acti · n, the
are not unfrequ ntly all d nece ary partie · or in other word
becau
h y mu ' t be joined a defendant in a particular uit
in or ler that the ju lgment therein may bind them they are
uch per u ar
l nominat cl n ce ary ' parties ab olutely.
nece ar ' sub mo lo - that i.. , , the ' mu t be brou ht in if it
i, expected to conclude them by he decre ; but to call th m
n ce ary" ab olut ly i to ignore the familiar and fundamental
di 'tinction betw en the tw cla es of parties which ha ju ·t be n
mentioned. This inaccurate use of language would make eyer .,.
per ·on a nece ~ary party who should actually be joined a a codefendant in an equitabl action .
227. * 330. Distinction between Necessary and P roper Parties
Illustrated.
Practical Test.
I will illu trat th e po ition by
a familiar exampl . In an action to oreclo e a mortg g th
wner of the land covered by it i a n
ary def ndant,
cau
with ut hi pre ence n deer e an b made f r he 1 of the
land· in other w rd , n
ff ctiv d cree at 11 an l the uit
would be an em ty sh w f litigation. The h ld r
f ub equent m rtgage ~ judgm nt and h r lien upon th am land
are not nece. ary par ie in r l r t th r ndi ti n f an eff cti v
judgm nt becau
the le n 1 can b
lcl wi h u t th ir pr n e
and with ut utting ff h
If h w er, th plaintiff
cl .. ·ir , to . tt1 all th iu · ion.· inv 1 eel in n
ntr v r r,
aud t
righ
f all h p r n wh hav any
n n:L l ring in all h
f uh qu ·nt li ~n · :o bat ( ju lgm ut may L giv n whi ·h ·hall for l [J ·i er L'. Ciigri<'h (1 94 , !l l\Iinu.
• G , <ii • '.
:10, 1pt<Jti11g th· text; J u<ld
1. J•o N·n (1~100)
2 \li1111.41, -! J.. W.
-t!HJ; rir ·lwr ·. 1 <·du u11 (I ~JU:3), 117 \

"r·

- , !J.'3 . . :r. ·w. l.'3 quotin
a lifornia l'.
• on h m P~w. l y. o., I 57 T. c '. 229 :
, teinlia<'h '" J>rnde11tinl In . o. {1902),
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.Y.4il,G5 ... '.E.
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close their rights. To accomplish this end, these persons must

be made defendants; and in that respect they are necessary

parties — that is, necessary in order to attain the particular result

desired. They are not, however, necessary to the decision of the

main issues involved in the suit and to the granting of a decree.

If we use language accurately, we shall call them 2)roper parties,

and shall thus distinguish them from the other class, without

whom the judicial machinery cannot be put in motion. Every

person who' is rightly joined as a defendant in an equitable

action, is, in a certain broad sense, a necessary party, because his

presence is necessary, to accomplish some particular end, and to

make the judgment more complete than it otherwise would have

been ; but to use the term in this broad sense is to lose all the

benefits of an accurate classification and of practical rules de-

pending on such classification. To sum up: Necessar}?^ parties

defendant are those without whom no decree at all can be ren-

dered ; proper parties defendant are those whose presence renders

the decree more effectual; and all the proper parties are those by

whose presence the decree becomes a complete determination of
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all the questions which can arise, and of all the rights which are

connected with the subject-matter of the controversy. A prac-

tical test will at once fix the class into which any given persons

interested in an equitable litigation must fall. If the person is a

necessary defendant, a demurrer for defect of parties on account

of his nonjoinder will be sustained; and conversely, if the de-

murrer will be sustained, the person is a necessary party. If the

given person is merely a proper party, such a demurrer will not

be sustained on account of his nonjoinder, although the court

may undoubtedly, in the exercise of its discretion, order him to

be brought in.

§ 228. * 331. Equity Doctrine herein. Statutory Provision.

The principal provision quoted at the commencement of the

present section, and which is the same in all the codes of pro-

cedure, is a general and concise statement of the doctrine which

had long prevailed in courts of equity in relation to the joinder

of defendants. As the language of this provision is permissive

— any person may be made a defendant, not must be — it was

evidently intended to embrace "proper" as well as "necessary"

parties within its requirement. The doctrine of equity, ex-

pressed in its most general form, is, that all persons materially

clo e their rights. To ace mpli.'11 thi n<l, the ·e per on mu t
be made defendants; and in that respec t they are neces ·ary
parties - that is, necessary in order to attain the particular re ul t
desired. They are not, however, nece sary to th cl ci ion of the
main i ues involve l in the suit and to the granting of a decree.
If we use language accurately, we shall call them proper partie ,
and shall thus distinguish them from the other cla s, without
whom the judicial machinery cannot be put in motion. Every
person who is rightly joined as a defendant in an equitable
action, is, in a certain broad sense, a necessary party, because his
presence is necessary, to accomplish some particular end, and to
make the judgment more complete than it otherwise would have
been; but to use the term in this broad sense is to lose all the
benefits of an accurate classification and of practical rules depending on such classification. To sum up: Necessary parties
defendant are those without whom no decree at all can be rendered; proper parties defendant are those whose presence renders
-the decree more effectual; and all the proper parties are those by
whose presence the decree becomes a complete determination of
all the questions which can arise, and of all the rights which are
connected with the subject-matter of the controversy. A practical test will at once fix the class into which any given persons
interested in an equitable litigation must fall. l£ the person is a
necessary defendant, a demurrer for defect of parties on account
of his nonjoinder will be sustained; and conversely, if the demurrer will be sustained, the person is a n ecessary party. If the
given person is merely a proper party, such a demurrer will not
be sustained on account of his nonjoinder, although the court
may undoubtedly, in the exercise of its discretion, order him to
be brought in.
§ 228. * 331. E quity Doctrine herein. Statutory Provision.
The principal provision quoted at the commencement of the
present section, and which is the same in all the codes of procedure, is a general and concise statement of the doctrine which
had long prevailed in courts of equity in relation to the joinder
I
of defendants. As the language of this provision is permissive
- any person may be made a defendant, not must be - i t was
evidently intended to embrace "proper " as well a "necessary"
parties within its requir~ment. The doctrine of equity, expressed in its most general form, is, that all persons m ~terially

CIYIL REMEDIES.
320 CIVIL REMEDIES.

interested, either legally or beneficially, in the subject-matter of

the suit, should be made parties to it, either as plaintiffs or as

defendants, so that there may be a complete decree which shall

bind them all.^ Those whose interests are adverse to the claims

set up by the plaintiff, and who would therefore naturally resist

such claims, should be brought into the action as defendants.

On the other hand, those whose interests are concurrent with

the interests of the principal plaintiff" who actually institutes and

prosecutes the suit, should primarily be joined with him as

co-plaintiffs. But, as has already been shown in the preceding

section, equity procedure is not strenuous in respect to this ac-

curate division, and often permits individuals of the latter class

to be made defendants, being satisfied if they are before the

court so as to be bound by the decree. The persons who are

interested in resisting the demands of the actual plaintiff, and

who must therefore be defendants in the action, are separated,

according to the nature of their interests and of their relations

with each other, into two classes, — those immediately inter-

ested, and those consequentially interested. When an individ-
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ual is in the enjoyment of the subject-matter, or has a right,

interest, or estate in it, either in possession or in expectancy,

1 See Story, Eq. PI. §§ 72, 76 a. It The following are illustrations of de-

has been suggested that this general doc- fendanti* properly joined : Miles i'. Du Bey

trine should be stated as follows: All (1894), 15 Mont. 340, 39 Pac. 313 (all per-

persons materially interested in the object sons diverting water from a water course) ;

of the suit should be made parties. See Brown v. Canal & Reservoir Co. (1899),

Calvert on Parties, pp. 1-11; Story, Eq. 26 Colo. 66, 56 Pac. 183 (ditch company

Pi. §§ 76 6, 76 c. and persons claiming right to prorate

^Paine v. Foster (1900), 9 Okla. 213, 53 water, in an action to restrain pro-rating) ;

Pac. 109: The syllabus by the court reads, West Point Irrigation Co. v. Ditch Co.

"Courts of equity ' delight to do justice, (1900), 21 Utah, 229, 61 Pac. 16 (all per-

i her 1 gally r b neficiall; in he ubject-matter of
h uld b mad partie t it, eith r
plaintiff or as
that ther m y b a complete d r e which shall
Tho who intere t ar adv r e to the claim
up b he plaintiff, and who would ther fore naturally re i t
uch claim' h uld b
rought into the a ti n as defendants.
th r hand, th e whose int r t are concurrent with
n th
he int re t of the rincipal plaintiff who a tually in titutes and
he uit bould primarily be joined with him as
-pl intiff . But, a ha already been shown in the preceding
e ti n e uity ro edure i not trenuous in r pect to this acurat li i ion, and often permits individuals f the latter clas
t be ma e d fondants, being atisfied if they are efore the
court so a to be bound by the decree. The persons who are
inter ted in re i ting the demands of the actual plaintiff, and
who mu t therefore be defendants in the action, are separated,
ac ordin to the nature of their interests and of their relations
with ach other, into two classes, - tho e immediately intere t d, and tho e c nsequentially interested. When an individual i in the enjoyment of the subject-matter, or has a right,
inter t or e tate in it, either in possession or in expectancy,

and nut by halves;' and it is a general sons obstructing flow of water in ditch);

rule in equity that all persons materially United Coal Co. v. Canon City Coal Co.

interested, either legally or beneficially, in (1897), 24 Colo. 116, 48 Pac. 1045 (a min-

the subject-matter of a suit, are required to ing company and its agent where one or

be made parties, either plaintiff or defend- the other or both were taking coal from

ant, however numerous they may be, so plaintiff's mines) ; Siever v. Union Pac.

that there may be a complete decree, whicli R. R. Co. (1903), — Neb. — , 93 N. W.

should bind them all." 743 (employer and creditor of employee in

In Abbott V. Caches (1899), 20 Wash, suit by employee to restrain vexatious

517, 50 I'ac. 28, the court quoted as fol- attempts to garni.shee exempt wages) ;

lows fruui High on Injunctions: "The State ex rel. v. Mctschan (1896), 32 Ore.

true test, however, in all cases would .seem 372, 46 Pac. 791 (the holder of a county

to be to make such parties defendant as warrant in a suit to enjoin its pay-

are necessary to a proper solution of the ment).]

<|uestion« at issue."

i
e
tory, Eq. Pl. §§ 72, 76 a. It
has b n sugge ted that this general doct ri ne hould be tat d a follows: All
per ou materially interested in the object
-0f the . uit . hould be mad e partie .
ee
alvert on Partie , pp. 1-11; tory, Eq.
Pl. §§ 76 b, 76 c.
[Paine v. Fo t er (1900), 9 Okla. 213, 53
ac. l 0 : The yllabu by the court r ad ,
" ourt f quity 'd lig ht to do ju. ti e,
an<l n t by halve ; ' and it i a gen ral
rul in equity that all p rson materially
int re t d, ither 1 gaily or ben fi ially, in
the ubject-matter of a uit, ar r equired to
be made partie , eith r plaintiff r d f endant, howev r num r us they may be,
that th r may b a mplete decree, whi h
hould bind hem all."
In Abbott . a he (l 99), 20 Wa h.
5li, 56 Pa'. 2, th
ou rt quot d a f 11 w. from High on Tnjun ti n : "The
ru t t, howev r, in all r11
w uld
m
to h 1 rnak
u h par i d f nd n a
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which is lial)le to be defeated or diminished by the plaintiff's

success, he has an immediate and direct interest in resisting the

phiintiff's demand, and is, in general, a necessary defendant.

The interest here spoken of need not be personal and beneficial ;

it includes any estate or right in the subject-matter, legal or

equitable, whether beneficial to the holder thereof or not.^

Numerous illustrations of this fundamental doctrine are given in

the succeeding portions of this section.

§ 229. * 332. Persons consequentially Interested. If a person

not thus immediately interested is, nevertheless, so related to

the subject-matter and to the principal defendant that, upon the

plaintiff's success, he will be liable to be proceeded against by

such defendant, and to be compelled to make compensation, in

whole or in part, for the loss, he is consequentially interested in

the subject of the action, and is also, in general, a necessary,

or at least a proper, co-defendant. Equity requires this class of

persons to be joined as defendants, not because they will be

directly affected by the decree when rendered, but because, if

the plaintiff succeeds against the principal defendant, the latter
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will then have the right to call upon them to reimburse him,

wholly or partially, or to do some other act which shall, accord-

ing to the nature of the case, restore or tend to restore him to

his former position before the recovery against him. To avoid

a multiplicity of actions, such persons should, in general, be

brought into the suit in the first instance, so that their secondary

or consequential liabilities may be determined and adjusted

together with the main issues in the one decree. ^ I shall now

apply these very general statements of doctrine to the classes of

cases which most frequently arise in actual practice.

§ 230. * 333. II. Actions to foreclose Mortgages. Introductory.

Statutory Distribution of Parties. The first claSS or group of equi-

table actions which I shall take up, both because it is the most

1 1 Dan. Ch. PI. (4th Am. ed.) p. 246. 2 j paQ. ch. PI. (4th Am. ed.) p. 282.

On the general doctrine concerning de- See also Story Eq. PI. §§ 159, 162, 169,

fendauts in equity, and necessary and 169 o, 172, 173, 176 ; Greenwood i\ Atkiu-

proper parties, see Douglas Cy. Sup. v. sou, 5 Sim. 419; Wilkinson v. Fowkes,

Walbridge, .38 Wis. 179, citing Williams 9 Hare, 19.3; Knight i'. Knight, .3 P. Wms.

V. Bankhead, 19 Wall. 563 ; Janes v. Wil- 333 ; Crosljy's Heir.s I'.Wickliffe, 7 li. Mou.

liams, 31 Ark. 175; Hamill r. Thomp.sou, 120; Wiser v. Bhichly, 1 Johns. Ch. 437;

3 Col. 518, 523 ; State v. Jacksonville, P. New Eng. Com'l Bk. v. Newport Steam

& M. R. Co., 15 Fla. 201 ; Satterthwaite Factory, 6 11. I. 154.

V. Beaufort Cy. Com'rs, 76 N. C. 153.
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whi h i' liabl o b def at d r dimini h l by the plaintiff s
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Th int r
I ok n of n d not be personal ancl beneficial;
it in lud
any
tat or right in th e . uhj ' t-rna ter, lebal or
qui ta bl , wh th r benefi ial to th e h 11 r th r of or not. 1
N um rou illu tration ' of thi fundam ental <lo trin e are gi v n in
the ucce ding portion of thi ection.
§ 229. * 332. Persons consequentially Interested. If a per on
not thus immediately interested i , neverthele ·, so related to
the subject-matter and to the principal defendant that, upon the
plaintiff's succe s, he will be liable to be proceed d again t by
uch defendant, and to be compelled to make compensation, in
whole or in part, for the lo s, he i consequentially interested in
the ·ubject of the action, and is also, in gen ral, a necessary,
or at least a proper, co-defendant. Equity r quires this clas of
p rsons to be joined as defendants, not because they will be
directly affected by the decree when rendered, but because, if
the plaintiff succeeds against the principal defendant, the latter
will then have the right to call upon them to reimburse him,
wholly or partially, or to do some other act which shall, accor ling to the nature of the case, restore or tend to re tore him to
his former position before the recovery again t him. To avoid
a multiplicity of actions, such person should, in general, be
brought into the suit in the first instance, so that their secondary
or consequential liabilities may be determined and adjusted
together with the main is ues in the one decree. 2 I shall now
apply these very general statements of doctrine to the cla ses of
cases which most frequently arise in actual practice .
§ 230. * 333. II . Actions to foreclose Mortgages. Introductory .
Statutory Distribution of Parties.
The first class or group of equitable actions which I shall take up, both because it is the mo t
1 1 Dan. Ch. Pl. {4th Am. ed.) p. 246.
On the general doctrine concerning defendants in equity, and nece. , ary and
proper partie , see D ougla Cy. Sup. 1: .
Walbridge, 3 Wis. 17 9, citing Williams
v. Bankhead, 19 Wall. 563 ; J aue v. ' Villiam , 31 Ark. 175; Hamill v. Thomp on,
3 Col. 518, 523; State i:. Jack onville, P.
& M. R. Co., 15 Fla. 201; attertbwaite
v. Beaufort Cy. Com'rs 1 76 N. C. 153.

2 1 Dan. Ch. PL (4th Am . ed.) p. 2 2.
See also Story Eq. Pl. §§ 159, 162, 169,
169a, 172, li3, li6; Greenwoodv.Atkinsou, 5 im . 419; Wilkin on v. Fowke. ,
9 Hare, 193; Kni g ht v. Knig ht, .'3 P . Wms .
333; rosliy 's ll eirs v."rickliffe, 7 B. l\lon.
120; Wi -eL· i: . Blaehly, 1 J ohns. Ch. 43i;
New Eng . Com'l Bk. v. Newport Steam
Factory, 6 H.. I. 154.
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familiar and because it illustrates very clearly the general doc-

trine, is that of suits to foreclose mortgages. The statute dis-

tributes the persons who may be proper or necessary parties

defendant into two divisions, those "who have or claim an

interest in the controversy adverse to the plaintiff," and those

" who are necessary parties to a complete determination or settle-

ment of the questions involved therein." It is plain that the

latter division is the more comprehensive, and in fact includes

the former. Every person " who has or claims an interest in the

controversy adverse to the plaintiff" is evidently "a necessary

party to a complete determination of the questions involved

therein;" but, on the other hand, it is equall}' evident that

there may be persons " who are necessary parties to a complete

determination of the questions involved, but who do not have

nor claim any interest in the controversy adverse to the plaintiff."

A single example will illustrate this position. The codes of

several States require the assignor of a thing in action to be

made a co-defendant "to answer to the assignment" in a suit

brought by the assignee. Of the two defendants, when this is
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done, the debtor alone has an interest in the controversy adverse

to the plaintiff. The assignor has no such interest; he is not

liable for the debt; his interest in the result is rather in accord

with than in opposition to the plaintiff. He is, however, a

necessary party to a complete determination and settlement of

the questions involved in the suit. One of these questions is,

whether the cause of action was in fact assigned to the plaintiff ;

and it is important to the rights of the debtor that this question

be for ever settled in the single action. In the absence of any

positive requirement of the statute, the assignor would not be a

necessary defendant, because a judgment could be rendered

against the debtor without the presence of the assignor. This

example well illustrates my statement above, that one may be a

party necessary to the settlement of all the questions involved in

tlie suit, and at the same time neither have nor claim any interest

adverse to the plaintiff. This evident distinction will aid us

in discriminating between the necessary and the proper parties

defendant in any given equital)le action, for, as a general propo-

sition, all those persons who have or claim an interest in the

controversy adverse to the plaintiff are '"''necessary''' defendants,

if by "interest adverse" is intended an interest opposeij to a

famili, r an l b au .. e it illu trat v r - 1 arly he g neral doctrin , i that of ui to for lo e m rt a0
The atute l tribut : .; th per ·on ·who may be r ror r
ary artie
tl f m1< nt into ' o cliYi"ion , tho e wh ha-ve or laim an
int r :t in h
on tr v r ad r e to th I laintiff, ,, an l tho e
·who are n
'...,ary parti t a mpl te let rminati n or e 1 ruent f th qu tion inv 1 ed therein.
It i plain that th
la t r 1ivi "ion i th m re compreben iv an l in fa t in lud
the former. Ev ry per on wb ha or laim an inter t in th
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recovery of judgment hy the, ijlaintiff ; while those who, in con-

tradistinction to the former, are merely "necessary parties to a

complete determination of the questions involved," are, in the

main, "jsro^gr" defendants.

§ 231. * 834. Object of the Judgment in Foreclosure. Necessary

and Proper Parties herein. These principles Jiiay now be applied

to the class of actions under immediate discussion, — those

brought to foreclose mortgages. Those persons who own or

have an estate in the land to be sold under the decree, and those

who, in the original creation of the debt, or by any subsequent

assumption of it, are debtors to the mortgagee, and therefore

liable to a personal judgment for a deficiency, have an interest in

the controversy adverse to the plaintiff, and are beyond doubt

necessary parties, if the plaintiff desires to obtain all the relief

which the law affords him, namely, of sale and personal judgment

for deficienc}^ If, however, the plaintiff will be satisfied with

a partial relief, and simply asks a decree for a sale without any

personal judgment for a deficiency, the debtor, unless he is also

owner of the land in whole or in part, is not a necessary defend-

Generated for facpubupdates (University of Michigan) on 2014-06-17 15:32 GMT / http://hdl.handle.net/2027/uc2.ark:/13960/t02z1c23b
Public Domain / http://www.hathitrust.org/access_use#pd

ant. The decree and sale must of course divest all ownership

and titles to the land or any part thereof, or else there would be

no sale but simply the show of one. But in order that the land

may produce its full value, the decree and sale must go further

than this, and must cut off all subsequent liens and incumbrances,

and inchoate interests which are not titles but merely the seeds

of titles. There is thus a threefold object of the judgment: (1}

To divest the title of the present owner, and transfer the owner-

ship to the purchaser. This is essential, and all persons who

have any such title are necessary parties, for without them the

whole action would be a nullity.^ (2) To cut off all liens and

inchoate interests, so that the land can be sold at a greater ad-

vantage. This is of course not absolutely essential, for a sale can

be effected without it. The holders of such liens and inchoate

interests are proper parties. (3) To obtain a decree for any defi-

ciency which may arise after the sale, against those jjersons who

are liable for the mortgage debt. All such debtors are necessary

parties if the plaintiff seeks to obtain this particular relief; biit

1 [3" Any one who has the right to pay v. Hotel Ass'n of Omaha (1901), 63 Neb.

the debt and redeem is a necessary party 181, 88 N. W. 17.5, citing Denney i-. Cole,

to the foreclosure proceedings, and a dc- 22 Wash. .372, 61 Pac. SS.]

cree in his absence is nugatory : " Brown

r ecovery of Jndgrnent b!J the plrtint~ff ,: whil tho:e who, in ·ontradi tin tiou t the former, ar rn rely "n e '.'ary partie: to a
omplet d termination of the questions involv <l, ' ar , in th
main, ' proper" def ndants.
§ 231. * 334. Object of the Judgment in Foreclosure. Necessary
and Proper Parties herein.
Th e principle: may now be appli cl
t the class of actions under imm ediate diRcu ion, - tho ·
brought to foreclose mortgages. Those person \Yho own or
have an estate in the land to be sold under the decree, and thos
who, in the original creation of the debt, or by any sub equ ent
assumption of it, are debtors to the mortgagee, and therefore
liable to a persona.I judgment for a deficien cy, have an interest in
the controversy adverse to the plaintiff, and are beyond doubt
necessary parties, if the plaintiff desires to obtain all the reli f
which the law affords him, namely, of sale and personal judgment
for deficiency. If, however, the plaintiff will be satisfied with
a partial relief, and simply asks a decree for a sale without any
personal judgment for a deficiency, the debtor, unless he is also
owner of the land in whole or in part, is not a necessary defendm1t. The decree and sale must of course divest all ownership
and titles to the land or any part thereof, or else there would be
no sale but simply the show of one. But in order that the la.nu
may produce its full value, the decree and sale must go further
than this, and must cut off all subsequent liens and incumbrances,
an.d inchoate interests which are not titles but merely the seeds
of titles. There is thus a threefold object of the judgmen t: (1)
To di vest the title of the present owner, and transfer the ownership to the purchaser. This is essential, and all persons who
have any such titl e are necessary parties, for without th em the
whole action woulJ be a nullity. 1 (2) To cut off all liens and
inchoate interests, so that the land can be sold at a greater advantage. This is of course not absolutely e~sential, for a ale can
be effected without it. The holders of such liens and inchoate
interests are proper parties. (3) To obtain a decree for any deficiency which may arise after the ale, against those persons who
are liable for the mortgage debt. All such debtor8 are necessary
parties if the plaintiff seeks to obtain this particular relief; but
1

["Any one who has th e ri ght to pay
the debt and refleem is a ne('essary party
to th e foreclos ure proceeding., and a dec;ree in hi s aLsenc;e i::; nugatory:" Brow11

v. H otel A~s'n of Omaha (1901 ), 63 Xeb.
181. 88 N. ' V. 175, citing Denne.'· i:. Cole.
2:2 "'af'h. 37:2, 61 Pac. 3 .]
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he may waive this relief and content himself with the sale and

the proceeds thereof, in which case these mere debtors would not

be necessary defendants. The foregoing principles have been

adopted by all the courts. The doctrine is universally estab-

lished that in the equitable action to foreclose a mortgage by a

thi, r lief

h
th
l

out nt him lf "IT"i h
th

h

n

sale of the mortgaged premises, all persons who own the land

or anv part thereof, all who have any interest therein vested or

contingent, perfected or inchoate, subsequent to the giving of

the mortgage, all who are owners or holders of an}^ subsequent

liens or incumbrances thereon, and finally all who are personally

or

liable for the debt secured by the mortgage, may generally be

f

united as defendants; and must be made defendants if the

plaintiff seeks to obtain a decree affording him all the relief

which the court can grant. As titles, interests, and liens prior

and paramount to the mortgage are in no way affected by it

or by the decree of foreclosure and the sale thereunder, the

owners and holders thereof are neither necessary nor proper

parties.^

§ 232. * 335. Variations in Practical Rules Due to Differences in
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Local Law as to Nature of Interests in Land. While this general

statement of the doctrine is universally accepted, there are some

points of difference in its practical application. These differences

will be found, upon careful examination, to arise, not from any

doubt as to tl>e general principle itself, but from a certain want

of uniformity in the local law of the various States in respect to

the nature of liens and incumbrances upon the land, and in

respect to the nature of inchoate or contingent interests in the

land. Thus, if in one State a judgment, when docketed, be-

comes a lien upon the lands of the debtor, and in another such a

judgment is not a lien, a judgment creditor of the owner of the

mortgaged premises would plainly be a proper part}'- defendant

in the tirst-named State, and as plainly not a proper party in the

second. The most important difference in the local law defining

and regulating the nature of interests in the land, relates to the

inchoate dower of the wives of mortgfaofors and of other subse-

(juent owners, and especially where the mortgage is given for

purchase-money so as to take precedence of the dower right of

the mortgagor's wife. In some States where dower is carefully

protected, the wives of the mortgagors and of other subsequent

1 QBut see note to § *.342/]
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owners of the land are in all cases regarded as liaving a positive

interest in the equity of redemption, even though they joined in

the execution of the mortgage, or even though the lien of the

mortgage be prior to their dower right; and they are therefore,

under all possible circumstances, necessary defendants if the

plaintiff wishes to cut off their rights of redemption. In other

States, the wives, under some circumstances at least, are not

regarded as having any real interest in the land, nor any right of

redemption, and they need not therefore be made defendants for

any purpose. This example is a sufficient illustration, and shows

that any difference in the practical rules laid down by various

courts arises from a variation in the law defining the nature of

interests in the land ; what constitutes an interest in one State

may not do so in another.

^ 233. * 336. Mortgagor and his Grantee as Parties. I paSS

from this broad statement of the general principle to a more

careful discussion of the rules, with an analysis of some leading

cases. The doctrine which I have thus stated is approved and

applied under various circumstances, and to different classes of
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persons having different interests and liens in the cases cited in

the foot-note. 1 When the mortgagor remains owner of the

1 [[The author's original note has heen wife join in mortgage on wife's property :

classitied and condensed as follows : Owner Wolf r. Banning, 3 Minn. 133. Trustee

of laud: Lenox v. Heed, 12 Kan. 223; and beneficiary ; Mavrich y. Grier, 3 Nev.

Green i\ Dixon, 9 Wis. 532 (containing a 52. Wife of grantee of mortgaged prera-

full discussion of subject of parties) ; Sum- ises : Watt v. Alvord, 25 Ind. 533 ; Kay v.

uer y. Coleman, 20 Ind. 486 (holding that Wliittaker, 44 N. Y. 565. Third party

owner of land subject to mortgage is interested in mortgage debt : Johnson v.

proper but not necessary party) ; Semple Britton, 23 Ind. 105. Assignor of instru-

r. Lee, 13 la. 304 (same doctrine) ; Daven- meut secured by mortgage: Holdridge u.

owners of the land ar in all ca es regard cl a having a po itive
intere t in the equity of r d mption, even though th y join u in
the ex cution of the mortgag , or ven though th li n of the
mortgage be prior to their <lower right; and they are th refore,
under all pos ible circum tance , neces ary def n<lants if the
plaintiff wishes to cut off their rights of redemption. In other
States, the wives, und r some circumstances at least, are not
regar led as having any real interest in the land, nor any right of
r demption, and they need not therefore be made defendants for
any purpose. This example is a sufficient illustration, and shows
that any difference in the practical rules laid down by various
courts arises from a variation in the law defining the nature of
interests in the la11d; what constitutes an interest in one State
may not do so in another.
§ 233. * 336. Mortgagor and his Grantee as Parties. I pass
from this broad statement of the general principle to a more
car fol discussion of the rules, with an analysis of some leading
ca,ses. The doctrine which I have thus stated is approved and
applied under various circumstances, and to different classes of
persons having different interests and liens in the cases cited in
the foot-note. 1 ·when the mortgagor remains owner of the

port y. Turpin, 43 Cal. 597. Grantee of Sweet, 23 Ind. 118; Gower v. Howe, 20

jiart of mortgaged premises: Douglass y. Ind. 396. These cases fell within a special

Bishop, 27 la. 214. Judgment creditor of provision of the Indiana code. Rankin v.

mortgagor : Union Bank of Masillon v. Major, 9 la. 297 ; Sands v. Wood, 1 la.

Bell, 14 O. St. 200; Gaines v. Walker, 16 263. Prior mortgagee: Standish v. Dow,

Ind. 361; Morris v. Wheeler, 45 N. Y. 21 la. 363. Occupant of mortgaged prem-

708 : "This is certainly a most extraordi- ises: Suiter v. Turner, 10 la. 517. Heirs

nary decision; it is in direct conflict with of deceased mortgagor : Muir v. Gibson, 8

other decisions made by the same court, Ind. 187; Leggett c Mutual Life Ins. Co.,

and is an utter confounding of all distinc- 64 Barb. 23. Person claiming title ad-

tious between necessary and proper par- verse to mortgagor : Brundage v. Domes-

ties. The decision is so clearly erroneous tic, etc. Soc, 60 Barb. 204. Wife, where

that it can only be regarded as an ina'd- husband and wife join in mortgage (not

vertence." Verdin v. Slocum, 71 N. Y. necessary) : Thornton v. Pigg, 24 Mo.

345. Obligor on mortgage debt other 249 ; Powell v. Ross, 4 Cal. 197 (neces-

than mortgagor: Nichols v. Randall, 5 sary) : Chombersw. Nicholson, 30 Ind. 349;

Minn. 240, Husband, where husband and McArthur v. Franklin, 15 0. St. 485, s. c.

1 [The author's original note has Leen
classified and coudensetl a follows: Owuer
of land : Lenox v. Reed, I 2 Kan. 223;
Green v. Dixon, 9 Wis. 532 (co ntaining a
full tli ·c.:us. ion of subject of parties); Sumner v. Coleman, 20 Ind. 4 6 (holding that
owner of land subject to mor tgage is
proper but not necessary party) ; Semple
1:. Lee, 13 Ia. 30-1 ( ·ame doctrine); Dan'lnport v. Turpin , 43 Cal. 597. Grantee of
p:ut of mortgaged premises: Dougla v.
Bishop, 27 Ia. 214. Judgment creditor of
mortgagor: Union Bauk of Masillon v.
Bell, 14 0. St. 200; Gain es v. Walker, 16
Ind. 361 ; Morris v. ·w heeler, 45
. Y.
708: " This is certainly a most extraonlinary decision; it is in (lirect conflict with
other decisions made by the same court,
and is an utter confounding of all di tinction between necessary and proper partie . The decision is so clearly erroueons
that it can only be regarded as an inadvertence." Verdin v. Slocum, 71 :N". Y.
345. Obligor on mo~tgage debt other
than mortgagor: Nichols v. Randall, 5
Minn. 240. Husband, where husband and

wife join in mortgage on wife' property :
Wolf 11. Banning, 3 Minn. 13.'3. Tru tee
and beneficiary: Mavri c.:h v. Grier, 3 Nev.
52. ·w ife 0£ grantee of mortgaged µremi es: ·w att v. Alv ord, :25 Ind . 533; l\:ay v.
Whittaker, 4+ N. Y. 565. Third part-''
intere ted in mortgage debt: Johnson v.
Britton, 23 Ind. l 05. Assignor of inst rument secured by mortgage: Holdridge v.
R\reet, 23 Intl. 118; Gower v. Howe, 20
Ind. 396. These eases fell within a :pecial
provision of tbe Indiana code. Rankin v.
Major, 9 Ia. 29i ; Santis v. Wood, 1 Ia.
263. Prior mortgagee: Standish l'. Dow,
21 Ia. 363. Occupant of mortgaged premi e : Suiter v. Tn'rn r , 10 Ia. 517. Heirs
of deceased mortgarror: Mnir v. Gib on, 8
Ind. 1 7; Leggett ~~ l\J u tnal Life In . Co.,
64 Barb. 23. Per on daiming title adYer e to mortgagor: Brundage 1·. Domestic, etc. Soc., 60 Barb. 20+. ·w ife, where
husband and wife join in mortgage (not
n ecessary): Thornton v. Pigg, 2+ l\Io.
249; Powell v. Ros , 4 Cal. 197 (necesary): Chamber v. icholson, 30 Ind. 349;
foArthur v. Franklin, 15 0. t. 4 5, . c.
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premises, he is of course, on every account, a necessary defend-

ant. ^ If, liovt'ever, he has conveyed away the entire hind hy an

absolute deed of conveyance, the grantee, who is the owner at

the time of commencing tlie suit, is a necessary party defendant,

even though his deed has not been put upon record, because

without his presence the decree for a sale, which is the essential

primary remedy granted by the action, cannot be made.^ In a

few cases, however, such parties have been spoken of as projyer

16 id. 19.3. Wife, where she did not join

with her liushand in mortgage : Fletcher

V. Holmes, 32 Ind. 497 ; Moouey v. Maas,

of cour-e on
unt, a n ece ar ' d f ndtlll .1
I L h we \' r h e ha convey d away tl e ntiT lar 1 by an
~ b vlnt de cl f cony ·a.nee th grante , wh i
be wn r at
the tim
uit, i a n e 'ary part 1 f ndant,
y n b
n t b n pu t u p n record, b au e
ntial
nee the clecree for a al , which i " h
2
by
th
e
acti
n
cannot
be
mad
.
In a
ran
eel
primary r
uch parti ba.ve be n p oken f a prop er
f "
pn:rni

l:

,

h

i ·

22 la. 380; Merchants' Bank v. Thomp-

son, .55 N. Y. 7. Personal representative

of deceased mortgaj^or : Miles r. Smith,

22 Mo. .502 ; Darlington v. Effey, 13 la.

177; Belloc r. Rogers, 9 Cal. 123 ; Schadt

V. Hep])e, 45 Cal. 433 ; Huston v. String-

ham, 21 la. 36. Mortgagor after convey-
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ance of equity of redemption : Burkham

V. Beaver, 17 Ind. 367 ; Johnson r. Monell,

13 la. 300; Mnrray v. Catlett, 4 Greene

(la.) 108; Stevens v. Campbell, 21 Ind.

471 ; Daly v. Burchell, 13 Abb. Pr. n. s.

264; Williams v. Meeker, 29 la. 292.

Junior mortgagee: Procter v. Baker, 15

Ind. 178; Newcomb v. Dewey, 27 la. 381 ;

Ansoi} V. Anson, 20 la. 55 ; Knowles v.

Rabliu, 20 la. 101 ; Chase v. Abbott, 20

la. 1.54 ; Street v. Beal, 16 la. C83 ; Hein-

street v. Winnie, 10 la. 430; Crow v.

Vance, 4 la. 434 ; Veach i'. Schaup, 3 la.

194; Hayward r. Stearns, 39 Cal. 58.

As.signee of mortgage as collateral secu-

rity : Sinison v. Satterlee, 64 N. Y. 657.

Joint obli'zors with mortgagor : Fond du

Lac Harrow Co. v. Haskins, 51 Wis. 135.

Citing also, Hall v. Nelson, 23 Barb. 88,

14 How. Pr. 32; Peto i;. Hammond, 29

Beav. 91 ; Maule v. Duko of Beaufort, 1

Russ. 349; Drury v. Clark, 16 How. Pr.

424 ; Denton v. Nanny, 8 Barb. 624 ; Mills

V. Van Voorhie.s, 20 N. Y. 415 ; Delaplaine

V. Lewis, 19 Wis. 476; Bigelow i-. Bush,

6 Paige, 343 ; Shaw v. Iloadley, 8 Blackf.

165; Van Nest v. Latson, 19 Barb. 604;

Cord V. Hirsch, 17 Wis. 403; Riddick u.

Walsh, 15 Mo. 538; Martin /;. Noble, 29

Ind. 216; French v. Turner, 15 Ind. 59 ;

Ten Eyck v. Casad, 15 la. 524; Parrott v.

Hughw, 10 la. 459; Bates v. Ruddick, 2

la 42'): Harworxi r .Marye, 8 Cal. 580;

Carpenter v. Williamson, 25 Cal. 161 ;

Patou V. Murray, 6 Paige, 474 ; Church v.

Smith, 39 Wis. 492 ; De Forest v. Holum,

38 Wis. 516.]

1 Q Where mortgaged premises are sub-

sequently subjected to an easement ijy the

public, and damages therefor are awarded

to the owners of such premises, the owner.s

are pro])er if not necessary parties to an

action by the mortgagees to have the liens

of their mortgages adjudged to be liens

upon the money awarded as damages :

Lumbermen's Ins. Co. v. Cit_v of St. Paul

(1899), 77 Minn. 410, 80 N. W. 357.

Carey-Lombard Lumber Co. v. Bier-

bauer (1899), 76 Minn. 434, 79 N. W. 541 :

Where a person has an equitable interest

16 id. 193. Wif , where she did not join
with her hu band in mortgage : Fletcher
t'. H olm ·, 3:l Ind. 497 ; ~I o oney v . faas,
22 Ia. 3 0; Merchant ' Bank v. Thompon, 55 ... . Y . 7. P er-oual repre entatiYe
of decea ed mortg agor : i\Iile l' . mith,
22 }[o. :>02 ; Da rlington v. E ffe y , 13 la.
l;'i'; Belloc 1'. R oger -, 9 al. 123 ; "chadt
v. H eppe, 45 C'al. -!3.3 ; Ilu ton i -. tringham, 2 1 Ia. 36. ::\[ortg agor after co nYeyance vf e1 1uity of rede mption: Burkham
v. Bea,·er, l 7 f nd 367; .Joh n, on 1-. ::\Ion ell,
13 fa. :mo; ::\lurray v. Catlett,-! Gr eue
(Ia.) 10 ·; .' t ,·en- e. Campbell, 21 Ind.
-ti l ; Dal\· L'. Burchell, 13 A bb. Pr. :x. s.
26-! ; Wi ili nnr v. Meeker, 29 fa. 292.
,J uuior mort o-agee : Procter v. Baker, 15
Iml. l i' ; • • e wcomb v. Dewey, 27 Ia. 3 l ;
An on i-. An on, 20 Ia. 55; K uowle v.
Rabliu, 20 Ia. 101 ; Cha ·e v. Abbott, 20
Ia. 154 ; 'tree t v. Beal, 16 Ia. G83 ; H eintreet l'- " ' iuuie, 10 Ia. 430 ; Crow v .
Vance, -! Ia . 434; V ach v. chaup, 3 Ia.
194 ; Ilaywa rd ''· . ce11ru , 39 Cal. 5 .
A ·io-uee of mor tgage a colla eral ecuri ty: ,' im~ on v. atterlee , 64 N. Y . 65i.
,Join t ouli!!Or . with mortgao-or : F on<l du
Lac B arr w o. 1 . [!· kin ·, 51 \ Vi ·. 13'.".
i ti 11 ~ al o, Hall v.
l ou, 2.3 Barb . ,
14 How. Pr. 32; P to v. H ammond, 29
B"a'' I ; Maule v. I uke of Beaufort, J
J u . 349; Drury v. Cla r k, 16 H w. Pr.
-!U ; De11 ton ,._ ~ anny, Barb. 624; Iill
v. V au \ '01Jr hi , 20 . Y. -! 15; Delaplaine
n. Lewi:, l
Wi . 476 i B i(J'elow v. Bu h,
' Paig , 3-!3; haw v. Hoadley, Blackf.
I 65; Y a n 'e. t v. Lat on, 19 Barb. 604;
( ',,rel v. Il ir e h, 17 Wi . 403 ; H.icldick v.
\ al h, 15 i\f o. 53 ; Martin 1 . • Tobie, 29
l ud. :!16; I• r<mch 11, Turn r, 15 Ind. 59;
'J',·11 Ey1·k 11
ad, I 5 I . 524; Parrnt v.
11 11 rl1••, I I . 45!1 ; Bat . u. uclrlic· k , 2
la 4'..!'3 · I lanMod 1• .\I a rye,
al. 5

arpenter v. William on, 25
al. 161;
P atou v. Murray, 6 Pai ge 474; Church v.
mi t b, 39 Wis. -!92; D e F or e t v. Hoium,
38 Wi . 516. J
1 [Where mor to-aged premi
are u bsequ ntly ubj ted to an a ·ernent by the
public, and damage therefo r a r a ward tl
to the own r of ·nch premi
the own r ·
are proper if not nece;;; ary partie. t an
actiou by the mor tgagee to have the lieu
of their mor tgage adj udged to be lieu ·
UJ on the mouey awarded a damage, :
L umberm en' Iu . Co. v. ity of t. P aul
(l 99 ), i i i\Iiu n . 410, 0 ... . W . 35 7.
Car y-Lombar d L u mber o . v . B ierbauer ( l 99) , 76 M inn. 434, 79 . W. !'> 41 :
W h r a p r ·on ha· an q ui tabl iut r t
in a building subject to lien, uch interest may be l roceeded again t a nd t h
li en enforced wi thout joining the legal
owner of th land ou which the buildiu g
tands.J
2 H a ll v. 1 e on, 23 B ar b.
; 14 How.
P r. 32; ord v. H1r ch, 17 Wi . 403; J ohu·ton v. D onvan, 106 X Y . 269.
e, howYer, , ' bip p n v. Kimball, 47 Kan . li3 , t
th
ffect that a grantee wh e <l ed ha
uot b en put n recor d i · n t a n c
ar~'
party to the fo r ·lo ure,
a t r ud r
th proceedin o- ineffectual to
title.
[ oodwin v. T yrr 11 (1903), Ari z., 71
Pac. 906; r m tr og v. Hufty (1 901 ), 156
Ind. 606, 55 N. E. 443; II pkin v. Warn r
b rn
(1 95), 109 al. 133, 41 P ac. 6 ;
v. Logu ( I 95 ), 2
r e. 3 6 4- Pa . 997 ;
Brown v. H otel A 'n of maha (1901 ) ,
63 r b. 1 1,
N.W.17 5.
B ut it i not n ee
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UITS.
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defendants merely.^ This latter view is, in my opinion, clearly

incorrect, since it leads to the inevitable conclusion that there

may be an action without any necessary defendant. If, how-

ever, the mortgagor has conveyed away only a portion of the

premises and remains owner of the residue, the grantee of the

part so conveyed is not a necessary defendant. The suit against

the mortgagor alone is not a nullity; there is a title in him for

the decree of sale to act upon; but the rights of the grantee

would be unaffected.^ It follows as an evident corollary from

the proposition just stated, that the mortgagor who has conveyed

away the whole of the mortgaged premises is no longer a neces-

sary party defendant in a foreclosure action, that is, he is not

indispensable to the rendition of a simple judgment of sale, if no

decree for a deficiency is asked. ^ He is, however, an eminently

proper party; and if the plaintiff wishes a personal judgment for

any deficiency which may arise upon the sale, he, or his personal

representative if he is dead, is a necessary party, and may defend

the action, and defeat the same by any competent defence which

he may establish.* The decisions do not make any distinction
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between the case in which the mortgagor has simply conveyed

the land incumbered by the mortgage, and that in which the

grantee has assumed to pay the mortgage debt, and in fact there

is and can be no such distinction. Whatever arrangement the

mortgagor may make with his grantee, he cannot by his own act

free himself from his liability to the holder of the mortgage ; he

1 Sumner v. Coleman, 20 Ind. 486; 471; Biirkliam v. Beaver, 17 Ind. 367;

Semple v. Lee, 13 Iowa, 304. In the last Huston v. Stringham, 21 Iowa, 36 ; Johu-

■case, the mortgagor and the owner to son v. Monell, 13 Iowa, 300; Semple v.

whom the land had been conveyed were Lee, 13 Iowa, 304 ; Murray v. Catlett,

both joined, and the court said the owner 4 Greene (la.), 108 ; Belloc v. Rogers,

was a ;»-o/>«' party, and the mortgagor was 9 Cal. 123; Williams v. Meeker, 29 Iowa,

not a necessa/vy one. [^The same doctrine 292, 294; Story, Eq. PI. § 197. See also

was announced iu Talbot v. Roe (1903), Ayres v. Wiswall, 112 U. S. 187; Daugh-

171 Mo. 421, 71 S. W. 682, the court say- erty v. Deardorf, 107 Ind. 527; Bennett

ing that the only result of not joining the v. Mattingly (Ind. 1887), 10 N. E. 299;

grantee was to leave her right to redeem Keister v. Myers, 115 Ind. 312; West v.

defendant merely. 1 This latt r Yiew is, in my opinion, clearly
incorrect, since it 1 ac.18 to the inevitaLl ·on lusion that there
may b an action without any nee ·a,ry def n<lant. If, howev r, the mort.;agor ha conveyed away only a p rti n of th
pr mi e and remain own r of the residue, the grantee f the
part so conveyed is not a nee ·ary defendant. Th uit against
the mortgagor alone i not a nullity; there is a title in him for
the decree of sale to act upon; but the rights of the grant e
would be unaffected. 2 It follows as an evident corollary from
the proposition just stated, that the mortgagor who has conveyed
away the whole of the mortgaged premises is no longer a necessary party defendant in a foreclosure action, that is, he is not
indispensable to the rendition of a simple judgment of sale, if no
decree for a denciency is asked. 3 He is, however, an eminently
proper party; and if the plaintiff wishes a personal judgment for
any deficiency which may arise upon the sale, he, or his personal
representative if he is dead, is a necessary party, and may defend
the action, and defeat the same by any competent defence whi h
he may establish. 4 The decisions clo not make any distinctioL
between the case in which the mortgagor has simply conveyed
the land incumbered Ly the mortgage, and that in which the
grantee ha' as urned to pay the mortgage debt, and in fact there
is and can be no such distinction. Whatever arrangement the
mortgagor may make with his grantee, he cannot by his own act
free himself from his liability to the holder of the mortgage; he

still open.] Miller, 125 Ind. 70 ; Jolinson v. Foster, 68

- Douglass V. Bishop, 27 Iowa, 214, Iowa, 140; Watts v. Creighton (Iowa,

216. There is certainly a plain distinc- 1892), 52 N. W. 12; Miner v. Smith, 53

tion between this case and the one where Vt. 551 ; Tutwiler v. Dunlap, 71 Ala. 126;

the entire premises are conveyed by tlie Butler v. Williams, 27 S. C. 221 ; QHop-

mortgagor. Watts )a Julian, 122 Ind. 124. kins v. Warner (1895), 109 Cal. 133, 41

3 Drury v. Clark, 16 How. Pr. 424; Pac. 868; Weir v. Rathbun (1895), 12

Delaplaine v. Lewis, 19 Wis 476, and Wash. 84, 40 Pac. 625]

cases cited ; Stevens v. Camnbell, 21 Ind. * See cases cited in last note.

1 Sumner v. Coleman, 20 Ind. 486 ;
471 ; Burkham v. Beaver, 17 Ind. 36i;
Semple v. Lee, 13 Iowa, 304. In the last Huston v. Stringham, 21 Iowa, 36; John<:ase, the mortgagor and the owner to son v. Monell, 13 Iowa, 300; Semple v.
whom the land had been conveyed were Lee, 13 Iowa, 304; 1urray v. Catlett,
both joined, and the court said the uwuer 4 Greene (Ia.), 10 ; Belloc v. Rogers,
was a prnpe1· party, and the mortgagor was 9 Cal. 123 ; William v. Meeker, 29 Iowa,
not a necessary one. [ The same doctrine 292, 294; Story, Eq. Pl. § 197. See also
was announced in Talbot v. Hoe (1903), Ayres v. Wiswall, 112 U. S. 187; Daugh171 Mo. 42 1, 71 S. W. 682, the court say- erty v. D ea rdor£, 107 Ind. 527; Bennett
ing that the on ly result of not joiu ing the v. Mattingly (Ind. 1 87), 10 N . E. 299;
grantee was to leave her right to redeem ·Keiter v. Myers, 115 Ind. 312; "\Vet v.
Miller, 125 Ind. iO; Johnson v. Fo ter, 68
till open.]
Iowa, 140; Watt · v.
reighton (Iowa,
• 2 Douglass v. Bi bop, 21 Iowa, 214-,
216. There is certainly a plain di.tinc- 1892 }, 52 N. W. 12; Miner v. Smith, 53
tion between this case and the one where Vt. 551; Tutwiler v. Dunlap, 71Ala.126;
the entire premi. es are conveyed by the Butler v. William , 27 . C. 221 ; [Hopmortgagor. Watts v. Julian, 122 Joel. 124. kins ii. Warner (1895), 109 Cal. 133, 41
3 Drury v. Clark, 16 How. Pr. 424 ; Pac. 868; Weir v. Rathbun (1895), 12
D elaplaine v. Lewis, 19 YVi 476, and Wah . 4, 40 Pac. 625 .J
4 See cases cited in last note.
<:ases cited; Stevens v. Campbell, 21 Ind.
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Avill therefore remain liable, either as principal debtor or as surety

for the grantee who has assumed the payment, and will continue

subject to a judgment for a deficiency.^

vj 234. * 337. Successive Grantees of Mortgaged Premises as

i her a· principal 1 b or or a uret
''ill th r for r main liabl
"'h ha a um cl h pa ment and will on lI u
cl :fi ien 1
234.
· 3: - . Successive Grantees of Mortgaged Premises as
Parties. Administrator and H eirs of Mo r t gagor.
The C: me pnn£ univer al appli ati n, and embr
all
cipl
p
of th Ir mi e wh have made th m h
liabl
r the m rtg. ·e l bt. Thu if the mortO'acror on-.;the Ir mi ' · to . who tak them ·imply burdened by le lien
hut doe
and ag1· e to pay the d bt, and A . afterward, conve · in the am manner t B., wh again c nY y to
' . wh i · the own r when th foreclo ur is comm nc d
. and
B. are plainly neither nece :sary nor pr per artie ; the 'have
retain l n intere t in th land and were n ver p r 01 all re'pon ibJe for th d bt. If on the other han<l, in this erie. of
an l 0 . bad a h in turn a urned a1 cl
· nveyance
acrr d t pay the mortgage debt, . would be th nece ·ary cl f ndant in any action t fore lo e becau e he is th own r of the
land. 1 h mortgagor, A ., and B. woul l be proper d f ndan t ,
becau e they are per onally li, ble for he debt. The m01-tga or'·
liabilit '"a: r ate l by the original in trum nt bond, not or
utl em i
and l lid not become freed. t herefrom becau other
als a um cl it. . . s and . s liability wa ' C"eat d L ' their
voJuntar a umpti n, au l 1 aving be n on
incurred it ould
not be hr :vn off with ut h con ent of h
r ditor. If the
l lain iff th ref re lemand ' a j urlgmen t for lefici nc · an l d ir
t 111< ke hi: . ecurity a c mplet a p ibl h may j in h
mort agar and . and
a co-d f ndant in the uit to for 2
clo:
f the mor gagor ha conv y d his n u int r t and
1

Parties. Administrator and Heirs of Mortgagor. The same prin-

ciple is of universal application, and embraces all successive

grantees of the premises who have made themselves personally

liable for the mortgage debt. Thus, if the mortgagor conveys

the premises to A., who takes them simply burdened by the lien,

but does not assume and agree to pay the debt, and A. after-

wards conveys in the same manner to B., who again conveys to

C. who is the owner when the foreclosure is commenced, A. and

B. are plainly neither necessary nor proper parties; they have

retained no interest in the land, and were never personally re-

sponsible for the debt. If, on the other hand, in this series of

conveyances. A., B., and C. had each in turn assumed and

agreed to pay the mortgage debt, C. would be the necessary de-

fendant in any action to foreclose, because he is the owner of the

land. The mortgagor. A., and B. would be proper defendants,
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because tiiey are personally liable for the debt. The mortgagor's

liability was created by the original instrument, bond, note, or

otherwise, and he did not become freed, therefrom because others

also assumed it. A.'s and B.'s liability was created by their

voluntary assumption, and having been once incurred, it could

not be thrown off without the consent of the creditor. If the

plaintiff therefore demands a judgment for deficiency, and desires

to make his security as complete as possible, he may join the

mortgagor and A. and B. as co-defendants in the suit to fore-

close.^ If the mortgagor has conveyed his entire interest and

' See same cases last citeil. QIii Plan- in several cases, after the repeal of the

kinton v. Hildebraiid (1895), 89 Wis. 20'>, statute, that the legal cause of action on

CI N. \V. 8.')9, the court said : " In the the note or bond could not properly be

aiisence of some statute extendinj^ tlicir joined with the equitable one to fore-

p jwer, courts of equity, in foreclosure close the mortgage, unless both causes

cases, have invariably left the complainant of action affected all the p.arties to the

to his remerly at law for tlie jiart of the action"]

mortirage ilebt not satisfied by the fore- - See same causes last cited. See also

closure and .s;ile. Statutory provisions of Logan v. Smith, 70 Ind 597 ; Scarry v.

the character referred to were adopted in Eldridge, 63 id. 44. QJohns c. Wilson

Wisconsin during its territorial existence, (IS'JS), Ariz. 53 Pac. 583; Hopkins v.

and continued in force until, by the ado))- Warner (1895), 109 Cal. 133, 41 Pac. 868.

tion of tlie code, they were repealed. The One who becomes liable by endorsement

•

T

result wxs tiiat it was held by this court, on note of mortg.\gor may also be joined

•

e

~ame

ca e la t ci e11. [In PlnnllilrlPbra11 I (I !15), 9 Wis. 20'1,
bl ••. \\' . :i~1. th e> (•ourt . ai1l: ' In the
ab-r·1H:e r1f ·0111e ·tatut
xte111li1w 1,heir
}' 1wn, cuurt: uf quity, in forecl ure
t•a e , ha,·e inrnriably 1 ft th omplaiuaut
l

ki11t1m

1· .

J hi: r1·11u:<ly at law for th
part of the
r 1 r''.!ng · 1lr·IJt not ati fi tl by the for ·I uri a111l -alf>. . 'ta ntory p;·oyi·ion: 1Jf
111 rliaractr-r r<!ferr<•u t.o \\"re atlupterl in
\\' i-ron in rluri1w it: t •r ritorial exi .t nee,
and ·0111i1111 •d iu forC'e until, by th· ad<JJ>tiou llf t lie r·<Jd , they w r<' rep al d. Th
r • ult wa that it wa: held by t.lii · con rt,

t

c al 0
Logn11 c. . ' mi th, 70 Iml 597 · • carry t'.
Eldritlg , 63 id. H. [.John 1·. \Yil. on
(I ~. ),
riz. 53 Par. 5 3; IIopkiu 1..'.
Warner (l 95). I 9 al. 133, 41 ac. 6 .
011 · who heconw.· lialJl Ly n<lc r '<'Ill _nt
011 uot of mortg.1gor may al o b • joiuNl
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::2a

afterwards dies, 1 is administrator or executor must be joined as

a defendant if a judgment for deficiency is prayed, and may be

admitted to contest the validity of the mortgage and of the debt

it is given to secure.^ It is even said by some courts that the

personal representative of the deceased mortgagor is a necessary

party defendant with the heirs and widow. ^ When the mort-

gagor dies intestate owning the land, or when any subsequent

owner thus dies, his heirs are indispensable parties ; and if the

objection to their nonjoinder has not been taken, the court will

of its own motion order them to be brought in as defendants.

No effectual decree of sale can be made without them.^

in foreclosure suit : Meehan r. Bank

(1895), 44 Neb. 213, 62 N. W. 490. A.s

to the grantee being subject to an action

at law while a separate suit in etjuity is

afterwards di s, 1 i ac1mini tra tor r executor rnlL't he JOlll d a.
a. lefen<lant if a jnclgm nt for d ficienc ' i.· prayed, an l may lJe
admitted to conte ·t th validity of th mortgag and of the d.e1t
it is given to secure. 1 It i · ven aid by some court' that the
personal repre~entative of the cl cea ·ed mortga.gor is a. nee s. ary
party defendant with the heir and wido' ·. 2 \Vh n the mortgagor dies intes tate owning the land, or when any :uLsequ ut
owner thus di s, his heirs are inc.l isp nsfthl iur:.i 'S; aml if the
objection to their nonjoinder has not been taken, the court
of its own motion order them to be brought in as d fondants .
No effectual decree of sale can be made without them . a

'"ill

ijrosecuted to foreclose the mortgage, see

(iarneau v. Kendall (1901), 61 Neb. 396,

8o N. W. 291 ; Meehan v. Bank (1895),
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44 Neb. 213, 62 N. W. 490.]

1 Huston V. Stringham, 21 Iowa, 36 ;

Darlington v. Effey, 13 Iowa, 177.

^ [ivelsey v. Welch (189C), 8 S. D. 255,

66 N. W. 390; Simon v. Sabb (1899), 56

S. C. 38, 33 S. E. 799, where it is held that

under the act of 1894, making it necessary

to recover judgment for a specific sum

against tlie mortgagor's estate before the

mortgaged property can be sold, the per-

sonal representative of a deceased mort-

gagor is a necessary party.]] Miles r.

Smitli, 22 Mo. 502. If the plaintiff seeks

a ])ersoiial judgment for a deficiency, the

personal representative of a deceased mort-

gagor is of course a necessary defendant ;

but if tiie plaintiff demands no such judg-

ment, and is contented with the security

of the land alone, it seems, the personal

representative is not a necessary party.

Story's Eq. PI. §§ 196, 200; Buncombe

V. Haiisley, 3 P. Wms. 3.33 in.) ; Fell v.

Brown, 2 Bro. C. C. 276; Bradshaw i'-

Outram, 13 Ves. 234. See also Stanley

V. Mather, 31 Fed. Rep. 860 ; Van Schaack

V. Saunders, 32 Hun, 515 ; Munn v. Mar.'^h,

38 N. J. Eq. 410; Eraser r. Bean, 96 N. C.

327 ; Levering v. King, 97 Ind. 130; Hodg-

don V. Heidman, 66 Iowa, 645 ; Hill v.

Townley, 45 Minn. 167 ; Renshaw v. Tay-

lor, 7 Ore. 315. But even if the c(mi-

plaint prays for judgment for a deficiency,

the personal representatives are not neces-

sary iu the sense that their omission will

render tlie complaint demurrable ; for the

prayer is not part of the complaint : so

held in Butler v. Williams, 27 S. C. 221.

[]A devisee and those claiming under him

are necessary parties, as well as the heirs :

Chadbourn i\ Johnston (1896), 119 N. C.

282, 25 S. E. 705.J

3 Muir 1-. Gibson, 8 Ind. 187 ; Story's

Eq. PI. § 196. In North Carolina, when

the mortgagee dies, his heirs are, in gen-

eral, necessary parties plaintiff or defend-

ant ; but there are exceptions, as where

the mortiragee had assigned, and died in-

solvent, leaving non-resident heirs. Ethe-

ridge v. Veruoy, 71 N. C. 184, 186, 187.

See also Retishaw v. Taylor, 7 Ore. 315

in foreclos ure suit: Meehan v. Bank sary iu the ense that their omis ion will
(1895), .J4
eb. 213, 62 N. W. 490. As reuder the complaint demurrable; for the
ro the grantee be ing subj ect to an action prayer is not part of the complaint: o
at law while a separate sui t in equity is held in Butler v. William , 2i S. C. 2:::1.
prosecuted to foredose the mortgage, see [A devisee and tho e claimiug und er him
Garneau v. Kendall (1 901 ), 61 Neb. 39G, are uecessar y parties, as well as the heirs :
5 N. W. 291; Meehan v . Bank (1895), Cha<luourn u. J oh1rton (IS!JG), 119 K . C.
282, 25 S. E. i05. J
4-1- Neb 213, 62 N. W. 490.J
1 Huston v. Stringham, 21 fowa, 36;
3 Muir v. Giuson, 8 lull. 1 7; Story's
Eq. P l. § 196. In North Carolina, wh en
Darlin gton v. Effey, 18 Iowa, 177.
:i [Kel ·ey v. W elch (1 89G), 8 S. D . 255,
the mortgagee dies, his hei rs are, in gen66 N. W . 300; Simon v . Sabb (1899), 56 eral, necessary parties plain tiff or defend. C. 38, 33 S. E. 799, where it is h eld that aut; uut there are exceptions, as where
uuder the act of 189-1-, rnaking it necessary the mor t)!agee had assigued, a nd died inol ve11t, leaving non-r esiden t heirs. Etheto recover judgment for a • pecific um
again . t t he mortgagor' estate before the ridge v. Veruoy, 71 N. C. 184, 1 6, 18i.
mortgaged property can be sold , th e per- See also RenP.haw 11. Taylor, 7 Ore. 3 I 5
onal represe ntative of a deceased mort- (hei rs neces ary with the aL1miuistrator) ;
gagor i~ a n ecessa ry part.v.] }.files 1·. Zoge r v. Ruster, 5 l W i . 32 (heirs nece 8mith, 22 Mo. 502. If the plaintiff eek'> sary); Hill v. T own ley, 45 Minn. 167
a perso 11al judgment for a deficiency, the (sam e) ; P illow v. ,' entelle, 39 Ark. 6 1
p erso nal re presentative of a deceaP.ed mort· (same); D eForestv. Holum,38Wis. 516
gago r is of coun;e a necessary defemlaut; ( <le\·isee of decea ·ed vend ee in forec lo nre
but if t he plaintiff deman d. no such jud g- of the vendor's lien); l!ib ruia S::t\·. &:,
m en t, and is contented with the ecurity L oan Soc. v. Herbert, 53 Cal. 3 :- .J ( mortof the land alone, it see ms, the personal gagor conveyed to a grantee an.J t1 ihl , 1.0
r epresentative is n ot a n ecessary party. judgrne11t for a deficic ncy h<•iJJg a:>kcil,
Story's Eq. Pl. §§ 196, 200; Duncombe hi administrator is n >t a uec:es.-ary dev. Hn.n sley, 3 P. Wm s. 333 (n.) ; Fell v. fendant). In Harsh v. Griffin, 72 Iowa,
Brown, 2 Bro. C. C. 276; Bradshaw V· 608, it was held that the failure to join
Outram, 13 V es. 234. See al o Stanley the heirs does not render the foreclosure
v. Mather, 31 Feel. Rep. 60 ; Van chaack sale wholly void; thei r only ri ght i-; to
v. Saunders, 32 Hun, 515; l\Iunn v. MarP.h, redeem. L'uder the statute of .Missouri
38 N. J. Eq. 410; Fraser 1·. Bean, 96 X C. and of California the personal r epr c~cnt
327; Lovering v. King, 97 Ind. 130; H odg- atiYe is t;rn only nece . nry defeudant;
don v. H eidman, 66 Iowa, 645 ; Hill v. Tierne,1· v. Spirn, 97 Mo. 9 ; Hall i·. ElepTownley, 45 Iinn. 167; R enshaw v. Tay- zig, 99 l\fo. 3; Bayly v. J\Iuehe, 65 Cal.
lor, 7 Or e. 315. But even if the com- .'345. [It is not nee · ary to join th e heirs
pl aint prays for judgment fo r a deficiency, of n dec:easec1 mortgagor: Dickey v. Gibth e per onal representatives are not nece - son (1 9 ) , 121 Cal. 27G, 5.3 Pac. 704.
0
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§ 235. * 338. Personal Representative of Owner of Mortgaged

Premises Necessary Party in California. Judgment Creditors of Mort-

gagor. Assignor of Secured Debt. Ill California, the personal repre-

sentative of a deceased person sncceeds at once to all lands as

well as personal property ; the title vests in him for purposes of

administration ; and if an owner of mortgaged land dies, his ex-

ecutor or administrator is therefore an indispensable party defend-

ant.^ A mortgagor having conveyed the land to assignees in

trust for the benefit of creditors, judgment creditors whose judg-

ments were recovered subsequent to such assignment, and which

were therefore not direct liens on tlie land, were held to be proper

parties defendant in an action brought to foreclose the mortgage

against the mortgagor and the trustees. These trustees having

suffered a default, the judgment creditors were permitted to in-

tervene and to contest the validity of the mortgage and of the

debt which it secured by setting up usury .2 The general proposi-

tion was announced by the court, that the cestuis que trustent are

proper defendants as well as the trustees. When a mortgage was

given to secure a note payable to the order of the mortgagee, and
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the latter indorsed and transferred the note and assigned the

mortgage, the assignee cannot maintain an action against the

mo)'tgagor and maker of the note, and the indorser of the note

(the mortgagee), to foreclose the mortgage and to ol)tain judg-

ment asrainst both for either the whole amount of the note or for

the deficiency. A legal action may be brought against both on

the note, but a foreclosure must be against the mortgagor alone.^

This last rule is exactly otherwise in Minnesota by virtue of an

express statute. If the mortgage debt is secured by the obliga-

tion of any person other than the mortgagor, he may be joined as

a defendant in the foreclosure suit, and a judgment for deficiency

may be rendered against him alone, or jointly with the mortgagor,

as the case may be.*

The heirs and devisees of a deceased ment will result prejudicially to the estate,

mortn;a<?or are necessary parties : Wall v. a necessary party.]

McMillan (189.'j), 44 S. C. 402, 22 S. E. - Union Hank of Masillon v. Bell, 14

424.] Ohio St. 200. |[But see Sidney Stevens

' Harwood v. Marve, 8 Cal. 580. It is Implement Co. c. Improvement Co. (1899),

held that the heirs of the deceased mort- 20 Utaii 267, 58 Pac. 843, where it was

gagor ar<? not necessary parties. Bayly held tiiat the trustees of a deed of trust

V. Mueliu, G5 Cal. .'545. [|Sec Kelsey c. were not ueces.sary ])arties in an action to

Welch (1890), 8 S. I). 255, 66 N. W. 390, foreclose the same.]

where tlie heirs were lield proper parties, ■'' Sand.* v. Wood, 1 luwa, 26.1.

and the aiministrator, wliere the judg- ■* Nichols v. Kandall, 5 Minn. 304, 308.

235. ·· 33 '"' . Personal Representative of Owner of Mortgaged
Premises Necessary Party in California. Judgment Creditors of Mort-

In alifornia, the per. onal r preas
entatiY • of < decea 'ed per~on ncce d at nee to all lan
w 11 a. per onal property· be titl v t in him for pmpo ' es of
admini 'trati n; and if an owner of mort ·ag d land die hi executor r admini 'trator i herefor an indi. p n ble party defendant.1
morto·a0 or havino- con eyed the land t a ignee m
tru'tf rthebenefitof ere 'tor",jud mentcreditor who judgment
ere r coYered subsequent to such a ignment, and whi h
w re therefore not direct lien · on the land, wer held t be pr per
par ie def ndant in an action brought to foreclo e th mort a e
again t the mortgagor and the tru tee . The e tru tee · ha ing
uffered a d fault, the judgment reditor were permitted to interven and to conte"t the validity of the mortgag and f th
debt which it ecured b3 . etting up u ury. 2 The general Ir I :ition wa announced by the court, that the cestuis que trustt>nt , re
proper defendant: a well as the trustee . When a mortga, ·e wa'
giYen t ·ecure a n te payable to the order of the mortgao- , and
the latter indor ed and transferr d the n te and a . igne
he
mortgage, the a ignee cannot maintain an action again. t the
m rtO'agor and mak r of he note, and the iudor er of the note
(the mortgagee), to foreclo e the mortgage and to obtain jud0 ment again t both f r either he whole am unt of the note r f r
the d fi iency. A legal action ma. be brou ht again t ho h n
th n te bnt a foreclo ure mu t l again t the mortgagor al ne.3
Thi la:t Tule i exactly o berwi e in Minne ·ota by irtue of an
ex r
tatute. If the mortgag debt i ecured by the bli ·ation of any per. on other than he m rtgag r he may be j in d a
a defendant in h foreclo. ur ui , and a judgment for d fi i n y
may b rendered again ·t him alone, or j intly with the mortg~ r,
a· the a·e may be. 4
gagor.

A ssignor of Secured Debt.

nrnrtgagor are ne e ary partie : Wall i:.
~ff':\lillau (I 95),4+ ' . . 402, 22 •·. E.
42+.J
1 Harwood v. :'If arve,
al. 5 0. I t i
hr•ld that th heir:
the <le<' a "e<l mortgagor ar•· 11ot nece ary par t ies.
ayly
. • Iuehc, G:> al :J4-:-. [.' e Kel ·ey 1· .
lch (I !Hi). ' ' D. 255, 66 ,_T _ W . 390,
wh11re th<' licir: w1·re held pr per part.i · ·,
an1l till' a lnii11i. rat1J1', wher Lhc judg-

,;r
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§ 236. * 339. Special Statutes Making Assignor of a Thing in

236.
Action a Necessary Party- The special provisions ill the codcs of

some States requiring the assignor of a thing in action to be made

a defendant under certain circumstances in a suit by the assignee,

affects the general doctrine as to parties in forech)Sure actions in

those States. These provisions, it will be remembered, require

the assignor to be made a party " when the thing in action is not

assignable by indorsement," or when it is not a negotiable instru-

ment, or when the assignment is not expressly authorized by

statute so as to transfer the legal title to the assignee. It has

been held in States where these provisions are in force, that if a

mortgage is given to secure a negotiable note, and this note is

transferred in the usual manner by indorsement, although there

is no written assignment of the mortgage, the assignor need not

be made a defendant. The transfer of the note by indorsement

carries v^ath it the title to the mortgage, and the assignee thus

becomes legal owner of both by a form and mode of transfer

which permits the action to be brought mthout the assignor as

a party defendant.^ On the otlier hand, if the mortgage alone is
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assigned by a written transfer, while the evidence of the debt, for

example a bond, is merely transferred by delivery, the assignor,

who might be the mortgagee, is a necessary defendant under the

provision above referred to.^ This decision would undoubtedly

embrace all cases where the instrument which is the principal evi-

dence of debt, whether bond or negotiable note, unless the latter

be payable to bearer, is transferred by delivery merely. If a note,

secured by mortgage is payable to bearer, so that the legal title

will pass by mere delivery, it would seem the assignor need not be

made a defendant. Such a note being negotiable, the case falls

directly within the language of the provision as it is found in

several codes.

§ 237. * 840. "Where Holder of less than all of a Series of Notes

Secured by same Mortgage brings Foreclosure Suit. When a mort-

gage is given to secure a series of notes made by the mortgagor,

'■ Gower (,". Howe, 20 lud. 396. Mort- closed by the assignee without making the

gagees who have assigned their entire assignor a party, the latter may redeem

interest are not necessary parties. Pullen upon payment of his debt. Re Gilbert's

V. Heron Min. Co., 71 N. C. 567 ; Smythe Est., 104 N. Y. 200. QSee Styers v. Als-

V Brown, 25 S. C. 89. It is held in New paugh (1896), 118 N. C. 631, 24 S. E.422.]

York that where the mortgage has been - Holdridge v. Sweet, 23 Ind. 118;

assigned by the mortgagee as collateral French v. Turner, 15 Ind. 59. See Kittle

security for his own debt, and is fore- v. Van Dyck, 1 Saudf. Ch. 76.

* 339.

Special Statutes Making Assignor of a Thing in

The sr ecial provision in the CO(lcs of
'om ~tate requiring the a io·nor of a. thin in action to be made
a cl fendant under certain ircum 'tance in , ·nit by the a signee,
affect, the general loctrine a to pa1ties in for clo ur action· in
tho ·e tate . The e provi ion , it will be rem mber d, r quire
th a ignor to be made a party " when the thing in action i not
a' ignable by indor ement," or when it i not a negotiable in trument, or when the a signment is not expre sly authorized by
statute so as to transfer the legal title to the as ignee. It has
been held in States where these provisions are in force, that if a
mortgage is given to secure a negotiable note, and thi note is
tran £erred in the usual manner by indorsement, although there
i · no written assignment of the mortgage, the assignor need not
be made a defendant. The tran fer of the note by indor. ement
carries with it the title to the mortgage, and the assignee thus
become legal owner of both by a form and mode of transfer
which permits the action to be brought without the assignor as
a party defendant. 1 On the other hand, if the mortgage alone is
assigned by a written transfer, while the evidence of the debt, for
example a bond, is merely transferred by delivery, the as:::;ignor,
who might be the mortgagee, is a necessary defendant under the
provi ion above referred to. 2 Thi decision would undoubtec)ly
embrace all cases where the in. trument which is the principal evidence of debt, whether bond or negotiable note, unless the latter
be payable to bearer, is transferred by delivery merely. If a note.
secured by mortgage i payable to bearer, so that the legal title
will pass by mere delivery, it would seem the assignor need not be
made a defendant. Such a note being negotiable, the case falls
directly within the language of the provision as it is found in
'everal codes.
§ 237. * 340 ,' Where Holder o f less than all of a Series o f N ates
Secured by same M o rtgage b rings For eclosure Suit. When a mortaage i given to secure a series of notes made by the mortgagor,
Action a Necessary Party.

i Gower v. Howe, 20 Ind. 396.
~Iort
<Yagee who have a._signed their entire
i ntere t are not nece ary partie . Pullen
,,_ Heron Min. Co., 71 N. C. 567; mythe
v Brown, 25 S . C. 9. It is held in New
York that '"here the mortgage has been
a signed by the mortgagee as collateral
erurity for his own debt, aud i fore-

closed by the a ignee without making the
assignor a party, the latter may redeem
upon payment of hi debt. Re Gilbert's
Est., 104 N. Y. 200. [ ' e tyers v. Al paugh {l 96), 11 N. C. 631, 24 . E. 422.J
2 Holdridge v. , weet, 2.'3 Ind. 118;
French v. Turner, 15 Ind. 59. See Kittle
v . Van Dyck, 1 autlf. h. 76.
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having different periods of time to run, as, for example, one, two

haYincr diff ren erio 1 f im t run, a for xam 1 on two
an l thr e y ars the pr ce
f the 1, n 1 wh n lcl upon f re1 ur ar t b appli cl t th I a m n
f the e note in he
n l r in " ·hi ·h t h · fall lu · th, t i , th c n will h fir fall ' lu
i · t l> paicl in full and the urplu , if , n r
f the econd an
on. If the mort < e
0f ·uch not
and r tains h o her , or if the n
a · icrn cl to liff r nt p l " n , th hold r "' unno unit
ptlintiff, in c n a ti n
forecl e b
the debt ha l> en
-=·e \· r cl an l their intere. ts are
I a.Tat am l di tine . , ilher
hold r. ho" e,· r may bring an acti n t foreclo , and ma' make
the oth r holler ( r hold r ) defendant, and uch lef ndant an
et ur hi ribht in hi an wer. The fact beino- tbu
., nt d,
the decree can ad.ju t he variou intere t and
f the
cliff rent holder and apportion the pr vevd accordincr
he
prioritie . The f regoing rule are e..,btbli hed in Iowa.1
.• 238. : -±1 . Occupa nt of Premis es as P arty. Averments of Peti·
tion as to each Person M a de Defen dant . An occupant of th
tha i" a per ·on in po e ion without alleging h title t
in
hi m elf i not a nece ary par · hi right , ho we' er wha Yet'
t hey m ty be, will n t be affected by the d cree in a uit t "hich
he \Y a n made a def ndant. 2 The complaint or petition mu
all e m r : p ct of ev ry per on ma le a defendant, that he ha
or ·h in
me intere ·t advere to the plaintiff or that h i ., a

and three years, the proceeds of the Land when sold upon fore-

closure are to be applied to the payment of these notes in the

order in which they fall due ; that is, the one which first falls due

is to be paid in full, and the surplus, if any, goes to the payment

of the second, and so on. If the mortgagee assigns one or more

of such notes, and retains the others, or if the notes are separately

assigned to different persons, the holders cannot unite as co-

plaintiffs in an action to foreclose, because the debt has been

severed and their interests are separate and distinct. Either

holder, however, may bring an action to foreclose, and may make

the other holder (or holders) defendant, and such defendant can

set up his rights in his answer. The facts being thus presented,

the decree can adjust the various interests and equities of the

different holders, and apportion the proceeds according to the

priorities. The foregoing rules are established in lowa.^

§ 238. * 341. Occupant of Premises as Party. Averments of Peti-

tion as to each Person Made Defendant. An occupant of the land,

that is, a person in possession without alleging the title to be in
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Idmself, is not a necessary party; his rights, however, whatever

they may be, will not be affected by the decree in a suit to which

he was not made a defendant.^ The complaint or petition must

allege, in respect of every person made a defendant, that he has

or claims some interest adverse to the plaintiff, or that he is a

1 Kankin v. Major, 9 Iowa, 297. It was uot raised. In the recent case, how-

must he confessed this is a sacrifice of ever, of Guthrie v. Treat (190:i), — Neb.

suhstance to form. If the assignee may — , 92 N. W. 595, iu au ehil)orate and well

have affirmative relief as a defendant, it rea-soned opinion in which the rule in Ran-

is difficult to see any substantial reason kin v. Major (siijira), aud the similar ca.^e

why he should not l)e permitted to join of Swenson i,-. Plow Co., 14 Kau. 387, is

as plaintiff in the first instance. For a thoroughly discussed, the court holds that

statement of the varying rules on the sub- under the facts of this case a joinder is

ject of mortgages to secure several notes, proper. The Iowa and Kansas rule is

see .'{ I'om. Eq. Jur. §§ 1200-120.3. See explained on tjie iiasis of the different

also Johnston v. McDuffee, 83 Cal. 30; methods of procedure in foreclosure in

Studcbaker Bros. Man. Co. c. McCargur, those States. But in Bacon v. O'Keefe

l H ankin 1·.
Iowa, 29 /. It
mru t 11 eoufe
a a rifice of
nh ·tan"e o fo r m. If t h a::;. ig n · may
Jia,·e affirrnati' P r el i f a a tlefe11 dant, it
i~ <liffi cnlt to ee a ny
u b:tant ia l r a o n

20 Neb. 500. (1896), 13 Wash. 6.55, 43 Pac. 886, that

\_h was held in the following Ne- court held that a joinder was not only

bra-ska cases that the holders of the proper but necessary, ami refused to Ssanc-

different notes .secured by the mortgage tion the rnle in Burnett v. Hoffman

might maintain separate actions of fore- {.supra). "2

closure: Todd r. Cremer (1893), 36 Neb. - Suiter v. Turner, 10 Iowa, 517. See

430, 54 N. W. 674; Burnett v. Hoffman liichardson v. Iladsall, 106 111. 476. That

(1894), 40 Neb. 569, 58 N. W. 1134; Sloan he is a proper party, see Buyter r. Keid,

V. Thoma« (1899), 58 Neb. 713, 79 N. W. 121 N. Y. 498 (motion for rehearing de-

728, but the question of the right to join nied, Oct. 14, 1890, 25 N. K. 377).

•
:!O , "eh . .ilJO

ll wa..; hel <l in th frillnwi11g • • .
br. ka "a e that the hol1lr>r: eof thP
. eeurc·d liy th irwrt~age
rni~h 111ai11 ai11 . parat action <Jf fori!1 ur: '! od d 1·. Cremer {I !13), :3G .T•b.
3o ,:; • T. \V. J74 B urnett 11. Jlriffi11a11
( I . 4 ) , 0 .. "d1. j f, !I, 5 ·' \\ . I 134; . 'loan
t'. 'I hom:
(1 !I') ,:; •• b. 713, i' ~I • -. W .
12 , Lm the <JU • lion 1if hr• ri <rh to join
•

court h e ld t hat a join d r wa n ot nl.'·
prop<'r lmt n '<' <; ·ar.L a n rl r fu eel t o. :rnrtion thr> rn le in Bu rn •tt v. Il offman

(s11pm) .]
~ , nitP r i• . Tnrn Pr , l
Iowa , 51 i' . , et'
Hicharrl : on t. Ifad all, 1 G Tl! -!i G. T hat
h e i a pr pe r pa r ty, ~eP l II \ lt'r ,. He:irl,
121 • •. Y. 49 (motion fu r r ·h aring d uiccl, 0<'t. 14 , I ~10, 25 _•. E. :3 1;) .
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necessary party to a complete settlement of the questions involved

in the controversy. A clofendant concerning whom no sueli aver-

ment is made may demur for want of sufficient facts. ^ Parties

remotely and contingently interested in the result, although lia\'-

ing no estate in or lien on the land, may be proper defendants in

order to protect their rights and to effect the settlement of the

questions.^

^ 239. *3-12. Subsequent and Prior Incumbrancers as Parties.

Husband in Case of Mortgage on Wife's Land. It is a rule univer-

sally established that all subsequent incumbrancers, who are

holders of general or specific liens on the land, whether mort-

gagees, judgment creditors, or whatever be the nature of the lien

if it can be enforced against the land, are not necessary parties in

the sense that their presence is indispensable to the rendition of a

decree of sale ; but they are necessary parties defendant to the

recovery of a judgment which shall give to the purchaser there-

under a title free from their liens and incumbrances. If they are

not joined as defendants, their rights are unaffected ; their liens

remain undisturbed and continue upon the land while in the
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hands of the purchaser ; and they retain the right of redemption

from the holder of the mortgage before the sale, and from the

purchaser after the sale.^ It is not, in general, considered that

1 Martin v. Noble, 29 lud. 216. It is 288, 293; Newcomb v. Dewey, 27 Iowa,

not necessaiy to allege auy particular in- 381 ; Auson v. Anson, 20 Iowa, 55 ; Ten

terest. A general averment, as stated in Eyck ;■. Casad, 15 Iowa, 524 ; Knowles v.

tlie text, is sufficient in respect to all the Kahlin, 20 Iowa, 101 ; Chase c. Abbott,

defendants, except those against whom a 20 Iowa, 154; Street v. Beal, 16 Iowa, 68;

personal judgment is asked, and those who Ileimstreet v. Winnie, 10 Iowa, 430;

are owners of the land. See Anthony v. Veacli v. Schaup, 3 Iowa, 194 ; Bates v.

Nye, 30 Cal. 401 ; Sichler y. Look, 93 Cal. Ruddick, 2 Iowa, 423; Hayward v.

600 r Carpenter v. Ingalls (S. Dak. 1892), Stearns, 39 Cal. 58, 60; Green v. Dixon,

51 N. W. 948. [McKibben v. Worthing- 9 Wis. 532 ; Story's Eq. PI. § 193 ; Haines

ne s cry party t a omr 1 te ettl m nt f th qncsti n inv lved
in th
ntrover ·y. A cl f ndant cone ming whom n . u ·h av rm n t is mad may demur for want of :uffici nt fact .1 Parti ~
rnmot ly and ontin ntly intere tecl in the re~ulL, alth ucrh 11< \'ing no tate in or lien on the lancl, may b pr l er lefernlan t · in
rcler to l rotect th ir right' and to effect th ettlement of the
que i n .2
' 239. *3-±2. Subsequent and P ri o r Incumbrancers as Parties.
Husba nd in Case of Mortgage o n W ife 's L and.
It is a rule univerally e tabli 'hed that all sub equent incumbrancer , who ar
holder ' of general or specific lien ' on the land, whether mortgagees, judgment creditor , or whatever be the nature of the lien
if it can be enforced against the land, are not nece ary parties in
the ense that their presence is indispensable to the rendition of a
decree of sale; but they are nece ary partie ' defendant to th
recovery of a judgment which shall give to the purcha er thereunder a title free from their liens and incumbrances. If they are
not joined as defendants, their rights are unaffected; their liens
remain undi turbed and continue upon the land while in tl1
hands of the purchaser; and they retain the right of r~clemp tion
from the holder of the mortgage before the sale, and from th
purchaser after the sale.3 It is not, in general, con iclered that

ton's Ex'r (1898), 103 Ky. 356, 45 S. W. v. Beach, 3 Johns. Ch. 459; Draper v.

233; Commonwealth v. Robinson (1895), Lord Clarendon, 2 Veru. 518; Lomax v.

96 Ky. 5.53, 29 S. W. 306.] Hide, 2 ^'ern. 186; Godfrey v. Chadwell,

'^ See, as illustrations, Johnson v. Brit- 2 Vern. 601 ; Morret v. Westerne, 2 A^ern.

ton, 23 Ind. 105; Parrott v. Hughes, 10 663; Rolleston i;. Morton, 1 Dr. & W. 171 ;

Iowa, 459. Such persons are not, how- Besser v. Hawthorne, 3 Ore. 129; Par-

ever, necessary parties : United States dee v. Steward, 37 Hun, 259 ; Douthit r.

Trust Co. of N. Y. v. Roche, 116 N. Y- Hipp, 23 S. C. 205; Hensley v. Whiffin,

120, 130. 54 Iowa, 555 ; Stanbrough v. Daniels, 77

3 Kay r. Whittaker, 44 N. Y. 565. 572 ; Iowa, 561; Williams v. Brownlee, 101

Bloomer v. Sturges, 58 N. Y. 168; Rath- Mo. 309; De Lashmutt v. Sellwood, 10

bone V. Hooney, 58 N. Y. 463 ; Gaines r. Ore. 319; Johnson v. Hosford (lud., 1887),

Walker, 16 Ind. 361 ; Proctor r. Baker, 10 N. E. 407. See, however, per contra,

15 lud. 178; Wright v. Howell, 35 Iowa, Morris v. Wheeler, 45 N. Y. 708, — a

1 Martin v. Noble, 29 Ind. 216.
It is
not nece ary to allege any particular int e re t. A general averment, a stated in
the text, i · sufficient in respect to all the
defendant , except those against whom a
personal judgment i a ked, and those who
are owner of the land. See Anthony v.
Nye, 30 Cal. 401; Sichler v. L ook, 93 Cal.
600: Carpenter v. Ingalls (S. Dak. 1 9:!),
51 N. W. 9t . [McKibben v. Worthington' Ex'r (1898), 103 Ky. 356, 45 S. W.
2:33: Commonwealth v. Robin on (1895),
96 Ky. 553, 29 . W . 306.J
2 'ee, as illustrations, Johnson 11. Britton , 23 Ind. l 05 ; Parrott v. Hughes, 10
Iowa, 459. Such per ons are not, howtates
ever, nece ary parties: Unitf'd
Tru t Co. of N. Y. v. Roche, 116 N. y,
120, 130.
a Kay r. Whittaker, 4.J. N . Y. !56:5. 572;
Bloomer v. Sturge , 58 N. Y. 16 ; ] athbone v. Hooney, 58 N. Y. 46.3 ; Gaine 1·.
Walker , 16 Ind. 36 1 ; P roctor 1 . Baker,
l 5 I ud. 178; Wright v. Howell, 35 Iowa,

28 , 293; Newcomb v. Dewey, 27 Iowa,
38 L ; Auson v. Anson, 20 Iowa, 55 ; Ten
Eyck 1-. Casad, 15 Iowa~ 524; Knowle v.
Rablin, 20 Iowa, 101 ; Cha e c. Abbott,
20Iowa, 154; Stree tt'. B eal, 16 Iowa,6 ;
Heim treet v. Winnie, 10 Iowa, 430;
V eaeh v. Schaup, 3 Iowa, 194 ; Bate v.
Ruddick, 2 Iowa, 423; Hayward v.
f\tearn , 39 Cal. 5 , 60; Green v. Dixon,
9 Wi . 532; tory' Eq . Pl.§ 193 ; Haines
v. Beach, 3 John s. Ch. 459; Draper v.
Lord Clarendon, 2 Vern. 51 ; Lomax 1:.
Hide, 2 Yem. l 6; Godfrey v. Chadwell,
2 Vern. 601; 1orr t v. vVesterne, 2 Yern.
663; R ollestonv.l\1ortou, l Dr. & W.171 ;
R e ser 1>. Hawthorn e, 3 Ore. 129; Pnrdee v. , teward , 37 Hun, 259; D outhit r.
Hipp, 23 S. C. 205; Hen ley v. Whiffin,
5.J. Iowa, 555; .. tanbrough v. Daniel , 77
Iowa, 561; William v. Brownlee, 101
Mo. 309; De Lashmutt v. ellwood, 10
Ore. 319; Johnson v. Ho for d (In d., 18 7),
10 r . E. 407.
ee, however, per contra,
M orris v. Wheeler, 45 N. Y. 708, - a
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prior incumbrancers are even proper defendants, for as their liens

are paramount to the mortgage, they cannot be in any manner

affected by the action or the decree therein. ^ It is said in Iowa,

however, tliat they are proper parties.^ If a mortgage is given

by a liusband and wife on hinds whicli are her separate estate, he

is a necessary co-defendant with his wife, except in the very few

States whose statutes expressly exclude him in actions having

reference to the wife's separate propert}'. If he united with the

wife in the note, bond, or other obligation secured by the mort-

clearly erroneous decision. The holder

of an interest in the laud not adverse or

paramount to the mortgage, but also not

rior incu mbrancer · are eyen rop r d fenclant for a th ir lien
are paramount to the mortgage they cann b m
affect d b. - the action or the clecre therein .1 It i
ho\Y Y r. that th y are 1 r per parti 2 If a m r
by a hu b1. ncl and wif on land \d1ich are h r parat
i a nece · ·;uT co-d f ncla.nt with hi~ wif
:x: l t in th Yery fe,,tate who "e tatute · x1 re ·ly x ·luc.le him in acti n haYing
ref rence to the wif ·. e1 arate pro1 erty. If he united wi b he
wife in the note bond or oth r obligation ec ired by the mor -

subject to it, may be made a party de-

fendant. Brown v. Volkenning, 64 X. Y.

76, 84. As to the proper relief against

persons holding subsequent interests, see

Heath v. Silverthoru Lead Miu. Co, 39

Wis. 146. Q)sborn v. Logus (1895), 28
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Ore. 306, 42 Pac. 997 ; Gammon v. John-

son (1900), 126 N. C. 64, 3.5 S. E. 18.5;

Williams v. Kerr (1893), 113 N. C. 306,

18 S. E. 501. In Gaines v. Childers (1901),

38 Ore. 200, 63 Pac. 487, the court said :

" If encumbrancers are not made parties

to a suit to foreclose a lien, they are, of

course, in no respect bound by the decree

or proceeding thereunder; but the decree

itself is valid, and vests in the purcliaser

the legal title to tiie premises, and the

right, in a proper proceeding, to compel

such lien creditors to redeem."

A purcha.'ser at a sheriff's sale, where

land is sold under the execution of a judg-

ment junior in lieu to a mortgage thereon,

and who seeks to refer for the security of

his title to a judgment senior to such

mortgage, is a proper party to the fore-

closure of the mortgage : Baura f. Tran-

tham (1895). 45 S. C. 291, 23 S. C. 54.]

1 Story's Eq. PI. § 193; Rose v. Page,

2 Sim. 471 ; Delabere i'. Norwood, 3

Swanst. 144 (n.) ; Wakeman i;. Grover,

4 Paige, 23 ; Parker v. Fuller, 1 Russ. &

My. 656 ; Hagan v. Walker, 14 How.

U. S. 37 ; Ricliards v. Cooper, 5 Beav.

304 ; Arnold v. Bainbrigge, 2 De G., F. &

J. 92; Aud.^ley v. Horn, 26 Beav. 195;

1 De G., F. & J. 226; Person f. Merrick,

5 Wis. 231 ; Wright ?>. Bandy. 11 Ind.398;

Rathbone r. H«.oney, 58 N. Y. 463; Je-

rome V. .McCarier, 94 U. S. 734 ; Wabafh,

St. L. & P. Ry. Co. V. Central Trust Co. of

N. Y., 22 Fed. Rep. 138. As to whether

they are proper though not necessary

defendants, see Warren v. Burtou, 9 S. C.

197 ; Baas v. Chicago & N. W. Ry. Co., 39

Wis. 296 ; Emigrant L Sav. Bk". v. Gold-

man, 75 X. Y. 127 ; Lockman v. Reilly, 95

N. Y. 64 ; Hinsou v. Adrian, 86 X. C". 61 ;

Harwell v. Lehman, 72 Ala. 344 ; Foster

V. Johnson & Trowbridge, 44 Minn. 290;

First Xat. Bk. of Salem r. Salem Capital

Flour Mills Co., 31 Fed. Rep. 580.

£iiee, on the contrary, Van Loben Sels

V. Bunnell (1901), 131 Cal. 489, 63 Pac.

773, where the court said : " There is no

doubt of the jurisdiction of the court to

adjudicate the claims of a prior encum-

clearly erroneous deci ion. The boliler
of an intere t in the Janel not adver ·e or
paramount to .the mort age, but al o not
ubject to it, may be made a party defendant. Brown r. olkenning, 64 X. Y.
i6, 4. A to the proper relief again t
per on holding ub eq ueut intere t , ee
Heath t'. ih·erthoru Lead Min. o, 39
\Vi . 146. [O born v. Logu · (1 95), 2
re. 306, 42 Pac. 997; Gammon v. Johnon (1900), 126 :N. C. 64, 35 . E. 1 .- ;
William v. Kerr {l 93), 113 ~- C. 306,
1
.E.501. InGaine v. hilder (1901),
3 Ore. 200, 63 Pac. 4 i, the court . aid :
"If encumbrancer are not made partie
to a uit to foreclo e a lien, they are, of
cour e, in no re pect bonn<l by the d cree
or proceedino- thereunder; but th d cree
it elf i~ valid aml ve~t in the purcha. er
the le al title to the premi e , and the
right, in a proper proceeding, to compel
uch lien creditor to redeem."
A purcha er at a heriff' ale, where
land i ol<l under the execution of a judgment junior in lien to a mortgage thcr on
and who eek to refer for the .ecurity of
his title to a judo-ment enior t
uch
mortgao-e, i. a proper part\' to the foreclo ure of the mortgage: Baum v. Trantham (I 95). 4-5 '. . 291, 23 . C. 54.]
1 :"tor}' Eq. Pl. § 193 ; Ro e v. l}age,
2 • irn. 471; Delahere v. Xorwood, 3
r ver,
·wan t. 144 (n.); Wak man v.
-~ l'aige, 2.'3 ; l'arker v. Fuller l Ru . &
. Iy. 636; Hao-an i•. Walk r, 14 How.
U . . . 3i; Hid1ard 1•. ooµ r, 5 B a'··
304 ; A rwiJ.l '" Bain brigge, 2 D
., I'. &
.1. !12; Au<l~lr-y t'. Iluru, 26 B av 195;
I ,,, n, F . . ,J. 226; I' r~on I'. ~I rrick,
5 \\'j . J'j) ; \\'ri~ht 1•. Bawhc 11 lllll. :J!I ;
Ha hbu11 · 1•. Ilno11,·y, 5 •• • Y. 4G:3; ,J rolllc 1•.• l C.Lrtr;r, ~4 t:.,.·. 734, \ alJa.h,

t. L. & P. Ry. Co. v Central Tru t Co. of
N. Y. 22 Fed. Hep. 13 . A to whether
they are proper though not nece ar
defendant , e Warren v. Burton, 9 . C.
l9i; Baa v. hi ago & X W. Ry. Co., 39
Wi . 296; Emigrant I . av. Bk. v. oldman, i5 ~~. Y. 12i; L oc kman 1-. Reillr 95
. Y. 64; IJin on t•. Adrian, 6 ... . C~ 61;
Harwell v. Lehman, 72 Ala. 344; Fo ter
v. John on & Trowbridge, 44 i\linn. 290;
Fir t :Sat. Bk. of alem v. 'alem Capital
Flour i\lill · o., 31 Fed. Rep. 5 0.
[ 'ee, on the contrary, Yan Loben el
v. Bunn 11 (l 901) 13 I al. 4 9 63 Pac.
7i3, where th court aid: "There i no
doubt of the juri diction of the court to
adjudicate the !aim of a prior encumbrauc r if mad a party.
n h ncumbrancer are not nece ary parti ·, but
they are alway proper partie., and it i
good practice to join them for the purpo e
of liquidating their claim . Whenever a
prior encumbrancer i made a party, it i
hi. right to file a cro . -complaint to forelo·e bi lien." T the ame effect ee al o
Gammon v. John on (1900), 126 X . . 64,
35 '. E. 1 5; Jacobi v. Mi kle (1 94),
l-lc4 k-. Y. 237, 39 :r. E. 66, wh re a pri r
ncumbranc r wa made a party and
u!Ter d default, and wa h ld t be barr d
chcreby from foreclo. iug hi morto-ao-e.
Prior n umbranc r · may b mad pnrti
fur th purpo of determining the amount
and rank of their lien': .1li~souri, tc .
Tru t o. v. l icharcl on (l 99), 5i N h.
61 i, i ,. -. W. 273. Hel<l proper but not
nec:e . ary parti
lobe Loan & Tru t
u. i·. Eller ( l l ), l i\eb. 2:l6, 5 ~. W.
4 .]
2 • 'tancli h 1·. Dow, 21 Iowa 363; II mtr et,._ \Viuui , 10 Iowa, -t30.
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gage, he is a proper defendant in Minnesota, for the further

reason that a judgment for deficiency may be rendered against

him in the action.^

§ 240. *343. Joinder of Wife of Mortgagor. In regard tO the

necessity or propriety of joining the wife of the mortgagor, or of

any subsequent owner of the mortgaged premises, there is some

conflict among the decisions. The solution of this question

depends mainly upon the law of the State regulating the wife's

right of dower.2 In most of the States the common-law doctrines

as to dower prevail without substantial alteration. In some,

however, they have been entirely abrogated, or at least radically

changed. As at the common law, the wife's inchoate dower right

attached to all lands owned in fee by the husband during the

marriage, any mortgage, except for purchase-money, given by the

luisband, in which the wife does not join, is subject to her dower

right. When such a mortgage — not for purchase-money — is

executed by the husband alone, a foreclosure thereof by an action

in which she is even made a party defendant does not affect her

rights ; she can assert her claim to dower in the land after her
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husband's death without redemption; the decree as to her is a

mere nullity.^ If the wife unites with her husband in executing

the mortgage, her dower right becomes subject to the mortgage

lien ; in other words, she is entitled to dower in the equity of re-

demption. This entitles her to redeem upon the same principle

that any other junior incumbrancer is thus entitled. In all those

States where the common-law doctrines as to dower have not

been abrogated, the wife of the mortgagor, who has united in

executing the mortgage, though not an absolutely necessary

party, must be made a defendant in order to cut off her right

of redemption. If not a party to the foreclosure suit, she may

come in and redeem f]-om the purchaser.^ The same is, of course,

1 Wolf V. Banning, 3 Miun. 202, 204. * McArthur v. Franklin, 15 Ohio St.

Qn Padley v. Neill (1896), 134 Mo. 364, 485; 16 id. 193; Chambers v. Nicholson,

3.5 S. W. 997, a wife commenced an 30 Ind. 349 ; Chase v. Abbott, 20 Iowa,

action to cancel a mortgage on her prop- 154 ; Anthony ),-. Nye, 30 Cal. 401 ; Mills

erty, and a foreclosure was allowed on a r. Van Voorhies, 20 N. Y. 412. For the

cross bill without joining her husband.] peculiar law of North Carolina, see Creecy

^ []But where a wife renounces her i-. Pearce, 69 X. C. 67 ; Etheridge v. Ver-

dower right, she is not a necessary party : noy, 71 N. C. 184, 185-187 ; Nimrock v.

Miller v. Bank (1897), 49 S. C.'427, 27 Scanlin, 87 N. C. 119. Wife is a neces-

S. C. 514.] sary defendant in Wisconsin : Foster v.

® Moomey v. Maas, 22 Iowa, 380 ; Mer- Hickox, 38 Wis. 408, overruling Cary v.

chants' Bank v. Thomson, 55 N. Y. 7, 11. Wheeler, 14 id. 281. In Alabama, she is

gage, he i. a proper defendant in ~\1inne ota, f r the further
r a on that a judgment for deficiency may be r ndered against
hjm in the action. 1
& 240. *3-13. Joinder of Wife of Mortgagor. In .regard to the
nece i y or propriety of joining the wife of the mortgagor, or of
any subsequent owner of h mortgaged premi e , there i ome
conflict among the decision· . The solution of this que tion
depends mainly upon the law of the State regulating the wife's
right of dower. 2 In most of the States the common-law doctrine
as to dower prevail without substantial alteration. In some,
however, they have been entirely abrogated, or at least radically
changed. As at the common law, the wife's inchoate dower right
attached to all lands owned in fee by the husband during the
marriage, any mortgage, except for purchase-money, given by the
husband, in which the wife does not join, is subject to her dower
right. When such a mortgage - not for purchase-money - is
executed by the husband alone, a foreclosure thereof by an action
in which she is even made a party defendant does not affect her
rights ; she can assert her claim to dower in the land after her
husband's death without redemption; the decree as to her is a
mere nullity. 3 If the wife unites with ·her husband in executing
the mortgage, her dower right becomes subject to the mortgage
lien; in other words, she is entitled to dower in the eq uity of redemption. This entitles her to redeem upon the same principle
that any other junior incumbrancer is thus entitled. In all those
States where the common-law doctrines as to dower have not
been abrogated, the wife of the mortgagor, who has united in
executing the mortgage, though not an absolutely necessary
party, must be made a defendant in order to cut off her right
of redemption. If not a party to the foreclosure suit, she may
come in and redeem from the purchaser. 4 The same is, of course,
1 Wolf v. Banning, 3 Minn. 202, 204.
[ In Padley v. Neill (1896) , 134 Mo . 364,
35 S. W. 997, a wife commenced an
action to cancel a mortgage on her property, and a foreclosure wa allowed on a
cross bill without joinin g her hu banrl.]
2 [But >vhere a wife renounces her
dower right, she is not a necessary party :
Miller 1. Bank (1897), 49 S.C. 427, 27
s. c_.514.J
8 Moomey v. Maas, 22 Iowa, 380; Merchants' Bank v. Thomson, 55 N. Y. 7, 11.

4 McArthur v. Franklin, 15 Ohio St.
485 ; 16 id . 193; Cham hers v. Nichol on,
30 Ind. 349; Chase v. Abbott, 20 Iowa,
154 ; Anthony 11. 1:\ye, 30 Cal. 401; Mills
v. Van Voorhies, 20 N. Y. 412. For the
peculiar law of North Carolina, ee Creecy
?:. Pearce, 69 N. C. 67; Etheridge v . Vernoy, 71 N. C. 18-t., I 5-1 7; 1:\imrock v.
Scanlin, 87 N. C. 119. Wife is a necessary defendant in '\Vi consin : Fo ter v.
Hickox, 38 V\ris. 408, overruling Cary v.
''Theeler, 14 id. 281. Iu Alabama, she is
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true of any owner to whom the land or a part thereof has been

conveyed, subject to the mortgage, and who remains owner at the

time of commencing the action to foreclose.^ It is not necessary

to set out the wife's interest in detail in the plaintiff's pleading ;

it is sufficient to aver in the usual general formula that she has or

claims an interest in the land adverse to the plaintiff.^ A con-

trary rule prevails in a few States, in which it is held that the

wife, under the circumstances mentioned, need not be made a

defendant.^ This ruling must be based upon the local law of

dower radically different from the common law.

§ 241. * 344. Joinder of Wife of Mortgagor in Foreclosure of Pur-

chase-Money Mortgage. There is a marked conflict in the deci-

sions defining the wife's right under a purchase-money mortgage.

One theory holds that the legal position of a wife whose husband

has executed a purchase-money mortgage in which she did not

unite is exactly the same as that of a wife who has united with

her husband in executing a mortgage not given for purchase-

money. The lien of the mortgage is, of course, paramount to

the dower interest, but she still has a right of redemption, and,
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in order to cut this off, she must be made a defendant in the

foreclosure action.* The same rule also applies to the wife of

the person to whom the land or a part of it has been conveyed,

subject to a purchase-money mortgage, and who is owner at the

time of the foreclosure.* The other theory denies that the wife

whose husband executes a purchase-money mortgage in which she

does not join has any interest in the land, or any right of re-

demption. According to this view, she need not be made a

defendant in the action to foreclose, and is cut off by decree and

sale, although omitted as a party. ^ When a trustee of a married

not a necessary party, though she claims Ross, 4 Cal. 197. This last case cannot be

an equity in the land on tlie ground that reconciled with Anthony r. Nye, supra.

her funds were used in paying the pur- Qln Morgan v. Wicklifle (1903), — Ky.

chase-money: Flowers r. Barker, 79 Ala. — , 72 S. W. 1122, under Ky. St., § 2i;J5,

445. [^Wife is a proper, if not a neces- restricting the wife's dower right, it was

sary, party : Ilausmann Bro.s. MTg Co. v. held that the wife was not a nece.s.sary

Kempfert (1896), 9.3 Wis. 587,67 N. W. party to a suit to foreclose a mortgage in

1136. So is the widow, who joined in the which siie liad joined. J

mortgage: Chadbourn v. Johnston (1890), * Mills v. Van Voorhies, 20 N. Y. 412.

119 N. C. 282, 25 S. E. 705.] Also in Fo.ster v. Ilickox, 38 Wis. 408.

1 Watt V. Alvord, 25 lud. 533, and ^ Fletcher v. Holmes, 32 lud. 497, per

caaes last cited. Elliott J. ; Etheridge j\ Vernoy, 71 N. C.

'•^ Anthony I'. Nye, 30 Cal. 401. 184-186. QSce also, Schaefer v. I'urvi-

there f h
remam wn r a
1
ti n t n c ary
t
lain tiff' pl ading ·
i
uffici nt to aY r in h u ual general formula tha l e ha r
ch im an in r t in th L ncl d er e t the plain iff. 2 A contrar - rule preYail , in a f w at m hich it i held that th
wif un l r th
ircum tanc
m ntion d, n ed not be ma
a
cl f nclant.3 Thi ruling m t be ba ed upon the local law of
do\Y r radicall different from the common law.
tru

of

241.

ny
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Joinder of Wife of Mortgagor in Foreclosure of Pur-

There is a mark d confl.i t in the deciion" defining the wife right under a purcha e-money mortgage.
ne theory hold that th legal po ition of a wife whose hu band
ha ex cu ed H. pur ha e-mon y mortgage in which be did not
unite i
xactly tl same a that of a wife ho ha unit d with
her bu band in executin a mor gage not given for purcha emoney. The lien f th mortgage i , f cour , param unt to
he dower intere t, but b till ha a ri ht f r demp ion and
in order t cut this off she mu t be ma l a def ndant in the
foreclo ure action. 4 The ame rule al o applie to th wif
f
the per on to whom the land or a part of it ha been con
u bj ct to a purcha e-mone mortgao·e, and "ho i own r at
tim of the foreclo ure. 4 The other theory deni
tha the wife
who husband ex cute a purcha e-mon m rtgage in whi h h
cl e not join ha any intere t in the land or any rigb f r de pti n. According to thi view, he n d not b mad a
1 f ndan in th a ion t for clo e, an 1 i cut ff by d r and
. al al hough omit cl a a I ar y . 5 \Vb n a tru t e of a marri
chase-Money Mortgage.

» Thornton v. Pigg. 24 Mo. 249 ; Rid- ance (1903), — - lud. — , 66 N. E. 154.] •

dick 1-. Walsh, 15 Mo. 538; Powell i-.

uot a nece ary party, though h ·laim
an equity in the land on he ground that
h r funtl were u d in paying th purcha e-mouey: 1lower ?'. ark r, 79 Ala.
445. [Wife i a pr per, if not a n e , iry, party: Hau mann Bro . d'fg o. v.
1\empfert (l 6) 93 \ i . 5 7 67 . W.
1 l.'36. . o i the wid ow, who j in d in tl e
mort~a re:
hadbourn . ,John · ton (l . ),
11 !) - '.
2 2, 25 . E. i05.J
l Watt ,._ Alvord, 25 Intl. 533, and
a ·e ht.· cit u.
-i Antlt<rny v. ry , .'J
al. 401.
8 Thornton t'. I igg, 24
I . _49; H.id·
di ·k t" W l h, 15 do. 53 ; Pow 11 v.
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woman purchased lands in trust for her, and gave a purchase-

money mortgage therefor, it was held, in Nevada, that the wife

and her husband were both necessary defendants in an action

brought to foreclose the mortgage.^

§ 242. * 345. Parties in Foreclosure of Mortgage upon Homestead.

Adverse Claimant as Party. Other Cases. Under the law of Cali-

fornia in respect to homesteads, it is held that the husband and

wife must both join in a mortgage of the homestead in order that

it should have any validity as against either; and of course the

wife is a necessary defendant in an action to foreclose such a

mortgage in which she has joined. ^ In an action to foreclose a

mortgage, a person who sets up a claim to the land adverse and

paramount to the title of the mortgagor, and who therefore denies

the efficacy of the mortgage lien, cannot properly be joined as a

co-defendant by the plaintiff. ^ Such an adverse claim to the

land in opposition to the mortgage cannot be tried in the equi-

table action to foreclose. So far as mere legal rights are

concerned in such an action, the only proper parties are the

mortgagor and the mortgagee, and those who have acquired
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rights under them subsequent to the mortgage. The mortgagee

or holder of the mortgage cannot make one who claims prior and

adversely to the title of the mortgagor a defendant for the pur-

pose of trying the validity of his adverse claim. ^ In Iowa, a

1 Ma^Tich V. Grier, 3 Nev. 52. And whose homestead rights are not subject to

■when mortgaged land is conveyed in trust, a mortgage, are not proper parties to its

or vested in trustees, the cestuis que trustent foreclosure : Hoppe v. Fountain (1894), 104

are necessary defendants in a suit to fore- Cal. 94, .37 Pac. 894.]

close. Clark v. Keyburu, 8 Wall. 318; '^ QSo held in Joslin y. Williams (1901),

Faithful V. Hunt, 3 Anst. 751 ; Calverley 61 Neb. 859, 86 N. W\ 473.]

V. rhelp, 6 Mad. 229 ; Osbourn v. Fallows, * Eagle Fire Ins. Co. v. Lent, 6 Paige,

1 Rus. & M. 741 ; Newton w. Earl Egmont, 637, per Walwortli Chan.; Corning v.

A Sim. 574, 584, 5 Sim. 130, 135; Coles Smith, 6 N. Y. 82; Palmer v. Yager, 20

V Forrest, 10 Beav. 552, 557 ; Goldsmid v. Wis. 91, 103, per Dixon C. J. ; Pelton v.

woman purchased lands in tru t for her, and gave a purcha emoney mortgage therefor, it was held, in Nevada, that the wife
and her husband w re both necessary defendants in an action
brought to foreclo e the rnortgage. 1
242. * 345. Parties in Foreclosure of Mortgage upon Homestead.
Adverse Claimant as Party. Other Cases . Under the law of alifornia in respect to home teads, it is held that the husband and
wife must both joiu in a mortgage of the homestead in order that
it should have any validity as against either; and of course the
wife is a necessary defendant in an action to foreclo e such a
mortgage in which she has joined. 2 In an action to foreclose a
mortgage, a person who sets up a claim to the land adver e and
paramount to the title of the mortgagor, and who therefore denies
the efficacy of the mortgage lien, cannot properly be joined as a
co-defendant by the plaintiff. 3 Such an adver e claim to the
land in opposition to the mortgage cannot be tried in the equitable action to foreclose.
So far as mere legal rights are
-concerned in such an action, the only proper parties are the
mortgagor and the mortgagee, and those who have acquired
rights under them subsequent to the mortgage. The mortgagee
or holder of the mortgage cannot make one who claims prior and
.adversely to the title of the mortgagor a defendant for the purpose of trying the validity of his adverse claim. 4 In Iowa, a

Stonehewer, 9 Hare A pp. 38; Story's Eq. Farmin, 18 Wis. 222. See also Roberts u.

PI. §§ 206, 207 ; United States Trust Co. Wood, 38 Wis. 60 ; Crogan r. Spence, 53

of N. Y. V. Roche, 116 N. Y. 120, 1.30; Cal. 15; Houghton v. Allen, 75 Cal. 102;

Kirkpatrick V. Corning, 38 N. J. Eq. 234. McComb v. Spangler, 71 Cal. 418, 423;

2 Revalk v. Kraemer, 8 Cal. 66 ; Marks Farmers' Loan & T. Co. v. San Diego

V. Marsh, 9 Cal. 96 ; Moss v. Warner, 10 vStreet-Car Co., 40 Fed. Rep. 105; but

Cal. 296 ; Sargent v. Wilson, 5 Cal. 504. may try the validity of a claim which is

See also Mabury v. Ruiz, 58 Cal. 11; not thus adverse and paramount, and maj

Hefner v. Urton, 71 Cal. 479. [^Held in make the holder thereof a defendant :

Spalti y. Blumer (1894), 56 Minn. 523, 58 Brown v. Volkenning, 64 N. Y. 76, 84;

N. W. 1 56, that a decree of foreclosure. Baas v. Chicago & N. W. Ry. Co. 39 Wis.

where the wife is not a party, will not 296 ; Lyon v. Powell, 78 Ala. 351.

affect her homestead interest. Children

l Mav-rich v. Grier, 3 Nev. 52.
And wh ose hom estead rights are not subject to
wh en mortgaged land is conveyed in trust, a mortgage, are not proper parties to its
or vested in trustees, the cestuis q11e trustent foreclosure: Hoppe v. Fountain (1894 ), 104
.are necessary defendants in a suit to fore- Cal. 94, 37 Pac. 894 .J
3 [So held in Joslin v. "Williams (1901),
-clo e. Clark v. Reyburn, 8 Wall. 318;
Faithful v. Hunt, 3 An t. i51; Cah·erley 61 Neb. 859, 86 N. W. 473 .J
v. Phelp, 6 Mad. 229; Oshourn v. Fallows,
4 Eagle Fire Ins. Co. v . Lent, 6 Paige,
1 Ru . & M. i41; Newton v. Earl Egmont, 6-37, per Walworth Chan.; Corning v.
4 Sim. 574, 5 -t-, 5 .. im. 1:30, 135; Coles Smith, 6 N. Y. 2; Palmer v. Yager, 20
v Forrest, 10 Beav. 552, 557; Goldsmid v. Wis. 91, 103, per Dixon C. J.; Pelton v.
tone hewer, 9 Hare A pp. 38; Story's Eq. Farmin, I 8 ·w is. 222. See al o Roberts v.
Pl. §§ 206, 201; United States Trust Co. Wood, 38 \Vi s. 60; Crogan r. pence, 53
of . Y. v. Roche, 116 N. Y. 120, 130; Cal. 15; H oughton v. Allen, i5 Cal. 102 ;
Kirkpatrick v. Corning, 38 N. J. Eq. 234.
McComb 1·. Spangler, il Cal. 41 , 423;
2 Revalk v. Kraemer, 8 Cal. 66; Marks
Farmers' Loan & T. Co. v. San Diego
.v. Marsh, 9 Cal. 96; Mos v. \Varn er , 10 Street-Car Co., 40 Fed. Rep. 105 ; but
Cal. 296 ; Sargent v. Wilson, 5 Cal. 504. may try the validity of a claim which is
See also Mabury v. Ruiz, 58 Cal. l 1 ; not thus au verse and paramount, and may
Hefner v. Urton, il Cal. 419. [Held in make the holder thereof a defendant:
Spalti v. Blumer (1894), 56 Minn. 523, 58 Brown v. Volkenning, 64 N. Y. 76, -t;
N. W. 156, that a decree of foreclosure, Baas v. Chicago & N. W. Ry. Co. 39 Wis.
where the wife is not a party, will not 296; Lyon v. Powell, i8 Ala. 351.
affect her homestead intere t. Children ·
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trust deed of land or of chattels intended as security for a debt

is by statute regarded as a mortgage, and may be foreclosed by

action in the same manner as a mortgage.^ A subsequent in-

cumbrancer, as, for example, a mortgagee, who has not been

made a party to the foreclosure of a prior mortgage, may redeem

the land from the sale, and, in his action to compel the redemp-

tion, he should make the mortgagor and his prior mortgagee, and

the purchaser at the sale and his grantees, if any, tlie parties

defendant. 2 The grantee of the purchaser is an indispensable

defendant in such an action ; and if his omission is properly

objected to by the actual defendant, the action must fail.^

§ 243. * 340. III. Parties in Creditors' Actions : and Actions by

or on Behalf of Creditors to set aside Fraudulent Transfers by their

Debtors. General Remarks. It is not within the SCOpe of this

work to inquire into the nature of creditors' suits, nor to discuss

the question when and under what circumstances they may be

maintained. My only present concern is with respect to the

proper selection of parties defendant, whenever the actions them-

selves may be properl}^ brought. The general purpose of a

1 f land r f chatt l · inten 1 d a
curit; f r a lebt
'tatute r ganle l a a m rtgage and ma · b f r l d
a i n in the am rnann r a a I 10rtg g . 1
umbran r
f r :x:·:tmpl , a m rtgag e, who
n
ma 1 a part r
ure of a prior mortgag , ma r d m
th l, nd from
, and, i1 hi action to mp 1 h red mption he 'hould mak h mort0 ag r and his pri r mortgag e, and
th pur ha er at the sale and hi grantees, if an , the par ies
lef ndant. 2 The grantee of the purcha er i an indi I en able
def ndant in uch an acti n; and if bis om1s ion i pr perl
bj cted to by the actu 1 def ndant, the action mu t fail. 3
§ 243. * 3-1 . III. P arties in Cre ditors' Actions · and Actions by
t

or o n B ehalf of Creditor s to set aside Fraudulent Transfers by their
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creditor's suit proper is to reach, at the instance of a judgment

creditor whose legal remedies of judgment and executifm thereon

have been exhausted, the assets of the judgment debtor, which,

either by reason of their intrinsic nature, or by reason of their

transfer alleged to have been fraudulent as agiiinst tlie creditor,

are or have been placed beyond the reach of an execiition at law,

1 Darlington v. Effey, 1.3 Iowa, 177. It was held in Swenney v. Hill (1902),

Trust deeds appear to be used in place of 6,5 Kan. 826, 70 Pac. 868, that " if promis-

murtgages in several other of the AVestern sory notes be given to one f)ei\son, and a

States. mortgage securing them is given to an-

2 Anson v. Anson, 20 Iowa, 55 ; Knowles other, who by tlie terms of the latter instru-

V. Rablin, 20 Iowa, 101 ; Street j;. Keal, 16 ment is given active powers and authority

Iowa, 68 ; Rurnap !•. Cook, 16 Iowa, 149. over the subjects of the mortgage relation.

So, too, where the prior mortgagee seeks the mortgagee is a necessary party to a

a second time to foreclose his mortgage suit bruuglit by the payee of the notes to

against a subsequent mortgagee who was foreclose the mortgage." (Syllabus by

not made a party to the first foreclosure the court.)

suit, all tlie jjurchasers at the first fore- ]Vht'?-(' the Mortfjagee Dies.. An action

Ge neral R emar ks.
It is not within the ope f this
work to inquire into the nature of creditors' uits, nor t di cu
the que ion when and under what circum tance they ma · be
maintained. My only pr ent concern i with re pect to the
proper election of parti s defendant whenever the a tion them. elve may be pr perl brought. The general purpo e of a
er ditor' suit proper i to reach, at the in tance of a judgment
creditor who ·e legal reme lie f j ldgmen and executi n tpereon
hav been exhausted, the a t of the judgment d btor, which
i th r b rea on of their intrin ic nature or b rea ~ on f their
tran fer alleg d to have been frau lulent as a ain t the credit r,
ar or ha e b en plac d b 011 l th reach of an x cution a law,
D ebt ors .

closure sale are neces.sary parties : Moulton for possession and foreclosure brought by

r. Cornish, 61 Hun, 4.38. a mortgagee against a mortgagor and

* Winslow I'. Clark, 47 X. Y. 221, 263; others, cannot be continued by the mort-

citing Dias i-. Merle, 4 Paige, 259. And gagee's executfir when tlie mortgagee dies

in an action to set aside a foreclosure sale pending the suit, without joining the mort-

for fraud, the purchaser is a necessary de- gagee's heirs as parties: Hughes v. Gay

fendant : Wibson r. Bell, 17 Minn. 61^ 64. (1903), 132 N. C. 50, 43 S. E. 539.]

^ Where }f(jrlg<i<jpe is not Payee of Debt.

arling;ton v. Effey, 13 I wa, 177.
deed app ar to be u ed iu place of
m1Jr gage.· in everal oth r f the Yv e tern
, ·tate .
2
n on v. An. on, 20 Iowa, 55; Kno' les
v. Raulin, 20 Io wa, l O1 ; 'tr et v. Beal, 16
Iowa , 6 ; Burnap v.
k, 16 I owa 149 .
• o, too, wh re th e prior mortgagee
k
a eco nd time to fo reclo e hi · mor gage
acrain:t ~ ·ubsequ ut m r tgag who wru
n<Jt macle a party
the fir t forf>clo. ur
. ui t, all the purclia: r at th e fir. t f r clo urr- . ale ar 11 c :. ary parti : .\[oulton
,._ ('<Jmi. h, Gl !J un, 4:3 .
3 \'in low t'.
la rk , 4i ..... Y . 221, 263;
1·i i1w Dia '" • [crlP, 4 Paige 259. A11c1
i11 an artio11 to t a~ i clc a for ·cl o: nr :;al
for fraud, the pnrcha er i an · ":ary cl •
f •Jlflant: \\'ii. on 1-. Bell, 17 Minn . GI , 64..
Tru ~ t

[ lf '/,,,,.c

Jfort9ag~e is 11ol
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and which are therefore denominated equitable assets. Certain

and whi h are th r for cl uominat cl quitabl a t. .
rtain
. p ci s of property, a., for e. . ample, thing in action~ although
in the owner hip f the l bt r, annot be · iz cl n xe ·ution.
The di tinctive f ature of th a tion, how v r, i to r a ·h land
and sometim cha,tt 1. . , whi h the debt r, having own d by a
1 gal title, has transf rrecl to ome grantee or a ·signee in fraud
of his creditors; or to reach uch lan l, and om tim s per onal
roperty, the legal title to which stands, and alway.· has stood,
in other parties, while by reason of alleged fact the equitable
ownership, at least so far as the creditors are concerned, is held
by the debtor himself, and the property is thus, as i alleged,
liable to be taken and applied to the discharge of the creditor's
demands . Under what circumstances a tran. fer of property is
fraudu lent as against the creditor , or the equitable ownership is
held by the debtor while the legal title is vested in another,
it is not now the place to inquire. A suming that uch circumstances exist, and that when they exist an action may be
m intained by the judgment creditor whose legal remedies are
exhausted, to reach the property anc1 have it applied in some
manner to the payment of his demands, it may be asked, Who
sh0uld be made parties defendant in such an action? The
answer to this question is plain, and the rule has been well
established, depending as it does upon the most evident principles of equity jurisprudence. The creditor's suit, properly
, o called, and which has been thus described in general terms,
hould not be confounded with actions that creditors may sometimes brmg, based upon the law of trusts and the right of a cestui
que tri1,st to compel the performance of his duty by a trustee.
§ 244. * 34 7. Parties Defendant in Action by Judgment Creditor
1

species of property, as, for example, things in action, although

in the ownership of the debtor, cannot be seized on execution.

The distinctive feature of the action, however, is to reach land,

and sometimes chattels, which the debtor, having owned by a

legal title, has transferred to some grantee or assignee in fraud

of his creditors ; or to reach such land, and sometimes personal

property, the legal title to which stands, and always has stood,

in other parties, while by reason of alleged facts the equitable

ownership, at least so far as the creditors are concerned, is held

by the debtor himself, and the property is thus, as is alleged,

liable to be taken and applied to the discharge of the creditor's

demands. Under what circumstances a transfer of property is

fraudulent as against the creditors, or the equitable ownership is

held by the debtor while the legal title is vested in another,

it is not now the place to inquire. Assuming that such cir-

cumstances exist, and that when they exist an action may be

maintained by the judgment creditor whose legal remedies are

exhausted, to reach the property an^ have it applied in some
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manner to the payment of his demands, it may be asked. Who

should be made parties defendant in such an action? The

answer to this question is plain, and the rule has been well

established, depending as it does upon the most evident prin-

ciples of equity jurisprudence. The creditor's suit, properly

so called, and which has been thus described in general terms,

should not be confounded with actions that creditors may some-

times bring, based upon the law of trusts and the right of a cestui

que trust to compel the performance of his duty by a trustee.

§ 244. * 347. Parties Defendant in Action by Judgment Creditor

to reach Equitable Assets ; and to reach Property fraudulently Trans-

ferred. In an action by a judgment creditor to reach the equi-

table assets of the debtor in his own hands, or to reach property

which has been transferred to other persons, or property which is

held by other persons under such a state of facts that the equi-

table ownership is vested in the debtor, the judgment debtor is

himself an indispensable party defendant, and the suit cannot be

carried to final judgment without him. In some cases, as when

the property has been assigned at different times to different

assignees, or is held by different legal owners, who are all made

co-defendants, he is the very link which unites them all together.

to reach Equitable Assets ; and to reach Property fraudulently

Tr~ns

In an action by a ju lgment creditor to reach the equitable assets of the debtor in his own hands, or to reach property
which has been tran £erred to other person·, or property which is
held by other persons under such a state of fact· that the equitable ownership is vested in the debtor, the judgment debtor is
himself an indispensable party defendant, and the uit cannot be
carried to final judgment without him. In some cas , as when
the property has been a signed at different time to different
assignees, or is held by different legal owners, who are all made
co-defendants, he is the very link which unites them all togeth r,

ferred.
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the common centre to which they are all connected, and it is

because he is a party defendant that they can all be joined in one

action as co-defendants. ^ Even if the objection to his nonjoinder

be not taken by the actual defendants, the court will on its own

motion order him to be brought in.^ If the judgment debtor

himself is dead, his administrator or executor is an indispensable

1 [^Sheppard v. Green (1896), 48 S. C.

165, 26 S. E. 224; First Nat. Bank v.

the
mm n c n re to whi ·h they are all conn cted, and it is
party d fondant that they can all be joined in one
be au:' h i
-def
nda t . 1
u if the objection to hi nonjoinder
cti n
y the actual d £ 11dant , the cour t will on it own
b 11
mo ti n or er him t be br ught in .2 If the judgm nt debtor
n able
him 1£ i · d a 1, his admini t rator or x cu tor i an indi

Slmler (1897), 15-3 N. Y. 16.3, 47 N. E. 262,

in which the court said : " The authorities

are decisive in affirming the general rule

that, in a creditor's action brought to im-

peach and set aside a general assignment

by a debtor of his property for the benefit

of creditors, the court will not proceed to

judgment in the absence of the debtor as

a party defendant, unless by death or other

circumstance his joinder, as a defendant,
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is wholly impracticable. It has been held

in some cases that in a suit hronght by a

creditor against a fraudulent alienee of tlie

debtor, to set aside a specific transfer for

fraud, where the conveyance was absolute

and transferred as between the parties an

indefeasil)le title or interest, the fraudulent

vendor is not a nece.s.sar3' party. (Butling-

ton V. Harvey, 95 U. S. 103 ; Campbell v.

Jones, 25 Minn. 155; Potter v. Phillips,

44 la. .357 ; .«ee, also. Fox v. Moyer, 54

N. Y. 130). But the relaxation of the rule

has never, so far as we can discover, been

extended to the ca.sc of an assignment in

trust for the benefit of creditors." See

also Williamson v. Selden (1893), 53 Minn.

73, 54 N. W. 1055 ; Beviiis v. Eisman

(1900), Ky., 56 W. W. 410; First Nat.

Bank v. Gibson ( 1 903), — Neb., — 94 N. W.

965.] Lawrence t>. Bank of the Rei)ublic,

N. Y. 320 ; vShaver v. Braiuard, 29 Barb.

25; Wallace v. Eaton, 5 How. Pr. 99;

Logan V. Hale, 42 Cal. 645 ; Allison v.

Weller, 6 N. Y. Sup. Ct. 291 ; Vanderpoel

u. Van Valkenburgii, 6 N. Y. 190; Gay-

lords V. Kelshaw, 1 Wall. 81 ; Miller v.

Hall, 70 N. Y. 250; llubbell r. Mercliants'

Bk. of Syracuse, 42 Hun, 200 ; Hickox >:

Elliott, 10 Sawy. 415; 8. C. 22 Fe<l. Bep.

13, 20; Coffey v. Norwood, 81 Ala. 512;

Pottery. Phillips, 44 Iowa, 353; Blanc i'.

Paymiister Min. Co., 95 Cal. 524; Wil-

liam.son i-. Selden (.Minn. 1893), 54 N. W.

1055; Dunn i-. Wolf, 81 Iowa, 688; Wea-

ver f. Cressman, 21 Neb. 075; Taylor r.

Webl), 54 Miss. 36. Where the creditor

seeks to establish his debt, as well as to

subject the property fraudulently conveyed

to the payment thereof, the debtor must,

of course, be made a party : Chadbourne

V. Coe (C. C. A). 51 Fed. Kep. 479. As

illustrations of various actions by credi-

tors, see Boone Co. v. Keck, 31 Ark. 387 ;

Holland v. Drake, 29 Ohio St. 441 ; Eraser

V. Charleston, 13 S. C. 533 ; Potter v. Phil-

lips, 44 Iowa, 353; Green v. Walkill Nat.

Bank, 7 Hun; 63; Dewey v. Moyer, 9 id.

473 ; Haines r. Hollister, 64 N. Y. 1 ; Scott

r. Indiauap. Wagon Works, 48 Ind. 75.

[^See Glover v. Hargadiue-McKittrick

[.-'heppard v. reen (I 96), 4
. E. 224 ; Fir t Nat. B ank i·.
Imler (1 9i), 153 . Y. 163 47 . E . 262 ,
in which th court aid : "The authoritie
are deci i''e in affirm ing the gen ral ru le
th.at, in a creditor' action brought to impeach aud et a ide a ueueral a ' ignment
by a debtor f hi· property for the benefit
of creditor , the court will not p roceed to
judgment in the ab euce f the debtor a
a party defendant, unl
by death r oth r
circum tan
hi joiuder, a a defendaut,
is wholly impracticable. It ha been held
in ome ca e that in a uit brought by a
creditor a 0 ain ta fraudulent al ienee of the
debtor, to t a. ide a "p cific tran f r fo r
:fraud, wh r the on,·e_vauce was ab olute
and tran ferretl a· betw en the partie an
iodefea ible title or intere t, the fraudulent
Yendor i not a nece :ary party. (Buffington v. Harvey, 95
. '. 10.'3; Campbell v.
Jone , 25 i\linn. 155; Potter 1:. Phillip ,
4-i Ia . .'3:57;
e, al o, Fox v. Ioy r, 54
. Y. 13 ). But the relaxation of the rule
ha.s never, o far a· we can di cov r, be n
extended to he ca c of an a . ignment in
tru t for the benefit of redi or."
e
al-o '' illiam on v. elden ( I 93), 53 ~Tinn.
i3, 54 .... W. 1055; Bevin v. Ei man
(1900) Ky., 56 ,·. W . 410; Fir t
at.
Bankv. ib on(! 03), - '"eb.,- 94N. W .
965.J Lawr nee v. Ba11k f the Republi ,
. Y. 320; , haver v. B rainard, 29 Barb.
25; \\r allac v. Eaton, 5 H w . l'r. 99 ;
Logan v. Ilale, 42 al. 645; lli · u v.
Weller, 6 N. Y. 'up. t. 2 l ; a nderp 1
v. an Valkenhurah, 6 N. Y. 19 ;
ylord. 1•. K l h::i.w, 1 Wall. 1 ; :'\ I ill t v.
Hall, 0 ... Y. 25 ; II ubb 111·. to.I r ·hant·'
Bk. of yra.cuse, 42 llu n, 200 ; H i ·kox 1.
~llio , I
'wy. 415;
. 22 F e<l. R p.
13, -0; offoy v. Torw od, l Al . 512 ;
Pott r v. Phillip-, 44 Iowa, 35.'3; Dlanc v.
l'ayrna ter '\1i11. o., 95 al. 5_4 ; \Villi m on t•. 'clden ~Iinn. 1 9.'3), . 4 lT. \V.
l 055 ; Dun u v. \V olf, I Iowa., 6 ; \\' ver t'. ( r · · man, :ll .. · •11. G7.); Ta; r>r '!:.
i

165, 26

v

hh, 54 L\1.i . 36. \Yh re t he reditor
ta l.>lish h i · debt, a well a · to
eek. to
su bject t he proper ty fra udul ently conveyed
to th e pay ment t hereof, the debto r mu t,
of c ur. e, be made a par ty : Cha<lbourn e
v . Coe (C. C. A .) , 51 :F d. Hep. 479. A
illu t ration of var iou • action by cred itors, . e B oone o. v. I eek, 3 l Ark. 3 i ;
Holland v . Dra ke, 29 h io t. 44 l ; Fra er
v. Charle t on, 13 •. C. 533; P otter v. Phill ip , 44 Iowa, 353 ; Gr een v . W al kill Tat.
B ank, 7 Hun; 6.'3; Dewey v. Mo ·er, 9 id.
4 73 ; H a in es v. Holli ter, 64 . Y. I ; cott
v. In diauap. W ag n W ork , 4 Ind . ~ 5 .
[ ee Glover v. H a r o-ad iue-McKittr ick
DryGood Co.( 1901 ), 6-Neb. 4 3, 7N. W.
l / O, where t he cou rt "aid: " Th e vendor in
a conveyance alleged a nd proved to have
be n fraudulently made and t o be for t hat
r ea~ou v id a again t ·reJ itor i alway
a pr per but not in a ll case a uece . nry
par ty to an action by the latter to et t he
iu trument or tran action a ide. If he !ta
re. en d or retained no title or int. re t in
or li n upo n the proper ty, bu t h parted
with it both ab. lutely and ompl tely, he
ha n rio-ht to be aff cted by the re ult

It
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defendant; ^ ;ind if the objection be taken for the first time in the

appellate court, the cause will be remanded in order that he may

be added as a defendant.^ When, however, the debtor convej'ed

his land to A. for the purpose of a second conveyance to his own

wife in fraud of his creditors, which second conveyance was

made, and the debtor afterwards died, it was held that his heirs

were neither necessary nor proper parties to the creditor's action

brought to set aside these conveyances. "The conveyance of

their ancestor, though fraudulent, concludes them, and effectually

cuts off all their interest in the pro2:)erty."^

§ 245. * 348. Assignee of Judgment Debtor a Necessary Party.

"Where Legal Title is in Third Person and Equitable Ovsmership in Debtor.

If the object of the action be to reach property which has been

assigned by the debtor, the assignee is a necessary party defend-

ant, even if he be a non-resident of the State ; * and on the same

principle, if the plaintiff seek to reach property of which the

legal title is in a third person, but the equitable ownership of

which is alleged to be in the debtor, such holder of the legal title

must be a defendant.^ When the debtor conveyed land to a
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third person with the purpose that such person should at once

convey the same to the debtor's wife, which second conveyance

was forthwith made, it was held, in an action against the debtor

and his wife to reach the land in her hands, that the first grantee

was a necessary party defendant.^ A debtor fraudulently con-

1 Alexander i». Quigley, 2 Duvall, 300; real property, the wife is not a proper

Postlewaite v. Howes, 3 Iowa, 365 ; Coates party in an action by creditors to set aside

V. Day, 9 Mo. 315; [jPrentiss v. Bowden the conveyance, but the wife of a fraud-

(1895), 145 N. Y. 342, 40 N. E. 13 ; Shep- ulent grantee isa proper party : Tatum v.

pard V. Green (1896), 48 S. C. 165, 26 S. E. Roberts (1894), 59 Minn. 52, 60 N. W. 848.

224; First Nat. Bank v. Shuler (1897), See also Stevenson y. Matteson (1893), 13

153 N. Y. 163, 47 N. E. 262. In the last Mont. 108, 32 Pac. 291.

case the wife of the debtor was one of the Where an action is brought by a

alleged fraudulent vendees, and she be- creditor to set aside a fraudulent confes-

came his executrix upon his death pend- sion of judgment by the debtor in favor

ing the suit. She was already a party in of H., and a conveyance of land to H.

her individual capacity, and was not made under execution sale, the administrator

a party in her representative capacity, and heir at law of H. are necessary par-

Held that she was not bound as executrix ties : Sloan v. Hunter (1899), 56 S. C.385,

and the judgment could not be sustained.] 34 S. E. 658. If the grantee be dead, his

2 Postlewaite v. Howes, 3 Iowa, 365. heirs are necessary parties : Bevins v.

3 Harlin v. Stevenson, 30 Iowa, 371, Eisman (1900), Ky., 56 S. W. 410.3

375. * Ogle V. Clough, 2 Duv. 145.

* Gray v. Schenck, 4 N. Y. 460. [[Where « Bennett v. McGuire, 5 Lans. 183, 188.

a husband and wife jointly execute a The necessity of making this grantee a

fraudulent conveyance of the husband's defendant is not apparent. It is true, his

IYIL TIE . IEDIES.
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veyed hind to A., and took back a purchase-money mortgage

whicli he assigned to B. In an action to set aside the convey-

ance, or to reach the mortgage, it was held that the debtor and

both A. and B. were proper and necessary parties defendant.^

^5 246. * 849. Assignees of Separate Parcels of Property should be

joined. Reason herein. When the action is brought for either of

these objects, if the debtor has at different times assigned, in

alleged fraud of his creditors, different parcels of his property to

different assignees, or if different parcels of property are held by

dift'erent persons in alleged fraud of the debtor's creditors, so

that the equitable ownership is claimed to be vested in him, all

of these assignees, or all of these holders of tlie legal title, may

be joined with the debtor as co-defendants in one action. ^ The

reason given for this rule permitting separate assignees or holders

of the legal title to be joined, although they take by different

conveyances and at different times, is, "that the}' ail have a

common interest centering in the point at issue in the cause ; so

that, while the title to one piece of property is in one defendant,

and the title to some other distinct piece is in another defendant,
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yet these various titles Avere taken and are now held for a com-

mon purpose, and to accomplish the same fraudulent end. All

are privy to have been concerned in acts tending to the same

illegal result. The matters are not distinct, but are in truth all

connected with the same fraudulent transaction in which all the

defendants have })articipated.^

§ 247. * 350. Other Cases. Trustees of an Express Trust. Inno-

cent Third Parties. In an action brought by or on behalf of a

judgment creditor, to reach a fund in the hands of an express

trustee for the debtor, such debtor is a necessary defendant, and

deed is sought to l)e set aside, but lie has Reed (•. Stryker, 12 Abb. Pr. 47 ; Jacot

no iiitere.st wliatever in the result; all v. Boyle, 18 How. Pr. 106; Hamliu v.

title luw passed out of him, and he cannot Wright, 23 Wis. 491 ; Winslow v. Dous-

be affected by the judgment. See Spicer man, 18 Wis. 456; North v. Brad way, 9

V. Hunter, 14 Abb. Pr. 4. Minn. 18.'i.

1 Foster v. Townshend, 12 Abb. Pr. ■' Winslow v. Dousman, 18 Wi.s. 4,i6,

N. 8. 469. When a debtor had conveyed 462, per Cole J.; Hamlin v. Wright, 2.'?

y ,. d land t .. \.., and uok ba 1- a I ur h. e-money mort , g
·l ic h lie a· ~ignecl t o B. In an action to set a~ id he on ymor gage, it wa h 11 tlm th c.l btor an 1
. '" r I rop r and nee .., ary parti · ]ef nc.lant. 1
: .fl . Assignees of Separate Parcels of Property should be
j oined. Reason herein.
\Vh n tl e action i · br u ht f r ith r f
h, · uh j t ' if th c1 bt r ha at cliff r nt im
a, ign d, in
a ll J d framl of hi · r dit r · liff r nt pare 1 f hi property
differ nt a i n e · or if li:ff rent pare l · f I ro1 rty are h ld by
tliff r nt p r ' n ' in alleg cl fraud f the debtor'
r ditor , o
tha t the quitabl owner:hip i lairne 1 to be
t cl in him, all
f th .· a · ·ign e.' , or all of th · bold rs of th l ·al itl may
u join 1 with th l btor a co-clef ndant in
a tion. 2 The
r .v ·un gi Yen for hi rnle permitting parat a ·i ·n
or h ld r
f the legal title t be joined, although th y take by cliff r nt
conve ranee and at different time · i
'thut they all have a
e mmon int r t cent ring in the p int at i · ·u in the au ; ·o
that , while th title o one I iece of I rop rty i in u d fondant
ancl h itle to ome other di ·tinct piec i · in anoth r cl fen<lant,
yet the' vanou itl wer taken an<l ar n w held f r a com non purp · , and to accompli h th am fraudul nt ncl. All
ar privy t hav b n
n erned in act t nding to th ame
ill ·al r ult. Th matt r ar n t di tinct, but ar in trnth all
conn cted with th am fraudulent tran action in whi h 11 the

laud in fraud of his creditors, and the Wis. 491, 494; Briiikcrhoff v. Brown, 6

grantee had executed a mortgage thereon, Johns. Ch. R. 139, l.")? ; Fellows c. Fellows,

llie mortgagee was held a necessary de- 4 Cow. 682; Boyd v. Hoyt, 5 Paige, 65;

fendant in a creditor's suit to set a.'iide the N. Y. & N. H. R. Co. r. Schuyler, 1 7 N. Y.

conveyance. Copis i-. Middleton, 2 Mad 592 ; Story's Eq. PI. §§ 285, 2S6 : Di\ v.

410 Briggs, 9 Paige, 595; Sizer v. Miller, 9

^ Morton r. Weil, 11 Abb. Pr. 421; Paige, 605.

247.

. ;- .

Other Cases.

Trustees of an Express Trust.

Inno-

In an a tion brought by r n b half f a
f an xpr
ju grn nt r dit r, t r a h a fun l in th han
tru.'t f r the debt r u ·h cl bt r i an c cry d fen ant, and

cent Third Parties.

dee rl i · . ought to h
et
itl , bnt h ha
u o inte re:t whatev r in th r ult; all
ti tle ha.: pa cil out of him, ancl h anuot
Le aff ·cted by th judgmeut. ' e , picer
11 . Hun te r, 14 Abb. Pr. 4.
l Fo·t•~ r 11. Towmh nd, 12 Abh. Pr.
·" . .t G9 \Vhe n
cl ht r ha.cl
nv .vecl
Jau r! in fr· II U Of hi c•rptfitor , and th
Kra11 t1• hat! exer· ulerl a mortgag , th r n,
t ltf· 111 1rtuag"" wa · hC> ld a nPc' •; ry clPf •nda nt iu a r rerlilo r' , u!t to . Pl a . id thP
ronv yaur ·. Co pi.· 1· . Mirldl Lou,~ ~Tad
110
2 • f<J rt•m ,, W ii , 11 Abu. Pr. -!21;
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should be joined with the trustee; he is the person directly

iuterested in the fund, and the one to be directly affected by the

judgment. 1 When a creditor's suit was brought to reach prop-

erty fraudulently transferred by the debtor, and the alleged

fraudulent transfer was consummated through the means of a

third person, who in good faith received a conveyance of the

property in trust for the alleged fraudulent grantee, and who

subsequently conveyed the same to such grantee in accordance

with the trust, such third person was held not to be a proper

defendant; there was simply no cause of action against him,

because he was free from any fraudulent intent. ^

§ 248. * 351. IV. Actions Relating to the Estates of Deceased Per-

sons. The "administration suit " in chancery, by means of which

the estates of deceased persons are usually settled in England, is

uncommon, if not entirely unknown, in the United States. The

actions which will fall under the above heading are almost en-

tirely special cases, depending upon special circumstances: suits-

by judgment creditors to reach the property of deceased debtors,

or of beneficiaries to reach trust property lield by deceased
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trustees, or of heirs or next of kin, or legatees, to set aside the

fraudulent transactions of administrators and executors, and the

like. It is almost impossible, therefore, to collect these various

cases into any well-defined groups; each must stand upon its own

facts, and will illustrate as far as possible the broad generalities

of the equitable doctrine as to parties.^

1 Vanderpoel v. Van Valkenburgh, 6 son of creating preferences, the ci-editors

N. Y. 190. alleged to have been preferred are not

2 Spicer v. Hunter, 14 Alib. Pr. 4; necessary parties: Bradley y. Bailey (189.5),

Bartlett v. Drew, 57 N. Y. 587, 589. 95 la. 745, 64 N. W. 758. But wliere one

For a peculiar case of misjoinder of de- creditor seeks to be placed aliead of prior

fendants in a creditor's action, see Gale v. creditors such prior creditors must be

Battin, 16 Minn. 148, 150. made parties: State ex rel. v. Hickman

Q Receiver as Party. Held in Daisy (1899), 150 Mo. 626, 51 S. W. 680.]

Roller Mills v. Ward (1897), 6 N. D. 317, ^ For various examples of such actions

70 N. W. 271, that where judgment credi- see Littell v. Sayre, 7 Hun, 485; Skid-

tors brought suit merely to set aside con- more v. Collier, 8 id. 50 ; Selover v. Coe,

should be joined with the tru tee; he j the p rs n directly
interested in the fund, and the one to be dir ctly aff ctetl hy the
ju<lgment. 1 When a creditor' "uit wa brought t r ·wh property fraudulently transferr cl by the cl btor, and the alleged
fraudulent transfer was con ummatetl through the means of a
third person, who in good faith r ceivetl a onveyance of the
property in trust for the alleged fraudulent grant e, and who
subsequently conveyed the same to such grantee in accordance
with the trust, such third per on was held not to be a proper
defendant; there was simply no cause of action against him,
becau e he was free from any fraudulent intent. 2
§ 248. * 351. IV. Actions Relating to the Estates of Deceased Persons. The "administration suit" in chancery, by means of which
the estates of decea eel persons are usually settled in England, i
uncommon, if not entirely unknown, in the United States. The
actions which will fall under the above heading are almost entirely special cases, depending upon special circumstances: suits
by judgment creditors to reach the property of deceased debtors,
or of beneficiaries to reach trust property held by deceased
trustees, or of heirs or next of kin, or legatees, to set aside the
fraudulent transacc;ions of administrat0rs and executors, and the
like. It is almost impossible, therefore, to collect these various
cases into any well-defined groups; each must stand upon its own
facts, and will illustrate as far as possible the broaJ. generalities
of the equitable doctrine as to parties. 3

veyauces of real estate as fraudulent, and 63 N. Y. 438 ; Janes i'. Williams, 31 Ark.

asked for no accounting for rents and 175 ; Williams v. Ewing, 31 id. 229 ;

profits, a receiver of the rent.s and profits Whitsett r. Kershaw, 4 Col. 419 ; Wall v.

appointed after the conveyances were made Fairley, 77 N. C. 105 ; Harris v. Bryant,

is not a necessary party. 83 id. 568 ; Conolly v. Wells, 33 Fed. Kep.

Other Creditors as Parties. In an 205 (in an action against executors for an

action between certain creiiitors and the accounting, all must be joined, including

general assignee, raising the issue as to one who was outside tlie jurisdiction of

the general assignment being void by rea- the court) ; Howth i\ Owens, 29 Fed. Hop.

1

Vanderpoel

11.

Van Valkenburgh, 6

N. Y . 190.
2
picer v. Hunter, 14 Abb. Pr. 4;
Bartlett v. Drew, 57 N. Y. 5 7, 589.
J!'or a peculiar case of misj oind er of defe ndants in a creditor's action, see Gale v.
Battin, 16 Minn . 148, 150.
[ Receiver as Party. Held in Daisy
Roller Mills v. Ward ( 1897), 6 N. D. 317,
70 N. W. 271, that where judgment creditors brought suit merely to set a. ide conveyances of real estate as fraudulent, and
a keel for no accounting for rent and
profits, a receiver of the rents and profits
~ppointed after the conveyance were made
is not a necessary party.
Other Creditors as Pm·tie . In an
action between certain creditors and the
general assignee, ra ising the i::; ue a to
t he general ass ign ment being voicl by rea-

son of creating preferences, the creditors
alleged to have been preferred are not
necessary parties: Bradley v. Bailey (1895),
95 Ia. 745, 64 N. W. 758. But where one
creditor seeks to be placed ahead of prior
creditors r-nch prior creditors must be
made parties: State ex r l. v. Hickman
(1899 ), 150 Mo. 626, 51 S. W. 680.J
s For various example of such actions
see Littell v. Sayre, 7 Hun, 485; Skidmore v. Collier, 8 id. 50; elove r v . Coe,
63 N. Y. 438; Janes v. Williams, 31 Ark.
175; Williams v. Ewing, 31 id. 229;
Whitsett t'. Kershaw, 4 Col. 419; Wall v.
Fairley, 77 . C. 105; Harri v. B ryant,
83 id. 568; Conolly v. Well·, 33 Fed. Rep .
205 (in an action again t executors for an
accounting, all must be joined, induding
one who '"a out ide the juri diction of
the court); Howth u. Owens, 29 Fed. Hep.
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§ 249. *352. Illustrations. A testator left real and personal

property in fee to A., but if she should die without issue, $10,000

of it were given over to B. The original executor of this will

died leaving the trust fund mingled with his own property, and

the whole passed to his executor, C. A. died without issue, and

B. brought an action to recover the legacy of $10,000, making C,

the then executor of the original executor, the defendant. It

was held by the Court of Appeals in New York, that C. was a

necessary party, but that the administrator of A. was also a

necessary defendant without whom the issues in the cause could

not be decided.^ " He [this administrator] is a trustee of the next

of kin of A., and they are interested in the fund after satisfying

all charges upon it, and have a right to be heard upon any claim

which tends to take it away for the benefit of another or to

reduce it."^ In an action brought by one executor against his

co-executor for an account, — the ground of the proceeding being

the breach of his trust by the latter, and the misuse of funds

belonging to the estate, — the legatees, next of kin, and creditors

of the deceased are not necessary defendants unless the account-
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ing is to be final ; if it is made the final accounting and settle-

ment of the trust, then all these persons must be brought in as

defendants.^ The administrator, in violation of his trust, fraudu-

lently conveyed lands of the estate to a person who was a partici-

pant in the fraud. This grantee died intestate. The children

— the only heirs and next of kin — of the deceased original owner

brought an action against the administrator and the heirs of the

grantee, to set aside the fraudulent transfer, to compel a re-con-

veyance of the land, and for an accounting by the administrator.

This action was held proper; the heirs of the grantee were held

to be necessary defendants, and properly united with the

722 (representative of deceased executor this [wliere creditors of tlie testator are

rnuBt be joined). For a full discussion claiming contract liens upon ))roperty

of the jurisdiction of erjuity over admin- which is charf,'ed by the will with tlie pay-

istration suits in tliis country, see 3 Pom. ment of debts generally], with no one

Eq. Jur. §§ 1152-1154, and extended note representing them and their debts a charge

to § 1154. upon the realty, they, or some of them,

QIu Payne v. .Johnson's Ex'ors (ISO.T), were necessary ])arties to the action en-

95 Ky. 17.5, 24 S. W. 238, the court .said forcing this lien. "3

that " while all creditors are not necessary ^ Auburn Tlieol. Sem. Trs. i-. Kellogg,

parties to an action by an administrator IG N. Y. 83. '

for the settlement of an e-^tate, still thoy - Iliid., p. 00, per Dcnio J.

are entitled to be iieard ; and inaca-selike ^ Wuud v. Brown. .'54 X. V. 337.

249. * 52. Illustrations.
te tator left real and personal
r
rty inf e o . but if be h uld die' ithout i ue, $10 000
f i w r giY n
er to
Tb
riginal x cutor of bi ' ill
lied 1 ving h tru t fund mingl l with bi
' n proper · nd
th ' bol a ed to hi· execut r
A. di d ' i bout i u , and
. br ugbt an action tor cover the 1 ga y f 1 000 making
th then executor of the original executor the defendan . I
a b ld by b
ourt of ppeal in ew York that . wa a
r party, but that th admini trator f A. wa al
a
nee
r defendant without whom the i "u in the cau e c uld
not be decided. 1
e [thi admini trator] i a tru tee of th nex
f kin of . and they are intere ted in the fund after ati f ing
all charge up n it and have a right to be h ard upon any claim
which tend to take it away for the benefit of anoth r or to
reduce it. 2 In an action brought by one xecutor again t hi
co-executor for an account, - the ground of th proceedin being
the breach of hi tru t by the latter, and the mi use of fund
b 1 nging to the tate,- the legatees, next of kin, and er ditor
f the decea ed are not necessary defendant unles the ace unting i to be final; if it is made the final accounting and ettlement of the tru t, then all the e persons must be brought in as
defendan . 3 The admini trator, in violation of bis trust, fraudu
len ly conveyed land of the e tate to a per on who wa a participant in the fraud. Thi grantee di d int ate. The children
- the only heir and next of kin - of the dee a d original wner
rought an ac ion again t th admini trator and the heir of the
grantee to et a ide the frau ulent tran fer to comp 1 a r -c ney n ·e of the lan and for an ac oun ing by th admini rat r.
hi action' a b 1 pr p r · h heir of the rant w r h ld
to 1 e nece ary d fen lants and r perl united wi h be
722 (repr entativ of <lece ed ex cut r
rnu t be j ined). F r a full di cu ·ion
f he juri.<liction of quity ov r admini tration . uit' in thi
uotry , ee 3 l'om.
l~<t Jur. § · 1152-1154, and extended uot
() : 115·1.
[Iu Payne r. ,John. 011' Ex'or. {I 0.1),
';; Ky. 1i:J, 24 •. \V. 23 , th ·ourt . aid

hat "wliilc all <'r rli or· ar not nPC . .-ary
Jiarli
" an a ·ti1m liy a11 admi11i.·trator
I r thr· ctt)1>111<•nt ,,f a11 c• ta ', ~till tllf'y
fl r. •11titl •<l t<J
h •anl; aud in ca lik<~

m. Tr .
~

i:.

h:cllo.,.rr,

I liiil., p !Hi, p r Denio .f.
3 \\'uu1l '" Hrow11, .'3-1. •. Y . .1.'37.
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administrator.^ And when in a similar case the fraudulent

administrator had at different times conveyed portions of the

land to different grantees, an action by tlie heirs of the deceased

owner against the administrator and all of these grantees, was

sustained. "If there is a common point of litigation, the

decision of which affects the whole number of defendants, and

will settle the rights of all, they may ail be joined in the same

proceeding. "2

§ 250. * 353. When Administrator ia not a Necessary Party.

Illustration. An administrator is not a necessary party defend-

ant unless some claim is made against the estate which he would

have the right to resist, or unless the judgment would be in some

manner prejudicial to the estate;^ a fortiori^ he is not a necessary

defendant when the immediate object of the action is to increase

the amount of assets available to the payment of the debts of the

deceased, even though the ultimate purpose of the proceeding

may be the benefit of the creditor who prosecutes it. Thus,

where the deceased in his lifetime had received an absolute deed

of lands, which he did not put upon record, and had subsequently
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with a fraudulent intent destroyed this deed, and procured the

grantor therein to execute another conveyance of the same land

without consideration to a third person who took the same with

full knowledge and collusively and put the same upon record, a

judgment creditor of the deceased, whose judgment was recov-

ered while the deceased held the deed to himself, brought an

action against the second grantee and the heirs and widow of the

deceased, seeking to set aside the second deed, and to establish

1 Bassett v. Warner, 2.3 Wis. 673. 474, 70 Pac. 455, where the court says : " It

This case is plainly the same in principle is, in effect, a suit to determine a contro-

as the suit by a judgment creditor against versy between the different heirs as to

a fraudulent debtor and his grantee. their respective riglits of inheritance, and

2 Bowers v. Keesecher, 9 Iowa, 422, in such a controversy it is well settled

424 ; citing Story's Eq. PI. §§ 284, 534 ; that the administrator has no interest, but

Bugbee v. Sargent, 23 Me. 271 ; Kayner is a mere officer of the court, holding the

I'. Julian, Dickens, 677 ; Brinkerhoff v. estate as a stake holder." See also Hall

Brown, 6 Johns. Ch. R. 152; Varick v. v. Bank (1898), 145 Mo. 418, 46 S. W.

Smith, 5 Paige, 160. 1000, where it was held that an adminis-

^ QSee McCabe v. Healy (1902), 138 trator cannot bring a suit in equity to set

Cal. 81, 70 Pac. 1008, where it was held aside a fraudulent conveyance of land

that the administrator had no concern or made by the deceased unless an order i*

administrator. 1 And when in a similar case the fraudulent
administrator had at different times convey d portions of the
land to different grantee , an action by the heir f th deceased
owner against the admini trator an<l all of the e grante , was
sustained.
"If there i a common poin t of litigation, t he
decision of which affect the whole number of d f ndants, and
will settle the rights of all, they may all be joined in the same
proceeding." 2
§ 250. * 353. When Administrator is not a Necessary Party.
Illustration. An administrator is not a necessary party defend ant unless some claim is made against the estate which he would
have the right to resist, or unless the judgment would be in some
manner prejudicial to the estate; 3 a fortiori, he is not a neces ary
defendant when the immediate object of the action is to in crease
the amount of assets available to the payment of the debts of the
deceased, even though the ultimate purpose of the proceeding
may be the benefit of the creditor who prosecutes it. Thus,
where the deceased in his lifetime had received an absolute deed
of lands, which he did not put upon record, and bad subsequently
with a fraudulent intent destroyed this deed, and procured the
grantor therein to execute another conveyance of the same land
without consideration to a third person who took the same with
full knowledge and collusively and put the same upon record, a.
judgment creditor of the deceased, whose judgment was recovered while the deceased held the deed to himself, brought an
action against the second grantee and the heirs and widow of the
deceased, seeking to set aside the second deed, and to establish

interest in a suit between the plaintiff first obtained from the probate court

who claims under a contract to make a directing him to take possession of the

will and tlie heirs of the decedent. And land for the payment of debts.]]

also //( re Healv's Estate (1902), 1-37 Cal.

1 Bassett v. Warner, 23 Wis. 670 .
474, 70 Pac. 455 , where the court says : "It
This case is plainly the same in principle is, in effect, a sui t to determin e a controas the suit by a judgment creditor against versy between th e different heirs as to
a fraudul ent debtor and his grantee.
their respecti ve ri g hts of iuheritance, and
2 Bowers v. Kee echer, 9 Iowa, 422,
in such a controversy it is well settled_
424; citing Story's Eq. PL §§ 2 4 , 534 ; that th e adminis t rator ha no interest, but
Bugbee L'. Sa rgent, 23 Me. 271; R ayn er is a mere offi cer of the court, holding thev. Julian, Dickens, 6i7 ; Brinkerh off v. estate as a stake holder."
ee al o Hall
Brown, 6 J ohns. Ch. R. 152; V arick v. v. Bau k {l 9 ), 145 l\Io. 4 1 , 46 . W.
Smith , 5 Paige, 160.
1000, where it was held that an adminisa [ See McCa be v . H ealy {1902), 13
t rator cannot bri ng a suit in equi ty to set
Cal. 1, 70 Pac. 100 , wher e it was hel<l aside a fraudulent com·eyance of land
t hat the administrator had no concern or made by the deceased uule s au on!er is
in terest in a su it between the plaintiff first olitain ec1 from the probate cuurt
who claims un der a contrart to make a. directi ng hi 11 t tn.ke po ession of t he
will and the heirs of the decedent. .And lai1 d fo r t he: pa: mc1: t of deut ·.]
also In re Healy's Estate {l902 ), l ::l i' C'al.

3-±fi

fflL H. E.\IEDlE ...:.
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the original title of the judgment debtor, and to enforce the

lien of his own judgment upon the land; this action was held

to have been properly brought against the defendants named.

The administrator of the deceased was held not to be a neces-

sary party defendant, because the proceeding was really for the

benefit of the estate, and he could make no opposition if he were

present.^

§ 251. * 354. "When Legatees and Next of Kin are neither Neces-

sary nor Proper Parties. In actions by creditors against executors

or administrators to recover debts alleged to be due from the

deceased, or by the owners of the property to recover assets

which had been in the possession of the deceased and apparently

belong to his estate in the hands of his personal representatives,

the legatees or next of kin are not necessary nor even proper

parties defendant. ^ The executors or administrators represent

the estate. They can bring all suits to recover property in

the hands of third persons alleged to belong to the estate, with-

out joining the legatees or distributees as co-plaintiffs, ^ and on

the same principle they can defend all actions brought against
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themselves, involving the ownership of property in their own

hands, or the indebtedness of the estate, without the presence of

legatees and next of kin as co-defendants. Thus in an action

against executors to reach certain moneys and securities in their

possession as apparent assets, but which it Avas claimed had

been held by the testator in trust for the plaintiff and actually

belonged to him, the legatees were held not to be necessary de-

fendants.* And in an ordinary suit to recover a debt due from

the deceased, brought against the administrator, the widow, and

the next of kin, it was held that all these defendants, except the

administrator, were improperly joined; he represents them, and

his defence is their defence.^

1 Cornell v. Radway, 22 Wis. 260, 2 [^Byrcl v. Byrd (1895), 117 N. C. .523,

26.5, per liixon C. J. It was said that 2.3 S. E. 324.]

the administrator or executor might ^ QlJnt where a. «uit was brought by the

bring the suit; but this authority did heirs of a devi.see under a will to recover

not ^ take away the right of the cred- property mi.sdirected by the life tenant,

itor. Wis. R. S., ch. 100, §§ 16-18. the administrator was held a necessary

But see per contra, as to the necei»sity party: Burford v. Aldridge (1901), 165

of the personal representative being Mo. 419, 63 S. W. 109.]

made a party in such actions, 1 Dan. * King c. Lawrence. 14 Wis. 238.

Ch. I'l. (4th Am. ed.), p. 200, and cases ' Nelson r. Hart, 8 Ind. 293. That the

cited. personal representatives are the only

tlw ri -inal title of the ju 1 m nt 1 btor and t
nf rce the
li n of hi own ju lgmen up n the land; hi action wa h ld
t hav b en pr I rl ' brout;ht again t th def ndant nam d.
Th <H1mini trator f th de a eel 'va h kl n t to b a nee ·ary par · d fe uclant, becau e th proc ding wa r all for h
·b n fit f thee ate and he uld mak n oppo ition if he were
pr ~en . 1
· 251. * . '"'.f. W h en L egatees an d N ext of K i n are n either Necessary nor Proper P arties. In a tion by credi ors again t xecutor
or ad mini tr t r to rec v r lebts all ged to be ue from h
llec a d, or by th owner of the prop rty to recover a t
which had been in the po
sion of th decea ed and apparently
belon to hi e tate in th hand of hi per nal repr ntative ,
the legatee. or next of kin ar not neces ary nor ven proper
partie defen lant. 2 The executor or administrator r pre ent
the
tate . 'I hey can bring all uit to recover pr per y in
the band of hircl person all ged to belong to the e tate, without joining the l gatees or li tribute a co-plaintiff , 3 and n
the c.tme prin ciple they can defend all action brought again t
them elve , involving the ownership of property in th ir own
han l '. or the incl htedness of the e tat , without the pr ence of
legat e and next of kin a a-defendants . Thu in an action
a ain ·t executor ' to rea h certain m n y and ecuriti in th ir
po ··ion a apparent a
but which it wa claim
had
been h ld by the te. tator iu tru t for th plaintiff and a tuall
ary d b longed to him the 1 ga tee were h ld not to b n
f ndant ·.4
nd in an ordinar r uit tor ver a d bt due fr m
the cea eel brought again t the admini ra or, th widow, and
the 1 xt f kin it wa h lcl that all th
def ndant , xc pt tl e
admini rator wer impr p rly joined · h r pr nt them, and
hi ' cl f nee i their def n · . 5
1 Cornell v. Rad way, 22 Wi . 260,
2G5, per l>ixon
. J. It wa aid that
hP admiui. trato r or ex cutor mig ht
liriug th
uit; but thi authori y did
1wt take away the ri ght of th
creditor.
Wi.. R. , ., ch. 100, . § 16-1 .
But . cc }/f'r r·ontra, a to th n c .. ity
11f th" per ·oual r pr ,., utati'· b ing
madro a party in .'II ·h a ·ti on., l J au.
... h . l'I. {41.li A m. <l.), p. 20 , and a · s

1•i P1(.

[Byrd 1. Byrd {l 95), 117 N. . 523,
. E . 324.]
s [Bu t wh re a uit was brought by the
heir of a d vi
und r a wiU t r
ver
prop rty mi dir ct d by the life t naut,
he at! min i'trator wa held a n
ary
party : Bt1rf rd v. Aldridge (190 1), l 5
fo. 419, 63 . W. I 09.J
4 King i• . Lawreu · , 14 Wi . 23 .
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§ 252. * 355. When a Dififerent Rule applies. A different rule,

however, prevails in an action by u distributee against the ad-

ministrator, legatee against the executor, or beneficiary against

the trustee, when the right asserted, if it exists at all, is also

held by all the other parties similarly situated with the one who

sues, and the decision would in fact determine all their rights.

In such a case, in order that the trustee may not be subjected to

a multiplicity of suits, when the whole controversy could be de-

cided in one, the equitable doctrine primarily requires that all the

distributees, legatees, or beneficiaries should unite as plaintiffs ;

but if any refuse to join, they should be made defendants.^ The

statutes of several States permit an equitable action to be brought

by the heirs of the testator to set aside a will of lands for any

cause which can invalidate it. In such a suit the devisees under

the will are indispensable defendants. ^ In fact, the executor can

hardly be called a necessary party, for he takes no interest in the

land. Conversely, in an action to reach the land of a deceased

intestate, his heirs are indispensable defendants, without whom
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proper defendants in such actions, see

Story's Eq, PI. §§ 10+, 140 ; Anon., 1 Vern.

261 ; Lawsou v. Barker, 1 Bro. C. C. 303 ;

Brown v. Dowthwaite, 1 Mad. 446 ; Jones

V. How, 7 Hare, 267 ; Haycock v. Hay-

cock, 2 Ch. Cas. 124 ; Jennings v. Paterson,

15 Beav. 28; Micklethwait v. Winstanley,

13 W. R. 210; Pritchard v. Hicks, 1

~ 252. * 355. When a Different Rule applies.
A different rule,
however, prevails in an action by a di tribut against the administrator, legatee again t tbe xecutor, or beneficiary again t
the tru 't e, when the right a erted, if it xi ts at all, is al o
held by all the other parties similarly situated with the one who
ue , and the decision would in fact determine all their rights.
In such a case, in order that the trnstee may not be ubj ct d to
a multiplicity of suits, when the whole controversy could be decided in one, the equitable doctrine primarily requires that all the
distributees, legatees, or beneficiaries should unite as plaintiffs;
but if any refuse to join, they should be made defendants.I The
tatutes of several States permit an equitable action to be brought
by the heirs of the testator to set aside a will of lands for any
cause which can invalidate it. In such a suit the devisees under
the will are indispensable defendauts. 2 In fact, the executor can
hardly be called a necessary party, for he takes no interest in the
land. Conversely, in an action to reach the land of a deceased
intestate, his heirs are indispensal>le defendants, without whom

Paige, 270; Wiser v. Blachly, 1 Johns.

Ch. 437 ; Davison v. Rake, 45 N. J. Eq.

767. In general, all the personal rep-

resentatives must be joined. Offey ?'.

Jenney, 3 Ch. Rep. 92 ; Hanip v. Robin-

son, 3 De G., J. & S. 97 ; CouoIIy v.

Wells, 33 Fed. Rep. 205 ; Howth v. Owens,

29 Fed. Rep. 722. But if an executor has

not proved, he need not be joined. Strick-

land r. Strickland, 12 Sim. 463; Dyson v.

Morris, 1 Hare, 413 ; Farrell v. Smith, 2

B. & B. 337 ; Clegg v. Rowland, L. R. 3

Eq. 368. And, in an action by a creditor

against the heirs and devisees of his de-

ceased debtor, to make his claim out of

the land of the decea.sed in their hands,

tiie joinder of such heirs and devi.sees was

held proper, since the judgment could

provide for the order of their liabilities.

Rockwell V. Geery, 6 N. Y. Sup. Ct. 687 ;

Schermerhorn v. Barhydt, 9 Paige, 28;

Houston V. Levy's Ex., 44 N. J. Eq. 6 ,

Read v. Patterson, 44 N. J. Eq. 211;

Dandridge v. Washington's Ex., 2 Pet.

370 ; Deegau v. Capner, 44 N. J. Eq.

339.

1 Dillon V. Bates, 39 Mo. 292. [^Hill v.

Dade (1900), 68 Ark. 409, .59 S. W. 39:

Where a suit is brought by heirs to deter-

mine whether an executrix iiad power

under a will to sell the fee of tlie ancestor's

land, all persons holding portions of said

land through conveyances from the ex-

ecutrix are ])roper parties. See also Reiser

V. Gigrich (1894), 59 Minn. 368, 61 N. W.

30, where the action was brought by the

administrator against parties connected

with a fund belonging to the estate.]

2 Eddie v. Parke's Ex., 31 Mo. 513.

The action was brought against the ex-

ecutors alone. See Morse v. Morse, 42

Ind. 365 ; infra, § *379, note. [^In Fogle

-proper defendants in such actions, see
Story's Eq, Pl.§~ 104, 140; Anon., 1 Vern.
261; Lawson v. Barker, 1 Bro. C. C. 303;
Brown v. Dowthwaite, 1 Mad. 4-16; Jones
v. How, 7 Hare, 267 ; Haycock v. Haycock, 2 Ch. Cas. 124; Jenniugs v. Paterson,
15 Beav. 28; Micklethwait v. Winstanley,
13 W. R. 210; Pritchard v. Hicks, 1
Paige, 270; Wiser v. Blachly, 1 Johns.
Ch. 437 ; D a,·ison v. Rake, 45 N. J. Eq.
767. In general, all the personal representatives must be joined . Offey v.
Jenney, 3 Ch. Rep. 92; Hamp v. Robinson, 3 De G., J. & S. 97 ; Conolly v.
Wells, 33 Fed. Rep. 205; Howth v. Owens,
29 Fed. Rep. 722. But if an executor has
not proved, he need not be joined. Strickland v. Strickland, 12 Sim : 463; Dyson v.
Morri , 1 Hare, 413; Farrell v. Smith, 2
B. & B. 337 ; Clegg v. Rowland, L. R. 3
Eq. 368. And, in an action by a creditor
again t the heirs and devisees of his deceased debtor, to make his claim out of
the land of the deceased in their hands,
the joinder of such heirs and devisees was
held proper, since the judgment could
provide for the order of their liabilities.
Rockwell v. Geery, 6 N. Y. Sup. Ct. 687;
Schermerhorn v. Barhydt, 9 Paige, 28;

Houston v. Levy's Ex., 44 N. J. Eq. 6,
Read v. Patterson, 44 N. J. Eq. 211 ;
Dandridge v. Washington's Ex., 2 Pet.
370; Deegan v. Capner, 44 N. J. Eq.
339.
1 Dillon v. Bates, 39 Mo. 292. [Hill v.
Dade (1900), 68 Ark. 409, 59 S. W. 39:
'\Vhere a suit is brought by heirs to determine whet her an executrix had power
under a will to sell the fee of the ancestor'
land, all persons holding portions of said
land through conveyances from the executrix are proper parties. See also Reiser
v. Gigrich (1894), 59 Minn. 368, 61 N. W.
30, where the action was brought by the
administrator against parties conuected
with a fund belonging to the estate.]
2 Eddie v. Parke's Ex., 31 Mo. 513.
The action was brought against the executors alone. See Mor e v. Morse, 42
Ind. 365; infra, § * 379, note. [In Fogle
v. St. Michael Church {1896), 48 S. C. 86,
26 S. E. 99, it was held that neither the
executor nor heir at law wa a necessary
party in an action to enforce a contract to
dispose of property by will, when the
executor has turned over the entire assets
to the devisee.J
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no decree can be made, and it is difficult to see how the admia-

istrator could be a necessary party. ^

i^ 253. * 35G. V. Trusts. Actions to enforce Performance of Ex-

press Trusts. Trustees and Survivors Necessary Parties. It is a

universal and elementary rule that, in an action to enforce the

performance of an express trust, the trustee is an indispensable

defendant. This doctrine was applied in a case where a debtor

had transferred personal property to a trustee upon trust to sell

the same, and out of the proceeds to pay the demands of the

creditor. The directions of the trust not having been complied

with, the creditor brought an action against the debtor alone to

foreclose the trust deed and for a sale of the goods. The trustee

was held to be a necessary defendant. ^ Where there were origi-

nally two or more trustees, and one or more have died, in an

action by the beneficiary to enforce the trust, and especially if a

violation thereof is alleged against all the trustees, the survivors

and the personal representatives of the deceased not only may

1 Muir V. Gibson, 8 Ind. 187, 190.
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That the adniinistrator is a proper party

in Buch au action, see Lowry v. Jackson,

27 S. C. 318. See Silsbee v. Smith, 60

Barb. 372. In an action for an account

of personal estate which came into the

hands of a deceased administrator or ex-

n

cree can e made an it i difficult to ee how the admin1 tr(
r c ul l b a nee ary party. 1
253. * 35 . V . Trusts . Actions to enforce Performance of Express Trusts . Trustees and Survivors Necessary Parties. It is a
uni r al and 1 mentar rule that, in an ac ion to enfor e the
rformance of an expre tru t th tru t e i an indispen able
l f ndant. Thi doctrine was ar li cl in a ca where a debtor
had tran ferred per onal proper y to a tru tee up n tru t to ell
the arne and ut of the proceed to pay the demand of the
credit r. The direc ions of he tru t not ha ing be n complied
with, the creditor brought an action again t the debtor alone to
foreclo e the tru t deed and for a ale of the good . The trustee
wa held to be a necessary defendant. 2 Where here were originally two or more tru tee and one or more ha e died, in an
acti on by the beneficiary to enforce the tru t, and e pecially if a
iol ation thereof i alleged again t all the tru ·tee , the survi ors
and the personal representative of the decea ed not only may

ecutor, his personal representatives are

necessary defendants. As to the neces-

sary parties in an action to construe a

will, see McKethan o. Ray, 71 N. C. 165,

1 70. '

2 Tucker v. Silver, 9 Iowa, 261, per

Wright C. J. After stating the rule as

laid down in the text, the court declares

that it has not been changed by tlie new

procedure. See also McKinley v. Irvine,

13 Ala. 681 ; Cassiday v. McDaniel, 8

B. Mon. 519; Morrow v. Lawrence, 7

Wis. 574; Jones v. Jones, 3 Atk. 110.

And, in general, all the trustees must he

l M uir v. Gib on,
In d. I 7, 190.
That the admini · t rator i a proper party
in u h an act ion, ee L owry v. Jack on,
27 . C. 31 .
ee il bee v. Smith, 60
Bar b. 3 72. In an action for a n account
of per onal e tate whi ch came into the
hand of a decea ed admini trator or executor, hi per onal repre enta ive a re
nece ary defendant . A to th e nece . a ry parti e in an a ction to c n t rue a
. 165,
will, ee McK eth an v. Ray, 71
170.

joined. Coppard v. Allen, 2 De G., J. &

S. 173; Howth v. Owens, 29 Fed. Rep.

722. But a trustee who has never acted,

and has relea.sed all his interest to his

co-trustee, need not be made a party.

Richanlson v. Hulbert, 1 Aust. 65. When

a trustee has assigned his interest in the

trust estate, in general both lie and the

assignee should be defendants. Story's

Efj. I'l § 209 ; Bailey i-. luglce, 2 Paige,

278. But if he has assigned his entire

interest absolutely, the assignee alone

should be sued, unless the assignment

was a breach of trust. Story's Eq. PI.

§§211, 213. 214; Munch v. Cockerell, 8

Sim. 219. As examples of this general

rule, when a demand is to be enforced

against idiots or lunatics, their commit-

tees or guardians must be sued, the luna-

tics or idiots themselves being proper

but not necessary parties. Beach v.

Bradley, 8 Paige, 146. And in suits re-

lating to the property of insolvents or

bankrupts, their assignees are nece.ssary

defendants. Storm r. Davenport, 1 Sandf.

Ch. 135 ; Movan v. Hays, 1 Johns.

Ch. 339; Sells i'. IIubbell,"2 Johns. Ch.

394; Botts V. Patton, 10 B. Mon. 452.

And the assignees are the only necessary

defendants ; neither the insolvents or

a ru "" ha. a. igrwd hi.· int r
rm
r· atr., in geu ral lioth 11
a i•r11p•• ._Jioultl Ii• dc•f nclant:.
hr1. I I : .!09; Ihil"Y '" foo-Jce, 2 P :ti"<',
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be united as co-defendants,^ but they must be so joined, or else

no decree enforcing the trust can be made.^

§ 254. * 357. Joining Beneficiaries. Distinction bet'ween Actions

in Opposition to, and in Furtherance of, the Trust. There is a broad

distinction between the case of an action brought in opposition

to the trust, to set aside the deed or other instrument by which

it was created, and to procure it to be dechired a nullity, and

that of an action brought in furtherance of the trust, to enforce

its provisions, to establish it as valid, or to procure it to be

wound up and settled. In the first case, the suit may be main-

tained without the presence of the beneficiaries, since the trustees

represent them all and defend for them. In the second, all the

beneficiaries must be joined, if not as plaintiffs, then as defend-

ants, so that the whole matter may be adjusted in one proceed-

ing, and a multiplicity of suits avoided.^ The reason of this

distinction is obvious. It is, that any one person interested in

opposition to the trust has a right to test the validity thereof,

and his voluntary action cannot be controlled by the will of
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a suit to enforce the trust against the

property: Bridge Co. v. Fowler (1895),

55 Kau' 17, 39 Pac. 727.]

1 Sortore v. Scott, 6 Lans. 271, 276.

It was held that the rule forbidding such

union of parties in a legal action against

joint debtors had no application to such

be united as co-defendant , 1 but they mu t b o joined, or else
no decree enforcing the trust can be made. 2
§ 254. * 357. Joining Beneficiaries . Distinction between Actions
in Opposition to, and in Furtherance of, the Trust. There i a broad
di tinction between the ca e of an action brought in oppo ition
to the trust, to set aside the de u or other instrum nt by which
it wa created, anu to procure it to be declared a nullity, and
that of an action brought in further~nce of the trn t, to enforce
its provisions, to establish it as valid, or to procure it to be
wound up and settled. In the :first case, the suit may be maintained without the pre ence of the beneficiaries, since the tru tee
represent them all and defend for them. In the second, all the
beneficiaries must be joined, if not as plaintiff , then a defendants, so that the whole matter may be adjusted in one proceeding, and a multiplicity of suits avoided . 3 The rea on of thi
distinction is obvious. It is, that any one per on interested in
opposition to the trust has a right to test the validity thereof,
and. his voluntary action cannot be controlled by the will of

an equitable suit. See also Petrie v.

Petrie, 7 Lans. 90; King v. Talbot, 40

N. Y. 76. See also Hazard v. Duraut, 19

Fed. Rep. 471.

^ Sherman v. Parish, 53 N. Y. 483, 490.

Action by a sole beneficiary against a

trustee for an alleged breach of the trust.

There had been other trustees who were

dead, and their personal representatives

were not made defendants. Folger J.

said : " It is the principle of courts of

equity, in cases of breach of trust, when

no general rule or order of the court in-

terferes, and when the facts of the case

call for a contribution or recovery over,

that all persons who should be before

tlie court to enable it to make complete

and final judgment are necessary ])arties

to the action. Nor has our mode of pro-

cedure abrogated the rule." Ho cites Hill

on Trustees, 520, 521 ; Perry on Trusts,

§§ 875, 876, 877 ; Lewin on Trusts, 845 ;

Munch V. Cockerell, 8 Sim. 219; Perry v.

Knott, 4 Beav. 179; Shipton r. Rawlins,

4 Hare, 619 ; Cunningham v. Pell, 5 Paige,

607; New York code, § 118. The court

add the following very important rule :

That, on timely objection to the want of

necessary parties, if the plaintiff does not

bring them in, the complaint must be

dismissed, hut not absolutelij ; the dismissal

should be without prejudice. The com-

plaint, however, should not even be thus dis-

missed if the cause can be made to stand over

on terms, in order to enable the plaintiff Xo

brinq in the 7iecessnri:/ parties. This ruling is

in e.xact conformity with the plain intent

of the codes, and with the views expressed

by me iu the text in a former paragraph.

See also Haines v. Hollister, 64 N. Y. 1 ;

Howth V. Owens, 29 Fed. Rep. 722. Au

heir at law is a proper, though not a

necessary, ])arty to a suit against the

a suit to enfo rce the trust against the
property: Bridge Co. v. Fowler (1895),
55 Kan. 17, 39 Pac. 727 .J
l Sortore v. Scott, 6 Lans. 271, 276.
It was held that the rule forbidding such
union of parties in a legal action against
j int debtors bad no application to such
an equitable suit. See also Petrie v.
Petrie, 7 Lans. 90; King v. Talbot, 40
N . Y. 76. See also Hazard v. Durant, 19
F ed. R ep. 4 71.
'..!
herman v. Parish, 53 N. Y. 483, 490.
A ction by a sole beneficiary ao-aiu t a
tru tee for an alleged breac h of the trust.
There had been other trustees who were
dead, and their personal representatives
were not made defendants. Folger J.
aid: " It is the principle of courts of
equity, in cases of breach of trust, when
no general rule or order of the court interfere , and when the facts of the case
call for a contribution or recovery over,
that all per on ~ who should be before
the court to enable it to make compl ete
and final judgment are neces ary parties
to the action. Nor has our mode of procedure abrogated the rule." He cite Hill
on Trustee , 520, 52 1 ; Perry ou T ru t.,
§§ 87 5, 8i6, 877; Lewiu ou Tru ts, 845;
MLrnch v. Cockerell, 8 Sim. 219; Perry v.

Knott, 4 Beav. 179; Shipton v. Rawlin ,
4 Hare, 619; Cunningham v. Pell, 5 Paige,
607; New York code, § 118. The court

add the following very important rule:
That, on timely objection to the want of
nece ary parties, if the plaintiff does not
bring them in, the complaint must be
di missed, but not absolutel.IJ; the di mis al
hould be without prejudice. The complaint, however, should not ei·en be tlw d ismissed if lhe cause can be made to sland oi·er
on terms, in order to enable the plaintijf to
brin.fJ in the necess11ry parties. This ruling i
in exact conformity with the plain intent
of the codes, and with the views expressed
by me in the text in a former paragraph.
See also Haines v. Holli- ter, 64 N. Y. I ;
Howth v. Owens, 29 Fed. Rep. 722. An
heir at law is a proper, though not a
necessary, party to a uit again t the
legal repre entative of hi ance tor to recover loss sustained by a hreach of tru t
of the ancestor as executor. McCartin v.
Traphagen's Adm., 43 N. J. Eq. 323.
s [B ut in an action by trustees, brought
in furtherance of their duty a such, in
r e pect to the trust property, the beneficiari es are not neces ary partie : Roberts
v. New York Elevated R. R. Co. (1898),
155 N. Y. 31, 49 N. E. 262. J
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others, while the trustees themselves are sufficient to represent

and defend all the interests of those who claim under the trust. ^

But when the trust is assented to, and the purpose is simply to

carry out its provisions, all the beneficiaries are alike interested

in tiiat object and in reaching that same result, and it is just to

the trustee that the controversy should be ended in one proceed-

ing. As illustrations of this principle: In an action brought to

set aside a trust deed made by a railroad company to a trustee

for the benefit of bondholders, and to restrain a sale of the road

thereunder, the beneficiaries under the trust were declared not to

be necessary or even proper parties, and the application of one of

them — a bondholder — to be admitted as a defendant was denied,

although he alleged that the trustee intended to make no defence,

and was actually colluding with tlie plaintiff and the company.^

On the same principle, wliere a testator had devised all his lands

to his executors with power to sell and distribute the proceeds

among his heirs, an action by a third person claiming to own part

of these lands, denying that they belonged to the testator, and

seeking to reach them or their j)roceeds in the hands of the ex-
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ecutors, was held to ba properly brought against the executors

alone without joining the heirs of the deceased as defendants.

The suit in effect sought to set aside the trust pro tanto between

the executors and the heirs. ^ In like manner, an action by one

1 QThe trustee is a necessary party in 150; Dewey v. Mover, 9 id. 473; Moore

a suit to set aside the deed of trust : Mark- v'. Hegemar, 6 id. 290 ; Benjamin v.

well V. Markwell (1900), l.")7 Mo. .326, 57 Loughborough, 31 Ark. 210; The Trus-

8. W. 1078. But it wa-s held in Ilohin.son tees v. Gleason, 15 Fla. 38-t; Hill v.

V. Kind (1896), 23 Nev. 330, 47 Pac. 1, Duraud, 50 Wis. 354. For further in-

that the beneficiaries were also neces.sary stances of actions brouglit in opposition

parties in a suit by one of them to revoke to the trust, to which the beneficiaries are

the trust.] not necessary parties, see Vetterlein v.

'^ QF. G. Oxley Stave Co. v. Butler Barnes, 124 U. S. 169; Uedin v. Bran-

County (1804), 121 Mo. 614,26 8. W. 367 : han,43 Minn. 283 ; Watkins v. Bryant, 91

" If the trustees were made parties and Cal. 492 ; Ward v. Waterman, 85 Cal.

o h r , while th tru t
ar
r pre nt
and tlef nd all the int r
£ ho e ' ho 1 im under th tru. . 1
Bn "·h n the rn:t i a" ent d to an l the purpo i imply to
·a rr.· ou t i ·· pro vi ·i n < 11 the ben fi iari
are alik intere 't cl
i!1 t l1·1t Lject ancl in r < hing the t am i· • ult and it i ju~t to
th tru tee that the controv r'} hould be n led in one rr c 1lJlO'.
illu ti'< ti n f thi. principle : In an action br u ·ht to
set a i e a tru t l cl m< cl by a railr ad c rnpan to a tru te
for th benefit of b nclh lder and to re train a ale of the r
thereunder the beneficiarie under the tru t were declared not to
he nece ary or even proper partie and th application of one of
them - a bon lhold r - t be admitted a' a defendant a d ui d
although he all O' d that the tru tee inten l d to make no defence
and wa actually c llucling with the plaintiff and the compan . 2
n he ame princir le, 1 here a te tator had levi ed all bi land
t bi executor with I ower to ell and di tribute the procee l
among his heir , an action by a third I er on claiming to own part
of these land , denying that they ~elongecl to the te 'ta tor and
seeking to reach them or their proceed in the hand of the xcutor was held t b.., properly brought again t the e:xecut r
alone without joining the heir of th decea eel a defendant .
The . uit in effect
ught t et a ·ide the tru t pro tanto be '"een
the executors an l tbe b ir . 3 In like manner, an acti n b,- ne

notified, tliat was sufficient. This is un- 488. The trustee is a necessary party :

doubtedly the rule in trusts of this cliar- McArthur v. Scott, 113 U. S. 340.

acter. Whatever binds the trustee in ^ Paul i-. Fulton, 25 Mo. 156. See also

proceedings to enforce tlie trust, liinds llidenour ?'. Wherritt, 30 Ind. 4S5. QWo-

tiie bondholders, and whatever forecloses men's Cliristian Ass'n v. Kausiis City

the trustee, in the absence of fraud or bad (1898), 147 Mo. 103, 48 S. W. 960: In an

faith, forecloses them " See alsoBuinsey action to have effectuated and carried out

V. Peoples' Ry. Co. (1900), 154 Mo. 215, a charitable trust cstabli.slied by a will, the

55 S. W. 615.] Winslow y. Minn. & Pac. heirs of the testatrix are not necessary

K. Co., 4 Minn. 313, 316. As to when the parties. See al.so Lacklami v. Walker

cp.s^/(x f/i(f f;«,s7e«; are or are not necessary (1899). 151 Mo. 210, 52 S. W. 414. In

defendants, see Vcrdin c. Slocuni, 9 Ilun, Newman r. Newman (1899), 152 Mo. 398,

1 [The tru tee i. a nee
ary party in
a nit to et a ide the deed of tru ~ t: Markwell v. Markwell (1900), 15i i\fo. 326, 57
• . W. !Oi . But it wa held in Robin on
v . Kin<l {l 96 ), 23
v. 330, 47 ac. 1,
that the beueficiarie were al o n ce . ary
partie in a nit lJ one of them to revoke
the tru. t.J
2 [F. G. Oxley
tave
o. v. Butler
County (l 94 ), 121 )[ . 614, 26 •. W. 36i;
" If th tru tee wne made parti
and
notified, that wa uffici nt. Thi. i 11ud1JuLte<lly the rule i11 trn t of thi: charWhate,·er liiud» the tru tee in
acter
Jiroceetl iu g · to uforc· th e trn. t, bind.
th~ lio11dlwlrler..: , a 111l wltate' r for '" lo e:
tlw tru tee, i11 the a b euce of framl ur had
faith, for· ·lo P the m " •'(•e al."o um ey
''· J»11plr·' lty. f':<J . ( l!JOO), 15+ '.\Io. 215,
5~1 '. \\' . Gl:J.]
'Vin: low 1•. :\Ji1111. & Pac.
I . <'o, ·1 :.\I inn. 3 13. 3 1 . As to wh 11 the
r•. t"1 '!''" tru le11l a r , or are not n c· "" an•
t],.fcrul.111 , <~e 'er li1 t' .• ~lucu 1 11 , 9 Hu~,

ewey v. Moyer, 9 id. 4 73 ; 'i\f oore
6 id. 290; Benjamin v.
Loughborough, 31 Ark. 210 · The Tru tee v.
lea on, 15 Fla. 3 4; Hill l'.
Dur.md 50 Wi . 354. For furth r in150;

v.' Hegemar,
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or more creditors against tlie debtor and liis assignee in trnst for

all the "creditors, to set aside the assignment on the ground of

fraud, or for any other reason, is properly brought without

joining all or any of the other creditors, who are the beneficiaries,

either as defendants or as jjlaintiffs.^

§ 255. * 358. Same Subject. On the other hand, if an action

is brought based upon the assignment or other deed as a valid

transaction, seeking to enforce the trust, to obtain an account-

ing, to procure a final settlement, or for any other similar relief

which recognizes and adopts the trust, and which, when obtained,

would alike beneficially affect all the persons similarly situated,

all the creditors or other cestuis que trustent must either unite as

plaintiffs, or, if the suit is instituted by one or by some, the

others must be joined as defendants. The court will not permit

the same question to be litigated in separate suits at the instance

of each person who has a demand identical in its nature with

that held by all the others. ^ An action by distributees against

their administrator, or by any beneficiaries against their trustee,

to open an account once settled, on the ground of an alleged
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fraud, and for a new accounting and distribution of the shares

54 S. W. 19, real estate was conveyed to a ants in the action to recover it. Einmert

trustee, his heirs and as.signs. After his v. De Long, 12 Kan. 67, 83. Except in

death the cestui que trust brought suit to the cases of administrators and executors,

vest the title in a new trustee, on the and of assignees for the benefit of cred-

ground that the trustee in his lifetime itors, the general rule is tliat in all actions

had illegally conveyed the same. It was against trustees based upon tlie existence

held that the heirs of the trustee were of the trust, the benejliciaries also must

necessary parties, although the trustee by be made parties. Story's Eq. PI. §§ 192,

will had conveyed all his property to 193, 207 ; Helm ii. Hardin, 2 B. Mou. 232 ;

or mor creditor again ·t the l htor and hi· a. "·ign m trn:::::t for
all the · reclitor , to s t a ·ic.l th a· ·ignment on t11 grouncl f
fr( ud, or for a.1y oth r r a on, i.' properly Lronght without
joining all or any of th th r reclitor , who ar th Len ficiari :,
ei her a defendants or a plaintiff ' .1
§ 255. * 358. S ame S ubject . On the other hand if an a tion
i brought based up n the a . ignment or oth r <le cl a· a alid
tran action, seeking to enforce th tru. t, to obtain an accounting, to procure a final ettlement, or for any other similar r lief
which recog nizes and adopts the trust, and which, when obtained,
would alike beneficially affect all the person' similarly situated,
all the creditors or other eestuis que trustent must either unite as
plaintiffs, or, if the suit is instituted by one or by ome, the
others must be joined as defendants . The court will not permit
the same question to be litigated in separate suit at the instance
of each person who has a demand identical in its nature with
that held by all the othern . 2 An action by distributees against
their administrator, or by any b neficiaries against their trustee,
to open an account once settled, on the ground of an alleged
fraud, and for a new acco unting and distribution of the shares

another as trustee, since the title on the Clemens v. Elder, 9 Iowa, 272 ; Van Doreu

trustee's death descends to his heirs.] d. Robinson, 1*6 N. J. Eq. 2.56. See al.so

1 Bank of Briti.sh North America v. Brokaw i;. Brokaw's Ex., 41 N. J. Eq. 215 ;

Suydam, 6 How. Pr. 379 ; Hancock v. Biron v. Scott, 80 Wis. 206. If, however,

Wooten, 107 N. C. 9. See, however, Hud- the cestuis que trustent are very numerous,

son V. Eisenmayer Milling, &c. Co., 79 the rule is sometimes relaxed, or a por-

Tex. 401 . See also Mitchell v. Bank tion of them only are brought in as repre-

of St. Paul, 7 Minn. 252, which was an sentatives for the whole number. Story's

action by a stockholder to set aside pro- Ec]. PI. §§ 118, 150 ; Holland v. Baker, 3

ceedings of the officers, and particularly Hare, 68 ; Harrison v. Stewardson, 2 Hare,

an assignment in t^-ust for creditors ; also, 530. In Fitzgibbon v. Barry, 78 Va. 755,

French v. Gifford, 30 Iowa, 148, 159. a cestui que trust, whose interest was future

~ Bank of British North America v. and very uncertain and contingent, was

Suydam, 6 How. Pr. 379; Garner v. held an unnecessary party to a suit to sub-

Wright, 24 How. Pr. 144, 28 id. 92. stitute a new trustee. [^See, also, Howe

Generally, when a demand is payable i;. Gregg (1897), 52 S. C. 88, 29 S. E. 394 ;

out of a trust fund, the trustees and the Cook v. Basom (1901), 164 Mo. 594, 65

beneficiaries must be joined as defend- S. VV. 227.]]

54 S. W . 19, real estate was conveyed to a
trustee, his heirs and a ign . After his
death the cestui que trust brought uit to
ve t the title in a new trustee, on the
gro un d that the t rustee in his lifetime
had ill egally co nveyed the same. It was
held t hat the heirs of the tru. tee were
necessary parties, altho ngh the tru tee by
will had co nveyed all hi p roperty to
another as t ru tee, since the title on the
trustee's death descends to his heirs.]
1 Ban k of Bri tish Nor th America v.
S uyda m, 6 How. P r . 379 ; H ancock v.
W ooten, 107 N. C. 9. See, however, H udson v. E isenm ayer Milling, &c. Co., 79
T ex. 401 . See also Mitchell v. Bank
of St. Paul , 7 Minn. 252, which wa an
action by a stockholder to ·et a id e proceedings of the officer , and part icularly
an a ignm ent in t"USt for creditor ; also,
French v. Gifford, 30 Iowa, 14 , 159.
2 Bank of British North America v.
S uydam, 6 How. Pr. 379; Garn r v.
W right, 24 How. Pr. 14-t., 2 id. 92.
Ge nerally, when a demand is payable
out of a trust fund, the trustees and th e
ben efi ciaries must be joinet1 as defeucl-

ants in the action to recover it. Emmert
v. D e L ong. 12 Kan . 67, 83. Ex cept in
the cases of administrators and execu tor. ,
and of assig nees for the uenefit of creditors, the general rule is that in all actiou
against trustees baseu upon the existence
of the tru t, th e ben~ficiaries al o rn u t
be made parties. Story's Eq. Pl. §§ l 92,
193, 20 7 ; H elm v. Hardin, 2 B. Mon. 232;
Clemens v. Elder, 9 Iowa, 2i2; Vau Doreu
v. Robinson , 1'6 N. J. Eq. 256. ~ee al. o
Brokaw v. Brokaw' Ex., 4 1 l\ . J . Eq . ~ 15;
B iron v. cott, 80 \Vis . 206. If, however,
the cestuis qu e tntstent are very n urn erous ,
the rule is sometimes relax ed, or a portion of them only are br ught in as r preentative fo r the who] number.
tory'
Eq. Pl. §§ 11 , 150; Uolland v. Bak er, 3
Hare, 68; Harri on v. 'tewa rd ·on, 2 Ilare,
530. In Fitzgibl)Qu v. Barry, 7 Va . 755,
a cestui que trust, whose intere t wa future
anrl very uu certain and contingent, wa
held au unuece ary party to a ·uit to snl>stitute a new trn , tee. [ ee, also, Howe
v. Gregg (1 897), 52 . C . 8 , 29 S. E. 394;
Cook v. Ba om {1901), 164 1\Io. 594, G~
s. w. 227.J
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claimed to be due, is plainly controlled by the same rule. It is

entirely analogous to the suit above mentioned by creditors to

clc im

procure an accounting from their assignee; it adopts and seeks

t
to carry out the trust. All the distributees or beneficiaries must

therefore be made parties, if not as plaintiffs, then as defendants.^

§ 256. * 359. Implied Trustee Necessary Party in Actions to

reach Property Impressed with Implied Trust or to enforce a Lien

thereon. Examples. In actions to reach property impressed with

an implied trust, or to enforce a lien thereon, the person in whom

the legal title is vested, and who is an implied trustee, is, of

be
na.l

er

plainl.J c ntr lled by the same rule. It is
u ,
u t the ui t a
e mentioned by er di tors to
un ting fr m their
ignee; it ad pt and eeks
tru t.
11 the di tribut e or benefici ri mu..,t
le parti , if not a plaintiff , th n a defendants. 1

. Implied Trustee Necessary Party in Actions to
reach Property Impressed with Implied Trust or to enforce a Lien

course, a necessary defendant. Some examples will illustrate

this rule. A husband purchased land with his own funds, but

procured the deed to be made to his wife; he afterwards em-

ployed a person to erect a dwelling-house upon the land, who

obtained a mechanic's lien on the premises for the price of his

labor and materials. An action to enforce the lien was held to

be properly Ijrought against the wife and the husband; the legal

title was held by her in trust for her husband, as this title was

to be divested by the judgment which was based upon a demand
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against the cestui que trust, both were necessary parties. ^ Land

was purchased by a husband, but by arrangement was conveyed

to his wife, the sale and conveyance being procured, as was

alleged, by the fraudulent representations of both. The grantor,

alleging the fraud and the non-payment of the price, brought an

action against the husband and wife to establish his debt and to

1 Dillon V. Bates, .39 Mo. 292. Thi.s Knott, 4 Beav. 179, 181 ; Shiptoii i'. Raw-

rule is general. Whenever au action is lins, 4 Hare, 619. And in an action by

brous^ht for an accounting and settlement one trustee against a co-trustee for a

of a trust estate, all persons interested in breach of the trust, all the beneficiaries

the estate must be parties. Devaynes v. who have concurred in such breacii are

Robinson, 24 Beav. 86 ; Coppard v. Alien, necessary defendants. Jesse v. Bennett,

2 I)e G., J. & S. 1";} ; Hall c. Au.stin, 2 6 De G., M. & G. 609 ; Williams v. Allen,

Coll. 570 ; Biggs v. Penn, 4 Hare, 469 ; 29 Beav. 292 ; Roberts v. Tunstall, 4

Chancellor v. Morecraft, 11 Beav. 262; Hare, 2.57, 261.

Penny v. Penny, 9 Hare, 39. If several - Lindley v. Cross, 31 Ind. 106. [^Xa-

trustees have been guilty of a breach of tional German-American Bank >•. I.aw-

In acti n ~ t r ach r perty impr
d with
an irnpli d ru , or to nforc a li n th re n, th per on in wh m
th 1 0 • 1 title i v t d, and wh i an implied tru t , i,, of
ar - lef ndan .
me exampl
will illu trate
hu b nd punha d land ith hi own fund , but
deed t be m::i.d to hi wife; he aft rward emd a p r n to erect a dwelling-house up n th land, who
ob ine a m chanic lien on th premi s for the pri
of hi
lab r and mat rial . An action to nforce the li n ' a h ld to
be pror rly br ught again t th ·wife and the husband; the legal
i le " a h ld by her in tru t f r l r h u band, a thi title wa
to be div ted by he judgment which wa ba eel upon a de and
ag in t le ce tui que tru,. t, both were n ces ary parties. 2 La1 cl
" a. pur h cl by a hu band, but by arrangement was c n eyed
bi ' if , th
ale and conv yan
being procured, a wa
all o-e l l> th fr 1dulent r pr ntati n of both. The grant r,
all 0 in th fraud and th non-r a ·m nt f th price, brought an
th bu band and wif o
abli h l i debt an t
thereon.

Examples .

trust, all must [may] be joined in a suit rcnce (1899), 77 Minn. 282, 79 N. W. 1016 :

by the cestui que trust brought to obtain In an action by a judgment creditor of

39

relief against such broach. The liability the husband to enforce a resulting trust

of the ilefaulting trustees in such a case is against the land of the wife for the pay-

joint and several. See 2 Pom. Eq. Jur. nient of the judgment, on the ground that

§ 1081, ami numerous cases cited ; Stock- the consideration for the grant to the wife

ton ('. Anderson, 40 N. J. Eq. 486 ; Walker was paid by the husband, the husband is a

V. Symonds, 3 Swanst. 7.") ; Munch r. proper though not a necessary party.]

Cockerell, 8 Sim. 219, 231 ; Perry v.

, ym ond.,
'ul'k r 11 ,

1•.

1o. 2 2.
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enforce a lien for the same upon the land. Pending the suit the

wife died, and her heirs were substituted as defendants in her

place. The Supreme Court of Iowa, conceding that the heirs

were necessary parties, held that the wife's administrator was a

proper and, under certain aspects of the case, a necessary defend-

ant, and ordered him to be brought in. If the action was simply

to recover a pecuniary demand from the defendant, he was clearly

a necessary party ; but if it was only to establish a specific lien,

he was only a proper party. ^ A railroad company having placed

certain of its bonds in the hands of a trustee upon trust to pay

therefrom a debt due to a certain creditor of the company, and

the trustee having, in violation of his duty, surrendered up the

bonds to the company, and permitted them to be cancelled,

whereby the security was utterly lost, it was held, in an action

by the creditor against the trustee for a breach of his trust, that

the railroad company was not a necessary defendant.^ The

owner of bonds and other securities deposited them with his

agent for a specific purpose. The agent, in violation of his

fiduciary capacity, disposed of them to divers persons at different
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times and in different amounts. The owner brought an action

against the agent and all the transferees for the purpose of set-

ting aside the sales and reaching his property or its proceeds. It

was held that this common action was improperly brought ; that

there was no community" of interest among the defendants ; and

that a separate suit should have been instituted against the agent

and each assignee.^

1 Parshall v. Moody, 2-t Iowa, 314 Pac. 393. In an action against an incom-

2 Ridenour r. Wherritt, 30 Ind. 485. petent person, the guardian is neither a

■^ Le.xington & B. S. R. Co. v. Good- necessary nor proper party : Redmond v.

man, 5 Abb. Pr. 493, per Peabody J. Peterson (1894), 102 Cal. 59.5, 36 Pac. 923.

This decision, as it seems to me, is in See also Leavitt y. Bell (1898), 55 Neb. 57,

direct conflict with the well-settled priu- 75 N. W. 524.

ciple which has been stated in the text, Administrators and Executors : An ad-

and which is fully sustained by the au- miuistrator cannot be sued in the same

thorities. action in his individual and in his repre-

[^Guardians : " The administrator of a sentative capacity, nor can a complaint

guardian is a necessary party to a suit in- against him as a representative be amended

volviug an account of the guardiauship " : so as to constitute an action against him

uit the
enforce a li n for the same upon the land. P nding t]
wife li d, and her heir w re ub tituted a d f ndant in her
place. The upr me Court of Iowa, cone cling that th heir
were nece ary parti s, held that the wif ' admini trator was a
proper and, under certain a pects of the ca e, a nece ary def ndant, and ordered him to be brought in. If the acti n wa simply
to recover a p cuniary demand from the defendant, he wa learly
a neces ary party; but if it was only to establish a specific lien,
he was only a proper party. 1 A railroad company having plac d
·c ertain of its bonds in the hands of a tru$tee upon tru t to pay
therefrom a debt due to a certain creditor of the company, and
the tru tee having, in violation of his d~ty, surrendered up the
bonds to the company, and permitted them to be cancelled,
whereby the security was utterly lost, it was held, in an action
by the creditor against the trustee for a breach of his trust, that
the railroad company was not a necessary defendant. 2 The
Dwner of bonds and other securities deposited them with his
agent for a specific purpose. The agent, in violation of his
fiduciary capacity, disposed of them to divers person at different
times and in different amounts. The owner brought an action
against the agent and all the transferees for the purpose of setting aside the sales and reaching his property or its proceeds. It
was held that this common action was improperly brought; that
there was no community of interest among the defendants; and
that a separate suit should have been instituted against the agent
and each assignee. 3

Brassell v. Silva (1897), 50 S. C. 181, 27 as an individual : Sterrett w. Barker (1897),

S. E. 622. In a proceeding to .determine 119 Cal. 492, 51 Pac. 695. In an action

whether certain additional credits should against executors o?fi .so>( fo?-^, the complaint

be allowed to a removed guardian, the sliould be against them as executors gen-

guardian is not a necessary party: Wil- erally : First Nat Bank )-. Lewis (1895), 12

son's Guardianship (1902), 40 Ore. 353, 68 Utah, 84, 41 Pac. 712.]

Parshall v. Moody, 24 Iowa, 314
Pac. 393. In an action against an incomRidenour v. Wherritt, 30 Ind. 4 5.
petent person, the guRrdian is neither a
3 L exington & B. S. R. Co. v. Goodneces ary nor proper party : Rerlmond v.
man, 5 Abb. Pr. 493, per P eabody J. Peterson (189.J.), 102 Cal. 595, 36 Pac. 923.
This decision, as it seem to me, is in See al o Leavitt v. Bell (189 ) , 55 eb. 5 7,
direct conflict with the well- ettled prin- 75 N. W. 524.
ciple which has been tated in the text,
Administrators ancl E:i:ecutors : An adand which i fully sustained by the au- ministrator cannot be sued iu the ame
action in his indiYidual and in his reprethorities.
[ Giwrdians: "The atlministrator 0£ a sentative capacity, nor can a complaint
guardian is a neces. ary party to' a su it in- against him a:> a repre entative be amended
volving an account 0£ the gnardiau hip ": so a to constitute an action against him
Bra ell v. Silva (1897), 50 S. C. 1 1 , 27 as an indivitlual: terrett v. Barker (1897) ,
S. E. 622. In a proceeding to ,determine 11 9 Cal. 492, 51 Pac. 695. In au a tion
whether certain additional cred it. ·hould against executor de son tort, the compla int
be allowed to a removed guardian, the should be again t them a. executors genguardian is not R neces ar,v party : 'Vil- erally: Fir tNat. Bank i·. Lewi (1 95), 12
son's Guardianship (1902), 40 Ore. 353. 68 'Utah, 84, 41 Pac . 7 I 2.J
l
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CIYIL RE)IE DIES.

CIVIL REMEDIES.

§ 257. * 3(50. VI. Actions against Corporations and Stockholders

and between Partners. Introductory. Actions to wind Up the

affiiir.s of corporations, and tlio.se permitted by creditors against

stockholders to enforce a personal liability of the latter, depend

so entirely upon special statutory provisions, and these are so

different in different States, that no general rule can be laid down

concerning them which shall be a part of the common procedure.

In fact, the subject does not strictly belong to a treatise upon the

principles of the codes. I have collected some cases, however,

which indicate the tendencies of the courts in the various States. ^

§ 258. * 361. Receivers." Creditors. Directors. An insurance

company became insolvent, and a receiver was appointed to wind

up its affairs. While it was in an insolvent condition, the direc-

tors had declared dividends which had been paid to stockholders.

Certain creditors brought separate actions against individual

stockholders to recover back the dividends so paid and received,

which actions were pending. In this condition of affairs the

receiver instituted a suit against all the stockholders to compel a
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repayment of all the illegal dividends, and made the above-men-

1 As examples, see Chase v. Vauder-

bilt, 62 N. Y. 307 ; Osgood v. Maguire, 61

id. 524; Westcott v. Fargo, 61 id. 542;

Hackley v. Draper, 60 id. 88; Hun v.

Gary, 82 id. 65 ; People v. Albany & Vt.

R. Co., 77 id. 2.32 ; Watkins v. Wilcox, 4

Hun, 220; Pierce v. Milwaukee Constr.

Co., 38 Wis. 233

*: 0. VI. Actions against Corporations and Stockholders
a n d between P artners . Introductory.
ti n t
ind up t h
I ermi tted b credi or a · m
a air· f corp ra ti n and th
't kh Ider t enforce a p r nal liabili t' £ th 1 t r d l nd
ntirely upon pecial atutor prov1 10n
nd th
are
liff r nt in diff r nt t, te , hat no eneral rule can be 1 id l wn
concernino- h m ' hich hall b a part of th common pr cedur .
In fact the ubjec 1 e n t trictl bel ng to a treati e upon h
de . I haYe collected ome ca e , ho' ever
principl of the
whi h indica e the t ndencie of the court in he variou tat 1
258. * 61. R eceivers .2 Creditors . Directors.
An in uran e
c mpany becam in olvent and a receirnr wa a1 pointed to ·wind
u1 it affair . While it wa in an in olvent condition the lirector had declared dividend which had b en paid to ockh 11 r .
rtain creditor brought e1 arate action again t indiYidual
t kholder t recover back the dividend o paid and r c ive l
which actions were pending. In this cm dition f affair the
receiver in tituted a uit again t all the tockhol lee to om1 1 a
repayment of all the illegal divi lend , and mad the abov -men257.

2 [l_Actions hy and aguhixt Receivers:

A corporation which has passed into a re-

ceiver's hands is no longer capable of suing

or being sued, and should not be joined

with the receiver : Idaho Gold Reduction

Co. V. Croghan (1899), 6 Idaho, 471, 56

Pac. 164; Ueland v. Haugan (1897), 70

Minn. 349, 73 X. W. 169. A receiver ap-

pointed in another State has a right to

maintain an action in tiie courts of Ken-

tucky : Hallam i-. Ashfonl (1902), Ky., 70

S. W. 197. A receiver is a stranger to all

proceedings instituted before his appoint-

ment, and remains a stranger until made

a party by the court, and the action may

legally proceed to judgment without his

being made a party : St. Louis, etc. Ry.

Co. r. IloUaday (1895), 131 Mo. 440, .33

S. W. 49. A receiver, being an officer of

the court appointing him, cannot be sued

in any other court without the consent of

the appointing court : Smith v. St. Louis,

etc. Ry. Co. (1899), 151 Mo. 391, 52 S. W.

378. A personal tax assessed against the

corporation cannot be collected in an action

against the receiver personally, instituted

under G. S. 1894, § 1569: State v. Red

River, etc. Co. (1897), 69 Minn. 131, 72

N. W. 60. A receiver, in onler to main-

tain an action, must allege facts showiiii,'

his appointment, by what jurisdiction he

was appointed, and enough of the proceed-

ings to show that his appointment was

legal, and tlie allegations must be made

with suflicient certainty to admit of being

traversed : Rhorer v. Middlesboro Co.

(1898), 103 Ky. 146, 44 S. W. 448.

" The failure of a party to obtain leave

of the court to sue a receiver appointed by

it, does not affect the jurisdiction of the

court in which the suit is brought, ^o hear

1 A
example , . ee ha e v. Vanderbilt, 62 N. Y. 307;
g od L'. Maguire, 61
id. 524; We tcott v. Fargo 61 i<l. 542;
Hackley v. Draper, 60 id.
; Hun v.
ary, 2 id. 65 · People t'. lbany & Yt.
R. o., 77 id. 232; Watkin v. Wilcox, 4
Hun, 220; Pierce v. ")!il waukee on tr.
Co., 3 \"Vi . 233
2 [Action
by rznd again~/ R ec ii-er :
A corporation which ha:- pa . etl into a receirnr' hand i no lon<Yer capable of uin<Y
or being ~ue<l, and hould not be joine1l
with the receiver : Ida.ho Gold R cluction
Co. l!. 'roghan (1 99), 6 Idaho, 411 ~6
Pac. 16-t; Telan<l. v. Uaugan 1 !li), 10
.\Jinn. 3-t9, 13 .T. W. 169.
recch·er appointr-d in another ,_ at ha a right to
mai11tai11 an action in the conrt of K entucky: Hallam 1·. A bfonl (1902), Ky. , 'iO
.. \V. 191. A ref'ei,· r is a trarwer to 'tll
proc:e ·ding· iu.titnterl bP.for<' hi appointlllPnt, a1J1! rPmain: a · rauirr>r nntil m:ul
a party liy tlH· <'onrt. allll tlw action may
]r.. rally pmcc cl to judg111e11t without hi:'
bPill'' mad1i a party: . t. Loni·, <'le. Hy.
C 'J. 1•. Holladay (I ~1~1), 1:J1 Mo . .irn. :3:3
.. \V. 4!.I. • rP i>i\f•r, l1Pi11~ au oflker <Jf
th1, ourt al'f iutin;; him, c:wnut 11~ .·u cl

in auy other court without the con ent of
the appointing court: mi th i:. t. L ui ,
etc. Ry. Co. (1 99). 151 )lo. 391, 52 . \V .
37 . A per ual tax a. e ed again. t the
corporation cannot be collected in an action
again t the receiv · r p r onally, in titut d
under
. l 94 § 1569: tate v.
d
River, etc. . o. (1"91) 69 ,\!inn. 131, 72
:N". W. 60.
receiver, in order t maintain an action mn ·t allege fact.- howi11!.;
hi appointm nt, by what juri~diction he
wa appoint d, and enou<Yh of th 1 rocecding to . how that hi appointm nt wa
J <Ya], and the allegation mu. t b made
with :nflici nt certaintj to aclmit of being
traver cl : R hor r v. ~Ii<ldl, boro
o.
(1 9 . 103 Ky. 1-16, -1-4,. W. H .
"The failure of a part~· to obtain leave
of the eonrt t . ue a r
in~r app iuted b.v
it, rloe.· not affect the jnri di ·tion of th
court in which th . uit i brought, ob a r
ancl d ·t rmine the matt r. The r quirement is for th prot ct ion f the recei' r,
an1l if 11 make:; 110 objection to th nit
l.r!i111Y hron~ht \\ ithout lea• . it i. 1litlicnlt
trJ 1wr<' j,·e wh~· anyone
>) ·
• honld u
p••n11ittrd to rlo .-o" : Tohia ?'. Tobia
(1 f.14), 51 () • t. 519, 3
. E. 311.J
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tioned creditors defendants, asking- against them an injunction

to restrain the further prosecution of their actions. It was held

by the New York Court of Appeals that the receiver could main-

tain such an action; that the creditors could not; that all tlie

stockholders were properly sued together ; - and tliat the creditors

were properly joined so as to restrain their proceedings and avoid

a circuity of action, and settle the whole in one controversy. ^ A

stockholder, suing on behalf of all the others, instituted an action

against a railroad company to compel the declaration of a divi-

dend, alleging that funds were in its hands sufficient and appro-

priate for that purpose. The action was dismissed because, if

sustainable at all, it should have been against the directors, who

were the managing trustees, and whose duty it was to declare a

dividend, if any such duty existed. ^

§ 259. * 362. Judgment Creditors. Stockholders. In a Suit by

judgment creditors of a corporation (on behalf of all others who

should come in) against the stockholders, who were made liable

by statute for the debts of the company in specified contingencies,

certain other judgment creditors were united as defendants.
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Upon a general demurrer interposed by them, they were deter-

mined to be neither necessary nor proper defendants. They

should have been joined as plaintiffs, if at all ; but this was not

necessary, and the comj^laint contained no allegation that they

had refused to unite in that manner.* In Ohio, under statutes

making stockholders liable to judgment creditors when the ordi-

nary legal remedies against the corporation have been exhausted,

it has been held that all the stockholders must be united as

defendants, and proceeded against in a single action.^

1 [[All properly sued together in action ^ Karnes r. Rochester & G. Val. R.

to enforce -stock liability, even when resi- Co., 4 Abb. Pr. n. s. 107. per T. A. John-

dent in different counties : Gainey v. Gil- son J. [[In an action to compel a cor-

son (1897), 149 Ind. 58, 48 N. E. 6.33. poration to deliver shares of stock, the

Co«i/a, in Kell V. Lund (1896), 99 la. 153, directors are proper but not necessary

68 N. W. 593. Held in Waller v. Hamer parties : Wells v. Green Bay, etc. Canal

(1902), 65 Kan. 168, 69 Pac. 185, that all Co. (1895), 90 Wis. 442, 64 N. W. 69.]

who were within the jurisdiction of the ■* Young v. N. Y. & Liv. S. S. Co., 10

court must be brought in. See also Ryan v. Abb. Pr. 229, per Hogeboom J.

Jacques (1894), 10-3 Cal. 280, 37 Pac. 186.] ° Umsted v. Buskirk, 17 Ohio St. 113.

2 Osgood V. Laytin, 5 Abb. Pr. n. s. 1 ; Contra, Thompson v. Lake, 19 Nev. 103,

[[Van Pelt v. Gardner (1898), 54 Neb. 115 ; Hatch r. Dana, 101 U. S. 210; Baines

701, 75 N. W. 874; Gianella v. Bigelow y. Babcock (Cal., Sept. 1891), 27 Pac. R.

tian cl creditors lefendant. , a ·hng agctin ·t th m au injunction
to re train the forth r pro ' cution of their ac ion·. It wa · held
Ly the New Y rk Court of Appeal that th receiv r c ukl maintain u h an action; that the creditor c.:ould not; that all th
stockh l ler w re properly sued together· 1 and that th er di tors
were I roperly joined so as to restrain their proceeding· and avoid
a cir uity of action, and settle the whole in on controver y. 2 A
·tockholder, suing on behalf of all the other , instituted an action
again t a railroad company to compel the declaration of a divilend, alleging that funds were in its hands ·ufficient and appropriate for that pnrpose. The action was dismis eel becau e, if
sustainable at all, it should have been against the director , who
were the managing trustees, and whose duty it was to declare a
dividend, if any such duty existed. 3
§ 259. * 362. Judgment Creditors. Stockholders. In a suit by
judgment creditors of a corporation (on behalf of all others who
should come in) against the stockholders, who were made liable
by statute for the debts of the company in specified contingencies,
certain other jndgment creditors were united as defendants.
L"pon a general demurrer interposed by them. they were determined to be neither necessary nor proper defendants. They
Hhould have been joined as plaintiffs, if at all; but this was not
necessary, and th'e complaint contained no allegation that they
had refused to unite in that manner. 4 In Ohio, under statutes
making stonkholders liable to judgment creditors when the ordinary legal remedies against the corporation have been exhausted,
it bas been held that all the stockholders must be united as
defendants, and proceeded against in a single action. 5

(1897), 96 Wis. 185, 71 N. W. Ill ; Smith 674. That the corporation is not a neces-

V. Dickinson (1898), 100 Wis. 574, 76 sary party to such an action, see J^lour

N. W. 766.] City Nat." Bk. v. Wechselberg, 45 Ped.

1 [ All properly sued together in action
to enforce· ·tock liability, even wheu resident in different countie : Gainey v. Gilon {1897), 149 Ind. 5 , 4 N. E. 63.3.
Contra, in Kell v. Lund (1896), 99 Ia. 15.3,
6 N. W. 593. Held in Waller v. Ham er
(1902) , 65 Kan. 168, 69 Pac. l 5, that all
who were within the jurisdiction of the
court mus'!; be brought in. ee al o Ryan v.
Jacques {1894), 103 Cal. 2 0, 37 Pac. I 6.J
2 Osgood v. Laytin, 5 Abb. Pr.
s. l;
[\an Pelt v. Gardner (1 98), 54 Neb.
701, 75 N. ·w. 874; Gia.nella v. Bigelow
( 1897 ), 96 Wis. 185, 71 . W. 111 ; Smith
v . Di ckin on (1 98), 100 Wi . 57+, 76
T .

x

w.

766.J

Rochester & G. Val. R.
. 107, per T. A Johnson .J. [In au action to compel a corporation to deliver ha.re of tock, the
director a.re proper but not nece ary
parties : Well v. Green Bay, etc. Canal
Co. (l 95), 90 Wis. 442, 64 N. W. 69.J
4 Young L'. N. Y. & Liv. S.
. Co., 10
Abb. Pr. 229, per Hogeboom J.
0 Um~ted r. Bu, kirk, 1 i Ohio
t. 113.
Contra, Thomp. on v. Lake, 19 Nev. 103,
115; Hatch 1·. Dana, 101 U. . 210; Baines
v. Babcot:k (Cal., f-;ept. 1891) , 27 Pac. R.
674. That the corporation is uot a nece~ar.\• party to such an action, ~ ee Flonr
City i\at. Bk. v. Wechselberg, 45 l'e<l.
3

Kame

L

Co., 4 Abb. Pr.

N.
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^ 260. * 363. Corporation, Officers, and Assignee. All action by

Stockholders of a bank against the president and other officers,

the corporation itself, and an assignee, alleging fraud and viola-

tion of duty by the officei-s, misajDplication of funds terminating

in a fraudulent assignment, and praying that the assignment

might be set aside, the officers removed, a receiver appointed,

and the bank wound up, was sustained in Minnesota as being

within the jurisdiction of an equity court, and was declared to be

brought against the proper parties.^ In a similar action, based

upon the same facts, and asking for a removal of the officers, the

appointment of a receiver to take charge of the assets, and for an

election under the direction of the court, the corporation was

held to be a necessary party defendant as well as the officers

implicated. 2

^ 261. * 364. Assignor of Stock. Rule in Indiana. In New^ York.

The holder of stock in a corporation assigned it to a creditor as

collateral security for the debt, and this creditor in turn assigned

or pledged the security to a third person. The latter having

commenced an action to enforce his right of property against the
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){ep. 547 ; Sleeper v. •Goodwin, 67 Wis. necessary party, when insolvent, in an

577, 586; Nolan v. Hazen, 44 Min. 478. action by a receiver to recover money

In a bill by creditors of a corporation to belonging to tlie corporation from a

enforce the liability of a stockholder for third party : Nealis v. Am. Tube & Iron

his unpaid subscription, the corporation, Co. (1896), 150 N. Y. 42, 44 N. E. 944.

if it still exists, is a necessary party : Pat- The corporation is an indispensable party

terson v. Lynde, 112 111. 196. [|A11 the defendant in a suit to marshal its assets:

stockholders and all the creditors must be Steele Lumber Co. i'. Laurens Lumber

made parties: Van Pelt i-. Gardner (1898), Co. (1896), 98 Ga. 329, 24 8. E. 755.

54 Neb. 701, 75 N. W. 874 ; Gianella v. In an action by stockholders against the

260.
· 6 . Corporation, Officers, and Assignee.
n c ion by
tockbokle of a bank ag in t he re ident and other fficer
he corp ra ion its elf, and n a ignee alle in · fraud and vi 1 ti n of uty b the offi er mi ap licati n f fund terminating
in a fraudulen a i nm nt and pra ing that the a ignment
micrbt be et a ide the officer remo d, a receiver appointe ,
an<l the bank wound up, wa u tained in Minn ota a being
within the juri dicti n of an equity court, and wa declared to be
brought again t the proper ar ie . 1 In a imilar action, ba ed
up n he ame fact , and a king for a remo al of the officer , the
appointment of a receiver to tak e charge of_ he a e , and for an
electi n under the direction of the court, the corporation wa
held to be a nece ary party defendant a well a the officers
implicated .2
261. " 364. Assignor of Stock. Rule in I n diana. In New York.
T he holder of tock in a corpora ion a igned i o a credi or a
collateral ecuri ty for the debt, and thi creditor in turn a igned
or pl dged the ecurity o a third per on. The latter ha ing
orumenced an ac tion to enforce hi right of property again t the

Bigelow (1897), 96 Wis. 185, 71 N. W. directorsof a corporation for an accounting

111; Gainey i-'. Gilson (1897), 149 Ind. for moneys received from an improper sale

58, 48 N. E. 633 (even wliere they reside of stock, where one of the defendants dies

in different counties), but see contrary * pending the suit, his administrator may

rule in Kell v. Lund (1896), 99 la. 153, 68 be substituted without giving rise to a

N. W. 593, where it is held that each misjoinder: Morgan v. King (1900), 27

stockholder is entitled to a sejiarate action Colo. 539, 63 Pac. 41 6. J

in the county of his residence.] - French v. Gifford, 30 Iowa, 148, 159.

1 Mitchell V. Bank of St. Paul, 7 Min. See also Wickersham v. Crittenden, 93

252. [jThe corporation is not a necessary Cal. 17,33; Swan Land & Cattle Co. v.

party in a suit by the receiver of a corpora- Frank, 39 Fed. liep. 456. Qln J. K. Orr

tion against the stockholders to recover Co. v. Kimbrough (1896), 99 Ga. 143, 25

the amouut of their liability for the debts S. E. 204, the court said : " Although an

of the corporation : Moore i*. Hipley (1898), equitable petition may mention the name

106 Ga. 556, 32 S. E. 647. Corporation of a corporation and contain a prayer for

not a necessary party in a suit by corpo- certain relief against it, such corporation

ration creditors to enforce unpaid stock is not a party to the petition wherp there

cub<criptions: Van Pelt i\ Gardner (1898), is no prayer for process as to it. "3

5t Neb. 701, 75 N. W. 874. Nor is it a

Rep. 547 · , leeper v. -Goodwin, 6 7 ~ri . nece ary pa r ty, when in olven t, in an
5;; , 5 6; Tolan v. H azen, 44 Min. 47 . action b,r a receh·er to r ecover mon ey
In a bill by creditor of a corporation to belonging to t he cor por a tion .from a
enforce the liability of a tockholder fo r third par ty: Neali v . A m. Tub e & Iron
hi· unpaid ub cription, the corporation, Co. ( l 96), 150 N. Y. 42, 44 N. E . 944-.
if it till exi t . i a nece ary party: Pat- T he corpor ation i an incli pen able pa r y
ter on i'. I,ynde, 112 Ill. 196. [ All the defendant i u a ui t t mar'hal it· a t :
. tockholder :rnrl all the creditor· mu t be
teele Lum her o. v. L aur en L um ber
made partie. : Yau Pelt L'- Gardner (1 9 ), Co. (1 96), 9 Ga. 329, 24 . E. 755.
54 ... ~eb. 701,75 N. W . 7-l;
ianeJla v.
Inanactionby tockholder again tthe
Bigelow ( l 97), 96 ' ' i . l 5, 71
. W. director of a corporation fo r an acco untin
lll ;
ainey 1•.
il on (1 9i), 14-9 Ind. for money recei ,·eel from an improper. al
5 , 4 ... ~. E. 633 (even wh re they re ide of to k, where one of the de~ ndant die
iu different couutie ), but ee contrary • pending he uit hi. admini trato r may
rule in Kell v. Lund (1 96), 99 Ia. 153, 6
be ub tituted without giving ri 'e to a
w·. 5~.'3. where it i. held that a h mi joiuder: M organ r. Ying (19 0), 2i
torkhvlcler i.' entitled to a • eparate action
olo. 539, 63 Pac. 416 .]
iu the count~· of hi' re. idence.J
2 Fren ·h i 1 • Gifforcl, 30 Iowa, 14
l :\Iitcl1ell v. Bauk of
t. Paul, 7 _fin.
ee al. o \\ icker ham v.
rittend u, 93
252. [The corpc rati•>n i.· not a nece. :ary f'al. 1 7, 33 ; •'wan L and
attle o. '"
party in a. nit liy th rerei\·er of a corpora- Frnnk, 39 Feel. nep. 456 . [In J .
rr
ti•m a~ai11 t the .tr1ck lwliler to re ·ov r
'o. 1'. Kimbrough (1 96) 9
a. 1.rn, 2:the amouut of th ir Jialiility for th rlebt
•. E. 204, th ·ourt aid: "..Although an
of the C'orpora ion: • foore v. l ipley (l !) ), equitahl petiti n may mention th nam
I G ra. 556, 3:l •·. E. 6..J.7.
orporatiou of a orporatiou , utl ntain a pray r fo r
111Jt a u ce•. ary party in a uit hy corportai11 relief aO'ain t it uch orpo ratiun
r io11 rreclitor,; to Pnforce nupaid ,'lock i not a party o the p titi u wh re ther
. 11!.-rripti<Jn. : \'au l' It i:. Gar<luer (I. !.I ), i · 110 prayer fo r proc
a to it.']
id • 'i.:b. 701, 15
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corporation alone, it was decided, in Indiana, that both of the

assignors were necessary defendants under the special provisions

of the code of that State, which require the assignors of things in

action not negotiable to be made parties in a suit by the assignee.^

But in New York, where the debtor, defendant in an action by

an assignee of the demand, was entitled to an accounting with

the assignor in respect of the claim sued upon, in order to ascer-

tain in fact whether any such claim existed, and applied for an

order bringing him in as a defendant for that purpose, it was

held that such assignor was neither a necessary nor a proper

party, and could not be brought in.^ The courts of New York

seem to have established the rule under the code for that State,

that an assignor of a thing in action is never a proper, much less

a necessar}^ defendant in an action by the assignee, even when

the plaintiff's contention depends upon the legal relations and

liabilities existing between the defendant — ^the debtor — and the

assignor. This doctrine is entirely contrary to that which pre-

vails in many of the States, and which is sanctioned by their

codes and approved by their courts ; and it seems to be equally
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opposed to the former doctrine of. equity, which permitted, if it

did not require, the presence of the assignor in all cases where

the assignment did not convey a legal title, and especially where

an accounting or other settlement of matters in dispute between

the assignor and the defendant was necessary in order to ascertain

the amount of the plaintiff's demand.^

§ 262. * 365. Accounting by one Partner against another* and

by Surviving Partner. In an action virtually of accounting by one

partner against another to recover the plaintiff's share of the

assets or profits, and, a fortiori, when the action is confessedly

one for accounting, all the partners must be defendants.^ This

special rule assumes that there has been no settlement, no bal-

ance ascertained and agreed upon, so that a simple action at law

1 Ind. & lU. Cent. R. Co. r. McKernan, 3 Story's Eq. PI. § 153, and notes;

24 Ind. 62. I Dan. Ch. PI. (4th Am. ed.), pp. 197-

^ AUenr. Smith, 16 N.Y. 415. See also 199, and notes; Miller v. Bear, 3 Paige,

Andrews v. Gillespie, 47 N. Y. 487, which 467, 468; Whitney v. McKinney, 7 Johns,

holds that the mortgagee who assigned Ch. 144; Trecothick v. Austin, 4 Mason,

the mortgage is not a proper defendant 41-44.

in an action to foreclose, even though the * ^See § * 104, and cases cited in the

defence pleaded by the mortgagor is that notes to that section.]

of mistake in drawing the mortgage, and ^ Duck v. Abbott, 24 Ind. 349 ; Set-

pr.ays the relief of reformation. tembre v. Putnam, 30 Cal. 490.

corporation alone, it was decicl cl, in Indiana, that both of the
a ignors were nece sary def ndants under the pecial rov1 10ns
of the code of that tate, whi h require the a ignor of thing in
action not negotiable to b made parties in a suit by th assignee. 1
But in New York, wh re the iebtor, iefendant in an action by
an a ignee of the demand, was entitled to an accounting with
the a ignor in respect of the claim suecl upon, in order to a certain in fact whether any such claim existed, and appli cl for an
order bringing him in as a defendant for that purpo e, it was
held that such assignor was neither a neces ary nor a pror er
party, and could not be brought in. 2 The courts of New York
eem to have established the rule under the code for that , tate,
that an assignor of a tl?ing in action is never a proper, much less
a necessary, defendant in an action by the assignee, even \Yhen
the plaintiff's contention depends upon the legal relations and
liabilities existing between the defendant- the debtor - and the
a signor. This doctrine is entirely contrary to that which prevails in many of the States, and which is sanctioned by their
codes and approved by their courts; and it seems to be equally
opposed to the former doctrine of . equity, which permitted, if it
did not require, the pre ence of the assignor in all cases where
the assignment did not convey a legal title, and especially where
an accounting or other settlement of matters in dispute between
the assignor and the defendant was necessary in order to ascertain
the amoun t of the plaintiff's demanu. 3
§ 262. ·• 365. Accounting by one Partner against another 4 and
by Surviving Partner.
In an action virtua1ly of accounting by one
partner against another to recover the plaintiff's share of the
as ets or profits, and, a fort·iori, when the action is confessedly
one for accounting, all the partners must be defendants . 5 This
special rule assumes that there has been no settlement, no balance ascertained and agreed upon, so that a simple action at law
l In d. & Ill. Cent. R. Co. v. McKernan,
24 Ind. 62.
2 Allen v. Smith, 16 N. Y. 415. See al o
An drews 1i . Gillespie, 47 . Y. 487, which
holds that the mortgagee who a sigued
the mortgage is not a proper defendan t
in an action to foreclose, eYen though the
defence pleaded by the mortgagor i that
of mistake in drawing the mortgage, and
prays the relief of reformation.

a Story's Eq. Pl. § 153, and notes ;
l Dan. Ch. Pl. (4th Am. ed.), pp. 197199, and notes; Miller v. Bear, 3 Paige,
46i, 46 ; Whitney v. McKinney, 7 Johns.
Ch. 144; Trecothick v. Au tin, 4 Ma on,
41-44.
4 [See § * 104, and cases cited in the
notes to that section.]
5 Duck v. Abbott, 24 Ind. 349; Sett emb re i-. Putnam, 30 Cal. 490.
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could be maintained therefor by one partner against another, but

the situation is such that an action for an accounting is the only-

relief given by the law. In such equitable action all the part-

ner are necessary parties. A partnership, being engaged in the

business of buying and selling lands, for i)urposes of convenience

had all the titles taken in the name of one member of the firm.

He died, ])eing at the time thus the apparent owner of lands

which Avere actually firm property. An action by the survivor

for an account and settlement was properly brought against the

heirs, widow, and administrator of the deceased; these persons

were all held to be necessary parties.^

§ 263. * 3(36. VII. Actions for Specific Performance. Conflict of

Opinion herein. It is the established rule of equity procedure

that, in the ordinary and direct action to compel the specific

performance of a contract for the sale of lands, the parties to the

contract themselves, or the persons who have become substituted

in their place, as the heirs, ^ and under certain circumstances the

executors or administrators, are the only proper parties plaintiff

or defendant. A suit for the purpose of obtaining this special
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relief cannot be combined with a cause of action for relief against

other persons claiming an interest in the same land; in other

words, this action cannot be made to determine the titles of

other claimants, nor to foreclose the liens of subsequent incum-

brancers.^ This well-settled rule has, however, been departed

1 Gray v. Palmer, 9 Cal. 616. But the 8 Taskcl r. Small, 3 My. & Cr. 63, 68,

heirs of a devisee of the deceased, it has per Lord Cotteuham, Cliau. ; Mole v.

been held, are not nece.ssary parties: Smith, Jacob, 490, 494, per Lord Eldon,

Van Aken v. Clarke, 82 Iowa, 2.56. j^Iii Chan. ; Wood v. White, 4 My. & Cr. 470;

an action against a rreceiver. of a part- Kobertson v. Gr. Western Ry. Co., 10

ner-ship on a contract made by him as Sim. 314; Fagan v. Barnes, 14 Fla. .53,

receiver, the surviving partner is not a .57 ; Knott v. Stephens, 3 Oreg. 269 ;

necessary party : Painter v. Painter (1902), Monlton i". Chafee, 22 Fed. Kep. 26;

138 Cal. 231, 71 Pac. 90. And where one Ashley v. Little Kock (Ark. 1892), 19

partner institutes proceedings for a re- S. W. 1058; Washburn & M. Man. Co. r.

ceiver of partnership assets to prevent Chicago G. W. F. Co., 109 111. 71. In

ould be nH intainecl therefor b · n ar ner again tan ther, but
th itu. ti on i " uch that an a ion for an a un in 0 i the only
r li f gi · n b • th law. I n u h quitabl a ti n all the partn
ary partie . \ partn r hip b in , .11 0 < g d in the
bu ·in "· f bu in a.nd lli11 0 land , f r purr
f n ni nc
had all h ti 1 . taken in th name f one m mb r f th firm .
H di d b ing at the time thu th ap ar nt wn r of land
which w re tually firm prnperty. An action by the urvi or
f r an ace unt and ettlemen wa properly brough against th e
heir , wid w, and admini trator f the decea
· the e per ons
1
were all h 1 t b nece ary parti
263.
6. VII. Actio ns for Specific Performance . Conflict of
Opinion herein. lt i the e tabli bed rule of equity procedure
that ju th ordinary and direct action t compel the pecific
performance of a contract for the al of land the parti s to the
contract them elve , or the per on who have become ub t itu cl
ir t heir place, a the heir', 2 and un ler certain circum tance he
executor ' or admini trator , are the only proper parti I laintiff
or defendant. A uit for the purp e of obtaining this pe ial
relief cannot be corn bined wj th a cause of action for relief again t
other per rs claiming an intere t in the ame lan i; in other
w rd , hi action cannot be made to determine the i tle of
ther clai mants, nor to foreclo e the liens of ub equ nt incumbrancer . 3 Thi well- ettled rule ha , however, b en d par d

another jiartner from wasting them, firm Ta.sker i-. Small, mortgagees of the land

creditors are not necessary parties: Allen were held to be ini])roper defendants. In

" Couley (1898), 53 S. C. 414, 31 S. K. another case, a tenant of the vendor in pos-

034.] session was declared an improper party.

- [[It was held in Salinger v. Gunn All persons interested iu the subject-

(1895), 61 Ark. 414, 33 S. W. 959, that matter of the action as holders of the

in a suit by the vendee of land for specific legal or equitable titles to the premises in

performance of the contract of sale, the question were declared to be necessary

heirs of the deceased vendor are necessary ])arties, plaintiff or defendant, in McCotter

partie.<.3 r. Lawrence, 6 N. Y. Sup. Ct. 392, 395.

1 Gray v. P almer , 9 Cal. 616. B ut t he
heir of a dev i ee of t he decea ed, it ha
been held, are not nece ary par t ie :
Van ken v. ,lar ke 82 Iowa, 256. [ In
an a tion again t ar l'eceiver of a partntra t made by him a
ner hip on a
recei,·er, th e ur ivioo- partner i not a
nece ary party: Painter v. Painter (1902),
I 3 Cal. 231, 71 Pac. 90. And where one
partn<>r in. tit ut
proceeding for a r ceh·er of par tner hip a et t o preYent
a nother partner fro m wa Ling them, firm
creditor· ar uot uece .-ary par t i e~: A li en
•• '.,1l<>y (18~ ), 53 :. . 414, 3 1 . E.

fi:J-t.. J

[ ft wa · hel1l in , 'aliu ge r
!JI A rk. 4 U, :33 ~- \Y.
i11 a u1t liy th v ·nil <!f Jami f
)' rforina111·e of thP c·o11 ra!' t of
l1Pir uf th,.. ilec ·a ·cd ven~fo r are
part i · .]
2

( I <i:;),

v. Gnnn
959, thn t
r . pecific
ale, th
ueces arv
·
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from by some State courts. Thus, in a case decided by the

Supreme Court of Minnesota, a contract to convey land had

been given, and the vendee had gone into possession. Subse-

quently to the execution of the agreement and the change of

possession, certain persons had recovered judgments against the

vendor, which they claimed to be liens upon the land. These

judgment creditors were held to be proper defendants in the suit

for a specific performance brought by the vendee for the purpose

of cutting off their rights of redemption, it being assumed that

their liens were subordinate to the vendee's rights.^ And it was

held in a recent case in California that, in an action to compel

the specific performance of such a contract, — the land being an

undivided share of a specific tract, — all persons subject to the

vendee's equities, and holding adversely to him, must be made

defendants. 2

§ 264. * 367. Holder of Adverse Claim. Personal Representative

of Deceased Vendor. Heirs. New York and lo-wa Cases. In a

somewhat peculiar case recentl}' decided by the Supreme Court of

New York, a person holding a subsequent and adverse claim to
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the plaintiff was declared to be a necessary defendant to a com-

plete determination of the issues. The action being brought to

procure the specific performance of a land contract made between

the plaintiff and the defendant, the complaint alleged that the de-

fendant had made a subsequent contract to convey the same land

to F., and prayed an injunction restraining defendant from making

a conveyance to F. Upon this allegation and prayer for relief,

it was held that such subsequent vendee was a necessary party. ^

1 Seager v. Burns, 4 Minn. 141, 14.5, ^ Fullerton v. McCurdy, 4 Lans. 1-32.

per Emmet J. The judge made no sug- "When A. agrees to convey to B., and

gestion of a doubt wliether these creditors afterwards conveys to C, who has notice

were proper parties. The whole discus- of tlie prior contract, C. is a necessary

sion turned upon the question whetlier defendant in an action by the original

the general allegation of the plaintiff, that vendee to compel a specific performance,

they "claimed an interest,'' etc., was Stone i'. Buckner, 12 Sm. & M. 73 ; Dailv

enough. They were likened by the court ?>. Litchfield, 10 Mich. 29; Spence v. Hogg,

to junior incumbrancers in a mortgage I Coll. 225; Atchison, T. & S. F. Ry. Co.

foreclosure. None of the authorities last v. Benton, 42 Kan. 698. One to whom

cited were mentioned. the vendor had assigned the contract as

■^ Agard v. Valencia, 39 Cal. 292. This collateral security was held to be a proper

from by some Stat court . Thu , m a
clecid d hy th
~ upr me
ourt of l\linn 'Ota, a contract to convey land had
be n given, and th
nd e had gone into po .. · s ion. , ub:equently t the ex cution of th agreement and the cbang
f
po · ion, rtain I er on had r cov reel j uclgmen t · again t the
vendor whi h they laim l to b lien u1 on the land. The e
judgment creditor wer held to be pr l er cl f nclant · in th uit
for a specific performanc brought by the vend for the purr o e
of cutting off their rights of re lemr tion, it b ing a· um cl that
their lien were subordinate to the vendee's right . 1 And it was
helu in a recent case in California that, in an action to compel
the specific performance of such a contract, - the land being an
undivided share of a specific tract, - all I er ons subject to the
vendee's equities, and holding adver ely to him, must be made
defendants. 2
§ 264. * 367. Holder of Adverse Claim. Personal Representative
of Deceased Vendor. Heirs. New York and Iowa Cases.
In a
, omewhat peculiar ca. e recently decided by the , upreme Comt of
New York, a person holding a subsequent and adYerse claim to
the plaintiff was declared to be a necessary defendant to a complete determination of the issues. The action being brought to
procure the specific performance of a land contract made between
the plaintiff and the defendant, the complaint alleged that the defendant had made a subsequent contract to convey the same land
to F ., and prayed an injunction restraining defendant from making
a conveyance to F . Upon this allegation and prayer for relief,
it was held that such subsequent vendee "\\as a necessary party. 3

case is somewhat peculiar, and the facts defendant in Butler v. Gage (Colo. Sup.

are exceedingly complicated. The deci- 1889), 23 Tac. R. 462. [^See also Water

sion certainly seems to conflict with the Supply Co. v. Root (1895), 56 Kan. 187,

general rule as established by equity 42 Pac. 715, where the court in the svlhv-

courts, and as stated in the text. bus said : " Where A. makes a written

1 Seager v. Burn , 4 Minn. 14-1, 14-5,
per Emmet J. The judge made no suggestion of a doubt wheth ~ r the,;e creditors
were proper partie.. The whole discussion turned upon the que -tion whether
the general allegation of the plaintiff, that
they " claimed an intere t,'' etc , " ·a,;
enough. Th ey were likened by the cou rt
to junior in cumbrancer in a mortgage
foreclosure. N oue of the authorities la:,t
cited were mentioned.
2 Agard v. Valencia, 39 Cal. 292. Thi
ca e is :;omewhat peculiar, and the fact
are exceedingly complicated. The deciion certainly eems to conflict with the
general rule as establi bed by equity
cou rts, and a stated in the t xt.

3 Fullerton v. McCurdy, 4 Lan . 132.
When A. agrees to convey to B., and
afterwards conveys to C., who ha notice
of the prior contract, C. is a nee ssary
defendant in an action by the original
vendee to compel a specific performance.
Stone v. Buckner, 12 Sm. & 1\1. i3; Dai]\·
11. Litchfield, l 0 Mich. 29; Spence v. Ilogg,
l Coll. 225; Atchi ·on, T. & S. F. Ry. Co.
v. Benton, 42 Kan . 698. One to whom
the Yenclor had a. ~ignecl the contract as
collateral security was held to be a proper
defendant iu Butler v. Gage (Colo. up.
1889), 23 Pac. R. 462. [ ee also Water
Supply Co. v. Root (1 95), 56 Kan. 11.: /,
42 Pac. 715, where the court in the sdlabu . aid : " \Yhere .A. make a wrltteu

crnr;
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Where the vendor has died, and the vendee brought his action

en or ha di d, and h
he ole h ir at law of th
plaint that he entir

acainst the sole heir at hiw of the deceased, but conceded in

his complaint that the entire purchase-money had not been

paid, and averred a tender and a readiness to pay, the adminis-

trators of the vendor were held to be necessary defendants in

New York.^ It would appear from the reasoning of this case

that its decision is confined to the single case in which the vendor

has died before the purchase-money has been entirely paid, and

in which the same remains unpaid up to the time of commencing

the action. If the purchase price has been paid in full, either to

the vendor during his lifetime, or to his administrators after his

death, then his heire would seem to be, in general, the only

necessary parties defendant, his personal representatives not then

having any interest in the controversy. ^ In the face of a statute

providing that an action for a specific performance of a land

contract may be brought against the executor or administrator of

a deceased vendor, and that other parties are not necessary, but

may at the discretion of the court be brought in, the Supreme

Court of Iowa has held that such personal representatives are not
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necessary, but only proper parties; that in the absence of the

statute the heirs of the vendor are the only proper or possible

parties ; and that, the language of the statute being permissive,

it will not be construed to make the administrators or executors

necessary defendants. ^

contract for a sale of real property to B., Champeinownc, 9 Price, 130. See also

wliicli is forthwith placed on record, and Lowry v. Jackson, 27 S. C. .318; Sawyer

afterwards conveys tlie property to C, v. Baker, 66 Ala. 292 ; Houston v. Black-

who buvs with constructive notice of the man, 66 Ala 5.59 ; Coffey r. Norwood, 81

rights of B., under his contract, AcW, that Ala. 512; Walters r. Walters, 132 111.

an action to compel a conveyance of the 467. If the vendor sues the heirs alone

lei^al title, after full perf<jrmance of his of the deceased vendee, the latter can in-

part of the contract hy B., may be main- sist upon the administrators being brought

taiued against C, and that A. is not an in. Story's Eq", PI. § 177; Cock i'. Evans,

iudispensable party to the action. "J 9 Yerg. 287. The vendor and the vendee

1 Potter V. Ellice, 48 N. Y. 321, 323. having botii died, the heirs and widow

f the

n
ary
m
I woul l appear from the r a oning of hi a e
onfined t the in 1 ca in whjch the vendor
the purcha e-mone h ' been ntirely paid an
in which the ame remain. unpaid ur t the time of comm ncin
the ac i n. If the purcha e price ha b n paid in full, ith r o
the en lor lurinrr his lifetim or o hi administra or aft r hi
dea h hen hi heir w ukl s em to b , in general, th 011~3
nece ary partie lefendant his per onal r pr ntative not th n
having an inter t in the controv r 2 In th fa e of a tatute
providing that an action for a p citic performance of a land
ontract may be brought again t the xecutor or admini trator of
a decea eel v ndor and that other partie are not nece ar but
ma at the di cr~tion 0£ the court be l>rought in, the • u rem
Court f Iowa ha held that such per nal repre entati ve ar n t
nece ary but only proper parti ; that in the ab ence of the
tatute the heir of the vendor are th only proper r p ible
partie ; and that, the language of th tatute being permi ive,
it will not be c n trued to make the a lministrators or executors
nece ary defen ]ants. 3

See also Tiiompson v. Smith, 63 N. Y. of the latter brought a suit against the

301 ; Rain v. Koper, 15 Fla. 121 ; Butler devisees of the vendor to wliom tiie laud

j;. Gage (Colo. Sup. 1889), 23 Pac. R. 462. had been devised, and the parties were

2 All tiie lieirs of a deceased vendor are all held to l)e proper, in Peters u. Jones,

necessary defendants in the action. House 35 Iowa, 512, 518; see ca.ses cited by

i: Dexter, 9 Midi. 246; Duncan n. Wick- Miller J. at page 518. When the oldigor

liffe, 4 Scam. 452. See also Rogers v. in a title bond has died, his heirs at law

Wolfe, 104 Mo. 1. are necessary parties to a suit by iiis per-

•* Judil V. Moseley, 30 Iowa, 423, 427; sonal rei)resentatives to subject the laud

Story's E(|. PI. §§ 160, 177; Champion r. to tiie ])ayment of the purchase-money:

Bruwn, 6 Joims. Ch. 402; Townsend v. Gruljb r. L.okabill, 100 N. C. 267-

ontract for a ale of real property to B.,
whi ch i forthwith placed on record, and
afterward convey. the property to C.,
who buv with con tructive notice of the
ri ht o.f ., under hi 011tract, held that
au acti n to compel a ·ouv yance of the
legal titl , after full p rformaoce of !ii
part of the onLract by B., may be maintained again t ., and that A. is not an
iudi pen able p r y to the action."]
l .Pott r v. Elli e, 4
. Y. 321, 323.
ce al o Thomp. on v. mi th, 63 . Y.
301 ; I a.iu i:. Roper, 15 Fla. 121; Butler
v. age ( olo. up. 1 9), 23 Pa . . 462.
2 All Lhe h ir of ad · a ed vendor are
u c . :ary d fondant in the a ti on. II u e
r. I xt r, 9 ~lich.
46; uncan i:. \ \ ickliff , 4 .'cam. 452. · e a o Roger v.
'\\i ,,}f

.

104 ~Io. 1.

.Judd v. >fo eley, 30 Iowa, 423, 427;
, c,ry'.· J.,'I l l. § l GO, 177; ham pi n v.
li ·11\\ 11,
.Jvlllls. 'h. 4 02; T wn ucl v.
3
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§ 265. * 368. Prior Mortgagee. Agent of Vendor. Person Mak-

§ 265.

* 36

.

Prior Mortgagee.

ing Redemption. Ill an action against the vendor to compel the

specific performance of his contract, the pLaintiff united with him

as co-defendants the holders of two prior mortgages embracing

the land agreed to be conveyed, which had been given by the

vendor, alleging in his complaint that the vendor had agreed to

pay off and remove these mortgages, and that they included other

lands in addition to that claimed by the plaintiff, which were

sufficient to satisfy the demand secured thereby, and praying

that the mortgagees might be compelled to sell such otlier lands

first. The New York Court of Appeals, however, held that these

mortgagees could not be joined as co-defendants in the action. ^

When in the contract for the sale and conveyance of land the

vendor appointed a certain person as his agent to make and

deliver a deed in his name to the vendee, and directed the agent

to execute and deliver the same, and neither the vendor nor the

agent complied with the terms of the agreement, an action

brought against the vendor and the agent as co-defendants was

held to be improper, and the agent was declared not to be a
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proper party in any aspect of the case, since he had no interest

in the controversy adverse to the plaintiff. ^ Land had been sold

at execution sale, and afterwards redeemed in alleged compliance

with the statute which prescribes the manner of redemption.

The purchaser, denying the validity of the redemption, brought

an action against the sheriff alone to compel an execution and

delivery of the deed, and this action was held insufficient; it

should have embraced the person who made the redemption, and

who claimed to hold the land by virtue thereof, as a co-defendant

with the sheriff.'^

§ 266. * 369. VIII. Actions to quiet Title. Scope of Statute

herein in "Western States. Multiform Use of. The nature of the

action to quiet title is such that it is impossible to lay down any

but the most general rule in relation to its parties defendant.

1 Chapman >•. West, 17 N. Y. 125. joined witli B. in tlie action, primarily as

2 Dahoney v. Hall, 20 Ind. 264. a plaintiff; but if not, then as a defendant ;

3 Crosby r. Davis, 9 Iowa, 98. Wiiero but if the agreement between B. and C. is

the vendee sub-contracts, there is a dis- that B. will convey the land to C, then

tinction depending upon the nature of the B. is the onlv necessary partv in the ac-

sub-contract. If A. agrees to convey to tion against A. Alexander v. Cana. 1

B., and the latter in turn agrees with C. De G. & Sm. 415; Chadwick r. Maden,

that the conveyance shall he made by A. 9 Hare, 188; B v. Walford, 4 Russ.

directly to him, — C, — then C. must be 372.

In an action again t th v ntl r to c mp 1 the
specific p rformance of hi
ntra t, the plaintiff unit d with him
a c -defendants the hold r f two prior mortgag embra ing
th land agreed to b
nv y d, which had b n given by the
v ndor, alleging in hi om laint tl at the vendor had agr d to
pay ff and remov th se m rt a , and that th y includ d oth r
Jan l ' in addition to that laim tl by th plaintiff, which w r
suffici nt to ·atisfy th cl mand ecured ther by, and praying
that the mortgagees might be compelled to sell such other lands
first. The New York ,ourt £ Appeals, however, held that the e
mortgagees could not b join cl as co-defernlants in the action. 1
When in the contract for the sale and conveyanc of land th
vendor appointed a certain person as his agent to mak and
cl liver a deed in his name to the ven<lee, and directed th agent
to execute and deliver the same, and neither the v ndor nor the
agent complied with the terms of the agreement, an action
brought against the vendor and the agent a.s co-defendants ·was
held to be improper, and the agent wa declared not to be a
prop r party in any aspect of the case, since he ha<l no int rest
in the controversy adver e t the plaintiff. 2 Land had been sold
at execution sale, and afterwards redeemed in alleged compliance
with the statute which prescribes the manner of redemption.
The purchaser, denying the validity of the redemption, brought
an action against the sheriff alone to compel an execution and
delivery of the deed, and this action was hell insufficient; it
hould have embraced the person who made the redemption, and
who claimed to hold the land by virtue thereof, as a co-defendant
with the sheriff.a
§ 266. * 369. VIII. Actions to quiet Title . Scope of Statute
herein in Western States. Multiform Use of.
The nature of the
action to quiet title is such that it is impossible to lay down any
but the most general rule in relation to it· parties defendant.
ing Redemption.

Chapman r. vVest, 17 N. Y. 125.
Dahoney v. Hall, 20 Ind. 264.
3 Croshy i· . Davis, 9 Iowa, 9 .
Where
the veudee sub-contracts, there i a di tinction depending upon the nature of the
sub.contract. If A. agrees to conv y to
B., and the latter in turn agree with C.
that the conveyance shall be mad by A.
directly to him, - C., - then C. mu:t be
1
2

joined with B. in the action primarily a
a plain tiff; but if uot, th n a a cl feuclant;
but if the agreem nt b twe n B. aud . i
that B. will couv x the land to C., then
n. is the only 111'(' • . ary party in th action again t A. Alexand r v. Cana, l
De G. & Sm. 415; Chadwick r. Mad n,
9 Hare, 188; B - v. Walford, 4 Ru s.
372.
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The very object of the proceeding assumes that there are other

claimants adverse to the plaintiff, setting up titles and interests

in the land or otlier subject-matter hostile to his. Of course all

these adverse claimants are proper parties defendant, and if the

decree is to accomplish its full effect of putting all litigation to

rest, they are necessary defendants. ^ Originally, and independ\

ent of statute, this particular jurisdiction of equity was onhi

invoked when either many persons asserted titles adverse to that

of the plaintiff, or when one person repeatedly asserted his single)

title by a succession of legal actions, all of which had failed, anq

in either case the object of the suit was to settle the whole ootJ-

troversy in one proceeding. The action has, however, been A

greatly extended by statute, especially in the Western States,

and is there an ordinary means of trying a disputed title between y

two opposite claimants. The general scope of these statutes i^

as follows : The_plajjitiff must be in possesion claimin g an ^tate

in the lands. ^ The adverse claimant or claimants must be ouFbf

po^essiSri",' and must assert a hostile title or interest. In this

conditiou the possessor of the land, without waiting for any pro-

Generated for facpubupdates (University of Michigan) on 2014-06-17 15:32 GMT / http://hdl.handle.net/2027/uc2.ark:/13960/t02z1c23b
Public Domain / http://www.hathitrust.org/access_use#pd

ceeding, legal or equitable, to be instituted against him, may take

the initiative, and, by commencing an equitable action, may

compel his adversaries to come into court, assert their titles, and

have the controversy put to rest in a single judgment. It is

plain, therefore, that this statutory suit is the converse of the

legal action of ejectment. The action to quiet title is not, how-

ever, confined to the ownership of lands; its use is multiform; it

may be invoked to determine conflicting rights over personal

property, and even rights growing out of contract where a multi-

plicity of actions depending upon the same questions will thereby

be avoided. I shall now give some il'lustrations of the action and

of its different forms. It will be seen that each case must stand

1 ^Browning v. Smith (1894), 139 Ind. liad delivered possessiou to tlie grantee,

280, 37 X. E. 540: In a suit for quieting under an agreement that a portion of the

title t<j land, the omission of the holder purcjiase price should he de))osited with a

of an erpiity of re(leni))tion as party de- third jiarty to he ])aid over^after a cloud

fendant does not prevent the decree from on the title should he removed, has suffi-

ojicrating to bar and foreclose those who cient interest tq maintain an action to

were made parties.] quiet title. See, also, ]\ruczinski ?\ Neuen-

- ^Sco, however. Slyer v. Sprague dorf (1898), 99 Wii^: 264, 74 N. W. 974,

(1896), GJ Minn. 414, 6.5 N. W. 6,')9, where where one not in possession was allowerl

a grantor who had conveyed land hy to maintain an action to remove a cloud

warranty deed with full covenants, and from his title.]

he Yer, obj ct of he pr ce cli1w a "Um that there are oth r
claimants acl-..;er e to the plaintiff
t ing up i 1 an l inter
iu th land or other ubject-matter h til
hi .
f cour all
the"e aclY r claimant are prop r par ie d fendan , n if tb
decree i,~ to acco mr li --h it full ff ct f putting all litigation
r t he are ne
· r l fen lant .1
rjginally and ind p n l
ent f
thi par icular juri diction f
ui y w s 1 1.\
inY keel wh n ith r rn , ny I er. n R' erted titl adv r to that
of the plain iff, or ' hen one per n r l eat 11 a rt d bi in 1
title b a ucc i n of 1 gal acti n , all of whi h had failed, an
in ither ca the bj c of the uit wa
ettle the wh le r troYer y in on pr ceeding. The action ha , howe er, b en
grea 1 · ext nd d b tatute
peciall in the W t rn tat
and i here an or linary mean of tryin 0 a di put d title b tw n
two oppo ite claimant . The g neral scop of the e tatut i ,
a follows : The lain tiff mu t be in po es ion claimin an e at
in th lancls. 2 The adver ~mant or claimants must be ~f
posse l n, and mu t a ert a ho tile title or in re t. In thi
condition the po se sor of .the land, w!thout waiting f r any pr ceeding legal or equitable, to be in tituted again. t him, may tak
the initiatiYe and, by commencin an quitabl ac i n, ma r
comr el his aclver aries to come in o court, a ert their titl s, an 1
ha;\ e the ontrover y put to r t in a ingle judgm nt. It i
plain, ther fore, that thi tatutory uit i ' the c nv r e of th
1 O'al action of ej ctment. The acti n to quiet itle i n t, h wever, confined to the own r hip f land. ; it use i , ruul if rm; i
ma r be invok cl t d termine conflicting righ o · er p rs I al
prop rty, and ev n rights growing out f con ract wh r a mul!,iplicit of a tion d pendin 0 up nth ame qu ti n will th r
be avoided. I shall now give me il1u tra ion f the action ri l
of it differeI t form . I t will b e n that a h a mu t ~nd
1 [BrO\vning v.
mith (l 9-!), 139 Ind.
2 0, 37 T. E. 5-40: fo a uit fur quieting
t itle trJ lanu, the omi "ion of th holtl r
.,f a n ~quity of r d 11q tion a. party tl f•·111 ·111t rl •iP.' 11ot prev •11t th · d <·re from
operatin~ t1J bar awl fon~ clo
tlw::;c who
'H f f' 111a•le pa rLiP:.J
- [.-.• •· , li11\\'!'Yet', , tyer 1•. • 'pragn

1 < J, c;:1 ~ I i 1111 . 41-!, G5 • '. " . G39, "lior
a rrra11 t1J r who had c·ouv y <l la111l l1y

warrauty deed with fnll

·m· 11a11 "· a11tl

hail d liver d po.. e ~ioo_}o the graot e,
nuder an agreem nt that a porti n f the
purc~1a e price houlrl he dPp<Jsited "ith a.
third JI• rty to lie paid ,-er ,aft r a ·lolHl
n th title should h rerno\•ecl , has • uffii nt inter :t to maintain au acti•m to
quiet title. . · e, al , J\rue1in.k i i• . •uendorf ( 1 9 ), !J \Yi .. 26-4., 7-1. . W . 974,
wh r on not in p .. . . ion ,,a, allowNl
to maintain n.n ::tj'tion to r 111 ,.e a clouil
from h iis ti ti .]
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mainly upon its own circumstances under the guidance of tlie

general principle which requires all persons whose rights and

interests could be affected by the decree to be made parties.

§ 267. * 370. Illustrations of Action and its Forms. The officers

of a railroad company, in violation of their duty and of the

charter, and with a fraudulent intent, issued large amounts of

spurious stock of the corporation, which had all the appearance

on the face of being genuine. These issues had been made at

different times, and to various persons, and the stock was actu-

ally held by three hundred and twenty-six separate owners, who

had bought it in the course of business supposing it to be genuine.

Most of these holders had commenced suits against the company

to compel it to recognize the stock as valid in their hands.

Under these circumstances the corporation began an action

against all these three hundred and twenty-six persons as de-

fendants, to procure the stock to be declared spurious, to enjoin

the suits then pending, and to determine the controversy at one

blow. The suit was sustained as a bill of peace and to quiet

title, and the defendants were held to have been properly united
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in the one proceeding ; their stock was tainted (if at all) by a

common vice, and the same fundamental question disposed of

all their claims. ^ On the same principle, the receiver of an

insolvent insurance company was permitted to unite all the judg-

ment creditors of the corporation who were separately suing the

stockholders on their personal liability, and to enjoin their actions

in order that the liability of all the stockholders might be enforced

by himself in the same action. -

§ 268. * 371. Same Subject. In an action to quiet title to

lands by correcting mistakes in deeds thereof, all persons having

any interest in the land, or having an}^ interests which could be

affected by the relief demanded, must be brought before the

1 N. Y. & N. H. R. Co. V. Schuyler, 17 Story's Eq. PI. §§ 120, 130 e( seq. ; London

N. Y. 592. The final result was, that the v. Perkins, 4 Bro. P. C. 158 ; Hardcastle v.

court pronounced the stock valid as against Smithsou, -3 Atk. 2-45 ; Adair v. New River

the company, and each defendant obtained Co., 1 1 Ves. 429 ; Newton v. Earl of Eg-

a separate judgment against the plaintiff, mont, 5 Sim. 130; Harrison ;;. Steward-

s. <;. 34 N. Y. 30. Bills of peace are some- son, 2 Hare, 530; Holland v. Baker, 3

times permitted to be bronght against a Hare, 68. See also Supervisors v. Deyoe,

part only of those claiming adversely to 77 N. Y. 219. '

the plaintiff when their number is very - Osgood v. Laytiu, 5 Abb. Pr. n. s. I

large ; but in all such cases the right must (Ct. of App.).

be s:eneral anions: all these claimants.
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court as defendants.^ When the land has passed through several

owners by a succession of conveyances, all the series of grantors,

or their heirs if they themselves are dead, are necessary defend-

ants. ^ In another case involving the same principle, a sale had

been made under a power of sale contained in a mortgage of land,

and a deed of the land executed by or on behalf of the mortgagee

to the purchaser. In the description of the premises contained

in this mortgage there was an important mistake, which was

repeated in the deed to the purchaser who took the conveyance

in ignorance thereof. On discovery of this error he brought an

action to reform the mortgage and his deed by correcting the

mistake, and made the mortgagor the only defendant. The

Supreme Court of Missouri held upon these facts the mortgagee

was a necessary defendant, and must be brought in before any

judgment could be rendered.^

§ 269. * 372. Case in New York. The general rule governing

actions to quiet and determine title to lands brought b}^ the one

in possession against the persons who set up adverse claims was

clearly and accurately stated by the New York Court of Appeals
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in a recent case. The proceeding was instituted under a statute

which corresponds in its important features with the description

of that class of enactments given in a preceding paragraph

(§ * 369). The party in possession had united all the adverse

claimants as defendants in his suit, and this was objected to as a

misjoinder. The court stated the doctrine in the following man-

ner: " It is claimed on the part of the respondents that the jilain-

tiff could not unite all the claimants as defendants in the action.

I cannot doubt that this claim is entirely unfounded. Here are

twenty-four persons claiming title to this real estate. They all

^ [^Iii IIiiiiiiilia],etc. K. R. Co. w. Nortoiii Jle. 507. As to necessary or proper de-

(1900), 154 Mo. 142, 55 S. W. 220, it was fendants in actions to correct mistakes in

sou<^ht to quiet title Ijy liaving a deed set instriunents, see Newman v. Home Ins.

aside wliich wa.s executed by a third party. Co., 20 Minn. 422, 424 ; Durliam r. Hisdioff,

Held that tlie grantor and grantee of 47 Ind. 211. Also Bush r. Hicks, GO N. Y.

fraudulent deed were necessary parties.] 298; Mills i*. IJuttrick, 4 Col. 123; Steven-

^ Flanders v. McClanahan, 24 Iowa, son v. I'olk, 71 Iowa, 278; Coggswell v.

486. See this case for a very elaborate Griffith (Neb. 1888), .30 N. W. Hc]). 538;

discussion of the doctrine stated in the Roberts v. Chanilierlaiu, .30 Kan. 677.

text; but see Thomas v. Kennedy, 24 '■' Haley v. Bairley, 37 Mo. 363. The

Iowa, 397; and see Beckwith v. Darges, court finally lield that the purchaser could

18 Iowa, 303. In an action to refurm a not maintain such an action at all; that

deed, both the grantor and the grantee are he was not in such ])rivity with the mort-

cour a d fendan
\i\Then the land ha pa ed through everal
ri
f grant r ,
n r
a ucce ion of c nv yan e , 11 th
r th ir h ir if th th m el
are d ad, ar n c s ary defendant . 2 In noth r a inv 1 ing the arne I rin iple, a al bad
n ma le und r a power of al
n ain l in a mortga
f land .
and a d ed of the lan executed by or n b half f the mortgag e
t th
urcha er. In th
cripti n f th pr mi e
n ain l
in thi mortgag th re wa an impor ant mistake, wbi h wa
rer ea l in he de to the purcha er who t ok the con eyan e
in ignoranc th reof. On Ii ·cov ry of this error he br ught an
action to reform the mortgag and hi deed by corre ing the
mi tak and mad the rnor gagor th
nl
l f ndant. The
'upreme ourt of Mi souri b ld upon the fa t the m rtgag e
wa a nece ary lefendant, and mu t be brought in befor any
judgment coull be r nd r d. 3
269. * 72. Case in Ne'W York. The general ru]e 0 rning
action to quiet and let rmine titl to lands brought by th one
in po ·e ion against the I erson who et up adverse claim wa
1 arly and accurat 1 stated by th New Y ork ourt of PI eal
in a recent case. The proce cling wa instituted un l r a tatute
which corre pon ls in its important featur s with the de cription
f that la
f nactm nts given in a preceding para raph
§ * 6 ) . Th party in po e sion had united all the a h rer e
laimant as defendants in hi uit, and tbi wa object d to a a
mi joinder. The court tate l the doctrine in the f Bowing manner : It i claimed on th part of th r pondent bat h plaintiff ould not unite all the laimant a def ndant in the ac ion.
I cannot doubt that thi claim i entir ly unfounded.
re are
twenty-four per on claiming title t thi r al tate. The all
r

nece?sary parties. Pierce v. Faunce, 47 gagnr as to ontiile him to the relief.

1 [In Ifanni baJ, etc. R.R. Co. v. ortoni
(1900), 154 Mo. 142, 55 , . W. 22 , it wa
ought to qui t title by having a cl cl • t

a iile wl1ich wa exe uted by a thircl party.
ll eltl that the grantor and grantee of
frautlul ut d ed w re nece · ary partie .]
2 Flauder
v. Mc lanahan, 2-l I wa,
-I Ii. , ·e thi ca e for a very laLorate
cli c·u.- ion of the do ·trine tat cl in the
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denied the plaintiff's right upon the same ground, and chiimed

title from the same source, and therefore had the same defence

to the action. It cannot be that under the Revised Statutes it

would have been necessary for the plaintiff to have instituted in

such a case tv/enty-four special proceedings. Under the Revised

Statutes these defendants, if they had all been in possession of

this real estate, claiming the same title which they set up as de-

fendants in this action, could all have been united as defendants

in an action of ejectment ; and they could, if they had chosen to

do so, all have united in an action of ejectment against the plaintiff.

Hence there was no error in the joinder of these defendants." ^

§ 270. * 373. IX. Actions for Partition. Their General Purpose.

General Creditors. Holders of Liens on Entire Tract. The action of

partition has been made the object of so many special and vary-

ing statutory regulations in the different States, that it cannot

properly be said to fall within the domain of the general procedure

as the same is established by the codes. I shall only attempt,

therefore, to point out its general features relating to parties de-

fendant, and such as are common to all or several of the States in
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which the reformed system prevails. The primary object of the

action is to divide the land according to their respective interests

among the co-owners. The proceeding may be instituted by any

co-owner, and all the other co-owners are of course necessary de-

fendants, and they are in such case the only necessary or even

proper defendants, for the rights of no otlier classes of persons

could be affected by the decree making the division.^ General

1 Fisher v. Hepburn, 48 N. Y. 41, 55, the defendants claimed and exercised their

per Earl J. Goldsmith v. Gilliland, 24 Tights and interests severally and sepa-

Fed. Rep. 154; Kiucaid v. McGowan, 88 rately, each to a distinct part of the shore.

Ky. 91 ; Ellis v. Northern Pac. R. Co., 77 The question of misjoinder of parties de-

Wis. 114; Keens v. Gaslin, 24 Neb. 310; fendant was presented by demurrer and

Johnson v. Robinson, 20 Minn. 170; answer. The joinder of the several de-

Story's Eq. PI. §§ 144, 198; Sutton v. fendants was proper. They severally

Stone, 2 Atk. 101 ; Reynoldson w. Perkins, claimed riglits affecting plaintiff's right

Arnb. 564; Mead v. Mitchell, 17 N. Y. appurtenant to liis land, and their claim,

210, 214, 215; Clemens o. Clemens, 37 thougli under different patents, was from

N. Y. 59. I^Heckman v. Swett (1893), 99 the same source, and tlie injury to the

Cal. 303, 33 Pac. 1099, was an action to plaintiff, as well as their defence to the

denied th plaintiff's right up n th ame groun 1, and claimed
titl from the ame sourc , and ther for had th same def nee
to the action. It cannot b that under the R vi d tatut it
would have be n nece ary for th plaintiff to ha,v in titut d in
sucb a ca e twenty-four special proc edings.
nd r th Hevi l
tatute t he e def ndants, if they had all been in po
ion of
this real estate, claiming the same title which th y set up a~ defendants in this action, could all have been united a' defendante
ju an action of ejectment ; and they could, if they had cho en to
do o, all have u nited in an action of ejectrnent against the plaintiff.
Hence there was no error in the joinder of these defendants." 1
§ 270. * 373. IX. Actions for Partition. Their General Purpose.
General Creditors . Holders of Liens on Entir e Tract. The action of
partition has been made the object of so many special and varying statutory regulations in the different States, that it cannot
properly be aid to fall within the domain of the general procedure
as the same is established by the codes. I shall only attempt,
therefore, to point out its general features relating to parties defendant, and such a are common to all or several of the States in
which the reformed system prevails. The primary object of the
action is to divide the land according to their respective interests
among the co-owners. The proceeding may be instituted by any
co-owner, and all the other co-owners are of course necessary defen<lants, and they are in such case the only necessary or even
proper defendants, for the rights of no other classes of persons
could be affected by the decree making the division.2 General

quiet title to a fishing privilege. The action, depended as to each upon the same

plaintiff was tlie owner of certain lands facts. Pom. Rem. & Rem. Rights, §* 372 ;

on the north side of the Eel river, and Fisher v. Hepburn, 48 N. Y. 41-55.'']

the defendants each severally owned cer- '-^ C^nly a joint tenant or a tenant in

tain lauds on tlie south side of the same common can maintain an action for tlie

river, opposite the plaintiff's lands. The partition of real estate : Phillips v. Dorris

courtsavs: " The court further found that (1898), 56 Neb. 293, 76 N. W. 555. An

1 Fisher v. H epburn, 48 N. Y. 41, 55,
the defend ants claimed and exercised their
p er Earl J. Gold smi t h v. Gilliland, 2-! ·rights and in tere. t . everally a nd sepaF ed. Rep. 154; Kincaid v. McGo wan, 88 rately, eac h to a di stinct part of the shore.
K y. 91; Ellis v. Northern Pac. R. Co., i7 The question of mi sjoind er of parties deWi . 11-! ; Keen v. Gaslin, 24 Neb. 310; fendant was presented by demurrer and
J ohnson v. R obinson, 20 Minn. 1 iO; answer. The joincler of the seve ral deThey severally
Story' Eq. Pl. §§ 144-, 198; Sutton 11. fendants was proper.
Stoue, 2 A tk. l 0 1 ; Reynoldson v. Perk in s, claimed ri ghts affecting plaintiff's ri g ht
Arnb. 56 4; l\Iead v. Mitchell, 17 N. Y . appurtenant to his land , and their claim,
210, 21-l-, 215; Clemens v. Clemens, 37 though und er different patents, was from
. Y. 5G. [Heckman v. Swett (1 93), 99 the same so urce, ancl th injury to the
Cal. 303, 3.3 Pac. l 099, was an action to plain tiff, as well as their defence to the
quiet title to a fi hin g privilege. Th e action, depended as t eac·h npon the same
plain tiff was the owner of ce rtain lands facts. Porn. R em. & R e m. Ri g ht , § * 372;
on the north side of the Eel river, and Fi her v. Hepburn, 4 N. Y. 41-55 .' ]
2 [Only a joiut te-nant or a tenant iu
th e defendant each severally owned cet·tain lands on th e outh side of the same common can mainta in an action for the
ri ve r, opposite the plaintiff's lands. The partition of real estate : Phillips v. Dorri
co urt says; " T he court further found t hat ( 1898) , 56 "eb. 293, 76 N. W. 555. An
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creditors of any co-owner, or of any prior owner of the whole

tract of land, — as, for example, the deceased ancestor of the

present co-owners, — or of any prior owner of part of the land,

not liaving obtained judgment, and not therefore holding any

lien upon the premises or a part of them, would not be proper

defendants for any purpose, any more than the general creditors

of a jiiortgagor in the case of a foreclosure. The holders of liens

upon the entire tract to be divi.ded, such as judgment creditors of

tlie former owner, or the holders of mortgages given by a former

owner, would not be necessary defendants, nor would they be

even proper paities to the action. Their liens would be utterly

unaffected by the decree and subsequent division in pursuance

^'hereof. As their judgments or mortgages were incumbrances

upon ti.o whole land prior to the titles of the present co-owners,

tlie division u£ the real estate among these co-owners would leave

the same liens undisicirbed and effectual upon the same premises

in their full force and effect. The transaction would be the same

in substance as the conveyance .by a mortgagor of the mortgaged

premises to a grantee who takes tlicMi subject to the existing lien.
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Such incumbrancers are therefore, acco.i-tlin<T to the doctrines of

equity, not even proper parties defendai.-t, when the action is

simply for a division of the soil.

§ 271. * 374. Holders of Liens on Undivided Shares. The caSG

of those who hold liens upon the undivided shares of individual

co-owners, may appear at first view to be somewhat d\ifferent from

the one last described, but it really falls within the same^ principle.

As long as the co-owner's share remains undivided, thc^ incum-

brance upon it is equally vague ; that is, it is not a lien upion any

specific and determined part of the whole common tract, but "upon

an undivided and undistino^uished fraction of it. As the sincrle

co-owner himself cannot say of any particular spot of the territory

ill ([uestion, " This is mine, I am entitled to the exclusive poss€>ts-

sion of this," so his judgment creditor or mortgagee cannot sa\y

of any particvdar lot, " I liave a lien upon this, and can enforco

that lien by selling this specific portion." The sole effect of the

decree and the decision in execution- tliereof is to allot a certain

specified and determined piece of land to the eo-OAvner in place

of his former undefined share, and to transfer the lien-holder's

aiimiiii.strator of a deceased joint tenant Thruckmorton r. I'ence (189.3), 121 Mo.

is nut a jmjjfcr party to a piiLliion suit: oO, 2.'> S. W. 843.]

er lit r of any co-owner, OT of any ri r owner of he h le
tr, c f land, - a fo r example, h l
a ed ance tor f t h
pr .: nt co-owner r of , n Tprim· wner f I art f th land,
not ha ,-iu 0 obtain cl judgment and n t her fore holdin an
li n upon the pr mi~ · or a p, rt of th m ' nkl not be prop r
d fend<mt, for any purpo "'e, an r m r tlmn h g nera,l er dit r
of am rt a 0 or in he ca e of a for cl ur . The h lcler' of lien
n pon the en iT tract t be di vi~lecl ' UC h a. j nd0 men credi r f
the f rm r o ner or the h older of m 1 -t age 0 i en b · a I rmer
own r, w uld not be nece sary defen·lan , n r would th T be
eY n pr per partie o the action. Their lien woul l be ut terl
unaff te l by the lecree and sub equent li i 'ion in pur. uan
"-h r f. A their judgment or mort0 aO'e,' w re incum ranee
upon lJi..., whole land 1Jrior to the title. of he I re ent co-o' n r
the divi ion ur tbe real e tate amOUO'
these co-owners would lea.Ye
b
the ame lien' uncli k1rbecl and effectual upon the sam, pr mi:e
in their full force and effeL,t-. The tra,n 'action would be the 'am
in ·ub. tance a' the conve3Tance l1y a mortO'n,o·or of he mor O'a.geLl
I remi. e to a grantee who t ke tht:.·n ubject t the existing lien .
•'uch incnmbrancer are therefore accvJ·ding to the doctrin
f
quity, not even proper parties clef nda.1 .. t, when the action i
imply for a clivi 'ion of the soil.
271. * 37 4. Holders of Liens on Undivided Shares.
The ca e
f tho e who hold lien upon the undi vi led 'hare of imlivi hrnl
· -mvner may appear at fir t view to b om what ·l1,ifferent fr m
the on 1' t cle.'cribecl, but it really fa.lls within t he am& principl .
.£
long a th co-owner's hare remain. undivided thb iucumbrance u1 on it ix equally vague; that i.' it i n t a lien u1 \ 11 ( Jl r
pe0ifiu and cletermine;l part of the whole com mon trac but upon
an undivided and undi tinO'ui bed fraction f it. A. th i1 1gl
·o-owner him 'elf canno say of any particular pot £ the territcwy
iu que: ion, 'Thi.· is mine I am ntitl l to he xclu i e po"' . . _
·ion of thi:, so hi. judgment re litor r m rtga0 ·ee canno t a~y
of any particular lot
I ha Ye a li n upon this and can nforc ·~
tliat lien by :ellinO' thi. pec:ific portion. ' Th
le ffect of th
clee.:re' awl the clec:i:ion in .·e ·ution· th r of i ·
allot a · "'rtain
spec:ifli·rl awl determined pi c of lantl o h co-owner in pla ·c
nf hi: f rmer uncle fin l har a.ncl to tra.n:f r the li ~n-lwkler':.;
ail111i11i trator 1Jf a <1 cea" ·d j1.i11t cnant
i 1111t a 1•rupc-r party l<J a I' 1rt .i.,11 ·uit:

Throekmorto11 r. P ll •e (I 93), 121 '.\Io.

:;o,

2;; •. \\'.
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incumbrance to this specified and determined portion of tlie

soil. The incumbrance itself is neither increased nor diminished

in amount; it is merely changed from its floating to a fixed

character. It is plain, therefore, that the incumbrancer thus

described has no real legal or equitable interest in the parti-

tion suit when the same is instituted and carried on to its end for

the mere purpose of dividuig the land among the co-owners. His

rights are unaffected; his lien undisturbed. The only apparent

interest which he has, or can possibly have, is not in the action

itself, nor even in the judgment ordering a partition, but in the

execution of that judgment. It may be said that he has an in-

terest to see that the division is properly made, so that the co-

owner on whose share he has the lien will receive a fair allotment,

and that thus the value of his own security will be preserved. He

has such an interest undoubtedly, but it is not a legal one ; nor

does it commence until the cause is decided and the judgment

rendered. Moreover, the actual division is 'made by officers of the

court, — the sheriff, or commissioners appointed in the case, — and

they act under the direction and control of the court itself. As
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in the case of all other administrative official acts the law presumes

that they will be rightly done, it does not require a person to be

made a party to the action in order that he may be in a position

to protect himself against the wrongful acts of the officers who

are appointed to carry a judgment of the court into effect. Per-

sons are made parties in order that they may have an opportunity

of presenting their rights and claims to the judge before he makes

his decree, to the end that they may be considered and passed

upon and established by the judgment itself. When that judg-

ment can in no possible manner affect his rights, he is not even

a proper party to the suit. I have thus stated the principles of

equity unmodified by statute which govern the action of partition

when the same is brought for an actual division of the land. The

statutory provisions in relation to the action may have altered

these rules in some particulars; but I have only designed to

present the equity doctrine pure and simple with the reasons

therefor; so that local changes, wherever tliey have been made,

will be the more readily understood and their effect appreciated.^

1 Prior \o any contrary statute, tlie tract, are not proper parties. Harwood

rule was well settled that incumbrancers v. Kirby, 1 Paige, 469, 471 ; Sebring v.

on the undivided shares, or on the whole Mersereau, Hopli. 501, 503; s. c. on app.

incumbrance to thi. peci:fi d and determin d portion of the
soil. The incumbrance it lf i neither increa .cl n r limini. hed
in amount.; it i merely chang c1 from i flo·1ting to a fixed
character. ·rt i , plain, th r fore, that the in ·umbrancer thus
de:cribed has no real legal or equitable inter st in the partiion suit when the same i in titutecl and carried on to it ncl for
the mere purpo e of dividing he land among the co-owner-·. His
rights are unaffected; his lien undisturbed. The only apparent
intere t which he has, or can po,sibly have, is not in the action
itself, nor even in the judgment ordering a partition, but in the
execution of that judgment. It may be said that he has an interest to see that the division is properly mad , so that the coowner on whose share he has the lien will receive a fair allotment,
and that thus the valu of his own secu rity will be preserved. He
ha such an interest undoubtedly, but it is not a le.r;al one; nor
does it commence until the cn,u e is decided and the judgment
rendered. Moreover, the actual di vision is made by officers of the
court, - the sheriff, or commissioners appointed in the case, - and
they act under the direction and control of the court itself. As
in the case of all other administrative official acts the law presumes
that they will be rightly done, it does not require a person to be
made a party to the action in order that he may be in a position
to protect himself against the wrongful acts of the officers who
are appointed to carry a judgment of the court into effect. Persons are made parties in order that they may have an opportunity
of presenting their rights and chtims to the judge before h e makes
his decree, to the end that they may be considered and pas 'ed
upon and established by the judgment itself. \Vhen that judgment can in no possible manner affect his rights, he is not even
a proper party to the suit. I have thus st.'Lted the principles of
equity unmodifie<l. by statute which govern the action of partition
when the same is brought for an actual division of the land. The
statutory provisions in relation to the action may have altered
these rules in some particular ; but I have only de 'igned ta
present the equity doctrine pure and imple with the rea on
therefor; so that local changes, wherever they have been made,
will be the more reaclil y understood and their effect appreciated. 1
1 Prior to any contrary
tatute, the
rule was well settled that incumbraucers
on the undivided shares, or on the. whole

tract, are not proper parti . Harwood
v. Kirh.v, l Paige, 469, 471; ehring- P.
Mersereau, Hopk. 501, 50:3; s. c. on app.

IYIL REJ\lEDIE .
3ti8 CIVIL REMEDIES.

§ 272. * 375. Different Rule where Object of Suit is to sell Land

272 .

and divide Proceeds. Tliere is another aspect, however, of the

partition suit which places it in very different relations to the

to sell Land

and divide P roceeds.

holders of liens and incumbrancers either upon the whole land

paramount to the titles of the co-owners, or upon the undivided

ar

l l

shares of the co-owners themselves. Its object is sometimes to

sell the whole land, and to divide the proceeds, and not to divide

the land itself. When this is the nature of the judgment, it is

plain that the riglits and interests of the lien-holders must be

adjusted and determined in tlie one action, and especially so when

the land is to be sold free from all incumbrance, so that the lien

of all the mortgages and judgments will be transferred from the

real estate to the fund which is the proceeds thereof, and they

the lan
lain that th

will be paid off and satisfied therefrom. There is then a neces-

sary antagonism between the co-owners and all classes and species

of incumbrancers upon their undivided shares. Their rights are

clashing ; they are opposing claimants of the same fund ; the in-

terests of all are to be finally established and satisfied at the

one judicial proceeding. It is evident, therefore, upon the most
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familiar principles of equity jurisprudence in its relation to par-

ties, that in the a:>pect of the action now described, all the holders

of liens and incumbrances upon the undivided shares of individual

co-owners, created subsequent to the inception of their titles, are

not only proper but necessary defendants in order that a decree

should be made determining all these conflicting rights and

claims, while the holders of prior liens, if not necessary, are at

9 Cow. .344, 34.') ; Wotten v. Copoland, 7 sary defendant unless a sale of the land is

Johns. Ch. 140, 141; Agar r. Fairfax, 17 to be made. Tanner t;. Niles, 1 Barb.

Ves. 542, 544 ; Baring v. Nash, 1 Ves. & 560. It is held in New York that, iude-

B. 551. All the tenants in common, or pendent of statute, subsequent contingent

owners of undivided shares, niu.^t be remainder-men, or persons holding under

]iarties either plaintiffs or defendants, executory devises, who may hereafter

Buriians v. Burhans, 2 Barb. Cli. 398 ; come into being, are bound by a decree in

Teal V. Woodworth, 3 Paige. 470. When partition made by a court of equity, when

a tenant in common has assigned his the, ])resent owners of a vested estate of

share for the benefit of Iiis creditors, such inlieritance in the land have been made

creditors are not proper parties. Van parties. Mead v. Mitchell, 17 N. Y. 210,

Arsdale v. Drake, 2 Barb. 599. A widow 214, 215 ; Clemens v. Clemens, 37 N. Y. 59.

i n an e pe iall
th
i-·
ld free fr m all in umbrance,
tha
of all h m r gao-e and jud men will be tran f rr d from the
o h fund which i th pr
ds thereof, an th y
r al
ill be paid off and ati fi d t her fr m. There i ' th 11 a ne
a1 y anta · ni m between the a-owner and all cla' es nd pe i
of in umbrancer upon their undivided hare . Th ir right are
la I ing · they are oppo in · claiman
f he ame fund; th inf all are to be finally e abli h d and ati fied a he
ter ,
one judici 1 proceeding. It i evicl nt, herefore up n h m t
familiar prin iple of equit juri prudence in i · re~ i n t pari , hat in the a·, pect of the action now de cribed, all the hol er
of liens ancl incumbrance upon the undivid d hare of in lividu 1
c - wn r , reated ub quent to t he inc tion of their itl , are
n t nly pr I r but nee ' ary d fen dan m rder that a l r e
nflicting righ and
h ukl b made d termining all he
claim whil the holder of l rior li n if not nee ar
at

entitled to dower in an undivided share is [Hidd in Chalmers v. Trent (1894), 11 Utah

a necessary party. Wilkinson v. Parish, 8S, 39 Pac. 488, that the holder of a lien

3 Paige, 653 ; Green v. Putnam, 1 Barb. n|)on a joint tenant's share was a necessary

500; Gregory v. Gregory, 69 N. C 522, ])arty to a suit for partition, and that such

526. But a widow who is entitled to necessary party might be brought in by

dower in the whole tract is not a neces- cross-hill.]

9 ow. 344, 345; Wotten i•. ope1an<l, i
,John . h. 14 , 141; Agar t:. Fairfax 1 i
Ye. 542, 544; Baring v. Na h, l S. . e .. &
B . 551. All the tenant in common, or
wnPr of undiYi<leu . h, re , must he
partie either plaintiff or cl fendant • .
Burhan i•. Burhan , 2 Barb.
h. 39 ;
Teal v. "ooclworth, 3 Paig . 470. \Yheu
n t naut in c mn10n ha· a.,cign •<l hi
hare for th lJeuefi of hi· -r •<l itor , uch
neditor: are not prop r partie-. Yan
Ar 1lale v. rake, 2 Barb. 599.
wid w
< utitli>rl to clow r in an uncliYi<l cl ;;h, re i ·
a 11r·ee.·:ary part~··
\ ilkin 0n 1·. l ari h,
:J l'ai~ , 53;
r n 1'. utnam, l Barb.
5 O; 'r 1rory " 'regory,
),.~ .
. 52:..,
52
But
wirlow who i
11titl u to
cJ,11 <>r iu tit ,•Jwl' net i. not a n cc -
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least proper parties for a complete adjudication.^ It may some-

times be impossible at the commencement of the action to deter-

mine whether the judgment will be given for a simple partition

of the land itself, or for a sale of the land and a division of the

proceeds after satisfying the incumbrances, and therefore tlie

classes of persons described may be joinfid as defendants from

motives of precaution. The results thus reached from an analysis

of the action itself with its peculiar relief, and the application

thereto of familiar equity doctrines, have, however, been largely

modified in many States by statutory reo-ulations.-

1 It is held in Indiana, that all persons

interested should be made parties, and

that lien-holders ou undivided shares may

be joined. Milligan v. Poole, 3.5 Ind. 64,

least proper parties for a complete adjudication. 1 It may sometime be impos ible at the commencement of th action to determine whether the judgment will be giv n for a simple partition
of the land it lf, or for a ale of the land and a division of the
proce d aft r ati fying the incumbrances, and ther fore the
cla
f p r on de ' Crib cl may be joined a d fon dant from
motive · f precaution. Th results thu r ach U. from an analy. i.:)
of the a tion itself with its peculiar r lief, and th n.pplication
thereto of familiar equity doctrines, have, however, been larg ly
modified in many States by statutory regulations.2

68. In Missouri, all the co-owners, in-

cluding infants hy their curator, may unite

in the proceeding as plaintiffs, so that it

will be entirely ex parte. Larned v. Ren-
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shaw, 37 Mo. 458 ; Waugh v. Blumeu-

thal, 28 Mo. 462. Where a deed of trust

covered a portion of the land, the trustee

and cestui que trust were held to have been

properly made defendants in order to bind

their interest, altliough no relief was asked

against them. Reiuhardt ;;. Weudeck, 40

Mo. 577 ; Harbison v. Sauford, 90 Mo. 477.

Such a deed of trust is equivalent to a

mortgage, so that these defendants were,

in fact, incumbrancers. As to the parties

in Ohio, see Tabler v. Wiseman, 2 Ohio St.

207 ; Williams r. Van Tuyl, 2 Ohio St.

336. In New York, it is said that all in-

cumbrancers should be brought in as par-

ties in order that the land may be sold free.

Bogardus v. Parker, 7 How. Pr. 305.

- [|Most of the States have special stat-

utes respecting parties to suits for parti-

tion. The following brief synopsis of

these statutes will indicate tiieir general

scope and effect.

A7-izona : Any owner or claimant of real

estate or any interest therein, or a part

owner of personalty, may compel a parti-

tion. Rev. St., 1901, §§"3492-3515.

Arkansas: Every person having an in-

terest in the premises, including tenants

for years, for life, by curtesy, or in dower,

those entitled to the reversion, remainder,

or inheritance, and all who, upon any con-

tingency, may become entitled to any bene-

ficial interest in the premises, vrhether in

possession or otherwi.se, shall be made

parties. Sand. & Hill's Dig. §§ 5415-5417.

California : " The summons must be di-

rected to all the joint tenants and tenants

in common, and all persons having any

interest in, or any liens of record by mort-

gage, judgment, or otherwise upon the

property, or upon any particular j)ortion

thereof ; and generally to all persons un-

known who have or claim any interest in

the property." Code Civ. Pro., § 756.

Colorado : Same as in Arkansas. Code

1883, Chap. XXIV. §§ 2, 3.

Idaho : Same as in California. Code

Civ. Pro., 1901, § 3398.

Indiana : Any person holding lands as

joint tenant or tenant in common, whether

1 It is held in Indiana, that all per ons
intcreste l hould be made partie.-, and
that lieu-holders on undfrided hares may
be joined. Milligan v. Poole, 35 Ind. 64,
68. In Missouri, all the co-owners, ineluding infants by their curator, may unite
in the proceed ing as plaintiffs, so that it
will be entirely ex parte. Larned v. Renshaw, 37 Mo. 458; ·w augh v. Blumeuthal, 28 Mo. 462. Wh ere a deed of trust
covered a portion of the land, the t rn tee
and ceslui 'JUe trust were held to ham been
properly made defendant in order to bind
their interest, although no relief was asked
again,;t them. Reinhardt v. Weudeck, 40
1\10. 5 77; Harbi::>on v. Sanford, 90 Mo. 4 77.
uch a deed of trust is equivalent to a
mortgage, so that these defe ndants were,
in fact, iocumbran cers. As to the parties
in Ohio, ee Tabler v. Wi seman, 2 Ohio St.
207 ; Williams v. Van Tuyl, 2 Ohio St.
3.36. In New York. it is said that all incumbrancers should be brought in as parti es in order that the land may be sold free.
Bogardus v . Parker, 7 How. Pr. 305.
2 [Most of the States have special statutes respecting parties to suits for partition. The following brief synopsis of
these statutes will indicate th eir _general
scope and effect.
Arizona: Any owner or claimant of real
estate or any interest therein, or a part
own er of personalty, may compel a partition. Rev. St., 1901, §§ 3492-35 15.
Arkansas : Every person having an interest in the premise. , including tenants
for years, for life, by curtesy, or in dower,
those entitled to the r eversion , remainder,
or inheritance, and all who, upon any contin ge ncy, may become en titled to any bene_ficial intere t in the premises, whether in

possession or otherwise, . hall be mad e
parties. Sancl. & Hill's Dig.§§ 5415-5-ffi.
California: "The. ummon must be directed to all the joint tenants and tenants
in co mmon, and all persons having any
interest in, or any liens of r ecord by mortgage, judgment, or otherwise upon the
property, or upon any particular portion
thereof; and generally to all persons unknown who have or claim any interest in
the property." Code Civ. Pro., § 756.
Colorado: Same as in Arkan ·as. Code
1883, Chap. XXIV. §§ 2, 3.
I daho: Same as in California. Coue
Civ, Pro., 190 1, § 3398.
Ind iana: Any per. on holding 1and as
joint tenant or tenant in common, 'vhether
in his own right or as executor or trustee,
may compel partition, and trustees, administrators, and executors, may be made
parties to answer as to any interest they
may ha've in the property. Burns' St.,
1901, § 1200.
Iowa : Persons having apparent or contingent interests in the property may he
made parties. Creditors haviug general
specific liens upon the entire property,
may be made parties, and those holding
liens upon one or more of the undivi ded
interests shall be made parties. Code,
· 1897, §§ 4243 , 4244, 4250 .
Kansas : " Creditors having a pecific
or general lien upon all or any portion of
the property may be made parties." Gen.
St., 1901, § 5103.
K entuck.'f : "All persons interested in
the property who ha,·e not uuited in the
petition shall be summoned." Cocle, § 499.
!Jfinnesota : "The summon shall be
addressed hy name to all the owner and
lien-holders who are known, and generally
24
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5 273. * 37''. Joinder of Wife of Tenant in Common. Administra-

tor of Deceased Tenant in Common In New York. Jii New York,

when the action for a partition i.^ brought bv one tenant in com-

mon in fee, his wife is a necessary party, but ratlier a.'j a defendant

than as a plaintiff. Her inchoate right of dower is entitled to

protection.^ If one tenant in common dies, so that his estate

to all persons unknown, havinf^ or claim-

ing an interest in the property." St.,

'

37

1.

Joinder of Wife of Tenant in Common.

Administra-

In
w ·or] ,
when the action f r a I artiti n i' bran ht u1· n tenant in mmon in fee hi ' wife i a nece ary party but ra h r a , a l fend ant
han a a I lain iff. H r inchoa e ri ht f l
r i en ti tlecl
tion.1 If one tenan in comm n die
o that bi
e
tor of Deceased Tenant in Common .

In New York.

1894, § 5771.

Missouri: " Every person having any

interest in snch premises, wliether in pos-

session or otherwise, shall be made a ])arty

to such petition." Rev. St., 1899, § 4376.

Montana : " Every person having an

undivided share, in possession or otherwise

in tlie property, as tenant in fee, for life,

or for years ; every person entitled to the

reversion, remainder or inheritance of an
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undivided share, after the determination

of the particular estate therein ; every per-

son who, by any contingency, contained in

a devise, or grant, or otherwise, is or may

become entitled to a beneficial interest in

an undivided share tliereof ; every person

having an inchoate riglit of dower in the

property or any part thereof, whicii has

not been admeasured, must be a party to

an action for partition. But no person

other than a joint tenant or a tenant in

common of tlie property, shall be a plaintiff

in the action." " The plaintiff may, at his

election, make a tenant in dower, for life,

or for years, of the entire property, or a

creditor or other person, having a lien or

■ interest, which attaches to the entire prop-

erty, a defendant in the action." Also a

section identical with tlie California stat-

ute given above. Code Civ. Pro., §§ 1.342,

1.34.3, 1.347.

Nebraska: "All tenants in common,

or joint tenants of any estate in land may

be comj)elled to make or suffer partition

of such estate or estates." " Creditors

having a specific or general lien upon all

or any portion of the property may or

may not be made parties, at the option of

tiie' plaintiff." Comp. St. 1901, §§6.323,

6325.

Xi ratio : .'^ameas in California. Comp.

Laws, 1900. § .3365.

New y^ork : Has the same jirovisiuns

quoted above from Montana, with others

too long to be set out here. Code Civ.

Pro., §§ 1538, 1539.

North Dakota : Same as California.

Rev. Codes, 1899, § 5799.

0/iio : Eacli tenant in common, copar-

cener, or otlier interested person, shall be

named as defendant in the petition. Bates'

St., § 5756.

Oklahoma : " Creditors having a specific

or general lien upon all or any j>ortion of

the property, may be made parties." St ,

1893, § 4513.

Oregon : " The plaintiff may, at his

election, make a tenant in dower by the

curtesy for life or for years of the entire

))roperty or auy part thereof, or creditors

to all per on unknown , hav ioa r lairning au intere ·t in th
pr p rty."
't ,
l 94, 577 1.
Jl is ouri : " EYery perou ha,·ing any
int re tin uch pre mi e wh e th r in po. ion or otherwi e hall be ma<l a party
to n h petiti on. ' Rev. t. l 99, § 4376.
Jl ontana: 'Every per on havina an
undi"id d bar in po e ion or therwi'e
iu the proper ty, as tenant in f , for life,
or fo r years · e,·ery per on n titled to the
re,·er ion, r e main der or inh eritance of au
uudiYi<led hare, after the determination
of the particular e tate therein ; ,·ery per·on who, by any contiogen y, coutn ined in
a deYi. e, or arant, or othcrwi:-: , i · or may
become entitled to a hen ficial intere:t in
an nntli vided share thereof; e\'C~ry pe r on
haYing an iu choate right 0£ dower iu the
prop rty or any part ther of, which ha
not be n aclmea ur d, mu t be a party to
an action for partition. But no per on
th r than a joint tenant or a tenant in
com monoftheproperty ~ hallb aplaintiff
in th action." "The plaintiff m y, at hi
lection, make a tenant in dower, for life ,
or for year , of the entire property or a
c-recl itor or other per~ un, haYina a li en or
intere. t. which atta h
o the ntire pr prty, a defendant in the action. " Al. o a
l'ectiou identi cal 1Yith th
alif rnia ·tatute ~iven abo,·e.
ode iv. Pr ., § 1.3-1-2,

too long to be et out h re. Code i 1-.
Pro., § · 15 , 1539.
~ orlh Dakota: ~ ame a
alifo ruia.
R e''· ode , 1 99, § 5i99.
Ohio : Ea h tenant in common, oparcener, or other int re. ted p er ou hall be
uam d a cl fentla11t in the petiti o. Bat . '
t. § 5756.
Oklahomo : " r clitor~ ha' ing a p ·ific
or general li u upou all or auy porti
the property, may be made parti ·. "
l 93, § 4513.
Oregon: ' The plaintiff may, at hi
l ction, make a tenant in dower 1>!' h
urte. y for life or for year
f the 11tire

aliforuia.
ReY.

t,

l .'3-!3, 13-! 7.
~ ebra~ka: ".\11 tenant. in ·ommon,
or joint ten nt; f ::iuy t, te in land may
bP compcll<'<l to make or . uff r partition
of .-nt·h .'tate or . tat ."
r <litors
l1avi11~ a. pec·ifk r o-eneral li en upon all
•1r an.\· portion of th prop rty may or
111n.y 111it 11<> marl partiP. , at th option of
the plaintiff."
omp .• ·t. 19 I, ,:-i6:323,

1;·:2:-1 .

• '11'""": . 'a111<' a-. iu

a dd<'11<la11t."

alifor11ia.

omp.

Law , I '.HHI, ~ :3'Jli;"1.
,\'1 II } U!'f.·; Jh . tJi ~:l.lll' ]'fO\'i. i r)ll.
quut••d abo\ c fro111 .\fo11ta11a, with oth r

IT'110111inq:
1 !19 ~.JO :i.J
1 no:Pkrn11s

I'.

'Vhic . 7

L an-:. 4, ' f'\.

[But it w, - h •lcl in Iln .,..,.crty 1-. Wa."ller,
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DEFENDANTS IN SUITS FOR I'AIiTITION.

'1.

descends to his heirs, if other of the co-owners were indebted to

him for rents and profits of the hind, his administrator should ])r

joined as a party defendant with his heirs, since the sum due for

these rents and profits, and which would be ascertained by an

accounting and determined by the decree, would go to his per-

sonal estate in the hands of the administrator, and not to hisheirs.^

§ 274. * 377. In Indiana and California. In Indiana, the widow

takes an undivided portion of the husband's land in fee, as his

statutory heir. In an action of partition, brought by the widow

against the other heirs of her deceased husband in that State, his

creditors, it is held, cannot be made defendants for any purpose.^

Under, the California homestead laws, the wife is a necessary co-

defendant with her husband in the partition of lands which they

claim or she claims to be a homestead.^ The general rule is laid

down in that State that " all persons having or claiming any

interest in the land are not only proper but necessary parties to ;i

suit for partition." *

(1897), 148 Ind. 625, 48 N. E. 366, that
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the wife of a tenant in common is not a

necessary party. And in Cochran v.

Thomas (1895)' 131 Mo. 258, 33 S. W.

6, the husband of a co-tenant was held

not to be a necessary party, under G. S.,

1865, chap. 152. Same- rule stated in

descends to his h eir , if oth r f the co-owners wer inclebt d t()
him for rents and profits of the land, hi · administrator ·houl<l lw
joined as a party def ndant with hi heir , ince th sum due fo ·
these rent and profits, and which would be aBcertain d by aa
accounting tnd leterminecl by t l e decree, would go to hi. pe. ·on al e tat in the hands of the administrator, an l no t to hi h ir: . 1
274. * 377. In Indiana and California.
In Indiana, the wido ·,y
takes an undivided portion of the husband's land in fee, as hi.·
statutory h eir . In an action of partition, brought by the wiclo v
against the ot her heirs of h er deceased husband in that State, hi.·
credi tor , it is held, cannot be made defendants for any purpose.2
Under . t he California homestead laws, the wife i a necessary codefendant with her hu band in the partition of lands which they
claim or she claims to be a homesteacl.3 The general rule is laill
clown in that State that "ctll persons having or claiming any
interest in the land are not only proper but necessary parties tD :i,
uit for partition." 4

Estes V. Nell (1897), 140 Mo. 6.39, 41 S. W.

940. In Chalmers v. Trent (1894), 11

L'tah, 88, 39 Pac. 488, the wife of a co-

tenant was held a necessary party ]

1 Scott V. Guernsey, 60 Barb. 163,

181; s. c. on app. 48 N. Y. 106. \J.n

Budde V. Rebenack (1896), 137 Mo. 179,

38 S. W. 910, it was held that in an action

for partition of lauds devi.sed to minors,

brought before the settlement of the

estate, the executor is a proper party de-

fendant. In such a proceeding against

infants, it was held in Bogart v. Bogart

(1896), 138 Mo. 419, 40 S. W. 91, they

must be represented by a legal guardian

and curator, otherwise tlie purchaser at

the sale under the decree obtains no title

as to them.]

■^ Gregory v. Iligli, 29 Ind. 527. The

court said : " Any decree of partition be-

tween the widow and heirs could not con-

clude the rights of the creditors against

the estate of the deceased ; nor could

creditors prove their claims in such a

proceeding to which the administrator

was not a party."

8 De Uprey v. De Uprey, 27 Cal. 329.

* Ibid. p. 332, per Sanderson J. See

Gates V. Salmon, 35 Cal. 576.

pn Hiles v. Rule (1893), 121 Mo. 248,

25 S. W. 959, the court said: "No judg-

ment in partition should be made when it

appears that the parties, wlio are not be-

fore the court, have an existing vested in-

terest in the subject-matter of the suit.

In such case the parties interested sliould

be brought iu, or partition should be

denied." And it was held that the general

rule that defect of parties, appearing on

the face of the petition and not objected

to by demurrer, is waived, does not apply

to partition suits. So, iu Lilly v. Menke

(1894), 126 Mo. 190, 28 S. W."643, it was

held that a petition in partition which dis-

-(1 97 ), 1~s Ind . 625, 48 N. E. 366, that proceeding to which the admini. trator
the wife of a tenant in common is not a was not a party."
uecessary party. Arnl in Cochran 1J.
s De Uprey v. D e Uprey, 2i Cal. 329.
Thomas (1895), 131 Mo. 258, 33 S. W .
4 Ibid . p. 332, per Sanderson ,J.
See
G, the husbaml of a co·tenant was held Gates v. Salmon, 35 Cal. 576 .
i10t to l.Je a necessary party, uu<ler G . S.,
[ In Hiles v. Rule (1893), 121 Mo. 248,
l 65, chap. 152.
Same. rule stated in 25 S . W . 959, the court said: "No judgE te 1•. Nell (189 i) , 140 Mo. 639, 41 S. W . ment in partition should be made when it
940. In Chalmers v. T rent ( 1894), 1 l appears t hat the par ties, who a r e not beUtah, 88, 09 P ac. 488, the wife of a co- fore the court, have au existing vested interest in the subject-matter of the suit.
tenant was h eld a neces ary party J
1 Scott v. G uernsey, 60 Bar b. 163,
In such case th e parti es interested hould
18 1; s. c. on app. 48 N . Y . 106. [In be brought in, or partition shoul<l be
Bu<lile v. Reben ack (l 96), l 3 i Mo. 1 i 9, den ied." A nd it was hel<l that the general
38 S. W. 910, it was held t hat in a n action rule that defect of parties, appearing on
fo r pa r t ition of lauds deY ised to mi nors, the face of the petition and not objecteu
bro ng ht before the settlemen t of t he to by dem urrer, is waived, does not appl y
e tate, tb e executor is a p rope r par ty de- to partition suits. So, in Lilly v. Men ke
fen da nt. In such a proceeding against (1 89-! ), 126 Mo. 190, 28 S. W. 643, it was
infants, it was h el d in B ogar t v . B ogart h eld that a petition in partition which dis(!896), 138 Mo. 4 19, 40 S. W . 91, t hey closes the interests of persous not made
must be represented by a lega l guarcfotn parties does not state a cau e of action.
In Campbell v. Stokes (1 94), 142 N. Y.
and curator , other wise the purchase r a t
the sale under the decree obtains no t itle 2.3, 36 N. E. 811, it was held that in an
action of partition among a te ·ta tor'
a· to them.]
2 Gregory v. Hi gh, 29 Ind. 527.
The children, they taking as life tenants,
court said : "Any decr ee of partition be- grandchildren living at the time of the
tween the widow and heirs could not con- suit were uece ary parties, since they
clude t he r ights of the cre<litors against were presumptively entitled to po ·es. ion
the estate of the deceased ; nor could on the death of the life tenant. Becker v.
creditors prove their claims in such a Stroeher (1002),, l6i fo: 306, 66 . W.

372 CIVIL KKMEDIES.

5 275. * 378. X. Actions for Various Miscellaneous Objects. Part-

nership Matters and Accounting. .Vu action by one partner against

another for a dissolution and a winding up of the concern, partly

based on the ground of a fraudulent transfer of firm property

by the defendant partner to a third person, may properly include

this assignee as a co-defendant, since the sale may be declared

void, and he may be ordered to account.^ When two of three

partners — or any part of tlie entire firm — entered into a con-

tract with a third person, by which they transferred, or agreed to

transfer, to him a certain share of their interest in the concern —

a mine — and a like share of the profits made by their interest, an

action by such assignee to determine his rights, and to obtain his

share in the profits, would be properly brought against the two

contracting parties alone ; the other members would not be

necessary defendants. But if the action is to wind up the con-

cern, to dissolve the firm, and to sever the interests of the re-

spective members, all the partners are indispensable parties ; if

the action is instituted by one, or by his assignee, all the others

must be joined as defendants.^ And, as a general proposition, in
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an action to compel an accounting growing out of any transac-

tions or relations, all persons interested in obtaining the account,

or in the result thereof, are necessary parties, and should be made

defendants, if not plaintiffs.^

108.3: "Where a deed of trust is executed to contribute towards satisfying the plain-

after a partition suit has been instituted, tiff's claim, should be joined. Story's

the beneficiary and trustee, while they Eq. PI. § 169; Madox v. Jackson, 3 Atk.

may be made parties to the partition if 406 ; Bland v. Winter, 1 Sim. & S. 246 ;

they so desire, are not necessary parties.] Jackson v. Rawlins, 2 Vern. 195 ; Ferrer v.

1 Webb V. Helion, .3 Uobt. 025; Wade Barrett, 4 Jones Eq. 455; Hart v. Coffee,

V. Rusher, 4 Bosw. 537. 4 Jones Eq. 321 ; Dunham v. Ramsey, 37

2 Settembre v. Putnam, -30 Cal. 490. N. J. Eq. 388. When a debt is joint, all

See Blood v. Fairbanks, 48 Cal. 171, 174, the joint debtors must be made defeud-

175; and Skidmore i-. Collin.s, 8 Hun, .50. ants; a.s, for example, if the suit is to

Where a bill is filed against one partner enforce a demand against a firm, all tlie

to set aside partnership transactions, and partners must be joined; and if the action

vacate a conveyance of real estate, assets is brought against the personal roprescnt-

of the partnershij), but lield in the name ativcs of a deceased partner, tlie survivors

of one of the partners for the benefit of must also be co-defendants. Story's Eq.

the firm, and for an account, all the part- PI. §§ 166-168; Pienson v. Robinson, 3

uers are necessary parties. Bell r. Dono- Swanst. 139 (n.) ; Sdiolefield v. Heafield,

hoe, 8 Sawyer, 435 ; s. c. 17 Fed. Rep. 710. 7 Sim. 067 ; Hills ;•. McRae, 9 Hare, 297 ;

3 Petrie v. Pctrie, 7 Lans. 90,95. The Butts r. Genung, 5 Paige, 254. Re Mc-

gcneral doctrine is. that all persons inter- R.ae, 25 Ch. I) 16 ; 7?^ IIo.lg.s<n),31 Ch. D.

ented in re.si.sting the jdaintiff's demands 177; AV Barnard, 32 Ch. D. 447. Seenl.xo

must be made dofenilants. As an exam- Eirtell >•. Savrc. 7 Hun, 485; Sonthal r.

pie, all yaiit debtor.!, a;id all persons liable Shields, 81 N. C. 28 ; Getty c. Develin, 70
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§ 276. * 370. Rescission and Cancellation. In actions to obtain

this remedy, each case must to a great extent stand upon its own

circumstances. Tliere is one general principle which is generally

applicable, and whicli regulates the selection of parties in all

causes of this nature, whatever be the particular facts upon which

each depends. It is the simple but comprehensive rule that all

persons whose rights, interests, or relations with or through the

subject-matter of the suit, would be affected by the cancellation

or rescission, should be brought before the court as defendajits, so

that they can be heard in their own behalf. This general principle

is assumed or expressly announced by all the decided cases, and

those which are quoted are intended simply as illustrations.^

§ 277. * 380. Same Subject. — In an action to set aside an

award, even for the misconduct of the arbitrators, the arbitrators

themselves cannot properly be made defendants, as they have no

interest in the subject-matter, nor are they legally affected by the

relief if granted.^ For the same reason, a sheriff is neither a

necessary nor a proper defendant in an action to set aside a deed

of land given by him upon a sale under an execution against the
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plaintiff.^ The owner of land who had been induced to sell by

the fraud and collusion of his own agent, and of the purchaser,

conveyed the entire tract to such purchaser, who took the ap-

parent ownership in fee of the whole ; but, in fact, by a secret

arrangement between himself and the vendor's agent, the latter

was entitled to one half of the land so sold and conveyed, and

actually advanced to that end one half of the purchase price.

An action by the grantor to set aside this conveyance was held

to be properly brought against the ostensible purchaser of the

whole, who took the deed in his own name, and the agent

jointly, because the latter was in reality one of the purchasers,

and his equitable interest would be affected by the decree of

cancellation.'^

N. Y. 509 ; Fnlkerson ;•. Davenport, 70 '^ Knowlton v. Mickles, 29 Barb. 465.

Mo. 541 (equitable set-off). 3 Draper v. Van Horn, 15 In J. 155.

1 Morse v. IMorse, 42 Ind. 365; Ziin- See, however, Colorado Man. Co. v. Mc-

merman r. Schoeufeldt, 6 N. Y. Sup. Ct. Donald, 15 Colo. 516, to the effect that it

142. See also Sanders v. Yonkers Vill., is a matter for the discretion of the trial

63 N. Y. 489, 493 ; Hammond r. Peunock, court whether the sheriff in such a case

61 id. 145 ; Potter v. Phillips, 44 Iowa, should be made a party. See also Gilbert

353 ; Watkins v. Wilcox, 4 Hun, 220 ; v. James, 86 N. C. 244*.

Hill V. Lewis, 45 Kan. 162; Dailey v. * Roy I). Ilaviland, 12 Ind. 364

Kinsler (Neb.), 47 N. W. 1045.

§ 276. * 79. R es cission and C ancellation. In action to obtain
this r m cly, ach a ·e mu ·t t a great extent sta.ncl upon it own
cir urn ta,n
Th r i on gen rctl principl which is gen rall
ap licabl , and which r 0 ulat
the sel ction of parti s in all
cau e of this nature, what v r b the particular fact u on which
ea h lep n i . It i th sim11 but compr hen ive rule that all
per on who right intere ·t · or relations with or through the
ubject-matter of the nit, would be aff ctec.l by the cancellation
or rescission, should be brought before the court a. def ndant , o
that they can be heard in their own behalf. This general principle
is assumed or expres ly announced by all the decided ca e ', and
tho e which are quoted are intended simply as illustrations.1
§ 2 7 7 . * 380. Same Subject. - In an action to set aside an
award, even for the misconduct of the arbitrators, the arbitrato rs
t hemselves cannot properly be made defendant , as they have no
interest in the subject-matter, nor are they legally affected by the
relief if granted.2 For the same reason, a sheriff is neither a
necessary nor a proper defendant in an action to set aside a deed
of land given by him upon a sale under an execution again t the
plaintiff.3 The owner of land who had been induced to sell by
the fraud and collusion of his own agent, and of the purchaser,
conveyeJ the entire trac t to such purchaser, who took the apparent ownership in fee of the whole; but, in fact, by a ecret
arrangement between himself and the vendor's agent, the latter
was entitled to one half of the land so sold and conveyed, and
actually advanced to that end one half of the purchase price .
An action by the grantor t set a ·ide this conveyance wa held
to be properly brought aga.inst the ostensible purchaser of the
whole, who took th . ., cl eel in his own name, and the agent
jointly, b cause the latter was in reality one of the purchaser ,
and his equitable interest would be affected by the decree of
cancellation.4
N. Y. 509; Fulkerson r. Davenport, 70
Mo. 54 1 (equitable et-off).
1 ?lforsc 1-. Morse, 42 I nd. 365; Zimmerman r . chocnf ldt, 6 :N'. Y. Rup . Ct.
142 . Sec al so , anders t'. Yonkers Y:ll.,
63 .J. Y. 4 9, 493; Ilarnrn ollCI t· . Penn ock,
6 1 iLl. 145; Potter v. Phillips, 44 Iowa,
353; \Vatkins v. Wilcox, 4 Hnn, 220;
11 ill v. L ewis, 45 K an. 162; Dailey v.
Kiu sler (N eb. ), 47 N. W . 104 ~>.

Knowlton v. ~Iickle:-:, 29 Barb. 46.'i.
Draper v. Yan Horn, i 5 In l. 155.
See, however, Colontdo Man. Co. !'. M..:D onald, L> Colo. 51G, to the effect that it
is a matter for the di ·cretiou of the t ri al
oll!'t whether the sheriff in nch a ca e
i;;hould he mad e a party.
ee also Gilb rt
v . J a 1u cs, G N. C. 244.
4 Roy v. Ilavilantl, 12 In d. 364
2
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§ 278. * 381. Same Subject. — In an action against a trustee to

cancel a' mortgage given to him as such, or to set aside a deed

to liim absolute on the face, which it was alleged was in fact a

mortgage, all tlie persons interested in the mortgage debt and

the security thereof, and particularly the beneficiaries for whose

benefit the trustee held the security, are necessary parties defend-

ant, and their absence would be fatal to the recovery of the relief

demanded.^ When the lands of a deceased testator or intestate

have been sold in pursuance of an order of the surrogate, on the

application of the administrator or executor, for the alleged pur-

pose of paying the debts of the deceased, an action to set aside

such sale must be brought not only against the persons to wliom

the land was sold, and the present owners thereof, but also against

the personal representatives of the deceased, so that the question

whether there were debts of such a nature and extent as to ren-

der the sale necessary may be determined.^ Bonds having been

issued in tlie name of a town in aid of a railroad under color of

legal authority, and the town subsequently bringing an action

to set aside the entire proceedings on the ground of illegality and
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to procure the bonds to be delivered up and cancelled, all the

holders of such bonds, it was held, could be united as defendants

therein, so that their rights could be determined in one proceed-

ing ; it was not considered requisite to such joinder that any

common interest in respect to their ownership of the securities

should exist among the defendants ; it was enough that their

rights as hoklers all depended upon the one question involved

in the suit.^ If a judgment has been recovered against two or

more joinths and one of them afterwards institutes an action

to set aside such judgment or to restrain its enforcement on the

ground of want of jurisdiction in the court which rendered it, or

on the ground of fraud, his co-judgment-debtors must be made

parties to the proceeding, either as plaintiffs, or, upon their

refusal to join, as defendants ; their presence before the court

is necessary to any adjudication upon the merits.*

1 Clemon.s v. Elder, 9 Iowa, 272, 275. ^ Venice v. Breed, fi.'j Bail). .597.

2 SiLsbee v. Smith, GO Barb. 372. In * Gates v. Lane, 44 Cal. .•}92. (^AIl the

sach an action all persons who participated partie.<i to a judgment should he made

ia the fraudulent transaction, and who parties to the proceeding to annul it : Day

claim a present interest in the property v. Goodwin (1898), 104 la. .374, 7.3 N. W.

affected hy it, should he made defendants. 804.

Howse V. Moody, 14 Fla. 59, 03, 64. Land was conveyed to two sons of the

3 1. Same Subje ct. - In an acti n against a trust e t
cane 1 n: mort0 ag gi n t him a u h, r t set asid a leed
t him ab lute on the fac , which it 1 as alleged a:., in fa t a
mortgag all th perons inter te in th rn rtgage debt and
the sec uri ty hereof an l particularly the b n :ficia.rie ' f r who e
en fit t he truste h ld the curity, are nee · ar3 p rti defenc1tmt, and their ab enc woul be fatal to the rec very f the r li f
demanded.l When the lan
of a decea ed t ta.tor or int tate
hav been ~ ld in pur ' uance of an order of th urr gate, on th
application f he admini tn: or or execut r, f r the alleg d purpo --e of paying the d ht ' of the decea ed an action to et aside
uch le mu ' t b br ught n t only again t the pers ns to whom
the land wa sold, and the pre ent owner thereof, bu a1 q again 't
the p r onal representative of the decea ed o thttt the qu sti n
whether there were debt of such a nature and ex ent as t renier the sale nece sary may be determined.2 B 1 d havin · been
i ue in the name of a town in aid of a railroad under col r of
lega.l authority, and the town sub equently bringing an a ion
t
et a ide t he entire proceeding:, on the ground of ill gality and
to proc ire the bond to be delivered up and cane lled, all the
holders of such bonds, it was held, could be united a defer dant
ther in, o that their rights could be determined in one proce ding· it wa not con idered requi ite to uch joinder that an
common intere t in re pect to their ownership of the e uritie
hould exi t among the defendant · it was nough that th ir
ri ht a holders all depende up n the one question in lv d
in the it.3 If a judgment has been rec ver d again ·t two r
more jointly, and one of l em afterward. in titute an ction
to et a ide uch judgm nt or
r train its enforcement n he
ur which r nd re it, cir
g ro nd f want of juri diction in the
on the r und of fraud, hi c -ju gment-d bt r mu t b mad
p. r ie to the I roceeding, ither a plaintiff , r upo n th ir
r efusal to join, a d f nclant ; th ir pr nc before the ourt
nece ry t a.ny adjudi a i n upon th m rit .4
278.

c

lemo n v. Elde r, 9 Iowa, 272, 275.
.' il Lee v. mith, 60 Barb. 37-. Io
och au a<'tio 11 a ll p r on wh par icipat d
iu thP- fraudul nt tran a ti n. and who
clai111 :i p re. e11t in te re t in Lhe pre p rty
aCfrl'l d liy it, : liuul<l b rnatl d f n<lant .
l

-i
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.Moody, 14 ; Ja. 59, G3 , 64.
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DEFENDANTS IN SUITS FOR ENFORCEMENT OF LIENS.
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§279. * 382. Enforcement of Liens. — In an action by a sub-con-

tractor or materialman to enforce the mechanic's lien given

by statute, it is proper to make the contractor a party defendant

as well as the owner of the building, so that all the claims may be

adjusted in one suit.^ It is decided, in California, that when the

building or other premises upon which the labor was performed

is owned l)y a partnership, all the members of the firm are neces-

sary defendants in an action to enforce a mechanic's lien, even

though the plaintiff was employed by one of the partners alone

grautor in cousideration of their agreement

to support their mother during her natural

life, boon afterwards the grautor died,

§ 279. * 382. Enforcement of Liens. -In an action by a sub-contractor or materialman to enforce the mechanic's lien given
by ·t::i,tute, it is proper to make the contractor a party defendant
a well a the owner of the building, so that all the claims may b
adjusted. in one suit. 1 It is decided, in alifornia, that when th
building or other premi es upon which the labor was performed
is owned by a partnership, all the members of the firm are nece 'ary defendants in an action to enforce a mechanic's lien, ev n
though the plaintiff was employed by one of the partners alone,

tlie sous failed to Iceep tiieir contract, and

the mother, together with the children

of tiie grautor other thau the grantees,

brought suit for rescission of the contract.

Held that the heirs of the grantor were

proper parties : Lane v. Lane (1899), 106
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Ky. 530, 50 S. W. 857.

Reformation. Grigshy r. Barton County

<1962), 169 Mo. 221, 69 S. W. 296: All

persons who will be affected by the refor-

mation of an instrument should be made

parties. See also Horner v. Bramwell

(1896), 2.3 Colo. 238, 47 Pac. 462. If a

party necessary to tlie suit is not brought

in, the case will be dismissed on motion at

the close of the evidence : Steinbach v.

Prudential Ins. Co. (1902), 172 N. Y. 471,

65 N. E. 281.]

1 Carney v. La Crosse & M. R. Co., 15

Wis. 503 : Lewis v. William.s, 3 Minn. 151 ;

Lookout Lumber Co. ;;. Mansion Hotel &

B. Ry. Co., 109 N. C. 568 ; Davis v. John

Mouat Lumber Co. (Colo. App. 1892), 31

Pac. R. 187 ; Northwestern Cement, etc.

Co. V. Norwegian-Dan. Ev. L. A. Sem., 43

Miun. 449. Compare Hubbard v. Moore,

132 Ind. 178 ; Green v. Clifford, 94 Cal.

49. But it is held in Missouri tliat the

sub-contractor need not bring in all of

several joint contractors ; the statute re-

quiring the " original contractor " to be

made a defendant is satisfied if one of

them is joined. Putnam v. Ross, 55 Mo.

116; Steinmann v. Strimple, 29 Mo. App.

478 ; Horstkotte v. Menier, 50 Mo. 158,

does not conflict with this decision, since

it merely holds that the original contractor

must be a defendant.

[^Contractor is proper but not necessary

party in suit by materialman : Wood v.

Uakiand, etc. Transit Co. (1895), 107 Cal.

500, 40 Pac. 806. Contractor is necessary

party in suit by sub-contractor : Union

Pac. Ry. Co. ;•. Davidson (1895), 21 Colo.

93, 39 Pac. 1095 ; cfharles v. Mallack Lum-

ber Co. (1896), 22 Colo. 283, 43 Pac. 548 ;

H. B. C. Co. V. N. Y. C, etc. R. R. Co.

(1895), 145 N. Y. 390, 40 N. E. 86. Con-

tractor is not necessary party in suit by

materialman : Bethune v. Cleveland, etc.

Ry. Co. (1899), 149 Mo. 587, 51 S. W.

465. (contractor is a necessary party in

suit by materialman : Castleberry v. John-

stem (1893), 92 Ga. 499, 17 s" E. 772.

The person with whom the plaintiff con-

tracted is a necessary party : Gilliam v.

grantor in consideration of their agreement
to suppo rt their mother during her natural
life. ::,oqn afterward ' the grantor died,
the sons failed to keep their contract, and
the mother, together wir.h the children
of the grantor other than the grantees,
brought suit for r escissiou of the contract.
Helll that the h ei rs of the grantor were
proper parties : Lan e v. Lane ( 1899), I 06
Ky. 530, 50 S. W . 857.
Rf!fonnation. Grigsby v . Barton County
(1902), 169 Mo. 221, 69 S. W. 296: All
person s who will be affected by the refor111atio11 of an instrument shoulll be maue
parties.
"ee also Horner v. Bramwell
( 1896), 2.3 Colo. 238, 47 Pac. 462. If a
party nece. sary to the suit is not brought
in, the case will be dismissed on motion at
the close of the evidence : Steinbach v.
Prudential Ins. Co. (1902), 172 N. Y. 471,
65 N. E. 281.J
1 Carney v. La Crosse & M. R. Co., 15
Wis. 503: Lewis v. Williams, 3 Minn . 151 ;
Lookout Lumber Co. v. Mansion Hotel &
B. Ry. Co., 109 N. C. 568; Davis 11. John
Monat Lumber Co. (Colo. App. 1892), .3 1
Pac. R. 187; Northwestern Cement, etc.
-Co. v. Norwegian-Dan. Ev. L.A. Sem., 43
Minn. 449. Compare Hubbard v. Moore,
132 Ind. 178 ; Green v. Clifford, 94 Cal.
49. But it is held in Missouri that the
sub-contractor need not bring in all of
several joint contracto rs ; the statute requiring the " original contractor" to be
made a defendant is $atisfied if one of
them is joined. Putnam v. Ro s, 55 Mo.
116 ; 'teinmann v. Strimple, 29 Mo. App.
47 8; Horstkotte v. Menier, 50 Mo. 158,
does not conflict with thi . decision, since
it merely holds that the original contractor
must be a defendant.
[ Contractor is proper bnt not neces ary

party in suit by materialman: 'V"ood v.
Oakland, etc. Transit Co. (I 95), 107 al.
500, 40 Pac. 806. Contractor is uece sary
party in suit by sub-contractor: Uniou
Pac. Ry. Co. l'. Dav idson (1895), 21 Colo.
93, 39 Pac. 1095 ; harles v. Hallack Lum·
ber Co. (1896), 22 Colo. 283, 43 Pac. 548;
H. B. C. Co. v. N. Y. C., etc. R. R. Co.
(1895), 145 N. Y. 390, 40 N. E. 86. Contractor is not necessary party in snit by
materialman: Bethune 11. Cl eveland, eLc.
Ry. Co. (1 99), 149 Mo. 587, 51 S. W.
465. Contractor is a necessary party in
suit by materialman: Castlebeny v. Johnston (1893), 92 Ga. 499, 17 S. E. i72.
The person with whom the plaintiff contracted is a necessary party : Gilliam v.
Black (1895), 16 Mont. 217, 40 Pac. 303.
The person to whom the premises are sold
during the life of the lien is a necessary
party: Pickens v. Polk (1894), 42 Neb.
26i, 60 N. W. 566.

In Blanshard v. Schwartz ( 1898), 7
Okla. 23, 54 Pac. 303, the court, quoting
with approval the case of Johnson v.
Keeler, 46 Kan. 304, said: "In an action
to foreclose a mechanic's lien, all lien
holders and encumbrancers should be made
parti es, and a lien holder who i not made
a party in the first instance is entitled,
upon application, to come in at any time
before final judgment, and, by answer in
the nature of a cross petition, set forth his
claim of lien , and ask to have the same
foreclosed."
An attorney who has a li en on the judgment recovered for hi client, who secures
an affirmation of the judgmen t on app al,
may properly make the ureties ou the
appeal bond parties to a suit to enforce
the lien : Coombe !'. Knox {1903), 28
Mont. 202, 72 Pac. 641.J
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was ignorant of the other co-owners, and had filed his notice of

lien only against the one employing him.^ It may be stated as a

general rule, that in all actions to enforce a lien, the person in

whose adveree possession the property subject thereto is held, is

a necessary defendant, or otherwise the decree would virtually

be a nullity .2

§ 280. * 383. Same Subject. — A contract for the sale of lands

being pledged or assigned by the vendee as collateral security for

the payment of a debt, and the creditor — the pledgee, or assignee

— bringing an action to foreclose the right of redem^Jtion, and to

sell the security, and to apply the proceeds in payment of his own

demand, the vendor in the contract is held not to be a necessary

party defendant in such suit.^ The same rule must apply to all

kinds and forms of securities and things in action which are

pledged or assigned for the purpose of collateral security, such

as bonds, notes, certificates of stock, and the like. The obligor

on the bond, the maker of the note, the corporation which issued

the stock certificate, cannot be a necessary defendant in an action

to foreclose and sell.
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§ 281. * 384. Same Subject. A mortgage was foreclosed in a

summary manner prescribed by statute in Iowa, and the premises

were conveyed to A., the mortgagee. He afterward assigned the

mortgage and the note secured by it to B., and entered into a

written agreement to convey to him the land. B. subsequently

brought an action to foreclose the same mortgage against the

mortgagor, and the subsequent incumbrancers, and also made A.

a defendant, setting up the former summary proceedings and A.'s

1 McDonald v. Backus, 45 Cal. 262. Carolina, in order to cut off her inchoate

2 Wingard v. Banning, 39 Cal. 543. A dower right. Bunting v. Foy, G6 N. C.

junior incuinhraucer shoukl Ije made a de- 193. See also Win.'ilow i-. Urqnliart, 39

fendant, or his right of redemption will Wis. 260; Church r. Smitii, 39 id. 492;

not be cut off. Evan.s v. Tripp, 35 Iowa, DeForest v. ilolnm, 38 id. 408; Boorman

371. When tlie original owner of tlie i\ Wisconsin, etc. Co., 36 id. 207 ; Rice v.

premises on wliich the lien exists has con- Hall, 41 id. 453 ; Crawfordsville r. Barr,

veyed all his interest hy deed, he is no 65 lud. 367 : Chapman r. Callalian, 66

longer a necessary defendant if no personal Mo. 299; Th<j7n])son ;•. Smith, 63 N. V.

judgment is asked ; the suit must be against .301. ^It was lield in National Bank of

the grantee. McCormick v. Lawton, 3 Deposit v. Rogers (1901), 166 N. V. 380,

Xeb. 449, 451. In an action by the vendor 59 N. E. 922, that where a bank brought

in a land contract against the vendee to an action to enforce a lien ujion property

wa ignorant of he other co-owner an had fil d hi n ti of
lien nl - again t the one employing him. 1 It may be tat d
a
gen ral rul
hat in all ac ions o enf r e a lien, the per 11 m
who ' , d er e po se ion the prop r y ubj t beret is h ld is
a nee ary def ndan , or oth rwi e the d er e \ ould virtually
be a nulli 2
280 . * 3 3. Same Subject. con ract fo r the al f land
bein 1 dge or a igned by the end e a collat ral curi y for
th a ment of a debt and the er dit r - h pl dgee or a i 0 n e
- bringin an ac i n to foreclo' tf righ f r clem1 tion, n l to
ell th ecurity and o apply th proceed in I a.yment f l i "n
tl mand, the endor in the contract is h ld not to be a nee ar
pc r def ndant in u h suit. 3 The ame rule mu t apply o all
kind and form of securities and hing in action which are
pledged or a igned for the purpo e of
llateral e urit , uch
a bon
note , certificate of stock, and the like. The obligor
on the bond, the maker of the note, the corporation which · ued
the tock certificate, cannot be a nece ary defendant in an action
to foreclo e and sell.
§ 281. * 384. Same Subject. A mortgage was foreclo ed in a
summary manner prescribed by statute in Iowa, and the premises
-. ; ere conveyed to A ., the mortgagee. He afterward a signed the
mortgage and the note ecured by it to B., and entered into a
written agreement to convey to him the land. B. , ubsequently
brought an ac ion to foreclo e the ame mortgage ag in the
mortgagor, and the subsequent incumbrancer ~ and also mad
a efendant, setting up the former summary proceeding and

foreclose the latter's rights, and to sell his assigned by the pledgor to an assignee for

interf-it in the land for tlie balance of the the benefit of creditors, the assignor, while

jmrcliase- price unpaid, the vendee's wife a proper, i.'i not a neces.sary party.]

must lie made a co-defendant, in North •* \'auglin t>. Cusliing, 23 Ind. 184.

Carolina in order to cut ff her in hoate
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agreement to convey, averring that such proceedings were invalid

and worked no change in the rights of the parties, and also

alleging that there was a mistake in the description of the land

contained in the contract made by A., and praying that such mis-

take might be corrected, that A. might be ordered to convey the

proper premises, and that the title might be quieted, or, if the

former proceedings should be held invalid, that the usual decree

of foreclosure of the mortgage might be rendered and the land

sold thereunder. This action was held by tlie Supreme Court of

Iowa to be properly brought ; there was no improper joinder of

defendants or of causes of action.^

§ 282. * 385. Contribution. It is a general rule of the equitable

procedure that, in an action to enforce an obligation to contribute

and to recover the amounts due from contributors, all the persons

liable to make contribution should be joined as defendants, in

order that their respective amounts may all be adjusted in a

single suit. On the other hand, when several parties are en-

titled to a share from a common source, and the claims have not

been adjusted and made specific and personal, but they all de-
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pend upon the same facts and involve the same questions, all the

claimants should unite in the action, or at least should be brought

before the court as defendants, if they are not joined as plaintiffs.^

§ 283. *386. Actions by Taxpayers. In many States taxpayers

and freeholders are permitted to maintain actions to set aside pro-

ceedings by local authorities, and to restrain the enforcement and

collection of the tax which is the result of such proceedings, on

the ground of their illegality. In such actions not only the

officials themselves whose proceedings are sought to be set aside,

and the administrative officers whose function it is to enforce the

tax, must be made defendants, but also all other persons whose

1 Thatcher v. Ilaun, 12 Iowa, 303. rule is that all the co-sureties must be

This was, in fact, a suit to reform a cou- made defendants, and the personal repre-

tract for the conveyance of land, and to sentatives of any that are dead, and also

com])el a specific; performance as reformed, the principal debtor. Story's Eq. PI.

or, in the alternative, for the foreclosure § 169 a; Ferrer f. Barrett, 4 Jones Eq.

of a mortgage. If the relief was ])roper, 455; Haywood v. Ovey, 6 Mad. 113;

the parties defendant were clearly so. Moore v. Moberly, 7 B. Mon. 299 ; Tres-

2 Carr 1-. Waldron, 44 Mo. 393 ; Story's cott v. Smyth, 1 McCord Ch. 301. See

Eq. ri. § 169 ; Madox r. Jackson, 3 Atk. also McDearman v. McClure, 31 Ark.

406 ; Bland v. Winter, 1 S. & S. 246 ; 559 (between co-tenants) ; Rosenthal v.

Jackson I'. Rawlins, 2 Vera. 195 ; Hart r. Sutton, 31 Ohio St. 406 (between co-

Coffee, 4 Jones Eq. 321. In an action by sureties).

a .surety for contribution, the general

agreement to convey, averring that such proceeding were invali
and w rked no change in the rights of the arties, and al
all ging that there wa a mistake in the d cri1 tion of the land
contain d in th contract made by A., an l praying that u h mi take might be orr cted, that . might b ord red to nv y the
pr per pr mi e , and that th title might be qui ted, r, if the
former proc edings hould be h ld invalid, that th u ual d er e
of for losure of the mortgage might be r ncl r cl and the land
old th reunder. This action was held by the upr m
ourt of
Iowa to be properly brought; there was no improper joinder of
defendants or of causes of action.1
§ 282. * 385. Contribution. It is a general rule of the equitable
procedure that, in an action to enforce an obligation to contribute
and to recover the amounts due from contributors, all the persons
liable to make contribution should be joined as defendant , in
order that their respective amounts may ~11 be adjusted in a
single suit. On the other hand, when several parties are entitled to a share from a common source, and the claims have not
been adjusted and made specific and personal, but they all depend upon the same facts and involve the same questions, all the
claimants should unite in the action, or at least should be brought
before the court as defendants, if they are not joined as plaintiffs. 2
§ 283. *386. Actions by Taxpayers. In many States taxpayers
and freeholders are permitted to maintain actions to set aside proceedings by local authorities, and to restrain the enforcement and
collection of the tax which is the result of such proceedings, on
the ground of their illegality. In such actions not only the
officials themselves whose proceedings are sought to be set a ide,
and the administrative officers whose function it is to enforce the
tax, must be made defendants, but also all other persons whose
J

1 Thatcher v. Haun, 12 Iowa, 303.
This was, in fact, a suit to r ef rm a colltract for the conveyance of la nd , ancl to
compel a speci fi c performance as refo rm ed,
or, in the alternati"e, for the fore lo. ure
of a mortgage. If the relief wa, proper,
the parties defendaut were clearly o.
2 Carr v. ·w aldron, 44 Io. 393;
tory'
Eq . Pl. § 169; Mad ox 1: . Jackson, 3 Atk.
406; Bland v. Wiuter, 1 S. & . 246;
Jackson v. Ra,vlin , 2 Vern. 195 ; Hart v.
Coffee, 4 Jones Eq. 321. In an action by
a surety for contribution, the gelleral

rule is that all the co- m etie· mu·t be
made defendants, and the per ·onal repreentatiYes of ally that are d ad, alld al o
the principal debtor. Story' Eq. Pl.
§ l 69 a; F errer l'. Barrett, 4 Jone Eq.
455; Haywood 1·. Q,·ey, 6 Mad. 113;
Moore i-. .'\Ioherly, i R. l\Ion. 299; Tre. ee
cott v. Smyth, 1 llicCord Ch. 301.
al ·o McDearman u. McClure, 31 Ark.
559 (betweeu co-te nants) ; Hosenthal v.
Sutton , 31 Ohio
t. 406 (between cosureties).
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rights or interests may be adversely affected by a decree granting

the relief demanded by the plaintiifs. For example, in such a suit

brought to set aside the proceedings of certain municipal au-

thorities, and to restrain the levy and collection of a special tax

im^Hised l)v them for the purpose of paying certain illegal judg-

ments held by different judgment creditors, all these judgment

creditors were declared to be necessarily joined as defendants ;

the}' had a common interest among them all, centring in the point

at issue in the cause. ^

§ 284. * 387. Actions to Redeem In an action by a mortgagor

or person holding under him to redeem, all those, in general,

should be made defendants whose interest will be affected by the

decree. If the mortgagee is living, he is, of course, an indis-

pensable defendant ; and if he is dead, his personal representatives,

according to the theory of mortgages which prevails in this

country .2 As a general rule, all persons who are interested in

the mortgage-money or debt secured by the mortgage must be

joined.^ Thus, if the mortgage is held by a trustee, the cestui

que t?-ust should be a co-defendant.'^ If the mortgagee has ab-
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solutely assigned all his interest in the mortgage, he is no longer

a necessary party in the suit to redeem, but the assignee takes his

place : and if there are several successive assignments of such a

character, the last assignee is the only necessary defendant.^ But

1 ([Ander.soa v. Orient Fire Ins. Co. ^ [Wood v. Holland (189.3), 57 Ark.

(1893), 88 la. 579, 55 N. W. 348 ; Wabaska 198, 21 S. W. 223.]

Electric Co. v. City of Wymore (1900), 60 ^ Story's Eq. PI. § 188 ; Palmer v. Earl

Xeb. 199, 82 N. W. 626; McCaim v. City of Carlisle, 1 Sim. & S. 423; Osbourn v.

of Louisville (1901), — Ky. — , 63 S. W. Fallows, 1 Kus. & M. 741 ; McCall v. Yard,

446; Comiiiunweakli v. Scott (1901), 112 1 Stockt. 358; Large v. Van Doreu, 14

Ky. 252, 65 S. W. 596. Tbe St;ite, liuw- N. J. Eq. 208.

ever, is not a proper party plaintiff in an * Story's Eq. PI. §§ 192, 208 ; Drew v.

action a<2;ainst a county auditor to recover Harman, 5 Price, 319 ; but .';ec Swift i*.

money belonging to the county wrongfully State Lumi)er Co., 71 Wis. 476. Where

received by him, where the county com- tiie mortgagee had assigned the mortgage

ri ht or intere ts may be adYer ely ~ff ct d by a decree granting
th r lief lemanded by the plaintiff ·. For example, in uch a uit
brought to set a ide the pro edin 0
f ert in muni ipal auth ritie ~ and to re train he le y and c 11 c ion of a p cial tax
impo d b • h m f r the purpose of payiug cer aiu illegal judgment." held by diff rent judgment creditor , all th e judgment
~'r ditor " were eel r d to be nece arily joined a defendants ·
the./ had a ·ommon intere t among them all, cen ring in he point
at i" ~ ue in h cau e.1
284. * 387. Actions to Redeem . In an action by am rtgagor
0r l er on holding und r him to r deem, all tho , in general,
~hould be made defendants who e inter twill be affected by the
decree. If the mortgagee is living, he is, of cour. e an indi I en able defendant · and if h i dead hi p r onal representative ,
according to the theory of mortgage which prevails in thi
country. 2 A a general rule all per ons who are interested in
he mortgage-money or debt secured by the mortgage mu t be
j ined. 3 Thu , if the mortgage i held by a trustee, the cestui
que trust hould be a co-defendant. 4 If the mortgagee has abolutely a igned all hi intere t in the mortg 0 e, he i no longer
a nece sary party in the suit to redeem, but the a signee take his
pla e · and if there are everal ucces i ve a ignments f n h a
character, the la ta ignee is the only nece sary defendant. 5
ut

missioners refuse to sue ; nor can it be in trust for his family, it was held that, in

made sufh by joining ta.xpayers as re- an action to redeem, the mortgagee, the

lators : State y. Casper (1903), — Ind. — , trustee, and the beneficiaries were all

67 N. K. 185.] Newcomb v. Hortou, 18 necessary defendants. Wetherell v. Col-

Wi«. 566, 570, per Cole J., citing Hrinker- lins, 3 Mad. 255.

hoff V. Brown, 6 Johns. Cii. 139; Fellows ^ Story's Eq. PI. § 189 ; Chaml)ers r.

V. Fellows, 4 Cow. 682; Story's Eq. PI. Goldwin, 9 \'es. 269; Hill i;. Adams, 2

§§ 285 el seq. See also Wilson v. Mineral Atk. 39 ; Whitney r. McKinney, 7 Johns.

Point, 39 Wis. 160; Watkins v. Mihvau- Ch. 144; Williams v. Smith, 49 Me. 564;

kee, 52 id. 98 ; Bettinger r. Bell, 65 Ind. Beals v Col)b, 51 Me. 348; Bryant r.

445 ; Hayes v. Hill, 1 7 Kans. 360 ; (Jraliam Erskine, 55 Me. 153, 158. See also Swift

r. Minneapolis, 40 Minn. 436. c. State Lumber Co., 71 Wis. 476.

1 [Andero n v . Orient Fire Ins. Co.
(l 93),
Ia. 5i9, 55 r. W. 34 ; Waba ka
Electri Co. i•. City of Wymore(J900}, 60
.i..Teb 199, 2 .1. • W. 626; McCann v. City
of L oui ville (1901), - Ky.-, 63 . W .
446; OtnlllOUWCll l th v. ,' cott (1901), 112
Ky. 252, 65 ·. ·w. 596. The Stnte, however, i. not a proper party plaintiff in an
action again t a county auditor to recoYer
money belonging to the county wro11gfully
receivNl by him, where the coun y commi .. ·ioner refu e to ue ; nor can it lie
mall e .· u ·h by j oin ing taxpayer~ a· r elator : , tate v. a. per (1903), - Iud . - ,
67 • ' E. l 5.]
ewcom b t'. II or on, 1
Wi . 566, 570, per ,ole J., citing Bl'ink rhuff 1 Brown, 6 .John . h. 1.39; Fell w
1·. Fellow. , 4
,ow. 6 2 ; , tory' Eq. Pl.
.' • :2 5 el sl'q. .' e al ·o \ViJ.·on t:. Min eral
p,,int, :3 Wi . 160; ' atkin r. lil waukee, !>2 id. 9 ; B tti ng r i•. B ll, 5 Incl.
-1 5 · !Jay 1•. Hill , 17 Kan . . 360; ' raltam
1· • fi1111eapoli ·, 40 ~lino. 436.

2 [Woocl v. Holland (1 93}, 57 Ark.
19 '2l . w. 223.J
s tory' Eq . 1. § l ; Palmer v. Earl
of arli le, I im. & . 423 · 0 bourn ,,,.
Fallow , l Ru . . & L 741; Mc all v. Yard,
l
tock . 35 ; Large v. an Dor n, 14
N. J . Eq. 20 .
4 'tory" Eq. 1. § 192, 20 ; Drew v.
Harman, 5 Price, 319 ; but . e wift v.
tate Lumber u., 71 Wi . 4i6. Where
he morto-ageP- had a. igned th m rtgao-e
in tru t for his family, it wa Ii ld that in
an action to r deem, the mortgagee, the
tru:tee, ancl th
ben fi ·iari
w r
all
n ce · ary defendant . W eth r 11 u. oll iu , 3 M d. 255.
s tory' Eq. Pl. § 1 9 ; bamber i 1 •
oluwin, 9 Y . . 269; Hill v.
darn , 2
Atk. 39; Whi t n y 1. i\f Kimi y, 7 J hns.
h. 144; William t•. , mith 49 1 . 564;
R als
bh, 51 I . 34 ; Bryant 1•.
Er kin , flS M . 153 , lfl
e also wift
v. tat Lumber o., 71 Wi .. 476.

ONE SUING ON BEHALF OF OTHERS. 6 id

wliere the mortgagee has made only a partial assignment, and

retains any interest in the mortgage or in the debt secured by it,

he must be joined with the assignee as a co-defendant.' When

the suit is brought, not by the mortgagor, but by a subsequent

mortgagee or other incumbrancer, to redeem from a prior mort-

gage, all the owners of the equity of redemption are necessary

co-defendants with the holder of such prior mortgage.^ If the

mortgagor conveys his entire estate in the land, he need not be

made a party in an action to redeem by his grantee."* Persons

having partial interests in the equity of redemption, or subsequent

liens or incumbrances upon it or upon a portion of it, may

redeem ; but in such case they must bring in all other parties

who are interested in the land ; such other persons are necessary

parties to the action either as plaintiffs or defendants, in order

that all the rights and claims may be determined in one decree.*

SECTION SEVENTH.

WHEN ONE PERSON MAY SUE OR BE SUED ON BEHALF OF ALL

THE PERSONS INTERESTED.

§ 285. * 388. Statutory Provision. In immediate connection
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with the general topics treated in the preceding two sections,

there are certain special subjects which, though subordinate, are

sufficiently important to require a separate notice, and they will

therefore be considered in the present and the following two

sections.^ The first of these involves an answer to the questions,

1 Story's Eq. PI. § 191; Hobart v. ton v. Lothrop, 46 Me. 297; Bailey v.

Abbott, 2 P. Wms. 643. Myrick, 36 Me. 50; [Crais; v. Miller

2 Story's Eq. PI. §§ 186, 191 ; Palk v. (1893), 41 S. C. 37, 19 S. e'. 192, citiug

Cliuton, 12 Ves. 48; Lord Cholmondeley the text.]

V. Lord Clinton, 2 Jac. & W. 134; Smith ■* Story's Eq. PI. §§ IB."), 186; Henley

V. Moore, 49 Ark. 100 (chattel mortgage) ; v. Stone, 3 Beav. 3.5.5 ; Chappell ;;. Pee.-*,

Hunt V. Rooney, 77 Wis. 258. As to the 1 De G., M. & G. 393; Fell v. Brown, 2

necessary defendants in an action for re- Bro. C. C. 278 ; Palk v. Lord Clinton, 12

demption by a subsequent incumbrancer Ves. 58, 59 ; Farmer v. Curtis, 2 Sim.

when the prior mortgage has been fore- 466 ; |^Dunn r. Dewey (1898), 75 Minn.

closed without making him a party, see 153, 77 N. W. 793.]

Anson v. Anson, 20 Iowa, 55 ; Knowles r. ^ Qrhe close connection of the statu-

Rablin, 20 Iowa, 101 ; Street v. Beal, 16 tory provision under discussion with the

Iowa, 68; Burnap i'. Cook, 16 Iowa, 149; provision requiring the joinder of parties

Winslow V. Clark, 47 N. Y. 261, 263; when united in interest, wlien the New

Dias v. Merle, 4 Paige, 259 ; Bloomer v. York Code was adopted, is shown by tlu-

Sturges, 58 N. Y. 168. frfllowing quotation from Tobin v. Port-

3 Williams v. Smith, 49 Me. 564 ; Hil- land Mills Co. (1902), 41 Ore. 269, 68 Pac.
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When may one person sue as the representative of others who,

although not named, are regarded as virtual co-plaintiffs in the

action? and, When may one person in like manner be sued as

tlie representative of others who are regarded as co-defendants?

The statutory provision permitting this method of bringing the

parties before the court is as follows: "When the question is

one of a common or general interest of many persons, or when

the parties are very numerous and it may be impracticable to

bring them all before the court, one or more may sue or defend

for the benefit of the whole." ^

§286.

589.

Author's Analysis of Language of Statute. Two

Distinct Cases. Essential Elements of each Case. Following the

\Vl n may one p r on ue a the re re entati e f oth r wbo,
alth u 5 h n t n, med, are r gar i a irtual co-plain tiff in the
n ? an l \Vhen may one p r on in lik mann r b u d a
a
ard i a ' c -cl f n<l n ?
ntati' e of othe wh
m th d f brin 0 in 0 the
ry pr vi i n
\Vh n the qu ti n i
th
ourt
fman · 1 r ·on, rwhn
and
th
m
lJ imr racticabl t
tut, on r m r ma ue or cl fend
whol . 1

course which has generally been adopted thus far, I shall first

of Language of Statute.

examine this provision of the codes by an independent analysis

of its language, and shall then state the interpretation which

has been put upon it by the courts. It is very evident that it
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describes two distinct and separate cases in which a plaintiff or

defendant may be clothed with the representative character de-

743 : " In McKenzie v. L'Amoureux, 1 1

Barb, 516, Mr. Justice Harris, comment-

iug upon the exceptions spoken of by

Judge Story, and explaining the adoption

of the section of tlie code adverted to,

says : ' So far was the legislature from in-

Two

F ollowin0 the
ur e whi h ha g nerally b en al pt d thu far, I lrn,ll fir t
ind pendent anal · i
xamine thi provi ion of the code
of it langua0 e, and shall th q. tate h inter r tation which
ha lJ n put upon it by the court . It i
r e id nt that it
d cribe two di tinct and s parate
in which a plaintiff or
d fendant may be clothed with the i· pre entative character deDistinct Cases.

Essential Elements of each Case.

tending any change in the rule on this

subject, that, in making the great changes

contemplated by the adoption of the code,

it was careful to preserve this convenient

practice of the Court of Chancery. The

code commissioners had reported a section,

copied substantially from one of the rules

of tiie Supreme Conrt of the United States,

providing that those wiio are united in

iiit<;rest must be joined as plaintiffs or de-

fendants, except that, if the consent of

any one wlio should have been joined as

jilaintiff cannot be obtained, he may be

made a defendant, the reason thereof

being stated in the complaint. This, too,

was the jiractice in tiie Court of Chancery.

The legislature adopted the provision

tlms reported, but added to tlie section as

follows : And when the question is one of

common or general^interest of many per-

sons ; or wlien tiie parties are very numer-

ous and it may be impracticable to bring

tliem all before the court, one or more

mav sue or defend for the benefit of tlie

whole: Code, § 119. This was also in

acordance with the tiien existing practice

of tiie courts of equity. The legislature

seems to have apprehended that by adopt-

ing the rule reported by the commissioners

it might be understood to have rejected

the kindred rules embraced in the latter

clause of the section. To prevent this

misapprehension the latter clause was

added, thus retaining in the new practice

the same rules by which to determine

whether the proper parties were before

the court which then prevailed in the

Court of Chancery.' "J

1 New York, § 119 (448); California,

§ .382 ; Kansas, § .38 ; Iowa, § 2.549 ; Ken-

tucky, §37 ; South Carolina, § 142 ; Ore-

gon, §381 ; Nevada, § 14 ; Nebraska, § 43 ;

74-3 : ' In 1\1 Kenzie v. L' Amourenx, 11
Barb, 516, Mr. Ju tice Harri , commenting upon the ex ception spoken of by
Judge 'tory , and expla ining the adoption
of the ecti n of th e code adverted to,
far wa the legi lature from inay : '
t e 11 d in any ·ba u e in the rul e on this
·ubject, that, in ma kin g th e great change
out m pla ted by the a d ption of t he corl e,
it w car fu l t pre er ve t h i con ve11i ent
practic of t he ourt of hancery. The
cude com mi ioner had r por ted a ectiou,
· pied ub tantially from on e of th e rule
of the u pr m
ourtof t he Tnited 'tate ,
providing that th ·e w ho are uui t d in
iutn :<t mu t b join d a. pl int iff or deicodaut ·, xc pt t hat, if th
on nt o f
au_,. one who ho uld h aY b en joiu d a
plaintiff c:auuot be btaiu cl, he may b e
made , def lll!ant, th r a on t h r of
Ji,.iu" . tat ·<l iu th ·um plaint. T hi too,
wa · tlw pra ·tit in th 'ourt of han · r~· .
Tb<' l<'gi latu r adopt •rl th
tl111 rc>purt •rl, but add <l t t.he ec:tiu11 a
follow·: Aurl wh1·11 the qn tion i_ 011 of
r11111111(111 or "<'11eral.. i11t ·r · t of mnny JI ·r011 ; •ir wh •11 the partic are very 1n11nrr1111 all!! it 111. y L • impra •t.icabl to liri n rr
th •111 all L ·forr~ th co urt, one or n1 or e
111· y ue or d ·f nd fo r the l> uefi t of t.h

wh J : Code, § 119. Thi wa al o in
acordan e with the then exi ting practi e
of the ourt of equity. The legi lature
eem to have appr hended that by adopting th rul rep rted by the com mi ion er
it might be und r tood to haYe rejected
the kindred rule embraced in th e latte r
of th
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scribed, and may thus stand in the pkice of others whose rights

and interests are determined together with his own.^ These two

cases depend upon distinct and separate facts and circumstances,

and are as follows : (1) Tliere must be a " question of common or

general interest" to wiavi^ persons involved in the action. The

two essential elements of this case are, the question of common

or general interest to be determined, and the many persons who

have this common or general interest in the matter at issue.

The " many persons " in this case is opposed to the very numerous

parties in the other, and is doubtless satisfied by a number actu-

ally less. It is certainly not necessary, in order to fulfil its

requirements, that there should be any impractleahility of bring-

ing all the persons having the common or general interest before

the court. (2) The second case depends entirely ujDon the

number of the persons who should, according to the ordinary

rule, be made plaintiffs or defendants. The single essential

element is the impracticability of bringing all the parties before

the court on account of their great number. The language does

not in terms require an}^ question of common or general interest
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to this great number, but it is difficult to conceive of an action

in Avhich a very large number of persons should be capable of

joining as plaintiffs — so large that it would be impracticable to

bring them all actually before the court — unless the question to

be determined was one of common or general interest to them

all.^ It inevitably follows, therefore, from the customary nature

1 [^See Hawardeni'. The Youghiogheuy sons." See also Tobiu v. Portland Mills

& Lehigh Coal Co. (1901), 111 Wis. 545, Co. (1902), 41 Ore. 2G9, 68 Pac. 743, quot-

87 N. VV. 474, in which the court said : " It ing the text. J

is to be noted that there are two cases - [^The language of tlie courts, respec-

named in the statutes referred to in which tively, in the cases of Tobin v. Portland

one may sue for all, viz. : (1) When the Mills Co. (1902), 41 Ore. 2G9, 68 Pac. 743,

question is one of common or general in- and George v. Benjamin (1898), 100 Wis.

terest of many persons, and (2) when the 622, 76 N. W. 619, suggests, but does not

parties are very numerous, and it is im- settle, the question, whether the statutory

practicable to bring them all before the provision can be invoked when the interest

court. The latter class was under consid- is joint. In tlie former case the court, iu

scribed, and may thus stand in th place of th r whose right
and int r ts are d termin d t g th r with hi own. 1 The e two
ca~
<l p ml upon di tinct and pa.rat fa t an ircumstance:,
arn.l ar
follow : (1) There mu t L a "q u 'ti n of common or
g n ral int r t ' t many p r n involY <l in th a ·tion. Th
two
ntial elem nts of thi · ca.'e a.re, the qu i:iLi n of common
or gen ntl int re t to Le <letcrmin cl, and the many per ons who
have this common or gen ral int re t in the ma.t.ter at i ue.
The "many I rsons" in thi cas i opposed to tl ver!J numerou
parties in the other, and is douLtless sati fied Ly a numLer actually les ·. It is certainly n t nece ary, in order to fulfil it
requirement , that there should be any impracticability of bringing: all the persons having the common or general interest Lefore
th~ court.
(2) The second case depends entirely upon the
number of the persons who should, according to the ordinary
rule, be made plaintiffs or defendants. The single essential
element is the imprac6cability of bringing all the parties before
the court on account of their great number. The language does
not in terms require any question of common or general interest
to this great number, but it is difficult to conceive of an action
in which a very large number of persons should be capable of
joining as plaintiffs - so large that it would be impracticable to
bring them all actually before the court - unless the question to
be determined was one of common or general interest to them
all. 2 It inevitably follows, therefore, from the customary nature
L

eration in the cases of George v. Benjamin, referring to the latter clause of the section,

100 "Wis. 622, and Hodges v. Nalty. 104 said: It " in effect enacts tlie third excep-

Wis. 464; hence what is said in those tion to th« rule in equity, in respect to the

ca.ses as to the number of persons which necessity of making all persons immedi-

will be deemed ' very numerous,' is inap- ately interested in the subject-matter

plicable here, because this ca.se comes parties, omitting therefrom, however, the

under the first sul)division, wliich onlv words, ' and although they have, or may

requires the presence of a question of have, separate, distinct interests.' This

common or general interest of many per- omission cannot mean tliat tlie legislative

sons." ~ ee also Tobin v. Portland ~I ill .
Co. (1902), 41 Ore. 269, 68 Pac. 743, quot87 :N. W. 474, in which the court saitl: "It ing the text.]
:i [The lauguage of the courts, r e pecis to be noted that there are two case
named in the tatutes referred to in which tiYely, in the cases of Toi.Jin v. Portland
one may sue for all, viz. : ( 1) When the Mills Co. (1902), 41 Orn. 269, 6 Pac. 743,
question is one of common or general in- and George v. J3 cnjami11 (1 9 ), 100 Wis.
terest 0£ many per ous, and (2) wh eu the 622, 76 N. \V. 619, uggests, but does not
partie are very numerous, and it is im- settle, the que, tion, w hcther the statutory
practicable to bring them all before the provi ion can he inYok d wh en the interest
co nrt. The latter clas. was und er consid- i joint. In th e former case th e court, iu
eration in the ca. e of George u. Benjamin, referring to the latter tlaus · of the section,
100 \"Vi . 622, and Hodges v. Nillty. 104 said: It " iu effect enacts the third excep' 'Vis. 464 ; hence what is said in those tion to the rule in equity, in rc>spect to th e
cflses :is to the numhPr of per ons which nece ity of makiu~ all person immediwill he deemed 'very numerous,' is inap- atel.v intere tecl in the ubject-matter
plicable here, because thi case comes pnrti e , omitting therefrom, however, the
under the fir t . uhclivi ion, which onlv words, 'and although they have, or may
requi res the presence of a cinestion of have, separate, rli. tinct in tereRts.' Thi.
common or general in tere t of many per- omi sion cannot m au that th e lc>gi lative
1 [See Hawarden v. The Yough1ogheny
& Lehigh Coal Co. (1901), 111 Wis. 545,

CI\"IL

RE~IEDIE ... .

3S2 CIVIL REMEDIES.

of litigations, that these two cases described by the statute are in

practice constantly united ; they constantly run into each other.

In fact, it seldom if ever happens that a suit arises which falls

strictly within the terms of the second case, and not within those

of the first.^

§ 287. * 390. Necessary Allegations herein. Wlienever these

provisions are invoked, in order that a plaintiff may he entitled

to sue or a defendant to be sued in the representative character

described, the facts showing that the requirements of either case

have been complied with must not only exist, but must be alleged

bv the plaintiff as the very ground and reason for adopting the

peculiar form of action permitted by the statute. The complaint

or petition must show either that many persons have a common

or general interest in the questions involved in the action, or else

that the number of persons who would be joined as plaintiffs or

defendants, if the ordinary rule was applied, is so very great

that it is impracticable to make them all victual parties. Unless

the pleading contains these averments, the action must be re-

garded as though brought by the single plaintiff or against the
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single defendant named. '-^ It should be carefullv observed that

.nssemlily intended thereby to limit the own name if he was before the court."

tliiril exception to cases in vvliicli the very The court tiieu proceeds to show that, iu

numerous parties mentioned had a joint accordance with the common law rules

and indivisible interest in the subject- as stated by Dicey and Chitty, " the fact

matter of the suit, for to give the statute that all the parties to the contract are

such construction would render tlie statute united in interest affords a suflScieut rea-

superfluous, as the preceding clause of the son for holding that they are necessary

section extends the second exception to parties to the action." And finally con-

that very class of parties, but limits it to a eludes the discussion of tiiis question by

less number." It seems to be assumed by saying : " So in whatever view we consider

f litigation, that h "e bYo a e

de crib cl by h tatut ar i1
pr. tice con ( ntly unit 1· th · con tan ly run into c h th r.
In fact i 'ek1om if Y r hap
tba a ui ari
which fall·
tri ·tly within th t rm f th
nd not ithin th e
f th fir t. 1
' 287. '* 9 . Necessary Allegations herein.
\' hen ver th
provi i n ar inv k cl, in orcl r that a plaintiff ma b
nti tl cl
t
u or a cl f nc1ant to be ued in the repre "en ati
hamct r
t1 cribed the fac
bowing hat the requir ment of eith r ca
have b n mplied ' i h mu t not only xi t but mu t b alleg cl
1J,· th plaintiff a th Y ry r un l an 1 re n for a<lopting the
I e uliar form of action permitt cl by he a ute . Th complaint
or I etition mu t bow ither that man · per on l av a common
r general intere t in h qu tions involY cl in th action, 01 e_l
that h numb r of person who would be join cl a plaintiff r
rdinary rule "·a ' applied, i
;;ery gr < t
l fendant", if th
that it i impra icabl t make them all actual parti
lJnle
th pl ading contain. th e averments, the action mu t b regarded a though brought by the single plaintiff or again t th
singl defendant named .2 It hould be carefully ob erY 1 that

tiie court, in this language, that tlie statute the c:ise we are unable to see how the

applies to the case of a joint and indivis- plaintiff can maintain the action alone."

ible interest in the subject-matter <>f the Bearing in mind the facts of tlie two cases,

suit. Turning to the language of the it is difficult to reconcile tlie language of

court in George v. Benjamin, we find it the courts. J

reads as follows : " It requires but a mere i QSee Ilawarden r. The Youghiogheny

inspection of the complaint to show that & Lehigh Coal Co., .fMyjcfl, for a case where

the claim that tlie question involved in this the two do not "run into each other."

action is ' one of a common or general in- Hodges v. Nalty (1899), 104 Wis. 464, 80

tcrest to many jiersous ' is not justified by N. \V. 726.]

the L'lcts alleged. It shows positively and ■^ j^Castle c Madi.son (1902), 113 Wis.

definitely that <tll are united in interest. 346, 89 N. W. 156. In this ca.se the

... It seems too ])lain for argument that court said : " It is argued that it is im-

the complaint fails to state any fact which practicaide to bring iu all the riparian

shows that the parties to this contract have owners, au<l that all interests are repre-

a common or general interest which would seuted in the suit as it is This contention

enable each to maintain an action in his cannot be sustained. It is not shown that

as. embly intended thereby to limit the
third exception to ca e in which the Y ry
iiumerou · partie mentioned had a joint
a11cl intlivi ible int re·t in the ubje tmatter of the uit, for to give the tatute
uch cou truction would render the tatute
uperfluuu a the preceding clan e of the
ection xtend the econcl exc ption to
that very clas of partie , but limit. it to a
1 ~· number." I t em t be a urned by
the co urt, in thi language, that the statute
applie to the ca e f a j int anti indi vi·.
ible iotere t in the ubj ct-matt r of the
·nit. Turning to the lauguacre of the
court in
eor<re v. Benjamin, w fi.ntl it
read: a follow. : "It rcquir lrnt a m re
iu ·pPction of the complaint tu how that
he daim that the qu tion iurnh·erl in thi
action i 'one of a common or g ueral inr t tu many per nu ' i nut ju:tifi d li.v
he fa •t : all<'ge11. It ·how po itiY •ly and
delinit<'ly that 11/l are u11ited in int re t .
. . . It . P<'m · too plain fur argninPT1t that
tlu~ <'omplaint fail to .-t t any faet which
. how th lt the parti ,. to thi. contraC't ha\'e
a Mmrnon or gc·ucral intt?rc t whi1·h wonl<l
.nablc each to mai11tai11 an acti1m in hi

own name if he wa before the court."
Th court then proceed to how that, in
a cco rdance with the common law rule
a. ·tat d by Dicey and hitty, "the fact
that all the partie to the contract are
united in i11tere ·t afford a uffici at r aou for holding that th y ar uece,·ar!·
partie to th action." Aud finally on lutle the di · u ~ ion of thi que tion by
:aying : " o in whate,·er Yi " . we ou;;itler
the ·rue we are uuable to ee how he
plain ti ff an 111aintain the action alone."
Bearing in mint! the fact of the two ca. e.,
it i tliffi ult to r cou ile th lan guage of
th <.:OUl't'.]
1 [ .'
H award n v. Th Y oughi gh ny
& Lehigh oal
., upra, fo r a ca wh re
the tw do not ''run iuto ach oth r."
Hodo- : t'. Xalty ( 1 99), 104 Wi . 464, o
W, 726 J
2 [
n~tle1·. ::\fadi.on ( 19 2),113 W i..;.
346, fl ...
156. In thi ca;;e the
con rt aid : "It i ar u d that it i. i mpracticalil to bring in all th riparian
owner,;, all!l that all inter . t
cule1l i11 tlw r:nit as it i: Thi contention
<.:au11ut lie: sn taiuc:J. It i · not ·hown tl1at
... T.

T.
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this provision does not create any new rights of action, nor

enhirge any of those now existing. The suit cannot be sustained

by one as the representative of the many others who really sue

in his name, unless it could have been maintained if all these

many others had been regularly joined as co-plaintiffs, or unless

it could liave been maintained by each of them suing separately

and for himself. The statutory provision is simply a matter of

convenience, a rule of form, a means of enabling many persons

to have their rights determined without their actual appearance

in court as litigant parties.

§ 288. * 391. Judicial Interpretation of Statute. Order Pursued

in Examination of Decided Cases. Passing to the judicial interpre-

tation of the clause, I shall ascertain, from an examination of

the decided cases, (1) when one person may sue or be sued in a

representative capacity ; and (2) the purpose and object of such

form of action, and especially its effects upon the rights and

duties of the other persons who are represented in and by the

actual party. ^ The conclusions reached in the preceding para-

graphs as to the meaning of the provision, and the two distinct
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cases mentioned in it, are fully sustained by the authorities.

The construction of this section of the codes has been established

by the courts, and the rule is settled as already stated, that,

where the question to be decided is one of " common or general

interest " to a number of persons, the action may be brought by

or against one or all the others, even though the parties are not

so numerous that it would be impracticable to join them all as

actual plaintiffs or defendants ; but, on the other hand, when the

parties are so very numerous that it is impracticable to bring

them all into court, one may sue or be sued for all the others,

it is impracticable to bring all the owners those thus represented, the court may so

into the suit. We shall not assume that determine when the merits of the answer

it is because they are numerous. Furtlier, in abatement are considered." The num-

the owners who have been let in are not ber of owners referred to was 2.56. See

here in a representative capacity. The Tobiu i-. Portland Mills Co. (1902), 41 Ore.

order making them parties allows them in 269, 68 Pac. 74.3. ]

on their own behalf alone, and not on be- ^ [^In McCann r. City of Louisville

half of any other riparian owner. If it be (1901), — Ky. — , 63 S. W. 446, the court

shown that there is difficulty in making .«aid : " The purpose of the section is to

the numerous owners defendants, " and avoid a multiplicity of suits, and settle the

the court believes that some may be pro- rights of all parties having a common or

ceeded against as representatives of a class general interest in one suit." See, how-

under the statute, so that the litigation as ever. Northwestern Loan Co. v. Muggli

thi prov1s10n does not er ate any new right· of action, nor
nlarg any f tho e now e 'i ·ting. The suit ·annot be . ustain <.l
by on a the representativ of the many other· who r ally ue
in hjs n( me, unle s it coulc.l have been maintain cl if all th se
many oth r h::t.d been r gularly joined as co-plaintiffs, or unl ss
it o ild have been maintain d by ach of them uing ..;eparat ly
and f i· him elf. The statutory provision is simply a matter of
convenience, a rule of form, a means of enabling many per ons
to have their rights determined without their actual appearance
in court as litigant parties.
§ 288. * 391. Judicial Interpretation of Statute. Order Pursu.ed
in Examination of Decided Cases . P assing to the judicial interpretation of the clause, I shall ascertain, from an examination of
the decided cases, (1) when one person may sue or be sued in a
representative capacity; and (2) the purpose and object of such
form of action, and especially its effects upon the rights and
duties of the other persons who are representecl in and by the
actual party. 1 The conclusions reHched in the preceding paragraphs as to the meaning of the provision, and the two distinct
cases mentioned in it, are fully sustained by the authorities.
The construction of this section of the codes has been e tablishecl
by the courts, and the rule is settled as already stated, that,
where the question to be decided is one of "common or general
interest" to a number of persons, the action may be brought by
or against one or all the others, even though the parties are not
so numerous that it would be impracticable to join them all a
actual plaintiffs or defendants; but, on the other hand, when the
parties are so very numerous that it is impracticable to brin g
them all into court, one may sue or be sued for all the others,

carried on will end the controversy as to (1895), 8 S. D. 160, 65 N. W. 442.]

it is impracticable to bring all the owners
into the suit. We shall not assume that
it is because they are numerous. Further,
the owners who have been let in are not
here in a representative capacity. The
or der makin g them parties allows them in
on their own behalf alone, and not on behalf of any other riparian owner. If it be
shown that there is difficulty in making
the numerous owners defeudants, "and
the court believes that some may be proceeded against as representatiYes of a class
under the statute, so that the litigation as
carried on will end the controver y as to

those thus represented, the C'ourt may o
determine when the merits of the an wer
in abatement are considered." The number of owners referred to was 256. See
T obin v. Portland Mills Co. ( 1902), 41 Ore.
269 , 68 Pac. 74-:3.J
1 [In l\1cCann v. City of LouisYille
(1901), - Ky. - , 63 S. ·w . 446, the court
said : "The purpose of the ection i to
avoid a multiplicity of uit , and settle the
rights of all pal'tie. having a common or
general intere ' t in one i:mit." See, howernr, Northwestern Loan Co. v. :M:uggli
(1895), 8 S. D. 160, 65 N. W. 442.]
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ve n

even though they have no common or general interest in the

questions at issue ; ^ and the necessary facts to bring the case

within one or the other of these conditions must be averred. ^

^ 289. * 392. Statute re-enacts Equity Rule. Must be some

qu
'l

a

hin

ommon or g neral intere t in th
1 D
ary fa t to bring the as
f th e on di ti on mu b a rr d. 2
re -enacts

Connection between Parties Represented in both Cases. Test. This

E q uity Rule.

M u st

be some

.section of the codes is a re-enactment of a rule ^vllich had pre-

vailed in equity, and is to receive a construction which will make

it identical with the pre-existing doctrine.^ Although the case

1 ^IcKenzie v. L'Amourcux, 11 Barb.

516. See also Towner v. Tooley, 38 Barb.

598, 607.

Thi.
e tion £ th
1 ' i a r - nactm nt of a rul which la l Ir Yniled in gui y an l i t r iv a n tru tion wbi h will mak
i
i lenti al with th pr - x1 ing 1 ctrin . 3
1th ugh the a.
Connection between Part ies R epresente d i n both Cas e .

T e st.

2 Bardstown & L. R. Co. i: IMetcalf,

4 Mete. (Ky.) 199, 204.

3 [[George v. Beujainin (1898), 100

Wis. 622, 76 N. W. 619. In thi.s case

thirty-one persons by -written agreement

formed a syndicate to purchase, manage,

and sell a tract of land, and each agreed
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to contribnte a certain sum at once, and

to ]jay from time to time such sums as

should be needed for payments. One of

the number was made trustee, and a trust

in favor of each was declared to the extent

of a oue-thirty-first interest in the land.

The suit was brouglit by the trustee in

belialf of liimself and associates against

one of the parties to said agreement to

recover S4,900, claimed to be due on the

agreement. Plaiutiif, to su})port his right

to bring the action in his own name alone,

relied upon the jjrovisions of tlie statute

under discussion in the text. The court

said : " He seeks to sustain his riglit to

maintain this action on the two grounds

mentioned in the statute, — that the ()ue.s-

tion involved is one of common and gen-

eral interest of many persons, and that

nzie r. L'Am our ux, 11 Barb.
516.
e al - Towuer t. Tooley, 3 Barb.
5 '607.
2 Bard town & L. R.
o. i:. l\Ietcalf,
4 i\Ietc. (K .) 199, 204.
3 [G orge v. Benjam in (1 9 ), 100
Wi . 622, 76 N. W. 619. In thi ca e
thirty-one per on by written ao-reement
formed a yndicate to purcha e, manag ,
and ell a tract of land, and ach agr d
ontribute a certain . nm at on e, and
t
to pa~· from time t tim
uch
houl<l be needed for pa~' m eut .
the number wa made tru tee, and a tru t
in fayor of each wa declar d to the xt ut
of a one-th irty-fir t int r e t in tlte land .
The uit wa br ught by the trn tee in
b half of him elf and a >'Ociate- again t
one of the partie to aid agr ment to
r ecoYer .J.,900, claim d to be lue 0 11 the
agree ment. l)laintiff, to. upport hi right
to bring the action in hi. own nam alone,
reli u upon the proYision of the tatute
under di u. ion in the text. Th e urt

would be impra ·ticahle Lo bring th m all
b for the · urt . . . . h r quire lint a
mere in ·pectio11 f th om plaint to. how
that th daim that the qn stion involv d
in thi action i 'oue of ommon r genral intere t to many per ou 'i not ju ti fi <l by the fa ·t all ged.
u the contrary,
the complaint how that the que · tiou involv d ari e
ut f coutra t, per oual to
ach one of the ub criber to it. It
. how po itively and d finitely that all
are united in intere t. Each ub rib r
tp the ontra t agrees with every other
ub criber that he will 'pay uch um r
um a • hall be needed for future pay·
meut ou aid property, a th
am are
demanded an I required by th parti in
intere t herein.' . . . It would eem to
the complai11t
bows that
ntra t hav a mmou
t whi h w uld nahle
owu

the parties are very nnmerons, and it is

impracticable to bi'ing them all before the

court. As stated in Day v. Buckingham,

87 Wis. 215, and repeated in Frederick r.

Douglas Co., 96 Wis. 411, this statute has

been construed as merely re-enacting the

rules which j)revailed in equity, and which

otherwi.se might have been held to be

abolished by the code. So, also, it has

been lield that when the question is one

of common or general interest, the action

may be brought by one or more for the

benefit of all who have such common or

general interest, without siiowing that the

parties are even numerous, or that it

would be im])racti cable to bring them all

before the court. ... It re(iuires hut a

mere inspection of the complaint to show

that tiie claim that the question involved

r

g 11c-ral int •r

in this action is ' one of common or gen-

eral interest to many persons ' is not justi-

fied by the facts alleged. On the contrary,

the complaint shows that the <|uestion in-

volved firises out of contract, personal to

each one of the subscribers to it. It

shows positively and definitely that all

are united in interest. Each subscriber

to the contract agrees with every other

subscriber that he will ' pay such sum or

sums as shall be needed for future pay-

ments on said i)roperty, as the same are

par ie. arc;

without h0wing that the
v ·n uum runs, 01· that it

:t,

. E i35.
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secondly mentioned omits the element of a " common or general

interest," and speaks only of the very great number as the sole

ground for permitting one to sue or to be sued for all the others,

yet even in this case there must be some connection between the

parties who are to be represented, according to the familiar prin-

ciples of equity procedure. The right which the suit is brought

to assert must in some manner or degree belong to all who are

represented by the actual plaintiff; and all the persons who are

represented by the actual defendant must have some interest

adverse to the demand for relief set up by the action. The par-

ties thus represented by the plaintiff or defendant may not be in

privity with each other, but there must be some bond of connec-

tion which unites them all with the questions at issue in the

action. The test would be to suppose an action in which all the

numerous persons were actually made plaintiffs or defendants,

and if it could be maintained in that form, then one might sue

or be sued on behalf of the others ; but if such an actual joinder

would be improper, then the suit by or against one as a represen-

tative would be improper, notwithstanding the permission con-
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tained in this section of the statute.^

§ 290. * 398. Applicable both to Legal and Equitable Actions.

Number of Parties in Second Case. The provision applies both to

legal and to equitable actions, since no restriction or limitation

is contained in its language ; but when the second case is relied

upon, the parties must be so numerous that it is really impracti-

cable to make them all actual plaintiffs or defendants ; and it has

see Commonwealth v. Scott (1901), 112 Ky. Vesey, 444 ; 1 Turner & Euss. 297 ; 2 Sim.

252, 6.5 S. W. 596, where the court, after 369 ; 1 Dan. Ch. PI. pp. 2-35, 237 ; Story'.s

a review of the eiuiry practice, says: Eq. PI. §§ 99-103 ; and legatees or next of

"Section 25 of Civil Code of Practice of kin, 1 Dan. Ch. PI. p. 238; Story's Eq.

this State, which is substantially a re- PI. §§ 104-106; Brown r. Ricketts, 3 Johns,

enactment of section 37 of the former Ch. 553 ; Fish r. Howland, 1 Paige, 20,

Code, recognizes and codifies this equita- 23 ; Hallett v. Ilallett, 2 Paige, 18-20, 21.

hie practice. It is this: 'If the question For further illustrations in ca.'^es of volun-

involve a common or general interest of tary associations and the like, see Story's

many persons, or if the parties be numer- Eq. PI. §§ 107-115 6; 1 Dan. Ch. PI.

ous and it is impracticable to bring all of pp. 238, 239. The same principle applies,

them before the court within a reasonable under similar circum.^tances, to defend-

s ondly mentioned omits the element of a ' common or geu ral
int re t, ' and speak only of th v ry gr at num er as th ole
ground for permitting one to ue or to b ued for all the other ,
y t ven in this ca e th re mu t b some onnection 1J tw n the
partie who are w be repres nt d, ac ordin · to the familiar rinciple of equity procedure. The right which th uit i brought
to a ert mu t in some manner or d gree belong to all who are
repr sented by the actual plaintiff; and all the p r ons who are
repr sented by the actual defendant must have ome int rest
adi; er e to the demand for relief set up by the action. The parti s thus represented by the plaintiff or defendant may not be in
privity with each other, but there must be some bond of connection which unites them all with the questions at issue in the
action. The test would be to suppo~e an action in which all the
numerous per ons were actually made plaintiffs or defendant ,
and if it could be maintained in that form, then one might sue
or be sued on behalf of the other ; but if such an actual joinder
would be improper, then the suit by or against one as a representative would be improper, notwithstandi~g tbe permi ·sion contained in tbi section of the statute. 1
§ 290. * 393. App licable b oth t o L e gal and Equitable Actions.
N umb er of Parties i n S eco n d Case . The provision applies both to
legal and to equitable actions, since no restriction or limitation
is contained in its language; but when the second case is relied
upon, the parties must be so numerous that it is really impracticable to make them all actual plaintiffs or defendants; and it bas

time, one or more may sue or defend for ants. 1 Dan. CIi. PI. pp. 272, 273 ; Story's

the benefit of all.'" Tobin v. Portland Eq. PI. §§ 116 etseq.; Wood y. Dummer,

Mills Co. (1902), 41 Ore. 269, 68 Pac. 743.] 3 Mason, 315-319, 321, 322; Gorman v.

1 Reid I'. The Evergreens, 21 How. Pr. Russell, 14 Cal. 531 ; Cullen v. Duke of

319. 321, per Emmott J. citing Story's Queensberry, 1 Bro. C. C. 101; 1 Bro.

Eq. PL § 123 ; Adair v. New River Co.,"ll P. C. 396.

see Commonwealth v. Scott (1901), 112 Ky.
252, 65 S. W. 596, where the court, after
a review of the e·wir.'· pnic:tiee, says:
"Section 25 of Civil Code of Practice of
this tate, which is nbstantially a reenactment of section 37 of the former
Code, recognizes and codifies this equitable practice. It is this: 'If the question
invoh"e a co mmon or gene ral interest of
many persons, or if the parties be nu merQus and it i impracticable to bring all of
them before the court within a reasonable
time, one or more may ue or defend for
the benefit of all.'" Tobin v . Portlaufl
Mill Co. (1902),41 Ore. 269, 68 Pac. 743 .J
1 Reid v. The Evergreens, 21 How. Pr.
3 19 , 3 21, per Emmott J. citing Story's
Eq. Pl. § 123; Adair z·. New Rive r Co., 11

Ve ey, 444; 1 Turner & Russ. 297; 2 Sim.
369; 1 Dan. Ch. Pl. pp . 23fi, 237; tory's
Eq. Pl. §§ 99-103; and legatees or next of
kin, 1 Dan. Ch. Pl. p. 238; Story's Eq.
Pl.§§ 104-106; Brown v. Ricketts, 3 John .
Ch. 553; Fish v. Howland, 1 Paige, 20,
23; Hallett z:. Hallett, 2 Paige, l -20, :21.
For furth e r illustrati o n ~ in ca~es of voluntary as. ociatio11s and the like, see tory's
Eq. Pl. §§ 107-115 h; l Dan.
h. P l.
pp. 23 , 239. The sam principle apJ lies,
under imilar circumstances, to defendant . 1 Dan. Ch. Pl. pp. 272, 2i3; tor.r's
Eq. Pl. §§ 116 et seq. ; vVoocl v. Dummer,
3 Mn on, 315-319, 321, 32:2; Gorman v.
Russell, 14 Cal. 53 l ; ullen 11. Duke of
Queeusberry, 1 Bro. C. C. 10 1 ; l B ro.
P . C. 396.
2=>
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been held that the number thirty-five was not sufficiently great.*

When one sued on behalf of an association by its name, upon a

promissory note, and alleged in his complaint that it was unin-

corporated, and that its members were very numerous, the mere

n h el 1 hat h numb r hirt -fiY wa not uffici n 1
u cl on b half

facts thus alleged were held to be insufficient.^ Undoubtedly in

such a case the plaintiff: should sue on behalf of the persons who

compose the society, and not on behalf of the society itself.

Indeed, this point has been directly decided. It is held that, in

case of such a society whose members are too numerous to bring

them all before the court, the plaintiff must make one of them a

defendant as a representative of the others, and not make the

association a defendant.^

§ 291. * 394. Particular Instances. The following are some

particular instances in which these principles have been applied,

and in which it has been held that the action might be maintained

by one or more for the benefit of the others. One creditor may

sue on behalf of all the other creditors in an action to enforce the

terms of an assignment in trust for the benefit of creditors, to

obtain an accounting and settlement from the assignee and other
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like relief; also, in an action to set aside such an assignment on

the ground that it is illegal and void; and also one judgment

creditor may sue on behalf of all other similar creditors in an

action to reach the equitable assets, and to set aside the fraudu-

lent transfers of the debtor. In all these classes of cases the

creditors have a common interest in the questions to be deter-

mined by the controversy.^ When a mortgage had been given

1 Kirk V. Young, 2 Abb. Pr. 453, per in allowing one or more to sue for all."

Gierke J. at S. T. Undoubtedly, a num- This was a case in which ten subscribers

ber much less than thirty-five would be brought an action for the benefit of all

sufficient when a " common interest " is subscribers who had paid their subscrip-

set up. In an action by creditors it was tions against a subscriber who had refused

held, by a very able English judge, that to pay his subscri|)ti(Hi. See also George

twenty was too small anumber Harrison v. Benjamin (1898), 100 Wis. 622, 76 N. W.

V. Stewardson,2 Hare, 5.S0. QSee Hodges 619, holding that thirty-one "was not so

T. Nalty (1899), 104 Wis. 464, 80 N. W. large as to be called very numerous and

726, from which we quote as follows : render it impracticable to bring them all

"Seventy-five persons is surely a very before the court." Tobin <;. Portland Mills

large and unwieldy number of persons to Co. (1902), 41 Ore. 269, 68 Pac. 743.]

fat bu
. uch a a e th plain i
hould ue on b h:::tlf of the per. n who
the o i t , an l n t on b l alf of the so i
it lf.
Ind
hi point ha
en dire tly ]e id l. It is heltl that in
ca e of u h a ociety ho e memb r are too numerou to bring
them all before tl
ourt, the plaintiff mu t make one of them a
def n lant a a repre entati e of the oth r , and not make th
a o iati n a def ndant. 3
§ 291. * 3 -±. P arti cul a r I n sta nces. The following are ome
particular in tanc in which the e principle ha e b en appli ,d
and in which it ha been held that th a tion might be maintained
h one or more for the ben fit of the others.
ne ere htor may
ue on behalf of all the other creditor in an action to enf rce he
t erms of an a ignment in tru t for the benefit of ere litor , to
obtain an accounting and settlement from the as ignee an l oth r
lik relief; also, in an action to sr.t a ide such an a ignm nt on
the ground that it is illegal and void; and al o one ju lgmen
creditor may sue on behalf of all other imilar credit r m an
action to reach the equitable a et , and to t a ide the frau u lent transfers of the debtor. In all th e cla e f ca
the
creditor have a common interest in the que tion to be determin d by the ontrover y. 4 vVhen a mortgage had b en gi en

j<jiii in an action where it is practicable for 2 Habicht v. Pemberton, 4 Sandf. 657.

a few to settle the controversy for the ^ Keller i'. Tracy, 11 Iowa, 530; Stew-

benefit of all. A line mu.st be drawn art v. Erie & W. Transp. Co., 17 Minn,

somewhere, and, while it may be difficult 372, 398.

to draw it at any precise number, we hold ^ Greene v. Breck, 10 Abb. Pr. 42;

that seventy-five is a sufficient number, in Hrooks v. Peck, 38 Barb. 519. See Story's

a case like the present, to justify the court Eq. PI. §§ 99-103; 1 Dan. Cli. PI. (4th

1 Kirk v. Youn , 2
bb. Pr. 453, per
lerke .J. at . T.
ndou btedly, a num11 r much le than thirty-five wonlcl be
: ufficient wh en a ' comm n intere~ t " i
et up. In an act i n hy cr ed itor it wa
helcl, by a v r y able Eng li :-h judg , th a t
tweu t r wa - t o m all a num be r Ilani. on
c. . t,e~vard ou, 2 Hare, 5;3 . [
Iloclg s
r. ~Tal ty (1 99} , 104 \\ i. 464, o N. W.
726, from w hic h we quote a
" . ev uty-fh·e per . on i. . urely a Yery
large aud unwieldy nn111 be r of per; n · t o
j11i11 in au a ·tion wh re i t i - practical 1lc fo r
a f w to . ettle he con tro' r. y fo r the
benefit of al l. A Jiu must b clr; '"11

in allowing one or more to . ue for all."
This wa a ca e in whi h ten ub criber.
brought an action for the b n fit £ all
u h. criber who had paid th ir ub~ ription agaiu ta ·ubscrib r who had r fu-ed
to pay hi ub criptiou.
ec al o
rge
v.B njamin (1 9 ), 10 \\ i . 622, 76 .._:r. W.
619 , holdiug hat thirty- n '· wa n t o
l:u o-e a t be call d v ry num rou and
render it impra ·ti able to bring th m all
befor t hee tirt.' T obin I,,' .
rtlaud L\lill
o. (1902), 41 Or . 269, 6 Pac. 743.J
2 IJ::ibi t ht ii . I emb rt n, 4
and£. 657.
a Kell r i •. Tracy, 11 Iowa, 530 ; t wart 1• . Eri & W . Tran p. o., 17 Minn.
3 72, 39 .
to d raw it at any prec i:c numb r w hold
r eeuc v. Bre k, 10
that eventy-five i , a nffi cie u numher, iu Brooksr .
k , 3 Barh. 519.
a ca e like t he present, to ju t,ify th ourt Eq. Pl. s. 99-103; 1 Dan.
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by a railroad company to a trustee in order to secure bondholders,

and he desired to obtain directions of the court in respect to the

payment of coupons, and brought an action for that purpose, and

alleged in his complaint that the holders of the coupons were

very numerous, so that it was impracticable to bring them all

before the court, it was held proper, and within the provision of

the code, to make a few of these persons defendants as the repre-

sentatives of all the others, with suitable averments showing the

reasons for such a form of action.^ Conversely, a suit can be

maintained by one on behalf of all to foreclose a mortgage when

the number of mortgagees, or of bondholders, is large. It would

be hardly necessary in such a case that the number of persons

should be so great as to make it impracticable to bring them all

in; they have a common interest in the questions at issue. ^ The

provision also applies to actions by distributees for their shares,

and by legatees brought to settle the estate and to recover their

legacies;^ and to actions by heirs to set aside a deed or will of

their ancestors.* In both these cases there is a common interest

among the claimants.
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§ 292. * 395. Same Subject. An action by members or share-

holders of an unincorporated association for a dissolution, wind-

ing up, and division, or for other like relief, plainly falls within

Am. ed.), pp. 235, 237. See also Libby v. - Blair v. Shelby Cy. Agr. Soc, 28 Ind.

Norris, 142 Mass. 246; Sears v. Hardy, 175. Action on behalf of one hundred

120 Mass. 524; Mason v. Pomeroy, 151 and thirty-eight mortgagees. Bardstown

Mass. 164. Twenty creditors were held & L. R. Co. v. Metcalf, 4 Mete. (Ky.) 199.

to be too small a number in Harrison v. See also Carpenter v. Cincinnati, etc. Ky.

Stewardson, 2 Hare, 530. [^Williams v. Co., 35 Ohio St. 307 ; Chicago, etc. Land

Meloy (1897), 97 Wis. 561, 73 N. VV. 40; Co. v. Peck, 112 111. 408.

Harper v. Carroll (1895), 62 Minn. 152, ^ McKenzie v. L'Amoureux, 11 Barb.

64 N. W. 145; Corey v. Sherman (1895), 516; Towner v. Tooley, 38 Barb. 598. In

96 la. 114, 64 N. W. 828; Herrick v. the first of these cases the number of

by a railroad company to a tru t e in ord r to .· nre bondholcl rs,
and h cl ir cl to btain dire tion of the court in re:-;p ct to th
payn-:. nt of coupons, and brought an action for that purpos , and
all ged in hi complaint that the holders of th coup ns ·wer
Yery numerou , so that it wa impracticable to bring th m all
1 efor the court, it was held proper, an l within the provi ion of
the co le, to make a few of th e per ons def nclants as the r presPntati v of all the other , with suitable averrnents shmving th
reason, for such a form of action. 1 Conversely, a suit can be
maintained by one on behalf of all to foreclose a mortgage wh n
the number of mortgagees, or of bondholders, is large. It would
be hardly necessary in such a case that the number of person,
should be so great as to make it impracticable to bring them a11
in; they have a common interest in the questions at issue. 2 The
provis{on also applies to actions by distributees for their hares,
and by legatees brought to settle the estate and to recover their
legacies; 3 and to actions by h eirs to set aside a deed or will of
their ancestors. 4 In both these cases there is a common interest
among the claimants.
§ 292. * 395. Same Subject. An action by member or shareholders of an unincorporated association for a di solution, winding up, and division, or for other like relief, plainly falls within

Wardwell (1898), 58 O. St. 294, 50 N. E. persons represented by the plaintiff was

903.] three. Story's Eq. PI. §§ 104. 105 ; 1 Dan.

1 Coe V. Beckwith, 10 Abb. Pr. 296. Ch. PI. (4th Am. ed.), p 238; Hallett r.

See P.eid v. The Evergreens, 21 How. Pr. Hallett, 2 Paige, 18-20. 21 ; Fish i\ How-

319. I^In Gorley v. City of Louisville land, 1 Paige, 20, 23 ; Brown r. Ricketts,

(1901), — Ky.—, 65 S. W. 844, it was 3 Johns. Ch. 5.53. See also Hills r. Put-

held that where a large number of police- nam, 152 Mass. 123 (bill for iu.structions

men have claims against the city for com- as to the disposition of an estate not dc-

pensation during the time they were fective for want of parties, if the numer-

illegally suspended, several may sue for ous claimants are fully represented by

the benefit of all, and that the aggregate those having similar interests) ; Hills v.

amount would determine the jurisdiction, Barnard, 152 Mass. 67.

and not the amount claimed by each one '' Hcndrix v. Money, 1 Bush (Ky.),

of the parties.] 306.

Am. ed.), pp. 235, 23i. See also Libby v.
Norris, 1-12 Ma s. 246; Sear i·. Hardy,
120 Mass. 524; Mason v. Pomeroy, 15l
Ma 'S . 16-L Twenty creditors were held
to be too small a number in Harrison v.
Steward on, 2 Hare, 530. [Williams v.
Meloy (1897), 97 Wis. 561, 73 N . W. 40;
Harper i:. Carroll ( l895), 62 Minn. 152,
64 N. W. 145; Corey v. Sherman (1895),
96 Ia. 114, 64 N. W . 28; Herrick t'.
Wardwell {1898), 58 0. St. 29.J., 50 N. E.
903.J
1 Coe v. Beckwith, 10 Abb. Pr. 296.
See Heid v. The E,·ergreens, 21 How. Pr.
.'319. [In Gorley v. City of Loni ·vill e
(1901},-Ky.-, 65 S. W. 844, it was
helcl that where a large number of policemen have claims again ·t the city for compensation during the time they were
illegally suspended, several may sue for
the benefit of all, and that the aggregate
amount would determine the jurisdiction,
and nut the amount claimed by each one
of th e parties.]

2

Blair v. Shelby Cy. Agr. Soc., 28 Intl.
Action on behalf of one hundred
and thirty-eight mortgagees. Bardstown
& L. R. Co. v. Metcalf, 4 Mete. (Ky.) 199.
See also Carpenter v. Cincinnati, etc. Ry.
Co., 35 Ohio St. 307; Chicago, etc. Land
Co. v. Peck, 112 Ill. 408.
3 McKenzie i•. L' Amoureux, I 1 Barb.
516 ; Towner v. Tooley, 38 Barb. 598. In
th e fir. t of these cases the number of
persons represented by the plaintiff was
three. Story's Eq. Pl.§§ 104, 105; l Dan.
Cb. Pl. (4th Am. eel.}, p 238; Hallett 1·.
Hallett, 2 Paige, l ~-20. 21 ; Fish v. H owland, l Paige. 20, 23; Brown v. Ricketts,
3 ,John C'h. 553. . ec also Hill - i·. Putnam, 152 1\fass. 123 (bill for in tructions
as to the disposition of an estate not clcfective for want of partie , if the numcrus claimants ar<' fully represented by
those having similar intere ts) ; Rills v.
Barnard, 152 Ma s. 67.
4 Hendrix u. Money, l Bush (Ky.),
175.
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the statutory provision, and may be brought by one of tlie

associates in a representative capacity. In some instances the

proceeding would plainly fall within the first subdivision, since

there would be a common interest among all the members or

shareholders; in other instances, it might, perhaps, fall within

the second, and be based upon numbers alone. ^ The question,

whether one taxpayer or freeholder can sue for the benefit of

others similarly situated, to restrain or set aside the acts of local

officials done under color of authority, can only be properly con-

sidered and determined by those courts which hold that such

actions are proper in their general form. Wherever this par-

ticular kind of action is condemned in toto, the decision of tlie

particular point now referred to must, of coarse, be entirely

h

i ion and ma b br u 0 bt by one f th
o i~ t " in a r Ir ntati e a1 a i y . In om in tan
t he
pr ce lin 0 w uld plainly fall wi hin th fir 't ub livi i n, in
h r would b a comm n int r t among all th
·har b ld r , · in th r in tan
it might,
th
coml, and b ba l up n numb r al n . 1
wheth r
r fr hold r
al

extra-judicial. In the States which permit such suits by a tax-

payer or freeholder generally, there is some conflict of opinion in

respect to the question whether one can sue on behalf of others

similarly situated with himself. It has been held in Wisconsin

that an action cannot be maintained by one taxpayer as a repre-

sentative of all others in a local district, to prevent the enforce-
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ment of an alleged illegal tax which would be a lien upon real

estate, on the ground that the lands owned by the individual

taxpayers, and affected by the tax, are distinct and separate par-

cels, and there is no common interest among the owners thereof.

The conclusion was that each taxpayer must sue separately.^

§ 293. * -30(3. Nature of such Action. What Essential on Part of

those not Named in order to become Parties. I pass now to con-

sider the nature of an action brought by one on behalf of others,

and its effects upon the riglits and duties of those who are repre-

sented by the actual plaintiffs. The persons not named in such

cases are not parties to the suit unless they afterwards elect to

come in and claim as sucli, and bear their proportion of the

1 Warth V. Radde, 18 Ahb. Pr. 396; Perry y. Whitaker, 71 N.C.477; [McCaiui

Gorman v. Russell, 14 Cal. 531; Von v. cfty of Louisville (1901), — Ky. —, 63

Schmidt v. Iluutinj^tou, I Cal. 55; Stew- S. W. 446 ; Commonwealth r. Scott (1901),

art f. Erie & W. Transp. Co., 17 Minn. 112 Ky. 252, 65 S. W. 596. In thiscase one

.■{72,398 ; Cockhurn r. Thomjison, 16 Ves. of many taxp'iyers of an iJlef^al tax sued

321 ; Story's Eq. PI. §§ 107-115 b ; 1 Dan. to recover, for the benefit of all, the taxes

Ch. V\. (4th Am. ed.), pp. 238, 239; At- .so paid. The action was sn.stained not-

lanta Real Estate Co. v. Atlanta Nat. with.^tanding the i)arty in whose name

Bank, 75 Ga. 40 ; Dousman v. Wisconsin, .suit was l)ron;;lit was anon-resident of the

etc. Co., 40 Wis. 418 ; Chester f. Halliard, county. See, however. Stiles v. City of

36 N. J. Ecj. 313. Guthrie (1895), 3 Okla. 26, 41 Pac. 383.]

■^ Newcomb v. Ilorton, 18 Wis. 566;

sid reel an l l t nnin d by th
co urt
ac i n are I r per in their g neral f rm .
t icular kind of action i c nd mu d in toto, the d
articular p int now referr d to mu t , of cour , be ntir ly
extra-}udicial. I n the tates which permit uch uit by a tax pa' r or fr eholder g nerally, there i om conflict of opinion in
re p ct to the que tion whether one can ue on b half of h r
imilarly itu, t d with him elf. It has been h lcl in vVi, on in
that an action annot be maintain 1 by one taxpay r a a r pr sen t<. t ive of all oth r in a local di trict, to preven t the nf rcemen t of an allege l ill gal tax which would be a lien upon r al
-·t te, on the ground that the land owned by th indi vidual
axpayer and affec t cl by the tax are di tinct and par t pare l · and ther i ' n common inter t among the owner th r of.
Th onclu i n wa that ea h taxpayer mu t u e par t ly. 2
I
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What E sse n tia l on Part of

I pa n w t c ni l r th na ur f an acti n brou ght by one n b half £ th l" ,
ancl it' eff ct' ur on t he right an l d uties of tho e wh ar r pr ented by th actual plaintiff . Th p r n n t n, m d in ·u li
ca·
, r not par i ' o t he ui t unl s t h y aft r ward' 1 t t
eome in and ·laim a such, arnl b ar th ir I ror r i n f
those not Named in order t o b e com e Parties .

l Warth v. Radde, l
Ahb. Pr. 396;
Go rm au v. J u. :ell, l4 Cal. 53 l ; Yon
, ehrn i1lt '" Jiuntingtou, 1 al. 55; • tewar '" Erie & W. Tra11 p Co., l 7 .Jiinu.
:! 72 , .'3
; ockliurn I'. Thrnnp:on, 16 V .
!321 ; tory': I•,q. Pl. .' I i'- 1 l:; b · l Dan.
Ch l'I ( ~th Am . <'<l.), pp. 2:3 , 2. 9; Atlanta HPal E ate
o 1•. A t la nta :Nat.
Bank, 75 <' :i 40; ) o u man v . \ i,ccrn: in,
tc. ('o' rn \Vi .. 4 1 ; he te r t:. llnlli , r<l,
3G . •J. Eq :31:3.
2 ;.T wcomu v. H or to n, l
Wi . 566;

P rry v. W hitake r, il N". C' . 4ii ; [M ann
v. ity of Lou i. vill (1<JO l ), - K y . - , 63
•.. \ V. 4·t6; o mm nn\\'eal t h t•.- c tt ( 19 l ),
112 J ~v. 252, 63, '. \ V. 506. In t hi . ca;; one
of ma;1y taxp·1.\Pr;; of an ill ga l tax . tH'cl
t r O\'l' l', for th h 11 fi t of all, t h ta x
.·o pni rl . The at'tio n wa . . u: tai ne d n ot w it h:-tan d in g th p arty in wlw:c na m
, ni t wa b r Uf1' 1t t \ 3.8 :\ 11011 - r id lit f t h
v. i v f
o un tv. , · , h 1 , . r, t il
' u t h~·i e ( 1 9") ,3 O kla. 26, 41 a·.3 :3. ]
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expenses. It is optional with them whether they will become

parties or not, and until they so elect they are, in the language

of tlie books, "in a sense deemed to be before the court." ^ They

are so far before the court, that if they neglect, after a reasonable

notice to them for that purpose, to come in under the judgment

and establish their claims, the court will protect the defendants

and parties named from any furtlier litigation in respect of the

same fund or other subject-matter, especially so far as such liti-

gation may tend to disturb the rights of the parties as fixed by

the judgment. A person who elects to come in and make him-

self a party must apply for an order making him such, and upon

the granting the order he is to all intents and purposes a party. ^

§ 294. * 397. Equity Rule. Rule in Kentucky. This rule,

which is merely the doctrine and practice of equity applied to

cases arising under the statutory provision, has not been ac-

quiesced in by all the courts. In Kentucky, where the chancery

has always existed as a separate tribunal, and where even under

the code there is a nominal distinction kept up between legal

and equitable actions, it is held that the assent of those who are
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not actual parties, but who have a common interest with their

representative, will be presumed unless they show their dis-

approval by some act indicating the dissent.^ This is in direct

conflict with the rule first stated. According to the one, the

persons who are represented must do some affirmative act of

approval and adoption, and regularly this act should be an

application to the court, and the obtaining an order declaring

them to be in all respects j)arties ; according to the other, these

persons must do some act of disaffirmance and rejection, but

what particular act is not disclosed.

§ 295. * 398. Question whether One has made himself a Party

may present itself in Two Aspects. The question whether any

spocitied person among the number of those represented had

made himself or was a party to the suit, may present itself in

1 Story's Eq. PI. § 99 ; Adair v. New Iron & Steel Co., 46 Fed. Rep. 33G. Cred-

River Co., 11 Ves. 444. itors who refuse to join are postponed to

- Stevens v. Brooks, 22 Wis. 695, 703, thu.se creditors who do come in under the

704, per Dixon C. .J.; Hallett v. Hallett, 2 general creditors' bill. Bank of Rome v.

Paige, 18, per Walworth Ch. ; Good v. liaselton, 15 Lea (Tenu.), 216. See also

Blewit, 19 Ves. 336, 339, per Lord Kldon ; Bilmyer v. Sherman, 23 W. Va. 656.

Story's Eq. PI. § 99 ; Barker v. Walters, ^ Flint v. Spurr, 17 B. Mon. 499, 513.

8 Beav. 92 ; Belmont Xail Co. v. Columbia

expense . It is optional with th m whether th y will b come
partie or not, and until they o elect th y ar , in the languag
of the book , "in a s ns cl em c1 to be before th
urt. 1 Th y
ar ·o far before the c urt, that if they negl ct, aft r a r asonable
notice to them for that purpo , to come in under tbe ju<lgm nt
and stablish their claims, the court will prot ct the d f ndant
an 1 parti s named from any further litigation in respect of the
"ame fund or other subject-matter, especially so far as such li tigation may tend to disturb the right8 of the parti s as fixed by
the judgment. A person who elect to come in and make himself a party must apply for an or ler making him uch, and upon
the granting the order he is to all intents and purposes a party. 2
§ 294. * 397. Equity Rule. Rule in Kentucky. Thi' rule,
which is merely the doctrine and practice of equity applied to
cases arising under the statutory provision, has not been acquiesced in by all the courts. In Kentucky, where the chancery
has always existed as a separate tribunal, and where even under
the code there is a nominal distinction kept up between legal
and equitable actions, it is held that the assent of those who are
not actual parties, but who have a common interest with their
representative, will be presumed unless they show their disapproval by some act iudicating the dissent. 3 This is in direct
conflict with the rule first stated. According to the one, the
persons who are represented must do some affirmative act of
approval and adoption, and regularly this act should be an
application to the court, and the obtaining an order declaring
them to be in all respects parties; according to the other, these
p .::sons must do some act of disaffirmance and rejection, but
what particular act is not disclosed.
§ 295. * 398. Question whether One has made himself a Party
may present itself in Two Aspects.
The question whether any
sp 1'cified person among the number of those represented had
made himself or was a party to the suit, may present itself in
1 Story's Eq. Pl. § 99 ; Adair v.
ew
Ri1·er Co., 11 Yes. 44-4-.
2
teveus v. Brook , 22 Wi . 695, i03,
704, per Dixon C. J.; Hallett 1'· Hallett, 2
Paige, 18, per Walworth h.; Good v .
Blewit, 19 Yes. 336, 339, per Lord Eldon ;
Story' Eq. Pl.§ 99; Barker v. Walters,
8 Beav. 92; Belmont Nail Co. v. Columbia

Iron & Steel Co., 46 Fed. R ep. 336.
reditor who refuse to join are po ·tpone<l to
tho e creditors who do come in under the
general creditors' bill. Rani· of Rome v.
Ilaseltun, 15 Lea (Tenu.), 216. 'ee al o
Bilmyer v. Sherman, 23 ,V. Va. 656.
3 Flint v. 'purr, 17 B. Mon. 499, 513.
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two very different aspects, and its answer may be necessary for

two very different purposes. ^ In the first place, tlie question

may be, wlietber this individual, as against the defendants in

the action, and perhaps as against those who were the original

plaintiffs, or who had made themselves such, is entitled to the

immediate benefits of the recovery, to a share in the relief

granted by the court in its decree. It is evident that, under

this aspect of the matter, a slight affirmative act of assent and

adoption may be sufficient if the person is then willing and does

contribute his share to the expenses of the litigation. The

nature of the cause of action may be such that, if the relief is

granted at all, it will necessarily enure to the benefit of all who

may be situated in the same position as the actual plaintiff.

On the other hand, the cause of action may be such that a sepa-

rate application will be necessary to bring each person within the

operation of the judgment, although the decision made in one

case may control that in all others : as, for example, in a cred-

itors' suit to set aside fraudulent transfers of the debtor's land,

and let in the liens of the plaintiffs' judgments, a separate action
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of the court is necessary in the case of each judgment creditor,

in order that he may reap the benefit of the general decision

pronouncing the debtor's transfer to be void.

1 [[To the point tliat one cannot be wheat deposited at Black's warehouse at

made a party plaintiff against his consent, Halsey, could, if they so desired, have ex-

see Tobin V. Portland Mills Co. (1902), 41 pressed their assent to be joined as plain-

Ore. 269, 68 Pac. 74."J, the court saying : tiffs, thereby demonstrating the practica-

"A person materially interested in the l)ility of bringing them all before the court,

subject-matter of a suit may, against his If tlie depositors had not been interrogated

will, be made a party defendant, but we in respect to their willingness to pay their

know of no rule whereby he can, witliout part of the expenses, the law would prob-

his consent, be joined as plaintiff. The ably have presumed that, as they were

desire of a person to be joined as a j)arty anxious to secure their share of the grain

plaintiff is indicated ijy a willingness to alleged to have l)een shipped to the de-

tw

ver liffer nt a pect
n 1 it an wer ma be n
1
y ry differ nt ptuI_Jo
Ir th
may b wh th r thi individual, a again t
h acti n and perha1 a again t tho e wh " er he ri ·inctl
pl< intiff or wh had mad them lv such is en itl d to th
imme lia ben fit of the r coyer , o a hare in the r li f
ranted by the court in its deer e. It i
id nt that, under
thi a p c of th matter, a light a:ffirmati e act f a ent and
ad p i n may be ufficient if the per on i th n willing and do
ntribute hi
har t the expen
of th litigation. The
nature f the cau e f acti n may be such tha , if the reli f i
grant d at all, it will ne e arily enure t the benefit of all v h
ituat d in the ame positi n as th actual plaintiff.
ma - b
n the th r hand, h cau e of action may be ucl that a eparate applica ion will be n ce ary to bring ea.ch per on within the
operation of th judg men , although the deci ion mad in on e
ca 'e may c ntrol that in all other : as, for example, in a r <lit r ' uit to et aside fraudulent tran fers of the debtor' land
and 1 tin th li en of the plaintiff judgment , a eparate acti n
f h ourt is nece ary in the ca e of each judgment creditor,
in ord r that he may reap the benefit of th general deci i n
pronouncing the debtor' transfer to be void.
T

£

w

bear his siiare of the expenses of tiie trial fendants they were also willing to contrib-

and while 3.5 of tlie depositors were ute tlieir part of the expenses incurred

anxious to participate in tlie profits of the in recovering it, or its value ; but their

suit if any were realized, .'i^ of them, testimony dispels such ])rcsumptioii, if it

tacitly, at least, expressed their unwilling- could ever have been invoked." But see

ncss so to contribute, therein- manifesting Mct.'anni'. City of Louisville (1901), — Ky.

their dissent to being joined as plaintiffs, — , G3 S. W. 446, in wliicii it is held that,

notwithstanding which a decree is given under the facts therein stated, parties

in their favor, thus in effect making them may be made plaintiff against their con-

parties against their will. Besides this, tlie sent. In tliis case the statutory provision

101 depositors, liaving made voluntary under dicussion was invoked.]

affidavits of their respective claims for

l [To t he point that one cannot be
made a party plaintiff again t bi co n ent,
ee Tobin v. P ortland Mill Co. (1902), 41
re. 269, 6 P ac. 743, the co urt aying:
' A per ·on materially intere ted in the
subject-matte r of a . uit may, again t hi s
will, be made a party d fondant, but we
know of u rule wher by he can, without
hi con ent, be join d a . plaintiff. The
de. ir of a pr.on to b joined a· a party
plaintiff i. indicatecl by a willingu
to
bear hi. ·hare of the xpen
of the trial
and while 35 of th
lepo. itor. w re
a.11.·iou. to participate in the pl'ofit of the
. uit if any were realiz cl, :3+ of t.hein,
ta itly, at Jeai t, expr
cl th ir u11willing11e • · ~ O to ·outribute. thereby man if . ting
tb ·ir iii-. ut t.o being join cl a, plaintifftl,
tJ•Jtwith. landing whkh a clr>CTPP i.· giY n
i11 t.heir favor tht1s i11 eff c:t makiug th m
partic'. agaiu t th ir will. B . ide · thi., th
IOI dr>pn. ilor., ha\•i11g macle voluntary
allida\'it of th,..ir n• pr>di,·e tlairn for
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§296. * 309. Same Subject. Ill tlie second place, the ques-

tion may be whether tlie specified individual who is one of those

represented by the actual plaintiff, is concluded and bound by

the judgment rendered in tlie action. This question will gener-

ally arise at a subsequent time, and in another action brought by

or against the individual, and involving the same issues as those

embraced in the former controversy.^ Is this person bound by

the former judgment ? Of course he is not bound unless he was

practically a party to the proceeding; the plainest principles of

common justice refuse to hold a man concluded if he has not had

"a day in court." When the matter is presented in this aspect,

the strict rule of the equity courts first above stated must be

controlling. If the subsequent proceeding is a hostile one

against the person, the former adjudication cannot be relied

upon as an estoppel or as conclusive, unless he had affirmatively

taken the steps which made him an actual party by adopting the

suit with all its burdens and benefits, or unless, after having had

notice, and an opportunity of coming in and making himself

such a party, he had refused or neglected to do so. If, however,
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this subsequent proceeding is on behalf of the person, set in

motion by him, the same doctrine must apply; he cannot under

exactly the same circumstances claim and receive the benefits of

the former litigation, but disclaim and be freed from its burdens

and disabilities.

§ 297. * 400. Conclusion of Author from Discussion. The con-

clusion to which I arrive from the foregoing discussion may be

summed up as follows: There may be a marked difference in

the manner of enforcing the rule, or even in the rule itself,

depending upon the position of the litigation, and the situation

of the person who invokes its aid or against whom it is invoked.

If the prior suit is still pending, and the purpose of the claimant

who belongs to the class of persons represented by the actual

plaintiff or defendant, be to take a practical part in the contro-

vers}', or to share the benefit of the judgment which has been or

may be rendered, his mere act of making the claim, coupled with

a willingness to bear his share of the expenses, will be of itself a

sufficiently positive and affirmative act to make him a party to

the proceeding and entitle him to his personal relief. Even in

this case, however, the action may be of such a nature and the

1 Stevens v. Brooks, 22 Wis. 695.

*. 09.

In th econ 1 plac , the que::;tion may be w h th r th p i fi 1 incli id n. 1 w h is on of those
r pre nt d by the a tual l laintiff, is on lu l and bound by
th jud m nt rend r d in th action. Thi qu tion will g n rally ari at a ub qu nt tim , and in anoth r acti n brought by
or again t the individual, ancl involving th am i 'U a ho e
embra cl in the form r ontro rsy. 1 I thi p r on b un l by
the former judgment?
f
ur e he i not bound unl
he was
practically a party to the proceeding; the plainest principle· of
common justice refuse to hold a man concluded if he has not bad
"a day in court. ' When the matter is presented in thi a pect,
the trict rule of the equity courts first above stat cl mu t be
controlling.
If the subsequ nt proceeding is a hostile one
again t the person, the former adjudication cannot be relied
upon a an e topp 1 or as conclu ive, unles he had affirmatively
taken the step which made him an actual party by adopting the
uit with all it burdens and benefits, or unless, after having had
notice, and an opportunity of coming in and making himself
uch a party, he had refu ed or neglected to do so. If, however,
thi subsequent proceeding is on behalf of the person, set in
motion by him, the same doctrine must apply; he cannot under
exactly the same circumstances claim and receive the benefits of
the former litigation, but disclaim and be freed from its burdens
and disabilities .
§ 297. * 400. Con c l usion o f Aut hor fr o m D iscussion . The conclusion to which I arrive from the foregoing di cu ion may be
um med up as follows: There may be a marked difference in
the manner of enforcing the rule, or even in the rule itself,
depending upon the po ition of the litigation, and the ituation
of the person who invokes its aid or against whom it i' invoked.
If the prior suit iB still pending, and the purpos of the claimant
who belongs to the class of persons represented by the actual
plaintiff or defendant, be to take a practical part in the controver y 01· to share the benefit of the judgment which ha been er
may be rendered, his mere act of making the claim, coupled with
a willingnes to bear his share of the expen , , will b of itself a
. uffici ntly po itive aml affirrnatiYe act to rnak him a party to
the proceeding an<l entitl him t his personal reli f. E-rnn in
this case, however, the action may be of such a nature and the
296.
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juclo-ment of such a character, that a separate order or adjudi-

cation of the court will be necessary in order to determine the

particular rights under the general decree of each party, and to

award to him his special portion of the general relief. The case

already mentioned of the different judgment creditors interested

in the result of an ordinary creditors' suit, is a sufficiently illus-

trative example. If, however, the prior suit has been termi-

nated, and the question arises in a subsequent controversy, and

involves the conclusive effect of the former adjudication upon

the class of persons represented by the actual parties, in order

that such judgment should be conclusive upon any particular

person of the class either in his favor or against him, there must

have been the previous formal act on his part of applying to the

court, and an order thereon making him a party to the action, so

that his name should have appeared in some manner upon the

record ; or it must be shown that he had notice of the proceed-

ings, and an opportunity to unite in them of which he neglected

or refused to avail himself. These views and conclusions recon-

cile the decisions which at first sight appear to be conflicting,
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and they present a practical and harmonious rule of procedure.^

S 293. * 401. Necessary Averments of Complaint or Petition. It

has already been stated that the complaint or petition should

contain averments which bring the action within one or the other

of the cases mentioned in the section of the codes. The allega-

tions showing the existence of a common or general interest in

the questions at issue in the one case, or the impracticability, on

account of numbers, of bringing all the persons before the court

in the other, should be positive and specific, so that, if denied,

an issue may be raised upon thera.^ It is not necessary, hoAv-

ever, that the persons who, it is alleged, have the common or

general interest, or who, it is said, are so numerous that they

cannot all be brought before the court, should be named, nor be

described with particularity ; nor is it necessary that they should

be an association or special class, or be described as such.'^ The

1 See on this subject, Story's Eq. PI. 2 Paige, 18, 19; Bilmvcr v. Sherman, 23

§§ 99, 196 ; David v. Frowd, 1 Myl. & K. W. Va. 050 ; Glide v. i)\v_vcr, 83 Cal. 477,

200; Gillespie v. Alexander, 3 Kuss. 130 ; 487. See David v. Frowd, 1 .M. & K. 200;

Farrell v. Smith, 2 Ball & B. 337; Cock- Thompson r. Huftakcr, 19 Nev. 291.

burn y. 'i'hoTnp.son, 10 Yes. 327; Good v. - [Castle v. Madison (1902), 113 Wis.

Ble wit, 19 Yes. 330, 339; Leigh v.Tliomas, 340, 89 N. AY. 1.50; Hodges v. Nalty

2 Ye.s. 312, 313; Hendricks v. Pohiiisun, (1899), 104 Wis. 404, 80 N. W. 726.]

2 Johns. Gil. 283, 290; Ilallctt v. Ilallctt, ^ Sourse v. Marshall, 23 Iiul. 194.
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general averment descriptive of the persons as a wliole is enough ;

and the question whether any particular individual is included

within it will arise, and must be decided upon his application to

be admitted as a participant in the suit while in progress, or in

the relief after judgment. If any opposition is made to his a])-

plication, the matter will be sent to a master or referee to hear

and report, and upon his report the court will make the proper

order admitting or rejecting the applicant.^

SECTION EIGHTH.

PERSONS SEVERALLY LIABLE UrON THE SAME INSTRUMENT.

§ 299. * 402. Reasons for Separate Treatment. Two Classes of

Statutory Provisions. The subject-niatter of this section has al-

ready been treated in a general manner in the discussions relating

to joint, joint and several, and several liabilities, and to actions

thereon, and to the changes wrought in the common-law rules regu-

lating the same, which are contained in the sixth section of this

chapter. It is of so great importance, however, and the statutory

provisions have made so sweeping an alteration in the ancient

law, and withal there is so marked a difference in the special
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legislation of the State codes upon this particular topic, that the

subject demands an independent and thorough examination.

The statutory provisions themselves must be separated into two

classes. The first class, which is found in most of the codes,

embraces special rules relating only to persons severally liable

upon the same instrument, and the language which embodies the

enactment is substantially alike in all the statutes which contain

the provision at all. The second class, which is found in a por-

tion only of the codes, is much more sweeping and radical in its

changes ; it embraces rules relating to joint, joint and several,

and several liabilities arising upon all contracts ; while the lan-

guage used by the legislatures is not the same in an}'- two of the

codes.

§ 300. * 403. Quotation of Statutory Provisions. I quote these

two classes of provisions separately. — First class. " Persons

severally liable upon the same obligation or instrument, including

1 Steveus v. Brooks, 22 Wis. 695.

394 CIVIL REMEDIES.

the parties to bills of exchange and promissory notes, may all or

any of them be included in the same action at the option of the

plaintiff." ^ In Kentucky the section is somewhat varied, and

reads as follows : " Persons severally liable upon the same con-

tract, and parties to bills of exchange, to promissory notes placed

upon the footing of bills of exchange, or to common orders and

checks, and sureties on the same or separate instruments, may all

or any of them, or the representatives of such as may have died,

be included in the same action at the plaintiff"s option." ^ — Sec-

ond class. The Missouri code contains the following: "Every

person who shall have a cause of action against several persons,

including parties to bills of exchange and promissory notes, and

who shall be entitled by law to one satisfaction therefor, may

bring suit thereon jointly against all or as many of the persons

liable as he may think proper, and he may, at his option, join any

executor or administrator or other person liable in a representa-

tive character, with others originally liable." ^ According to the

last revision of the California code, " All persons holding as tenants

in common, joint tenants, or coparceners, or any number less than
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all, may jointly or severally commence or defend any civil action or

proceeding for the enforcement or protection of the rights of such

party." * A section is found in the Nevada code nearly the same

as the foregoing in most respects, but with one very marked dif-

ference: " Tenants in common, joint tenants, or copartners, or any

number less than all, may jointly or severally bring or defend, or

continue the prosecution or defence of any action for the enforce-

ment of the rights of such person or persons." * The changes

1 New York, § 120 (454) ; Kansas, § 39 ; 2 [^Kentucky, § 26 ; Arkansas, Sand. &

Oregon, § 36 ; Nevada, § 15 ; South Caru- Hill's Dig., § 5633.]

liua, § 143; California, § 383; Minnesota, 3 (^Missouri, Rev. St., 1899, § 545.]

§ 35 ; Nebraska, § 44 ; Oiiio, § 38 ; North ♦ California, code of 1872, § 384 ; ori-

Caroliua, § 63; QUtah, Hev. St., 1898, ginally statute of 1857, p. 62.

§ 2918; North Dakota, Rev. Codes, 1899, » Nevada, § 14. This section is plainly

§ 5233, in somewiiat different form; copied from the California statute of 1857.

South Dakota, Ann. St., 1901, § 6080, The change from " coparceners " to "co-

same form as in North Dakota; Arizona, partners" is remarkable. The use of the

Rev. St., 1901, § 1306, in somewhat differ- word "coparceners" was natural, per-

ent form; Oklahoma, St., 1893, ij 3911 ; haps, though doubtless entirely unneces-

Washington, Bal. Code, § 4836 ; Montana, sary in the earlier enactments, for certainly

§ 585; Llalio, Code Civ. Proc, 1901, no estate in " coparcenary " e.xi.sts in C.ali-

§3171; Wyr.ming, Rev. St., 1899, § 3483, furnia. The word used in the Nevatla

in somewhat different form ; Cohjrado, code, unless treated as a mistake, pro-

§ 13; Indiana, Buhls' St., 1901, §271; duces a most violent and exceptional

WLscousin, St.. 1898, § 2609.] change in the prior law. The language
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in the common law made by the Iowa and Kentucky codes are

radical and complete. In the former : " When two or more per-

sons are bound by contract or by judgment, decree, or statute,

whether jointly only, or jointly and severally, or severally only,

including the parties to negotiable paper, common orders, and

checks, and sureties on the same or separate instruments, or by

any liability growing out of the same, the action thereon may, at

the plaintiff's option, be brought against aiiy, or all of them.

When any of those so bound are dead, the action may be brought

against any or all of the survivors, with any or all of the repre-

sentatives of the decedents, or against any or all of such repre-

sentatives. An action or judgment against any one or more of

several persons jointly bound shall not be a bar to proceedings

against the others." ^ The corresponding section of the Kentucky

code differs from this verbally rather than substantially : " If two

or more persons be jointly bound by contract, the action thereon

may be brought against all or any of them at the plaintiff's option.

If any of the persons so bound be dead, the action may be brought
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is not broad enough to cover all joint lia-

bilities arising from contract ; the single

case of partnership liability is excepted.

QSee ante, p. 198, note 2, for other statutes

of the same character.^

1 Qlowa, Code. 1897 § 3465. Lull v.

Anamosa Nat. Bank (1900), 110 la. 5.37, 81

N. W. 784 : " If plaiutitf maintains his ac-

tion against one of several defendants, he

may have judgment against that one, and

the other defendants may have judgment

against plaintiff for costs. The rule is

alike applicable to actions ex contractu and

ex delicto." Kellogg v. Window (1897),

100 la. 552, 69 N. W. 875. In Curran v.

Steiu (1901), — Ky. — , 60 S. W. 839, the

court say : " In Gasson v. Badgett,

6 Bush, 97, it was held that in an action

against two upon an alleged joint con-

tract no judgment could be rendered

against one upon proof that the contract

was made with him alone. But after this

decision was rendered by the act of 1888

the following amendment was made to

section 131 of the Code of Practice: 'In

an action on a contract alleged to have

been made by several defendants, in the

event the evidence shall show the contract

to have been made witli less than all those

defendants bv whom it is alleged to have

been made, this shall not be deemed

either a variance or failure of proof, but

judgment may be rendered against the

party or parties shown to be bound and in

favor of those shown not to be bound.' "

See also Council Bluffs Savings Bank v.

Griswold (1897), 50 Neb. 753, 70 N. W.

376, in wliich the court construing the

Iowa statute quoted in the text said :

" The evident purpose of tlie statute above

quoted is to abolish tlie joint liability of

persons bound by contract, judgment, or

statute, and to authorize the prosecution

of actions against any or all of the parties

so liable, at the election of the plaintiff,"

and see further Schowalter v. Beard

(1900), lOOkla. 454, 63 Pac. 687, as fol-

lows ; " Another defence urged is that the

obligation is joint, and that all the ob-

ligors should be made parties defendant.
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against any or all of the survivors, A\ith tlie representatives of all

or any of the decedents, or against the latter or any of them. If

all the persons so bound be dead, the action may be brought

against the representatives of all or of any of them. An action

or judgment against any one or more of several persons jointly

bound shall not be a bar to proceedings against the others." ^

Substantially, the same change in the common law is made b)'

the North Carolina code.^

§ 301. * 404. Two Classes of Statutory Provisions Compared and

Distinguished. These two classes of legislative enactments must

be examined separately. The provisions of the first class relate

solely to persons severally, as opposed to those jointly or jointly

and severally liable. The term " severally liable " has long had

a well-known technical meaning in the law, and is plainly used

with that meaning in this connection. The modification of the

former rules made by tliis section is therefore quite restricted.

Again, this several liability must arise from the fact that the

persons are all parties to one single instrument, except that, in a

few States, sureties upon separate instruments are also included.
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This latter clause is probably intended to cover the case, which

is not infrequent, of two or more official or other bonds given on

behalf of the same principal and to the same obligee, and in-

tended to secure the same object, the rights and obligations of

the sureties thence arising being the same as if they had all

executed a single undertaking.^ In the third place, there is no

limit upon the kind of contract from which this several liability

may arise, provided it is in writing. The broad language of the

clause includes any and every species of written contract."* The

instances given of bills, notes, checks, orders, etc., are illustra-

tions merely, and do not restrict the operation of the section to

themselves. The result is, that the provision as a whole has the

same force and effect in all the States of whose codes it forms a

part, with the single exception, already noticed, in reference to

sureties upon separate instruments. Fourthly, no change is made

1 QKentuckj, Codes, 1895, § 27.] QSee ante, p. 289, note 1, for similar

- Code of North Carolina, § 63 a. " In statutes in Arkansas, Kansas, Missouri,

all cases of joint contract of co-partners in and Minnesota ]

trade, or others, suits may he brouf^ht and -^ See Towcll v. Powell, 48 Cnl. 234.

prosecuted on the same against all or any * Tlie clause does not enihrace qr

number of the persons making sucli con- apply to oral contracts : Excliange Bauk

tract." See Merwin v. liallard, 65 N. C. i-. Ford, 7 Colo. .'iU.

168.
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in the prior rules of law which define the nature of " several

liability." The contracts from which such a liability arises, and

the cases in which it exists, are left as the codes found them.

Finally the only change made by the section is, that while the

common law required a separate action by the creditor against

each one of the persons thus severally liable, he is now per-

mitted at his option to sue all, one, or any of them.^ How far

the provision permits the joinder of the personal representatives

of deceased parties with any or all of the survivors as co-defend-

ants must be a matter for judicial construction ; that found in

the Kentucky code removes all possible doubt by expressly

authorizing such a proceeding. The second class of provisions

goes to the root of the matter, and practically destroys all dis-

tinction between joint, joint and several, and several liabilities,

in respect of actions against the original parties, and of those

against the survivors and the representatives of such as have

died. These enactments are so express, so full, and so plain in

their language, that they leave very little room for forensic

exposition or judicial interpretation.
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§ 302. * 405. Turning-Point of Decisions herein. Illustrations.

From this analysis of the language I proceed to the judicial in-

terpretation which has been put upon it. Most of the conclusions

contained in the foregoing paragraph result so plainly from the

express terms of the statute, that no doubt can be entertained of

their correctness, and no necessity can arise for judicial construc-

tion. It will be found, therefore, that the decisions based upon

this section have generally turned, not upon any question as to

its meaning, but upon points of the former law. Nearly all of

these cases will be seen, when we get at the ratio decidendi, to

have determined either that the parties were or were not severally

liable, or that they were or were not liable upon the same instru-

ment. These points, I say, are preliminary only, and do not

belong to any exposition of the statutory provision itself ; they

simply settle the question whether or not the particular case falls

1 QRuffatti V. Lexiugton Mining Co. is no ground of complaint on the part of

(1894), 10 Utah, 386, 37 Pac. 591. "In tlie mining company, if it, in fact, was

suit upon a contract, where the evidence bound by the contract, that the plaintiff

warrants it, we think it is universally saw fit to sue some one else who was not

held that a recovery may be had against bound, in connection with it, to recover

one or the other, or both, of the defend- damages for a breach."]

auts, who are sued upon the contract. It

398 CIVIL REMEDIES.

39

IYIL RE:-.IEDIE .

■within its terms. The decisions to be cited will illustrate this

statement, and show its correctness. In a leading case, giving a

construction to the section, the New York Court of Appeals said :

" It relates to several, and not to joint liabilities. The latter did

not require the aid of a special provision. It relates in terms to

cases where a plurality of persons contract several obligations

on the same instrument." ^ The Supreme Court of Wisconsin

has expressed itself to the same effect. " The language of this

statute is very clear and positive, and no doubt can exist as to its

meaning. It has changed the rule of the common law with

respect to the actions which it mentions. No demurrer can now

be sustained for the nonjoinder or misjoinder of parties defendant

where a part only of the persons severally liable are included in

the action, and the rest omitted, and that fc>ct appears on the face

of the complaint." '^

§ 303. * 406. Forms of Contract included in Statute. Illustrations.

Form of Judgment. The terms of the statute are so broad and

unrestricted, that they include every kind and form of written

contract upon which the parties thereto are made severally liable.^
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It is not necessary that they .should be bound for the same identical

demand or debt, nor that each should be responsible for the aggre-

gate amount of all their several liabilities. In other words, it is

not neces.sary that the judgment sliould be a joint one for the

same single debt, nor even a separate judgment against each for

that one sum, nor, as it would seem, a separate judgment against

each for the same sum. If a contract should be made by a num-

ber of promisors, by which each bound himself in an amount

different from that of all the others, the liability Avould plainl}''

be several, and the agreement itself would be embraced within

the terms of the section. The Supreme Court of Kentucky has

used the following language in reference to such a contract.

" In this case there is but one contract, and it is the same con-

tract between the same parties, but several as to its obligation.

1 Carman v. I'la-ss, 2.3 X. Y. 280, 287, .several liability, and not a joint liability

j)er Denio .1. with the otiicr subscril)ers, and hence isio

- Decker v. Trilling. 24 Wis. 610, 612, be enforced in an action .at law against

])er Dixon C. J. (^Hut see Hodges v. him alone. "]

Xalty (1899), 104 Wis. 464, 80 N. W. 726, " [[.Main r. Johnson (189.3), 7 Wash,

in which the court, speaking of the liabil- .321, .35 I'ac. 07 ; Kodini v. Lytle (1896),

ity incurred by the subscribers to a fund 17 Mont. 448, 43 I'ac. 501 ; Loustalot v.

for the construction of a church, said: Calkins (1898), 120 Cal.- 688, 53 Pac.

" Tlie liability of each subscriber is a 258. 3
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303. * 406 . For ms of Con tra ct incl uded in Sta tute . Ill ustratio n s .
Form of Ju dgm ent. The t rms of the tatute are o br c"td and
unre trict cl that the include every kind and form of wri tt n
ontr, ct upon which the partie thereto are made ,·erally liabl .3
It i not nee ar; that the houlcl be bound f r he ame i lenti al
d mancl or debt nor that each h ulcl be re pon ible for th ·
ate amount of c 11 their veral liabilitie . I n other worl it i
n t n ce ary that the judgment ·h ull b a joint one f r th
. ame ingle <leb , nor even a eparat judgm nt a ·a.inst ach f r
ha.t one um nor, a it w ulJ. em a 'eparat juclarnent a ain
each f r the ·am um . If a ontra t hould be m, 1 by a number of pr mi or b whi h ach b und 1 im lf in an am un
cliff rent from that of all the ther the liability w ulcl lainl r
be : v ral and th acrre ment it elf w ukl b embr, c l wi bin
t he t nu of he
·tion. Th
upr me
urt of r en tuck r h,
U ' •cl tlie f llowing language in r f r nc
t
u h a c01 trac .
'In hi
th r i but one
and it i the am ·ontract bet,Ye n th am partie. but veral a t i
obli , ti n .
T

l
Jif'f
::!

Carm a n c. Plas., 23 •

T .

Y. 2 6, 2 i

I) •uici .T.
IJ•'tk<>r

1·.

Tr illin g . 24 \Yi · . 610, 12,

l'"r Dix•111 ( '. J . [But c II orl ge t•.
. 'alty (I 99), lrH W L . 464-, 0 ...'. \V. i26,
i11 '" hid1 the court, p •aking of th li aL il"ty ilH:urrecl l1y t he ub c ri l,er to a fnnd
fur tl11: cnu:tructio n f a church aid :
" T he liability of

everal liability, and not a j oint liability
with he oth er . ub criber , and h nc i to
l ie nforc cl in an acti on at law agaio . t
him ~ Jou ."]
3 [~Iain 1·. John on (1 9.'3), i Wach.
321 , 35 Pac. Gi; I ocliui t'. Lytl ( 1 9 ),
l i l\l ont. 44- , 43 Pac. 5 l ; Lou , lot .
alkin (1 9 ), 120
al. 6 , 53 la.
25 .]
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And neither the hmguage nor the presumed objeet of the section

can be constructively restricted to a several contract binding

each separate obligor for the whole amount of their aggregate

liabilities. The letter of the section certainly authorizes no such

restriction; and the policy of avoiding a vexatious multiplicity of

actions for the breach of the same contract, would apply equally

to every contract made at one and the same time by the same

parties severally liable upon it." ^ Upon this doctrine a joint

action was sustained against twenty-seven persons who had exe-

cuted the following undertaking : " We the undersigned agree

to become bound to A. as sureties for B., each for the sum of

8100, for any goods he may buy of said A., each of us to be

bound for $100 and no more, it being the true intent and mean-

ing that each incurs for himself a separate liability for $100." ^

Although such an action 'is brought against all the debtors, and

thus appears to be joint, the judgment of course is not joint but

separate, that is, against each for the amount of his own liability.

It could certainly make no difference in -the principle if the par-

ties to such an agreement each undertook a different amount of
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liability instead of all incurring the same. These views have

been approved, and it has been expressly held that when persons

are bound for separate sums by the same instrument, and are

sued jointly, a separate judgment should be entered against each

for the amount of his individual indebtedness.^ The case thus

resembles the ordinary contract of subscription, which in accord-

ance with the principle of the decisions above quoted would

clearly be embraced within this section.*

§ 304. * 407. Form of Judgment Continued. Discussion by Wis-

consin Supreme Court. The question has been raised whether in

an action, under this provision of the codes, against all or some

of the persons thus severally liable upon the same instrument, a

joint judgment against the defendants can ever be proper, and

whether the final determination of the court should not be in the

form of a separate judgment against each for his individual liabil-

ity.^ It has been said that the statute permitting debtors sever-

1 Wilder. Haycraft, 2 Duvall, 309, 311, " The case of an action against the

per Robertson J. makers and indorsers of a note or bill is

^ Ibid. special. A suit against them resulting in

3 People V. Edwards, 9 CaL 286. a joint judgment for the amount due, is

* [^But see Hodges v. Nalty (1899), 104 ])ermitted by express statutes passed long

Wis. 464, 80 X W. 726.]] jjrior to tiie new procCkiure.
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ally liable to be sued jointly, and the joint action brought in

accordance therewith, do not make them jointly liable ; and it can

make no possible difference in the apphcation of this principle,

whether each person is severally bound on the contract for the

same or for a different sum.^ An action against the maker, and

the personal representatives of a deceased indorser of a promissory

note has been sustained under this section, but it was held that a

joint judgment against them could not be rendered. This ruling

was placed upon the ground that the judgment agiiinst one must be

de bonis propriis, and against the other de bonis testatoris.^ The

whole subject has been ably and exliaustively treated by the

Supreme Court of Wisconsin, and I shall quote their discussion

and conclusions. The action was upon a joint and several prom-

issory note, the plaintiff electing to treat it as several, and pro-

ceeding to sue two only of the five makers. He had obtained a

joint judgment for the amount of the note against both, and each

was of course liable for that entire amount. The court say:

" Another objection is to the form of the judgment. The judg-

ment is a joint one against both of the defendants, instead of
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being several against each. It is urged that this is erroneous.

It is contended that the option given to the plaintiff to include in

the action all or any of the persons thus severally liable, is to

enable him to accomplish in one action what by the former prac-

tice required several actions, — that is, to enforce in the action

the several liability of each defendant in the same manner as if

a separate suit had been brought against him. But for its being

obviated by a provision of the statute to which I shall presently

refer, this objection would be fatal to the judgment. The form

of the judgment is not directed by the statute authorizing per-

sons thus severally liable to be included in the action. The

second subdivision of § 11 of chapter 124 of the Revised Statutes

of Wisconsin ^ has no relation to the question, because, as held by

the Court of Appeals in Pruyn v. Black,"* the words there used,

'• defendants severally liable," mean defendants liable separately

from the defendants not served, though joi)itly as respects each

1 Kelsey v. Bradljury, 21 Barb. 531 ; ^ Tliis section provides for taking

Parker v. Jackson, 16 Barb. 3.3. judgment against some of tlie defendants

2 Eaton i;. Alger, 47 N. Y. 345; 2 " .severally liable " in an action, when the

Keyes, 41 ; Churchill r. Trapp, 3 Al)b. otliers liave not been servc'l. It i.-< the

Pr. 306. See also Burgoyne v. U. L. Ins. same as [^§ 2884, St., 1898.]

& Tr. Co., 5 Ohio St. 586. •• I'ruvii c. Black, 21 N. V. .300.

all~

li, ble o be ued jointly, arnl h j int acti n brought in
ac ordauce herewith, do n t m· k th m J'ointly li bl ; and i can
im ke n po ible differen in h alI li a i n of this principle,
' h h r ach p r on i ev rail b und on he contra t for the
me r or a differ n um. 1
n action a ain t the maker, and
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joint judgment again t hem could n t be render d. Thi ruling
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of i c n. in 3 ha no relation o th qu ti 1 b au
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ourt f Appeal in I rnyn v. Bla k
h w rd h r l d,
f n lent liabl
para ely
·cl f nclan · . v rally liabl ' m an
cl thou ·h j intl
ct ach
from h cl fenclant' n t
1 Y l ey v. Bradbury, 21 Barb. 5.31;
Parker v. Jackson, 16 Barb. 33.
2 J-..aton v. Alg •r, 4i
. Y. 3-1-5; 2
} ey , 41;
hur hill . Trapp, 3 Abu.
r. 306. , 'ee al o urg yne v. . L. Iu .
& Tr. Co., 5 hio t. 5 6.
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other. And the provisions of § 20 of chap. 132 of the Revised

Statutes of Wisconsin ^ do not affect it, for the reason that the

judgment tliere authorized against one or more of several defend-

ants is only when a several judgment may be proper. It seems

to me to be left therefore for the courts to determine according

to the general principles of the law governing the subject what

the form of the judgment shall be ; and, acting upon these prin-

ciples, it seems very clear to me that the judgment should follow

the nature oi the claim establislied ; and if that is separate and

several as against each defendant, then the judgment should be

so." ^ The judgment in this case was not, however, reversed,

since another section of the Wisconsin code requires the court to

disregard any error which does not affect the substantial rights of

the parties.

§ 305. * 408. Joint and Several Liability may be treated by Prom-

isee or Obligee as Several under Statute herein. — Although persons

jointly and severally liable on a contract are not mentioned in

this section of .the codes, it is within the option of the promisee

or obligee in such an agreement to treat it as several, and by his
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act to render it so to all intents and purposes. A joint and sev-

eral contract has been held, therefore, to fall within the scope and

operation of the provision ; and the creditor, in pursuance of its

permission, has the election to sue each of the debtors singly, or

1 This section is the general provision force in this State, for the reason that the

rel.atiug to judgments, permitting judg- question is regulated by our code of civil

ment to be rendered for some of the de- procedure.' " And it is said tlie statute

fendants, and against the others, under provides : " Though all the defendants

certain circumstances; it corresponds to have been summoned, the judgment may

[^§ 2883, St., 1898.3 be rendered against any of them severally,

- Decker v. Trilling, 24 Wis. 610, 613, when the plaintiff would be entitled to

per Dixon C. J. [|In Haasler v. Hefele judgment against such defendants if the

(1898), 151 Ind. 391, 50 N. E. 361, it was action had been against them severally."

objected that since the cause of action See Bunnell v. Berlin Iron Bridge Co.

alleged was joint a separate judgment (1895), 66 Conn. 24, 33 Atl. 533, in which

against each of the two defendants for the court say : " Independently however

one-half the amount of plaintiff's claim of such autliority, we think the provisions

was erroneous. In answer to this objec- of the Practice Act for including in one

tion the court said : " If any one should action parties defendant liaving separate

complain of this it would seem to be the and even antagonistic interests, and for

appellee,' who was not given the joint authorizing tlie court by orders for sepa-

judgment for which she had asked in her rate trials and otherwise to protect their

complaint. In answer to a similar objec- differing interests, clearly implies the pos-

tion, it was said by this court in Loui.sville, sibility of a 'final judgment' as to one

etc. 11. W. Co. V. Treadway, 143 Ind. 689 : party, altliough the action continues in

' The authorities cited by appellant in court for the disposition of the rights of

support of the rule asserted can have no other parties. "J

26
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402
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to sue all, or to sue an}^ number of them.^ The question might

arise, whether, if he elected to sue all, the contract would be

reo-arded as joint in accordance with the former practice, or

whether by virtue of this statutory enactment it would be taken

as several. I am not aware that this question, which perhaps has

little practical importance, has been passed upon by the courts.

^ 306. * 409. Case of Guarantor and Principal Debtor. Weight of

Authority. Rule in Iowa. — It has been decided in many cases, and

undoubtedly the weight of authority sustains this ruling, that a

guarantor and the principal debtor cannot be sued together in

one action ; even though the guaranty be written upon the same

paper with the agreement which it undertakes to secure. It is

said that the principal debt and the collateral undertaking do not

constitute one instrument, and the parties therefore do not come

within the language of the statute.^ A diiferent rule, however,

1 Decker v. Trilliug, 24 AVis. 610, 612;

Clapp V. Preston, 15 Wis. .543 ; Burgoyiie

V. O. L. Ins. & Tr. Co., 5 Ohio St. 586 ;
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People V. Edwards, 9 Cal. 286; People v.

Love, 25 Cal. 520, 526. Action on a joint

and several bond. The court held it gov-

o u all or to ue an n mb r of th m .1
h que ti 11 mi h ari e whether if h
1 cte l o ' U all h · ntract ' · ultl Le
r l d a join in accor lan e 'Yi th th
01
\Yh th r b - virtue
f thi ta utory na ·tm n i would be tak n
a
Yer< 1. I am n t a war that tbi q u ti n which p
lit tle r, ctical im ortan e ha be n pa d up n b · th
306 . *-± 9. Case of Guarantor and Principal Debtor. Weight of
Authority . Rule in Iowa. - I t ha be 11 l cid d in man
a
an<l.
uncloubtelll the weigh
f auth ri
u ·tain hi , rulin
ha a.
uarantor and he principal l btor cannot be ued t
h r in
11e action · e er hon h th guaranty be written upon the am
paper with the a r m n wbi h it uncl rtak to
·ure. I
aid hat the prin ipal l b an l the collateral undertaking do not
con titute one in trumen , and the partie therefore do n ot om
"ithin the languag of the tatut .2
different rul h wever

erned by the statute as though several.

It lias been said, therefore, that this pro-

vi.<ion has in effect destroyed joint and

several liability arising on single express

written contract. Hepj)e v. .Johnson, 73

Cal. 265; Steffes v. Lemke, 40 Minn. 27.

2 Le Roy v. Shaw, 2 Duer, 626; l)e

Ridder v. Schermerhorn, 10 Barb. 638;

Allen V. Fosgate, 11 How. Pr. 218; Phalen

V. Dingee, 4 E. D. Smith, 379; Carman

r. Plass, 23 N. Y. 286, 287, per Denio .J. ;

H-mdurant v. Bladen, 19 Ind. 160; Virden

r. Ellsworth, 15 Ind. 144. See also Burton

V. Speis, 5 Hun, 60; Graham v. Ringo, 67

Mo. 324; Tyler v. Tualatin Academy, 14

Ore. 485. For a lonn of contract under

which the guarantor man be sued jointly

with the principal debtor, see Decker v.

Gaylord, 8 Hun, 110, a case analogous to

Carman v. Plass, <:ited in the following

note. ([Loustalot v. Calkins (1898), 120

Cal. 688. .53 Pac. 258. In this case Calkins

had indorsed note sued upon before de-

livery and under .section 3117 of the Civil

I D ecker v. Trilling, 24 Wi . 610, 612;
demurred beca.u. e of a "mi. joincler of
Japp v. Pre ton, 15 Wi . 543; Burgoyne parti e. defendan t in that J. '\\'. alkin ,
v. . L. Ins. & Tr. Co., 5 Obi
t. 5 6; an all eged and . uppo ed guarantor, i
P eople r. l<.. dward-, 9 Cal. 2 6; P ople v. joined with the principal µr omi.or ." A
L oYe, 25 Cal. 520, 526. Action on a joint j oin t and eYeral judgment wa rendered
a nd ~eve ral bond. The cour t held it gov- again t the deti udant . F or re,·eral upon
rued lJy t he t atute a · th oug h ev ral. ap peal ne of the two groun d r li d upon
I t ha · lJee n aid, th er for , that thi pro- wa "the demurr r of J. \Y. n,Jkin to
Yi:-i on h
in effect d troyed joint and the complaint hould have b en
. Yeral liability ari ing on ·ingle expre s tained ." The cour t aid: "In
writ ten contract. Reppe v. J hn on, 73 to partie~ who may be join d
al. 265; teffe v. L mke, 40 Milin. 27.
ant , the ode of i"il Proc <lure, ection
2 Le Roy v.
haw, 2 Duer, 626; De 3 3, declare. : ' Per on
everally fr ble
Ridder v. 'chermerhorn, l 0 Barb. 63 ; upon the ame obligation or in t rum nt,
All en v. Fo gate, l l llow. Pr. 21 ; Phalen including the partie to bill of exchange
1•. Dingee, 4 E. D. , mith, 3- 9; arman aud promi ory not
and . ur tie on the
r. Pla · , 23 N. Y. 2 6, 2 7, per Denio J.;
ame or epar ate in ·trum nt , may all
B undurant v. Bladen, 19 Ind. 16 ; Virden or aqy of th m be in cluded in the ame
1· . Ell · worth, 15 I nd. 144.
'ee al o Burton action, at the option of th plaintiff.' B
1·. , ' pei., 5 Hun, 60;
raham L'. ingo, 6 i a liberal con truction of thi provi ion it
_Io. 324; T ler v. Tualatin A ad my 14 may be fairly aid that an indor er, u h
c>re. 4 5. For a :form of contract unrler a th cl ef ndant alkin , i a part to the

Code of that State thereby became liable

ecti n f th

as an indorser. One Libcn and A. C.

Calkins, the makers, and .J. W. Calkins

plici t~·

•were joined us defendants .J. W. Calkins

demurred because of a " misjoinder of

parties defendant in that .1. W. Calkins,

an alleged and supposed guarantor, is

joined with the principal jiromisors." A

joint and several judgment was rendered

against the defendants. For reversal upon

appeal one of the two grounds relied upon

was "the demurrer of J. W. Calkins to

the complaint should have been sus-

tained." The court said: " In speaking as

to parties who may be joined as defend-

ants, the Code of Civil Procedure, section

383, declares : ' Persons severally liable

upon tlie same obligation or instrument,

including the parties to bills of exchange

and j)romissory notes and sureties on the

same or separate instruments, may all

or any of them be included in the same

action, at the option of the plaintiff.' By

1){ tha, , 'tatr~ tlwr b.\· Ii ·earn· l ial1lr.
an i11dor:Pr. ( 11c L ilien and A. C.
<'al kin . tl1« m•tkn., a111l .J. '\ . (' a)kiu ·
wn join ·d a defeudaut
.J . W. 'alhu ·

( '1,1lc•

:i

of acti on . Aud w . e no . uhautial ohjcction t th application of th
Tpon
rul o a ea. e lik th e on at b, r.
an x a miuati ou of the aut horitie. from
<Jt he> r . ta te lw,·ing . tatntory proYi ion.
. nl1sta11 tially im ilar to the one found i11
our 1·r>1le, w fiwl t ho ~ auth oriti e..; pr pond rat i ng to th ·ffcct tha , ~ n :n:wtur
au1l the mak r of a prom i . o r~· uotc rn: y
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prevails in Iowa, and it is there held in a series of cases, that the

guarantoi- and the principal debtor may be sued in one action,

since they are liable for the same debt, and are, within the mean-

ing of the section, bound upon the same instrument.^

§307. * 410. When Liability arises from same Instrument. — A

surety or guarantor may be joined as a co-defendant with his

principal if the contract be in such a form and of such a nature

that his liability ar'ises from the same instriniient. A lease made

between the lessor of the first part, and the lessee A. of the

second part, and B. of the third part, contained the usual clauses

of demise to A. and covenants on his part to pay rent, etc., and

also a covenant, on the part of B., whereby " he did, in con-

sideration of the premises and of the sum of one dollar, guar-

antee unto the lessor the payment of the aforesaid rent, and the

faithful performance of the covenants in said lease contained."

The instrument was signed and sealed by all the parties. The

New York Court of Appeals held that the lessor might, by vir-

tue of the section under consideration, maintain an action against

A. and B. to recover a sum due for rent. The case was distin-
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guished from the others cited above, in reference to ordinary

guaranties, since the parties to this lease were made liable by the

same instrument.'"^ I cannot refrain from expressing the opinion

not be joined as parties defendant; but ground of improperly uniting two causes

that question is not directly before us, of action. 3

and we pass it by for tliat reason. In this ^ Tucker ;'. Shiner, 24 Iowa, 334 ; Mix

State from its earliest judicial history the v. Fairchild, 12 Iowa, 331 ; Marvin v.

makers and indorsers of negotiable prom- Adamson, 11 Iowa, 371;' Peddicord ?•.

issory notes have been joined as parties Whittam, 9 Iowa, 471.

defendant, and no question as to the cor- ^ Carman v. Plass, 23 N. Y. 286, 287.

rectness of the practice has ever been Where an administrator in the course of

suggested. For this reason alone we feel his administration gave two bonds with

constrained to give the statute a construe- different sureties, but the umlertaking and

tion it has tacitly borne for so many the liabilities of the sureties being the

years. . . . Tlie demurrer was properly same in each, it was held, in California,

overruled." that all the sureties on both bonds coulil

See also Gilmore v. Skookum Box be sued in one action under the special

Factory (1899), 20 Wash. 703, 56 Pac. provision of the code in that State. Pow-

934. where it was held that under Bal. ell v. Powell, 48 Cal. 234; QStoner v.

Code, § 4836, providing that persons sev- Keith County (1896), 48 Neb. 279, 67

erally liable upon the same promi.ssory N. W. 311. "It is further claimed that

note may all, or any of them, be included there was a misjoinder of parties ; that

in the same action, a complaint declaring the sureties on the first bond should not

against the maker of a note on his written have joined in an action with those

undertaking, and also against another who signed the second. Under the view

party on a verbal promise to pay the that the default of the treasurer occurred

same note, is not demurrable on the after the execution of tiie second bond,

404 CIVIL KEMEDIKS.
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that this is a distinction without a difference. Believing that

the decision of the court was right, it is impossible to discrim-

inate the cases of ordinary guaranties from it by any valid and

substantial reasons. By permitting parties to a contract resem-

bling this lease to be joined in a single action, and refusing to

admit the same form of suit against a principal debtor and his

guarantor, whose undertaking is perhaps indorsed upon the same

writing, the courts in fact make the nature of their obligation to

depend upon the position of the written matter on the paper, and

not upon the terms and nature of their agreements. The rules

of procedure, as established by the reformed system, were never

designed to be controlled by such considerations. The judicial

decisions which illustrate the second class of provisions quoted

at the commencement of this section have already been cited and

discussed in section sixth, and need not be repeated here.

SECTION NINTH.

BRINGING IN NEW PARTIES: INTERVENING.

§ 308. * 411. Two Types of Code Provisions herein. As the

equitable theory of parties was adopted in the new procedure, we
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should naturally expect some provision for changing them, either

by addition or diminution. In accordance with this expectation,

the codes all contain sections prescribing rules more or less elab-

orate and explicit for tlie guidance of the courts in this respect.

tba

thi" i a distincti n \\ ith ut a differenc
B eli in tha
t
ll ci ion of the court wa ri 0 ht it i imp ' ible t di 'crimina t th ca " of ordinary guanin tie from it b ~ any alid and
ubstantial re . on . By permit tin · p·:irties t a ontract re mbliu · thi 1 a e to be j ined in a ingle action, aLCl r fu ing to
< drnit the ame f rm of uit again ' t a prin ipal lebtor an l hi
guamnt r 'Yho under ·ik in 0 • i · p rhar ' inclor ed up n the am
1ni in ·, tl co irt in fact nrnk the nature f th ir obli 0 ation to
depen l upon t h p i ion of th written matter on the paper, and
not up n the term and natur of their agreem nt ·. 'lh rul
of procedure, a e tabli he l by the r formed stem, w r ne1 er
le igned t be contr lled by uch on ider tion" The judi ial
deci ions which illu ·tra e the econ l cla " of provi i ns quoted
at the commencement of thi ection have already been cited and
di cu ' ed in ection sixth, and need not be repeated here.

They follow two different types. The one is the mere statement

in a statutory form of the doctrine as to bringing in new parties

which had long prevailed in courts of equity, and to it is atlded a

provision which permits a summary interpleader to be ordered by

SECTION NINT H.

the court, upon motion, in certain specified cases, thus avoiding

the delay and trouble of a fonnal interpleader suit. The New

BRINGING IN NEW PARTIES: INTERVENING.

York code adopted this type, and it has been followed, sometimes

with slight variations, but often with literal exactpess, by most of

the State codes and practice acts. The other type is entirely dif-

ferent. It discards entirely all the ancient notions; it goes far

beyond the concessions made by the equity courts; it creates,

the sureties on both bonds were properly prin(i]);il to faitlifuUy jicrfonn the duties

joined as parties defendants. They were of liis oflke."3

each and all liable for the failure of the

§ 308 . * 411. Two T y p es of Code Prov isio n s herein . As the
eq uitabl theor of parties \\a adopted in the new procedur we
houlcl naturally expect me provi ion for hanging hem, either
b; addition or diminution . In a rdance with thi xpec ation,
the code ' all ontain ec i ns pr scribing rule mor or le" laborate and xplicit f r the guidanc of he court in hi r e I e · .
Th r follow two cliff rent type . The one i the m r statem nt
in a tatutory form f the do trine as o bringin in new par i
which h ad lon · pr aile l in ourt of equit ancl to i i aid d a
proYi ·ion yvhi h p rmit · a summar interplead r
be rder b r
he court upon m tion in c r ain pe ifi cl a e · thu av i ling
the d b y and trouhl f a f rmal interpl <t l r iit. Th
York end aclop cl hi t ·p , nd i ha. b en f 11 w cl
with .·li0 l t Yaria ions lmt oft n with literal xa p · by rn : of
th e tate ode and prcw ti · a ·t . Tl other yp i" nlirely diff r "llt . I t di.· ·ar<l: ntir ly all h an i n
far
lJeyon<l he
nee· i n m·ule by th
qui
T

T

the nr<"tie on both bo nd w r prop rly
j•Jiur- a. partie d f nu:w ·. Th y \\'Cl'
acl1 :1.t1(l all Ji, lik· fo r the fa ilure of th

prin cipal 10 fai hfully perfo r m
of hi . office."]

h
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under the title "Intervention," or ''Intervening," a new division

of the procedure. The fundamental notion is, that the person

ultimately and really interested in the result of a litigation — the

person who will be entitled to the linal benefit of the recovery —

may at any time, at any stage, intervene and be made a party, so

that the whole possible controversy shall be ended in one action

and by a single judgment. The States v/hicli have adopted this

type to its fullest extent are Iowa and California, and their ex-

ample has been followed in a number of others.

§309. *412. Statutory Provisions of First Form. The provisions

which follow the first form, as thus described, are all represented

by the sections contained in the New York code : " The court

may determine any controversy between the parties before it,

where it can be done without prejudice to the rights of others,

or by saving their rights ; but where a complete determination

of the controversy cannot be had without the presence of other

parties, the court must cause them to be brought in.

" And when in an action for the recovery of real or personal

property a person not a party to the action, but having an interest
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in the subject thereof, makes application to the court to be made a

party, it may order him to be brought in by the proper amendment.

"A defendant against whom an action is pending upon a con-

tract, or for specific real or personal property, may, at any time

before answer, upon affidavit that a person not a party to the

action, and without collusion with him, makes against him a de-

mand for the same debt or property, upon due notice to such

person and the adverse party, apply to the court for an order to

substitute such person in his place, and discharge him from

liability to either party, on his depositing in the court the amount

of the debt, or delivering the property or its value to such person

as the court may direct; and the court may, in its discretion,

make the order." ^

1 [^The present New York statute reads a person, not a party to the action, has au

as follows : Code Civ. Pro., § 4.52 : " The interest in the subject thereof, or in real

court may determine the controversy, as property, tlie title to which may in any

between the parties before it, where it niauuer be affected by the judgment, or

can do so without prejudice to the rights in real property for injury to which the

of others, or by saving their rights ; but complaint demands relief, and makes ap-

where a complete determination of tiie plication to tlie court to be made a party,

controversy cannot be had without the it must direct him to be brought in by tlie

presence of other parties, the court must proper amendment." Code Civ. Pro.,

direct them to be brouglit in. And where §820: "A defendant against whom an

under the title '' Interv n tion, " or '' lnterve nin " a new <livi::;ion
of th proce<lme. The furn.lam ntal notion i::;, tha.t i hc person
ultimately and really inter ste l i1 t he result of a litigation - lie
person who will be eni itl d to t he final benefit of the i·ecoY ,ry -nuty at any time, at a.ny 'tage, intervene and be macle a part ·, so
that the whole possible controver.sy ·hall be ended in one acti•m
and by a single judgment. ,. he State ,,,-hich haye adopted this
type to its fullest extent are Io\va ancl \ilifornia, and their example has been follo wed. in a number of others.
~ 309. * 412. Statutory Provisions of First Form . T he provi ions
which follow the first form, as thus described, are all represented
by the sections contained in the Kew York code : " The court
may determine any controversy bet ween t he parties before it,
where it can be done without prejudice t o the rights of others,
or by saving their rights; but where a complete det ermination
of th~ controversy cannot be had without the presence of other
parties, the court must cause them to be brought in.
" And when in an action for the r ecovery of real or personal
property a person not a party to the action, but having au i11terest
in the ubject thereof, makes application to the court to be made a
party, it may order him to be brought in by the proper amendment.
"A defendant against whom an action is pending upon a contract, or for specific real or personal property, may, at any time
before answer, upon affidavit that a person not a party to the
action, and without collusion with him, makes against him a demand for the same debt or property, upon due notice to such
person and the adverse party, apply to the court for an order to
substitute such person in his place, and discharge him from
liability to either party, on his depositing in the court the amount
of the debt, or delivering the property or its value to such person
as the court may direct; and the court may, in its discretion,
make the order.'' 1
1 [Th e present New York st atute reads
as follows: Code Civ. Pro., § 452: "Th e
co urt may determine th e controYer y, as
betw een th e parties before it, " ·he re it
can do o without prejudice to th o ri g hts
of oth ers, or by saving their ri ghts ; but
where a complete det ermination of th e
controversy cannot be had wi thout th e
presence of other parties, the court must
direct them to be brought in. And where

a person, not a party to the action, ha an
interest in the subject the reof, or in real
p roperty, the title to which may in an,:-·
maimer be affected by the judgment, or
in real property fo r i11jury to whi ch th 0
complaint demands relief, and make appl ication to the court to be made a party,
it must di rect him to be broug ht in by rh
proper a mendment ."
Code Civ. Pro.,
§ 820: "A defend ant again ·t wh om an
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§ 310. * 41 o. Statutory Provision of Second Form. The Second

form of the statutory provisiou creating and regulating the subject

of "Intervention" is as follows: "Any person who has an in-

terest in the matter in litigation, in the success of either of the

parties to the action, or against both, may become a party to an

action between other persons, either by joining the plaintiff in

claiming what is sought by the petition, or by uniting with the

defendant in resisting the claim of the plaintiff, or by demanding

anything adversely to both the plaintiff and the defendant, either

before or after issue has been joined in the cause, and before the

trial commences. The court shall determine upon the inter-

vention at the same time that the action is decided, and the

iutervenor has no right to delay ; and if the claim of the inter-

venor is not sustained, he shall pay all costs of the intervention.

The intervention shall be by petition, which must set forth the

facts on which it rests ; and all the pleadings therein shall

action to recover upou a contract, or an

action of ejectment, or an action to recover
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a chattel, is pending, may, at any time be-

fore answer, npon proof, by affidavit, that a

person, not a party to the action, makes a

demand against bim for the same debt or

property, without collusion with him, ap-

ply to the court, upon notice to that person

~

Jl: . S tat utory Provision of Second Form. Th
nd
ionn f the 'tntu ry pro ·i 'ion c:r atint; and r egulatino· th
of .. Interventi n" i . . a· follow.:> : ~ n r per on " ·ho ha an in t re t m b matter in li i0 , ion in the ucc ,,., of i her f t h
I artie to th action or a0 ·ain t both, ma b (.;Olll a party
an
ither by joining the plain iff in
a.ction between other per n
claiming wha i ou ·h t by the l etition, or b uni ing with th
d f ndant in re i. tin()' the laim of the plain iff, r by deman ing
<tnythiug ad er ely to Lo h the I la.inti££ and th d f udant, either
before or after i ue ha" been joined in l e au "e and befor th
tri~tl
mmence." . The court 8hall det nnine upon th ii rv ntion at the ame 1m that the acti n i d cicl d and he
i nterven r ha n right t o delay · and if the claim f th int rv nor i n t usta.ined, he shall pcy all costs of the in er enti n.
T he inter ention shall be by petition, which mu t set f rth the
facts on which it re t ; and all the pleading ther in hall
.' 310.

and the adverse party, for an order to

substitute t!iat person in his place, and to

discharge him from liability to either, on

his paying ijito court tlie amount of the

debt, or delivering the possession of the

property, or its value, to such person as

the court directs ; or upon it appearing

that the defendant disputes, in whole or in

]iart. the liability as asserted against him

by different claimants, or that he has

some interest in the suljject-matter of the

co.itroversy which he desires to assert, his

applii-atioa may be for an order joining

the other claimant or claimants as co-de-

fendants with him in the action. The

court may, in its discretion, make such

order, upon such terms as to costs and

payments into court of the amount of

the debt, or part thereof, or delivery

of the po.ssossioii of tlie property, or its

value or part thereof, as may be just,

and tlierenpon the entire controversy may

1)6 determiiK'd in tlie action."] Ohio.

§§ 40-4.T; California, §§ 386, 389; Ne-

bra.ska, §§ 46-48; North Carolina, § 65;

Nevada, § 17; ^Arizona, ,Kev. St., 1901,

§ 1308; Arkansas, Sand. & Hill's Dig.,

§§ ."jCSj-.^es: ; Colorado, §§ 16-18; Con-

necticut, Gen. St., 1902, §§ 621, 1019:

Idaho, Code Civ. Pro., 1901, §§ 317.5,

3176, 3178; Indiana, Burns' St, §§ 273,

274; Iowa, Code, 1897, §§ 3466, 3487;

Kan.sas, Gen. St., 1901, §§4469-4471 ; Ken-

tucky, Code, 1895, §§ 28, 29; Missouri,

Rev. St., 1899, § 543 ; Montana, §§ 588,

591; North Dakota, Rev. Codes, 1899,

§§ 5238, 5240 ; Ohio, Bates' St., §§ 501.-5,

5014, 5016; Oklahoma, St., 1893, §§391.3-

3915; Oregon, Hill's Laws, §§ 40, 41;

South Carolina, Code, 1893, § 143; South

Dakota, Ann. St., 1901, §§ 6085, 6087;

Utah, Rev. St., 1898, §§ 2924, 2926;

Washington, Bal. Code, §§ 4840, 4842;

Wisconsin, St., 1898, § 2610; Wyoming,

a ction to recov r npou a contr act, or an
action of ejectment, or an action to r ecover
a chattel, i- pending, may, at a ny ti me before au-wer upon proof, by affidavit, th at a
per-on, not a party to the action , make a
tlemaud agaiu t him for the ame debt or
p r perty, without collusion with him., apply to the court, upon notice to t hat per on
anrl the a l \'er e par ty, for an or der to
·ub titute that per on in hi place, ancl t o
d i charge him fr m liability to e ither , on
hi' payiug iu o ourt the amo unt of the
debt, or <leli veri ug the po es. ion of t he
property, or it· val u , to uch per ou a
the court dire"t ; or u on it appeari ng
that the <lefeudaut di ·pute:, in whole or in
pa.rt, the liahili ty a, a. erte again t hi m
Ly different ·l. imant , or that he ha
ubjet:t-matt r of he
"'me intere t iu th
co.1tro,·er·y which he de ·ir · t a .. ert, hi
applil'a.tion may l>e for an or<l r joining
the other daimant or daimaut: as o-defemlaut: with him in t he act ion. T he
court may. in it di creti u, make . uch
order, np1111 ·n<'h t rm· a to co t and
p _,·met
i11ro c·otnt of the amount of
the debt, or part thereof, or del i v ry
of he p :;.;" :inn (Jf h property or it
'" Jue or p·lr thPreof. a ma~· he ju. ,
:rn l dtf'rf-llJ• 111 tit<' e11tir controvn. y ma\'
Ii•• dPtr•rinirtl'd i11 the action.''] . h i~.
"; .J.U-l'l; Culiforuia, f:.§ 3 6, 3 9; Ne-
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be governed by the same principles and rules as obtain in other

pleadings." ^

§ 311. * 414. Three Transactions herein. First of said Transac-

tions. Moving Party. Tlxe several clauses thus quoted at large

relate to and establish three entirely different transactions in the

conduct of an action. Not a little confusion has arisen from a

neglect to keep these three subjects separate ; the requisites of

the one have been confounded with those of another, and thus

mistakes have followed which a little care in examining the statute

would have obviated. The three transactions referred to are the

following: The first is provided for in all the codes, and is the

brief enactment of a familiar rule in equity. It is the bringing

in additional parties by the court when a complete determination

of the controversy cannot be had without their presence. This

act plainly contemplates the fiict that there are already parties

before the court, defendants against whom the plaintiff has a

cause of action, and is entitled to some relief. The enlarmnsf

the number of parties, under such circumstances, is clearly not
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the same thing as the commencing a new action because the

plaintiff has failed to make out any cause of action against those

1 Code of Iowa [;i897, §§ 3594-3596],

slightly changed in phraseology from the

former revisions of the statutes ; Califor-

nia, Code of 1872, § 387 : " Any person

may, before the trial, intervene in an action

or proceeding, who has an interest in the

matter in litigation, in the success of either

of the parties, or an interest a;^ainst botli.

be governed by the ame principles antl rul s as obtain m other
plen,cling ·." 1
~ 311. * 414. T hree T r a nsacti ons herein. First of said Transactions. Movin g P arty. The everal clause, thus quotetl at large
relate to and establi ·h three entirely different tran ·action· in the
conduct of an action. l' ot a little confu ·ion ha· arisen from a
n glect to keep these three subjects separate; the r quisite, f
the one have been confounded with tho ·e of another, and thus
mif;takes ha,ve followed which a little care in examining the statute
woultl have obviated. The three transactions referred to are the
follow ing: The first is provicled for in all the codes, and is the
brief enactment of a familiar rule in equity. It i' the bringing
in additional parties by the court when a complete determination
'Of the controversy cannot be had without their presence. This
act plainly contemplates the fact that there are already parties
before the court, defendants against whom the plaintiff ha a
cause of action, and is entitled to some relief. The enlarging
the number of partie , under such circumstances, is clearly not
the same thing as the commencing a new action because the
plaintiff has failed to make out any cause of action against tho ' C

An intervention takes place when a third

person is permitted to become a party to

an actiou or proceeding between other

persons, either by joining the plaintiff in

claiming what is sought by tlie complaint,

or by uniting with the defendant in resist-

ing the claims of the plaintiff, or by de-

manding anything adversely to both the

plaintiff and the defendant, and is made

by complaint setting fortli the grounds

upon which the intervention rests, filed

by leave of the court, and served upon

the parties to the action or proceeding

who have not appeared, and upon the at-

torneys of the parties who have appeared,

who may answer or demur to it as if it

were an original complaint." Tliis provi-

sion is somewhat changed from the origi-

nal f<irin in the statutes of 18.54, ch. 84,

§§ 71-74. It is substantially the same as

that in Iowa, except that tlie intervenor

must obtain leave of the court to file his

complaint, while in Iowa lie files his pe-

tition as a matter of course at his own

election.

QThe provisions of the Calforuia statute

respecting intervention are found in sub-

stantially similar form in Idaho, Code Civ.

Pro., 1901, 4) 3177 ; Montana, §589 ; North

Dakota, Rev. Codes, 1899, § 5239; South

Dakota, Ann. St., 1901, § 6086; Utali,

Rev. St., 1898, § 2925; Washington,

Bal. Code, § 4846; Colorado, §§ 22-24.

The provisions of the Iowa statute are

found in substantially similar iorm in Min-

nesota, Gen. St., 1894, § 5273; Nebraska,

Comp. St., 1901, §§ 5638-5640; Nevada,

Comp. Laws, 1900, § 3694. The Arizona

statute reads as follows : " Any person who

has an interest in the sul)ject-matter of tlie

1 Code of Iowa [ 1897, §§ 3594-3596],
§§ 71-7 4. It is substantially the same as
lightly changed in phraseology from the that in Iowa, except that the intervenor
former revision of the tatutes; Califor- must obtain leave of the court to file his
nia, Code of 18i2, § 387: "Any person complaint, while in Iowa he files his pemay, before the trial, intervene in an action tition as a matter of course at his own
or proceeding, who has an interest in the election.
matter iu litigation, in the success of eitber
[ The provisions of the Calfornia statute
-0£ the purtie , or an inte rest a~ainst both. · respecting intervention are found in subAn intervention takes place when a third stantially similar form in Idaho, Code Civ.
person is permitted to become a party to Pro., 1901, § 3177; Montana,§ 589; North
.an actioi;t or proceeding between other Dakota, Rev. Codes, 1899, § 5~39; South
persons, either by joining the plaintiff in Dakota, Ann. St., 1901, § 6086; Utah,
claiming what is sought by the complaint, Rev. St., 1898, § 2925; Washington,
or by uniting with the dcfenclant in resist- Bal. Code, § 4846 ; Colorado, §§ 22-24.
ing the claims of the plaintiff, or hy de- The proYisions of the Iowa statute are
manding anything adversely to both the found in substantially ~ imilar form in Minplaintiff and the defendant, and is made nesota, Gen. St., 1894-, § 5273; Nebraska,
by complaint setting forth the grounds Comp. St., 1901, §§ 5638-5640; NeYada,
upon which the inten'ention rests, filed Comp. Laws, 1900, § 3£94. The Arizona
by lea\'e of the court, and served upon statute reads as follow. : "Any per on who
the partie to the action or proceeding has an interest in the subject-matter of the
who haYe not appeared. and upon the at- suit which can be affected by the judgtorney of the parties who have appeared, ment, may, on leave of the court or judge,
who may answer or demur to it a if it intervene in such uit or proceedinO' at any
were an original complaint." This pr0Yi- time before the trial." Rev. St., 1901,
i () 11 is somewhat changed from the origi§ 1278. ]
nal form in the statute of l ::>-!, ch. 8-1,
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whom he has already sued. By whose desire or on whose motion

the additional parties shall be brought in, the section does not

specify, but the terms are broad enough to include every case.

In the majority of instances the plaintiff doubtless applies for the

additional parties. Cases may and do arise in which the defend-

ant, deeming it necessary to protect his own interests, makes the

application. Finally, the court may, on its own motion, order in

the persons whose presence it regards proper to a complete de-

termination of the issues.

§312. * 415. Second of said Transactions. Scope of Statutory Pro-

vision herein. Moving Party. Tlie second of these transactions, in

the progress of an action, is the bringing in and making a party

to the suit a third person upon his own application, — or, in the

very aj)propriate language of certain codes, the Intervening of a

third person. In respect to this proceeding there is the marked

difference between the two types of statutory provisions abeady

whom he has already ued. B y ho e d ire or on who e motion
th ad li ional par i
hall be brou ·ht in l e ection doe no
pecif , bu the t rm ar br a l nough
in lude v r
In the rnajorit · f in "tan " th plaintiff d ubtl
appli for the
adcliti nal partie . Ca e Ill< y and do ari ·e in which th l fondant l erning it n c , ry t protect hi own int r st m, ke the
applica ion . Finally h c urt may, n it
wn m tion, rd r in
the per on' who e presence it regards proper o a compJete cletermina ion of the i ·u .
312.

* 41 .

legislated upon the subject with great caution, and have merely

given a certain extension to the familiar common-law practice of
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permitting a landlord to come in and defend an action of eject-

ment in the place of his tenant. The provision itself is Very

brief, and by its terms is confined to actions for the recovery of

real or personal property. Beyond a doubt it embraces all equita-

ble actions in which the remedy is the recovery of real or personal

property, and is not restricted to the legal actions which cor-

respond to the ancient ejectment and replevin. This short and

simple clause is the only one which authorizes a third person to

be made a party upon his own motion.

§ 313. * 416. Intervention in Iowa and California. Origin of.

Passing to the codes of Iowa and California, we see that Inter-

vening rises at once into a proceeding of great importance. It

may be resorted to in any and all actions, and at every stage in

the action prior to the commencement of the trial. Tlie inter-

venor may have an interest witli tlie j^laintiff, or with the defend-

ant, or one special to himself and adver.se to both of the original

parties. He does not ask the privilege of intervening, and obtain

that privilege by an order; he intervenes as a matter of right, by

filing and serving his petition in the same manner as though he

was commencing an ordinary action, and his rights are passed

upon and disposed of, together wilh those of the plaintiff and

Scope of Statutory Pro-

The second of th e transc l n , m
the progre' of an action, i the bringin in aml makinO' a pc rty
to the uit a thir l per on upon hi own arr lie, tion, - or in th
ver appropriate languag of certain co l , the Interv ning of a
third per on. In re pect to this proce din 0 there j s th mark d
cliff rence between the tw type of statutory provi i n already
pok n of. Most of the codes, fo llowing that of New York, have
legi lated upon the subject with great caution, and have merel
given a certain exten ion to the familiar common-law practice of
permitting a landJord to come in and defend an ac ion of ej ctment in the place of his tenant. The provi ion it elf is very
brief, and by its terms is confined to actions for the recovery of
real or personal property. B eyond a doubt it embrace all equitable actions in which the remedy is the recovery of r eal or per onal
property, and is not restricted to the legal actions which orrespond to the ancient ejectment and replevin. This hort and
imple clause is the only one which au thorizes a third per on to
be made a party upon hi wn motion.
§ 313. * 416. Intervention in Iowa and California. Origin of.
Pa ing to he od of I wa an l alif rnia "
ee h, Int rvening ri es at on e into a pr ceeding f great imp rta1 c . It
may be re rted to in any an l all r ction and at ev ry
the action prior to l e
mm nc m nt of tl
rial. r h ii rv nor may l e an int r t' ith th i l, in iff r ' i h th cl I ndan t, or on pcci~ 1
him. H an l adv rs
bo l f th ri crinnl
rmrtie:. H doe not a k th pri\'il g·e of int ry ning an l btain
tlm privil g 1 y an orcl r · h' int rv n :; , a. 1 a t r of rirrh , by
filing ancl . rving hi I ti ion in th . am ma.nn r a· th uo-h h
' , comm n ·ing a ordinary a ti01 and hi· righ ( r l a s"cl
u n an
i po ed f, t geth r wi h th
f the pl intiff ancl
vision herein.

spoken of. Most of the codes, following that of New York, have

Second o f said Trans actions.

Moving Party.

BRINGING IN NEW PARTIE .
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defendant, at the trial. ^ It is plain that this is a judicial pro-

ceeding utterly unknown before in our ordinary courts, entirely

unlike anything which had been customary in the common law or

equity tribunals of England or the United States. Indeed, it was

confessedly borrowed from the procedure established by the code

of Louisiana.

§ 314. *417. Third of said Transactions. Interpleader. How-

Distinguished from other of said Transactions. The third judicial

transaction is the act of a defendant in procuring anotiier person,

not a party to the suit, to be substituted in place of himself as

the party defendant, and himself to be thereby discharged from

all liability in respect of the cause of action, — a special remedy

long known in another form as an Interpleader. It should be

carefully distinguished from each of the two former proceedings.

Unlike the second, the stranger does not come in on his own

motion ; unlike the first, the application can only be made by a

defendant. It is confined in its operation to three kinds of

actions: those brought to recover money on a contract, either

debt or damages, those brought to recover specific real property,

Generated for facpubupdates (University of Michigan) on 2014-06-17 15:32 GMT / http://hdl.handle.net/2027/uc2.ark:/13960/t02z1c23b
Public Domain / http://www.hathitrust.org/access_use#pd

and those brought to recover specific personal property. It is a

substitute, by means of the summary mode of a motion and an

order made thereon, for the ancient equitable action called the

Bill of Interpleader. The consideration of this subject does not

legitimately fall within the purposes of the present work; it

does not involve the question who are and who are not proper

^ [|But see East Riverside Irrigation those whom he desires to make defend-

District v. Holcorab (1899), 126 Cal. 315, ants, and that new parties brought in

58 Pac. 817. In this case third parties against his will cannot be allowed to set

had been brought in and made defendants up against him defences and affirmative

at the request of the original defendant causes of action which the original defeud-

and against the objection of the plaintiff, ant could not have set up ; and this is

These third parties " set up new matters especially so where the granting of the

and causes of action not involved in the relief sought by the original complaint

original suit — not defences to the action, would not have prejudiced the other

and not available at all to the original causes of action wliich the new parties

defendant," and their right so to do was seek to liave adjudicated. Peculiar cir-

one of the questions passed upon by the cumstances may make exceptions to the

defendant, at the trial. 1 It is plain that thi is a judicial proceeding utterly unknown b fore in our rdinary urt. , entirely
unlike anything which had be n customary in th ommon law or
equity tribunals of Englanl r he nited 'tate.' . Ind ed, it was
confe dly borrowed from the procedure e::;iabli heel by the code
of Loui iana.
~ 314. * 417. Third of said Transactions.
Interpleader.
How
Distinguished from other of said Transactions.
Th third judicial
tran1..·action is the act of a clcfenchtnt in procuring anoth r pcr:-:on,
not a party to the suit, to be substituted in place of him. elf as
the party defendant, ancl him. elf to be therel>y clisclrnrg cl from
all liability in respect of the cau e of action, - a sp cial remedy
long known in another form as an Interpleader. It should be
carefully distinguished from each of the two former proceeding .
Unlike the second, the stranger does not come in on his own
motion; unlike the first, the application can only be made by a
defendant. It is confined in its operation to three kinds of
actions: those brought to recover money on a contract, either
debt or damages, those brought to recover specific real property,
and those brought to recover specific personal property. It is a
substitute, by means of the summary mode of a motion and an
order made thereon, for the ancient equitable action called the
Bill of Interpleader. The con ideration of this subject does not
legitimately fall within the purposes of the present work; it
does not involve the question who are and who are not proper

Supreme Court. Among other things the rule, but tlie general principle is as above

Court said : " The principles which govern stated." See also Clay County Laud Co.

are, however, to a great extent those v. Alcox (1902), P8 Minn. 4, 92 N. W.

wliich a])ply to interventions and counter- 464. See Yaiuiieter v. Fidelity Trust Co.

claims and the bringing in of new parties (1899), 107 Ky. lOS, 53 S. W. 10, in which

and those which would apply to cros.s-bills Horn v. Volcano Water Co., 13 Cal. 62, is

under the old equity practice. The gen- quoted and approved.]

eral rule is, that a plaintiff may select

1 [But see East Riversiue Irrigation
District v. Holcomb {1899) , 126 Cal. 315,
58 Pac. 8 1 7. In this case third parties
had been brought in and made defendants
at the request of the original defendant
and against the objection of the plaintiff.
These third parties "set up new matters
and causes of action not involved in the
original suit- not defences to th e action,
and 11 ot available at all to the ori ginal
clefe11dant," and their right so Lo do wa
one of the questions pa,secl upon h,v the
upreme Court. Among other thing the
Court said: "The principles which 0·01·eru
are, however, to a great extent tho e
whi ch apply to in te rv entions and counterclaims and the bringing in of new parties
and those which would apply to cross-bills
under the old equity practice. The general rule is, that a plaintiff may select

those whom he desires to make defendants, and that new partie brought in
against bis will cannot be allowed to et
up again t him uefences and affirmative
causes of action which the original defendant could not have set up; and this is
especially so where the granting of the
reli ef sought by the original complaint
would not have prejulliced the other
causes of action whi ch the new parties
see k to have acljud1 cated. Peculiar circum tances may make xception to the
rule, but the ~enc ral principle i a above
tated."
ee also Clay ounty Lanu C'o.
v ,\]cox (190:2).
:'llinn. -1-, 92 ... ~. \V.
46-1-. S ec r:lllllJC'tcr I'. Fid lit_I' Tru,;t Co.
(! 99), lOi Ky. 10 ~ . 53 , . W. IO, in which
Horn t'. Y olcano \\' ater Co., 13 Cal. 62, is
quoted and approved.]
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parties, and there is no possible reason for its being discussed in

this connection except that the statutory provision which regu-

lates it is immediately associated with other clauses which do

relate to parties.^ The two other judicial proceedings will now

be examined with the aid of such judicial decisions as have

explained their scope and effect.

^ 315. *418. I. Bringing in Additional Parties. When the Court

must act. The issues between the original parties are to be

rti , and there i no po ible rea on for i 1 ing cli cu d in
tbi .. connec ion exc pt that the tatutory pr vi ion which r gul::tt
it i ~ immec.liatel · a ociated with tber clau e which d
relat to partie . 1
h tw
ther judicial procee ling \\ill n w
h
-aminec.l with th
i l of uch judici· 1 decision a have
c_·plained their co
an l effect.
1<

determined, if that can be done without prejudice to the rights

315 .

of others, or by saving the rights of others; if this be possible,

the cause should be adjudicated as it was presented for decision. ^

1 QSee the folluwing receut cases re-

specting Interpleader : Hirsch v. ISIayer

(1901), 165 N. Y. 236, .59 N. E. 89; E. G.

L. Co. V. McKeige (1893), 139 N. Y. 237,

34 X. E. 898; First Nat. Bank v. Beebe

* 41 .

I . Bringing i n Additional Parties .

The i ue b tween the ori0
cl t rmined if that can be done withou
of other" or by a-..'ing th right of oth
the cau, hould be adjudicat d a it wa
must act.

When the Court

inal par ie are t b
r judice t the right
r · if thi be p ible
pre en ed for de i ion. 2

(1900), 62 0. St. 41, 56 N. E. 485; John-

ston v. Oliver (1894), 51 O. St. 6, 36 N. E.

Generated for facpubupdates (University of Michigan) on 2014-06-17 15:32 GMT / http://hdl.handle.net/2027/uc2.ark:/13960/t02z1c23b
Public Domain / http://www.hathitrust.org/access_use#pd

458 ; Brownwell & Wright Car Co. i-.

Barnard (1897), 139 Mo. 142, 40 S. W.

762 ; Scott-Force Hat Co. v. Hombs (1894),

127 Mo. 392, 30 S. W. 183; Roselle v.

Farmers' Bank (1893), 119 Mo. 84, 24

S. W. 744 ; McFadden v. Swinerton

(1900), 36 Ore. 336, 59 Pac. 816; North

Pacific Lumber Co. v. Lang (1895), 28

Ore. 246, 42 Pac. 799 ; Austin v. March

(1902), 86 Minn. 232, 90 N. W. 384 ; John

R Davis Lumber Co. r. The First National

Bank of Milwaukee (1894), 87 Wis. 435,

58 N. W. 743; Jaques v. Dawes (1902),

_ ^Qh. — , 92 N. W. 570 ; Hartford Life

& Annuity Ins. Co. v. Cumming.s (1897),

50 Neb. 236, 69 N. W. 782 ; Daulton r.

Stuart (1902), 30 Wash. 562, 70 Pac.

1096; Walker r. Bamberger (1898), 17

Utah, 239, 54 Pac. 108; Hockaday v.

Drye (1898), 7 Okla. 288, 54 Pac. 495J

■^ Qln Clay County Land Co. i-. Alcox

(1902), 88 Minn. 4, 92 N. W. 464, plain-

tiff commenced an action against Alcox

for the restitution of its offices and to

restrain him from using them. " The an-

swer denied the allegations of the com-

plaint and alleged that the appellant

commenced the action in the name of the

land company without authority for hi.s

own benefit. It then alleged that the re-

spondent and appellant were copartners

under the firm name of the Clay County

Land Company, fur the purpose of buying

and selling real estate ; that the prosecu-

tion of the business resulted in a profit of

$7,500, one half of which belonged to the

respondent, but that the appellant had re-

tained the whole thereof, and refused to

account for ancr pay over the same. The

answer prayeti that the appellant be made

a party to the action, that a receiver be

appointed for the co-partnership business,

and that an accounting be had b_v the

court, or under its direction." Alcox pro-

cured an order from the court " on appel-

lant to show cause why he should not be

made a party plaintiff to the action and

reply to the respondent's answer therein."

Appellant moved to dismiss the order on

the ground that he was a resident of an-

1 [See the following recent ca e repectin Inte rplea uer: Hir ch v. Mayer
(1901) 165 ~. Y . 236. 59 ... E.
; E . G.
L. o. v. ~IcKei O'e (I 93), 139 :N". Y. 23i,
3-t.
E. 9 ; First Nat. Bank v. Beebe
(1900), 2 0. t. 41 56 N. E. 4 5; J oh n·
ston v. Oli,·er (1 9-t.), 51 0. t. 6, 36 . E .
45 ; Brownwell & \\right Car Co. v.
Barnard (l 9i}, 139 Mo. 142, 40 . W.
762; cott-Force Hat Co. t•. H omb (1 94),
l 2i :\Io. 39 2, 30 ·. W. l :3; R o elle v.
Farmer· Bank ( 1 93), 119 l\fo. 4, 24
• . \\. i44 · McFadden 1:.
winerton
11~~00), 36 Ore. 336, 59 Pac.
16 ; North
Pacific Lumber Co. v. Lang ( l 95), 2
re. 246, 42 Pac. 799; Au tin v. March
( 1902) 6 Minn. 232, 90 ... •. W . 3 4; John
I Davi Lumber Co. v. The Fir t ational
Bank of Milwaukee (l 94), 87 Wi . 435,
5 ..•. \\' . 743 · Jaque v. Dawe (1902),
- .. ·eh. - , 92 :X. W. 510; Hartfo rd Life
& ..Annuit\' In . Co. v. CumminO' (1 97),
50 ~-eL . 236, 69 . . :r. W. i 2; Daulton v.
,'tuart (1902), 30 Wah. 562, iO Pac.
1096; Walker v. Bamberger (1 9 ), 17
l;tah, 239, 54 Pac. 10 ; H ockaday v.
Drye (l 9 }, 7 kla. 2 , 54 Pac. 495.J
2 [In Clay County Land
o. v. Alcox
(1902),
.Ylinn. 4, 92 . . '". W. 464, plaintiff commenced an action again ~ Alcox
for the re ti utiou of it office an<l to
re ·traiu him from u.iug them. "The anw r denied the allegatiou of the cum·
plaint and allt>ged t.hat th appellant
1·0111 mrouced the actiou in
he name of th
lanrl l'ompauy withont authority for hi.·
o ·n benefit. It then all ged that the repon<leut and appellant were ·o-partner:1
under thn firm name of the lay 'o unty
La nd ompany, fur the purpo of buying
J.. • •

and elling real e tate; that the pro ·ecution of the bu ·ine " r e· ulted in a profit f
7 ,500, one half of which belonged to the
r e pon<l ent, Lut that the appellant had retained the whole thereof, aud refu ed to
account for ancf' pay O\'er the ame. The
an wer prayed that the appellant be ma<l
a party to the action, that a receirnr be
appointed for the co-partner hip bu ine ,
and that an accounting be bad by ti e
court, or under it direction."
!cox procured an rder from the court" on appella nt to how cau e why he hould not be
made a party plaintiff to the action and
reply to the r e pondent' an wer therein.'
Appellant moved to dismis the order on
the ground that he was a re irlent of another county and that the court was without juri diction to make him a p rty
plaintiff. The trial court denied thi motion of di mi al and made an rder requirinO' appellant to reply to the 'answer
of the re. pondent within twenty day , and
in default of uch reply, tha judgment
for the relief demanded in the an.:-w r be
r ender ed again t him a if he had he n
made a part r to the action in the fir t intance." The nl_\' que tion con idere<l by
the upr m
ourt in r ev r ·ing the ca e
wa "whether the trial court err d in
makincr its order compelling the appellant
to app ar
a pl intiff iu the action and
reply to th r e pondent' an wer under
penalt.v of having judgment eut r u
again t him for th reli ef demanued in
the an. wer." In di::-po ing of th que tiou th ourt aid: "It i not a qu tion
£ juri 1lic ion of the court to make h
ord r , a, coun. el cem t tr at it, but
whether it was error to ma ke it iu view of

BIUNLIING IN NEW PARTIES.
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If a complete determination of the controversy cannot be had

without the presence of other parties, the court must cause them

to be brought in. The force and effect of the whole provision

depend upon the interpretation given to the clause, " when a

complete determination of the controvers}- cannot be had without

the presence of other parties." To use the language of an emi-

nent judge which has been repeatedly approved by other courts

in different States, this clearly means, " When there are other

persons, not parties, whose rights must be ascertained and settled

before the rights of the parties to the suit can be determined.

Doubtless there are many other cases in which a defendant may

require other parties to be brought in, so that the judgment of

the court in the action may protect him against the claims of

such other parties; but this is his own privilege and he may

the facts of tliis particular case. We are of

the opiniou that it was, aud that the error

was one which deprived the appellant

of his legal right to have any transitory
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action which the respondent might bring

against him tried in the district court

If a complete determination f the controver. y cannot be had
without the presence of other parties, the court must cause tbem
to be brought in. The force and effect of th whole provi ·ion
depend upon the interpretation given to the clan e, "when a
complete determination of the controversy cannot be had without
the pre 'ence of other parties." To use the language of an eminent judge which has been repeatedly approved by other courts
in different States, this clearly means, "\Vhen there are other
per ons, not parties, whose rights must be ascertained and settled
before the rights of the parties to the suit can be determined.
Doubtless there are many other cases in which a defendant may
require other parties to be brought in, so that the judgment of
the court in the action may protect him against the claim of
uch other parties; but this is his own privilege and he may

of the county in which he resided, unless

the place of trial was changed by tlie court

for cause. . . . The statute now provides

that whenever the plaintiff or defendant,

or in case of counterclaim, or a demand

for affirmative relief, in any action shall

discover that any party ought, in order to

a full determination of such action, to

have been made a party plaintiff or de-

fendant therein, the court, if satisfied that

such is the case, shall make its order

bringing in such new party, and require

liim to answer the complaint, or reply to

the answer, as the case may be. That is,

it is only when the bringing in of other

parties is necessary to a full determi-

nation of the controversy between the

original parties tendered by the complaint,

answer, or counterclaim that the court

can compel them to come into the action

as parties plaintiffs or defendants. Now,

the defendant's so-called counterclaim in

this action tenders no issue between the

original parties to the action for a full

determination of which it is necessary that

appellant should be made a party plaintiff.

It is simply an allegation of a cause of

action wholly distinct from the cause of

action alleged in the complaint, aud with

which the plaintiff has no connection.

We have here a case where the defendant

denied all of the allegations of the com-

plaint, aud alleged that the appellant

commenced the action in the name of the

land company without authority. This

did not make it necessary to bring in the

appellant as a party in order to secure a

full determination of the controversy be-

tween the plaintiff and the defendant, for,

if his answer was true, he was entitled to

a judgment against the plaintiff on the

merits. But the respondent, conceiving

that he had an independent cause of action

against the appellant, alleges it in his

answer, and makes it the basis of tlie

order compelling the appellant to reply to

the answer and litigate the action with

him in the county of Clay In this way

the facts of this particular case. We are of We have here a case where the Jefendant
the opiniou that it was, and that the error denied all of the allegations of the comwas one which deprived the appellant plaint, and alleged that the appellant
of hi legal right to have any transitory commenced the actiou in the name of the
action which the respoudent might bring land company without authority. This
again't him tried in the district court did not make it necessary to bring in the
of the county in which he resided, unless appellant as a party in order to secure a
the place of trial was chauged by the court full determination of the controversy befo r cau e . . . . The statute now provides tween the plaintiff and the defendant, for,
that whenever the plain ti ff or defendant, if his answer was true, he was entitled to
or in ca e of counterclaim, or a demand a judgment against the plaintiff on the
for affirmative relief, in any action shall merits. But the respondent, conceiving
discoYer that any party ought, in order to that he had an independent cause of action
a full determination of such action, to against the appellant, alleges it in hi
have been made a party plaintiff or de- answer, and makes it the · basis of tlte
fendant therein, the court, if sati fied that order compelling the appellant to reply to
uch is the case, shall make its order the answer and liti gate the action with
bringing in such new party, and require him in the county of Clay Iu this way
him to answer the complaint, or reply to the original action is converted iuto one
the answer, as the case may be. That is, by the respondent against the appellant,
it is only when the bringing in of other the former being in fact the plaintiff and
parties is necessary to a full determi- the latter defendant, whereLy the appelnation of the controversy between the lant is deprirnd of his legal right to a trial
original partiAs tendered b_v the complaint, thereof in the county where he resides.
answer, or counterclaim that th e court It needs no argument to support the concan compel them to come into the action clusion that the statnte authorizes nothing
as partie plaintiffs or defendants. Now, of the kind, and that there has been a
the defendant's so-called counterclaim in miscarriage of justice in this ca e. We
this action tenders no issue betweeu the therefore hold that the order of the district
original parties to the action for a full court making the appellant a party aud
determination of which it is nece sary that requiring him to reply to the an wcr was
appellaut should be made a party plai11tiff. reYersible error, and that the action should
It i simply an allegation of a cause of have been dismis ·ed a to him." See to
action wholly distinct from the cause of the same effect Ea t Riverside Irrigatiou
action alleged in the complaint, and with District v. Holcomb (1899), 126 Cal. 315,
which the plaintiff has no connection. 58 Pac. 817.]

412 CIVIL REMEDIES.
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Cl IL

RE~IEDI:ES .

waive it."^ The distinction between the two conditions here

spoken of is plain. In the first, the rights of the parties to the

record are so bound up with those of others, that they cannot be

ascertained and fixed without at the same time ascertaining and

fixing the rights of the others also, and to do this, these others

must of course be before the court. In the second, the issues

between the parties to the record can be decided, but the rela-

tions of the defendant towards third persons are of such a nature

that they will be affected by the decision, and it would be better

and safer for him if these persons should be brought in so that

his relations might be defined and protected in the single judg-

ment. Such a proceeding is not, however, absolutely necessary

to the determination of the controversy, and the defendant may

waive his claim to the additional parties ; it is, in fact, a privi-

lege, not an absolute necessity. The circumstances and relations

to which I allude were aptly described and the rule concerning

them accurately stated by another judge: "There are cases in

which it is proper and necessary to make a jierson defendant

upon the ground of avoiding a multiplicity of suits. His rights
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may not be directly affected by the decree, but it may occur that

if the plaintiff succeeds, the defendant will thereby acquire the

right to call upon the party omitted or not joined, either to re-

imburse him or reinstate him in the position lost by the plaintiff's

success. And if so, the person consequently liable to be thus

affected should be before the court that his liability may be

adjudicated by one proceeding. "^

§ 316. * 419. Same Subject. If the case comes within the

first described condition, that is, if there are other persons, not

parties, whose rights must be ascertained and settled before the

rights of the parties to the suit can be determined, then the

1 McMahon r. Allen, 12 How. Pr. 39, 358; Judy v. Farmers' & Traders' Bank,

45, jjer Woodruff J. ; affirmed, 3 Abb. Pr. 70 Mo. 407 ; Southal v. Shields, 81 N. C.

89; approved, Chapman v. Forbes, 123 28; Isler r. Koonce, 83 id. 55 ; Hodges r.

N. Y. 532, 538. Jvimball, 49 Iowa, 577 ; Prouty r. Lake

2 Camp (•. McGillicuddy, 10 Iowa, 201, Shore & M. S. U. Co., 85 N. Y. 272;

per Wright C J., citing 1 Dan. Ch. I'r. Dows r. Kidder, 84 id. 121; New York

329; Story's Eq. PI. § 173; Wiser v. Milk Pan Co. v. Remington Works, 25

IJlachly, 1 Johns. Ch. 4^7. See akso Hun, 475 ; Abbott v. .lewett, 25 id. 603 ;

Forepaugh v. Appold, 17 B. IMon. 632; Delancy v. Murphy, 24 id. 503; Dubber.-?

Baas r. Chicago & N. W. Ky. Co.. 39 r. Goux, 51 Cal. 153; Rol)in.son i-. Glea-

Wis. 296 ; Oro Fino, &c. Min. Co. v. Cul- son, 53 id. 38; Pfister /•. Wade, 56 id. 43 ;

len, 1 Idaho, 113 ; Clark v. Stanton, 24 Derham v. Lee, 87 N. Y. 599.

Minn. 232; Penfield v. Wheeler, 27 id.

we i ·e it." 1 The li tine ion b w en he
· oken uf i plain. In he :fir. t th ri 0 ht
r c n l ar o lJ und ur \Yi h th · of h r
be
• c rtain cl and fixed without at th ame ime a certainin 0 and
tixinu· th
and to d
court. In th econcl the i ~ u
mu ·t of co m·~e b
1Jetween t he I . r tie" t t h r cord can b lecicled but th rela tion .. of the defendan t warl · t hird peron ' are of uch a nature
tlrn.t they will be affect cl by t h cleci..:ion an 1 it would b better
and <tfer for him if the 'e per ·on· ho nlc.1 lJ br ught in
hat
hi r elat ion mi 0 ht be l fined ancl I ro tec ted in th e ingle judguch a proce din er i .. n ot h o"- Yer ab olutel - nece ar
ment.
t o the de ermination of th controv r y and th def ndant may
waiYe hi claim to the additional par ie ; it i in fact, a l ri 'ilege not n au olute n ce ·i y. The circum tance an l relation
t which I allude were aptl de cribed and the rule c nc rnin 0
hem accurately tated b another ju<l 0 e : There are ca
in
which it i prop r and nece ary to ma.k a per on def ndant
upon the O'round of avoiding a multiplicity of uit . Hi ri h
ma n t be directly affected b th lecree, but it ma occur hat
if the plain iff ucceed ·, the d fondant will th reb3 acquire the
ri ht t call upon the party omitted or not join d ei th r o reim bur e him or rein tatc him in the po ition lo t b th plaintiff'
~ ncce .
And if o the per ·on con equently liaLle to be thu
aff ct d bould b bef re the court that hi liabili y may be
adjuclicat cl by one proceeding. 2
316. * 41 . Same Subject. If h ca. e come within he
fir t cl ·en d con lition that i if there are oth r p r on n t
arti
who e ri ht mu t be a certain l and t l d 1 f re the
rig h of th
arti
to th
uit an b cl t rmin 1 then the
1 >I ·:)l ah<m 1•. All en, 12 H o w. Pr. 39,
45, pe r \\'oorlruff ,J.; affir m ed, 3 \ bh. P r.
9; a1>r r J\"hl, Chapman c. F orlJe 123

~ •.

Y.

53~.

;;a .

Camp 1·. >Ic illic uddy, 10 Io wa , 201,
prr Yri,:ht . .J., citiU"' l I n
h. Pr.
3:U,
t<Jry' · E<J.. Pl. · l / 3; 'Vi ·r 1•.
Bl rnl_ l .Jolin. . Ch. -t!3 7. , ee al. o
For pau!!'h t'. _,\ l'l'nld. 17 B. ~Ion. 632;
Ba;ii i·. C'hic:1"'0 ,'·
\V Hy.
o. , 39
\Vi . :UG : I lro Fino, ·c. ~li u. o. 1·. ullen, 1 Idaho, 113; 'l a rk v . • tauton, 24
J: !inn. 131; Pen fi eld v. 'V he ler, 27 i<l..
!!

.T

35, · .Jnrl y t•. Farmer ' - Trade r-.' Bank,
70 :)fo. 407 ; uutha l v . hicld ", I _-. .
~ ; I ler r. K ounce, 3 id . 5- ; H od ge" t'.
K imlJall , -1 9 Iowa, 5/7; P routy 1· . L. k
, hure & )I. . l . o., 5 ••. Y. 272;
D ow 1· . K id1ler , 4 id . 12 l · • • e w Y or :'ll ilk Pan o t'. I c miu ~ t 11 'York .-, :.. 5
Jinn, 4 75; A libott 1· • •J w t t, 2.3 i(l. 603;
l >ela11cy 1· • .:'llurphy. 24 id. 50:3 ; l uhl11 r,.
1•. (,uu.·, 5 1
al. 1:s:3; R ohiu.o n t·.
I .011, 53 id. 3 ; P fi ·t r r . \ ad , 56 id. 43;
D erham v. L e , I ~ Y . 599.
T .

BRINqr G IN

TEW l'AHTIES.
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4i:

statute is peremptory; the court must cause such persons to be

brought in; it is not a matter of discretion, but of absolute judi-

cial duty.-^ The enforcement of this duty does not rest entirely

upon the j^a-rties to the record. If they should neglect to raise

the question, and to apply for the proper order, the court, upon

its own motion, will supply the omission, and will either directly

bring in the new i)arties or remand the cause in order that the

plaintiff may bring them in.^ The fact that the necessary party

is a non-resident of the State does not change the rule ; he must

still be brought in.^ The addition of the necessary party may be

made at any stage of the cause.* The action of the court may

consist in requiring necessary defendants to be served with pro-

cess, who had been named on the record, but not brought in by

actual service or appearance. °

§ 317. * 420. Same Subject. Limitations herein. This per-

emptory duty does not arise unless the conditions of the statute

are fully met, and the court will not order in new parties de-

fendant, against the will of the plaintiff, unless they are actu-
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ally necessary in the sense already defined.^ Thus, in an action

1 Davis V. Mayor, etc. of N. Y., 2 Duer,

663 ; 3 Duer, 119 ; Shaver v. Brainard, 29

Barb. 2.t ; Sturtevaut v. Brewer, 9 Abb.

Pr. 414; Mitchell v. O'Neale, 4 Nev. 504;

Jones c. Vautress, 23 Ind. 533; Johnson

t'. Chandler, 15 B. Mon. 584, 589 ; John-

ston 1-. Neville, 68 N. C. 177 ; Whitted v.

Nash, 66 N. C. 590 ; [^Eureka v. Gates,

statute i peremptory; the court mu ·t cau ·e such per ons to be
brouo-ht in; it i not a matt r of li cretion but of ab olute judicial duty. 1 Th
nforcem nt of thi · duty cl e · not re ·t ntirely
upon th I arti s to the record. l£ they ·hould neglect o raise
the qu tion, and o ar ply for the pror er onler, the court, UJ?On
it own m tion, will upply the omi 'sion, and \\'ill either dir ctly
briner in the n w partie or reman l the caul'e iu rd r that the
plaintiff may bring th m in. 2 The fact that the n ce ary party
i a non-re ident of the State doe not change the rule; he mu::;t
still be brought in. 3 The addition of the necessary party may be
made at any tage of the cause. 4 The action of the court may
con ist in requiring necessary defendants to be served with proce , who had been name l on the record, but not brought in by
actual service or appearance. 5
§ 317. * 420. Same Subject. Limitatio n s h e r ein. This peremptory d uty does not arise unless the conditions of the statute
are fully met, and the court will not order in new parties defendant, against the will of the plaintiff, unless they are actually neces ary in the sense already defined. 6 Thus, in an action

'(1898), 120 Cal. 54, 52 Pac. 125. In this

case the court said : " The rule is not

questioned that, under our practice, when

new parties are necessary for the deter-

mination of the issues raised by a cross

complaint they may and should be brought

in." See also Chalmers v. Trent (1894),

11 Utah, 88, 39 Pac. 488. For valuable

and interesting case in this connection

see Steinbach v. Prudential Ins. Co. (1902),

172 N. Y. 471, 65 N. E. 281. See also

dissenting opinion in this case. Hannegan

V. Roth (1896), 12 Wash. 695, 44 Pac. 256.

In Emerson v. Schwindt (1900), 108 Wis.

167, 84 N. W. 186, the court said: " But

the statute also provides that, ' when a

complete determination of the controversy

cannot be had without the presence of

other parties . . . the court shall order

them to be brought in,' sec. 2610. This

language seems to be mandatory." See

also Wheeler v. Lack (1900), 37 Ore. 238,

61 Pac. 849, in which the text is freely

quoted. For an interesting case quoting

the text see Robinson v. Kind (1896), 23

Nev. 330, 47 Pac. 1 ; Wilkius v. Lee

(1894), 42 S. C. 31, 19 S. E. 1016.]

2 Jones V. Vantress, 23 Ind. 533 ;

Mitchell V. O'Nenle, 4 Nev. 504 ; Young

V. Garlington, 31 S. C. 290.

^ Sturtevaut v. Brewer, 9 Abb. 414;

s. c. on app., 4 Bosw. 628.

* Attorney-General r. Mayor, etc. of

N. Y., 3 Duer, 119; [^National Savings

Bank i: Cable (1900), 73 Conn. 568, 48

Atl. 428.]

5 Powell I-. Fincli, 5 Duer, 666. [|For

valuable discussion respecting the proper

practice when an order has been made al-

lowing additional persons to be made

parties to a cause, see White '.-. Johnson

1 Davis v. Mayor , etc. of N. Y., 2 Duer,
663; 3 Duer, 119; Shaver v. Brainard, 29
Barb. 2:1; turtevant v. Brewer, 9 Abb.
Pr. -1-14; J\l itchell v. O'Neale, 4 Kev. 504;
Jones ~-. V au tress, 23 Ind. 533 ; Johnson
v. Chaudler, 15 B . Mon. 58-1-, !189 ; Johnston v. Neville, 68 . C. 177; Whitted v.
Nash, 66 r . C. 590; [ Eureka v. Gates,
' (189 ), 120 Cal. 54, !12 Pac. 125. Iu this
case the court saicl : " The rule is not
que tionecl that, under our practice, when
new parties are necessary for the determination of the i sue rai eel by a cross
complaint they may and should be brought
in." See al ·o Chalmers v. Trent (1894),
11 Utah, 88, ,39 Pac. -188. For valuable
and interesting case in th is connection
ee teinbach v. Prudential In . Co. ( 1902),
172 ?\. Y. 471, 65 N. E. 2 l. See al·o
dissenting opinion in this case. Hannegan
v. Roth (1896), 12 Wash. 695, 44 Pac. 256.
In Erner on v . Schwindt (1900), 108 Wis.
.W. 186,thecourtsaicl: "Ilut
167, 4
the statute al o proYicles that, 'when a
complete determination of the controver:>y
cannot be had without the presence of
other parties . . . the court shall order
them to be brought in,' sec. 2610. This

language seems to be mandatory." See
also Wheeler v. Lack (1900), 37 Ore. 23 ,
61 Pac. 849, in which the text is freely
quotecl. For an interesting case quoting
the text see Robinson v. Kind (1896), 23
Nev. 3.30, 4-i Pac. 1; Wil kius v. Lee
(189-!), 42 s. c. 31, 19 . E. 1016.J
2 J oues v. Van tress, 23 Ind. 533 ;
Mitehell r. O'?\eale, 4 ev. 504; Young
v. Garlington, 31 S. C. 290.
a Sturtevant c. Brewer, 9 Abb. 414;
s. c. on app., 4 Bo w. 62 .
4 Attorney-General r. Mayor, etc. of
N. Y., 3 Duer, l 19; [.~fati onal Savings
Bank z'. Cable (1900), 73 Conn. 568, 48
Atl. 428.J
5 Powell r. Finch, :'i Duer, 666.
[For
valuaLle discussion respecting the proper
practice when au order bas been made allowing additional perons to be made
parties to a cau e, see \\'hite 1;. J ohnson
(1895), 27 Ore. 2 2, 40 Pac. 511.J
6 [Northwestern Telephone C'o. t'. Railway Co. (1900), 9 N. D. 339, 83 X. \'I'. 215.
ee Bauer v. Dewey (190 1) , 166 ... T. Y.
402, 60 N. E. 30, in which it i ~ aid the
court ha no authority under ection 452
of the Code of Civil Proeedure to compel
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ao^ainst the indorsers of a note, the pLaintiff will not l)e compelled

to bring in the maker as a co-defendant.^ Xor is a new party to

be ordered in merely for the purpose of settling matters between

him and the defendant in which the plaintiff has no interest. ^

The statute Avill not permit the plaintiff to add a new defendant

without whose presence he could have no recover// sinca he would

have no cause of action. Such a proceeding would in effect be

the commencing a new action, and the statutory provision as-

sumes that in the pending action a right to obtain a recovery is

set up as against the original defendants. ^ The plaintiff cannot

be allowed, under the color of bringing in additional parties, to

commence a tiew action when he would have failed entirely in the

former one because he had not set up a good cause of action.

8 318. * 421. Examples and Illustrations. Pleadings. Rule in

Indiana in Reference to Assignors. I aeld a few examples of cases

wliere parties have been brought in ; they are designed merely as

illustrations. Additional parties have been ordered in, in an

action for the specific performance of a contract executed by

three when two only Avere at first made defendants;* in an action
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for an accounting between two of a larger number of tenants in

common of a mine, the complete adjustment of the account re-

(piiring that all the others should be added ;^ in a similar action

for an accounting between partners in a mining venture, and for

a winding up of the concern;^ in an action upon a promissory

note given for the purchase price of land in which the vendor

and holder of the note sought to enforce his lien, the heirs of the

deceased vendee, to wliom the land had descended, were made

the plaintiff in an action in which a money holding that the section of the code (§ 452,

judgment only is sought and in which the C. C. P.) referred to parties in what, un-

title to no real, specific or tangible per- der the oki practice, would have been

sonal property is involved, to bring in suits in equity, aud that it was never

as a defendant a third party on his own intended to make it incumbent upon a

application] plaintiff in an action at law to sue any

^ Sawyer r. Chambers, 11 Abb. Pr. 110. otlier than the parties he .should choose;

2 Frear ;•. Bryan, 12 Ind. .34.3, 345. citing Webster v. Bond. 9 Hun, 437;

See Carr r. Collins, 27 Ind. 306; Fagan Peoples. Albany & Vt. R. Co., 15 Hun,

r. Barnes, 14 Fla. 53, 56, 58; Pecic r. 126.

Ward, 3 Duer, 647 : Fischer r. Holmes, ^ McMahon v. Allen, 18 How. Pr. 39;

123 Ind. 525 ; Pollard r. Lathrop, 12 Colo, affirmed, 3 Abb. Pr. 89.

171; White's Bk of Buffalo r. Farthing, * Powell v. Finch, 5 Duer, 666. See

ain . . t th ind or er of a n
compe 11 t~
t bring in the maker , a c
~or i a n 'Y party to
l
nler tl in m r 1 for the purp
t Jina m, tt r b tw n
him and the cl f nclant in "hi h th plain iff ha n int r t.
tl ute ' ill n t p rmit he plaintiff t a kl a 1 w d f ncL n
without who e pre ence he coidd have no r cov r!J inc..., he w ul l
haY no ca.u e f a i n .
u h a pr ceeding would in ff ct h
tl com mencm a new ac i n an l the tatutory proYi ion a um
hat in th pending action a right t obtain a r co ry i
et up a again t th oribinal defendant . 3 The plain iff cann t
to
be allowed under the ol r of brin 0 ing in a lditional I arti
ornmence a new action wh n he w ul l have failed entir ly in the
f rmer one becau eh ha l not et up a oocl au of action .
318. * 421 . Examples and Illustrations.
Pleadings.
Rule in
Indiana in Reference to Assignors.
I add a few exampl of ca e
wh r parties have b en brough in; they are de igned mer ly a
illu ·tration . Additional parties have been orcl r d in, in an
a ·Lion for the sp cific performance of a contract ex cutecl by
lire when two only were at fir t made def ndant ; 4 in an ac ion
f ran accounting betw n two of a larg r number of t enant in
c mmon of a mine, the complete adjus ment of the account r quiring that all the others houlcl b add cl; 5 in a imilar acti n
for an accounting betwe n partners in a mining
n ure an l f r
6
a winding up of th cone rn; in an action upon a promi or r
no e gi en for the purcha pri of lan l in whi h the v n lor
and holder of the note ught to nf rce hi li n, the h ir of the
cl c a cl vende , to whom he land had de c nd d, w re made
,

0

101 N. Y. 344, 348; Chapman v. Forbes, Johnston »•. Neville, 68 N. C. 177.

123 N. Y. 532. It is said in this last case » Mitchell r. O'Xealo, 4 Xev. 504.

(p. .538) that the decisions of tlie New ^ Settembre v. Putnam, -30 Cal. 490.

York courts have been fpiite uniform in

the plaintiff in an action in which a mon ey
judgmeut onl_v i · ought and in whi ch the
title to no real , pecific or tangible personal prop rty i involved, to bring in
a a defendant a third party n hi own
application J
1 , 'awyen·. Chamb r , 11 A bb.
r. 110.
2 Fr ar 1•. Bryan, 12 Ind . 343 . 345.
,
C!
arr 1•. oll in., 27 In tl. 306; Fagan
r. Barne., 14 Fla. 53 56, 5 ; IJ rk r.
ar,J, 3 Duer. 647: Fi chPr r. Holme.,
l :n Incl. 513 ; P ollard r. Lathrop, 12 olo.
17t , 'VttitP's Bk Qf B11ffalo v. Farthing,
I 01 •. Y 344, .1.i ; hap man ''- Forli . ,
123 •. Y. 532. It i. ,;airl in thi," la. t c·a e
(p 51 ) th.it the clN·i!'ion« of th! 'pw
York r·onrt: have li«Pn quite utJiform in

h oldinO' that the ecti n of the code (§ 452,
, . . P.) r ferr d to partie in what, uncl r the ol l practice, would hiw b en
uit in qu1ty, and that it wa , uev r
in ncl d to make it incumbent np u a
plaintiff in au a tion at law to ue any
oth r than h partie h
hould hon e :
itin g W b te r v. B ond. 9 Hun , 437;
l ple v. lbaoy & t.
o., I 5 II un,
l 26.
a :\fcMahon v. 11 n, 1 H ow. Pr. 39;
affirmed, 3 bb. Pr. 9.
4 Pow 11 1•. Finch, 5 Duer. 666.
, ee
,Jolin.;ton 1•. ,,"' ville, 6
. . I 7i .
5 :'lfitrhl'll 1·. 'Xeal , 4 ~ ''· 504
6 , • tt m bre i•. Putnam, 30 al. 490

mu~GI

TG T. • KEW l'.\.RTrns.

BRINGING I.\ NEW PARTIES. 415

defendants;^ in proceedings in aid of an execntion the judgment

debtor is a necessary party, and will be brouglit in.^ Under the

requirements of the Indiana code in reference to assignors of

tilings in action when transferred without indorsement, if the

assignor dies, the assignee must make liis personal representative

a defendant in the action, or must show that there is none.^

After new parties have been brought in, the pleadings must be

made to show that they are proper. When new defendants have

been added on the application of the plaintiff, but the complaint,

which stated no cause of action against them originally, had not

been amended so as to supply this defect, it must be dismissed

as against such defendants at the trial, and judgment thereon

rendered in their favor.^

§ 319. * 422. Author's Suggestions herein. I cannot paSS from

this subject without adding certain remarks which are suggested

by it, and which concern the practical administration of justice.

The clause of the codes under examination is expressed in the

most general terms, containing no exception nor limitation.

Whenever a necessary party has been omitted by the pleader, the
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court has the power in any stage of the cause to remedy the

defect by ordering him to be brought in, and the case to stand

over until that is done.^ It is almost universally the fact that

an objection for the nonjoinder of parties is really technical, that

is, it does not go to the entire merits of the controversy. A

cause of action is generally set forth against those, or in favor of

those, who are actually made parties ; and the only error consists,

not in stating the cause of action incorrectly, but in omitting

some of the persons who are or rather may he beneficially or

injuriously affected by it. If it be the true purpose and design

of courts to administer justice between litigants, and to ascertain

and enforce their rights and obligations, then it would seem to

be the primary duty of the judges to decide every cause as far

1 Jones I'. Vantress. 23 Ind. 53,3. defendant to make liis answer more defi-

2 Wall V. Whisler, 14 Ind. 228. nite and certain by alleging the name of

3 St. John r. Hardwick, 11 Ind. 2.51. such third party was sustained.]

See Darty. McQuilty, 6 Ind. 391 ; Bray !•. •* Smith v. \Veage, 21 Wis. 440. See

Black, 57 Ind. 417. \\\\ Kyes r. Wilcox also Blakely v. Frazier, 20 S. C. 144.

(1900), 13 S. D. 228, 83 N. W. 93, the al- & QMiUs y Callahan (1900), 126 N. C.

legations of the answer disclosed that the 750, 36 S. E. 164: l^obson i-. Southern

presence of a third party was necessary to IJy. Co. ( 1901 ), 129 X. C. 289, 40 S. E. 42 ;

a complete determination of the contro- Finch v. Gregg (1900), 126 N. C. 176, 35

ver.'^y. The plaintiff's motion to require S. E. 251.]

1 fondant ; 1 in proce ling in aid f nn xccution th jndg11 l'llt
d htor is an
ary party, a.ml will b hrouulit in. 2
nc.ler th
r qnir ment of th Indiana o<l in r fer •n
t a.· 'ignon; of
things in action wh n transf rr <l without indors m nt, if t1i
a' ·ign r dies, th a' ·ign e mu ·t make his per onal i· pre entati
a l f ndant in th act.ion, r must how that th r i non . 3
Aft r n w partie have b n hr ught in, th pl ading mu t L
mad to how that th y ar pr I r. \Vhen new d f ndant hav
b n added on the appli ation of the plaintiff, but th complaint,
which tated no cause of action agaim;t th m originally, had not
b en amend cl so a· to upply thi defect, it mu. t be dismis cl
a again t such defenclan ts at the trial, ancl judgment th r on
render d in their favor. 4
. 319. * 422. Author's Suggestions herein. I cannot pa
from
thi subject without adding certain remarks which are sugge. ted
by it, and which concern the practical administration of ju ·tice.
The clause of the codes under examination is expre eel in the
most general terms, containing no exception nor limitation.
Whenever a necessary party has been omitted by the pleader, th e
court has the power in any stage of the cause to remedy tl1 '
defect by ordering him to be brought in, and the case to taml
over until that is done. 5 It is almost universally the fact that
an objection for the nonjoinder of partie is really technical, that
is, it does not go to the entire merits of the controversy. A
cause of action is generally set forth again t those, or in favor of
those, who are actually made parties; and the only error con ·ists,
not in stating the cause of action incorrectly, but in omitting
some of the persons who are or rather may be beneficially or
injuriously affected by it. If it be the true purpose and cle ign
of courts to administer justice between litigants, and to asc rtain
and enforce their rights and obligations, then it would seem to
be the primary duty of the judges to decide every cause as far
Jones v. Vantress. 23 Ind. 533.
Wa11 v. Whi sler, 14 Ind. 228.
s St. John 1·. Hardwick, 11 Ind. 251.
See Dart v. McQnilty, 6 Ind. 39 1; Bray i:.
Black, o7 Ind. 417. [In Ky sl'. Wilcox
(1900) , 13 . D. 228, 83 N. W. 93, th allegations of the answer <lisclosed that the
pre. ence of a third party was nece sary to
a complete determination of the controYer:y. The plaintiff's motion to require
1

2

defendant to make his answer more definite aucl certain by all eg ing the name f
uch third part.v wa, u taiued.J
4 Smith v. Weagc, 21 \Vi . 440.
e
ali>o Blakcl 1· 1-. Frazi er , 20 , . C. 14.f.
5 [ :\Iill . l' Callah a n (1900), 126 1 J . C'.
7f>6 , .36 f' . E. 164 ; ]) ob. on L'. South ern
Hy. Co. ( 19 01 , 129 .T. . 2 9, 40 fl . E . 4:! ;
]<in ch ?'. Gregg (1900), 126 N. C. li6, 35

. E . '2 51.]
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as possible upon the merits, and not upon some technical point

which puts no question at rest, but simply renders it necessary

to commence a new suit. Most emphatically does this seem to

be their duty when the statute has provided a mode for accom-

plishing this result, and has even required in peremptory terms

that this mode shall be pursued. AVhenever the objection that

there is a defect of necessary or proper parties is raised, it is

always possible for the court in a summary manner to order them

in, and to retain the cause for tliat purpose, and to decide the

issues upon the merits, when the required addition has Ijeen

effected. Not only is this course possil)le, but it is actually

enjoined upon the courts by the. codes. And yet this most bene-

ficial provision of the statutes is to a great extent a dead letter.

I believe there is hardly another section of the codes so well

calculated, if it were observed in its spirit and letter, to prevent

the success of mere technicalities and to promote justice among

suitors by procuring the decision of causes upon their merits.

In marked contrast with the judicial practice which prevails to

so great an extent in the States which have adopted the reformed
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American procedure, is a provision of the new system of practice

recently approved by the British Parliament, which declares that

under no circumstances sliall an action be dismissed, and the

plaintiff turned out of court, because he has committed an error

in the selection of parties, either by uniting too many or too

few, but that in every instance the court shall make the proper

amendment, and by striking out or bringing in, shall shape the

action into a proper form and condition for a decision of its

issues upon the merits.^ Although our codes do not contain

such a provision in express terms, they do contain all that is

necessary for the adoption and enforcement of the same general

rule of procedure by the courts. The New York Court of

Appeals has recently made a decision which is in close agreement

with the foregoing views. It holds that if the plaintiff does not.

bring in tlie necessary parties after an objection properly made,

the complaint may, in the discretion of the court, be dismissed,

but without prejudice to a new action. An unqualified judg-

ment of dismissal in such a case is erroneous. But the com-

plaint should not be dismissed even without prejudice, and the

plaintiff thus put to a new action, when the same end can be

1 Supreme Court of JiKiitature Act ; Schedule, § 9.

a p ible upon he m rit and not up n om t chni al point
'vhi h l ut n qu "tion at re t but imr 1 r nd r i n c
t comm nee , n w uit. :Jio t emr baticall do , hi
b their luty wh n th tatute ha pr Yi led a m d for a ompli "hin thi ' r ul , an l ha Yen r quir l in I r mpt r. 1 t rm,
bl t thi mod
hall b I lll"Ue l. \Yh ne'' r th obj ti n bat
ther i ' a def ct of n c "ary or prop r parti
i' rai 1 it i,
alw, · lo ·ibl for h
urt in a ummary mann r to r l r th m
in and t r tain th
f r that I urr o
and
d id the
i '" U
upon h merit wh n the r quir cl additi n h·1 b n
effec ed. Not only i thi
ours p ibl , but it i a tually
enjoined ur on th court b he cod . And } t thi' m ·t L n :ficial provi ion of th tatute i t a great xtent a d ad lett r.
b liev there i hardly anoth r
ction of th cod
o w 11
calculated if it w r ob erved in it pirit and 1 tter to prev nt
the ucce of mere technicalitie and to promote ju ti e among
ui or b procuring the cleci ion of cau e .upon their merits.
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o great an xtent in the tate which have adopted the r f rmecl
merican procedure, i a pr i ion of the new system of practice
recently approved by th Briti h Parliament, which cl clar that
under no circum tance
hall an acti n be di mi d, and lt
plain iff turn l out of cour , b cau e he h· committ l an rr r
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·am
u 1 an b
1

T

1

1

upremc

ourt of Judicature A t;
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reached by allowing the cause to stand over in order that the

plaintiff may add the necessar}' j)artie.s.i

^320. * 423. II. Intervention. Need not be Necessary Party.

Discretion of Court. Time of Application. I proceed first to

examine tlie force and effect of that provision which is found in

most of the codes. In order that a iierson may avail himself of

the permission given by it, and may make himself a party to an

action, he need not be a necessary party.^ The granting of such

an application lies in the discretion of the court, and it should

not be permitted if the applicant is already a plaintiff in another

suit in. which he may obtain all the relief he asks.^ The appli-

cation must be made before judgment, if made at all.^

§ 321. * 424. statutory Provision Limited. Illustrations. The

occasions on which a third person may intervene in a pending

action are very few. The scope of the provision is exceedingly

limited; it has been said that its operation is confined to those

cases in which a bill of interpleader would have been permitted,

under the former practice, to accomplish the same end.^ It is

certain that the right to intervene can only be exercised in
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actions for the recovery of real or personal property. ^ It does

1 Sherman r. Parish, 53 N. Y. 48.3,490, 3 gcheidt v. Sturgis, 10 Bosw. 606.

491. QSee the importaut case of Steiubach That tlie grautiug of the application is

V. Prudential Ins. Co. (1902), 172 N. Y. di.scretionary, see Colgrove i\ Koonce, 76

471, 65 N. E. 281, the facts of which are N. C.363. QMcNamara r. Crystal Mining

set out in note to § *287. In this case the Co. (1900), 23 Wash. 26, 62 Pac. 81.]

court said : " The personal representatives * Carswell v. Neville, 12 How. Pr. 445 ;

of Fehrman were necessary parties, and Meadows v. Goff (Ky. 1890), 14 S. W.

tlie court should have dismissed the com- IJep. 535 ; Chapman v. Forbes, 123 N. Y.

plaint unless within a reasonable time they 532, 540. [^Safely i\ Caldwell (1895), 17

were brought in, not necessarily for the Mont. 184, 42 Pac. 766; Dupont v. Amos

reache by allowing the cau to tand over m order that the
plaint iff may add the nece ary parti I
§ 320. * 423. II. Intervention. Nee d · not be Nec essary Party .
D iscretion of Cour t .
Time of Application .
I pr c, d fir. t to
examine th fore;e and ff ct of that provi ion whicl i found in
most of the codes. In ord r that a p r on may avail himself of
the permi ·ion given by it, and may make him, lf a party to an
actio n, h need not be a neces ·ary party. 2 The granting of such
an application lie in the di er tion of the court, and it bould
not be permitted if the applicant is already a plaintiff in another
suit in· which he may obtain all the relief he a k ·. 3 The application must be made before judgment, if made at all. 4
§ 321. * 424. Statutor y Provision Limited. Illustrations . The
occa ions on which a third per on may intervene in a pending
action are very few. The scope of the provision i exceedingl y
limited; it has been said that its operation is confined to those
case in which a bill of interpleacler would have been permitted,
under the former practice, to accomplish the same end. 5 It is
certain that the right to intervene can only be exercised in
actions for the recovery of real or personal property. 6 It does

protection of the defendant as it had neg- (1896), 97 la. 484, 66 N. W. 774 ; Keehn v.

lected its rights, but for their own protec- Keehn (1902), 115 la. 467, 88 N. W. 957 ;

tion, as well as the seemly and orderly Owens v. Colgan (1893), 97 Cal. 454, 32

administration of justice." See, however, Pac. 519; Clarke r. Baird (1893), 98 Cal.

the vigorous dissenting opinion in this 642, 33 Pac. 756 ; Hibernia Savings and

case by Haight J. concurred in by O'Brien Loan Society i'. Churchill (1900), 128 Cal.

and Martin JJ. In Hannegan v. Roth 633, 61 Pac. 278; McConniff v. Van

(1896), 12 Wash. 695, 44 Pac. 256, the Dusen (1898), 57 Neb. 49, 77 N. W. 348;

court said : " While a court will not pro- Deere v. Eagle Mfg. Co. (1896), 49 Neb.

ceed to final judgment in the absence of 385, 68 N. W. 504.]

a necessary party, it will not dismiss the ^ Hornby !>. Gordon, 9 Bosw. 656. The

action on account of the nonjoinder of following cases are illustrations of such

such party, but will retain it until all ne- intervention : Sims v. Goethe, 82 N. C.

cessary parties are brought in, after which 268 ; Peck v. Parchin, 52 Iowa, 46 ; Peo-

it will proceed to judgment on the merits." pie i'. Albany & Vt. Tl. Co., 77 N. Y. 232 ;

Citing § *292 and * 293 of the text.] Conant v. Frary, 49 Ind. 530.

'■2 Carter v. Mills, 30 Mo. 432. 6 Kelsey v. Murray, 28 How. Pr. 24:;;

27

1 Sherman v. Pari sh, 5.'3 "· Y. 483, 490,
491. [ ee th e importaut case of Steiubach
v. Prud ential In . Co. (1902), 172 N. Y.
471 , 65 N. E. 28 1, the facts of whi ch are
set out in note to§ 287. In this case the

*

court said: " The personal representati ves
of Fehrman were necessary parties, and
th e court should have dismis ed th e complaint unless within a reasonable tim e they
were brought in, not necessarily for the
protection of the defendant as it bad neglected its rights, but for their own protection, a well as the eemly and orderly
admini tration of ju tice." See, however,
the vigorous di · enting opinion in this
ca e by Ha ig ht J. concurred in by O' Brien
and Martin JJ. In Hann egan v. Roth
( 1896 ), 12 Wah. 695, 44 Pac. 256, the
court said: "While a court will not pro<'eed to final judgment in the ab. ence of
a necessary party, it will not dismiss the
aC'tiou on accoun t of the nonj oiuder of
such party, but will retain it until all necessary partie are brought in, after which
it will proceed to judg ment on th e merits."
C iting § * 292 and * 293 of the text.]
2 Carte r v. Mills, 30 Mo. 43 2.

3 Scheidt v. Sturgis, 10 Bosw. 606.
That t he granting of the application is
di cretionary, see Colgrove r. Koonce, 76
J.: • C. 363 .
[Mc 'amara v. Crystal Mining
Co. (1900), 23 W as h. 26, 62 Pac. 8 1.J
4 Carswell v. Keville, 12 H ow. Pr. 445;
Meadows v. Goff (Ky. I !JO), 14 . W.
H ep. 535; Chapman v. Forbes, 123 N. Y.
532, 540. [ Safely v. Caldwell (1895), 17
Mont. 184, 42 Pac. 766; Dupont v. Amos
(1 896), 97 Ia. 484-, 66 N. W. 774; Keehn v.
K eehn (1902), 11 5 Ia. 46i,
r. W. 95 7;
Owens t'. Colgan (1 93), !Ji Cal. 454, 32
Pac. 519; Clarke v. Baird (I 93), 9 Cal.
642 , 33 Pac. 756; Hibern ia Savings and
L oan Society v. Churchill (1900), 12 Cal.
633, 6 1 Pac. 27 ; l\IcConniff v. Van
Dusen ( 1 9 ), 57 Neb. 49, 77 . W. 34 ;
D eere v. Eagle Mfg. Co. (1 96), 49 Neb.
3 5, 68 N. W. 504.J
5 H ornb.v 11. Gordon 9 Bo w. 656.
The
following ca es are ill u trat iou of nch
interveutiou: Sim L'. Goethe, 2 N. r.
268; Peck v. Parchin, 52 Iowa, 46; People v. Albany & ,~ t. R. o., i7 N. Y. 232;
onant v. Frarx, 49 Ind . 5.'30.
6 K e! ey v. l\Iurray , _
!low. I'r. :?~:' ;

27
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not exist, therefore, in an action to recover money; as, for

example, in a suit for wharfage, persons claiming to be owners

of the wharf were not permitted to intervene;^ nor in an action

in the nature of a creditor's suit, to reach a surplus of money in

a certain person's hands ;2 nor in an action to dissolve a partner-

ship, and for an accounting;^ nor in any action on contract for

the recovery of debt or damages.'* In an action to recover pos-

session of goods, on account of the vendee's fraud, third persons,

claiming to have purchased them from him, cannot intervene.^

18 Abb. Pr. 294; Tallman i: Ildllister,

9 How. Pr. 508 ; Judd v. Young, 7 How.

Pr. 79.

1 Kelsey v. Murrny, 18 Abb. Pr. 294.

- Tallman ;•. Hollister, 9 How. Pr. 508.

no e.'l
th ref r
ion t re OY r mone · · a f r
x..ampl in a uit f
laiming t b Mm r
of the wharf
· 1 nor in n action
in tl1e natur
r
o r ach a urr lus of mon m
2
< c rtain I r on
ht n 1 · nor in an acti n to di olYe a par n r·hip and for an a c unting · 3 nor in an ac i n n contract for
th r c y ry f cl bt or lamag 4 I n an ction to reco er o e ion of go l
n ccount of the ndee fraud tl ird per on
laiming to hav purcha l th m from him, cannot int r en . 5

3 Daytou v. Wilkes, 5 liosw. 655.

•* .Judd V. Young, 7 How. Pr. 79.

I
5 Hornby i". Gordon, 9 Bosw. 656.

QFor additional cas6s in which interven-

Generated for facpubupdates (University of Michigan) on 2014-06-17 15:32 GMT / http://hdl.handle.net/2027/uc2.ark:/13960/t02z1c23b
Public Domain / http://www.hathitrust.org/access_use#pd

tion was not permitted, see the following:

Murray v. Polglase (1899), 23 Mont. 401,

59 Pac. 4.39 (by one who had not filed

adverse claim under the statute to mining

claim, though he claimed an interest in

tlie premises adverse to both plaintiff and

(iefendant) ; Dietrich v. Steam Dredge

(1894), 14 Mont. 261, 36 Pac. 81 (by a

stranger to a suit commenced, and who

had not obtained leave of court or made

any showing by complaint, but who upon

his own motion appeared and demurred to

the complaint) ; Denver Power & Irriga-

tion Co. V. Denver, etc. Co. (1902), —

Col. — , 69 Pac. 568 (by a party who had

no interest in the subject-matter of dis-

])ute between litigants) ; Ball v. Cedar

Valley Creamery Co. (1896), 98 la. 184,

67 N. W. 232 (by one claiming an interest

in property about to be sold under an

execution issued upon a judgment) ; Bank

of Commerce v. Timbrell (1900), 113 Iowa,

713, 84 N. W. 519 (by one to whom an

ab.solute a.ssigninent liad been made; he

must be .substituted a.s plaintiff) : Hoppe

/•. Fountain (1894), 104 Cal. 94,37 Pac. 894

(by parties holding title not subject to a

mortgage in an action brouglit to foreclose

the mortgage) ; Goodrich v. Williamson

(1901), 10 Okla. 588, 63 Pac. 974 (by a

general creditor of a husband claiming

that the promissory note sued upon was

executed by the wife in fraud of the

creditors of the husband of whom the

intervenor was one, the latter asking that

the proceeds of the note be awarded to

it); Bray v. Booker (1897), 6 N. D. 526,

72 N. \V. 933 (by a bank, who was the

creditor of the vendor, in a suit by the

vendor against the vendee to enforce a

vendor's lien for the unpaid jjurchase

price, the vendee having agreed to ])ay a

portion of the purcliase price to the bank) ;

McXaniara v. Crystal .Mining Co. (1900),

23 Wash. 26, 62 Pac. 81; Dickson v.

Dows (1902), 11 N. D. 404, 92 N. W. 798 ;

Churchill v. Stephenson (1896), 14 Wash.

620, 45 Pac. 28 (by a mere general or

contract creditor in an action against an

administrator for the recovery of real

Aub. Pr. 294 ; Tallman v. Hollister,

9 How. Pr. 50 ; Judd 1:. Young, 7 How.
Pr. 79.
l Kel ey v. Murray, 1 Abb. Pr. 294.
2 Tallman v. Holli ter, 9 How. Pr. 50
3 Dayton v. 'Vilke , 5 Bo w. 655 .
4 Judd v. Young 7 How. Pr. 79.
5 Hornby v.
ordon, 9 Bo w. 65fi.

[For additional ca
in which intervention was not permitted, ee the following:
::\Iurray v. Pl la e (199},23 :Vlont. 401,
59 ac. 439 (by one who had not filed
ad,·er e claim under the tatute to mining
·l im, thouo-h he claimed an intere t in
the l remi e adverse to both plaintiff and
defendant) ; Dietrich v.
team Dredge
( l 94). 1-1 i\lont. 261, 36 Pac. 1 (by a
:tranger to a uit commenced, and who
had not obtained leave of c urt or made
any howino- by complaint, but who upon
hi own motion appeared and demurred to
the complaint); Denver Power & Irrigation Co. v. D enver, tc.
o. {1902), ol. - , 6 Pac. 56 (by a party who had
no intere t in the uhject-rnatter of di pute between litio-ant ) ; Ball v.
edar
Vall y reamery o. (1 96), 9 Ia. I 4,
Gi ~~. \V. 232 (bv one claimin~ a11 interc t
i11 property about to b . old unrler an
•·xecution i. ued upoo a judgment); Bank
• f 'ommercev.Timbr 11 (190),113 Iow,1,
713, 4- .... \V. 511 hynne to whom au
ab:<J!ute a,.: i~111nent hail liren made; he
11111 t be :ub,;tirut •1l a. plaintiff): H oppe
,. Fou11tai11(l !14),lO~C'a l ().+,37Pa<'. ()4
(by partie. holding title not . ulij C't to a
mortga"C in a11 ae iou hr<nwht to for 'C:lo. e
the 11111rtgage); ooclrich t•. ' illiami;on
( l !JOI), 10 Okla. 5 , G3 Pa . 97.+ (IH' a
general creditor <JC a hn ·baud claim.in"
that Lhe promi . ory note :111.:d upon wa.
·x cu •d 1y the wife in fraud of th•

creditor of the hu band of whom the
intervenor was one, the latter a kino- that
the proceed· f the note be award d to
it); Bray v. B ooker (1 7 ), 6 . D. 526,
72 N. W . .33 (b_1' a bank, who wa th
creditor of the Yeudor, in a uit b,,. the
vendor aO"aiu t the veodee to enf rec a
vendor' lien for the unpaid purcha e
pric , th Y nd e haYing agreed to pay a
portion of the purcha ·e price to th bank);
Mc , arnara i•. ry ta! :\lining o. ( 1900),
23 'Va h. 26, 62 Pac.
1 · Di k n t•.
Dow · (1902), 11 ... . D. 40-!, 92 ~. \V . 79 ;
Churchill v. t phen on (1 96), 14 Wa h.
620, 45 Pac. 2 (by a mere general r
contra ·t credit r in an action a ain t an
admini ·trator for the recoYery of r al
e tate); Haine v. tewart (1902), - ... eb.
- , 91
. W. 539 (by on wh
rnerely
claim to be the own t· of a tach d proprty for the purp e of having hi own r. hip determined in the attachm nt . uit) ;
maha
o. v. Bee on (1 93), 36
~Teb. 361, 54 .... W. 55 7 (mu t haYe ·ome
intere t in the ubject of contr 1·er . y. A
mere
ntingeut liability t an w r ov r
to he d f udant, without any privity with
th plaintiff, i. n t uffici ut); tanle.v 1·.
Fo te et af. (I 00), 9 Wyo. 335, 6.1 Pa .
940 (by a Jaimant t moo ;.- g;trni h d,
or propPrt~· a ta h d in au a tion b Lw n
oth r partie , for the purpo. e f haYi11g
hi right. ther to cl t rmin rl);
rla11 r.
w ~ h (1 :.), - Leh. - 9 ~T•
.j~f
(hy on alleo-i no- that h wa. th
on £
th mort~a~ot·, in a mortgaO" for clo ure
• uit. that tire pr mi .• mort~a!{Nl on-titut .d a horn . t a<l, that th nwrt.gagor
wa. tlea1l and th int '"" nor"" · i-r :l.rd in
hi-. O\\ n right of th r al . ta d«> nibecl
i11 Iii" prtitio11, and a ·king that hi iut r t
in the: ho111c. tead b dct rmin d. Th
1

\\

•

IXTERVENTIOX. 419

419

Tliis ruling, however, is not based upon the nature of the

suit itself, but upon the absence of any rights in the proposed

iiitervenors.

§ 322. * 425. Additional Illustrations. The following are some

instances in which an intervention has been permitted. In an

action for the partition of lands, any person having an interest

in the land may intervene; but when the partition is among the

heirs and devisees of a deceased owner, a judgment creditor of

such decedent has no such interest nor right. ^ In an action to

recover land, a landlord may intervene when his tenant only has

been made a defendant;^ and in an action to recover the posses-

sion of goods taken on execution, the execution creditor may

intervene.^ In a suit to compel the specific performance of a

contract to convey land against the vendor alone, a third person

alleging title in himself to the same land from the same vendor,

prior and paragiount to that of the plaintiff, was allowed to

intervene and to defend. It was said that the intervenor need

not be a necessary party, but should be permitted to come in if

the judgment as between the original parties would cast a cloud
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upon liis own title. ^ Under the former practice, no intervention

was ever permitted in actions at law, except that in ejectment the

landlord might make himself a defendant in place of his tenant. ^

court said : " The matters set up in tlie - Godfrey v. Townseiid, 8 How. Pr. 398.

petition for intervention of Herman Riihl 3 Conlclin v. Bishop, 3 Duer, 646. In-

are not determined or in any way affected tervention in attachment proceedings bv a

liy the decree in this case. They were person claiming an interest in the prop-

not nece.ssary to a proper determination of erty : Blair v. Puryear, 87 N. C. 101.

the matters presented in the issues herein, ^ Carter v. Mills, 30 Mo. 432. In Sum-

aiid the motion to strike the petition of mers r. Hutson,48 Ind. 228, a third person

intervention from the files was correctly was permitted to intervene in an action

sustained ; " Moline, Milburn & Stoddard upon a promissory note, to make himself

Co. V. Hamilton (1898), 56 Neb. 132,76 a defendant, to set up in his answer facts

N. VV. 455 (by atliird person who filed a showing that he was the real party in

Thi ruling, however, i' not ba ed upon th nature of the
suit it. lf, but upon the absence of any righh; in th vroposed
int .rven r .
§ 322. * 425 . Additional Illustrations. Th f llowing are som
instance in which an intervention has been p rmittec1. In an
action for the partition of land ', any person ha Ying an interest
jn the Ian l may intervene; but when the partition i among the
h irs and devisees of a decea el owner, n. judgment creditor of
such deced nt has no such interest nor right. 1 In an action to
recover land, a landlord may intervene when his tenant only has
been made a defendant; 2 and in an action to recover the possession of goods taken on execution, the execution creditor may
intervene. 3 In a suit to compel the specific performance of a
contract to convey land again t the vendor alone, a third person
alleging title in himself to the same land from the same vendor,
prior and paral]lount to that of the plaintiff, was allowed to
intervene and to defend. It was said that the intervenor need
not be a necessary party, but should be permitted to come in if
the judgment as between the original parties would cast a cloud
up.Jn hi8 own title. 4 U ncler th e former practice, no intervention
was ever permitted in actions at law, except that in ejectment the
landlord might make himself a defendant in place of his tenant. 5

l)etition of intervention in a replevin case, interest, and the equitable owner of tiie

in effect nothing but a general denial, the note, and the one solely entitled to its pro-

court said : " The first requisite of an in- ceeds, and to recover thereon as against

tervention is tliat the intervenor show tliat the maker, who was the original defend-

he claims an interest in the subject-matter ant. This is certainly identical with the

of the litigation ") ; Bohart r. Buckingham .system which prevails in Iowa and Cali-

(1901), 62 Kan. 658, 64 Pac. 627; Gam- fornia. This intervention was permitted

mage v. Powell (1897), 101 Ga, 540, 28 under the general provision of § 18, that

S. E. 969.] " any person may be made a defendant

1 Waring v. Waring, 3 Abb. Pr. 246. who has an interest in the controversy

See Baker v. Riley, 16 Ind. 479, which adverse to the plaintiff."

holds that a person claiming title to the ^ Hornby v. Gordon, 9 Eosw. 656 ;

whole land should not be permitted to Godfrey ;;. Townseud, 8 How. Pr. 398.

intervene in a partition suit. QMooney v. N. Y. EI. R. Co. (1900)

comt saicl; "The matters set up in th e
2 Godfrey v. Townsend, 8 H ow. Pr. 398.
3 Conklin v. Bishop, 3 Duer, 646.
petitiou for inten•ention of Herman Ruhl
Inare not determined or in any way affected tervention in attachment proceeding by a
by the decree iu this case. They were person claiming an interest in the propnot necessary to a proper determinatiou of erty: Blair v. Puryear, 87 N. C. 101.
the matters prese nted in the iss ues h erein.
4 Carter v. Mills, 30 Mo. 432.
In Sumand th e motiou to strike the petition of m ers u. Hutson, 48 Iucl. 228, a third person
iutervention fr om th e files W<lS correctly was permitted to iutervene in an action
sustainecl;" M oline, Mil burn & StoclLlarcl upon a promissory note, to make himself
Co. v. Hamilton (1898), 56 Neb. 132, 76 a defendant, to set up iu his an wer facts
X W . 455 (by a third per son \\'h o filed a show in g that he was the real party in
petition of in ter vent ion in a replev in case, interest, and the equitable owner of the
i n effe t noth iu g but a general denial, the note, and the one solely e11titled to its pro·ourt , aid: "The first requisite of an in - ceeds, and to reeover thereon as again. t
te l'ventio11 is that the iutervenor show that the maker, who wa · ihe original defendh e claims an interest in the subj ect-matter ant. This is certaiuly ideutical with th e
of the litigation"); B ohart v. Buckin g ha m system which prevail· in Iowa aud Cali(1901), 62 Kan. 658, 64 Pac. 627; Gam- fotnia. This intervention wa · pennitteu
mage v. Powell (l 897), 101 Ga. 540, 2
under the general pro,·i~ion of § 18, that
S. E. 969.J
" any person may be mad a defendant
l Warin g v. Warin g, 3 Abb. Pr. 24-6.
who has an intel'cst in the controversy
Bee Baker v. Riley, 16 Incl. 4i9, which aclver e to the plaintiff."
holds that a person claiming title to the
5 H ornby v. Gordon, 9 B osw. 656 ;
whole land should uot be permitted to Godfrey v. Town ·end, 8 How. Pr. 398.
intervene in a partition suit.
[Mooney v. N . Y. El. R. o. (1900)
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§ 323. *426. The Iowa and California System of Intervening.

Illustrative Examples. The peculiarities of this proceeding, the

3 23.

J:.,6.

T he Iowa a nd California Syste m o f I n t e rv ening.

163 N. Y. 242, 57 N. E. 496, was an action ways in which it is conipeteiit for the

by a property owner against a railroad to court of original jurisdiction to bring in

Illustrative Examples .

The peculiari i '

restrain its operation, by injunction, and new ])artics, and the particular course that

for damages. Pending the action j)lain- it may decide to adopt generally presents

tiff conveyed the premises to one Cohen, a question of choice or discretion not open

Avho in turn conveyed to one Scalliou. In to discussion in this court. The facts

plaintiff's deed to Cohen the former " re- which rendered the presence of the new

served the easements of light, air, and ac- parties necessary in order to permit a

cess as taken and used by the defendants, final adjudication of the controversy were

and all the claims for damages for such patent and undisputed. They were evi-

taking and use, both as to tlie fee and deuced by the two conveyances made sub-

rental value, past, present and future;" setjuont to the commencement of the

and in Cohen's deetl to Scallion the same action, and the defendants were permit-

reservations were made. At the trial dc- ted by the court to raise any question

feudants moved to dismiss the complaint growing out of tiiese new facts that they

on the ground that phiintiff was not then
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the owner of the fee or of any part thereof,

or entitled to any relief by injunction.

The court reserving its decision upon this

motion, an adjournment was moved on be-

half of the defendants until all tlie parties

in interest were properly ])efore the court

" by an application on the part of the

jilaiutiff for leave to serve a supiilemeiital

could rai.-^e in any form or in any manner.

The original plaintiff, by his counsel, sug-

gested one method of bringing in the new

parties, wliile the defendants' counsel sug-

gested another method. The defendants'

metliod was to put the plaintiff to his

application at a Special Term to amend the

process and the pleadings and to serve a

supplemental complaint with the right to

summons and com])laint, bringing in his the defendants to serve a snpplenivntal

grantees as parties plaintiff, with leave to

the defendants to answer the su})plemental

complaint." The court not passing upon

this motion at the time, tiiereupon Cohen

and Scallion requested to be made parties

plaintiffs and consented to submit their

rights to the court. This request was

granted, and an order made that the

pleadings and proceedings be amended

accordingly. The defendants were " al-

lowed on the trial to make any defence

that they may be advised, with the same

force and effect as if a supplemental com-

plaint and answer had been made and

served," and for that purpose " tiie cause

was postponed for two weeks." The trial

court awarded a money judgment to

Mooney, and also to Cohen and Scallion,

each in a different amount; and also

awarded an injunction to be operative

upon certain conditions nameil. The Ap-

pellate Division reversed the judgment.

The ()uestion presented by the record in

answer. The learned trial judge doubt-

less had the power to compel the plaintiff

to resort to that method, dilatory as it

was, but he decided to make them parties

on their own application and to let the

cause proceed as if everything had been

done that the defendants' counsel askeil.

The contention of the learned counsel for

the defendants is that the judge bad no

163 N. Y. 242, 5i . E. 496, wa an action
by a property own r ngain ' t a railroad to
r traiu it op ration , by iojunctiou, aud
for damacre . Pending the actiou plaintiff conYeyed the premi ·e to oue oh n,
who in turn on'' y d t one calli on. Iu
plaintiff' deed to oh n the former ' reen·ed th
e rn ent of light, air, and actaken and u ed b_v the defendant ,
e aud all the !aim. for damacre. ~ r ~ uch
ta.kiucr and u ·e, b th a' to the fee and
rental ,·alue, pa t, pre. eut and future;"
and in ohen' · d etl to callion the same
re ·ervati n wer made. At the trial defoudaut mo,·ed to di - mi
the complaint
on the round that plaintiff wa. not theu
the owner of the fee or of any part ther of,
or entitl cl to any relief by injunction.
The court re-e rving it· de i ·ion upon this
motion, an adj urnment wa·· moved on behalf of the d feodant until all the parti e.
in intere t were properly before the court
"by au application ou the part of the
plain tiff for leave to .erve a upplemental
u111moo and complaint, bringing iu hi
grantee a partie: plaintiff, with leave to
the defendaut to an ·wer the upplemental
c mplaiat." Th court uot pa ing upou
thi motion at the time, thereupon ohen
and 'callio n reque-ted to be made partie
plaintiff and con euted to ubmit their
ricrht · t the court. This reque t wa
granted, aud au order made that the
pleadings and proceeding- be amended
accordingly. The defendan t were "allowed on the trial to make any d f nee
that th y may be ad vi. ed, with the arne
force and eff t a. if a . upplernental omplaint and an wer had he u made and
en·e<l," and for that purpo e " I.he au -e
wa po tpon cl for two we k ." Th tri, 1
court awarded a m ney jndcrm nt to
~looney, and al:-<o t
oh n and 'callion,
each in a diff rent amount; anrl al o
awarder! an injunction to be
upon ccrt<liu mdition. name1l.
pellate Divi ion re\' r et! t.h judgm ut.
Th qu . tion pre. nt cl by the r cord in
th
ourt of A I p al was t.h power
the trial judge, at I.he trial, t hring in
'oh u anrl 'call ion a parti . . In rr,·e r irw th · e the ourt of
µpe ls, a111 ng
th r thing·, 11aid: "There re variou

f

hi

war in whi ch it i-

roe din;

h

omp t nt for the
riginal juri -diction to brin"' in
new parti , and th particular cour:e that
it may d cide to adopt g uerally pre nt.
a q u ti on of choice or di' -reti n not pen
to di-cu i n in thi · ourt.
The fact·
which rendered the pre e uce of the new
parti
n ce ary in ord r to permit a
final adjnd ieation of the controv r y wcr
patent and uncli · puted. They , were evidenced by the two conveyance mad
ubequ ent to th e ·omm 11 ·ement of the
a ction, aatl the defendant· wer p rmitted by the ourt to rai . e auy que tiou
growing out of th e n 'W fact that they
could raise in any form or in any m nn r.
The original plaintiff, by hi oun l, u~r
ge ted one method of hringin in the new
partie , while th defeudaut 'cou11. l ucrge ted another m thou. Th def ndant.'
m thod wa to put the plaintiff to hi
applicati on at a pecial Term to amend the
pro ·e and the pleaclin o- and to
ne a
uppl em ntal complaint with th ri crh t t
the d efendaut to erve a uppl mf ntal
au wer . The learned trial judge <loubtle · had the p wer to ompel the plaintiff
to re ort to that meth d, dilatory as it
wa , but h deci<l d to make them partie
on their own applicati n and to let the
auE:e proce d a if everything had be n
done that the def udaut. ' ouu el asked.

c urt f

I TERVENTIO.t<'.

4.. 1
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extent of its innovations upon all prior methods, antl its useful-

ness in procuring controversies to be decided on their merits in a

extent of it innovations ur n all prior methods, and it u. efulnes in procuring controver ie to b clecicl d on their merit in a

is whether a court of equity may, upon the

trial, admit new parties to the record when

thi^y ask to be heard and when their

presence is necessary for a complete de-

termination of the controversy. When

all the parties are before tlte court, as in

this case, we entertain no doubt with

respect to the power to order the amend-

ment in the manner and upon the con-

ditions that it did. It was an exercise of

discretion by the trial judge in furtiier-

ance of justice, and no rule of practice or

]irinciple of law was violated. We think

tliere was power in the court to order the

amendment as it did, and hence the order

appealed from sliould be reversed and the

Generated for facpubupdates (University of Michigan) on 2014-06-17 15:32 GMT / http://hdl.handle.net/2027/uc2.ark:/13960/t02z1c23b
Public Domain / http://www.hathitrust.org/access_use#pd

judgment of the Special Term affirmed

with costs."

See also the following cases in which

intervention was allowed: Majors v.

Taussig (1894), 20 Colo. 44, 36 Pac. 816

(by stockholders to defend an action upon

a note fraudulently executed by the offi-

cers, the company refusing to defend) ;

Wood y. Denver City Water Co. (1894),

20 Colo. 253, 38 Pac. 739 (by residents

supplied by one water company, in action

brought by another company to enjoin the

furmer and claiming an exclusive privilege

to supply wnter to the inhabitants of the

town); Maddox v. Teague (1896), 18

:\Iont. 593, 47 Pac. 209 (by joint mort-

gagee in an action against a sheriff on his

official bond by the other mortgagee for

failure to pay over the proceeds of a sale

of the mortgaged property in satisfaction

(jf his claim, which was alone sufficient to

exhaust the ])enalty of the bond) ; Dunn

'.-. Nat. Bank (1898), 11 S. D. 305, 77

N. W. Ill (by payee named in a certifi-

cate of deposit and claiming owuei-shij)

thereof in an action thereon by the holder,

who was alleged to have obtained it

through fraud) ; Cooper v. Mohler (1898),

104 Iowa, 301, 73 N. W. 828 (by a third

parly, the owner of one of the notes

secured by a mortgage- which plaintiff is

seeking to foreclose, he having an interest

in determining the priorities of the various

claims secured by the mortgage) ; A. E.

Johnson Co. i: White (1899), 78 Minn. 48,

80 N. W. 838 (by one partner where the

otiier partner was sued upon notes exe-

cuted by him alone and the two partners

joined in intervention coinjjlaint alleging

the partnership, that the notes were given

for partnership debt and setting up coun-

ter-claims against plaintiff to them as

partners) ; Ex parte Kenmore Shoe Co.

(1897), 50 S. C. 140, 27 S. E. 682 (by a

party seeking to establish an eifuitalde

lien over the fund sought to be distributed

in the principal case) ; McKldowncy v.

Madden (1899), 124 Cal. 108, h<o Pac.783

(by a subsequent attaching creditor who

has levied upon property levied upon in a

i whether a court of equity ma_v, upon the
trial, a<lmit new partie to the record wh n
they a k to be heard and wh e n th ir
pr ence i nece · ary for a complete deWhen
termination of the controv rsy.
all the parties are before th>e court, a in
thi ca e, we entertain no doubt with
r p ct to the power to order the am endment in the manner and up on the condition that it di<l. I t was an exerci e of
ckcretion by the trial judge iu furtherance of justice, and no rule of practi ce or
principle of law was violated. W e think
there was power in the court to order the
amendment as it did, an<l hence the order
appealed from should he reYersed and the
judgment of the Special Term affirm ed
with co t ."
ee al o the following cases in which
intervention was allowed : :Majors i·.
Tau ·ig (1894), 20 Colo. 44, 36 Pac. 816
( liy stockholders to defen d an action upon
a iiote fraudulently executed by the officer , the company refusing to defend) ;
\V ood v. D enver City Water Co. (1 9-±),
20 Colo. 253, 38 Pac. i 39 (by r e ·id ents
i::upplied b.v one water company, in action
urought b_v anoth er company to enjoin the
former anrl claiming an exclusi \ 'C privil ege
to supply water to the inhabitants of the
town); l\faddox v. T eague (18%), 18
)fo11t. 593, 47 Pac. 209 (by joint mortgagee in ri u action against a sheriff on his
official bond by the other mortgagee for
failure to pay over the proceed· of a sa le
of the m ortgaged property in satisfaction
of his claim, which was aloue sufficient to
exhaust the peualty of the bond); Dunn
'"· i\at. Bank (1898), 11 S. D. 305, 77
. W. 111 (by payee nam ed in a cert ificate of deposit and claimiug owner hip
thereof in an action thereon by the holder,
wh o was alleged to ha,·e oLtaiuecl it
through fraud); Cooper v. l\Iohler (189 ),
l 04 Iowa, 30 I , 73 N. W. 828 (by a third
part~·, the owner of one 0£ th e notes
secured by a mortg;ag& which plaintiff is
seeking to foreclose, he having an iulere ·t
iu determining the priori tie· of the Yariou
claims secured by the mortgage); ..:\.. E.
Johnson Co. v. White (1899) , 7 .:\linn.-!8,
80 i . ·w. 838 (by one partu er where the
other partn er was sued upon notes exe-

cuted by him , lone and th e two partn r
joined in i11tcn"ntion complaint allegiug
th e partn er ship, that the note were giY n
for partner: hip debt ands ttiug up counter-claim · ao-aiust plaiutiff to them a
partners) ; E:r: parfP Kenmore , hoc o.
(1 9i), 50 ". . 140, 27 . E. 6 2 (by a
party ec kiug to establ ish au equitalil
li en over the fund soug ht to be di trihnted
in the principal ca e) ; Mc!•:ltlowncy v.
Madd en (I 99), 124 Cal. 108, !'16 Pa . 7 ."3
(by a ub -equent attaching creditor who
has le,· ied upon propert y l eYiecl upon i11 a.
prior action to defeat the li en of the prior
le,·y); Hice v. Dorriau ( l 93), 57 Ark.
5-!l, 22 S. \V. 21.3 (by an attaching creditor, in a prior attachment, to show that
the prior order of attachment wa · wrongfully issu ed); State ex nl. v. ~lack
(1902), 26 Nev. 85, 69 Pac. 862 (where a
corporation, of which the district judge
was a stockholder, brought mamlamns to
compel him to pass upon a claim against
an insohent estate, another claimant bas
s11fficieut interest to intervene by askiug
that he be compelled to call another
judge ); l\Iuhlenberg r. Tacoma {1901),
25 Wash. 36, 64 Pac. 925 {by the recei ,·er 0£ an in solvent bank in an action
by the trustee of a pl edgee of such bank,
iustituted for the purpo. e of establishing
the validity of certain city warrants, etc.);
Guncl v. Parke (1 896), 15 Wash. 393, 46
Pac. 408 (by a wi £e for the purpose of
having any jndgm eut that may be rendered against h er Im. baud adjudged n ot
a c:omlllunity debt am! that it hould
not be satisfiec.l out of the commuuity
propert.Y, in an actiou ou the husband's
prom is ·ory note) ; Pi tman r. Ire la.nd
(1902), 6-± Neb . 675, 90 N. W. 5-W (hy a
m ortgagor who has com·eyeJ lands hy
au unconditional deed 0£ geueral warranty for the purpose 0£ pleading usury
iu au action to forcdo~e the mortgage);
State ex rel. i:. Hulm es (1900), 60 Neb. 39,
82 ~". W'. 109 (by the shareholder of a
corporation for Lhe purpo ·e of protectiug
thei r own inte rest:>, where the officer,; of
the corporation fail and r efo e to protect and conserve the corporate property) ;
to the same effect is Fitzwater t'. Hauk
(1901), G2 Kan. 163, 61Pac.6 4; McCon-
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single action, will be best shown by detailing the facts of one or

sino·le action will be be...

hown b - d tailin the fact of one or

niff 1-. Van Dusen (1898), 57 Neb. 49, 77

N. W. 348 (by a person claiming owner-

ship of i)roperty in litigation). " That any

person who can by proper averments show

that he Ikis an interest in the matter in

litigation may, without leve of court, be-

come a party to the suit and obtain an

adjudication of his claim," see the two

following cases : Spalding v. Murphy

(1901), 63 Neb. 401, 88 N. W. 489;

Greenwood r. Ingersoll (1901), 61 Neb.

785, 86 N. W. 476 (by a chattel mort-

gagee in proceedings in garnishment

instituted by judgment creditors of mort-

gagor to appropriate the proceeds of the

mortgaged property to the payment of the

judgments) ; Deere v. Eagle Mfg. Co.
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(1896), 49 Neb. 385, 68 N. W. 504 (by a

second attaching creditor to have his lieu

adjudged superior to that of plaintiff) ;

Joshua Hendy, etc. Works v. Dillon

(1901), 135 Cal. 9, 66 Pac. 960 (by a third

party claiming ownership of the property

sought to be recovered in an action of re-

plevin, said tliird party's title being

pleaded in the answer of the defendant,

who averred his willingness to surrender

the property to the owner, and the third

party himself alleging " tliat he was the

owner of the said property and entitled to

the exclusive possession thereof," and

asking judgment awarding him the posses-

sion of the same) ; German Savings Bank

I'. Citizens Nat. Bank (1897), 101 Iowa,

530, 70 N. W. 769 ; Smith v. City of St.

Paul (1896), 65 Minn. 295, 68 N. \V. 32.

We quote from the opinion of the court

in the case last above cited as follows :

" The city of St. Paul had taken by con-

demnation proceedings a tract of land for

the purpose of opening a street, the com-

pensation or damages awarded being one

gross sum for the entire tract. Tlie plain-

tiff brought tliis action against the city to

recover the amount of the award, alleging

that she was tlie owner of tiie entire tract.

The St. Paul Trust Co. and Mrs. Sache

interposed 'com])laints in intervention,'

alleging that they respectively owned cer-

tain portions of tlie tract, and hence were

severally entitled to a part of the awani.

To these complaints the plaintiff demurred

on the ground that the facts stated did not

constitute a ground of intervention. Tliis

appeal is from an order overruling the

demurrers.

" The contention of the plaintiff is that

these parties had no right to intervene,

under G. S. 1894. § 5273, for the reason

that they ' wouhl neitlier gain nor lose by

the direct legal operation and effect of the

judgment;' that any interest they might

have in tlie property, or any claim they

might have against the city, would be

wholly unaffected by the result of a suit

between tlie city and the plaintiff. Lewis

V. llarwood, 28* Minn. 428, 10 N. W. 586.

ni ff i-. Y an Du en ( l 9 ), 57 Teb. 49, 7i
_ T. W . 34
(by a per. on claimin a ownerhip of prope rty in litigation ). ''That any
per ~on who can by proper ayerment
how
t hat he h an intere t in the matter in
Jitiaation may, without lea.ve f court, be·
come a party to the ' uit and btain an
adjudication. of hi claim," ee the two
following c e :
palding v. 1urpby
(1901), 63
eb. 401,
. W. 4 9;
Greenwood t'. In er oll (1901) , 61 eb.
7 5, 6 .... W. 476 (by a chattel mortga ee in proceeding in garni hment
in tituted by judgment creditor of mortgaaor to appropriate th e proc d of the
mortgaged property to the pay ment of the
judgment ) ; Deere v. E agle Mfg. Co.
(1896) , 49 :reb. 3 5, 6
. W . 504 (by a
secoud attach ing cred itor to have hi lien
adjud ed uperior to that of plaintiff);
J o· hua Hendy, tc. W ork v. Dillon
( 1901 ), 135 Cal. 9, 66 Pac. 960 (by a third
party claiming owner-hip of the property
ought to be reco,·ered in an action of replevio, aid third par ty' title being
pl eaded in the an · wer of the defendant,
who averred hi willingne to urrender
the property to the owner, and the third
party him elf alleging " that he was the
owner of the aid property and entitled to
the exclt ive po e ·ion th ereof," and
askiu judgment awarding him the po e ion of the ame); erman :.w ina Bank
v. Citizen Nat. Bank (1897), IOI Iowa,
~30 , 70 - . W. 769 ;
mith v. ity of t.
Paul (1 96 ), 65 Minn. 295, 6 - . \V . 32.
W e quote from the opinion of the court
in the case last above cited a · follow :
" T he city of t. Paul had taken IJy condemnation proceeclin a a tract of land for
the pu rpo e of openi ng a treet, the compen. ation or damage awarded being one
g ro ·um fo r the eutir tract. T he plaintiff IJrou~ht th i. actio n a.,.ai n. t he city to
reco'· •r the amount of the awar1l, alleging·
that . he wa: the uwue r of the entire trnct.
The • t. Paul T ru. t Co. and :\Ir . :ache
i11t<·rpr1~Pd 'eomplaiut. in intcrveutiou,'
all"giu6 that they re:]'ecti ,,ely owul'd certai11 ]'1Jrtio11. of the tra<·t, a111l liem·c were
·cvnally c-11title1l to a part of the awar1l.
To thP:P complaint tlie plaintiff <lemurre1l
011 th,. ~mund that tl1c fact. state1l 1li1l 11ot
·un titutc a ground of iuterveutiun. Thi,

appeal i from au order OYerruling the
demurrer .
' The contenti n of the plaintiff i that
the e parti
had no right to intervene,
under . . 1 94, 5273, for the r a on
that they 'would neither gain nor lo e by
the direct legal operation aud effect of the
judgment;' that any iutere t they mi ht
ham in the property, or any claim th y
might have again t the city, would b
wholly unaffected by the re ult of a - uit
between the city and the plaintiff. Lewi
v. Harwood, 2
finn. 42 , 10 . W. 5 6.
If the action had been brought by plaintiff ~
to recov r an ordinary debt alleged to be
due her from th e ity, or if the intervenor
bad to rely exclu ively upon the tatut
for their right to om e into the action,
the plaintiff' contention might be difficult to an wer. But compul ory interpleading and voluntary intervention in an
action orig inally between other partie.
were alway known and recognized a
an cillary remedies by mean of whi h
court were enabled more conveniently
and perfectly to adjudicate upon the ultimate right of the partie in the ubjec: matter inv lved in the litigation, and thu
award full and final relief in the further
judicial proceeding to which the e remedies were auxiliary. I t i not to be uppo e l that the tatute in relation t
interpleader and iuterventi n wa intended
to aboli. h tho e ancillary r medies in c e
where they were previou ly authorized,
and to limit them exclu h-ely to ca e
falling trictly within the term of the
tatute.
" ondemnation proceeding under the
i y charter are in rem again t the land.
The award become a fund tanding in
the place of the land, and whoever wu.
the land is utitled to tl award. II the
a ward i I aid over to one al'I own r wh
i:- not the tru e wn er, h will be liahl to
th true own er in an action for mou y hail
and received . IIeuce, if the whole of th
award hould he paid over o th e plaintiff.
aud the fact hould be that . h wa.> uot
cutitl d to the whole of it, but tliat th
iutl· n ·enor. were .everally enti tled to a
par t of it, they ·ould main tain a tio11 .'
Uf;aiu t her to r •cover t heir . hare . 'fltr:
fact that t.h y mi ght, at their el ·tio11 ,
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two cases in which it has been resorted to.' An action in tlie

two cases in which it has be n resort d to. 1 An aetion in tli'
u ual f rm wa brought by A., th payee of two promissory note,

usual form was brouglit by A., the payee of two promissory notes

have a remedy agaiust the city would uot

deprive them of this right of action. If

this is so, why may they not intervene in

this action, in order to have the award

apportioned, and to recover their share 1

Why shoukl they have to wait until tlie

money was paid over to the plaintiff, and

then sue her 1 Where the duty is de-

volved on the court or other tribunal

before which the condemnation proceed-

ings were had, to distribute or apportion

the award among those entitled to it, there

is no question of the right of any claimant

to appear and assert his right to it, or of

the court or other tribunal to require any

such claimant to appear and establish his
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claim. . . . Doubtless the city might, in

a proper case, require the plaintiff and

other claimants to interplead ; but if it

appeared that a third party claimed a

portion of the award, the court would, in

our opinion, have the power to require

such person to be brought in as a party

to the action, in order that there might

be a full and final adjudication of the

rights of all parties in the fund ; and, if

such a person can be thus brought in,

there is no reason why he may not be

allowed to come in voluntarily."

Citizens' Nat Bank v. City Nat. Bank

(1900), 111 Iowa, 211, 82 N. W. 464;

Valley Bank r. Wolf (1897), 101 Iowa,

51, 69 N. W. 11.31; Enger v. Lofland

(1896), 100 Iowa, 303, 69 N. W. 526;

Palmer v. Bank of Zunibrota (1896), 65

Minn. 90, 67 X. W. 893.]

1 [;Dennis v. Kolm (1901), 131 Cal. 91,

63 Pac. 141. We quote from this case as

follows : " This action was brought to

recover for goods, wares, and merchan-

dise, alleged to have been sold to the

defendants as copartners under the firm

name of ' Kolm Bros.' One Perkins had

in his hands about eight hundred and

seventy dollars, which plaintiff claimed

to be the money of H. Kolm, who was

alleged to be one of the partners. Plain-

tiff had the eight hundred and seventy

dollars attached in this action as the

property of H. Kolm. Bertha Kolm, a

sister, filed a complaint in intervention in

which she denied that the money so at-

tached was the property of H. Kolm or of

' Kolm Bros.,' and alleged that the same

was her property, and asked that she bo

adjudged to l)e the owner thereof. A

demurrer was interposed by plaintiff to

the complaint in intervention, overruled,

and plaintiff filed an answer to said com-

plaint. The respondent II. Kolm filed an

answer to the complaint of plaintiff, in

which, among other things, he denied that

he ever was, at any time, a meml)er of the

firm of ' Kolm Bros.,' or that he was in

any way indebted to the plaintiff. The

case was tried before a jury, and verdicts

have a remedy again t the city would uot
d prive them of this right of action. If
thi is , why may they not interv ne in
thi:; action, in or<ler to have the award
apportion cl, and to reco,·er th ir hare ?
\Vhv hould ther have to wait until the
mo;ey wa paid .over to the plai.11tiIT, and
then ue her? Where the Juty is <levolved ou the court or other tribunal
before which the condemnation proc eding were had, to distribute or apportion
the award among t ho ·e entitled to it, there
i no que tion of the right 0£ any claimant
to appear an<l a ert hi::; right to it, or of
the court or other tribunal to r quire any
uch claimant to appear and establi h his
claim . . . . Doub t les the city might, iu
a proper ca. e, require the plaintiff and
other claimants to interpleau; hut if it
appeared that a third party claimed a.
portion of the award, the court would, in
our opinion, l'l.a,·e the power to require
uch per on to be brought in as a party
to the action, in order that there might
be a full and final a<ljudication of the
rights of all parties in the fund; and, if
such a person can be thus brought in,
there is no reason why he may not be
allowed to come in voluntarily."
Citizens' Nat. Bank v. City Nat. Bank
(1900), 111 Iowa, 211, 82
. W. 464;
Valley Bank v. Wolf (1897), 101 Iowa,
51, 69 N. W. 1131; Enger v. Lofland
{l 96), 100 Iowa, 303, 69 N. W. 526;
Palmer v. Bank of Zumbrota (1 96), 65
Minn. 90, 67 "1\. W. 893 .J
1 [Dennis v. Kolm (1901), 131 Cal. 91,
63 Pac. 141. We quote from this ca ea
follows: "This action was brought to
recover for goods, ware , and merchandise, alleged to have been sold to the
defeudants as copartners under the firm
nam e of 'Kolm Bros.' One Perkin had
in his hands about eight hundre<l and
eventy tlollars, which plaintiff ·]aimed
to be the money of H. Kolm, who was
alleged to be one of the partner . Plaintiff had the eight hundred and event_v
dollars attached in this action a the
property of H. Kolm. Bertha Kolm, a
' i,.ter, filed a complaint in iuterveution in
which she denied that the money o attached was the property of II. Kolm or of

'Kolm Bro'.,' and all g <l that the same
was her prop rty, aud aske<l that he be
adjudged to be the owner thereof. A
demurrer was int rpo ed by plaintiff to
the compluiut in intervention, ov rruled,
anrl plaintiff filed an an wer to aid complaint. The respondent II. Kolm filed an
answer to the ·omplaint of plaintiff, iu
which, among other thiuo- , he denied that
he ver wa, , at any time, a member of the
firm of ' K olm 13ros.,' or that he was in
auy way i11d chtcd to the plaintiff. The
ca e was tried before a jury, and verdict
rendered for the respondent H. Kolm and
the intervenor Bertha Kolm. Upo11 the e
verdict judgmeut wa eutere<l. The appeal is from the jnclg-ment and au order
Jen.ring plaintiff', motion for a new trial.
It is claimed that the court erred in O\'erruling the clemurr r to the complaint in
intervention, for the rea. on that the . ai<l
complaint does not tate facts howing
that the intervenor has any interest in
the matter in controversy, or that the
decision would in auy way affect her
rights . It is provided in the Code of
Civil Procedure, section 387; 'Any per on
may, before the trial, intervene in an
action or proceeding, who has an intere::;t
in the matter in litigation, iu the ucce::;s
of either of the parties, or au intere t
against both.' Iu this case the intervenol·
claimed the money in the hands of Perkins,
a the proceed of a uote and mortgage
that had been a::; igned to her by respondent H. Kolm.
he alleged that ' Kolm
Bros.' were at no time the owner of aid
note or mortgage or of the money in the
hands of Perkins, but that Rhe was the
owner of the same. If he could show
that H. Kolm was not one of the copartners of the firm of 'Kolm Bros.,' then he
was not ind ebted to plaintiff. If plaintiff
was not a creditor of H. Kolm at an.\'
time, then he could not attack the tran fer
of the note and mortgage made by Kolm
to the intervenor. 'Ve think the intervenor had uch int re t a would entitle
her to iuterrnne unuer the tatute. 1c
was aid by thi. court in offey v. Grc"nfi cld, 55 Cal. 3 2 in peaking of the inter
est which entitle a part.'· to i11terY e11e:
'And the Code doc ' 110 , ;\ d •111 ,t to :'perify
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made by B., in which B. made no defence. At this stage of the

cause C. filed a petition of intervention, alleging the following

facts: Before the giving of these notes, B. was indebted in the

amount thereof to one D., and was not indebted at all to the

plaintiff ; that the plaintiff A. caused B. to execute and deliver

to him these notes, and the consideration thereof was B.'s said in-

debtedness to D. ; that A. had no authority to take tliese notes in

his own name, but they should have been given in the name of

D. ; that D. is dead, and the intervenor C. is bis administrator;

that the notes belong really to the estate of D., and the plaintiff

has no interest in them, except that the legal title is in him. The

petition prayed that the intervenor might become a party plain-

tiff, and that judgment might be rendered in his favor as admin-

istrator for the amount of the notes against B., the niidcer thereof.

To this petition the original plaintiff A. demurred, and the

Supreme Court of Iowa held that the case was a proper one,

within the system established in that State, for an intervention,

and that upon the facts alleged in the petition the intervenor
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was entitled to judgment. ^ In another case. A., claiming to be

wlmt or how great this interest shall be, in

order to give a right to intervene. Any

interest is sufficient. The fact tiiat the

intervenor may or may not protect liis

interest in some other way is not material.

If lie " has an interest iu the matter in

litigation or in the success of either of the

parties" he has a right to intervene.'

B., in which . mad no defence.
t thi
ta
of be
au e . fil d a p titi n of int r nti n, all ging tb f 11 win 0
f, t : efore th. giving of the e not ·,
in lebtccl in th
amount h reof to on D . ancl wa n t in l bt <l a.t a.11 to the
1 laintiff; that the plain iff A. cau 'eel B. t
xecute < nd leliver
t him he e note' and the consiclerati nth r of m ,1,
::i,i l in cl bt dne
o D . · that . had n authority to t-tk he e n t " i1
his own name but they sh ukl hav bven gi en i.1 the name f
D . · that . i d , d, and the intervenor C. i hii-:1 ad mini trn or ·
that the note:s l>-.J n really t the e ·tate of ., :.tn<l the phtintiff
h no interest in them e. cept that the legal title is in him . The
p titi n prayed tlrnt the int rven r might becom a P< rt pbintiff and that judgment mi ·ht be rendei cl in hi' favor a' aclrnini trat r for he a onnt of the notes against ., the mak r thereof.
To this petition the original plaintiff A. dernurre 1, and the
upreme Court of Iowa held that ( the case was a proper one,
within the system established in that State, for an intervention,
and that upon the facts alleged in the petition the interven r
wa entitled to juclgment. 1 In another case, A ., claiming to be

The provisions of our statute are taken

from tiie Code Procedure of Louisiana,

and the practice iu that State is to allow

a party to intervene whose property has

been seized or att.acked in the suit.

(Pomeroy in Keniedies and Remedial

Rights, sec. 427 ; Field v. Harrison, 20

La. Ann. 411 ; Yale i: Hoopes, 16 La.

Ann. 31 1 ; Letchford v. Jacobs, 17 La. Ann.

79)." Tiie section cited from Remedies

and Remedial Rights appears in Code

Remedies as § *429.]

1 Taylor v. Adair, 22 Iowa, 279. [The

following quotation from Taylor r. Adair

appeared as § 427 ia the text of the last

edition : " To tlie lawyer not thoroughly

conversant with the sweeping and radical

changes in procedure and practice made by

the Revision, the y>r<)position that such an

intervention as that sought in tlie present

instance is allowaV)le, would be not a little

startling. ... A design to avoid needless

multiplicity of actions is everywhere ap-

parent iu the present system of procedure.

Consonant with the other provisions of

this system are those governing and regu-

lating the rights of tliird parties to inter-

vene in a pending action. Applying the

section of the code (§ 2683) to the case iu

hand, we first inquire wliether C, as the

administrator of I)., has 'an interest in

the matter in litigation.' What was tlie

matter in litigation ? Clearly tlie debt

wiiich B. owed. We say the debt rather

than the note, for the debt is the substance

of whicli the note is simply a memorandum

or visildc evidence. Now this debt is al-

leged, and on tlie record admitted, to be

OAving by B. to 1) .and not to the plaintiff.

If 1). or his administratcu- had possession

of the notes, though they are made pay-

what or bow great thi~ intere t hall be, in
order to g ive a right to intervene. Any
intere ·t i
ufficient. The fact that tha
interrnnor may or may not protect his
inter t in ome ther way i not material.
If lie "ha au intere t in the matter in
litigati n or in the ~ ucce of either of the
partie " he ha a right to interven e .'
'fhe provi..,i u of our tatute are tak n
from the Code Procedure of Loui iana,
arnl the practice in that tate i to allow
a party to intervene who e property has
l1eeu eized or attacked in the ui t.
(Pomeroy in I emedic an l R medi al
Rights, ec. 427 ; Field v. Harri on, 20
La. Ann ...n l ; Yale !'. Hoope., 16 La.
Ann. 311 ; Letchford t'. Jacob , 17 La. Ann.
79)." The ection ·ited fr m Remerlie
and Hem rlial Right. appear iu
ode
He111edie,; a. § *429.J
l Taylor v. Ada ir, 22 I wa, 279.
[The
following <1uotation fr< m Taylor t'. P.dair
appeared as 'S 427 i.1 the text of the la. t
•clitio11: "To the lawy r not thoroughly
011,·n:ant with tli swe<>piug an<l r, dical
hange.· i11 procedur and pra ti, macl c Ly
th<.' Hcvi io11, the propo:ition that nch an
iutcrventiou a.· that . ought in th pr ent

in tance i allowable, woul 1 be not a little
startling . . . . A design to avoicl needle
multiplicity of actions i:; everywhere apparent in the pre eut sy · em of procedure.
Consonant with th other pr ,.iRion
f
thi i:.y tern are thoHe gov rniug and regulating the right of third parti . to iuterven iu a pen cling action. A pplyinO' the
section of the cod ( § 26 3) to the ca e iu
hand, we fir t inquire whether C ., as the
admini trator of D., ha 'au intere t in
the matter iu litigation.' What wa. th
matter in litigation'!
learly the debt
which B. ow d. V\ e . ay the debt rath r
than th not , for the debt i · 1h e :ub tan ·e
ofwhich the not i . simply a rn ·moranclum
or vi. il ilc erid nc· . :N'ow thi · cl bt i. alleged, and on the r cortl n.dmitte<l, t h
owing by B. to }) , antl not L th plain~iff.
If D. or his adminbtrator ha<l po .C. $i n
of th note .. though th y ar made payable to the plai11tiff A., he might, on. howing !tis owner$hiJ,. uc ther on in hi own
uam . , 'o, nlthough the plaintiff A. might
sue in his own mun
n th note th y
l1cing made payabl to him, y t if tli y
were i11 r ality th property of D., the
maker might avail himself f any defence
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assignee of a note and mortgage executed to 1j. as the payee

and mortgagee, commenced an ordinary action for a foreclosure.

Thereupon C. filed a petition of intervention as administrator of

B., the mortgagee, in which he denied that the note and mortgage

had ever been assigned to A., denied that the latter had any

interest or right therein, and averred that they were assets of tlie

estate of his intestate B., and prayed for judgment in his own

favor of foreclosure and sale against the mortgagor and other

defendants. Upon a demurrer to this petition, the Supreme

Court of California held that the intervention was entirely within

the intent and the letter of the statute, and that the intcrvenor

should have judgment.^ Again, in an action commenced to fore-

he mi^ht have against D. These consid-

erations are advanced to ilhistrate how

thoiougiily the laW penetrates beyond

names and forms and externals into the

assignee of a note and mortgage exe ut d t B. as the pay e
and mortgag , commenc d an ordinary acti n for a for closur
Thereup n
filed a p tition of interv ntion as administrat r f
B., th mortgag , in which h leniecl that the not an 1 mortgage
had ever be n as ign d to A ., denied that the latt r had any
inter t or right ther in, an l av rred tha,t they w re a t' f the
state f hi intestate B., and prayed for judgm nt in his own
favor of foreclo me and sal against the mortg:-lgor and other
defendants. Upon a demurrer to this petition, the ~ 'npr m
Court of California held that the intervention was entirely within
the intent and the letter of thv statute, and that the intervenor
houkl have judgment.1 Again, in an action commenced to fore-

very substance and kernel. Now, if the

plaintiff succeeds, he recovers that which,
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on the assumption of tlie truth of the pe-

tition of intervention, belonged to another ;

that wliich D. or his representative may

sue him for and compel him to pay. He

m.ay be insolvent. He may, if he re-

cover the judgment, assign it. Why

should the real owner of the del)t not

have the privilege of coming into court,

and, on establishing as against the plain-

tiff the right to the debt, directly re-

cover it in his own name 1 This avoids

niuliiplicity of actions, consequent delay,

and augmented costs. It may, as above

suggested, be the , only protection against

the insolvency or fraud of the plaintiff.

We are not prepared to admit the truth

of the proposition advanced in support of

the demurrer, that the interest of D. is of

such a nature that it could be asserted

only in a court of equity. Nor are we

prepared to admit the further proposition

that in a legal action an intervenor's in-

terest in the matter in litigation must be

a legal interest, to entitle him to the benefit

of the statute. We conclude by announc-

ing it as the opinion of the court that this

is a case in which the applicant has shown

that he has ' an interest in the matter in

litigation against both parties,' — a case

in which he demands something adversely

to both plaintiff and defendant. This

interest is adverse to the plaintiff, as he

claims against him tlie amoimt of the note

and debt. His interest is adverse to the de-

fendant, since he claims to recover against

him a judgment for the amount of the

note."3 See Summers v. Ilutson, 48 Ind.

228.

1 Stich V. Dickinson, .38 Cal. 60S. {The

following quotation from Stich v. Dickin-

son appeared as § 428 in the text of the

last edition: "The intervention in this

case comes within the last category of

either [that is, where his interest is ad-

verse to both of the original parties].

The intervenor certainly lias no inter-

est in common either with the plaintiff

or the defendant ; but we think he has

an interest in the matter in litigation

adverse to both within the meaning of the

h e mi g:ht have again t D. These con iderations are advauced to illn trate how
thoroug hl y th e l aw penetrates beyond
names anll forms and extcrnnls into the
very ubf;tan ce and kern el. Now, if the
plaintiff succeeds, h e reco 1•ers that which,
on the a · umpti on of the t ruth of th e petition of intervent ion, belo nged to another;
that which D. or his r ep resentative m ay
sue him fo r and co mpel him to pay . H e
may be insolven t. H e may, if h e r ecove r th e j nd gment, ass ig n it. \Vhy
h oultl the r eal own er of the d ebt not
have the privil ege of coming in to court,
and, on e tabli,.;hing as again st th e plaintiff the rig ht to the deht, directly r ecov er it in his own name? This avoids
mul tipli city of actions, consequent delay,
and anp;m ented co. ts. It may, as above
suggested , be th e only protection against
the insol reucy or frarnl of the plaintiff.
vVe are not prepared to arlmit th e truth
of the proposition ad1·a ucecl in s upport of
the demurrer , that th e iuter e t of D. i. of
such a nature that it co ulu he asserted
onl.v in a co urt of equit,v. Nor are w e
prepRred to adm it the further prop os ition
that in a le.gal a ction an i uterven or' s i utcrest in the mat ter in li t igati on rnu;;t he
a l egal inter est, to entitle him to the benefit
of the statute. " Te coucl ude by announcing it as the opinion of the co urt th a t this
is a case in which the a ppli cant ha ,: hown
that he has 'an interest in the matter in
litigation against both parti es,' - a case
in which he d emands so m ething aclver ely
to both plaintiff and defendant. This
iuterest is adverse to the plaintiff, as h e

claim. ~gain st him the amount of the note
and de lit. !Ii. interest is ad 1·erse to the defendan t , siuce h e claim s to r ecover again ·t
him a judgment for the amount of the
note. "]
See Summers v. Ilutson, 48 Ind.
228.
1 Stich v. Dickin so n, 38 Cal. 60 . [ The
followin g quotati on from St ich !'. Dick inso n appeared as § .J. 28 in t he text of the
last edition: "The in ten ·ention in this
ea e comes within th e las t category of
eith er [that is, wh er e his interest is all·
verse to both of the orig inal partie ].
Th e intervenor certainl y has n o interest in common either with the plaintiff
or th e defendant; bnt we think h e lms
an in terest in the matter in litigatio n
adverse to both within th e mcauiug of the
ection r efe rred to. H e has an interest
against the preten sion of the plaintiff
to be owner of th e note and m ortgage ,
and to have a denec of foreclosure for
bi s ben efit, and against the defendant for
the collection of the clebt. The subjrctmatter of the liti gation is the not all(l
m ortgage, arnl th e r ight of the pl a in ti ff
to haYe a decree of foreclos ure and sal e.
The in terve1wr daim::; as aga ins t the pla inti ff that he a11 1 l not the plaintiff is entitled
to the decree of foreclosure; and as agaiust
the def P,udant. that the mortgage debt is
due a;Hl unpaid, aucl that he i,; entitled to
a for clo;;ure. In thi,.; case t he iuten• nor
claims the dematHl in snit, Yiz. the 1wtC'
ancl mort!:','age, and we can perceiYe 110
r eason founded ou the policy of the law
which shoulil prechule the settlement of
the whole controYer y in o ne action."]
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close a mortgage given (together with a note) by a corporation

which had become insolvent, certain judgment creditors of the

company intervened, alleging fraud in the execution of the note

and mortgage by the defendant, and that they were void as

against its creditors; and praying that they might be adjudged

void, and the action to foreclose be dismissed. The intervention

of these judgment creditors was sustained, but it was hold, at the

same time, that simple contract creditors had no foundation for

an intervention, since they could not dispute the mortgage.^

1 Horn r. Volcano Water Co., 13 Cal.

62. []Tlie following quotation from Horn

V. Volcano Water Co. appeared as § 429

cl ~ a rnortgag giYen ( og th r with a n e by a orr ration
, bich hatl becom in . . olvent, rtain ju lgm n credit r
f th
c mpan · int rv n cl all o-ing fraud in h
cution f tl n e
an l mor a e by he clefen l nt
that th y w r v
a ain t it r ii ors; and pra ·in
might b adjudg cl
1
and the action t foreclo e be di "mi . , d. r h in terv nti ll
f h
jud m nt ere itor wa u ain d but i ' a h l l, at tl
ame rm tha imple ontract credit r h cl n foundation f r
an inter rention in e they could n t di ut he mortgao· .1
T

in the text of the last edition: "The

petition of the creditor K. docs not disclose

any right on his i)art to intervene ; it shows

that he was a sim])le contract creditor,

holding obligations against the company,

but it does not show that any portion of
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them are secured by any lien on the mort-

gaged premises. His intervention is only

an attempt of one credit(jr to prevent an-

other creditor from obtaining judgment

against the common debtor, — a proceed-

ing which can find no support either in

principle or authority. The interest men-

tioned in the statute which entitles a per-

son to intervene in a suit between other

parties, 7nust be in the matter in litigation,

and of such a direct and immediate charac-

ter that the intervener will either r/nin or lose

by the direct legal operation and effect of the

judgment. The provisions of our statute

are taken substantially from the Code of

Procedure of Louisiana, which declares

that ' in order to be entitled to intervene,

it is enough to have an interest in the

.success of either of the parties to the

suit ; ' and the Supreme Court of that

State, in passing upon the term ' interest,'

thus used, held this language: 'This we

8U|)pose must be a direct interest by which

tlie intervening ])arty is to obtain imme-

diate gain or suffer loss by the judgment

which may be rendered between the origi-

nal parties; otherwi.^ie the strange anomaly

would be introduced into our jurisiiruileiicc

of suffering an accumulation of suits in

all instances where doubts might be cnter-

tainc<l or enter into the imagination of

subsequfnt jdaintiffs, that a defendant

against whom a previous action was under

prosecution might not have property suffi-

cient to discharge all his debts. For as

tlie first judgment ol)tained might give

a preference to the person who siiould ob-

tain it, all subsequent suitors down to t he

last would have an indirect interest in de-

feating the action of the first.' To author-

ize au intervention, therefore, the interest

must be that created by a claim to the

demand or some part thereof in suit, or a

claim to or lien upon the jiropcrty or some

part thereof which is the subject of litiga-

tion. No such claim or lien is asserted in

the petition of R., and his right to inter-

vene in consequence thereof fails. The

petition of S. and others stands u|)on a

different footing. It shows that they were

1 Horn r . Volcano 'Vater Co., l 3
al.
62. [Th following quotation from Horn
v. '\ olcau Water o. app ared a
429
in the text of the la. t edition: "The
p tition of the creditor R. doc not di clo e
any right on bi part to intervene ; it how
that he wa a imple c ntract reditor,
h lding obliaation aaain t th e company,
but it doe n ot h ow that auy portion of
th m are ecured by any lien on th e mortgaged premi e . Hi intervention i only
an a ttempt of oue creditor to prevent auother er ditor from obtaining judgment
aaain. t t he comm on debtor, - a proceediu O' whi h an find no support either in
prin ciple or auth ority. The in tere t menti on din the tatute whi h entitle a p'e ron to intervene in a suit bet ween other
partie , must be in the matter in Litigation,
and of uch a direct and immed iate character that the intervenor will eith er qnin or lose
by lhe direct legal operntion and effect '?f the
judgment. The provi ion of our tatute
are taken ub ta ntially from the Code of
Procedure of L oui iana, which declares
that 'in order to he entitled to intervene,
it i e noug h to haYe au int re t in the
• ucce
of it her of the parties to the
uit; ' aud the , ' upr me ourt of that
, tatc, in pa:-. ·in g upon the term 'in terc t,'
t hu U ' cl , heJrl thi lan g uag : 'Thi we
. uppo!'e mu:t be a direc t int re t hy which
th<' i11tcn eui11g party i to ob taiu imm eclia l' ,!.{ain or uffe r lo .. by t he judgment
wlii1·'1 Ill:\_\' lie r Pwl red h tween the original parti<•. ; otherwi <'the. rra11ge anornal y
wonld Ii· i11tro<luc d in to our juri:p rn1le11cc
•if . nlfr>riw• an ac<"111T111]a1ion of ui t: in
all i11 l:tll('<'S whr> rc <loulJt. mi!4ht b c·ut rtairwd or <rntr>r i11t11 the imag inat ion of
suh:c·quP11t 11laiuti ff:, t hat a defendant
agaiu t whom a prcv iou act ion wa uu tler
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§ 324. *430. Author's Statement of the Doctrine. The doc-

trine stated by Mr. Justice Field [in Home v. Volcano Water

Co.] is clearly the correct interpretation of the provisions con-

tained in the California and the Iowa codes, and the opinion of Mr.

Justice Dillon [in Taylor v. Adair] is in complete harmony with

it. The cases cited above all fall within this doctrine. In each

the intervenors had a direct interest, either in prosecuting the

action and obtaining the benefit of the recovery, or in defending

the action and entirely defeating the i-ecovery. If the intervenor

claims to be the only one entitled to the relief, if he asserts that

the ultimate cause of action is vested in him and not in the

original plaintiff, then his interest is adverse to both of the

parties. The doctrine may be expressed in the following man-

ner : The intervenor's interest must be such, that if the original

action had never been commenced, and he had first brought it as

the sole plaintiff, he would have been entitled to recover in his

own name to the extent at least of a part of the relief sought; or

if the action had first been brought against him as the defendant,

he would have been able to defeat the recovery in part at least.
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His interest may be either legal or equitable. If equitable, it

must be of such a character as would be the foundation for a

recovery or for a defence, as the case might be, in an independent

action in which he was an original party. As the new system

permits legal and equitable causes of action or defences to be

united by those who are made the parties to an ordinary suit, for

the same reason either or both may be relied upon by an inter-

venor. In short, the same rules govern his rights which govern

those who originally sue or defend.^ The proceeding by inter-

vention is not an anomalous one, differing from other judicial

controversies, after it has been once commenced. It is, in fact,

the grafting of one action upon another, and the tr34ng of the

combined issues at one trial, and the determining them by one

judgment. In this aspect of the proceeding it is both plain and

reasonable that the intervenor should not be required to appl}'

for permission to come in. He brings himself into court, and

1 I^See Wall v. Mines (1900), 130 Cal. the iutervention, and snch defendant then

'27, 62 Pac. 386, in which the court say : has all the rights to plead given tlie dc-

" The intervention may be adverse to fendants in an ordinary action, and may

botli plaintiff and defendant. Where it file a cross complaint to the intervention

is adverse to either, such party becomes under sec. 442."]

defendant, and the intervenor plaintiff in

§ 324. *430.

The doctrine tat d by Mr. Justice Field [in Horne v. olcano Water
Co. ] i' clearly th corr t interpretation f the pr vi ion contain cl in the California. and the Iowa code , and the opinion of Mr.
Justice Dillon [in Taylor v. Adair J is in com pl te harmony with
it. The ca e cited above all fall within this doctrine. In each
the intervenors had a direct int r t, either in pro ecuting th
action and obtaining the benefit of the recovery, or in defending
the action and entirely defeating the recovery. If the intervenor
claims to be the only one entitled to the relief, if he as erts that
the ultimate cause of action is vested in him and not in the
original plaintiff, then his interest is adverse to both of th
parties. The doctrine may be expressed in the following manner: The intervenor's interest must be such, that if the original
action had never been commenced, and he ha.cl. first brought it as
the sole plaintiff, he would h ave been entitled to recover in his
own name to the extent at least of a part of the relief sought; or
if the action had first been brought against him as the defendant,
he would have been able to defeat the recovery in part at least.
His interest may be either legal or equitable. If equitable, it
must be of such a character as would be the foundation for a
recovery or for a defence, as the case might be, in an independent
action in which he was an original party. As the new system
permits legal and equitable causes of action or defences to be
united by -those who are made the parties to an ordinary suit, for
the same reason either or both may be relied upon by an intervenor. In short, the same rules govern his rights ~which govern
those who originally sue or defend. 1 The proceeding by intervention is not an anomalous one, differing from other judicial
controversies, after it has been once commenced. It is, in fact,
the grafting of one action upon another, and the trying of he
combined issues at one trial, and the determining them by one
judgment. In this aspect of the proceeding it is both plain an 1
reasonable that the intervenor should not be required to apply
for permission to come in. He brings himself into court, and
Author's

Statement of the

1 [See Wall v. Mines ( I 900), 130 Cal..
2i, 62 Pac. 3 6, in which the court say:
" The iutervention may be adverse to
both pl:iintiff and defendant. 'Vhere it
is adverse to either, such party becomes
defendant, and the intervenor plaintiff in

Doctrine.

the intervention, and such defendant th en
has all the rig hts to plead given the <l efondants in an ordinary action, and may
fil e a cross complaint to the intervention
under sec. 442."J

428 CIVIL REMEDIES.

becomes a litigant party by filing and serving his petition, which

is answered by the adversary parties — plaintiff or defendant, or

both — in the same manner as though it was the pleading of a

plaintiff : the issues are thus framed, — issues upon the plaintiff's

petition and the intervenor's petition, — and tlie trial of the

whole is had at one hearing. If the intervenor fails on this

trial, a judgment for costs is of course rendered against him ; if

he succeeds, a judgment is given in his favor according to the

facts and circumstances of the case.-^

§ 325. *431. Concluding Remarks. This is certainly a great

innovation upon the procedure which has liitherto prevailed in

courts of law and of equity. It is, however, a method based

upon the very principles which lie at the foundation of the en-

tire reformed American system. The onlj- possible objection is

the multiplication of issues to be decided in the one cause, and

the confusion alleged to result therefrom. This objection is not

real: it is the stock argument which was constantly urged in

favor of retaining the common-law system of special pleading,

and was repudiated when the codes were adopted by the Ameri-
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can States, and has been at last utterly repudiated in England.

Complicated issues of fact are daily tried by juries, and compli-

cated equities are easily adjusted by courts. The description

1 Poehlmann r. Kennedy, 48 Cal. 201 ; Cal. 3 ; Loughborough v. McNevin, 74

Brooks 1-. Hager, 5 Cal. 281, 282; Sargent Cal. 250; Kobinson t--. Crescent City Mill,

V. Wilson, .5 Cal. 504, 507; Moss v. War- &c. Co., 9.3 Cal. 316 ; Kansas & C. P. Ry.

uer, 10 Cal. 296, 297 ; People v. Talmage, Co. v. Fitzgerald, .33 Neb. 137 ; Welborn

6 Cal. 256, 258; County of Yuba (•. f. Eskey, 25 Xeb. 193; McClurg ;;. State

Adams & Co., 7 Cal. 35;" Davis v. Ep- Bindery Co. (S. D. 1892), 53 N. W. 428;

pinger, 18 Cal. 378, 380; Dixey v. Pol- Gale ?\ Shillock (Dak., Oct. 1886), 30 N.

lock, 8 Cal. 570; Speyer v. Ihmels, 21 W. 138; Smith v. Gale, 12 Supr. Ct. Kep.

Cal. 280, 287 ; Coghill v. Marks, 29 Cal. 674; Yetzer v. Young (S. D. 1892), 52 N.

673. Contra to the.se case.s, see the well- W. 10.54 ; Dunham f. Greenbauni, 50 Iowa,

considered opinion of Clark .1. in Lewis 303 ; Lewis v. Harwood, 28 Minn. 428 ;

V. Harwood, 28 Minn. 428. Dutil r. Teachout v. Des Moines B. G. S. Uy. Co.,

Pacheco, 21 Cal. 438, 442; Coster v. 75 Iowa, 722 ; Van Gorden r. Orinsby, 55

Brown, 23 Cal. 142, 143; Gradwohl Iowa, 657; Goctzman v. Whitaker, 81

V. Harris, 29 Cal. 150, 154; People ?;. Iowa, 527. Further illustrations: Des

Se-xton, 37 Cal. 532, 534 ; Joliet Iron, Moines Ins. Co. v. Lent, 75 Iowa, 522 ;

&c. Co. i;. Chicago C. & W. K. Co., 51 Wohlwend v. Case Threshing-Mach. Co.,

Iowa, 300; Switz t'. Bl.ick, 45 Iowa, 597 ; 42 Minn. 500; Dennis r. Spencer, 45

Ingle r. Jones, 43 Iowa, 286 ; Harwood y. Minn. 250; Pence v. Sweeney (Idaho,

QuiMl)y, 44 Iowa, 385 ; Henry v. Cass Cy. 1891), 28 Pac. Rep. 413 ; Curtis r. Lathmp,

Mill, &c. Co., 42 id. 33 ; (^olmrn r. Smart, 12 Colo. 109; Liml)erg i-. Higginbothani,

53 Cal. 742; Rosecrans i;. Ellsworth, 52 11 Colo. 316; Bennett v. Wliitcomb, 25

Cal. 509; Porter v. Garrissino, 51 Cal. Minn. 148; Thompsou d. Huron Lumber

559. See also Martin v. Thompson, 63 Co., 4 Wa.sh. 600.

INTERVENTION.

INTERVENTION. 429

429

wliich I have here given of the enlarged power of intervention

admitted by the codes of California and of Iowa may, by intro-

ducing its methods to the profession of other States, procure its

general adoption wherever the new procedure is established.

Courts and legislatures of the several States may well borrow

the improvements which have been made in other common-

wealths ; and thus, by a comparison of methods, the common

system may become perfected and unified.^

1 See ante, § *413, and note.

which I have here given of the enlarged pow r of interv ntion
admitted by the cod of California and of Iowa may, by introducing it methods to the profession of other tates, procur it ·
g neral adoption wherever the new procedure is e tabli hed.
Court and legislatures of the several tates may well borrow
the improvements which have been made in other commonwealths ; and thus, by a comparison of methods, the common
ystem may become perfected and unified.1
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1

See ante, § *413, and note.

CIYIL

•ioO CIVIL REMEDIES.

RE~fEDIE

.

CHAPTER THIRD.

THE AFFIRMATIVE SUBJECT-MATTER OF THE ACTION: THE

FORMAL STATEMENT OF THE CAl'SE OF ACTION BY THE

PLAINTIFF.

SECTION FIRST.

THE STATUTORY PROVISIONS.

§ 326. * 432. Introduction. I here collect all the provisions of

the various codes which relate in a general manner to the plain-

H""'

tiff's complaint or petition, and wliich contain the rules applicable

T ~R

HIRD.

to the theory of plciuling as a whole : those which prescribe the

mode of alleging certiiiu particular classes of facts, or regulate

the joinder of causes of action, or define the nature and uses of

THE .AFFIRMATIVE
TBJE T-UATTER
F THE
TIO~: THE
F R:JIAL TATE1\1E T F THE A E OF CTI l\ BY TIIE
PLAINTIFF.
T

the reply, will be quoted in subsequent portions of the chapter,

in immediate connection with the several subjects to A\hich they

refer. The important clauses which announce the fundamental

E 'TI :::l FI

and essential principles and doctrines of the reformed system in

regard to all pleadings, and whicli determine the form and sub-

stance of the one by which the plaintiff sets forth the grounds of

THE

.

TAT"GTORY PR VI IO ...

liis claim for judicial relief, are nearly the same in the different
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State codes. With the few variations in the language, which will

be pointed out, there is no substantial difference ; and the system

of pleading, as found in the statute, is absolutely the same wher-

ever the reform prevails. The following are all the provisions

which it is necessary to quote in order to exliibit the simple and

natural metliods introduced b}'- the new procedure.

§ 327. * 433. statutory Provisions as to Complaint. *' All the

forms of pleading heretofore existing are abolished; and hereafter

the forms of pleading in civil actions in courts of record, and the

rules by which the sufhciency of the pleadings is to be deter-

mined, are those prescribed l)y this act." ^ " Tlie first pleading

' Kansas, § 8o ; Nebraska, § 90; North and pleadin;;. all common counts, general

Carolina, § 91. The corresponding pro- issues, and all fiction.s, arc abolished ; and

vision of the Iowa code is more detailed : hereafter the forms of ))leading in civil

" § 2644. All technical forms of action actions, and the rules by which their suffi-

* -±32.

I here c llect all the provi ion of
the variou code ' bi h r late in a eneral manner to the plaintiff ' complaint or petition, and which contain the rul ap1 licable
to the th ory f 1 leading a. a w h le : tho · whi h l re crib l e
m <le of alle ing certain parti ular la e of fact
r reo·ufate
th. joinder of cau ·e' of ac ion or define th na LU and u · of
th r pl· will be quoted in ub eq uent portion of th chapter,
in immediate connection \\ith the . e' ral ubj ·t' t " ·hich they
r fer. The important clau e which ann unce the fumla m ntal
' n l e enti::tl principle and doctrine of the ref rm c.1 y ·t r in
r arcl to all pleading and which cletermin th f rm and ub:tc n · of the one by 'vhich the plaint iff t f rth th gr uncl · f
hi· da,im for judicic 1 r li f ar nearly h
in th differ nt
. 'tat ·ode. . \Vi th the f w v, riati n in th lan ·ua ·e \Vhich ' ill
l I oint cl out th re i' n ub ·tantial liffer nc · and th
tern
of pl acling a found in th tatute i ab lu el th ame wher'YPr the r f rm pr vail. .
Th foll win ar all h pr vi ' i n
which it i: 11 c; ':ary o qu t in rel r to xhibi th impl and
1mtural m thocl. introcluc cl b ' th 11 w I roe clur .
.' 27. ·:. -±0· . S tatutory Provisions as to Complaint.
ll th
f1Jrm.· of pleacling hePt f r xi ·tin ar aboli:h d · and h r c.Lit r
1 lie fuun <1[ pleacling in ·iYil ar ions in cour :
f r · r 1, and li
rnl ·: by "l1it·h th, :nf'fic.:i ·ney f th . i l a.din -. · to 1 d t r111in ;cl ar tho e pre:(;rih ·d hr tlti ' act .. , 1
1 h fir.-t pl a lin
326.

1

Introduction.

Kar1-a ·, § 5, • -ebra ka,

90;. 'orth

( aruli11a , .' !II. The corre pondiug pro'i iun <Jf thP fowa cod i: more cl ·tail cl :
" , 2G Ii. All technical forrn: <Jf a ·Lion

an1l ple, ding, all common count., g u ral
i ·:u . , a111l all fictiou . , arc al>nli . hP1!; ancl
h •reaft r th fur111 . of pl a1lino- in "'' il
a ·tiou ·, an<l. th• rule, Ly which th ir :uffi-

PROVISIONS IN RELATION TO PLEADING.

PR

n

ION

IN RELATION TO rLE .\DI1 (' .

431

431

on the part of the phxintiff is the complaint." ^ " The only plead-

ciency is to be determined, are those pre-

on the part of th i laintiff is th complaint." 1 "The only pl a<l-

scribed in this code."

{^Arkansas, Sand. & Hill's Dig., § 5710.

California, § 42, reading as follows •

" The forms of pleadings in civil actions,

and the rules by which the sufficiency of

the pleadings is to be determined, are

those prescribed in this code."

Colorado, § 47, reading as follows :

" The mode of pleading in civil actions, and

the rules by which tlie sufficiency of the

pleadings shall be determined, shall be as

prescribed in this act, and not otherwise."

Connecticut, Gen. St., 1902, § 607, read-

ing as follows : " There shall be but one

form of civil action, and the pleadings

therein shall be as follows."
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Idaho, Code Civ. Pro., 1901, § 3201,

same as California, supra.

Indiana, Burns' St., 1901, § 3.39, read-

ing as follows : " All the distinct forms of

pleading heretofore existing, inconsistent

with the provisions of this act, are hereby

abolished ; and hereafter the forms of

pleadings in civil actions in courts of rec-

ord, and the rules by which the sufficiency

of the pleadings is to be determined, are

modified as prescribed by this act."

Kentuckij, Code, 189.5, § 88, reading as

follows: "The forms of pleadings, and

the rules by which their sufficiency is to

be determined, are those prescribed by

this code."

Minnesota, St., 1894, § 5228. reading as

follows: "The forms of proceedings in

civil actions, and the rules by which the

sufficiency of pleadings is to be deter-

mined, shall be regulated by statute."

Missouri, Eev. St., 1899, § 591, reading

as follows: "The forms of pleading in

civil actions in courts of record, anil the

rules by which the sufficieuc}' of the plead-

ings are [.s(V] to be determined, are, except

as otherwise specially provided by law,

prescribed by this article."

Montana, Code, 1895, § 661, reading as

follows : " The forms of pleading in civil

actions, and the rules by which the suffi-

ciency of the pleadings are \si<-\ to be de-

termined, are those prescribed in this code."

Nevada, Comp. Laws, 1900, § 3132,

reading as follows : " All the forms of

pleadings in civil actions, and the rules by

which the sufficiency of the pleadings

shall be determined, shall be those pre-

scribed in this act."

New York, Code Civ. Pro., § 518, read-

ing as follows : " This chapter prescribes

the form of pleadings in an action, and

the rules by which the sufficiency thereof

is determined, except where special pro-

vision is otherwise made by law."

North Carolina, § 91, same as California,

supra.

North Dakota, Rev. Codes, 1899, § 5265.

Ohio, Bates' St., 1903, § 5054, reading as

follows : " The forms of pleading in civil

ciency i · to be de termined, are tho e preTibed in thi· code."
[A rkansos, and. & Hill 's Dig., § 5il0.
California, § -1-2, r eading a follow :
" Th forms of pleadi ngs in civil acti n ·,
and the rul by which the ·ufficiency of
the pleauing i to be determined, are
tho e pre c:ri betl in thi · cod ."
Colorado, § 4 7, r ead ing a follow :
"The mode of pleading in civil actions, r.11<1
the rules by which the sufficiency of the
pleadings shall be determin ed, hall be a
prescribed in th is act, and not otherwi e."
Connecticut, Gen. St., 1902, § 607, reading as foll ows : " There shall be but one
form of civil action , and the pleadings
therein hall be as follows."
Idaho, Code Civ. Pro., 1901 , § 3201,
same a California, supra.
l ndinna, Burn ' St., 1901 , § 339, r eading a follows: "All the distinct fo rms of
pleatling heretofore existing, inconsistent
with the proYi ions of this art, are hereby
abolished; and h ereafter the forms of
pleadings in civil actions in court of r ecord, and the rules by which the sufficiency
of the pleadings is to be determined, are
modified as prescribed by this act."
K entucky, Code, 1895, § 88, read in g as
follows: "The forms of pleadings, and
the rules by which their sufficiency is to
be determin ed, are those prescribed by
thi · code."
_,l finnesota , St., 1894, § 5228, r eading as
follows : "The forms of proceedings in
ci \·il actions, and the rul es by whi ch the
f;ufficiency of pleadiu gs is to be determiried, shall be r egulated by statute."
,lfissouri, Rev. St., 1899, § 59 1, reading
as follows : "The fo rms of pleading in
civi l a ctions in courts of r ecord, and the
Tnles by which the sufficiency of the pleadings are [sir] to be determiued, are, except
a· otherwi e specially provided by law,
pre ·c ribed by this article."
Montana, Code, 1895, § 66 1, r ead in g a
follows: "The forms of plead ing in civi l
actious, and the rules by whi ch the sufficiency of the pleadings are [sic] to be determined,arethose prescribecl in thi corl .'~
N evada, Comp. Laws, 1900, § 3132,
r ead ing as follows : " All the form of
pleadings in civi l actions, and the rul by
whi ch the suffici ency of the pleading

hall be determined, hall Le tho ·e precrib d in thi- act."
.New York, ode Civ. Pro., § 51 , reading a follow : "Thi
hapter pre cribe
the form oi pleading in an action, ancl
the rule by whi h th . nfficiency thereof
i determined, except where pecial provi ion i otherwi e made by law."
Nortli Carolina,§ 9 1, ame as California,
supra.
orth Dakota, Rev. Codes, 1899, § 5265.
Ohio, B ate' 't., 1903, § 5054, reading as
follows: " The form of pleading in civil
actions in courts of record, and the rules
by which their uffieicncy hall be determined, are those pre cribed in this
chapter."
Oklahoma, t., 1893, § 3963, reading as
follows: "The rules of pleading heretofore existing in ciYil actions are aboli. hed;
and hereafter, the forms of pleadings in
civil actions in courts of record, and the
rules by which their sufficiency may be
determined, are those pre·cribed by this
code."
Ore.r;on, Hill's L aws, § 63, containing
the words "in actions at Jaw " after the
word ex isting in the form given in the
text.
outh Carolina, Code, 1893, ~ 161,
r ead in g as follows : "There shall be no
other forms of pleadin g in civi l action s in
cou r ts of record iu this State, and no other
rules by which the sufficiency of the
pleading is to be determined, than tho e
prescribed l)y this code of procedure."
South Dakota, Ann. St., 1901, § 61 11.
Utah , Rev . t., 1898, § 2957 , ame as
Cali fornia, supra.
TVasliinqton, Bal. ode,~ 4903, ubstant ially same as Indiana, su1mi.
Wisconsin, St., 1898, § 2644, reading
as follows:' "The forms of pleadiug in
civil actions in court. of record, and the
rules UJ which the sufficieney Of the p]Pading are [sic] determined are tho e prescribed hy thi chapter."
W11omi11g, R ev. t., l 99, § 3530, same
a - Ohio, s1111ra .
1 New York, § 1-1-l (47 ) ;
alifornia,
§ 425; Oregon, § 64; I orth Carolina, § 92.
[Arkan as,, and. & Hill'. Dig.,§ 5715;
Connecticut, G n. 't., 1902, § 607; Idaho,
Code CiY. Pro., 1901, § 3203; Indiana,

4 2

432
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ings allowed are, 1, the petition by the plaintiff; 2, the answer or

demurrer by the defendant; 3, tlie demurrer or reply by the

plaintiff ; 4, the demurrer to the reply by the defendant." ^ " The

I'iurns' St., 1901, § 341 ; Minnesota, St.,

1894, § 5230; Missouri, Rev. St., 1899,

mo- all wed ar 1 the p ition b r h lain iff · 2 the an wer or
the
mu n r r r I ly b the
1 murr r b r th def ndant ·
pl r by 1 lef ndan . 1 The
1 lain tiff . -! th lemurr r to h

§ 592 ; Montana, Code, 1895, § 670; North

i)akota, Rev. Codes, 1899, §5266; Ohio,

Bates' St., 1903, § 5057 ; South Carolina,

Code, 1893, § 162; South Dakota, Ann.

St., 1901, § 6112 ; Washington, Bal. Code,

§ 4905 ; Wisconsin, St., 1898, § 2645 :

Wvoming, Rev. St., 1899, § 3533.]

1 Kausa.s, § 86 ; Nebraska, § 91.

\;^Arizona, Rev. St., 1901, § 1275, reading

as follows : " The pleadings in all civil

suits in courts of record shall be by corn-

plaint and answer."

Ar/cansas, Sand. & Hill's Dig., § 5711,
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allowing (1) complaint, (2) demurrer or

answer by defendant, (3) demurrer or re-

ply by plaintiff.

California, § 422, allowing, on part of

plaintiff, (1) complaint, (2) demurrer to

answer, and on part of defendant, (1)

demurrer to compbiint, (2) answer, to

which were added by the conimi.ssiouers'

amendment of 1901, on the part of plain-

tiff, (3) demurrer to cro.ss-coniplaint, (4)

answer to cross-com])laint, and on part of

defendant, (3) cro.ss-complaint, (4) demur-

rer to answer to cross-complaint. But see

Lewis V. Dunn (1901), 134 Cal. 291, as to

unconstitutionality of this amendment.

Colorado, Code, 1890, § 48.

Idaho, Code Civ. Pro., 1901, § 3202,

allowing, on part of plaintiff, (1) com-

plaint, (2) demurrer to answer, and on

part of defendant, (1) demurrer to com-

plaint, (2) answer.

/Hc/fflHa, Burns' St., 1901, § 340, allow-

ing (I) complaint by plaintiff, (2) demurrer

and answer by defendant, (3) demurrer and

reply by plaintiff.

Iowa, Code, 1897, § 3557, allowing

(1) petition of plaintiff, (2) motion, de-

murrer or answer of defendant, (3) mo-

tion, demurrer or reply of plaintiff, (4)

motion or demurrer of defendant.

Kentucky, Code, 1895, § 89, allowing

"(1) petitions, answers and replies, and

such additional pleadings, by way of re-

joinder and rebutter, .as may be necessary

to form a material issue of fact, (2) de-

murrers."

Minnesota, St., 1894, § 5229, substan-

tially the same as Indiana, supra.

Missouri, Rev. St., 1899, §§ 592, 596,

607.

Montana, Code, 1895, § 662.

Nevada, Comp. Law.s. 1900, § 3133,

allowing, on part of plaintiff, complaint

and demurrer to answer, and on part of

defendant, demurrer and answer.

Neu! York, Code Civ. Pro., §§ 478,487,

493, 514, supra.

North Carolina, §§ 92, 94, 105, 107,

allowing complaint, demurrer and reply

on part of plaintiff, and answer and de-

t. 1901, § 341 ; I inne ota,
5230; Mi. ouri, Re\•. t., 1
· 592; 1 utaua, ode, l 95
670 ·
])akota, Rev. ode , 1 99, 5266;
Ba e ' t., 1903,
o
outh
ode, l 3, § 162 ;
a kota, nn.
t., 1901, 6112; W hiogton, Bal. ode,
4905 · vVi con in ,
t., 1 ~
§ 2645 :
Wyoming, ev. t., l 99 § 3533.J
1 Kan a ~ ,
6; Tebr ka, 91.
[Arizona, Rev. t., 1901, 1275, read ing
Burn
-1,

follow : "The pleading in all civil
uit in
urt of record hall be by complaint and an wer."
Arkan a , and. & Rill' Dig., § 57 11 ,
allowmg ( 1) omplaint, (2) demurr er or
au wer by defendant, (3) dem ur rer or reply by plailltiff.
al~fornia, § 422, allowing, on part of
plaintiff, (1) complaint, {2) demurrer to
an wer, and on part of defendant, (1)
demurrer to complaint, {2) an wer, to
which w re added by the commis ioners'
amendment of 1901, on the part of plaintiff, ( 3) demurrer to ro · om plaint, (4)
an wer to cro -complaiut, and on part of
defendant, (3) cro -complaint, ( 4) demu rrer to an ·wer to cro -complaint. But ee
Lewi v. Dunn (1901), 134- al. 2 l, a. to
uncon titutionality of thi amendment.
Colomdo, ode, 1 90, § 4 .
Idaho,
ode CiL Pro., 1901, § 3202,
allowing, on part of plaintiff, {l) complaint, (2) demurrer to an wer, an<l on
part of defendant, (l) d murr r to complaint, (2) an wer.
I ndiana, Burn ' , t., 1901, § 34 , allowmg (l) complaint by plaintiff, {2) d murrer
a ud an wer by d fendant, (3) demurr r an<l
re ply by plaintiff.
f 01m,
ode, l 97, 'S 3557, allowing
( l ) pPtition of plain iff, (2) motion, d murrer or au wer of cl fondant, (3) motiou, d murr r or r ply of plai nt.iff, {-1-)
mot ion or demurr r of clef udant.
K entucky, od , 1 fJ5, $ 9, allowiua
' · ( 1) pPti t ion , an. w r: an rl r pli , and
· u ~ h additional pleading · , hy way of r ary
jfJiud r nd r butter, a may be n
t<J form a material i: ue 1£ I ct, (- ) dem rr r: ."

5229, ub tan1llinnesola, t., l 94,
tially the .-ame a Indiana, upra.
Mi ouri, R ev. t., 1 99, § 592, 596,
607.
lo11ta11a, Code, l 95, 662.
~ernda,
omp. Law ", 1900,
3133,
allowing, u par t of plaintiff, c mplaint
and d n1urrer to a.o we r, and on part of
defendant, demurrer and an wer.
i\"ew rork, ode i\•. Pro., §§ 47 , 487,
493, 514 . supra.
1. orth
arolina, §§ 92, 94, 105, 107,
a llowing ompla int, demurr r a nd reply
on part of plaintiff, and an wer and demurrer on par t of defendan t.
0. orth Dakota, Rev . Code , l 99,
§§ 5266, 5267, 5277 5279.
Ohio, Bate ' t., 1903, § 5055 , providing
t hat the an wer may be tyled a cr o -petition when affirmative relief i demanded.
Oklahoma, t., 1 93, § 3964 .
Oregon, Hill's L aw , § 64, a llowing on
the part of the pla intiff, {l) co mpla in t ,
(2) <lem urrer, or (3) r eply; and on p a rt
of the defendant, (1) dem urrer , or (2)
an wer.
oulh arolina, Code, 1 93, §§ 162, 164,
174, 176.
outh Dakota, An n. t., 1901, §§ 6112,
6114, 6 124, 6 126.
tah, Rev. t., 1 9 , § 295 .
Wa hington, Bal. Code, 4904 .
TVi consin, t., l 9 , § 2645, 264 ,
266 1, 2663.
1Vyoming, Rev. 't., l 99, § 353 2, a llowing (I) p tition , (2) demurrer, (3) an wer,
which, when affirmative relief i demanded
therein, may be
tyled cro -petition,
(4) reply.
u pp l n ienta l Pl a clings .

But upplemental pl ading may be
fil d n11 o-ing fact oc urring aft r th filinrr of th original pleading", in aid f t he
rigiual pl adiog : Elli •. ity of Indianapoli (l 7), 14 Ind. 7 , 4 7 . E . 21 ;
, ' wedi ·h Am. Nat. Bank v. Dickin n
(1 9 ), 6 . l . 2 2, 69 . W. 455; Ba rker
v. Priz r ( I 97), 150 In d. -1, 4
. E. 4 ;
JCirhy 1 1• l\'fuen ·h (190 ). 12 '. I . l 6, • \\r. 93 ; Zal ·ky v . H ome In . o.
(l 7), 10- Ia. 6 13, 71 . W . 56ti : Foote
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complaint shall contain, 1, the title of the cause specifying the

name of the court in which the action is brought, the name of the

county in which tlie plaintiff desires the trial to be had, and

the names of the parties to the action, — plaintiff and defendant ;

2, a plain and concise statement of the facts constituting a cause

of action without unnecessary repetition; 3, a demand of the

relief to which the plaintiff supposes himself entitled. If a re-

covery of money be demanded, tlie amount thereof shall be

stated." 1 " The defendant may demur to tlie complaint when it

V. Burlington Gaslight Co. (1897), 103 la.

576, 72 N. W. 755; Christie v. Iowa Life

complaint hall ontain, 1 th title f th
au e pecifying th'
nam f th court in which th acti n i · lH' ugh , th nam f tlll'
county in which h plaintiff cl ir the trin1 to be ha.cl, all<l
the nam ' f the l a.iti to th c ction, - plaintiff and clef nclant;
2, a plain and conci:-; tat ment f the fact: onstituti1\:; a ·nnl"
of acti n without unnece sary r petition; · , a cl ma.nc.l of 1lic
reli f to which the plaintiff snp1 :es himself ntiiled. If a recoYery f money be clemancled, the am unt ther of hall h ,
stated. 1 "The defendant may cl mur to the ·omplaint wh '11 it

Ins. Co, (1900), 111 la. 177, 82 N. W. 499 ;

Lathrop v. Deariug (1894), 59 Minn. 234,

61 N. W. 24; Malmsteu v. Berryhill

(1895), 63 Minu. 1, 65 N. W. 88; Guptill

V. City of Red Wing (1899), 76 Minn. 129,

78 N." W. 970; Bomar ;.•. Means (1896),

47 S. C. 190, 25 S. E. 60; Wade v. Gould
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(1899), 8 Okla. 690, 59 Pac. 11 ; Childs v.

Kansas City, etc. R. R. Co. (1893), 117 Mo.

414, 23 S. W. 373; Barnard v. Gantz

(1893), 140 N. Y. 249,35 N.E. 430; Bank

of Chadron v. Anderson (1895), 6 Wyo.

518, 48 Pac. 197; Williams i\ Eikenbary

(1893), 36 Neb. 478, 54 N. W. 852 ; Chap-

man V. Jones (1897), 149 Ind. 434, 47 N. E.

1065.

But if a party has no cause of action at

the time of the commencement of the

action, he cannot maintain it by means of

a supplemental complaint : Hill v. Den

(1898), 121 Cal. 42, 53 Pac. 642; Gordon

V. City of San Diego (1895), 108 Cal. 264,

41 Pac. 301 .

Permission to file supplemental plead-

ings is within the discretion of the court :

Jacob V. Lorenz (1893), 98 Cal. 332, 33

Pac. 119; Allen v. City of Davenport

(1901), 115 la. 20, 87 N.'W. 743 ; Schou-

weiler v. Hough (1895), 7 S. D. 163, 63

N. W. 776 ; Fitzgerald's Estate v. Union

Bank (1902), — Neb. — , 90 N. W. 994.

A supplemental complaint, without an

original complaint upon which to stand,

cannot be the foundation of an action :

Ellis V. City of Indianapolis (1897), 148

Ind. 70, 47 N. E. 218.

" It seems to us that ' a plea since the

last continuance' is not what would

strictly be termed an amendment, but

more in the nature of a supplemental

pleading — something more than was

pleaded before. Such pleas nmst be made

by leave of court, that is, they must have

the sanction of the court, and the oppos-

ing j)arty must have an opportunity to be

v. Burlington Ga light Co. (189i), 103 Ia.
576, 72 N. W. 755; Christie v. Iowa Life
In . Co. (1900), 111 Ia. 177, 2 . W. 499;
Lathrop i-. Dearing ( l 894), 59 Miu n. 23.t,
61 N. \V. 24; Malmsten v. B erryhill
( 1895), 63 Minn. 1, 65 N. W. 88; Guptill
v. City of Red Wing (1899), 76 Minn. 129,
78 N. \V. 970; Bomar v. Means (1896),
47 . C. 190, 25 S. E. 60; Wade 1;. Gould
(1899), 8 Okla. 690, 59 Pac. 1 l; Child v.
Kan a City, etc. R. R. Co. ( l 93), 117 Mo.
41-l, 23
. \V. 373; Barnard v. Gantz
( l 93), 140 N. Y. 249, 35 r . E. 430; Bauk
of Chadron v. Anderson ( l 95), 6 Wyo.
518, 4 Pac. 19i; \Yitliams u. Eikenbary
(1893), 36 eb. 478, 54 . W. 852; Chapman v . .Jone (1897), 149 Ind. 434, 47 N. E.

pleaded before. Such pl as mu st be made
by leave of court, that is, they must h~w e
the ·anctiou of the court, aud th
pposiug party must have an opportnuiLy Lo lie
heard. This is aud should be so wheth r
it i a matter of discretion with the court
or a ri g ht the party has to iu. ist on it
beiug filed a a matter of law . . . . To
entitle the <lefeudant a a mattee of law
to file uch a pl ea, it mu. t appear from
the petition that the facts stated, if true,
would be a good defence and a bar to the
plaintiff' action . . . . But if the petiLiou
doe not et forth facts which, if true,
would be a bar to plaintiff's recover.r, then
the court i. not bound to allow the I lea
to be filed:" Balk v. Harris (1902), 1.30

1065.

N. C. 381, 41 S. E. 9-t-O.J
1 ICan~a s, § 87 (petition); Nebraska,

.

But if a party ha no cau e of action at
the time of the commencement of the
action, he cannot maintain it by means of
a upplemental complaiut: Hill v . Den
(189 8), 121 Cal. 42, 53 Pac. 6-t-2; Gordon
v. City of San Diego (1895), 108 Cal. 26-t-,
41 Pac. 301.
Permi ion to file supplemental pleading is within the discretion of the court:
.Tacob v. Lorenz (l 93), 9 Cal. 3.'32, 33
Pac. 119; Allen v. City of Davenport
(1901), 115 Ia. 20, 87 N. W. 743; Schouweiler v. Houg h {1895), 7 S. D. 163, 63
N. W. 7i6; Fitzgerald's E:tate v. Union
Bank (1902), - Neb.-, 90 . W. 994.
A npplcmeutal complaint, \Yithout an
original omplaint upon which to stand,
cannot be the foundation of an acti on :
Ellis v. City of Indianapolis (1897), 14

Ind . 70, 47 N. E. 218.
" It eem to u that 'a plea ince the
last continuance' i not what would
strictly be termed an amendment, but
more in the nature of a upplemental
ple~ding - something more than wa

§ 92 (petition); Oregon, § 65 (complaint) ;
North Carolina,§ 93 (complaint). Iu Ohio,
Kan sa , and Nebraska, the second ubdivi ion reads, " A statement of the facts
constituting, etc., in ordinary and conci:-e
language."
[Arizona, Rev. t., 1901, § 12 9, reading as follows: " The complaint shall . t
forth clearly the names of the partie , a
concise statement of the cause of action,
without any distinction between uit at
law and in equity, and hall al. o state the
nature of the relief which he demand ."
Arkansas, Sand. & Hill' Dig.,§ 5715,
r ead ing a· follow : ''The complaint mu t
contain: (1) The tyle of the court in
whi ch the action i brought; (2) The
sty le of the action, consi ting of the nam e·
of all the partie · thereto, distingui hiJJ g
them a plaintiffs and defendant , followed
by the word 'com1 laiut at law,' if th e
proceeding are at law, and hy the wo1 d ·
'complaint in equity,' if the proceedings
are equitable; (3) A tatament in ordi-

heard. This is and should be so whether

it is a matter of discretion with tlic court

or a right the party has to insist on its

being filed as a matter of law. ... To

entitle the defendant as a matter of law

to file such a plea, it must ap])ear from

the petition that the facts stated, if true,

would be a good defence and a bar to the

plaintiff's action. . . . But if the petition

does not set forth facts which, if true,

would be a bar to ])laintiff's recovery, then

the court is not bound to allow the plea

28
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shall appear on the face thereof, either, 1, that the court has no

jurisdiction of the person of the defendant or the subject of the

action ; or, 2, that the plaintiff lias not legal capacity to sue ;

or, 3, tliat there is another action pending between the same

parties for the same cause ; or, 4, that there is a defect of parties

plaintiff or defendant; or, 5, that several causes of action have

been improperly united; or, 6, that the complaint does not

state facts sufficient to constitute a cause of action." ^ " When

n.iry and concise laii^juage, witlioiit repeti-

tion, of the facts cunstitutinj^ the phiiutiff's

.hdl (pp ar n the fa e
ha the court ha no
·uri '<..li ·ti n of th p r on
n lan or the ubject f th
.;., that th plaintiff ha n t 1 gal capacity t
u ·
ano h r a ti n p n ling b twe n the
me
-±,
tha
th
r
i:
a
d
feet
of
parti
r
I ar l
plaintiff
tha
f acti n lmY
b en impro erl unit cl ·
6
ompluint 1 e n
~tat fact
ufficient to
of action.' 1
\Vb n

cause of action; (4) A demand of tlie

relief to which the phiiniitf considers him-

self entitled."

California, § 426 (complaint), substan-

tially as set out in tiie text.

Colorado, Code, 1890, § 49 (complaint).

Connecticut, Gen. St., 1902, § 614 (com-

plaint), reading aS follows : " All pleadings
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shall contain a plain and concise statement

of the material facts on which the pleader

relies, but not of the evidence by which

they are proved, such statement being

divided into paragraphs numbered cou-

secuiively, each containing, as nearly as

may be, a separate allegation."

'/c/«^o. Code Civ. Pro., 1901, §3204 (com-

])laint), substantially as set out in the text.

Indiana, Burns' St., 1901, §341 (com-

plaint), the second subdivision reading,

"A statement of tiie facts constituting the

cause of action, in plain and concise lan-

guage, without repetition, and in such

manner as to enable a person of common

understanding to know what is intended."

Iowa, Code, 1897, § 3.i59 (petition),

sulistantially identical with the jirovisions

in Arkansas.

Kentucky, Code, 189.5, § 90, reading as

follows : " The petition must state facts

which constitute a cause of action in favor

of the plaintiff against the defendant, and

must demand the specific relief to whicli

tl>e plaintiff considers himself entitled ;

and may contain a general prayer for any

other relief to which the plaintiff may

apj)ear to be entitled."

Minnesola, St , 1894, § 5231 (complaint).

Missouri, Hev. St., 1899, § .592 (petition).

Montana, Code, 1895, S 671 (complaint).

Nerndn, Comp. Laws, 1900, § 3134

(complaint).

Ntw York, Code Civ. I'ro., § 481 (com-

plaint), the second clause quoted under (3)

in the te.Kt being absent.

North Carolina, § 93 (complaint), add-

ing to subdivision 2 the words, "and each

material allegation shall be distinctly

numbered."]

North Dakota, Rev. Codes, 1899, § 5266

(complaint).

0/i''o, Bates' St., 1903 (petition), § 5056,

5057, reading as follows : § 5056 : " Every

pleading mu.st contain the name of the

court and the county in which the action

is brought, and t!ie names of the parties,

followed liy the name of t!ie plcailing."

§ 5 57 : " 'ihe first pleading shall be the

petition by the plaiutilf", which must con-

nary and conci e language, without repetition of the fact~ cou cituting the plaiutdf'
<'•Ill e of action ; ( 4) A dcmaud uf the
reli f to which the plaintiff cou ' icler bimelf ntitled."
alifornia, § 426 (complaint), ub tantially a et out in the text.
'olorado, Code, 1 90, ~ 49 (complaint).
Connecticut, Gen. t. 1902, 6 U (complai ut), reading a foll ". : ' All pleadin()'
. hall contain a plain aud onci e tatem nt
of the material fact· on which the pleader
relie , but not of the vid nee by whid1
they are pro\•ed, uch statement ueing
di' ided into para<Yraph numbered conarly a
ecutiYely, each co11tai11mg, a
may be, a eparate alle 0 ·ation."
Idaho, oJe fr.Pro.,1901, 3204(complaint), ub tantially a. ct out in the text.
Ind iana, Burn ', t., 1901, § 341 (complaint), the 'e ond ubdivi ion reading,
"A tatement of the fact con tituting the
cau.e of action, in plain and couci e language, without rep tition, and iu uch
mauner a tO enable a per on of c mmon
unc!er:tanuing to kn w what i int nded ."
Iowa, o<le, 1 97, § 3559 (petiti n),
. nh t::111tially identical with the provi ion
iu .\.rkan ·a .
Kentucky, ode, l 95, § 90, reading a
follow : "Th petition mu:t tat fact
which con:titute a cau e of acti n in favor
of the plaiutiff agaiu t th defendaut, aUtl
mu ·t d ma11d the , pecific r •lief to which
the plai11tiif l'on i l r~ him elf utitletl;
and m·ty co11tain a g n ral pray r for a11y
<Jther relief to "·hich the plaintiff may
appear to be ntitlecl."
J!im1P.·ota,. 't 1 94,. 5231 (rnmplaiu ).
J/i.· <m,.i, l'e,· . .'t., I U9,. 5!J'.l (petiti1 ll ).
,\fu11/<111a, C<Jd~. 1 '5, .' G7 I (cuntplaint).
. '"""""• 'ump. Law., 1900, · 3134
cor11]'lai11t).
~v, 11· } ,,tf..:,
ode ,h·. Pro., § 4 1 (l·orn-

plaint), th econd clau e quot I under (3}
in the text bein ab ent.
Nort/1 . arnlina,
93 (c mplaiut), addincr t ubdi\'\ ·iou 2 the word , "autl each
material :1Ji gation
ball be dhinL:tly
num bere<l. "]
_ Torth fJu!.:ota, ReY. Code , 1 99, 5266
(complaint).
Oh io, Bates' t., 1903 (petition), 505 ,
5057, readiuo· a follo" : 50jG: '' • Y ry
pleaclincr mu t contain the n1me of the
court au<l the cou11 \. in which the action
i • brought, and the name. of th parti s,
followeu liy the nam~ of tl1e plcadillg.'
5 .5i: 'The fir:t pleading hall be the
petition uy the plaiutift~ which lllll ·t COlltain: (l) A tatemeut uf th fal't cou titnting the can e of action ia ordinary and
conci. c language. (2) A cl mand f r th
relief to which the plaintiff ..;uppo-c· himelf entitl d. If the r eco,·ery f money i
demaud c.I, the amount hall b
tat d;
and if inter t i claimed, the time for
which intcre ' t i to be computed hall al o
be • tate<l."
Oklahoma, t 1 93, 3965, adding to
the fir~t ubdivi. iou a gi,·eu in the text,
the w rd , " followed by the word ' p t 1tion.'"
outh arolina, Code, 1 9.3, 163 ( omplaint), mittiug the econd clau · quot c.I
uud r (.'3) in the text.
'1alt, It v. t., I 9 , 2960 (c mpl int).
lVa !ti119to11, Bal. ode § 4906 (c:omplai ut) .
lVi con in, t., 1
mplaint ).
HTyomi119, Re .
3533, addincr th . ame word·
klahoma
ta tut , ·up1·a.
1 Ka11~a ·,
- bra. ka, 94; ali4.30 (adding, ' ' - , that th
fornia,
·omplaiut i · ambiguon., uuintelligil>l ,
or un "rtain "); ,_ orch ar lina, s 95. In
Iowa, tlif' fir four . 11liilivi iow: of · 2G-I..,

PROVI-^IONS IN liKL.VTKlN TO PLEADING.

PROYI..:;IO~

1

REL .\. TION TO PLEADING.

435

435

an}^ of the matters eniinierated do not appear upon the face of

the complaint, the objection may be taken by answer. If no sucli

objection be taken either by demurrer or answer, the defendant

shall be deemed to have waived the same, excepting only the

objection to the jurisdiction of the court, and the objection that

the complaint does not state facts sufficient to constitute a cause

of action." ^

are the same as those given in the text,

and the section then proceeds : " or, 5, that

the facts stated in the petition do not en-

any of t he matt rs numerate l do n t ar pear upon the fa· · of
th
mplaint, the bj ction may b ta1¥en Ly ani:;w r. I { no ~ul;h
bj tion be ta.k n ith r by cl 111111'1' r or an w r, th def ndant
shall be cl em cl to have waived t h ::;am , exc pting nly th~
objection to he juri ·di cti n f the cour , and th oLjection that
the complaint does not tate fa,cts 'Uinci nt to con ·titute a. cau ·
of action. ' 1

title the plaintiff to the relief demanded;

or, 6, that the petition on the face tliereof

shows that the claim is harred by the stat-

ute of limitations ; or fails to show it to be

in writing when it should be so evidenced ;

or, if founded on an account or writing as

evidence of indebtedness, and neither such

account or writing, or a copy thereof, is
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incorporated with, or attached to, such

])leading, or a sufficient reason stated for

nut doing so."

\^Arizo)ia, Rev. St., 1901, § 1351, adding

'• (7). 'J'hat the caitse of action is barred

Ijy limitation."

Arkansas, Sand. & Hill's Dig., § 5717,

omitting the fifth gi-ound given in the text.

California, § 430, the commissioners'

amendment of 1901 adding to subdivision

5 the words, " or not separately stated."

Colorado, Code, 1890, § 50, adding the

words " or misjoinder " after the word

" defect " in subdivision 4, and adding " 7,

that the complaint is ambiguous, unintel-

ligible and uncertain."

Idaho, Code Civ. Pro., 1901, § 320G,

identical with the provisions of the Colo-

rado Code.

Indiana, Burns' St., 1901, § 342.

Kenturkij, Coile, 1895, § 92, adding the

words " in this State " after the word

" pending " in subdivision 3, and omitting

subdivision 5.

Minnesota, St., 1894, § 5232.

Missouri, Rev. St. 1899, § 598, adding

the words " in this state " at the end of

sul)division 3, and adding " 7, that a party

plaintiff or defendant is not a necessary

party to a com])lete determination of the

action."

Montana, Code, 1895, § G80, identical

with the provisions in Colorado.

Nevada, Comp. Laws, 1900, § 3135,

identical with the provisions in Colorado.

New York, Code Civ. Pro., § 488, omit-

ting from subdivision 1 the words " or the

sui)ject of the action," and making that a

separate ground in subdivision 2, adding

two subdivisions in place of subdivision 4,

as follows : " 5. That there is a misjoinder

of parties plaintiti". 6. That there is a

defect of jjarties, plaintiff or defendant."

North Dakota, Rev. Codes, 1899, § 5268.

Ohio, Bates' St., 1903, § .5061, substan-

tially the same as New York, except that

ground 5 reads " That there is a mi.s-

joinder of parties plaintiff or defendant,"

and adding "8. Tliat separate causes of

action against several defendants are im-

are the same a tho ·e g iven in the text,
and the "ection then proceeds: "or, 5, that
t he facts stated in the pet ition do not entitle th pla in t iff to the reli ef demanded ;
or, 6, that th e petition on the face thereof
shows th at the claim i qarred by the tatute of limi tations; or fail s to how it to be
in writing wh eu it hould be o ev id enced;
or, if founded on an account or 'vriting as
ev idence of in debtedness, and 11 eithe r snch
account or writiug, or a copy thereof, is
incorporated with, or ;:i,tt<\Ched to, suclt
ple::tding, or a sufficieut r eason stated fo r
net doing o."
[A rizona, Rev. St., 1901, § 1351, allding
" ( i). That the can e of actiou is barred
lJy limitation."
Arkansas, Saud. & Bill's Dig.,§ 57li,
omitting the fift h g ronnd g iven iu the text.
California, § 430, the commissiouers'
ame ndm ent of 1901 add in g to subdivi sion
fi t he word s, "or not eparately stated."
Colorado , Code, 189 0, § 50, adding the
word s "or mi sjoinder " after the word
"defect" in subd ivis ion 4, and adding " 7,
that the co mplaint is ambiguous, unintelli g ible and un certain. "
Idaho, Co<l e Civ. Pro., 1901, § 3206,
identicai with the provisions of the Color ado .ode.
I ndiana , Burn 'St., 1901 , § 342.
K entnck!J , Cocle, 189 5, § 92, adding the
worcls "in this State" after th e wor<l
"pending" in subdi vision 3, and om ittin g
ubd ivi ion 5.
M innPsota, St., 1894, § 5232.
Ji i.~so ll r i, R ev. t. 1899, § 598, add i11g
the words "in thi . tate" at the end of
suli<l ivision 3, and adding" 7, th at a party
plaintiff or <lefenctant is not a nece sary
pa rty to a complete determination of the
actioll ."
Montana, Code, l 95, § 680, identical
with th e proYisions in Colorado.
...Y evac;ia, Comp. Laws, 1900, § 3 135,
identical with the provisions in Colorado.

1Vew York, Code iv. Pro., § 48 , omitt ing from ubdivi ·ion I the wor<ls "or th
ulij e ·t of the action ," and making that a
separate ground in subd i1·i ion 2, addi11g
two subdi1·isio11s in place of subdivision .i,,
as follow · : " 5. That th ere is a rni ·jomdcr
of partie pla intiff. 6 . That there is a
defeet of parri es, plaintiff or cl feudant."
North /Jak ota, Rev. Codes, 1899, § 526 .
Ohio, Dates' St., l 903, § 506 1, sn], tantially the ' arne as l\ew York, except that
ground 5 reads "That there is a n1isjoinder of parties plaintiff or defendant,"
aud addi11g "8. That separate causes of
action agaiust several c1efe11cla11t,; are improperly joine<l. 9. That the action was
not brought within the time limi ted for
the commencement of su<.:h actiou ·."
Oklah oma, St., 1893, § 396 7.
Oregon, Hill's Laws, § 67, adding, " 7.
That the action has not been commenced
within the tim e limi tecl by this ode."
So1ttlt Carnlina, Code, 1893, § 165.
South Dakota, Ann . St., 190 1, § 6115.
Utah, Rev. St., 1898, § 2962, itlentical
with the Colorado statute.
Washington, Bal. Code, § 4907 , adding,
" 7. Th at t he action ha not been commen ced within the time limi ted by law."
W isconsin, St., 1898, § 2649, identical
with the statute of Wa hi11gto11.
1Vyom i11g, Hev. :::;t., 1899, § 3535,
a<ld ing two ubdi,·isiou in place of ubdivision 4 , a foll ows: "4. That there is a
mi sjoinder of parti e, plaintiff. 5. That
there i:s a defect of parti c,,,, pl;1iutiff or
defendant," and adding another ubcliYision, as follow : " 7. That ,e parate
causes of attion again. t everal defendants are im properly juiued."
I New York, §§ 14-7 (49 ), 1-!
(4-99);
Kan sas, § 91 ; ,, ebraska, § 96; alifornia,
§§ 433, 43-1-; Oregon, §§ 69, 70; North
Carolina,
9 , 99. The Iowa
ode,
§ 2650, after the . ame provi ion a that in
the text, adds, "If th facts tated by the
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43-±. Statutory Provisio ns Applicable to all Pleadings.
'h
in; pr vi ' i 11' d rib th
mr lain r p iti n : he
lat
m f vrhich h '" Y r, ar
f ur l in all
nq n th g 11 ml rul appli aLI t all 1 leac.lin ·'
whic:l r crula their
ont nt:, an l dct rnun th ir ·ufwhi ·h drn.1'< ·t rize th
f nuctl pro clure: 'In
f Jet nninino· it
n ru cl 'vith a Yi w
If
1 Vt llt r r tru k ut n
328.

The foregoing provisions describe the complaint or petition : tlie

following clauses — some of which, however, are not found in all

the codes — comprise the general rules applicable to all pleadings,

which regulate their form and contents, and determine their suf-

ficiency, — the general principles, in short, which characterize the

system of pleading provided for by the reformed procedure : " In

the construction of a pleading for the purpose of determining its

effect, its allegations shall be liberally construed with a view to

substantial justice between the parties." ^ " If irrelevant or re-

dundant matter be inserted in a pleading, it may be struck out an

petitiou do not entitle the plaintiff to any

relief wiiatever, advantage may be taken

of it by motion in arrest of judgment

before judgment is entered."

[^Arizona, Kev. St., 1901, § 135.3.

Arlcansas, Sand. & Hill's Dig., § 5720,

adding the words " over the subject of the
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action " after the word "court."

Colorado, Code, 1890, §§ 54, 55.

Idaho, Code Civ. Pro., 1901, §§ 3209,

3210.

Indiana, Burns' St., 1901, § 346, adding

the words " over the subject of the action "

after the word " court," and adding the

following clause: "Provided, however,

That the objection that the action was

brought in the wrong county, if not taken

by answer or demurrer, shall be deemed

to have been waived."

Kentucky, Code, 1895, §§ 92, 93, add-

ing the words " of the subject of the

action " after the word '' court," and pro-

viding that a neglect to raise the questions

seasonably subjects the party to the pay-

ment of costs.

Minnesota, St. 1894, §§ 5234, 5235.

Missouri, Rev. St., 1899, § 602, adding

the words " over the subject-matter of the

action " after the word " court."

Montana, Code, 1895, §§ 684, 685.

Nevada, Comp. Laws, 1900, §§ 3139,

3140.

A^ortA Z>afco<a, Rev. Codes, 1899, §§ 5271,

5272.

Ohio, Bates' St., 1903, § 5063.

Oklahoma, St., 1893, § 3969.

South Carolina, Code, 1893, §§ 168,

169.

South Dakota, Ann. St., 1901, §§ 6118,

6119.

Utah, Kev. St., 1898, §§ 2966, 2967.

Washiwiton, Bal. Code, §§ 4909, 4911,

in slightly different form.

Wisconsin, St., 1898, §§ 2653, 2654.

Wyoming, Kev. St., 1899, § 3537.]

1 New York, § 159 (519) ; Kansas,

§ 115 ; Nebraska, § 121 ; California, § 452 ;

Oregon, § 83; North Can^lina, § 119.

^Arkansas, Sand. & Hill's Dig., § 5754.

Colorado, Code, 1890, § 77.

Idaho, Code Civ. Pro., 1901, § 3223.

Indiana, Burns' St., 1901, § 379, adding

the following: "but when the allegations

of a pleading are so indefinite or uncertain

that the precise nature of the charge or

defence is not apparent, the court may

require the pleading to be made definite

petition (lo not ntitle the plaintiff to any
r~lief whate,· r, ad,·anta"'
may be taken
of it by motion in arre r of judgment
before jud"'m 11t i entered."
[A ri.::o;ic1 , H Y. ,'t., 1901, 'S 1353.
Arkan ·a , aud. & Hill' Dig.,
5i20,
addip th wurd "over the ubjed of the
action " aft r the wore! "court."
olorndo, ode, l 0, §:s 5-l, 55 .
Idaho, Code iv. Pro., 190 1, §§ 3209,
3210.
Indiana, urn ' t., 1901 , § 3-16, adding
the word ' OYer the ubject of the acti n "
after th word ' court,'' and addiug the
foll wiu"' lau e: "Provided, howernr,
That the objection that the acti n wa
urought in the wrong county, if not taken
hy an w r or demurr r, hall be deemed
to ha,·e been wai,·ed ."
K enlul'k!J, . ode, 1 95, §:i 92, 93, adding th word
of the , ubject of the
action " aft ·r the word ·' court " and providing that an "'lect t rai e the '}Ue'tion
a ouably ubj ct the party to the payment of o ·t .
Ji i1111e otu, t. l
J!1 ·s,,uri, R v. t., I 99, 'S 602, adding
the word " v r the ubject-martcr of the
action " aft r the word "court."
Jlo11t1111fl, od , l 95,
+, 6 5.
~Yf'vudu ,
ump. Law , 1900, 'S 313 ,

.+909, -!911,
in

3.

:H-lO.
~

Torth /Juk,,ta, ev. Cod , l 99

!\

52i I,

5272.

ltio, Bat ' . t., 1
5063.
OHalwma, t., l
• 'outh
'arolma,
§§ 16 ~ ,
IG .
011tl1 Dakota, Ann .• t., 19 I, §§ 611 ,
(j 11

6130.
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motion of any person aggiieved thereby ; and when the allega-

tions of a pleading are so indefinite and uncertain that the precise

nature of the charge or defence is not apparent, the court may

require the plea'ding to be made definite and certain by amend-

ment." ^ " All fictions in pleading are abolished." '-^ " A material

allegation in a pleading is one essential to the claim or defence,

1 Kansas, § 110; Kebraska, § 125;

California, § 453 (altered verbally) ; Ore-

f a.ny p rson acrgri v d ther ' l>y · a.ml wh n th allegaind fi.nit and un rta.in that th pr c1i-;
na tnre f th clmrg
r d f n
is not ap1 ar nt, th court mn, ·
reqmr the pl n~<l.ing t b made clefinit and certain by am mlment." 1 "All fietions in i l ~1,c.1in g are aholishec.1. ' 2 "A ma1.eri,tl
allegati n in a pl atling i · on es 'en tial to th ·laim r tlef ncc
motion

tion

fa pl aling ar

1

gon, § 84 ; North Carolina, § 120.

[^Arkcinsas, Sand. & Hill's Dig'., § 5755,

containing first clause only.

Colorado, Code, 1890, § 60, containing

the provisions quoted in the text, together

with considerable other matter.

Idaho, Code Civ. Pro., 1901, § 3224,

reading as follows : " Sham and irrelevant

answers .and irrelevant and redundant

matter inserted in a pleading, may be
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stricken out, upon such terms as the court

may, in its discretion, impose."

Indiana, Burns' St., 1901, § 385, read-

ing in part as follows : " All surplusage,

tautology, and irrelevant matter shall be

set aside and struck out of any pleading,

when pointed out by tlie party aggrieved,"

and also § 379, quoted on page 436, supra.

Iowa, Code, 1897, § 3618, almost iden-

tical with the Idaho statute, quoted supra,

and also § 3630, very similar to the second

clause quoted in the te.xt.

Keniuckfj, Code, 1895, § 121, reading

as follows : " Irrelevant or redundant

matter in a pleading shall be stricken

out, upon or without motion, at the cost

of the party whose pleading contains it."

Minnesota, St., 1894, § 5248, slightly

varied from the form given in the text.

Missouri, Rev. St., 1899, § 612, slightly

varied from the form given in the text.

Montana, Code, 1895, § 742, almost

identical with tlie Idaho statute.

Nebrcisha, Code, 1901, § 125, slightly

varied from the form given in the text.

Nevada, Comp. Laws, 1900, § 3152,

reading as follows : " If irrelevant or

redundant matter be inserted in a pleading,

it may be stricken out by the court, on

motion of any person aggrieved thereby."

Neiv York, Code Civ. Pro., §§ 545, 546,

substantially similar to the statute quoted

in the text, but somewhat more specific.

North Dakota, Rev. Codes,.1899, § 5284.

Ohio, Bates' St., 1903, §§ 5087, 5088,

sub.stantially similar to the statute quoted

ill the text, l)ut somewhat more specific.

Oklahoma, St., 1893, § 3997.

South Carolina, Code, 1893, § 181.

South Dakota, Ann. St., 1901, § 6131.

Utah, Rev. St., 1898, § 2987, very

similar to the Idaho statute.

Washington, Bal. Code, § 4932, adding

to the statute given in the text " or may

dismiss the same."

Wisconsin, St., 1898, § 2683, substan-

tially similar to the statute given in the

text, but somewhat more specific.

Wijominf;, Rev. St., 1899, §§ 3561, 3562,

identical with the Ohio statute.]

1 Kan as, § 119; i:~f'lira;;ka, § 12;'5;
California, 'S 45.'3 (alt 'red v rhall:·); Oregon, § -t-; Torth Car uli11a, § 1:20.
[Arka11sas, and. & llill's Dig.,§ 5i55,
containing fir t cla use 011ly.
Cofomdo, Code, 1890, § 60, containing
the pru,· i ~ i o11s quoted in the text, together
with cousideralile other matter.
Idaho, Code Civ. Pro., 1901 , § 3224-,
reading a follows: " ham and irrelm·ant
am;wers and irrelevant and r ed undant
matter inserteJ in a pleading, may be
stricken out, upon such ter ms as the court
may, in its di . cretiun, impo e."
Indiana, Burus' St., 190 1, § 385, readiug in part as follows: " All surplusage,
tautology, and irrelevant matter shall be
et aside and strnck out of any pleading,
when puiuted out by the party aggrieved,"
and al ·o § 379, quoted on page 436, supra.
Iowa, Cocle, l 97, § 361 , alm o ·t ideutical with the I daho statnte, quoted su1)ra,
and al o § 3630, very imilar to the second
clause quoted in the text.
f\_enlucky, Co]e, 1895, § 121, readi ng
as foll ows: " I rrelevant or redundant
matter ·in a pleadi ng shall be stricken
out, upon or witho ut motion, at the cost
of the party whose pleading contaius it."
~Minnesota , St., 189-1-, § 52-1- , slightly
varied from the form giYen in the text.
ll11 sso uri, R ev. t., l 99, § 612, slightly
varied from the form given in the tex t.
llfontana, C'otle, 1 95, § 742, almo t
iden t ica l with the Idaho statute.
N elm1sl.-11, Cude, 19 01, § 12\ sli g htly
varied from the form g i rnn in the text.
Neuad11, Comp. Law , 1900, § :1152,
reading as follow : "If irrelevant or
r edundant matter be inserted in a pleading,
it may be • trick.en out by the court, on
mot ion of any per on aggrieYcd thereby."
N ew Yori.-, Code Oiv. Pro., '-§ 5-1-5, 546,
. ubstantially similar to the statute quoted
in the text, but. omewhat more spe ·ific.
North Dakota, R ev. odes,.1899, § 52 -! .
Ohio, Bates' St., 1903, §§ 5087, 50 ,

. nhstantinll y .-imilar to the .. tatnt quoted
in the text, liut sornPwhat more pecific.
Vldr1hom11, St., l~\J:~. S .'3997 .
South C11roli11a, CodC', 1893, § l I.
'011 /h /Ja kota , Aun. St., 190 1, § 61.'31.
Utah, H cv. St., 1L9 , § 29 i, very
imilar tu the Idaho .-tatute.
~Va:;hi11!1/"11, Bal. Cotle, § 49.'32, addiug
to the ~tatnte gi1·eu in the text" or may
dismi s the same."
I V1sro11si11, St., 1 9 , § 2683, sub tantially similar to the tatute gi ,·en in the
tex t, Lut so mew hat more specific.
W ,1;01ni11y, H.ev. St., 1899, §§ 3561, 3562,
id enti cal with the Ohio statute.]
'.l Kan a , § 116.
[ Zclalio, Const., Art. 5, sec. I, providing
that "Feigned issue are prohibited."
India11a, Burn 'St., 1901, § 381.
Iou·a, Code, l 97, § 3557 .
1llisso1tri, Hev. t., 1899, § 610, providing that "No allegation hall be made in
a pleading which the law doe. n ot require to be proved, and only the substantial fact necessary to con titute the cause
of action or defen ce shall be stated."
Nebraska, Code, 1901, § 4-, identical
with Ohio tatute.
North Carolina, § 15, proYiding that
"Feigned issues are aboli hed."J
North D(/kota, Rev. Code , 1 99, § 51 3,
prov idin g th:i.t "Feigned i sue· are abol·
i. h d ."
Ohio, Bate.' St., 1903, § 4-97.'3, providing
that " There t:an be no f igned i · ·ue."
Oklalw111a, ~t ., 1 93,
3a -1-, identical
with ( lhio st:i.tnte.
South C(/mfin(/, Code, 1 93, § 92, providing that "Feigned is.· ue
hall not lie
allowed."
0 111/t T>okotrt, Ann. , t, 1901, "S 60.'3:2,
ic1 e ~ tical with the i\orth Dakota sta ute.
IJ 'i.~ro11si11, St., l 9,,
2 -!1, stating
that" .Fl'igne<l is· n : hav been abolished."
HT.1;0111111:;, HP\'. ~t., I 99, § 34-1-5, idcn·
tical with Ohio tatute.

s
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which, could not be struck from the pleading without leaving it

insufficient. Neither presumptions of law nor matters of which

judicial notice is taken need be stated in the pleading,'" ^ The fol-

lowing special provision, which is found only in a portion of the

codes, and is not impliedly contained in the general principles

common to them all, is quoted because of its practical impor-

tance as a rule of procedure in those States whose legislation has

adopted it : " If the action, counter-claim, or set-off be founded

on an account, or on a note, bill, or other written instrument, as

evidence of indebtedness, a copy thereof must be attached to and

filed with the pleading. If not so attached and filed, the reason

thereof must be shown in the pleading." ^

1 Kansas, §§ 129, 130; Nebraska,

§§ 135, 136 ; California, § 463 (first clause

only) ; Oregon, § 93 (tlie first clause

oulv).

'[^Arkansfis, Sand. & Hill's Dig.,

which c uld no be ·truck from th I 1 adincr 'Yithout leaving it
in ·ufficient. .J.. ~either pr ·ump imr of la,,v n r matter f whi •h
judicial n tice i tak 11 ne cl be tat c.l in th r l ading. ' 1 Th
11 "~in
ecial pr vi ion whi ·h · found only in a I orti n E
eode , and i n
impli cliy ontain d in th gen ral prin i1 le
· mmon
them all i qu ted b cau e f i ' p1\ cti 1 impor.mce a a rule f pr cedure in tho e tate who' legi lati r ha
adopted it: 'If the action
unter- laim or et-off be founded
on an account, or on a n t , bill r o her writ en instrum nt a
vidence of inclebtednes < c py thereof mu t b a ached
an l
filed with th pleading. If not o a tached and filed he rea on
thereof mu t be ·hown in the pleading. 2

§§ 5762, 5751.

only.
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Colorado, Code, 1890, § 72, first clause

'Idaho, Code Civ. Pro., 1901, § 3234,

first clause only.

Indiana, Burns' St., 1901, § 377, last

clause only.

Kentucky, Code, 1895, § 127, providing

that " A material allegation is one which

is necessary for the statement or support

of a cause of action or defence," and

§ 119, providing that "neither the evi-

dence I'elied on by a party, nor presump-

tions of law, nor facts of which jurlicial

notice is taken, excepting private statutes,

shall be stated in a pleading."

Missouri, Rev. St., 1899, § 631, second

clause only.

Montana, Code, 1895, § 756, first

clause only.

Nevada, Comp. Laws, 1900, § 3161,

first clause only.

Ohio, Bates' St., 1903, §§ 5082, 5083.

Oklahoma, St., 1893, §§ 4007, 4008.

Utah, Rev. St., 1898, § 2997, first

clause only.

Washington, Bal. Code, § 4944.

Wyoming, Rev. St., 1899, §§ .•»56,

3557.J

•^ Kan8a.s, § 118 ; Nebraska, § 124.

[^Arkansas, Sand. & Ilin's Dig., §5752,

with slightly different wording.

Indiana, Burns' St., 1901, § 365, read-

ing in part as follows : " When any

pleading is fountled upon a written instru-

ment or on account, the original, or a

cop3' thereof, must be filed with the jjlead-

ing. . . . Such copy of a written iu.'^tru-

ment, when not copied in the pleadings,

shall be taken as part of the record."

Iowa, Code, 1897, § 3561, giving as one

ground for demurrer, " if founded on an

account or writing as evidence of indebted-

ness, that neither such writing or account

or copy thereof is incorporated into or

attached to the pleailing, or a sufficient

reason stated for not doing so."

Kansas, Code, 1901, § 118, adding the

following clause, " But if the action, coun-

ter-claim or set-off be founded upon a

series of written instruments executed by

lKana,
129, 130·
ebra, ka,
135, 136; alifornia, 463 (firt clau e
only); Oregon,
93 (the fir t clau e
only).
[ Arkan. '' · ,
and. & Hill
Dig.,
5i6:?, 5751.
Coloncdu, Code, 1 90, § i2, fir t clau e
only.
ldnlw, otle Civ. Pro., 1901, § 3234-,
fir t clau e only.
l11dia110, Burn' t., 1901, § 377, la ·t
dau e only.
Kentucky, Code, 1 95, 127, prodding
that · \. material allecration i- oue which
i neces ·ary for the "tatement or upport
of a cau e of action or defence," and
11 9, pr \•idincr that " neither the evi<l nee relied on b.v a party, nor pre. umption of law, nor fact of which judicial
notice i taken, exce1 ting pri \'ate tatutes,
hall be taterl in a pleading."
Jli souri, Rev. t., l 9, § 631, econd
clau e on ly.
J!ontarw,
ode, l 95, § 756, fir t
·lau e only.
4Y,,mda,
omp. Law~ , 1900, § 3161,
fir~ t clau.
only.
Ohio, Bate '. t 1903, .. 50 2, 50 3.
Oklahoma, t., l 93, §. 4-007, 40
Utah, Ilev. 't., 1 9 , § 2 97, fir t
dau ·e onlr.
~V1.1 slti11ytan, Bal. ode, ~ 494.+.
IV!10111 iny, Her. ,'t., l 99, 'S ~:56,
3557.]
:.! Kan-. , . 11 ; ~Tehrn. ka,. 12.+ .
[Arhm .·11.-,. and. & Hill '· Dig.,§ 5i52,
with light.ly diff rent worrling.
l 11di1.111a, Burn ' 't, l ~ l , 3 5, r ad&

ing in part a follow·: "When au_v
pleading i fo unded upon a written in trument or 011 account, the rig iu al, or a
rop.r ther eof, mu t be filetl wi th the pl ading. . . . ' uch copy of a writt n iu. trument, wh n not copietl in the pl a<liucr
hall be taken a part of the record."
I ou·a, ode, 1 97, § 3561 giving
one
g round fo r demurrer, "if found d on an
account or writing a vidence of iud el te<l ne , hat neither. uch writ ing or ac ou nt
or opy thereof i incorp rated into or
attached to the pleading, or a ufficient
r ea on tated fo r not doinu o."
K ansa , ode, 1901, l l , addi11 the
following clau e, ' ' But if the a ti n, oun ter-claim or et-off be founded upon a
erie of written in. trument exe uted h\'
the am p r n, it hall be nfficieut t~
attach and file a copy of one only, anti in
su ceed ing au e of action or d fcnre.
to et forth in g neral term de criptiou
of the everal in trum ut re pectiv ly. '
K enluck.11, orle 1 95, § 120 id ntical
with the Arkan:a. tatute.
lllissouri, I v. 't., I 99 630, allowing
a copy of an account to be attached, at
pleader'
pti n, in lieu of ettincr forth
th item in th pl ad in g.
Jfu11tana, ode, 1 9."i · 7+7, r a<ling a·
follow. : " 'V h r a can e of a ti u, defen
or ount r-claim i found d upon
au in. trum nt fur th paym nt of mon y
nly, th par ty ma.y ·et forth a copy of
th in, trument, ancl ta.te that tit r
i
tlue him thereon, from the adverse p: rty.
a pecifi d . um, which h ·laim:. • ' tteh
au alleo-a.tion i qui val ut to ettiug forth
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§ 329. * 435. Statutory Provisions Respecting Ameudmeut.

Ample provision is made for the amendment of pleadings, either

at the trial itself, or at any other time in the progress of the

cause. The following sections are contained in all the codes,

with some unimportant verbal variations in a few of them : " No

variance between the allegation in a pleading and the proof shall

be deemed material, unless it have actually misled the adverse

party to his prejudice in maintaining his action or defence upo-n

the merits. Wlienever it sliall be alleged that a party has been

so misled, that fact shall be proved to the satisfaction of the

court, and in what respect he has been misled ; and thereupon

the court may order the pleading to be amended upon such terms

the instrument according to its legal

effect."

New York, Code Civ. Pro., § 534, iden-

tical with Montana statute.

Ohio, Bate.s' St., 1903, § 5085, substan-

§ 329 . * 435.

Statutory

Provisions

Respecting

Amendment.

Ample provision i made for the amendmen of pl a<lings, either
at the trial itself, or at any other time in the I rogr ss of he
cause. The following ection are Cimtainecl in all the codes,
with ome unimportant verbal variations in a f w f them : ''No
variance between the allegation in a pleading ancl the proof shall
be deemed material, unle. · it have actua.lly mi ·led. the acl.ver:e
party to his prejudice in maintaining his action or cl fence upon
the merits. vVhenever it shall be alleged that a party has been
o misled, that fact shall be proved to the satisfaction of the
court, and in what respect he has been misled; and thereupon
the court may order the pleading to be amended upon such term ·

tially the same as the provision quoted iu
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the text, and § 5086, reading as follows :

■" In an action, countei-claim, or set-off,

founded upon an account, or upon an in-

strument for the unconditional payment

of money only, it shall be sufficient for a

party to set forth a copy of the account or

instrument, with all credits and the in-

dorsements thereon, and to state that there

is due to him, on such account or instru-

ment, from the adverse party, a specified

sum, wliicli he claims, with interest ; and

when others than the makers of a promis-

sory note, or the acceptors of a bill of

exchange, are parties, it shall be necessary

to state the facts which fix their liability."

Oklahoma, St., 1893, § 4001, reading in

part as follows : " In an action, counter-

claim or set-off, founded upon an account,

promissory note, bill of exchange or other

instrument, for the unconditional pay-

ment of money only, it shall be sufficient

for a party to give a copy of the account

or instrument, with all credits, and the

indorsements thereon, and to state that

tliere is due him, on such account or in-

strument, from the adverse party, a speci-

fied sum, which he claims, with interest."

Oregon, Hill's Laws, § 83, allowing the

pleader to set out tlie items of an account

in the pleading, or to file a copy thereof,

at his option.

Wisconsin, St., 1898, § 2G75, reading as

follows : " In an action, defence or coun-

ter-claim founded upon an instrument for

the payment of money only, it shall be

sufficient for the party to give a copy of

the instrument, and to state that there is

due to him tiiereou, from the adverse

party, a specified sum which he claims."

[Vi/ominr/, Ttev. St., 1899, § 3559.

In the following States the pleader may

deliver a copy of an account to the adverse

party within a designated period, in lieu

of setting out the items in his pleading :

Idaho, Code Civ. Pro., 1901, § 3225;

Nevada, Comp. Laws, 1900, § 3151 ;

North Dakota, Kev. Codes, 1899, § 5282 ;

South Carolina, Code, 1893, § 179; South

Dakota, Ann. St., 1901, § 6129; Utah,

Rev. St., 1898, § 2988; Arizona, Rev. St.,

the in trument according to its legal
effect."
iVew York, Code Civ. Pro., § 534-, identical with Montana ·· tatute.
Ohio, Bates' St., 1903, § 5085, substantially the same as the provisio~1 quoted in
the text, and § 5086, reading as follows:
«In an action, counter-claim, or set-off,
founded upon an ar.count, or upon an instrument for the unconditional payment
of money only, it shall be sufficient for a
party to set forth a copy of the account or
instrument, with all credits and the indorsements thereon, and to state that there
i:s due to him, on such account or instrument, from the adverse party, a specified
urn, which he claims, with intere t; and
when others than the makers of a promissory note, or the acceptors of a bill of
exchange, are parties, it shall be necessary
to state th e facts which fix their liability."
Oklahoma, St., l 893, § 4001, reading in
part as follows : "In an ar.tion, counterclaim or set-off, founded upon an account,
promissory note, bill of exchange or other
instrument, for the uncond itional payment of money only, it shall be sufficie nt
for a party to give a copy of the account
or in . trument, with all credits, and the
indorsements thereon, and to state that
there i due him, on such account or iu·trument, from the adverse party, a specified sum, which he claims, with intere t.''
Oregon, Hill's Laws, § 83, allowing the
pleader to set out the items of an account
in the pleading, or to file a copy thereof,
at his option.
W isconsin, St., 1898, § 2675, reading as

follows : "In an action, defence or counter-claim founded upon an instrument for
the paym ent of money only. it shall be
sufficieut for the party to give a copy of
the instrurnen t, and to state that there is
due to him thereon, from the adverse
party, a specified sum which he claims."
Wyominq, Rev. St., 1899, § 3559.
In the following States th e pleader may
deliver a copy of an account to the adverse
party within a designated period, iu lieu
of setting out the items in hi pleading :
Idaho, Code Civ. Pro., 190 1, § 3225;
Neuada, Comp. La"·s, 1900, § 3151;
North Dakota, Hev. Codes, 1899, § 5282;
South Carolina, Code, 1893, § 179; South
Dakota, Ann. St., 1901, § 6129; Utah,
Rell'. St., 1898, § 2988; Arizona, Rev. St.,
1901, § 1287 .J
For illustrations, see Evans v. Clermont, etc. Co., 51 Ind. 160; Excelsior Dr.
Co. v . Brown, 38 id. 384; Etchison Ditching Ass'n v. Busenback, 39 id. 362; Dobson v. Duckpond D. Ass'n, 42 id. 312;
Alspaugh v. Ben Franklin Dr. A s'n, 51
id. 27 l ; Montgomery v. Gorrell, 51 id.
309 ; Browu v. State, 44 id. 222; Mitchell
v. Am. Ins. Co., 51 id. 396; Hinkle v. Margerum , 50 id. 240; Sanford v. Wood, 49
id. 165; Jagers v. Jager , 49 id. 428; Hay
v. Miller, 12 id. I 7; Tyler v. Kent, 52
id. 583 ; Cal 1·in v. Woolen, 66 id. 464
(neglect to file i cured by verdict) ; Ohio
& Mis. Ry. Co. v. Nickle , 71 id. 2il;
Surginer v. Paddock, 31 Ark. 528; Hannibal & St. Jos. R. Co. v. Knud on, 62
Mo. 569.

4-±0

440

CI IL REM EDIE ., .

CIVIL REMEDIES.

1

as shall be just." ^ " When the variance is not material, as pro-

vided in the last section, the court may direct tlie fact to be found

according to the evidence, or may order an immediate amend-

ment without costs." 2 " Where, however, the allegation of the

ac or lin0

to

cause of action or defence to which tlie proof is directed is un-

proved, not in some particular, or particulars, but in its entire

scope and meaning, it shall not be deemed a case of variance

within the last two sections, but a failure of proof.*' ^ An}^ plead-

ing may be amended once by the party filing or serving it, as a

matter of course, and without costs, and without prejudice to

proceedings already had: such amendment must be made within

specified times, which differ in the various codes ; but will not be

permitted if it appear to be merely for purposes of delay.* In

1 New York, § 169 (539) ; Kansas,

§ 133 ; Nebraska, § 138 ; California, § 469 ;

Oregon, § 94; Nortli Carolina, § 128.

[Arkansas, Sand. & Hill's Dig., § 5764;

Idaho, Code Civ. Pro., 1901, §3237; In-
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diana, Burns' St., 1901, § 394; Iowa, Code,

When th ari~ nee i n t mat rial a proour ma dir ct th fa t t b f nnd

rn n wi h u t o t ' ."

2

can e f a tion r 1 fen
i
unpr ,. l n t in om pn· i ular.
in it ntir
:cop an 1 meanin 0 it ' hall n ot
ca 'e f Yari<. nee
ction , but a failure of pr £.' 3 \.ny plead'" ithiu th e la t '"
ing ma , be am ml c.l one b ' th party fili ng or
rvmg i a.. a
matt r f our · anl with ut cost· and ' ithou rr judic t
procee ling alr a ly ha l: su h amend men must b ma le within
I cifi cl ime , wl ich differ in the variou c 1 ; but will n be
I ermitt d if it app ar to be mer ly for purr o es of delay.4 In

1897, § 3597; Kentucky, Code, 1895,

§129; Minnesota, St., 1894, § 5262; Mis-

souri, Kev. St., 1899, § 655; Montana,

Code, 1895, § 770; North Dakota, Rev.

Codes, 1899, § 5293; Ohio, Bates' St.,

§ 5294; Oklahoma, St., 1893, § 4011;

South Carolina, Code, 1893, § 190; South

Dakota, Ann. St., 1901, § 6140; Utah,

Rev. St., 1898, § 3001; Washington, Bal.

Code, § 4949 ; Wisconsin, St., 1898,

§ 2669; Wyoming, Rev. St., 1899, § 3736;

Colorado, Code, 1890, § 78, in a different

form.]

2 New York, § 170 (540); Kansas,

§ 134 ; Nehnvska, § 139 ; California, § 470 ;

Oregon, § 95; North Carolina, § 129.

[Arkansas, Sand. & Hill's Dig., § 5765;

Idaho, Code Civ. Pro., 1901, § 3238 ; In-

diana, Burns' St., 1901 , § 395 ; Iowa, Code,

1897, § 3598 ; Kentucky, Code, 1895,

§ 130; Minnesota, St., 1894, § 5263 ; Mis-

souri, Rev. St., 1899, § 656 ; Montana,

Code, 1895, § 771 ; North Dakota, Rev.

Codes, 1899, § 5294; Ohio, Bates' St.,

§.5295; Oklahoma, St., 1893, § 4012;

South Carolina, Code, 1893, § 191 ; South

Dakota, Ann. St., 1901, §6141 ; Utah, Rev.

St., 1898, § .3002 ; Washington, Bal. Code,

§ 49.50; Wisconsin, St., 1898, § 2670;

Wyoming, Rev. St., 1899, § 3737. j

2 New York, § 171 (541); Kansas,

§ 135 ; Nebraska, § 140 ; California, § 471 ;

Oregon, § 96 ; North Carolina, § 130.

[Arkansas, Sand. & Hill's Dig., § 5766 ;

Idaho, Code Civ. Pro., 1901, §3239; In-

diana, Burns' St., 1901, § 396; Iowa,

Code, 1897, § 3599 ; Kentucky, Code, 1895,

§ 131 ; Minnesota, St., 1894, § 5264 ; Mon-

tana, Code, 1895, § 772; North Dakota,

Rev. Codes, 1899, § 5295; Ohio, Bates'

St., § 5296 ; Oklahoma, St., 1893, § 4013 ;

South Carolina, Code, 1893, § 192; South

Dakota, Ann. St., 1901, § 6142; Utah,

Rev. St., 1898, § 3003; Washington, Bal.

Code, § 4951 ; Wiscon.-in. St., 1898, § 2671 ;

Wyoming, Rev. St., 1899, § 3738.]

"* New York, § 172 (542, 543, 497);

Kansas, § 136; Nebra.ska, § 141 ; Califor-

nia, § 472 ; Oregon, § 97 ; North Carolina,

l New York, § 169 (539); Kan. a ,
133 ; Xebra ka, § 13 ; alifornia, § 469;
Oregon, 94; rorth arolioa, 12 .
[ Arkansa , and. & Hill' DiO'., 5764;
Itl aho, ode iv. Pro., 1901, § 3237; Indiana, Burn' t., 190 1, § 394; Iowa, Code,
1 97, § 3597; K entucky, Cod , 1 95,
129 ; )Iinne ota, t., 1 94, § 5262; Mi ouri, R v. t., l 99, § 655; Montana,
ode 1 95, § 770; North Dak ta, Rev.
ode , l 99, § 5293;
hio, Bate ' St.,
§ 5294;
klahoma,
t., 1 93, § 4011 ;
ou h arolina, Code, l 93, § 190; outh
Dakota,
nn. t., 1901 , § 6140 ;
tab,
H ev. t., l 9 , § 300 1; Wa hingt n, Bal.
ode, § 4949 ; Wi con in,
t., 1 9 ,
2669; " yomiog, R v. t., l 99, § 3736;
'olorado, ode, l 90, § 7 , in a different
form.]
2 New Y ork, § 1-o (540); Kan a ,
§ 134 ; . . 'ebra, ka, § 13 ; ali fo rnia, 470;
Or gon, § 95 ; r-orth a r olin a, § 129 .
[Ar kan a , , a nd. & Hill' I ig ., 5765;
I daho,
de iv. Pr ., 1901
3 23 · Incliana, B ur n ', 't., 1901 , .'3 95 ;
l 97, § 359 ; K ·nt u ·k;-,
§ l.'30; :\Ii nuc.ota ,, t, l 94, 52 63; ?IIi·onri, J C\', .'t., 1 9, . G:-6; Montana,
Corle, l H5 ,
771 ; ~orth D akota, H ,..
('o<lc.-, l ~Hl, § 5294; c >hio, Bat· ' •'t.,
~ 5:!' .; ; <>klahoma, •'t., l '9:3,
.' 40 12;
onth arolina, Corle-., I '.J.'3, .' JU I ; fo'outh
JJakota, .\1111 .• t., l !JOI, § Gl 41 ; rtah, Hr\· .
• ·1., l !J , ,' :wo2; \Vasliiugto11, Bal. orl ,
,' 49:i0; Wi 1·011 ·in, , 't., 1 !J , .' 2G70;
·w urning, l e:v . • t., l 9 , § 3737.J
a ..: ·w Yor k, § 171 (541 ) i Kan a ,

135; .r ebra. ka, § 140; alifornia, 4il;
Oregon, 96 ; N rth ar Jina, § 130.
[Arkan a, and . & Hill '· Dig. 5i 66;
Idaho, ode iv. Pr ., 1901, § 3239; Indiana, Burn ' t., 190 I ,
396 ; Iowa,
Code, 1 97, § 3599; Keutucky, ode, 1 95,
§ 131 ; 1inne ota, t., l 94, t:. 5264: M ntana, ode, l 95, § 77 2;
r th Dak ta,
Rev. ode , I !J9, § 5295 · hio, Bate '
t., § 5296; Oklahoma, , t., l 93, 4013;
Sou th arolina, Code 1 93, 192 ;
uth
Dakota, Ann. t., 1901, § 6142;
tah,
R ev. t., l 98, § 3003 · W a hington, Bal.
od , :; 4951 · Wi on -in, t., 1 9 , § 2671;
W yoming,
v. t., 1 99, § 3 73 .]
4
' ew Y rk, § 172 (542, 543, 497);
Kan a § 136; N bra ka, 141; alifornia, 472; regon, § 97; ' or th arolina,
131.
Arolo-

u.

uh tau tially th
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addition to this privilege of voluntary amendment accorded to the

parties, the court itself may, on motion, amend a pleading, or per-

mit it -to be amended, at any stage of the cause, before and in

most of the States, after the judgment, on such terms as may be

proper. This authority is conferred in very broad terms, with the

limitation, however, that the cause of action or defence shall not

be substantially changed. ^ Finally, all the codes contain the fol-

lowing most righteous provision, which, as appears by their re-

ported decisions, is treated by the courts of some States as though

it were a legislative command binding upon them : " The court

shall, in every stage of an action, disregard any error or defect in

the pleadings or proceedings which shall not affect the substantial

rights of the adverse party, and no judgment shall be reversed or

affected by reason of such error or defect." '^

same, except in respect to the time within

which the amendment can be made; they

all permit one such amendment by the

party of his own pleading, as a matter of
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course.

1 New York, § 173 (723); California,

addition to this pri il g 0£ v luntary am nclm nt a rel l to the
parties, the court it elf may, n rnoti n, nm ml a, pl < ling, or p rmit it ·to be amend l, at any tag of t.he aus , b for ancl in
mo t f th
tat , aft r th jnclgm nt; on :n h term as may be
pr per. Thi · au th rity is · nferr cl in Yery brnarl t ,rm , with the
limitati n, h wev r, that the carn;e of action or defence shall not
b . ubstantially chang ll. 1 } inally, all the cocle: contain th following mo 't right ou · provision, which, a: app 'a.rs by their r ported decisions, is treated by tho comts of 8ome States as though
it were a legislative command binding upon them: "The court
hall, in every stage of an action, dis regard any error or defect in
the pleadings or proceedings which shall not affect the substantial
right of the ad ver e party, and no judgment shall be reversed or
affected by reason of such error or defect.' 2

§473; North Carolina, § 132.

[^Arizona, Rev. St., 1901, § 1288, at

any stage of the action ; Arkansas, Sand.

& Hill's Dig., § 5769, at any time ; Colo-

rado, Code, 1890, § 7.5, without limitation

as to time; Connecticut, Gen. St., 1902,

§ 639, — at any time, § 645, —after de-

fault before final judgment, § 646, — from

contract to tort, and vice versa, § 647, —

from equitable to legal cause, and vice

versa; Idaho,' Code Civ. Pro., 1901,

§ 3241, without limitation as to time ; In-

diana, Burns' St., 1901, § 399, at any

time; Iowa, Code, 1897, § 3600, at any

time; Kansas, Code, 1901, § 139, before or

after judgment; Kentucky, Code, 1895,

§ 134, at any time; Minnesota, St., 1894,

§ 5266, before or after judgment ; Mis-

souri, Rev. St., 1899, § 657, at any time

before final judgment, § 660, — after final

judgment; Montana, Code, 1895, § 774,

without limitation as to time ; Nebraska,

Code, 1901, § 144, either before or after

judgment ; Nevada, Comp. Laws, 1900,

§ 3163, without limitation as to time ;

North Dakota, Rev. Codes, 1899, § 5297,

before or after judgment ; Ohio, Bates'

St., § 5114, before or after judgment;

Oklahoma, St., 1893, § 4017, before or af-

ter judgment ; Oregon, Hill's Laws, § 101,

at any time before trial, § 102, — allowing

court to enlarge time limited by code ;

South Carolina, Code, 1893, § 194, before

or after judgment ; SoutJi Dakota, Ann.

St., 1901, § 6144, before or after judg-

ment; Utah, Rev. St., 1898, § 3005.

without limitation as to time; Washing-

ton, Bal. Code, § 4953, without limitation

as to time; Wyoming, Rev. St., 1899,

§3588, before or after judgment; Wis-

consin, St., 1 898, § 2830, at any stage of

the action, before or after judgment.]

The following is the clause as found in

all the codes substantially, and exactly in

most of thera. The court ma}' at any

time "amend any pleading or proceeding

by adding or striking out the name of any

party ; or by correcting a mistake in the

ame, except in respect to the time within
which the amendment can be made; they
all permit one such amendment by the
party of his own pleading, as a matter of
cour e.
1
ew York, § 173 {723) ; California,
§ 473; North Carolina, § 132.
[Arizona, Rev. St., 1901, § 1288, at
any tage of the action; Arkansas, Sand.
& Bill's Dig., § 5769, at any time; Colorado, Code, 1890, § 75, without limitation
a to time; Connecticut, Gen. St., 1902,
§ 639, - at any time, § 645, - after default before final judgm ent, § 646, - from
con tract to tort, and vice versa, § 64 7, from equitable to legal cau e, anu 1•ite
t•ersa; Idaho, Code Civ. Pro., 1901 ,
§ 3241, without limi tation as to time; Indiana, Burus' St., 1901, § 399, at any
time; Iowa, Coue, 1 97, § 3600, at auy
time; Kan sas, Code, 1901,§139,beforeor
after judgment; Kentucky, Code, l 95,
§ 134, at any time; Minnesota., St., 1894,
§ 5266, before or after judgment; Misouri, ReY. St., 1 99, § 657, at any time
hefore final jud gment, § 660, - after final
jud gment; l\Iontana, Code, 1" 95, 6 ii-!,
without limitation a. to time; Nebraska,
Code, 1901. § 144, either before or aft r
judgment; NeYacla, Comp. Lawf', 1900,
§ 3163, without limitation a to tim e;
orth Dakota, Rev. Codes, 1 99, § 5297,
before or after judgment; Ohio, Bat '
St., § 5114, before or after jnclgment;
Oklahoma, St., 1893, § 4017, before or af-

ter judgment; Oregon, Hill's Law , § 101,
at auy time before trial, § I 02, - allowing
court to enlarge time limited by code;
outh Carolina, Code, 1893, § 194, before
or after judgment; South Dakota, Ann.
St., l 901, § 6144, before or after judg ment; lJtah, Hev. St., 1898, § 3005,
without limitation a to time; 'Vashington, Bal. Code, § 4953, without limitation
a to time; W yoming, Rev. St., I 99,
§ 35 8, before or after judgment; 'Vi con in, St., I 9 , § 2 30, at any stage of
the action, before or after judgment.]
The following is the clause a found in
all the codes ubstantially, and exactly in
most of them. The court may at any
time "arnend any pleading or proceeding
by adding or striking out the name of any
party; or by correcting a mi,;take in the
name of any party, or a mi:-;tak e in any
other respect; or hy in:c rt ing allco-ations
material to the case; or, when the amendment does not sub tantially change the
claim or defence, b.v conforming the pleadin g or proceeding to the fact proYe<l ."
2 Nebraska,§ 145 ; Kn.n a , § 140;
regon, § 104; :Xorth arolina, § 135.
[Ari wna, R eY . ._ t., I ~lO I, § 1293; Arkan as, a1Hl. & Ilill',; t., R 57i2; alifornia, ~ 4i5, . ome what more "pecitk;
Coloraclo, Co1lc>, l 90, ~ 7 ; I daho, o .e
Civ. Pro., 1901, \3 3243; Indiana, Bnrnf''
St.,1901, §40 1; I wa, ode, I 97,~.''1601;
Kentu ·k.'-, Corle, l 95, § 13-1; Iiun esota,
t.,
St., 1894, § 5269; Mis ·ouri, Rev.

ffIL HE.IEDIE .

442 CIVIL kemedils.

N^ 330. * 43G. Order of Proposed Treatment. Ill the important

discussions based upon tlie foregoing statutory provisions, which

will form the substance of the present chapter, the natural and

scientific order of treatment would undoubtedly lead me lirst to

develop the general and essential principles upon which the whole

reformed theory of pleading is Ijased, and afterwards to apply

these principles in determining the rules that regulate the matter"

and form of the plaintiff's complaint or petition. Scientific method

must, however, be sometimes abandoned from considerations of

convenience and expediency ; and such a course seems to be

proper in this instance. In attempting to obtain a correct notion

of the essential principles and doctrines of the new system, it will

be necessary to fix the meaning of certain terms and phrases used

in all the codes; and it so happens, from tlie course of judicial

decisions involving the question, that tliese veiy terms and phrases

can be most advantageously examined, and most easil}^ interpreted,

in connection with the particular subject of " The Joinder of

Causes of Action." The entire discussion wdll, tlierefore, be ren-

dered simpler, and useless repetition will lie avoided, by adopting

Generated for facpubupdates (University of Michigan) on 2014-06-17 15:32 GMT / http://hdl.handle.net/2027/uc2.ark:/13960/t02z1c23b
Public Domain / http://www.hathitrust.org/access_use#pd

the arrangement thus suggested. In pursuing this plan, the

subject-matter of the chapter will be separated into the following

general di%dsions : (1) The joinder of different causes of action in

one proceeding ; (2) the essential principles w^iich lie at the

foundation of the reformed system of pleading ; (3) the general

doctrines and practical rules deduced from these principles, wliich

determine and regulate both the external form and the substance

of the plaintiff's complaint or petition.

1899, § 659 ; Montana, Code, 189."), § 778; to the reply, and to the joinder of causes

Nevada, Comp. Laws, 1900, § 3166 ; New of action, are given hereafter. In a few of

York, Code Civ. Pro., § 721, enumerating the codes, especially in tho.se of Iowa, lu-

twelve classes of defects whicli shall not diana, and Missouri, there are certain

effect tlic judgment ; Nortli Dakota, Rev. special clauses prescribing wliat may be

Codes, 1899, § 5'iOO; Ohio, Bates' St., jiroved under the answer of denial, and

§ 5115; Oklahoma, St., 189.3, § 4018; what must !>e pleaded as new matter, or

South Carolina, Code, 1893, §197; South referring to some mere points of detail:

Dakota, Ann. St., 1901, § 6147 ; Utah, as these clauses are all embraced by im-

Itev. St., 1898, § 3008; Washington, Kal. j)licatiou in the more general provisions

Code, § 4957 ; Wisconsin, St., 1898, §2829; common to all the codes, and thus make

Wyoming, Rev. St., 1899. § 3589.] no change in the law of the States where

The foregoing are all the general provi- they are found, they are surplusage, and 1

· 330. * -136 . Order of Proposed Treatment. In the in: portant
cli:cus "ions ba "" d ur on th f r oin
t tutory pro i ion ' which
will form the ub tance of the l re ""ent ch· l r he n ural and
cientific ord r of tre, tment would und ubt Uy lead m nrt to
leY 1 p the 0 eneral and
ential principle upon which the whole
r, f rmed theory f pleading i ba el, ·tnd afterward to apply
t 11e ,,, principle . . in leterminin 0 the rul th regulate the matt rand f rm of the r lain iff omplain or pe i ion.
ci ntifi m thod
mu 't, howev r b ome rn
abandoned from considerati n of
cor Y nience and xpedien y; an l uch a c ur e seem to be
pror er in thi · ins ance . In attemr ting ·o obtain a ·01T ct n tion
of th e enfr 1 principles and doctrines of th news tern, it will
Le nece ary t fix the meaning of certain term and phrase u ed
in all th codes; and it
ha.ppens from the cour e of ju icial
d ci ·ion. involving he question, that the every terms and pbra s
can be mo t adv ntageously examined, and mo t easily interpreted,
in connedion with the particular subject of ' The J oin<ler of
CLu 'e' of Action. ' The entire di cussion will therefor , b renlered impler, and u ele r petition will be avoided by adopting
t!ie arrangement thus suggested. In pursuing thi plan he
ubjec -matter of the chapter will be eparated into the f 11 wing
general divi ion : (1) The joinder of different ca1: e of acti n in
or;ie proceeding; (2) the essential principle which lie at he
founda ion of the reform d 3 tern of pleading ; (3) the g n ral
doc rine and practic 1 rul deduced from the e principle , which
determine and regulate both the xternal form and the sub tance
of the plaintiff's complaint or petition.

Bions relating to the plaintiff's pleading, have not quoted them. Strunk v. Smith,

or to the theory of pleading as a whole: 36 Wis. 631.

those relating to the defendant's pleading,

I 99, § 659; Iontana, Code, l 9:"", & i~ ;
.·e,·ada, omp. Law, 1900, § 3 166; ·ew
Y or k, ode Ci v. Pro., 72 1, enumeratin
tweln• cla e of defec t which hall uot
·ff ct the judg me nt; ~ orth Dakota, Rev.
'ocll'., 1899,
5300; Jhio Bate '
t.,
.' 51 l 5; Oklah.,ma, , t. , 1 3,
401 ;
'cJUth C'aroliu a , Cod , L 93, § 191; ou Lh
J>ak•1ta, Ann. t ., I 901, . 61-1-7; ' tah,
l eL . t, I 9 , 300 ; Wa hiugton, Bal.
<'<>c.le, ~ 4.95i; "\Vi. co u ·in .. 't., 1 () , l\ 2 29 ;
W!'<Jmin~, Rev .• t. 1 9 . : 35 9.J
The fo r<'going are all t he g ne ral provii(Jns rPlati u ~ t o th e plaiutiff' plcadiug,
o r to the~ th eory of pl eading a a wh ole:
tho. r la tiog to the tle fe1. rl ut'; pleading,

*

t the r eply, and to the joinder of cao e
of a tion, are g iYeo he r aft r. In a few of
the otl , e pecially in tho e £ I w , Indiana, and Mi ouri, there ar
rtain
speci , 1 fau , pre cribi ng what may be
pr ,·eel m d r the an wer of d nial, and
what mu t lie plead ed a n w matter, r
rcferrin o- t
ome mere point of cl t ii :
a · t he e lau. e are all mbmc d by implica t ion in the more gen ral l r vi iou:-:
commnn to all the code. , and thn · make
n o chang in th law £th •. tat.
' h r
they ar fouud, th y are urplu age, and I
ha\'e not quot d them.
t runk v. mith,
36 Wi ·. 631.

JOINDElt OF CAUSES OF ACTION. 443

SECTION SECOND.

JOINDER OF CAUSES OF ACTION.

§ 331. * 437. Subdivisions for Discussion herein. The discus-

sion of tliis important subject will be sepai'ated into the following

subdivisions : I. The statutory provisions found in the various

State codes. II. The forms and modes in which a misjoinder

may occur, and the manner in which it must be objected to and

corrected. III. The legal import of the term " cause of action,"

and the case discussed in which only a single cause of action is

stated, although several different remedies, or kinds of relief, are

demanded. IV. The legal import of the term " transaction ; "

discussion of the case of "causes of action arising out of the

same transaction, or transactions connected with the same subject

of action." V. Instances in which the proper joinder of causes of

action is connected with the proper joinder of defendants ; discus-

sion of the provision that all the causes of action must affect all

of the parties. VI. Instances in which all the causes of action

are against the single defendant, or against all the defendants

alike ; and the only question is, whether the case falls within any
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one of the several specified classes, except the first which em-

braces those arising out of the same transaction, etc. These sub-

divisions, I think, entirely exhaust the particular subject-matter

to which this section is devoted.

I. Tlie Statutory Provisions.

§ 332. * 438. Language of the Codes herein. The provision,

which is found substantially the same — with very sliglit modifi-

cations, if any — in most of the codes, is as follows : " The plain-

tiff may unite in the same complaint several causes of action,

whether they be such as have heretofore been denominated legal

or equitable, or both,^ when they all arise out of, 1. The same

transaction, or transactions connected with the same subject of

1 [^Preferred Accident Ins. Co. v. Stone 175, 87 N. W. 1067; Swihart v. Harles.s

(1899), 61 Kan. 48, .58 Pac. 986 ; Haskell (1896), 93 Wi.s. 211,67 N. W. 413 ; Blakely

Co. Bank v. Bank of Santa Fe (1893), 51 v. Smock (1897), 96 Wi.s. 611, 71 N. W.

Kan. 39, 32 Pac. 624. But see Pietsch 1052; Lane v. Dowfl (1903), 172 Mo. 167,

V. Krause (1903), 116 Wis. 344, 93 N. W. 72 S. W. 632; Plankiuton v. Ilildcbraud

9; Reeg v. Adams (1902), 113 Wis. (1895), 89 Wis. 209, 61 N. W. 839.3
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action ; 2. Contract, express or implied ; or, 3. Injurie.-;, Avith or

AWthout force, to person and property, or either ; or, 4. Injuries

to character ; or, 5. Claims to recover real property, with or with-

out damages for the withholding thereof, and the rents and profits

of the same; or, 6. Claims to recover personal property, with

or without damages for the withliolding thereof; or, 7. Claims

against a trustee, by virtue of a contract, or by operation of law.i

" But the causes of action so united must all belong to one of

these classes, and, except in actions for the foreclosure of mort-

gages, must affect all the parties to tlie action, and not require

different places of trial, and must be separately stated.^

1 QBosworth V. Allen (1901), 168 N. Y.

157, 61 N. E. l&'i. "The cause of action

to set asitle the contract may properly be

united with the cause of action to coin])el

an accountiug for the injurious results of

a tion ·
r im li d · or, 3. I njuri · with or
''i h u for
p r on and rrop rt· or ither · r -±. Injurie
haract r · r
laim t rec ,. r r al pr p rt·, wi h or \Tithout clamacr for th "ithh lding h r of, and the r nt anc.l l r fit~
f the am
r G. laim to r coYer per ~onal proper · "·ith
r with u t la.ma0 e for th with h lding th er of · or 7. Claim ,
again-t a tru tee by virtu of a contract, or . • 01 era.ti n of l:rn-. 1
ut the can e of a tion so united mu t all b 10110 to one of
the ' cla.: e ancl, except in ac ion for the fore 1 ' Ur of mortga
mu t affect all the par ti s t the a ti n, an l not req wr
different place of trial, an l mu t bv I arat ly tated.2

the arrangement of which it is a part,

since both causes of action were founded
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upon claims against trustees, arising by

operation of law. "J

- QState V. Krause (1897), 58 Kan. 651,

50 Pac. 882 (cause of action on one bond

of county treasurer cannot be joined with

cause of action on another bond where

.sureties are different) ; Barry v. Wach-

osky (1899), 57 Neb. 5.34, 77 N. W. 1080.

Tlie facts in this case were as follows:

James M. Barry, J. M. Brannan, and

C. D. Ryan made their non-negotiable

promissory note, and delivered the same

to D. F. Clarke, who was payee of the

same. The latter, before maturity of the

note, seems to have sold and delivered it

to the plaintiff, and before doing so

" wrote his name across the back of the

note, and over that he recited in writing

that lie guaranteed the payment of the

note." Wachosky brouglit suit on the

note making Barry, Brannan, Ryan, and

Clarke defendants. In the opinion the

court, among other things, said : " In tlie

case at bar Clarke did write over his

signature on this note a guaranty of pay-

ment, and by so doing he became liable to

Wachosky a.s a guarantor of this note.

But thi; makers of the note were not

parties to this contract of guaranty. . . .

Wachosky has, perhaps, two causes of

action. One cause of action is on the

note and against the makers thereof.

The other cause of action is against Clarke

on his guaranty of payment. These

two causes of action cannot be united, for

the obvious reason tliat each one does

not s^ffect all the parties to the action."

Plankinton r. Hildebrand (1895), 89 Wis.

209, 61 N. W. 839; Gunder.son v. Thomas

(1894), 87 Wis. 406, 58 N. W. 7.50;

A. T. & S. F. Rid. Co. V. Commr's of

Sumner Co. (1893), 51 Kan. 617, 33 Pac.

31 2 ; Draper r. Brown (1902), 115 Wis. 361,

91 N. W. 1001 ; Stewart v. Rusengren

( 1902), — Xeb. — , 92 N. W. 586 ; Hughes

v. Ilunner (1895), 91 Wis. 116, 64 N. W.

887; Blakely v. Smock (1897), 96 Wis.

611, 71 N. W. 1052; Egaard v. Dahlke

(1901), 109 Wis. 366, 85 N. W. 369;

Hilton V. Hilton's Adm'r (1901), — Ky.

The other cause of action i a<Yain t Clarke
on hi guaranty of payment.
The e
two can e of action ann t be united, fo r
united with the cau of action to compel the t l'iou reason that ach one doe
an accountin<Y for the injuriou re ult of not !\£feet all the partie to the action."
the arrangement of which it i a part, Plankinton i:. Hildebrand (1 95), 9 Wi .
ince both ·au e of acti n were founded 209, 61 I . W . 39; under on r. Thoma
upon laim again. t tru tee , ari ing by ( 1 94), 7 Wi . 406, 5 N. W. 750;
operation f law."]
A. T . & S. F . Rld. o. v. ommr' of
[ tate i·. Krau e (1 97), 5 Kan. 65 1,
umuer o. {l 93), 5 1 E.an. 6 1i 33 Pac.
50 Pac.
2 (cau e of action on one bond 31 2 ; Draper v. B rown ( 1902), 11 5 " i . 36 1,
of couuty tr a urer cannot be joined wit h 91 N. W. 100 1 ; t wart v. Ru eng ren
cau of at:tion on another bond where (1902), - Neb. - , 92 N. W . !i 6; Hughe
. uretie are different); Barry v. \Vach- i•. Iluuner (1 95) , 91 Wi . 11 6, 64 r . W.
o ky (l 99) , 5i , ' u. 534, 77 I . W . 10 ' O.
i; Blakely v.
mock (l 97) 96 W i.
The fact. in thi ca e '''ere a follow : 611 , i l N. W. 1052; Egaanl t'. Dahlke
Jam e M. Barry J. M. Brannan, and (190 1), 109 Wi . 366, 5
. W . 369;
. D. Ryan made their non-n gotiable Hilton v. H ilton' Adm'r (190 1 ), - K y .
promi ory note, and delivered the . ame - 62 . W . 6; Clayton L'. 'ity of H eoto D. F. larke, who wa pay e of the derou ( l 9 ), 103 K y. 22, 44 . W . 667;
, ame. The latter, u fore maturity of the Th lin v. tewart (1 93), 100 al. 372 34
note, e m to hase . ol<l and cl li v red it Pa. 61; Jami on v. Culligan (I 99), 151
to the plaintiff, and before doing
.Thlo. 410, 52 . W . 224; Kru ·zin ki v. N u" wrote hi name a ro . the back of the endorf, 99 Wi . 264, 74 . W . 974; Aud rnote, and O\' r that h r cited in writing , on '" candia Bank (1 93) , 53 Minn. 191,
hat he guarante cl the paym nt of the 54 ... '. 'V. 1062 ·
arri r r. B rn tern
note." Wacho. ky brought nit n t.h
(1 9 ), 104 Ia. 5i2 - 3 r. W. !Oi6 · 1Ic·
uote making Barry, Br unan, Ryan, and Donald v. econd Nat. ank (1 9 ) 106
('Jarke defendant . In the opinion the la. 5li, 76 ~. W. 1011 (wh r the mi r·ourt, amou,,. other thiu"' , , aid: ''In the jornder re. ult cl from the cau e' faction
ca.-e at bar Clarke <lid write ov r hi' being riabl in di ff r nt onr ti . ) ; ~[nr
.·ig11ature rm thi 11ote a guaranty of pa_y- tou i-. W tern nion Tel. o. ( 1902}, 1:30
mc>ut, ar1<l liy o cloiug It hecam lia.l1le t
~ . C. 299, -t l , . K 4 4; J>lauki11tu11 '"
'Vaclw-ky a· a guarautor of till. 1wte. Ililrl ln·anrl (I 9.)), 9 Wi. 209, 61 ~'. ""
But tlil• maker: of the note " •re uut
39, Blllhle v. R ·b nack (1 9 ). J.'37 Mo.
Jlartie to thi· co11tract of rrnara11t.y . . . . l i'J. 3
. ,Y. 910; E t p L'. 1Iai11111011!i
\Yat'hv ky Ila , p ·rbap , two l·au.-e: of (I !J ), 10+ K,·. H.t, 46. '. W. ii 5; II awaractio11. <l11c <'an e f action i: on t.h
e! u i·. Th Y ~rnghiun·h 11y & Lehigh Coal
note amt again. t the m ker thereof.
'u. (1901), 111 \ i. 54·, i 1:. \\'. 472.J
l [Bo worth v. All n (1901), 16 N. Y.
157, 61 N. E. 16'l. "The cau;,.e of action
to et a id the contra t may properly be
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" In actions to foreclose mortgages, the court shall have power

to adjudge and direct payment by the mortgagor of any residue

of the mortgage debt that may remain unsatisfied after a sale of

the mortgaged premises, in cases in which the mortgagor shall be

personally liable for the debt secured by such niortgage ; and if

the mortgage debt be secured by the covenant, or obligation,

of any person other than tlie mortgagor, the plaintiff may make

such person a party to the action, and the court may adjudge

paj-ment of the residue of such debt remaining unsatisfied after a

sale of the mortgaged premises, against such other person, and

may enforce such judgment as in other cases." ^

1 ^Arizona. " Only such causes of action

may he joiued as are capable of the same

character of relief. Actions ex contractu

shall not be joiued with actions ex delicto.

In actions ex delicto there shall not be

" In actions to for close mortgu.g , th · urt hall have power
to a ljuc.lge and dir ct payment by the m rtgao- r of any r . idue
of the mor gage debt that may remain un a.Li ·iiec.l after a i-;ale of
th mortgagec.l l remi e , in a. ·es in which the morto·agor hall be
personally liable for th debt cur cl by ·u ·h mortgage; ancl if
th mortgage debt ue 8ecurecl by the cov enant, 01' olJlio·ation,
of any person other than the mortgagor, the phtintiff may make
uch person a party to the action, and the court may acljuclge
payment of the residue of such debt remaining unsati 'fi cl alter a
ale of the mortgagecl premises, against such other person, and.
may enforce such judgment as in other cases." 1

joined actions to recover for injuries to

the ])erson, to property, or to character ;
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but they shall be sued for separately."

Kev. St.", 1901, § 1291.

Arkansas. " Several causes of action

may be united in the same complaint,

where each affects all the parties to the

action, may be brought iu the same

county, be prosecuted by the same kind of

proceedings, and all belong to one of the

following classes: (1) Claims arising out

of contract, express or implied ; (2) Claims

for the recovery of specific real property,

and the rents, profits, and damages for

■withholding the same ; (3) Claims for the

recovery of specific per.sonal property, and

damages for the taking or withholding

the same; (4) Claimsfor partition of real or

personal property, or both; (5) Claims aris-

ing from injuries to character; (6) Claims

arising from injuries to person and prop-

erty ; (7) Claims against a trustee by

virtue of a contract or by operation of

law." Sand. & Hill's Dig., § 5703.

California. " The plaintiff may unite

several causes of actiou in the same com-

plamt, where they all arise out of: [( 1 ) A

single act committed by the defendant, or

several such acts constituting but a single

transaction]. (I) [2] Contracts, express

or implied; (2) [3] Claims to recover spe-

cific real property, with or without dam-

ages for the withholding thereof, or for

waste committed thereon, and the rents

and profits of the same; (3) [4] Claims

to recover specific personal property, with

or without damages for the witliliolding

thereof; (4) [.ij Claims against a trustee

by virtue of a contract or by operation of

law; (5) [6] Injuries to character ; (6) [7]

Injuries to person; (7) [8] Injuries to

property. Tlie causes of action so united

must all [, e.xcept in the cases mentioned

in subdivision one,] belong to one only of

these classes, and must affect all the par-

ties to the actiou, and not require different

places of trial, and must be separately

stated ; but an action for malicious arrest

and prosecution, or either of them, may

be united with an action for either an

injury to character or to the person."

The portions inclosed in brackets are

to recover specific per:onal property, with
l [Arizona. "Only uch causes of action
may be joined a are capable of the same or without damage for the withholding
character of relief. Action ex contractu thereof; (4) [!')J Claim · again -ta tru ' tee
hall not be joined with action ex delicto. by virtue of a cont.ract or by operation of
In actions ex delicto there shall not be law; (5) (6] luJuries to character; (6) [7]
JOined actions to recover for injuries to Injuries to person; (7) [ ] Injuries to
the person, to property, or to character; property. The causes of action o uuited
but they shall be sued for separately." must all [, except in the ca es mentioned
iu subdivision one,] belong to one only of
Rev. ~t., 1901, § 1291.
Arkansas. "Several causes of action these clas es, aud must affect all the parmay be united in the same complaint, ties to the actiou, and not require different
where each affects all the parties to the places of trial, and must he separately
action, may be brought iu the same stated ; but an action for malicious arrest
county, be prosecuted by the same kind of and pro;,ecution, or either of them, may
proceedings, and all belong to one of the be united with au action for either an
follo\\'ing dasse : ( l) Claims arising out injury to character or to the person."
of contract, express or implied; (2) Claims The portions indosed in bracket are
for the recovery of specific real property, the portions added by the Comm is ·ioners'
and the rents, profits, and damages for Am endment of 1901. See Lewis v. Dunne
withholding the same; (3) Claims for the (1901), 134 Cal. 291, su taining technical
recoYery of specific per onal propert.\', and objections to the con tirutionality of the
damages for the taking or withholding ameude<l code. Code Civ. Pro., § 4:27.
the ' ame; (4) Claim for partition of real or The paragraph of the text r elative to
per-onal property, or both; ( 5) Claim aris- foreclosure suits is found in different form
ing from injuries to character; (6) Claims in § 726.
ari ing from injuries to person and propColorado. "The plaintiff may unite
erty; (7) Claims against a trustee by several causes of action iu the same comvirtue of a contract or by operation of plaint, when they all ari e out of any one
law." Sand. & Hill's Dig., § 5703.
of the following named cla e : Provided,
California. "The plaintiff may unite They affect all of the ame partie , both
everal cau es of action in the ame com- plaintiff and defendant, and affect them
plamt, where they all ari e out of: [( 1) A in the same character and capacity; and
ingle act committed by the defendant, or provided, they do not require different
everal uch acts con tituting bnt a ·ingle places of trial, to wit : Clas First - Actran action]. {l} [2] Contract , xpre s tion to recover pecific real property,
or implied; (2) [3] Claim to recover pe- whether the same be claimed by virtue of
citic real property, with or without dam- superiority of title r by uperiority of
age· for the withholding thereof, or for pos essory right, or on account of unlawwa te committed thereou, and the rents ful detainer or for ·iblc utry; and with
and profits of the same; {3) [ 4] Claims such claims may be united any and ~11
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§ 333. * 439. Features Common to many Codes. States in

333.

· -±3.... Features

Common

to

many

Codes.

States

in

which these Features are wanting. The scheme contained in all

these codes is marked by certain common features, which should

claim.s for damages, for rents in arrear,

he ch me •ontain cl in all
code i · marked by certain c mm n feature ' whi h h ul l

which these Features are wanting.

th

~e

for profits during any unlawful occupa-

tion thereof, and for any waste committed

thereon. Provided, That all such claims

arise from the same property for the re-

covery of which the suit is brought.

Class Second — Action to recover specific

l)ersonal property with which may be joined

any and all claims for damages for the

uulawfiJ detention of the same, or for the

forcible taking of the same, including, in

proper cases, claims for exemplary dam-

ages, and in case the property cannot be

recovered in specie, damages for the un-

lawful conversion thereof. Class Third
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— All actions sounding only iu damages,

whether the same be for breach of con-

trace, sealed or parol, express or implied,

or for injuries to property, person or char-

acter, or for any two or more of these

causes, and in all cases it shall be neces-

sarv to state separately in the complaint

the different causes for which the action is

brought, and in all cases equitable relief

may be granted." § 70. For provisions

relative to foreclosure suits, see § 252.

Connecticut. " In every civil action not

brought before a justice of the peace, the

plaintiff may include in his complaint

botii legal and equitable rights and causes

of action, and demand both legal and

e(iuitable remedies ; but wiiere several

causes of action are united in the same

complaint tiiey must all be brought to re-

cover either (1) upon contract, express or

implied ; or (2) for injuries, with or without

force, to person and property, or either,

including a conversion of property to de-

fendant's use; or (3) for injuries to char-

acter ; or (4) upon claims to recover real

property, with or without damages for the

withholding thereof, and the rents and

profits of tiie same; or (5) upon claims to

recover personal property specifically, with

or without damages for the withholding

thereof; or (6) claims arising by virtue of

a contract or by operation of law, in favor

of or against a party, in some representa-

tive or fiduciary capacity; or (7) upon

claims, whether in contract, or tort, or

both, arising out of the same transaction

or transactions connected with the same

subject of action. The several causes of

action so united must all belong to one of

these classes, and, e.\cept in actions for

the Ibreclosure of mortgages or liens, must

affect all the parties to tiie action, and not

require different places of trial, and must

be separately stated ; and in all cases

where several causes of action are joined

in tlie same complaint, or as matter of

counter-claim or set-off, in the answer, if

it appear to the court that they cannot all

be conveniently heard together, the court

may order separate trials of any such

claim. for damagE' , for rents in arrear,
for profit Jurin any unlawful oc:cuµariun ther of, and fur an - wa te committed
thereon. Provided, That all u h laim
ari e from the ame property for the r ecoYery of which the uit i · brought.
.,la · econd - Action to recover pecific
per onal property with which may be joined
an_,. and all claim for damage for the
unlawfnl detention of the ame, or for the
forc ible taking of the ame, including, in
proper ca e , claim fo r exemplary damaO'e , and in c ·e the property cannot be
recoyere<l in pecie, damage fo r the unlass Thfrd
lawful couYer ion thereof.
- .·Ul action· oun<ling only iu damaO'e ,
whether the ·ame be fo r breach of contract, ealeJ or parol, expre - or impli ed,
or for iujurie· to property, person or c:haraetcr, ur fur any two or more of the e
·au e , an<l in all ca e. it ·hall be nece . ary to tat ·eparately in t he complaint
tlie <lifiereut cau·e fu r which the action is
bruught, and in all case eq ui table r elief
may be gran ted." § 70 . For pro1·i iun ·
relative to foreclo. ure uit., e ' 252.
UoT111eclin1l . " ln eYery civil action not
l1ruught b fore a ju,ti a of the peace, the
plaintiff may include in hi complaint
both legal and equitable righ t and cause
of action, and demand both legal and
quitable r medie ; but where e\·eral
tau e of act.ion are uni ted JU the ame
complaint they mu tall be brought to re·
cor r eith r ( 1) upon ·ontract, expre or
implied; or (:l) for injurie , with or without
force, t per ·on and prop rty, or either,
including a conv r ion of property to defendant' u e; or (3) for injurie to character; or (4) upon claim to recover real
property, with or without damage for the
withholding thereof and the rent and
profit. of the. ame; or (5) upon claim to
r ·1·uv r per onal property pecifically, with
or \\ ithout damage, for th, withholdi110'
tlH'renf; IJT (G) claim· ari ing by virtue of
a coutract or by 111eration of law, in fa,·,Jr
r)f or a~ai11ta11arty, in .orne r prc:cutativ1• or tid11 ·iary l'll)l:t<'ity; or (/) lljlCJll
"lai111 , \\ hPt},1·r in c·1mtrac:t, or t<>rt, <Jr
lJ1Jth,. ri i1;.; out of the ~awe trau ·actiun

the

am

the e el ~ e. , and, except in acti 11. fur
the foreclo ure of mortgag
r li en , mu t
affect all the partie to the action, and not
r eq uire different place of trial and mu t
be eparately tated; and iu all ca e
wher e evera l cau e of action are join cl
iu the ame complaint, or a matter of
count r-claim or .et-off in the an wer, if
it appear to the court that th y cannot all
be conveniently heard toO"ether, the court
may order eparate trial· of any uch
cau e of action, or may dir ct that any
one or mor of them be xpunged from
the complaint or an wer." 'en. 'r., 1902,

§ 613.
Geor9ia. " All claim ari ing ex contractu between the a.me partie ma.'· be
joined in the ame action, and all ·]aim
ari:ing ex d elicto may in like manner be
joined. The defendant may al o et up,
a a defence, all claim again t th 1ilaiutiff uf a · imilar nature with th plaintiff'
d mand." Code, 1 95 § 4944.
I dalw. Id eutical with the provi ·ion
of the alifornia Code without the por·
tiou. added by the Commi. i n r 'Am ndmeut of I 901. ode Civ. Pro. 1901, 3205.
F or provi iou r elati ,·e to foreclo ure uit ·
ee § 333 1.
l 11diana. " The plaintiff may unite
_ev ral cau e of action in the ame om·
plaint, wh 11 they are included in eith r f
th following ·la e : Fn· t. Money demand on contract.
econd. Iu juriei' to
property.
Third. Iojurie to p r on or
hara.cter. Fourth. !aim to recov r the
po· e.: ion of per onal property, with or
without damage for the withhold ing
th reof, and for injuri
to th prop rty
withh ld. Fifth.
laim t r e ov r tbe
po e. ion of real propert.' with or "i thout 1lamag , r ut au<l profit for th
withholding thereof, ao<l for wartc ur
damarre don to the land; to m kl· partitiCJn of a111l to cl 'term ine and qui et th~
title t r al pro11erty. • i.rl/1. ( ')a1rn.., tu
e11f 1tTC th• :p • ·ifiC' pcrformam.. !Jf l'Ulllrac:t!'.', and to <!Yuid cuutrac:t · fur frand
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be noticed ; namely, the express provision for the uniting of legal

and equituble causes of action, and the exceedingly general and

Le notic l ; nam ly, the xpr ss pro vi ion for th uniting of legal
' nd q uitabl cau'
of acti n, and th
x eeclingly general and

or mistakes. Seventh. Claims to fore-

close mortgages ; to enforce or discharge

specific lieus ; to recover persoual juiig-

ment upon the debt secured by such mort-

gage or lien ; to subject to sale real

property upon demauds agaiust decedents'

estates, when such property has passed to

heirs, devisees, or their assigns ; to mar-

siial assets ; and to substitute one person

to the rights of another ; and all otlier

causes of action arising out of a contract

or a duty, and not falling within either of

the foregoing classes. But causes of ac-

tion so joined must affect all tlie parties to

the action, and not require different places

of trial, and must be separately stated and
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numbered." Burns' St., 1901, § 279.

loira. " Causes of action of whatever

kind, where eacii may be prosecuted by

the same kind of proceedings, if held by

the same party, and against the same

party, in the same rights, and if action

on all may be brought and tried in that

county, may be joined in the same peti-

tion ; but the court may direct all or any

portion of the issues joined to be tried

separately, and may determine the order

thereof," Code, 1897, § 35-15.

Kansas. The enumeration of classes

is identical with that given in the text,

followed by this clause : " But the causes

of action so uniteii must all belong to one

of these classes, and must affect all the

parties to the action, except in actions to

enforce mortgages or otlier liens." Code,

§ 8.3, Gen. St., 1901, §4517.

Kentucky. Identical, with very slight

verbal changes, with the Arkansas statute,

exclusive of subdivision 7. Code, 1895,

§83.

Minnesota. Identical with the provi-

sions of the text, except that, in the second

paragraph, the words " except in actions

for the foreclosure of mortgages " are

omitted. St., 1894, § 5260. Third para-

graph wanting.

Missouri. The enumeration of classes

is identical with that given in the text

except the seventh class, which is as fol-

lows : " Claims bj' or against a party in

some representative or fiduciary capacity,

by virtue of a contract or by operation of

law," followed by this clau.se: "But the

causes of action so united must all belong

to one of these cla.sses, and must affect all

the parties to the action, and not require

different places of trial, and must be sepa-

rately stated, with the relief sought for

each cause of action, in such manner that

they may be intelligibly distinguished.'

Kev. St., 1899, § 593.

Montana. Identical with the provi-

sions of the California Code without the

portions added by the Commissioners'

Amendment of 1901, except that the .sec-

ond paragraph reads as follows : " The

or mi tak e .
Claim to foreclo e mortgage. ; to 11 fo rce or tli charge
pet'ific li u ; to r cov r per onal judgment upon th e d lit ·~ cured by uch mortgage or li en; to subject t o ale real
proper ty upou demand again t <leced nts'
e tate , wh en uch property has passed to
heir. , devi. ees, or their a sig n ; to marshal a sets; and to substitu te ouc p r ou
to the right of another ; aud all othe r
causes of action ari sin g out of a contract
or a duty, and not fallin g with in either of
th e fo regoing classes. B ut ·au es of acti on so joined mu st affect all the parties to
the action, a nd uot require diffe rent place.
of tri al, and mu t be eparately stated and
num bered." Burns' St. , 1901, § 279.
I owa . "Cau e of action of whatever
kind , where eac h may be prosecuted by
the same kind of proceedi11gs, if held by
the same party, an l against the same
p~rty, in the same r ights, and if action
on all may be Lrought and tried iu that
county. may be joined in the same petiti on ; but the court may direct all or any
portion of the is. ues joined to be tried
separately, a nd may determine the order
thereof." Code, I 97, § 3545.
Kan sas. T he enum eration of classes
is identical with that g iven in the text,
followed by this clanse: " Bu t the cau es
of action so united mu. t all belong to one
of th ese classes, and must affect all th e
parties to th e acti on, except in a ctions to
enforce mortg age or other liens." Code,
§ 83, Gen . St., 1901, § 4517.
Kentucky. Identi cal , with very slight
verLal changes, with the Arkan sa statute,
exclusive of subdivision 7. Code, 1895,
§ 3.
Minn esota. Id enti cal with the proviion of the t ext, except th at, in the second
paragra ph, the words " except in acti ons
for the for eclosure of mor tgages " are
omitted. St., 1894, § 5260. Third parag raph wanting.
Missouri. Th e enumerati on of cla. ses
is id entical with that g iven in the t ext
except t he seven th cla s, wh ich i a foll ows: "Claims by or aaaiust a party in
. ome representative or fiduciary eapacit~·.
by virtue of a contract or hy operatiou of

law," followed Ly thi. c:lause: "But th
can e of action o united must all Lelo11g
to oue of the ·e cla. sc., arnl must affect all
t lie parties to the a tion, and not requir
d ifferent plac s of trial, and mu t be eparately stated, with the relief ought for
each cause of action, in . uch manner that
they may Le iutelliai bly distingui bed."
R e v. St., 1899, § 593 .
J.lontmw. I dentical with the pro,·ision · of the Cali fornia ocle without the
portions ad<led by the Commil" ion rs'
Amend ment of 1901, except that the ~cc
onil paragraph read~ as follow· : " The
cau es of acti on so united mu t all appear
on the fare of the complaint to belong,"
et c., the remainder being identical ·with
the Californ ia provi ion.
Co<le, 1 95,
§ 672.
Nebraslca. Theenumeratiou of classe
is identical with that giYen in the text,
except that the order of classes 5 and 6
i · r eversed, the euumeration ueiug followed by this claui:;e : "The e:rn:;e of a<'tion o un ited, must affect all the parties
to the action, aud not require different
places of trial." Code, 1901, §~Bi, 88.
Nerad a. Identical with the provi ion.
of the Californ ia Code, without the portions added by the Commissioner 'Amendm ent of 180 1, with ver_v slight verbal
changes. Comp. L a w , 1900, § 3159.
New York . " T he plaintiff may unite,
in the sa me co mplain t, t v\'O or more cau es
of acti on, wheth er t hey are uch as were
fo rm erly denomi nated legal or equ itable,
or both, wh ere they are brought to recoYer
as follo ws : ( l) Upon contract, ex pre s 01·
implied; (2) For personal in ju ri i:;, e.·cept li bel, slander, cri minal conver atiou,
or sed uction ; (3) For libel or sla nder;
(4) For inj uries to real pr operty; (5)
R eal proper ty, in ejec tment, wit h or wi th out damage fo r the withho lding t hereof;
(6) F or injuries to per onal property;
(7 ) Chattels, with or with out damages
fo r the taking or detention t hereof; ( )
Upon claims again ta tru tee, by virtue
of a contract, or by operation of law; (9)
Upon claim ari. ing out of the ~amc trau action, or transaction connectecl with the
ame uLject of action , and not iu ·lp icu

en IL
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vague clause permitting the union of causes of action arising out

of the same transaction, or transactions connected with the same

vagu clau e permitting he uni n of cause of action ari ing out
f h

, m tran action, r tran action c nnect

with th

am

witliiu oue of the foregoiug subdivisions

of tills section; (10) For penalties in-

curred under the fisheries, game and forest

laws. But it must appear, upon the face

of tlie complaint, that all the causes of ac-

tion, so united, belong to one of the fore-

going subdivisions of this section ; tliat

they are consistent with each other; and,

except as otlierwise ])rpscril)ed by lavr,

that they affect all the parties to the ac-

tion ; and it must appear upon the face of

the complaint, that they do not require

different places of trial." Code Civ. Pro.,

§ 484, as amended Laws, 1877, c. 416, and

Laws, 1900, c. 590.

North Carolina. Identical with tlie
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provisions given in the text. § 126.

North Dakota. Identical with the pro-

visions given in the text, except that tlie

words "or waste committed tliereon" are

added to the fifth subdivision. Rev. Codes,

1899, §5291.

Ohio. " The plaintiff may unite several

causes of action in the same ))etition,

whether they are such as have heretofore

been denominated legal or eiiuitable, or

both, when they are included in either of

the following cla.^ses : ( 1 ) The same trans-

action ; (2) Transactions connected with

the same subject of action ; (3) Contracts,

e.xpress or implied; (4) Injuries to person

and property, or to either ; (5) Injuries to

character; (6) Claims to recover tlie pos-

session of personal property, with or with-

out damages for the withholding tliereof ;

(7) Claims to recover real property, with

or without damages for the withholding

thereof, tlie rents and jn-ofits of the same,

and the partition thereof; (&) Claims to

foreclose a mortgage given to secure the

payment of money or to enforce a specific

lien for money, and to recover a personal

judgment for the debt secured by such

mortgage or lien ; (9) Claims against a

trustee, by virtue of a contract, or by

operation of law." Bates' St., 1 90.3, § 5058.

Oklahoma. The enumeration of classes

is identical with that of the text, except

that the order of classes 5 and 6 is

reversed, and the enumeration is followed

by this clause : " But the causes of action

80 united must all l)elong to one of these

cl.isses, and mu.st affect all tlie jiartics to

tlie action, except in actions to enforce

mortgages or other liens." St., 1893,

§3961.

Oregon. "The i)laiutiff may unite sev-

eral cau.ses of action in the same complaint

wlien they all arise out of — ( 1 ) Contract,

express or implied ; (2) Injuries, with or

without force, to the person; (3) Injuries,

with or witiiout force, to property ; (4)

Injuries to character; (5) Claims to

recover real property, with or witiiout

damages for tiie witliholdiiig thereof; (6)

Claims to recover personal property, with

within one of the for going nb!li\·i. i n
of thi ~ ·ection ; (I 0) For p nalti · incurre1l untler the fi heri s, .,.ame am! fore t
law . BuL it mu t appear, upou the face
uf the complaint, that all the cuu ·e- of acti on, o united b long to one of the foregoing ubdi,·i i n of thi
ti n: that
they are on. i:tent with ach other; and,
e.-cept a otherwi ·e pre. ribed by law,
that they alf ct all the partie to the action ; and it mu t a1 pear upon the face of
the complaint, that they do uot r quire
diff rent place- of trial."
ode Ci"' Pro.,
4 4 , a amended Law , l i7, c. 416, and
L aw , 1 900, c. 590.
orth Carolina. Identical with t he
provi ion gi ,·en in the text. § 12 6.
North Dakota. Identical with the provi ion, given in the text, except that the
word "or wa:te ommitted thereon" are
added to the fifth ubdivi ion. R ev. ode ,
i 99, s5291.

Ohio. "The plaintiff may unite everal
cau e of actiou in the ame petition,
wh ther they are uch a have heretofore
been denomiuat d legal or cqnit:tble, or
both, when they are inclurlecl in either of
th following claii e : ( 1 ) The a me transaction; (2) Tran ·action connected with
the ame ubject of action: (3) ontrnct ,
expre · or impli ed; (4) Injuri s to person
ant! property, or to ith r; C) Injurie t
charc cter; (6
laim to recover the po:-e ion of per onal property, with or with·
out damag for the wi thhol<lin g th reof;
(i) )aim to reco,·er r al property, with
or without damage for the withholding
thereof, the rent and profit of the :;a,me,
and the partition ther of; ( -) laim · to
forecl1 ea mortgnge cri1· n to . ccure the
paym ut f moo y or to nforce a pecifi
lien for money, and to reco'' r a per onal
judO'meut for the debt ecured by uch
mortgaO' or lien; (9) laim. again t a
tru t , by YirLue of a contra t, or hy
op ratiou flaw ." Bate:'. t., 1903, § 505 .
O/..;/ulioma . The enumeration of ·la·.
i id ntical with that of the text, x ept
that he order f la e 5 and 6 i
rever e<l, and th enum ration i followed
by thi Jan. e: "But the ·au ' of a ·tion
o united mu:t all h long to o of th" e
la · , and rnu t aff •ct . II th parti . to

the action, except in a tion
mortgage or othcl' li n ."
!.\

to enfo rce
't., 1 93,

3961.
Oregon.

"The plaintiff may uuite ,._
ral cau. e of action in the ame omplai1Jt
when they all ari e out of - ( l) onLract,
xpre . or impli d; (:2) Injurie , with or
without forr , to the p r 011; (3) Iojurie ,
with r without for ·e, to propert.Y; (4)
Injuri
to haraeter; (5)
la.im' to
recover real prop rty, with or with ut
damages for the with hol Ii 11g Lher of; (6)
Iaim to rec 1·er µer on al prop rt), with
or without damage for the withholding
thereof; (7) laim again t a tru tee, by
virtue f a cont ra t or by operation f
law. But the cau e of action o unit d
mu t all belong to one only of the e
cla e , and mu t affect all th partie to
the action, and not require different pla es
of t rial, and mu t be epa.rately tated."
Hill' Law , § 93.
'outh
arolina. I d ntical in all repect with all three parag raph given in
the text.
ode, 1 93 , § I
outh Dakota. Iden t ical in all regiv n

cla

wanting.

ev.
of
of

r
l'<'I'

r'erl, the num rati on b iog follow cl
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subject of action. In a few States these peculiar features are

wanting ; while the other classes of causes of action which may-

be joined are substantially the same as provided in the arrange-

ment already given. This is the case in Kentucky, in Oregon,

and in California.^ It should be remembered that in Kentucky

and in Oregon [also in Iowa and Arkansas] a slight distinction

between legal and equitable proceedings is preserved ; and this

fact, doubtless, accounts for the form of the pi'o vision in the codes

of those States. No such distinction remains in California, and,

as has been seen in a former chapter, legal and equitable causes

of action may be united, according to the established procedure in

that State, notwithstanding the omission in the clause expressly

regulating such joinder.

§ 334. * 440. Departures from Original Type. In other States,

the original type set forth in the New York code has been widely

departed from. Thus, in Indiana, an attempt is made to enumer-

ate and arrange the particular classes of equitable as well as legal

causes of action which may be joined. In Iowa the departure

from the common type and the changes of the common law are
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much wider, and more radical. The code of that State, as do the

codes of Kentucky and of Oregon, retains some slight separation

between legal and equitable actions, but permits all possible

actions that are legal, or all that are equitable, to be united in one

petition. The only requirement in reference to their nature is,

that all causes of action so united must be in the same kind of

proceedings ; that is, all legal, or all equitable.

§ 335. *441. Scope and Meaning of Statutory Provisions.

Difficulties of Interpretation. These various statutory provisions

will be examined, and the judicial interpretation put upon them

will be ascertained, in a subsequent portion of the present section.

Their general scope and meaning, however, are very plain. Ex-

cepting in Iowa, a plaintiff may unite different causes of action in

the one complaint or petition, under the following restrictions :

They must affect all the parties ; they must all be triable in the

same county ; and they must all belong to one of the various

specified classes. The result is, that all the causes of action so

l)y this section, " The causes of action so mortgage foreclosures in some respects

united must not require different places of similar to tliat given ia the text. llev.

trial, and, except as otherwise provided, St., 1899, §§ 3493, 3494, 3495. ;]

must affect all the parties to the action." ^ [^Lanib u. Harbaugh (1895), 105 Cal.

Following this is a section relative to 680, 39 Pac. 56. J

29

"'ubj ct of action. In a f w tates the ·e peculiar features are
wanting; while the other cla e of cau e of action which may
be joined are substantially the am a. provic.l cl in the arrangement already given. This i the case in Kentucky, in r gon,
anc.l in California. 1 It h ul l be rememberecl that in Kentucky
and in Oregon [al o in Iowa. and Arkansa J a sli;ht di tin tion
b tw en l gal and equitabl proceecling$ i' pr s rvecl; and this
fact, doubtless, accounts for the form of the provi ion in the codes
of tho e States. No such distinction remains in California, and,
as has been seen in a former chapter, legal ancl equitable cau es
Df action may be unitecl, according to the established procedure in
that State, notwithstanding the omission in the clau. e expres ly
regulating such joinder.
§ 334. * 4-!0. Departures fr o m O riginal T ype. In other State '
the original type set forth in the New York cocle has been widely
Q.eparted from . Thus, in Indiana, an attempt i made to enumerate and arrange the particular classes of equitable as well as legal
causes of action which ma.y be joined. In Iowa the departure
from the common type and the changes of the commo~1 law are
much wider, and more radical. The code of that State, as do the
code of Kentucky and of Oregon, retains some slight separation
between legal and equitable actions, but permits all posi;;ible
actions that are legal, or all that are equitable, to be united in one
petition. T he only requi rement in reference to their nature .i~
that all causes of action so united must be in the same kind of
proceedings; that is, all legal, or all equitable.
§ 335. * 441. Scope a n d Meaning o f Statutory Provisions .
D iffi c u lties of I n terpr etatio n. These various statutory prnvisions
will be examined, and the judicial interpretation put upon them
will be ascertained, in a subsequent portion of the present section.
Their general scope and m aning, however, are very plain. Excepting in Iowa, a plaintiff may unite different causes of action in
the one complaint or petition, under the following re trictions :
They must affect all the partie ; they must all be triable in the
ame county; and they must all belong to one of the various
pecified clas es . The result is, that all the cau es of action o
by this ~ection, "The cam;es of action . o
un ited mu t not require different place of
t rial, and , except as other wise prov iJed,
must a ffect all th e parti es to th e action."
F ollowing this is a section relat ive to

mortgage foreclo ur
in ome re pccts
similar to that gi \'en in the text. Rev.
St., 1899, §§ 3493, 3494, 3495 .J
1 [ Lamb v. Harbaug h ( 1895), 105 Cal.
680, 39 Pac. 56.]
29
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united must be either upon contract, or for injuries to person or

property, and tlie like, unless they all arise out of the same trans-

action, or transactions connected with the same subject of action.

This latter exception does not, as has been seen, prevail in a few

of the States ; but, where it does prevail, the most incongruous

and dissimilar causes of action may be joined, if they arise out

of the same transaction, or transactions connected with the same

subject of the action, within the meaning of that phrase.^ It is

evident that very little difficulty can arise in interpreting and

applying most of the classes. The real doubts and uncertainties

grow out of (1) the confounding the reliefs demanded by the

plaintiff with the cause of action upon which such demand is

based ; and thi.s confusion is more apt to exist in equity causes,

and especially in those where legal relief is prayed for as well as

equitable ; (2) the clause permitting the joinder of causes of

action arising out of the same transaction, etc. " Transaction "

has had no technical legal meaning, and is a word of very vague

import at best; but this vagueness is largely increased b}^ the

additional clause which permits causes of action arising out of
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transactions connected with the same subject of action to be

united. These are the two chief, and almost only, sources of

doubt in the practical construction of the passage in question.

The first one — the liability of confounding the reliefs demanded

with the causes of action — may, of course, be avoided by the

exercise of care and discrimination: the second is much more

embarrassing, and it is hardly possible that all doubt should ever

be removed from the legal meaning of the language.

II. The Forms and Modes in ivJdch a Misjoinder may occur, and

the Manner in lohich it must he objected to and corrected.

§ 336. * 442. Separate Statement of Different Causes of Action.

All of the codes require that the different causes of action

should be separately stated. In other words, each must be set

forth in a separate and distinct division of the complaint or

1 ^Pollock r. Association (1896), 48 further sum for maliciously instituting^

S. C 6.'), 2.5 S. E. 977, (jnoting the text, the injunction proceeding for the purpose

Willey t). Nichols (1898), 18 Wash. 528, .52 of hara.ssing and injuring plaintiffs is

Pac. 237, to the effect that "an action demurrable on the ground of misjoinder

against the principal and sureties upon an of actions, one being based on contract,

injunction bond for the penalty therein the other on tort."]

named and against the princij)al in a

unit cl mu t be either u n contrac r for injuries to per on or
pr I rt · and the like unle the all ari e ut f the am ran a i n, r tran a tion~ connect d wi h 1 e ame ubject f ac ion.
bi l<t r ex pti n doe not, a ha b en e n pre ail in a few
revail th m t incongruou
of th , ' at · bu where i doe
of c ion ma b join l if th ari e out
ame rau a ti n, or tran action onn
with the ame
ubj ct f the acti n within he m nin of ha.t phra e. 1 I t i
vil nt that
lit le difficul y an ari e in interpre ing and
applyin mo t of the cla e . The r al loub and unc r ainti
row u t of (1) he confounding the relief d ,mand d by the
plaintiff with the au
of action upon whi h such d mand i
au e
ba el· and thi confu ion i more apt to exi t in equi
and pecially in tho e wher legal reli f i prayed for a well a
he j inder of cau
of
equitabl · (2) the clau e permittin
'Tran action
action ari ing out of the ame tran action etc.
ha had n technical legal meaning and i a word of v r; ague
imp rt at be t · but thi vaguene i largely in rea d b ' th
addi ional clau e which permit cau e of action ar· in
ut of
tran actions connected with the ame subje of action t b
unit cl. The e are the wo chief, and almo t only, our e of
loubt in the prac ical con tructi n of the pa age in que tion.
The fir tone - the liability of confounding the relief demanded
with the cau e of action - may of ourse be avoi ed by the
exerci.
f care and di crimination : the econd i much mor
embarra ing an lit is hardly po ible that all d ubt should ev r
be reruo eel from the 1 gal m aning of the language.

II. The Forms and Mode in which a ll!li :Joind r may occur and
the M anner in which it must be ob;'ected to and corrected.
336.

* 442.

Separate Statement of Different Causes o f A ction.

11 f the co
require that h
iff r nt au e f action
r word , ach mu t b set
. h uld be :epara ly tat cl. In
forth in a , para e an li inct li i 10n f th c mplaint or
1
••

[ P ollock v.
J.

6!'>, 25

Willey

r

. E. 9i7 , q noting t h <> t .·t.

~'iC'hol

( 1 9 ), I W ah. 52 , 5:..

l'ac. 23 i , to h
ff ·t tha t ' an arcio n
a"ain t the principal and nr eti upon an
injuuction bond fo r th p nalty th r in
am e<l a nd ag ain st t he prin ipal in a

fur t h<' r nm f r mali ciou ly in tituting
th in jnn ction proC"e <ling f r the purpo. e
f har ing au rl injurin g
laintiff. i
cl murralile on the g round of mi joitJder
of a t ion ·, 011 h ioo- ba ed on contra t,
the oth er on tort."]
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potiiion, in sncli a manner that each of these divisions might,

if taken alone, be the substance of an independent action. In

fact, the whole proceeding is the combining of several actions into

one. At the common law, these separate divisions of the declara-

tion were termed " counts ; " and that word is still used by t€xt-

writers and judges, although, with one or two exceptions, it is

not authorized by the codes ; and it tends to produce confusion

and misapprehension, since the common-law "count" was sub-

stantially a very different thing from the " cause of action " of

the new procedure. In one or two States, the term " paragraph "

is used to designate these primary divisions. The difificulty in the

use of this term is that it is now very generally used in England,

and in most of the States where the reformed system prevails, to

designate the short sub-divisions, or allegp.tions, of facts into which

each cause of action is separated, according to a mode of plead-

ing which has become very common. Tlie term " cause of action"

is perhaps as proper as any which can be used for the purpose.

That such a separation should be made, and that each distinct

cause of action should be stated in a single and independent divi-
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sion, so that the defendant may answer or demur to it without

any confusion with otliers, is plainly indispensable to an orderly

system of pleading, and is expressly required by all the codes ; ^

and in some of the States the courts have strictly enforced the

requirement, and liave thereby done much to prevent the formal

presentations of the issues to be tried from falling into that con-

fused and bungling condition which exists to so great an extent

in certain of the States.

§ 337. * 443. How Question of Misjoinder of Causes of Action

is raised. Effect of Sustaining Demurrer upon this Ground.

The special provisions respecting the manner of raising an

objection to a misjoinder of causes of action, and the effect there-

of, are as follows : In all the codes but two, it is prescribed

that the defendant may demur to the complaint, or petition, if it

shall appear on the face thereof that several causes of action have

been improperly united ; that, if the error does not so appear, the

objection may be taken by the answer; and that, if not taken

in either of these modes, it is waived.^ The sustaining of a de-

1 I^Maisenbacker v. Society Concordia are identical with those which regulate

(1899), 71 Conn. 369, 42 Atl. 67.3 t'le method of objecting to a defect of

2 See these provisions, collected in the parties ; and tlic decisions already cited

text or notes, sicpra, § *43.3. These rules (§§ *206, *207, *287), of course, apply to

petition, in . nch a m~nner that ea.ch of these clivi ·ions might,
if fa.ken alone, be the sub tance of an independent action. In
fact, the whole proceedin 0 i the combining of several actions into
one. At the common law, these separate divi. ions of the declaration were termed " counts; " and that word is still u ed by textwri ters and judges, although, with one or two exception , it is
not authorized by the codes; and it tends to produce confusion
and mi apprehension, since the common-law "count" w;; subtantially a very different thing from the "cause of action" of
the new procedure. In one or two States, the term "paragraph "
is used to designate these primary divisions. The difficulty in the
u e of this term is that it is now very generally used in England,
and in most of the States where the reformed system prevail ', to
designate t he short sub-divisions, or allev~tions, of facts into which
each cause of a.ction is separated, according to a mode of pleading which has become very common. The term" cause of action"
is perhaps as proper as any which can be used for the purpose.
That such a separation should be made, and that each distinct
cause of action shou1d be sta,tecl in a single and independent division, so that the defendant may answer or demur to it without
any confusion with others, is plainly indispensable to an orderly
system of pleading, and is expressly required by all the codes; 1
and in some of the States the courts have strictly enforced the
requirement, and have thereby done much to prevent the formal
presentations of the issues to be tried from falling into that confused and bungling condition which exists to so great an extent
in certain of the States.
§ 337. * 443. H o w Q u e s t i o n o f M isj o ind er o f Causes of Action
is

raise d .

E ffe ct of Sustaining

Demurrer

upon

this

G roun d.

The special provisions respecting the manner of raising an
objection to a misjoinder of causes of action, and the effect thereof, are as follows: In all the codes but two, it is prescribed
that the defendant may demur to the complaint, or petition, if it
shall appear on the face thereof that several causes of action have
Leen improperly united ; that, if the error doe · not so appear, the
objection may be taken by the answer; and that, if not taken
in either of these modes, it is waived. 2 The su taining of a de1 [ Mai enbacker v. Soci ety Concordia
are identical with tho e which regulate
(1899), 71 Conn. 369, 42 Atl. 67.J
the method of objecting to a defect of
2 See these provisions, collected in the
parties; ?-Dd the decisions already cited
text or notes, supra, § *433. These rules (§§ *206, *207, *2 7), of course, apply to
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raurrer upon this ground is not fatal to the action in all the

States. Several codes contain the very just provision, that,

when such a demurrer is sustained, the court may simply order

the action to be divided into as many as may be necessary for the

proper hearing and determination of the causes of action set forth

in the original pleading.^ The plaintiff is thus not thrown out

of court in respect of any of the causes of action alleged by liim ;

he is merely required to separate the single cause into the number

of independent suits which he should have originally brought.^

§ 338. * 444. ESect of Misjoinder iu soma States. In one or

two States a misjoinder is attended with even less serious con-

sequences than this, the sole object of the statutorj^ provision on

the subject being to secure a trial of each cause of action before

the proper tribunal. In Iowa there can be no misjoinder, prop-

erly so called, except by uniting a legal and an equitable cause of

action. Still, if two legal causes are so utterly incongruous as to

prevent a trial of them together, the court may order them to be

tried separately. The clauses of the Iowa code are found in the
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foot-note.^ The provisions of the Kentucky code, in reference to

the present subject-matter. If the, objec-

tion appears on the face of the pleading, it

must be raised by demurrer, and not by an-

swer ; and this is substantially the same

as saying that it must always be raised

by demurrer, because the misjoinder will

ahvai/s appear on tiie face of the jjleading.

See James v. Wilder, 25 Minn. .305 ; Mead

V. Brown, 65 Mo. 552 ; Finley v. Ha\'es,

mun er upon this groun l i.· not fatal to the ac ion in all the
tate~.
. 'ezerJ.l code contain the v ry ju t provi ion, that,
tL ined, he court may imply ord r
when uch a demurrer i
th action to be d.ivi ed into a many a:-.; may be nece ,, ry f r he
proper hearin0 and letermination of the cau ·e of action set orth
in the original pleadiug.1 The plaintiff is bu" not tbrown out
of court in respect of any of the cau es of action alleged by him·
he i merely r quir cl to parate the single cau e into the n u m b~r
of independent uit · which he hould have originally bro ugh t.2
338. * 4-!-1. E fiec t o f M isjoinder i u som 3 S t ates. In one or
o t te · a mi joinder i' attended with e en le s seri u conequeuce than thi , the ole object of the tatutory pro i ·ion n
the ubject being to ecure a trial of each can "e of action b fore
the pr per tribunal. I n Iowa there can be no misjo inder properl ·
called except by uniting a leg· 1 and an equitable a e f
action.
till, if two legal cau e are so utterly incon ruou · as t
prevent a trial of hem toge her, the court may order them to be
tried eparately. The clause of the Iowa code are fo und in the
foot-note. 3 The provi ions of the Kentucky code, in reference to
1

81 N. C. 363; Boon v. Carter, 19 Kans.

135; Keller v. Boatman, 49 Ind. 104;

Rankin v. Collins, 50 id. 153; Hardy v.

Miller, 11 Neb. 395.

(^Gardner v. Gardner (1896), 23 Nev.

207, 45 Pac. 139 ; Smith v. Putnam (1900),

107 Wis. 155, 82 N. W. 1077; Porter r.

Sherman County Banking Co (1893), 36

Neb. 271, 54 N. W. 424 ; Beale /•. Baniett's

Ad'm (1901), Ky.. 64 S. W. 833 ; Murray

>'. Booker (1900). Ky., .58 S. W. 788; Sick-

man V. WoUett (190.3), — Colo. — , 71 Pac.

1107; Koss r. Wait (1894). 4 S. 1). 584,

57 N. W. 497 ; Corbett v. Wreun (1894),

25 Ore. 305, 35 Pac. 658.]

1 QOhio, Bates' St., 1900, § 5065; Wis-

consin. St.. Ift98, § 2686; North Carolina,

Code. § 272;] New York, § 172 (497);

Nebraska, § 97 ; Kansas, § 92 ; South Car-

olina, § 195. See Alexander r. Thacker,

30 Neb. 614.

- I^Solomon v. Bates (1896), 118 N. C.

311, 24 S. E. 746: Where a demurrer

for rai.sjoinder of causes is well founded,

the action should not be dismissed but

simply divided (Code, § 272). But where

there is a misjoinder botii of cau.ses and

parties, tlie action cannot be divided under

this section of the code : Cromartie i*.

Parker (1897), 121 N. C. 198, 28 S. E.

297 ; Mortou r. Western Union Tel. Co.

(1902), 1.30 N. C. 299, 41 S. E. 484. See

also .Matthews v. Bank (1901), 60 S. C.

183, 38 S. E. 437; Weeks v. McPhail

(1901), 128 N. C. 134, 38 S. E. 292.

Gattis V. Kilgo (1S99), 125 N. C. 13.3,

34 S. E. 246 : Where a demurrer is sus-

tained on the ground of misjoinder of

causes of action, it i.s within the discretion

of the judge to allow an amendment, and

the pre ent abject-matter. If the, objection appear on the face of the pleading, it
mu t be rai ed by demurrer, and not by an wer · and thi i ub tantially the ame
as aying that it mu t alway be rai ed
by demurrer, becau e the mi joinder will
alwar appear on the face of the pleading.
ee Jame v. Wilder, 25 ! inn. 305; Mead
v. Brown, 65 Mo. 552 ; Finley v. H:iye ,
l X
. 36 ; Boon v. Carter, 19 Kan .
135 ; Keller v. Boatman, 49 Ind. 10-!;
ankin v. Collin , 50 id. 15 ; Hardy v.
Miller, 11 Neb. 395.
[ ardner v.
ardner ( l 96), 23 .1: ev.
20i, 45 Pac. 139; mitl v. Putnam (1900),
107 \Vi . 15~, 2 N. W. 1077; Porter v.
'herman ounty Banking o (1 93), 36
. . Tell. :271, 54 X. \\ . 424; Beale 1•. Baruett'
Ad'rn (1901), Ky., 64 ..' . W . .'3 ; i\lurray
••. Buriker (1900) Ky., 5 , '. W . i
· , ickman v. \Vull••tt (1903}. - Colo.-, 71 Pac.
1 lOi J{.,. '" \V, it (1 4 ), 4 .'. D . 5 4,
57 • ' W. 4!>7; l'orbett 11. \Vreun {l 4),
25 < >rP.. 305, 35 Pac. 65 .]
l [Ohi.J, Bate'. t, 19 0,
5065; Wi con in, . t., 1
. § 26 6; • 'orth arolina,
~or!,§ 272 ;] .lTew York,§ 17 2 (4.i);
.. ebr ka, § 97; Kan 3.8, § 92; outh a r-

olina, § 195.
ee Alexander t>. T hacker,
eb. 6 14.
2 [
olomon v. Bate (l 96), 11 ... C.
3 11 , 24 '. E . 746: \Vbere a demu rrer
fo r mi. joinder of cau e i well founded,
the action hould not be di mi erl bu t
imply divided (Code, § 272). But wh re
there i a mi;;joiuder both of cau:e and
partie , the action cannot be divide1l und r
thi
ection of the code : Cr<>martie t'.
Parker (I i), 121 ..... C. 19 , 2 :. E .
297 ; Morton v. \V tern
(1902), 130 . . 299, 41 . E. ,i 4. , ee
al o Matthew r. Bank ( 190 l ), 60 , .
1 3, 3
. E. 437 · Week u. IcPhail
(1901), 128 .1."'. . 13+, 3
'. E. 292.
Gatti v. Kilgo (l 99), 125
. 133,
34 . E. 246: Wher a demurr r i u tained on the ground f mi joiuder of
cau · of action, it i: within th di crelion
of the judo- to allow au am ndm nt, ancl
if :uch am ndment i not mad it become
the d11ty of the judge to <li\'ide the act ion
on th d ck t for eparat tr ial .]
8 [Towa,
ode of l 97, § 35.J.G: "Tho
plaintiff may· at any timP. hefor t 11. :inn!
~uhmis ion of he a. e t< the j11rr ur to
t he c ur when the trial i · l1y the cou rt,
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the remedy for a misjoinder, are similar to those of lowa.^ The

practice in Indiana differs from that which prevails in the States

generally, and also from that established in Iowa. A demurrer

for misjoinder is permitted ; but its effect can never be fatal to

the action. In fact, the matter seems to be practically left in the

discretion of the lower or trial court, and any disposition of the

objection to a misjoinder made by it cannot be assigned as error

so as to reverse a judgment on review. The sections of the

Indiana code are quoted in the note.^

strike from his petition any cause of ac-

tion or part thereof." § 3547 : " The

court, at any time before the answer is

the remedy for a mi joincl r, a.re similar to tho e of Iowa.1 The
practice in Indiana differs from that which prevails in the ~ tates
generally, and al o from that e tablished in Iowa. A demurrer
for mi joinder is permitted; but it effect can never be fatal to
th action. In fact, the matter eems to be practically left in the
cli cretion of the lower or trial court, and any di ·po ·ition of the
objection to a misjoinder made by it cannot b a ·igned as error
o a to reverse a judgment on review. The section of the
Indiana code are quoted in the note. 2

filed, upon motion of the defendant, shall

strike out of the petition any cause or

causes of action improperly joined with

others." § 3548 : " All objectious to the

misjoinder of causes of action shall be

waived, unless made as provided in the
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last preceding section." § 3549 : " When

a motion is sustained on the ground of

misjoinder of causes of action, the court,

on motion of the plaintiff, sliall allow him,

with or without costs, in his discretion, to

file several petitions, each including such

of said causes of action as may be joined,

and an action shall be docketed for each

of said petitions, and the causes shall he

proceeded in without further service, the

court fixing by order the time of pleading

therein."]]

Tliis mode of procedure is simple, and

eminently just, and sweeps away a mass

of technical defences which .still disfigure

the pure ideal of the American system in

many States. For a construction of these

provisions, see Hinkle v. Davenport, 38

Iowa, 355, 358 ; Cobb t: 111. Cent. R. Co.,

33 Iowa, 60!, 016; Grant v. McCarty, 38

Iowa, 468.

£Bai see McDonald v. Second Nat.

Bank (1898), 106 la. 517, 76 N. W. 1011,

where it was held that under Code, § 3545,

providing that " Causes of action of what-

ever kind, ... if action on all may be

brought and tried in that county, may be

joined in the same petition," there is a

misjoinder of causes of action when fore-

closure is sought in one petition of mort-

gages on two different pieces of land,

securing the same debt, one piece of land

being in the county of venue and the

other in another county. See also Wedge-

wood V. Parr (1900), 112 la. 514, 84 X. W.

528, where it was held that where a peti-

tion claimed judgment on a note with in-

terest and possession of wlieat, tliere was

a misjoinder of causes under the Code,

§ 4164, providing that, in actions of re-

plevin, there could be no joinder of any

cause of action not of tlie .same kind]

1 [^Kentucky, Code, §§ 84, 85, 86 ;]

Sale V. Critchfield, 8 Bu.sh, 636, 646. The

defendant must move before answer that

plaintiff elect between the causes of ac-

tion, and strike out the others ; if no .such

motion is made, tlie objection is waived.

Tiie same rule prevails as to tiie misjoin-

der of parties, which is never ground of

strike from bis petition any en.use of action or part thereof." § 354 7 : "The
court, at any time before the answer i
filecl, upon motion of the defendant , shall
strike out 0£ the petition any cau e or
ea,u ·~ of action improperly join ed with
others." § 3548 : " All obj ectious to the
mi.'joinder of causes of action shall be
waived, unle,s made as provided in the
last preceding section." § 3549: " \Vh en
a motion is sustained on the ground of
misjoinder of causes of action, the court,
on motion of the plaintiff, shall allow him,
with or without costs, in his discretion, to
file several petitions, each i nclu ding such
of aid causes of action as may be joined,
a111l an action shall be docketed for each
of aid petitions, and the causes shall he
proceeded in without further servi ce, the
C'uurt fixing by order the time of pleading
therein."]
Thi mode 0£ procedure is simple, and
emimmtly just, and sweeps away a mass
of t ec hni cal defenees whi ch still disfigure
the pure ideal of the American system in
many States. F or a construction of these
prol'isions, see Hinkle v. Davenport, 38
lowa, .355, 358 ; Cobb c. Ill. Cent. R. Co.,
:; ' Iowa, 60l, 616; Grant v. McCarty, 38
I wa, 4-68.
[But see McDonald v. Second Nat.
Bank (1 98), 106 Ia. 517, 76 N. W. 1011,
where it was held that under Code, § 3545,
pro,·iding that "Causes of action of whateYer kind, . . . if action on all may be
brought and tried in that count.''• may be
joined in the same petition," there i. a
misjoiuder of causes of action when foreclosure is sought in one petition 0£ mortgage- on two different pieces of land,
securing the same debt, one piece of land
being in the county of venue and the
other in another county. See also \Vedge-

wood v. Parr (1900), 112 Ia. 514, 84 :::\. W.
528, where it was held that where a petition claimed jndgment on a. note with interest and posses ion 0£ wheat, there was
a misjoinder of cau es un der the Code,
§ 4164, proYiding that, in actions of reple,·in, there could be no joinder of any
cause of aetion not of the same kind.]
1 [ Kentucky, Code, §§ 84, 85, 86 ;]
Sale v. Critchfield, 8 Bu h, 636, 646. The
defendant must move before answer that
plaintiff elect between the causes of action, aud strike out the others; if no such
motion is made, the objection i waived.
The same rule prevails as to the misjoinder of parties, which is never ground of
demurrer; defendant must moYe to strike
out the improper parties, or else waive all
objection. Dean v. Engli h, l B. Mon.
132; Yeates v. Walker, 1 Duv. 84.
2 [Burns' Indiana St., 1901, § 342.J
"The defoudant may demur to the complaint when it appears upon the face
thereof, . .. 6th, that several cau e of
action haYe been improperly joined.
§ 3-t.3. Wh en a demurrer is sustained on
the ground of Se\·eral causes of action
being improperly joined in the .ame complaint, the court shall order the misjoiuder
to be noted on the order-book, aml cause
as many separate actions to .be docketed
between the parties a th ere are causes
decided by the court to be improperly
jointd, and each shall stand a a eparate
action, and the plaintiff shall thereupon
file a separate complaint in each of the
above ca es, to which the defendant .hall
enter his appearance and plead antl go to
trial, or suffer a default, in the same manner as in the original action. § 34'!. No
judgment • hall ever be reversed for any
error committ d in sustaining or oYcrruling a demurrer for mi joinder of causes
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§ 339. * 445. Motion by Adverse Party Requiring Correction of

Pleading. There is another section found in all the codes,

which has an important bearing upon the suljject under con-

sideration in some of its aspects, — that which permits the cor-

rection of pleadings at the instance of the adverse party on his

motion by striking out irrelevant and redundant matter, and by

requiring the pleading to be made more definite and certain by

amendment where its allegations are so indefinite and uncertain

that the precise nature of the charge or defence is not apparent.^

§ 340. *446. Possible Forms of Misjoinder. Three forms or

modes of alleged misjoinder are possible, and tliey must be ex-

amined separately in respect to the manner in which the objection

thereto should be taken. They are, (1) When different causes

of action which may properly be united are alleged in the one

complaint or petition not distinctly and separately as required by

the statute, but combined and mingled together in a single state-

ment. (2) When different causes of action which cannot prop-

erly be united are alleged in the one complaint or petition, and

are separately and distinctly stated. (3) When different causes
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of action which cannot properly be united are alleged in the one

complaint or petition not distinctly and separately, but combined

and mingled together in a single statement.^ These three cases

will be examined in order.

§ 341. * 447. First Form of Misjoinder not Ground of Demurrer.

Remedy is by Motion. Although the sections of the codes, de-

fining what causes of action may be united, all require in posi-

tive terms that when so joined each must be separately stilted,^ it

is settled by the weight of authority, and seems to be the gen-

eral rule, that a violation of this particular requirement is not a

ground of demurrer. This conclusion is based upon the language

of action." "§ 346. Where any of the 44 Ind. 22.3, 227, that no objection can be

matters enumerated in § [342] do not rai.sed on appeal,

appear on the face of the complaint, the ' See supra, § *434.

objection (except for misjoinder of causes) - QLewis v. Hinson (1902), 64 S. C. .571,

may be taken by answer." It is plain 43 S. E. 15 (quoting the tcxt).^

from the foregoing tliat the practical " [^Xot so in Connecticut. See Knap[)

effect of a siicce.ssful demurrer is trivial, r. Walker (1900), 7-3 Conn. 459,47 Atl. 6.5.'>.

It compels the separation of the action, And in Ronth Carolina, by the act of

and the trial of two or more suits instead 1898, it is not necessary, in an action er

of one. No discretion is left to the court, delicto, to make use of separate allegations

as in New York, Iowa, and other States ; setting up actual and punitive damages :

the court .s/,nll cau.se tlie separate actions Machen v. Tol. Co. (1902), 63 S. C. 363,

to be docketed. See Clark c. Liueberger, 41 S. E. 448-3

44 -. Motion by Adverse Party Requiring C orrectio n of
Pleading.
Th r i anoth r
ction f und in all the cod
which ha, an im rtant be ring upon tl e ubj ct Lmd r conid I\ tion in ome of i a pect"', - that which I ermit the corr c ion of plea ·n a th in anc of t he adv r par y on hi
m ti n by rikin; out irrelevant and redundant matt r, and by
requirinO' the 1 ing t be mad more definite and - er ain b r
amendment where it all gation are o indefini and UJ1certain
tha the preci "'e nature of the char ·e or d fence is n t apparen .1
340. :4-16 . P ossib l e F orn:i.s o f M isj o inder.
Three form
r
of all ged misjoinder are po ible, and hey mu t be examined eparately in respect to the manner in which th objecti n
ther to hould be taken. They are, (1) When different cau
of , tion wl ich may properly be united are alleged in the ne
complaint or eti ion not di tinctly and separately as required
the tatute, but combined and mingled t ogeth r in a ingle tat ment. (2) When different cau e"' of action which cannot pr p- .
erly be united are alleged in the one complaint or petition, an<l
are ·eparatel and distinctly stated. (3) When different cau
of ac ion which cannot properly be united are alleged in the on
complaint or petition not di tinctly and eparately, but combio cl
and mingled together in a ingle statement.2 These three ca e '
will be examined in order.
339.

341 .

* 44 7.

F irst Form of M isjoinder not Ground of Demurrer .

Although the ection of the code , d fi.nin what cause of action may be unit d, all require in po itive term that wh n o joined ach must be eparately tated,3 it
i. ettled by the w ight of authori y, and seem to be the general rule tha a violation of thi · particular r quir ment · not a
ground of demurrer. Thi ' c nclu ion i ba ed upon the langua ·
Remedy is by Mo tion.

of action." " § 346 . Where any f he
matter
num rat d in § [3 42 ] d no t
appear ou the fa
of tlte complaint. h
obje"ti<1u (except for mi.joiu<ler of eau e )
may be taken IJy au ·wer." It i. plain
frum the foregoing that the pract1eal
<•ffr·et uf a :ncce::ful <I murrrr i · tri,·ial.
It r·urnpeL· the <-paratiou of the action,
a11tl the trial of twu or 111orr• nib iu:tPa.d
o{ ouc. • 'o rliscr ion i }r>ft to th onrt,
a · i 11 • 'r>w York, Iowa, awl othPr . 'tate. ;
the ·rrnrt lucll cau:e th<· :ep:ll'at • ac·tio11 ·
to Le dCJckctetl. ..e;e 'lark c. Liucbcrger,

44 Ind. 223, 227, that no obj ection an b
ra.i ed on app al.
1
ee supra, § 434.
2 [L wi v. Hin ·ou (190:2), 64
43 '. E. 15 (quotiug th text) .]
a [.-ot . o in oun cticut. , ee Knapp
v. Walker(l900\, 7.1 oou. -159 4-i ,\ti. G5.>
And in • outh arolina, 11y h a · of
J 9 , it is not 11 r . al'y, in an aeLi n .r
delirto, to mak tve of parate all ga.tiou
i:;Pttin~ up artnal an<l pun iti v damaire::
'rachen i•. T <'l. 'o. (1902), 63 ·. ,. 3G:3,
41 . E. 44 .]
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of the codes autliorizing a demurrer for the reason that causes of

action " are improperly united in the complaint or petition." ^ It

is said that this expression only points to the case in which

causes of action have been embraced in one pleading which could

not properly be joined ; while in the special case under considera-

tion it is assumed that all the causes of action may be united, and

the only error consists in the external form or manner of their

joinder. The remedy is, therefore, not by a demurrer, but by a

motion to make the pleading more definite and certain by sepa-

rating and distinctly stating the different causes of action.^ The

1 QThis ground for demurrer applies to

the whole complaint, aud not to one of

several paragraphs: (iilleuwaters y. Camp-

bell (1895), 142 Ind. 529, 41 N. E. 1041.]

f the co 1 authorizinO' a demurrer for th rea ·on that cau:e · of
action
re impr perly unitecl in the om1 laint or p titian." 1 IL
is aid that thi · expre si n only point· to th ·a e in whic;h
cau ·e · of action hav b n mbra cl in on pleaclin · which ould
not pr perly be j in cl; ' hil in the p cial ca · uncl r on icl ration it i ' as um d hat all the cau e' f at:tion may be unit cl, ancl
the nly error on i · ' in the external form r mann r of th ir
joinder. The remedy i , therefore, not by a demurrer, but by a
moti n to make the pleading more d finite ancl ertain by ·eparating and di 'tinctly stating the different cau e of action.2 Th

■^ Bass V. Conistock, 38 N. Y. 21 ; 36

How. Pr. 382, and cases cited ; Wood v.

Anthony, 9 How. Pr. 78 ; Hendry v.

Hendry, 32 Ind. 349 ; MulhuUand v. Rapp,
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50 Mo. 42 ; Pickering r. Miss. Valley Nat.

Tel. Co., 47 Mo. 457, 460 ; House v. Lowell,

45 Mo. 381. See Wiles i-. Suydam, 6 N. Y.

Sup. Ct. 292. A different rule formerly

prevailed in Missouri, and it was held that

the error was not only ground for a de-

murrer, but even for a motion in arrest of

judgment after verdict ! McCoy v. Yager,

34 Mo. 134; Clark's Adm. t;. Han. & St.

Jos. R. Co., 36 Mo. 202 ; Hoagland v. Han.

& St. Jos. R. Co., 39 Mo. 451 ; Farmers'

Bank v. Bayliss, 41 Mo. 274, 284, per

Holmes .1. These prior cases, however,

are expressly overruled by the more re-

cent decisions of the same court cited

above. See also Freer v. Denton, 61

N. Y. 492 : Sentinel Co. v. Thomson, 38

Wis. 489 ; Riemer v. Johnke, 37 id. 258 ;

Hardy v. Miller, 11 Neb. 395; but see

Watsou V. San Francisco & H. B. R. Co.,

50 Cal. 523. See, further, Townsend v.

Bogert, 126 N. Y. 370; Ellsworth v.

Rossiter, 46 Kan. 237 ; State v. Tittmann.

103 Mo. 553. The mi.sjoinder is waived

by going to trial without objection : Beers

V. Kuehn (Wis., Jan. 10. 1893), 54 N. W.

Rep. 109. If the plaintiff refuse to sepa-

rate and distinctly state the different

causes of action, it is pi'oper to dismiss

the suit, but without prejudice ; so held

in Eisenhouer v. Stein, 37 Kan. 281.

[^City of St. Louis r. Weitzel (1815),

130 Mo. 600, 31 S. W. 1045; IMarviu ?.-.

Yates (1901), 26 Wash. 50, 66 Pac. 131;

Childs V. Kansas City, etc. R. R. Co. (1893),

117 Mo. 414, 23 S" W. 373; City Carpet

Beating Works v. Jones (1894), 102

Cal. 506, 36 Pac. 841 (citing the te.xt) ;

Cargar v. Fee (1894), 140 Ind. 572,39 N. E.

93; Kearney Stone Works v. McPherson

(1894), 5 Wyo. 178, 38 Pac. 920; Richard.sou

r. Carbon Hill Coal Co. (1895), 10 Wash.

648, 39 Pac. 95 (citing the text) ; A. T. & S.

F. R. R. Co. V. Comm'rs of Sumner Co.

(1893), 51 Kan. 617, 33 Pac. 312 ; Shrigley

V. Black (1898), 59 Kan. 487, 53 P.ac. 477 ;

Fox V. Rogers (1899), 8 Idaho, 710, 59

Pac. 538.

See late case of Lane v. Dowd (1903), 172

Mo. 167, 72 S. W. 632, in which the court

1 [Thi ground for demurrer applies to
the whole complain t, and not to one of
e\·eral paragraph : Gillenwaters u. Campbell (I 95), 1-12 Ind. 529, 41 i .E.10-1-l.]
2 Ba
v. Com tock, 3 N. Y. 21 ; 36
How. Pr. 3 2, and case cited; W ood v.
Anthony, 9 How. Pr. 'i ; Hendry v.
H end ry, 32 Ind. 349; Mulholland u. Rapp,
50 Mo. -1-2 ; Pickering 1•. Mi ·s. Valley at.
Tel. Co., 4 7 Mo . 45 7, 460; House v. Lowell,
45 .\Io. 3 1. ~ee Wiles i· . ' uydam, 6 J . Y.
Sup. Ct. 292. A different rule formerly
prevailed in Mi ·suuri. and it was held that
the error was not only ground for a demurrer, but e,•en for a motion i11 arrest of
judgment aft.er i·erdict !
foCoy v . Yager,
3 4 Mo. 13.J.; Clark's Adm. v. Han. & St.
Jos. R. Co., 36 Mo. 202; Hoagland v. Han.
& St. J os. R. C0., 39 Mo. 451 ; Farmer '
Rank v. Bayli , 41 Mo. 274, 2 4, per
H olme .r. The e prior cases, however,
are expre sly overr uled by the !}lore recent deci ion 1)f the same court cited
above.
ee also Freer v. Denton, 6 1
N. Y. 492; • entinel Co. v. Thom on, 38
Wis. 4 9 ; Ri emer u. .Johnke, 37 id. 25 ;
Hardy ,._ Miller, 11 ~eb. 395; but see
Wat on v. S·t11 Francisco & H. n. R Co.,
50 Cal. 523. . ee, furth er, Town encl v.
Roe;ert, 126
. Y. 370; El!,.;worth 1•.
Ho ·iter, 46 Kan. 23i ; , tate 1'. Tittmr,,nn.
103 ::\Io. 553. The misjuinder i;: wai,·ed
by goin~ to trial withou objection : Rrer;;;
v. Kuehn (\Vi., .Jan. IO, l 93). 54 ~. W.
Rep. 109. If the plaintiff refn e to . eparate and di tinctly tate the different
cau e of action, it i proper to rlismi s
the uit, but without prejudice; so held
1n Ei enhouer ,_._, tein, .37 Kan . 2 l.
[ City of t. Loui. 1· . -nreitzel (I 1)5),
130 fo . 600, 31 S. W. 1045 ; Marviu v.

Yate. (1901}, 26 Wash. 50, 66 Pac. 131;
Child ,._ Kan:a City, etc. R.R. Co . ( 1893),
11 i ;\fo. 41-1-, 2.3 S. W. 3i3; City 'arpet
Beating Works i-. .Jon es (1 94), 10:2
Cal. 506, 36 Pac. +l (citing the text);
Cargar v. Fee (1 9-1-), l-1-0 Ind. 572, 39 X. E.
93; Kearney Stoue Works v. McPher.on
(1894),5 Wy o. l i8, .'3 Pac. 920; Richardson
v. Carbon Hill Coal Co. (l 95), 10 Wash.
648, 39 Pac. 95 (citing the text); A. T. & ,'.
F. R. R. Co. v. Comm'r of Sumner Co.
( 1893), 51 Kan. 61 i, 3.3 Pac. 312 ; , hrip;ley
v. Black (189 ), 59 Kan. 4 7, 53 Pac. 477;
Fox v. Rogers (1 99),
Idah o, i I 0, 59
Pac. 53 .
See late case of Lane v . Dowd (1903) . 17:2
Mo. 167, 72 . W. 632, in which the court
said: "There is a long and unbroken lin e
of decisions drawing the distincti on a to
the method of taking advantage of a defective petition. If there are two cause of
actiou that can he united in one petition,
but are improperly joined in one count,
thi defect is rea he<l by a motion, before
the trial is begun, to elect upon which
cause of action the plaintiff will proeee 1.
If the petition contains two cause of
actiou that are of uch character that th y
cannot legallv be joined in one act ion,
then demurrer is the proper pleading to
reach the irregularity. Thi i what the
ca~es cited h~- app llant hold.
Hence as
there i.;; no dispute on that propoi:;ition, it i<:
unnece sarytofnrther ref rtotho ecm:e .. "
But see. L\ us tin, Tomlin ou, & W b. tC'r
11. C'o. 1-. IIei:;;er (1 , 9.J.}, 6 .... D. 429, fil
N' W. 4-1-:> . t•iting the text; Brewer u. • fcC'ain {l 9:>), 21 Colo. :3 2, 41 Pac. :!:! ;
Jackin" 1-. Dickin. on (I 9.3), 39 . C. 436,
1 i • . E. 99fi; Ponca ~fill Co. v. Mike ell
( l 9 ), 55 I'ch. 9 , i.3 N. W. 46, the court
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plaintiff can thus be compelled to amend his complaint or peti-

tion, and to state each cause of action by itself, so that the

defendant may deal with it by answer or demurrer as the nature

of the case demands. It seems to be the settled rule in Califor-

nia, however, that the defect may properly be taken advantage of

by demurrer.^

§ 342. * 448. Remedy when Second Form of Misjoinder occurs.

When causes of action separately state 1 are improperly united in

1 in iff can thu be compelled to am n l hi complaint r p ~iti n an to tate e ch cau e of
ti n by i ·elf o that the
d f ndant may deal with it b au wer r l murr r a' th natur
f h ca e d mands. It eem t be the et led rul in
lif rnia, l ow ver, thL t the defect may properly be taken ad va.nt~w f
lff demurrer.1

the same com[)laint or petition, the rule which prevails in all the

342.
States, except in the few whose special legislation has already

been described, is the same as that which applies to the case of a

defect of parties. ^ If the error appears on the face of the plead-

ing, the defendant must demur, and cannot raise the objection by

answer.^ The statute adds, that, if the error do not thus appear

on the face of the pleading, the defence may be pi-esented by the

answer. If the defendant omits to use either of these methods

saying : " Moreover, only one cause of

action is in form stated. If two were in
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fact included in the averments, the remedy

was by motion to strike out surplusage or

to require the two causes to be separately

stated. A demurrer does not reach tlie

commingling of two causes of action in a

* 4-1 .

Remedy when Second Form of M is j o inder occurs.

\ hen c u e . . of action eparately ta.t l n.r impr pvrly uni d in
foe a e comr la.int or petition th rule whi h pr vail · in 1: 11 the
Sta e exc l t in the few who e p cia1 1 i ·lation ha < lr ady
h:;en cl cribecl i the ame a th t which ar 1lie· to the a ·e of a
defect of partie .2 If the rror app ar n the face f the pl ~ul
ing, the defendant must demur, and cann t raise the objevti n b
an wer.3 The tatute adds that, if the err01 do not thu, ap1 ear
on the face of the pleading, the defence ma., bv pre ·ented hy the
answ r. H the defendant omit., to u e either of these m th els

single count, if they be, under the code,

of such character tliat they may be joined."

See also Chicago, 11. I & Pac. Ry. Co. v.

O'Neill (1899), 58 Neb. 2.39, 78 N.'w. .521 ;

Building & Loan Assn. v. Cameron (1896),

48 Neb. 124, 66 N. W. 1109; Ponca Mill

Co (;. Mikesell (1898), 5.t Nel). 98, 75 N. W.

46 ; Glover v. Remley (1898), 52 S. C. 492,

30 S. E. 405.

A motion to strike out surplusage

would also be projjer : Ponca Mill Co. r.

Mikesell (1898), 55 Neb. 98, 75 N. W. 46.

But a motion to compel plaintiff to elect

on which to stand will not lie : Austin, etc.

Co. V. Heiser (1894), 6 S. D. 429, 61 N. W.

445. Nor is it ground for dismissing the

complaint that with one good cause of

action others are mingled: Mattliews v.

Bank (1900), 60 S. C. 183, 38 S. E. 437.

Hayden v. Pearce (1898), 33 Ore. 89, 52

Pac. 1049. Where a misjoinder of causes

of action ai)])ears on tlie face of the com-

plaint, the plaintiff .should be re<|uired to

elect on whidi cause lie will proceed ; but

when the def<!ct is not apparent until the

judgment is entered a writ of review will

lie to correct the error. (Compare with

Lane v. Dowd, sit/ira.) See also Smith

v. Day (1901), 39 Ore. 531, 65 Pac. 1055,

where the court said tliat a non-suit should

be granted fur misjoinder of causes. Un-

less the proper objection is taken by mo-

tion, the defect of intermingled counts

is waived : Smith v. Jones (1902), — S. D.

—,92 N. W. 1084]

^ Nevada Cy., etc. Canal Co. v. Kidd,

43 Cal. 180, 37 Cal. 282; Watson v. San

Francisco & H. B. R. Co., 41 Cal. 17, 19 ;

Buckingham v. Waters, 14 Cal. 146;

White V. Cox, 46 Cal. 169. In Wright

V. Conner, 34 Iowa, 240, 242, it was said :

"If through bad pleading two or more

distinct causes of action or defences are

contained in one division of a j)etition or

answer, which is called a count, a de-

ayina: "l\foreover, only one cau e of
action i in form tated. If two were in
fact iuclud din the a,·erment . the remedy
wa by motion to ·trike out nrplu:-;age or
to r quir the two cause.' to be eparately
tated. A demurrer doe not reach the
commingling of two can. es of a tion in a
iu 1 count, if they be, under the code,
of ·uch character that they m <ty be joined."
ee al o hicago, l . I & Pac. Ry. o. v.
<J'.\'eill (1 99}, 5 .::\ b. 239, 7 X W. 521;
Buildiug & Loan A · ·u. v. Cameron (1 96),
4 ~ 'eb. 124, 66 J.. • W. 1109; Pom:a illill
. <J 1:. :}like ell (1 9 ), 55 ~·eh. 9 , i5 N. W.
46 · Glover v. Hemley (1 9 ), 52 S. C. 492,

au ·. E.

405.

A motion to trike out nrplu age
would al o be proper: Ponca ~Iill o. v.
~like ell (1 9 ), 55 Xeb. 9 , ~5 "N. W. 46.
But a motion to compel plaintiff to lcct
on which to tantl will not lie: Au tin, etc.
'o. u. IIei er (1 9-1), 6 . D . 429, 61 X. W.
4-t.5.
'or i. it ground for di mi sinv the
'IJIJljJlai11t that with oue good Cllll e Of
a ·ti1J11 others are 111i11~led: :\Iatthew · v.
Hauk (!!JOO), GO.·. C. 1 3, 3 '. E. 43i.
Hayd<>11 v. J'earcP (1 !l ), 33 Ore. n, 52
I'ac. I om. "'h1·re a mi.'joinder of cause·
of action appr·ar · 0:1 tit<! fat·c of the complai11 , tlw pJ.tiutiff .·lwulcl be re11uirc<l t
1·l••et 011 ' ' liicl1 eansc lie will procee<l; hut
wli<•11 lh · 1IL•f1·1·t i. IJ()t apparent until the
ju .;111 •ut i ·cut ·red a\\ rit of review will
i

lie to correct the error. ( ompare \\ith
L ane r. Dow<l, . uµru.)
ee al 'o , ' mith
v. D ay (1'.JOl), 39 Ore. 531, 65 Pac. 1055,
where the court . aid that a n on-suit hould
be grautecl f r mi ·joinder of rau ·e . Uole the proper objection i: takeu by motion, the cl feet of interm ingl ed count
i waived: mith v. J one (1902), . D.
- , 92 N. W. 10 -t.J
1 .i: 1 evada
y., tc. Canal o. t'. Kidd,
43 al. l 0, 37 al. 2 2; Wat 0n v. an
Fran i co & H. TI. R. l'o., 41 al. 17 19 ;
nckinglrnm v. "'ater, 14
al. 146;
Whi te v. ox, 46 Cal. 169. In '' riaht
v. onner, 34- Iowa, 240 2-!2, it wa airl:
"If through bad pleadina two or more
di tinct cau.'e of a ·tion or defeuc
are
contained in one diYi. ion of a petition or
an wer, which i· call d a rount, a demurrer ma.'· be directed at 011e of them
if insuffi ieut at law.' In triclne. ~, the
obj ect ing party ouaht fi r t to r quir by
motion, that the petition or au. w r Le
JH'opcrl.'· dh·ided, or an lec:ti 11 made between the cau e. of, etion or the defence· ;
Lut, omitting thi,;, he mny demur.
2 [Ih111ley v. Dun\l (1902}, 29 Wa~h.
52 , 70 Pac. 6 ; Lan 1•. I owtl (1903), 1 i2
~To. lui, 72
. W. 632; .ce Baurlmann v.
Da' i · (I !.HJ) 23 :\lout. 3 2, !59 a·. .)6.J
3 [A dcmurr •r for want of ufficient
fanin
fac-t1'will notr aeh thi. obj ctio11.
v. Yat s (1901), 2G Wa. h.5, 6G ac.1:31.]
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properly, he is deemed to have waived the objection. The prac-

tical result is, that a demurrer must always hj resorted to, or all

objection to such misjoinder will be waived.^ The demurrer

may be by any of the defendants ; '^ and it must be to the entire

complaint or petition, and not to any cause or causes of action

supposed to have boen improperly joined.^ To sustain a demur-

rer for this reason, however, the complaint must contain two or

more good grounds of suit which cannot properly be joined in

the same action. .When a complaint, therefore, consists of two or

more counts, and one sets forth a good cause of action, and an-

other doos not, although it attempts to do so, the pleading is not

demurrable on the ground of a misjoinder, even though the causes

of action could not have been united had they been sufficiently

and properly alleged.^

§ 343. * 449. Rule in Few States. In a very few States, how-

ever, the practice is different, and a demurrer is not permitted as

the remedy for a misjoinder. It is so in Kentucky. The defend-

ant must move to strike out, or to compel the plaintiff to elect

which cause of action he will proceed upon, and to dismiss the
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others ; and a failure to make such motion is a complete waiver

of the objection. The plaintiff may also at any time before trial

withdraw any cause of action.^ The sections of the Iowa code

1 Blossom I'. Barrett, 37 N. Y. 434, 436 ; 219 ; Bassett v. Warner, 23 Wis. 673, 689,

Smith r. Orser, 43 Barb, 187, 193; Mead 690; Willard v. Reas, 26 Wis. .540, 544;

V. Bagnall, 1.5 Wis. 156 ; Jamison v. Copher, Lee v. Simpson, 29 Wis. 333 ; Cox v. West.

35 Mo. 483, 4S7 ; Ashby >\ Winston, 26 Pac. R. Co., 47 Cal. 87, 89, 90; Sullivan

Mo. 210: Flibernia Sav. Soc. v. Ordwav, v. N. Y., N. H. & H. R. Co., 19 Blatchf.

38 Cal. 679; Lawrence v. Montgomery, 388; Jenkins r. Thomason, 32 S. C. 254.

37 Cnl. 183. See also Field v. Hurst, 9 ^ Forkuer u. Hart, Stanton's Code, p.

S. C. 277 ; Eversdon v. Mayhew, 85 Cal. 1 ; 60 ; Wilson r. Thompson, id. j). GO ; Hart

QRoss V. Jones (1896), 47 S. C. 211, 25 v. Cundiff, id. p. 61 ; Hord r. Chandler,

S. E. 59.] 13 B. Mon. 403; McKoe v. Pope, IS id.

2 Ashby V. Winston, 26 Mo. 210. If 548,555; Bonney y. Reardin, 6 Bu.'ih, 34 ;

A. and B. are sued together on several Dragoo v. Levi, 2 Duv. 520 ; Chiles r.

causes of action, the joinder of which Drake, 2 Mete. (Ky-) l+G ; Hancock

would have been proper had the suit v. Johnson, 1 Mete. (Ky.) 242 ; Sale v.

been against A. alone, A. may demur to Crntchfield, 8 Bush, 636, 646; Hinkle v.

the misjoinder of causes of action. Hoff- Dave.nport, 38 Iowa, 355, 358 ; Cobb v. 111.

man v. Wheelock, 62 Wis. 434. Cent. R. Co., 38 Iowa, 601, 616 ; Grant v.

3 Boughcr y. Scobey, 16 Ind. 151, 154; McCarty, 38 Iowa, 468. If the plaintiff

and must be on the specific ground of refuse to elect, the court cannot therefore

the misjoinder, — a demurrer for want of dismiss the action, but must make the

sufficient facts does not raise the objec- election for him. Sheppard v. Stephens

tion : Cox V. West. Pac. R. Co., 47 Cal. (Ky. 1887), 2 S. W. Rep. 548.

87, 89, 90 ; Remy v. Olds, 88 Cal. 537. "[^Arkansas also follows this practice.

* Truesdell v. Rhodes, 26 Wis. -215, Eiley v. Norman, 39 Ark. 158. In For-
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quoted in § 338 show that a similar practice exists in that

111

State.

33

how

hat

imilar

r

tice

xi t

m that

S 344. * 450. Remedy wheu Third Case of Misjoinder occurs.

The third case presents some difficulties. When the complaint

or petition contains causes of action which cannot properly be

united, and they are mingled and combined in the same allega-

tions, — in other words, the pleading in form sets forth but one

cause of action, while in reality it embraces two or more which

cannot be joined in any form, — is the defendant's remedy by

demurrer, or by motion in the first instance that the pleading be

made more definite and certain by separating the causes of action,

and by demurrer when such separation has been accomplished?

In Missouri it is definitely settled that the remedy is by demur-

rer.^ That this is a proper practice is implied with more or less

distinctness by decisions in several other States.^

§ 345. *451. Author's Criticism and Suggestion herein. There

are grave difficulties attendant upon the adoption of such a rule,

although it seems to be generally supported by the decided cases.

When, upon sustaining a demurrer interposed upon the ground of
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a misjoinder of causes of action, the action itself is not defeated,

but the causes of action improperl}' united are merely separated,

and new actions corresponding with such division are proceeded

with, it would seem to be a necessary prerequisite that the causes

dyce I'. Nix (1893), 58 Ark. 1.36, 23 S. W. distinctly held by these later cases : Gold-

967, the defendant demurred for mis- berg v. Utley, 60 N. Y. 427, 429 ; Wiles v.

joinder, but the court considered the de- Suydam, 64 id. 173 ; Liedersdorf v. Second

nuirrer as a motion to strike and as such Ward Bk., 50 Wis. 406 ; Anderson v.

p;issed upon its merits. See also Rev- Scandia Bk. (Minn., May, 1893), 54 N. W.

nolds r. Roth (1895), 61 Ark. 317, 33 Rep. 1062; Lamming v. Galusha (N. Y.

S. \V. 105.] App. 1892), 31 N. E. Rep. 1024.

1 Mulhulland v. Rajjp, 50 Mo. 42 ; [^Haskell County Bank v. Bank of

Ederlin v. Judge, 36 Mo. 350; Young v. Santa Fe (1893), 51 Kan. 39, 32 Pac. 624.

Coleman, 43 Mo. 179, 184; Cheely's Adm. See Lane v. Dowd (1903), 172 Mo. 167, 72

V. Wells, .33 Mo. 106, 109. And see Pick- S. W. 632 ; Baudmanu v. Davis (1899), 23

344.

* 450 .

Remedy when T hird Case of Misjoinder occurs.

The thir
pr ·ent" ome diffi ul i . \Vh n the omplaint
or p titi n onta,in cau :::> £ ac ion which cannot pr p rly b
unite , and the are min led and
mbined in
ame alleg· tion - in o her word , the pleadin ii fonn t f t h but on
ca , of action while in reality it embrace two or more which
cannot b join d in any form, - i tl e defendant · remedy by
demurrer orb motion in the fir tin tanc ha he plea.din be
ma le more definite and certain by eparating the cau e £ ac i n
and by d murrer when uch eparati n ha · been accomr li he ?
In Mi uri it i definitely ettled hat the r emedy i ' by demurrer.1 That thi i a proper practice i implied with more r le
distinctne by ueci ion in everal other tate .2
& 345. *-!51. Author's C riticism and Suggestion herein.
h r
are grave difficulties attendant upon the adoption of u h a rule
although i eem to be generally upported by the decid cl ca ' e .
\Vhen upon u ·tainiug a demurrer interpo eel upon the groun f
a mi joinder f cau e of action, the action it elf i not d f ate l,
but the cau es of ·action improperly united are merely s parated,
and new action corresponding with such divi ion are pr ceede
with, it would eem to be a nece ary prerequisite that th cause

ering v. Miss. Val. N. Tel. Co., 47 Mo. 457 ; Mont. 382, 59 Pac 856, in which the court

House I'. Lowell, 45 Mo. 381. said : " A motion to exclude evidence or

'^ Gary v. Wheeler, 14 Wis. 281 ; Bur- an objection to receiving it, is not the rem-

rows V. Holderman, 31 Ind. 412 ; Lane r. edy for the intermingling in one count of

State, 27 id. 108, 112; Fritz ?■. Fritz, 23 several causes of action ; nor is there rem-

iil. .383, 390 ; Hibernia Sav. Soc. i-. Ord- edy other than demurrer, by which the

way, 38 Cal. 679 ; Ander.son v. Hill, 53 complaint may be attacked upon the

Barb. 238. See, however, Rogers v. Smith, ground that causes of action are improp-

17 Ind. 323, per Perkins .J., which seems to erly united." Plaukinton v. Ilildebrand

hold that tlie remedy should be by motion. (1895), 89 Wis. 209, 61 N. W. 839.]

That a demurrer is the proper remedy is

d y ce v. Nix (1 93 ), 5 Ark. 136, 23 . W.
967, the defendant demurred for mi joinder, but the court con idered the demurrer a a moti n to . trike and a · ·uch
pa etl upon it merit .
ee al o Reynold L'. R th (1 95 ), 61
rk. 317, 33
. w. 105 .]
1 :\Iulholland v. Rapp, 50 ~fo . -12 ;
E der lin 1:. Ju dge, 36 :\[o. 3 50; Youn g 1: .
Cole ma n, 43 Mo. l i9, 1 4; beely ' A d m.
v. W ell:, 33 Mo. lOfi , 109. And ·e Pic: kerirw t'. )[ i·. \'al. ~~. T el. o. ,47 l>lo. 457 ;
llou,.e "" L owell , 45 :\fo. 3 l.
:.!
ary u. W he ler , 1-! Wi . 2 l ; Burrow c. Holtlermau, 3 1 Ind. 412 ; L ane !'.
at•, :! " i11. 10", 11:2 ; F ritz 1-. F ritz, 2:3
i I. :, · , :390; Ilib rn ia , a'·· . oc. 1•. r<lw.ty, 3 r al. 67 ; An d r on 1•. Hill , 53
ll. rl1. :!3 . • ·(·e, how ver , R oge r 1• •• 'mi h,
l; Iutl. :J2:3, per P rkin .J., whi ch em to
lwl1l that the rem 1lv h uld be bv moti on.
'l ha a <lcmrnrr r i ·. t h 11roper ~c mc<ly i

di tinctly held by the elater ca e : oldberg u. Utley, 60 N. Y. 427, 429; Wile v.
u dam, 64 id. l 73; Lieder dorf v. econd
Ward Bk., 50 Wi . 406; Ander on v.
cantlia Bk. (Miun ., May, 1 93), 54 N. W .
R e p. 1062; Lamming v.
alu ha ( . Y.
App. I 92), 31 . K Rep. 1 24 .
[Ila k 11 ' unty Bank v. Bank of
an ta F ' (1 93), 5 l l\:an. 39, 3_ la . 62-L
• e Laneu.Dowd(l903),172 I .167,72
. W . 632; Ban lmann v. Davi (1 ~9 ), 13
)lou t. 3 2, 59 a . 56, in which th · urt
a id : " A m t ion to xclude evid nee or
au bjecti ou to r cc iviug it, i not th remedy for th e in te L·miugling in ne count of
everal a u c of acti n ; nor i th r r emd ~· ot her than d murrer , by whi h th
compla int may be attack d upon th
ground t hat ca u e of a ti o n ar impr prly unit tl ." l lankinton v. Hild e brand
(1 95) , 9 Wi . 209 1 . W. 39.]

JOI DER OF OAl:SES OF ACTION.

459

JOINDER OF CAUSES OF ACTION. ' 459

of action should have been separately and distinctly stated in the

original pleading. To allow the demurrer to a complaint or peti-

tion in which several causes of action are mingled up, and to

divide this mass of confused allegations into as many complaints

as there are causes of action, would seem to be a work of great

difficulty, if not of absolute impossibility. Again : it is always

difficult if not impossible to determine with exactness whether a

complaint or petition does contain two or more different causes of

action when the allegations are thus combined into one state-

ment. If the averments are found sufficient to express one cause

of action, it may generally be said that the other averments are

mere surplusage, which should be rejected on a motion made for

that purpose, and not the material allegations which set forth a

second cause of action. For these reasons, which are based

chiefly upon notions of convenience, a demurrer does not seem to

be an appropriate remedy until the causes of action have been

separated, and it is known with certainty what and how many

they are. In this case, therefore, the more convenient practice

would seem to be a motion in the first instance to make the plead-

Generated for facpubupdates (University of Michigan) on 2014-06-17 15:32 GMT / http://hdl.handle.net/2027/uc2.ark:/13960/t02z1c23b
Public Domain / http://www.hathitrust.org/access_use#pd

ing more certain and definite by arranging it into distinct causes

of action, or a motion to strike out the redundant matter and sur-

plusage and thus reduce it to a single definite cause of action.

The latter order would take the place of a demurrer ; the former

would be followed by a demurrer after the causes of action had

been separated.^

III. Meaning of the Term " Cause of Action ; ''^ Where one Cause

of Action only is stated^ although several Different Kinds of

Relief are demanded.

§ 346. * 452. Confounding " Cause of Action " ■with " Remedy."

Decisions herein. Definition Obtained by Analysis. Tlie cause

of action is very often confounded with the remedy. This mis-

take or misconception is peculiarly apt to occur in cases where,

under the code, the plaintiff seeks to obtain legal and equitable

relief combined, the right to such relief springing from the same

state of facts. To avoid this tendency to confusion, it is abso-

lutely necessary to ascertain and fix with certainty the true mean-

. 1 [[Lewis r. Hinson (1902), 64 S. C. 571, Times Publishiug Co. v. Everett (1894),

of action should have been eparat ly ancl distinctly tated in th
orio·inal pleadiug. To allow the d murrer to a complaint or petition in whi h several can e of action are mingl d up, and to
divide thi · mas of confu e 1 allegations into a many complair t
a there are cau s of action, would eem to be a work of gr at
difficulty, if not of ab olut impos ibility. Again: it i al ways
difficult if not impossible to determine with exactne : whether a
complaint or petition doe contain two or more diff rent cau e of
action when the allegations are thus combined into one statement. If the averments are found sufficient to expre one cause
of action, it may generally be said that the other averment are
mere surplusage, which should be rej ected on a motion made for
that purpose, and not the material allegations which set forth a
econd cause of action. For these reasons, which are based
chiefly upon notions of convenience, a demurrer does not seem to
be an appropriate remedy until the causes of action have been
·epamted, and it is known with certainty what and how many
they are. In this case, therefore, the more convenient practice
would seem to be a motion in the first instance to make the pleading more certain and definite by arranging it into di tinct causes
of action, or a motion to strike out the redundant matter and surplu age and thus reduce it to a single definite cause of action.
The latter order would take the place of a demurrer; the former
would be followed by a demurrer after the causes of action had
been separated.1

43 S. E. 15 (quoting the text) ; Cargar v. 9 Wash. 518, 37 Pac. 695.]

Fee (1894), 140 Ind. 572, 39 N. E. 93;

III. Meaning of the Term " Cause of Action ; " Where one Gause
of A ction only is stated , although several Different Kinds of
Relief are demanded.

§

346.

* 452.

Confounding "Cause of Action" with "Remedy ."

The ca use
of action is very often confounded with the remedy. This mi8take or misconception is peculiarly apt to occur in ca es where,
under the code, the plaintiff seeks to obtain legal and equitable
relief combined, the right to uch relief springing from the same
. ., tate of facts . To avoid this tendency to confu ·ion, it is ab olutely nece sary to ascertain ancl fix \\-ith certainty the true mean-

Decisions herein.

1

43

Definition

Obtained by Analysis.

[ Lewis v. Hinson (1902), 6-1- S. C. 57 1,
. E. 15 (quoting the text); Cargar v.

Fee (1894), 140 Ind. 572, :39 N. E . 93;

Time ' PublLhing Co. v. Everett (1 94),
9 Wah. 51 , 3i Pac. 695.]
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iner of the term " cause of action."' The American courts of the

present clay seem to avoid the announcement of any general

principle, or the giving of any general definitions. While, there-

in

f be term

p1 ' n

cau e of ac ion.
m to a oi l h

The

f he

fore, they have repeatedly held that but one cause of action was

stated in a case before them, and have carefully distinguished it

in that instance from the reliefs demanded, they have not at-

prin
f r

tempted to define the term " cause of action " in any general and

abstract manner, so that this definition might be used as a test in

all other cases. We shall obtain no direct help, therefore, from

their decisions ; but they will furnish examples and tests to de-

termine whether any definition which may be framed is accurate.

1 shall, however, attempt a definition or description, basing it

t mp

ab'tI< ct mann r

upon an analysis of the essential elements wliich enter into every

judicial proceeding for the^jixutection of a private right on the

O MC side, and the enforceiu ent o t aT^jnyat'e Hiity^h "_ffie othe r.

There are such elements or ieatures which necessarily combine in

every action ; they are independent of any judicial recognition ;

they exist in tha very nature of things; and, if we can by an

accurate analysis discover these elements, we shall at once have
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obtained a correct notion of the term " cause of action."

§ 347. * 453. Remedy. Elements of every Judicial Action.

Elements Constituting Cause of Action. Every action is brought

in order to obtain some particular result which we term the

remedij^ whicli the code calls the " relief," and which, when

granted, is summed up or embodied in the judgment of the court.

This result is not the "cause of action " as that term is used in

the codes. It is true this final result, or rather the desire of ob-

taining it, is the primary motive which acts upon the will of the

plaintiff and impels him to commence the proceeding, and in the

metaphysical sense it can properly be called the cause of this ac-

tion, but it is certainly not so in the legal sense of the phrase.

This final result is the " object of the action " as that term is

frequently used in the codes and in modern legal terminology.^

It was shown in the introduction that every remedial riglit arises

out of an antecedent primary riglit and corresponding duty and a

delict or breach of such primary- right and duty by the person on

whom tlie duty rests. Every judicial action must therefore involve

^ Q" Every actiou is brought in orflcr not ' the cau'^e of action ; ' it is rather

to obtain some particular result whicli is tlie ' object of the action.' " Wildinau'T.

termeii the remedy. This final result is WiMnian (ISOS,', 70 Conn. 700, 41 Atl. 1.]

n i
Ther e are su ·l
'arily ombine in
eY r action· they are indep ndent of any judicial rec gnition ;
they exi t in tha Yery nature f thing · and, if we an by an
accurate ana.ly'is di coyer the e el ment , we hall at once have
obtained a correc notion f th term ' au ·e f ac ion.
347. * 453. Remedy.
E lements of every Judicial Action.
E :ements Cons tituting Cause of Action. Every action i brought
m rd r t obtain ome particular r ult which w t rm he
reniPd!J, whi ·h the code all t h ' r lief ' and whi h when
granted, i: ummed up or rnb li cl in l judgment f le ourt.
This re:ult i not the "cau 'e f acti n a that term i u ed in
the c de:. I t i true thi final re ult, or ratb r the de ir
f btainin · it, i: the primary moti which act upon the will of the
plaintiff a.n l impe1' him to
mrnence the proceeding and in the
metaph r ical en e it can pro1 erly b all cl the cau e
ion, but it is ertainly not .· in he 1 gal n e of h I lira .
hi final re ·ult i the "obj ct f th action' a ~ hat t rm i
freciuenily u.'ecl in tl e o l ~: an 1 in mo lern legal t n 1i1 olo'",y.1
It wa: . ho\Yll in th introcln ·tion tha y r~T r nPdial ri ~_;Lt ari
out C>f an antef'C<l 'n primar. T right ancl orr , pondin · duty and .t
<1 li ·t or breach of :uch primary ri ·h and clnt · b r th 1 r: n n
\vl1nm the duty re t '. EY ry judicial action mu. t therefor iffrnlve
01

[ "Ev ry action i: hrou~ht in orrlPr
0111e partieular re _ult wliiC'l1 is
t rrnc:<l the rcme1ly. '111is final re:ult i
l

to 11litai11

n(lt 'the ran e of action;' it i r:tth r
thP 1111,it·d of the netion.'" 'Y il11i11an ' v.
Wildman (1 !I \' 'iO onu. 700, 41 ,\tl. l.]
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the following elements : a 2£HB2LiXLisbi B9§^6^si^^

and a corresponding primary duty. devolving iip()n the defendant;

a delict or wrong done by the defendant which consistei|.. in _a

bfeacK of sucli"^i5"rrmarY rifflit and duty ; a remedial xiirht in iayor

of the plaintiff, and a remedial duty resting on the defendant

springing from this delict, and finally the remedy or relief itself.

Every action, however complicated or however simple, must con-

tain these essential elements. Of these elements, the primary-

right and duty and the delict or wrong combined constitute thej

cause of action in the legal sense of the term, and as it is usedJ

in the codes of the several States. They are the legal cause oij

foundation whence the right of action springs, this right of action

being identical with the " remedial right " as designated in my

analysis.^ In accordance with the principles of pleading adopted

in the new American system, the existence of a legal right in an

abstract form is never alleged by the plaintiff ; but, instead thereof,

the facts from which that right arises are set forth, and the right

itself is inferred therefrom. The cause of action, as it appears in \

the complaint when properly pleaded, will therefore always be the 1
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facts from which the plaintiff's primary right and the defendant's j

corresponding primary duty have arisen, together with the facts!

whicli constitute the defendant's delict or act of wrong.^

1 [^Jameson v. Bartlett (1902), 63 Neb. out of tlie wrong of the defendant, and if

638, 88 N. W. 860.] not, what that cause of action is. The

plaintiffs are the owners of a strip of land

^ IXeariina of "Cause of Action." ^^^^^ ^j^j^j^ jl^^ defendant has wrongfully

"The question is not determined by entered and erected a wall which is a por-

the Code of Civil Procedure, for though tion of her house. The facts alleged show

in section 484 it prescribes what separate one primary right of the plaintiffs and one

causes of action may be joined in the same wrong done by the defendant which in-

complaint, it nowhere assumes to define vol ves that right. Therefore, the plaintiffs

what is a single cause of actiou : " Reilly have stated but a single cause of action,

I.'. Sicilian Asphalt Paving Co. (1902), 170 no matter how many forms and kinds

N. Y. 40, 62 N. E. 772. of relief they may be entitled to. The

" We are of the opinion that the cause relief prayed for, or to which they may be

of the action con.^ists of the negligent act entitled, is no part of their cause of action

which produced the effect, rather than in (Pomeroy's Code Kemcdios, § *455):"

the effect of the act in its application to llahl v. vSugo (1901), 169 N. Y. 109, 62

different primary rights, and that the in- N. E. 135. "In every cause of action

jury to the person and property as a result tiiere must exist a primary right, a corre-

of the original cau.se gives rise to different sponding primary duty, and a failure to

items of damage:" King v. Chicago, M. perform that duty : " South Bend Cliilled

& St. Paul Ry. Co. (1900), 80 Minn. 83, 82 Plow Co. v. George C. Cribb Co. (1900),

N. W. 1113. 105 Wis. 443, 81 N. W. 675.

" Let us nov7 see whether the plaintiffs " In applying the rule, some confusion

have more than one cause of action arising has resulted from the neglect to define the

4 2

462
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CIVIL REMEDIES.

§ 348. * 454. Cause of Action

348.

Examples. The cause of action

terms ' cause of action ' and ' action ; ' to

whidi, tlicrefore, our attention must be

first directed. The latter term is very

comniouly confounded with the suit (litis)

ill which the action is enforced. But this

is not the technical meaning of the term,

according to which an action is simply the

right or power to enforce an obligation.

' An action is nothing else than the right

or power of prosecuting in a judicial pro-

ceeding wliut is owed to one,' — which is to

say, an obligation, . . . The action there-

fore springs from the obligation, and

hence the ' cause of action ' is simply the

obligation. . . . The ' cause of action ' is

therefore to be distinguished, also, from
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the ' remedy,' — which is simply the means

by which the obligation or the correspond-

ing action is effectuated, — and also from

the ' relief ' sought : " Frost v. Witter

(1901), 132 Cal. 421, G4 Pac. 703. "It

does not appear from the petition that the

trustees have been in any way extravagant

or negligent or dilatory in the perform-

ance of the duties of their office, or that

they have violated any law or contract, or

caused any injury, or done any wrong, or

witiiheld any right, or that they have

threatened or are about to do any such

thing. At least, some one of these ele-

ments is essential to a cause of action : "

Sands v. Gund (1903), — Neb. — , 93

N. W. 990. " As was said iu Bruil v.

Northwestern M. K. Ass'n, 72 Wis. 430,

the words ' cause of action ' . . . include

the act or omission without which there

would be no cause of action or right of

recovery : " Hosley i'. Wisconsin Odd

Fellows Mutual Life Ins. Co. (1893), 86

Wis. 463, 57 N. W. 48. Threatt v. Mining

Co. (1896), 49 S. C. 95, 26 S. E. 970.

" To borrow the phraseology of Mr.

Pomeroy, the primary right, which the

plaintiffs are seeking to enforce, is the

right to have the assets of the estate of

their alleged debtor applied to the pay-

ment of their cbiirn, and the breach of this

primary right in the modes stated in the

complaint is the delict complained of.

These two things, says Mr. Pomeroy, in

his work on Remedies, according to the

Code Pleailing, at page 487, sec. 4.')3

[*45.3], con.«titute the cause of action:*'

and Remedial Right Differentiated,

thus defined is plainly different

Sheppard v. Green (1896), 48 S. C. 165, 26

S. E. 224. Smith -■. Smith (1897), .50 S. C.

54, 27 S. E. 545, quotes the author's Analy-

sis of a cause of action with apparent

approval. Broughel v. So. New Eug. Tel.

Co. (1900), 72 Conn. 617, 45 Atl. 435. " A

cause of action consists of a right belong-

ing to the plaintiff, which has been violated

by some wrongful act or omi.ssion of the

defendant : " Goodrich v. Alfred (1899), 72

Conn. 257, 43 Atl. 1041. Wildman v.

Examples.

454. C a u se o f Acti on a n d
Tb cau3e of ac ion thu

term ' cau ·e of action ' and action ; ' to
which therefore, our attention mu t be
fir t directed. The latter term i very
c:ommoul,r coufounded with the suit (liti~)
iu whi h the action i eJJforced. But this
i not the technical meaning of the term,
according to which an action i imply the
right or power to euforce an obligation.
' n action i · n thing el. e than the right
or power of pro ecuting in a judicial proeeding what i ou;ed to one,' - which i to
ay, an obligation . ... The action therefore prin.,. from the obligation, and
hence the ' cause f action ' i , imply the
obligation. . . . The • cau e of action ' i
therefore to be di tingui hed, al o, from
the 'remedy,' - which i · imply the mean
by which the obligation or the corre pondio.,. action i effectuated, - a nd al o from
the 'relief' ought:" Fro t v. \Yitter
(1 01), 132 Cal. -121, 64 Pac. i 03 . ' It
doe not appear from the p etition that the
tru ·tee have Leen in any way extravagant
or negligent or dilatory in the performance of the <lutie' of then· office, or that
they have Yiolatecl any law or contract, or
·au ed any injury, or done any wrong , or
withheld any right, or that they have
threateneu or are about to <lo any such
thing. At lea t, ·ome one of he e elemeut · i e ·ential to a cau e of action:"
and i:. Gund (1903 ), - Neb. - , 93
... ~. \ . 990. '' A wa · kaid in Bruil v.
Northwe tern l\I. R. A 'n, 72 Wi . 430,
tli word ' cau e of action' . . . in clude
the act or orni ·ion without which thP.re
would be no cau · of action or right of
recovery : " Ho ley v. W i con in Odd
.F ellow l\fotual Life In . Co. (1 93), 6
Wi . 463, 5
. W. 4 . Threatt v. Mining
Co. (1 96}, 49 . C. 95, 26 . E. 9i0.
"To borrow the pbra eology of fr.
omeroy, the primary right, wh ich the
plaintiff are eeking to enforce i the
right to have the a et of the tate of
their alleged dehtor applied to the payment of their claim, and th br ach of thi·
primar.'· ri~d1t in tlte mode .. tated in the
• <Jmplaint i: the delict complain d of.
'J lw c twr, thiug.·, ay. :Jfr. Pom r y, in
hi. work <m Remedi , a ·cording to the
Corl· l'lr>a1li11g-, at page 4 7,
c. 45:3
[ ~::], '<.lll~titutc the cau e of a ·Lion:.,

R e medial R i ght D ifferentiated.

l fined i, plc. inly di · ren

reen (l 96),4
. E. 224.
mi th c 'm i th ( 1 9i ), 50 ~. .
naly 54, 2i . E. 545. quot the autb r'
i· f a cau
f ac ion with app· rent
ap prorn l. Br ughel t '. .'o .• · w En". T I.
o.(l900), i2 ,01m.6 i ,45 tl. 435. "A
cau of action Mll'i t of a ri .,.ht belong·
iug tu the p:aintiff, whi ·h ha· been violar cl
by o u wron!Yful at·r or omi. ion of th
defendant:" ood riclH'. Alfred ( L 99) 72
ouu. 25 i, 43 A tl. 10·!1. "ilclmau i-.
\1-ildman (l 9 ) 70 Conn. 700, 41 . \ tl.
1, quote from f:. 453 of the t ext an d adJ _ :
ta ecl iu brief, a can. e f a t ion may be
aicl to cou i ·t of a right belou.,.in.,. to the
plaintiff and . ome wrongful act or omision done by the defendant, by which that
right ha· been violated."
"It i
ai<l, though that eYeu if the
amendmeut et forth a c:rn:e of a ·tiou, it
houlcl haxe been tricken for the r a on
that it et forth a new ancl di ·tinct cau-e
of action. To determine thi · q u tiou it
i nece ary to a certain what was the
cau e of action ·et forth in the original
petition. If the right to r eCO \'er t he
property in cout roYersy upon the legal
titl e wa the cau e of action originall.r ·et
forth , then it would see m that the am nclment di<l. contain a uew cau e of ac:tion,
for it wa ba eel upon au alleged right to
recorer the property upon an equitable
title. It need no argument to how that
au equitable titl i entirely epara te and
ddiuct from a legal title. 'I'o ay, boweYer, that the au e of a ction et forth in
the original petition wa
the right to
recoYer upon a 1 gal title i giYing the
t rm ' cau
of action ' too re tri ted a
meaning. Th e au e of a ·tion in ucb a
ca. e on i t , not on ly of the right f the
plaintiff but f the wron.,. f the defendant. The ri ght of the plaintiff on i t iu
being ntitlecl to h po e ion of the
property whi ·h i owned by him, and the
wrong of the def ndaut on. i t in hi;;
withholiling from th plaintiff that whit•h
~ ncl e r thi· riew uf th
i · ri!{htfully hi .
matter the ·au
of action k t forth h
the origiual p tition wa ha. d upon tw1J
faet : ow11 r ·hip of t.lrn pr p rty hy th
plai11tiff, n11d th Wl'ongful withholtlin!{ of
po. · .,. ion IJy the <l f udaut : " .McCau<l -
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from the remedial riglit, and from the remedy or relief itself.

The remedial right is the consequence, the secondary right which

springs into being from the breach of the plaintiff's primary right

less V. Inland Acid Co. (1902), 115 Ga.

from the remedial right, ancl from the r m cly r relief itself.
The r medial right i th on eqnence, the con<lary right which
pring into b ing from the brea h of the plaintiff'8 primary right

968, 42 S. E. 449.

"A 'cause of action,' as the term is

used in pleading, is not the name under

which a state of facts may he classed, hut

it consists of the facts giving rise to the

action. An action is a proceeding in

court. Code, section 3424. The cause of

action is the fact or tlie facts that 'justify

it or show the right to maintain it.'

Hence, when a material fact, necessary to

a recovery, is omitted from a petition, we

say it does not state a cause of action.

In 5 Am. & Eng. Euc. Law, 776, it is

said : ' The cause of action is the entire
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state of facts that gives rise to an ehforce-

ahle claim. The phrase comprises every

fact which, if traversed, the plaintiff must

prove in order to obtain judgment.' This

definition is taken, substantially, from

the case of Read v. Brown, 22 Q. B. Div.

128. In that case it is said that a cause

of action is ' every fact which it would

be necessary for plaintiff" to prove, if

traversed, in order to support his right to

the judgment of the court.' It is tlien

said : ' It does not comprise every piece of

evidence which is necessary to prove each

fact, but every fact which is necessary to

be proved.' In Hutchinson v. Ains-

worth, 73 Cal. 452 (15 Pac. Eep. 82),

speaking of a cause of action with ref-

erence to the statute of limitations, it

is said : ' The facts upon which the

plaintiff's right to sue is based, and upon

which the defendant's duty has arisen,

coupled with the facts which constitute

tlie latter 's wrong, make up tlie cause of

action.' See Bruil v. Association, 72

Wis. 430 (39 N. W. 529), and Rapalje

& Lawrence, Law Dictionary, 180. Care

siiould be taken not to confuse the term

' cause of action ' as used abstractly and

as used in pleading. In a general sense,

the term means ' a claim which may be

enforced.' Bucklin i-. Ford, 5 Barb. 393.

' It is a right which a party has to insti-

tute and carry through an action.' Myer

V. Van Collem, 28 Barb. 230. ' The right

to prosecute an action with effect.'

Douglas V. Forrest, 4 Bing. 704. Look-

ing to these cases, it will be seen that the

term ' cause of action ' is used with no

purpose to indicate a rule by which one

cause of action may be distinguished from

a^iother, but merely with reference to the

existence of a cause of action. We use

expressions like these: ' A cause of action

for negligence ; ' ' A cause of action for

malicious prosecution ; ' ' A cause of action

for desertion.' They indicate the subject

or subject-matter of the action, but are

meaningless as showing a particular cause

of action. In Rodgers c. Association, 17

S. C. 406, are the following (juery and

le

v. Inland Acid Co. (1902), 115 Ga.

96 , 42

. E. 44-9.

"A 'cau e of action,' a the term i
us cl in plending, i. ·not the nam e under
which a sta te of fact may be cla ed, but
it con ·i ts of the fac.:t · giv in g ri to the
act ion. An ac.;tion i a pro eeding in
court.
ode, ection 34-24- . The cause of
action i the fact or the facts that 'ju ·tify
it or ho w the right to maintain it.'
Hence, wh eu a material fact, nece ~a ry to
a recov ry, is omitted from a petiti on, we
say it does 11 ot state a <'au e of action.
In 5 Am. & Eng. Enc. Law, 77 6, it is
said : ' The can e of action is the enti r e
state of fac ts that g ives ri se to au enforeeahle claim. The phrase comprises every
faet which, if traY er eel, th e plaintiff must
prove in order to obtai~ judgment.' T hi s
definiti on is taken, substantially, from
th e case of R ead v. Brown, 22 Q. B . DiY.
128. In that ca e it is said that a cause
of act ion is 'eYery fact which it wou ld
he necessary for plaintiff to proYe, if
traYersed, in order to upport hi right to
th e jud gment of the cour t.' I t is then
said : 'It does not cornpri e every piece of
evillence which is nece sary to prove each
fact, but every fact which is nece sary to
be proved.' In Hutchinson v. Ainsworth, 73 Cal. 452 (15 Pac. R ep. 82),
speaking of a cau e of action with reference to the statute of limitation , it
i~
aid : 'The facts upon which the
plaintiff's right to sue is based, and upon
whi ch the defendant' duty has ari en,
coupl ed with the fact ·which constitute
the latter ' wrong, make up the cause of
act.ion.' See Bruil v. A soeiation, 72
\V is. 4.30 (39 N. W. 529), and Rapalje
& Lawre nce, Law Dictionary, l 0. Care
sho uld be take n not to confuse the term
' cause of action' as used abstractly and
as u~ed in pleading. In a ge neral ense,
the term mean ' a claim which mav be
enforced.' Bucklin v. Ford, 5 Barb. "393.
' I t i a right which a party ha to in titute and carry through an action.' Myer
v . Van Collem, 2 Barb. 230. 'The ri ght
to prosecute an action with effect.'
Dougbs r. Forre t, 4 Bing. 704-. Look -

in g to the,e case , it will be seen that the
term ' cau e of a ·tiou ' i u ed with uo
purpo e to iudicate a rule by which one
cause of a -tion may be di tingui . bed from
apother, but mer ly with r efereuee to the
exi tence of a can e of action. W e u e
xpres ions like th e : 'A cause of ac·tion
for negligence;' 'A cause of action for
mali cio u pro 'ecution;' 'A cau e of action
for desertion.' They indicate the ubject
or ubject-mattcr of the action, but are
meaning less as showiug a, particular cau e
of a<:tion. Iu Rodgers v. Associatio11, 17
S. C. 406, are the following query and
an wer: ' \Vh at i a cause of action ~ \\ e
must keep in view the difference between
the ubject of the action and the cause of
th e action. The subject of the action was
what was formerly understood a. the uLject matter of the action .. . . Th e cau e of
the action is the ri ght claimed or wrong
suffered by the plaimiff, on the one hand,
and the duty or delict of the defendant,
on the other; and these appear by the facts
qf each separate case. We have emphasized closing words to call especial
attention to the rule wh en applied to a
particular ca e : " Box v. Chicago, R. I . &
P. Ry. Co. (1899 ), 107 Ia. 660, 78 N. W.
694.

" But nei ther the conception of the
plaintiffs or defendant, n or the kind of
relief prayed, while they may be considered, i conclu i\' e upon the court a to
what the cause of action i \\.hi ch the
pleading sets up. Th at fact must be
determined from the pleading it elf.
Upon a careful analy ·is of this co mplaint,
we think it quite clear that the real cause
of action stated is the vi olation by the
trustee of hi duty to the cestuis que trusten t i11 indirectly buying for himself the
trust property at th e exec utor' ale: "
French v. W oodruff (1 ' 9 ), 25 olo. 339,
4-5 Pac. 416. ··The foundation of the
cau e of action in both complaint
the trau actiou con. titutin o- the tru t; the
cause of action in both i the violation of
that tru t; a nd hoth ar e equitable in cha racter:" _ Iullen v. l\fcKim {1896) , 22
Colo. 46", 45 Pac. 4-16.]
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by the defendant's wrong, wliile tlie remedy is the consummation

or satisfaction of this remedial right. From one cause of action,

that is, from one primary right and one delict being a breach

thereof, it is possible, and not at all uncommon, that two or

more remedial rights may arise, and therefore two or more differ-

ent kinds of relief answering to these separate remedial rights.

This is especially so when one remedial right and corresponding

relief are legal, and the other equitable ; but it is not confined to

such cases. One or tw^o very familiar examples will sufficiently

illustrate this statement, and will show the necessity as well as

the ease of discriminating between the "• cause of action " and the

remedy. Let the facts which constitute the plaintiff's primary

right be a contract duly entered into by which the defendant

agreed to convey to the plaintiff' a parcel of land, and full pay-

ment by the plaintiff of the stipulated price and performance of

all other stipulations on his part. Let the debet be a refusal by

the defendant to perform on his part. This is the cause of ac-

tion, and it is plainly single. From it there arise two remedial
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rights and two corresponding kinds of relief ; namely, the reme-

dial right to a compensation in damages, with the relief of actual

pecuniary damages ; and the remedial right to an actual perform-

ance of the agreement, and the relief of an execution and deliv-

ery of the deed of conveyance. If the plaintiff in one action

should state the foregoing facts constituting his cause of action,

and should demand judgment in the alternative either for dam-

ages or for a specific performance, he would, as the analysis above

given conclusively shows, have alleged but one cause of action,

although the reliefs prayed for would be distinct, and would have

belonged under the old system to different forums, — the common

law and the equity courts. Again : let the plaintiff's primary

right be the ownership and right to possession of a certain tract

of land, and let the facts from which it arises be properly alleged ;

let the delict consist in the defendant's wrongful taking and re-

taining possession and user of sucli land for a specified period of

time, and let the facts showing this wrong be properly averred in

the same pleading. Evidently the plaintiff will have stated one

single and very simple cause of action. The remedial rights aris-

ing therefrom, and the remedies tliemselves corresponding thereto,

will be threefold, and all of them legal : namely, (1) the right to

be restored to possession, with the actual relief of restored pos-

b ·th lefendant wrong while th remed is he con ummation
or "ati .. faction of thi remeclial right. :t rom one cau e of a tion
that is from one primar right an one d lict being a br ach
thereof it is po .. ible, and not at all uncommon that wo or
more remedial right ma; ari
and therefore t\Y or mor differen kinds of rnlief an
rm to h e ·eparate remedial rights .
Thi i e pecially so when one remedial right and corre ponding
relief are legal and the o her equitable · but it i .. not confined t
uch ca e .
ne or two er familiar exampl s will u:fficien ly
illu "trate thi tatement and will how the ne e sity a well as
the ea e of di criminatin between the ca e of action
nd the
rerned ·. Let the fac t which con titute the plaintiff primary
rio-h be 't contract duly entered into by which the defendant
aO'reed to conve to the plaintiff a parcel of land, and full payment b he plain iff of the tipulated price and performance of
· 11 oth r ipulation on hi ' part. Let the d lict be a ref al by
the defendant to perform on hi part. Thi i be cau e of action and it i. plainly sin le. From it there ari e two remedial
right , nd t\\'O corre ponding kind of relief; namely he remedial ri ht to a compensation in dama e with the relief of actual
pecuniar damage ; and the remedial right to an actual performance of the agr emeut, and the relief of an execution and delivery of the deed of conveyance. If the plaintiff in one action
hould tn.ve the foregoinO' fac con tituting hi cau e of action
and hould demand judgment in the alternative either f r dama e or for a peci:fic performance he would, a the anal i above
giYen conclu ivel' how have alleO' cl but one cau e of action
although the relief prayed for would Le di tinct and would ha e
belon cl under he old sy't m t liff rent forum , - the common
law an the equity court . \.gain : le the plaintiff primary
right 1 e the wn r hip and ri ht t po e sion f a certain tract
of land, and let the fact from which it ari e be properly alleged;
let the cl lict c n i ·t in the defen lan ' wrongful taking and reta.inino- po. e . ion and u r of u h lan l for a
ified I ri cl of
time and let th fact. . h "·inb hi wr ng be pr p rly averred in
th . am pl a in . EYicl 1 1 the plaintiff will l e tate one
inrrl ancl Yery imple cau
f • c ion. The r m
in therefr m n h rem cli
h
el
will b hreef 1 and all f th m 1 gal : nam 1
i n with the actual reli f
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session ; (2) the right to obtain compensation in damages for the

wrongful withholding of the land, with the relief of actual pecu-

niary damages ; and (3) the right to recover the rents and profits

received by the defendant during the period of his possession,

with the relief of an actual pecuniary sum in satisfaction therefor.

Here, also, the single nature of the one cause of action plainly

appears, and its .evident distinction from the various remedial

rights and actual remedies which do or may arise from it.^

§ 349. * 455. Test in Determining whether Different Causes of

Action have been stated. Caution in Applying Test. The result of

this analysis of tlie necessary elements which enter into every

action is simple, easily to be understood, and yet exceedingly im-

portant ; and the principle I have thus deduced will serve as an

unerring test in determining whether different causes of action

have been joined in a pleading, or whether one alone has been

stated. If the facts alleged show one primary right of the plain-

tiff, and one wrong done by the defendant which involves that

right, the plaintiff has stated but a single cause of action, no

{A matter how many forms and kinds of relief he may claim that he
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^,/is entitled to, and may ask to recover ; the relief is no part of the

cause of action. In applying this test, however, it must be ob-

served that the single primary riglit, and the single wrong, which,

taken togetlier, constitute the one cause of action, may eacli be

very comj^licated. For example, the primary right of ownership

includes not only the particular subordinate rights to use th^

thing owned in any manner permitted by the law, but also similar!

rights to the forbearance on the part of all mankind to molest the/

proprietor in such use. The facts which constitute the delicti

complained of may, embrace not only the wrongful obtaining, ana

keeping possession, in such a case as the one last supposed, but

also the procuring and holding deeds of conveyance, or other

muniiheats^pf title^jDy which such possession is made possible^

and to appear rightful. These suggestions are necessary to guard

against the mistake of supposing that a distinct cause of action

1 The fact that the codes generally See Larned r. Hudson, 57 N. Y. 151, which

seem to treat these different claims for is based entirely upon the language of the

relief as distinct causes of action does not statute.

affect the correctness of my analysis; they [^Christensen v. Hollingsworth (1898),

are plainly no more than separate reliefs 6 Idaho, 87, 53 Pac. 211 ; Vermont Loan &

or remedies based upon the same facts Trust Co. v. McGregor (1897), 5 Idaho,

which constitute a single cause of action. 320, 51 Pac. 102.J

30

ses ion; (2) the right to obtain comp nsation in damages f r tl1e
wrongful ' ithholding of the land, with the r lief of actual peeuniary damages; and (3) th right to recover the rent and profit
received by the defendant during the period f hi · posse sion,
with the relief of an actual pecuniary sum in atisfaction therefor.
Here, also, the ingle nature of the one cause of action plainly
appears, and its evicl nt di tinction from the various remedial
right and actual remedies which do or may arise from it. 1
§ 349. * 455. Test in Determining whether Different Causes of
Action have been stated. Caution in Applying Test. The result of
thi ~nalysis of the necessary elements which enter into every
action is simple, ea ily to be understood, ancl yet exceedingly important; and the principle I have thus deduced will serve as an
unerring test in determining whether different causes of action
have been joined in a pleading, or whether one alone has been
tated. If the facts alleged sh w one primary right of the plaintiff, and one wrong done by the defendant which involves that
right, the plaintiff has stated but a single cause of action, no
matter how many forms and kinds of relief he may claim that he
i entitled to, and may ask to recover; the relief is no part of the
cause of action. In applying this test, however, it must be observed that the single primary right, and the single wrong, which,
taken together, constitute the one cause of action, may each be
very complicated. For example, the primary right of ownership
includes not only the particular subordinate rights to use the
thing owned in any manner permitted by the law, but also imilar
rights to the forbearance on the part of all mankind to molest the
(
proprietor in such use. The facts which constitute the delic
complained of may embrace not only the wrongful obtaining, an
keeping possession, in such a case as the one fast supposed, bu
aL o the procuring and holding deed ' of conveyance, or other
muniment 'Of title, by whi ch such possession is made possible
and to a_ppear rightful. The e suggestions are necessary to guard
___..-again t the mista.ke of supposing that a distinct cau e of action
1 The fact that the codes generally
seem to treat these different claims for
r elief a distinct cause of action does not
affect the correctne s of my analy i ; they
are plainly no more than separate reliefs
or remedies based upon the :;ame facts
which constitute a ingle cau c of action.

See Larned v. Hud on, 57 N. Y. 151 , which
is based entirely upon the language of the
tatute.
[Clui ten en v. Holling worth ( l 98),
6 Idaho, 87, 53 Pac. 21 l; Yermont Loan &
Tru t Co. v. IcGregor (189i), 5 Idaho,
320, 51 Pac. 102.J
30
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will arise from each special subordinate right included in the

general primary right held by the plaintiff, or from each particular

act of wrong, which, in connection with others, may make up the

composite but single delict complained of.^

1 r Different Kinds of Itclief frotn one

ill ari e from each pecial ubordinate right included in tl
n ral prim ry right held by the plaintiff or from ach particular
0
a
f wr ng, which, in connecti n with other , may make up the
mp ite but ~ ingle delict complained of.l

Cause of Action,

" The first common tirouml of demurrer

is that several causes of action are improp-

erly united. A general rule governing

such objections as this is that a complaint

in equity is not multifarious which presents

but one primary right for enforcement, or

one subject of action for adjudication,

though it may pray for many and various

forms of relief, all germane to that single

subject of the action, or to the vindication

of that primary right : " Level Land Co.

V. Sivyer (190l"), 1^2 Wis. 442, 88 N. W.

ett v. Fair llaYen & W.R. o. (1900), 73
onn. 42 , 47 Atl. 763; Anglin ''· 'ouley
'The fir t common ground of demurrer {1903), -Ky.-. 71 . W. 926; :'lfi te:h 11
i- that everal cau e of action are improp- v. J w Farmer ' Bank 'fru ·tee ( 19 1 )
rly united. A general rule governing -Ky.-, 60 . W. 37;-; Hne·ton u. Mi·. (1 99),
u b objection a thi i. that a complaint ·i ippi & Rnm Rin~r Boom
76 Minn. 251, 79 N. W. 9_ · hica<YO, Ro ·k
iu equity i not multifarious which pre ent
but one primary rio-h t for enforcement, or I ·laml, & P. Ry. Co. v. Hayw otl & on
ooe ubject of action for adjudicati on, (1897), 102 Ia. 392, 'il N. \\r. 35 ; Eagle
Iron ·work n. Railway Co. ( l 897), 101 Ia.
though it may pray for many and variou
form of relief, all germane to that illgle 2 9, 70 . W . 193; Glo"er v. arcy (1 94),
ubject of the action, or to the vindication 92 Ia. 286, 60 ... IV. 53 l ; Baxter v. Camp
of that primary right:" LeYel Land Co. (1 9 ) 71 onn. 245, 41 Atl. 03. But ee
v. iv_ver (1901), 112 Wis. 442, 8 N. W. Ramsdell v. Clark (1 97), 20 !II nt. 103,
317; Imperial hale Brick Co. v. Jewett 49 Pac. 591 ; raft Refrigeratiu('J' :\facbiue
(1901), 169 . Y. 143, 62 . E.167; White- Co. v. Quinnipiac Brewil!g C'o. (1 93), G
head v. weet (1 .. 99), 126 Cal. 67, 58 Pac. Conn. 551, 29 tl. 76, in whi ch the coun
aid : ' Separate counts are required for
3i6.
ee also \Va hington ational Bank
v. Woodrum (189 ), 60 Kan. 34, 55 Pac.
eparate and distinct cause of action, but
330; 'herrin v. Flinn (1900), 155 Ind. not for the pr selltation of Repar:ite and
422, 5
. E. 5+9 ; Gunder v. Tibbits di. Linet claim for relief fountlecl n the
( L 99 ), 153 Ind. 591, 55 . E. 762; Darby same cau e of actiou or tran actiou.'
v. ::\1. K. & T. Ry. Co. ( 1900), 156 1\Io. 391,
See al o Threatt v. Mining o. (1 96),
57 . W. 550; Pr.var v . Kansas City (1899) , 49 S. C. 95, 26 . E. 9i0, from whi l' h the
153 Mo. 135, 54 . W. 499; Ris ler v. Ins. following is qi10ted: '"The fir t and econtl
o. (l 99), 150 Mo. 366, 51 S. W. 755; gr unds of appeal are intended to allege
Wheeler avings Bank v. Tracey (1 97), error in the refu. al of the ,ir uit Judge
Ul Mo. 252, 42 ::S. W. 9-16; ~fointo h v. to grant defendant' motion to requir th
Rankin (1896), 134 fo. 340, 35 S. w. plaintiff to elect whi ·h one f the e'' ral
95; Thomp on v. Harri ( 1902), 64 Kan. cau e of acti n et out in the omplaint he
124, 67 Pac. 4 56 ;
heppard v. Green would go to trial upon. No d ubt exi t
(1 96), 4
. C. 165, 26 . '. 224, quoting that the
ircuit Judge m t thi hme
the text; Adkin v. Loucks (1900), 107
quarely; h de ided that the c mplaint
Wi . 5 7, 83 . W. 934; Jordan v. E tate stated but one cau e of a tion. W th i
of Warner (1900), 107 Wi . 539; 83 N. W. error 1 .. . A.ft r all it re olve it elf into
94G; Fo ter v. Po on {1 99), 105 Wis. 99, a que tiou of what the complaint actuallv
ne r ~eY ral
l .... W. 123; P erry v. J efferie (1901 ), 61 allege , wh th r it wa.
·. C. 292, 39 S. E. 315; Aatthews v. Bank cau es of a tion. Great care mu t alwa.'
(19 l), 60 . C. 183, 38 S. E. 437; Day t'. be obser\'ed to gra p the que ti on, What
.'chneider (1896), 28
re. 457, 43 Pac. right of the plaintiff ha the cl fcnd:rnt inG.;o; H ugh i:. Hough (1 94), 25 Ore. 218, Yade<l 1 . . . What the plaintiff in th ca e
ek i t p r v ut th <l :i5 l'ac. 24!l ; Bo ick v. Barne ( 1900), 59 at bar r ally
. 22, 37 8. E. 2-1; Mew v. Railway fendant, through its milling peratiou
o. (1 99), 55 . C. 90, 32 . E. 2 ; from i1n-acling hi right of pr perty. The
I loan
I', J ail way ro. ( 1902), 64 L ,
i11jury to hi· b tom land i ne I ment
:3 !J, 42 S. E. 197 ; Fal'ley i· . Ba ket a11cl i11 t,l1i. iuvasion of hiR right £ prop r y;
Ve11 Pr 'o. (1 !JI}, 51 S. . 222, 2 • '. E. the injllry o hi. ri rht
wat r bi tock
I !r3; .faekius t'. Die· kin 011 ( 1 93), 39 , '.
in th • Lream is a not.her 1 m nt; the i o43 , 17 .'. B !l!J6; J)aw on t'. :\far. h ju ry to pure air at hi home i an t..her
(l!J02), i4 C1mu. 49, 51 \ ti. 52!J; Brodlemeut; tlic injnry to hi fi hing pri\"ilcg
l

[Different Kinds of :Relief from one
Cau e of Action.

T.
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317; Imperial Shale Brick Co. v. Jewett

(1901), 169 N. Y. 143, 62N. E.167; White-

head V. Sweet (1899), 126 Cal. 67, 58 Pac.

376. See also Washington National Bank

V. Woodrum (1898), 60 Kan. 34, 55 Pac.

330; Sherrin v. Flinn (1900), 155 Ind.

422, 58 N. E. 549 ; Gunder v. Tibbits

(1899), 153 Ind. 591, 55 N. E. 7G2 ; Darby

V. M. K. & T. Ky. Co. (1900), 156 Mo. 391,

57 S. W. 550; Pryor v. Kansas City (1899),

153 Mo. 135, 54 S. W. 499 ; Rissler v. Ins.

Co. (1899), 150 Mo. 366, 51 S. W. 755;

Wheeler Savings Bank v. Tracey (1897),

141 Mo. 252, 42 S. W. 946; Mcintosh v.

Kaukin (189G), 134 Mo. 340, 35 S. W-

995; Thompson f. Harris (1902), 64 Kan.

124, 67 Pac. 456; Sheppard v. Green

(1896), 48 S. C. 165, 26 S. E. 224, quoting

the te.xt; Adkins v. Loucks (1900), 107

Wis. 587, 83 N. W. 934; Jordan v. Estate

of Warner (1900), 107 Wis. 539 ; 83 N. W.

94G; Fo.ster v. Posson (1899), 105 Wis. 99,

81 N. W. 123 ; Perry v. Jefferies (1901 ), 61

S. C. 292, 39 S. E. 315 ; Matthews v. Bauk

(1901), 60 S. C. 183, 38 S. E. 437; Day v.

Schneider (1896), 28 Ore. 457, 43 Pac.

6.'.0; Hough V. Hough (1894), 25 Ore. 218,

35 Pac. 249; Bostick v. Barnes (1900), 59

S. C. 22, 37 S. E. 24; Mew v. Railway

Co. (1899), 55 S. C. 90, 32 S. E. 828;

Sloan V. Railway Co. (1902), 64 S. C.

389, 42 S. E. 197; Farley v. Basket and

Veneer Co. (1897), 51 S. C. 222, 28 S. E.

193 ; Jackins v. Dickin.son (1893), 39 S. C.

436. 17 S. E. 996; I)aw.«on v. Marsh

(1902), 74 Conn. 498, 51 At). 529; Brock-

ett 1-. Fair Haven & W. R. Co. (1900), 73

Conn. 428, 47 Atl. 763 ; Angliu c. Couloy

(1903),— Ky.—, 71 S. W. 926; :\Iitchc]l

V. New Farmers' Bank's Trustee (1901),

— Ky.— , 60 S. W. 375; Hueston v. Mis-

sissippi & Rum River Boom Co. (1899),

76 Minn. 251, 79 N. W. 92; Chicago. Rock

Island, & P. Ry. Co. v. Haywood & Sou

(1897), 102 la. 392, 71 N. W. 358; Eagle

Iron Works v. Railway Co. (1897), 101 la.

289, 70 N. W. 193; Glover I'.Narcy (1894),

92 la. 286, 60 N. W. 531 ; Baxter i;. Camp

(1898), 71 Conn. 243,41 Atl. 803. But see

Ramsdell v. Clark (1897), 20 Mont. 103,
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§ 350. * 456. Two or more Distinct Rights each Invaded by Dis-

tinct Wrongs, and t"wo Rights Invaded by one and the same Wrong,

§ 350. * 436.

Two or more Di'Stinct Rights each I nvaded by Dis-

or one Right Broken by two Separate Wrongs. Oil the other

hand, if the facts alleged in the pleading show that the plaintiff

is possessed of two or more distinct and separate primary rights,

each of which has been invaded, or that the defendant has coiii-

niitted two or more distinct and separate wrongs, it follows inevi-

tably, from the foregoing principle, that the plaintiff has united

two or more causes of action, although the remedial rights aris-

ing from each, and the corresponding reliefs, may be exactly of

the same kind and nature. If two separate and distinct primary

rights could be invaded by one and the same wrong, or if the

single primary right should be invaded by two distinct and sepa-

rate legal wrongs, in either case two causes of action would re-

sult ; a fortiori must this be so when the two primary rights are

each broken by a separate and distinct wrong.

§ 351. * 457. General Principle Drawn from Analysis of Essen-

tial Elements of a Judicial Action. The general principle which I

have thus drawn from an analysis of the essential elements which
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make up a judicial action can be applied to all possible cases, and

v.'ill furnish a sure and simple test by which to determine whether

one or more causes of action have been embodied in any complaint

or petition.^ The demand for relief must be entirely disregarded ;

in sucH stream is another element; tlie in- ing at the wliole pleading, there is more

jury to the two neighborhood roads is an- than one primary right presented thereby

other element; tlie injury to his ditches for vindication. There may be many

another element ; and the injury to the air minor subjects, and facts may be stated

he breathes while in his bottom lands is constituting independent grounds for re-

another element. All these elements enter lief, either as between the plaintiff and all

in to complete the alleged wrong to plain- the defendants, or the former and one of

tiff by this defendant tlirough his milling the latter, or between defendants, and

operations. The Circuit Judge evidently there be still but a single primary purpose

took this view of the complaint when he of the suit, with which all the other mat-

overruled this objection to it. We take the ters are so connected as to be reasonably

tinct Wrongs, and two Rights Invaded by o ne and the same Wrong,

On th ' other
hand, if the fact allege<l in th pleading show that the plaintiff
i po e sed of two or more distinct and se1 ara.te primary right ,
eac h of which has been invaded, or that the cl fo ndant has committ d two or more distinct and separate wrongs, it follows inevitably, from the foregoing principle, that the plaintiff has uni ted
two or more causes of action, although the remedia.l rights ari ing from each, and the corresponding reli efs, may be exactly of
the same kind and nature. If two separate and distinct primary
rights could be invaded by one and the same wrong, or if the
single primary right should be invaded by two distinct and separate legal wrongs, in either case two causes of action would result; a fortiori must this be so when the two primary rights are
each broken by a separate and distinct wrong.
§ 351. * 457. General Princi p le Drawn from Analysis of E sse ntial E l ements of a J u dicial Action. The general principle wl1ich I
have thus drawn from an analy sis of the essential elements which
make up a judicial action can be applied to all possible cases, and
will furnish a sure anJ simple test by which to determine whether
one or more causes of action have been embodied in any complaint
or petition. 1 The demand for relief must be entirely disregarded ;
or one Right Broken by two S eparate Wron gs.

same view of tliis matter, and, therefore, considered germane thereto, — parts of one

overrule these two exceptions." Wildinan entire subject, presenting to the court but

V Wildman (1898), 70 Conn. 700, 41 Atl. one ])rimary ground i'or invoking its juris-

1 ; South Bend Chilled I*low Co. u. George diction. That was the rule before the

C. Cribb Co. (1900), 105 Wis. 443, 81 code, and it was preserved thereby iu un-

N. W. 839.] mistakable language, as this court has said

1 \_Test to determiue tvhHher Plnad- On many occasions:" Herman v. Felthou-

inff states one, or more than one, sen (1902), 114 Wis. 423, 90 N. W. 432.

Cause of Action. Sec also Level Laud Co. v. Sivyer (1901),

" The test to be applied in order to de- 112 Wis. 442, 88 N. W. 317. " The infal-

termine whether a complaint states more lible test, by which to determine whether

than one cause of action, is whether, look- a complaint states more than one cause of

in sucli stream is another element; the injury to the two nei ghb orhood roads is another element; th e injury to his ditches
another element; and the injury to the air
he breathes while in his bottom lands is
another element. .All th ese element enter
in to complete the alleged wrong to plaintiff by this defendant through his milling
operations. The Circuit Judge ev id ently
t oo k t his view of the complaint wh en he
overruled thi. objection to it. We tak e the
same view of this matter, and, th erefore,
ornrrule the e two exceptions." Wildman
v \Vildman (1 898), 70 Co nn . 700, 41 At!.
l ; South Bend Chilled P low Co. v. George
C. Cribb Co. (1900), 105 Wi ·. 4.J.3, 81
N. W. 839 .J
1

[Test to d ete1"rni1w wh ethe1· Pleading states one, 01· nwre thrtn one,
Cause of Action.

"The test to be applied in order to determine whether a co mpl aint states more
than one cause of action, is whether, look-

ing at the whole plead in g, there is more
than one primary rig ht presented thereby
for vindication. There may be mauy
minor subjects, and facts may be stated
constituting independent grounds for reli e t~ either as between the plaintiff and all
th e defe ndants, or the fo rm er and one of
the latter, or between defendants, and
there be still but a si ng le primary purpose
of the suit, with whi ch all the other matt ers are so conne~ted as to be reasonably
con idered ge rmane thereto, - part of one
entire subject, present ing to the court but
on e prim ar_v grouncl for invoking its jurisdiction. That was the rule befo re the
code, aud it was pre crv ed there by in unmistakable lan guage, a this c.:ourt ha· said
on man y oc.:ca ·ions :" Herman v. F elthouen (1902), 114 Wis. 423, 90 N. W . 432.
Sec also Le,·el Laud Co. v. S ivyer (1901),
112 Wis. 442, 8 N. W. 317. "The infallibl e test, b\' whic h to dete r mine whether
a c~mplaiut. ~tatcs more than oue cause of

4
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whether single or complex, it

effect upon, the " cause of action,

action, is, Does it present more than one

subject of action or primary right for ad-

judication 1 ... If it stand that test, no

matter how many incidental matters may

be connected with the primary right, ren-

dering other parties than the main defend-

ant i)roper or necessary to the litigation

for a complete settlement of the contro-

versy as to plaintiff, or for the due protec-

tion of their rights as against him or

between tliemselves, there is yet but one

cause of action, and a demurrer upon the

ground of tlie improper joinder of causes

of action will not lie : " Adkius r. Loucks

(I'JOO). 107 Wis. 587, 83 N. W. 934.

'■ As has often been said by this court,
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the test of wliether there is more than one

cause of action stated in a complaint is not

whether there are different kinds of relief

prayed for or objects sought, but wlietlier

there is more than one primary right

sought to be enforced or one sul)ji'ct of

controversy presented for adjudication ; "

South Bend Chilled Plow Co. v. Geori^e C.

Cribb Co. (1900), 105 Wis. 443, 81 N. W.

675. See also Zinc Carbonate Co. v. The

rirst National Hank of Shullsburg (1899),

103 Wis. 125, 79 N. W. 229; Gager

r. Marsden (1899), 101 Wis. 598, 77 N. W.

922. In Threatt v. Mining Co. (1896), 49

S. C. 95, 26 S. E. 970, it is said: "Great

care must always l)e observed to grasp the

question, What right of the plaintiif has

the defendant invaded ■? "

The test prescribed in the text was

adopted in the case of lleilly v. Sicilian

Asphalt Paving Co. (1902), 170 N. Y. 40,

62 X. E. 772. In this case it was claimed

by appellant "that while driving in Cen-

tral Park in the city of New York both

his person and his vehicle were injured in

conse(|uence of collision with a gravel

heap jjlaced on the road throuirh tb.e neg-

ligence of the defendant. Thereupon he

brought an action against the defendant

in the Court of Common Pleas to recover

damages for the injury to his person. Sub-

sequently he brougiit another action in one

of tiie District C<jurts in tiie city of New

York to recover for the injury to his vehi-

cle. In this la.st action he obtained jmig-

ment, which was paid by the defendant.

Thereafter the defendant set up by sup-

forms no part of, and has no

,"" Rejecting, therefore, all those

plemental answer the judgment in the

District Court suit, and its satisfaction as

a bar to the further maintenance of the

action in the Common Pleas." On the

trial in the Supreme Court " it was held

that the plaintiff's right of action was

merged in the judgment recovered in the

District Court and his complaint was dis-

missed. The judgment entered upon this

direction was affirmed by the Appellate

Division." The Court of Appeals, revers-

wheth r m le or complex, it form no part of, and has no
ff ·t upon, th ' cau e of action.'
jecting, therefore, all those
action, i , D e it pre ent more than one plemental an wer the judgrn nt in the
·ubj ct of action or primary right for atl- Di ·trict ourt • uit, and it ati fa tion a
judicatiuu ? .•. If iL taud that te , no a bar t the further rnaintenan e of the
matt r h w man . incidental matter· may action in the
omrnou Pl a ."
n the
be c nnec.:te<l with the primary right, ren- trial in the upreme ourt " it wa held
derina oth r partie than the main def nd- that the plaintiff' right of action wa
ant prupeL· or nece ary to the litigation merged in the judgment recovered in the
for a complete ettlement of the contro- Di trict ourt and hi complaint wa di ver y
t plaintiff, or for the due protec- mi ed. The judgment entered upon thi
ti n of their right a agaiu t him or direction wa affirmed by the Appellate
between them el ve , there i yet but one Di vi ion." The ourt of Appeal , reYer cau e of action, and a demu rr r upon the iua the judgment appealed from, aid:
"The que tio n now b fore u ha been the
gr uutl f the improper joinder of cau ~e
ubj ect of eouftictiug deci i n iu diff r nt
of action will not lie: " Adkin l'· L uck
juri d ictions.
In Eugla11 l it ha beea
(1900), 107 Wi -. 5 7, 3 N. W . 93+.
o urt of \ p al, Lord
1.. A has ofren been aid by thi co urt, held by th
the te·t of wh ther there i mor than one rid ge, Ch ief Ju ·tic.:e, di· en ting. that da111-.
cau of actiou tateJ in a comp!aint i not age. to person and to pr p ·rt. , thouah
whether there are different kind , of reli ef occasiuuecl L>y the ame wrongful a ·t. g i1 e
praye l for or object sought, but whether ri e to different cau.es of a ·tion (I3ru11 ·there i more than one primary right den v. llnrnphrey, L. R. [14
. 13. D .]
sought to be enforced or one ubject of 141); whi le in Ma a hu. etts, Minn ota.,
contro\"er y pre ented for a<lj udication : " and :.ri onri the coutrary d ctrine Ila~
'outh B nd Chilled Plow Co. v. George C. be n declared (Doran v.
oheu, l+i
,ribb ,o . (1900), 105 \Vi . 4'1-3, l r. \Y. .Ma s. 342; Kina v. Chicago, M . & , t. P.
675. , e also Zinc arhonate Co. z·. The Hy. 'o., 2 N. W. Rep. l l l3;
ou ~ raatein v. Windler, 2 Mo. App. !59 ). The
Fir t "Natioual Bank of hulL'iburg (1899),
10.'3 \Vi . 125, 79 N. W. 229; Gager argument of those court whic.:h maintain
1•. Mar ·d n (l899), 101 Wi . 598, 77 "N. W.
that an injury to per ·on and pr p rty
922. In Threatt v. Mining Co. ( 1896}, 49 create but a single cause of a tion i th:\t
. C. 95, 26 . E. 9i0, it i aid: "Great a the defendant's wrongful act wa . ingle,
care mu t always be ob erved to gra p the the au e of action mu t be ~ingl , and
que tion, What right of the plaintiff ha
that the different injurie occa ioned by it
the d fendaut in,·ad d?"
ar m r 1 ' item of d:image pro eeding
Tl e te t pre cribed in the text 1rn
from the ame wrong, while that of the
adopted in the ca e of Reilly v 'icilian Engli -h court i that then g ligeut act of
phalt Pavina Co. ( 1902) , l~O r. Y. 40, the d f ndant in it elf con titute no cau::;e
62 X. E. ii2. In thi ca cit was ·laimed of action and become an actionabl wr 11""
by appellant "that while dri1·ing in en- only out of the damage whieh it cau.e .
tral l': rk in the city of .._"ew Y rk both
done a
oon a th
hi per n and Ii ' vehicle were injur d in
con equ!lHCe of colli ion with a gravel
heap placed on the roa.d through th ne~ wrona aro::: a
lige11c·e of the d feudaut. Thereupon he
brought an a tion ag, in t the tlefondaut
in th 'ourt f ommon Pl a- t recoY r
damag for the inju ry t hi p r -on ....·ubqu ully h , brought anoth 'l' action iu on
of the Di ·~ rict ourt in th ·it\' f ~ 'ew YChi ·l
York to recover for the injury
his "chicle. In thi last acti n he btained jndg11t , \\ hich wa' pai cl h.v the d f 11 la11 .
Tb reaf~er the def rnla11t et up by ·u1-

t;
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portions of the pleading which describe the remedy or relief de-

manded, the inquiry should be directed exclusively to the allega-

botli tlie horse and the vehicle, being the faction. Ujjon the trial below, judgment

jToperty of the same person, were injured, was rendered for the ftiil amount, and de-

tliere would be but a single cause of action fendant appeals." In the course of the

for the damage to both. If, wiiile in- opinion it is said : " 'I'he learned trial

jury to the horse and vehicle of a person judge, in a carefully written memoran

gives rise to but a single cause of action, dum, based his decision upon the proposi-

injury to the vehicle and its owner gives tion that at the common law every person

rise to two causes of action, it must be was possessed of two distinct primary

because there is an e.ssential difference

between an injury to the person and an

injury to property that makes it imprac-

ticable or, at least, very inconveinent in

the administration of justice to Ideud the

two. We think tliere is such a distinc-

tion. . . . While some of the difiiculties

in the joinder of a claim for injury to the
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person and one for injury to the property

in one cause of action are created by our

statutory enactments, tbe history of the

common law shows that the distinction

between torts to the person and torts to

property has always obtained. . . . Tliere-

)re, for reason of the great difference

riyhts, — the right of personal security

and the right of private property, — and

that a di.stinct cause of action arose from

an infringement of either. And, it is

argued, these rights have been carried

into our system of jurisprudence, and

remedies provided for their preservation ;

that the constitution guarantees a certain

remedy by tlie law for injuries thereto;

that statutes have been enacted with the

special purpose of keeping these rights

separate and distinct, in order that the

remedy for an infringement of each may

he enforced without reference to the other,

as the statute of limitations . . . ; also,

lietween the rules of law a])plicable to the statute providing what causes of ac-

injuries of the person and those relating tions survive. Counsel for respondent,

to injuries to property, we conclude that taking this distribution of primary rights

an injury to person and one to property, as a basis, have argued ably that it ueces-

though resulting from the same tortious sarily follows that the cause of action in

act, constitute different causes of action." this case did not consist of the act of neg-

To the^sarae effect, see Watson v. Kail-

way Co* (1894), 8 Tex. Civ. App. 144, 27

S. W. 924.

The author's test, however, was rejected

in King v. Chicago, M. & St P. Ky. Co.

(1900), 80 Minn. 83, 82 N. W. 111.3. In

this case the facts were as follows : '' Plain-

tiff, while riding in and driving his wagon

across defendant's tracks, was run into by

defendant's train. As a result, he was

])ersonally injured, and the wagon and

horses and harness were damaged. There-

ligence on the part of the defendant in

injuring the plaintiff and his property, but

the cause of action arose from the results

of the act; that instantly upon the strik-

ing and throwing of plaintiff by the engine

the cause of action arose for injury to his

person, and another cause arose as soon as

plaintiff's enjoyment of his pro])erty was in-

terfered with. . . . We are of the opinion

that the cause of the action consists of the

portions of the pl acling \Yhi ·h de cribe the r m ly or relief demanded, t he inquiry sh ukl b c.lir te<l exclu ively to tl1e allegaboth the horse and the vehiel , being th
faction. "Cpon the trial b low, judgment
property of the same per ·on. were i 11j Ltr •d, was rendered for the foll arnount, aucl l!Cthere would be but a ingle cause of acti on f n<laut appeal ·." In th cou r ·e of the
for the damage to both. If, while in- opinion it is said: "T he learned trial
jury to the horse and vehicle of a J ersou judge, in a car 'fully written memornu
gives ri e to but a iugle cau e of aetion, dum, based his decision upon the propo:iinjury to the vehicle and its owner gives tiou that at the common law every per on
rise to two causes of action, it mu!'t l.Je was posse sed of two di tiuct vrimary
because there is an essential di ff rence rights, - the right of per onal security
between an injury to the per on am! au and the ri g ht of private property, - and
injury to property that makes it irnprac- that a di tiuct cause of actio11 aro e from
ticable or, at least, very inconv e11i e11 t iu an infriugemci;t of either. And, it is
the admiuistration of justice to l.Jlc11d the argued, the e rights have been carried
two. We thiuk there is such a cli. tinc- iuto our syste m of jurisµ rud ence, and
tion . . .. While some of the difficulties remedi es pro\·ided for th ei r preservation ;
in the joinder of a claim for injury to the that the con,: ti LU tion g uarantee a certain
pe r:on and oue for inj ury to the property remedy Ly th e law for injuries thereto;
in one cause of action are created by our that statutes have been e11acted with the
statutory euactments, the hi. tory of the special purpose of keeping these rights
common law shows that the di tinction separate aud distinct, in order that the
between to rts to the person and torts to remedy fo r an infringemeut of each may
property has always obr.ai ued . . . . There- be enforced without reference to the other,
fore, for reason of the great difference as the statute of l imitations . . . ; also,
between the r ules of law appli cable to the statute providi ng what causes of acinj uries of the perso n and t hose r elating tions surv ive. Coun el fo r respondent,
tu inj uri es to property, we conclude that taki ng th is distribution of primary rights
an injury to person a nd one to property, as a Las is, have argued ab ly that it uece:;t houg h r e. ult in g from the ame tor tious sarily follows that the cau e of action in
act, constitute differe11 t causes of action ." this C'ase did 11ot eonsist of the ad, of negT o the same effect, see Watson v. Hai l- ligence on the part of the defendant in
way Co~ ( 1894), 8 Tex. Civ. App. 144, 2 i iujuring the plaintiff and his property, but
the cause of action arose from the results
8. w . 924.
The a uthor·s test, however, was rejeeted of the act; that instantly upon the strikin Kin g v. Chi c·ago, M. & St P. Hy. Co. ing and throwiug of plaintiff by the engine
(1900), 80 Mi1111. 83, 82 N. W. 111 3. In the eause of action arose for injury to liis
this case the facts were as follows: "Plain- person, and another cause arose as soon as
tiff, wh ile rid i11 g in a11 d dr iving h is wagon plaintiff's enjoyment of his property was inacross defendant's tracks, was run into by terfered with . . . . \Ve are of the opi11ion
defendant's train. As a result , he was that the ca use of the action consists of the
personally injured, and the wagon and negligent act which produced the effect,
horses aud harness were damaged. There- rather than in the effect of the act in its
after plaintiff brou g ht an action again st applirntion to d ifferent primary rights,
defendant to recover for the injuries uf- and that the injury to the per on and
fered in his person, and secured a judg- property as a result of the original cause
ment for $ 1,000. While that action was gives rise to different items of damage.
till pending on appeal in this court .. . . .. The views we have adopted seem to
plaintiff commenced the pre ent proceed- us more in harmony with the tendency
ing to recover the damage su tained by towards simplicity and directn e s in tbe
the injury to the horses, wagon, and har- determination of controve rsial rights.
ness, alleged to be $225. As a defence to That rule of con truc·tiou should be
this action, defendant pleaded the former adopted which will most peedily and
jn<l '.! ment as a bar, and, by an am endment econom ically bring litigation to an end,
larer , pleaded its full payment and satis- if at the same time it conserves the ends
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tions of fact which set forth the primaiy right of the plaintiff and

the wrong done by the defendant. If one such right alone, how-

ever comprehensive, is asserted, and if one such wrong alone,

however complex, is complained of, but one cause of action is

alleged.^ If the examination discloses more than one distinct and

independent primary right held by the plaintiff, and all of them

invaded by the defendant, or more than one distinct and inde-

pendent wrong done by the defendant to the plaintiff's primary

right or rights, then the complaint or petition has united different

causes of action, and the rules which control their joinder are

brought into opei'ation.^

of justice. There is nothing to be gained

in splitting up the rights of au injured

party as iu this case, and much may be

saved if one action is made to cover the

subject." Judgment reversed. See also

t i n , of fa.ct whicl

et for th he primary righ t of the plaintiff and
th wrong tlone by h defendant. If one su h right alon , howver comr rehensive, i a ' er eel, antl if on ' t:mch wrong alon ,
h w ver
mplex i complained of, but on
a.u of ac i n i
, llegecl.1 If th xamination di clo e more than one di inc and
ind penden t primary ri h held by the plaintiff, and all of th m
i1waded by th defendan , or more than ne di ' tinct and ind penden t wrong don by the defendant to th plaintiff primary
right or rio·ht . , th n the complaint or petition h· united diff r nt
cau
of action, and the rules which control their j ind r are
brou h t into op rati n. 2

Foerst v. Kelso (1901), 131 Cal. 376, 63

Pac 681 ; and Hanson c. Anderson (1895),
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90 Wis. 195, 62 N. W. 1055.

^ ^Splitting a "Cause of Action."

"The rule is that a single or entire

cause of action cannot be subdivided into

several claims and separate actions main-

tained thereon. Secor v. Sturgis, 16 N. Y.

548 ; Nathans v. Hope, 77 N. Y. 420. As

of ju t ice. Tb ere is nothing to be gained
in plitting up t he rights of au injured
par ty a in thi ca. e, and much may be
aYed if one action i made t o cover the
·ubject." Judgm ent reYer eu.
ee al 0
F oer ·t l.'. K el o (1901) , 131 Cal. 376, 63
P ac. 68 l ; and Hanson v. 4nderson (1895 ),
90 Wi -. 195, 62 . W. 1055.

to this principle there is no dispute : "

lleilly r. Sicilian Asphalt Paving Co.

(1902), 170 N. Y. 40, 62 N. E. 772. See

to same effect, Brunsden v. Humphrey

(1884), L. R. [14 Q. B. D.] 141 ; King v.

Chicago, M. & St. Paul Ry. Co. (1900), 80

Minn. 83, 82 N. W. 1113; Norvell v.

Mecke (1900), 127 N. C. 401, 37 S. E. 452;

Huffman v. Knight (1900), 36 Ore. 581,

60 Pac. 207; Achey v. Creech (1899),

21 Wash. 319, 58 Pac. 208 ; Haiil i-. Sugo

(1901), 163 N. Y. 109, 62 N. E. 135 ; Pat-

node V. Westenhaver (1902), 114 Wis.

460, 90 N. W. 467 ; Smelker v. Chicago &

Northwestern R. Co. (1900), 106 Wis.

135, 81 N. W. 994 ; Richardson v. Opelt

(1900), 60 Neb. 180, 82 N. W. 377 ; Don-

nell V. Wright (1899), 147 Mo. 639, 49

S. W. 874; Fort v. Penny (1898), 122

N. C. 230. 29 S. E. 362 ; Day v. Brenton

(1897), 102 la. 482, 71 N. W. 538 ; Atlanta

Elevator Co v. Cotton Mills (1898), 106

Ga. 427. 32 .S. E. 541 ; Little v. City of

Portland (1894), 26 Ore. 235, 37 Pac. 911 ;

Insurance Co. v. Bulleue (1893), 51 Kau.

764, 33 Pac. 467 ; Hoffman v. Hoffman's

Executor (1894), 126 Mo. 486, 29 S. W.

603 ; Wheeler Savings Bank v. Tracey

(1897), 141 Mo. 252, 42 S. W. 946 ; Wild-

man V. Wildniaii (1898), 70 Conn. 700, 41

Atl. 1.3

- See Davenport r. Murray, 08 Mo.

198; Donovan v. Dunning, 69 id. 436;

Young V. Young, 81 N. C. 91. As exam-

ples of only one cause of action, altliough

several distinct reliefs are asked and ob-

tained, see the following cases : Pet>]ilc v.

Tweed, 63 N. Y. 194, 5 Hun, 3.53 ; ILiines

V. Hollister, 64 N. Y. 1 ; Boardman v. Lake

Shore & M. S. Ry. Co., 84 N. Y. 157 ; Tis-

dale V. Moore, 8 Hun, 19 ; Skidmore v. Col-

lier, 8 id. 50 ; Walters v. Continental Ins.

Co., 5 id. 343 ; Young v. Drake, 8 id. 61 ;

l

[Split tiny a " Cause of Action."

"The rule i that a sin g le or entire
cau:e of action cannot be u bdivided into
eYeral claim and eparate a ctions maintained thereon. . _ ecor v . turgi , 16 N. Y.
54 ; Nath.10 u. Hope, 77 . Y. 420. As
to thi principle th ere is no dispute: "
icili an A:phalt Paving
o.
R eilly v.
( 1902 }, 170 . Y . 40, 62 N. E. 772.
ee
to ame effect, Brun den v. Humphrey
( 1 4), L . I . (14 Q. . D.J 141; King v.
hi cago, M . & t . Paul Ry. Co . (1900}, 80
:M inn . 83, 2 N. W. 1113; ·orvell v.
Mecke {1 900 ) 127 "N". C. 401, 37 . E. 452;
Huffma n v. Knig h t ( 1900), 36 Ore. 5 1,
reech (1 99),
60 P ac. 207 ; A chey u.
2 1 W a h . 3 19 , 58 Pac. 20 ; Hahl v. ugo
( 1901 ), 16:J "N". Y . 109,6 2 :r. E.135;
atuo<le l". '\ e tenhaver ( 1902), 114 Wi.
460, 90 •. W. 4 67; ,. melk r t•. ,hicago &
_'orthwe t rn R.
o. {1 900 ), 106 '\Yi .
135, l ~·· W . 99 4 ; Hi ·har <l n v. pelt
(1900), 60 .·cb. 1 0, 82 Lr . W. 3 77 · Donuell 1·. Wright {I 99), 1-4-7 :\Io. 39 , 49
. W. 87 +; F rt v. P nuy (1 9 ), 122
• . 230, 2 S B. .'36 2 ; Day t• . Br nton
( l !17), 10:! Ia. 4 :2, 71 N. W. 5.3 · \ lan ta
E levato r o v. ottuu :'II ill: ( l 9 ), 106
a. 4 :.!7, 3 _ • •. E . 541 ; Li ttle ·. ' ity of
Po r tlan<l ( l !14), 26 Ore. 235, 37 Pac. 911;
l u u rance o. v. Bulleue ( 1 93 ), 51 Kan.

764, 33 Pac. 467; Hoffman v. Hoffman'
Executor ( l 94), 126 :'lfo. 4 6, 29 S . \Y.
aviug Bank v. Tracey
603 ; "Wheeler
(1 97), 141 Mo. 252 42 . W. 946 ; Wildman v. Wildman (1 9 ), 70 Conn. 700, 41

Atl.

1.J

2

See Da,·enport v . l\iiurray, G l\f o.
198 ; Donovan v. Dunning, 69 id. +36 ;
Y oung v. Youn g , 8 1 .1..' . C. 91. A ex, mple of only one can e of a ·tion , al t ho ,~ h
everal distinct r eli ef · are a keel and btainecl, see th e fo llowin g ca e : P opl t· .
Tweed, 63 . Y . 19..J., 5 Hun, 353; Il ain e.
v. Hollister, 64 N. Y . l ; Boardman v. Lake
hore & l\I. . R y . Co., 84 . Y. 157; Ti dale v. Moore, 8 Hun, 19; kidmore v. ollier, id. 50; Walter v.
ntinental In .
Co., 5 id. 343 · You11g v. Drake, 8 id. 61;
Prenti ·e v. Jansen, 7 id. 6; Van Wagen n
v. K mp, 7 i !. 32 ; William v. Peabocl -,
id. 271 ; Board of u per vi or v. Walbridg e, 38 Wi . 179; Lieder dorf v. Flint,
50 id. 401 ; ollins 1 . owen, 52 id. 634;
Kahn v. Kahn, 15 Fla. 400 ; Don van v.
Dunning, 69 Mo. 43<i; t wart v. Carter, 4
eb. 564; Y o rng v. Y oung, l
. 91;
Barr tt v. "\Vatt, 13 . . 441.
ee al o
W e tlake 1· . Farrow, 34 . . 270; Johnn . old r, 132 i: . Y. 116; Tuer u.
T uer., 100 N. Y. 196; Trowbridg v.
T ru . 52 onn. 190 ; Lournll v. rid] y,
al. ' 507 · rniley i·. ewee e, 1 Ind.
App. 211; L oui-y iJl , t. L . & T. Ry .
v . .1..~ afn (Ky. I 92 ) 1
. W . R p. l 30
(diffe ren t 1 m nt of damage ari in
from in 1 Lr ach of outra t.); r :wdona . Lo\'cl al, 70 al. 161 (pray r for
a batc m nt f nuisan e and d ma s). 111
t he full wiug ·a · ·, l o, it wa b lU tha t
but ne cau c ( a ction wn · lated : ay 1 s

471

JOINDER OF CAUSES OF ACTION.
JOINDER OF CAUSES OF ACTION. 471

§ 352. * 458. Cause of Action not to be confounded with

Relief. Illustrative Cases. Although the decisions do not at-

tempt to furnish any general test by which one may determine

the nature of a " cause of action," and whether a pleading con-

tains one or more, they fully recognize the fact that the cause

of action is not to be confounded with the relief, and that the

demand for or the granting of many forms of remedy may be

based upon a single cause of action. The following cases not

only exhibit the proneness to confound the remedy with the cause

of action, and the necessity of understanding the essential dis-

tinction between them, but they also illustrate, and fully sustain,

the foregoing principles, which I have proposed as the test by

which such distinction may be at once recognized : a complaint

alleged that the plaintiff, being indebted to the defendant upon

several promissory notes held by the latter, had assigned to it a

bond and mortgage as collateral security ; that the defendant had

collected the amount due on the bond and mortgage, which was

more than sufficient to pay all the notes in full ; that a surplus

was left remaining in its hands, and upon these facts demanded
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payment by the defendant of such balance, and surrender and can-

cellation of the notes so given by the plaintiff. To this complaint

the defendant demurred, on the ground that causes of action had

been improperly joined. The New York Court of Appeals held

that there was no uniting at all of different causes of action, and

that only a single one was stated, although two distinct reliefs

were demanded.^

V. Bemis, 57 Wis. 31.5 (trespass ou land, cellation of a release of the defendant foi

aggravated by injury to personal prop- liability for the injuries) ; also Damon v.

erty) ; Whatling v. Nash, 41 Hun, 579 Damon, 28 Wis. 510; Moon ?;. McKnight,

(same) ; Gilbert v. Pritchard, 41 Hun, 46 54 Wis. 551. Several of these cases ap-

(trespass on land, aggravated by assault) ; pear to consider the invasion of distinct

Butler V. Kirby, 53 Wis. 188; Loveland rights of the plaintiff by one tortious act,

■V. Garner, 71 Cal. 541 ; Thames r. Jones, or series of connected tortious acts, as

97 N. C. 121 ; Welch v. Piatt, 32 Hun, 194 ; constituting but one cause of action; thus

Lehnen i\ Purvis, 55 Hun, 535 ; United making the latter consist in the delict

States L. Ins. Co. I'. Jordan, 21 Abb. N. alone. Comjiare ^josi, p. 476, note 5. For

Cas. 330; Whitner v. Perhacs, 25 Abb. an instance of two causes of action itn-

N. Cas. 130; Newcombe i\ Chicago & properly mingled, see American Button-

§

352.

* 458.

Cause

of

Action

not to be

confounded

with

Although the decision do not attempt to furni h any general test by which one may determine
the nature of a "cause of action," and whether a pleading contains one or more, they fully recognize the fact that the cause
of action is not to be confounded with the relief, and that the
<lemand for or the granting of many forms of rem dy may be
based upo~1 a single cause of action. The following cases not
only exhibit the proneness to confound the remedy with the cause
of action, and the necessity of understanding the essential distinction between them, but they also illustrate, and fully sustain,
the foregoing principles, which I have proposed as the test by
which such distinction may be at once recognized: a complaint
alleged that the plaintiff, being indebted to the defendant upon
everal promissory notes held by the latter, had assigned to it a
bond and mortgage as collateral security; that the defendant had
collected the amount due on the bond and mortgage, which was
more than sufficient to pay all the notes in full; that a surplus
was left remaining in its hands, and upon these facts demanded
payment by the defendant of such balance, and surrender and cancellation of the notes so given by the plaintiff. To this complaint
the defendant demurred, on the ground that causes of action had
been improperly joined. The New York Court of Appeals held
that there was no uniting at all of different causes of action, and
that only a single one was stated, although two distinct reliefs
were demanded. 1
Relief.

Illustrative Cases.

N. W. Ry. Co. (N. Y. Supreme, Jan. 1890), Hole, etc. Sew. Mach. Co. v. Thornton, 28

8 N. y. Suppl. 3C6 ; Leary v. Melcher IMinn. 418.

(N. Y. Supreme, May, 1891), 14 N. Y. i Cahoon v. Bank of Utica, 7 N. Y.

Suppl. 689 ; Wickersham v. Crittenden, 486. The defendant insisted that a cause

93 Cal. 17 ; Whetstone v. Beloit Straw of action for the recovery of money was

Board Co. (Wis. 1890), 45 N. W. 535 united with one equitable in its nature,

(damages for personal injuries, and can- The court said, per Johnson J. (p. 43S);

-v. Bemis, 57 Wis. 315 (trespass ou land,
aggravated by injury to personal property); Whatling v. Nash, 41 Hun, 579
(same) ; Gilbert v. Pritchard, 41 Hun, 46
(trespass on land, aggravated by assault);
Butler v. Kirby, 53 Wis. 188; L oYeland
v. Garner, 71 Cal. 541; Thames v. Jones,
97 N. C. 121; Welch v. Platt, 32 Hun, 194;
Lehnen v . Purvis, 55 Hun, 535; United
8tates L. Ins. Co. v. Jordan, 21 1 bb. N.
Cas. 330; Whitner v. Perhacs, 25 Abb.
N. C'as. l .'3 0; Newcombe v. Chicago &
N. W. Ry. Co. (N. Y. Supreme, J an. 1890) ,
8 N. Y. Suppl. 366 · Leary v. Melcher
(~. Y. Supreme, May, 1891 ), 14
. Y.
Suppl. 689; Wickersham v. Crittenden,
93 Cal. 17; Whetstoue v. Beloit Straw
Board Co. (Wis. 1890) , 45 N. W. 535
{damages for personal injuries, and can·

cellation of a release of the defend ant for
liability for the injuries) ; also Damon v.
Damon, 28 Wis. 510; Moon v. McKnight,
54 Wis. 551. Several of these cases appear to consider the invasion of distinct
ri ghts of the plaintiff by one tortious act,
or series of connected tortious acts, as
constituting but one cause of action; thu
making the latter consist in the clelict
alone. Compare post, p. 4 76, note 5. For
an instance of two causes of action improperly mingled, see American Button·
H ole, etc. Sew. Mach. Co. v. Thornton, 28
1\Tiun. 418.
1 Cahoon v. Bank of 1Jtica, 7 N. Y.
486. The defendant in i ted that a cause
of action for the recovery of money was
united with one equitable in its natnre.
The court said, per Johnson J. (p. 48. ) :
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§ 353. * 459. Same Subject. Actions brought to reform instru-

353.

* 45

ments in writing, such as pohcies of insurance and other con- i

tracts, mortgages, deeds of conveyance, and the like, and to

enforce the same as reformed by judgments for the recovery of

rn n
tra t

m
m

. Same Subject.
ritin
u h a p li
ds f

i

ctio brou ht to r f rm rn truof m UI'< n e and h r
n1 the lik an l

the money due on tlie contracts, or for the foreclosure of the

mortgages, or for the recovery of possession of tlie laud conveyed

by the deeds, fall within the same general principle. One cause

of action only is stated in sucli cases, however various may be the

reliefs demanded and granted.^ Tlie principle also applies to

" The ground ou which this case ought to

be put is, that the complaint does not cou-

tain two causes of action. The claim is

single. . . . The plaintiff now seeks an

nforce
th 111011
n
mor ga
r for th re o
b · he 1
fall within th
f a tion nl · i · tat 1
r li f, demanded aud

the
to

account of the proceeds of the mortgage

and of their disposition, and to have the

balance paid over, and the notes which

are satisfied delivered up. It is no an-

swer to say that the balance of moneys
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could have been recovered in an action for

money had and received. It would none

the less have been the proper foundation

for a bill in equity. ... It is only be-

cause there is no dispute about the amount

due that there seems to be any room for

mistake as to the character of the claim.

If that remained to be ascertained, it

would be the clearest possible case for an

account ; and yet this case is not clearer

than the one before us. ... It is, in short,

a complaint by a debtor to have his obli-

gation delivered up and cancelled, and an

account of the securities pledged, and

payment of the surplus. That a claim so

simple in its character, so well recognized,

and even familiar, under the old practice

in chancery, should be seriously regarded

as two distinct causes of action, requiring

distinct modes of trial, and incapable of

being joined in a single suit, is quite as

surprising as the doctrine itself, if held to

be well founded, wouM be inconvenient."

See also Connor v. St. Anthony Bd. of

Ed., 10 .Minn. 4.39, 444; Sortore V Scott,

6 Lans. 271, 275, 276; Reedy v. Smith, 42

Cai. 245, 250.

1 Bidwell V. Astor Mut. Ins. Co., 10

N. y. 263 ; N. Y. Ice Co. v. N. VV. Ins.

Co., 23 N. Y. 357 ; Guernsey v. Am. Ins.

Co., 17 Minn. 104, 108 (actions to reform

a policy of insurance, and to recover the

amount dne on it as reformed); Gooding

I'. McAllister, 9 How. Pr. 123 (action to re-

form a written contract, and to recover a

money judgment upon it for the sum due

when corrected) ; McCown v. Sims, 69

N. C. 159; Rigsbee v. Trees, 21 Ind. 227

(actions to reform a promissory note, and

to recover the amount thus shown to be

due. The decision in the latter case is re-

ferred, however, to the special provision of

the Indiana code, § 72) ; Hunter v. McC^oy,

14 Ind. 528 ; McClurg v. Phillips, 49 Mo.

315, 316 (actions to reform a mortgage, to

foreclose as thus corrected, or to reform a

deed and quiet the title thereunder). Walk-

up i". Zehring, 13 Iowa, 306 (action to cor-

rect mistakes in a series of title-deeds, to set

aside anotlier deed of the same land, and

"The o-round on whi h thi ca ought to
be put i, that the complaint doe not con tain two cau e of action. The claim i
ingle. . . . The plai utiff now eek an
ac ·ount of the proceed of the mortgage
and of their di po ition, and to have the
balance paitl over, and the note which
are ati ·fied d livered up . I t i no anw r to ay that the balance of moneys
could have been recovered in an action for
m ney had and received. It would none
the le have been the prop r foundation
for a hill in equity . . . . I t i only becau e there i no di~pute about the amount
due that there eem to be any r oom for
mi take a to the character of the claim.
If that remained to be a certain ed, it
would be the cleare. t po ible ca e fo r an
account; and yet thi ca e i not clearer
than the one before u . . . . It i , in hort,
a complaint by a debtor to have hi obliation deli\•ered up and cancelled, and an
account of the ecuritie pledo-ed, and
payment of the urplu . Th at a ·laim o
imple in it character, o well recoo-nized,
and even familiar, und r th e ld practice
in chanc ry, honl<l be eriou -ly r <Yarded
a two di. tinct cnu e f action, requiring
di tinct moil
of trial, and incapaule of
!ming joiu tl in a . ing l
uit, i quit a .
urpri iug a the doctrin it elf. if h lei t
Ii w •11 found tl, woulil be inco11v ni n t."
P
al:o
ou11or r . , 't. Anthouy Bel. of
Ed , I 0 • [inu . 4-39, 4-i4; • ' ortore -v . • eott,
U La11s. 271, 275, 276; J e ·dy ~. mith 42
'al. 245, 250.
I Bidwell i'. . \ -t or :\fnt. Iu
o., 16
... •. Y 2fi3 ; • •. Y. I c, o. 1·. ~ • W . Ins.
f'o ., 23 J Y. 357; 'u r11 ey v. Am. In s.
_,u., 17 ::\!inn. 1 4-, 10 (ac·tion . to r form
a p<>liry of iwnranc , a111l to r c·ov r h
amou11t clu CJtl it a r formed); ;roo(ling
i•. ~fr Alli ter, 9 How. Pr. L.'3 (a ·tio11 to re-

form a written contract, and to rec r r a
money juclgm ut upon it for the nm tlue
wh n correct d) ; l\lc own v.
im , 69
N. . 159; Rig b e v. Tr e , 21 Ind. 227
(action to r eform a promi · ory n te, and
to recoYer th amount tbu . hown to be
due. The deci ion in th latt i· ca e i. referred, howe\· r, to the pecial pro\'i ion of
t heludiana ·otle, § 72); Hunter v. i\I ·Coy,
14 Inrl. 52 ; Mc ,lu rg t'. Phillip ·, 49 l\lo.
3 15, 316 °{a tion to reform a mort age, to
fo reclo -e a tbu orrectetl, or to r form a
deedandquietthetitleth r und er). ' alkup v. Zehring, 13 Iowa, 306 (action to correct mi take. in a erie of title-deed., to et
a ide another deed of t h e ame laud, and
to quiet t he plaintiff' title and po. e ion).
ee, however, per contra, Harri on v. Juneau Bauk 17 W i:. 3 4-0, which w
uit
to reform a contra t, and to rec " r the
money due upon it wh n corrected.
Dixon
. J. aid (p. 350) : "The comf acplaint contain two di t in t cau
tion, - the pne equitable, th
ther 1 gal,
houhl hav been
- which in tri tne
. eparately tated. That for the r f rmation wa equitable, and wa for th court;
the oth r , I r th r c ,·er:' f m u v, wa ·
le!!al, and wa for th jury.' Th e 1 arn d
rourt ha h r fallen into the vid u rror
of onf unding th
au . of nc·tion with
the r li >f; and it deci . ion i. in direct
·onfli t with th cl ctrine ::;tabli. h d by
anthorities quoted • uo\·e
and hel w, whi (' h im·oh
imil, r fa ·t:
and the . a 111 pri nci pl . Th doc:tri 11 of
thi" a £' ha;; h com e. tabli. h cl in \Vi 011 in; a nniou of eqnitahl a11cl lr>g-al
C'ause of a tion i hardly Jl rmitt d in
that . tat .
[C'ltri. ten. n v. Holling. worth (1
),
r. Idaho, 7, 5.'3 Pa . 211 ;
rm ont Loan
& Tru t o. v. )Jc regor ( 1 97), 5 l1laho,
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actions brought against a fraudulent grantor or assignor and his

grantees or assignees to set aside the transfers, although made

at different times and to different persons, and to subject the

property to the plaintiff's liens, as in creditors' suits ; or to com-

pel a reconveyance and restoration of possession of the propert}',

as in the case of suits by defrauded lieirs or cestuis que trustent,

and the like. There is but one cause of action against the

various defendants in these and similar suits. ^ In like manner,

the principle applies to actions brought by persons holding the

I equitable title to lands against those in wliom the legal title is

I vested, for the purpose of setting aside the deeds under which

the latter claim, on the ground of fraud or other illegality, and of

I recovering or confirming possession and quieting title. The dif-

1 ferent reliefs which the plaintiff seeks to obtain do not constitute

fdifferent causes of action.^ It also applies to actions for the fore-

/t:

320, 51 Pac. 102 ; Jenkins v. Taylor (1900),

Ky., 59 S. W. 853 ; Steinbach i\ Prudential
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Ins. Co. (1902), 172 N. Y. 471, 65 N. E.

281 (action to reform policy and judgment

thereon as reformed). Imperial Shale

actions brought again t a fraudul nt grant r r a. ign r antl his
grante s or assignees to s t a, id th trans[ I"' although made
{
at di:ff r nt time and t differ nt 1 er 'Ons and to ubje t the
prop rty to the plaintiffs li n , a in ·rediL r ' . nits ; or to omp 1 a r conv yanc and r ·t ration of po · ssion of th property,
as in th a ·e of suits by tl frauded heir · or cestuis que trustent,
and the like. Ther
but one cau e of action again ·t the
vanon defendants in th e and similar suitH.1 In like mann r,
the principle applie to a tions brought by I ersons holding the
equitable title to lan l against tho 'e in whom the legal title is /
ve tecl, for the purpos of s tting aside the deed.' under ·which
the latter claim, on th ground of fraud or other illegality, and of
recovering or confirming p session and quieting title. The different reliefs which the plaintiff seeks to obtain clo n t con titute
different causes of action. 2 It al o applies to actions for the fore-

Brick Co. v. Jewett (1901), 169 N. Y. 143,

62 N. E. 167 (also an action to reform pol-

icy and recover thereon as reformed).

Hahl V. Sugo (1901), 169 N. Y. 109, 62

N. E. 135, see note ( 1 ) to p. 27, ante, for the

facts of this case. Robinson v. Brown

(1901); 166 N. Y. 59, 159 N. E. 775; Keys

V. McDermott (1903), — Wis. —,93

N. W. 553.]

1 Bassett v. Warner, 23 Wis. 673, 685 ;

Blake v. Van Tilborg, 21 Wis. 672 ; Bow-

ers V. Keesecher, 9 Iowa, 422 ; Howse v.

Moody, 14 Fla. 59, 63, 64. These were

actions by heirs, or otlier persons in the

position of benefiriaries, against adminis-

trators, or other individuals holding a fidu-

ciary relation to them, and their grantees

or assignees, to set aside fraudulent trans-

fers, to compel an accounting and a re.'^to-

ration, and other like reliefs. Tlie doctrine

of the text was freely applied in them all ;

Winslow V. Dousman, 18 Wis. 456; Gates

V. Boomer, 17 Wis. 455; North v. Brad-

way, 9 Minn. 183; Chautauqua Cy. Bk. v.

White, 6 N. Y. 236. These actions were

all ordinary creditors' suits.

2 Phillips V. Gorham, 17 N. Y. 270;

Laub V. Buckmiller, 17 N. Y. 620; Lattin

V. McCarty, 41 N. Y. 107. See, further,

Johnson v. Colder, 132 N. Y. 116 (com-

plaint alleging that tlie plaintiff is the

owner of laud subject to a mortgage which

was fraudulently foreclosed, and praying

for redemption, accounting, and that a

pretended mortgage given by the pur-

chaser at a foreclosure sale be cancelled,

states but one cause of action) ; Louvall

V. Gridley, 70 Cal. 507 (prayer that a deed

be declared a mortgage, and the title to

the land involved be quieted).

[[Beronio v. ^'entura Lumber Co. (1900),

129 Cal. 23-2, 61 Pac. 958, was an action to

have a sheriff's deed adjudged void and to

quiet title to certain premises tlierein de-

scribed. Defendant demurred upon the

/ ground that two causes of action had been

/ improperly united in the complaint, "viz.,

320, 51 Pac.102; Jenkinsv.Taylor(1900), Johnson v. Golder, 132 N. Y. l 16 (comKy., 59 S. W. 853; Steinbach v. Prudential plaint alleg ing that the plai utiff is the
In . Co. (1902), 1i2 N. Y . 471, 65 N. E. owner of land subject to a mortgage which
281 (action to reform policy and judgment was fraudulently foreclosed, and praying
thereon as refo rmed). Imperial Shale for redempti on, accounting, and that a
Brick Co. v. Jewett (1901), 169 N. Y.143, pretended mortgage given by the pur62 N. E. 167 (also an action to r eform pol- chaser at a fore<.:losure sale be cancelled,
icy and recover thereon a· reform ed). .tate · but one cause of action); Louvall
Hahl v. Sugo (190 1), 169 N. Y. 109, 62 11. Gridley, 70 Cal. 507 (prayer that a deed
N. E. 135, see note ( 1) top. 27. ant e, for the be declared a m ortgage, aud the title to
fact. of this case. Robinson v. Brown the land involved be quieted).
[ Beronio v. Ventura Lumber Co. (1900),
(1 901); 166 N. Y. 59, 159 N. E. 7i5; Keys
v. McDermott (1903), - Wis. - , 93 129 Cal. 232, 61 Pac. 958, was an a~tion to
have a sheriff 's deed adjudge<l void and to
N. W. 553 .J
1 Bassett v. Warner, 23 Wi . 6i3, 6 5;
quiet title to certain premi ·e th erein deBlake v. Van Tilborg, 21 Wi . 672; Bow- scribed. Defendant demurred upon the
e1·s v. Kee echer, 9 Iowa, 422; How e v. gronlld that two can. e of action had been
Moody, 14 Fla. 59, 63, 64. The e were improperly united in the complaint, "viz.,
acti ons by h e in~ , or other persons in the an action to quiet th e plaintiff's title, and an
po ition of benefil'inries. against aclmiui - action to have the sheriff's deed deC'lared
tratnrs, or other indi viduals holdin g a fidu- void." The court below u tain cl the deciary relation to them, and their grantees murrer. The Supreme Court in reYer ing
or assignees, to set aside fraudulent trans- the case said : "The complaint presents
fer" to compel an accounting aJHl a resto- On ly a Single Cause of action Yiz., the enration, and other like r eli ef . The tlo<.:trine forcement of the plaintiff' right to the
of the text was freely applied in them all; premi e in question a.gaiust the unlawful
·winslow v. Dousman, 18 Wi s. 456; Gat<'s claim of the defendant thereto. A a
v. Boomer, 17 ,\.,.is. 455; North v. Brad- portion of the remedy for the nforceway, 9 Minn. 183; Chautauqua Cy. Bk. v. ment of that rio-ht it :-:eeks the annnlm nt
White, 6 N. Y. 236. The "e acti ons were of the sheriff's deccl, but a plaintiff may
frequently be entitled t
eYeral pecie
all ordinary creditors' suit .
2 Phillips v. Gorham, 17 N. Y. 270;
of reme<ly for the nforcement of a sinode Remedi e , .ec.
Laub v. Buckmiller, 17 . Y. 620; Lattin , gle right (Pomeroy'
v. Mc Carty, 41 N. Y. 107. See, further, *459);" Sau P ed ro Lumber Co. v. I~cy·
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closure of mortgages, where the phiintiff seeks to obtain not only

a sale of the mortgaged premises, but also a judgment for a

detioiency against the mortgagor and other persons who are per-

sonally liable for the debt.^ In several States the codes expressly

authorize such actions.^ The weight of authority, however, in

those States whose codes do not contain isuch expiess provisions,

seems to be the other way ; and the rule therein seems to be gen-

erally established, that, in an action of foreclosure, a judgment

for a deficiency cannot be obtained against any persons liable for

the debt other than the mortgagor himself ; it is said that the

noMs (1896), HI Cal. 5S8, 44 Pac. 309;

Bremuer i". Leavitt (1895), 109 Cal. 130,

41 Pac. 859; Richardson v. Opelt (1900),

m Neb. 180, 82 N. W. 377.]

clo ure of mortgc. e ·where he plaintiff eek o obtain uot only
a ~ale of the mort0 a ed pr mi
but al o
jud ment r ~
d fi12iency , a.in 't th mor 0
other p r n who ar
r,ouall r liable f r he clebt. 1 In severnl tat
l1e c des xpr ·ly
authorize uch action , .2 The w i ht of au hori y, how er, in
ho e ' ate' who e code do n t contain , u h x.pr ss pr vi 'ions
~ m t b
he other wa · and the rule her in em to be nera11; e abli ' lied hat in an ac ion of for 1 sure, a jud ment
f r a deficiency cann t be obtained again t any persons liable for
the debt other than the mortgagor himself; it is said that the
1

1 QReichert i;. Stilwell (1902), 172

N. Y. 83, 64 N. E. 790: Uuder the statute

iu this State in an action to foreclose a

mortgage there is but one cause of action
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alleged, even if the bond is set forth iu

the complaint and judgment for deficiency

is demanded as a part of tlie relief. The

statutory authority to render a personal

judgment for the deficiency does not

create a distinct and independent cause of

action, but is an incidental remedy, de-

pendent wholly upon the statute and sub-

sidiary to the main object of the action.

See Plaukinton v. Hildebrand (1895), 89

Wis. 209, 61 N. W. 839. In Security Loan

and Trust Co. v. Mattern (1901), 131 Cal.

326, 63 Pac. 482, the defendant Lena 1).

Mattern executed and delivered to plain-

tiff her promissory note for $3,500, and

secured the payment of the same by her

mortgage upon certain land. Subse-

quently, Mrs. Mattern desiring to ex-

change a portion of the land mortgaged,

the plaintiff released tliis portion of the

land from the lien of tlie mortgage in

consideration of defendant Bechtel exe-

cuting and delivering to iiim his mortgage

on land owned by the latter as security

for the payment of .said note in lieu of

said release. The action was brought to

recover upon the note and to foreclose tlie

Mattern and Bechtel mortgages. Mrs.

Mattern and Bechtel were made defend-

ant.s. Defendants demurred to tlie ctmi-

plaint, among other grounils, because of a

misjoinder of causos of action. It was

claimed that two distinct causes of action

were set fortli in the complaint — one

against defendant Mattern and one against

Bechtel. It seems that plaintiff had sep-

arated his complaint into two " Counts."

In sustaining the ruling of the court be-

low in overruling the demurrer the Su-

preme Court said: " Altliougti one portion

of the complaint is entitled therein ' First

Count ' and another portion ' Second

Couut, ' the portions so entitled do not

purport to set forth separate causes of ac-

tion, but to state tlie facts by which the

defendants Mattern and Bechtel are re-

spectively relateil to the plaintiff's cause

of action. A complaint, while setting

forth a single cause of action, may at the

same time ask for different relief from

nold (1 96), 111 Cal. 5 , 44 P a . 309;
Bremner v. L eavitt ( 1 95), 109 Cal. 130,
-H Pac. 59 j Richard on v. Opelt (1 900) ,
·o .c eb. l o, 2 r"'. w. 3 77.J
1 [Reichert v. ... ti lw 11 ( 1902),
172
.J . Y. 3, 64 N. E. 790: Under the tatute
iu thi , tate in au action to forecl e a
mortO'age there i but one cau e of action
alleged, even if the bond i et fo r th in
the om plaint and judgment for deficiency
i demanded a a part 0£ the r elief. The
tatutor:· authority to render a per onal
jutl ment for the deficiency doe not
ere:ite a di tinct anu in dependent ause of
n.ction, but i an inciuental r emedy, dependent wholly upon the tatute and ub·i<liary to the main object of the action.
."ee Plankinton v. Hildebrand ( 1 95 ), 9
Wi . 209, 61 N. W. 839. In ecurity L oan
and Tru t o. v. Mattern ( 1901 ), 131 al.
326, 63 Pac. 4 2, the defendaut Lena D.
Matter n executed and deliver ed. to plaintiff her promi
ry n ote for $3,500, and
ecure<l the payment of the same by her
mortgage upon certain land.
ub · equently, dr . 1\Iattern <le iring to xchange a por ti n of th lan d mortgaged,
the plaiutiff r lea e<l thi portion of the
l; ud from the li en of the mortgag in
con~i<leration of defenllant B echtel
xeutiug aud deli r riug to him hi ' morig ge
OU land. OWllCU IJ_v the latler a ;
urity
fur the payment of . aitl not in li n of
aid relea e. The a ·t.iou wa: Lrought t
r corer upon the note aucl to foredo c the
lattem and B chtel mortgag s. l\Ir .
.Mattern and Bech 1 were made cl f udant .

plaint, am ng other grouurl.-, 11 l':lU. e uf
mi ·joiuder f au .<>: of a ·tiou. lt wn
claimed th t two di ·tiuct. caus s of ction

were set f r t h in the complaint- one
again t <lefeudan t Mattern and one again t
B ec htel. I t eem tbat plaintiff had eparated bi · omplaint in to two " ount ."
In ·u tainin <Y the ruling of the court below in overrul iug the demurr r tile upreme Court aid: "Althoug h one porti on
of the complaint i entitled therein ' First
ount' and a nother portion ' cond
ount,' t he portion
o en titled do not
purport to set forth parate cau e. of action, but to tate the fact by which the
defendant · Mattern and B echtel are respectively related to the plaintiff ' cau ·e
of action. A complaint, while etting
forth a single cau e of action, m y at the
same time a k for different r lief fr m
<l ifferent defendant , according as they are
connected with thi cau e of a ti n, and
it character i to be determined from it
content rather than from a misnomer n
the part of the pleader." In Am ri an
"aviug and Loan A
ciation v.
urghardt (l 9i), 19 Mont. 3:...3, 48 Pa. 39 1,
it wru held that a mplaint in u ha a e
as hat tat d in the text did not tate two
cau e. of a cti n, and th· t the moo yjud ment and the d ree were diff r ut m de~
of relief for he . ame ·w r nQ'. , e al
Fir t Tat. Bank v. L ambert. (1
liun. 263, 65 . W . 451 .J
2 Coun. Mut. L . In . C
v.
"~i . 10 ;
auer u. teinbau r,
70; Weil v. H ward,4 "Y.3 4 ; r ith r
v. Alexand r, 15 I wa 470, 473, p r
'Vright . J.; Eastman u. Turman 24
Cal. 379, 3 2, per aw er J.;
lliu v .
Ii orb " 1
al. 299 · Farwell v. J a k on
2 C:i.J. IO:> ; [I~ndre
v. hove (1 01),
110 Wi . 1 3, 5 . W. 653 .J

JOL. DER OF

c

USE

OF A

·no.·.

JOINDER OF CAUSES OF ACTION. 4(.j

making such third person a party, and the praying a decree for

deticiency against him, is a misjoinder of causes of action.^ A

suit by the vendor of land to recover the purchase price, and to

enforce his hen therefor upon the premises sold or conveyed, in-

cludes but one cause of action, the double relief plainly arising

from the single state of facts.^

§ 354. * 460. Same Subject. The following are some ad-

ditional instances in which the doctrine has been approved and

enforced by the courts, and the cause of action lield to be a single

one. An action against a husband and wife, brouglit upon an

alleged indebtedness of both, and an agreement of Ijotli to secure

the same by a mortgage upon the wife's lands, although at the

trial the debt was shown to be against the husband alone, and no

such agreement as the one alleged was proven ; ^ an action by the

vendee in a land contract for a specific performance and for dam-

ages, where judgment was given for damages alone ; * an action

by the heirs and administrator of a deceased cestui que trust

against the trustee, who held both real and personal estate in

trust, for an accounting, a conveyance of the land, and a transfer

Generated for facpubupdates (University of Michigan) on 2014-06-17 15:33 GMT / http://hdl.handle.net/2027/uc2.ark:/13960/t02z1c23b
Public Domain / http://www.hathitrust.org/access_use#pd

of the personal property ; ^ an action to remove a nuisance, for

damages, and for an injunction ; ^ for admeasurement of dower,

possession, and recovery of rents and profits ; " by one tenant in

common against the other, to compel a specific performance of

the latter's agreement to convey his share, or for a partition ; ^ an

action by a stockholder against a bank, its officers, and their

assignee, to set aside an assignment, to remove the officers, for an

accounting, and for a winding-up of the corporation, — all based

1 Faesi v. Goetz, 15 Wis. 231 ; Gary v. v. Sedgwick, 8 Cal. 398. In the latter

Wheeler, 14 Wis. 281 ; Jesup v. City Bk. case, the action was on notes given for the

of Raciue, 14 Wis. 331 ; Stilwell v. Kel- price.

logg, 14 Wis. 461 ; Borden v. Gilbert, 13 ^ Marquat v. Marquat, 12 N. Y. 336.

Wis. 670; Doan v. Holly, 26 Mo. 186, 2.5 * Barlow v. Scott, 24 N. Y. 40; Stern-

Mo. 357. In Ladd v. James, 10 Ohio St. berger v. McGovern, 56 N. Y. 12,21. And

437, it was said that when a mortgage is see Duvall v. Tiusley, 54 Mo. 93, 95.

given to secure a note, and an action is ^ Bichtmyer v. Richtmyer, 50 Barb. 55.

l)rought setting out both, and demanding "* Davis v. Lambertson, 56 Barb. 480.

judgment for money on the note, and for ' Brown v. Brown, 4 Robt. 688.

a foreclosure and sale on the mortgage, ^ Hall v. Hall, 38 How. Pr. 97. This

any issue of fact affecting the former de- decision is certainly opposed to the prin-

mand for relief must be tried by a jury ciple stated in the text, and to the weight

making such third per on a party, an<l. th praying a <l.ecr for
d fl.cien y against him, is a misj ind r of cau: s of a,ction. 1 A
nit by the v ndor of lan<l. t r ov r the purclrn pric , and to
enforc his li n ther for up n the premi ·e. ld r onv y d, includ ' but one cau e f a tion, th double r lief plainly ari ing
from th ingle state f fact .2
~ 354. * 460. Same Subject.
The following ar
omc additionaJ in "'tance in whi h the doctrine has b en approved arnl
enforced by the courts, and the cause of action h l<l. to be a single
on . An action again t a, husband and wife, brought upon an
alleged indebtedne s of both, and an agreement of both to secure
the same by a mortgage upon the wife't:> lan<l..·, although at the
trial the debt was shown to be against the husband alone, and no
::mch agreement as the one alleged was proven; 3 an action by the
vendee in a land contract for a specific performance and for <lamage , where judgment wa given for damages alon ; 4 an action
by the heirs and administrator of a deceased cestui que trust
again t the tru ·tee, who held both real and personal estate in
tnrnt, for an accounting, a conveyance of the land, and a transfer
of the personal property; 5 an action to remoYe a nuisance, for
damages, and for an injunction; 6 for admeasurement of dower,
pos ession, and recovery of rents and profits; 7 by one tenant in
common against the other, to compel a specific performance of
the latter's agreement to convey his share, or for a partition; 8 an
action by a stockholder against a bank, its officers, and their
a signee, to set aside an assignment, to remove the officers, for an
accounting, and for a winding-up of the corporation, - all ba eel

if either party require it. See also Mc- of authority. Two different primary rights

Carthy i'. Garraghty, 10 Ohio St. 438. are clearly stated ; one based upon the con-

2 Stephens v. Magor, 25 Wis. 533 ; tract, and the other upon the ownership in

Turner v. Pierce, 34 Wis. 658 ; Walker common.

1 Fae i v. Goetz, 15 Wi . 231; Cary v.
Wheeler, 14 Wis. 281 ; J esup v. City Bk.
of Racine, 14 Wis. 331; Stilwell v. Kellogg, 14 Wis. 461 ; Bordeu v. Gilbert, 13
Wis. 670; Doan v. Holly, 26 Mo. 186, 25
Mo. 357. In Ladcl 1:. James, JO Ohio St.
4.3i, it was said that when a mortgage i
g iven to secure a note, and an a tion is
hrouo·ht ·etti11g out both, and demanding
judgment for money on the note, and for
a foreclo ure and sale on the mortgage,
any issue of fact affecting the former demand for reli ef must be tried by a jury
if either party require it. , ee also McCarthy v. Garraghty, 10 Ohio t. 4.38.
2 Stephens v. Magar, 25 Wi . 533 ;
Turner v. Pierce, 34 Wis. 658; Walker

v. Sedgwick, 8 Cal. 398. In the latter
case, the action was on note given for the
price.
3 Marquat v. Marquat, 12 N. Y. 336.
4 Barlow v. Scott, 24 N. Y. 40;
t rnberger v. McGovern, 56 N. Y. 12, 21. And
see Duvall v. Tin . ley, 54 Mo. 93, 9!5.
5 Richtmyer t'. Richtmyer, 50 Barb. 55.
G Da\·is v. Lambert. on, 56 Barb. 4 0.
7 Brown t'. Brown , 4 Hobt. 6
.
s Hall v. Hall , 3 How. Pr. 97. This
decision i certainly ·oppo. eel to the priuciple tated in the text, and to the weight
of authority. Two different primary right;;
are clearly stated; one ba ed upon the con tract, and the other upon the ownership in
common.
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upon the fraudulent practices of the officers ; ^ where a debtor who

had executed a deed to A. in trust for his creditor B. alleged that

the two had fraudulently sold the land which had been bought in

by B., and sought to set aside the sale and to redeem ; ^ an ac-

countino- against the executor of a father and the administrator

of his son, where the estates were so mingled and confused that

a separate accounting was impossible ; ^ an action against the

executor of a lessee who had continued to occupy the premises,

to recover the rent accruing before the death, as well as that ac-

cruing after ; ^ an action to recover damages for negligently driv-

ing against and injuring the plaintiff and his horse and carriage ; ^

an action to recover damages for fraudulent representations in the

sale of some sheep, the plaintiff claiming special damages for the

destruction of his entire flock, caused by the communication of

disease from those which he had purchased ; ^ an action for ma-

licious prosecution, in which special acts of wrong and damage

were alleged ; "' and, it has been said, an action to recover damages

for several distinct and separate breaches of one contract.^

§ 355. * 461. Cases in Missouri. To the principle which I have
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thus stated, and the doctrine approved by such an overwhelm-

ing weight of judicial authority, there w^as opposed a series of

decisions in Missouri, which, w^hile they remained unquestioned,

rendered the law of tlie State widely different in this respect

fi-om that \\iiich was established in other commonwealths. The

Supreme Court held in numerous cases, and a great variety of

circumstances, that where upon the facts the plaintiff would ulti-

mately be entitled to different kinds of relief, — such as, for

example, the setting aside deeds of conveyance to the defendant,

and the recovery of the possession of the land, — if, after alleging

1 Mitchell V. Bank of St. Paul, 7 Minn. tlie. injury to lliem created two causes of

2.J2, 255. action.

■•2 McGlothlin v. Hemery, 44 Mo. 350. « Wilcox r. McCoy, 21 Oliio St. 655,

The opinion in this case is an elaborate citing Packard v. Slack, ."32 Vt. 9.

discussion of the entire doctrine. '^ Scheuck v. Biitsch, 32 Ind. 338.

8 McLachlan v. Staples, 13 Wis. 448, » Fisk v. Tank, 12 Wis. 276, 298, per

451. Dixou C. J. Tlie acts and defaults com-

* Pugsley V. Aikiu, 11 N. Y. 494. jdained of in this ca.se can liardly be called

° Howe V. Peckhani, 10 Barb. 056 distinct and separate Itreaches. See also

(S. T.). The correctness of this de- Smiley v. Dawcese (Ind. App. 1891), 27

ci.sion is. more than doubtful. Ma.son J. N. E. Rep. 505. See Roehiing r. Huebsch-

inakes the cause of action to con.sist mann, 34 Wis. 185; Kansas City Hotel

of the delict alone. Certainly the plain- Co. v. Sigement, 53 Mo. 170, that different

tiff's rigiit to his own person and to items of an account or claim constitute

his property were different rigiits, and but one cause of action.

upon the fraudulent practices of the officer · 1 where a bt r who
h, d ex ut l a leed to . in tru t f r hi credit r . all 0 ed that
th \
old he lan l which ha l been bough in
. an l ought to et a id he al and o red em; 2 an accountina a0 ain t the xecutor of a father and the a lmini 'trc tor
of hi on wh re th
ta e wer . mingled and confu eel that
a ~ pa.rate accounting wa impo -- ' ibl · 3 an action a0 ain t he
x cutor of a le e who had continu cl to occupy the pr mi e ,
to r c Y r the rent accruing before th leath a well a that accruin0 aft r · 4 an action to recover dama es for negligently dri in again t and injuring the plain iff and hi hor 'e and arriage · 5
an ac ion to rec ver damage for frau lulent r pre entati n · in the
ale of ome h ep, th pla.intiff claiming I ial lamag f r the
d truction of hi entire flock, cau l by the commuui ti n of
di ea e from tho e which he had purcha ed · 6 an ac ion for maliciou pro ecution, in which spe ial act of wron an l damage
w r all g d; 7 and, it has been said, an action to recover dama es
for e' eral di tinct and separate breache of one contract.
§ 355. * 461. Cases in M i ssouri. To the principle whi l I have
thu tated, and the doctrine appro ed by uch an ov r h lming weight of judicial authority, th re wa oppo ed a erie of
de i ion in Mis ouri, which, while th y r mained unqu esti ned ,
rendere l the law of the tate widely different in thi re pect
from th, t whi h wa e 'tabli hed in other comm nwealth . The
uprem
ourt held in numerou ca e. and a r at vari ty of
circumstanc that where up n the fa ts the 1 laintiff ' ul ultintitl d to differ nt kin l of relief, - uch a f r
ance to th l f ndant,
ampl , the tting aside d cl of con
an<l. th r covery of the I o e ion f the land - if, af r all 0 ing
l

:\I itchell v. Bank of

t. Paul, 7 :\lino.

Pug,lcy t.'. Aikin, ll N. Y. 494.
IIowe i·. l'eckhani, 10 Barb. Ci5G
(~· T.).
'lhe orrcctu ... of thi· dc<'i io11 i.· 1w,re than doubtful. :\ta.. on .J.
111ak1: the ·au. P. of ac-tir111 to con. i t
1A tl11• dP!ict alou . ' rtaiuly the plain tiff'. right to hi own p r · 11 anc.l t.
bi property were c.liffer nt right~, aucl
4

i;

the. injury to them reated two

au e of
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all the facts, he should demand the separate reliefs, liis complaint

would contain different causes of action, and would be held bad

on demurrer, or even judgment arrested after verdict, or reversed

on appeal because of tlie error. In other words, the court .com-

pletely identified tlie relief, and even the prayer for it, with the

cause of action. ^ The court has, however, recently receded from

this most untenable position, and seems to have overruled this

long series of decisions.^ Tlie Missouri court seems to have finally

brought the law of that State in reference to the subject-matter

under consideration into harmony witli the plain intent of the

code and the well-settled doctrines of equity jurisj)rudence, as

well as into a conformity with the rule settled by the unanimous

consent of other courts.-^

§356. *462. Summary. — I have thus described the cases in

which but one cause of action is alleged, although the many and

sometimes conflicting demands for relief may make it appear that

several causes of action have been united and mingled together in

the pleading. I have stated a general principle whicli will furnish

a certain test for determining all such cases, by ascertaining what
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allegations contain the " cause of action," and what contain the

demands for relief, and by showing the essential nature of each,

and the necessary distinctions between them. I shall now pro-

ceed to consider the classes of cases in which different causes of

action are united either properly or improperly.

IV. The Joinder of Causes of Action Arising out of the same Trans-

action or Transactions Connected with the same Subject of

Action; Legal Meaimig of the Terms '■'- Transaction^^ and ^

" /Subject of Action.^^

§ 357. * 463. Most Frequent Applications of this Class. In-

cludes Legal Controversies. The class which is described by the

language of the codes quoted in the above heading is broad,

comprehensive, vague, and uncertain. The principal design was

1 Curd V. Lackland, 43 Mo. 139 ; Wynn 3 {In State ex rel. v. Horton Land and

V. Cory, 43 Mo. 301 ; Gray v. Payne, 43 Lumber Co. (1901), 161 Mo. 664, 61 S. W.

Mo. 203; Peyton v. Rose, 41 Mo. 2.57; 869, it is said: "The character of the

all the facts, he hould d mand the eparate r li f , his complaint
woulcl ontain differ nt cau es of action, ancl w uld be held Lael
n d murrer, or even juclo-ment arrested after vcr li L, or reversCll
on ap1 eal becau 'e of th error. In other word~, the court ,complet ly identified the r lief, and even th prayer for it, with the
au e of action. 1 The ourL ha', however, recently re<..:ccled from
this mo. t untenable po ition, and seems to have overruled this
long series of decisions. 2 The Missouri court seems to have finally
brought the law of that State in reference to the subject-matter
under consideration into harmony with tbe plain intent of th
code and the well-settled doctrine of equity jurisprud nee, as
well as into a conformity with the rule settled by the unanimous
consent of other courts. 3
§ 356. * 462. Summary. - I have thus described the cases in
which but one cause of action is alleged, although the many and
ometimes conflicting demands for relief may make it appear that
several causes of action have been united and mingled together in
the pleading. I have stated a general principle which will furnish
a certain test for determining all such cases, by ascertaining what
allegations contain the "cause of actio n," and what contain the
demands for relief, and by showing the essential nature of each,
and the necessary distinction between them. I shall now proceed to consider the classes of cases in which different causes of
action arn united either properly or improperly.

Gott r. Powell, 41 Mo. 416; Moreau v. action is determined by the facts stated in

Detchemendy, 41 Mo. 431. the petition and not by the prayer for re-

2 Henderson v. Dickey, 50 Mo. 161, lief." See also Liese 2'. Meyer (1898), 143

165, per Wagner J.; Duvall v. Tinsley, Mo. 547, 45 S. W. 282.]

54 Mo. 93.

IV. The Joinder of Causes of Action Arising out of the same Transaction or Transa ctions Connected with the same 8u~iect of
A ction; L egal Meaning of the Terms " Transaction" and
"8ubJect of Action."

§ 357.

* 463.

Most Frequent Applications

o f this

Class .

In-

The class which is described by the
language of the codes quoted in the above heading is broad,
comprehensive, vague, and uncertain. The principal design was
cludes Legal Controversies.

1 Curd v. Lackland, 43 Mo. 139; Wynn
v. Cory, 43 Mo. 30 1 ; Gray v. Payne, 43
Mo. 203; Peyton v. Rose, 41 Mo. 257;
Gott v. Powell, 41 Mo. 4 16 ; Moreau v.
Detchemendy, 41 Mo. 43 1.
2 Henderson v. Dickey, 50 Mo. 161 ,
165, per Wagner J.; Duvall v. Tinsley,
54 Mo. 93.

3 [ In State ex rel. v . Horton Land and
Lumber Co. {1901), 161Mo.66-!, 61 . W.
869, it is said: "The character of the
action is determined by the fact stated in
the petition and not by the prayer for relief." See al o Liese v. Meyer {1898), 143
Mo. 547, 45 S. W. 282.J

crnL R1·::m : rn . .
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undonbtedl}' to embrace tlie vast mass of equitable actions and

causes of action which could not be classified and arranged in any

more definite manner; and the language was properly left vague,

so that it might not in any manner interfere with the settled doc-

trines of equitable procedure and pleading, parties and remedies.

u rnlonhte Uy t em ra
th Ya."' ma
an ·e f action \\'hic: h lHllcl n t b cla.
m or tl tini t mann r : an l the t ngua

f

and

W<

Although tiiis general design is very apparent, 3'et it is no less

evident that the author of the clause failed to distinguish between

the " cause of action " and the remedy or relief Avliich is sought

to be obtained by means of the action. The most fre([uent appli-

cation of this class in the actual administration of justice has been

and will be to equitable actions : but the language is not confined

to them ; it includes legal controversies as well. If all the other

requisites of the statute are complied with, legal causes of action

of the most dissimilar character — for example, contract and tort

Ylcl
th
to b

an

— may be united in one proceeding, provided they all arise out of

the same transaction, or out of transactions connected with the

same subject of action.^ With respect to equitable cases, there

cannot be much difficulty ; it is always easy to say, and perliaps

to see, that the facts constituting the causes of action arise at
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least in some vague manner from the same transaction, or from

transactions connected witli the same subject of action. With

respect to legal cases the difficulty is much greater, and is some-

times impossible to be overcome by any logical reasoning. The

question will be sometimes presented, not only whether the facts

constituting two or more causes of action have arisen from the

same transaction, but whether it is possible, in the nature of

things, that they could arise in such a manner.

§ 358. * 464. Controlling "Words herein. Necessity of Judicial

Definition of. A full interpretation of the language used in the

* QPollock V. Association (1896), 48 and each of them, sounded in tort, and

R. C. 65, 25 S. E. 977, citing the text. See tliey all grew out of and were connected

also Dinges u. Kiggs (1895), 43 Neb. 710, with the same transaction, and were tliere-

62 N. W. 74, a suit where the "petition fore properly joined. (Code of Civil I'ro-

set up three causes of action: First, nia- ccdure, sec. 87; Freeman v. Webb, 21

licious prosecution; second, damage to Neb. 160.)" See Commercial Union As-

jilaintiff's business by arresting occujiants surance Co. i: Shoemaker (1901), 63 Neb.

of her place of business; third, slander." 173, 88 N. VT. 156, for c;ise suggesting

'I'he court in sustaining the ruling of the that "contract and tort" may not be

District Court in overruling the motion of united. See also Bank ?'. Grain Co. (1898),

the defemlant to compel jilaintiff to elect 60 Kan. 30, 55 Tac. 277, where this ques-

upon which one of the three causes of tion was raised but not decided ; and see

an 1 will bet
a \Yell.
complierl with, 1 o'< 1 cau ' of action
ter - for xa.mple, ontra t an<l tort
- may he uni cl in one proc <lino·, proYicled they all arise u of
th ame t ransaction, or ou t of trawauti ns connected \Y ith the
:ame ·ubj ct of action .1 vVith r e pect t o quitable ca8 , there
cann ot bv much difficulty · it i · al w< ~ ea y to sa3 and perhap
to see that the fact· con.' titu tin t h au. e of ac i n ari ' at
lea. t in ·o me vagu mann r fr m th
ame tran a Lion, or from
tran ·action onnec eel with the S< me ubj ct of action. W ith
re.'pect t o 1 al ca ·e t he diffi nlty i m uch g reater, an d i
metim ,' imp . 'ible to be ov rcom by any lo;ical r a oning . The
q u 'tion will be ometime ' pre en ted, n only wh th r th fact
on.' i uting two r more cau s of action h a
ari n from he
sam ran action, bu t whether it is po ibl , in the n ature f
thing' th at they coul l ari e in u h
manner.
358.

* 4 4.

action stated in her petition she would further Willey c. Nichols (1898), 18 Wash,

rely, said: "There was no error in this 528, 52 Pac. 237.]

ruling of the court. The causes of action,
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codes would result in a general rule applicable to all actions ; a

rule which should determine when causes of action may and do

arise out of the same transaction, or out of transactions connected

with tlie same subject of action. This rule would be obtained, not

from an analysis of all possible causes of action, but from a con-

struction of the language used by the legislature ; and it would

require a legal definition, in an accurate but universal manner, of

the terras " titans action," " connected Avitli," and " subject of ac-

tion." These three terms are the controlling words upon which

the whole clause turns ; and until the courts shall have defined

them in a general and positive manner, all attempts at interpret-

ing the language and deducing any comprehensive and practical

rule from it must be futile. Until such a definition is made, each

case must be decided upon its own circumstances, in a mere em-

pirical method, so that the confusion and uncertainty will con-

tinue, and even increase, in the place of the uniformity and

certainty in the practice which the profession and suitors have

the right to demand. In short, the courts must break away from

the judicial habit which has of late years grown upon them, and
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must be willing to attempt the discussion and settlement of defi-

nitions, principles, and doctrines connected with the reformed pro-

cedure, in a general and comprehensive form. Although little

aid can be derived from judicial decisions I shall attempt the

extremely difficult task of defining these terms, or, to be more

accurate, shall attempt to describe their legal significance and

effect, and thus to aid in reaching a general rule or principle by

which to determine whether any given cases are embraced within

the class designated by the legislature.

§ 359. * 465. Language of Comstock J. and Author's Criticism.

In corroboration of the statement made above in regard to the

general purport and object of the class in question, I quote the

language used by an eminent judge of the New York Court of

Appeals, which, while it contains some unjust remarks upon the

authors of the New York code, is a very pointed and accurate

description of the clause and of its immediate design : " In respect

to the joinder of causes of action, the provision of the law, so far

as is material to the question, now is, that ' the plaintiff may unite

in the same complaint several causes of action, whether they be

such as have heretofore been denominated legal or equitable, or

both, where they all arise out of the same transaction or transac-

code woul d r ult in a g n ral rule applicable to all actions; a,
rul which should tletermine wh n cause.' of action may ancl do
arise out f the sam tran action, or out of tran a ·tion connee;ted
with the ::;ame subject of a tion. Thi:::; rul w uld be oLtained, not
from an analy i' f all po sible cau 'es of a tion, hut from a on:::truction f t he langna()'e us cl by the legi.'lature; and it woulcl
re quir a 1 gal defin ition, in an accurat but universal manner, of
t he t erms " tran action," " onnect cl with," and ":::;ubject of action. " These three terms are the controlling words upon \Yhieh
the whole clause turn s; and until the court· shall have clefinecl
them in a general and positive manner, all attempts at interpr ting t h e language and ded ucing any comprehensive and practical
rule from it must be futile . Until such a definition is made, each
case must be decided upon its own circumstances, in a mere empirical meth od, so that the confu 'ion and uncertainty will continue, and even increase, in the place of the uniformity and
certain ty in the practice which the profession and suitors have
the right to demand. In short, the courts must break away £1om
the judicial habit which has of late years grown upon them, and
m ust be willing to attempt the discussion and settlement of defin itions, principles, and doctrines connected with the reformed procedure, in a general and comprehensive form . A lthough little
aid can be derived from judic1al deci:: ; ions I shall attempt the
ex tremely difficult t as k of defining these t erms, or, to be more
accurate, shall attempt to describe their legal significan ce and
effect, and thus to aid in r eaching a general rule or principle by
which to det ermine whether any given cases are embraced within
the class de ignat ed by the legislature.
§ 359. * 465. Language of Comstock J. and Author's Criticism .
In corroboration of the stat ement made above in regard to the
general purport and object of the class in q uestion, I q uote t he
language used by an eminent judge of t h e New York Court of
A ppeals, which, while it contains some u n just remark s upon the
authors of the N ew York code, is a very poin ted and accurate
d escription of the clause and of its immediate de ign : " I n respect
to the joinder of causes of action, the provision of the law, o far
as is material to the que t ion, now is, that 'the plaintiff may nnite
in the same complaint several causes of action, whether the.· 1 e
su ch as have heretofore been denominated legal or q uita l >le, or
both, where they all arise out of the same transaction or transac-
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tions connected with the same subject of action.' The authors of

the code, in framing this and most of its other provisions, appear

to have had some remote knowledge of what the previous law

had been. This provision as it now stands was introduced in the

amendment of 1852, because the successive codes of 1848, 1849,

and 1851, with characteristic perspicacity, had in effect abrogated

equity jurisdiction in many important cases by failing to provide

for a union of subjects and parties in one suit indispensable to its

exercise. This amendment, tlierefore, was not designed to intro-

duce any novelty in pleading and practice. Its language is, I

think, well chosen for the purpose intended, because it is so

obscure and so general as to justify the interpretation which shall

be found most convenient and best calculated to promote the ends

of justice. It is certainly impossible to extract from a provision so

loose, and yet so comprehensive, any rules less liberal than those

which have long prevailed in courts of equity." ^ 'Sir. Justice

Comstock plainly regards it unnecessary, if not impossible, to

attempt a definition of the terms employed in the passage which

he quotes, and would leave each case to be decided upon its own

Generated for facpubupdates (University of Michigan) on 2014-06-17 15:33 GMT / http://hdl.handle.net/2027/uc2.ark:/13960/t02z1c23b
Public Domain / http://www.hathitrust.org/access_use#pd

circumstances. This is undoubtedly the easier method for the

courts to pursue ; but suitors, as well as the profession, have a

right to ask from them some rules by which a reasonable degree

of certainty as to the correct manner of bringing and conducting

causes shall be secured. Regarded as a statutory enactment of

the equity doctrine touching the joinder of causes of action in one

suit, the clause perhaps requires no special interpretation, since it

may be assumed to permit tlie previous equitable principles and

rules of procedure to exist unchanged. In this light alone it is

treated by Mr. Justice Gomstock in the extract taken from his

opinion. But as it applies also to legal actions, and as there were

no prior doctrines and rules of practice in courts of law which

it reproduces or suffers to remain operative, it does as to them

" introduce a novelty in pleading and practice." In order to fix

its application in such cases, the meaning of its controlling terms

must be determined. There was no prior rule of the common-law

procedure which permitted the union of a claim upon contract

with another arising from violence to property or person under

any circumstances, and yet it is possible that such a combination

may be made by virtue of this particular provision.

1 N. Y. k N. II. R. Co. V. Schuyler, 17 N. Y. 592, 604, per Comstock J.

tion " connected with the me subjec f action. The author of
the co le in framin hi" and mo t of i o her pr vision', app r
o haYe had ome remote knowledge f h t tl e pr viou law
had be n. Thi provi ion a it now
wa in roduc cl in he
amendment f 1 5:. b cau e the uc e" iv code of 1 J 1 4 ,
and 1 -1 with charc ct ri. tic per picacity, ht cl in effect al>r gc t d
quity jur· diction in many important cas b - failing to provide
for a union of ubj ct and partie in one uit incli 'pen able t it
exerci e. Thi amendment, therefore, wa n t de igne<l to introcluc an nov lty in pleading and practice. I · lano-nage i I
hink well cho en for the purpo e intended becau e it i'
ob cure and o general as t ju tify the interpr tation which shc 11
be found most convenient and be t calculated to prom te the end
of ju ice. It is cer ainl) impo ible to extract from a pro ision
loo e and yet so compr hensive, any rules le s liberal than th 'e
which have long prevailed in court of equity. ' 1 Mr. Ju tice
om tock plainly regard it unnece ary, if not impo ible, to
attempt a defini ion of he term employed in the pa age which
he quote , and would leaYe each ca e to be decided upon i
nn
circum tance . Thi i undoubtedly he ea ier method for the
court to pur ue · but suitor a well a the profe sion, h'tve a
righ to a k from them some rules by which area onable degr
of certain y as to the correct manner of bringing and concluctin
cau e hall be ecuretl. Regarded a a ta utory enactment f
the equity doctrine ouching the joincler of cau e of acti n in one
uit, the clau e perhap requires no ,pecial interpreta i n, inc it
may be a urned to permit he rrev1 us equitable principl s an
rule of proc dure to exist unchanged. In thi light alone it i,
treated by Mr. Ju tice , omstock in the xtract taken from l i
op1m n. But as it applies also to 1 gal action and
here w re
no rior doctrine and rule of practice in cour s of law whic.;11
it reproduces or uffer to remain opera iv it doe a t th m
In order t fix
introduce a novel y in pleading an practice.
it ap lication in uch m
the me, ning f i controllin term·
mu l e determined. There was n prior rul of the comm n-1( w
r c dure which 1 ermitted the union f a claim upon con r< t
r perty r er n un r
itl another ari in fr m vi lence t
any circum ance and y it i po ibl that such a combination
ay be made by irtue f hi articular pro i ion.
1
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^ 360. * 466. Observations Made by Courts Respecting Meaning

360.

of these Terms. I shall lirst collect some general observations

these terms, and shall, with whatever aid is derived from the

judicial interpretation, attempt an mdependent analysis. A com-

plaint united a cause of action for an assault and battery with one

for slander, alleging that the defamatory words were uttered while

tlie beating was in actual progress. To a demurrer for a mis-

joinder, it was answered that both causes of action arose out of

the same transaction. The court disposed of this position in the

following manner : " It by no means follows that, because the

two causes of action originated or happened at the same time,

each cause arose out of the same transaction. It is certainly

neither physically nor morally impossible that there should be

two transactions occurring simultaneously, each differing from the

other in essential attitudes and qualities. As here, the transac-

tion out of which the cause of action for the assault springs is

the beating, the physical force used ; while the transaction out of

which the cause of action for the slander springs is not the beat-
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ing or the force used, but the defamatory words uttered. The

maker of a promissory note might, at the very instant of its de-

livery and inception, falsely call the payee a thief ; and yet who

would say that the two causes of action arose out of the same

transaction ? It has been held that a contract of warranty and a

fraud practised in tlie sale of a horse at the same trade did not

arise out of the same transaction, so as to be connected each with

the same subject of action, and that a complaint containing both

causes of action was demurrable.^ Assault and battery and slan-

der are as separate and distinct causes of action as any two actions

whatever that can be named. The subjects of the two actions are

not connected with each other. Each subject is as distinct and

different from the other as the character of an individual is from

his bodily structure. The question is not whether both causes of

action sprang into existence at the- same moment of time. Time

has very little to do with solving the real question. The questionV

f is, Did each cause of action accrue or arise out of the same trans-

[V action, the same tiling done f It is apparent that each cause of''^

I action arose, and indeed must necessarily have arisen, out of the ;

1 doing of quite different things by the defendant, — diiferent in

1 Sweet ;•. Lif^crscni, 12 How. ]''r. .3"!.

."1

* 466.

Observations Made by Courts Respecting Meaning

I hall fir t collect some general olrervations
which have been ma.de by the court upon Lhe 1 gal import of
the e terms, and shall, with whatever aid i derived. from the
jud.i ial int rpretation, attempt an ind.ependent analysis. A complaint united a cause of action for an as ault and battery with one
for sland r, alleging that the defamatory words were uttered while
the beating wa in actual progre:s . To a demurrer for a misjoind r, it wa answered that both causes of action arose out of
the same transaction. The court disposed of this position in the
following manner: "It by no means follows that, because the
two causes 0£ action originated or happened at the same time,
each cause arose out of the same transaction. It is certainly
neither physically nor morally impossible that there should be
two transactions occurring simultaneously, each differing from the
other in essential attitude and qualities. As here, the transaction out of which the cause of action for the assault springs is
the beating, the physical force used; while the transaction out of
which the cause of action for the slander springs is not the beating or the force used, but the defamatory words uttered. The
maker of a promissory note might, at the very instant of its delivery and inception, falsely call the payee a thief; and yet who
would say that the two causes of action arose out of the sa~e
transaction? It has been held that a contract of warranty and a
fraud practi ed in the sale of a horse at the same trade did not
arise out of the same transaction, so as to be connected each with
the same subject of action, and that a complaint containing both
causes of action was demurrable. 1 Assault and battery and slander are as separate and di tinct causes of action as any two actions
whatever that can be named. The subjects of the two actions are
not connected with each other. Each subject is as distinct and
different from the other as the character of an individual is from
bis bodily structure. The question is not whether both causes of '
action sprang into existence at the. same moment of time. Time
has very little to do with solving the real question. The question
is, Did each cause of action accrue or arise out of the same transaction, the same thing done? It is apparent that each cause of
action arose, and indeed must necessarily have arisen, out of the
doing of quite different things by the defendant, - different in
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Sweet,., Ingerson . 12 How. Pr ..'3~!.
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ytheir nature, in all their qualities and characteristics, and inflicting-

.injuries altogetlier different and dissimilar. The same evidence

'would not sustain each cause of action, and they may require

different answers." ^ It has been held, however, that the twd

causes of action under exactly the same circumstances do arise!

inut of the same transaction, and may be united in the samaf

complaint.^ -^

§ 361. * 467. Author's Criticism. A complaint contained one

cause of action for the breach of a warranty given on the sale of

a horse, and a second cause of action for fraudulent representa-

1 Anderson v. Hill, 53 Barb. 2.38, 245,

per T. A. Johnson J. ; and see Dragoo i".

Levi, 2 Duv. 520, which reaches the same

conclusion. It should be noticed that

heir na ure in all their quali ies and characteristic , ancl inflicting
injuri ' altog h r different and di imila,r. T he same idenc
would not u tain each cau e of action, and t hey may require
differ nt an w r ' 1 It ha been h lcl, how er, that the two
au
of action und r xactl the ame ircum t ance do ari e
ut f the ame trnn action, and may be u nited in the am
complaint. 2
361. * 46 7. Au t hor's C r iticis m . A c mplaint contained one
cau e of action for the breach of a warran ty given on t he ale of
a hor e, and a econd ause of action for frau lulen t repre en ta-

Judge Johnson offers no affirmative defi-

nition of " transaction," except in making

"the same transaction" equivalent to

" the same thing done " See also Wiles
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V. Suvdam, 64 N. Y. 173, per Church C. J. :

Held, that the two causes of action cannot

be joined ; one is on contract, and the

other is for a penalty given by statute;

they do not " arise out of the same trans-

action, "^nor are they " connected with the

same su!)ject of action." Hay v. Haj^ 13

Hun, 315; French v. Salter, 17 id. 546;

Douglas Cy. Sup., 38 Wis. 179; Ogdens-

burgh & L."C. R. Co. v. Vt. & Can. R. Co.,

63 N. Y. 176 (meaning of " subject-matter

of the action ").

- Brewer v. Temple, 15 How. Pr. 286 ;

Harris v. Avery, 5 Ivans. 146 The first

of these was a special term decision, and

is expressly overruled in Anderson v. Hill.

I quote from the opinion in the other as

an example of the argument on the other

side of the question. The defendant had

wrongfully arrested the plaintiff, and at

the same time called him a thief. The

court say : " We think that these facts

constitute only one transaction. . . . Our

code has abolished all cummon-law forms

of action, and has established a system

for the joinder of actions more philo-

sophical and complete in itself. It fol-

lows the rules of equity more closely than

it does those of the common law, one

object seeming to be to avcjid the multi-

plicity of actions, and to settle in one suit

as eijuity did, as far as practicable, the

whole subject-matter of a controversy. It

is probably true that the two causes of

action for assault and battery and for

slander cannot, under our code, be united,

unless both arise out of the same trans-

action ; but we do not know any reason

why they should not be united when both

do arise out of the same transaction."

The court here simply assumes that both

causes of action did arise out of the same

transaction, but does not venture upon

any reasons for that opinion. The deci-

sion is a mere begiring of the question.

[Benton v. Collins (1896), 118 X. C.

196, 24 S E. 122. In this case a cause of

action for assault and batterv and an

equitable cause of action to set aside a

deed alleged to have been fraudulently

i · probably true that the t wo cau e of
l Ander ou v. H ill , 53 Barb. 23 , 245,
per T. A. John on J.; and ee Dragoo v. action for a. ault and battery and fo r
Levi, 2 Du\'. 520, which reache the ame
lander cannot, uucl r our code, be united,
conclu ion. It houltl be noticed that unle both ari e out of the ame tran ·
J udg John on offer. no affirmative defi- action; but we do not know any rea on
nition of 'tran action," except in making why they hould not be united when both
"the ame tran a tion " equivalent to do ari ~e out of the ame trau:action."
" the ame thing done." See al o Wiles The court here imply a sumes that l>oth
i: . 'uydam, 64 ~. Y. 113, per Church C. J.:
cau e of action did ari e out of the ame
lleld, that the two cau es of action cannot
be joined; one i on contract, and the
other i for a penalty given by tatute;
they clo not "ari ~e out of the ame transaction," nor are they "connected with the
ame ubje t of action." Hay v. Hay, 13
Bun, 315; French v. alter, 17 id. 546;
Dongl.l Cy. up., 3 Wi . 179; Ogden burgh & L. C. R. Co. v. Vt. & Can. R. Co.,
63 :N. Y. 176 (meaning of " ubject-matter
of the action ').
2 Brewer v. Temple, 15 How. Pr. 2 6 ;
Harri v. A very, 5 Kan . 146 The fir t
of the e wa~ a pecial term cl ci:iou, and
i~ ex pre ·ly overruled in And er ·on v. Bill.
I quote from the opinion in the other as
an example of the argument n the other
~itlc of the que:tion. The def nclant had
wrono-fully arre-ted th plaintiff, and at
the . amc time called hi1 a thi £. The
court ay: "\Ve think that · the e factcon titute uly one tran action . . . . Our
code ha aboli -hecl all comm n-law form
of action, and ha.
talJli h l a y tern
for the joiuder f a tion. m re phil . ophical and complete in it. elf. It follow tlie rule of quity mor ·lo el 'than
it doe tho e f the comm n law, ne
object eeming to be to avoid th multiplicity of action , aud to ttl in on . uit
a· 'Jllity did, a far as pra ticabl , tb
"hole.;. ubject-matt r of a controver y. I t
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tions respecting the quality and condition of the horse made at

the same sale, the plaintiff claiming that both causes of action

arose out of the same transaction. The court said : " It is some-

w liat dil'licult to determine the precise extent and boundaries of

tlie first subdivision of § 167 of the code, which provides for the

joinder of causes of action where they arise out of the same trans-

action or transactions connected with the same subject of action.

In this case the plaintiff first counts in assumpsit on an alleged

warranty of the horse, and in the second count for fraud and de-

ceit in wrongfully concealing the defects of the same horse. It

may be true that these causes of action arise out of the same

transaction, to wit, the bargain for the purchase of the horse ; but

are they connected with the same subject of action ? The subject

of the action is either the contract of warranty, or it is the fraud-

ulent concealment of the defects complained of. These causes of

action cannot consist with each other. I am inclined to think

that the object of the section was to allow the plaintiff to include

in his complaint two or more causes of action actually existing,

arising out of the same transaction, and when a recovery might
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be had for both in the same action ; and that the joinder must be

of those - causes of action which are consistent with, not those

which are contradictory to, each other." ^ The judge here fell

into at least one palpable error and misreading of the statute. If

the causes of action arise out of the same transaction, it is not

necessary that they should also be connected with the same sub-

ject of action. There are two alternatives: first, the causes of

action must arise out of the same transaction, that is, one trans-

action , or, secondly^ they must arise out of transactions which are

themselves connected with the same subject of action. When it

was conceded by the learned judge that the two causes of action

in this case arose out of the same transaction, namely, the bargain

for the sale of the horse, he had no room for further argument;

the case was practically decided. The real question was, whether

they did in fact arise out of the same transaction ; whether the

negotiation preceding the sale ivas the "transaction " within the

legal meaning of the provision. The rule laid down at the end of

^ Sweet V. Ingerson, 12 How. Pr. 331, stood that a vendor cannot enter into a

per Bacon J. What inconsistency exists contract of warranty, and also make false

between these two causes of action ? representations at the same sale and in

Does the learned judge mean to be under- llic Kdine langiuvje?

tions resp cLing th quality and concliti n £ the hor e matle at
h ~am e ale, the plaintiff claiming that b t h e;rns s of a tion
aro · out of the am trnn action. Th court aid : " It i. somewhat difficult to cJ Lermine the preci 'e xt nt and bountlari s of
the :first subdivi ion f § 167 of the ode, which provitl s for the
joinder of cause of action where th y arise out of the same tran action or tran action ' connected with the sarn subject of action.
Jn thi
a the plaintiff first counts in assump it on an all g d
warranty of the hor e, and in the econd ount for fraud antl cl ceit in wrongfully concealing the defects of t he same horse. It
may be true that these causes of action arise out of the same
transaction, to wit, the bargain for the purchase of the horse; but
are they connected with the same subject of action'? The suuject
of the action is either the contract of warranty, or it is the fraudulent concealment of the defects complained of. These causes of
a,ction cannot consist with each other. I am inclined to think
that the object o·f the section was to allow the pla.intiff to inclucl
in his complaint t\YO or more cause of action actually existing,
arising out of the same tnmsaction, and when a recovery might
l>e had for both in the same action; and that the joincler must be
of those causes of action which are consistent with, not those
which are contradictory to, each other.'' 1 The judge here fell
into at least one palpable error and misreading of the statute. If
tbe cau es of action arise out of the same transaction, it is not
nece sary that they should also be connected with the same subjert of actio n. There are two alternatives : first, the causes of
action mu t arise out of the ame transaction, that is, one transaction, or, secondly, they must arise out of transactions which are
themselves connected with the 'ame subject of action . "'When it
was conceded by the learned judge t hat the two causes of action
in this case arose out of the same transaction, namely, the bargain
for the sale of the horse, he h ad no room for further argument;
the case was practically decided. The real question was, whether
they did in fact arise out of the same transaction; whether the
negotiation preceding the sale was the ''transaction " within the
legal meaning of the provision. The rule laid down at the end of
1 Sweet v. Ingerson, 12 How. Pr. 331,
per Bacon J. What inconsistency exist
between the e two cau es of action ?
DoeR th e learn ed judge mean to be und er-

stood that a vendor cannot enter into a
contract of >varranty, and also make fal e
representation at the same ale and in
th (' same lcm_q11a9e '?
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the citation affords no help in solving the difficulty, if indeed it

has any meaning whatever.

§ 362. *4:68. Same Subject. In a case where the defendants —

common carriers — had carried a quantity of wheat of the plain-

tiffs on their boats from Buffalo to New York, the complaint

separately stated two causes of action. The first alleged a

wrongful conversion of 340 bushels of wheat, and demanded

judgment for their value, as damages ; the second alleged an

overpayment of freight on the shipment to the amount of il70,

and demanded judgment for that sum. In passing upon the

question raised by the defendants' demurrer, the court said : " It

must be admitted that the first cause of action is for a tort, and

that the second is on an implied contract to recover back money

paid by plaintiffs under a mistake of facts. But the counsel for

the plaintiffs insists that both causes of action arise out of the

same subject of action, viz. the transportation of wheat from Buf-

falo to New York, or arise out of transactions connected %vith that

subject of the action, and are therefore joined under the first sub-

division of § 167 of the code. Cases throw but little light on
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the unmeaning generality of the first subdivision of this section.

Now, I do not think the transportation of the wheat to New York

is the subject of the plaintiffs' action. The plaintiffs have two

causes of action. The subject of the first would be the loss,

waste, or wrongful conversion of the 340 bushels of wheat by the

defendants, and their wrongful neglect or act by which the plain-

tiffs lost their property. The subject of the second cause of action

would appear to be the 8170 of the plaintiffs' money, which the

plaintiffs overpaid to the defendants on account of freight, and

which the defendants ought to have paid back to the plaintiff's.

But have both these causes of action, or subjects of action, arisen

out of the same transaction, within the meaning of this provision

of the code ? I do not want to nullify the code, and I have no

right to nullify it ; and this provision has, or was intended to

have, some meaning. Why, then, should I not saj^ that the trans-

action in this case, out of which have arisen the plaintiffs' two

cau.ses of action, and subjects of action, commenced witli the ship-

ment of wheat at Buffalo, and has not ended yet, even by the

commencement of this action ; the plaintiffs' two causes of action

being links in tiie chain of facts containing tlie transaction, and

thus arising out of, or connected with, the same transaction ? By

he cita ion aff rd no h lp in solYing the difficulty if indeed it
ha . . any meaning wbate er.
362. * 4o . S ame S ubject. In a ca e h re he defen lant ~
common carrier . . - had carri d a quan -ity of wheat f the plaine' York the complaint
tiff on their boat from uffalo t
e arately tated wo cau e of action. The firt all
a
wron ful con er ion f 3-±0 bu hel of wh at, and de man l d
juclgm nt for heir 'alue a damag · the econd alleged an
overpayment of fr i ht on the hipment to the am unt f '170,
t ncl demand cl jud<nnent for hat um.
In pa 'ing u on the
que tion rai 'ed b; the defenda.n demurrer h court aid : It
mu t be admitted that the fir t cau e of action i f r a tort, and
that the econd is on an implied contract to recoYer back m ney
paid b plain iffs under a mi . . take of fact .
u he coun el for
be plaintiffs in i t that both cau e of action ari e out of he
ame ubject of action viz . the transportati n f wheat from uffalo o '" ew York or ari e out of transactions connected with that
ubjec t of the action, and are therefore join cl under the fir t u b di vi 'ion of
167 of the code.
a e throw but little lig1 t on
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cause of action. The ubject of the fir t would be the lo ,
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would appear o be the $170 of the plaintiff mone
hich he
plain iff ov rpaicl to the def ndant on account of fr i h and
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u have both th e cau e of acti n, or subj ct of acti n ari en
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f thi ro i i n
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right
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the ' subject of action' in this section of the code must be intended,

not the subjects of the different counts, or of the several causes of

action, but of the action as a unit. To say that by the ' subject

of action ' is meant the several causes of action nullifies this pro-

vision of the code. To give force and effect to it, it appears to

me you must say that it means that the plaintiffs can unite several

causes of action against the same party, arising out of the same

transaction, and nothing more ; and you must treat the concluding

words, ' or transactions connected with the same subject of action,'

as useless and unmeaning surplusage. Upon the Avhole, I have

come to the conclusion that the plaintiffs had a right to unite the

two causes of action in this complaint ; but I have done so, know-

ing that no reasoning on this point can have much logical pre-

cision, or lead to a satisfactory result." ^

§ 363. * 469. Same Subject. This opinion, which I have quoted

in full, is one of the most elaborate attempts to be found in the

repo)'ts at an analysis and definition of these terms. Some obser-

vations upon it are appropriate here, before passing to the other

citations. It is plain that the learned judge labored under a hope-
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less confusion, both in respect to his notions of the meaning of

the important terms, ancl in respect to his reading of the clause

itself. He is completely afloat as to the legal import of "subject

of action," constantly treating it interchangeably with "transac-

tion," and, notwithstanding his disclaimer, confounding it with

"cause of action." Why, in the one case, is the "subject of

action " declared to be the conversion of the wheat, the wrongful

act or neglect by which tlie wheat was lost to the plaintiffs, —

that is, the very delict committed by the defendant, and in the

other case declared to be the ononey^ — the very physical thing

which the plaintiffs had mistakenly paid to the defendants, and

which the defendants were under an implied contract to repay ?

It is self-evident that, if by the term " subject of action " is meant

the delict or wrong by which the plaintiffs' primary right of prop-

erty in their wheat was invaded, it must also mean the wrrong in

the other case, — - that is, the breach of the implied contract to

repay the money; ancl if it denotes, in the one instance, the

money which is the subject of the plaintiffs' claim, it must denote

the same in the other. But the great error of the learned judge

consists in his mistaken reading of the statute. The view of the

1 Adams v. Bissell, 28 Barb. 382, 385, per Sutherland J.

the ' ubject of action' in hi. section of th co le n u ·t b int i cl ·d,
not th ubjects of th di.ff rent aunt., r f th :e ral cau e of
action, but of the action a a unit. T
ay tlrnt hy the 'subject
of a tion is meant th ev ral caus of a tion nnllifi this provi ·ion of the code. To giv fore and eff ct to i , it appear to
rne y u mu t say that it m an· that the plaintiff can unite everal
cau
of action again t the same party, ari:ing out of the :ame
tran a tion, and nothing mor ; and you mu t treat the concluding
words, 'or trnnsaction connected " ·ith the. ame subject of action,'
a usele sand unm eaning surplusage. epon the whole, I have
come to the conclusion that tlie plaintiffs had a right to unite the
two cau e of action in hi complaint; but I have don o knowin that no reasoning on this point can have much logical preci:'ion, or lead to a atisfactory result." 1
§ 363. * 469. Same Subject. Tbis opinion, which I have quoted
in full, i one of the most la.borate attempts to be found in the
reports at an analysis and definition of these terms .
ome observations upon it are appropriate here, before pa sing to the other
citations. It is plain that the learned judge labored under a hopele s confusion, both in respect to his notions of the meaninO' of
the important terms, and in respect to his reading of the clause
itse1f. He is completely afloat as to the legal import of "subject
of action," constantly treating it interchangeably with "tran action, ' and, notwithstanding his disclaimer, confounding it with
''cause of action." "\Vhy, in the one case, is the " ·ubject of
action" declared to be th e conrnrsion of the wheat, the wrongful
act or neglect by which the wheat was lo t to the plaintiff\ that is, the very delict committed by the defendant, and in the
other case declared to be the 11wney, - the very physical thing
which the plaintiffs hH.d mistakenly paid to the defendant , and
which the defendants were under a~ implied contract to repay?
It is self-evident that, if by the term " subject of action" i · meant
the delict or wrong by which the plaintiffs' primary right of property in their wheat wa" invaued, it mu ·t al o mean the wrnng in
the other ca 'e, - that i , the breach of the implied contract to
repay the money; and if it denotes, in the ne in tance, the
money which is the subject of the plaintiffs' claim, it mu t denote
the same in the other. But the great error of the learned judge
consists in his mistaken re, ding of the statute. The view of the
1
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plaintiffs' counsel, which he repudiates, was certainly simple and

intelligible. That view regarded both causes of action as arising

whic h h r pndiat

wa

out of one and the same transaction, — the transport of the grain,

with all of its incidents. After rejecting it, the judge, in fact,

returns to this theory at last, and rests his decision u[)on it. In

er ainl · impl an
of acti n a · arisin
ran ort f h

his discussion, however, he reverses the order of the statute ; he

treats it as though it required the " subjects of action " to be con-

nected with one "transaction," instead of prescribing that the

" transactions "' should be connected with the same " subject of

action ; " and, finding that this construction leads him into diffi-

culties from which there is no escape, he finally pronounces the

important clause of the section useless surplusage, to be entirely

rejected. I need hardly say that courts have no authority to

reject any portion of a statute, unless it be absolutely meaning-

less. This clause is certainly not thus without meaning. Causes

of action may arise from the same transaction, and they may arise

from transactions which are connected with the same subject of

action, — that is, which have a common point of connection witli

which they are all united, and whicli common point is the subject
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of the action. This, I say, is far from meaningless ; on the con-

trary, it is a simple and plain expression, as far as the language

is concerned, when that language is used in its oixiinaiy and pop-

ular signification. The difficulty, and the only difficulty, springs

from the question, whether the words are thus used in their proper

sense, or whether they must receive a special and technical legal

inteipretation in order to amve at the legislative intent, and to

frame from them a definite rule which shall be applicable to all

possible cases. It is an abuse of judicial power to reject an

express provision of a statute on the sole ground of a difficulty

in understanding and enforcing it.

§ 364. * 470. Same Subject. In an action by a judgment cred-

itor against his debtor and an assignee of such debtor to set aside

transfers, to recover propert}', and for other relief, it was said b}*

the court: " What is the subject of the action in this case? It is

the restitution of the propert}-- of the judgment debtor, whom the

plaintiff represents. To entitle himself to this rehef, the plaintiff

avers in liis complaint different transactions out of which his riglit

to a restitution flows." ^ There is here a plain cfmfusion of ideas.

The restitution of the debtor's property, which is the relief de-

1 Paleii V. Buslincll, 40 B.irlj. 24.
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re cribin
hat h
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manded, is the object of the action. If there is anything con-

nected with this matter clear,, it is that the authors of the code

used the terms "subject of action" and "object of the action" to

describe different and distinct facts.

§ 365. *4T1. Jones v. Steamship Cortes. The general theory

of pleading and of actions embodied in the new system was stated

with some fulness by the Supreme Court of California, in an

action brought against a steamboat company by a passenger to

recover damages. The plaintiff had purchased a ticket from San

Francisco to San Juan, being led to believe, by public advertise-

ments of the defendants, that the vessel landed at the latter place.

She was carried on to Panama, the boat not stopping at San Juan,

and was subjected to many personal discomforts and injuries, and

also suffered consequential pecuniary losses and damage. The

complaint was in the form of an action for deceit, rather than

on the contract, and contained allegations of false and fraudulent

representations. In respect to this complaint, the court pronounced

the following opinion : " Our system of pleadiiig is foi'med upoJi

the model of the civil law, and one of its principal objects is to
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discourage protracted and vexatious litigation. It is the duty of

the courts to assist as far as possible in the accomplishment of this

object, and it should not be frittered away by the application of

rules Avhieh have no legitimate connection with the system. The

provisions for avoiding a multiplicity of suits are to be liberall}'

and beneficially construed ; and we see no reason why all matters

arising from, and constituting part of, the same transaction, should

not be litigated and determined in the same action. Causes of

complaint differing in their nature, and having no connection with

each other, cannot be united ; but the object of this rule is to

prevent the confusien and emljarrassment which would necessarily

result from the union of diverse and incongruous matters, and it

has no application to a case embracing a variety of circumstances,

so connected as to constitute but one transaction. . . . Every

action under our practice may be properly termed an action on

the case ; and it would seem that every ground of relief which

can be regarded as a part of the case may with propriety be in-

cluded in the action. . . . The plaintiffs have brought their suit

upon the whole case to recover damages, not only for the breach

of the contract, but for the wrongs and injuries committed by the

owners and agents of the defendants in that connection. The

mand d, i the obJect of the action. If ther i · anything conn cted with this matter lear,. it is that th autl r of the code
u ed the term. "subj ct of action" and "obj · of he action" to
d e cribe different and di inct fact .
365. * 471. Jones v. Steamship Cortes. The general h ory
of pleading and of action embodied in the new y ·t m was tat d
with some fulne by the upr me Court of alif rnia, in an
action brought against a ·t amboat company by a pas enger to
recover damage. . The plaintiff had purchased a ticket from Sau
Francisco to San Juan, being led to believe, by public advertisements of the defendants, thitt the vessel landed at t~e latter place.
She wa carried on to Panama, the boat not stopping at San Juan,
and was subj ected to many personal discomforts and injurie , and
al o suffered consequential pecuniary lo ·ses and damage. The
complaint was in the form of an action for deceit, rather than
on the contract, and contained allegations of false and fraudulent
representations. I n respect to this complaint, the court pronounced
the following opinion : "Om system of pleading is fonped upon
the model of the civil law, and one of its principal objects is to
discourage protracted and yexat ious litigation. It is the duty of
the courts to assist as far a possible in the accomplishment of this
object, and it should not be frittered away by the application of
rules which have no legitimate connection with the system. The
provisions for avoiding a multiplicity of suits are to be liberally
and beneficially construed ; and we see no reason why all matters
ari»ing from, and constituting part of, the same transaction, shoul<l.
not be litigated and determined in the same action. Cau e of
complaint differing in their nature, and having no connection \vith
each other, cannot Le united; but the object of this rule i · to
prevent the confusien and embarrassment which 1vo11lcl necessarily
result from the union of diverse and incongruous matters, and it
has no application to a case embracing a variety of circumstance ,
o connected a to constitute but one transaction . . . . Every
action under our practice may be properly termed an action on
the case; and it would eem that every groun<l. of relief which
can be regarded as a part of the case may with propriety b included in the action. . . . The plaintiffs ha.Ye broub'ht their suit
upon the whole case to re oYer damages, not only for th bre~ch
of the contract, but for the wrong and inj~tll'ie committed by the
owners and agents of the defendants in that connection. The
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defendants are liable for all the damages resulting from these

causes ; and there is certainly no impropriety in adjusting the

whole matter in one controversy." ^ The section found in all the

codes defining a " counter-claim " contains the expressions " trans-

action " and " connected with the subject of action," used in the

same sense as in the passage now under consideration. In a few

of the decisions which have been based upon that section, there is

some approach towards a general interpretation of these phrases.

The cases are collected in the succeeding chapter, in the section

which treats of the counter-claim, and may be consulted for what-

ever light they throw upon tlic present discussion.

§ 366. * 472. Observations of the Author. Two Alternatives.

It is plain that little real help can be obtained from the foregoing

judicial explanations, and we must return to the very language of

the statute itself. This language must be caiefuUy studied, and

the proper force and effect given to all its words. In order that

<l fendan are liable for all th 1ama
resultin
au
· and tl ere i certainly n
"h 1 m< tter in on controv r y . 1 The
cle · 1 finin a' ounter-claim' ontaiu
an<l
onn ct d wi h the ubj
:ame n a in he pa ag now under c nsidera ion. In a f w
of the l ci ion which ha e b en b
l up n hat ecti
· me a roach toward a general int r re ta ti n of th e hra.' .
'l h ca 'e ar collecte l in the ucceec.ling hapter in the ection
which tr ct of the counter-claim and ma be 01 ·ultecl f r wbatY r liO'ht th y throw upon the pr ent c.li ~c us ion.

different causes of action may be united, they must arise out of a

transaction, or out of transactions. Nothing is said about their

being connected with or arising out of the same "subject of
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action." There are two alternatives only : First, these different

causes of action may arise out of the same transaction, — that is,

out of one ; or, secondly, they may arise out of different transac-

tions ; but in that case these transactions must be connected with

the same '• subject of action." The words " arise out of " are

important and em]^hatic. They indicate a sequence of cause and

effect, so that the causes of action must result as consequences

from, or be produced by, the transactions. It is plain that there

must be a close connection between the transaction, as the origin,

and the causes of action, as the products.

§ 367. * 473. Meaning of " Transaction." " Transaction " is de-

fined by Worcester as " the act of transacting or conducting any

business; negotiation; management; a proceeding." We must

recur to the definition of cause of action already given. It in-

cludes the plaintiff's primary right which has been invaded, and

the wrongful act or defaidt — the delict — of the defendant by

wliich the right is broken. In oider that causes of action may

arise out of a transaction, tliere must therefore be a negotiation,

or a proceeding, or a conduct of business, between the parties, of

such a nature that it produces, as necessary results, two or more

1 .Joiie.s V. Stcain.sliip Cortes, 17 Cal. 487, 497, por Cope -J.
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different primary rights in favor of the plaintiff, and wrongs done

by the defendant wliich are violations of sneh rights. The pro-

ceeding, or negotiation, or conduct of business, must, of course,

be a unit, one affair, or else it would not be a single transaction ;

and yet it must be in its nature complex, for it must be the origin

of two or more separate primary rights, and of the wrongs which

violate them. In order that tliis may be so, the facts from

which the different primary rights flow must he parts of^ or stejjs

in, the transaction ; and, for the same reason, the wrongful acts

or omissions of the defendant must be parts of the same transac-

tion. If a single transaction — that is, a single, continuous, and

complex proceeding, or negotiation, between the parties — is

analyzed and reduced into its series of acts and defaults, and some

of these acts are the facts from which spring one primary right

in favor of the plaintiff, and other acts are the facts from which

spring a different primary right in his favor, and others still are

the violations or breaches of these rights, these two causes of

action do truly arise out of the same transaction.

§ 368. * 474. Same Subject. It is clear that every event affect-
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ing two persons is not necessarily a " transaction " within the

meaning of the statute ; indeed, the word as used in common

speech has no such signification. " Transaction " implies mutu-

ality, something done by both in concert, in which each takes

some part. Much less can it be said that, because two events

occur to the same persons at the same time, they are necessarily so

connected as to become one transaction. The case cited above,

in which a cause of action for an assault and battery and one for

a slander were united, illustrates this statement. Two events

happened simultaneously, the beating and the defamation, but

neither was a "transaction" in any proper sense of the word.

The wrong which formed a part of one cause of action was the

beating ; that which formed a part of the other was the malicious

speaking. The plaintiff's primary rights which previously existed

were broken by two independent and different wrongs. The only

common point between the causes of action was one of time ; but

this unity of time Avas certainly not a " transaction." ^ Much of

1 [^See De Wolfe v. Abraham (189G), the presence and hearing of a large nuni-

151 N. Y. 186, 45 N.E. 455, in which "the her of people, the defendants, through

plaintiff sued the defendants, merchants their lawful agents, charged plaintiff

in the city of Brooklyn, for slander, alleg- with theft, in that she had stolen from

ing that at their place of business, and in them a certain ring. The ])laintiff's

differ nt primary rights in favor of th plaintiff ancl wrongs clrme
by th d f nclant which ar viola.ti ns f ·u ·h right· . The proee<ling, or negotiation, r oncl n t of bu ·in ·" , muHt E · ur ·e,
b a unit, one affair, or 1 e it w nkl not be a. ingl tran action ·
and t it mu t be in i · natur ompl x, for it mu ·t be the origin
of two or mor eparate primary right , ancl of th wrono-' whic.:h
Yiolate them. In order that thi... may be o, the fa.ct:-3 from
which the diff rent primary right fl.aw ?rm ·t be patt.· of, or sfrps
in, the transaction; and, for the s:une rea on, th wrongful acts
or omissions of the cl fondant must be parts of Lhe same tran «tction. If a single trJ.ns ~wtion - that i ', a single, continuou ', and
complex proceeding, or negotiation, batween the pa.rtie ' - is
analyzed and reducerl into its 8eries of acts and default , ancl some
of these acts are the f;tvts from which spring one primary right
in fo.vor of the plaintiff, and other acts are the facts from which
spring a different primary right in his favor, and others till are
the viobtions or br c.tche, of these right·, these two ca.uses of
action do truly arise out of the sa.m tran:-;a.ction.
~ 368. * 4 7-±. Same Subject. It is clear that every event affecting two persons i not necessarily a " trnnsaction " within the
meaning of the statute; indeed, the word as used in common
speech has no such signification. " Tran ·action" implie' mutuality, something clone by both in concert, in whic.:h each takes
some part. Much less can it be said that, bec8.u 'e t11·0 events
occt1r to the same persons at the same time, they are nece sarily .._o
connected as to become onu tran action. The ca e cited above,
in whid1 a cause of action for an assault ancl battery aml one for
a slander were united, illustrate this statement. Two ev nb:;
happened simultaneously, the beating and the defamation, but
neither was a " transaction" in any proper sense of the "·onl.
The wrong which formed a part of one cause of action w·as the
beating; that which formed a part of the other was the malicious
speaking. The plaintiff's primary rights which previou 'ly existed
were broken by two independent ancl different wrong . The only
common point between the causes of action wa one of time; but
this unity of time was certainly not a "transaction." 1 ::\Inch of
I [See De Wolfe v. Abraham (1 96), the pre-ence and hearing of a laro-e num151 N. Y. 186, 45 N. E. 455, in which" the ber of people, the defendant , throug-h
plaintiff sued the defendants, merchant their lawful agents, charged plaintiff
in the city of Brooklyn, for lancler, alleg- with theft, in that she had stolen from
ing that at their place of busiuess, aucl in them a certain ring. The plaintiff's
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the difficulty in construing this Language has resulted, I think,

from a failure to apprehend the true nature of a " cause of action,"

from a forgetfulness that it includes two factors, — the primary

counsel, in opening the case to the jury,

th
iffi ulty in
n truin 0 hi.' lancruao- ha re nl d I hink,
au e of a. tion,
from a failure
appreh ncl th ru nu.tur fa
from a forge fuln
hat i includ tw fact r - the primar
r

stated that the alleged slander was not

uttered by the defendants, or either of

them, but by a clerk or salesman in their

employ ; that plaintiff, at the time of tlie

slander, was falsely imjjrisoned by a de-

tective of defendants, and that slie sought

to recover damages for false impris-

onment and the slander. Thereupon

the counsel for the defendants moved

upon the complaint and the opening

for a dismissal upon the ground that

the defendants were not liable for the

slander of their clerk, and that the com-

plaint was solely for slander. This
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motion was denied and the plaintiff was

allowed to withdraw a juror for the pur-

pose of applying to the Special Term for

leave to amend her complaint, so as to

allege a cause of at'tion for false imprison-

ment against the defendants. A motion

■was accordingly made at Special Term,

and the justice ])residing held that the

proposed amended complaint contained a

union of the causes of action for slan-

der and false imprisonment, and denied

the motion. On aj)])eal the Appellate

Division reversed the order of the

Special Term and allowed the amend-

ment, hohling that ' injury at the same

time to the jiersou by physical violence

and to the character by language may

well be regarded as parts of a single

tort.'" The question presented to the

Court of Appeals was " whether under all

the circumstances of tlie case the plaintiff

should have been allowed to amend her

complaint for slander by adding thereto

the statement of a cau.se of action for

false imprisonment." lu reversing the

order appealed from the Court of Appeals,

among other tilings, said : " We are

unable to agree with the conclusion

reached by the learned Appellate Division

that injury at the same time to the jjer-

son by physical violence and to the

character by language may well be

regarded as parts of a single tort. We

think to so hold is to ignore a distinction

that exists in all jurisdictions where the

common law is administered. It is not

necessary, however, to examine pre-

cedents, as the Code of Civil Procedure

(§ 484) is decisive of this appeal." After

stating the provisions of this section of

the code ttie court proceeds: "It thus

apjjears that the legislature has indicated

with great clearness and j)articularity the

causes of action that may i)e united in the

same complaint. The test is very simple,

as all causes of action united must belong

to the same subdivision of the section we

are considering. False imprisonment is

an injury to the person and is embraced

within subdivision 2, while slander is in

conn el, iu pen incr the ca e to the jury,
tated that the alleg d lan de r wa n ot
utter d by the d fendant , o r
ither of
them, but by a clerk or ale man in th ir
employ ; that plaintiff, at th time o f the
lander, wa fal ly impri oned by a detectiY of defendant · and that h ought
to r ecov r damag
fo r fal e imprisonmcn
ancl the
land r.
Th ereupon
the coun 1 for the defendant moved
upon the omplaint and the op niug
for a di mi a l upon the gro und that
the defendant were not li able fo r the
Jami.er of their ·lerk, and that the omplaint wa
olely for ~lauder.
Thi
motion was cleni d and th plaintiff wa
allowed to withdraw a juror for the pur.
po e of applying to the pecial T rm for
l eaYe to am end her complaint, o a to
alleue a cause of action for fal e imprisonment arrain. t the d fondants. A motion
wa a('cordin~ly made at ~pecial Tern1
~llll the ju ·tic
pr siding held that the
propo::,e<l amende1! eomplaiut conLain 1! a
unio11 of th causes of action for slancler auil fab impri~oum c11t , a11C! cleniecl
the motiou. On appeal the 1\ ppellate
Did . ion r Ye rseil th
order
of the
• p ·cial T rm aml al low d the am e ndment, holdiu!r that 'injury at th . ame
tim to the J;er:--on by phy. ical violeu ce
an<l to th
·haracter hy language may
well lie r rrardcd a part of a . iugle
tort.'" The r1u :tion pr
nted to the
'ourt of \p p als wa · '' wh th r u11d er all
the r·irl'umsta11l'I'. of th ease the plaintiff
. houl<l ha Ye l1cc11 al lo\\ ul to am 11d h r
cut11plai nt for ·laud •r by atl<ling th rcto
ti r• :-tawn1P11t of a C"au~e of action for
faJ,;e i 111 pri ·11u rn<'nt." Ju l'PYCr ·i ng the
1ml r appeal<·d frolll tht· 'ourt uf .A pp<'aL,
a111ong other clii11~..... s;ti•l: "\\'e are
nnalile to agre
wiLh the couclu. iun
r1•ad1P<l by the l a.nwil App >.llatc Division
that injury at th . am· time to the per. 011 by phy:ical YiolPnc·e an<l to the
charal'tcr by language may w II Ii
rr-gar<lnd a · part: of a. :ingl tort. \V
th iu k ti, :o '11,J<l i · to i gn1>r a <l i:-ti n ·tiun
hat c~xi L in all j11ri. diction. wh r the

I t is n t

. e tion, which proYicl ~ for u111ting c·nu e.
of action upon claim. arising out of the
, am tran action. I t do 110 follow that
two caus
of action, oriD;inatinrr at the
:ame tim , aro a. matter of law out of
the . ame tran::.action, or are pro' <l h.''
the am eYid nee (Anderson i·. fl ill, .5'.l
Barb. 2.J-5, 2.J-6)
In th c·n . cited the
eneral T rm o th , upreme ourt h hl
that cause;; of action for assault aucl hatt r.'· and lamler ould not h unit d in
the . a.me complaint." Iler the
quote the text c mm 11ting- upon
of .A nd rs n v. Hill cited in th opiui n
and c·oncl nd
a follow : The eparnte
and clist.in t nature of the cau . of a t ion
of fal ·e impri · nment and
appar 11t when we appl~· th
th
circum. tanc . of th
at bar,
whC'thn the . am
the plain iff: •as .
would 1111 ; in th<' action for fall><' impri. 011nH'11t plaintiff 11111 t how au unla,,,fnl
atTP:-t a111l detention ; i11 the aet ion for
1. ruler the proof w11ul1l h' th uttc>ring of
th :-;lau<l r in th pr ..;enc of others, it:-;
fa) ity, if ju tifi d, and
xtriu. fr
'1UPJH'
of malil'
if any
xi:t d. The
rn a~nre, ut! proof of d:t111a~c'. in th two
c·au ·<': of actiou \\otilt! be •ntir Jy dif..
f rent."]
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right and the wrong which invades it. A " cause of action " can-

not be said to " arise out of " an event, when the event produces

or contains but one of these factors, — the deUct or wrongful

act.^

1 rjUeaning of the Term "Transac-

r'io-ht and the wrong which invad ' it. A " au e of action " cann t be ·aid to "arise out of" an event, wh n th ev nt produces
or ·ontains but one of these factors, - the delict or wrongful
act .1

tion."

Gutzman v. Clancy (1902), lU Wis-

589, 90 N. W. 1081, holds that the word

" transaction," in the statute, is broad

enough to include an entire, continuous

physical encounter ; Gilbert r. Loberg

(1894), 8.6 Wis. 661, 57 N. W. 982; Story

& Isham'c. Co. v. Story (1893), 100 Cal.

30. -M Pac. 671, quoting the author. In

Kuapp v. Walker (1900), 73 Conn. 459, 47

Atl. es."), the court said : " The complaint

before us, containing but one count,

describes a cause of action for fraud. It
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alleges that the defendant by certain

false and fraudulent representations,

which are set forth, induced the plaintiff

to ])art with his horse of the value of

$100. It also describes a cause of action

for breach of contract. It alleges that

the defendant failed to perform his agree-

ment to deliver a certain gray mare in

exchange for the horse vi^hich he had

received from the plaintiff. Tiie dealings

between the plaintiff and defendant with

reference to an exchange of horses was the

transaction out of which both the alleged

causes of action arose, and a st:iteuient of

all the claimed facts of the entire trans-

action therefore involved a statement of

both of said causes of action."

In Craft Refrigerating Machine Co.

v. Quinni])iac Brewing Co. (1893), 63

Conn. 551, 29 Atl. 76, the court said :

" As the word is employed in American

codes of pleading and in our own Prac-

tice Act, a transaction is something wliich

has taken place whereby a cause of action

has arisen. It miist therefore consist of

an act or agreement, or several acts or

agreements having some connection with

each other, in which more than one per-

son is concerned, and by which the legal

relations of such persons between them-

selves are altered. The transaction be-

tween the parties to the present action

began when they made the contract for

the manufacture and sale of the two

machines. Then followed the delivery of

the machines, the refusal to accept them.

the attempt of the plaintiff to retake

them, the forcible prevention of their

removal, and the subsequent continuance

of their use in the defendant's business.

Without taking each aiul all of these

events into consideration, the legal rela-

tions of the parties could not be fully

determined. From the delivery of tlie

machines to the commencement of the

action, they had remained continuously in

the defendant's possession. It had simply

dealt with them in a different way at dif-

ferent times. The l^ractice Act is to be

' favorably and liberally construed as a

l [Meaning of the T e1·m "Transaction."

Gutzman v. Clancy (1902), 114 Wi ·
589 , 90 N. W. 1081, holds that th e word
"tran action," in the tatute, is broad
e nough to include an entire, co ntinuous
phy ical encounter; Gilbert v. Loberg
( 1894), Sp \Vis. 661, 57 N. W. 982; Story
& I ham C. Co. v. Story ( 1893 ), 100 Cal.
30. :34 Pac. 671, quoting the auth or. In
Kna pp v. Walker (1900), 73 Conn. 459, 47
At1. 655, the court a id : "The co mplaint
before us , containing but one count,
<le cribes a cause of action for fraud. It
allege that the defendant by cert ain
fal e and fraudulent r epre entations,
which are set forth, induced the plaiutiff
to part with his hor e of the value of
100. I t abo describes a cau e of action
for breach of contract. It alleges that
the defenclant fai led to perform his agreement to defo·er a certain gray mare in
exchange fo r the horse wh ich he had
received from the plai11tiff. The dealiugs
between the plaiutiff aud clefrudaut with
reference to an exchange of hor>'es was the
t ransaction out of which both the allegrd
cau-e, of action arose, and a st:itement of
a ll the claimed facts of the entire transaction therefore inrnh ed a statement of
both of said ca uses of action."
In Craft R efrigerating Machine Co.
v. Quinnipiac Brewing Co. ( I 93), 63
Conn. 551, 29 Atl. 76, tl1e coul·t said:
" A the word is em ployed iu Am eri can
codes of pleading and in our ow11 Practice 1\ct, a transaction is so mething which
has taken place whereby a cause of action
ha ari:;en . It must therefore con i ·t of
an ac~ or agreement, or several acts or
agreements having some comiection with
each other, in which more than one p ron i concerned, and by whiC'h the legal
r elation of such persons between themelves are altered. Th e transaction between the parties to the pre -ent action
began when they made the contract for
the manufacture and sale of the two
machines. Then followed the defo·ery of
the machines, the refusal to accept them,

the attempt of the plaintiff to retake
them, the forcible prevention of their
r emoval, and the ub equent continuan ce
of their u e in the defendant' busine. .
Without taking ea h aud all of the c
eve nts into consideration, the legal relations of the parties could not be fully
determined. From the delivery of the
machin e to the com mencement of th e
action , they had r emained continuo usly iu
the lefenda11t' po se sion. I t had impl y
dealt wi th them in a d ifferent wa\' at different times. The Practice Act . i to be
'favorably and liberally constrned as a
remed ial statute.' . . . I t ha, taken the
word transaction, not out of any legal
vocabulary of technical term , hut fron1
th e common speech of men . So far as we
are aware it has never been th e . ubject
of any exact judicial definition. It is
therefore to lie con trued a men com
moHly understand it, when applied, as i11
our J.Jractice Act it certainly is applied ,
to any dealings between the
parties, resulting in wrongs, wilhout
regard to wh ether the wrong be done by
violence, neglect, or breach of contract.
Jt seems to us hardly to be doubted that
any ordi nary rna11 would eousider e1·er,rthing stated in the complaiut as properl.1·
belonging to a narrati 1·e of the wh ole
transaction between the partie ', aud
n eces ary for the informatiou of one ll'hu
was to form a jml .~ment as to their
r espectiYe rights. That a broader mca11ing should be given to the term 'transaction' than it has recei ,·ell in ome of tho
courts of our sister States, i plain from
the provision in the Practice Book, . . .
that 'where several tort are committed simnltaneou. ly agaiu t the plaintiff
(as a battery accompanied by slanderous.
words) they may be joiue<l as eau e of
action ari 'ing out of the a.me trausaction,
notwithstanding they may belong to different classes of action.' This wa. the
deliberate adoption of a Yiew of the meaning of the word in que tion which hau
been prel'iou ly disapproved in New York,
as well as by J ndge Bli - iu hi treati 'e on
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§ 369. * 475. Meaning of "Subject of Action." The same analysis

applies also to the remaining portion of the clause, the sole cliff er-

ence being that the causes of action arise out of different trans-

actions instead of one. The common tie between the causes

of action in that case is, that the transactions themselves are

connected v/ith the same " subject of action." What is meant

bv this term? It cannot be synonymous with "cause of action."

This appears from making the substitution, since the result would

be, " causes of action may be united when they arise out of trans-

actions connected with the same cause of action ; " which is an

absurdity, a mere statement in a circle. " Subject of action "

must, therefore, be something different from "cause of action."

It is also different from " object of the action," The object of

the action is the thing sought to be attained by the action, the

remedy demanded and finally awarded to the plaintiff. Causes

of action cannot arise out of transactions connected with the

" object of the action," because that object is something in the

future, and could have had no being when the transactions took

place out of which the causes of action arose. As the causes of
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action arise out of certain transactions, and as these transactions

are connected with a " subject of action," it is plain that this sub-

ject must be in existence simultaneously with the transactions

themselves, and prior to the time when the causes of action com-

mence. This fact also shows that the " subject " must be some-

thing other than the cause of action. The phrase was not used

in legal terminology prior to the code, but another one very

similar to it was in constant use, and had acquired a well-defined

meaning ; namely, " subject-matter of the action.'''' Thus the rule

is familiar, that courts must have jurisdiction of " the subject-

matter of the action," as well as over the parties. Courts might

have the power in a proper case to grant any kind of relief, legal

or equitable, and to entertain any form of proceeding, and yet

not have jurisdiction over some particular " subject-matter." The

term "subject of action," found in the code in this and one or

two other sections, was doubtless employed by its authors and the

legislature as synonymous with, or rather in the place of, " subject-

matter of the action." I can conceive of no other interpretation

Code Pleading (§125), though accepted See also McHard v. Williams (1S96), 8

in Kansai?. Anderson v. Hill, .5.3 Barb. S. D. 381, 66 N. W. 930.3

23S, 245; Harris f. Avery, 5 Kans. 146."

§ 369. *' 4 5. M eaning of " Subject of Action." T he same anal · i
applie al o to the remaining portion of he lau e, th ole difference bein 0 that the can e of action ari e out f different tran action. in_tead of one. The common tie between the cau e
of act] on in that ·a e i , that the tran ·actions them 1ves are
connected \',rith the ame ' ubject of action.' What i meant
by thi term? It cannot be ynonymou with ' cau e of action.
Thi appear from making the sub tituti n 'ince the re ult would
be, cau e of action may be united when they ari e out of tran action connected with the ame cau e of action; which i an
ab urdity a mere tatement in a circle.
ubject of a tion
mu t, therefore, be omething different from ' cau. e of action .'
It is al o · cliffernnt from "object of the action." The object of
the action i the thing ought to be attained by +he a tion the
r emedy demanded and finall awarded to he plaintiff.
au e
of action cannot ari e out of tran actions connected with the
'ol>je ·t of the action," becau e that object i 'Omething in the
·future and could have had no being when the tran action took
place out of which the cau e of action aro e. A the cau e of
action ari e out of certain tran action , and a the e tran action
are connected with a " ubject of action,' it is plain that hi ubject mu t be in exi tence imultaneously with the tran a.ction
them elYe and prior to the time when the cause of action commenc . Thi fact al o hoi:v. that the " ubject '' mu 't be . omethincr other than the cau . . e of action. The phra e wa not u ed
in legal terminology prior to the code but another one Yer r
imilar to it wa in con tant u
and bad acquired a well-defined
me:mino- ; namely sub}ect-matter of the action .. , Thu the rule
is familiar, that court mn t have juri di ion of "
matter f the action," a '\Yell a ov r the partie .
have th power in a proper ca e to grant any kind of
or eqnitable, and t entertain an form f proceeclin
not haY juri ·diction over. om particular " ·ubject-matt r.·
term ' ·ubject of a tion f und in th code in hi. and on r
two other ·ection wa dou btle: m1 lo · cl b it. author an l he
legi:lature a synon ·mou with, r rather in the plac of
ubj ectrnatt ·r of the action.' I can conceive f no other int rpretation
ode Pleading (~ 125}, though acc<>ptecl
in Kau ·a . Ander:•m 1·. IIill, 5.'3 Barb.
_3 , 245; Harri· i-. A,·ery, 5 Kan . l.J. 6."

l\TcHard v. William
• ee al
. D. 3 1, 66 l . W. 930.J

(1 96 ),
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which will apply to the phrase and meet all the requirements of

the context. " Subject-matter of the action " is not the " cause

of action," nor the " object of the action." It rather describes the

physical facts, the things real or personal, the money, lands, chat-

tels, and the like, in relation to which the suit is prosecuted. It

is possible, therefore, that several different " transactions " should

have a connection with this " subject-matter," or, what seems to me

to be the same thing, with this " subject of action. " The whole

passage is, at best, a difficult one to construe in such a manner

that any explicit and definite rule can be extracted from it.^ I

remark, in bringing this analysis of the language to a close, that

the latter clause of the subdivision — "or transactions connected

with the same subject of action " — can probably have no applica-

1 [^Meaning of the Term " Subject

of Action.^''

Ill Box V. Chicago, R. I. & P. Ry. Co.

(1899), 107 la. 660, 78 N. W. 964, the

court quotes as follows from Rodgers v.

which will apply to the phra. e ancl me t all the requirement f
the context. " ubject-matter of the action" is not the " cause
of action," nor the "object of th action.'' It rath r cl scribes the
phy ical facts, the thing real or p rsonal, the mon y, lands, chattel , and the like, in relation to which the uit i prosecuted. It
i. po. ible, therefore, that everal different "transaction " should
haYe a connection with this " ubject-matter," or, what seems to me
to he the same thing, with this "subject of action." The whole
pa 'age is, at best, a difficult one to construe in such a ma.nn r
that any explicit and definite rule can be extra tecl from it.1 I
remark, in bringing this analysis of the language to a close, that
the latter clause of the subdivision - "or transactions connected
with the same subject of action'' - cap probably have no applica-
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Association, 17 S. C. 406: "What is a

cause of action 1 We must keep in view

the difference between the subject of the

action and the cause of the action. The

subject of the action was what was for-

merly understood as the subject-matter

of the action." See Adkins v. Loucks

(1900), 107 Wis. .587, 83 N. W. 9.34; Jor-

dan V. Estate of Warner (1900), 107 Wis.

5.39, 8.3 N. W. 946 ; Foster v. Posson

(1899), 105 Wis. 99, 81 N. W. 123. In

Zinc Carbonate Co. v. First National Bank

of Shullsburg (1899), 103 Wis. 125, 79

N. W. 229, the court said : " There is

but one subject of action, — the conspir-

acy to defraud and its consummation to

the damage of plaintiff. All the allega-

tions of fact are parts of the presentation

of that one subject." Dinau v. Coneys

(1894), 143 N. Y. 544, 38 N. E. 715:

" The subject-matter of the plaintiff's ac-

tion w<as the alleged right of possession of

the land sought to be recovered. The

subject-matter of the counter-claim was the

right to recover against the plaintiff

the amount of the legacy, and also . . .

the right to relief by sale of the land for

its payment." Ponca Mill Co. v. Mikesell

(1898), 55 Neb. 98, 75 N. W. 46: "An-

other ground of demurrer was that two

causes of action are improperly joined.

This is because the plaintiff alleged the

proceedings to set aside the conveyance to

Jordan and the lien re.sulting to himself,

and prayed a foreclosure. The Code of Civil

Procedure provides (sec. 87) that the plain-

tiff may u«ite several causes of action relat-

ing to ' the same transaction or transactions

connected with the same subject of action.'

The vagueness of tliat language has

caused the profession much difficulty ; but

the facts out of which the lieu arose em-

brace a part of the fraudulent conduct

justifying interposition through a receiver-

ship; they resulted in giving plaintiff a

special interest aside from that of a stock-

holder, and it would certainly seem that

the language quoted is I)road enough to

cover such a state of facts." McHard v.

Williams (1896), 8 S. D. 381. 66 N. W.

1lleaninu of the Te ·r m "Subject
of Action."

This is because the plaintiff alleged the
proceeding to et a ide the conveyance to
Iu Box v. Chicago, R. I. & P. Ry. Co. Jordan and the lien resulting to himself,
(1 99), 107 Ia. 660, 78 N. W. 964-, the ancl prayed a foreclosure. The Code of C'i ril
court quote as follows from Rodger v. Procedure provides ( ec. 87) that the plainAs ociation, 17 S. C. 406 : " What i a tiff may U'llite everal causes of action relatcau e of actiou ~ We must keep in view ing to' the same transaction or transactions
the difference l>etween the subject of the connected with the ame subject of action.'
action and the cause of the action. The The vagueness of tl1at Ltng-uage hn
sul>ject of the actiou was what was for- caused the profe sion much uifficulty; but
merly understood as the subject-matter the facts out of which the lieu arose emof the action." See Adkins v. L oucks brace a part of the fraudulent conduct
( 1900), 107 Wi •. 587, 83 N . \V. 934; Jor- ju. tifying in terposition through a recei1·erdan v. Estate of Warner {1900), 107 Wi s. ship; they re ulted in giving plaintiff a
pecial iutere t aside from that of a toek539, 83 N. W. 946; Foster v. Po ·son
{1 99), 105 Wis. 99, 81 N. W. 123. In holder, and it would certainly seem that
Zinc Carbonate Co. v. First ational Bank the language quoted i · broad enough to
of
hullsburg (1 99), 103 Wis. 1:25 , 79 cove r uch a state of facts" Mc Hard v.
. W. 229, the court said: "There is William (1896), 8 S. D. 381. 66 N. W .
but one subject of action, - the conspir- 930. In Craft Refrigerating fachine
acy to defraud and its consummation to Co. v. Quinuipiac Br ·wing Co. (1 93), 63
the damage of plaintiff. All the allega- Conn. 55 1, 29 Atl. 76. it is said: "It foltions of fact are parts of the pre entation low that both the cau~es of action were
of that one subject." Dinan v. Coneys properly united in the same com plai ut.
( 1894), 143 N. Y . 54+, 38 N . E. 715: The same result would also be reached
"The subject-matter of the plaintiff's ac- if what we ha1·e Yiewed as one transaction
tion wa the alleged right of pos ·ession of coul<l be regarded a eon~isting of several
the laud sought to be recovered. The tran action , since such would all be consubject-matter of the counter-claim was the nected with the ame uhject of action,
right to r ecove r again t the plaintiff that is, the two machines and the title to
the amount of the legacy, and also . .. th em;" Daniels l'. Fowler (1897), 120
the ri ght to relief by ale of the land for N . C. 14, 26 S. E. 635 ; olomou v. Bates
its payment." Ponca Mill Co. v. M ike ell (1896) , 11 8 N. C. 311, 24 S. E . 74-6 :
(1 89 ), 5!5 Neb. 98, 75 N. W . 46: "An- "There is the same ' ubject of action'
other ground of demurrer was that tw o throughout, i.e. the plaintiff's l oss of Iii,;
causes of action are improperl_v joi ned. deposit."]
1 [

c

49-±

494

CI lL RE1IEDIE .

CIVIL EEMEDIES.

tion to legal causes of action, and can only be resorted to in prac-

tice as describing some equitable suits which involve extremely

complicated matters. In fact, Mr. Justice Comstock's position is

doubtless correct, that the entire subdivision finds its primary and

by far most important application to equitable rather than to legal

proceedings.^

§ 370. * 476. Examples of Causes of Action Held to have arisen

out of the same Transaction. Althougli the courts have generally

refrained from any discussion of this clause, they have had

frequent occasion to invoke its aid ; and the following cases will

furnish some examples of judicial decisions based upon it.'- The

causes of action united in the same complaint or petition were

held to have arisen out of , the same transaction, where one was

for the recovery of the possession of land, and the other was for

the value of its occupation by the defendant ; ^ for an accounting

and payment of the bahance found due, and for the surrender up

of securities ; * for injuries to the person and for those to the

^ In support of the interpretation of
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the phrase " suhject of the action," sug-

gested by the text, namely, that it " de-

scribes the physical facts, the tilings real

or personal, the money,- lauds, chattels,

and the like, in relation to which the suit

is prosecuted," see Holmes v. Abbott,

tion to le al cau · of ac ion an l an onl be r orted to in practi
a de criLin
ome quitabl , nit whi h in ol e _ tr mel '
omplicat c1 matter
In fwt, 1\Ir. Ju. ice
m 't k' p ition i'
<.l ubtle corr c , hat h n ire ubdiYi i n find it primary a.ml
by f, r mo t imp rtant ap1 lication to equi abl rath r than to 1 <Yal
proc eding .1
370. ·· 4 6. Examples of Causes of Action Held to have arisen
out of the same Trans acti on. Although th courts hav genera.Uy
r £rained from any di cu sion of thi ' lau · , they have had
frequ nt occa ion o invoke it aid; an l he following c e will
furni h some examples of judicial deci ion ba ·ed upon it. 2 The
cau e of action united in th same complaint or p ti ion were
held to have arisen out f t he ame t ran action, where one was
for the recovery of the pos e ion of land, and the oth r ' a~ for
th value of its occupation by the defendant ; 3 for an accounting
and payment of the balance found due, and for the SUIT nder up
of ecurities; 4 for injuries to the person and for those to the

53 Hun, 617, 6 N. Y. Suppl. 943. A

cause of action entitling to injunction

and damages for continuous interference

with rights of pn^perty by the mainte-

nance and operation of a steam railn^ad

in a highway may be united with a tdaim

for damages for personal injuries suffered

by the plaintiff while driving along the

highway in conseiiuence of his horses be-

ing frightened l)y the noise of a passing

engine and train ; since both claims are

" connected with the same subject of ac-

tion," wliicli in this case is the unlawful

obstruction of the highway by the de-

fendant : Lamming o. Galusha, 135 N. Y.

239.

2 [^Bush V. Froelick (1896), 8 S. D.353,

66 N. W. 939. " Under Comp. Laws, sec.

4932, authorizing the joinder of causes of

action arising out of ' the same transac-

tion, or transactions connected with the

same subject of action,' the holder of a

note secured by a trust deed may in one

action seek to f<jrecloso the trust deed, to

»et aside a prior foreclosure made by the

trustee without plaintiff's knowledge or

consent, to enjoin the county treasurer

from issuing to the trustee a tax deed for

the mortgaged premises, ami to adjust the

equities of the various parties." Dinges

V. Riggs (1895), 43 Neb. 710, 62 N. W. 74;

for malicious prosecution, for damage to

plaintiff's business by arresting occupants

of iier place of business, and for slander.

Maldaner v. Beurhaus (1900), 108 Wis.

25, 84 N. W. 25 ; Alliance Elevator Co. v.

Wells (1896), 93 Wis. 5, 66 X. W. 796:

one count alleged the withholding of

premises wrongfully after expiration of

lease therefor; the other count, that cer-

tain ]iersonal property, that by the terms

of' the lease defendant was entitled to the

use of, had been converted. Held, upon

demurrer for improper joinder of causes,

1 In . upport of the interpretation of
the phra e "subject of the action," sugge ted b.v th te.·t. namely, that it" describes the physintl fact , the things real
or per. on al, the money; lantls, chl\ttels,
and th like, in relation to which the suit
L- pro. ecute<l," !'Ce Jlol me' v. A 1.J uott,
53 Hun, 61 i, G N. Y. 'uppl. 9-rn. A
can. e of action entitling to injunction
and damage for coutiJJuous iutcrf renee
with right of property by the nrn.intenance and operation f a steam rail r oad
i11 <L highway may he united with a d;tim
for damages for }J ri:;onal injuries . uffer cl
by the pliiintiff whil dri\'in<Y along th
highway iu con equen ·e of hi horses being frightened by the noi. e f a pa in 0
11gine and train ; ince b th him are
" ·ouuectetl with the ame subj ct f action," which in th i · ca e i the unlawful
obstruction of the highway by tl1 defcu<lant: Lamming v. 'alu. ha, 135 N. Y.
239.
2 [Bu lt v. Fr Ii ·k (l 96) , 8, .
. 353,
66 X. \V. ():~9. " Tnd r omp. Law , R c.
4f1:3:l, autborizi11g the join<ler of ·au
of
:v·tion ari ing out of 'th
ame tran actiu11, or tran.·action
oun ct d with th
sa1ric .-ubjeet of action,' the holcl r of ,
11ot•
cnr d by, rn <1 ed ma in n
ru . t rl d, t
ac·tiou ;N·l· to f<Jreclo , th
c a:;i<lc a prior foreclosure mad Ly the

trustee without plaintiff' know! <lge or
consent, to njoiu the count:· treasu rer
from is ning to the trustee a tax deed fo r
th e mortga ed premi e , and to alljn t the
equitie of the variou partie ." Dinge
v. Higg; {l 95), 43 ~eb . 710, 6:. N. "\.\r. i+;
for malicious prosecution, for damage to
plaintiff' Lu ·iu .. by arre. ting occupant
of her place of bu ine · , and for lau1ler.
.Maldan r v. B eurha n · (l900), 10 ' ' i.
2.·, 8+ N. '\V. 2· ; .Alliance Elevator o. v.
'\Yell ' ( I 96), 93 \Vi . 5, 66 X . \V. i96:
oue c uut alleg d the withholding of
premi es wrongfully after expiration of
lea e th r efor ; the oth r count, that certain per oual pr p rty, that hy the t rm
of the lea e def uclant was entitled to the
u
of, had b n ·onver t d. Held, upon
demu rrer for impr per joi ud r of cau e ,
tl1at both au c. aro e ut of the ame

35 I.

JOI IDER OF

A

ES OF ACTION.

495

JOINDEE OF CAUSES OF ACTION. 495

property of a passenger, coinmitted by tlie wrongful acts and

frauds of a steamboat company on the same voyage ; ^ where the

owner of stereotype plates of a book alleged a breach of defend-

ant's contract to furnish paper and print a book therefrom, and

also injuries negligently done to the plates themselves while in

the defendant's possession ; ^ detaining the plaintiff's chattels, and

wrongfully and negligently injuring tliem wliile thus detained ; ^ an

action by a judgment creditor against his debtor and another to

recover back money wrongfully paid as usury to such person by

the debtor, to compel this assignee to account for actual securities

placed in his hands by the debtor, and to set aside certain trans-

fers of personal property made by the debtor ; * an action in

which the plaintiff sought to recover the agreed price in a con-

tract for building a house, damages caused by the defendant's

delay to have the premises read}- in time for the work to go on,

and the price of extra work and materials, and finally to set aside,

on the ground of fraud, an award made in reference to certain of

the matters in dispute ; ^ an action to recover damages for the

conversion of goods by the defendant, a common carrier, and to
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recover back money mistakenly paid as freight for the same

goods ; ^ where lands incumbered by an outstanding mortgage

had been conveyed by a warranty deed, and the grantee therein

brought an action against the grantor and the holder of the

mortgage, and prayed a judgment fixing the amount cUie upon

the mortgage, if anj, and directing the same to be delivered up

and cancelled upon payment hy the plaintiff of tlie amount so

ascertained, and ordering the grantor thereupon to repay that sum

to the plaintiff ; "* action against a constable and the sureties upon

his official bond, alleging the issue of an execution to such officer

and a levy by him upon propei'ty of the judgment debtor sufficient

to have made the amount due, a neglect to return the execution,

1 Jones V. Steamboat Cortes, 17 Cal. ^ Paleu r. Bushnell, 46 Barb. 24. It

487, 497. See, however, Graut ;■. Mc- raiglit, perhaps, have beeu better to say

Carty, 38 Iowa, 468. Injury to tlie per- that there was but one cause of action,

son and injury to tlie property of the ^ Lee v. Partridge, 2 Duer, 463.

])laintiff by one negligent act of the de- •'.Adams v. Bissell, 28 Barb. 382, SS.").

fendant : Rosenberg i'. Staten Island Ky. " Wandle v. Turney, 5 Duer, 661.

Co. (Com. n. 1891), 14 N. Y. Suppl. 476. Although Bosworth J. says the causes

But ste Taylor v. Metropolitan El. Ry. of action all arose out of the same trans-

Co., .52 N. Y. Super. Ct. 299. action, yet, upon the principles already

2 Badger v. Benedict, 4 Abb. Pr. 176. stated in the text, there was actually but

^ Smith r. Orser, 43 Barb. 187. one cause of action.

prop rty of a pas enger, ommittecl by the wr ngful act and.
fraud of a steamboat c mpany on the am voyage; 1 where th,
owner of stereotype plate of a bo k alleged a breach f cl f mlant's c ntract to furni h paper an<l print a b ok th refrom and
also injurie ' neglig ntly d n to the plat s th m 1 e while in
the def ndant's po . e. ion; 2 detaining the plaintiff' hattel.· ancl
wrongfully and n egligently injuring them whil thu cl tain d · 3 an
action by a judgment er ditor again t his cl btor and another to
recover back money wrongfully paid as usury to such person by
the debtor, to compel this assiO'nee to account for aetual securities
placed in his hands by the debtor, and to et asicl · rtain tran ·fers of personal property made by the debtor; 4 an action in
which the plaintiff sought to recover the agreed price in a contract for building a house damages cau eel by the cl. fondant's
delay to have the premise ready in time for the work to go on,
and the price of extra work and materials, and finally to set aside,
on he ground of fraud, an award made in referenc.:e to certain of
the matters in dispute; 5 an action to rec:over damages for the
conversion of goods by the defendant, a common carrier, and to
recover back money mistal-enly paid as freight for the same
goods; 6 where lands incumber d by an outstanding mortgage
had been conveyed by a warranty deed, and the grantee therein
brought an action against the grantor and the holder of the
mortgage, and prayed a judgment fixing the amount dne upon
the mortgage, if any, and directing the same to be deliYered up
and cancelled upon payment by the phtintiff of the amount "'o
ascertained, ancl ordering the grantor thereupon to repay that um
to the plaintiff; 7 action again t a constable and the suretie' upon
his official bond, alleging the issue of an execution to uch officer
and a levy by him upon property of the judgment debtor suffici nt
to have made the amount due, a neglect to return the execution,
l J ones v. Steamboat Corte , 17 Cal.
487, 497.
ee, however, Grant 1' McCarty, .'3 Iowa, 468. Injury to the per·on and injury to the property of the
plaintiff by one negligent act of the defendant: Rosenberg v. Staten I land Ry.
Co. (Com. Pl. 1891), 14 N. Y. uppl. 476.
But 5'1:le Taylor v. Metropolitan El. Ry.
Co., 52 N. Y. Super. Ct. 299.
2 Badger v. Benedict, 4 Abb. Pr. 176.
8
mith v. Orser, 43 Barb. 187.

4 Paleu v. Bu hnell, 46 Barb. 24. It
might, perhap , haYe been b tter to ay
that there wa but one cau e of action.
6 Lee v. Partridge, 2 Du r, 463.
G. Adams v. Bi , ell. 2
arb. 3 2, 3 5.
1 Wandle v. Turney, 5 Duer, 661.
Although Bosworth J. ay. the cau e
of action all aro e out of the ame tran. action, yet. upon the prin iple already
tated in t he text, there wa actually but
one cau e of a tion.
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the receipt and collection of the money, and refusal or neglect to

pay over the same to the plaintiff,^ ^liere the plaintiff alleged that

he had placed SlOO in the defendant's hands for the purpose of

entering an eighty-acre lot in the plaintiff's name, at the expected

price of SI. 25 per acre ; that the defendant thereupon entered the

lot in his own name, but paid therefor only SIO, and converted

the residue of the money to his own use ; and demanded judgment

for the S90 and interest, and also for a conveyance of the land to

himself ; ^ an action to recover a specified sum due upon a written

contract, and damages for the breach of certain covenants in the

same instrument, and also to compel the specific performance of

a covenant to convey land contained therein ; ^ where one cause

of action was for the defendant's deceit practised in the sale of

oil leases to the plaintiff, and the other was for money had and

received, being the price paid by the plaintiff in the same sales.*

The owner in fee of land having been induced by the defendant's

fraud to convey the same by a deed in which the wife joined, the

grantor and his wife brought a joint action to recover damages

for the deceit. The New York Court of Appeals held that the
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husband had a cause of action for the loss of the land which he

owned in fee ; that the wife had a cause of action for the loss of

her inchoate dower right ; that they could recover one joint judg-

ment as a satisfaction for both claims ; and, finall}', that the two

causes of action were properly united, since they arose out of

the same transaction, — namely, the bargaining and sale of the

premises and the fraudulent representations made therein by the

defendant.^ Several of the cases cited in the last preceding sub-

^ Moore v. Smith, 10 How. Pr. 361. they may be joined) ; Barr v. Shaw, 10

'■' Callaghan r. McMahan, 33 Mo. 111. Hun, 580 (causes of action for different

3 Gray v. Dougherty, 25 Cal. 266. torts may arise out of the same trans-

4 Woodbury v. Delap, 1 N. Y. S. C. action, and be joined); Young y. Young,

20; s. c. 65 Barb. 501. The first count 81 N. C. 91.

set out the sale and tlie deceit and the ^ Simar i;. Canaday, 53 N. Y. 298, 305,

damages ; the others, for money had and per Folger J. The coinphiint was not

received, alleged that the money had been framed at all ufwn the theory which the

had and received by the defendant "a.s court adopted in making this decision,

above stated." This, it wa.s held, iucor- It did not purport to set forth two sepa-

porated into the latter counts the aver- rate causes of action ; it was a joint com-

ments of the former, and showed that all plaint, and alleged a joint cause of action

arose out of the same transaction. See in favor of the jjlaintiffs, and demanded

the receipt and collection of he money and refu al or neglect to
pay O\~er the .,ame to he r laintiff 1 where he plaintiff all g d that
he ha l placed 100 in he d £enc.le n ' ., h< ne, for the purp e of
enterin an eight ·-acre lo in the plaintiff" name at he expec d
price of 1.2.- p r acre · that the defendant thereupon entered th
lot in hi., own mun but paid ther for onl . 10 and c nv rte l
the re idue of them ne r to hi own use . and demanded judgment
f r the 0 and intere t and al o for a conveyance f he lancl t
him elf· 2 an ac ion to reco r a pecifi d um due upon a wri ten
contract and damage for the breach of certain covenan in the
to compel the pecific performance of
, me in trument, and a
a coYenant to conve land contained therein· 3 where one ause
of action wa for he defendant deceit practi ed in the ale of
oil lea e to the plaintiff, and the other wa for money had and
received, being he price paid by he plaintiff in the ame sale .4
The owner in fee of land having been induced by the defendant
fraud o conyey the same by a deed in which the wife joined le
grantor and hi wife brought a joint ac ion to recover damage ·
for the leceit. The New York Court of Appeals held hat the
hu band had a cau e of action for the lo s of the land which he
o"IT"ned in fee; that the wife had a cause of action for the lo· of
her inchoate dower right; that they could recover one joint judgment a a atisfaction for both claims; and, finally, that the two
cau e · of action were proverly united ince they aro e out of
the same tran acti n, - namely, the bargaining and ale of the
premi es and the fraudulent repre entation made ther in by t e
everal of the cases cited in the last preceding ubdefendant. 5

also Gertler v. Linscott, 26 Minn. 82 (if a a single joint judgment. The peculiar

cause of action on contract and one for a feature of the decision is that which sus-

tort arise out of the same tran.saction, or tain,-* a single judgment for one sum as

out of a series of connected transactions, damages in satisfaction of both demands.

)foore v. mith, 10 How. Pr. 361.
allaghan v. ~[c~fahan 33 ~Io. 111.
3 Gray v. Dougherty, 25
al. 266.
-t 'V<Jodburx r. D lap, l N. Y. , ·. C.
20; . c. 65 Barb. 501. The fir t ·ouut
et out tlte ale and the deceit aad tlie
damage·; the other , for money harl and
reC'eiw·d, alleged that th money had been
had aud r ceived by the defendaut "a
aLuve . tat d." Thi , it wa h l<l, iucor}>Orated into the latter count the averrneut. ,,f the former, and how rl that all
aru e •Jut o{ the arne tran actiou.
ee
als1J erLler v. Lin ·utt, 2 .Minn. 2 (if a
aw·e ,,( a<'tion on contra t and on for a
tort ari e out of the :\m t'an.'a tion, or
out of a erie of connected tran actions,
1

~

they may be joined) ; Barr v. haw, 10
Hun, 5 0 ( au
of action for di:ff rent
tort may ari e out of the ~ame tran .
action, and Le joined); Young v. Young,
J

.J.: •

,.

91.

s imar v. anaday, 53 N. Y. 29 , 305,
per Folger .J. The complaint wa not
fram d at all upon the theory which the
court ad pted iu making thi d i ion.
It did not purport to t forth two separate cau e of action; it wa a joiut complaint. and all g d a joint cau e of action
in favor f th plaintiff , and demand d
iugle j int judgment. The p uli r
f ature of th cl ci ion i that which u .
aimi , in•rl judgm nt for one um as
damage· iu ati faction of b th de mands,
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division of this section might perhaps be regarded as instances

of causes of action arising out of the same transaction ; they cer-

tainly would be so if they were to be considered as embracing

more than one cause of action.^

§ 371. * 477. Examples of Causes of Action Held not to have

arisen out of the same Transaction, The following are examples

of causes of action contained in the same complaint or petition

which have been held not to arise out of the same transaction :

for an assault and battery and for a slander, although committed

simultaneously ; ^ for a breach of a warranty of soundness given

on the sale of a horse, and for fraudulent representations as to the

soundness made at the same sale ; ^ a claim by the plaintiffs as

next of kin and legatees of A., two of tlie defendants being A.'s

executors, and a claim by them as legatees of B., one of the

defendants being B.'s executor, the action being for an account

and settlement of both estates.^

§ 372. * 478. What Facts must be averred herein. When

the plaintiff unites two causes of action which can only be joined

because they arise out of the same transaction, or out of transac-
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tions connected with the same subject of action, the facts show-

ing such common origin or connection must be averred, so tliat

the court may see whether the joinder is proper. A mere general

allegation that the causes of action all arose out of the same

transaction is of no avail, and would be surplusage.^

although tlie case is expressly based upon tion in this case clearly arose out of the

tlie doctrine that there were separate aud same transaction ; indeed, a more illus-

distinct causes of action. Assuming that trative example could hardly be found

the court was correct in this position, among purely legal actions,

they plainly both arose out of the same * Viall v. Mott, 37 Barb. 208. The

transaction. Supreme Court of North Carolina, in a

1 ^ee supra, §§*459,*460,andespecially very recent case, seems to deny any opera-

Bidwell V. Astor Mat. Ins. Co., 16 N. Y. tive force whatsoever to the first clause

263; Phillips v. Gorham, 17 N. Y. 270; of the section under consideration, which,

Laub V. Buckmiller, 17 N. Y. 620; N. Y. as it occurs in the code of that State, is

division of this section might perhaps be r gard cl a in tanc
of cau e of action ari 'ing out of th am tra.n action· th y c rtainly would be so if they were to be c nsic.lered a embracing
more than on cau e of action.1
. 371. * 4 77. Examples of Causes of Action Held not to have
arisen ~ut o f the same Transaction.
The following ar exampl s
f ca.us of a tion contained in the sam complaint or p titian
which have been held not to ari e out of the same tran acti n:
f r an a sault and ba.ttery and for a slancl r, although committed
imultan ou ly; 2 for a breach of a warranty of ·oumlne giv n
on the sale of a horse, and for fraudulent repr seutations a to the
unclnes made at the same sale; 3 a claim by the plaintiff a
next of kin and legatees of A., two of the cl f .ndant being
executor , and a claim by them as legatee· of B'., one of the
defendant being B .'s executor, the action being for an account
and settlement of both estates.4
§ 372. * 478. What Facts mus t be averre d h ere in. \Vh n
the plaintiff unites two causes of action which can only be join cl
. because they arise out of the same transaction, or out of transact ions connected with the same subject of action, the facts showing such common origin or connection must be averred, so that
the court may see whether the joinder is proper. A mere general
allegation that the causes of action all arose out of the same
tran action i of no avail, and would be surplusage. 5

Ice Co. V. N. W. Ins. Co., 23 N. Y. 3.57 ; identical with the one given in the text.

Lattin v. McCarty, 41 N. Y. 107 ; Howe Although the language used by the court

V. Peckham, 10 Barb. 6.56; Blake v. Van is only a dictum, it is a strong expression

Tilborg, 21 Wis. 672; Fish v. Berkey, 10 of opinion that no causes of action can

Minn. 199. be united by reason of that particuhir

- Anderson v. Hill, 53 Barb. 238, 24.'); provision unless they are embraced witliin

Dragoo r. Levi, 2 Duv. 520. But, per some of the other classes mentioned by

contra, see Harris v. Avery, 5 Kan. 146; tlie section. See N. C. Land Co. y. Beatty,

Brewer v. Temple, 15 How. Pr. 286. 69 N. C. 329, 334.

3 Sweet V. Ingerson, 12 Ilow. Pr. 331. ^ piynn v. Bailey, 50 Barb. 73. See

In accordance with the principles main- Woodbury i'. Delap, 1 N. Y. S. C. 20, 65

tained in the text, the two causes of ac- Barb. 501.
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although the case is expressly based upon tion in this case clearly arm•e out of the
the doctrine that there were eparate and same transaction; indeed, a more illu di tinct causes of action. Assuming that trative example could hardly be found
the court was correct in this position, among purely legal actions.
4 Viall v. Mott, 37 Barb. 20 .
they plainly both arose out of the same
The
tran action.
Supreme Court of North Carolina, in a
1 See supra, §§*459, *460,andespecially
very recent case, seems to deuy an)· operaBidwell v. Astor l\Int. Ins. Co., 16 N. Y. tive force whatsoever to the fir t clau e
263; Phillips v. Gorham, 17 . Y. 270; of the ection under con °ideration, which,
Laub v. Buckmiller, 17 N. Y. 620; N. Y. as it occur in the code of that Stat , i.
Ice Co. v. . W. Ins. Co., 23 N. Y. 357; identical with the one given in t1rn text.
Lattin v. McCarty, 41 N. Y. 107; Holl'e Although the language u, ed by the court
v. Peckham, 10 Barb. 656; Blake i. Yan i only a dictum, it is a trong ex pre ion
Tilborg, 21 Wis. 672; F i h v. Berkey, 10 of opinion that no cau. c of action can
Minn. 199.
be united by reason of that particular
2 Ander on v. Hill, 53 Barb. 23 , 245;
proYi ion unle they are em bra ·ed within
Dragoo v. Levi, 2 Duv. 520. But, per some of the other clac:: e. mentioned hy
contra, see Harri v. Avery, 5 Kan. 146; the section.
ee r. C. Laud o. v. Beatty,
Brewer v. Temple, 15 How. P r. 2 6.
69 N. C. 329, 334.
3 Sweet v. Ingerson, 12 How. P r. 331.
5 Flynn v. Bailey, 50 Barb. 73.
ec
In accordance with the principle main- Woodbury v. Delap, 1 N. Y. . C. 20, 65
tained in the text, the two cause of ac- Barb. 501.
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V. Instances i)i which the Proper Joinder of Causes of Action is

connected with the Proper Joinder of Defendants ; Discussion

of the Provision that all the Causes of Action must affect all

of the Parties.

In tance in which the P roper J oin de r of tau ·es of A ction is
eo1u1 cted with th ProlJ r J oincler of .Defendant.· ). IJi ·cu· ion
of tl1e Proz·i ·io1i that all the C'a u ·e of A ction must affect all
of th P artie .
J.

§ 373. * 479. Statement of Question Examined in this Sub-

division. Questions relating to the uniting of causes of action

may be presented in two forms. In whatever one of the enumer-

•

~

ated classes they fall they may (1) be against the single defend-

ant, or the several defendants all equally liable, — perhaps jointly

liable. — in which case the inquiry has to do solely with the

373.

* -±7 9.

S tatement of

Q ue s ti o n

Examined in this

Sub-

u i n r elatin to the uniting of au e of action
ma be pr ented in tw form . In whate r one of the enum rat d la ' es h . fall h may 1) be again t the ingle defendan or the everal defendant all equally liable, - perhap jointl
he inquiry ha to l
olely with the
liabl ~ - in whi h ca
joind r of the cau e of ac ion th
el
and is no cone rn d
'Yith the joinder of the 1efendant · or (:2 th y may be agai
veral defendant un qual] and diff ren tl ' liable, one c l e f
ac ti n aff ·ting a I ortion of the d fondants more dir c ly and
sub antially than it d e others. In uch a e the inquiry l a
to do with the joincl r of the defend ants as 11 as with the union
f the cau e of action. I hall in t he pr sent ubdivi i n exIt is required by all the co 1e
amine the lat ter of the e ca
a~ a prerequi ite to t he unitiug of different ause of action, th at
n twith tan ling they may all bel ng t o t h same class, they mu t
affect all the parti to th action. 1 The only exception mention d in any tatut i he action to foreclo e a mortgage.2
d i vision.

joinder of the causes of action themselves, and is not concerned

with the joinder of the defendants ; or (2) they may be against

several defendants unequally and differently liable, one cause of

T

action affecting a portion of the defendants more directly and

substantially than it does others. In such case the inquiry has

to do with the joinder of the defendants as well as with the union

of the causes of action. I shall, in the present subdivision, ex-

amine the latter of these cases. It is required by all the codes

as a prerequisite to the uniting of different causes of action, that,
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notwithstanding they may all belong to the same class, they must

affect all the parties to the action.^ The only exception men-

tioned in any statute is the action to foreclose a mortgage.^

1 QHayden v. Pearce (1898), 33 Ore. (1901), 109 Wis. 366, 85 N. W. 369;

89, 52 Pac. 1049 ; The Victorian Number Hilton v. Hilton's Adm'r (1901), 110 Ky.

Two (1894), 26 Ore. 194, 41 Pac. 1103; 522, 62 S. W. 6 ; Clay ton ?■. City of HendeV-

Pretzfelder v. Merchants' Ins. Co. (1895), son (1898), 103 Ky". 228, 44 S. W. 667;

116 N. C.491, 21 S. E. 302 ; Cook i'. Smith Jamison v. Culligan (1899), 151 Mo. 410,

(1896), 119 N. C. 350, 25 S. E. 958 ; Bur- 52 S. W. 224; Kruczinski v. Neuendorf,

roll f. Hughes (1895), 116 N. C. 430, 21 99 Wi.s. 264, 74 N. W. 974 ; Anderson v.

S. E. 97i ; Barry v. VVachosky (1899), 57 Scandia Bank (1893), 53 Minn. 191, 54

Neb. 534, 77 N.' W. 1080; A. T. & S. F. N. W. 1062; Carrier v. Bernstein (1898),

md. Co. V. Comm'rsof Sumner Co. (1893), 104 la. 572, 73 N. W. 1076 ; Smith v. Day

51 Kan. 617,33 Pac. 312 ; Drapers. Brown (1901), 39 Ore. 531, 65 Pac. 1055 ; Beane

(1902), 115 Wis. 361, 91 N. W. 1001; i'. Givens (1898), 5 Idaho, 774, 51 Pac. 987 ;

Stewart v. Iloseugren (1902), — Neb. —, Insley v. Shire (189.5), 54 Kan. 793, 39

92 N. W. 586 ; State v. Krause (1897), 58 Pac. 713.^

Kan. 651, 50 Pac. 882; Hughes r. Ilunner ^ This exception, in fact, confounds

(1895), 91 Wis. 116, 64 N. W. 887; John "relief" with "cause of action." It sim-

)i. Davis Lumber Co. v. Home Insurance jdy permits dcfen<iants to be joined against

Co. of New York (1897), 95 Wis. 542, 70 whom some .'special relief is demanded,

N. W. 84, tlie olijection tliat the causes and is therefore entirely unnecessary. In

joined do not affect all the parties to the every such suit there is only one cause

(1901), 109 Wi . 366, 85
. W. 369;
Hilton v. Hilton' Adm'r (1901 ), 110 K .
522, 62 . W. 6 ; 'layton v. City of Henderon (1 9 ), 103 Ky. 22 , 44 . W. 667;
Jami on v. ulligan {l 99), 151 Mo. 410,
uendorf,
52
. W. 224 · Kruczin ki v.
99 Wi . 26-! 74 . W. 97-! · And r on 1·.

action must be raised by demurrer on that of action, unless a common-law action

ground : Blakely v. Smock (1897), 96 Wis. on the note or bond is combined with the

611,71 N. W. 1052; Egaard v. Dahlke foreclosure.

foreclo .. ure.
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§ 374. * 480. Effect of Code Provision Requiring that Causes of

~ 374.

~~

480.

Effect of Code P r ovision Requiring that Causes of

Action Joined in one Complaint must affect all the Parties. While

the causes of action thus united must affect all of the parties,

it is not necessary that they should affect them all equally or in

the same manner.^ If equality and uniformity were required, a

large part of the equity jurisdiction would be swept away at one

blow ; for it is the distinguishing feature of that system that all

persons having any interest in the subject-matter of the contro-

versy or in the relief granted should be made parties, however

various and unequal their interests may be. Indeed, equality

of right or of liability was not essential in all common-law

actions. It was only when the proceeding was in form joint that

this equality was indispensable according to legal conceptions.

The provision of the codes has not changed any of these former

doctrines ; it simplj^ enacts in one statutory and comprehensive

1 Vermeule v. Beck, 1 5 How. Pr. 333.

Tlie fullowiug cases furnish illustrations

of the questions discu.ssed in this and
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the succeeding paragraphs. Schnitzer r.

Cohen, 7 Hun, 665 ; Barton v. Speis, 5

id. 60; Nichols r. Drew, 19 id. 490;

<"ook V. Horwitz, 10 id. .586; Brown v.

"\Vhile
the cau
of action i.hu united mu ·t affect a 1 of the parties,
it is n t n ce sary that they should aff ct them all
ually or in
1
the ame manner. If equality and uniformity were requir cl a
large part of the equity juris liction would be we t away at on
blow; for it i the di ·tingui bing feature of that y tern that all
per on having any interest in the ubject-matter of the coutrover y or in the relief granted should be made parti s, howev r
variou and unequal their interests may be. Indeed, equality
of right or of liability was not es ential in all common-law
action . It was only when the proceeding was in form joint that
this equality was indispensa,ble according to legal conceptions.
The provision of the codes has not changed any of these forme r
doctrines; it simply enacts in one statutory and comprehen iv
Action Joined in one Complaint mus t affect all the Parties.

Coble, 76 N. C. 391 ; Mendenhall v. V7il-

son, 54 Iowa, 589 ; Thorpe v. Dickey, 51

iJ. 676 ; Cogswell v. Murphy, 46 id. 44 ;

Addicken v. Schrubbe, 45 id. 315 ; Hack-

ett V. Carter, 38 Wis. 394 ; Heath v.

Silverthorn Min. Co., 39 id. 146; Greene

V. Nnnnemacher, 36 id. 50 ; Lull v. Fox

& Wis. Imp. Co., 19 id. 101 ; Arimond v.

Green Bay & Miss. Canal Co., 31 id. 316.

See also Kelly r. Newman, 62 How. Br.

156 (defendants); Higgius v. Crichton,

11 Daly, 114; Hynes v. Farmers' Loan

& Tr. Co. (Supreme, 1890), 9 N. Y. Suppl.

2G0 (plaintiffs) ; Mitchell v. Mitchell (N.

C. 1887); 1 S. E. Rep. 648 (defendants);

Himes v. Jarrett (S. C. 1887), 2 S. E. Rep.

393 ; Hoffinan r. Wheelock, 62 Wis. 434 ;

Waddell v. Waddell, 99 Mo. 338 ; Lever-

ing V. Schnell, 78 Mo. 167 (per.sons injured

by fraud, whose interests are distinct, can-

not join as plaintiffs unless the fi-aud was

accomplished through a joint transac-

tion) ; Mullen v. Hewitt, 103 Mo. 639

(fraudulent conveyances to .separate gran-

tees, no common design shown) ; Faivre

V. Gillan (Iowa, 1892), 51 N. W. Rep.

46; Berg v. Stanwood, 43 Minn. 176 (im-

proper joinder, where complaint alleges

separate promises by two defendants to

I)ay for the same work, and does not allege

a joint promise) ; Langevin v. St. I'anl

(Minn. 1892), 51 N. W. Rep. 817; Bren-

ner V. Egly, 23 Kan. 123 ; Lindh v. Crov^r-

ley, 26 Kan. 47 (a cause of action against

all the parties to a promissory note cannot

be united with a cause of action on a judg-

ment rendered on the note against one of

the parties thereto) ; Heutig v. S. W.

Mut. Benev. Ass., 45 Kan. 462 ; Rizer v.

Davis Cy. Comm'rs, 48 Kan. 389 ; Has-

kell Cy. Bank v. Bank of Santa Fc (Kan.

1893), 32 Fac. Rep. 624; Hoye r. Ray-

mond, 25 Kan. 665 ; Johnson r. Kirby, 65

Cal. 482 ; Powell v. Dayton, etc. R. Co.,

13 Ore. 446. It is not a misjoinder to

sue tlie sureties on a guardian's original

1 Vermeule v. Beck, 15 How. Pr. 333.
The following cases furnish illustrations
of the questions discussed in thi and
the succeeding paragraph . Schnitzer t' .
Cohen, 7 Hun, 665 ; Ba rton 1'. Speis, 5
id. 60; Nichols t'. Drew, 19 id. 490;
< 'ook v. Horwitz, 10 id. 586; Brown v.
f'oble, 76 N. C. 391 ; Mendenhall v. Wilson, 54 Iowa, 5 9; Thorpe v. Dickey, 51
iJ. 676; Cogsw 11 r. i\lurphy, 46 id. 44;
Addicken v. Schrubbe, 45 id. 315; Hackett v. Carter, 38 Wis. 394; Heath v.
bilverthorn Min. Co., 39 id. 146; Greene
'" Nnnnemacher, 36 id. 50; Lull v. Fox
& Wis. Imp. Co., 19 id. 101; Arimond v.
Green Bay & Miss . Canal Co., 31 id. 316.
See also Kelly t•. Newman, 62 How. Pr.
156 (defendants); Higgins t'. Crichton,
11 Daly, 114; Hynes v. Farmers' Loan
& Tr. Co. ( upreme, 1890), 9 N. Y. Suppl.
2GO (plaintiffs); Mitchell v. Mitchell (N.
C. 1887); 1 S. E. Rep. 648 (defendants);
Himes i·. Jarrett (S. C. 1887), 2 S. E. Rep.
393; Hoffman v. Wheelock, 62 Wis. 43-4 ;
Waddell v. Waddell, 99 Mo. 33 ; Levering v. Schnell, 78 Mo.167 (per ousinjured
by fraud, whoi-1e interests are distinct, cannot join. as plaintiffs unl cs th e fraud was
accomplished through a joint transac·
ti on) ; Mullen v. Hewitt, I 03 l\Io. 639
(fraudulent conveyances to separate grantees, no common design hown); Faivre
i-. Gillan (Iowa, 1892), 51 N. W . Rep.
46; Berg v. Stanwood, 43 Minn. l 7G (im-

proper joinder, where complai nt alleg-es
separate promis s by two defendant · to
pay for the sa me work, and does not allege
a joint promi e); Langevin v. St. 'nnl
(Minn. 1892), 51 N. W . R ep. 81 i ; Brenner v. Egly, 23 Kau. 123 ; Lindh v. Crowley, 26 Kan . 47 (a can e of action · against
all the partie~ to a prom is ory note cannot
he united with a cause of action on a judgment rendered on the note again~t one of
the parties thereto); Heutig v. S. W.
Mut. Benev. Ass., 45 Ran . 462; Rizer v.
Davis Cy. Comm'rs, 48 Kan. 389; Haskell Cy. Bank v. Bank of Santa F e (Kan.
1893), 32 Pac. Rep. 624 ; Hoye i: . Raymond, 25 Kan. 665; John. on '" Kirby, 6!1
Cal. 482; Powell v. Dayton, etc. R. Co.,
13 Ore. 446. It is not a mi joinder to
sue the sureties on a guardian's original
bond and those on his additional bond in
a single action ; as "the rights and lia.
bilities of each set of ureties depend for
their extent on a corr ct a certainment
and adjustment of th o ·e of the other set,
each is interested in th e r esult of the litigation with the other ; hence all the
p:uti es are affected as required by th
code;" 26 Weekly Law Bnll etin (Cincinnati Com . P lea ), 147, 14 , citing .Allen
v . tate, 61 I nu. 26 ; l\1atthew v. Cop land, 79 X. C. 493; Holeran t'. chool
Di t., l O i 'eh. 406; and other ca e
[ Gracly r. l\[aloso 11 96), 92 Wi . 666, 66
N. W. o .]
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form the principle which controlled the courts, both of law and

equity, under the former practice. It leaves an equitable action

to be governed by the same rules as to parties which controlled

it when equity was a distinct department, and it extends the

theory at least to legal actions as well. The practical effect

of tliis clause in the statute will be best learned from an ex-

amination of the cases in which it has been applied, and from

the judicial construction which has been thereby put upon it.

Those which are quoted first in order pronounce against the pro-

priety of the union made by the plaintiff, because the causes of

action did not affect all the parties.

§ 375. *481. Illustration. The owner of a tract of land had

made O. his agent for the purpose of selling it, and O. had sold

the land to S., who also stood in a fiduciary relation to the owner,

and S. had conveyed portions of the land to different purchasers.

The original owner thereupon brought an action against O. and

S., charging fraud and a violation of their fiduciary duty against

both. The complaint demanded a judgment of damages against

O. for his deceit, and against S. an account and payment of all
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the proceeds and profits that he had or might have made from his

own sales, and a reconveyance of the portion yet remaining unsold.

The Xew York Court of Appeals held that the causes of action

were improperly united ; and, as its opinion is instructive, I quote

from it at some length. " The plaintiff has elected to regaixi S.

as his trustee, and the complaint as to him and the decree proceed

on this basis. The plaintiff therefore elects to aflirm the sale as

to S. He cannot uno Jiatu afiirm it as to him, and disaffirm it as

to the defendant O. It is difficult to see how under the provision

of § 167 of the code these causes of action may be united in the

same complaint. Although it may be said that both causes of

action arise out of tlie same ti-ansaction, namely, the sale of the

plaintiff's land to the defendant S., yet the cause of action against

O. is for an injury to the plaintiff's property, while that against

S. is a claim against him as a trustee by operation of law. The

causes of action joined in tlie complaint do not affect both of the

i^arties defendant. O. is not affected by nor in any way responsi-

ble for S.'s acts as plaintiff's trustee, and the complaint does not

profess to make him liable therefor. So S. is not sought to be

made responsible for the fraudulent acts of*0. On the plain-

tiff's own showing, he has separate and distinct causes of action

form the l_Jrinciple which con rolle 1 the courts, both of law and
eq nit ·, under the former practice. It lea e an equitable ac ion
to be gov rned b3 the same rul s a o par ies which controlle 1
it "·hen equity wa a di tinct depar ment, and it extend th
theory at lea t to le al actions a well.
he practi al eff ct
of his clau e in he tatut will be be t learned from an examination of th
a e in which it has been ap1 lied, and fi m
the judicial co truction which ha been ther by put upon it.
Tho ·e whicl ar quo ed firs in orler pronounce against the propriety of he union made by the plaintiff, because the ause of
action did not affect all the parties.
37 5. * 481. Illustrat ion.
The owner of a tract of land } ad
made . hi agent for the purpose of selling it, and 0 . had sold
the land o S., who a.I o st od in a fiduciary r lation to the own r,
and S . had conveyed portions of the land to differ nt purcha er .
The original owner thereupon brought an action against . an<l.
., chargi11g fraud and a violation of their :fiduciary duty aga.in ~ t
both. The complaint demanded a judgment of J.amages again ' t
0. for hi deceit, and against S. an account and l_Jayment of all
the proceed and profits that he had or might have made from b~
o n ales and a reconveyance of the portion yet remaining un ld..
The New York ourt of Appeals held tfiat the causes of action
were improperly united; and, as its opinion is in tructive, I quote
from it at ome length . "The plaintiff has elected to regard '.
a his trustee, and the complaint as to him and the decree pro eed
on this ba i . The plaintiff therefore elect to affirm he ale a
to . He cannot uno flat1.1, affirm it a to him, and di affirm it a
to the defendant 0 . It i difficult to ee how under the provi. ~ i n
.of 167 of the code hese cau e of action may be united in he
ame complaint. Although it may be ai i that both cau
f
action ari e out of the ame transaction namely, he al f th
plaintiff's land to the d fendan . yet th , ause of action a 0 ain t
0. i · for an injury to the pl( intiff' I roper y, while that against
. '. is a claim again t 11 im a a trust by operation of la w. Th
cau es of action joined in th omplt int d not affect b th of th
partie def ndant.
. i not affect d by 1 r in any wa r p n ·ible for . . act a pl" in iff'' tru ·tee, and the omr laint doe not
rof , s t mak him liable th refor.
. i n t s ught t b
marl re
n ihl f r h fraudulent ct' f• .
n the I lainiff'
wr showing h lia · .· I, ra
nd cli me au ·e. f acti n
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against each of the defendants which cannot be joined under

the code." ^

§ 376. * 482. Illustrations. The same doctrine was asserted and

ruHng made in the following cases, the causes of action being held

improperly united in each because they did not affect all of the

parties : where one cause of action was on a judgment against the

defendant and two others, a second on a judgment against the de-

fendant and one other, while a third was on a judgment against

the defendant alone ; ^ where the first cause of action was against

a husband and wife for a slander by the wife, and the second

against the husband for his own slander ; ^ an action against a

husband and wife on a contract made by both in the wife's busi-

ness, where a personal judgment was demanded against him, and

a judgment to enforce the demand against the wife's separate

estate ; * where the plaintiff's agent, with whom certain securities

had been deposited, had transferred them, in violation of his duty,

to various assignees, and a single action was brought against him

and all these transferees to set aside the assignments and to re-

cover the bonds or their proceeds ; ^ an action by a reversioner
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against the tenant for life and the occupant to recover damages

for injuries done b}^ them to the land, the complaint containing

1 Gardner i'. Ogilen, 22 N. Y. 327, 340, fendantsalone, even though such certificate-

per Davies J. was obtaiued as one of the fruits of the con-

[| Tew y. Wolfsohn (1903), 174 N. Y. 272, spiracy." Hawarden r. Youghiogheny &

66 N. E. 934. In this case the complaint Lehigh Coal Co. (1901), 111 Wis. ,54.5," 87

alleged that one defendant conducted a N. W. 472 : k?ld, that a cause of action at

certain business as agent for the other law for damages to the plaintiff growing

defendant, liis wife, who owned it ; that he out of an unlawful combination cann(^t be

])retended to be conducting the business united with a cause of action in equity in

as his own, and entered into a contract favor of the plaintiff and others similarly

with plaintiff as agent for his wife, his situated to restrain further operations by

against each of the defendants which cannot be join d under
the code.'' 1
§ 376. * 482. I llustrations. The same doctrine was ~ ·sert d and
ruling made in the following ca c , the causes of action b ing held
improperly united in each becau e they did not aff ct all of t11e
parties: where one cau e of action was on a judgm nt again t the
defendant and two other , a second on a judgment against the defe ndant and one other, while a third was on a judgment again t
the defendant alone; 2 where the first cause of action was against
a husband and wife for a slander by the wife, ancl the second
against the husband for his own shtnc.ler; 3 an action again t a
husba.nd and wife on a contract made by both in the wif 's busin ss, where a personal judgment WttS demandeLl again t him, and
a judgment to enforce the demand against the wife's separate
e tate; 4 where the plaintiff's agent, with whom certain securities
had been deposited, had transferred them, in violation of his duty,
to various assignees, and a single action was brought against him
and all these transferees to set aside the assignments and to recover the bonds or their proceeds; 5 an action by a rever ioner
against the tenant for life a,nrl the occupant to recover damages
for injuries clone by them to the land, the com12laint containing

undisclosed principal ; that the defendants the combination, since both causes of ac-

refused to perform the terms of the con- tions do not affect all the parties. Plank-

tract, and induced plaintiff to pay money, inton v. Hildebraud (1895), 89 Wis. 209,

for which they refused to account. Held, 61 N. W. 839.]

not demurrable on the ground of mi.sjoin- ^ Barnes v. Smith, 16 Abb. Pr. 420.

der of causes of action, as, if it does not ^ Malone r. Stilwell, 15 Abb. Pr. 421.

state a single cause of action against the And see Dailey v. Houston, 58 Mo. 361,

wife only, it states a single cause of action 366.

against both defendants. Haskell County * Palen v. Lent, 5 Bosw. 713.

Bank v. Bank of Santa Fe' (1893), 51 Kan. ^ Lexington & B. S. R. Co. v. Goodman,

39, 32 Pac. 624. In this case it was held 15 How. Pr. 85. This was a special term

that "an action to recover damages against decision, and is therefore not entitled to

a number of defendants for a fraudulent much authority. The case is clearly in

conspiracy cannot be joined with an action principle identical with the ordinary cred-

to obtain a cancellation of a certificate of iter's suit,

deposit owued and held by one of said de-

1 Garduer v. Ogden, 22 N. Y. 327, 340,
per Davies J.
[ l'ew v. Wolfoohn ( 1903), 174 N. Y. 272,
66 N. E. 93-!. In this case the complaint
alleged that one defendant conducted a
certain bu in ess a3 agent for the other
defendant, his wife, who owned it; that he
pretended to be conducting the business
a his own, and entered into a contract
with plaintiff as agent for his wife, his
undisclosed principal; that the defendants
refused to perform the terms of the contract, and induced plaintiff to pay m oney,
for which they r efused to account. H eld,
not demurrable on the ground of misjoinder of causes of action, as, if it does not
tate a single cause of action against the
wife only, it ·tates a single cau e of action
against both defendants. Haskell County
Bank v. Bank of Santa Fe (1893), 51 Kan.
39, 32 Pac. 624. In this case it was held
that "an action to recover damages again ·t
a number of defernlants for a fraudulent
conspi racy cannot be joined with an action
to obtain a cancellation of a certifirate of
deposit ow ued aud held by one of aid <le-

fondants alone, even though such ce rtificate ·
was obtained a one of the fruits of the conspiracy." Hawarden v. Youghioghen,v &
L ehigh Coal Co. (1901), 111Wis.545, i
N. W. 472: ht>ld, that a cau e of action at
law for damages to the plaintiff growing
out of an nulawful combination cannot be
united with a cause of action in equity in
favor of the plaiutiff and other. imilarly
situated to restrain further operations by
the combi nati on, since both cau es of actions do not affect all the parties. Plankinton v. Hildebrand (1 895), 89 Wis. 209,
61 N. W. 839 .J
2 Barnes 11 . Smith, 16 Abb. Pr. -!20.
3 Malone i:. Stil well, 15 Abb. Pr. 421 .
And see Dailey v . Houston, 5 Mo. 361,
366.
4 Palen v. J,ent, 5 Bosw. il3.
5 Lexington & B. R.R. Co. v. Goodman,
l!S How. Pr. 85. This was a. pecial term
decision, and is therefore not entitled to
much authority. The ca e i clearly in
principle identical with the ordinary creditor' suit.
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a cause of action asfainst 07ie defendant for cuttinsj and removingr

timber, a second against both for the same acts, and a third against

both for removing fire-wood already cut; ^ an action for deceit, in

which one count of the comphiint alleged fraudulent acts against

a part of the defendants, and other counts charged similar acts

against all ; ^ ^vhere damages were claimed from the owner of a

city lot for making an excavation in a street, into which the

plaintiff fell, and from the city for permitting the street to be

broken up ; ^ an action against two defendants to recover damages

for the flowing of plaintiff's lands, the complaint alleging in the

fii'st count that one defendant erected a dam in the north branch

of a certain river, and in the second count that the other defend-

ant constructed a dam in the south branch of the same stream,

by the combined effects of which obstructions the injury was

done ; ^ an action against two defendants, in which the claim

against one was for goods sold and delivered, and that against

the other was on his promise to pay the price thereof; ^ an action

against a public officer and the sureties on his official bond for a

breach thereof, the complaint containing also a cause of action
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against the officer alone for damages caused by a distinct and

different negligent act ; ^ a cause of action against A., B., and

C. for money loaned to them, and one against A., D., and E. on

a note given by them as collateral security for the same loan."

§ 377. * 483. Causes of Action so Joined must also affect all the

Plaintiffs. Illustrations. The causes of action must not only affect

all the defendants, but all the plaintiffs as well, the provision of

the codes applying equally to both parties.^ Thus an action by

1 Rodgers i\ Rodgers, II Barb. 59.5. [;Davis r. Novotney (1901), 15 S. D.

2 Wells i;. Jewett, 11 How. Pr. 242. 118, 87 N. W. 582: A trustee iu baiik-

" Trowbridge v. Forepaugh, 14 Minu. ruptcy cannot join in one complaint causes

133. See also Kelly v. Newman, 62 IIow. of action against several defendants, each

Pr. 156. of whonijin a separate suit, obtained prop-

* Lull c. Fo.\ & Wis. Imp. Co., 19 Wis. erty of the bankrupt by replevin or levied

100, 102. upon it in attachment, within the prohibi-

^ Sanders I.'. Cla.son, 13 Minn. 379. tiou of the bankruptcy act, since such

* State '•. Kruttschnitt, 4 Nev. 178; causes of action do not arise out of the

Ghirardelli v. IJourland, 32 Cal. 585. And same transaction nor are they connected

against the sureties on an administrator's with the same subject of action. There is

bond for a breach thereof, and against the also a misjoin<ler of parties defendant]

administrator himself for a viidation of iiis ^ Where a husband and wife sued for

a c,rn ~ of action again ·t one defendant for cutting and ·em vin
timber, a econd ao-ain both for the . ai rn act ' , an<l. a third a a.in
both for remoYin · fir -·~yood alrea l ~ cu · 1 an action f r tlec it in
which one un f the complain all o·ecl fraudulent ac ac;ain
a part of th cl f ndan and other ount charged 'imil· r act
aaain . . t all· where d, mag were claimed from the owner of a
cit: lot for making an excava i n in a treet int which th
i laintiff fell and from th cit for permi ting th treet t be
broken up; 3 an a ti on aaain t \VO lefendan t t r cover dama
for the fio ing of pfaintiff' land th com pt int all ing in the
fir t c unt that on defendant erected a dam in the north branch
f a cer ain river and in the econd ount that the other d fen an con tructed a lam in the outh branch of the s me tream
b the combined effect of whi h ob truction he injury wa
done · 4 an action against two lefendant , in which the claim
a ain t one wa for good sold and deliver cl and that ag in t
the other wa. on his promi e to pay the price ther of · 5 an ac im
again:..,t a public officer and the sureties on his official bond for ,L
breach thereof, the complaint containing also a au e of a tion
a ain. t th e officer alone for damage cau ed by a di tinct and
ifferent negligent act ; 6 a cau e of action again t A ., . and
C. for money lon.ned to them and one again t ., D. and E . n
a not given by them a collateral security for the ame loan. 7
§ 377. * 483 . Causes o f Actio n s o Join ed m ust also affe c t all t h e
Plaintiffs. Illustratio ns. The cause of action mu. t not only affec
all the defendants bu all the plaintiff a well he proYi i n of
the code applying equally to both par ies. Thus an action by

trust. Howse v. Moody, 14 Fla. 59, C4,65. an assault and battery upon the wife, asxl

' Farmers' Bank of Mo. r. Bayliss, 41 the petition set forth a claim for the iiijn-

Mo. 274. And see Lane v. State, 27 Ind. ries su-stained by the wife, fur wliicii 1k)1]i

108. must sue, and also a claim for the loss of

Rod er· v. Rodger , 11 Barb. 595.
Well v. Jewett, J l How. Pr : 242.
a Trowbrid<Ye i-. Forepau h, H :\[inn.
ee al ·o relly v. Kewmau, 62 How.
133.
Pr. 156.
4 Lull i-. Fox & Wi . . Imp. o., 19 \Yi .
100, 10~.
& 'antler v.
)a-o n, 13 :.\liun. 379.
6 .' tate 1•. Krntt. ch11itt, 4
~ev. l i ;
Ghirar<lPJli ,., Bourland, 32 Cal 5 5. Aud
a•rain. t the nretie ou , n ad mini t rator' ·
lirm1l for a bread1 thereof, an<l ag. in t the
• dmini ·1.rator him ·clf for a Yi11Jati on o( hi
tru t. How:e t'. :Jloody, 14 Fla. 59, 64- 65.
~ Farmer' Bank of Mo. n. 13ayli ., 41
r fo. 274. .An<l ee Laue IJ. tate, _ 7 Ind.
10 .
1
2

[Davi r. ovotney (1901), 15 . D.
l l , 7 r. W. 5 2: A tru tee in bankrupt ;.- cannot join in one complaint cau ,of action again t everal defendant , eal'h
of whom, in a - parat ui t, outai11etl I roprty of the uaukrupt b_r r cpl vin or le"i d
upon it in attachm nt, withiu th prohibition of the bankruptc:· a ct, ~ inl'
u h
cau e of a ction do not ari. e out of th
am tran action nor are they
n nect ll
with the •ame ubj ect f action. Th r i ·
al o a mi joind r f partie · defendant.]
s \rh er a hu band and wife ucd for
an a. ault and batter~· upon the wife, an1l
the petition et forth a claim for the injn·
rie w tained by th wife, for which Ii lh
mw:t ue, and al o a laim for the lo:; u'
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three persons having entirely distinct and separate claims against

the defendant for work and materials, brought to foreclose their

individual mechanics' liens on their debtor's house, was held

improper ; ^ and where six persons, owners of distinct and sepa-

rate parcels of land through which a stream ran, each being

entitled to the use of the water as it passed through his land,

joined in a suit to restrain the defendant from diverting the

entire stream at a point above all their premises, the Supreme

Court of Nevada condemned the complaint as improperly uniting

the causes of action and the plaintiffs.^ In an action to recover

possession of land brought by two plaintiffs, the complaint con-

her services, for which he alone must sue,

two causes of action were held to be im-

properly united. Dailey r. Houston, 58

Mo. 361, 366 ; Tell v. Gibsou, 66 Cal. 247 ;

three per ons having entirely di tinct and parate claim: against
tl e defendant for work and materials, brought to foreclo.·e their
inclividuc 1 mechanics' liens on their cl btor' · house was helc.l.
improper; 1 and where six persons, owner f distinct ancl separat parcels of land through which a tream ran, each being
entitled to the use of the water as it pa ·:;eel through his lancl,
joined in a suit to restrain the defendant from diverting the
entire stream at a point above all their premi es, the Supreme
Court of Nevada condemned the complaint as improperly uniting
the causes of action and the plaintiffs. 2 In an action to recover
p ossession of land brought by two plaintiffs, the complaint con-

Reynolds v. Robinson, 64 X. Y. 589 ; Filer

v. N. Y. Central R. Co., 49 X. Y. 47 ; Mo-

sier V. Beale, 43 Fed. Rep. 358 ; and see
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mite, § * 242.

^Anderson v. Scandia Bank (1893), 53

Minn. 191, 54 N. W. 1062: A cause of

action by a husband and wife to avoid

usurious securities given by them upon a

loan made to the wife, cannot be joined

with another by the wife alone to recover

back money paid by her upon the usurious

contract. See also Morton r. Western

Union Tel. Co. (1902), 130 N. C. 299, 41

S. E. 484.

The several causes, in order that they

may be united, must not only affect all the

plaintiffs but must be brought in the same

right. In the case of Carrier v. Bernstein

(1898), 104 la. 572, 73 N. W. 1076, plaintiff

filed a petition in two counts, the first

being a suit by her as wife under § 1557

of the code to recover actual and exem-

plary damages for injury to her person,

property, etc., caused by sales of intoxicat-

ing licjuors to her husband, the second

being a suit by her as a citizen of the

county, under Code, § 1539, for one-half

the forfeit imposed by law for the selling

of liquor to an intoxicated person or ha-

bitual drunkard. Held, that there was a

misjoinder because the causes of caction,

while prosecuted by the same kind of

proceedings, are not by the same party as

plaintiff or in the same right, as required

by Code, § 2630. As to the parties plain-

tiff, in one the plaintiff sues in her own

name. In the second count the plaintiff

does not sue as wife but as a citizen of the

county and as informer. But even though

the actions be considered brought by the

same party, " surely it cannot be said that

they are in the same right. The first is in

the right as wife (or damages to her per-

son, property, and means of support, aud is

a right existing solely and exclusively in

favor of the plaintiff, for injuries actually

suffered by her. The second is in the

right of the county, not to damages, but

to the forfeiture to its school fund. The

citizen prosecuting such au action as in-

former has no personal right of recovery.

He cannot recover anything in his own

right, and it is only when recovery is had

her services, for which he alone must sue,
two causes of action were held to be im·
prope rly united. Dailey v. Houston, 58
.Mo. 361, 366; Tell v. Gibson, 6fi Cal. 24i;
Reynolds v. Robinson, 64 ~. Y. 589; Filer
v. N. Y. Central R. Co., 49 N. Y. 47; Mosier v. Beale, 43 Fed. R ep. 358; an d see
ante,§* 242.
[A nderson v. Scandia Bank (1893), 53
Minn. 191, 54 N. W. 1062: A cause of
action by a husband and wife to avoid
usurious securities given by them upon a
Joan made to the wife, cann ot be joined
with an other by the wife alone to recover
back money paid by her upon the usuri ous
contract. See also Morton v. W estern
Union Tel. Co. (1902), 130 N. C. .299, 41
S. E. 4 4.
The several causes, in order that they
m ay be united, must not only affect all the
plaintiffs but must be brought in the same
right. In the case of Carrier v. B ernstein
(1898}, 104 Ia. 572, 73 N. W. 1076, plaintiff
filed a petition in two counts, th e first
bein g a suit by her as wife under § 1557
of the code to recover actual and exemplary damages for injury to her person,
µroperty, etc., cau ed by sales of intoxicating liquors to her husband, the second
being a suit by her as a citizen of the
county, under Code,§ 1539, for one-half
the forfeit imposed by law for the elling
of liquor to an intoxicated person or habitual drunkard. Held, that there was a
misjoinder because the cau ·es of action,
while prosecuted by the ame kind of
proceedings, are not by the same party as
plaintiff or in the same right, as requ ired
by Code, § 2630. As to the parties plain-

tiff, in one the plaintiff sues in her own
name. In the second count the plaintiff
does not sue as wife but as a citizen of the
co unty and as informer. But even though
the actions be considered brought by the
same party, "surely it cannot be f'aid that
th ey are in the same ri ght. The first is iu
the right as wife for damages to her person, property, and means of suppo rt, and is
a right existing solely and exclu ively in
favor of the plaintiff, for injuries actually
suffered by her. The second is in the
right of the co un ty, not to damages, but
to the fo rfeiture to its school fund. The
citizen prosecuting such an action as informer has no personal rig ht of r ecovery.
He cann ot recover anything in his own
right, and it is only when recovery i hall
in favor of the school fund that the informer is compensated by receiving ouehalf the am ount recovered." J
1 Harsh v. Morgan, 1 Kan. 293, 299.
Tenants in common who have been imposed on by the fraud of a common vendeo
to whom they have at different times executed separate deeds, each of hi s intere t,
can not join in a sui t to set these aside:
J effer · i·. Forbes, 28 Kan. 174.
:l Schultz 1·. w·inter, 7 Nev. 130.
For
contrary cases, see supra, § * 269 (note).
Though the separate owners may, by
the weight of authorit_y, join in claimi ng
an injunction, the uniting of their everal
claims for damages in one complaint i,.;
improper, as the plaintiffs have a common
interest in obtaining the equitable, but not
the legal relief. ee Barham v. Ho tetter,
67 Cal. 272; Foreman v. Boyle, 88 Cal
290.
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tained two counts : the first averred a title to the premises in one

of the pLaintiffs, while the second alleged a different and even

hostile title in the other. A demurrer to this complaint was sus-

tained, on the ground that the two causes of action did not affect

both of the plaintiffs. The former practice of naming different

lessors of the plaintiff in ejectment, and afterwards of uniting

different plaintiffs who claim under distinct and hostile titles, has

been abolished by the code. " The action to recover possession

of land now stands on the same footing precisely in respect to

parties and the union of causes of action with all other actions." ^

§ 378. * 484. The Doctrine, as Stated by the New York Court

of Appeals, respecting a Cause of Action against an Executor, Ad-

ministrator, or Trustee United with one against him in his Individual

Capacity. Causes of action to recover possession of different

chattels from different defendants cannot be joined in the same

suit.-^ Nor can a cause of action against a trustee to compel the

conveyance of the trust property be united with a cause of action

against an administrator on a demand growing out of the same

taine two count : t he fir t averred a ti le to the premi . in one
f the plaintiff , while the econd 11 ged a different and e en
h o t ile title in the other . A demurrer to his complaint was u tainecl on t he ground that the tw cau 'e of action did not affect
both of t he plaintiff . The former prac ice of namin different
1 ., or of t he plaintiff in ejectment and afterw<Lrd. of mir;ing
li:fferent plaintiffs who claim uncler di tinc t and h tile title ha
been aboli hed by t he code.
The action to recover p o e ion
of land now t and on the ame fo o ing precisely in re pect o
parti and he union of cau . . es of action wi th all o her ac ion . 1
378. * 4 4. The Doctrine , as Sta ted by t h e New York Court
of Appeals, respecting a Cause o f Ac tion against a n Executor, Ad-

property.^ A cause of action against an executor, administrator,

ministrator, or Trustee United w ith o n e against him in his Individual
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or trustee, in his representative character, cannot be united with

one against the same individual personally. The doctrine was

recently stated by the New York Court of Appeals, as the result

of an elaborate examination of the authorities : " The following

principles are settled by these authorities : 1. That, for all causes

of action arising upon contract made by deceased in his lifetime,

an action can be maintained against the executor or administrator

as such, and the judgment would be de bonis testatoris, or intesta-

toris. 2. That in all causes of action, where the same arise upon

a contract made after the death of the testator or intestate, the

1 Hubbell V. Lerch, 62 Barb. 295, 297, damages for withlioldin'^ the same, it

per T. A. Johnson, J. ; St. John v. Pierce, has been held, cannot he joined with a

22 Barb. 362 ; Hubbell v. Lerch, 58 N. Y. similar cause of action in respect to an-

2.37, 241. QSee Behlow v. Fischer (1894), other parcel, sed qu., Holmes v. Williams,

102 Cal. 208, 36 Pac. 509.] 16 Minn. 164, 169 ; nor can a claim for a

2 Robinson v. Rice, 20 Mo. 229. specific performance against A. be joined

3 McLaughlin v. McLaughlin, 16 Mo. with a claim to recover possession of land

242. Tiie following cases are additional against B., Fagan v. Barnes, 14 Fla. 53,

illustrations of the rule that the causes of 56 ; nor can a cause of action for fraud

action must affect all the parties. Cheely's agai«st one defendant be united with a

Adm. r. Wells, 33 Mo. 106 ; Liney v. cause of action upon contract against an-

Martin, 29 Mo. 28 ; Stalcup v. Garner, 26 other. Van Liew v. John.son, 6 N. Y. S. C.

Mo. 72. A cause of action to recover f.48 ; N. C. Land Co. v. Beatty, 69 N. C.

possession of one parcel of land with •'3^9.

Causes of action to recover pos e ion of cliff ren t
chattel from different defendants cannot be joined in t bv ame
suit. 2 Nor can a cau 'e of action again t a tru tee t o compel t he
conveyance of the trust property be united wit h a cause of action
again t an administrator on a demand growing out of the ame
property. 3 A cause of action against an ex ecu tor, administrator,
or t ru tee, in his representative character ca,nnot be united with
one again t the same individual per onally. The doctrine was
recently stated by the New York - ourt of A ppeal , a the re ult
of an elaborate examination of t he authoritie : " The foll wing
principles a~·e ettled by t hese authori ie : 1. T ha , for all cau e
of action ari ing upon con ract made by deceased in hi life ime,
an action can b maintained again t the executor or administrator
as ueh, and the judgment would b de bonis testatori or inte tatori . 2. That in all cau e of action, where the ame ari ·e upon
a contract made after the death of th e te tator or intes ate, the
Capacity.

1

1 Hubbell v. L er h, 62 Barb. 29- , 297,
per T . A ..Johnson, J .; t . J ohn v. P ierce,
22 Barb. 362; Hubbell v. L erch, 5
. Y.
237, 24 1. [ ee Behlow v. Fischer (1894),
102 al. 20 , 36 Pac. 509.J
2 Robinson v. Rice, 20 Mo. 229.
a McLaughlin v. fcLaughlin, 16 Io.
242. The following ca e ar e additional
illu tration of the rule that the cau es of
, ction mu. t affect all the partie . 'heely's
Adm. r. Well , 33 Mo. 106; Liney v.
"fartin, 29 :\Io. 2 ; tal up v. arner, 26
Mo. i2. A cau e of action t r c ''er
o: e.. ion of one parcel of land with

damage for wi thholding the ame, it
ha be n held, a nn ot be j iued with a
imilar cau e of actio n in re pect to another par cel, d qu. Holme v. Williams,
16 -:\!inn . 164, 169; nor can a claim fo r a
~pecific performance again t
. be joined
with a claim to recover po e ion of land
again t B., Fa<Yan v. Barn , 14 F la. 53,
56 · nor can a ause of a tion for fraud
aga· t one defendant be uu ited with a
• u. of action up n contract aaain t a nther, an Liew !'. John. on, 6 .... Y .
. . Land o. v. Beatty, 69
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claim is against the executor or administrator personally, and not

against the estate, and the judgment must be de honh propriis.

3. That these different causes of action cannot be united in the

same complaint." ^

§ 379. *485. Illustrations. Under the provisions of the In-

diana code an action wi\s sustained against a husband and wife,

brought by a creditor of the husband to recover a judgment for

the amount of the demand against him, and to charge certain

land held by the wife under an implied trust for her husband

with a mechanic's lien which accompanied the demand ;2 and also

an action ao-ainst a husband and wife, which was brought to

obtain a judgment against him for the price of goods sold and

delivered, and also to set aside his deed of land fraudulently con-

veyed to her, so as to let in the hen of the judgment when

recovered.^

§ 380. * 486. Discussion of Questions under Consideration in

Wilson V. Castro. The questions under consideration, in their

application to equitable actions, were thoroughly and ably dis-

cussed by the Supreme Court of California in the case of Wilson
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V. Castro,* and I shall close this subdivision with an extract from

the opinion. After a statement of the general rules and doctrines

of equity in relation to parties, the learned judge proceeds to

discuss the question as to the joinder of causes of action in

connection with the union of the defendants, or, to adopt the

nomenclature used by equity courts, the subject of " multifarious-

ness.''^ " A bill in equity is said to be ' multifarious ' when dis-

tinct and independent matters are joined therein, — as, for

example, the uniting of several matters, perfectly distinct and,

unconnected, against one defendant, or the demand of several

matters of a distinct and independent nature, against severa

1 Ferrin i'. Myrick, 41 N. Y. 315, 319- be joined with a claim against him as a

322, per Hunt C. J. ; Austin v. Munro, 47 trustee of the company for the same de-

N. Y. 360, 364, 365, per Allen J. ; Austin mand, both being based upon a statute.

V. Munro, 4 Lans. 67. See, per contra. Wiles y. Suydam, 6 N. Y. S. C. 292, citing

Tradesman's Bank v. McFeely, 61 Barb. Durant v. Gardner, 10 Abb. Pr. 445; 19

522, decided in the face of Ferrin v. My- How. Pr. 94 ; Sipperly v. Troy & B. R.

rick. Joinder of causes of action against Co., 9 How. Pr. 83 ; Dickens v. N. Y. Cent,

executors and administrators in their in- R. Co., 13 How. Pr. 228. See /jos^, §* 502.

dividual and representative capacities is ^Schlicker v. Hemeuway (1895), 110 Cal.

permitted in New York in certain ca.ses 579,42 Pac. 1063.]

by C. C. P., § 1815. Bat a claim against 2 Lindley v. Cross, 31 Ind. 106.

the defendant as a stockholder, to recover ^ Frank v. Kessler, 30 Ind. 8.

a demand due from the corporation, may * W'ilsou v. Castro, 31 Cal. 420.

claim i again t the executor r administrator per. onally, and not
again t the estate, and the ju lgment mu t be cle bonis proprii"
3. That the e different cau e of action cannot be united in the
ame complaint." 1
379 . * 485. Illustrations.
Under the I rovision of the Indiana code an action wq. u tainecl againt>t a hu 'band and wife,
brought by a creditor of the hu band to recover a judgment for
the amount of the demand against him, and to charge certain
land held by the wife under an implied trust for her husband
with a mechanic's lien which accompanied the demand ; 2 and also
an action against a husband and wife, which was brought to
obtain a judgment against him for the price of goods sold and
delivered, and also to set aside hi deed of land frauclulently conveyed to her, so as to let m the lien of the judgment when
recovered.3
§ 380. * 486 . Discu s sio n o f Q u e stio n s under Consideration in
W ilso n v . Castro. The questions under consideration, in their
application to equitable actions_, were thoroughly and ably discussed by the Supreme Court of California in the case of Wilson
v. Castro, 4 and I shall close this subdivision with an extract from
the opinion. After a statement of the general rules and doctrines
of equity in relation to parties, the learned judge proceeds to
discuss the question as to the joinder of causes of action in
connection with the union of the defendants, or, to adopt the
nomenclature used by equity courts, the subject of" multifariousness." "A bill in eq:uity i said to be 'multifarious' when distinct and independent matters are joined therein, - as, for
example, the uniting of several matters, perfectly distinct and
unconnected, against one defendant, or the demand of event
matters of a distinct and independent nature, against sever,
1 F errin v . Myrick, 41
. Y. 315, 319322, per Hunt C. J.; Austin v. :Munro, 4-7
N. Y. 360, 364, 365, per Allen J. ; Au~ t in
v . Munro, 4 Lans. 67. See, per contrn,
Tradesman's Bank v. McFeely, 61 Barb.
522, decided in the face of Ferrin v. M y -

ri ck. J oinder of causes of action against
executo rs and administrators in their individual and representative capacities is
permitted in New York in certain ca ·e
by C. C. P., § 1815. But a claim again t
the defendant a a stockholder, to recover
a demand due from the corporation, may

be joined with a cla im again t him a a
trustee of the company for the same demand, both being based upon a statute.
\Viles v. Suydam, 6 i\. Y. S. C. 292, citing
Du rant v. Gardner, 10 Abb. Pr. 445; 19
How. Pr. 9+; ~ ipp e rly v. Troy & B. R.
Co., 9 How. Pr. 83; Dicken · 11. N. Y. Cent.
R. Co., 13 How. Pr. 228. See po t, § * 502.
[ Schlicker i-. Hemenway (1 95), 110 Cal.
57!), 42 Pac. 1063.J
2 Lindley l '. Cross, 31 Ind. 106.
3 :F rank v. Ke,sler, 30 Ind. 8.
4 \Yi1 ·ou v. Castro, 3 1 Cal. 420.
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defendants. But the case of each particuLar defendant must be

entirely distinct and independent from that of the other defend-

ants, or the objection cannot prevail : for, as said by Judge

Story, 'The case of one may be so entire as to be incapable of

being prosecuted in several suits, and yet some other defendant

may be a necessary party to some portion only of the case stated.

In the latter case the objection of multifariousness could not be

allowed to prevail. So it is not indispensable that all the parties

should have an interest in all the matters contained in the suit ;

it will be sufficient if each party has an interest in some matter

in the suit, and they are connected with the others.' ^ The same

autlior lays it down that, ' To support the objection of multifari-

ousness because the bill contains different causes of suit against

the same person, two things must concur: firsts the different

grounds of suit must be wholly distinct ; secoyidly, each ground

must be sufficient as stated to sustain a bill; if the grounds be

not entirely distinct and unconnected, if they" arise out of one and

the same transaction, or series of transactions forming one course

of dealing, and all tending to one end, if one connected story can
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be told of the whole, the objection does not apply.' ^ When the

2)oint in issue is a matter of common interest among all the

parties to the suit, though the interests of the several defendants

are otherwise unconnected, still they may be joined. In Salvidge

V. Hyde,^ Sir John Leach V. C. said, ' If the objects of the suit

are single, but it happens that different persons have separate

interests in distinct questions which arise out of the single object,

it necessarily happens that such different persons must be brought

before the court in order that the suit may conclude the whole

subject.' In Boyd v. Hoyt,* Mr. Chancellor Walworth laid

down the same doctrine in substantially the language used by

Sir John Leach in Salvidge v. Hyde ; and Mr. Daniell, in his

excellent work,^ says, in reference to the doctrine held in Sal-

vidge V. Hyde, there is no doubt that the learned judge stated

the principle correctly, though in the application of it he went,

in the opinion of Lord Eldon, too far.^ In Whaley v. DaAvson,"

Lord Kedesdale observed that in the English cases, when de-

murrers, because the plaintiff demanded in his bill matters of

1 Story's Eq. PI. §§ 271, 271 a. ^ 1 Daniell's Ch. PI. p. 386.

2 Ibid. § 271 6. 6 1 .Jac. R. 151.

8 Salvi(igei-. Ilyde.SMadd. Ch. K. 138. ' Whaley i-. Dawson, 2 Sch. & Lef.

♦ Boyd i;. Hoyt, 5 Paige, 78. 370.

def ndants. B t t the ca of each l ar icular defendant mu t
entirel. · di ' tine and ind I ndent from that of the th r defendi. nt . .'
or he obj ction cann t preyail · f r a
aid by Judge
'tnry ' Th ,, ca e f on m · be o entire
to be in apable of
b ing pro e ut d in everal "uit and yet me oth r def ndant
may be a nece ary part o m
rtion only of th
e tat d.
In the latter ca e he obj c ion of multifari u n
uld n t b
< 11 w d
pre-mil.
o it i not incli I en 'able hat all the parti
, h uld ha an intere t in all the matters contained in the uit ·
it will b ufficient if each party has an iutere ·t in me matter
in the uit, and they are conne ted with the others. 1 The ·am
au hor le y it down that, 'To suppor the objection of mul ifariou nes be au e the bill contain lifferent cau es of uit a ain t
th
ame per on two tl in
mu t con ur: first, the different
ground of uit mu t be wholly di tinct; secondly each ground
mu t be ufficient as tated to u tain a bill; if the grounds b
not entirelj distinct and unconnected, if they arise out of one and
the same tran action, or serie · of trim actions forming ne course
of dealing and all tending to one end, if one connected story can
be told of the whole, the objection does not apply. 2 \Vhen th
point in i ue i a ma ter of common intere t among all the
partie to the suit though the interests of the several defendant,
are otherwi e unconnected, till they may be joined. In Sa_lvid;
v. Hyde ,~ ir John Leach V. C. said, If the objects of th suit
a.re ingle, but it happens that different per ons ha
e r t
intere ts in di tinct que ion whi h ari 'e ut of th ingle bj ct,
it nece arily happens that ·uch di ff r nt per on mu t be brought
b fore the court in order hat the suit may conclud th whole
ubject.
In Boyd v. H yt 4 Mr. hancellor Val orth laid
down the ame doctrine in sub an iall the languag u d b
.'ir J ohn Leach in Salvitlge v. I ytl ; an 1 .Mr. a.niell, ir hi
excellent work 5 a r ir r fer nee to th d ctrin h ld in alvidge v. Hyde ther i n doub that th learne judge ta d
he prin iple correctly th u 1 in the ap1 li ion of it he w nt
in the opinjon of Lord -i ltl n, to a.r.6 J1 Whaley v. Daws n 7
.Jord H. de tlal
b · rve<l that ii th
ngli h a e , when d murrer: l ecau e the plaintiff d mantle. in hi bill matt rs of
-i

1
2

3
4

tory' El}.Pl. §§ 271, 271 a.
11lid. § 271 b.
alvidge v. Hyde, 5 dadd. h. R. 13 .
B oyd v. Hoyt, 5 l'aill'e, 7 .

s l Dani 11' h. Pl. p. 3 6.
6 1 .Jae. R. 15 1.
7 "'\Yhaley v. Daw on, 2 Sch. & Lef.
3 70.
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distinct natures against several defendants not connected in

interest, have been overrnled, there has been a general right

in the plaintiff covering the whole case, although the rights of

the defendants may have been distinct. In such cases tlie court

proceeds on the ground of preventing multiplicity of suits, when

one general right is claimed by the plaintiff against all the

defendants ; and so in Dimmock v. Bixby,^ the court held that

wlien one general right is claimed by the plaintiff, although the

defendants may have separate and distinct rights, the bill of

complaint is not multifarious. In the elaborate case of Campbell

V. Mackay,^ Lord Cottenham held that when the plaintiffs have

a common interest against all the defendants in a suit, as to one

or more of the questions raised by it, so as to make them all

necessary parties for the purpose of enforcing that common

interest, the circumstance of the defendants being subject to

distinct liabilities in respect to different branches of the subject-

matter will not render the bill multifarious. In the same case

his lordship observed that it was utterly impossible upon the

authorities to lay down any rule or abstract proposition as
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to what constitutes multifariousness which can be made uni-

versally applicable. The only way, he said, of reconciling the

authorities upon the subject, is by adverting to the fact, that

although the books speak generally of demurrers for multifarious-

ness, yet in truth such demurrers may be divided into two kinds,

one of which, properly speaking, is on account of a misjoinder

of causes of action ; that is to say, uniting claims of so different

a character that the court will not permit them to be litigated

in one record, even though the plaintiff and defendants may

be parties to the whole transactions which form the subject of

the suit. The other of which, as applied to a bill, is that a party

is brought as a defendant upon a record, with a large portion of

which, and with the case made by it. he has no connection wluit-

ever. A demurrer for such a cause is an objection that the com-

plaint sets forth matters which are multifarious ; and the real

cause of objection is, as illustrated by the old form of demurrer,

that it puts the parties to great and useless expense, — an objec-

tion which has no application in a case of mere misjoinder of

parties. Upon this subject Judge Story says: 'In the former

class of cases, where there is a joinder of distinct claims between

1 Dimmock v. Bixby, 20 Pick. 368. ^ Campbell v. Mackay, 1 Myl. & Cr. 60.1.

disLinct nature ' again ·t even:tl cl f 'nclant.· not c nnecte(l in
inter t, have been overruled, there ha.· been a o· 11 'ml rigltt
in the plaintiff cov ring th whol ca ·e, a1U10uo·h the rights of
the def nclant may have been di ·tinet. In ~mch ea el':> the ourt
proc ed on the Touncl of pr venLing multipli ·ity of 'ui , wh 'll
one general right is laim cl by the plaintiff again ' t all the
d f ndants; and so in Dimmack v . Bixby, 1 th
ourt helcl that
when one genenll right is claimed by the plaintiff, although the
defendant may have eparate and distinct right~, the Lill of
complaint is not multifarious. In the elaborate cas of Campbell
v. Mackay, 2 Lord Cottenham held that when the pla,intiff: barn
a common interest against all the clefenclant: in a suit, as to one
or more of the questions rai eel by it, so a: to make th m c.Lll
necessary parties for the purpose of enforcing that common
interest, the circumstance of the defendant. b ing uhject to
distinct liabilities in respect to different branches of the subject.matter will not render the bill multifarious. In the ame case
his lordship observed that it W<-LS utterly impossible upon the
authorities to lay down any rule or abstract proposition a~;
to what constitutes multifariousness which can be made universally applicable. The only way, he said, of reconciling the
authorities upon the subject, is by adverting to the fact, that
although the books speak generally of demurrer for multifariou ness, yet in truth such demurrers may be divided into two kincl ,
one of which, properly speaking, is on account of a misjoinder
of cau es of action; that is to say, uniting claims of so different
a character that the court will not permit them to be litigated
in one record, even though the plaintiff and defenclants may
be parties to the whole transactions which form the suLject of
the suit. The other of which, as applied to a bill, is that a party
is brought as a defendant upon a record, \vith a large portion of
which, and with the case made by it, he has no connection whatever. A demurrer for such a cause is an objection that the complaint sets forth matters which are multifarious· and the r al
cau e of objection is, as illustrated by the old form of demurr r,
that it puts the partie to great and u eless expense, - an obje ·tion which has no application in a ca e of mere misjoinder nf
parties. 1 pon this subject J ndge Story says: In the forrue:
class of cases, where there i a joinder of di tinct claims betweell
1

1

Dimmock v. Bixby, 20 Pick. 36 .

2

ampbell v. Mackay, l Myl. & Cr. 60.'3 .
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the same parties, it has never been held as a distinct proposition

that they cannot be united, and that the bill is of course demur-

rable for that cause alone, notmthstanding the claims are of

a similar nature, involving similar principles and results, and

may therefore without inconvenience be heard and adjudged

together. If that proposition were to be established and carried

to its full extent, it would go to prevent the uniting of several

demands in one bill, although the parties were liable in respect to

each, and the same parties were interested in the property which

may be the subject of each. Such a rule, if established in equity,

would be very miscliievous and oppressive in practice, and no

possible advantage could be gained by it.' ^ He states in conclu-

sion the result of the principles of the cases to be,- ' Tliat where

there is a common liability in the defendants, and a common

interest in the plaintiffs, different claims to property, at least

if the subjects are such as may without inconvenience be joined,

may be united in one and the same suit ; and further, that where

the interests of the plaintiffs are the same, although the defend-

ants may not have a co-extensive common interest, but their
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interests may be derived under different instruments, if the

general objects of the bill will be promoted by their being united

in a sincfle suit, the court will not hesitate to sustain the bill

against all of them.' " ^

1 Story's Eq. PI. §§ 531, 532. cases or claims united in the bill are of

'^ Ibid. §§ 533, 534. so different a character that the court

3 Wilson V. Castro, 31 Cal. 420, 42G- will not permit them to be litigated in one

431, per Currev J. record. It may be that the plaintiffs and

^ defendant.* are parties to the whole of the-

\ Multifariousness, , ,. i- i <• ^i i • .. r

I- transactions which form tlie subject of

We quote at length from the case of the suit, and nevertheless those transac-

Benson v. Keller (1900), 37 Ore. 120, 60 tions may be so dis.'^imilar that the court

Pac. 918, as follows: "Objections on ac- will not allow them to be joined together,

count of multifariousness seem to be di- but will rc{|uire distinct records. But

the ame partie it has never been held as a di tinct pro ition
h:tt the ' cann be united, an 1 that the bill i of cour <l. murra 1 f r ha cau e alone, notwi h tan ing the claim are 0£
a imilar nature, involving imilar principle and re ·ult , and
ma· therefor without inconveni nee be h arcl and adj udg <l.
togeth r. If that pr po ition \\ere o be e tabli heel and carri l
it full extent, it would o t o l r vent the uniting of e eral
demand in one bill, although the l , r ies were liable in re ' ect o
ach an l the 'ame partie were in erested in he proper ' hich
may be the ubject of each. uch a rul if e:ta,bli hed in quity,
woul b very mi chievou and oppre ive in practice a1 d no
po ibl advantage could be gained by it. 1 He tate in concluion the re ult of he principle of the ca --es to be, 2 'That where
there i a common liability in the defendant , and a c mmon
intere t in the plaintiffs, different claim to property, at least
if the ubje ts are such as may without inconvenience be joined
ma be united in one and the same suit· and further, that where
the intere t of the plaintiffs are the ame, although the defendant may not have a co-extensive common interest, but heir
interests may be derived under different instrument , if the
general objects of the bill will be promoted by their being united
in a ingle suit, the court will not hesitate to su tain the bill
against all of them.' " 3

vided primarily into two classes: (1 ) Tiiose what is more familiarly understood by the

which go to a misjoinder of two or more term "multifariousness " as applied to a

independent and incompatible causes of bill, is where a party is alile to say he is

suit ; and (2) where several matters of a brought as a defendant u])ou a record,

distinct nature are .stated and demanded with a large portion of whicli, and of the

Story's Eq. Pl. §§ 531, 532.
Ibid. §§ 533, 534.
a Wil on v. Ca t ro, 3 1 Cal. 420, 426431, per Currey J .
1

2

against different parties. The two kinds case made by whicii, he has no connection

of objections are well illustrated by Lord whatever.' See also G.irtland v. Dunn,

Chancellor Cottenham in Campbell r. 11 Ark. 720. It is said in Alexander r.

Mackay, 1 Mylne & C. 603, wherein the Alexander, 85 Va.353, 363 (7 S. E. 335, .339,

distinction is clearly stated. He says: 1 L. R. A. 125. 127). 'that a bill will al-

' Frequently the objection raised, though ways he deemed multifarious where several

termed " inultifariousnesiJ," is in fact more matters joined in the bill against one de-

properly misjoinder; that is to say, the feudant are so entirely distinct and iude-

[Multifariousn ess,

We quote at length from the ca e of
B en on v. Keller ( 1900) , 37 re. 120 60
P ac. 91 , a s follow· : " Objections on account of multifa riousne . seem to be divided primarily into t wo classes: (1) Thoe
which go to a misjointler of two or more
iudependef.lt and incl>mpatible cause of
:uit; and (2) where several matter of a.
rli tinct nature are .. tated an<l deman<led
a~:iin , t different partie · . The two kinrl.
of obj cctiou are w ,11 illu. t rated l1y Lord
hauc•ellor
otten ham in 'amph ·11 1• •
. Iackay, l • Iylne & C. G03, wherein the
rl i ·tin ction i clearly stated. H e .ay :
' F re<1uently the objectiou ra i ed, th ough
t erme<l "rnultifariou ne .. ," i in fact more
properly mi ·joinder ; that i to say, th e

cases or claims united in the bill are of
o differen t a character that the court
will not permit them to be litigated in one
record. It may be that the plaintiff and
defendant are parties to the whole of the·
tran a tion which for m the ubj ct of
the nit, and ne>erth le th o e tran actions may he . o li . imilar that th cou r t
will n tallow th m to b joiu d t og eth er,
but will req uir
Ii. tinct rec rd . 13u
wh at i more familiarly under t oot! b: the
term "multi far iou ne:< ' a a ppli d to a.
11ill, i wh r a parry i. ahl to .ay h i ·
l1rou~ht a . a rl ·f ndant upon a recor d
wi th a lar~e portion of which , a111l of tl1
ca. e ma1le hy "hil'h, hi' ha. no t•onn ction
whatever.' ' ee al ·o .. artlawl t;. n un n ,
11 Ark. i20 . I t i :ni1l in Al .·amler r .
~\lPxand e r, 5 \~a.:Fi.'.3, 363 (7 . },,33;- , 339,
1 L. R. A. 125, 127). 'that a hill will alway~ he d em d mu ltifar iou. wh er . cv ml
matt r join d in th hill a rain ~t 0 11e <1 ·
feud nt are o .ntirely di ·tiuct a u tl imle·
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§ 381. *487. Calvert's Observations upon the Distinction be-

tween " Subject " and " Object " of the Action. The observations of

]\Ir. Calvert upon the distinction between " subject " and " ob-

pendent of each other that the defendant

will be compelled to unite in his answer

and defence different matters wholly un-

connected with each other, and as a con-

sequence the proof applicable to each

woultl be apt to be confounded with each

other, and great delays might be occa-

sioned respecting matters ripe for hearing

by waiting for proofs as to some other

matter not ready for hearing ; or, again,

where there is a demand of several mat-

ters of a distinct and independent nature

in the same bill, rendering the proceeding

oppressive because it would tend to load

each defendant with an unnecessary bur-
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den of costs, by swelling the pleadings

with the statement of the several claims

of the other defendants, with which he

has no connection.' In Attorney-General

V. Craddoc-k, 3 Mylne & C. 85, it was

said : ' The object of the rule against

multifariousness is to protect a defendant

from unnecessary expense, but it would

be a great perversion of that rule if it

were to impt)se upon the plaintiffs and

all the other defendants the expenses of

two suits instead of one.' . . . The diffi-

culty of laying down any rule of universal

application, as it respects the subject of

nmltifariousness, is suggested by many of

the authorities. The cases upon the sub-

ject are extremely various, and the courts,

in deciding them, seem to have considered

' what was convenient in particular cir-

cumstances, rather than to have attempted

to lay down any absolute rule.' Gartland

V. Dunn, 11 Ark. 720. The objection does

not go to the merits of the cause, but re-

lates more nearly to a question of con-

venience in conducting the suit ; and, in a

large measure, it simply calls for an exer-

cise of discretion in deciding whether

both or all the causes of suit set forth in

the bill shall be tried in a single suit, or

be split up, and the parties relegated to

the bringing of two or more suits for

the accomplishment of their purposes, or

whether a defendant who is a necessary

party in respect of one or more matters

suggested by the complaint has a sufficient

interest in or connection with the other

matters involved to make him a proper

party in respect to such other matters ;

Bolles >: Bolles, 44 N. J. Eq. 38.5 (14 Atl.

593). Mr. Justice Depew, in Lehigh Val.

R. R. Co. V. McFarlan.Sl N. J. Eq. 706, 758,

says : ' The rule with regard to multifa-

riousness, whether arising from the mis-

joinder of causes of action or of defendants

therein, is not an inflexible rule of practice

or procedure, but is a rule founded in gen-

eral convenience, which rests upon a con-

sideration of what will best promote the

administration of justice without nmltiplv-

ing unnecessary litigation, on the one

§

381.

*-!87.
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The ob ervations of
Mr. Calvert upon the distinction between "subject ' and ' ohtween " Subject " and " Object " of the Action.

pendent of each other that the defendant matter inYohed to make him a proper
will be compelled to unite in his an wer party in respc<.:t to uch other matter:;;
and defence different matters wh olly un- Bo Ile 1· . Bolles, H • '. J. Eq. 38:> (14 A ti
connected with each other, aud as a con- 593). i\Ir. Justice Depew, in Lehigh \'al.
sequence the proof applicable to each R.R. Co. v. McFarlan, 31 N. J. Eq. i06, i58,
would be apt to be confounded with each say : 'The rule with regard to multifaother, and great delays might be occa- riommess, whether arising from the mi sioned respecting matters ripe for hearing joinder of causes of action or of Llefcndants
by waiting for proofs as to some other therein, is not an inflex il1le rule of praetice
matter not ready for hearing; or, again, or procedure, but is a rul e founded in genwhere there is a demand of several mat- eral convenience, whi ch re ts upon a conters of a distinct and ind ependent nature sideration of what will be t promote the
in the same bill, r endering the proceeding administration of ju tice without multiplyoppressive because it would tend to load in g unn ecessary litigati on, on the one
each defendant with an unnecessary bur- hand, or drawing uitors into needles
den of costs, by swelling the plea<liugs and unnecessary ex pen es on the other.'
with the statement of the several claims See also Stevens v. Bosch, 54 N. ,J. Eq.
of the other defendants, with which he 59 (3:3 At!. 293). Upon the whole, it
has no connection.' In Attorney-General would seem that each case must ue exv. Craddock, 3 Mylne & C. 85, it was amine<l with reference to its own parti csaid : ' The ohject of the rule against ular aud peculiar features; and, 'much,'
multifari ousness is to protect a defeudant as Mr. Justice Story remarks in Oliver v.
from unnecessary expense, but it would Piatt, 44 U. S. (3 How.) 333, 412,' mu.1
be a great perversion of that rule if it necessarily be left -where the authorities
were to impose u pon the plaintiffs and leave it - to the sound discretion of the
all the other tlefeudants the expenses of court.' See also Gaines v. Chew. 43
two suits insteau of one.' . . . The diffi- U. S. (2 How.) 619; Barney v. Latham,
culty of laying down any rule of universal 103 U. S. 205, 215; United States v.
application, as it respects the subject of Union Pac. H.. R. Co., 98 U. S. 569, 604."
multifari ousness, is suggested by many of
In Conley v. Buck (1896), 100 Ga. 18i,
the authorities. The cases upon the sub- 28 S. E. 97, the court said: "This court
j ect are extremely Yarious, and the coi.uts, has repeatedl.v decided that multifariousin deciuing them, seem to haYe considered ness is an objection not favored by court
'what was conYenient in particular cir- of equity. A leading case in this country,
cum tances, rather tban to have attempted on these two subjects, which has been
to lay dO\Yn any absolnte rule.' Gartland cited, approved, and followed in numerous
v. Dunn, 11 Ark. 720. The objection does decisions by courts of last resort in Amnot go to the merits of the cause, but re- erica, is that of Brinkerhoff v. Brown,
lates more nearly to a question of con- 6 Johns. Ch. 139, where it was urged by
venience in conducting the suit; and, in a way of demurrer that the bill was multi1arge measure, it simply calls for an exer- farious, first, as to parties ; second, as to
cise of discretion in deciding whether the objects of the bill. In that ca e the
both or all the causes of suit set forth in court decided that 'a bill may be filed
the bill shall be tried in a sin gle suit, or against several per ons, relative to matters
he split up, and the parties relegated to of the same nature, forming a connected
the bringing of two or more suits for series of acts, all intended to defraud and
the accomplishment of their purposes, or injure the plaintiffs, and in which all the
whether a defendant who is a nece sary defendants were more or less concerned,
party in respect of one or more matters though not jointly in each act.' And
ugge ted by the complaint has a suffici ent Chancellor Kent, after an able and elabointerest in or connection with the other rate review of the leading English author-
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ject " of the action, and upon the sense in which the former term

is used in the common method of statins the g-eneral rules of

ities, said : ' The principle to be deduced

from these cases is, tliat a bill against

several persons must relate to matters of

tlie same nature and having a connection

with each other, and in which all of the

defendants are more or less concerned,

though their rights in respect to the gen-

eral subject of the case may be distinct.'

In Fellows v. Fellows, 4 Coweu, 682, de-

cided by the Court of Errors of New

York, in 1825, one of the defendants de-

murred to the bill ' because it w^ for

several distinct matters and causes in

many of which the defendant was not

concerned ; ' but the court, following the

ruling in Brinkerhoff v. Brown, supra, held
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' that the defendants were properly joined,

and that the demurrer should be over-

ruled.' And the court said, ' This was

held as well because there was one con-

nected interest, centering in the point in

issue, or one common point of litigation,

as that the joinder tended to prevent mul-

tiplicity of suits.' The court stated that

' the general rule is, that where a bill is

filed concerning things of distinct natures

against several persons, it is demurrable ;

but unconnected parties may join in a

.'iuit, when there is one connected interest

among them all, centering in the point in

issue in the cause.' "

Montserrat Coal Co. v. Coal Mining

Co. (1897), 141 Mo. 149, 42 S. W. 822 :

" The sole question presented by this rec-

ord is the propriety of the judgment of

the circuit court liolding the petition mul-

tifarious and sustaining the demurrer. In

the leading case of Campbell v. Mackay,

1 Myl. & C. 603, 13 Condensed Eng.

Chcy. Repts. 543, Lord Cottenham, after

reviewing the English cases, remarked

that ' to lay down any rule applicat)le

universally, or to say what constitutes

multifariousness as an abstract proposi-

tion, is, upon the autliorities, impossible.'

The decided cases since his lordship's day

do not render the solution of the question

any tlie less difficult. Indeed, no rule

of equity pleading has less of certainty

and uniformity in its application ; a result,

doubtless, owing to the variety of degrees

of right and interest which enter into the

affairs of life. The general definition

given by this court in Clark et al. v. Ins.

Co., 52 Mo. 272, is as accurate as any to

be found in the books: 'A bill is said to

be multifarious when distinct and inde-

j)eudent matters are improperly joined

whereby they are confounded, as the

writing in one bill of several matters

perfectly distinct and unconnected against

one defendant, or tlie demand of several

matters of a distinct and independent

nature against several defendants in the

same bill.' In Gaines v. Chew, 2 How.

(U. S.) 619, the court say: 'In general

ject" of the action and upon the sen e in ,·;bi h he form r term
u cl in the common method of tating the generetl rules of
iti • , aid : ' T he princi ple to be deduced
from the e ca e i-, that a bill again. t
.e,·eral person mu t r elate to matter of
the a: 11t natu re aud having a connection
with each other, and in which all of t he
defen dant a re more or le s oncerned,
t houg h their rig ht in re. pect to the general ·ubj ect of the ca e may be di tinct.'
In Fellow v. F ellow , 4 Coweu, 6 2, decided by th e Court of Error of Jew
York, in l 25, one of th e defendants dem urred to t he bill ' because it w~s for
e eral di tin ct matters and causes in
many of whi h the defendant was not
concerned ;' but t he court, following the
r uling in Brinkerhoff v. Brown, sup ra, held
' that the defen dant were properly joined,
and that t he demurrer hould be overruled.' And th e court aid, ' This wa
held a well becau e there was one connected intere t, centering in the point in
L ue, or one com mon point of litigation,
a that th e joinder tended t o prevent multiplicity of ui ts.' The court stated that
' t 1e g eneral rule is, that where a bill is
fi led concerning thin gs of distinct natures
again t several persons, it is demurrable;
b ut unconnected parties may join in a
s uit, when ther e i one connected interest
a mong them all, centering in the point in
i sue in the cau. e.' "
Mont errat Coal Co. v. Coal Mining
Co. (1897), 141 Mo. U9, 42 S. W. 822:
" The sole que tion pre ented by this record is the propriety of the judgment of
t he circuit court holding the petition mult ifariou a nd u taining the demurrer. In
t he leading ca e of ampbell v. Mackay,
1 :vlyL & ' . 603, 13 Couden ed Eng.
Chey. ept . . 5-1-3, Lord ottenbam, after
reviewin g th e Engli h cases, remark ed
that ' to lay down any rule appli ca ble
univer,..ally, or to ay what con titute
rnult ifari u ne s a a n a b tract propo ition, i. , upon the a uthor iti es, impo · ible.'
The decided ca e since hi;- lord hip' day
do not render the olution of t he questi on
any the le
difficul t. Indeed, no rule
of ·quiLy pleading ha. le
of cer tain ty
ancl uniformity in it appli ati on ; a result,
doub le , owina to the vari ety of d g rees
of right and intere t which enter into the
affair · of life. The general definit ion

g iven by this court in Clark et al. v. In .
., 52 :\fo . 2i2, is as accurate a any to
be fo uud in t he boo ks : 'A bill i ~aid to
be multifari ou when di tinct and inuependent matters are improperly join d
whereby they are confo un ded, a tbe
writing in one bill of everal matters
perfectly di tioct and unconnected ag in t
one defendant, r the demand of ~ ev ral
matter of a di tinct and independent
uature again t everal defendants in the
·a.me bill.' In Gaine v. Chew, 2 How.
(U. , .) 619, the court say: 'In gen ral
term a bill i said to be multifarious
whi ch seek t o enforce again t di££ rent
individuals demands which are wholly di.conn ected.' The rnle L- be. t illu trated
by th e ca e th em elve ."
'ee al o Buclcle
v. Rebenack (1896 ), 137 l\fo. 1 i 9, 3 , . W.
910 ; Bogg e v. Bogge (1 9..i.), 12i fo.
305, 29 c. W. 101 .
Jn Fry v. Rush (1901 ), 63 Kan. 429 , G5
Pac. 701, the court said: "As before in timated, the petition in thi ca e i al ·o
objectionable because it present two di ·tinct forms of the vi ce of multifariou ne ·,
- that of uniting in the same count distinct and disconnected subjects, matter ,
and causes, and that of joining in the
same uit, both as plaintiffs and defendant , parties who are without a common
intere tin the ubject of the litigation and
have no connection with one another."
In Demare ·t v. Holdeman (1901), 157
Ind. 467, 62 . E. 17, it i aid: " I t has
been held sufficient to u tain a bill again t
the charge of multiiariou ne , ti at each
defendant ha an iutere. t in ome one
matter common to all the parti . And
where the ubject of th action ba be ome
so ompli at l and entangled that the
ri ghts of the parties are involved in d ub ,
and it i , difficult to d termine who i
liable, and who i not except upon a full
hearin g in which all the p r on in an •
way affe ·ted r intere ted are b fore th
court, equity p rmits the joinder of all
th o e
relat d to th e c ntrov r y, aod
who have a c;ommon intere t in
me one
or more branche f it."
In D ani el v. Fowl er (1897), 120 . C.
14, 26 , '. E. 635, the court aid : " If the
g round of tbe co mplaint 'ari e out of the
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equity procedure, are so valuable and instructive, that I shall

quote thera, with some condensation. They apply as well to the

doctrine of parties heretofore discussed as to the particular lan-

guage of the codes under consideration in the present section.

After layiilg down the equity rule as to parties in the customary

form adopted by several eminent judges, in which the necessity

or propriety of their being joined is made to depend upon their

interest in the " subject " of the suit,i he proceeds : ^ " The ex-

pression 'subject of suit' may mean one of two things, — either

the fund or estate respecting which the question at issue has

arisen, or else that question itself. For instance, in a foreclosure

same transaction, or series of transactions,

forming one course of dealing, and all tend-

ing to one end; if one connected story can

be told of the wliole,' it is not multifarious."

equity procedure, are o valuable and instructiv , that I shall
quote them, with some conden ation. They apply as w 11 to the
doctrine of parties heretofore discussed as to th I articular language of the codes under con ideration in the pre · nt ection.
After layirtg down the equity rule a to parties in th
u. tomary
form adopted by several eminent judge , in which the nece sitY
or propriety of their being joined is made to depend upon th ir
interest in the "subject" of the suit, 1 he proceed : 2 " The expression 'subject of suit ' may mean one of two things, - either
the fund or estate respecting which the question at i"'sue has
arisen, or else that question itself. For instance, in a foreclosure

In Foster v. Landon (1898), 71 Minn.

494, 74 N. W. 281, the rule was said to

be well settled that "the case against one
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defendant may be so entire, as to be inca-

pable of being prosecuted in several suits ;

and yet some other defendant may be a

necessary party to some portion only of

the case stated. In the latter case the

objection of multifariousness could not be

allowed to prevail," quoted from Story,

Eq. PI. § 271 a. The court also cited

Pomeroy, Code Rem. § * 486. See also

Allred v. Tate (1901), 113 Ga. 441, .39

S. E. 101 ; Level Land Co. v. Sivyer

( 1 901 ), 1 1 2 Wis. 442, 88 N. W. 37 ; South

Bend Chilled Plow Co. v. George C. Cribb

Co. (1900), 105 Wis. 443. 81 N. W. 675;

Plankinton v. Hildebrand (1895), 89 Wis.

209, 61 N. W. 839.

In Whitehead v. Sweet (1899), 126 Cal.

67, 58 Pac. 376, the court said: "On well

understood principles of equity pleading, a

bill is not multifarious because the plain-

tiffs are not entitled to a decree in their

favor jointly or in solido. It is sufficient

if they are injured in a similar way, that

they have common grievances to redress,

and that they are entitled to relief of the

same kind. (4 Thompson on Corporations,

sec. 4602.) Applying the principles above

laid down to this case, the complaint does

not contain actions improperly joined. It

tells one continued story, and alleges

wrongs wilfully perpetrated by the defend-

ants, and the way in which they were

])crpetrated. No third parties appear in

any way to be involved. If defendant

Sweet agreed for the benefit of the corpo-

ration to transfer his stock with proxy

irrevocable, and has violated his contract,

why should he not now and in this action

be compelled to perform it ? A bill iii

equity is said to be multifarious when dis-

tinct and independent matters are joined

therein. If the subject-matter in the main

relates to one transaction around which

the others cluster, and each ]jarty has an

interest in some matters in the suit, and

they are connected, even tliough all the

parties do not have an interest in all

the matters in the suit, the bill is not

multifarious."

"It is not, however, the mere fact that

same transaction, or series of t ransactions,
for mi rig one co urse of dealing, and all tending to one end; if one connected . tory can
be told of the whole,' it is not multifariou "."
In Foster v. Landon (1898), 71 Minn.
494, 74 N. W. 281, the rule was said to
be well settled that "the case against one
defendant may be so entire, as to be incapable of being prosecuted in several snits;
and yet scme other defendant may be a
necessary party to some portion only of
the case stated. In the latter case the
objecti on of multifariotnrnss could not be
allowed to prevail,'' quoted from Story,
Eq. Pl. § 271 a . The court also cited
Pomeroy, Code Rem. § * 486. See also
Allred v. Tate {1901), ll 3 Ga. 441, 39
S. E. 101 ; L evel Land Co. v. Sivyer
(1901), 112 Wi s. 442 , 88 N. W. 37; outh
Bend Chilled Plow Co. v. George C. Cribb
Co. (1900), 105 Wis. 443 , 8 1 N . W. 675;
Plankinton v. Hildebrand (1895) , 89 Wis.
209, 61 N. W . 839.
Jn Whitehead v. S weet (1899 ), 126 Cal.
67, 58 Pac. 376, the court said: "On well
understood principles of equity pleading, a
bill is not multifarious because the plaintiffs are not entitled to a decree in th eir
favor jointly or in solido. It is sufficient
if t hey are injured in a similar way, that
they have common g ri evances to r dres ,
and that they are entitled to relief of the
arne kind. ( 4 Thompson on Corporation ,
ec. 4602.) Applying the principles above
laid down to this case, the complaint <loes
not contain actions improperly join cl . It
tells one continued story, and a.liege
wrongs wilfully perpetrated by the def ndants, an d the way in which they were

perpetrated. No third parties appear in
any way to be involved. If defendant
Sweet agreed for the benefit of the corporation to transfer his tock with proxy
irreYocable, and has violated hi. coutrnC't ,
why should he not now and in this ac ion
be compelled to perform it ? A bill iu
equity is said to be multifarious when cli~
tinct and in dependent matter;; are join ed
therein. If the subject-matter in the main
relates to one transaction around " ·hic: h
the others cluster, and each party has au
interest in some matters in the suit, an<L
they are connected, even though all the
parties do not have an interest in all
the matters in the suit, the bill is not
multifarious."
"It i: not, however, the mere fact that
several causes of action are united in the
same suit which the plaintiffs may bring
in different ri ghts that wi ll make a complaint bad by reason of multifariousness.
There mu t be such an incon i teuc_v 01"
repugnancy in the various rights declared
on as to cause confusion and embarras ment on the part of t he court in admin istering th e relief which the facts might
warrant were :;eparate suits bro ught fol"
the e11forcement of the several rights:"
Henshaw v. Salt River Canal Co. (1 98),
Ariz., 54 Pac. 577.J
1 See Lord Redesdale, Plead. 164, 170;
Lord Hardwicke in Poore v. Clarke, 2 Atk.
515; Lord Thurlow in Anon, 1 Ve . 29;
ir William Grant in Palk v. Clinton, 12
Ves. 58; Wilkin v. Fry, l Meriv. 262 ;
Lord Eldon in Cock burn v. Thom p on, 16
Ves. 325; Calvert on Parties, pp. 3, 4.
2 Calvert on Partie , p. 5.
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suit it may mean either, in the first sense, the mortgage debt or

mortgaged premises, or, in the second sense, the question whether

a foreclosure ought or ought not to take place." He goes on to

show by citations from their judgments that in the cases quoted

below, Lord Eldon and Sir William Grant used the phrase in tlie

first sense, and adds : " If the words ' subject of suit ' were taken

suit it may mean either in the fir
en e the mortgage deb or .
morto·ao-ed premi e , or, in the second ense, the que ti n whe her
He g
on t
a f l' d " Ure OU ht or u h no to ak r lac .
quoted
how b cita ion fr m their judgment· bat in he ca
belonT Lord El on and ir '' illiam r· nt u ed he phra e in he
firt en e and adds: ' If the wor 'subject f uit w re taken
in that ver • exten ive meaning in which L rd Eldon an 'ir
'' illiam Grant u ed h m the general rule a laid down by
them would be incon ' i ·tent with several J.i inction · which are
firmly tabli he l . " Tl i taternent he illu. rates by a r fernce to many in tance in which it i well ettled that peron. who are dir ·tly intere ted in the property, fu nd, or ·tate
affected by the action, need not be made partie , - a. for xample in an action by or again t tru t es, the cestuis que tru tent are under ome circ um · ance neither nece ary nor proper
partie .1
3 82. *488. S a m e S ubj ect . Upon these premises 1r. alv rt
proceeds to develop hi.. own view as follows : "The rule, then,
which has been stated in the e case in reference t o the ' ubje ·t
of the suit,' meai+ing ther by the e tate or fund on whi h he
que tion at i ue ha arisen, does not appear to be adapte to
general application. It mu t be taken in connection with · other
authoritie which will now be quoted. ' T he autbori ie then
cited by him, while u ing the same phrase ' su bject of the uit,
make the neces ity of a persons being joined a a party to d p nd
upon hi intere t in the questions involved in the litigation, and the
effect which the decree will have upon that intere t. Thi d trine
wa ter ·ely xpre ed by Lord Lyndhur t : The general rule i ,
that all per ons who are interested in he question mu t be partie
to a uit in tituted in a ourt of equi y.' 2 H thus urns up th
matter :
ot all concerned in the subJ'ect-matter r p in
which a thing i demand d but all concern
in the very thing
which is demanded the matter petitioned for in the prayer of the
ar Li . in
bill in other word the oby'ect of suit . hould b mad
equity.
pon a combination of all the e
h ritie ' it i ' J?fOT

in that very extensive meaning in which Lord Eldon and Sir

William Grant used them, the general rule as laid down by

them would be inconsistent with several distinctions which are

firmly established." This statement he illustrates by a refer-

ence to many instances in which it is well settled tliat per-

sons who are direct!)- interested in the property, fund, or estate

affected by the action, need not be made parties, — as for ex-

ample in an action by or against trustees, the cestuis que trust-

ent are under some circumstances neither necessary nor proper

parties.^

§ 382. *488. Same Subject. Upon these premises Mr. Calvert

proceeds to develop his own views as follows : " The rule, then,

which has been stated in these cases in reference to the ' subject
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of the suit,' meaning thereby the estate or fund on which tlie

question at issue has arisen, does not appear to be adapted to

general application. It must be taken in connection with other

authorities wliich will now be quoted." The authorities then

cited by him, while using the same phrase, "subject of the suit,"

make the necessity of a person's being joined as a party to depend

upon his interest in the questions involved in the litigation^ and the

effect which the decree tuill have upon that interest. This doctrine

was tersely expressed by Lord Lyndhurst : " The general rule is,

that all persons who are interested in the question must be parties

to a suit instituted in a court of equity." ^ He thus sums up the

matter: "Not all concerned in the subject-matter respecting

which a thing is demanded, but all concerned in the very thing

which is demanded, the matter petitioned for in the prayer of the

bill, in other words, the object of suit, should be made parties in

equity. Upon a combination of all tliese authorities, it is pro-

^ Calvert on Parties, pp. 6, 7, 8. Davis, 1 Ves. & B. 550 ; Sir John Leach

2 Small V. Atwood, Younge, 458. The in Smith v. Snow, 3 Madd. R. 10; Lloyd

other dicta cited by Mr. Calvert are Lord v. Lander, 5 Madd. R. 289 ; I<ord Hard-

Loupjhboroupjh in King r. Martin, 2 Ves. wicke in Poore u. Clarke, 2 Atk. 515;

643; Lord Eldon in Fenton i'. Hughes, 7 Com. Dig. Tit. Chan, E. 2.

Ves. 288 ; Sir T. Plumer iu Whitworth v.

au

alvert on Partie , pp. 6, 7, .
mall v. Atwo d, Y un , 45 . The
other dicta cit d uy Mr. ,alvert ar Lord
Loughborough in King v. fartio, 2 Ve .
643; Lord Eldon in enton v. Hughe , 7
Ve . 2 ; Sir T. Plumer in ' hitworth v.
1

2

avis, l e . & B. 550; ir Joh u Leach
mi th v. now, 3 Madd. R. 10 · L loyd
t'. Lander, 5 ~fa d .
. 2 9; Lord IJa rdwi k in Poor v. larke, 2 Atk. 515 ;
Com. ig. T it. hau, E. 2.
in
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posed to state the general rule in the following words : All per-

sons having an interest in the object of the suit ought to be made

parties." ^

§ 383. *489. Author's Criticism of Calvert's Theory. This

theory is open to a very plain criticism. Assuming that " subject

of the suit " may be used in the two senses mentioned by Mr.

Calvert, and conceding that the rule requiring all persons in-

terested in the "subject," taken in the first of these senses, to be

made parties, would not be universally correct, the natural con-

clusion would be that the phrase " subject of the suit," as found

in the sreneral rule, should be taken in its second sense. The

author seems in his argument to reach this position ; but in the

very act of arriving at this result he confounds this second sense

of the expression with a very different thing, — the object of the

suit. The " object of the suit " is, as he states it to be, the very

relief prayed for by the bill, the remedy asked and granted ; but

this relief or remedy is certainly not identical with the " subject

of the suit " used in its secondary meaning. Taking his illustra-

tion of the foreclosure suit, the " subject" may be the mortgaged
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debt or the mortgaged premises on the one hand, or the question

whether a foreclosure ought or ought not to take place on the

other. The latter is clearly not the same as the sale of the land

and the payment of the debt out of the proceeds, which is the

only object of the action. It would seem very clear then, by

the author's own argument, that tlie final conclusion which he

reaches is not derived from his premises nor established by his

reasoning. The authorities agree, in one form of expression or

another, that all persons materially interested in the " subject of

the suit " should regularly be made parties. The " subject of the

suit " may be the fund, estate, or property, in respect of which

the action is maintained ; and it is true that, in a very large num-

ber of instances, — in fact, in a very large majority of instances,

— all the persons interested in this fund or estate should be par-

ties in an equity suit. But the " subject of the suit " may be

regarded as describing the questions respecting this fund or estate

which are involved in the litigation ; and if the rule as just stated

is too broad to be of absolutely universal application, it is cer-

tainly true that all persons materially interested in these questions

ought to be joined as parties.

1 Calvert, pp. 10, 11.

.33

po ·ed to tate the general rule in th following words : All peron , having an intere t in the object of the uit ught to be made
parti ." 1
383. *489. A utho r's Criticism of Calvert's The o r y.
This
theory i open to a very plain critici m.
urning that ' ubject
of the ·uit may be u d in the two en e · m ntion cl by Mr.
al Yert, and conceding that the rule req uirin 0 all person · intere eel in the ''subject,' tak n in the fir t of th e ·en e , to be
m, cle parties, would not be univer ally correct, the natural conclu ion would be that the phrase "subject of the suit," as found
in the general rule, shoul<l be taken in its second n · . The
auth r eems in his argument to reach this position; but in the
very act of aniving at thi re ult he confound · this second ense
of the expression with a very different thing, - the object of the
uit. The ' object of the uit '' is, as he state· it to be, the ery
r elief prayed for by the bill, the remedy asked and granted; but
thi relief or remedy is certainly not identical with the " ubject
of the suit" used in its secondary meaning. T aking his illustration of the foreclosure suit, the " suuject" may be the mortgaged
debt or the mortgaged premises on the one hand, or the question
whether a foreclosure ought or ought not to take place on the
other. The latter is clearly not the same as the sale of the land
and the payment of the debt out of the proceeds, which is the
only object of the action. It would seem very clear then, by
the author's own argument, that the final conclusion which he
r eaches is not derived from hi premises nor establi bed by his
reasoning. The authorities agree, in one form of expres ion or
another, that all person materially interested in the subject of
the suit" should regularly be made parties. The "subject of the
suit ' may be the fund, estate, or property, in re ' pect of which
the action is maintained; and it is true that, in a very large number of instances, - in fact, in a very large majority of in tances,
- all the persons interested in this fund or estate should be parties in an equity suit. But the " ubject of the suit'' may be
regarded a de cribing the questions re pecting thi fund or e tate
which are involved in the li tigation; and if the rule a' ju t tated
i too broad to be of ab olutely univer al application, it is certainly true that all persons materially intere ted in these questions
ought to be joined as par ties.
1

Calve rt, pp. I 0, 11.
3.'3
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^ 384. *490. Application of Calvert's Analysis to the Language

of the Codes. Let us apply Mr. Calvert's analysis of the term to

the language found in the codes. In equitable actions there is

generally, if not quite always, a fund, or estate, or property,

which is the subject of the suit, as well as questions concerning

the same to whicli the terra raay also be applied. The provisions

of the codes, however, embrace legal actions ; and in them it can-

not generally be said that there is any fund, property, or estate,

in relation to which the questions at issue have arisen, and which

can be regarded as the " subject." In a very large proportion of

legal actions, therefore, the term " subject of the action " can onl}'

be conceived of in the second sense which has been attributed to

it, and denotes the totality of questions at issue between the par-

ties, embracing, in short, both the primary rights and duties of

the litigants, and the remedial rights and duties which have

sprung from the injuries complained of. The term does not seem

capable of any clear and complete analysis, and the result is that

it may denote the " thing/' if any, — land, chattel, person, fund,

estate, and the like, — in respect of which rights are sought to be
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maintained and duties enforced, or it may denote the sum of the

questions between the parties to be determined by the judgment

of the court. The latter meaning is distinguishable and is to be

distinguished from the " object of the action," which is always

the relief to be obtained by the determination of the questions

which constitute the " subject of the action."

VI. Instances in which all the Causes of Action are against a Single

Defendant, or against all the Defendants alike.

§ 385. *401. Questions Discussed in this Subdivision pertain

■wholly to Joinder of Causes and not to Parties. In the cases in-

cluded in tliis subdivision, no question can arise respecting the

proper joinder of defendants. The only matter of inquiry is,

whether all the causes of action fall within some one of the

classes enumerated in the statute, so that they may be united in

one judicial proceeding. As the fn"st and most general of these

classes has already been fully considered in another subdivision,

it will not be again referred to. No general principle is involved

384.

*-1-90.

Application o: Calvert"s A nalys·s to the Language

L et u apply ".\Ir. Calvert' anal i · f the r to
the lan uage foun l in the col
In quit( ble action the e is
g nerall , if not quite alwayc, a fund, i· e tate r pr p rty,
which i the ubj ct of the ui a well
question concerning
he same t which he term may al o be appli 1. 'l he provision~
of he codes h \ e er embrace 1 al action · ancl in them it annot generally be aid that there i ' any fund pr per y r tai e,
in relation o which the que tion at i sue have ari en and hich
can be regarded a' the ' ubject . ' In a very large prop r ion of
legal action therefore, the term " ubjec of the action
an only
be oncei d of in the second sen e which h a been attribu ed to
it and d note the totality of quebtion at is ue between he parties embracing, in hort, both the primary right an<l dutie
f
the li igant and the remedial rights and dutie which have
prung from the injuries complained of. The term does not e m
capable of any clear and complete analri , and the rec·ult i that
it may lenote the "thing, ' if any, - land, chattel p r n, fund,
estate, and the like, - in re pect of which right are on ht o be
maintained and duties enforced, or it may denote the um of the
que tion between the parties to be determined by the judgment
of the court. The latter meaning is d.istingui hable and is to be
distingui bed from the "object of the action,n which i alway
the relief to be obtained by the determination of the qu tions
which con titute the "subject of the action."
of the Codes.

which needs illustration and explanation ; and I shall simply

state, first, a number of cases as examples of a proper joinder,

VI. In ·tances in which all the Oait e of Action are against a ingle
D efendant or again. t all the Df>fendants alike.

§ 385.

* 491.

Q u estions Discussed in this

Subdivision pertain

wholly to Joinder of Causes and n ot to Part ies. In the ca
in thi ubdivi ' ion no qu ti n an ari e r pe ing
clud
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wh th r all the cau ' e of a ion fall wjthin
m
of
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th· th
A he fir t c. nd

it will n t be again r £ rr
whi h
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i
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and, secondly, a number of instances in which the joinder has

been held to be improper.

§ 386. * 492. Joinder of Causes Arising out of Contract. Illus-

trations. All causes of action arising out of contract may be

united, and this includes, of course, implied as well as express

contracts. A complaint contained four causes of action. The

first alleged that the father of the defendant, being indebted to

the plaintiff, devised and bequeathed all of his property, real and

personal, to the defendant, and in his will declared that " the

said [defendant] is to pay all the debts that I may owe at my

decease," "and also $35 annually during her lifetime to" the

plaintiff : that the defendant accepted such gifts and took pos-

session of the property, and thus became liable to pay such debts

and said annuity. The second count was for money had and

received, the third on an express promise to pay money, and the

fourth for rent due. Upon demurrer to this complaint, the de-

fendant's liability in respect to the matters alleged in the first

count was held to be, in contemplation of law, on an implied

promise, and all the causes of action thus arising out of contract
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were properly united.^

§ 387. * 493. When Tort is ■waived and Suit is brought upon

Implied Promise. Illustrations. In certain cases the plaintiff is

allowed an election to treat the wrong done as a tort, or to waive

the tort, and sue as upoji an implied promise of the defendant.

1 Gridley v. Giidle}-, 24 N. Y. 130. (1894), .5 Wyo. 178,38 Pac. 920 (cause

See also Quellen i-. Arnold, 12 Nev. 234; of action for work and labor joined witli

Sullivan 1-. The Sullivan Co., 14 S. C. 494; one for money loaned); McCorkle v.

South Side Ass'u v. Cutler, etc. Co., 64 Mallory (1903), 30 Wash. 632, 71 Pac. 186

Ind. SCO; Witte v. Wolfe, 16 S. C. 256 (a cause of action to recover damages for

(on an unsecured money demand, and to breach of contract united with one alleg-

foreclose a mortgage) ; Childs c. Harris ing the same contract and that defendant

Manuf. Co., 68 Wis. 231 (a judgment is a had wrongfully taken possession of certain

contract within the meaning of the code buildings erected by plaintiff in order to

provision). Joinder of causes of action fulfil the contract). Dudley v. Duval

upon a (/iiaiitum meruit and for the breach (1902), 29 Wash. 528, 70 Pac. 68 (a cause

and, secondly, a number of inst< nee. in which the joincl r has
been held to b im proper.
§ 386. * 492. Joinder o f C auses Arising o ut of Contract. Illust ratio ns. All cau::;e of ac ion a.ri ing out of contract may b •
unit d, and this include , of cour e, implied a well as expre s
contracts. A com plaint contain d four cause of action. The
first alleged that the fath r of the defendant, b ing indebted t
the plaintiff, devised ancl bequeathed all of his property, real ancl
personal, to the defenclant, and in his will decla.recl that " the
said [defendant J is to pay all the debts that I may owe at my
decease," "and also $35 annually during her lifetime to " the
plaintiff; that the defendant accepted such gift ancl took po·session of the property, and thus became liable to pay such debts
and said annuity. The second count was for money had and
received, the third on an express promise to pay money, and the
fourth for rent due. Upon demurrer to this complaint, the defendant's liability in respect to the matters alleged in the first
count was held to be, in contemphtion of law, on an implied
promise, and all the causes of action thus arising out of contract
·were properly united.1
§ 38 7. * -±93. When T o rt is waived and Suit is brought upon
Implied Promis e . Illustratio ns. In certain cases the plaintiff is
allowed an election to treat the wrong clone as a tort, or to waive
the tort, and sue as upon an implied promise of the defendant.

of an express contract : Waterman r. of action on a contract for services united

Waterman, 81 Wis. 17; Wilson v. Smith, with one upon a guaranty). Reindl v.

61 Cal. 209; Cowan v. Abbott, 92 Cal. Heath (1901), 109 Wis. 570, 85 N. W. 495

100. A statute allowing an attachment (a cause of action to recover for work

to issue, under certain circumstances, on done by plaintiff under a contract, united

a claim before it is due, does not make it with a cau.se of action for breach of a

a cause of action, so that it may be joined provision in the same contract by which

in the same action with causes of action defendant agreed to furnish a certain quan-

on claims that are due: Wurlitzer v. tity of logs to be sawed). Gundersou u.

Suppe, 38 Kan. 31. Thomas (1894), 87 Wis. 406, 58 N. W.

QKearuey Stone Works v. McPherson 7bO~]

L Gridley v. Gridley, 24
~ . Y. 130.
See also Quellen v. Arnold, 12 Kev. 234 ;

Sullivan i: . The Sullivan Co., 14 S. C.494;
Si<le As 'n v. Cutler, etc. Co., 64
Ind. 5CO; Wi tte v. Wolfe, 16 ·. C . 256
(on an un ecnre<l money de mand, and to
foreclo e a mortgage) ; Ch ild c. Harri
Manuf. Co., 6 \Vi .. 231 (a judgment i a
contract within the meaning 0£ the code
provision). J cind er of causes of action
upon a 1111witum 11ieruit and for th e breach
of an ex pre s contract : vVaterman r.
vVaterman . 8 1 \Vi s. 17; WiL on v. Smith,
61 Cal. 209; Cowan v. Abbott, 92 Cal.
l 00. A statute allowing an attachment
to issue, under certain circumstances, on
a claim before it is due, does not make it
a cau e of action, so that it may be join ed
in t he ame act ion with cau es of action
on claims that are due: Wur1itzer v.
Suppe, 38 Kan. 31.
[Kearney Stone Works v. McPherson
~o uth

(1894 ), 5 Wyo. 1 i 8, 38 Pac. 920 (cause
of action for work and labor joined with
one for money loaned); McCorkle v.
Mallory (1903), 30 W ash. 632, 71 Pac. 186
(a cause of action to r ecover damages fo r
urea.ch of contract united with one allegin g the same contract and that defendant
had wrongfully taken po session 0£ certain
buildings erected by plaintiff iu order to
fulfil the contract). Dudley v. Duval
{1902), 29 Wash. 528, 70 Pac.6 (a cause
of action ou a contract for ervices uni ted
with one upon a guaranty). Reindl v.
Heath ( 1901 ), 109 Wi . 5i0, 5 N. \V. 495
(a cau~e of action to r ecover for work
done by plaintiff under a contract , united
with a cause of action for breach of a
provi ion in the same contract by which
defendant agreed to furnish a certain quantity of logs t o be awed). Gunderson v.
Thomas (1894), 87 Wis. 406, 58 N. W.
750 .J
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When this is permitted, a cause of action of such a nature in

which the tort has been waived and the claim placed upon the

footing of an implied promise may be joined with causes of action

arising out of any other form of contract, express or implied ; as,

for example, where the first cause of action was for goods sold

and delivered, and the second averred that the defendant had

wrongfully taken the goods of the plaintiff, had sold them and

received their price, and demanded judgment for this sum so re-

tained by him.^ It has been recently held by the Supreme Court

in New York, that where the plaintiff seeks to unite a cause of

action merely upon contract with another cause of action origi-

nally for a tort, but in which the tort may be waived and the

liability treated as springing from an implied promise, the plead-

ing must show in some direct manner that the tort is waived,

and that the claim is upon a promise ; and to this end tlie plain-

tiff must not only allege the facts as they occurred, but must

aver a promise to have been made by the defendant, in the same

manner as an action of assumpsit was distinguished under the

former system.^ A complaint contained three counts. The first
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alleged a sale by the defendants of certain county warrants dra^vn

in their favor as payees, and facts constituting an implied prom-

ise or guaranty that these instruments were legal and genuine,

but that they were not genuine, and hatl been adjudged invalid

as against the county in an action brought upon them ; tlie sec-

ond sought to charge the defendants as indorsers, treating- the

instruments as negotiable notes ; the third was for money had and

received. These causes of action were held to be properly united,

since they all arose out of contract.^

§ 388. * 494. Additional Illustrations. A claim to recover pos-

session of land, a claim to recover damages for its detention or

wrongful taking, and a claim for the rents and profits thereof

during the defendant's occupanc}', may all or any of them be

united in one action : * but the plaintiff is not compelled to do so ;

1 Hawk f. Thome, 54 Barb. 164; Leach * Vandevoort v. Gould, 36 N. Y. 639,

?•. Leach, 2 N. Y. S. C. 657. See also 045; Livingston v. Tanuer, 12 Barb. 481 ;

Freer v. Dentou, 61 N. Y. 492; Logan i-. Holmes r. Davis, 21 Barb. 265; 19 N. Y.

Wallis, 76 N. C. 416. Fifield v. Sweeney, 488; Tompkins v. White, 8 How. Pr. 520;

62 WiH. 204. Arm.strong ;-. Hinds, 8 Minn. 254, 256;

2 Bootli r. Farmers' & Mech. Bk. of Walker >•. Mitchell, 18 B Mon. 541 ; Burr

Rochester. 1 N. Y. S. C. 45. v. VVoodrow, 1 Bush, 602; Sullivnii r.

•■' Keller /■. Hicks, 22 Cal. 457. Davis, 4 Cal. 291; Laiig.sdiile r. W.xil-

·wh n thi.l: ·

permi ted, a au e of action of ' U h a n, ture in
whieh th tor ha been wai v l an h laim plac d up n he
f tin · f an impli pr mi e may be j in l with cu e of acti n
ntra
xpre or impli l · a ,
ari -in()' i of an other form f
xa.mple, her th fir t cau e of acti n wa f r g od old
anJ deli v red and the
rr d that th d f ndant h d
wron full t k n th g
f the I 1 intiff, had -old th m and
I' c ived h ir pric
and d mand d jud -ment for this um
r tained b him. 1 It ha be n recently held b the uprem
ourt
in
w Y rk hat' here h plaintiff eek · t unite a
f
ac ion merel upon contract with ano ther au of action ong11 all
for a t rt, but in which the tort ma b ' ai v d nd th
liability tr ated 't pringing from an impli d promi , th I leading mu t show in me direct manner that the tort is w iv l,
, nd that the claim i up n a promi e; and t thi end th plaintiff must not only all ge the fact ' a' th y oc UTT d, but mu t
av r a promi e to have been made by the defendant, in the am
manner a an action of a ump it wa di ·tingui hed und r he
former y tem. 2 A complaint contained three coun . The fa t
a1le()'e a ale by the defendants of certain county warran drawn
in th ir favor a" payees, and fact con titu ing an implied promi e r guaranty that the e instruments w re 1 gal and genuine,
but that tl1ey were not genuine, and had been a lju lg d inva.lid
a a;ain t the county in an acti n br ught up n th m; the
n l ou ·ht to charge the d fondants as indor er , tr atin · l e
instrum nt a negotiabl n te .. ; the third w, f r m n y l d and
received. The e c u es f action were held to be properly uni ed,
·ince th y all arose out of contract.a
· 388. * 49-!. Additional Illustrations.
laim to r cov r
se . ion f la1 , a claim to r co er <lama e f r it' etention r
wron ·ful takin , and a claim f r the ren an l pr fit th r f
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ccupancy may , 11 or any of th m b
united in one a ti n: 4 but the plaintiff i not c mpelle t o o;
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he may sue separately on each.^ An action to compel the spe-

cific performance of a contract to convey land is, within the

meaning of the statute, an action to recover possession of lands,

and may be united with a cause of action for damages on account

of defendant's delay in performing the contract.^ In like manner,

a claim to recover possession of chattels may be united with a

claim for damages for their taking or detention.'^

§ 389. * 495. Causes for Injuries to Property. Illustrations.

Causes of action for injuries to property form a distinct class,

and the generality of this language permits the union of claims

arising from injuries of all kinds, whether with or without force,

whether direct or consequential, and whether to real or to per-

sonal property. Singulai'ly enough, injuries to the person are

})laced in the same group in most of the States, rather than in a

class by themselves, or with injuries to character.* The following

are examples of causes of action arising from injuries to property

which have been held properly united in a single suit : in an ac-

tion against a railroad company, (1) for damages resulting from

the unlawful throwing down the fences on plaintiff's farm, whereby
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cattle entered and destroyed the growing crops, (2) for damages

caused by water thrown on to the farm by means of an embank-

ment, (3) for damages from earth piled upon the farm, obstructing

the passage of teams and the free use of the land, (4) for damages

occasioned by the killing of cattle by means of passing engines ; ^

leu. 120 Ind. 16; Hiles v. .Johnson, 67 Carter, .38 Wis. 394; Spahr v. Nicklaus,

Wis. 517; Black v. Drake, 28 Kau. 482; 51 Ind. 221 ; Bottorf u. Wise, 53 id. 32.

Fletcher v. Brown (Neb. 1892), 53 N. W. i Ibid.

577. A claim to recover land, with dam- - Worrall v. Munn, 38 N. Y. 137. A

ages for withholding the same, and a demand for a specific performance against

claim of the rents and profits for its use, A. cannot be, united with a demand to

are distinct causes of action, and evidence recover possession against B. Fagan v.

to prove the latter is inadmissible under a Barnes, 14 Fla. 53, 56.

complaint which does not contain such '^ Pharis v. Carver, 13 B. Men. 236.

cause of action, but simply alleges the '^ []Thelin v. Stewart (1893), 100 Cal.

former. Larned v. Hudson, 57 N. Y. 151 ; 372, 34 Pac. 861, holding that a .cause of

Pengrai'. Munz, 29 Fed. Rep. 830. But action for an injury to the person cannot

he may sue separately on eacb.1 An action to comp 1 the specific performance of a contract to conv y land i , within the
meaning of the statute, an acti n to recover poss s 'ion of land ,
and may be united with a cau of action for bmage' on account
of defendant's delay in performing the contract.2 In like manner,
a claim to recover pos e' ion of chattels may be united with a
claim for damages for their taking or detention. 3
§ 389. * -±95. · Causes for Injuries to Pro perty . Illustrations.
Causes of action for injuries to property form a distinct class,
and the generality of this language permits the union of claims
arising from i:r;ijuries of all kinds, whether with or without force,
whether direct or consequential, and whether to real or to personal property. Singularly enough, injuries to the person are
placed in the same group in most of the States, rather than in a
class by themselves, or with injuries to character. 4 The following
are examples of causes of action arising from injuries to property
which have been held properly united in a single suit: in an action against a railroad company, ( 1) for damages resulting from
the unlawful throwing down the fences on plaintiff's farm, whereby
cattle entered and destroyed the growing crops, (2) for damages
caused by water thrown on to the farm by means of an embankment, (3) for damages from earth piled upon the farm, obstructing
the passage of teams and the free use of the land, (-±) for damages
occasioned by the killing of cattle by means of passing engines; 5

cninpare § *454, an/e. It has been held be united with a separate cause of action

tliat a claim to recover possession of one for a subsequent injury to property, aud

p-xrcel of land cannot be joined with a that a demurrer to a complaint on this

similar claim in respect to another and ground, where such causes of action are

distinct parcel. Holmes v. Williams, 16 so set out, will be sustained. Code Civ.

Minn. 164, 169. See, however, Beronio Proc, § 427.]

V. Southern Pac. R. Co., 86 Cal. 415. See ' Clark's Adm. v. Han. & St. Jos. R.

also Merrill v. Deering, 22 Minn. 376 ; Co., 30 ]Mo. 202 ; and see Teudesen v.

Lord y Deering, 24 id. 110; Ilackett v. Marshall, 3 Cal. 440.

Jen, 120 Ind. 16 ; Hiles v. Johnson, 67
Wi s. 517; Black v. D;rake, 28 Kan. 482;
fletcher v. Brown (~eb. 1892), 53 N. W.
5i i. A claim to reco\·er land, with damnges fo r withholding the same, and a
claim of the r ents and profits for its use,
are distinct causes of actiou, and evidence
to pruve the latter is inadmissible under a
complaint which does not contain s uch
cause of action, but simply alleges the
former. Larn ed v. Hudson , 57 N. Y. 151;
Pengra v . Munz, 29 Fed. Hep. 830. But
cnmpare § * 45+, ante. It ha.s been held
that a claim to recover possession of one
p1.r<'el of land can not be joined with a
imilar claim in respect to another alJCl
distinct parcel. Holmes L'. William", 16
)!inn. 164, 169. See, howe,·er, Berunio
u. 8outhern Pac. R. Co., 86 Cal. 415. See
also .Merrill v. Deering, 22 Minn. 376;
L orrl i· neering, 24 id. 11 0; Hackett v.

Carter, 38 Wi s. 39-t.; Spahr v. Nicklam~,
51 I nd. 221; Bottorf v. Wise, 53 id. 32.
I bid.
Worrall v. l\funn , 38 N. Y. 137. A
demand for a specific performance against
A. cannot be~ united with a demand to
recover possession against B. Fagan v.
Barnes, 14 Fla. 53, 56.
3 Pharis v. Carver, 13 B . Mon. 236.
4 [T helin v. Stewart (1893) 100 Cal.
372, 3+ Pac. 86 l, holding that a ,cau e of
action for an injury to the per on cannot
be united with a separ:1te cau e of action
for a subsequent injury to property, aud
that a demurrer t o a complaint on this
ground, where . nch cau. e of actiou are
so set out, will be sustained. Code Civ.
Proc.,§ 427.J
5 Clark's Adm. i·. Han. & St. Jos. R.
Co., 36 i\Io. 202; and see Tendeseu v.
i\Iar ha.ll, 3 Cal. 440.
1
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an action by a mine-owner, alleging (1) injuries caused by the

bursting of defendant's dam, negligently constructed, whereby

gold-bearing earth was washed away and (2) damages resulting

from the delay and hindrance in working the mine ; ^ where the

complaint contained two counts, the first being for trespasses

done to the land prior to its conveyance to the plaintiff, the claim

having been assigned to him, and the second alleged that the

plaintiff was owner and in possession of the land, that the defend-

ants were about to enter upon the same and quarry and carry

away minerals therefrom, and prayed an injunction restraining

the trespassers, the two causes of action were held to be properly

joined, although one was legal and the other equitable.^ On the

same principle, in a suit to recover possession of land, a separate

cause of action may be added to restrain a threatened trespass

and commission of waste.^ A cause of action for deceit practised

in the sale of chattels may be joined with one for the unlawful

taking and conversion of other goods ; the claim of damages for

the fraud in such a case arises from an " injury to property "

within the meaning of the codes.^
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§ 390. * 496. Malicious Prosecution and Slander or Libel.

Within the class of "injuries to character" fall not only actions

for libel and for slander, but those for malicious prosecution ; the

gist of the latter, according to the old authorities, being the wrong

done to the plaintiff's reputation.^ A cause of action for malicious

1 Fraler v. Sears Union Water Co., 12 expressly authorizes a party to 'unite in

Cal. .'J55. the same complaint several causes of ac-

2 More V. Massini, 32 Cal. 590, 595, tion . . . where they arise out of ' and

per Shafter J. The opinion in this case is ' belong to one ' of the several classes

instructive. tlierein mentioned and affect all the ' pur-

■* Natoma Water Co. v. Clarkin, 14 ties to the action ' and do ' not require

Cal. 544. different places of trial ' and are 'stated

* Cleveland r. Barrows, 59 Rarb. 364, separately.' R. S. 1878, sec. 2647. One of

374, 375, ])er T. A. Johnson J. See also the classes so named therein is 'injuries

De Silver v. Holden, 50 N. Y. Super. Ct. to character.' Id. Under this statute this

236. Joinder of a cause of action for tres- court has held that a plaintiff may unite

pass to real property with one fur assault, in the same comjilaint a cause of action

n , ction by
mine-owner alleging (1) injurie c u e by th
bur ' tin
f d f ndant's dam, negligentl con meted, whereb
arth wa wa hed away an (""') damage r ultin
l -b arin
from h delay and hindrance in w rkin the mine; 1 wh r th
wo count the fir t b in0 for r a
compl, in c ntaine
clone
the lan prior to it conveyance to the pl intiff, the claim
h· Yin been
igned to him and the econd alleged that th
pl, in iff wa owner and in o 'e ion of the land that the defen me and quarry and carry
n were about to enter upon he
wa mineral therefrom, and prayed an injunction re trainin
the re pa ser , the two au e of action were held to be properly
Jome alth ugh one was legal and the other eq uitable.2 On th
ame principle, in a suit to recover po e ion £ 1 nd, a separate
cau e of action may be added to re train a threatene tre pa ·
cau e of action for deceit practi cl
an commi ion of waste. 3
in the ale of chattels may be joined with one for he unlawful
takin an co nv rsion of other good ; the claim of damage f r
he fraud in uch a ca e ari e from an "injury to property '
within he meaning of the code .4
390.
* 496. M alicio us Prosecu ti o n a n d S l ander or L i b el.
"\Vi hin the cla of "injurie to character ' fall not nly a ti ns
for lib 1 and for lander, but tho e for malicious prosecu i n; th
i t of the lat er, according to the old authorities, being th wrong
done to the plaintiff's reputation. 5 A cau e of action for malicious
L

Craig V. Cook, 28 Minn. 232; waste, and for lil)el and another cause of action for

deceit in the .sale of personalty, Gilbert r. .slander. Noonan i-. Orion, 32 Wis. lOO.

Loberg (Wis. 1892), .53 N. W. 500. It li><rically follows that two or more sepa-

^ ^Fred v. Traylor (1903), — Ky. — , rate causes of action for slander may bo

72 S. \V.7G8, Ilellsiern r. Katzer (1899), united in the same complaint. In the case

103 Wis. 391, 79 N. W. 429, in which the at bar we arc clearly of the opinion that

court said : " One ground of demurrer aa- only one cause of action is alleged, or

signed is that several causes of action attempted to be alleged. True, the coin-

have been improperly united. The statute plaint sets forth three several c.\cerpts

l Fraler v.
ear U nion Water Co., 12
Cal. 555.
2 ::\>lore v. Mas iai, 32 Cal. 590, 595,
per hafter J. The opinion in thi ca e i
in true ti ''e.
a ~ Tatoma Water o. v.
larkin, 14
al. 54+.
leveland v. Barrow , 59 Barb. 36+,
. John on J.
ee also
374, 375, per T.
De ilPr v. H olden, 5 •. Y. up r. t.
236 ,J 1iniler of a cau e of action for tre pa: to real propert~· with one for a . anlt,
! 'raiO' '"
ook. 2 ,:\[iau. 232; wa ·te, aucl
d l'eit in the :ale of per:onalty, ' illi rt!'.
Loi.erg (\Yi.. l 321, 53 .T. \Y. 500.
6 [Fred t•. Tra.'1 •r {1903), Ky.-.
72 . W. 7G , IIcll.-tcru v. Katz •r (I !"J),
103 \Yi . 391, 7() ... '. W . 429, in which tl1c
<>Ur aid : " OP ground of rl murrer a ·i~uc>tl i that i- ,·eral <'au. A of action
la\ lJ ·11 illlpropcrl • uuited. ''I • ·tatut
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prosecution may therefore be joined with one for libel or slander,

or both.^

§ 391. * 497. Special Cases. The following are some special

cases. In Wisconsin a complaint was sustained in an action by

a creditor, one count of which set up a cause of action against a

bank to recover certain property or its value, and another count

alleged a cause of action against delinquent stockholders of the

corporation.^ Where a complaint contained two causes of action,

the first to enforce an implied trust alleged to have arisen in favor

of the plaintiff on the conveyance of lands from himself to the

defendant, and the second to enforce a vendor's lien on the same

lands, they were held to be properly united, since both arose out

of trusts, the one by virtue of a contract, and the other by opera-

tion of law.3 In another equitable suit the joinder of four causes

of action was sustained, where the first was to reform a certain

trust deed by inserting the name of a trustee, and to foreclose it

when reformed, the second was to foreclose a mortgage upon the

same land, while the third and fourth were to enforce certain

charges which were liens on the land, and which the plaintiff had
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been compelled to pay in order to protect his security.*

§ 392. * 498. Rule in Iowa. All of the foregoing cases were

decided under State codes which contain substantially the same

provisions and the same division into classes. In Indiana and

Iowa, it will be remembered, the corresponding sections of the

from the discourse complained of ; but it prosecution, both causes of action arising

alleges that they were each and all made out of the same trausaction.]

at the same time and place, in the same ^ Martin v. JMattison, 8 Abb. Pr. 3 ;

connection, and that the language em- Hull v. Vreeland, 18 Abb. Pr. 182; Wat-

ployed in each of such excerpts was un- son v. Hazzard, 3 Code Rep. 218 ; Shore

derstood by the persons then and there v. Smith, 15 Ohio St. 173 ; Hargau v.

present in the congregation, or by the Purdy (Ky. 1892), 20 S. W. 432 (slander

most of them. It is true that in discuss- joined with libel).

ing the subject of damages it has been ^ Seaman v. Goodnow, 20 Wis. 27,

said that where the article complained of sed qu.

contains several expressions, each of which ^ Burt v. Wilson, 28 Cal. 632. See

is libellous per se, each such e.xpiession also Price v. Brown, 10 Abb. N. Cas. 67

prosecution may therefore be joined with one for libel or slander,
or both. 1
§ 391. * 497. Special Cases. The following are some special
cases. In Wi cousin a complaint wa su tained in an action by
a reditor, one count of which set up a cau e of action against a
bank to recover certain property or it value, and another count
alleged a cause of action again t delinquent stockholder of the
corporation. 2 Where a complaint contained two cause' of action,
the fir t to enforce an implied trust alleged to have ari ' en in favor
of the plaintiff on the conveyance of land from himself to the
defendant, and the second to enforce a vendor's lien on the same
lands, they were held to be properly united, since both aro e out
of trusts, the one by virtue of a contract, and the other by operation of law. 3 In another equitable suit the joinder of four cause
of action was sustained, where the first was to reform a certain
trust deed by inserting the name of a trustee, and to foreclose it
when reformed, the second was to foreclose a mortgage upon the
same land, while the third and fourth were to enforce certain
charges which were liens on the land, and which the plaintiff had
been compelled to pay in order to protect his security. 4
§ 392. * 498. Rule in Iowa. All of the foregoing cases were
decided under State codes which contain substantially the same
provisions and the same division into classes. In Indiana and
Iowa, it will be remembered, the corresponding sections of the

is, in legal effect, a separate cause of ac- (causes of action arising out of breach of

tion. Caudrian v. Miller, 98 Wis. 168. trust may be united in a suit against the

But that does not mean that each such trustee's executors).

expression must necessarily be pleaded as * Eurnside v. Wayman, 49 Mo. 356.

a separate cause of action." Scott v. The " trust deed " mentioned was, in fact.

Flowers (1900), 60 Neb. 675, 84 N. W. 81, a form of security used in several of the

in which it was said a cause of action for States instead of a mortgage. See also

false imprisonment may be joined in the Williams v. Peabody, 8 Hun, 271 ; Hay v.

same petition with a count for malicious Hay, 13 id. 315.

from the discourse complained of; but it
alleges that they were each and all made
at the ame time and place, in the same
connection, and that the language employed in each of such excerpts was understood by the persons then and there
present in the congregation, or by the
most of them. It is true that in discu sing th e subject of damages it has been
said that where the article complained of
contains several expres ion , each of whi ch
i li bellou pPr se, each such expre sion
is, in legal effect, a separate cau e of acti on. Candrian v. Mill er, 9 Wi . 168.
But that does not mean that each such
expression mu t necessarily be pleaded as
' cott v.
a separate cause of action."
Flower (1900), 60 Neb. 675 , 84 N. W. 81,
in which it was said a cause of acti on for
false impri onment may be joined in the
ame petition with a count fo r malicious

prosecution , both causes of action ari ing
out of the ame tran action.]
1 Martin v. Mattison, 8 Abb. Pr. 3;
Hull v. Vreeland, 18 Abb. Pr. 182; Watson v. Hazzard, 3 Code Rep. 218; Shore
v. mith, 15 Ohio t. 173; Hargau v.
Purdy (Ky. 1892), 20 S. W. 432 (slander
joined with libel).
2 Seaman u. Good now, 20 Wi . 27,
sed qu.
3 Burt v . Wilson, 28 Cal. 632.
See
also Price v. Brown, l 0 A bb. N. Ca . 67
(causes of action arisin g out of breach of
trust m ay be united in a uit again t the
trustee' executor ).
4. Burn ide v. Way man, 49 Mo. 356.
The " t rust deed " mention eel was, in fact,
a fo rm of ecurity u ed in f;eYe ral of the
States in tea d of a mortg age.
ee al o
Williams v. P eabody, 8 Huu, 271 ; H ay v.
H ay, 13 id. 3 15.
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statute are peculiar, and more latitude is permitted, especially in

the latter State, in the joinder of unlike causes of action. As

in Iowa all legal or equitable causes of action may be united,

a claim arising upon contract may be included in the same petition

with one for damages resulting from any kind of tort.^ And

where twent3^-two different parcels of land belonging to the same

owners had been conveyed to the plaintiff by as many separate

tax deeds, he was permitted to foreclose all these deeds, and thus

cut off the owner s right of redemption in one action. ^ In con-

struing the sections of the Iowa code which give the trial court a

discretion in reference to the joinder of unlike causes of action,

and which authorize it to compel ,an election, or to strike out

on the defendant's motion, it is held that the provision for

compelling the plaintiff to elect applies only to a case where

the various causes of action set forth in the petition are merely

different modes of stating one and tlie same demand, and the

defendant must file an affidavit showing this fact as the basis

of his motion ; but the court may, on defendant's motion, strike

out a cause of action which it deems impossible or inconven-
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ient to try ^vith the others, but in no case is a demurrer the

proper remedy.^

§ 393. * 499. Illustrations from Indiana and California. In

Indiana, a cause of action by a wife for an absolute divorce was

held properly joined with a cause of action to compel the specific

performance of an agreement to convey certain lands to her made

^ Turner r. First Nat. Bk. of Keokuk, tiffs for the destruction of chattels owned

20 luwa, 562. See also Memienhall i-. by them jointly, and also for au assault

Wilson, 54 Iowa, 589 (trespass and con- and battery committed upon each ; but,

tract); Thorpe v. Dickey, 51 id. 676; no motion havinj^ been made to strike

Stevens v. Chance, 47 id. 602. out, the irregularity was thereby waived :

2 Byington r. Woods, 13 Iowa, 17, 19. Grant i\ McCarthy, 38 Iowa. 468; an ac-

See, per contra, Turner v. Duchman, 23 tion l)y two persons not partners for a

Wis. 500. slander of each, but on the trial the case

[^Campbell v. Equitable Loan & Trust was severed, and the trial proceeded on be-

Co. (1901), 14 S. I). 483, 85 N. W. 1015. half of one alone, and this was held proper :

Under the statute allowing joinder of Hinkle v. Davenport, 38 Iowa, 335. For

causes of action to recover real j)roperty, it furtlier illustration, see Faivre i'. Gillan

ta ute are peculiar, and more latitude i permitte e peciall in
th latter ta , in he joinder of unlike cau e of action. A
in I wa all 1 gal or equitable caus s of ac ion ma be united,
a claim ari ing upon contract may be included in the a1ue petition
with ne for damage re ul ing from any kind of tor .1
nd
where tw n t -tw different parcels of land bel nging to the ame
own r had been conveyed to the plaintiff by a, many s parate
t x dee
he wa permi ed to foreclo e all th e leed and hus
cut off the owner's right of redemp ion in one action. 2 In contrning the sections of the Iowa code which give the trial court a
di ere ion in reference to the joinder of unlike au.:e f action,
and which authorize it to compel an election, or to s rike out
on he defendants motion, it i held that he provi ion for
compelling the plaintiff to elect applies only to a ca e where
the variou cause of action et forth in the petition are merely
different mode of stating one and the same demand, and tbe
def ndant must file an affidavit showing thi fact as the ba ,is
of hi motion; but the court may, on defendant mo~io n, trike
out a cau e of action which it deem impo ible or incom enient to try \vith the o hers, but in no case is a demurrer be
proper remedy.3
393. * -±9 . Illustrations from Indiana and California.
In
Indiana, a cau e of action by a wife for an ab olute divorce was
held properly joined with a cause of action to compel the ·pecific
performance of an agreement to convey cerj;ain lands to h r made

is proper to joiu five causes of action to (Iowa, 1S92), 51 N. W. 46.

set aside five tax deeds on five separate ^See the following recent Iowa cases :

tracts of land.] Devin r. Walsh (1899), 108 la. 428, 79

8 Keed i-. Howe, 28 Iowa, 250, 252 ; N. W. 133 ; Prader r. Nat. Acc't. Ass'n.

Iowa & Minn. II. Co. v. Perkins, 28 Iowa, (1899), 107 la. 431, 78 N. W. 60 ; Clayton

281. In the following cases, the causes County j-. Ilerwig (1897), 100 la. 03], 69

of action were held to have been im- N. W. 1035; Jenks v. Lansing Lumber

properly joined: an action by two plain- Co. (1896), 97 la. 342, 66 N. W. 231.]

1 Turner v. Fir t ... ~at. Bk. of Keokuk,
26 Iowa, 562.
ee al o Mendenhall v.
WiL on, 54 Iowa, 5 9 (tre pa s and con·
trac- t); Thorpe v. Dickey, 51 id. 676;
' te,·eu v. hance, 47 id. 602.
2 Byington 1·. Wood , 13 Iowa, 17, 19.
, ee, per contra, Turner v. Duchman, 23
' i .. 500.
[ 'ampbell v. Equitahle Loan & Tru. t
C'o. (1901 ), 14 . D. 4 3, 5 . W. 1015.
11der the tatute allowing joi uder f
ran: : of action to recO\·er real property, it
i · pr1Jpf'r to join fi ''e cau e of a<' ti on to
:et a~idf' fi rn tax <leecl on five separate
tracts <if land.]
a Hr·Prl ''· Howe, 28 Iowa, 250, 2:52;
l<1\ ·a - • Jinn. H.. 'o. 1•. P rkin , 2 Io~·a,
2 I. In the foll~wiug ca e , t.h eau~ s
•if ac·tio11 were held to have bee11 impr 1prorly joiner!: an action by two plain-

tiff for the de tructioo of chattel owned
by them jointly and al o for an a ault
and battery c mmitt d upon each; but,
no m otion having been made to trike
out, the irregularity wa ther by waiv d:
rant v. i\l CMthy, 3 Iowa, 46 · an ac·
tion hy two per,oo not partner fo r a
lander of each hut on the trial the ca e
wa•. ever d, and the trial proc ded on behalf of one alone, an<l thi wa. h 1d roper :
Hinkle r. Dav nport, .3 Iowa, 355. For
furt her illn . tration, ee Faine L'.
illan
(Iowa, l 92). 5 1 ,T. W. 4n.
[· · the following recent Iowa ca e :
De"in v. Wal h (1 9), l
fa. 42 , "9
.. '. \\ . 13:3 ; I radc•r 1·.
a . cc't.
(I 99). !Oi fa. 431, 7 ,. . \V. 60;
Jayton
onnty t•. Herwig (I 97 ), 100 Ia. 6.'H, 69
N. W. 1035; .Tenk t•. Lan~ing Lumber
0. (l 96), 97 Ia. 342, 66
. w. 231.]
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by the husband at the time of their separation.^ In California, by-

virtue of the provisions of a special statute, a cause of action

against a sheriff to recover damages for his neglect to execute and

return process may be joined with a claim to recover a statutory

penalty for the failure in his official duty.'-^

§ 394. * 500. Cause of Action upon Contract cannot be joined

w^ith one to recover Damages for a Tort. Illustrations. Author's

Criticism. I shall conclude this section with a classified series of

decisions which will illustrate the improper union of different

causes of action. Except in Iowa, the rule is universal that a

cause of action upon contract cannot be joined with one to recover

damages for a tort, unless both should arise out of the same trans-

action, and thus fall within the inclusive terms of the first class.

The following are examples merely of this elementary rule.^ A

count against the defendant for his wrongful acts as president of

a bank, and one against him as a stockholder in such bank to re-

cover on its notes, were improperly embraced in the same com-

plaint,* also a claim against certain part owners of a vessel to

recover her hire, which they had received, and one to restrain
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them from a threatened wrongful sale of the ship.^ It has been

held that a demand arising from the breach of a warranty given

upon the sale of chattels cannot be joined with one based upon the

vendor's deceit practised in the same sale.^ Notwithstanding

1 Fritz r. Fritz ; 23 Iiid. 388. 25 Ore. 305, 35 Pac. 658 : Where a com-

QSee late cases ill Indiana as follows: plaint contains allegations of a covenant

Coddington v. Canaday (1901), 157 Ind. against incumbrances and its breach, and

243, 61 N. E. 567 ; State px rel. v. Peck- also allegations of the representations of

ham (1893), 136 Ind. 198, 36 N. E. 28; the defendant as to the freedom of the

Kichwiue v. Presbyterian Church (1893), property from incumlirances, their falsity,

135 Ind. 80, .34 N. E. 737/] defendant's knowledge that they were

- Pearkes ?•. Freer, 9 Cal. 642. false, and plaintiif 's reliance on them,

^ [^Clough V. Rocky Mountain Oil Co. there is a misjoinder of causes, one being

(1898), 25 Colo. 520, 5.5 Pac. 809 : A cause in contract, the other in tort, but unless

of action in contract against a corporation the objection is taken by demurrer it is

by the husband at the time of their separation. 1 In alifornia, by
virtue of the provisions of a special statut , a cause of action
against a sheriff to recov r damages for his negl ct to execute and
return proc s' may be joined with a claim to recover a tatutory
penalty for the failure in his official Juty. 2
§ 394. * 500. Cause of Action upon Contract cannot be joined
with one to recover Damages for a Tort.

Illustrations.

Author's

I shall conclude this section with a classified serie of
decisions which will illustrate the improper union of different
causes of action. Except in Iowa, the rule is universal that a
cause of action upon contract cannot be joined with one to recover
-damages for a tort, unless both should arise out of the same tran action, and thus fall within the inclusive terms of the first class.
The following are examples merely of this elementary rule. 3 A
count against the defendant for his wrongful acts as president of
a bank, and one against him as a stockholder in such bank to recover on its notes, were improperly embraced in the same complaint,4 also a claim against certain part owners of a vessel to
recover her hire, which they had received, and one to restrain
them from a threatened wrongful sale of the ship. 5 It has been
held that a demand arising from the breach of a warranty given
upon the sale of chattels cannot be joined with one based upon the
vendor's deceit practised m the same sale. 6 Notwithstanding
Criticism.

cannot be joined with a cause of action waived. See also Conant v. Storthz

against the directors of the same corpora- (1901 ), 69 Ark. 209, 62 S. W. 415.]

tion brought under a statute making the ■* Butt v. Cameron, 53 Barb. 642 ; Imt

directors liable for the deljts of the com- see Wiles v. Suydam, 6 N. Y. S. C. 292.

pany in case they failed to make certain ^ Coster v. N. Y. & E. R. Co., 3 Abb.

reports as to the condition of the com- Pr. 332.

pany, the latter being the cause of action ^ Springsteed i\ Lawson, 14 Abb. Pr.

in tort. Allen v. Macon, etc. R. R. Co. 328; Sweet f. Ingerson, 12 How. Pr. 331.

(1899), 107 Ga. 838, 33 S. E. 696 : A cause See Gertler v. Linscott, 26 Minn. 82 ;

of action on contract cannot be joined in a Logan i\ Wallis, 76 N. C. 416 ; Doughty

.single suit with a cause of action arising i\ Atlantic & N. C. R. Co., 78 id. 22;

from a tort. Corbett v. Wrenn (1894), Keller v. Boatman, 49 Ind. 104.

Fritz v. Fritz; 2.3 Ind. 388.
[ See late cases in Indiana as follows:
Coddington v. Canaday (1901), 157 Ind.
243, 61 N. E. 567 ; State PX rel. v. Peckham ( 1893), 136 Ind . 198, 36 . E. 28;
Hichwinc v. Presbyterian Church (1893),
135 lllll. 80, 3-1, N. E. 737 .J
2 Pearkes 1•. Freer, 9 Cal. 642.
3 [ Cloug h v. Rocky Mountain Oil Co.
(1898) , 25 Colo. 520, 55 Pac. 809 : A cause
of action in contract against a corporation
cannot he joined with a cau e of action
again st thr directors of the same corporation hrought nnder a statute making the
directors liable fo r the debts of the company in case they failed to make certain
re ports as to the condition of the company, the latter being the cause of action
in tort. Allen v. ·Macon, etc. R. R. Co.
(1 899), 107 Ga. 838, 33 S. E. 696: A cause
of action on contract cannot be joined in a
single suit with a cause of action a risin g
from a tort. Corbett v . Wrenn (1894),
1

25 Ore. 305, 35 Pac. 658 : Vvhere a complaint contains allegations of a covenant
against incum brances and its breach, aud
also allegatious of the representations of
the defendant as to the freedom of the
property from incumbrances, their falsity,
defendant's knowl clge that they were
false, and plaintiff's r elian ce on them,
there is a misjoind er of causes, one being
in contract, the other in tort, but unless
th e objection is taken by demurrer it is
waived.
See also Conant v. ~torthz
(1901 ), 69 Ark. 209, 62 S. W . 415.J
4 Bntt v. Cameron, 53 Barb. 642 ; hut
see Wiles v. Suydam, 6 N. Y. S. C. 292.
5 Coster v. N. Y. & E. R. Co., 3 A bb.
Pr. 332.
6 Rpringsteed v . Lawson, 14 Abb. Pr.
328; Sweet v. Ingerson, 12 How. rr. 331.
See Gertler l'. Linscott, 26 Min n. L 2;
Logan v. \Vallis, 76 N. C. 416; D onghty
v. Atlantic &. N. C. R Co., 78 id. 22;
K eller v. Doatman, 49 Ind. 104.
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these decisions, it is impossible to conceive of two legal causes of

action which more completely and accurately correspond to the

lansruaofe of the codes, as '"arising out of the same transaction,"

The bargain between the parties is certainly a transaction ; certain

language used by the seller may amount to a contract of w^arranty ;

certain other language may be the false representations ; indeed,

it is possible, and not at all unlikely, that the selfsame words

spoken by the vendor might be at once the fraudulent representa-

tions and the promise, for language otherwise sulhcient is none

the less a promise because tlie person using it knowingly lied

when he uttered it. To say that these two demands do not arise

out of the same transaction is virtually to say that no two different

legal claims ever can so arise. I cannot regard these decisions,

therefore, otherwise than as mistaken.

§ 395. * 501. Illustrations. In an action against a railroad

company, the complaint contained three counts: the first for

wrongfully carrying away and converting cattle ; the second for

the same injury done to hogs ; and the third set up an agreement

to transport cattle from a specified place to another, and averred
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a breach thereof by means of a negligent omission whereby the

plaintiff lost his cattle. On demurrer, it was said tliat the first

two causes of action, being for torts, could be joined; but the

third was upon contract, and its union with the others was error.^

The joinder of a count for the conversion of chattels with one for

money had and received would be clearly wrong : ^ and the same

is true of any tort and implied contract.^ It is doubtful whether

a cause of action on contract and one for a tort to the person can

be conceived of as arising out of the same transaction, so that they

may be embraced in the same pleading. The attempt, however,

has been made to unite a claim for the breach of a written con-

tract to convey land \\\i\\ a cause of action for assault and battery

1 Cohvell V. N. Y. & E. R. Co., 9 How. construct and maintain a farm crcssiiig,

Pr. .311; Hoagland v. Han. &. St. .los. R. as required by statute, aii.^cs upon the

Co., .39 Mo. 451. See also Stark v. Well- breach of an iiii])lied contract to perform

man, 96 Cal. 400. a statutory duty, and tlierefore cannot

- Cobb I'. Dows, 9 Barb. 2.30, and cases be united witli a cause of action for dam-

in last note. See also Teall c Syracuse, ages for injuries to real jiroperty caused

32 Hun, .332. by the diversion of a stream. Followed

2 Hunter v. Powell, 15 IIow. Pr. 221. in Hodges v. Wilmington & W. R. Co.,

It was held in Thomas r. Utica & B. R. R. 10.=) N. C. 170, a case preseuting similar

Co., 97 N. V. 245, that a cau.se of action facts.

for the omis.sion by a railroad com]>any to

th e leci ion i i impo ible to onceive f two 1 gal cau e
acti n which mor corn 1 t 1 and accura 1 orre p nd to
lano-uage f the cod s a
ari ing out f he s<me tran action."
The bar0 ain b tw en he partie i ertainl a transaction· certain
languag u l by the 11 r may arnount t a contract of warranty·
certain other language ma be th fal e representations ; indeed,
it i po ible and not at all unlikely, that th self ame words
ken b · he v ndor might b at once th frau ulent r presentation and the promise, f r language otherwi e ufficient i n ne
the le a promi e because the person using it knowingly li d
when he uttered it. To say that the e two demands d n t ari
out of the ame tran action is virtually to say that no two different
legal claim ever can so arise. I cannot regard these decision ,
therefore, otherwi than a mi taken.
395. * 501. Illustrations. In an action a ain t a ra.ilr ad
company the complaint contained three count·: the fir t for
wrongfully carrying away and converting ca tle; the ec nd f r
he am injury done to hob ; and the third . et up an a T em nt
to transpor attle from a pecified place t an ther, and av rr l
a breach h reof by m an of a n glig nt omi ion wh reby th
plaintiff lost hi ' attle. On demurrer, it wa ~ aid that th fir~t
two cau e £ action, being f r torts, could b join d; but th
third wa upon contract and it union with the other wa rr r. 1
The join l r of a count for the conversion of hattels with on f r
money had and received would b cl arly wr ng: 2 and the am
i true of an) t rt and impfo~d contra t .3 It i d ubtful wheth r
a ·ause of action on contract and one for a tort to th
one i cl of a ari ing ut of the sarn tran a ion
may b mbrac l in th am pl adin . The a mp
r
ha been made t unit a laim f r the br a h f a ' ritt n ntr, ct to onv - land "ith a cau · of acti n for a ault and ba t ry
r

olwell i· . t ~. Y. & E. R. o., 9 How .
Pr. 31 l ; II oaglauu v. II an. & t .•Jo. H.
C•i., :~
lo. 451. •· e al ·o tark 1:. W llrna11, % al. 400.
::!
'r1hlJ 1.'. l>ow. , 9 Barb. 2.'30, an<l C'a. P
in la t uot .. , e al. o Teall t'. c'yracu c,
3~ 111111, :}:3~.
a 1Ju11~n 1'. P()well, 15 How. J>r. 221.
Jt wa' h<•ld in 'I lwma 1-. Ttica & B. . J .
<'<J., ' i • •. Y. ~45, ha a can. of ariiou
for he <Jrni ion hy a railroad co111.•a11y to

in IIodg-e. 1•. \\TiJmi11gto11 ,. W. J . o ,
1 :1
. 17 , a ca: pn:s uti110- imilar
fact .
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committed by the defendant in forcibly taking the instrument

from the plaintiff's possession, but it was unsuccessful.^ In like

manner, a cause of action against a lessee arising upon the

lease cannot be joined with a claim for damages on account of

injuries done to the property, unless, of course, the latter is

embraced within some stipulation or covenant of the lease, so

that it would in fact be a demand on the contract.^ It can make

no difference with the rule that the tort is a fraud consisting in

false statements or concealments. Thus, a complaint by an in-

dorsee against liis immediate indorser was held bad on demurrer,

one count of which alleged the ordinary liability of defendant as

indorser, and the other set up certain false representations as to

the solvency of the maker, by which the plaintiff was induced

to purchase the paper.^ The rule, in short, applies to all cases

of demands based upon a promise, express or implied, and claims

based upon fraud, unless the tort may be waived, and the com-

plaint be framed so as to present both causes of action as arising

from contract.*

§ 396. * 502. Cause of Action against one in Personal Char-
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acter cannot be united -with one against him in Representative

Character. Reason. Author's Criticism. Illustrations. Another

particular rule, which is but an application of the same doc-

trine, requires that the several causes of action against or for

a given person should all affect him in the same capacity.

In other words a demand for or against a party in his per-

sonal character cannot be united with another demand for or

against him in a representative character as trustee, executor,

administrator, receiver, and the like.^ The reason usually given

committed by the defendant in forcibly taking he instrument
from the plaintiff's possession , but it was un ucces ful. 1 In like
manne r a cau e of action against a 1 s e ari ing upon the
1 a e cannot be joined with a claim for damages on account of
in juries done to the property, unless, of cour"e, the latter is
embraced within some stipulation or covenant of the lease, so
that it would in fact be a demand on the contract. 2 It can make
no difference wit h the rule that the tort is a fraud consisting in
false statements or concealments. Thus, a complaint by an indorsee against his immediate indorse~ was held bad on demurrer,
one count of which alleged the ordinary liability of defendant as
indorser, and t he other set up certain false representations as to
t he solvency of the mak er, by which the plaintiff was induced
to purchase the paper. 3 The rule, in short, applies to all cases
of demands based upon a promise, express or implied, and claims
based upon fraud , unless t he tor t may be waived, and the complaint be framed so as to present both causes of action as arising
from con tract .4
§ 396. * 502. Cause of Action against o n e in Per son a l C h a r -

1 Ehle t'. Haller, 6 Bosw. 661. liigh Coal Co. (1901), 111 Wis. 545, 87

- Ederliu v. Judge, 36 Mo. 350. Con- N. W. 472. Plaintiff was a retail coal-

versely, a claim of damages for the breach dealer in the city of Superior, and filed his

of the lessor'.s covenant of quiet enjoy- compiaiutin two counts against the defend-

ment, and a claim of damages for a tres- ants, who are wholesale and retail coal-

pass in his wrongful entering upon the dealers. His first count stated a cause of

demised premises and injuring the lessee's action in favor of himself alone, for dam-

property thereon, cannot be joined. Keep ages caused by an alleged malicious con-

V. Kaufman, 56 N. Y. 332. spiracy on the part of the defendants to

^ Jamison v. Copher, 33 Mo. 483. destroy hisbusiness, said defendants having

■* Forkner v. Hart, Stanton's Code combined for the purjiose of establishing

(Ky.), 60; Wilson v. Thompson, Id. 60; a monopoly and preventing plaintiff from

Hubbell r. Meigs, 50 N. Y. 480, 487; purchasing coal. His second count stated

act er

cannot be u n ited with o n e again st h i m i n Repre s e n tativ e

Another
particular rule, which is but an application of the same doct rine, requires that t he several causes of action against or for
a given person should all affect him in t he same capacity.
In other words a demand for or against a party in his personal character cannot be united wit h another demand for or
against him in a representative character as t rustee, executor,
administrator, receiver, and t he like. 5 T he reason usu ally given
Character.

Reaso n.

Author's

Criticism.

I llustration s .

Booth V. Farmers' & Mecli. Bk. of Roch- an equitable cause of action in favor of

ester, 1 N. Y. S. C. 45. himself and a number of other retail coal-

^ QHawardeu v. Youghiogheny & Le- dealers similarly situated, in whose behalf

Ehle v. Haller , 6 Bosw. 66 1.
Ederliu v. J udge, 36 Mo. 350. Conversely, a claim of damages for the breach
of the lessor's covenant of quiet enj oyment, and a claim of damages for a trespass in hi s wro ngful eutering upon the
dem ised premi ses au d in juring th e lessee's
property thereon, cannot be joined. Keep
v. Kaufman, 56 N . Y. 332.
3 Jami on v. Copher, 35 Mo. 483.
4 Forkner
v. H art, Stanton's Cocle
(Ky.), 60; W ilson v. Thompson, I d. 60;
Hubbell ,., Meigs, 50 N. Y . 480, 487;
B ooth v. Farmers' & Mech. Bk. of Roche ster, 1 N. Y. S. C. 45.
5 [Haw arden v. Youghiogheny & L e·
1
2

hi gh Coal C o. (1901 }, 111 Wis. 545, 87
N. vV. 472. Plain tiff was a retail coal dealer in t he city of Superi or, a nd fi led his
complaint in two counts against the defen dants, who are wholesale and r etail coaldealers. His first coun t stated a cause of
action in favor of himself alone, for dam ages caused by an alleged malicious conspiracy on the part of the defendauts to
destroy his busines:, aid d fendauts hav ing
combined for the pu rpo ·e of e"tabli bing
a monopoly and preYentiug pla intiff from
purchas ing coal. Hi econd co unt stated
an equitable can e of action in favor of
him elf and a num ber of other retail coaldealers similarly it uated, in whose behalf
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for tliis rule when applied to defendants is, that the judgment

upon one cause of action would be against the defendant per-

sonall)', to be made de bonis proprils, while the judgment upon

the other cause of action would be against him in his representa-

tive or official capacity, and not perhaps to be made out of his own

property; as, for example, it might be made de bonis testatoris.

This reasoning, borrowed from the old law, is a mere formula of

w^ords, for there is nothing in the nature of things w^hich prevents

such a double judgment. It is just as easy for such a judgment

to be rendered in one action as it is for two distinct judgments

to be granted in separate suits. The argument, however, Hke so

much of so-called legal reasoning, still has convincing force with

most of the courts, even while administering the reformed system.

Tlie following cases are given as illustrations of this doctrine, and

in all of them the joinder was pronounced improper : a com-

plaint on a partnership debt against the defendant as surviving

partner, and against him in a separate count as executor of his

deceased partner ; ^ against the defendant personally, and also as

an executor or administrator ; ^ in a suit against an executor or
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administrator, a demand w^hieh existed against the deceased in

his lifetime, and a different demand which arose from a promise

made by the executor or administrator after the death, for as

to the latter claim the defendant is personally liable.^ On the

he sued to restrain the defendants from a affects but one party phiintiff, whereas

further enforcement of said conspiracy, tlie second cause of action affects numer-

A general demurrer was filed to the whole ous ])arties plaintiff. The doctrine is fre-

coniplaint on the ground that two causes quently stated that the several causes of

of action were improperly joined. The action for or against a person must affect

court said : " The statute provides that him in the same cajtacity in order to make

causes of action, in order to be united in them capable of being joined. Pomeroy,

one complaint, ' must affect all the parties Code Kemedics, § * .502. These conclu-

to the action.' Stats. 1898, sec. 2647. sions are conclusive to tlie effect tliat the

It is clear that this limitation would be general demurrer to the whole coiuplaint

violated if the two causes of action in liiis on riie ground of improper joinder .should

f r hi rule wh n appli d to d f ndant i , that th ju l ment
upon on cau of action ould b
gain t th
ef nclant peronall · o b made cle boni propru while th jud m n upon
th th r au of action w ul l b ag, in him in hi r pr ntatiY or official apacity, an l not perlm1 to be me. tl out f hi' own
prop r y · a , f r xampl it might be mad le bo11i te ·tatoris.
Thi rea oning b rrow d fr m th ol 1 law i a mer f nnula of
"- rd , f r th r i · nothing in the natur f thing whi h Ir y nt
u h a cloubl jud ment. It i ju t a. a y f r ·uch a jud m nt
to b r ncler l in one a ti n as it i for t\ · di tinct judgment
to b rant cl in er arate uits . The argument, howev r like o
mu h of o- ·alled 1 gal rea ning till ha convincing fOI with
mo of the court even w hil admini ering tlie r form d - tern .
The foll wing ·ase are given as illustration ' of thi doctrine an l
in all f them the join ler wa I ronounc c1 improper: n. omplaint on a partnership debt against the defendant a . un iYin~=;
partner, and again t him in a separate count a xecut r of hi
dee a cl partner · 1 against the defendant pers nally, and al o a
an executor or admini trator; 2 in a suit again ·t an ex cut r or
:ulmini tra.tor, a deman 1 which exi.'t d against the cle
d in
hi . lifetime, and a different lemand which aro e from a pr mi e
ma l by the executor r administrator after the l a.th, f r a
t o the t tter laim the def nclant is I er anally liablc.3
n th

comjdaint were allowed to be united in have been sustained. "3

one complaint. The fir.«t cause of action ^ Landau v. Levy, I Abb. ]'r. 376.

is a straight action at law for damages to - McMahon v. Allen, 3 Abb. Pr. 89.

tlie plaintiff alone. No one el.se has any By C. C. P. of New York, § 1815, such

interc,>it in the judgment in that action, joinder is allowed in certain specified

whatever it lie. But the second cause of cases. ^Crowley v. Hicks (1898), 93 Wis.

action is a cause of action in favor of a 5G6, 79 N. \V. 348.]

large numlper of persons constituting a ^ Ferrin r. Myrick, 41 N. Y. 315, 322;

class represented by the plaintiff. Poten- Austin r. Munro, 47 N. Y. 360, 364; s. c.

tially all of the class are parties. They 4 Lans. 67. See, however, Trailesman's

are invited to become formal parties plain- Bank ?;. McFeely, 61 Barb. 522, which

tiff, and presumably will accept the invi- cannot be regarded as correct in tlie liglit

tation. Tims the first cause of action of tlic.se otiier decisions.

ned to re train the defendant. fr ma
nforce ment f snid c n piracy.
A g n ral demurr r wa filed to the whole
co111plaiut on the ground that two cau e.
of attion we re improp rly joiued. The
C'Ourt . aid : "The :tatute provid
that
eause of action, iu ord er to b united in
oue compla int, 'mu ~ t aff ·ct all the parti e
to the action.' f-;tat. . 1 9 , • ec. 2 -ti.
It i · ·!ear t h at thi: limitat ion would lie
Yiulatecl if th two can. e · of action iu thi
c·1J111plai11t "ere allowC'cl to he u11it cl in
1111<' c·ornplaiu~.
Th e firf't cau e of action
i~ a .tr:ti~ht aeticm at law for damag : to
the plai11tiff alu11e . . 'u ouc cbe ha · any
intel'l''t iu the jn1l~m ·11t in that a('tion,
"lrat1•\' r it he. But the sccoJH! tan~c of
;wt1011 is a c·ausc of aC'tJou i11 fal'ur of a
l: r~·· 11u11il1c•r of pPr.·rn1.· co11. titutiug a
da l'i.'JH'P cutcd liy th plaintiff. l'otcntiall_r all ,,f the cla nr parti . They
arr• in,·itr~d to l11'come formal parti . plaiutiff. alJ(I J1rr-.·umalily will ac(' pt th invitatiu11. Thu tl1 fir. t cause of al'tio11
he

1;

affect· but one part ' plaintiff, wherea
the s oud can e 0f a riou affe t nnm ru partie plaintiff. Th e cl ctrine i frequently ·tated that the everal au e of
a<"tion for or against a p r~ u mu t affe t
him in the am capa ity in order to make
th e m ·apable f b ing join d. l ome ro.Y,
C' de H medi , s fi02. Th
coucluio n are onclusi\·e to the ff ct that th
gen ral cl c mmrcr to the whol
omplaint
on t·h e g r ound of improper joind r hould
ham h en . u:tain ecl."]
1 Lnuclan v. Levy, 1 A Lib. J>r. 3i6.
2 I :\Inhou i>. All n, 3 Abh. Pr. ~ 9.
Ry ' · . P. of N w Yo:ck, ~ l 15, . uch
jn i11d e r i. allowed in certain , p eri fi cl
ca~e- . [ rowley '" II1 ck: (1
), 9 Wi .
5u6 , i9 •. W. 3~ .]
a .E rriu r. 1\1) rick . 41 N. Y . .'.315, 322;
Au ·tin L'. :\Iunro, 4 i
. Y. 360, 364; . c.
4 Lan . 6 7.
ee, howeYe r, Traclc. m nu'.
Bank '" lcF · ly, 61 Barb. fi22, wh ic h
cannot lie r<>«ardcil a. orr c t i11 the l.).!'lit
CJf tli1 .. ·p nLli"r r!Pei.iuu .

*

JOINDER OF CAU ES OF ACTION.
JOINDER OF CAUSES OF ACTION. 525

same principle, a demand upon a contract between the plaintiff

and the defendant, and a claim by the plaintiff as a shareholder

in an unincorporated company against the defendant as president

thereof, in respect of matters connected with the management

of its affairs, were held to be improperly joined, since the de-

fendant's liability, if any, in the latter cause of action existed

against him as a trustee.^ The plaintiff must also sue in the

same capacity in respect of all the causes of action. lie cannot

in one count sue as an executor or administrator, and in another

sue in his personal character.^ In an action for malicious prose-

cution the complaint contained three counts: the first for the

malicious prosecution of the plaintiff himself ; the second for

the same wrong done to his wife, she having been imprisoned ;

and the third for a like tort to his minor children. The only

legal ground for recovery on the second and third of these counts

was declared to be the loss of the wife's society in the one

case, and of the children's services in the other; as these inju-

ries were personal to the plaintiff, they could be joined with the

cause of action alleged in the first count for the tort directly to
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himself.^

§ 397. * 503. Some Unclassified Cases. Author's Criticism. The

cases which follow do not admit of any classification, and several

of them are of doubtful authority, even if not palpably erro-

neous. A cause of action for a limited divorce on the ground

of cruelty, desertion, and the like, cannot be united with one for

an absolute divorce on account of adultery, or of any other

matter prescribed by statute. The two demands are simply in-

compatible.* It was decided by one judge in New York that a

1 Warth V. Radde, 18 Abb. Pr. 396. Co. v. Will's Adm'r (1002), — Ky. — , 66

See, however, Logau o. Wallis, 76 N. C. S. W. 628 ; Lewis Adm'r v. Taylor Coal

416. Co. (1902), 112 Ky. 84.5, 66 S. W. 1044;

- Lucas V. N. Y. Cent. R. Co., 21 Barb. Page v. Citizens Banking Co. (1900), 111

245. But see Armstrong v. Hall, 17 How. Ga. 73, 36 S. E. 418. " Cau.ses of action for

I'r. 76. ])er C. L. Allen J., at Special malicious prosecution, malicious arrest, and

Term, — a decision in direct opposition false imprisonment, all sounding in tort,

to the rule stated in the text ; also, Hart may be joined in the same action when

V. Metrop. El. Ry. Co , 15 Daly, 391. the plaintiff and defendants in each cause

See also Quellen v. Arnold. 12 Nev. 234; of action thus joined are identical. Civil

Cincinnati, etc. R. Co. v. Chester, 57 Ind. Code, § 4944." See also Sams v. Derrick

299. (1898), 103 Ga. 678, 30 S. E. 668.]

^ Rogers v. Smith, 17 Ind. 323. QA * Henry v. Henry, 17 Abb. Pr. 411 ;

same principle, a, demand upon a contract betw n the plaintiff
an<l the defendant, and a claim by the plaintiff a· a shareholder
in an unincorporated company against the d fondant a presi<l nt
th r of, in respect of matters onn cted with th management
of it affair , were held to be impr perly join d, inee the defendant liability, if any, in the latter cause of action existed
• again t him a a tru tee. 1 The I laintiff mu t al o sue in th
same capacity in respect of all the causes of action. Ile cannot
in one count sue as an executor or a<lministrator, and in another
sue in his personal character. 2 In an action for malicious prosecution the complaint contained three counts: the first for the
malicious prosecution of the plaintiff him..,elf; the second for
the same wrong done to his wife, she having been imprisoned ;
and the third for a like tort to his minor children. The only
legal ground for recovery on the second and third of these counts
was declare<l to be the loss of the wife' society in the one
case, and of the children's services in the other; as these injuries were personal to the plaintiff, they could be joined with the
cause of action alleged in 'the first count for the tort directly to
himself.3
§ 397. * 503. Some U n c l assified C ases . A utho r's Criticism. The
ca e which follow do not admit of any classification, and several
of them are of doubtful authority, even if not palpably erroneous. A cause of action for a limited divorce on the ground
of cruelty, desertion, and the like, cannot be united with one for
an absolute divorce on account of adultery, or of any other
matter prescribed by statute. The two demand· are simply incompatible.4 It was decided by one judge in New York that a

cause of action for pain and suffering Mcintosh y. Mcintosh, 12 How. Pr. 289;

cannot he joined with the statutory cause Zorn v. Zorn, 38 Hun, 67; but see contra.

;if nciiiin for death. See Louisville Ry. Grant v. Grant (Minn. 1893), 54 X W.

1 Warth v. Radde, 18 Abb. Pr. 396.
See, however, Logan v. Wallis, 76 N . C.

Co. v . Will's Adm'r (1902), - Ky.-, 66
S. W . 628; Lewis Adm'r v. Taylor Coal

416.

Co. (1902), 112 Ky. 84:i, 66 S. W. 1044;

Lucas v. N. Y. C'ent. R. Co., 21 Barb.
245. But see Armstrong v. Hall, 17 How.
Pr. 76, per C. L. Allen J., at Special
Term, - a uecision in direct oppositiou
to the rule statecl in the text; also, Hart
v. Metrop. El. Ry. Co, 15 Daly, 391.
'ee al o Quellen v. Arnold. 12 Nev. 234;
Ciucinnati, etc. R. Co. v. Chester, 57 Incl .

Page v. Citizens Banking Co. (1900), 111
Ga. i3, .'36 S. E. 418. "Causes of action for
malici ous prosecution, maliciou arrest, and
£al e imprisonment, all . ounding in t irt,
may be joined in the same action wheu
the plaintiff and defendant in each can e
of action thus joined are identical. Civil
"ode, § 4944." See also ams v. Derrick

299.

(1898), 103 Ga. 678, 30

2

a Rogers v. Smith, 17 In d. 323.

[A

ca use of action for pain an d suffering
ca.nu ot he j i11ed wi th the sta t utory cause
of nction fo r d eath. See L ouisvill e Ry.

. E. 668 .J

Henry v. Henry, 17 Abb. P r . 411;
Mcintos h v. Mcin tosh, 12 How. Pr. 289;
Zorn v. Zo rn, 38 Hun, 6 i ; bu t see co11trn.
Gr a11t v. Grant (Minn. 1893), 5-1- N W.
4

26
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demand to recover possession of a chattel cannot be united with

a claim of damages for the taking, detaining, and converting the

same. But as the codes expressly authorize the joinder of claims

for the possession of chattels, and of damages for the withholding

the same, this decision can hardly be sustained. " Withholding "

clearly includes " detaining,'' and, as it is not a technical term, it

was doubtless intended to embrace " taking " aud " conversion "

as well.^ A cause of action to recover the possession of a certain

parcel of land cannot, it has been said, be united with a demand

of damages caused by the defendant's trespasses upon other lands

of the plaintiff.2 It has also been held that a claim to recover

possession of land, and a demand of damages for the defendant's

tortious entry upon the same land, cannot be joined, because they

are entirely inconsistent.^

§ 398. * 504:. Grouping of Actions for Injuries to the Person

in some States. Illustrations. In one or two of the States,

actions for injuries to the person constitute a separate class,

and are not grouped together with those for injuries to property.
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Thus in California, an "action to recover damages for alleged

injuries to the person and property of the plaintiff, and for his

false imprisonment, and for forcibly ejecting him from a house

1059. It would be difficult to determine

in what class the action for either kind of

divorce fall.s. One judge in Mcintosh v.

Mcintosh suggested that limited divorce

was a claim for injury to the person. It

seems to be casus omissus. See also Has-

kell V. Haskell, .54 Cal. 262 (in an action

for divorce, adultery and habitual intem-

perance are distinct causes) ; Uhl i'. Uhl,

c.lemc n 1 to recover po - e ion of a ha t 1 cannot be uni cl \Yi h
1, im of damage £ r the taking 1 taining, antl cony rtin o- the
am . Bu a the code ex.pr sly auth rize the j in r f laim
f r th po e ion of cha tels, and f damag s for he wi hh klin
the am thi deci ion can hardly be u tain d. 'Wi hholcliu .,
cl arly include
detaining and a it i no a 1;echni al term it
a. daub le intended to embrac
taking and
onver ion
a well. 1 A cau e of action to reco er the p s e ion of a c rtain
parcel of land cannot, it ha been aid, be united with a d mand
of damage cau ed by the defendant tre pas ~es upon other land
of b plaintifI.2 I has al o been held hat a claim o recoYer
po e ion of land and a d mand f damage for the defemh nt'
tortiou' en ry upon the same land, cannot be joined, becau ·e they
are entirely incon ·istent.3
398.
50-!. Grouping of Actions for Injuries to the Person
in some S tates.
Illustrati ons. In one or wo of th
a,ction for injuries to the person con tjtute a eparate cla'
and are not grouped together wi h tho e for injurie t pr p rt '.
Thu in California, an "action to recov r damage f r alleged
lilJUrie to the person and proper y of the plaintiff antl f r hi
false impri onment, and for forcibly ejecting him fr m a hou e

.52 id. 250 (a cause of action to annul a

marriage by reason of a former marriage

of the plaintiff to one still alive cannot be

joined with a cause of action to (juiet

plaintiff's title to her separate property, in

which defendant falsely claims an inter-

est. Hut in Prouty i: Prouty, 4 Wash. 174,

a complaint in an action for divorce and

alimony, which asked tliat alleged fraud-

ulent conveyances by the husband of all

his property be set aside, was held to pre-

sent no misjoinder. The same complaint

cannot unite causes of action for divorce,

and to obtain the annulment of a separa-

tion deed : fJalusha v. Galusha (N. Y.

Apj), May, 1893), 33 N. E. 1062).

1 Maxwell v. Farnam, 7 How. Pr. 236,

per Harris J., at Special Term.

- Hulce V. Thompson, 9 How. Pr. 113.

But cannot both causes of action be re-

ferred to the single class of " injuries to

property " ? The recovery of possession

is merely the relief, and not the cause of

action.

3 Budd V. Bingham, 18 Barb. 494, per

Brown J. It is difficult to perceive this

inconsistency. This and some similar de-

cisions are cited, not because they have

any authority or any value, but to com-

plete the statement of the judicial iuter-

])retation put upon this provision of the

statute. For further illustrations, see

Buckmaster r. Kelley, 15 Fla. 180; Mat-

tair V. Payne, 15 id. 682: Williams r.

Lowe, 4 Neb. 382; Paxton >: Wood, 77

N. C. 11; Suber 1-. Allen, 13 S. C. 317 ;

Stevens v. Chance, 47 Iowa, 602 ; Schnit-

zer V. Cohen, 7 Hun, 665 ; French v.

1059. It would be difficult to determine
in what cla the action for either kind of
divorce fall:. One judge in I\Icinto h '!.'.
~lcJnto h ugge ted that limited dirnrce
wa · a c:laim for injury to the per OD. It
. eem • to be ms11s omis us.
ee al o Ha kell i·. Ha kell, 54 Cal. 262 (in an ac ion
for divorce, adultery and habitual intemperance are di tinct cau e ) ; uhl v. rhl,
52 id 250 (a cau e of action to annul a
marriag liy rca on of a former marriage
<Jf the plai11tiff LO on ·till alive cannot be
joined with a cau. e of action to qui t
plaintiff'. title to her eparate property in
which <I feudaut fal ' ely claim an intere. t. Bn in Prouty i'. Prouty•, 4 Wah. l i4,
a c1J111plaiut in an aC'tiou fur clivorc and
ali111011y, which a. k d that allegerl fraudulent tOll\' yanc
by th hu band of all
lii. pr<•p rty be . et a. ide, wa h ltl to pre~e11t no mi.joi11<ler. Th
ame complaint
a1111ot unit can e of action for divorc ,
and to obtain the annulment of a eparatiou d ·Pd: 1alu I a v.
a1u ha ( •. Y.
App, ~lay, I 93), 33 . '. 1062) .

1 Maxwell v. Farnam, 7 How. Pr. 2~6.
per Harri J ., at , pecial Term.
2 Hulce v. Thomµ ·on, 9 How. Pr. 113.
But cannvt both cau e of action b referred to the in le cla. of "iDju ri to
propertv " 1 The recovery of po e . ion
i merely the relief, and not the ca.u'e of
a<'tion.
.
3 Budd v. Bingham , l
Barb. 494, per
Brown .J. It i lifficult to µ r ei,· thi
in OD i tency. Tbi · and ome imilar de1 1 n
ar
i ed, n t b au
they haYe
an,v authorit or anv valne, but to omplete the tatement of th judicial int rpr tation put upon tbi proYi ioD of the
'tatutc. F r further illu tra ion ,
e
Buckma. t r l·. l " 11 y, 15 la. I O; , fattair 1'. Payn , 15 id. 6 2: William' i·.
Lowe, 4
b. 3 2; Paxton i·. Wood, ii
. l 1 ; 'uber v. Al len, l 3
. . 31 i ;
tev n v. han , 47 Iowa, 602; chnitz r i-. oh n, i Hun, 6 5;
r n h v.
alter. 17 icl. 54 ; Dyer v. Bar tow, ~
al. 652; Brown v. i<: , 51 id. 9.
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and lot in his possession, and detaining the possession thereof

from liini," was held to be an improper union, as it embraced

causes belonging to two if not three of the classes specified in

the code ; ^ and in another case, the joining of a claim to recover

possession of land, damages for its detention, damages for the

forcible expulsion of the plaintiff from the premises, and the

value of the im})roveraents made by him, was pronounced equally

an error for the same reason. ^

§ 399. * 505. Holding of Wisconsin Court in Action to quiet

Title. An action to quiet the title to three different tracts of

land which had belonged originally to different owners, and

which the plaintiff held under three distinct tax deeds executed

at separate times, was held in Wisconsin to violate the require-

ments of the code. The proceeding was likened by the court to

and lot in hi po
ion, and cl taining the po . ion thereof
from him," wa h lcl to b an improper union, as it mbra · cl
au s b longing to two if not three of th cla
·pecifi cl in
the c cl ; 1 and in another ca , the j ining f a laim t r cov r
po es ion f land, damage for it d tention, damage f r th
forcible expulsion of the laintiff from the pr mi ·, an l the
value f the impr ovem nts made by him, was pronounced equally
an error for the ame r ason . 2

§ 399. * 505 .

Holding of Wisconsin Court in Action to

quiet

An action to quiet the title to three different tracts of
land which had belonged originally to different owner , antl
which the plaintiff held under three distinct tax cl eds x cutetl
at separate times, was held in Wisconsin to violate the requirements of the code. The proceeding was likened by the court to
the foreclosure in one action of three different mortgages given
by three different owners upon three separate parcels of land. 3
Title.

the foreclosure in one action of three different mortgages given

by three different owners upon three separate parcels of land.^

SECTION THIRD.

THE GENERAL PRINCIPLES OF PLEADING.

§ 400. *506. The Three Types of Pleading Prior to the Re-
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formed System. Pleading by Allegation. In order that the sys-

tem of pleading introduced by the reformed procedure may be

accurately understood, I shall briefly describe the essential

principles and doctrines of those which prevailed in different

courts at the time of its adoption, and the comparison which can

thus be made will be of great assistance in arriving at correct

results. The three types of pleading then known either in

SECTION THIRD.

England or in this country were the common law, the equity,

and that which in the absence of a distinctive name I shall call

THE GENERAL PRINCIPLES OF PLEADING.

"pleading by allegation." The last-mentioned method was used

in the courts of admiralty, of probate and divorce, the ecclesi-

astical courts, and wherever the law as administered was based

§ 400.

* 506.

The Three Types of Pleading Prior to the Re -

directly upon the doctrines and modes of the Roman Civil Law.

Its peculiar features consisted (1) in breaking up an entire

pleading into a number of separate paragraphs, — technically

1 McCarty l. Premont, 23 Cal. 196, Bowles v. Sacramento Turnp. Co., 5 Cal.

197. [See late case of Lamb v. Harbaugh 224 ; Bigelow v. Gove, 7 Cal. 133.

(1895), 105 Cal. 680, 39 Pac. 56.] 3 Turner i'. Duchman, 23 Wis. 500.

2 Mayo V. Madden, 4 Cal. 27. And see

In order that the system of pleading intr~duced by the reformed procedure may be
accurately understood, I shall briefly describe the essential
principles and doctrines of those which prevailed in different
courts at the time of its adoption, and the comparison which can
thus be made will be of great assistance in arriving at correct
r es ults. The three types of pleading then known either in
England or in this country were the common law, the equity,
and that which in the absence of a distinctive nam e I shall call
"pleading by allegation." The last-mentioned method was us d
in the courts of admiralty, of probate and divorce the ecclesiastical courts, and wherever the law as admini tered was based
directly upon the doctrines and modes of the Roman Civil Law.
Its peculiar features consisted (1) in breaking up an ntire
pleading into a number of , eparate paragraph , - technically

formed System.

Pleading by Allegation.

1 McCarty t . Fremont, 23 Cal. 196,
197. [See late case of Lamb v. Harbaugh
(1895 ), 105 Cal. 680, 39 Pac. 56.)
2 Mayo v . Madden, 4 Cal. 27 . And see

Bowles v. Sacramento Turnp. Co., 5 Cal.
224; Bigelow v . Gove, 7 al. 133.
a Turner v. Duchman, 23 Wis. 500.

,... ·I "
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"allegations," — each of which should properly contain a single

important circumstance or principal fact going to make out the

cause of action ; and (2) the statement in each allegation of all

the minute and subordinate facts which taken together compose,

and are evidence of, the main circumstance or fact relied upon

by the litigant party to sustain his contention. The pleading as

a w^hole, therefore, comprised not only averments of the sub-

stantial facts, the important conclusions of fact which must be

established by the proofs, — those facts which in the common-

law system are called "issuable" or "material," — but also a

narrative of all the probative facts, of all the evidence from

which the existence of the "issuable" facts must be inferred.

A libel constructed upon this theory disclosed the whole case of

the complaining party; if properly framed, it set forth in a con-

tinuous and narrative form a complete account of the transaction,

describing the situation of the parties at its commencement, all

the various incidents which happened in its progress, its final

conclusion, and the results produced upon each, and prayed for

such relief as the law affords in the given case. The codes of
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several States have plainly intended to borrow one feature of

this system ; that is, the separation of the pleading into a number

of distinct paragraphs continuously numbered, and each com-

prising the statement of a single material or issuable fact. The

second feature, namel}', the narrative of probative facts and cir-

cumstances in the manner above described, violates the funda-

mental and essential principle of the reformed procedure.

§ 401. * 507. The Equity System of Pleading. The equity

method of pleading, when freed from all the superfluous addi-

tions which had become incorporated with it in practice, and

when thus reduced to its mere essential elements, consisted in

a statement of all tlie facts indicating the relief to which the

complainant is entitled, and in this original aspect it did not

differ in principle from that prescribed by the codes. I pur-

posely make use of the expression "facts indicating the relief to

which the complainant is entitled," rather than the ordinary

phrase "facts constituting the complainant's cause of action,"

for a reason which will be fully explained in the sequel. ' I now

call attention to the form of expression, for it is important, and

will assist in removing certain difficulties which have been sug-

gested by some of the judges in their exposition of the codes.

• , llega ion
ach of which hould properly contain a ingle
important circum tance r principal fact going o make out the
c u -e f acti n · and (:...) th
ta tern n t in ach allega ion of all
he mjnute an 1 ubordinate facts whi h tak n together c mpo e,
and ar
vjd nc of the main circum tanc or fact r eli d upon
by the li igant I arty to 'U tain hi ontenti n. The pl ading as
n. wh 1 ther f r
ompri ed not only av rm nts of the subtantial fact the imp rta.nt conclu ion of fact wh ich must be
-t bli bed by the proof' - tho e facts which in the commonlaw .y t m ar called 'i uabl ~' or 'mat rial,' ' - but also a
narrati e of all th probative fact , of all the e~idence from
which the exi t nee of th "issuable ' fact mu t be inferred.
A lib 1 con truct d upon thi theory di clo d the whole ca e of
the complaining party ; if properly fram ed, it set forth in a continuou and narrative form a complete account of the tran action,
describing the ituation f the pa.rties at it commencement, all
the variou inci lents which happened in its progress, it fin al
conclu ion, and the result produced upon each, and prayed f r
uch relief a the law afford ' in the given ca e. The codes of
everal tate have plainly intended to borrow one feature of
thi y tern ; that i , the s I a.ration of th e pleading into a numb r
of di inct paragraph continuously numbered, and each compri ing· the tatement f a i1wle m<.tt rial or i uable fact. The
econd f atur namely, h narrative of probati e fact' and circum tance in the manner above described, violates the fundameutal and
ential principle of the reform d procedure.
§ 401. * 507. The Equity System of Ple a ding. The equity
meth
of pl ading, when fr ed from all th
uperfiu us addition which had become in orporated with it in ractic , and
when thu r du d to it mere
ntial 1 ment c n i. t d in
a ta t ment f all the :fact in li ating the r li f
which the
complai11ant i. ntitle l and in tl i original a pe t it id n t
<liff r in principle fr m that pr crib cl b th
od . I puro ely make u ' f the xpr i n fa t indi ating th r lief t
whi 1 the c mplainant i ' ntitl <l ' r ather than th
rdinary
phn .
fact
n tituting th c mplainant
c u
of action,"
n ' hi h will l; f lly . plain d in he
qu 1. · I now
11 att n i n to h f rm f x:pl' ·i n for it i im or ant, and
rt· in iffi ulti e whi h ha b n ugwill a. , i t in r m ving
g . e<l by
me f th judg in their exp ition of the codes.
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Practically, a bill in equity, prior to any modern reforms, had

been changed from the original simplicity as above described,

and had come to consist of three distinct parts or divisions, the

narrative, the charging, and the interrogative. The first of

these contained a statement of the complainant's case for relief;

the second anticipated and rebutted the defendant's supposed

positions; while the last was used to probe the defendant's con-

science, and to extract from him admissions under oath in his

answer concerning matters within his own knowledge which the

existing rules of evidence did not permit to be proved by the

j)arties themselves as ordinary witnesses. The result of these

modifications was an almost entire departure from the simple

conception of equity pleading. The bill and answer were gen-

erally made to include the evidence by which either party main-

tained his own contention, or defeated that of his adversary, and

also legal conclusions and arguments which more appropriately

belonged to the briefs of counsel and the discussions at the

hearing. All this, I say, although very common and perhaps

universal in the actual practice before any reforms through
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legislation or rules of court, was really unnecessary, and formed

no essential part of the theory of equity pleading. The onlj^

indispensable portion of a bill was the narrative. Except for the

purpose of eliciting evidence from the defendant, there was no

more reason why this should contain mere evidence of the facts

that were the foundation of the complainant's demand for relief,

as contradistinguished from those facts themselves, than there

was for the same kind of probative matter to be inserted in a

declaration at law. The bill in equity, as has been already said,

should comprise a statement of all the facts which show the

relief to which the complainant is entitled, which indicate the

nature and extent of that relief whether total or partial, and

the modifications or exceptions to be made in it; wliile the

answer should perform the same office for the defendant. By

the application of this doctrine, a bill in equity was generally

quite different in its contents from a declaration at law; it was

ordinarily more minute in its averments, and contained state-

ments of matter which in a legal action would more naturally

and properly belong to the evidence rather than to the alle-

gations of issuable facts. The reason for this distinction lay

entirely in the difference between equitable and legal primary

34

Practically, a bill in equity, pri r to any modern ref rms, l1a<l
been changed from the original simplicity a::; abo e descriL u,
and had come to consist of three di tin(jt parts or di vision', the
narrative, the charging, and the interrogative. The first f
these contained a statement of the complainant's case for relief;
the second anticipated and rebutted the defendant' supposed
positions; while the last was used to probe the defenclanf::; conscience, and to extract from him admissions umler oath in his
answer concerning matters within his own knowledge which the
existing rules of evidence did not permit to be proved by the
parties themselves as ordinary witnesses. The result of these
modifications was an almost entire departure from the simple
conception of equity pleading. The bill and answer were generally made to include the evidence by which either party maintained his own contention, or defeated that of his adversary, and
also legal conclusions and arguments which more appropriately
belonged to the briefs of counsel an<l the discussions at the
hearing. All this, I say, although very common and perhaps
universal in the actual practice before any reforms through
legislation or rules of court, was really unnecessary, an<l formed
no essential part of the theory of equity pleading. The only
indispensable portion of a bill was the narrative. Except for the
purpose of eliciting evidence from the defendant, there was no
more reason why this should contain mere evidence of the facts
that were the foundation of the complainant's demand for relief,
as contradi:::;tinguished from those facts themselves, tha,n there
was for the same kind of probative matter to be inserted in a
declaration at law. The bill in equity, as has been already said,
should comprise a statement of all the facts which show the
relief to which the complainant is entitled, which indicate the
nature and extent of that relief whether total or partial, and
the modifications or exceptions to be made in it; while the
answer should perform the same office for the defendant. By
the application of this doctriue, a bill in equity was generally
quite different in its contents from a declaration at law; it was
onlinarily more minute in its averments, ancl contained stat ments of matter which in a legal action would more naturally
and properly belong to the evidence rather than to th allegations of issuable fact . The reason for thi li tinction lay
entirely in the difference bet ween equitable and legal primary
3-i
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rights and between equitable and legal remedies, especially in

the latter. A judgment at law was always a single award of

relief; the recovery either of a specific tract of land, or of a

specific chattel, or of a definite sum of money, and such judg-

ment, whatever might be its amount, was either wholly rendered

for the plaintiff, or wholly denied. Furthermore, the right to

recover a legal judgment always depended uj)on the existence of

a comparatively few important facts, — " issuable " or " material "

facts, — and the very definition of an issuable fact is, one which,

if denied and not proved, would prevent the plaintiff from re-

covering. In equit}^ the primary rights and remedies of the

complainant were often very different from those which existed

at law. His remedy was not necessarily a single recovery of

some specific form of relief; it might vary in its nature and

extent through a wide range; it might be total or partial, it

might be absolute or conditional. The defence, on the other

hand, might be total or partial; and it might even consist of

modifications made in the form of relief demanded by the com-

plainant, or in supplemental provisions added thereto in order
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to meet some future contingency. In short, it was impossible

to say that the complainant's right to recover always depended

upon the existence of certain " issuable " facts, the failure to

establish either one or even all of which would necessarily defeat

his contention. It is true that in some cases the equitable

remedy sought by the complainant might be of such a nature

that it would follow from the proof of such issuable facts as

completely and directly as the plaintiff's right to a common-law

judgment does in a legal action. While this was possible in

some instances, in the great majority of equitable actions the

relief was more complicated ; the primary rights were more com-

prehensive ; and the decree as a whole was shaped, modified, and

adapted to various circumstances and minor facts upon which

individually the cause of action or the defence did not entirely

rest, but all of which in combination entered into the resulting

remedial right belonging to the litigant parties. Now, on the

theory of equity pleading, all these facts should be averred by

the complainant or tlie defendant as the case might be; and

while it can be properly said that they all indicate and affect

the relief to be awarded by the court, they cannot all be said " to

constitute the cause of action " or tlie defence in the same sense

riD"ht. and between equitable an l legal remeclie , e pecially in
the latter. A judgment at law wa alway a "' in le award of
relief; the recovery either of a specific tra t of land, or of a
peci:fic chattel, or of a definite sum of money, ancl uch judgment whatever might be its amount, wa either wholly rendered
for the plaintiff, or wholly denied. Fmthermore, the right to
recover a legal judgment al way depended upon the exi t nee of
a comparatively few important fact', - "i uable ' or "material"
fact , - and the very definition of an issuable fact i , one which,
if denied and not proved, would prevent the plaintiff from recovering. In equity, the primary rights and remedies of the
complainant were often very different from those which exi ted
at law. His remedy was not necessarily a single recovery of
ome specific form of relief; it might vary in its nature and
xtent through a wide range; it might be total or partial it
might be absolute or conditional. The defence, on the th r
hand, might be total or partial; and it might e en consi t of
modifications made in the form of relief de!Ilanded by the omplainant, or in supplemental provisions added thereto in order
t meet ome future contingency. In short, it wa impo ible
t o ay that the complainant's right to recover always depended
upon the existence of certain "i. suable" facts, the failure to
establish either one or even all of which would neces arily defeat
his contention. It is true that in ome cases the equitable
r medy sought by the complainant might be of such a nature
t hat it would follow from the proof of such issuable fact as
completely and directly as the plaintiff s right to a common-law
juc1gment does in a legal action. While this was p ible in
. ome in tances, in the great majority of equitable action the
reli f wa more complicated; the primar ri hts were more mpr hen iv ; and the decree a a whol wa shaped, modifi d and
a.fapt l t variou circum tanc
anu minor fa t:s upon which
individually the cau e of action or th def nc did not ntir ly
r t, ut all of which in
mbination ntered into the r ulting
r m ial right b longing to the liti 0 ant parti . No
n the
] eory of
uity lea ling all th · fa t houl l b av n d b
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h r li f t h a ward cl 1
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in which the "issuable "' or "material "' facts constitute the cause

of action or the defence in a suit at law. I repeat the statement

already made, for it is an important one, that this descri[)tion

does not necessarily apply to every case of equitable relief.

Under certain circumstances, and in some particular instances,

the remedy and the right to its recovery are single and depend

in which the i' uable · r "mat rial., fa t con ·ti lut tl1 ·au.·
of action or the defence in a , uit at law. I r I at the ta Ill 11t
already made, for it i an imp rtant n , that tlii' d s 'l'ipti n
doe not nece arily apply to v ry case of quitabl r li f.
Und r certain circumstance , an l in ome parti ular in tan s
the remedy and the right to its r covery ar ingle and <l p n<l
upon the existence of 'a f w well-defined and controlling fa t· ·
such facts are then "material " or "is uable " in th
lri ·t t
. nse of those term , and they are all that it is r qui ite t all g
in the pleading. In mo t instances, howev r, an quity pleading
necessarily contained allegations of fact which were not ' i ·uable" in the technical meaning of that word, but which " ' r
nevertheless the basis of the relief demanded and obtained. I
have dwelt thus carefully upon the foregoing analysis, beeau e it
is the element which enters into and decides a mo t important
question to be considered in the sequel; namely, wheth r the
proper modes of pleading in legal and in equitable action und r
the reformed procedure can be referred to and derived from the
single fundamental principle announced hy all the code . Another essential feature belonged to the equity method of pleading,
and di tinguii:;hed it from that which prevailed in courts of law.
The facts upon which the contentions of the litigant partie
wholly or partially depended were averred as they actually happened or existed, and not the legal effect or aspect of those fact .
This distinction was a vital one, as will be fully pointed out in
the succeeding paragraphs, and its relations with the reformed
theory of pleading are direct and intimate.
§ 402. * 508. The Common-Law System of Pleading. Introductory. I come finally to the common-law system of pleading.
It has frequently been said, even by able judges, that under this
method the material, ·is uable fa cts constituting th cause of
action, and they alone, were to be alleged; and that, as xactly
the same principle lies at the basis of the new ystem, the latt r
ha made no substa.ntial change, but ha ou1y remov d th unnecessary and trouble ome in ident which had been gath red
arm: nd the original simple common-law conception. In support
of this view, the general language of Chitty and other textwriters is quoted as conclu iv . There i ju t enough truth in
this description of the common -law pleading to mak i plau ..·ibl ;
but enough of error to rend r it, \Yh en adopted a a mean of
1

1

upon the existence of a few well-defined and controlling facts;

such facts are then " material " or " issuable " in the strictest

sense of those terms, and they are all that it is requisite to allege

in the pleading. In most instances, however, an equity pleading

necessarily contained allegations of facts which were not " issu-

able " in the technical meaning of that word, but which m ere

nevertheless the basis of the relief demanded and obtained. I

have dwelt thus carefully upon the foregoing analysis, because it

is the element which enters into and decides a most important

question to be considered in the sequel; namely, whether the

proper modes of pleading in legal and in equitable actions under

the reformed procedure can be referred to and derived from the

single fundamental principle announced by all the codes. An-
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other essential feature belonged to the equity method of pleading,

and distinguished it from that which prevailed in courts of law.

The facts upon which the contentions of the litigant parties

wholly or partially depended were averred as they actually hap-

pened or existed, and not the legal effect or aspect of those facts.

This distinction was a vital one, as will be fully pointed out in

the succeeding paragraphs, and its relations with the reformed

theory of pleading are direct and intimate.

§ 402. * 508. The Common-La-w System of Pleading. Intro-

ductory. I come finally to the common-law system of j^leading.

It has frequently been said, even by able judges, that under this

method the material, issuable facts constituting the cause of

action, and they alone, were to be alleged ; and that, as exactly

the same principle lies at the basis of the new system, the latter

has made no substantial change, but has only removed the un-

necessary and troublesome incidents which had been gathered

around the original simple common-law conception. In support

of this view, the general language of Chitty and other text-

writers is quoted as conclusive. There is just enough truth in

this description of the common-law pleading to make it plausible ;

but enough of error to render it, wlien adopted as a means of
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interpreting the codes, extremel}' misleading. In fact, it is im-

possible to describe the common-law pleading as a unit: it was

o-overned by no universal principles ; the modes which prevailed

in certain actions were radically unlike those that were employed

in othei-s. I shall attempt in a very brief manner to point out all

its essential features, and to explain its general character.

§ 403. * 509. Technicality of the System. In the lirst place,

certain elements were firmly incorporated into the system which

were not really fandamental and essential, although often re-

garded and spoken of as its peculiarly characteristic requisites.

1 refer to the extreme nicety, precision, and accuracy which were

demanded by the courts in the framing of allegations, in averring

either the facts from which the primary rights of the parties

arose, or those which constituted the breach of such rights, in

the use of technical phrases and formulas, in the certainty of

statement produced by negativing almost all possible conclusions

different from that affirmed by the pleader, in the numerous

repetitions of the same averment, and finally in the invention

and employment of a language and mode of expression utterly
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unlike the ordinary spoken or written English, and meaningless

to any person but a trained expert. This requirement of accu-

racy and precision was in former times pushed to an absurd and

most unjust extreme ; as for example, the use of the past tense

"had," instead of the present "have," in a material allegation,

would be fatal to the plaintiff's recovery. If it be said that

these extreme niceties and absurd technicalities were things of

the past, abandoned by the law courts in modern times, a perusal

of some standard reports — for instance, those of Meeson and

"Welsln' — will show on what grounds of the merest form the

rights of litigant parties have been determined, even within the

present generation. Still, I do not regard this precision, accu-

racy, and general technicalit}-, which actually distinguished the

common-law system of pleading, as something essential to its

existence, as its absolutely necessary elements. It might have

retained all its fundamental principles in respect to the nature of

the allegations used and the kinds of facts averred, and at the

same time have employed the familiar language of common nar-

rative in making all these averments. The essential elements

of the system would then be presented in their naked sini[)licity.

The actual technicalities which have been thus mentioned, and

interpr tiua the code extr mely mi 1 a ling. I n fact, it i impo' ·iblv to d ·cribe the ommon-law pl a<ling a ' , unit : i \ a
cr yern d by n uni\' r al l rincipl s · th m c.le which
r ailed
in certain ac ion " wer radically unlik tho e that were mpl y d
in th I" . I 'ball attempt in a Yer · bri f manner to point out all
i , e, 'e ntial fet ture.-,, and to explain it general cbaract r .
· 403. * ~
. Technicality of the System. In h fir t pla
certain el m n , were firmly incorvorated into he - t m which
w re not re ·1 lly fundamental arnl "ential althou h f en r gard tl ·1rn.l "pol~e n of a it peculiarly characteri tic r qui ite ·.
I refer to he extreme nicet , preci ion and accuracy which w re
1 rnancl d by the court in the framing of allegation , in a rrina
either the fact from ''hich th primary right of the parti -,
aro e r tho e which con tituted the breach of uch ri ht ' in
the u
of technical phra e and formula , in the cer aint
f
bitement produced by neg;:ttivin almo ' t all po ible conclu ' ion
different from that affirmed by the pleader, in the num rou
repetition"' of the ame a\errnent, and finally in he inv ntion
an empl ym nt of a language and mo le of expre ion utt rly
unlike the ordinary poken or \Hitten Engli h and m aningl , '
t any p r on but a trained expert. Thi" requirement £ a cu ra.cy and preci ion was in former time pu bed to an ab ·urd an l
mo ·t unju t xtre me ; as for example the u e of the pa ·t n e
ha l ' in ·tead of the pre 'ent "have, ' in a material allega i n
would be fatal to the plaintiff . recovery. If it be ail that
the e xtreme nicetie and ab urd t echn icalitie were bing of
the I a ' t abandoned by the law c tut in modern time a peru al
f
me taudard reports - for in tance tho e of .1\Iee n and
W 1: by- will how on what gr und of he mere t form th
right· of litigant parti e ha ye be n l t rmined even within the
pre: nt en "'ati n.
till I lo n t r CYard thi pr ci i n accu racy and gen ral technicality whi ·h a tm 11 di tin ui h
th
comm n-law y. tern of plea Eng a
m thing
xi t nee a· it ab olutely n c ary 1 men .
retaine l ll it fundamental principl in r
th na ur
tl e allegati n u d and th kincl of f < t av rre l and at he
.· me im · ve emplo · cl h familiar lan uag
rati ve in makin all th e , 'erm nt .
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which were the boast of the skilful special pleader, were only a

disgrace to the administration of justice. However pleasant

they might have been as exercises in logic, they were productive

of untold injustice to suitors. It is simpl}^ amazing that they

could have been retained so long and adhered to so tenaciously,

and even lauded with extravagant eulogium, among peoples like

tiie English and the American. Tliat they were entirely abro-

gated by all the codes of procedure is plain ; and after a series of

improvements, commencing in 1834, when the celebrated " Rules

of Hilary Term " were adopted, the British Parliament has swept

them out of the English law, and has introduced the substance

of the American system.

§ 404. * 510. Essential Principles and Elements of Common-La-w

Pleading. Passing from these technical incidents, I proceed to

inquire what were the real and essential principles and elements

of the common-law pleading. How far was it true that the

material facts constituting the cause of action, and these alone,

were to be alleged ? This statement was partly correct, — that

is, correct under most important limitations and reservations, in
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certain of the forms of action ; while in the other of these forms

of action it was not true in, the slightest extent; in fact, it was

diametrically opposed to the truth. 1 will recapitulate the

important actions, and refer them to their proper classes. In

ejectment there can be no pretence that any attempt was made

to allege the actual facts constituting the cause of action; the

declaration and accompanying proceedings were a mass of fictions

which had become ridiculous, whatever may have been their

original usefulness, and the answer was the general issue; the

record thus threw no light upon the real issues to be tried by the

jury. In trover, the averments of the declaration were that

the plaintiff was possessed, as his own property, of certain speci-

fied chattels.; that he lost them; and that tlie defendant found

them, and converted them to his own use. Throwing out of

view the abused fictions of a loss and a finding, there was here

the statement of two facts, namel}', the description of the chattels

so as to identify them, and the plaintiff's property in them ; but

the most important allegation of all, the one upon which in the

vast majority of cases the whole controversy would turn, was

a pure conclusion of law. The statement that defendant had

converted the same to his own use did not indicate anv fact to

which were the boa t of th skilfol sp0c;ial pl •:-1,(.1 r, w r only a
di 'grace to the admini tration of ju ti ·e. ll ow v T pl ·a ant
th y might have be n as - rcis in logic they w r, proclnctive
of untold in ju tice to suit rs. It is simply amazing that tl1C'y
coulcl hav been r etained so long and a<lh reel to so tenaciou ·13,
and ev n lauded with extravagant e nlogium, among peopl like
tb Engli ·h and the .Ameri an . That they "·er
ntirely abrog( ted by all the codes of procedme is plain; a.1Hl aft r a. ·eri · of
improvements, commencing in 183-!, when the celebrated 'I ules
of Hilary Term 'were adopted, the Briti 'h Parliament ha · swept
them out of the English law, and ha · introduced th sul>:::;tance
of the American system .
§ 404. * 510. Essential Principles and Elements of Common-Law
Pleading. Passing from these techni cal incidents, I proceeJ to
inquire what were the real and essential principles and elements
of the common-law pleading. How far was it true that the
material facts constituting the cause of action, and these alone,
were to be alleged? This statement was partly correct, - that
is, correct under most important limitations and reservations, in
certain of the forms of action; while in th e other of these forms
of action it was not true in ,the slightest exten t; in fact, it was
diametrically opposed to the truth.
I will recapitulate the
important actions, and refer them to their proper classes . Iu
ejectment there can be no pretence that any attempt was made
to allege the actual facts constituting the cause of action; the
declaration and accompanying proceedings were a mass of fictions
which had become ridiculous, whatever may have been their
original usefuln ess, and the answer was the general i 'ue · the
record thus threw n o light upon the real issue to be tried by the
jury. In trover, the averments of the declaration were that
the plain tiff was possessed, as his own property, of certain pecified chattels.; that h e lo ·t them; and that the defendant found
them, aml converted them to his own u e. Throwing ut of
view the abused :fiction of a loss and a finding, there wa her
the statement of two fact , namely, the de cription of the chattel,
so as to identify them, and the plain tiff's I roperty in them; but
the most important allegation of all, the on upon which in th
vast majority of case the wh ole controver ·y would turn, wa'
a pure conclusion of law. The statement that defendant had
converted the same to hi own u e did not indicate any fart to
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be considered and decided by the jury in reaching their verdict.

In the action of debt, also, the important allegation was a mere

conclusion of law, namely, that the defendant was indebted to

the plaintiff in a certain sum whereupon an action had accrued ;

and although the declaration contained a further statement of

the consideration or cause of the indebtedness, yet as a whole it

did not pretend to set forth the material facts constituting the

cause of action. In assumpsit, the pleadings were of two very

different species, in all cases of implied promises, and especially

when the common counts were resorted to, the averments were

purely fictitious, as much so as in ejectment; there was not the

slightest approach towards a statement of the facts constituting

a cause of action as they actually existed. When the suit was

brought upon an express contract, and the declaration was in the

form of a special assumpsit, there was a greater appearance of

alleging facts ; but even here the facts were stated in their sup-

posed legal aspect and effect, as legal conclusions, and not simply

as they occurred. There are left to be considered the actions

of covenant, detinue, trespass, and case. In each one of these,
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according to the nature of the action, the facts constituting the

grounds for a recovery were more nearly stated, although in some

of them the averments were required to be made in an exceed-

ingly precise and technical manner. The declaration in a special

action on the case necessarily comprised a narrative of the actual

facts constituting the cause of action ; but as has been said, this

narrative was thrown into a very arbitrary, technical, and un-

natural shape. It therefore bore some resemblance in substance

to a complaint or a petition, when properly framed according to

the reformed theory ; and some judges have even said that every

such complaint or petition is a declaration in a special action on

the case. The assertion so often made by the older text-writei-s,

and repeated by modern judges, that the common-law system of

pleading demanded allegations of the facts constituting the cause

of action or the defence, is thus, as a general proposition, mani-

festly incorrect, for in many forms of action there was no pretence

of any such averments.

§ 405. *511. Same Subject. Hut we must go a Step farther

in order to oV)tain an accurate notion of the common-law theory.

In all the instances where fictions were discarded, and where the

important allegations were not mere naked conclusions of law,

b on id red anu ecided b the jury in reaching their
r ict.
In the action of d b , al ·o, the importan all ation wa a m re
fendant wa in ebted to
conclu 'ion of law namely that the
the plaintiff in a c rtain um whereup n an action had accrued;
and alth ugh the a claration contained a forth r tt tement of
th con id ration or cau e of the ind btedne , y t a a whole it
di not pretend to et forth the material fa t con tituting the
cau e f action. In a sump it, the pleadino- were of two very
diff r nt pecie , in all ca ' of implied promise , and especially
wh n the common count w re re orted to the averment were
purely fictitiou ·, a much
a in ejectment; there wa not the
lighte t approach toward a statement of the fact constituting
a cau e of action as they actually existed. When the uit wa
brought upon an expr
contract, and the declaration wa in the
form of a special a ump it, there wa::. a greater appearance of
all ging fac ; but even here the facts were stated in their suppo ed legal a pect and effect, a legal conclu ions, and not imply
a they occurred. There are left to be con idered the action
of covenant, detinue, tre pa , and case. In each one of the
accordin to the natm;e of the action, the facts con tituting th
round for a recovery were more ne rly tated, although in ome
of them the averment were required to be made in an excee lingly preci, e and technical manner. The declaration in a pecial
action on the ca::.e neces arily compri ed a narrati e of the actual
fact con tituting the cau e of action; but a ha been said, thi
narrativ wa thrown into a very arbitrary, technical, and un natural . hap . It therefore bore ome re emblance in ·ub tan
to a c mplaint or a petition, when properly framed accor in t
th r formed theory; an ome judge hav e n aid that ver
uch omplaint or petition i a declaration in a p cial action n
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but where, on the contrary, the pUiintiff assumed to state the

"issuable " facts constituting his cause of action, lie did not nar-

rate the exact transaction between himself and the defendant

from which the rights and duties of the respective parties arose ;

he stated only 2v7tat he conceived to he the leyal effect of these facts.

The " issuable " facts, in the contemplation of the common-law

system, were not the actual controlling facts as they really

occurred, and as they would be proved by the evidence, from

which the law derived the right of recovery: they were the legal

aspect of those facts, — not strictly the bare conclusions of law

themselves derived from the circumstances of the case, but rather

combinations of fact and law, or the facts with a legal coloring,

and clothed with a legal character. The result was, that the

"issuable" facts as averred in the pleading were often purely

fictitious; that is, no such events or occurrences as alleged ever

took place, but they were represented as having taken place in

the manner conceived of by the law. The pleader of course set

forth his ovai view of this legal effect under the peril of a pos-

sible error in his application of the law to his case ; if a mistake
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was made in properly conceiving of this legal effect, — or, in

other words, if the facts established by the evidence did not

correspond with his opinion as to their legal aspect stated in the

declaration, — the plaintiff's suit would entirely fail.^

1 la corroboration of these conclusions, put his case as wisely as he might have

I quote a paragraph from a series of ex- done. In practice, dangers of this l^iud

ceedingly able articles upon the English are mitigated, though by no means in-

Judicature Bill, which appeared in the variably escaped, by inserting a multi-

" Saturday Review" during the year tude of counts, all giving slightly different

1873, and were correctly attributed to one versions of the same transaction, in order

of the foremost English barristers as their that on one or other of them the plaintiff

author. While discussing the pleading may be found to have stated correctly tlie

which ought to be introduced, he describes legal effect of the facts. The jjerinission

the common-law methods by way of con- to do this was in fact a recognition of tlic

but where, on the contrary, the laintiff a um cl t ·Late the
" issuable" facts constituting hi au
f a tion, h lid not narrate the exact transaction betw n him lf and th d fendant
from which the rights and luti s f the re ·pe tiY parti · ar
he stated only what he conceived to be the legal effi ct of the e fact .
The ' i uable" facts, in th cont mplati n of th
ommon-law

y tern, were not the actual controlling facts a· they really
ccurred, and as they would be proved by the evideu e, from
which the law derived the right of recov ry: th y w re the leyal
aspect of those facts, - not strictly the bare conclu 'ions of law
themselves derived from the circumstances of the ca e, but rath r
combinations of fact and law, or the facts with a legal coloring,
and clothed with a legal character. The result was, that the
"issuable" fact as averred in the pleading were often purely
fictitious; that is, no such events 01~ occurrences as alleged ever
took place, but they were represented as having taken place in
the manner conceived of by the law. The pleader of cour e set
forth his own view of this legal effect under the peril of a po sible error in his application of the law to his case; if a mistake
was made in properly conceiving of this legal effect, - or, in
other words, if the facts established by the evidence did not
<3orrespond with his opinion as to their legal aspect stated in the
declaration, - the plaintiff's suit would entirely fail. 1

trast, and, among others, the following plaintiff's inherent right to ask alterna-

as one of its features: "The first .striking tive relief; but it was clogged by the ab-

difference is this, that, on the common- surd condition that he could only do so

law plan, a plaintiff is required to state, by resorting to the clumsy fiction of pre-

not the facts, but what he considers to be tending to have a number of independent

the legal effect of the facts. If his ad- grounds of action, when he knew that he

visers take a wrong view of a doubtful had only one, but did not know exactly

point, and make him declare, say, for what the court might consider the legal

goods sold and delivered when the real effect of his facts to be. This was not

facts, as proved, only make a case of only unscientific and irrational, but, in

goods bargained and sold, the unlucky some cases, it has led to enormou.s ex-

plaintiff is cast, not because he is not en- pense by compelling a plaintiff to declare

titled to recover, but because he has not on, and a defendant to plead to, scores ■ f

1 In corroboration of these conclusions,
I quote a paragraph from a series of ex~eedingly able articles upon the English
.Judicature Bill, which appeared in the
" aturday Review" during the year
l8i3, and were correctly attributed to one
of the foremost Engli h barrister as their
author. While discussing the pleading
which ought to be introduced, he describes
the common-law methods by way of contrast, and, among others, th e following
as one of its features: "The first striking
difference is this, that, on the commonlaw plan, a plaintiff is required to state,
not the facts, but what he considers to be
the legal effect of the facts. If his adviser take a wrong view of a doubtful
point, and make him declare, ay, for
goods sold and delivered when the real
facts, a proved, only make a ca e of
,goods bargained and sold, the unlucky
plaintiff ts cast, not becau:ie he is not entitled to recover, but because he has not

pnt his case as wi ely as he might have
done. In practice, dangers of this kind
are mitigated, though by no mean invariably e caped, by in erting a multitude of counts, all g iving slightly different
versions of the ·ame transaction, in order
that on one or other of them the plaintiff
may be found to have stated correctly tl1
legal effect of the facts. The permission
to do this wa in fact a recognition of the
plaintiff's inherent right to a k alternative r eli ef; but it was clogged by the al>urd condition that he c uld only do o
by resorting to the clum y fiction of pretending to have a. number of ind p nrlent
grounds of action, when he knew that he
had only one, but did not know exa tly
what the court might con ider the legal
effect of his facts to be. Thi was not
ouly un cientific aurl irrational, but, i11
some ca e , it ha led to en rmou expense by compelling a plaintiff to derlarr
on, and a defendant to plead to, score:; · · ~
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§ 406. * 512. History of the Action of Assumpsit. The extent

of these fictitious allegations in pleading, and their influence

upon the form and growth of legal doctrines at large, are ex-

hibited in a remarkable manner by the history of the action of

assumpsit, and its effect in originating and developing the doc-

trine of implied promises and contracts. At an early day, the

action of debt was the only one by which to recover for the

breach of an unsealed contract; but the defendant was permitted

to "wage his law," and by that means to greatly embarrass, if

not to defeat, the plaintiff's recovery. To obviate this difficulty,

the action of assumpsit was at length invented. The gist of this

action was the defendant's promise; the distinctive averment of

the declaration was the promise, of course express in form, and

so indispensable was it, that, if the allegation was omitted, judg-

ment would be arrested, or reversed on error, even after verdict

in the plaintiff's favor. The promise was stated to have been

fictitiou.sly differing counts, when there

was only one matter in di.spute between
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tliem. We do not suppose that the

greatest zealot among special pleaders

would say that sucli a queer sclieme as

this is ])referable to one under wliich the

plaintiff states the facts on which he

512. History of the Actio::::i of Assumpsit. The extent
of the e :fictitiou allegation in l adin
and their influence
upon the f rm and gro h f 1 gal loc rin a larg ar xhibited in a r markable m un r b · he hi or· f the action of
he docump it and it effect in originatin and dev lopin
and ontrac
t an early ay, the
trine of implied promi
ac ion of debt We th onl one bv whi h to reco1 r for th
br ach of an un ealed contr, ct · but be defendant "·a p rmi ed
to wa e bi law and by that mean t g1 a ly m arra
if
no to lefeat th plaintiff' r cover . To obviat thi lifficul ·
the acti n of a ump it was at leng b invent d. The gi t of thi
action wa the d fendant promi e · the di tincti\ av rment of
the de laration w::i. the promi e of cour e expre s in f rm and
so indi pen 'able was it, that, if the all aation wa omitt cl, judgment would be arrested, or rever ed on error, ev n aft r erdi t
in the plaintiff s favor. The promise wa tated to have been
406.

·

founds his claim, and asks for such relief

as their legal effect may entitle him to."

"Saturday Review," April 12, 1873, vol.

35, p. 472. In the face of this most ac-

curate description of common-law plead-

ing in its essence, the assertion that it

requires a statement of the actual facts

constituting the cause of action is seen to

be as fictitious as many of its ordinary

allegations, — one of the fictions which

make up so large a part of the system

itself.

^Some recent utterances of the Su-

preme Court of Missouri are interesting

in this connection. In Estes v. Dcsnovers

Shoe Co. (1900), 155 Mo. 577, 56 S.' \W.

3 1 G, the court said: "The petition, how-

ever, was obnoxious to a salutary rule of

pleading which would have rendered it

lial)le to demurrer if tlie demurrer lia.l

covered that feature. The defect in tlic

petition is tliat it sets out the contract

sued on in hcEc verba instead of pleading

it by its legal effect. That form of

pleading is to be considered none the loss

bad because it is not of uncommon jirac-

tice even among learned lawyers. The

rules of good pleading require that the

instrument relied on should be pleaded by

its legal effect, which requirement is not

for mere form, but rests on substantial

reason. The pleading is addressed to

the court and should state the pleader's

theory of his case, not leaving it to the

court to construct a theory as best it may

from the evidence set out, and not leav-

ing his adversary in the dark as to what

the theory advanced is, or what construc-

tion the pleader puts upon his contract.

It is not a contest in which the comba-

tants may catch as they can. If the con-

tract is inartificially drawn so that its

meaning or effect is obscure, it is all the

more important that tlie pleader advanc-

ing it should take the responsibility of

fictitiou. ly differing counts, when there
was ouly one matter in di pute between
them. We do not suppo e that the
greate t zealot among ~pecial pleader
would ay that such a queer cheme a
tbi i. preferable to one under which the
plaintiff tat
the fact on which he
found hi claim, and a ks for u ·h relief
a their le(Tal effect may nti tle him to."
" aturday Review," April l 2, 1 73, vol.
35, p. 4i2. In the face f thi mo t accurate <le cription of common-law pleading in it e ·ence, the a ertion that it
require a tatement of the actual fact
con tituting the can e of action i een to
be a fktitiou a many of it ordinary
allecratiou., - one of the .fictions which
make up o large a part of the y tern
it elf.
[ 'ome recent utterance of the . upreme Court of .Mt ouri are intere·ting
in thi: ·u1111ectioJ1 . Ju E te. v. D no\· r
hle 'o. ( 1900), 155 .i\lo. -77, f>6 :.· \\'.
:J 1 ·;, the court saiJ : "The p ition, how•\·er, wa · ub111>.·iuu: to a .alut.1n· rnle 11f

ple:uliug which '" ou!J liav. r .;,d >1· , it
1, ble
o d murrcr if the demurr ·r Jin.
'<1\ ·r ·d that f<•atu1 .
Th def ·t ill the
p•·titi•m i that it
t. ou the coutract
:u ·d on i11 !teer. t'NIJfl in ·tead of 111 atli11g
·t liy it l gal
ff'cct. That form of
pl :uli11g i.· to he con ·iclererl non ti l
lia.! liec: u ·e it i · not of uncommon )Jrac-

tice even among learued law. ·er. The
rules of good pleading requir that the
in tr ument relied on ho ul d be pleaded by
it legal effect, which requirem nt is not
fo r mere form, but r e t on sub tau ti al
rea on. The pleading i addre ed to
the court and hould tate the pleader'
theory of hi ca e, not leaving it to the
court to con ·truct a theory a best it may
from the evidence et out, and not leaving hi adverary in the dar k a to what
the theory advanced i , or what const ruction the pleader put upon hi contract.
It i not a conte t in which the combatant may catch a they can. If the contract i inartificially drawn
that its
meaning or eff ct i ob cure, i i all the
more importaut that the pleat! r a hancing it houlrl tak the r pon ibility of
tating it legal ffect , l a,·iucr the in ·trumcnt it elf to be u e<l ru eYid 11<: , whi ·I
i. it ouly ffi ·e."
nd in th
till lat r
ca of l ill: v. nll n ( 1900) 159 ~fo.
322, 60 ::;. \Y. 1:26, thecvurt aid thata petition '' hich all ell a coutrnd m hrec i•erba
i u,,t a!l f L.\' it I gal ffett left ti e i ue
mwertai11, t i.at th· ·u l i-:.· tem of pleading furni~:d1etl DCJ authority for . Ul'h unc rtai11ty, a11cl that uch a petition won!J b
h<·l1l had on d rnurr r ou the groui d that
it Ii I not tate fa l con tituting a cau e
factio n.]
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express, and in fact no form of common-law action provided for

a recovery upon an implied promise ; in every case of assumpsit,

either general or special, on the common counts or otherwise, the

defendant was represented as having expressly promised. For a

considerable period of time after the invention of assumpsit,

undoubtedly the contracts enforced by its means were all express,

so that the averment of the declaration accorded with the actual

transaction between the parties, as shown by the evidence. In

the course of time, however, cases were brought before the courts,

in which the right of action on the one hand, and the liability to

pay on the other, depended upon a moral and equitable duty of

the defendant, arising, not from any promise made by him, but

from the acts, circumstances, and relations existing between him

and the plaintiff. The courts were thus placed in a dilemma.

The obligation of the defendant and the right of the plaintiff

were founded upon the plainest principles of equity and justice,

and to deny their existence was impossible. Still, there was no

action directly appropriate for their enforcement. None of the

actions ex delicto could be used, since there was no tort; debt
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was also out of the question, because the amount claimed was

unliquidated damages ; even assumpsit was not applicable, for

there was no promise. In this emergency the English judges

were true to their traditions, and to all their modes of thought.

Instead of inventing a new action, and applying it to the new

class of facts and circumstances, they reversed the order, and

applied the facts and circumstances to the already existing

actions. They fell back upon their invariable resource, the use

of fictions; but went farther than ever before or since; and,

instead of inventing a fictitious element in the action, they

actually added a fictitious feature to the facts and circumstances

from which the legal right and duty arose. They selected the

existing action of assumpsit as the one to be employed in such

classes of cases ; and since that action is based upon a promise,

and since the declaration must invariably allege a promise to

have been made, the early judges, instead of relaxing this re-

quirement of pleading, actually added the fictitious feature of

a promise which had never been made to the facts which con-

stituted the defendant's liability. In other words, the courts

invented the notion of an implied promise, in order that the

cases of liability and duty resulting from certain acts, omissions.

express, and in fact no form of common-law acti n provicl cl for
a r covery upon an implied promi ; in every ca e of a .. ump it,
either general or p ci, 1, on the common aunt' or otherwi e, the
defendant was r presented a having expr , ·] prorni ed. For a
con:::;id rable period of time after th inv nlion of assump it,
undoubtedly the contracts enforced by its m ans were all expr s
so that th . averment of the declaration accorded wi h the actual
tran action between the parties, as shown by the evidence. ; In
the course of time, however, ca e were brought before the court ,
in which the right of action on the one hand, and the liability to
pay on the other, depended upon a moral and equitable duty of
the defendant, arising, not from any promise made by him, but
from the acts, circumstances, and relations existing between him
and tbe plaintiff. The courts were thus placed in a dilemma.
The obligation of the defendant and the right of the plaintiff
were founded upon the plainest principles of equity and justice,
and to deny their existence was impossible. Still, there was no
action directly appropriate for their enforcement. None of the
.actions ex delicto could be used, since there was no tort; debt
was also out of the question, because the amount claimed was
unliquidated damages; even assumpsit was not applicable, for
there was no promise. In this emergency the English judges
were true to their traditions, and to all their modes of thought.
Instead of inventing a new action, and applying it to the new
class of facts and circumstances, they reversed the order, and
applied the facts and circumstances to the already existing
actions. They fell back upon their invariable resource, the u e
of fictions; but went farth er than ever before or since; and,
instead of inventing a fictitious element in the action, they
actually added a fictitious feature to the facts and circumstances
from which the legal right and duty arose. They selected the
existing action of assumpsit as the one to be employed in such
classes of cases; and since that action is based upon a promi e,
and since the declaration mu t invariably allege a promise to
have been made, the early judges, instead of relaxing this requirement of pleading, actually added the fictitious feature of
a promise which had never been made to the facts which constituted the defendants liability. In other 'vord , the court
invented the notion of an implied promise, in order that the
cases of liability and duty resulting from certain acts, omis ion·,
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or relations wliere there had been no promise, might be brought

within the action of assumpsit, and be tried and determined by

its means. There is no more singuhir and instructive incident

than this in the whole history of the English law, and it has a

most direct and important connection with the practical rules of

pleading under the reformed procedure of the codes. We see

that the notion of an implied promise as the ground of recovery

in these cases of moral and equitable duty did not exist prior to

and independent of the action which was selected as the proper

instrument for its enforcement; on the contrar}', the action

already existed the distinguishing feature of which Avas the

allegation of a promise made by the defendant, and a fictitious

or " implied " promise was invented and superadded to the actual

facts constituting the defendant's liability, for the simple pur-

pose of bringing his case within the operation of that action and

its formal averment.^

1 It would be both interesting and in-

structive to trace this doctrine of implied
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promises tlirouu;h the whole series of

cases, from its first suggestion as a fiction

of pleading until it became firmly incor-

porated into the general theory of con-

tracts; l)Ut my limits will not permit such

or r la i n wher there had been no promi e mi ht b brought
wi bin the action of a ump it and be tri d and d t rmined by
inci nt
i m , n . There i no more in ular an l in ructi
than hi in the whole hi tory of the n li h law and it ha a
mo t lir ct :: nd import nt connecti n ith th practical rul of
pl adin 0 und r the ref rmed I rocedure of the ode . \V
that the no i n of an implied Ir mi a the gr und of r cover '
in the e ca e of moial an equitable duty did n t xi t pri r t
and independ nt of th
tion which a el ct d a th pr p r
in rument for i t enf r emen ; n th
n rary the action
alrea l exi t d th di ingui bing f ature of which was th
alle ati n of a romi e mad by th def ndant, and a fictitiou
or implied'' promi e a invented and superadd to the actual
fact con ~ tituting the defendant · liability, for the imple urpo"e of brin ing hi ca e within the operation of that ction and
it formal averment. 1

an excursion. I quote, however, the con-

clusions reached by Judge Metcalf in his

exceedingly able work upon Contracts, as

an authority for the position taken in the

text. After an analysis of numerous early

cases, he says : " As there will be no occa-

sion to advert hereafter to the fictions

adopted in setting forth the plaintiff's

claim in declarations in the action of as-

sumpsit, it may not be amiss to present a

succinct view of those fictions, and of the

reasons on which they are founded. The

usual action on a simple contract in old

times was debt. The declaration in that

action averred in substance that the de-

fendant owed the plaintiff, and thereupon

an action had accrued, etc. No promise

was alleged, for no promise was necessary.

But the defendant was allowed to wage

hifl law. To avoid this wager of law, a

new form of action was devised, to wit,

the action of assumpsit, in which a prom-

ise of the defendant was alleged, and was

indispensable. A dedaraticjn which did

not aver sucli prornise was insuflficient

even after verdict ; and the law is the

same at this day. The promise declared

on is always taken to be express. In

pleading, there is no such thing as an im-

plied promise. But as no new rule of evi-

dence was required in order to support

the new action of assumpsit, it being

necessary only to prove a debt, as was

necessary when the action was debt, the

fictitious doctrine of an implied promise

was introduced ; and for the sake of legal

conformity it was held, when the defend-

ant's legal liability was proved, that the

law presumed that he had ])romised to do

what the law made him liable to do. . . .

A single example will illustrate these

two fictions Qhe author had described the

kindred fiction of an (implied) request

alleged to have been made.] A husband

is bound by law to support his wife ; and

1 It would be both intere ting and in ·
tructi,·e to trace thi. doctrine of implied
promi ·e through the whole series of
ca e·, from it fir t ugge tion a a fiction
of pie ding until it became firmly incor·
porated into the general theory of con·
tract"; but m.r limit will not permit uch
a.u excur. ion. I quote however, the con ·
clu ion reached by Judge Metcalf in his
exceedingly able work upon ontract , as
an authority for the p ition taken in the
text. After an analy i of numerou early
ca e· , he ay : " A there will be no occa·
ion to ad ''ert hereafter to the fiction
adopted in etting forth the plaintiff'·
claim in declarations in the a tion of a ump it, it may not be ami to pre ent a
uccinct view of those fi ction , and of the
rea on on which they are founded. Th e
u ual action on a imple contract in old
time was debt. The declarati n in that
action averred in ub tance that th de·
fendant owed the plaintiff, aud thereupon
an action had accrued, etc.
pro mi ·e
wa alleged, fo r no promi wa n c ' ary .
But the defendant w allowed t wage
h. law. To avoid thi wa r of law, a
new form of action wa · devi,ed, to wit,
th ction of ru ump it, in whi h a promo( th dcfendaot wa alleged, an d w
ble. A declar:i.tiou whi h did
not aver uch promi e w
io ufficieot
T

eveu after verdict; and the law i the
ame at thi day. The promi e declared
on i alway taken to be expre. . Io
pleadin cr there i no uch thing a an im·
plied promi e. But a no new rule of eYidence was required in ord er to upport
the new a ction of a ·ump it, it being
n ece sary nly to prove a debt, as wa
nece ary when the action wa deht, ·the
fictitiou do trine f an implied prorni e
wa introdueed ; and for the ake of le al
conformity it wa held, when the d fendant' legal liability wa proved, that the
law pre urned t hat he had pr mi ed to do
what the law made him liable to do . . . .
A ingle example will illu trate the e
two fktion [th author had d cribed the
kindred fiction of an (implied) r que t
allerred to ha1· been made.] A hu band
i · bo und by law to .. upport hi wif ; c nd
if h wron full_ di card her, any p r ·on
may furni h upport to her, and r co,· r
pay ther f r of the hu band. In th
tion f debt, th re would be n nee
to all ge a promi e in ·uch a ase.
ut
the hu. band might wage hi law, and d fraud the plaintiff. In the a tion of as·
ump it, th furni hino- f the uppli e
mu t h alle" d to have b en by the
plain iff at the hu baod reque t, and a
prom i. e of th hu band to pay must a\so
I e all ged. But proof of th actual fact.!>
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§ 407. * 513. Outline of Proposed Discussion o'f Reformed Pro-

cedure. Having thus described the thiee types of pleading in

existence when the reformed procedure was inaugurated, I now

proceed to examine the system introduced by that procedure

itself. In pursuing this investigation, 1 shall endeavor, firsts to

ascertain the essential and general principles upon which it is

founded; secondly^ to determine the manner in which the plain-

tiff should set forth the affirmative subject-matter of the action

in his complaint or petition; and thirdly, to apply the results

thus reached to the most important and common instances of

action and remedy. Although I shall aim at a close conformity

with the true spirit and intent of the statutory legislation, yet

this intent will be sought for in the decided cases which have

given a judicial interpretation to the codes. It must be conceded

at the outset that there is an irreconcilable conflict between two

classes of decisions, not only in mere matters of detail, but in

their whole course of reasoning, in the premises which they

assume, and in the conclusions which they draw therefrom.

But this conflict was, in by far the greater part of the States,
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confined to the earlier periods of the reform, and has virtually

disappeared. There is a substantial agreement among the courts

in respect to the general principles which they have finally

adopted: whatever differences now exist arise in the process of

applying these fundamental doctrines to particular cases. The

confusion which actually prevails to a very great extent in sev-

eral of the States results not from any uncertainty either in the

general principles or in the more subordinate rules, but from an

entire ignorance or disregard of them by pleaders, and from a

neglect to enforce them by the judges.

§ 408. * 514. Two Theories as to the Relation between the New

and Old Systems. Before entering upon the matter thus outlined

a preliminary question suggests itself, upon the answer to which

much of the succeeding discussion must turn. This question

supports both these allegations. The in an action to enforce such a liability

husband, being in law liable to pay, is under the codes, the plaintiff should, in

held to have (impliedly) made both the addition to the actual facts from which

request and the promise." Metcalf on the defendant's liabilitj- arises, also allege

Contracts, pp. 203, 204. This origin of a promise to have been made by him.

the implied promise, of its invention as a The promise was simply a formal inci-

liction in order to bring the case within dent of the particular action in the old

the operation of " assumpsit " throws a system, and is certainly no more than auch

strong light upon the question, whether, an incident in the new.

§

51 3. Outline of Proposed Discussion of Re fo r m ed P ro cedure. Having thu d crib d the thr
typ · f pleading in
exi tence wb n the r formed proc dur wa inaugurat ed, I now
proce d to examin e the y t ern introduced by tl1at · proc dur
it elf. In pur uing thi inve tigation, I hall end avor, fir t, to
a certa.in the essential and general principl s upon which it i
fo unded; econdly, to determine the manner in which the plaintiff hould et forth the affirmative ubject-matter of the act ion
jn bi complaint or petition; and thirdly, to apply th e re ul t
thu reached to the most important and common in tanc
f
action and remedy. Although I shall aim at a clo e conformity
with the true spirit and intent of the statutory legis]ation, yet
this intent will be. sought for in the decided ca e which have
given a judicial interpretation to the codes. It mu t be concedeJ
at the outset that there is an irreconcilable conflict between two
classes of decisions, not only in mere matters of detail, but in
their whole course of reasoning, in the premises which they
assume, and in the conclusions which they draw th erefrom.
But thi conflict was, in by far the greater part of the State ,
confined to the earlier periods of the reform, and has virtually
disappeared. There is a substantial agreement among the courts
in _respect to the general principles which they have finally
adopted: whatever differences now exist arise in the process of
applying these fundamental doctrines to particular cases. The
confusion which actually prevails to a very great extent in several of the States results not from any uncertainty either in the
general principles or in the more subordinate rules, but from an
en tire ignorance or distegard of them by pleaders, and from a
neglect to enforce them by the judges.
§ 408. * 514. Two Theories as to the Relation between the New
and Old Systems. Before enterfr1g upon the matter thus outlined
a preliminary question suggests itself, upon the an wer to which
much of the succeeding discussion must turn. This question
407 .

upports both these allegations.
The
husband, being in law liable to pay, is
held to have (impliedly) made both the
request and the promise." Metcalf on
Contract , pp. 203, 20-!. This origin of
the implied promise, of its invention as a
fiction in order to bring the case within
the operation of "assump it" throws a
strong light upon the question, whether,

in an acti on to enforce such a liability
under the codes, the plaintiff should, in
addition to the actual facts from which
the defendant's liability arises, also all ege
a promise to have been made by him.
The promi e was imply a formal incident of the particular action in the old
system, and is certainly no more than such
an iucident in the new.
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involves the true relations between the doctrines and rules of

pleading enacted by the codes and those which existed previously

as parts of the common law and the equity jurisprudence, and

may be stated as follows: Are the doctrines and rules contained

in the statute to be regarded as the sole guides in pleading under

the reformed procedure? or are the ancient methods still con-

trolling, except when inconsistent with some express provisions

of the later legislation? In answering this inquiry, the two

schools of interpretation so often mentioned again appear, and

the difference between them is the same as that already described

under a somewhat altered shape. It is plain that the position

taken by the courts, in answering the question here suggested,

must to a very great extent influence the wliole body of practical

rules which they adopt in reference to pleading as well as to all

the other features of the civil action. According to one theory,

these doctrines and rules of the common law and of equity still

remain, although changed in many particulars by the reform

legislation : the pleader must first recur to them, and must then

examine how far their requirements have been abrogated or
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altered by the statute; in a word, the legislation is purely

amendatory, and is not reconstructive. According to the other

theory, these doctrines and rules of the common law and of

equity do not exist at all as authoritative and controlling, — that

is, as controlling because rules of the common law or of equity.

The general principles and fundamental requirements of the

codes have been substituted in their place, completely abrogating

them, and constituted by the legislature as the only sources of

authority to the bench and the bar in shaping the details of the

reformed procedure. If any particular doctrine or rule which

formerly prevailed is also found existing to-day, it so exists not

because it is a part of the common law or of the equity system,

but because it is either expressly or impliedly contained in and

enacted by the reformator}' statute. When, therefore, in dis-

cussing and interpreting such a doctrine, a resort is had to the

former methods for aid, the reference is, not to obtain authority,

but to liiid an analogy or explanation. In other words, the

system introduced by the codes is regarded as complete in itself,

entirely displacing the ancient modes. In several particulars,

however, its doctrines and rules are either identical with or

closely reseiuljle those which existed before; and, in tlioir judi-

in olv the rue
of
1 ·i lin
part f h
ma' b
in th
1 0 uid s in pl adin un<l r
the r formed proc dur ? or are th ancient methods till
ntr llin , _rcep when incon i t n \\·ith 'Om xpre prov1 iow
of h later 1 ·i lation? In an ·w rin
hi inquir;, the two
h ols of int rpreta ion
ften m n ion cl again appear, and
th cliff rence bet\ een th m is the ame a hat already d crib d
uncler a om what altered hape. I · j plain that the po ]tion
tak n b he court , in an wering th qu ion here ug
t d
mu ... t o a ver reat extent influence the whole body f l ra ical
rul 'i bich they adopt in referen e to pl ading as w 11 a
all
the other feature of the civil action . According to one tl eory,
the e do trine and rules of the common law and f equit till
rema.in, although changed in many particulars by the r f rm
legi lation: the pleader mu t first recur to them, and mu t l n
ex mine how far their requirement have been a r gated or
alt r d by the statute; in a word, the legislation is pur ly
amendat ry, and is not reconstructi e. According to the oth r
theory h
'd octrines and rules of the common law and of
equi y do not exi tat all as authoritative and controlling, - tha
i ' a c ntrolling because rules of the common law or of
quit .
The
neral principles and fundam ntal r quirement
f the
cod have been sub titute l in th ir pla
mplet ly a rogating
th rn an l con tituted by the legi lature a the only ur
f
a tbority to th b nch and the bar in baping tl e letai1 f the
reformed proc <lure. If an par icular d trine r rul whi b
fo merl ' prevailed i al o f und xi ting to-da it o
bet:au it i a part of h
mmon law or f h
quit
· t m
hut b cau it i
i ·her expr ly r irn1 li lly on ain l in an l
""nact l by th r f rma r3 ' tatut .
Vh n h r f r
in Ii ·u. ' iu anc.l int rpr ting u h a d rin . a r
r i l ul
h
fmm ·r rn th 1 for aid h r f r nc i. n t
but to foul an c nalog
ph na ion . In
.·: t<·m introduc l by th
i: r crar 1 tl a.
·utir ly cli ·pla ·ing th an i nt mod ~ .
Ji 1w ·vf'r, it: <loctrin
a1 cl rnl . , r
·I(). ·l · I'•·: ·mlJl ~ lios wl1i ·11
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cial construction, recourse must })C had by way of explanation

and analogy merely to these original forms, but no such recourse

is to be had for the purpose of obtaining the authority for any

proposed measure or practical regulation connected with the

pleading under the new procedure.

§ 409. * 515. The Theory generally Adopted. During the ear-

lier periods of the present system, there was an evident disposi-

tion on the part of some judges and courts to adopt the former

of these two views, and to hold that the old methods, rules, and

requisites of the common law and of equity, are still applicable

in substance when not inconsistent wdth the provisions cf the

statute; or, in other words, that they had been supplanted only

so far as such inconsistency extends. ^ The second theory has,

however, been generally if not universally adopted as the true

interpretation to be put upon the language of the codes, and as

the starting-point in the work of constructing a system of prac-

tical rules for pleading. The proposition, as stated in the fore-

going paragraph, has been expressly announced in well-considered

judgments ; in the vast majority of instances, however, it has
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rather been assumed and impliedly contained in the decision of

the court, yet none the less passed upon and affirmed. It may

now, I think, be regarded as the established doctrine, that the

code in each of the States is the only source of authority from

which rules of pleading may be drawn, that its methods have

completelj' supplanted those which preceded it, so that the latter

can no longer be appealed to as possessing of themselves any

force and authority. ^

§ 410. *516. Essential Principles of Reformed System of Plead-

ing. Introductory. I shall now proceed to gather from the text

of the codes, as interpreted by the most authoritative decisions,

and to state in order, the comparatively few general and essen-

tial principles of pleading introduced by the reformed procedure,

1 See Howard v. Tiffany, 3 Sandf. 695 ; 2 School Sec. Trs. v. Odlin, 8 Ohio St.

Fry V. Bennett, 5 Sandf. 54 ; McMaster v. 293 ; Jolly v. Terre Haute Drawbr. Co., 9

Booth, 4 How. Pr. 427 ; Rochester City lud. 421 ; White i-. Joy, 13 N. Y. 83, 90;

Bank v. Suydara, 5 How. Pr. 216 ; Woodeii People v. Ryder, 12 N. Y. 433, 438, 439 ;

V. Waffle, 6 How. Pr. 145 ; Buddiugtou Ahern v. Collins, 39 Mo. 145, 150. See

V. Davis, 6 How. Pr. 401 ; Houghton v. also Clark v. Bates, 1 Dak. 42 ; Clay Cy.

Townsend, 8 How. Pr. 447 ; Boyce v. v. Simonsen, 1 id. 403, 430 ; Scott v.

'Brown, 7 Barb. 80 ; Knowles v. Gee, Robards, 67 Mo. 289 ; Dunn v. Remington,

8 Barb. 300 ; Bank of Genesee v. Patchin 9 Neb. 82 ; lugle v. Jones, 43 Iowa, 286.

Bank, 13 N. Y. 309, 313.

cial construction, recours mu t b had by way f exr lanation
and analo1:;Y m rely to th e original f rm , but no u h r ourse
i to b ha,d for the purpose f obtaining the authority for any
propo e 1 rnea ure or practical r gulation onn ct d with the
pl ading under th n w pro clur .
409. ,i; 515. The Theory generally Adopted. During th
arli r period of the pre ent ·y ·t 111, there \nl.... an Yident cli:-.po ition on the part of some judge' and courts to ad >pt the funner
f the e two view , and to holc.l that the old rn tl od ·, rule , and
r qui ite of the common law and of equity, are still applicaule
in ub. tance when not incon i tent with the proYi 'ions d the
tatute; or, in other words, that they bad IJ en ur planted only
o far a uch inconsistency extends . 1 The second theory ha ,
howeyer, been generally if not uni versally adopted as the true
interpretation to be put upon the language of the cocle , and as
the starting-point in the work of con tructing a y tern of prac tical rul es for pleading. The proposition, as stated in the fore going paragraph, has been expressly announced in well-considered
judgments; in the vast majority of instances, however, it has
rather been assumed and impli edly contained in the decision of
the court, yet n one the less passed upon and affirmed. It may
now, I think, be regarded as the established doctrine, that the
code in each of the States is the only source of authority from
which ru les of pleading may be drawn, that its methods haye
completely supplanted those which preceded it, so that the latter
can no longer be appealed to as pos essing of them elves any
force and authority . 2
§ 410. * 516 . Essential Principles of Reformed System of Pleading. Introductory. I shall now proceed to gather from the text
of the codes, as interpreted by the most autboritati Ye decisions,
and to state in order, the comparatively few general and es ential principles of pleading introduced by the reformed proced ur ,
1

See Howard v. Tiffany, 3 andf. 695;
Fry v. Bennett, 5 Sandf. 54; McMaster v.
Booth, 4 How. Pr. 42i ; Roche ter City
Bank v. uydam, 5 How. Pr. 21 6; Wooden
v. Waffie, 6 How. Pr. l4fi; Buddington
v. Davi , 6 How. Pr. 401 ; Houghton v.
Towusen<l, 8 How. Pr. 447; Boyre v.
Brown, 7 Barb. 80; Knowles v. Gee,
8 Barb. 300; Bank of Genesee v. Patchin
Bank, 13 N. Y. 309, 313.

School Sec. Tr . i" Odlin, Ohio t.
Jolly i ·. Terre Haute Drawbr. o., 9
Ind. 421; White v. Joy, 13 . Y. 3, 90;
People v. Ryder, 12 N. Y. 433, 4:3 , 439;
Ahern v. Collin , 39 Mo. 145, 150. See
also Clark v. Bate , 1 Dak. 42; lay Cy.
v. 'imonsen, l id. 403, 430; cott v.
Robards, 67 Mo. 289; Dunn v. Remin gton,
9 eb. 82; Iugle v. Jone , 43 Iowa, 286.
2

~93;

T
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which constitute the foundation of its simple, natural, and scien-

tific as well as practical system. These essential principles apply

to certain classes of answers in addition to all complaints or

petitions, although from the nature of the two pleadings the}^

find their fullest and highest expression in the latter. Whenever

the answer is simply in the form of denial, whether general or

specific, it is of course governed by rules applicable to it alone.

But so far as the answer contains defences of new matter, and

a fortiori so far as it contains a counter-claim, or set-off, or the

l)a8is of any affirmative relief, its allegations and those of the

complaint or petition must conform to the same requirements,

must follow the same method. The general and essential prin-

ciples of the reformed pleading now to be discussed, illustrated,

and arranged in an orderly manner, apply therefore alike to the

plaintiffs statement of his case for relief, and to the defendant's

statement of affirmative matter, either by way of defences in con-

fession and avoidance, or by way of cross-demands against any

parties to the action.

§ 411. *ol7. Manner of Averring Material Pacts. The funda-
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mental and most important principle of the reformed pleading,

the one from which all the others are deduced as necessary

corollaries, is the following: The material facts which constitute

the ground of relief, or the defence of new matter (confession

and avoidance), should be averred as they actually existed or

took place, and not the legal effect or aspect of those facts, ^ and

1 \_Ph(uUnq according to Legal Efftct. according to their legal effect or as thev

The rule that facts should be averred as actually existed, at the option of the

they actually existed or took place, and pleader, and when the former mode is

not the legal effect or aspect of those adopted the oppo.site party may, if lie is

facts, is not universally sustained by the ignorant of the exact facts, demand a bill

cases. Thus the Supreme Court of Mi.s- of particulars or move to make more

Houri, in several recent cases, has taken definite and certain. New York News Pub-

the other view, holding that a contract lishing Co. v. Steamship Co. (1893), 148

should be alleged, not in hcEC verba, but N. Y. .39, 42 N. E. 514. So, in Kentucky,

according to its legal effect. Estes v. in Brady v. Peck (1896), 91» Ky. 42, 34

Desnoyers Shoe Co. (1900), 15.t Mo. 577, S. W. 906, it was held to be immaterial

\Yhi ch c I ·titute th fo un lation of it imr 1 natur, 1 , n l :ci nti c , w 11 a' practical y t m. Th
ntial princiJ?l , ap}Jly
t
rt in
f an w r in addition to all complaint or
p i i n although fr m he nature f the two pl ading th y
fi nJ th ir full t and highe
x re ion in th latter. Wh n y r
th an
r i simply in the f rm f d nial, wb her g neral or
speci.tic it i of cour e go erned by rul applicable to it alon .
But o far a the an w r c ntain def nces of new matt r an l
a fortiori o far as it contains a count r-claim or set-off or the
f any affirmati e relief it all gati ns and tho e of h
complaint or pe ition mu t conf rm to the same requir m nt ,
must f llow he ame method. The general and e ential principles of the r formed pleading now to be discussed illu trat d
and arranged in an ord rly rnann r apply therefor alik to th
laintiff ' tatement of bis cas for reli f, and to the d f n lant'
ta,1-ement of affirmative matter, either b wa of defence in conf . ion and avoidance, or by way of ro s-demand again t an •
ar ie to th action.
411. * 517. Manner of Averring Material Facts. The fundamental and mo t important principle of the reform d pl a in ,
the one from which all the others are deduced a n ce ar ·
corollarie , i. the following: Th material fac which con ti tut
the ground of reli f, or the def nee of new matter (conf ion
and avoi lan ) should be averr d a they actually xi ed or
took pl , and not the legal effect or aspect of those fact 1 an

56 S. \V. .316; Heilly v. Cullen (1900), whether an averment of a covenant be iu

159 Mo. 322, 60 S. W. 126; Anderson v. the words used in the deed or according to

Gaines (1900), 156 Mo. 604, 57 S. W. 726. the force and effect which the statute gives

See note to § * 511, where the fir.st two to the words. See also, to the .same effect,

cases are quoted from at length. An older More i;. Elmore County Irr. Co. ( 1 893), 3

case, Nichols v. Nichols (1896), 134 Mo. Idaho, 729, 35 Pac. 171 ; Porter i'. Allen

187, 35 S. W. 577, on the contrary, quoted (1902), — Idaho, — , 69 Pac. 105 ; Matthie-

the text with approval. In New York, sen v. Arata (1897), 32 Ore. 342, 50 Pac.

also, it is held that facts may be alleged 1015; Blaine v. Knapp & Co (1897), 140

I [Pleading accord ing to L egal Effect.
according to their legal effect or a they
The rul that facts should be averred a
actually xi ted, at the option of the
t hey actually exi ted or took place, and pleader, and when the former mod i
not th e legal eff ct or aspect of tho e adopted the oppo ite party may if he i
fact , i not uni ver ally u tam ed by the ign orant of the exact fact , d manJ a bill
ase . Thu t he upreme Court of ii - of particulars or move t make more
uri , in ev ral r ecent ca e , ha taken de finite and certain. I ew Y rk T w i~ ub
th oth r ''iew, holding that a contra ct li hiug o. -i:. teamsbip o. 1 95) , 14
hou lrt be al leged, not in hrec verba, but
. Y . 39, 42 N . E. 514.
o, in K nt ur ky,
accordi ag to it legal ffect.
E te v. in Brady v. eek ( I 96) , 99 Ky. 42, 3+
De noy r . hoe Co. (1900 ), 155 l o. 577 ,
. W . 906 , it wa b Id to b immat rial
56 '. W. 316; l illy v. ull en ( 1900), ' heth r an a'"erm nt of a venant b in
I 59 :\Io. 322, 60 , W . l 26; A nder on v. t h word u ed in th <l e<l or accord i n ~ to
;aiae. (1900), 156 Mo. 664, 5i .' . W. / _6. the fo rce a nd eff ct whi h tli . tat u t O'iv e
ee note to § 5 11 , where the fir t two to the word .
e al
to the ~ a tn ff ·t,
ra c are quot cl from at length. An older More v. El more oun ty Irr. o. ( I 93) , 3
ca! , • ichols v. • 'ichol ( 1 96 ), 134 :\lo. I daho, 729, 35 Pac. 171 ; Porter t'. lien
J i, 35 . \ . 57 , on th contrary, quot cl (1 902), - I dah , - , 69 Pac. 105; :\fatthi the t xt with approval. I n ew York, ·en v. Arata ( 1 97), 32 Or . 3.J.2, 5 l , c.
~il:o, it is h ·l<l that facts may L alleg cl
1015; Bl aine v. E: uapp & o (1 97), 140

-
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not the mere eviJ nee or probativ

543

matter by which th

ir

xi. t-

not the mere evidence or probative matter by which their exist-

Mo. 241, 41 S. W. 787; Nelson v. Great

Northern Ky. Co. (1903), 28 Mont.297, 72

Pac. 642. See also §§ * 74 et seq. See alio

South Milwaukee Co. v. Murphy (1902),

112 Wis. 614, 88 N. W. 583, where it was

held that the performance of conditions

precedent might he alleged according to

their legal effect, but solely by reason of

the statute.

Exhibits. Another method of pleading

a written instrument is to attach the same

to the pleading as an exhibit, but diffc^r-

ent rules prevail in different jurisdictions

as to the precise function of such exhibits.

In some States the exhibit is considered a

part of the pleading for all purposes, and

may be looked to in considering the suffi-
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ciency of the pleading : Elliot v. Roche

(1896), 64 Minn. 482, 67 N. W. 539;

Realty Revenue, etc. Co. v. Farm, etc.

Co. (1900), 79 Minn. 465, 82 N. W. 857 ;

Union Sewer Pipe Co. v. Olson (1901), 82

Minn. 187, 84 N. W. 756 ; Cox v. Henry

(1901), 113 Ga. 259, 38 S. K. 856; South-

ern Mut. Ins. Co. V. Turnley (1896),

100 Ga. 296, 27 S. E. 975 ; Walters v.

Eaves (1898), 105 Ga. 584,32 S. E. 609;

Reed v. Equitable Trust Co. (1902),

115 Ga. 780, 42 S. E. 102; Savan-

nah Ry. Co. V. Hardin (1900), 110 Ga.

433, 35 S. E. 681); Fitch j;. Applegate

(1901), 24 Wash. 25, 64 Pac. 147 ; Haj's v.

Dennis (1895), 11 Wash. 360, 39 Pac. 658

(recommending that the better practice is

to state a cause of action in the body of

the complaint without reference to ex-

hibits) : New Idea Pattern Co. v. Whelan

(1903), 75 Conn. 455, 53 Atl. 953; Cran-

mer v. Kohn (1898). 11 S. D. 245, 76

N. W. 937; First Nat. Bank ;•. Dakota

Fire Ins. Co. { 1894), 6 S. D. 424, 61 N. W.

439 ; Davison v. Gregory (1903), 132 N. C.

389, 43 S. E. 910; Stephens v. Am. Fire

Ins. Co. (1896), 14 Utah, 265, 47 Pac. 83 ;

Hudson !•. Scottish Union Ins. Co. (1901),

110 Ky. 722, 62 S. W. 513; Porter v.

Allen (1902), — Idaho —, 69 Pac. 105.

See also Am. Freehold Co. v. McManus

(1900), 68 Ark. 263, 58 S. W, 250.

In Nebraska an exhibit is considered a

part of the pleading only when it consists

of an instrument for the unconditional

payment of money only : First Nat. Bank

V. Engelbercht (1899), 58 Neb. 639, 79

N. W. 556 ; Lincoln Mortgage & Trust Co.

V. Ilutchins (1898), 55 Neb. 158, 75 N. W.

538 ; Home Fire Ins. Co. v. Arthur (1896),

48 Neb. 461, 67 N. W. 440 ; Holt County

Rank v. Holt Co. ('1898), 53 Neb. 827, 74

N. W. 259.

In Indiana an exhibit is deemed a part

of the pleading only when the iu.strument

is one upon whicli the action is founded:

Thompson v. Recht (1902), 158 Ind. 302,

63 N. E. 569 ; First Nat. Bank v. Greger

(1901), 157 Ind. 479, 62 N. E. 21 ; Bird v.

St Johns Episcopal Church (1899), 154

Mo. 241, 41 . W. 7 7; Ne! on v. Great
North rn Ry.
. {1903), 2 Mont.297, 72
Pa•. 642.
ee also§§* 74 et seq. See al10
outh Milwauke
o. v. Murphy {1902),
112 Wi . 614,
. W. 5 3, where it was
h ld that the performance of conditions
precedent might be alleg d according to
their l gal eff ct, but olely by reason of
the statute.
Exhibits. Another method of pleading
a written instrument i · to attach the same
to the pleading as an exhibit, but difi rent rules preYail in different juris<liction ·
as to the precise function of suc·h exhib its.
In some tates the exhibit is considered a
part of th e pleading for all purposes, and
may be looked to in c nsidering the sufficiency of the pleading: Elliot v. R oche
(1896), 64 Minn. 482, 67 N. W. 539;
Realty Revenue, etc. Co. v. Farm, etc.
Co. (1900), 79 Minn. 465, 82 N. W. 857;
Union ewer Pipe Co. v. Olson (1901 ), 82
Minn.181,84 . W.756; Cox v. Henry
(1901), 113 Ga. 259, 38 S. E. 856; Southern Mut. Ins. Co. v. Turnley (1896),
100 Ga. 296, 27 S. E. 975; Walters v.
Eaves (1898), 105 Ga. 584, 32 S. E. 609;
Reed v. Equitable Trust Co. ( 1902),
115 Ga. 780, 42 S. E. 102; Savannah Ry. Co. v. Hardin (1900), 110 Ga.
433, 35 S. E. 68 I) ; :F itch v. Applegate
(1901 ), 24 Wash. 25, 64 Pac. 147; Hay i·.
Dennis {1895), 11 Wash. 360, 39 Pac. 658
(recommending that the better practice is
to state a cause of acti on in the body of
the complaint without reference to exhibits): New Idea Pattern C'o. v. Whelan
(1903), 75 Conn. 455, 53 Atl. 953; Cranmer v. Kohn (189 ). 11 S. D. 245, 76
N. W. 937; First Nat. Bank v. Dakota
Fire Ins. Co. ( 1894), 6 S. D. 424, 61 N. W.
439; Davison v. Gregory (1903), 132 . C.
389, 43 . E. 91 G; Stephen. v. Am. Fire
Ins. Co. (!89fi), 14 tah, 265, 47 Pac. 83;
Hudson v. Scottish Union In . Co. (1901),
110 Ky. 722, 62 S. W. 513; Porter L'.
Allen (1902), - Idaho - , 69 Pac. 105.
See al o Am. Freehold C'o. v. l\lcManu
(1900), 68 Ark. 263, 5
. W. 250.
In Nehra ka an exhibit is considered a
part of the pleading only when it consi ts
of an instrument for the unconditional
payment of money only: Fir t at. Bank
v. Engelbercht (1 99), 58 Neb. 639, 79

N. W. 556; Linc ln Mortgag & Tru t
v. Hutchin (1 9 ), 55 Neb. 15 , 75
53 ; Home Fir In . o. v. Arthur (1 9G )
4 Neu. 461, 67 N. W. 440; Holt ount
Bank v. Holt o. (1 9 ), 53 Neb. 27, 74.
N. W. 259.
In Indiana an xhibit is deemed a part
of the pleading only when the iu trum ut.
i oue u pou w hi h Lhc acti 0n i found cl :
Thompson v. Recht (1902), 158 Ind. 302 ,
63 K. E. 569; Fir t Nat. Bank v. Greger
11901 J, 157 Ind. 479, 62 N. E. 21 ; Birt! v.
• t Johns Episcopal hurch (1 99), l 54
lnd . 13 , 56 X K 129; Murphy v. Branaman (1900), 156 lnd. 77, 59 N. E. 274- ;
Indiana, etc. As 'n v. Plank (1 98) , 152
Ind. 197, 52 N. E. 991; Frankel v. :\1ichigan Mutual In . Co. (1902), 158 Ind . 304 ,
62 N. E. i03 ; Miller v. Botten berg
( 1895), l H Inll. 312, 41 :r. E. 804; Fitch
v. Byall (1897), 149 Ind. 554, 49 N. E .
455; Forbes i:. Union Central Life In ·.
Co. (1 98), 151 Ind. 9, 51
. E. 4 ;
Fuller v. Cox (1893), 135 Ind. 46, 34 N . E .
822.
The Indiana rule has been followed in
Oklahoma: First Nat. Bank v. Jon e
{1894 ), 2 Okla. :353, 37 Pac. 824; Duuham
v. Holloway (1 95), 3 Okla. 244, 41 S. W.
HO; Grimes v. Cullison (I 95), 3 Okla.
268, 41 s. w. 355.
On the other hand, ome courts haYe
held that the exhib it cannot aYail to aid
the averments of the pleading: Hickory
County v. Fugate (1 9 ), 143 Mo. 71, 44
S. W. 789 (see also Cooms Commi ·sion
Co. v. Block (1895}, 130 i\Jo. 66 , 32 . W.
1139); Estate of Cook (1902), 137 al.
1 4, 69 Pac. 1124 (may aid formal but
not . ubstantial defect ) ; Palmer i-. Lavigne (1894), 104 Cal. 30, 37 Pac. 7i5;
Saving Bank v. Burns (1 94), 104 Cal.
473, 38 Pac. 102) ; Cave v. Gill (1900) , 5!>
S. C. 256, 37 S. E. 1 7 (may aid formal
defects) ; Hartford Fire In . Co. v. l\ahu
(1893) , 4 Wyo. 364, 34 Pac. 895; Altemu
v. A her (1903), Ky., 74
. W. 24~
(where merely filed with and referred to
in a pleading). But e Gardner v. Continental Ins. Co. (1903), Ky., 75 . \Y.
2 3, where the ourt aid: "The rule i
that an exhibit will not ure a defective
pleading or supply averment omit ted in
the pleadiJJ:,: . Bnt it i also the rule that
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I have purpo ely r £rain c1 from u ing th

ence is established.^ I have purposely refrained from using the

iu a suit on a written contract, if the con-

tract sliows that no cau^e of action exists,

the court on demurrer will consider the

exhibit. In other words, wliile an exhibit

cannot niaiie a pleading good, it ma\' make

it bad."3

1 I'eople V. Ryder, 1 2 N. Y. 433, 487 ;

HiU V. Barrett, 14 B. Mon. 83 ; Green v.

Palmer, 15 Cal. 411, 414; Rogers r. Mil-

waukee, 13 Wis. CIO, GU ; Bird v. Mayer,

8 Wis. 362, 367 ; Horn v. Ludingtou, 28

Wis. 81, 83; Groves v. Tallman, 8 Xev.

178; Pier c. Ileinrichoffen, 52 Mo. 333,

335; Wills V. Wills, 34 Ind. 106, 107;

De Graw v. Elmore, 50 X. Y. 1 ; Cowin v.

Toole, 31 Iowa, 513, 516; Singleton v.

Scott, 11 Iowa, 589; Bowcn r. Aubrey, 22
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Cal. 566, 569 ; Pfiffner f. Krapfel, 28 Iowa,

27, 34 ; White v. Lyons, 42 Cal. 279, 282;

Louisville & P. Canal Co. v. Murphy, 9

Bush, 522, 527 ; Gates v. Salmon, 46 Cal.

361, 379; King r. Enterprise Ins. Co., 45

Ind. 43, 55; Lytle v. Lytle, 37 Ind. 281 ;

Van Schaick v. Farrow, 25 Ind. 310; Chi-

cago & S. W. R. Co. V. N. W. U. Packet

Co , 38 Iowa, 377, 382 ; Boweu v. Emmer-

son, 3 Ore. 452; Cline v. Cline, 3 Ore.

355, 358 ; Gates v. Gray, 66 N. C. 442,

443; Farron v. Sherwood, 17 N. Y. 227 ;

Coryell v. Cain, 16 Cal. 567, 571. The

opinion of Marvin J. in People r. Ryder is

exceedingly instructive, and covers most

of the subordinate questions that arise in

connection with the general topic. He

said (p. 437): "This rule (§ 142 of the

New York Code) is substantially as it ex-

isted, prior to its enactment, in actions at

law. Chitty says : ' In general, whatever

circumstances are necessary to constitute

the cause of complaint or ground of de-

fence must be stated in the pleadings, and

all beyond is surplusage ; facts only are

to be stated, and not arguments or infer-

ences or matter of law, in which respect

pleadings at law appear to differ materi-

ally from those in equity.' (1 Ch. PI. 245.)

At page 266 he says: 'It is a most im-

portant principle of the law of pleading,

that in alleging the fact it is unnecessary

to state such circumstances as tend to

prove the tnith of it. The dry allegation

of the fact, without detailing a variety of

minute circumstances whicli constitute the

evidence of it, will suffice. The object

of the pleadings is to arrive at a specific

issue upon a given and material fact ; and

that is attained although the evidence of

such fact to be laid before a jury be not

specifically developed in the pleadings.'

I have supposed it safe, and a compliance

with the code, to state the facts consti-

tuting the cause of action substantially in

the same manner iu which they were

stated in the old system in a special count.

By that system the legal issuable facts

were to be stated, and the evidence by

which those facts were to be established

iu • uit on a writt n contract, if the contract ·how· tbat u cau e f action exi t ,
the conrt on demurrer will con ider the
exhibit. In other word while an exhibit
anuot make a plea.ding good, it may make
it had."]
1 I eople v. Ryder, 12
. Y. 433, 4 7;
Hill t'. Barrett, 14 B. i\Ion. 3; Green l'.
Palmer, 15 al. 411, 414; Roger r . .Jlilwaukee, 13 \Yi ·. 61 O, 611; Bird t• . Mayer,
Wi ·. 362, 36i; Horn t'. Ludington, 2
\\'i ·. 1. 3;
roYe · r . Tallman,
Xev.
l i ; Pier r. II eiuri choffen, 5:. Mo. 333,
335. \Yill t'. '\,\ill ' 34 Intl. 106, 107;
D
raw v. Elmore, 50 K. Y. l ; owin i·.
Toole, 31 Iowa 513, 516; 'ingleton v.
cott, 11 Iowa, 5 9; Bowen r. Aubrey, 22
al. 566, 569; Pfiffner v. Krapfel, 2 Iowa,
27, 34 · \Ybi.te i:. Lyon , 42 Cal. 279, 2 2;
Loui ville & P. Canal Co. v. Murphy, 9
Bu, h, 522, 527; Gate r. , almon, 46 Cal.
361 3 i9; Kin v. Enterpri ·e Iu.. o., 45
Ind. 43, 55; Lytle v. Lytle, 37 Ind. 2 l ;
an chaick v. Farrow, 25 Ind. 310; Chicago & . W. R. Co. v. . W. U. Packet
o, 3 Iowa, 377, 3 2; Bowen t'. Emmeron, 3 Ore. 452; Cline v. Cline, 3 Ore..
355, 35 ; ate v. Gray, 66 N. C. 442,
443; Farron v. Sherwo cl, l i
Y. 227;
Coryell v. Cain, 16 Cal. 56 7, 5 i I. The
opinion of Marvin J. in People i·. Hyder i
exce dingly in ·tructive, and cover mo t
of the ubordinate que tions that ari e in
connection with the general topic. He
said (p. 437) : "Thi rule ( § 142 of the
New York Code) i ub tantiall.'· a it exi ted, prior to it enactment, in action. at
law.
bitty ay : 'Jn general whatever
circum tance are nece ary to coustitute
the cau ·e of complaint or ground of defence mu t be tated in the pleading , and
all beyond i urplu age; fact only are
to be tated, and not argument or inference or matter f law, in whi ch re:rect
pleading at law app ar to diff r mat rially from tho e in equity.' (l .h. Pl. 245.)
J\t page 266 he ~ay : 'It i. a mo~t importaut principle of th law of pl a.cling
that in alleging the fact it i unn ce. ~ ary
to ·ta P • uch cir um tance. a tenrl to
prm thP tl'U h f i . The dry allegation
f h fart, without detailing a Yari ty of
minute cirC'nm. tall<'e. which con titute the
virl nee of it, will uffice. Th object
T.

of the pleading i to arrive at a p cific
i ue upon a given anu mat rial fact; au cl
that i· attain d although the evidence f
uch fact t be laid before a jury be not
pecifically deYeloped in the pleading .'
I haYe uppo cd it afe, aud a c mpliance
with the cod , to tate the fa t c n tituting the cau e of action ub tantially in
the ame manner in which th y were
tatecl in the old y tern in a special count.
By that y tern the legal i uable fa t
were to be tated, and the e id nee by
which th e fact - were to be e. tabli-h d
wa to be brought forward upon th trial.
Thi positiou will not embrace what w re
known a. the commou count . . . . It has
been uppo ed that a wid r latitude ·hould
be allowed iu equity pleading:, and hat
e,·iden ·c may to ome extent be incorporated in the tatement. The rule of
the code i broad enough for all
e ;
and it p rmit a tatement of fa ·t and
circum, ta.lice · a. ontra<li tiuguishe<l from
the evidence whi-ch i to e. tabli h tho. e
fact . But in all equity ca c the fa ·ts
may be lllore nuruerou,., more
mplicat d, more inYoh·ed; and the pl ad r
may , tate aU the e fact in a 1 gal and
conci e form which on titute the ·ause
of action, aud entitle him to r el ief. '1 he
rule touchiug the statement of fact con·
tituting th can e of action i he ame
in all ·a ·es ; an<l th rule by whi ·Ii the
ufficiency of pleading i to be determined are pre cribecl by the code." Ilow
far the po ition. quoted from Ir. hitty
are correct i: hown in the precedit10'
paragraph of thi. . ection. .i:To m r accurate expo:'ition f the fundam ntal <loc·
trine announc cl by the ode· i t 1J fou11tl
in the book than th foreO'oing opi1,io11
of l\lr. Ju, tice :\Ia.rvin. In eY rnl f the
ca e to he ·ited th di. ·u
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common £ rmula., 'fa ts which on ·titut ih cau e uf action,'' in

545

common formula, "facts which constitute the cause of action^''' in

of facts wliic-h sliould be averred, and de-

fined the nature of "material" or "issu-

able " facts in a most exhaustive manner.

From the elaborate opinion of Field C. J.

the following extracts are taken (p. 414) :

" First rule. Facts only must be stated.

This means the facts as contradistin-

guislied from the law, from argument,

from hypothesis, and from evidence of

the facts. The facts must be carefully

distinguished from the evidence of the

facts. The criterion to distinguish the

facts from the evidence is, — Second rule.

Those facts, and those alone, must be

stated which constitute the cause of ac-

tion, the defence, or the reply. There-

fore (1) each party must allege every
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fact which he is required to prove, and

•will be precluded from proving any fact

iiot alleged. The plaintiff, on his part,

must allege all that he will have to prove

to maintain his action ; the defendant,

on his part, all that he must prove to

defeat the plaintiff's title after the com-

plaint is admitted or proved. (2) He

must allege nothing affirmatively which

he is not required to prove. This is some-

times put in the following form : viz.,

' that those facts, and those only, should

be stated which the party would be re-

quired to prove.' But this is inaccurate,

since negative allegations are frequently

necessary, and they are not to be proved.

The rule applies, however, to all affirma-

tive allegations, and, thus applied, is uni-

versal. Every fact essential to the claim

or defence should be stated. If this part

of the rule is violated, the adverse party

may deumr. In the second place, nothing

should be stated which is not essential to

the claim or defence ; or, in other words,

none but ' issuable ' facts should be

stated. If this part of the rule be vio-

lated, the adverse party may move to

strike out the unessential parts. An un-

essential, or what is the same thing, an

immaterial allegation, is one which can be

stricken from the pleading without leav-

ing it insufficient, and, of course, need not

be proved or disproved. The following

question will determine in every case

whether an allegation be material : Can it

be made the subject of a material issue ?

In other words, If denied, will the failure

to prove it decide the case in wiiole or in

part ? If it will not, then the fact alleged

is not material (issuable) ; it is not one

of those which constitute the cause of ac-

tion, defence, or reply." This opinion was

ado])tcd, and tlie mode of distinguishing

" material " or " issuable " allegations was

approved by tlie Supreme Court of Ore-

gon in Cline v. Cliue, .'3 Ore. 35.5, 358,

359. The criterion thus proposed by Mr.

Chief Justice Field is- perfect in its appli-

cation to legal actions, l)ut is hardly broad

enough to include all cases wheje equi-

of fact which h uld be averred, antl defin cl the nature of "mat rial" or " i. uable" fa ·t in a mo t xhaustiYe manner.
From th elaborate opinion of Field . J.
the f llowing extract are tak en ( p . .+ 14) :
"Fir t rule. Fact only mu t he rated.
Thi mean. the fact a cont,ra<li tingui:_:;hed from the law, from argument,
from hypothe i , and from eYidence of
the fact . The facts mu t be arcfully
di tingui heel from the evidence of the
fact . The criterion to di tiuguish the
fact· from the eYidence i , - Second rul .
Tho e fa t , and those alone, mu t be
tated which constitute the cau e of action, the defence, or the reply. Th erefore (I) each party mu t nllege every
fact which he i required to prove, and
will be precluded from proving any fact
not allecrecl. The plaintiff, on his part,
mu t allege all that he will ha,·e to prove
to maintain his action ; the defendant,
-on his part, all that he must prove to
defeat the plaintiff's title after the complaint is admitted or proved. (2) He
mu t allege nothing affirmatively which
he i not required to prove. This is sometime put in the following form : viz.,
' that tho e facts, and those only, hould
be stated which the party would be required to prove.' But this is inaccurate,
iuce negative allegations are frequently
necessary, and they are not to be proved.
The rule applies, however, to all affirmative allegations, and, thus appl ied, is universal. Every fact essential to the claim
or defence should be tated. If this part
of the rule is violated, the adverse party
may demur. In the second place, nothing
should be stated which is not es-ential to
the claim or defence; or, in other words,
none but 'issuable' fact should be
stated. If this part of the rule be violated, the adverse party may mo,·e to
strike out the unes ential parts. An unessential, or what is the same thing, an
immaterial allegation, is one which can be
tricken from the pleading without leaving it in ufficient, and, of cour e, need not
be proved or di proved. The fo ll owing
quest ion will determine in every case
whether an all egation be material: Can it
he made th e su bject of a material i s u e~
Jn oth er word s, If den ied , will the fa ilure

to prov it d cid the ca. e in whole or in
part! If it will not, tli ·n th fact alleged
i. not material (i.- nalilc); it i. not ou
of tho o whi h con. titute the cau of nction, defence, or reply." Tlii opiuiou wa
adopted, and the moue of di tingui hiug
"material" or "issuable" allccration · wa:
approved by the ::-;upr me 'ourt of Or g u in line r. Cliue, a Or . 355, 35 ,
359. The triteriou thu: propo.ecl by [r.
hief Justice Fiel1l i: perf ct iu it application to legal action , hut is hardly broad
enough to iuclude all ca e. whm-e equitable relief is demand ed, nulc. s it wa
intended to embrace uch ca e · in the
lang uage "cl cide t,he case in whole or
in part." If uch wa. the intention, the
manner of . tatiug the mle is omewhat
obscure, and it clearly need amplification
and explanation. I return to thi que tiou
in a subsequent paragraph of the t xt.
In Pier v. H einrichoffen, 52 Mo. 333, which
wa an action against the indor ers of a
n ote, the pet,itiou alleged a demand of
payment at maturity, and notice of nonpayment g i,·cn to the defendant . At the
trial the plaintiff proposed to prove facts
excusing such demand and notice; and, the
evidence beiug rejected, a verdict was rendered again t him. Thi ruling wa u tained by the Su.preme Court, Ewing ,J.,
after aying that the plaintiff' mode
of pleading would have been proper
under the common-law sy tern, proceeds
(p. 335) : "As the vice of the old . yst m
of pleading was it prolixity, its general
averments and general i sues, and the
delay and expen e in eparable from it
the new system which we have adopted
ha little claim to be con idered a reform,
unless it avoids such defects, and furnishes rules by which the great object f
all pleadings i attained; Yiz., to arrive
at a mll,terial, certain, and ingle i , ue.
Hence the great improvement of our ode
consists in requiring the pleading to contain a plain and conci o tatement of the
facts con tituting the cau e of action, or
matter of defence. Fact, and not eYideuce nor conclusions of law, mu, t be
stated. Every fact which the plaintiff
mu t prove to maintain hi u it i constitutive in tho ·en, e f the code." The
petition iu this ca ·c, it was l1c ld, hon h.l
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order tliut the principle niiglit be expressed in its most compre-

hensive manner, and might include equitable as well as legal

actions. As will be shown in tlie sequel, it is only in legal

actions that the material or issuable facts which are to be

averred "constitute the cause of action" in the strict sense of

the term; while in equitable actions facts may be material, and

must be alleged, which, while they form the basis of or modify

the remedy demanded, do not properly constitute the cause of

action. This distinction will be fully developed in subsequent

paragraphs which discuss the mode of pleading in equitable

actions. This single and simple principle lies at the foundation

of the entire reformed method introduced by the codes. When

fully comprehended, it will be found to involve all the other

requisites of the system. It distinguishes the new pleading from

each of the three types which formerly prevailed, and which

have already been described; from the modes used in the equit}^

and the civil-law courts, by wholly dispensing with any state-

ments of probative matter, and by limiting the averments to the

fundamental facts which constitute the cause of action or the
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grounds of relief; and from the mode used in the common-law

courts, by discarding all fictions, all technicalities, all prescribed

formulas, and by requiring the material facts to be alleged as

have averred the matters of excuse sought Murphy, 9 Bush, 522, 527, the Kentucky

to be proved. The description here given Court of Appeals stated the general doc-

of issuable or " constitutive " facts is ap- trine in the following manner : " While

propriate to legal actions only, and must the ancient forms of pleading are abol-

be modified in its terms in order to meet ished, still every fact necessary to enable

the characteristic features of many equi- tlie plaintiff in the action to recover must

table suits. Wills v. Wills, 34 Ind. 106, be alleged, and every essential averment

is also very instructive, and contains a required to make a declaration good at the

princi])le of wide application which dis- common law upon general demurrer must

tinguislies the present from the former be made in the petition. Tlie facts must

ord r that th principl mio-ht b ex res d in its m t compremann r a,ncl might include quita le a w 11 a 1 0 al
acti n .
will b hown in the qu 1 it i only in 1 0 al
action
he 1 a.t rial or i ua.ble a t which are to b
aY IT 1 ' con titute th
cau e f action
trict en e f
the rm· whil in quitabl acti n fact ma be material, and
mu t b alleg ll which while th y form the ba i of or m lify
the r me ly 1 rnancl , do not pr p rly
n itu e he
u of
ac ion. Thi di tincti n will be fully d v 1 le l in ub qu nt
para~raph. which di cu
the m de of pleading in equitaLl
acti n . Thi ingle and imple prin ipl lie at he foundati n
of the n ire reformed. method intr due cl by the code . vVh n
full c mpreh nd cl, it will be foun 1 to in ol e all the o her
r qui it of h y tern . It di tingui h e the new pl ading fr m
ach of the three typ s which form rly prevailed, and whi h
ha
already been de cribed; from the mode u ed in the equity
and the civil-law courts, by wholly di p n in g with any tatements of probative matter, and by limiting the averments to th
fundamental facts which constitute the cause of action r the
ground of relief; and from the mode u ed in the common -law
cour by discarding all fictions, all technicalities, all pre cribed
formula , and by requiring the material facts to be allege a

theory of pleading. In Pfiffner r. Krapfel, be alleged so as to enable the opposite

28 Iowa, 27, 34, Cole J. very truly said : party to know what is meant to be proved,

" Our system of pleading is essentially and also tiiat an issue may be framed in

a fact system, intended to require the regard to the subject-matter of dispute,

parties in judicial proceedings to state and to enalile the court to pronounce the

the facts of their claims, and advise the law upon the facts stated. The dry alle-

opposite party of the true nature and gation of the facts in the petition, without

object of the suit. It is against the spirit setting forth the evidence of the truth

and plain intent of our code to alhiw par- of the statements made, is all that is re-

ties to claim as fruits of their litigation quired." See, as further examjdcs, Clark

that whicli was not by the fair and obvious v. Bates, 1 Dak. 42 ; Clay Cy. v. Simon.sen,

import of the pleadings put in issue and 1 id. 403, 430 ; Scott i\ Kobards, 67 Mo.

litigated between them." In the very re- 289; Dunn v. Remington, 9 Neb. 82;

cent case of Louisville & P. Canal Co. v. Ingle i-. Jones, 43 Iowa, 286.

have averred the matter of excu e sought
to be proved. The de cription here given
of i uable or "con titutive" fact i appropriate to legal acti n nly, an d mu t
be modifi ed in its term in order to meet
the haracteri tic feature.;; of many equitable uit . Will v. " ·in , 34 In d. 106,
i al o very in tructive, and contain a
pri11 iple of wide appli ation whi ch di tingui he. the pre ent from the former
heory of pleading. In Pfiffner 1" Krapfel,
2 Iowa, 2i , 34 , ole J . very truly airl:
"Our y tern of plead ing i
ntially
n fact .y tern, intend d to require the
partie in judicial proee ding t
tate
th Ia •t. of th ir claim , and ad vi e the
oppo. ite party of the tru nature and
ohj 'rt of tie ·ui . It i a ain. t th pirit
and plaiu inten of our ode L all w parti . to claim a fruit. of their litigation
that whi h wa not hy h fair and obYiou
import of the pleacling; put in i. n and
litigat d between tit m." Jn th v ry r ·en ta e of I.- uii>ville & P. anal
. v.
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they actually existed, and not tlieir legal effect, and still less

the legal conclusions inferred from them. In discussing this

fundamental principle, and developing from it the subordinate

doctrines and practical rules which are involved in its general

terms, its component elements must be separately examined,

and the full import of each must be carefully ascertained. This

analysis will lead me (1) to define the legal meaning of the term

"cause of action" as used in the codes, and to point out the

somewhat different senses which must be given to the phrase

when it is applied to legal and to equitable actions; (2) to

determine the nature of the facts which "constitute the cause

of action " in each of its two significations, and in this connec-

tion to point out the difference between the " issuable facts "

averred in legal actions and the facts material to the remedy but

not strictly " issuable " sometimes necessary to be alleged in

equitable actions, and to explain the distinction in this respect

which inheres in the modes of pleading employed in these two

classes of suits; and (3) to discuss the requirement that these,

material facts should be stated as they actually occurred or
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existed, and not their legal effect and meaning, and to display

its full force and significance. The result of this analysis will

then be applied in developing the various general rules which

make up the reformed system of pleading.

§ 412. * 518. The Term " Cause of Action." The term " cause

of action " is employed by the framers of the codes in several

different connections; but it must be assumed that in each of

them it was intended to have the same signification, that, wher-

ever used, it was designed to describe the same elements or

features of the judicial proceeding called an action. The courts

have never, so far as I have been able to discover, attempted any

thorough and exhaustive discussion of the phrase, and determined

its meaning by any general formula or definition ; and little or no

aid will therefore be obtained in this inquiry from judicial inter-

pretation. The few decided cases which venture upon a partial

description were quoted in the last preceding section. In another

instance, not there referred to, in which the plaintiff alleged that

the legal title to certain lands was vested in the defendant, but

that these lands were held by him in trust for the plaintiff, and

demanded an execution of the trust by conveyance, etc., the

cause of action was decided to be "the trust;" the court declar-

they actual ly exi t 1, ancl n t th ir 1 0 al ff ct, au<l ·till 1 8
the legal
n lusion inf l 'l' d fr m th m. In li uu · 'ing this
fondam ntal l rincipl , an<l lev loping fro m it th
uLorclinate
d ctrine ancl practical rul
whi h are invol v cl in it · g ,n m l
terms, it component el m nts must b sepa.rat ly xamin d
and th. full import of ach must b ar fully asc rtain <l. This
analysi will lead me 1) to defin e th legal m ani ng of the t rm
" ause of action" as used in the cocle , and to point out the
ornewhat different senses which mu t be given to the I hra8
when it is applied to legal and to equi table action·; ( 2) to
determine the nature of the facts which " constit ute t he cause
of action" in each of its two significations, an l in t hi connection to point out the difference between the " issuable facts "
averred in legal actions and the facts material to the remedy but
not strictly "issuable" sometimes necessary to be alleged in
equitable actions, and to explain the distinction in this respect
which inheres in the modes of pleading employed in these two
classes of suits; and (3) to discuss the requirement that these.
material facts should be stated as they actually occurred or
existed, and not their legal effect and meaning, and to display
its full force and significance. The re:sult of this analysis will
then be applied in developing the various general rules which
make up the reformed system of pleading.
§ 412. * 518. The Term "Cause of Action." The term "cause
of action " is employed by the framers of the codes in several
different connections; but it must be assumed that in each of
them it was intended to have the same signification, that, wherever used, it was designed to describe the same elements or
features of the judicial proceeding called, an action. The courts
have never, so far as I have been able to discover, attempted any
thorough and exhaustive discussion of the phrase, and determined
its meaning by any general formula or definition; and little or no
aid will therefore be obtained in this inquiry from judicial interpretation. The few decided cases which ve11ture upon a partial
description were quoted in the last precedin g section. In another
instance, not there referred to, in which the plaintiff alleged that
the legal title to certain lands was vested in the defendant, but
that these lands were held by him in trust for the plaintiff, and
demanded an execution of the trust by conveyance, etc. the
cause of action was decided to be "the trust; " the court declar-
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ing that in every money demand on contract " the debt " is the

cause of action, and holding that, in the case before them, the

cause of action itself — the trust — was stated in the complaint,

but that the facts constituting it were not averred.^

§ 413. *519, True Signification of the Term. The true signifi-

cation of the term "cause of action " was carefully examined and

determined in the second section of the present chapter; and I

shall not repeat the course of discussion there pursued, but shall

simply recapitulate the conclusions which were reached. Every

action is based upon some primary right held by the plaintiff,

and upon a duty resting upon the defendant corresponding to

such right. By means of a wrongful act or omission of the

defendant, this primary right and this duty are invaded and

broken; and there immediately arises from the breach a new

remedial right of the plaintiff, and a new remedial duty of the

defendant. Finally, such remedial right and dut}' are consum-

mated and satisfied tby the remedy which is obtained through

means of the action, and which is its object. Now, it is very

plain, that, using the words according to their natural import
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and according to their technical legal import, the "cause of

action " is what gives rise to the remedial right, or the right of

remedy, which is evidently the same as the term " right of ac-

tion " frequently used by judges and text-writers. This remedial

right, or right of action, does not arise from the wrongful act or

omission of the defendant — the delict — alone, nor from the

plaintiff's primary right, and the defendant's corresponding pri-

mary duty alone, but from these two elements taken together.

The "cause of action," therefore, must always consist of two

factors, (1) the plaintiff's primary right and the defendant's

corresponding primary duty, whatever be the subject to which

they relate, person, character, property, or contract ; and (2) the

delict, or wrongful act or omission of the defendant, by which

the primary right and duty have been violated. Every action

when analyzed will be found to contain these two separate and

distinct elements, and in combination they constitute the "cause

of action." The primary right and duty by themselves are not

the cause of action, because when existing by themselves, un-

})roken by the defendant's wrong, they do not give rise to any

action. For this reason, that definition is clearly erroneous

1 Iloru V. Ladington, 28 Wis. 81, 83.

ing that in every mone demand on contract ' the debt i the
ct u ,e of action and holding that, in the a bef r them, the
cau "' of action it lf - tb ru t - wa t e<l in the complain ,
bu that th fact· con ti uting it were not av rred. 1
, 413. ~ 51 . True Signification of the Te rm. The true ignification of th term
au e of action ' wa carefully examined and
d termined in the econd section of the r en hapter ; and I
hall not repea h cour e of di cu ion h re pur ued, but . hall
"imply recapi ulate the conclu ion ' hich ere reached. Every
action i, ba ed upon ome primary right h ld by the plaintiff,
and upon a duty re ting upon the defendant corresponding to
uch right.
y mean of a wrongful act or omi ion of he
defendant, thi primary right and this duty ar in aded an
broken ; and there immediately ari e from the breach a new
remedial right of the plaintiff and a new rem edial du of be
defendant. Finally such remedial right and duty ar consum mated and atisfied by the remedy which i obtained through
mean of the action an ' hich i it object. Now, it i v ry
plain, that u ing the words according to their natural import
and according to their technical legal import, the cau e f
ac ion i what gives rise to the remedial right, or the right of
r medy which is e idently the ame a the term ' right of action' frequently u ed by judge and text-writ r . This remedial
right, or right of action, doe not ari e from the wron ful act or
omi sion of the defendant-the delict- alone, nor from he
plaintiff primary right, and the defendant corre pondin · rimar) duty alone, but from th e tw elements taken tog th r.
The "cau e of action," therefor , mu t alway consi t of two
factor , (1 the plaintiff' primary right and th d fen la1 f
corre ponding primary duty whatever le the ubj ct to which
they relate per on character property or contract; and (2) be
d lict r wrongful act or omi ion of th d f r dant y whi h
the primary right and duty have been vi lated.
v ry acti n
when analyzed will b found t
ontain th
wo eparate and
di tinct element an l in c mbination th con titute the cau e
of a· ion .
The rimary right and du b th m elve are n t
the , u e of action becau e when xi ing b tbem el
lirok n b th d fend nt wr ng, they do no
acti
r thi rea on, that d fini ti n i
rr n o i
l Horn v. Ludington 2 Wi ·. 1, 3.
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which pronounced the "debt" in an action on contract, or the

"trust" in a suit to enforce a trust, to be the "cause of action."

Much less can the delict or wrong by itself be the cause of

action, because, without the primary right and duty of the

parties to act upon, it does not create any right of action or

remedial right as I have used the phrase. It is very clear from

this analysis that the "cause of action " mentioned in the codes in-

cludes and consists of these two branches or elements in combina-

tion, — the primary right and duty of the respective parties, and

the wrongful act or omission by which they are violated or broken.

§ 414. * 520. Complete Statement of Entire Cause of Action

■TO-onld include Legal Rules and Rights and Duties. The first of

these branches must always, from the nature of the case, be a

conclusion of law. The law by its commands creates a rule

applicable to certain facts and circumstances, by the operation of

which, when these facts and circumstances exist, a right arises,

and is held by the plaintiff, and a corresponding duty arises and

devolves upon the defendant. While this first factor of the

"cause of action" is therefore always a conclusion or proposition

Generated for facpubupdates (University of Michigan) on 2014-06-17 15:33 GMT / http://hdl.handle.net/2027/uc2.ark:/13960/t02z1c23b
Public Domain / http://www.hathitrust.org/access_use#pd

of law, and results from the command of the supreme power in

the State as its cause^ it necessarily presupposes the existence of

certain facts and events as the occasion of its coming into opera-

tion. A complete and exhaustive exhibition of it would thus

require a statement of the legal rule itself applicable to the

given condition of facts and circumstances, and of the primary

right and duty arising therefrom ; and also an allegation that the

facts and circumstances themselves to which the rule applies, and

on the occasion of which the right and duty arise, do actually

exist or have existed. If this principle were adopted in plead-

ing, every cause of action would demand a mingled averment of

legal rules, of the facts and events to which they apply, and of

the rights and duties resulting from the operation of the given

rule upon the existing facts. In the second branch of the cause

of action, there is, on the other hand, no element whatever of

the law: it is simply and wholly matter of fact. It consists

entirely of affirmative acts wrongfully done, or of negative omis-

sions wrongfully suffered by the defendant; and its statement in

a pleading can be nothing more than a narrative of such acts or

omissions. A primary right existed in favor of the plaintiff, and

a corresponding duty devolved upon the defendant, of which an

which pronounced the debt" in an acti n n contra"t, or the
" tru t" in a suit to enfor a tru 't, to L th "cau · f a ·ti on."
Much 1 s can the d li t r wrong by it ·elf b fh earn; of
action, becau e, without th primary right and cluty of th
I arti
to act upon, it do not create any right of acti n or
r m dial right as I hay u l the phra e. It i · Y ry cl ar from
thi analysis that the ' au e of action'' mention cl in the code includ s and consi ts of the e two branches or el ,m nt, in combina,tion, - the primary right and duty of the respective partie , and
the wrongful act or omis ion by which they are violated or Lrok n.
§ 414. * 520. Complete Statement of Entire C ause of Action
would include Legal Rules and Rights and Duties.
The fir t of
the e branches must alway , from the nature of the ca e, be a,
conclusion of law. The law by its commands create a rule
applicable to certain facts and circumstances, by the operation of
which, when these facts and circumstances exi t, a right ari e ,
and i held by the plaintiff, and a corresponding duty arises and
devolves upon the defendant. ·while this first factor of the
"cause of action" is therefore always a conclusion or propo ition
of law, and results from the command of the supreme power in
the State as its cause, it necessarily presupposes the existence of
certain facts and events as the occasion of its coming into operation. A complete and exhaustive exhibition of it would thus
require a statement of the legal rule itself applicable to the
given condition of facts and circumstances, and of the primary
right and duty arising therefrom; and also an allegation that the
facts and circumstances themselves to which the rule applie , and
on the occasion of which the right and duty ari e, do actually
exist or have existed. If this ·principle were adopted in pleading, every cause of action woul<l demand a mingled averment of
legal rules, of the facts and events t o which they apply, and of
the rights and duties r sulting from the operation of the given
rule upon the existing facts. In the second branch of the cau e
of action, there is, on the other hand, no element whateYer of
the law : it is simply and wholly matter of fact. It con..,ists
entirely of affirmative acts wrongfully clone or of negativ omi sions wrongfully suffered by the defendant; and it tatement in
a pleading can be nothing more than a narratiYe of such acts or
om1ss10ns. A primary right existed in fayor of the plaintiff, and
a corresponding duty deYolved 111 on the defendant, of which an
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integral element is a legal rule: this right and this duty, if

positive, called upon the defendant to do some act towards the

plaintiif, the nature of which depended upon the nature of the

right and duty; if negative, they called upon the defendant to

forbear from doing some act towards the plaintiff, tlie nature of

which was determined in like manner. In the one case, the

defendant's delict consists in his not doing the act winch his

duty obliged him to do; and in the other case, in doing the act

which his duty forbade him to do. In both instances, therefore,

the wrong which constitutes the second factor or branch of the

cause of action is a fact more or less complex, and not either

wholly or partially a legal conclusion or rule.

§ 415. *521. Term as Applied to Legal Actions. Such being

the general nature and signification of the term "cause of action,"

its different phases- of meaning, when applied either to legal or

to equitable actions, will next be pointed out and described.

These differences do not extend to its essential elements ; they

are wholly formal, and they result entirely from the external

differences sometimes subsisting between legal and equitable
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primar}^ rights and between legal and equitable remedies. In a

legal cause of action, the primary right of the jjlaintiff and duty

of the defendant are generally si7nple in their nature as contra-

distinguished from complex; that is, they call for some single,

simple, and complete act or forbearance on the part of the de-

fendant; and when broken by the defendant's delict, the remedial

right and duty which arise always demand a single, simple, and

complete act to be done by the defendant; namel}', either the

payment of a sum of money as debt or damages, or the delivery

of possession of a specific chattel, or the delivery of possession

of a specific tract of land, which constitute the only remedies

that can be oljtaincd b}' a legal action. It follows, therefore,

from the nature of a legal primary right and duty and of a legal

remedy, that the cause of action in a legal suit is always simple,

and can be stated, and must necessarily be stated, in such a

manner, that the remedial right, if it exists at all, will be shown

at once in its completeness and certainty. Furthermore, the

legal primary right must necessarily depend upon a few facts;

and these being all indispensable to its existence, the absence of

even a single one will entirely invalidate the whole cause of action,

and will sliow that no remedial riirht whatsoever has arisen.
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§ 416. * 522. Term as Applied to Equitable Actions. The

foregoing description does not apply to e(iuitable actions gener-

ally, although it undoubtedly does to some. In very many, and

indeed in most, equitable causes of action, not merely the facts

which are the occasion of the right, but the primary rights and

duties themselves of the parties, arc complex : it cannot be said

of them that they must either wholly exist, or must be entirely

denied; they do not, in other words, demand a single specific act

or omission on the part of the defendant, but a series, and often

a very complicated series, of acts and omissions. In determining

these primaiy rights and duties of the respective parties to an

equitable suit, there must frequently be a settlement and adjust-

ment of opposing claims; one must be modified by another; and,

as the result, a collection of rights and duties is established

inhering in each of the litigants, and embracing a great variety

of particulars. In certain classes of equitable actions it cannot

be properly said that any wrong or delict has been committed by

the defendant, or any violation of the plaintiff's primary rights,

unless an ignorance of those rights by all the parties, and a
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consequent hesitation on the part of all to act, can be deemed a

technical wrong. These classes of suits are prosecuted, not

hecause there has been any denial of right or duty, but because

in the absence of an accurate knowledge of their rights, or of

power to arrange and adjust them by voluntary proceedings, an

appeal to the courts becomes necessary in order to solve the

problem or to accomplish the adjustment. An action brought to

construe a will may be mentioned as an illustration of the first

class, and the ordinary suit for partition as an example of the

second. Again: the remedies furnished by equity are seldom

the single, simple, and complete awards of pecuniary sums, or

of possession of lands or of chattels, as is the case with all legal

judgments. They are complex and involved ; they often consist

in an adjustment and award of partial reliefs to each of the

parties; they may provide for future and contingent emergen-

cies; and they are sometimes nothing more than an: authoritative

determination by the court of the primary rights themselves

belonging to the plaintiffs and the defendants. This sketch

shows very plainly that an equitable cause of action is often very

different, in its external form at least, from any legal cause of

action; and although the same general principle of pleading

E!. 416. * 22. Term as Applied to
Equitable Actions.
Tlie
foregoing d cription d es not a.pply t quitabl acti ns generally, alth ugh it und ubtedly doe· to s m . In ery many, and
ind ed in most, equitable cau cs of action, not mer ly th facts
which are the occasion of the right, but the primary rights and
dutie them 'elves of the partie8, are compl x : it cannot b ·aid
of them that they must either wholly xi8t, 01· must be entirely
denied; they do not, in other word::;, demand a single ·pecific act
or om ission on the part of the defendant, but a seri ·, and often
a very complicated series, of acts and omissions. In determining
the e primary rights and duti s of the r pective parties to an
equitable uit, there must frequently be a settlement and adjustment of opposing claims; one must be modified by another; and,
as the result, a collection of rights and duties is established
inhering in each of the litigants, and embracing a great variety
of particulars. In certain classes of equitable actions it cannot
be properly said that any wrong or delict has been committed by
the defendant, or any violation of the plaintiff's primary rights,
unless an ignorance of those rights by all the parties, and a
consequent hesitation on the part of all to act, can be deemed a
technical wrong. These classes of suits are prosecuted, not
because there has been any denia,l of right or duty, but because
in the absence of an accurate knowledge of their rights, or of
power to arrange and adjust them by voluntary proceedings, an
appeal t o the courts becomes necessary in order to solve the
problem or to acco mpfa,h the adjustment. An action brought to
con true a will may be mentioned as an illustration of the first
class, and the ordinary suit for partition as an example of the
second. Again : the remedies furnished by equity are seldom
the single, simple, and complete awards of pecuniary sums, or
of pos es ion of lands or of chattels, as is the case with all legal
judgments. They are complex and involved; they often consist
in an adjustment and award of partial reliefs to each of the
parties; they may provide for future and contingent emergencies; and they are sometimes nothing more than an authoritative
determination by the court of the primary rights themselves
belonging to the plaintiffs and the defendants. This sketch
shows very plainly that an equitable cause of action is often very
different, in its external form at least, from any legal cause of
action; and although the same general principle of pleading
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applies to each, yet it must undergo some modification in that

application. The facts constituting the cause of action are to

be stated in an equitable as well as in a legal action; but facts

do not constitute the equitable cause of action in the same sense

nor in the same manner that they constitute the legal cause of

action.

§ 417. * 523. Nature of the Facts Constituting a Cause of Action

■when Term is applied to both Legal and Equitable Suits. The

result thus reached leads to the second subdivision of tlie present

inquiry; namely, the nature of the facts which constitute the

cause of action when that term is applied both to legal and to

equitable suits. As has already been remarked, the first branch

or division of the cause of action contains three distinct elements,

two of them legal, and the other of fact; the second branch con-

sists wholly of facts ; while the remedial right which flows from

the two is of course a conclusion of law. If the theory of plead-

ing required that all these elements should be expressed, then

the plaintiff's complaint or petition would always comprise the

following averments: (1) The rule of law applicable to certain
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facts from which his primary right and the defendant's primary

duty arise; (2) the existence of the facts to which such rule

applies, and which are the occasion of the right and duty; (3)

the primary right and duty themselves wliich spring from the

operation of such rule upon the given facts, — these three sub-

divisions forming the first branch of the "cause of action;" (4)

the facts constituting the violation of the primary right and duty;

that is, the wrongful acts or omissions of the defendant, — this

statement being the second branch of the "cause of action; " (5)

the remedial right held by the plaintiff, and the remedial duty

devolving upon the defendant, which result from the " cause of

action," and are wholly conclusions of law. In this manner

everything which enters into the plaintiff's case, fact and law,

would be spread upon the record. A bill of complaint in chan-

cery, prior to any statutory modification, was substantially con-

structed upon this plan, although the various subdivisions were

not so logically separated and arranged. The mode of pleading

which prevailed in the sui)erior courts of Scotland seems to have

been in complete conformity with this theory.-^

1 [^Tlie Supreme Court of Coiinectirut ford (1902), 75 Conn. TG, 52 Atl. 4S7. oom-

iii New York, etc. 11. K. Co. v. Hunger- pared au action at law to a svllogism.
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§ 418. * 524. Elements Omitted and Retained vsrhen Cause of

Action is set forth in the Complaint. Tlie reformed system, fol-

lowing in this respect the common-law method, dispenses with

several of these elements which make up the plaintiff's entire

ground for relief: it wholly rejects all the subdivisions which

are mere legal rules or conclusions, and admits only those that

consist of the facts to which the legal rules apply, and which are

the occasion whence the conclusions arise. It assumes that the

courts and the parties are familiar with all the doctrines and

requirements of the law applicable to every conceivable condition

of facts and circumstances, so that, when a certain condition of

facts and circumstances is presented to them, they will at once

perceive and know what are the primary and the remedial rights

and duties of both the litigants ; and this knowledge being com-

plete and perfect, it is a useless incumbrance of the record to

spread out upon it the legal propositions and inferences with

which every one is assumed to be acquainted. A complaint or

petition, therefore, drawn in accordance with this theory, must

omit (1) the legal rule which is the direct cause of the primary
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right and duty, (2) the primary right and duty themselves which

are the results of this rule acting upon the given facts, and (3)

the remedial right and duty which accrue to the plaintiff; and

it must only state (1) the facts which enter into the first branch

of the cause of action and are the occasion of the primary right

and duty, and (2) the facts which constitute the defendant's

wrongful act or omission, — that is, the delict which is the

second branch of the cause of action. As will be seen in the

sequel, a statement of the legal rule, or of the primary legal right

and duty without the facts to which they apply, and which are

the occasion for their existence, is insufficient: it alleges no cause

of action, and cannot be made the basis of an issue ; while such

a statement in addition to those facts is surplusage, and, if the

rules of pleading are strictly enforced, will be struck out on

using the following language : " The for instance, the defendant has done cer-

major premise is a proposition of law, as, tain acts (being the acts referred to in the

for instance, whoever does certain speci- proposition of law) to the damage of

fied acts to the injury of another is bound the plaintiff. These facts are alleged in

to pay that other the damages thus in- the complaint. The conclusion is the

flicted. This proposition is not pleaded, judgment or sentence of the law, which

but is necessarily involved in stating necessarily follows the establishment of

the facts alleged in the complaint. The the truth of the two premises."^

minor premise is a statement of facts, as,

§

418.

* 524.

Elements Omitted and Retained when Cause of

Action is set forth in the Complaiq.t. Th r formed y tern, following in thi res1 ect the common-law method, cli 'I ense with
several of these element which make up th plaintiff s ntire
ground for relief: it wholly rejects all the :ul><livi ion which
are mer legal rules or conclusions, aml admit· only those that
consi t of the fact to which the 1 gal rules apply, and which are
the occa ion whence the conclu ion ari e. It a. sumc that the
courts and the parties are familiar with all the doctrines and
requirements of the law applicable to every conceival>lc condition
of fact and circum tance , so that, when a certain condition of
facts and circumstances is presented to them, they will at once
perceive and know what are the primary and the remedial rights
and duties of both the litigants; and this knowledge being complete and perfect, it is a useless incumbrance of the record to
spread out upon it the legal propositions and inference with
which every one is a sumed to be acquainted. A complaint or
petition, therefore, drawn in accordance with this theory, must
omit (1) the legal rule which is the direct cause of the primary
right and duty, (2) the primary right and duty themselves which
are the results of this rule acting upon the given facts, and (3)
the remedial right and duty which accrue to the plaintiff; and
it must only state (1) the facts which enter into the first branch
of the cause of action and are the occasion of the primary right
and duty, and (2) the fqcts which con titute the defendant's
wrongful act or omission, - that is, the clelict which is the
second branch of the cause of action. As will be seen in the
sequel, a statement of the legal rule, or of the primary legal right
and duty without the facts to which they apply, and which are
the occasion for their existence, is insufficient: it alleges no cause
of action, and cannot be made the basis of an i sue; while such
a statement in addition to those facts is surplu age, and, if the
rules of pleading are strictly enforced, will be ~ truck out on
using the following language : "The
major premise i a propo ition of law, as,
for in tance, whoever does certain specitied acts to the injury of another is bound
to pay that other the damage tlrn infl.icted. This proposition is not plea<l ecl,
but is nece .. arily inYohed in stating
the fact all eged in the compl aint. The
minor premi e is a statement of fa cts, as,

for in tan ce, th e defendant has done certain acts (being th e act referred to in the
propo ition of law ) to the damage of
th e pla intiff. The e fact are alleged in
th e complaint. The conclu ion is the
judg ment or !'eute nce of th e la "·· wh ich
necessaril5' foll ows t he e tauli 5hme11t ,.[
t he t r uth of t he t wo premi e ."]

554

CIVIL RC IEDlE .

55-4 CIVIL KEMEDIES.

motion, and will, at all events, be wholly disregarded. We

thus arrived at the first general doctrine in relation to the facts

constituting tlie cause of action ; namely, the facts which are

among the elements of the cause of action, that is, those which

are the occasion for the primary right and duty to arise, and

those which form the breach of such right and duty must be

1 will at all ven
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l m nt of the cau

rn ti n
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into the cause of action, — - the legal rules, and the legal rights

and duties of the parties.

§ 419. * 525. Cases -wrhere Facts Show^ing Primary Right are

omitted because presumed. Before proceeding to the second

general doctrine, I shall notice an apparent modification of or

departure from the one just announced, which occurs in a cer-

wboll

an

tain class of actions. In a very great majority of instances, the

.., - .

complaint or petition must narrate in an express manner those

facts, which, as I have shown, form an element of the first

branch or division of the cause of action, — those facts to which

the general rule of law applies in order to create the primary

right and duty of the parties. In these cases, therefore, the
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pleading does actually contain, in direct and positive terms, the

allegations of two distinct groups of facts: first, those which are

the occasion of the primary right and duty; and secondly, those

which are the breach of such right and duty, — the wrong or

delict. There is nothing of fact left to be understood or as-

sumed. In another class of cases, however, the first group of

facts is not expressly averred ; it is omitted ; it is assumed to

exist in the same manner that the legal rules are assumed; and

the complaint or petition actually contains only those facts which

constitute the breach, — the Avrongf ul act or omission of the de-

fendant. The peculiar class of actions thus mentioned do not,

however, depart from or violate the theory of pleading before

described, but are constructed in exact conformity with it. The

facts upon which the primary right and duty of the parties

depend are omitted, because they are in accordance with the

universal experience of mankind, and must therefore be presumed

to exist, so that their averment, like the averment of legal rules,

is unnecessary. A simple and familiar illustration is the action

to recover damages for an assault and battery. The primary

right of the plaintiff is the right to liis own pcn'son, free from

molestation or interference by any one. This right, Ijcing a
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legal conclusion, is of course not averred. The fact upon which

it depends is simply that the plaintiff is a human being, existing

iind possessing the common faculties and attributes of humanity.

Since this fact conforms to the universal experience, its averment

in the complaint or petition is needless; it is tacitly assumed;

and the pleading consists wholly in statements of the wrongful

trespass committed by the defendant. Another illustration is

the action for slander or libel. The facts upon which the pri-

mary right and duty of the parties depend is the existence of the

plaintiff as a member of society, and as possessing a character

among his fellow-men. Although the common-law declaration

contained averments of the plaintiff's reputation, they are un-

necessary, and the complaint or petition may contain merely an

account of the defamatory words spoken or published by the

defendant and the other elements of the wrong. It may be

stated as a general proposition, that, in actions brought for

injuries to the plaintiff's own person or character, the facts

which enter into the first branch of the cause of action, and are

the occasion whence the primary right and duty of the parties
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arise, need not be expressly averred; they are assumed to exist,

and nothing but the delict need be alleged. Notwithstanding

this abridgment, the pleading in such cases is based upon the

same theory and governed by the same rules as the pleading in

all other classes of actions.

§ 420. *526. Only Ultimate Facts are to be alleged. The

second of the general doctrines included within the principle

under consideration is, that, in stating the two required groups

of facts, those important and substantial facts alone should be

alleged which either immediately form the basis of the primary

right and duty, or which directly make up the wrongful acts or

omissions of the defendant, and not the details of probative mat-

ter or particulars of evidence by which these material elements

are to be established. This doctrine applies to all classes of

actions, and if strictly enforced it would render the pleadings

simple, and the legal issues at least clear, cei'tain, and single.

The courts have been unanimous in their announcement of the

rule, and the decisions already quoted, as well as those to be

cited in subsequent paragraphs, will show the variety of circum-

stances, allegations, and issues to which it has been applied.

There can be no real difficulty, if the action is legal, in distiu-

legal conclu ion, is of cour e n t averr tl. Th fa t upon which
it lepen<ls i . imply that th plaintiff i a human b ing, exi ' ting
and po' e ina the common fa ultie and attrilmt of humanity.
inc thi fact conf rm t th universal exp rienc , its av·erm nt
in the c mplaint or petition i needle ; it i · tacitly a ·um d;
an l th 1 leadjng con i t wh lly in tat ment f the wrongful
tre I a
committed by th d fendant. Anoth r illu tration i
the action for slander r lib l. The fact upon which the primary right and duty of the parti s depend is the exi t nee of the
p laintiff as a member of soci ty, and as possessing a charact r
among his fellow-men . Although the common-law declaration
contained averm ent of the plaintiff's reputation, they are unnece sary, and the complaint or petition may contain merely an
account of the defamatory words spoken or published by the
defendant and the other elements of th e wrong. It may be
tated as a general proposition, that, in actions brought for
injuries to the plaintiff 's own person or character, the facts
whrnh enter into the first branch of th e cause of action, and am
the occasion whence the primary right and duty of the parties
ari e, need not be expressly averred; they are assumed to exi t,
and nothing but the delict need be alleged. Notwithstanding
this abridgment, the pleading in such cases is based upon the
same theory and governed by the same rules a the pleading in
all other classes of actions.
§ 420. * 526. Only Ultimate Facts are to be alleged. The
econd of the general doctrines included within the principle
under consideration is, that, in stating tbe two required group::>
of facts, those important and substantial facts alone should be
alleged which either immediately form the basis of the primary
right and duty, or which directly make up the wrongful act or
omis ions of the defendant, and not the details of probative matter or particulars of evidence by which these material elements
are to be established. This doctrine applies to all cla ses of
action , and if strictly enforced it would render th pleading
imple, and the legal is ues at least clear, certain, and single.
The court have been unanimou in their announcement of the
rnle, and the deci ions already quoted, as well as tho e to be
cited in ubsequent paragraph , will show the vari ty of circumstance , allegations, and i ' U s to which it ha been app]i d.
There can be no real difficulty, if the action is legal, in di tin-

CIVIL RE).IEDIE
55G CIVIL REMEDIES.

guishing between the facts which are material and issnable and

shoukl therefore be averred, and those which are merely pro-

bative or evidentiary and shonld be omitted. Since the legal

priniary right and duty are always simple, and demand from the

defendant the performance or the omission of some single and

well-defined act, they will always depend, for their occasion, upon

a few positive, determined, and certain facts, all of which are

necessary to their existence, so that neither of these facts could

be modified, and much less could be omitted, without entirely

defeating the right and duty, and with them the cause of action

itself. The same is true of the facts which make uj) the defend-

ant's delict or wrong. In order, therefore, tliat any given legal

cause of action should exist, in order that au}^ given remedial

ris'ht or risfht of action should arise, these determinate, un-

changed, and positive elements of fact must all conspire to pro-

duce that result, and must be alleged; they literally "constitute '*

the cause of action, and form the "'material" or "issnable " aver-

ments spoken of by the courts. The subordinate facts, on the

other hand, which make up the probative matter and the details
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of evidence, may vary indefinitely in their nature ; and so long

as they perform their function of establishing the " issuable "

averments, the cause of action will not be affected. To illustrate

by a very familiar example: In an action to recover damages for

the breach of a written contract, the allegation that the defend-

ant executed the agreement is material and issuable ; it cannot

be modified, and much less abandoned, without destroying the

whole cause of action. Its denial raises a direct issue, to main-

tain or disprove which evidence can be offered. The subordinate

probative matter l)y which this averment is established may vary-

according to the exigencies of the case, and a resort to or failure

with one method will not prevent the use of another. The plain-

tiff might rely upon the defendant's admissions that he executed

the paper, or upon the testimony of a witness who saw him sign

it, or upon the opinions of persons who are acquainted with his

handwriting, and who testify that the signature is liis. One or

the other, or even all, *of these means might be resorted to, and

the material fact to be proved would remain tlie same. If, how-

ever, instead of directly averring that the defendant executed the

written contract, the plaintiff should allege tliat the defendant

had a'lniiltcd liis signature to be genuine, or that a specified indi-

gui:hing betwe n be fa ·t which are m terial and i ua 1 and
b uld ther for , b a rre l and ho
whi b ar m rely I rob, tiYe r Yid ntiary an 1 hould b
mitt cl.
ince the l gal
primary right an l luty are alway im11 and l mand fr m the
lefench nt the p rforman e or th
m1 1011
f ome in le and
"' 11-1 fined act h ) will al wa · l
ncl f r th ir oc a i n upon
a few p itive det rmined and ertaiu fact aH of whi b ar
nece ary to heir exi ten e
that n ith r f th e fa t could
b modified and much le could b omitt cl, without entirel
l £ea in the rigl t an 1 dut , and with them the cau e of ac i u
it lf. The am i true of he fac whi h make up he lef n 1aut' delict or wrong. In order th r fore that an given 1 al
au e of action houkl exist, in rder that an giv u r medial
right or right of action bould ari e the e determinate un r banged and po itive element of fact mu t all con pir t pr duce that re ul , and mu t be alleged; t] y literally con itu e '
he cau e of acti n, and form the material or "i uable ' a rment poken of by the courts. The ' ubordinate fa t. on the
other haucl which make up the probative matt r an l the d ail
f evidence, may vary indefinitely in th ir natur ; an l o long
a the; perform their function of establi bing he ' i uable"
averment , the cau e of action will not be ~ff ct cl. To illu trate
by a very familiar example : In an action to rec v r lamag for
the breach of a writt n ontract, th allegation that th d f nd ant executed th agre ment i mat rial and i suable · it cannot
b modi:fie l, and much 1
aband ned witl ut d troying the
whole cau e of action. Its lenial rai, a dir ct i ue t maintain or di prove which evid n e can b off r d . Th ub rdinate
probative mattel' l y whi h tl i av rment i
tabli b d ma ary
according t the xig n i
f th
and a r rt to r failure
with ne m thod ill n t pr
ut th u
f c n tb r . Th plaintiff mi ht rely ur on the d f ,n lant a lmi i m tbat h • cut d
the pap r or up n tl t . timony f a wi n
' h aw him i n
it r up n he or ini01 . f p r on wh ar a quain eel
hand writing and wh
ti£ , that the . i0 natur i J i .
n or
tl1 oth r r v n all of h e m an. might b r rt l to and
lie material fa ·t t h Ir v cl w ul l r main h
If h weYPr in ·t ad f lir tly < rri1 g ha h d f ndant x u cl the
wri ttcn c·ontract h plai1 iff ·h mlcl all g
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vidual asserts that he saw the instrument signed, or that persons

familiar with his handwriting declare the signature to be his, it

is plain that neither of these statements would present a material

issue ; that is, an issue upon which the cause of action would de-

pend. This familiar illustration covers the whole field of legal

actions. The allegations must be of those principal, determinate,

constitutive facts, upon the existence of which, as stated, the en-

tire cause of action rests, so that, when denied, the issue thus

formed with each would involve the whole remedial right. ^ Every

legal cause of action will include two or more distinct and sepa-

rate facts; and in order that these facts may be issuable, the

failure to prove any one of them when denied must defeat a

recovery. If this fundamental doctrine of the reformed pleading

is fairly and consistently enforced in actual practice, the issues

presented for trial must necessarily be simple and single. Single-

ness and simplicity of issues do not require that the cause should

contain but one issue for the jury fo decide, one affirmation and

denial the determination of which disposes of the whole contro-

versy. This result of the common-law special pleading is often
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described by enthusiastic admirers of the ancient system, but it

was seldom if ever met with in the actual administration of jus-

tice. The issues are single when each consists of one and only

one material fact asserted by the plaintiff and controverted by

the defendant, of such a nature that its affirmative decision is

essential to the cause of action, while its negative answer defeats

a recovery. The reformed theory of pleading contemplates and

makes provision for such issues; and if its provisions are faith-

fully carried out, the disputed questions of fact would be as

sharply defined, and as clearly presented for decision to juries, as

can be done by any other possible method.

§ 421. *527. The Doctrine as Applied to Equitable Suits. The

discussion thus far of this particular doctrine has been confined

to legal actions ; are any modifications necessary to be made in its

statement when applied to equitable suits? The differences in

form between legal causes of action and remedies on the one side

and equitable causes of action and reliefs on the other have been

described, and need not be repeated. By virtue of these inherent

differences, the material facts which must be alleged in an equi-

table suit are often, in their nature and effects, quite unlike the

1 ^Nichols i\ Nichols (1896), 134 Mo. 187, 35 S. W. 577, quoting the text.]

vidual a rt that h aw th in trurn nt .·ign 1, or that p r. ons
familiar '' ith hi handwriting l clar th ignatur to 1J hi ·, it
is 1 lain that neith r £ the stat· m nt · w ul l pr · nt a ma. erial
i u ; that i , an i ·u up n wbi h he can e of a tion would d p ml. Thi fami liar illu ' tration c ver · th wh le fi ld f 1 gal
action ' . The allegation mu t be of tho e principal, clet rminate,
con titutive fact ·, ur n the xi t nc of whi ·h, a , tatecl, th ntire au e of action re t , o that, wh n cl ni d, the i ·su th us
formed with each would involve the whol remedial right. 1 1 very
legal cau e of action will include two or more distinct and s parate facts; and in ord r that these facts may be issuable, the
failure to prove any one of them when d nied must def at a
recovery. If this fundamental doctrine of the reformed pl ading
i fairly and consistently enforced in actual practice, the i. sues
pr entecl for trial must nece sarily be simple and single. Singleness and simplicity of i sues do not require that the cause should
contain but one issue for the jury to decide, one affirmation and
denial the determination of which disposes of the whole controver y. This result of the common-law special pleading is often
de 'Crib d by enthusiastic admirers of the ancient system, but it
was sel iom if ever met with in the actual administration of justice. The issues are single when each consists of one and only
one material fact asserted by the plaintiff and controverted by
the defendant, of su ch a nature that its affirmative decision is
essential to the cause of action, while its negative answer defeats
a recovery. The reformed theory of pleading contemplates and
makes provision for such issues; and if its provisions are faithfully carried out, the disputed questions of fact would be as
sharply defined, and as clearly presented for deci ion to juries, as
can be done by any other possible method.
~ 421. * 527 . The Doctrine as Applied to Equitable Suits.
The
discussion thus far of this particular doctrine has been confined
to legal actions; are any modifications necessary to be made in its
tatement when appli ed to equitable suits? The differences in
form between legal cau eR of action and remedies on the one side
and equitable causes of action and reliefs on the other have been
described, and need not be repeated. By virtue of these inherent
differeuces, the material facts which must be alleged in an equitable suit are often, in their nature and effects, quite unlike the
l

[Nichols v. Nichols {1896), 134 Mo. 187, 35 S. W. 577, quoting th e text.]
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"issuable" facts which constitute a legal cause of action. In

the legal action the issuable facts are few; in the equitable suit

the material facts upon which the relief depends, or which influ-

ence and modify it, are generally numerous, and often exceed-

ingly so: in the former they are simple, clearly defined, and

certain; in the latter they may be and frequently are compli-

cated, involved, contingent, and uncertain. These are mere

differences of external form, but there is another much more

important, and wliich more nearly affects their essential nature.

The legal cause of action so completel}' rests for its existence

upon the issuable facts, that if any one of them when denied

fails to be established by proof, the plaintiff's entire recovery is

defeated thereby, a result which is recognized by all the judicial

decisions as involved in the very definition of a legal issuable

fact. An equitable cause of action may undoubtedly rest in like

manner upon a given number of determinate facts. In general,

however, as has already been fully explained, facts may exist

material to the recovery in a certain aspect, or in a certain con-

tingency, or to a certain extent, and which therefore enter into
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the cause of action, but which are not indispensable to some kind

or measure of relief being granted to the plaintiff. These facts

if established will determine the character, extent, and com-

|)]eteness of the remedy conferred by the court; but if they are

not established, the remedy is not thereby wholly defeated; it is

only in some particulars modified, limited, or abridged. Since

tliese classes of facts assist in determining the nature, amount,

and details of the relief to be awarded, they in part at least

"constitute the cause of action" within the true meaning of the

term, and must l)e alleged. While the material facts of an equi-

table cause of action differ in the manner thus described from

the issuable facts of a legal cause of action, the single and com-

prehensive principle of the reformed procedure embraces and

controls both classes of suits. Mere evidence, probative matter

as contradistinguished from the principal facts upon which the

remedial right is based, are no more to be spread upon the record

in an equitable than in a legal action. A distinction iniieres in

the nature of the causes of action, and from this distinction the

facts material to the recovery in an equitable suit may be numer-

ous, complicated, affecting the right of recovery partially instead

of wholly, modifying rather than defeating the remedy if not

u, bl
fact whi h
n ti u
of a ti n. In
h le al acti n th i uabl fa
qui abl uit
h m, t rial fact up n whi h th
r whi h infinand m lif it, ar g 11 rall' num r 1 and ft n xc dn
in 1 · · : in h form r th • ar
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onting nt and un rtain. Th
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hich m re 11 arly aff t tl ir
ential natur .
The 1 0 al cau
f a tion
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established ; but still they are the material facts constituting the

cause of action, and not mere details of evidentiary or probative

matter.^

§ 422. * 528. This Distinction between Material Facts in Legal

and Equitable Actions Sustained by the Courts. The existence

and necessity of this distinction between the material facts to be

alleged in legal and equitable actions are fully recognized and

admitted by judicial opinions of the highest authority.^ It also

prevails, I believe, universally in practice. By no judge has it

been more accurately and exhaustively discussed than by Mr.

Justice S. L. Selden in two early cases which, although without

the binding authority of precedents, have the force of cogent and

unanswerable reasoning.*^ With the practical conclusions in

reference to the nature of the material facts that should be

averred in an equitable complaint or petition at which Mr. Jus-

tice Selden arrives, I entirely concur; his course of argument

upon which those conclusions are based is the same in substance

which has been pursued in the foregoing paragraphs. I wholly

dissent, however, from his inference that these results are not
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contemplated by and embraced within the single and comprehen-

sive principle announced by the codes, that the facts constituting

the cause of action, and they alone, must be stated. This infer-

ence does not follow from his argument, nor from the final posi-

tions which he reaches; it is wholly unnecessary; and it has

been rejected by judges who have accepted and maintained the

very doctrines concerning the nature of equitable pleading under

the code which he so ably supports. It is only by giving to the

phrase "facts constituting the cause of action" a narrow inter-

pretation, which it was plainly not intended to receive, that the

material facts of an equitable cause of action can be thus widely

separated from the issuable facts of a legal one. Both are aptly

described by the phrase which is found in all the codes. The

averment of issuable facts in one class of cases, and of the mate-

rial facts affecting the remedy in the other class, without the

details of evidence or probative matter relied upon to establish

1 [See Smith v. Smith (1897), 50 S. C. 2 gge People v. Ryder, 12 N. Y. 433,

54, 27 S. E. 545, where the court quotes 437 ; Horn v. Ludingcon, 28 Wis. 81, 83 ;

with approval almost the entire section of White v. Lyons, 42 CaL 279, 282.

the text relative to the difference between ^ Rochester City Bank v. Suydam,

material facts in equity and issuable facts 5 How. Pr. 216; Wooden v. Waffle, 6

at law.]] How. Pr. 145.

e tabli hed; but till they are th e material fact onstituting the
ause of action, and not mere d tails of vid ntiary or pr batiY
matt r. 1
~ 422. * 528. This Distinction between Material Facts in Legal
and Equitable Actions Sustained by the Courts. The xi. tence
and nece sity of this di tinction b tween the material fa t to b
alleged in legal and equitable actions ar fully r cogniz d and
admitt d by judicial opini ons of the high st authority. 2 I t al. o
pr vails, I beli eve, uni versally in practice. By no jnc1g has it
b en more accurately and exhausfr1; ely discussed than by Mr.
Justice S. L. Selden in two early cases which, although without
the binding authority of precedents, have the force of cogent and
unanswerable reasoning. 3 With the practical conclusions in
reference to the nature of the material facts that should be
averred in an equitable complaint or petition at which Mr . J ustice Selden arrives, I entirely concur; his course of argumen t
upon which those conclusions are based is the same in substance
which has been pursued in the foregoing paragraphs. I wholly
dissent, however, from his inference that these results are not
contemplated by and embraced within the single and comprehensive principle announced by the codes, that the facts constituting
the cause of action, and they alone, must be stated. This inference does not follow from his argument, nor from the final positions which he reaches; it is wholly unnecessary; and it has
been rejected by judges who have accepted and maintained the
very doctrines concerning the nature of equitable pleading under
the code which he so ably supports. It is only by giving to the
phrase "facts constituting the cause of action " a narrow interpretation, which it was plainly not intended to receive, that the
material facts of an equitable cause of action can be thus widely
separated from the issuable facts of a legal one. Both are aptly
described by the phrase which is found in all the codes. The
averment of issuable facts in one class of cases, and of the material facts affecting the remedy in the other class, without th e
details of evidence or probative matter relied upon to establi h
1 [See S mith v . mith (1 89 7) , 50 . C.
54, 27 S. E. 545, wh ere th e court qu otes
with approval alm ost th e entire section of
the text r elative to the differen ce between
material facts in equity and issuable fa ct s
at law.]

2 See People v. Ryder, 12 N. Y . 433,
437 ; Ho rn v. L uding ton, 28 Wis. 81, 83;
W hite r . Lyons, 42 Cal. 279, 2 2.
3 Rochester City B ank v .
uydam,
5 How. Pr. 216 ; W ood en v. W affle, 6
H ow. P r . 145 .
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either, is a necessary coDsequence of the single comprehensive

principle which underlies the whole reformed system.

§ 423. * 529. Facts should be alleged as they actually existed

or occurred, not their Legal Effect. The third and last point

remains to be considered in this general discussion. The issu-

able facts in a legal action, and the facts material to the relief

in an equitable suit, should not only be stated to the complete

exclusion of the law and the evidence, but they should be alleged

as they actually existed or occurred, and not their legal effect,

force, or operation. This conclusion follows as an evident

corollary from the doctrine that the rules of law and the legal

rights and duties of the parties are to be assumed, while the

facts only which call these rules into operation, and are the occa-

sion of the rights and duties, are to be spread u})on the record.

Every attempt to combine fact and law, to give the facts a legal

coloring and aspect, to present them in their legal bearing upon

the issues rather than in their actual naked simplicity, is so far

forth an averment of law instead of fact, and is a direct violation

of the principle upon which the codes have constructed their
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system of pleading. The peculiar method which prevailed at

the common law has been fully described ; it was undoubtedly

followed more strictly and completely in certain forms of action

than in others ; in a few instances — as in a special action on the

case — the declaration was framed in substantial conformity with

the reformed theory. But in very many actions, and those in

constant use, the averments were almost entirely of legal con-

clusions rather than of actual facts. The familiar allegations

that the plaintiff had "bargained and sold," or "sold and deliv-

ered," that the defendant "was indebted to the plaintiff," or

"had and received money to the plaintiff's use," and very fre-

quently even the averment of a promise made by the defendant,

may be taken as familiar illustrations from among a great num-

ber of other similar phrases which were found in the ordinary

declarations. Rejecting as it does the technicalities, the fictions,

the prescribed formulas, and the absurd repetitions and redun-

dancies, of the ancient common-law system, the new pleading

radically differs from the old in no feature more important and

essential than this, that the allegations must be of dry, naked,

actual facts, while the rules of law applicable thereto, and the

legal rights and duties arising therefrom, must be left entirely

eith r

a nece, ary con equence of the single comprehensive
he YI/ b le reformed } tern .
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to the courts. While this doctrine has been uniformly recog-

nized as correct wlien thus stated in an abstract and general

manner, it has sometimes been overlooked or disregarded in

passing upon the sufficiency and regularity of particular plead-

ings. Whether those decisions which have permitted the com-

mon counts to be used as good complaints or petitions, and those

which have required the promise implied by law to be expressly

averred as though actually made, are in conformity with this

doctrine, will be considered in subsequent paragraphs, and the

various cases bearing upon the question will be cited and dis-

cussed. It is sufficient for my present purpose to state the

doctrine in its general form, and to reserve its application for

another portion of the chapter.

§ 424. * 530. Cases Supporting Doctrine that Facts, not Legal

Conclusions, are to be stated. As the foregoing analysis has been

exclusively based upon the text of the codes, I shall now test

the correctness of its conclusions, and illustrate the extent and

application of its general doctrines, by a reference to the decided

cases, following in the arrangement of the subject-matter the
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order already adopted. The rule that facts alone are to be

stated, to the exclusion of law and of the legal rights and duties

of the parties, has been uniformly accepted by the courts, and

has been enforced in every variety of issues and of special cir-

cumstances. In a very recent decision, this general doctrine was

expressed in the following language : " Matter of law is never

matter to be alleged in pleading. No issue can be framed upon

an allegation as to the law. Facts only are pleadable, and uj)on

them without allegation the courts pronounce and apply the law.

This is true alike in respect to statutes and to the common law." ^

1 People V. Marlboro H. Com'rs, 54 of the law," and then adds the language

N. Y. 276, 279. The question was as to quoted in the text. See also Comnion-

the validity of a certain statute. The wealth v. Cook, 8 Bush, 220, 224 ; Clark

defendants, in their pleading, had ad- v. Lineberger, 44 Ind. 223, 228, 229. The

mitted its validity, and that they were material, issuable facts, not mere legal or

required by it to do the acts sought to be other conclusions, — as illustrations see

enforced by the action, and had nowhere Pittsburgh, C. & St. L. Ey. Co. v. Keller,

raised any objection on the record. The 49 Ind. 211 (in a complaint in an action

adverse party claimed that this admission against a railroad for killing plaintiff's

precluded the defendants from raising the cattle which got on the track, it is not

question at the argument. Johnson J. sufficient to allege, in reference to the

said: "The objection to its [this ques- fencing of the track, "that the said rail-

tion] being raised is that the defendants road was not at the time and place said

to the court . \Vhil this doctrine ha h n uniformly re ognized as c rr ct wh n thus stated in an ab 'traet and g neral
manner, it has som times been overlool~ <l r disregard cl in
paidng upon the suffi i ncy and r gularity of particular pleading . \\ hether tho de ii;;ion 'Yhich ha ye permitted the common count to be u cl a· good complaints or petition , and those
which have required th prornis implied Ly law to be expr 'Hly
avened as though actually made, are in conformity with this
doctrine, will be con id red in ubsequent paragraph , and the
various ca es bearing upon the question will be cited and di cussed. It is sufficient for my present I urpose to state the
doctrine in its general form, and to reserve its application for
another portion of the chapter.
§ 424. * 530. Cases Supporting Doctrine that Facts, not Legal
Conclusions, are to be stated. As the foregoing analysis ha been
exclusively based upon the text of the codes, I shall now test
the correctness of its conclusions, and illustrate the extent and
application of its general doctrines, by a reference to the decided
ca es, following in the arrangement of the subject-matter the
order already adopted . The rule that fact alone are to be
tated, to the exclusion of law and of the legal rights and duties
of the parties, has been uniformly accepted by the courts, and
has been enforced in every variety of issues and of special circumstances. In a very recent decision, this general doctrine was
expressed in the following language: "Matter of law is never
matter to be alleged in pleading. No issue can be framed upon
an allegation as to the law. Facts only are pleadable, and upon
them without allegation the courts pronounce and apply the law.
This is true alike in respect to statutes and to the common hw." 1

have, in pleading, admitted the obligation animals were killed fenced in by said de-

3G

1 People v. Marlboro II. Com'rs, 54
of the law," and then adds the language
N. Y. 276, 2i9. The question was as to quoted in the text. See also Commonthe Yalidity of a certain statute. The wealth v. Cook, 8 Bu h, 220, 224; Clark
defendants, in their pleading, had ad- v. Lin eberger, 44 Ind. 223, 228, 229. The
mitted its validity, and that they were material, issuable fa cts, not mere legal or
required by it to do the acts sought to be other conclusion , - a. illustration
ee
enforced by the action, and had nowhere Pitt burgh, C. & t. L. Ry. Co. v. Kell r,
rai ed any objection on the record. The 49 Ind. 211 (in a complaint in an action
adverse party claimed that this a.dmi sion again t a railroad for killing plaintiff's
precluded the defendants from rai ing the cattle which got on the track, it is uot
que5tion at the argument. Johnson J. sufficient to allege, in reference to the
aid: "The objection to its [thi ques- fencing of the track, "that the said railti on] being rai eel i that th e defendant. road wa not at the time and place said
baYe, in pleading, admitted the ol.Jligation animal ' Were 1.i!lc::d f!'llCed iu by , aid de36
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Among tlie allegations which have been condemned as legal con-

clusions, and for that reason as forming no material issue, and

which have been rejected as failing to state any element of a

cause of action, the following are given as illustrations: in an

action to dissolve a partnership, for an accounting, etc., the

averment that on a day named, and for a long time previous

thereto, the defendant and the plaintiffs "were partners doing

business under the firm name of T. & C.;"^ in an action to

restrain the removal of a county seat under a statute which was

claimed to be special and therefore void, the allegation that "said

act is a special law in a case where a general law of uniform

operation throughout the State exists, and can be made appli-

cable ;"2 in an action apparently to recover damages for the

wrongful interference with the plaintiff's possession of certain

fendant in manner and form as in the

statute provided ") ; Tronson v. Union

Lu;iib. Co., 38 Wis. 202 (in an action of

replevin the averments that " the taking
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[hy defendant] wa.s wrongful, and tlie de-

tention unjust," are mei-e jiropositions of

~

monO' the allegation whi h have been condemn
lu i n an l for that rea 01 a forming no n at rjal i -. u
"hich ha ·e b n r ject l a failing t
fate any lement
au e of a tion, the following are giv n as illu ' trati n : in an
a tion to li olY a partn r hip f r an accounting t . the
aY rment that on a day nam 1 an l f r a long ime previou
tl1ereto the defen lant and th plaintiff
were 1 urtner · loing
1 in an action to
bu ines under the firm na.me f T . &
re train the r mova.l of a county at uncl r a statute which wa
c~aimed to be pecial and therefore' oid the allegation that
aid
act i' a pecial law in a a where a general law f uniform
operation throughout the State exi ts, and can b made applicable · ' 2 in an action apparently to recover damage for he
wrongful interference with the plaintiff' posse ion of certain

law) ; Page ?•. Kennan, 38 Wis. ."20 (in

an action to quiut title to land tlie com-

plaint alleged that defendant claimed un-

der certain deeds, and that her " claim

is without foundation in law," and "that

she has no legal claim or lien u])on or

title or interest in or to the laud ; " A< W,

a mere legal conclusion, and insufficient

to show the invalidity of defendant's

title): Surginer v. Paddock, 31 Ark. 528;

Schilling v. Rominger, 4 Col. 100 ; Clay

Co f. Simonsen, 1 Dak. 403, 430; Scott v.

liohards, 67 Mo. 289 ; Botey v. Griswold,

2 Mont. 447 ; Peter.'^on r. Koach, 32 Ohio

St. 374 ; Pittsburgh, C. & St. L. R. Co. v.

Moore, 33 id. 384 ; Scott v. B. & S. W. R.

Co., 52 Iowa, 18; Cooper v. French, 52

id. 531 ; Ockendeu v. Barnes, 43 id. 615;

Northern Kan. T. Co. v. Oswald, 18 Kan.

336; Sheridan v. Jackson, 72 N. Y. 170,

173; Stack v. Beach, 74 Ind. 571 ; Leach

V. Rhoiles, 49 Ind. 291 (in action on a

contract a general averment that there

was a full and valuable consideration, is a

mere conc-lusion of law, and not suflicient ;

tied fjH. is not this the issuable allegation of

fact?); Moore v. Ilobbs, 79 N. C. 535 ;

Estate of David Gharky, 57 Cal. 274 ;

Pavne v. McKinlev, 54 id. 532; Fite v.

Orr's Ass'n (Ky. 1886), 1 S. W. Rep. 5?2 ;

McEntee v. Cook, 76 Cal. 187 ; Bowers v.

Smith (Mo. 1892), 20 S. W. Rep. 101 ;

Johnson r. Vance, 86 Cal. 128 (alle;rntion

that yjlaintiff is " owner in fee simple " of

property in dispute is statement of an ulti-

mate fact, not of a conclusion of law) ; Go-

ing V. Dinwiddle, 86 Cal. 633 ; Mitchell v.

Clinton, 99 Mo. 153. The complaint need

never anticijjate any defences which may

be set up in the answer, nor contain alle-

gations to meet them. Caflin v. Taussig.

7 Hun, 223 ; Metrop. L. Ins. Co. r. Meeker,

85 N. Y. 614; Cohen v. Continental L.

Ins. Co., 69 id. 300, 304 ; Roth v. Palmer,

27 Barb. 652 ; Kayser v. Sichel, 34 id. 89 ;

Bliss r. Cottle, 32 id. 322 ; Wygand v.

Sichel, 3 Keyes, 120.

1 Groves r. Tallman, 8 Nev. 178. A

fendant in manner and form as in the
tatute provided"); Tron on v.
mon
Lu mb. o., 3 Wi . 202 (in an action of
replevin the averment that "the taking
(hy dPfendant] wa wrongful, and the deteution uuju. t," are mere propo ·ition. of
law); Page r . Kennan, 3 Wi:. :320 (in
an action to qui et title to ]and the complaint alleged that defendant claimed under certain deed., and that her " laim
i witho ut foundation in law,'' and "that
he has no legal laim or lien upon or
title or intere t in or to the laud;" held,
a mere legal concln ion, and in nfficient
to ·how the invalidity of defendant's
title); 'urginer 1 . Paddock 31 Ark. 52 ;
..'chilling v. ominger, 4 ol. 100; ,lay
,o v. ' imon en, l Dak. 40.3, 430 ; cott v.
Hohar d , 67 .Mo. 2 ; Botey v . ri wold
2 ;\lont. 44i; P ter. on v. Roach, 32 . hio
t. 3i4; Pitt burgh, . & t. L. R. o. v.
l or , 33 id. 3 4; cott v. B . & . W. R.
o., 52 Iowa, l ;
ooper v. French, !12
id. 531 ;
kenden v. Barne , 43 id. 615;
_•orth rn Kan. T. o. v.
wald, 1 Kan.
336; 'heridan v. Jack on, 72
. Y. 170,
173; tack v. B each, 74 Ind. 57 1 ; L ach
11. I hode , 49 Incl. 291 (in acti n
u a
ontract a g neral averment that there
wa: a. full and valuahle con id ration, i a
lrl"rc: condu ion of law, and not ufficient;
.·nl 1111. is not thi the issuable a11 gation f
fal'I;

1 ) ;

L tat<>
l'ay11•

~foore

1•.

fiobl , 79

Orr' A 'n (Ky. 1 6), l . W. R ep. 5'12;
McEntee v. Cook, 76 Cal. 1 7 ; B ow r v.
mith (Mo. 1 92), 20 . W. Rep. 101;
John:<on 1·. ance, 6 al. l 2 (all g-ation
that plaintiff i' "owner in fee ·i mpl
of
property in di pute i tatemeut f au ultirnat fact, not of a conclu ion of law)· oing v. Dinwiddie, 86 Cal. 63:3 ; Mitchell v.
Clint n, 99 Mo. 153. The complaint 11 ed
n ver an ticipate an y defence which ma
be et up in the an . wer, nor contain allegation to m et th m.
aflin v. Tau ig.
7 Hun, 223 ; ~ l etrop. L. In . o. v. Ie ker,
5 N. Y. 614; ob n v.
ontineutal L.
In . o., 69 id. 30 , 304; Roth v. a im r,
27 Barb. 652 · Kay r v. ichel 34 id. 9;
Dli .. v.
ottle, 32 id. 322; Wygand v .
ichel, 3 Keye , 120.
1
roYe t'. Tallman,
Nev. 17 . A
genE>ral demurrer to the complaint wa
. u tained, the court hol<lino- that thi~ all gation wa a mere conclu i n f law, and
that he executed agr m nt £ pa rtn rt for th. Th
hip hould have been
deci ion,
it e m to m , i
ntir 1
wrong: the plaintiff hacl tat d he i uable fact, while th e
urt d mandecl the
vid n e: there may ha e been no written
ontract of partner 11ip.
e K J y v.
n nry, 4 Ind. 37, wl ich fully ·u tain
the view
ed in thi n te.

. 535;

of l>aYi1l C'harky, 57 a1. 274 ;
1'. ~1dG11lc·y, 54 id. 532; Fit
v.

au-

GEXERAL I'RIXCIPLE
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land, the averment that the plaintiff "was entitled to the ex-

clusive possession of" the premises in question;^ in an action

against a subscriber to the stock of a corporation to be organ-

ized, brought to recover the amount of his subscription, an

averment that the "company was legally organized, into which

organization the defendant entered." ^

§ 425. * 531. Same Subject. Also, in an action to recover on

a policy of fire insurance, by the terms of which the sum assured

did not become payable until certain acts had been done by the

plaintiff as conditions precedent, an averment merely "that the

whole of said sum is now due; "^ in an action to restrain the col-

lection of a tax on the plaintiff's land, an allegation that the

land "is by the laws of the State exempt from taxation;"* in a

suit to recover a stock subscription to a corporation, an allega-

tion that the party became a subscriber to the capital stock "by

signing and delivering" a specified agreement;^ an allegation

" that the title of the plaintiff to said lots by virtue of said, tax

sale is invalid, from an irregularity in the notice of such tax

sale ; " ^ in an action to set aside a judgment for a tax, an allega-
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tion " that no notice was given of the said proceedings, or any

of them," which resulted in the tax;" in an action brought to

recover land claimed by inheritance from a former owner, the

allegation that the plaintiff was "one of the heirs of" such

1 Garner v. McCullough, 48 Mo. 318. * Quinney w. Stockbridge, 33 Wis. 505.

The petition did not state that the plain- There was no other statement showing

tiff was or had ever been in possession, that the land was exempt; and, in order

and failed to disclose the nature of his that it should be so, certain special cir-

claim or the source of his right, the cumstances must have existed. Tlie

allegation (juoted being the sole asser- averment was held to be of no force what-

tion of a right in the land. It was held ever, unless accompanied by allegations

that no cause of action was stated, and all of the proper facts; and a preliminary

evidence should be exchuled at the trial, injunction was therefore dissolved upon

although the defendant had answered. the complaint alone.

land, the av rm nt that tbe laintiff wa n itl <l to the c. clu ·ive po
sion of" th l r mis in qu -tion; 1 in an action
again t a subscrib r to the tock of a corporati n to be organized, brought to recover the amount of his ·ub:cription, an
aYerment that the "company wa: legally organiz d, into which
organization the defendant nter d." 2
~ 42 5. * 531. Same Subject. Also, in an action to r coy r on
a policy of fire insurance, by the terms f which the um as:ur cl
lid not become payable until certain acts had been done by th
plaintiff as conditions precedent, an averment merely "that the
whole of said sum i now due; ' 3 in an action to restrain the collection of a tax on the plaintiff's land, an allegation that the
land His by the laws of the State exempt from taxation;" 4 in a
suit to recover a stock sub cription to a corporation, an allegati n that the party became a subscriber to the capital stock "by
igning and delivering" a specified agreement; 5 an allegation
"that the title of the plaintiff to said lots by virtue of said tax
sale is invaJid, from an irregularity in the notice of such tax
sale ;" 6 in an action to set aside a judgment for a tax, an allegation "that no notice was given of the said proceedings, or any
of them," which resulted in the tax; 7 in an action brought to
recover land claimed by inheritance from a former owner, the
allegation that the plaintiff was "one of the heirs of" such

2 Hain ;;. N. W. Gravel R. Co., 41 Ind. & Wheeler v. Floral Mill Co., 9 Nev.

196. This averment was held to have 254, 258. In an action against the corn-

raised no issue, citing Indianapolis, C. & pany, it set up the demand mentioned in

L. R. Co. V. Robinson, 35 Ind. 380. the text as a set-off or counter-claim, al-

3 Doyle V. Phoenix Ins. Co., 44 Cal. leging the plaintiff's liability in the man-

264, 268. The court having decided that ner described. A judgment in favor of

the comjilaint did not sufficiently aver a the defendant was reversed, because there

performance of the conditions precedent was no averment in the answer which

by the plaintiff, and so failed to state a made out a cause of action, citing Barron

cau.se of action, added: " The allegation r. Frink, 30 Cal. 486; Burnett v. Stearns,

that 'the sum is now due' may be laid 33 Cal. 473.

out of the case, inasmuch as that is a ^ Wel)b v. Bidwell, 15 Minn. 479, 485.

coiiclusion of law merelv." '^ Stokes i\ Geddcs, 46 Cal. 17.

1 Garner v. McC ullough, 48 Mo. 318.
The petition did not stnte that t he plaintiff was or had eYer been in possession,
and failed to disclose the nature of his
claim or the source of his rig ht, the
allegation quoted bein g the ole a ertion of a rig ht in th e land. It was held
that no cause of action was staterl, and all
ev idence should be exclu ded at th e trial,
although the defendant had answered.
2 Hain v . N. W. Gravel R. Qo., 41 Ind.
196 . This averment wa held to have
rai ed n o issue, citing Indianapolis, C. &
L. R. Co. v. Robinson, 35 Ind . 3 O.
3 Doyle i'. Phcen ix In s. Co., 44 Cal.
264, :?68. The court having decided that
the complaint did not sufficiently aver a
performance of the conditions precedent
by the plaintiff, anJ so failed to state a
cause of action, added: " The allegation
that 'the sum i now due' may be laid
out of the case, ina much as that is a
concl usion of law merely."

4 Quinney v. Stockbridge, 33 Wis. 505.
There was no other statement bowing
that the land was exempt; and, in order
that it should be so, certain special circumstances must have cxi ·ted. The
avermeut was held to be of no force whateYer, unless accompanied by allegations
of the proper facts; aud a preliminary
injunction was therefore dissolve<l upon
the complaint alone.
5 Wheeler v. Floral Mill Co., 9 Nev.
254, 258. In an action against the company, it set up the demand mentioned in
th e text as a set-off or counter-claim, alleging the plaintiff's liability iu the manner dei;cribecl. A judgment in favor of
the defen<laut was rever ed, becau e there
wa no averment in the answer which
made out a cause of action, citing Barron
1'. Frink, 30
al. 486; Burnett v. Stearu ,
33 Cal. 473.
6 Webb v. Bidwell, I 5 Minn. 4i9, 485
1 Stokes v.
etlde., 46 Cal. 17.

IYIL R EllIEDIES .
564 CIVIL REMEDIES.

former owner ;^ in an action on a contract where the defendant's

liability depended upon the performance of certain conditions

precedent by a third person, the mere allegation, without stating

any performance by such person, that " the defendant neglected

and refused " to perform the stipulated act on his part " accord-

ino- to the terms of said acjreement."^ The law of another State

f rmer owner· 1 in an ac i n n a contra t where the defen lant s
liability 1 p n letl ur n h I erforman
f certain c n<liti n
pr c tl I t by a tbinl I erson th m re alle a ion, with u tatin 0
any perform< uc 1_ uch p r n, hat the cl f nclant n gl ct d
<ml r fu · d '
p rform th
tipulat l a t on hi par ' ac n· ling to the term ·f ·aid <lgre ment. ' 2 Th law of auother 'tate
or country, however, i · r o·arcled, for purpo e · f I lea.din ·, a . .
matt r of fact, and mu t b averred with o much di tin tn
aml p<nti ut rity that the court may, from the statement al n ,
ju<lg of it operation an l ffect up n th issue pr ·ented in
the au e. Thu in an action upon a note xecutecl and mad
payable in Illin i , the allegation, "that by the law of Illinoi
th lefen lant was indebted to the plaintiff in the amount of u h
note - wa held in ufficient to adm~t evidence of what th Illin i
law i in refer nee to the subject-matter. 3 In Indiana the a rment, that the defendant '~ i ind ebted ' to the plaintiff in a
sr · cifi d amount, is held to be u:ffi cient. This ruling, howev r,
i not based ur on the general principles of pleading announced by
the code" but upon certain bort form authorized by the 1 gi le tur , which were copied from the anci nt common c unt in
a . ump it. 4 Exampl
imilar to the foregoing might be ind finitely multiplied; but the e are sufficient to illustrate the a tion
of he ourt , and to how how firmly tl y h ave adh r cl to the
doctrine that fact , and not law, mu t be alleg cl, and that t h
c verment of legal conclu ion without the facts from which th y
hav a.ri en form n is"u s, tate I cau e of acti n, admit no
eviden e and do not even :ur I ort a verdict or judgment, - in
short that they are mere nullitie ·. 5
T

or countr}^ however, is regarded, for purposes of pleading, as

matter of fact, and must be averred with so much distinctness

and particularity that the court may, from the statement alone,

judge of its operation and effect upon the issues presented in

the cause. Thus, in an action upon a note executed and made

payable in Illinois, the allegation, "that by the law of Illinois

the defendant was indebted to the plaintiff in tlie amount of such

note," was held insuihcient to admit evidence of what the Illinois

law is in reference to the subject-matter.^ In Indiana the aver-

ment, that the defendant "is indebted" to the plaintiff in a

specified amount, is held to be sufficient. This ruling, however,

is not based upon the general principles of pleading announced by

the codes, Ijut upon certain short forms authorized by the legis-
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lature, which were copied from the ancient common counts in

assumpsit.* Examples similar to the foregoing might be indefi-

nitely multiplied ; })ut these are sufficient to illustrate the action

of the courts, and to show how firmly they have adhered to the

doctrine that facts, and not law, must be alleged, and that the

averments of legal conclusions without the facts from which they

have arisen form no issues, state no causes of action, admit no

evidence, and do not even support a verdict or judgment, — in

short, that they are mere nullities.'^

1 Larue c. Hays, 7 Bush, 50, 53. Tliis doctrine or rule relied upou must be fully

allegation was held not to be admitted and accurately stated in the pleading. See

by a faihire to deny it, citing Bani<s v. Woolsey v. Williams, 34 Iowa, 413, 415.

•lohnson, 4 J. J. Marsh. 649; Currie v. * .lolinson v. Kilgore, 39 Ind. 147.

Fowler, 5 .1. J. Marsh. 145. Tiiese statutory forms, in my opinion,

2 Wilson V. Clarlv, 20 Minn. 367, 309. violate the fundamental princijdes of

This was declared to be a mere conclu- plcailing adopted by tlie reformed pro-

sion of liiw ; and as no facts were stated cedure, more so even than the ancient

from which it could be inferred, it wa.s a common counts. Tiiis question will be

nullity. particularly examined in a subsequent

^ Hoots ('. Merriwether, 8 Rush, 397, paragraph.

401. As a foreign law is a matter of fact,

the court does not take judicial notice of ^ £Facts, not Leyal Conclusions,

it. and if different from that of the forum, «''«"'<^ ''^ pleaded.

and if it must be invoked in order to make Upou this general proposition, and in

out the cause of action, the particular support thereof, .sec the following ca.se.s :

1 Larue v. Hay , 7 Bu h, 50 , 53 .
Thi
doctrine or rule r elied upon mu t be fully
allegation wa h lcl not to be aclmitt d and ac urately stated in the pleatliJJO'. 'ee
by a failure to deny it, citing Bank v . W 1 y v. William . 34 Iowa, 413, 415.
.Johu on, 4 J. J. Mar ·h. 649; urrie v.
4 John "on v.
Kilgore, 39 Intl. 14-7.
Fowler, 5 ,J. J. Mar h. 145.
Th .
tatutory form , in my piui n,
2 \V il ·on 1·.
lark, 20 ~linn. 367, 369. Yiolate the fundamental prin ipl
of
Thi wa · declared to be a mere ·011 ·In- pleading ad pt d by the reform d proo even than th anci ut
ion of law; and a. no fa ·t w r tat d cedur , mor
mm n c unt . Thi que ti u will li
from which it could b iJJf rred, it wa · a
particularly examined in a ub queJJt
nullit.1·.
3 I 00ts I' M rriwPth r,
nu h, 397, paragraph.
4 I . .A a foreign law i ' a matt r of fa t,
6 [Facts, not Leu al Con lu ions,
the court <loe. not tak judicial noLic of
i . anrl if rliffer nt from that of th forum, s 11 ould u plend d .
p 11 thi g 11 ral propo iti n, antl iu
a1111 if t 11111. t Ii i111·ok<'cl i11 0rdcr to m;Lk •
ouL the ·au e of a<.tiou, the particular
up1 ort thcr of, . cc th following ·a: " :
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§426.

§ 426. *. 32.

Cases Supporting D o ctri ne tha t M ateri a l, n o t P ro-

*.532. Cases Supporting Doctrine that Material, not Pro

bative, Facts are to be stated.

Wabaska P^lectric Co. v. City of Wymore

(1900), 60 Neb. 199, 82 N. W. G26 ; Wood-

ward V. State (1899), .58 Neb. 598, 79

N. W. 164; State ex rel. v. Osborn (1900),

60 Neb. 415, 83 N. W. 357; Blakeslec v.

Missouri Pac. lly. Co. (1894), 43 Neb. 61,

61 N. W. 118; Ilobinsoiir. Berkey (1896),

100 la. 136, 69 N. W. 433 ; Deiini.s v. Nelson

(1893), 55 Miun. 144, 56 N. W. 589; Folaud

V. Town of Frankton (1895), 142 Ind. 546,

41 N. E. 1031 ; Davis v. Clements (1897),

148 Ind. 605, 47 N. E. 105G; Lanier v.

Union Mortgage Co. (1897), 64 Ark. 39,

40 S. W. 466; Malliiickrodt Chemical

Works V. Nemnich (1902), 169 Mo. 388,
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69 S.. W. 355 ; Livingstone v. Buff (1903),

65 S. C. 284, 43 S. E. 678 ; First Nat. Bank

V. Myers (1895), 44 Neb. 306, 62 N. W.

459. "

But a pleading is not rendered insuffi-

cient because in addition to averments of

fact there are also conclusions of law :

Nourse v. Weitz ( 1903), — La. — , 95 N. W.

25 L

An averment of a legal conclusion is

not admitted by demurrer nor by failure

to deny it : Lanier v. Union Mortgage

Co. (1897), 64 Ark. 39, 40 S. W. 466;

Greer v. Latimer (1896), 47 S. C. 176, 25

S. E. 136; State v. Kanisey (1897), 50

Neb. 166, 69 N. W. 758 ; Markey v. School

District (1899), 58 Neb. 479, 78 N. W. 932 ;

Hoyer v. Ludiugtou (1898), 100 Wis. 441,

76 N. W. 348; knapp w. St. Louis (1900),

156 Mo. 343, 56 S. W. 1102 ; Bogaard v.

Ind. Dist. of Plainview (1895), 93 la. 269,

61 N. W. 859 ; Peake v. Buell (1895), 90

Wis. 508, 63 N. W. 1053; Edwards v.

Smith (1897), 102 Ga. 19, 29 S. E. 129.

The objection tliat some of the allega-

tions of the complaint are mere legal

conclusions is one of form rather than sub-

stance, and does not render the pleading

subject to a demurrer for want of facts :

Harris v. Halverson (1901), 23 Wash.

779, 63 Pac. 549. But in Mallinckrodt

Chem.- Works v. Nemnich (1902), 169 Mo.

388, 69 S. W. 355, it was held that a legal

conclusion rendered a pleading obnoxious

to attack by general demurrer. Same

rule stated in Ryan v. Holliday (1895),

110 Cal. 335, 42 Pac. 891, but this case

was expressly overruled by Penrose c.

Pursuing the order before indi-

Winter (1901), 135 Cal. 289, 67 Pac. 772.

See also Smith u. Kaufman (1895), 3 Okla.

568,41 Pac. 722. A legal conclusion ren-

ders the pleading liable to attacli by

motion to make more definite and certain :

Griffith v. Wright (1899), 21 Wash. 494,

58 Pac. 582. A pleading containing only

conclusions of law is to be regarded as

irrelevant, interposed for delay only, and

may be stricken out on motion : Dennis v.

Nelson (1893), 55 Minn. 144, 56 N. W. 589.

bative, Facts are to be stated.
\\ aba: ka Electri c o. v. ity of Wy more
(1900), 60 N b. 199, 82 J. \V. 626; Woodward v. tate (1 99 ), 5 Neb. 598, 79
~ . W. 164 ; Stat
x rel. v. Osborn ( 1900),
60 Neb. 4 l 5, 3 J . W. 357; Blak lee v.
i\ li ouri l ac. Ry. Co. (l 94), 43 eb. 61,
6 1 . W . 11 ; Robinson v. Berkey( ! 96),
100 Ia. 136, 69 N. W . 43.3; Dennis v. Nel on
( l 9.3 ), 55 Minn. 14-J., 56 N. W. 589; Foland
v. Town of F rankton (1 95), 142 Ind. 5-J. 6,
41 N. E. 103 1 ; D avis v. Clements ( 1 97),
148 Ind. 605, 47
. E. 1056; La nier v.
Un ion Mortgage Co. ( 1 9i) , 64 Ark. 39,
40 S. W . 466; Mallinckrodt Chemical
'\Vorks v. Nemni ch (1 902) , 169 Mo. 388,
69 S, W . 355 ; L iving tone v. R uff ( 1903 ),
65 S. C. 284, 43 S. E . 678 ; First Nat. Rank
v. Myers (1 895) , 44 Neb. 306, 62 N. W.
459 .

But a pleadin g is not rend er ed insufficient because in addition to averm ents of
fact th ere are al. o co nclu ions of bw :
No urse v. Weitz ( 1903 ), - Ia.-, 95 N . vV.
25 1.

An averment of a legal conclusion is
11 ot admit ted by de murrer nor by failure
to deny it: L ani er v . U nion Mortgage
Co. (1897 ), 64 Ark. 39, 40 S. W. 4 66;
Greer v. L atimer (1896) , 47 S. C. 176, 25
S. E . 136; State v. Ramsey (1 89 7 ), 50
Neb. 166, 69 N. W. 758 ; Markey v . School
D istri ct (1 899 ), 58 Neb. 479, 78 N . W. 932;
H oyer v . Ludin g ton (189 ), 100 \Vi s. 44 1,
76 N. W. 348; Kn app v. St. L ouis (1 90 0 ),
156 Mo. 343, 56 S. W. 1102 ; B ogaard v.
In d. D ist. of Pla in view ( 1895), 93 Ia. 269,
61 N. W . 859; Peake v. Buell {1 895), 90
Wi s. 508, 63 N. W . 1053; E d wards v.
Smith (1897), 102 Ga. 19, 29 S. E . 129 .
T he objection that some of the allegation of the complaint are mere legal
conclusions is one of form rather than ·ubstance, aud does not render the plead ing
subject to a demurrer fo r want of facts:
Harris v. Halver on (1901 ) , 23 Wash.
779, 63 Pac. 549 . But iu Mallinckrodt
Chem: Works v. Nemnich (1902), 169 Mo.
3 8, 69 S. W . 355, it wa held that a legal
concl usion rendered a pleauing obnoxio us
to attack by general demurrer. Same
rul e stated iu Ryan v. Holliday (1895) ,
110 Cal. 335 , 42 l>ac. 89 1, but t his case
was exp ressly overruled by P curo e v.

Pur uing the

Ol'll l'

b fore indi-

Winter (1901), 135 al. 2 9, 67 Pac. 772.
ee al o, mith v. Kaufm an (I 95), 3 kla.
56 , 41 Pac. 722. A legal conclu ion r nders th pleading Jiaule to atta ·k by
motion to mak e more rl finite and certain :
Griffith v. Wright (1899), 21 Wa: h. 49+,
58 Pac. 5" 2. A plead in g outaining only
concln ion· of law i · to be regarded as
irrelevant, in terposed for delay ouly, and
may be · tricken out on moti on : D enni. v.
Nelson (1893), 55 Minn. 144, 56 N. W. 5 9.
A mixed statem eut of fact and legal
conclu ·ion may properly be pleaded : Livingstone v. Ruff {1903), 65 S. C. 2 -J., 43
S. E. 6i8, quoting with approval Clarke i·.
Railroad Co., 28 Minn. 71.
o, aL o,
facts , toge t.her with the couclu ion whic h
the law impl ies from them, may both
properly be pleaded : W etmore v. Crouch
(1 899), 150 Mo. 67 1, 51 S. W . 738. But
it was held in Manry v. Waxelbaum Co.
(1 899 ), 108 Ga. 14, 33 S. E. 70 1, t hat where
a wri tte n instr ument is sued upon, allegati ons in t he petition which mere!.'' ought
to construe it were properly stricken out.
F acts or conclusions which are presumed or necessarily implied from facts
pleaded, need not be alleged : City of
Broo kfie ld v. T ooey (1 897 ), 14 1 Mo. 619,
43 S. W . 387 ; H artfor d F ire Ins. Co. v.
K ahn ( 1893),4 W yo. 364, 34 l'ac. 895;
Bi hop v. Middleton (1894), 43 Neb. 10, 61
N. 'V. 129 ; H enke v. E ureka Endowment
Ass'n ( 1893), 100 Cal. 429, 34 Pac. l 089 ;
McMurray-J udge, etc. Co. v. City of t.
L oui (1 8%), 138 Mo. 608, 39 S. W. 46 7;
L ord v. Hussell (1894), 64 Conn. 86, 29
Atl. 242; Pyle v. Peyton (1896), 146 Ind.
90, 44 N. E. 925 .
Conc/u ions of Fact. All egations of co nclusions of fact cannot avail unle s they
are accompani ed by statements of th e
facts th mselves from which the court
may draw th e conclui::ious: Longshore
Printing Co. v. H owell (1 94), 26 Ore. 527,
38 Pac. 5-J. 7; Bordeaux v. Greene (1 99) ,
22 l\1out. 25-J., 56 Pac. 218. \Vh en so accompanied the:.- are u eful as inclirating
th e pleader's t heory 0£ his ca e: Robin on
v. Berke:' ( 1896), 100 Ia. 136, 69 T. W. 433.
Conclusion do not limit the eY iden ·e
whi ch i ad mis ible: Alleud i• . Spokane
Falls, etc Hy. o. (1899), 2·1 ·w ash. 32.J ,
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catecl, the following cases will explain and illustrate the second

doctrine that the principal, material, and issuable facts must be

58 Pac. 24-1. Specific facts control general

• t tl, the following ase will xplain < nd illu ·trate th sec nd
1 c rine th. t the I rincipal ma rial, and i ' u bl fac mu be

stateiiieuts of fact : Frain v. Burgett (1898),

152 Ind. 55, 50 N. K. 873.

Instances of Allegations Held to be Con-

clusions of [mw.

Tliat money is due : Creecy v. Joy

(1901), 40 Ore. 28, 66 Pac. 295 ; Penrose v.

Winter (1901), 133 Cal. 289, 67 Pac. 772 ;

Kyan v. Holliday (1895), 110 Cal. 335, 42

Pac. 891 ; Ricliards v. Lake View Land

Co. (1897), 115 Cal. 642, 47 Pac. 683;

Baldwin r. Burt (1895), 43 Neb. 245, 01

N. W. 601. 'That a note is a wife's

separate estate : " Leahy v. Leahy (1895),

97 Ky. 59, 29 S. W. 852. That a wife, as

sole lieir of her husband, owns a cause of
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action: Butties i-. De Baun (1903), 116

Wis. 323, 93 N. W. 5. Tlie allegations in

the petition that the ordinance in question

was passed, " without any legal warrant or

authority therefor ; " that " the passage of

said ordinance was a violation by the city

of its duties as trustee ; " that " the use

hv the chemical company of the vacated

portions of tlie street is wholly illegal ; "

that " plaintiff has no adequate remedy at

law ; " that the " damages of plaintiff are

irreparable," are merely conclusions of

law and not averments of facts : Knapp

V. St. Louis (1900), 156 Mo. 343, 56 S. W.

1102. See also State ex rel. v. Wood

(1900), 155 Mo. 425, 56 S. W. 474, where

same rule is stated respecting allegation

of irreparable injury. That there was no

legal and sufficient levy of taxes : Weston

V. Meyers (1895), 45 Neb. 95. 63 N. W.

117. That the tax deed under which de-

fendant claims is void, because the officers

who made the a.ssessment and executed

tiie deed were legally disciualified, and

failed to publish jiroper notice : O'Hara v.

Parker (1893), 27 Ore. 156, 39 Pac. 1004;

^ha!lnon i>. Portland (1900), 38 Ore. 382,

62 Pac. 30. An allegation, in an action to

enjoin tiie collection of a certain tax, that

" the said board of directors has no juris-

diction or |)(jwer to appropriate said

money for said propo.sed highway : "

Bog.iard V. Jud. Dist. of Plainview (1895),

93 la 269, 61 N. W. 859. That a sale

wa.s made fraudulently for the purpose of

iiindcriag, delaying and defrauding credit-

ors : Coue V. Ivinsou (1893), 4 Wyo. 203,

33 Pac. 31. That a judgment was pro-

cured by fraud and is contrary to law :

Thomas v. Markmann (1895), 43 Neb.

823, 02 N. W. 20G. That the execution of

a deed was procured by fraud : First Nat.

Bank of Sutton v. Grosshans (1901), 61

Neb. 575, 85 N. W. 592. In an action by

a mortgagor to recover a surplus left in

tlie hands of the sheriff, an allegation that

" the remaining S51 arising from said sale,

as aforesaid, is surplus payable to plaintiff,

who is entitled to the same as mort-

gagor, and by virtue of a deed of convey-

5 Pac. U4.
peci fie fact control general
ta.temen s of fact: Frain t'. Burgett ( l
),
152 fo,1. 55, 50 •. E.

73.

lnstauces r~l AILegatious Held to be Cone u.·io11 uf Law.
That money i due:
reecy v. Joy
(1901 ), 40 Ore. 2 , 66 Pac. 295; Penro e v.
Wiuter (l90l), 135 al. 2 9, 67 Pac. 772;
Ryan 1·. Holli<lay (I 95), l 10 Cal. 335, 42
Pac. 91; Ri hard v. Lake View Land
o. (!Ji), 115
al. 642, 47 Pac. 63;
Baldwiu t'- Burt (1895), 43 .._Teb. 245, 61
J.
\V. 601. '· That a note i a wife'
separate e·tate:" Leahy v. Leah_v (1 95),
9i Ky. 5!1, 2 " . W. 52. That a wife, as
sole heir of her bu band, own a cause of
actiou: Buttle ' v. De Baun (1903), 116
Wi . 323, 93 :N. W. 5. The allegation in
the petition that the ordinance i11 question
wa pa. ed . ''without any legal warrant or
authority therefor;" that" the pa' age of
sa.i<l on.liuance war. a violation by the city
of it. dutie as trustee ; " Lh-at "the use
by the chemical company of the vacated
portion· of the treet i wholly illegal; "
that" plaintiff ha no adequate remedy at
law ; " that the " damag s of plaintiff are
irr parable," are merely conclu ions of
law aud not averments of fact : Knapp
v. , t. Loui ( 1900), I 56 Mo. 343, 56 S. W.
1102.
ee al o tate ex rel. v. Wood
(1900 ), 155 Mo. -l-25, 56 . W. 4i4, where
same rule is tated re pecting allegation
of irreparable injury. That there wa no
legal and sufficient levy of taxe : We ton
v . .Meyer· ( l 95), 45 i:Teb. 95, 63 N. W.
117. That the tax deed under which defendant claim~ i voi<l, because the officer
who ma<le the a· e ment aud x cuted
th dee l were legally di qualified, and
failed to publi. h proper notice: 'Hara v.
larker ( 195),27 re. 156, 39 Pac. 10 4;
. hannou v. Portland (1900), 3
r . 3 2,
G2 l'ac. 30. Au allerratiou, iu an a ·t.ion to
njoin the collection of a certain tax, that
"the :-.aid IJ)ar1l of <li rector. ha n juri uic tiou <H' power to appropriate ai<l
111011 y for aid propo ·ed highway :"
Ho~a.ar , l v .Jud . Di t. of Plaiuvi w (I 95),
3 Ia 269, fi l L • W. 5 . That a sal
wa mal fr, udulentl_r for the purpo e of
lii11rlcri11g, dela.yiug aud defrauding reditor · (on c hiu ou (I 93), 4 Wyo. 203,

33 Pac. 31. That a judgment wa procured by fra.url an<l i coutrary to law :
Thoma v. ilfarkmaun ( l 95). 4 ,3
eb.
23, 62 .N. W . 206. That th x cutiou of
a deed wa proeur d by fraud: Fir t ;\'at.
Bank of ' utton v.
ro hau (1901), 61
Neb. 5i5, 5 r. W. 59:2. Io an action by

a mortgagor to recover a urplus left in
the hand of the h riff, an all gation that
' tbe rem ain ing ... 51 ari ing from aid ale,
a afore aid, is urplu payable to plaiut iff,
who i ' e11titled to the am a· mortgagor au<l by Yirtue of a deed of conveyance of aid property o ~old. to her made
and deli,·ered by ·aid Arthur\ . .Jyde : "
lyde v. Joh n on (189+), 4 r . D. 92, 5
N. W. 512. That it wa defendant' duty
to erect and maintain guard - over a certain
window: Peake v. Buell ( l 95), 90 Wi -.
50 , 63 N. W. 1053. That a pole, which
cau. e<l per oual iDjurie , wa · "too near
the track:" Black toue v. Central of
Georgia I y. Co. (1 9 ) 105 Ga. 3 0, 31
. E. 90. That the plaiutiff had "u ed
all the diligence he coul<l: " Edwar<l i:.
mith (1 9i), 10:. Ga. 19, 29 . E. 129.
That a certain fence i liable to be blown
over on plaintiff' buildiug': Bordeaux v.
Greene (1 99), 22 font. 254, 56 Pac. 21 .
'I hat a corporation i the ucce or of
another, a um d all its liabilitie , a11d i
liable for the payment of the ouli ation
sued on: Rhorer v. i\liddle. bol'O Co. ( l ' 9 ),
103 Ky. 146, 44 . W. 448. That the" aid
P. \V. mith i not now or nev r h b n
legally appoiute<l a ·igu e for J.
wkirk:" ' mi th v. Kaufman (l 95), 3 Uk la.
568, 41 Pac. 722. That d feudant' refu al to trau mit the me ·ag t udere<l
wa
" without rea onaule grou11d ; "
Kirby v. W , tern nion Tel. ~ o . ( l lf3),
4 . D. 463, 57 . W. · 02. That d £ ndant put it ab· lutely out of hi pow r to
p rform hi · ·outra ·t: ,arb riu v. I h rt
(! 95), 109 al. 12\ 41 Pa . 57. That
' plaintiff
u t au inno nt hold r f r
~ i her
value of
(I 93), 9
t.ah, 303, 34 Pa . 64. That
plaintiff hai:i a Ji non
: !Jill
ampbll
o.( I
).!'i~
Teb. 59, 74
That phi 11tiff
ha a . pC'cial
rship in
rtain property:
riffing
urti ( I 97). 50 'eb.
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pleaded, and not the details of evidentiary or probative matter

from which the existence of the final facts is inferred. The

language employed by the court in an action brought to restrain

the execution of tax deeds of the plaintiff's land, on account of

illegality in the proceedings, furnishes a very instructive example

of such averments : " The plaintiff relied upon the absence of

preliminary proceedings essential to the validity of the tax sales.

But instead of averring, either of his own knowledge or upon

information and belief, that such proceedings were not had, he

only averred that he had searched in the proper offices for the

evidence that they were had, and failed to find it. The only

issue that could be made upon such an allegation would be

whether he had searched and found the evidence or not, which

would be entirely immaterial." ^ In pleading certain classes of

334, 69 N. W. 964. That certain acts of

au agent were within the apparent scope

of his employment : Hoyer v. Ludington

(1898), 100 Wis. 441, "76 N. W. 348.
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That a contract was not one for the sale

pl adecl, and not ihc detail of evidentiary or proLativ matter
from which the exi tence of th final fa ts is inf rr d. Th
languag mployed by the court in an acti n brought to re train
th ex cution of tax de ds of th plaintiff's land on a ·cotmt £
illegality in he procee lings, furni bes a ry instructive xam l
of such averments: "The plaintiff relied upon th ab ence £
preliminary proceedings essential to th validity £ th tax ale .
But instead of averring, either of bis own knowledg or up n
information and belief, that such proceedings were 11 t had, he
only averred that he had searched in the prnper offic s for the
evidence that they were had, and failed to find it. The only
issue that could be made upon such an allegation would be
whether he had searched and found the evidence or not, which
would be entirely immaterial." 1 In pleading certain classe of

of goods, but merely an agreement as to

prices which should be paid for goods

ordered from time to time: Gipps Brew-

ing Co. V. De France (1894), 91 la. 108,

58 N. W. 1087. That plaintiff is lessee of

premises and entitled to possession and to

the rents payable from tenants : Harris v.

Halverson (1901), 23 Wash. 779, 63 Pac.

549. That certain assessments were duly

levied : Harlow v. Supreme Lodge (1901),

Ky., 62 S. W. 1030. That a plat did not

contain a dedication to the public use of

certain streets, etc. ; Bellevue Imp. Co. v.

Ivayser (1903), — Neb. —, 95 N. W. 499.

That the Constitution requires every bill

to be read by sections on three several

days, unless the sevei'al readings are dis-

pensed with by two-thirds vote : Laudes v.

State (1903), — lud. — , 67 N. E. 189.

Instances of Allegations Held not to be

Conclusions of Law.

That defendant waived the non-pay-

ment of the entire stock : MacFarland >•.

West Side Improvement Ass'n (1898), 56

Neb. 277, 76 N. W. 584. In a suit to en-

force payment of city warrants, an allega-

tion that the warrants " were registered

for payment according to law by the "

city treasurer " at the dates of their re-

s)iective presentations : " Freeman v. City

of Huron (1897), 10 S. D. 368, 73 N. W.

260. " That the plaintiff is the owner

and that the property is her sole and

separate property : " Kemp v. Folsom

(1896), 14 Wash. 16,43 Pac. 1100. That

" he waived demand and notice : " Bay

View Brewing Co. v. Grubb (1901), 24

Wash. 163, 63 Pac. 1091. That title to

land is in the United States and is not

subject to taxation : Mo. Pac. Ry. Co. r.

Ilenrie (1901), 63 Kan. 330, 65 Pac. 665 ;

Security Co. v. Harper County (1901), 63

Kan. 351, 65 Pac. G60. That defendant

unlawfully procured the arrest of plaintiff :

Reynolds!;. Price (1900), Ky., 56 S. W.

502. That an assessment was duly made

and that notice thereof was duly given to

the assured : Miles v. Mutual Reserve

Fund Life Ass'n (1901), 108 Wis. 421, 84

334, 69
. W . 964. That certain act of
.au agent were within the apparent scope
of his employment: Hoyer v. Ludington
(1 98), 100 Wis. 441, 76 N. W. 348.
That a contract was not one for the sale
of goods, but merely an agreement as to
prices which should be paid for goods
ordered from time to time: Gipps Brewing Co. v. De France (1894), 91 Ia. 108,
58 ~. W. 108i. That plaintiff is lessee of
premises and entitled to possession and to
the reuts payable from tenant : Harris v.
Halverson (1901), 23 Wash. 779, 63 Pac.
549. That certain asse ments were duly
levied: Harlow v. Supreme Lod ge (1901),
Ky., 62 S . W. 1030. That a plat did not
~ontai n a dedication to the public use of
certain streets, etc. : Bellevue Imp. Co. v.
Kay ·er (1!!03), - Neb. -, 95 N. W. 499.
That the Constitution requires every bill
to be r ead by sections on three several
days, unless the several reading are dispensed with by two-thirds vote: Landes v.
State {1903), - Iud. - , 67 N. E. 189.
Instances <?f Allegations Held not to be
Conclusions <?( Law.
That defeudant waived the non-payment of tlie entire stock: MacFarland v.
W c t ide Improvement Ass'n (1898), 56
Neb. 277, 76 N. W. 584. In a suit to enforce payment of city warrant , an allegation that the warrants "were registered
for payment accordinO' to law by the"
city treasurer "at the dates of their re'Spective presentations :" Freeman v. City
of Huron (1897), 10 S. D. 368, 73 N. W.

260. "That the plaintiff is the owner
and that the property is her ole and
eparate property:" Kemp v. Folsom
(1896). 14 Wash. 16, 43 Pac. 1100. That
"he waived demand and uotice:" Bay
View Brewing Co. v. Grubb ( 1901), 24
Wa·h. 163, 63 Pac. 1091. That title to
land is in the United States and is not
subject to taxation: Mo. Pac. Ry. Co. v.
Henrie (1901), 63 Kan. 330, 65 Pac. 665;
Sec urity Co. v. Harper County (1901), 63
Kan. 351, 65 Pac. 660. That defendant
unlawfully procured the arrest of plaintiff :
Reynolds v. Price (1900), Ky., 56 S. W .
502. That an as e sment wa duly made
and that uotice thereof was duly given to
the assured: Miles v. Mutual He erve
Fund Life A 'n (1901), 108 Wis. 421, 84
. W. 159 , criticising Am. M. A. Soc. v.
Helburn, 85 Ky. 1, where the contrary
was held. That a warrant was duly aml
legally signed: Stephens v. pokane (1 95),
11 Wash. 41, 39 Pac. 266. That the debt
ued on is the same debt eYidenced by a.
certain note: Shirley v. tephenson (189 ),
104 Ky. 518, 47 S. W. 5 1.J
l Rogers v. Milwaukee, 13 Wis. 610,
611. If the plaintiff had alleged that the
proceedings iu que tion had been omitted,
the facts stated by him would haYe been
proper e,·ideucc in npport of the a.verment. This case exhibits very clearly the
di ·tincti n between the ultimate i._·uablc
fact which cannot be changed in ord r
to make out a O'iven cause of action. :incl
the probative matter by which such fa<.:t
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issues, it is undoubtedly difficult sometimes to discriminate

between the final facts and the probative matter. This is espe-

cially true in charging fraud, which must almost invariably

consist of many different circumstances, some affirmative and

some negative ; but the rule should nevertheless be applied. " It

is not necessary nor proper for the pleader to set out all the

minute facts tending to establish the fraud ; the ultimate facts,

and not the evidence, should be pleaded."^ An allegation of

mere evidentiary matter, and not an ultimate or issuable fact, is

surplusage ; it need not be controverted, and is not admitted by

a failure to deny. As was said in a recent decision, " the matter

averred is not an ultimate fact; that is to say, a fact which is

required to be stated in a complaint, and which, if not denied by

the answer, would stand as admitted; but it is merely matter of

evidence which might be stricken out of the complaint. "^ If in

addition to the issuable or material facts the pleading also con-

tains the details of evidence tending to establish them, these

latter averments should be stricken out on motion as surplusage.^
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is established, and which may vary ac-

cording to the exigencies of the case. Of

course the omission of the preliminary

proceedings must be proved, but it could

be proved by many different kinds of

evidence. This distinction is a certain

test by which to determine whether any

i ue , it is undoubtedly difficult sometimes to di criminate
bet een the :final facts and the probative matter. This is especially true in charging fraud, which mu t almost invariably
con i t of many different circumstance , ome affirmative and
ome negativ ; but the rule should neverth less be applied. "It
i ~ not n ce ary nor proper for the pl ader to et out all the
minute fact tending to establi h the fr ud · the ultimate fact ,
and not the evidence, should be plead d. ' 1 An allegation of
m r evidentiary matter, and not an ultimate or i suabl fact i
ur lusage ; it need not be controverted, and is not admitted by
a failure to deny. As was said in a recent l cision " he matt r
av rr cl i not an ultimate fact; that i to ay, a fact which i
required to be tated in a complaint, and which, if not denied by
he an wer would tand as admitted; but it i merely matter of
evidence which might be tricken out of tbe complaint. 2 If in
addition to the issuable or material facts he pleading al o contain the details of evidence tending to establi h them hese
latter averments should be stricken out on motion as surplusage.3

given fact is issuable and material, or is

only probative.

1 Cowin V. Toole, 31 Iowa, 513, 516;

Singleton i-. Scott, 1 1 Iowa, 589.

2 Gates V. Salmon, 46 Cal. 361, 379.

See also, as further illustrations. Clay

Cy. V. Siraonsen, 1 Dak. 403, 430; Scott

V. Robards, 67 Mo. 289 ; Terry v. Musser,

68 id. 477; Cook v. Putnam Co., 70 id.

668 ; Kansas Pac. Ry. Co. v. McCormick,

20 Kan. 107 ; Harris v. Hillegass, 54 Cal.

463 ; Elder v. Spinks, 53 id. 293 ; Damb-

raan v. White, 48 id. 439; Schilling v.

Rominger, 4 Colo. 100 (mode of allegation

in equitable actions). The complaint

need not anticijiate and meet expected

defences. Claflin v. Taussig, 7 Hun, 223,

and cases cited ; Metrop. Life Ins. Co. v.

Meeker. 85 N. Y. 614; Cohen v. Conti-

nental Life Ins. Co., 69 id. 300, 304.

2 King V. Enterprise Ins. Co., 45 Ind.

43 ; Van Schaiik v. Farrow, 25 Ind. 310;

Lytle V. Lytle, 37 Ind. 281.

^Ultimate, not Probative Facta, to be

alleged.

In support of this general proposition,

see the following cases : Stewart v. An-

derson (1900), 111 la. 329, 82 N. W. 770;

Durell V. Abbott (1895), 6 Wyo. 265, 44

Pac. 647 ; Markey v. School District (1899),

58 Neb. 479, 78 N. W. 932; Bee Publish-

ing Co. V. World Publishing Co. (1900),

59 Neb. 713, 82 N. W. 28 ; McCarville v.

Boyle (1895), 89 Wis. 651, 62 N. W. 517 ;

Stephens v. Spokane (1895), 11 Wash. 41,

39 Pac. 266.

What are Ultimate Facts ?

Meyer v. School Di.«trict (1893), 4

S. D. 420, 57 N. W. 68: " Ar ultimate or

issuable fact in a pleading is one essential

to the claim or defence, and wliich cannot

be stricken from the pleading without

leaving it insufficient. Such issuable facts

i e tabli hed, and which may vary ac[Ultim.ate , not Probative Facts, to be
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There is a class of allegations which are necessar}', Lut which

are not issuable in the ordinary meaning of this term as already-

defined, — that is, the cause of action is not defeated by a failure

to prove them as averred, and an omission to deny them does not

admit their truth, but still they must be stated, and a complaint

or petition w^ould be insufficient, or at least incomplete, without

them. This class includes in general the statements of time,^

cannot be stricken from the pleading with-

out leaving it insufticient." McLean v.

There is a class of allegations which are nee sary, but which
are not issuable in the ordinary meaning of tbi t rm a already
defined, - that i , the cause of action is not d f ated by a failure
to prove them as averred, and an omi sion to deny th m doe not
admit their truth, but still they mu t be stat cl, and a complaint
or petition would be in ufficient, or at least incomplete, without
them . This clas include in general the statements of time, 1

City of Levviston (1902), Idaho, 69 Pac.

478 : In actions for negligence, " the

pleader must state all facts necessary to

inform the defendant of all acts or omis-

sions that are charged against the defend-

ant, so as to enable him to make a full

and complete defence thereto."

" A material fact not alleged is pre-

sumed not to exist : " Stillings v. Van
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Allstine (1902), Neb., 89 N. W. 756.

Consequences of Pleading Evidence.

McCaughey v. Schuette (1897), 117 Cal.

223, 46 Pac. 666, 48 Pac. 1088. Where

cannot be tricken from the pleading without leaving it insuffic ient." McLean v.
City of Lewisto n (1 902), Idaho, 69 Pac.
478: In actions fo r negli gence, "the
pleader must state all facts necessary to
inform the defendant of all acts or omis. sion · that are charged against the defendant, so as to enable him to make a full
and complete defence th ereto."
"A mate rial fact uot alleged i pretillings v. Van
sumed not to exist : "
All tine {1902), Neb., 89 N. W. 756.

ultimate facts are not pleaded but the

complaint contains averments of such

Consequences of Pleading Evidence.

evidentiary facts as would, if proved, au-

thorize the court in finding the ultimate

facts, the complaint is bad on general

demurrer for want of sufficient facts.

The court say, " To uphold such a plead-

ing is to encourage prolixity and a wide

departure from that defiuiteness, certainty,

and perspicuity which is one of the para-

mount objects sought to be enforced by

the code system of pleading.'' This

decision seems opposed to the current of

authority and is not warranted by the

previous decisions in California. The

cases cited by the court do not go as

far as this case.

But, for the contrary view, see Dilla-

hunty r. Railway Co. (1894), 59 Ark. 629,

28 S. W. 657. In this case, where a fact

material to the cause of action was not

alleged as such in the complaint, but only

evidence of such fact was alleged, a demur-

rer on the ground that it did not state

facts sufficient to constitute a cause of

action was overruled. It was held that

the proper practice was to interpose a

motion to make more definite and certain.

So in Missouri Pac. Ry. Co. v. Hemingway

(1902), 63 Neb. 610, 88 N. W. 673, it was

held that the remedy for argumentative

pleading was by motion, not demurrer.

Facts within Knowledge of Opposite Parti/.

In Brashear v. City of Madison (1895),

142 Ind. 685, 36 N. E. 252, the court said :

" The true rule, as we understand it, is

that facts peculiarly within the knowledge

of the party against whom they should be

pleaded, and not accessible to the pleader,

may be dispensed with, but this may not

be done without showing that such facts

are so peculiarly within the knowledge of

the opposite party, and not accessible to

the pleader. . . . Under our code, the bur-

den rests upon the pleader to state in a

plain and concise manner the facts re-

McCaughey v. Schuette {1897), 117 Cal.
223, 46 Pac. 666, 48 Pac. 1088. Where
ultimate facts are not pleaded but the
complaint contains aYerments of such
ev iLl entiary facts as would, if proved, authorize the conrt in finding the ultimate
facti<, the complaint is bad on general
Ll emurrer for want of sufficient facts.
The co urt say, "To uphold such a pleading is to encourage prolixity and a wide
departure from that definitenes , certainty,
and per picuity whi ch is one of the paramount objects sought to be enforc~d by
th e code ystem of pleading." This
decision seems opposed to the curren t of
authority and is not warranted hy the
previous decision in California. The
cases cited by the court do not go as
far a thi case.
But, fo r the contrary view, ee Dillahunty v. Railway Co. (1894), 59 Ark. 629,
2 S. ·w. 657. In this case, where a fact
material to the cau e of action was not
alleged as such in the complaint, but only
evidence of such fact was alleged, a demurrer on the ground that it did not tatPfact sufficient to constitute a cau.e of
action was overruled. It was held that
the proper practice was to interpose a
motion to make more definite and certain.
o in Missouri Pac. Ry. Co. v. Heming way

(1902), 63 Neb. 610, 8 N. W. 673, it was
held that the rem edy for argumeutatiYe
pleading was by motion, not demurrer.

Facts within Knowledge of Opposite Party.
In Brashear v. City of Madison (1895},
142 Ind. 6 5, 36 N. E . 252, the court aid :

" The true r ule, as we und erstand it, is
that facts peculiarly within the knowledge
of the party against whom they should be
pleaded, and not accessible to the pleader,
may he di pensed with, but thi mav not
be done without showing that snch ·facts
are so peculiarly wi thin the knowledge of
the opposite party, and n ot accessible to
th e pl eader . . . . Under our code, the burden r ests upon the pleader to state in a
plain and con cise mann er the facts requiring the relief demanded, and to be
excused from this duty he must allege
that such farts are beyond his reach and
n ot within his kn owledge."]
1 [Railway Co. v. State (1 894), 59
Ark. 165, 26 S. W . 824. Wh ere plaintiff
alleged, in suing for a penalty, that on
the 24th of F'ebruar.71, 1889, at about 11
o'clock A. M., the defendant on a certai n
engine of a JJassenger train going south
failed to rin g bell or sound whistle, and
proved on the trial that in the spring of
1889, on a certain engine of afi·ei_qht train
going north the failure occurred, held that
there was a total variance. The court
discusses the allegation and proof of time,
and holds that the plaintiff mu t make
such allegation specific and e tabli h it by
proof, in order to advi e the defendant
what it is to meet on the trial. In the
following ca. ei< it was held that the time
wa ·immaterial, and need not be proved as
laid: Bancroft Co. v. Ila ·lett (1 "95), 106
Cal. 151, 39 Pac. 602 (<late of com rsion );
Carrier v. Bernstein (189 ), 104 Ia. 5i2. 73
N. W. 1076 (date of illegal. ale of intox icating liquors in action for penalty) j
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place, ^ value,- quantity, amounts,^ and the like; although, under

peculiar circumstances, the allegation of any one of these

matters may become in ever}' sense of the term issuable and

material. Ordinarily, however, this is not so. The rule thus

given prevailed in the common-law pleading, and has not been

changed by the new procedure. Thus, for example, in an action

for the conversion of chattels, the statement of their value is not

issuable; failure to deny does not admit its truth, nor exclude

evidence as to the real value.*

§ 427. * 533. Instances of Allegations Approved or Condemned

by the Courts. The decisions which follow in this and one or

two subsequent paragraphs are cited in order to furnish some

examples of allegations which have been judicially tested and

pronounced sufficient or insufficient, as the case may be. A few

such particular instances will better illustrate the general doc-

trine of the codes, and will more clearly explain the requisite

form and nature of issuable and material averments than can be

done by any other method, either of description or of argument.

In an action upon a guaranty of a note, the objection was raised
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by the defendant that the complaint failed to state any cause of

action. It set out a note payable to the defendant which fell

due October 1, 1867, and alleged "that on the 9th of October,

1867 [after it was due], the defendant, for value received, trans-

ferred said note to the plaintiff, and then and there guaranteed

the payment thereof by his written guaranty, indorsed thereon as

follows: 'For value received, I hereby guarantee the payment of

the within note when due, October 9, 1867 ; ' and although said

note became due and payable before the commencement of this

action, yet the said makers of said note, nor the said defendant,

Delsman v. Friedlander (1901), 40 Ore. .3.3, Cincinnati, etc. Ry. Co. v. McLain (1897),

66 Pac. 297 (date of execution and in- 148 lud. 188, 44 N. E. 306; Au.sic v. KuW-

dorsement of note ."sued on). See subject way Co. (1901), 10 N. I). 215, 86 N. W .

Time, ill note on Necessity and Form of 719; Coulter c. Great Nortliern Ry. Co.

Particular Allegations, p. 687.] (1896), 5 N. 1). 568, 67 N. \V. 1046.]

1 QFor ca,ses holding that there is no ^ [^Plumb v. Griffin (1901). 74 Conn,

material variance where there is a differ- 132, 50 Atl. 1 ; Derrick r. Cole (1894), 60

ence between the place allegeil and that Ark. 394, .30 S. W. 760; Campbell v.

proved, see Barrett r. Village of Ham- Brosius (1893), 36 Neb. 792, 55 N. W.

mond (18'J4), 87 Wis. 654, 58 N. W. 1053 ; 215.]

J'rewittj'. Mi.ssouri,oto. Hy. Co. (1896), 134 » QDenn v. Peters (1900), 36 Ore. 486,

Mo. 615, .36 S. W. 667. 59 Pac. 1109.]

For cases holding that such difference ■• Cliicago & .S. VV. U. Co. v. N. W. U.

pla 1 Yalu ~quantity amount , 3 an<l he lik ; altbou ·h un1er
I cufou ir um 'tance
th
f any ne of th
matt l" may be me in
t rm i uabl an l
ma rial.
rdinarily, h
r thi i not o. The rul tlrn
n·iy n pre ail d in h common-law pl ading and ha n t b n
han ed b' the n w pr c dur . Thu , for exam le in n a ti n
for th onver ion f hattel th tat m nt of h ir valu i n t
i · uable ; failure t den doe not admit it truth n r xclud
eYill nc a t th r al alue. 4
427. * · 3. Instances of Allegations Approved or Condemned
by the Courts.
Th d ci ion "hi h foll w in thi and n or
tw sub quent paragraphs are cited in rder o furni h ome
xampl of allegation whi h h a e b en judi ·iall t t d and
pronounc d ufficient or in ufficient, a' the ca e ma • b . A few
uch particular instanc will better illu ·trate th g neral do trine f the cod s, and will more clearly xplain th r qui it
form < nd nature of i uable and material averment than can b
don b any other method, either of d cription or of argument.
In an action upon a guaranty of a note, the obj ction wa rai ed
by he d fondant that the complaint failed to state any cau of
action . It et out a note payable to th defendant which f ll
ctober 1, 1 7, and alleged "that on the 9th of Octob r,
1 7 [after it was du ], the defendant, for alue r eive , tran £erred aid note to the plaintiff, and then and th re guarant ed
the payment thereof by his written ·uaran y, ind or d th r on a
follow : 'For value received, I her b guarc nt the paym nt of
the within note when du
ct b r 9, 1 67 · ' and althou b aid
note became du and paya1Jle b fore th
mm n m nt f l i ·
action, y t he aid mak r of aid not , nor th a.id ef ndant,

does constitute a material variance, see Packet Co., 38 Iowa, 377, 382.

re. 4 6,

.. N.W.U.
variauce,

ce
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have paid the same, nor any part thereof; that the plaintiff is

the owner and holder," etc., stating the amount due, and making

the usual demand of judgment. The defendant claimed that the

complaint did not state a cause of action because it failed to

allege that the amount due is due on the note and guaranty or

on the guaranty, or from the defendant to the plaintiff, and

failed to allege that the maker had not paid the note ; also

because the guaranty being executed after the note became due,

and stipulating payment ivhen due, is impossible and void.

After disposing of the last objection by holding that the guaranty

was payable at once, the court, by applying the rule of favorable

construction prescribed by the code, pronounced the complaint

sufficient.^ In an action against a railroad company for killing

the plaintiff's horses, which had strayed upon the track and been

run over, the only negligence charged upon the defendant at the

trial was in reference to its construction and maintaining of its

fences through which the animals escaped and reached the track.

The sole allegation of the complaint was that the defendant "so

carelessly and negligently ran and managed the said locomotive
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and cars, 'and the said railroad track, grounds, and fences, that

its said locomotive and cars ran against and over the said

horses." It was not even stated that the animals escaped

through the fences. In pronouncing upon the sufficiency of

this averment, it was said by the court that the best possible

construction for the plaintiff which could be put upon the lan-

guage was " that the defendant so negligently managed the fences

that its train ran over the horses," and that, even under the

liberal rule prescribed by the codes, this could not be taken as

alleging a cause of action for negligently constructing the fences,

1 Gunn V. Madigan, 28 Wis. loS, 163, the aid of that rule to enable us to hold

164. The opiniou of the court, after that it is a good pleading. It sets out the

stating the positions of the defendant's contract and the alleged breach thereof,

counsel, proceeded : " The rule practically the interest of the plaintiff and the lia-

applied by him is, that a pleading must l)ility of the defendant, and demands the

be construed most strictly against the proper judgment. Ought we to demand

pleader. He seems to have forgotten more ? " The only real defect of the

that this stern rule of the common law is pleading is, that, from the grammatical

repealed by the code, and in its place a construction of a single clause, it does not

more beneficent one has been enacted, allege that the note was not paid. " Yet

Looking at the complaint in the light of the said makers of said note, nor the saiil

this new rule, it seems to us that it states defendant, have paid the same." It is

a cause of action. Indeed, we are not thus made to aver that the makers have

have pa.id th same, nor any part th r of; that the plaintiff is
the owner and hold r, '' tc., ta.ting th am nnt <l uc, antl making
th u ' ual demand of judgm nt. The lefendant ·laim ,d Urnt the
complaint did not state a cause of action b cau::5e it fail d to
allege that the amount du is due on the not ancl guaranty or
on the guarnnty, or from th cl f n<lant to th plaintiff, and
failed t allege that the mak r had not paid th noLe; also
becau e the guaranty b ing executed after ihe note b came due,
and stipulating payment when due, is impossibl and void.
After disposing of the last objection by holding that the guaranty
was payable at once, the court, by applying the rule of favorab le
construction prescribed by the code, pronounced the complaint
sufficient. 1 In an action agains t a railroad company for killing
the plaintiff's horse , which had strayed upon the track and been
nm over, the only negligence charged upon the defendant at the
trial was in reference to its construction and maintaining of its
fence through which the animals escaped and reached the track.
The sole allegation of the complaint was that the defendant '" so
carelessly and negli gently ran and managed the said locomotive
and cars, and the said railroad track, grounds, and fences, that
its said locomotive and cars ran against and over the said
horses." It was not even stated that the animals escaped
through the fences. In pronouncing upon the sufficiency of
this averment, it was said by the court that the best possible
construction for the plaintiff which could be put upon the language was "that the defendant so negligently managed the f ences
that its train ran over the horses," and that, even under the
liberal rule prescribed by the codes, this could not be taken as
alleging a cause of action for negligently constructing the fences,

quite sure that it is necessary to invoke paid it.

Gunn v . Madigan, 28 Wis. 158, 163, the a id of that rule to enable us to hold
The opinion of the court, after that it is a good pl eadiug. It sets out t he
stating the po itions of the defendant's contract and th e all eged breach thereof,
counsel, p roceeded: "The rule practically the interest of th e plaintiff aud the liaapplied by him is, that a pleacling must bility of the defendant, and demand th e
be con trued most strictly against the proper judgment. Ought we to demand
pleader. He seems to have forgot ten more?" The only r al <lefel't of th o
that thi tern rul e of the common law is pleading is, that, from the gramrnati eitl
r epealed by the code, and in its place a construction of a ingle clau ·e, it does not
more benefi cent one has been 1macted. allege that the note wa not paid . " Yet
J~ooking at the complaint in the li ght of
the said makers of said note, nor the sai tl
t his new rule, it seems to us that it tates defendant, have paid the ame." Jt i::;
a cause of action. Indeed, we are not thus made to aver that t he makers !tave
qui te sure that it is necessary to invo ke paid it.
1

164..
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or suffering them to be out of repair, so that the animals escaped

through them on to the track. ^

§ 428. * 534. Same Subject. In an action for trespass to hind,

the petition stated that "plaintiff by virtue of a contract -with

one E. was entitled to the exclusive possession of " the premises,

" that subsequently to this contract the premises were purchased

by the defendant with knowledge of the plaintiff's rights, tliat

the defendant forcibly took possession and excluded the plain-

tiff," but did not allege tliat the plaintiff' was ever in possession,

nor the relation which E. bore to the land, nor the terms of the

contract with him, nor that defendant's acts Avere Avrongful.

This petition, it Avas held, stated no cause of action, and was

properly dismissed at the trial. ^ In an action to foreclose a

mortgage of land, the plaintiff obtained a preliminary injunction

to restrain the removal of machinery which had been so affixed'

to the land as to become part of the freehold. A motion was

made on the pleadings to dissolve the injunction on the ground

that the complaint contained no allegations which could be made

the basis of that relief. The clause relied upon by the plaintiff
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was the following: That the defendants had erected on the

premises a manufacturing establishment, "and put therein ma-

chinery which had become part and parcel thereof," and that

"among other machinery which they put therein was a steam-

engine," etc., enumerating other articles. This was held to be a

sufficient averment that the engine, etc., had become part of the

realty. If the defendants desired a more explicit allegation they

should have moved for that purpose, the manner of raising the

objection which they had adopted being tantamount to a de-

murrer for want of sufficient facts.^ The complaint, in an action

on a note against the maker and indorsers, alleged several suc-

cessive indorsements until it was thus indorsed and transferred

to one M., but omitted to state an indorsement and transfer from

him to the plaintiff. It contained, however, the following aver-

ment, " that the plaintiff is now the lawful owner and liolder of

1 Autisdel v. Chicago & X. W. Ry. Co., suits and issuable facts in legal actions.

26 Wis. 145, 147. A failure to prove this special averment

2 (uirner v. McCuUough, 48 Mo. .318. would not defeat the cau.se of action ; it

3 Kimball c. Darling, .32 Wis. 675, 084. would simply modify and limit the amount

The allegation in question is an admira- of relief to be obtained by the plaintiff;

hie illu.'Jtration of the di.stinctiou between but it was certainly a necessary allegation

facts material to the remedy in ecpiity fur tliat jjurpo.se.

or uff ring them to be out of re air, o that the animal
caped
throu h them on to the tr k. 1
428. * 53-!. Same Subject.
n an acti n for tr pa to land
the p titi n tat cl that ' plain iff b Yirtue f a con rac wi h
one E . wa entitl l to th xclu ~ iye po. e i n of ' the premi
that ub qu ntly to thi contra ·t the pr mi es w r pur ha
by h l fen lant with kn wledg of the plaintiff ri ht that
the l f n lant for ibly t ok p
ion an l xclu] d the plaintiff, ' but did n t allege that th plaintiff ,rn.., ever in Io e, i n,
nor the r lation \ hicb E. bore to th land, nor the t rru of the
con ract with him, nor tl at defendant' act wer \Vrongful.
Thi p titian, it was b ld, stated no cau e oE action, and \Ya
properly dismi eel at the trial. 2 In an action to foreclo e
mortgage of Ian l, the plaintiff obtaine l a preliminary injunction
to restrain the removal of machinery which had be n o affixed'
to the land as to become part of the freehold. A motion wa
made on the pleadings to dissolve the injunction on the ground
that the complaint contained no allegations which could be made
the basis of that relief. The clau e relied upon by the plaintiff
wa the following: That the defendant had erected on the
premises a manufacturing establi hment, "and put therein machinery which had become part and pare 1 thereof, " and that
' among other machinery which they put therein wa a teamen ine ' etc . enumerating other article . This was h ld to be a
sufficient averment that the engine, etc ., had become part of the
realty . If the defendant desired a more explicit allegation they
hould have moved for that purpo e, the manner of rai ing the
objection which they had adopted being tantamount to a demurr r for want of sufficient fact .3 The c mplaint, in an action
on a not again t the maker ·an l indors r ', all
d everal ucce i ve indor m nt until it wa thus in] rs d and tran f rre
to n M. bit omitted to state a.n in lor m nt and tran fer fr m
him to the pl intiff. I ontain ] how ' r, the followin av rment, that the plaintiff i now the lawful wn r and holder of
T

1 Auti:del v.
hicago & .... W. Ry. o.,
26 Wi:. 145, 147.
2 (iarncr v . • fr('ullough, 4 :\Io 31 .
3 nmliall c. Darling. 32 Wi . 675 6 4.
Th" allegati1J11 in 'IU tion i. au admirar
lile illu. tratioll of the di ·ti nction uetwe 11
fact.· mat rial to the rem c..ly in q uity

would imply m dif.,· and limit the amount
of reli f to h obt. in d by the plaintiff;
hut it wa (' rtainly a ll ce ary allenation
fur that purpo. .
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the said note, and the defendants are justly indebted to him

tliereon," etc. This was held to be a sufficient statement of the

plaintiff's title ; the defect, if any, was one which should be cured

by motion to make the pleading more definite and certain.^ The

material portion of the complaint in an action for work and labor

simply stated that the plaintiff performed w^ork " for the defend-

ant at an agreed price of $26 per month." It was objected on

demurrer that no request on the part of the defendant was

alleged, but the pleading was held to be sufficient under the rule

of construction adopted by the codes. ^ In an action on a town

treasurer's official bond, the complaint, after setting out the

bond, averred the breach thereof in the following manner, simply

negativing the conditions: "He has not duly and faithfully per-

formed the duties of his office, and has not faithfully and truly

accounted for and paid over according to law all the state and

county taxes which came into his hands ; " but it did not allege

that any such taxes had ever come into his hands. This com-

plaint was pronounced fatally defective on demurrer, as the facts

constituting the breach should have been pleaded."^
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§ 429. * 535. Same Subject. The petition in an action against

H. as maker and C. as indorser of a note set out the note made

by H. payable to bearer and a guaranty thereon, "I guarantee

the payment of the within note to C. E. [the plaintiff'] or order,"

signed by C, and added: "The defendant H. is liable on said

note as maker, and the defendant C. as indorser and guarantor.

The plaintiff C. E. is the holder and owner of said note. There

is due from the defendants to the plaintiff on said note the sum

of," etc. On demurrer by the defendant C, he Avas held to be

absolutely liable as a guarantor, and that under the liberal rule

of construction the allegations of the complaint imported a cause

of action, and w^ere sufficient.* In an action by the vendee for

1 Reeve v. Fruker, 32 Wis. 243. * Clay v. Edgerton, 19 Ohio St. 549.

- Joubert v. Carli, 26 AYis. 594, per The court, after stating that the defendant

Paiue J.: "The allegation that one has C. was absolutely liable as a guarantor,

performed work for another at an agreed added that the allegations above stated

price per mouth or per day, must be held implied a transfer of the note from him

to fairly import that the agreement was to the plaiutiff, and a consideration by

prior to the performance of the work, and means of such transfer. C. is thus shown

that the work was done in pursuance to be au indorser, and is, as it appears,

of it." therefore held liable as a guarantor. This

3 Wolff r. Stoddard, 25 Wis 503, 505; decision, in my opinion, cannot be sup-

Franklin Tp. Sup. V. Kirby, 25 Wis. 498. ported on principle. It is such ruling as

Dixon C. J. dissented in both cases. this that destroys the scientific character

the said note, and the lefendant are ju tly ind btecl to him
thereon " tc. Thi wa held to be a uflicient tat ment of th
plaintiff' title; the clef ct, if any, wa::; on " ·hich houlcl be cur cl
by motion to make the pleading more cl finite and c rtain. 1 Th
material portion of t.he complaint in an action for work and labor
imply tated that the plaintiff perform cl 'York ' for the def mlant at an a;reecl price of $26 per month.· It " ·a , obj ect d on
demurrer that no reque t on the part of th e defend ant " ·a ,
alleged, but the pleading wa held to be , ufficient under the rul
of construction adopted by the code . 2 In an action on a town
treasurer's official bond, the complaint, after etting out the
bond, averred the breach thereof in the following manner, simply
i1egativing the condition : "He ha not duly and faithfully performed the duties of hi office, and has not faithfully and truly
accounted. for and paid over according to law all the tate and
county taxes which ca.me into his hands;" but it did not allege
that any such taxes had ever come into bis hand . This complaint was pronounced fatally defective on demurrer, a the fact
con tituting the breach hould have been pleaded. 3
§ 42 9 . * 535. Same S ub ject. The petition in an action again ·t
H. a maker and C. as indorser of a note set out the note made
by H . payable to bearer and a guaranty thereon, "I guarantee
the payment of the within note to C. E. [the plaintiff] or order,"
igned by C., and added : "The defendant H . is liable on aid
note as maker, and the defendant C. as indorser and guarantor.
The plaintiff C. E . is the holder and owner of said note . There
is due from the defendants to the vlaintiff on said note the sum
of,' etc. On demurrer by the defendant C., be was held to be
absolutely liable as a guarantor, and that under the liberal rule
of construction the allegations of the complaint imported a cau e
of action, and were sufficient. 4 In an action by the vendee for
ReeYe v. Fruker, 32 Wis. 243.
Joubert v. Carli, 26 Wi . 594, per
Paine J. : "The allegation that one ha
performed work for another at an agreed
price per month or per day, mu t he held
to fairly import that the agreement was
prior to the performance of the work, and
that the work was done in pur uance
of it."
3 Wolff t•.• toddard, 25 Wi -. 503, 505;
Franklin Tp. up. v. Kirby, 25 Wi,. 498.
Dixon C. J . di ented in both ca e .
1
2

4 Clay v. Edgerton, 19 Ohio St. 549.
The court, after stating that the defendant
C. was ab olutely liable a - a guarantor,
added that the allegation aboYe tated
implied a tra.n fer of the note from him
to the plaintiff, and a con ideration by
means of such tran fer. C. i thu . hown
to be an indor~ er, and i , as it appear ,
therefore held liable a · a guarantor. Thi
deci ion, in my opinion, cannot be upporterl on principle. It i uch ruling a
this that de troy the cientific eharacter
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fraudulent representations miide on a sale, the complaint must

allege that the plaintiff relied upon them; and the absence of

sucli an averment will not be supplied by a statement of mere

evidentiary matter tending to show the existence of that material

fact, unless the evidence so stated is conclusive.^ In an action

brought to recover damages for the conversion of chattels, the

complaint was substantially as follows: That the plaintiff was

on, etc., the owner of certain chattels; that he leased them to

one S. by a written lease, in which he reserved the right to take

l^ossession of them, and to terminate the letting, whenever he

should deem himself unsafe, or that the chattels were not well

taken care of; that S. took possession under the lease; that the

defendant, who is a United States marshal, seized them while

thus in the possession of S. under a process in bankruptcy

against S. ; that plaintiff demanded them from the defendant,

who refused, etc. ; that the plaintiff demanded the possession

from the defendant "on the ground that the plaintiff deemed

himself unsafe, and did not think that the property was well

taken care of;" and that the defendant had converted the same
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to his own use. The complaint did not contain any further or

more express statement that the plaintiff did as a matter of fact

deem himself unsafe. A demurrer for want of facts was sus-

tained, and the pleading was held insufficient because it did not

show a right of possession in the plaintiff when the action was

brought, in that it failed to allege any fact entitling him to ter-

minate the letting, and to resume possession of his property. ^

The petition in an action for conversion alleged that the de-

fendant "had in his possession, and under his control, $5,000 in

money, and $10,000 in hardware, stoves, etc., of the money and

and usefulness of the reformed system, amonilmcnt on a motion to make it more

and tends to bring it into discredit. dotinitc and certain.

1 Goings V. White, 33 Ind. 125. This - Hatliaway v. Quinby, 1 N. Y. S. C.

decision assumes that, although in ac- 386. The construction given to the oom-

cordance with the general doctrine, the plaint in this case was certainly severe

principal fact and not the evidence of it and technical, and hardly in accordance

should be pleaded, yet a statement of the with the rule laid down in the code. The

evidence mni/ untier certain circumstances objection is for incomjilotcness and in-

be suflicient to raise a substantial issue, definiteness of the allegation. The j)lain-

If the principal fact be not alleged, but tiff certainly does state, although perhaps

the details of evidence are given, and in a jiartial manner, that lie deemed hiin-

thcse are positive and conclusive in their self unsafe. A motion was certainly more

frau lul nt r pr entati n ma.de on a ale, the complain mu t
, 11 g ha th plaintiff r li d upon h m · an<l th ab n e of
u h an av rm nt will not b
11 pli d by a tatem n f 1 re
Yirl n iary matter t n ling to bow b xi t n e of th· t material
fa ·t unl
the evid nee o tate l i
In an action
br ugh t r cov r darna
for th c m r ion of hatt l · th
c mplaint wa ub tantiall a foll w : That the plaintiff "·a
on tc. th own r of rtain chat el · tha he lea l th m to
on
. b a writt il lea e in which he re ' rved the ri ht t tak
p
ion f them, and to t rminate th
hould d em him elf un afe, r that the
ta.k n care of; that S. t ok Io e sion un ler the lease; th, the
d f ndant, who i a United State mar hal, seized t1 m whil
thu in the po ession of . under a proce
in bankrupt y
a0 ain t . · that plaintiff d mantled them from th 1 f n<lant
~'ho refused, etc. ; that the plaintiff 1 mantled the I
e ion
fr m the defendant "on the ground that the plaintiff deemed
himself un afe and did not think that the propert' wa well
taken care of;" and that the defendant had convert l th ame
t hi own u e. The complaint did not contain any further or
more expre
tatement that the plaintiff did a a mat r of fact
cl cm him 1£ unsafe. A demurrer for want of fact wa u fained, and the pleading was held in ufficient because it did not
how a right f possession in the plaintiff when the action wa
r ugbt, in that it failed to allege an; fact entitling him to terminate th 1 tting, and to r sum
e sion of hi propert ·. 2
The petiti n in an action for conver ion alleg d that the defendant "had in his pos s ion, and und r his control, $ 000 in
mane , and $10,000 iu hardware, t v , tc ., of them n y and

nature, the pleailing will not be bail ou appropriate than a demurrer.

demurrer, although it will be subject to

and u efulne of the reformed y. tern
and tend to bring it iuto di credit.
l
oing v. White, 33 Ind. 125. Thi·
cl i ·ion a ume that, although in ace r<lan e with th g neral d trio , the
principal fa t anct not the ridence f it
hould be pleader!, yet a statement f th
c·vicl nee mn.IJ uncler certain ·ircum tan ·
be· :u!lfoi nt t rai e a uh t u ial is ne.
Jf th prineipal faet he not all g d, but
tltc· <I tail: of •\icleuce are g-iv n, antl
th e. c arc po~itiv . and ·onclu iv in heir
lHl urr, the pleacling will n t be h, <l
n
ubj ct to
d rnurr r, although it will b

am ndment on a motion to make it more
definite and c rtain.
2 Ilatha,way v. Quinby, l
. Y. , . .
3 6. 'l he con tru tion iv n t th

ohj<'rti n i for inromplet n
and ind fiuiten . of the all gati n. Th plain·
tiff(' rtainly d . tate, although p rhap
in a partial manner, that he d m <I him. elf m1 , f . A m tion wa. ertaiuly m r
appropriat than a demurrer.
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property owned by the plaintiff," and converted tlie same. This

was declared, on a motion to make the petition more definite and

certain, to be a sufficient averment that the money and goods

were the property of the plaintiff. ^ If an action is brouglit on a

bail bond given in a criminal proceeding, the complaint should

allege that the person was released from custody upon the execu-

tion and delivery of the undertaking, and a pleading omitting

this statement was held bad.^ Where a tender is essential to

the plaintiff's cause of action, the complaint must either aver it

in express terms, or must state a sufficient excuse for omitting

it. In such a case the plaintiff alleged "that he has been ready

and willing during all the time aforesaid, and has offered, to

accept and take said conveyance, and to pay the balance of said

purchase-money." This averment was pronounced to be insuffi-

cient, and the complaint was held bad on demurrer, as it neither

stated a tender, nor an excuse for not making a tender.^ In

actions brought to recover damages, an allegation that damages

have been sustained is indispensable. As was said by the Su-

preme Court of California in a late decision, "it is not alleged
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in the complaint that the plaintiff has sustained damages, and

therefore he is not entitled to judgment for damages."*

1 Sturman v. Stone, 31 Iowa, 1 15. Mo. 400 ; Le May v. Mo. Pac. Ry. Co., 105

2 Los Angeles Cy. v. Babcock, 45 Cal. Mo. 361 ; plaintiff'.s, Higgins v. Jeff'erson-

252. ville, etc. R. Co., 52 id. 110; Toledo, W.

8 Englander v. Rogers, 41 Cal. 420, & W. Ry. Co. v. Harris, 49 id. 119 ; Hath-

422. away v. Toledo, etc. Ry. Co., 46 id. 25 ;

■» Bohall w. Diller, 41 Cal. .532. See also Jefferson ville, M. & R. Co. v. Eowen, 40

Bradley w. Aldrich, 40 N. Y. 504, and si(p?a, id. 545; Durgin v. Neal, 82 Cal. 595;

§ * 84, note 3 ; and comp. Graves v. Spier, Young v. Shickle, H. & H. Iron Co., 103

58 Barb. Si9, supra, §* 81, note 2. The Mo. 324; Lafayette & I. R. Co. v. Huff-

following cases furnish illustrations of man, 28 id. 287 ; Higley ?-. Gilmer, 3 Mont,

allegations held to be sufficient or insuffi- 90 ; in slander and lihel, Roberts v. Lovell,

cient in a variety of ordinary actions : of 38 Wis. 211 ; Hanuing v. Bassett, 12 Bush. '

fraud, Smith v. Nelson, 62 N. Y. 286 ; 361 ; Harris v. Zanone, 93 Cal. 59 ; of

Jones V. Frost, 51 Ind. 69; Arnold r. daynages, Argotaingev y. Vines, 82 N. Y.

Baker, 6 Neb. 134; Nicolai v. Lyon, 8 308; Ferguson v. Hogan, 25 Minn. 135;

Oreg. 56 ; Lafever v. Stone, 55 Iowa, 49 ; Johnson v. C, R. I. & P. R. Co., 50 Iowa,

Ockenden v. Barnes, 43 id. 615; Pence r. 25; Comer v. Knowles, 17 Kan. 436;

Croar, 51 Ind. 329 ; Hess v. Young, 59 Ind. Indianapolis, B. & W. R. Co. v. Milligan,

379 ; Sacramento Sav. Bank v. Hynes, 50 50 Ind. 393 ; Prescott v. Grady, 91 Cal.

Cal. 105; Hoester v. Sammelmann, 101 518; Brown v. Hannibal & St. J. R. Co.,

Mo. 619; of vegiigpnce, defendant's, Pitts- 99 Mo. 310; actions on express contracts,

burgh, C. & St. L. R. Co. v. Nelson, 51 Ind. performance of conditions, Preston v.

150; St. Louis & S. E. Ry. Co. v. Mathias, Roberts, 12 Bush, 570 ; Averbeck v. Hall,

50 id. 65; Smith v. Buttner, 90 Cal. 95; 14 id. 505; Andreas u. Holcombe, 22 Minn.

Pope V. Kansas City Cable Ry. Co., 99 339 ; Livesey v. Omaha Hotel Co., 5 Neb.
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430.

* 536.

Attitude of C ourt5 in Instances Ci te d l a r gely Due

^ 430. * 536. Attitude of Courts in Instances Cited largely Due

to Liberal Rule of Construction. The cases contained in the last

three paragraphs, and from which quotations have been made,

were not selected as examples of proper pleading according to

the principles established by the reformed procedure; on the

contrary, most of those which were sustained by the courts

escaped condemnation only by applying the liberal rule of con-

struction prescribed in the codes. These decisions are given

rather to show how far a pleading may disregard the require-

50 ; Estabrook v. Omaha Hotel Co., 5 id.

76 ; Lowry v. Magee, 52 Ind. 107 ; Rhodes

V. Alameda Co., 52 Cal. 350; Smith r.

The a e contained in th la t
hree paragraph and from which quotations haYe b n made,
·wer n t elec el a xampl of pro1 er I leading ace rding t
the princir 1 " e"tabli hed by th ref nnecl procedur ; n he
contrary mo "t of ho e '"'hi ch 'Yer ·u" tained by th
escaped con<lemnati n only by applyino· th libvra.l rule
ntru i n pre cribed in the cod s.
1
d i 10n are gi en
ra. her to how how far a pleading may di regard the re uireto Liberal Rule of Construction.

Moha, 87 Cal. 489 ; Ehrlich v. JFAna. L.

Ins. Co., 103 Mo. 231 ; work and ma-

terials, Steplienson v. Ballard, 50 Ind.

176; Wolf V. Scofield, 38 id. 175; the

consideration, Leach v. Rhodes, 49 id.

291 ; a written instrument, Waukon &,
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:Miss. R. Co. 1-. Dwyer, 49 Iowa, 121 ;

Brown i-. Champlin, 66 N. Y. 214, 218 ;

Pettit ('. Hamh-u, 43 Wis. 314 ; White v.

Soto, 82 Cal. 654 (modification of written

contract must be pleaded) ; McMenomy

V. Talbot, 84 Cal. 279 ; non-payment,

Roberts i-. Treadwell, 50 Cal. 520 ; Grant

V. Sheerin, 84 Cal. 197 ; Eliot v. Eliot, 77

Wis. 634 ; Tracy v. Tracy, 59 Hun, 1 ; 20

Civ. Pro. R. 98 ; Humphrey v. Fair, 79

Ind. 410; Singleton i-. O'Blenis, 125 Ind.

151 ; indebtedness. Pine Valley v. Unity,

40 Wis. 632 ; of a partnership, Stixr. Mat-

thews, 63 Mo. 371; Kilsey v. Henry, 48

Ind. 47 ; Jor obtaininrj an injunction, Wells,

Eargo, & Co. v. Coleman, 53 Cal. 416;

Boehme v. Sume, 5 Neb. 80 ; Thorn i-.

Sweeney, 12 Nev. 251 ; Portland v. Baker,

8 Ore. 356 ; of time, Balch v. Wilson, 25

Minn. 299 ; Leihy v. Ashland, etc. Co., 49

Wis. 165; Cohn v. Wright, 89 Cal. 86;

of compliance with statutory requirements,

Biroa v. St. Paul Water Com'rs, 41 Minn.

519 ; in miscellanf-ons rases, Calvin v. llun-

can, 12 Bush, 101 (action on vendor's

lien); Mitchell r. Mitchell, 61 N. Y. 398

(of adultery) ; Rhodes v. Alameda Co., 52

Cal. 350 (against a county) ; Wiebbold i-.

Hermann, 2 .Mont. 609 (name of party) ;

Orr W. Ditch Co. r. Larcombe, 14 Nev.

.53 (in intcrjdeader) ; Broome v. Taylor,

9 Hun, 155 (against a married woman);

Horn V. Chicago & N. W. Ry. Co., 38 Wis.

463 (a private statute) ; Pittsburgh, C. &

St. L. R. Co. r. Theobald, 51 Ind. 246

(against a railroad for injury to a passen-

ger) ; Crawford v. Neale, 56 Cal. 32 (a

guardian ad liteni) ; Darrah v. Gow, 77

Mich. 16 (defects in workmanship must

be specified) ; York v. Rockwood, 132

Ind. 358 (action to set aside fraudulent

conveyances) ; Nordholt v. Nordholt, 87

Cal. 552 (duress) ; Chicago & O. Coal,

etc. Co. V. Norman (Oiiio, 1892), 32 N. E.

Rep. 857 (injury to employee by defective

appliances); Brown r. Brown (Ind. 1893),

32 N. E. Rep. 1128 (partition). The fol-

lowing cases furnish examples of com-

plaints or petitions in some commiMi

species of actions which have been sus-

50 ; E tabrook v. Omaha Hotel
76; Lowr.1· v. fao-ee, 52 Ind. 10
v. Alameda o., 52 Cal. 350 ·
:Mohn, 7 al. 4 9 ; Ehrlich v.
In . o., 103 Io. 231; work

Co. 5 i<l.
· Hhode
mith v.
JEtna L.
and materia , tephen on v. Ballard, 50 Incl
1 i6 ; Wolf v.
cofield, 3 iu. 175; the
con ·ideration, Leach v. Rhode , 49 id.
291 ; a w1;tten in. trument, \.Vaukou &
l\li . R. o. v. Dwyer, 49 Iowa, 121 ;
Brown v. Champlin, 66
. Y. 214, 21 ;
Pettit 1. Hamlyu, 43 Wi . 314; White v.
oto, 2 al. 654 (modification of writt n
contract mu t be plea<le<l) ; l\k.\lenomy
v. Talbot, 4 Cal. 279; non-paym ut,
Robert v. Treadwell, 50 Cal. 520; Grant
v . . heerin, 84 al. 197; Eliot v. Eliot, 77
\Yi . . 634; Tracy v. Tracy, 59 Hun, l ; 20
Civ. Pro. R. 9 ; Humphrey v. Fair, 79
In<l. 41 ; ingleton v. 'Eleni., 125 Ind.
151; in<lebtedne ·. , Pine Yall ey v. Gnity,
40 "~i-. 632; of a partner hip, tix v. Matthew , 63 Mo. 371; Kil ey i-. Henry, 48
Ind. 4 ; for obtaining an injunction, \Yell·,
Fargo, & C'o. v. Coleman, 53 al. 416;
Boehme v. ume, 5 ~eb. 0 ; Thorn i-.
weeney, 12 ~.,.ev. 251; P rtlan<l v. Baker,
re. 356; of ti111e, Balch v. Wil on, 25
!inn. 299; Leiby v.
hland, etc. o., 49
Wi ·. 165;
ohn v. Wrigh t 9 al. 6;
of compliance u·itlz statutor.IJ reqnirements,
Biron 1• •• t. Paul 'Vater om'r., 41 Tinn .
519; in misrellu.1uou. rases, alvin z•. Dun·
can, I 2 Bu h, I 01 (action on Yendor'
li ·11 ; :\Iitchell t•. :\Iitchell, 61 N. Y. 39
(of a•lnltery); Rho<l 1·. Alam da o .. 52
'al :,5 (again a conn y); Wiebbold t•.
llerrnaun, 2 .\font. 609 (name of party);
Orr W. l>1teh o. ''- LarC'ombe, 14 .... v.
53 (in intNpl arler); Broom v. Taylor,
Hun, I 55 (again t a married woman);
lilJrn 1•. hicago & .... W. Ry. Co., 38 Wi .

463 (a pri,·ate

tatute); Pitt buro-h, C. &
t. L. R. o. 1:. Theobald, 51 Ind. 246
(again · t a railroad for injury to a pa enger) ; rawford v. Neale, 56 Cal. 32 (a
guardian ad litem); Darrah . Gow, 77
i\[ich. 16 (defect in workman hip mu t
be pecified); York v. Rockwood, 132
Ind. 35 (action to et aside fraudulent
conveyance ) ; Jordholt v. ordholt, 7
Cal. 552 ( dure ) ; hicago &
oal,
etc. o. v . .1..,.orruan (Ohio, 1 92), 32 . E.
Rep. 57 (injury to emplovee by defective
appliance ) ; Brown v. Brown (Ind. 1 93),
32 S. E. Rep. 112 (partition). The following ca e furni b example of complaint or petition in
ome comm0n
pecie of action which hav been u ·taiued; in ejectment,
ear i·. Taylor,
4 ol. 3 ; John. ton v. Pate, 3 N. . 11 ;
Tho mp on 1·. Wolfe, 6
re. 30 ; B nt·
ley v. Joue ·, 7 id. 10 ; u tin v. chluytcr, 7 Hun, 275; for a conver ion,\ ornble
v. Leach, 3 .... C. 4 · John on v.
i'aY. Co. 8 id. 35; Pea e v. mith, 61
~T. Y. 477; John on v. A ·hland
o., 44
Wi . 119 ; for breach of contract, Partriclo-e
u. Blancharrl, 23 !inn. 69 · .,. her v. II att,
1 Kan. 195 ; on promis ory 11otes, Adams
r. Adam , 25 l\Iinn. 72 · Harri :\fan.
o.
v. l\far. h, 49 Iowa, 11; .Ahi I t'. Harrington, 1 Kan. 253; Durland u. itcairn, 51
I nd. 426;
reen v. , uthain, 49 id. 139;
Friddle t'. rane, 6 id. 5 3 ; in lib I or
sla11rler, ar~· c llen, 39 Wi . 4 1 ; t rn
i:. Katz, 3
id. 136 ; Frank 1•.
uuning,
3 id. 270; Lipprant 1:. Lipprant, 52 Ind.
273; , higl y t•. • n~·rl r, 45 id. 54 l ;
Down y t. illon, 52 id. 442; D r tt 1·.
clam , 50 id. 129 ; , ch11rick v. Kollman,
5 id. 336; in rep/ i·i11, rawford u. Furl ug, 21 Kan. 69 ; Zit ke v. oldl.ierg, 3

v i . 216.
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ments as to form and method, and may violate all the principles

of logical order and precision of statement, and may yet be held

sufficient on general demurrer, because the material facts consti-

tuting a cause of action can be discovered among the mass of

confused or imperfect allegations. The principles and doctrines

of pleading adopted and enforced by the courts are illustrated

and explained by such examples as these, but the cases them-

selves are to be carefully avoided as precedents. The mode of

correcting imperfect and insufficient averments as distinguished

from those which state no cause of action, and the liberal rule of

construction introduced by the code, will form the subject of a

separate and careful discussion in a subsequent portion of this

chapter.

§ 431. * 537. Doctrine that Facts Pleaded should be stated as

they occurred or existed. Tvyo Questions Presented. In con-

sidering the third general doctrine developed in the preceding

analysis, — namely, that the facts pleaded should be stated as

they actually occurred or existed, and not their mere legal

aspect, effect, or operation, — two practical questions are pre-
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sented, and the discussion will be mainly confined to them.

These questions are, (1) whether in actions based upon the

common-law notion of an implied contract the pleader should

simply allege the facts as they really occurred from which the

legal duty arises, without averring a promise which was never

made, or whether he must or may, as in the common-law as-

sumpsit, state a promise to have been expressly made which is

the legal effect or operation of those facts ; and (2) whether the

ancient common counts, or allegations substantially identical

therewith, fulfil the requirements of the new procedure, and can

be used, in conformity with its fundamental principles, as com-

plaints or petitions in the classes of actions to which they would

have been appropriate under the former sj'stem. I shall take

up these questions separately, first collecting and comparing the

decisions bearing upon each ; and, secondly, discussing them

upon principle.

§ 432. '^ 538. (l) Necessity or Propriety of Alleging a Promise

in Actions upon Implied Promises. There is a marked unanimity

of opinion among the decisions which directly involve this ques-

tion, since most of them accept the language of the codes, and

fully recognize the radical change in principle effected by the

37

men ts a to form an cl method, an cl may violate all the principle· ·
of logical rd r and pr i ·i n of tat m nt and may y t be h lcl
uffici nt n gen ral d murrer b au the materjal fact' on tituting a cau of action can be di ' cov r <l mong th ma · of
confu ... ed or imperfect allegations. The princir les and octrin
of 1 leading adopted and enforced by the court ar illustrat ·cl
and explained by uch example as the e, but the a s th rnel e are to be carefully avoided as precedents. The mode of
correcting imperfect and insufficient averrn nts as distinguish cl
from tho e which state no cau e of action, and the liberal rule of
con truction introduced by the code, will form the subject of a.
eparate and careful discussion in a subsequent portion of this
chapter.
§ 4 31. * 537. Do ctri ne that Facts Pleaded should be stated as
t h ey occurred or e x isted . Two Questions Presented.
In conidering the third general doctrine developed in the preceding
analysis, - namely, that the facts pleaded shoul<l be stated as
they actually occurred or existed, and not their mere legal
a pect, effect, or operation, - two practical questions are preented, and the discussion will be mainly confined to them.
. These questions are, (1) whether in actions based upon the
common-law notion of an implied contract the pleader should
imply allege the facts as they really occurred from which the
legal duty arises, without averring a promise which was never
made, or whether he must or may, as in the common-law asumpsit, state a promise to have been expres ly made which is
the legal effect or operation of those facts; and (2) whether the
ancient common counts, or allegations substantially identical
therewith, fulfil the requirements of the new procedure, and can
be used, in conformity with its fundamental princjple , as complaints or petitions in the classes of actions to which they would
have been appropriate under the former sy tern. I shall take
up these questions separately, first collecting and comparing the
deci. ion bearing upon each; and, secondly, discus ing them
upon principle.
~ 432. * 538. (1) Neces s ity or Propriety of Alleging a Pro mise
in Ac tio n s upon I m plied Promises. There is a marked unanimity
of opinion among the decisions which directly involve this que tion, since most of t hem accept the language of the codes, and
fully recognize the radical change in principle fffectecl by the
37
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reformed procedure. In Farron v. Sherwood, ^ after sustaining

a complaint substantially a general count in assumpsit for work

and labor without any averment of a promise by the defendant,

the New York Court of Appeals said: "It is not necessary to

set out in terms a promise to pay; it is sufficient to state facts

showing the duty from which the law implies the promise. That

complies with the requirement that facts must be stated constitut-

ing the cause of action." This language was not a mere dictmn ;

it was absolutely essential to the judgment, since the complaint

contained no averment of a promise, and was nevertheless held

sufficient. The decision must therefore be regarded as settling

the doctrine for that State. In another action to recover com-

pensation for work and labor, where the complaint stated various

services performed by the plaintiff from which it was claimed a

duty on the part of the defendant arose, but alleged no promise

by him, the Supreme Court of New York adopted the same rule

of pleading. 2 On the other hand, the Supreme Court of Wis-

consin said by way of a dictum in an early case : " Good pleading

requires that a promise which the law implies should be stated."^
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And in an action for services alleged in the petition to have been

performed at the request of an agent of the defendant, the

Supreme Court of Missouri held that either the promise must be

averred, or the facts from which a promise will be inferred, as a

matter of law.* In Montana, the rule is distinctly established

1 Farrou v. Sherwood, 17 N. Y. 227, necessary, and perhaps not even proper, in

230. See also Mackey v. Auer, 8 Hun, such a case, for the plaintiff to allege in his

180; De la Guerra v. Newhall, 55 Cal. complaint any promise on the part of the

21 ; Moore v. Hobbs, 79 N. C. 535 ; Jones defendant, but he must state facts which,

V. Mial, 79 id. 164; Emslie v. City of if true, according to well-settled principles

Leavenworth, 20 Kan. 562; Stephenson of law, would have autliorized him to al-

V. Ballard, 50 Ind. 176. J^ge, and tlie court to infer, a promise on

2 Cropsey v. Sweeney, 27 Barb. 310, the part of the defendant before the code.

312, jjer Sutherland J., who delivered the TIic form of assumpsit is no longer neces-

following opinion : " Although the form sary, nor perliaps even proper, in such a

r form l procedure. In Farron v. herwood 1 after u taining
a om lain ub tantially a g n ral
unt in a. um it f r w rk
and lab r without an a erm nt f a r mi e b
d f nd, nt
h
urt f App al aid : "It i not n
ary t
out in t rm a pr mi e to pa T; it is ufficient to tat fact
~ h owin the luty from whi h th law implie the pr mi e. That
mpli wi h h r quir m nt that fa
mu ·t b tat l c n titutThi languag wa not a ru r dict·um ·
ing tl e au e f a tion .
it wa ab lutely
ntial to tb e jud 0 m nt in th omplain
c ntained n av rment of a prorni ·e, and was n rthel
h ll
uffi ient. The d ci ion mu t th r fore be r gar led a ettling
th doctrine for that tat . In anoth r acti n to rec v r
mp n ation f r w rk and labor, wh r th omplaint tat d Yari u
p rformed by the plaintiff from which it wa 1 imed a
ervi
duty on the part of the defendant aro e, but alleged n prom1 e
b him, the upr me ourt of New York adopted the arne rule
of pleading. 2
n the other han<l, th
upreme
urt f vYi con in aid by way of a dictum in an early ca · " ood plea lin
hould be tat d. 3
require that a promi e which the law impli
And in an action for ervices alleged in the petition to have been
erformed at the reque t of an agent of the defendant, the
upreme ourt of l\Ii souri held that ei her the pr mi e mu t be
averred, or the facts from which a promise will be inferred, a a
matter of law. 4 In Montana, the rule is di tinctly e tablished

of the action of assumpsit, and of tiie case; but facts sufiicieut to raise it, and

pleadings therein, has been abolished, to put it on paper were it lawful to do so,

yet the obligation of contracts and the are still necessary." He goes on to hold

distinction between an express and an that the special facts alleged in the corn-

implied assumpsit remain; and notwith- j)]aint raise no implied promise,

standing the code, in a large class of " Bird c. Mayer, 8 Wis. 362, 367. This

cases now as before the code, it is only remark was entirely obiter. The question

on tlie theory of an implied assumpsit, before the court was, whether a warranty

inferred from the conduct, situation, or sued on was express or implied.

mutual relations of the parties, that jus- * Wells r. Pacific K. R. Co., 35 Mo. 164.

tice can l^e enforced, and tlie performaiico The allegation of a performance at the

of a legal duty compelled. It is no longer request of an agent of the defendant

1 Farron v.
herwood, 17 N. Y. 227,
230.
ee al o Mackey v. Auer, 8 Hun,
I O; De la Guerra v. Newhall, 55 al.
21 ; Mo re v. Hobb , 79 N. . 535; J nes
i . Mial, 79 id. 164 ; Em ·lie v.
ity of
J~eavenwo rth, 20 K an. 562 ;
tephen on
v. Ballard, 50 In d. 176.
2
ropey v. wee ney, 27 Barb. 3 10,
.'312, per utherland J., wh o deli\'er ed the
fo llowing op ini n : "Although the form
of th acti on of a ump it, and f the
plead in g
th r in, ha.i; been aboli b <l,
y ·t the obli gation of contra ts and the
di. tinetion betwee n an expre. and an
implied a n rn p it r ema in; and n ot w ith·
tanrli1w the ode, in a larcre cla
of
ca. e now as b ·fo re the cod , it i, on ly
<m tl1e theory of an i mpli ed a . n mp ·it,
iuferrcd frorn t ir e ·01Hluct, . it uatirm, or
mutual rel ati n. of th pn.rti , th at jn: ti <· can be nfo rce<l . ml th p rf rmau ce
o f a legal d u ty compell ed. It is no l nger

ALLEGATIONS

u79

F IMPLIED PHO;>iHSES.

ALLKGATIONS OF IMPLIED I'lvOMISES.

79

that tlie facts from wliic-h the promise is inferred sliould be

pleaded, and not the promise itself; but that in an action on an

that th fa ts fr m "·hi ·h th I romise i' inf rrecl ·houlcl be
pl ad <l, and not the pr mise itself; but that in an a lion on an
er re promi it must be alleged. 1 The Supreme ourt of
Indiana has h Id with evident relu 'tance that in such a ·as it
is not nee s ary for th party to aver a promise, and that it is
nough for him to state the facts from whi h the law impli s it.
The court add cl, however, after this cone ssion, that it is l ttc:r
in all ca es t allege a promi e, saying: "It is al ways good :vl acling to state the legal effect of the contract whether it i written
or oral." 2 And in another case, where the action was brought
1

express promise it must be alleged. ^ The Supreme Court of

Indiana has held with evident reluctance that in such a case it

is not necessary for the party to aver a promise, and that it is

enough for him to state the facts from vi^hich the law implies it.

The court added, however, after this concession, that it is better

in all cases to allege a promise, saying: " It is always good plead-

ing to state the legal effect of the contract whether it is written

or oral. "^ And in another case, where the action was brought

was insufficient, being matter of evidence

only.

tin Wetmore v. Crouch (1899), 150 Mo.

671, 51 S. W. 7.38, the court said : " If the

contract relied on is express, it must be so

pleaded, but if it is implied, the facts out

of which it is claimed to arise must be

pleaded." See also Warder v. Seitz (1900),
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157 Mo. 140, 57 S. W. 537. In this case

the petition stated that plaintiff told de-

fendant at the time he was employed by

her that "the customary fee for such ser-

vices was five per cent if settled out of

court and ten per cent if settled after suit,

upon whatever amount she received, that

defendant made no objection to said fee,

but instructed plaintiff to take charge of

her interests and proceed in the premises

to secure a settlement by compromise, or

failing in that, to bring a suit to break

and set aside said will." The petition

further alleged that the services were ren-

dered at the special instance and request

of the defendant and were reasonably

worth five thousand dollars. " These are

apt and appropriate averments in a suit

upon a quantum meruit, and have no place

in a petition based upon an express con-

tract, and they clearly and unmistakably

show the pleader's intention to rely upon

a guantnm meruit and not upon a con-

tract."]

^ Higgins V. Germaine, 1 Mont. 230.

(^In Conrad Nat. Bank v. Great North-

ern Ry. Co. (1 900), 24 Mont. 1 78, 61 Pac. I,

the court said : " It is not necessary to

allege a promise to pay where the facts

as alleged imply a promise, as where the

board, food, lodgings, etc., are furnished

to defendant upon request ; but where the

furnishing or delivery is to a third person,

upon defendant's request, then, nothing

further appearing, no promise on the part

of the defendant to pay is implied ; for a

furnishing or delivery to a tliird party,

though upon defendant's request, does not,

as a matter of law, imply an undertaking

by defendant to pay. . . . Either the ex-

press promise should be alleged, or the

facts from which it may be implied, as

that the credit was extended to the em-

ployer and not to the employee (Chitty

on Pleading, pp. 308, 356) ; or the allega-

tion should have been made generally that

the food, board, lodging, and merchandise

were furnished to the employer at its re-

quest." See also Voight v. Brooks (1897),

19 Mont. 374, 48 Pac. 549.2]

wa in uffi cient, being matter of evidence
only.
[In Wetmore v. Crouch {1899), 150 Mo.
6il, 51 S. vV. 138, the court said: "If the
contract r eli ed Oil is express, it must be so
pleaded, but if it is implied, the facts out
of which it is claimed to arise must be
pleaded." See also Warder v. Seitz (1900 ),
157 Mo. 140, 57 S. W. 537. In this case
the petition stated that plaintiff told defendant at the time he wa employed by
her that "the customary fee for such services wa five per cent if ettlcd out of
court and ten per cent if settled after suit,
upon whatever amount she received, that
defendant made no objection to said fee,
but instructed plaintiff to take charge of
her interests and proceed in th e premises
to secure a settlement by compromise, or
failing in that, to bring a suit to break
and set aside said will." The petition
further alleged that the services were rendered at th e special _instance and request
of the defendant and were reasonably
worth five thousand dollars. "These are
apt and appropriate averments in a suit
upon a q1tantum meniit, and have no place
in a pet ition based upon an express contract, and they clearly and unmi stakably
how th e pl eader's intention to rely upon
a quanl11m meruit and not upon a contract."]
1 I-li g1?; ins v. Germaine, 1 Mont. 230.
[In Conrad Nat. Bank v . Great Northern Ry. Co. (1900), 24 Mont. 178, 61Pac.1,
the ourt said : "It is not nece ary to
allege a promise to pay where the facts
a alleged imply a promise, as where the
board , food, lodg in gs, etc., are furnished
to defendant upon r equest; but where the
furnishing or delivery is to a third per on,

upon defendanL's request, th en. nothing
further appearing, no promise on the part
of the defeudaut to pay is impli ed; for a
furnishin g or delivery to a tl1ird party,
though upon defeudaut's request, does not,
as a matter of law, imply an undertaking
by defendant to pay . . . . Either the express promise should be alleged, or the
facts from which it may be implied, as
that the credit was extended. to the employer and not to the employee (Chitty
on Pleadincr, pp. 308, 356); or the allegation should have been made generally that
the food, board, lodging, and merchandise
were furni shed to the employer at it request." See also Voight v. Brooks (1 9i),
19 Mont. 374, 48 Pac. 549.J
2 Wills v. Will , 34 Ind. 106, 107, 108.
[In Cox v. Peltier ( 1902), 159 Ind. 355,
65 N. E. 6, it was held that a complaint
on an undertaker's bill, which alleges that
a coffin was furnished and services rendered "at the special instance and request" of the defendant, sufficiently
charges an implied promise on defendant' part to pay the reasonable value
thereof.
Th e Supreme Court of Minnesota, in
Oevcrmann v. Locbertmanll (1891), 68
Minn . 162, 70 N. W . l 084, said : " It is
not necessary to plead implied promi;;e ."
See al o Hurlbut v. L eper (1900), 12 '. D.
321, 81 N. W. 631. H erc it was held that
a complaint alleging that "prior to the
22cl day of March, 1 96, the plaiutiff performed work ancl labor as a team ·ter and
laborer for the defe ndant, four and onethird months, at $40 per month," and
claimin g a balance of $9:2.65, with intere t
at seven per cent per annum, does not
purport to allege an express contract but
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for the value of goods sold, etc., the same court, while passing

upon the sufficiency of a complaint which was substantially in

the form of an old common count without a request or a promise

averred, used the following language : " In all these instances

the law implies the promise from the facts stated, and our statute

simply requires the statement of facts ; and if upon these facts

the law implies a promise, the complaint would be good." ^

§ 433. * 539. Case of Booth v. Farmers' and Mechanics' Bank

(n. y.). The question was discussed by the Supreme Court of

New York in a very recent decision; and the importance of the

case, and the positions taken in the opinion, make it necessary to

quote from the judgment at some length. The complaint con-

tained two counts. The second was for money had and received

to the plaintiff's use. The first set out the facts in detail, stat-

ing a liability which migliL be considered as resulting from the

tortious acts of the defendant, or might be regarded as arising

from an implied contract, but omitting to aver any promise. The

defendant demurred on the ground that two causes of action

had been improperly joined, one on contract, and the other for
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a tort, — an injury to property. The plaintiff, in answer to this

position, claimed that he could elect under the circumstances

to sue either for tort or on contract, and that the first cause of

action should be treated as of the latter kind, so that there was

no misjoinder. The court, however, entirely rejected this claim;

and after stating that the ancient assumpsit and case were in

many instances concurrent remedies for injuries to personal

propert}' ; that in assumpsit the pleader must always have alleged

that the defendant ''undertook and promised," etc., and a breach

of that promise, while in case the declaration was substantially

the same except that the allegation of an undertaking and

promise was omitted; that in the first count this averment is

wanting, and "it is therefore a count in case,'^ — proceeded as

follows: "If the plaintiff is right in supposing that the law

implied a promise by the bank not to satisfy the judgment after

ouly an imjjlied contract. A receut 1 75, tliat where one has received money

Oregon case — Waite v. Willis (1902), which equitably i)elongs to another, an

42 Ore. 288, 70 Pac. 1034 — holds that action lies in assumpsit, but sucli action is

it is not necessary to allege a fictitious noi founded upon the idea of a ro?i^iar/, but

promise. upon the idea of an ohiifntinn to refund,

It was held in Bates-Farley Bank i*. and no privity need be shown.]

Dismukes (1899), 107 Ga. 212, 33 S. E. i Gwaltuey i-. Cannon, 31 Ind. 227.

f r h \, lu of goods old etc., he ame court, bile pa ing
ur on the ufficiency of a complaint ' bich wa ub tan iall m
he f rm of an ol common count withou a r qu
or a pr m1 e
av rred u "ed th f 11 win langua e : In all th e in tan
th law implie the promi e from the facts tat l, and our a ute
imply requir th ta ement of fact ; and if upon the e fact
the la' impli a prouus the complaint would b ·ood. 1
' 433. ol! 5 . Cas e of Boot h v . F arm ers' and M e chanics' Ban k
( N. Y.). The que. tion wa di cu ed by h
upreme Court f
ew York in a very recent deci ion ; and the importance of the
ca e and he po ition taken in he opinion, make it n ce ary to
quote from the judgment at some length. The complaint ontained two count . The second was for money had and recei d
in detail, tatto the plaintiff u e. The fir t et out the fa
ing a liability which migh t be considered a re ulting fr m he
tortiou act of the defendant, or might be regar led as ari ing
from an implied contract, but omitting to aver any prornis . The
defendant demurred on the ground that t' o cause of action
bad been improperly joined, one on contract, and the other for
a tort, - au injury to property. The plaintiff, in an wer to tl i
po ition, claimed that he could elec under the circum ' ance
to ue either for tort or ou contract, and that the fir. t cau e of
action should be treated as of the latter kind, o that there a
no mi joinder. The court, however, entirely rejected this laim;
and after . tating that the ancient a. ump it an l ca e ' r in
many in tance concurrent r emedies for injuri
t I ,r onal
property- that in a ump it the pleader mu t al war have all ge l
that the defendant undertook and promised, etc. and a br ach
of that promi e whil in ca e the declaration wa ub an iall
the ame except that the all ga ion of an undertaking n l
promi e wa omitted; that in the fir t count hi averm nt i
wanting, and ' it i ther for a count in case, ' - proce ded a
follow : If the plaintiff i right in uppo ing that he law
implied a Ir mi e by the bank not to ati f the judgment aft r
only nu implied
on ract. A r cent
re•ron ea.e - Waite . Willi (19 -),
42 Ore. 2 , 70 Pac. 1034- h l<l that
i i n 1> 11 e ary to allege a fi titiou
µromi e.
It wa ueld in Bate -Farly Bank v.
i muk
( l 99), l 7 Ga. 2 12, 33 . E .
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it was assigned to him, he was bound to allege that the Lank

undertook and promised not to satisfy, etc., in order to make it

a count on contract. . . . The codifiers, while i)roposing to

abolish the distinction between forms of action, found it impos-

sible or impracticable in many cases to effect that object; and

this case illustrates their failure in at least one class of cases.

When case and assumpsit were at the common law concurrent

remedies, the form of action that the pleader selected was deter-

mined, as I have shown, by the insertion or omission from the

declaration of the allegation that the defendant 'undertook and

promised.' This right of selection remains; and whether the

action is tort or assumpsit must be determined by the same cri-

terion. If this is not so, then the right of election is taken

away. If taken away, which of the two is left? An action

on contract cannot be joined with one in tort. How are we to

determine whether the action is one on contract or in tort,

unless the pleader by averment alleges the making of the con-

tract, and demands damages for a breach in the one case, or by

the omission of such an averment makes it an action in tort? I
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know of no more certain or convenient criterion by which to

determine the class to which a cause of action belongs than the

one suggested. If some such rule is not established, the ques-

tion of misjoinder will arise in every case in which at the common

law assumpsit and case were concurrent remedies." ^

§ 434. * 540. Conclusions. It is very evident from the fore-

going collection of decisions that the courts have, by an over-

whelming preponderance of authority, accepted the simple

requirement of the codes, and have not destroyed its plain

import by borrowing the notion of a fictitious promise from the

common-law theory of pleading. The practical rule ma}' be

considered as settled, that, in all instances where the right of

1 Booth V. Farmers' & Mech. Bk. of promise, arises. De la Guerra v. New-

Roche.ster, 1 N. Y. S. C. 45, 49, 50, per hall, 56 Cal. 21 ; Mackey v. Auer, 8 Hun,

Mulliu J. it is very remarkable that the 180; a mere allegation of indebtedness,

judge makes no reference whatever to however, is not sufficient : Moore v.

the prior cases of Farron v. Sherwood and Hobbs, 79 N. C. 535. When a party to

Cropsey v. Sweeney, which are decisive of an express contract may sue upon an im-

the question involved. A promise need plied contract, and the proper allegations

not be alleged, and if alleged a denial of it in such case, see Emslie v. Leavenworth,

would raise no material issue, where the 20 Kan. 562 ; action for labor and mate-

fiicts have been averred from which the rials, see Stephenson v. Ballard, 50 Ind.

liability, represented by the fiction of a 176; Jones v. Mial, 79 N. C. 164.

it was assigned to him, he was bound to all ge that the Lank
und rtook and promised not to atisfy, et . , in rd r to make it
a count on contract. . . . Th codifier , whil
roposing to
aboli h the distinction betw n forms of a tion, found it imposible or impracticabl in many cas ' to effect that obj ct · and
thi ' case ill u tra tes th ir failure in at lea t one clas of cas .
"'\Vhen case and assumpsit were at the common law concurrent
remedie , the form of action that the pleader selected was cl termined, as I have shown, by the insertion or omis ion from the
declaration of the allegation that the defendant 'undertook and
promised.' This right of selection remains; and whether the
action is tort or assumpsit must be determin ed by the same criterion . If this is not so, then the right of election is taken
away. If taken away, which of the two is left? An action
on contract cannot be joined with one in tort. How are we to
determine whether the action is one on contract or in tort,
unless the pleader by averment alleges the making of the con tract, and demands damages for a breach in the one case, or by
the omission of such an averment makes it an action in t ort? I
know of no more certain or convenient criterion by which to
determine the class to which a cause of action belongs than the
ont: suggested. If some such rule is not established, the question of misjoinder will arise in every case in which at the common
Jaw assumpsit and case were concurrent remedies. " 1
434. * 540. Concl u s i o ns.
It is very evident from the foregoing collection of decisions that the courts have, by an over\vhelming preponderance of authority, accepted the simple
requirement of the codes, and have not destroyed it plain
import by borrowing the notion of a fictiti ous promise from the
common-law theory of pleading. The practical rule may be
considered as settled, that, in all instances where the right of

s

1 Booth v. Farmers' & Mech . Bk. of
Rochester, l N. Y . S. C. 45, 49, 50, per
M ulliu J . It is very r emarkabl e that the
judge makes n o reference whate1·cr to
th e prior cases of Farron v. Sherwood and
Cropsey v . Sweeney, which are decisive of
the question involved. A promi e need
not be alleged, and if alleged a denial of it
would raise no m aterial issue, where the
.fucts have been averred from which the
liability, r epresen ted by the fi ction of a

promi e, ari es. De la Gnerra v. Newhall, 56 Cal. 21 ; Mackey v. Auer, 8 Hun,
I 0; a mere allegation of indebted ness,
howeYer, is not
ufficient: Moore v.
H obbs, 79 N. C. 535. When a party to
an express contract may ne upon an implied contract, and the proper allegations
in such case, see Em lie v. Leavenworth,
20 Kan . 562 ; action for labor and m~te
rials, see ~tephenson v. Ballard, 50 Ind.
176; J one v. lial , 79 . C. 164.
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action is based upon a duty or obligation of the adverse party

which the common law denominates an implied contract, it is no

longer necessary to aver a promise, but it is enough to set out

the ultimate facts from which the promise would have been

a i n i ba d upon a du
r obliga i
whi h th
mm n law en minat an impli
1 n er 11 ce ary
bu it i

part'
ntrac , it i n
nough t
et ut
r 1111.
w ul l haY u 11
o a t p far b r. If it i

inferred. This being so, we must go a step farther. If it is not

necessary to make such an allegation, then it is not proper to do

so; although some of the judicial opinions, from a failure to

b

inf rr d.

apprehend the true grounds of the rule, would seem to permit,

while they do not require, the averment. A promise need not

be allesfed because none was ever made: the facts constitutino:

the cause of action are alone to be stated, and this promise is

not one of those facts ; it is simply a legal inference, contrived

for a very technical purpose to meet the requirements of form in

the ancient legal actions. The same reason which shows that

the averment is unnecessary demonstrates that it is improper,

that it violates a fundamental doctrine of the new theory; and

if an harmonious system is ever to be consti-ucted upon the basis

of the reform legislation, this doctrine should be strictly enforced.

§ 435. * 541. Criticism of Booth v. Farmers' and Mechanics'
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Bank. The only recent case which is in direct conflict with these

views is the one last quoted, Booth v. Farmers' and ^Mechanics'

Bank; and it seems to demand some comment. Perhajis there

cannot be found in the current reports a more striking example

of exalting form above substance, and of repealing an express

statutory provision by judicial construction, than is shown in

this decision. The learned judge virtually admits that the text

f raver
h an i nt legal a tion .
th averm nt i unnece ar · d m n trat
impr
ba it violat a fundam ntal doctrin £ h new th or ;
if an harmoniou ·y tern i e er to be on tructed upon the ba i
f th r f rm l gi lation thi doctrine hould be trictly nforc
435. · - 41.

of the code is opposed to his conclusions, when he assumes that

C riticism

of Booth v . Farmers' and Mechanics'

the codifiers failed to accomplish the results which they intended.

It may be remarked that he speaks of the statute as though it

were entirely the work of the "codifiers," and he seems to ignore

the authority of the legislature which made it a law. But are

the common-law notion of an implied undertaking and the arbi-

trary requisite of alleging this fictitious promise such necessary-

conceptions, are they so involved in the essential nature of juris-

prudence, that it is impossil)le or impracticable for the legislature

to change or to abolish them? The very suggestion is its own

answer. Nothing in our ancient law was more thoroughly tech-

nical and arljitrary, more completely a mere matter of form,

without even the shadow of substantial and necessary existence,

tlian this very notion of a certain kind of legal liabilit}^ being

B ank. The only recent ca e whi h i in direct conflict with th
view i the one last quoted, B oth v. Farm r an l AI bani
ank · and it eem to demand ome comment. P rhap th
c nno b found in the current r port a m r
triking xam
f xaltin f rm above ub'tanc an l f r pealin
tatut r; pro i ion by judicial con tructi n than i bown
hi deci ion. The learne l judg virtuall ' admit hat h t
f h cod i oppo eel to hi
nclu i n wh n h
h
lifi r fail d to ac ornr li h the r ult whi h
It nu y 1 r mark d that h p ak f h tatut a
ntir 1 th work of th
odifi r
th
tl

"
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1
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hi.· v ry n ot ion
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represented as arising from an implied promise, and the accom-

panying rule that the promise thus imagined must be averred as

though it were actually made. It was shown in a former part of

this section that the action of assumpsit was not even invented

as an instrument by which to enforce the liability thus conceived

of; but the fiction of an implied promise was itself contrived in

order that the liability might be enforced by the already existing

action of assumpsit, in which the allegation of a promise was the

distinctive feature. The error of the opinion under review is,

that it treats these matters of arbitrary form, these fictitious

contrivances of the old pleaders, as though they subsisted in

the nature of things, and were beyond the reach of legislative

action. The difficulty, suggested by the learned judge, of being

unable to distinguish between an action of tort and one of con-

tract, in order that an election might be made between them,

exists only in imagination. If we will look at the matter as it

really is, throwing aside the old technicalities and fictions, there

is plainly no necessity for any such distinction. If the pleader

unites a cause of action upon express contract with a cause of
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action consisting of facts, from which under the former system a

promise might have been implied, he has already made his elec-

tion, — all the election that is needed, — and there would be no

possibility of any subsequent change in or departure from this

original theory of his complaint. The only practical difference

which could ever arise from treating his second cause of action

as though founded upon tort would be the power sometimes

given of arresting the defendant either on mesne or final process,

and this power would plainly have been surrendered. To sum

up the foregoing criticism, the whole course of reasoning pursued

by the learned judge assumes that the most technical, arbitrary,

and fictitious distinctions between the ancient forms of action

are still subsisting; it does not merely ignore the legislation

which has abrogated those distinctions, but it expressly denies

the ability of the legislature to accomplish such a result. This

is not interpreting, it is repealing, a statute. 1 have dwelt upon

this case longer perhaps than it intrinsically merits ; but I have

done so because the principles announced in it, if generally fol-

lowed, would sap the very foundations of the reformed procedure,

and prevent the erection of any harmonious and symmetrical

system upon the basis of its fundamental doctrines.

represented as ari ing from an impli d promi , and th accompanying rul that the promi e thus imagin d nu ·t be av rred a
though it were actually mad . It was ·Lown in a form r part of
thi
ction that the acti n of a umpsit was n t Yen inv nted
a an in 'trurnent by whi h to enf r th liabilit thus cone ived
£; but the fiction of an implied promi8 wa · its lf contrived in
order that the liability might be enforced by th already xisting
action of a ump it, in which the allegation of a promise was th
distinctive feature. The error of the opinion unc.ler r view i ,
that it treats these matters of arbitrary form, these fictitious
contrivances of the old pleaders, as though they subsi ted in
the nature of things, and were beyond the reach of legi lative
action. The difficulty, suggested by the learned judge, of being
unable to distinguish between an action of tort and one of contract, in order that an election might be made between them,
exists only in imagination. If we will look at the matter as it
really is, throwing aside the old technicalities and fictions, there
is plainly no necessity for any such distinction. If the pleader
unites a cause of action upon express contract with a cause of
action consisting of facts, from which under the former system a
promise might have been implied, he has already made his election, - all the election that is needed, - and there would be no
pos ibility of any subsequent change in or departure from this
original theory of his complaint. The only practical difference
which could ever arise from treating bis second cause of action
as though founded upon tort would be the power sometimes
given of arresting the defendant either on mesne er final process,
and this power would plainly have been surrendered. To sum
up the foregoing criticism, the whole course of reasoning pursued
by the learned judge assumes that the most technical, arbitrary,
and fictitious distinctions between the ancient forms of action
are still subsisting; it does not merely ignore the legi lation
which has abrogated those di8tinctions, but it expressly denies
the ability of the legislature to accomplish such a result. This
is not interpreting, it is repealing, a statute. I have dwelt upon
this case longer perhaps than it intrinsically merit ; but I ha e
done so because the principles announced in it, if generally followed, would sap the very foundations of the r formed procedur ,
and prevent the erection of any harmoniou s and ymmetrical
system upon the basis of its fun<lam ntal doctrines.
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§ 436. * 542. (2) Common Comits under the Codes. Is a com-

plaint or petition, substantially the same in its form and its alle-

gations with the old common or general count in assumpsit, in

accordance with the fundamental principles of the new pro-

cedure, and can it now be regarded as a good pleading? The

courts have almost unanimously answered this question in the

affirmative, and have held that such complaints or petitions

sufficiently set forth a cause of action in the cases where the

declarations which they imitate would have been proper under

the former practice.^ Notwithstanding the imposing array of

1 I have collected in this uote the lead-

ing cases which sustain the position in the

text. Allen v. Patterson, 7 N. Y. 476 ;

§ 436. * 5-!2.

I s a complaint r petition, substantially the ame in it form and its alle gations with the old common or general count in as umpsit, in
accordance with the fundamental p1-inci1 les of the new proceclure, and can it now be regard d as a good pl ading? TLe
courts have almost unanimously an 'wered this question in the
affirmative, and have held that such complaint or petition
sufficiently et forth a cause of action in the cases where the
leclaration which they imitate would have been proper under
the former practice. 1 Notwithstanding the impo ing arra of
(2) Common Coun ts under the Codes.

Meagher v. Morgan, .3 Kan. .372 ; Clark

V. Fensky, 3 Kan. 389 ; Carroll v. Paul's

Ex., 16 Mo. 226; Brown v. Perry, 14

Iiid. 32 ; Kerstetter v. Raymond, 10 Ind.

199; Farron v. Sherwood, 17 N. Y. 227,
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229; Hosley v. Black, 28 N. Y. 438;

Hurst V. Litchfield, 39 N. Y. 377 ; Green

V. Gilbert, 21 Wis. 39.5 ; Evans v. Harris,

19 Barb. 416; Grannis v. Hooker, 29

Wis. 65, 66, 67 ; Cudlipp v. Whipple, 4

Duer, 610; Bates v. Cobb, 5 Bosw. 29;

Adams v. Holley, 1 2 How. Pr. 326 ; Betts

V. Baciie, 14 Abb. Pr. 279; Sloman r.

Schmidt, 8 Abb. Pr. .5 ; Goelth u. "White, 35

Barb. 76 ; Stout v. St. Louis Tribune Co.,

52 Mo. 342 ; Curran v. Curran, 40 Ind.

473 ; Johnson v. Kilgore, 39 Ind. 147 ;

Bon-slog V. Garrett, 39 Ind. 3-38 ; Wolf v.

Schofield, 38 Ind. 175, 181 ; Noble v. Bur-

ton, 38 Ind. 206 ; Higgins v. Germaine, 1

Mont. 230; Gwaltney y. Cannon, 31 Ind.

227 ; Fort Wayne, J. & S. R. Co. v. Uc-

Dotiald, 48 Ind. 241, 243; Raymond v.

Ilanford, 6 N. Y. S. C. 312 ; Fells v. Vest-

vali, 2 Keycs, 152; Pavisich v. Bean, 48

Cal. 364; Wilkins v. Stidger, 22 Cal. 231 ;

Abadie v. Carrillo, 32 Cal. 172; Merritt

V. Gliddon, 39 Cal. 559, 564. That the

common counts may still be used, see' also

Magee v. Kast, 49 Cal. 141 ; Ball v. Fullon,

31 Ark. 379 ; Jones v. :Mial, 82 X. C. 252 ;

79 id. 164 ; Emslie v. Leavenworth, 20 Kan.

562 ; Jennings Cy. Com'rs v. Verbarg, 63

Ind. 107; Dashaway A.ss'n v. Rogers, 79

Cal. 211 ; Castagnino v. Balletta, 82 Cal.

250 ; Leeke c. Hancock, 76 Cal. 127.

^The nse of the common counts has been

approvf^d ill tlir^ following cases: Johnson-

Brinkman Co. i-. Bank (1893), 116 Mo.

558,22 S. W. 813; Fox v. Easter (1900), 10

Okla. 527, 62 Pac. 283 ; Willard v. Carrigan

(1902), Ariz., 68 Pac. 538; Livingstone v.

School District (1898), 11 S. D. 150, 76

N. W. 301 ; Brown v. Board of Education

(1894), 103 Cal. 531, 37 Pac. 503 ; Snapp

r. Stanwood (1898), 65 Ark. 222, 45 S. W.

546; Goodman v. Alexander (1901), 165

N. Y. 289, 59 N. E. 145 ; Hatch v. Leonard

(1901), 165 N. Y. 435, 59 N. E. 270; Van-

derbeek v. Francis (1903), 75 Conn. 467, 53

Atl. 1015; Messmer v. Block (1898), 100

Wis. 664, 76 N. W. 598 ; Burton v. Rose-

mary Co (1903), 132 N.C. 17,43S. E. 480;

Kilpatrick-Koch Dry-Goods Co. v. Box

(1896), 13 Utah, 494, 45 Pac. 629 ; Pleasant

Brinkman Co. v. Bank (1893), 116 :i\Io.
1 I have collected in thi note the leading ra;;e which u taiu the position in the 558, 22 S. \V . 813 ·Fox v. Easter (1900), 10
text. Allen v . Patterson, 7 ~. Y. 476; Okla. 527, 62 Pac.~ 3; Willard v. Carrigan
( 1902), Ari z., 6 Pac. 538; Li ,·ing tone v.
~Ieagher v. Morgan, 3 Kan. 372; Clark
v. Fensky, 3 Kan. 389; Carroll v . Paul's School District (1898), 11 S. D. 150, 76
Ex., 16 Mo. 226; Brown v . Perry, 14 X. W. 30 1; Brown v. Board of Education
Ind. 32; Ker tetter v. Raymond, 10 In d. (189!), 103 Cal. 531, 37 Pac. 503; napp
199; Farron v . . herwood, 17 I . Y. 227, 1•. 'tanwood (1 9 ), 65 Ark. 222, 45 . W.
229; Hosley v . Black, 28 N. Y. 43 ; 546 ; Goodman v. Alexander (1901), 165
Hurst v. Litchfield , 39 N. Y. 377; Green N. Y. 289, 59 N. E . 145; Hatch t'. Leonard
v. Gilbert, 21 "\Vi . 395; Evan v. Harris, {1901), l 65 . Y. 435, 59 N. E. 270 · Van19 Barb. 416; Grannis v. H ooker, 29 derl•eek v . Franci (1903), 75 onn. 467, 53
Wi . 65, 66, 67; Cudlipp v. Whipple, 4 Atl. 1015; Messmer v. Block (189 ), 100
Duer, 610; Bates v. Cobb, 5 Bo w. 29; Wi . 664, 76 N. W. 598; Burton i•. Ro eAdams v. Holley, 12 How. Pr. 326; Betts mary o (1903), 132 N. C. 17, 43 . E. 4 0;
v. Bache, 14 Abb. Pr. 279; Sloman v. Kilpatrick-Koch Dry -Goods Co. v. Box
, chmidt, 8 Abb. Pr. 5; Goel th White, 35 (1 96), 13 Dtah, 494, 45 Pac. 629; Plea ant
Barb. 76; Stout v. St. Loui Tribune Co., v. Samuels ( 1 96), 114 Cal. 34, 45 Pac. 998 ·
52 Mo. 342; Curran v. Curran, 40 Ind. J enney Electric o. v. Branham (1 96 ),
473; Johnson v. Kilgore, 39 Ind. 1-!i; 145 Ind. 314, 41 . E. 44 ; 1inor v. BalBou ·log v. Garrett, 39 Ind. 33 ; Wolf v. dridge (1 9 ), 12.3 Cal. 1 7, 55 Cal. 7 3;
Schofield, 38 Ind. 175, 181 ; 'oble v. Bur- Nichol v. Randall (1902), 136 Cal. 426, 69
tou, 38 Ind. 206; Higgin v. Germaine, 1 Pac. 26; School Di t . To. 9 v. School
~Iont. 230; Gwaltney v. Cannon, 3 1 Ind. Di t. Jo. 5 ( 190.)), 118 Wi . 233, 95
227; Fort Wayne, J. & S. R. Co. v. J\lc- 148.
'ee the following ca es in re pect to the
])011ald, 48 Ind. 2-11, 243; Raymond v.
Hanford, 6 N. Y. . C. 312; Fell v. Vet- proper m thot1 of pleading the common
ounts and implied contracts: Glover v.
Yali, 2 Key s, 152; Pavi ich v. Bean, 48
al. 36!; Wilkins v . • tidger. 22 Cal. 231; Hender on (1 93), 120 Mo. 367, 25 S. W.
Abadie v. Carrillo, 32 Cal. 172; Merritt 175; Fox v. Easter (1900), JO kla. 527,
v. GlicM<)n, 3!) al. 559, 564. That the 62 Pac. 2 3; Hatch v. L onard (19 1), 165
T. Y. 435, 59 N. E. 270; Goo lrnan i;.
<'Ommon count may till be u.ed, ·ee al. o
Magee v. Ka t, 49 al. 141; Ball v. Fullon, Alexand er (190 1 ), 165 J. Y. 2 9 59 X. E.
3 1 Ark. 379; Jone v. l\lial, 2 ...''. . 252; l-1,5; Ward r v. eitz (1900), 157 i\Io. 140,
79 id. 164; Em lie v. Leavenworth, 20 Kan. 57 .·. W. 537; IInrlbnt '"Leper (19001. 12
at.
51,2; Jl"n11ing: Cy. Com'r v. Verharg 63 R. D. 321, l .:r. \V . 631 ; onr:ul
!111!. 107; l1a,haway ,\:;, 'n v. Roger ' , 79 Bauk v. Great ~ Torth rn lh·. o. (19 00),
Cal. 21 l ; ':t-;tagnino ,., Balletta, 2 al. 24 ~Iout. 17 , 61 Pac. 1 ; Pi~n er Fu 1 Co.
v. Hag r (1 94), 57 ~Iinn. 76, 5 .-. W.
250 ; L<'Ch! 1•. IIancock, i6 Cal. 127.
2 ; Thomp. on t'. Town of Elton (1901 ),
[The u:e of the eom1non counts ha been
appro,·c<l i11 the £ollowi11g ca es: John on- 109 Wi . 5 9, 5 J . \V. 425; Fnrwell v.

v.
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judicial authority shown by the citations in the foot-note, the

courts of one or two States have refused to foUow this course of

decision, and have pronounced such forms of conij)laint or peti-

tion to be in direct conflict with the correct principles of pleading

established by the codes. Although these few cases cannot be

regarded as shaking, or as throwing any doubt upon, the rule so

firmly established in most of the States, they may be properly

cited in order that all the light possible may be thrown upon this

particular question of interpretation.^

Murray (1894), 104 Cal. 464, 38 Pac.

199.

The use of the conimou couuts is pecu-

judicial auth ority shown by the citations in the foot-note, the
cour ts of one or two State have refu 'Cd to follow this cour e of
decision, and have pronounced such form· of omplaint or p tition t o be in direct conflict with the correct principl s of pleading
established by the codes . Although the ·e f w ca ·es cannot b
regarded as shaking, or as throwing any doubt upon, the rule so
firml y established in mo t of the State1::>, they may be properly
cited in order that all the light possible may be thrown upon thi
particular question of interpretation. 1

liar in Connecticut. See the following

cases in which the subject is discussed :

Cuminings v. Gleason (1900), 72 Conn.

.587, 45 Atl. 353 ; McNamaia v. McDonald

(1897), 69 Conn. 484, 38 Atl. 54 ; New York

Breweries Corporation v. Baker (1896), 68
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Conn. 337, 36 Atl. 785.

The common counts are available in

cases where they would have been so at

common law: Barrere v. Somps (1896),

113 Cal. 97, 45 Pac. 177. They are avail-

able against a municipal corporation as

well as against a private party : Brown v.

Board of Education (1894), 10.3 Cal. 531, 37

Pac. 503. An action for money had and re-

ceived may be maintained not only in case

of the actual receipt by defendant of money

belonging to the plaintiff, but where any-

thing is received as, or in lieu of, money :

Snapp V. Stanwood (1898), 65 Ark. 222, 45

S. W. 546.;]

1 Poerster v. Kirkpatrick, 2 Minn. 210,

212; Bowen v. Emmerson, 3 Ore. 452.

The complaint in the first of these cases

was, " that the above-named defendants

are justly indebted to the plaintiff in the

sum of, etc., on account for goods, M'ares,

and merchandise sold and delivered by

the plaintiff to the defendants at the spe-

cial instance and request of the defend-

ants, wherefore," etc. ; and it will be

noticed that this is fuller than several of

the forms before quoted, since it alleges a

request. In sustaining a demurrer to this

complaint, the court held it defective, be-

cause it contained ( 1 ) no statement of the

time of sale, and (2) no averment that

the goods were of the price or value of the

sum mentioned, or that the defendants

promised to pay that sum, and laid down

the general doctrine in the following man-

ner : '• In actions for goods sold and de-

livered, it is essential that one or the

otlier of these allegations should be made.

Without it the allegation of indebtedness

is a mere conclusion of law unsupported

by any fact. The defendant's liability

grows out of the fact that the goods were

either worth the amount of the claim,

or else tliat they promised to pay that

amount. If they were worth the amount,

the law implies a promise. Without one

or the other of these allegations, there

appears no consideration to support the

pretended indebtedness." In Bowen v.

Emmerson the Supreme Court of Oregon

Murray (1 894 ), 104 Cal. 464, 38 Pac.
199.

The use of the common counts is peculiar in Connecticut. See the following
cases in which the subject is discussed:
Cummings v. Glea on (1900), 72 Conn.
5 7, 45 Atl. 353; )1cNamara v. McDonald
(l 89i), 69 Conn. 484, 38 .Atl. 54; New York
Breweries Corporation v. Baker ( 1896 ), 68
Conn . 337, 36 Atl. 785 .
The common counts arc available in
ca es where they would haYe heen so at
common law: Barrere v. Somps (1896),
11 3 Cal. 97, 45 Pac. l 77 . They are available against a municipal corporntion as
well as against a pr ivate party: Brown v.
Board of Education (1894), 103 Cal. 531, 37
Pac. 50.'3. An action for money had and receirnd may be maintained not only in case
of t he act ual receipt by defendant of money
belongiu g to the pla intiff, but where anyt hing is received as, or in l ieu of, money:
Snapp 1:. Stanwood (1898), 65 Ark. 222, 45

s. w . 546. J

1 ]foer. ter v. K irkpatrick, 2 Minn. 210,
212; Bowen v. Emmerson, 3 Ore. 452 .
T he complaint in the first of the e cases
was, " t hat the above-named defendants
are justly indeb ted to t he plaintiff in the
sum of, etc., on account for goods, wares,
and merchandise sold and delivered by
the pla intiff to the defendants at the special instance and request of the defemlants, wherefore," etc.; and it will be
noticed that this is fuller than sc,·eral of
the forms before quoted, since i alleges a
requ est. In sustaining a demurrer to thi
complaint, the court held it defective. because it contained ( l ) no tatement of the
time of sale, and (2) no aYerment that
the goocls were of the price or valnc> of the
nm mentioned, or that the defendant::;

promised to pay that nm, and laid down
the general doctrine in the following manner : '· Iu actiou · for good, sold and Llelivered, it is esse ntial that one or the
ot her of the e allegation::. should be made.
Withont it the allegation of ind el>tedue s
is a mere couclusiou of law unsupported
by any fact. The defendant's liability
grows out of the fact that the goods were
either worth the amount of the claim,
or elf'e that they prnmisecl to pay that
amount. If they were worth the amount,
the law implies a vrom ise. Without 011e
or the other of th ese allegations, there
appears no con icleration to support the
pretended indebtedness." In Bowen t'.
Emmerson the Supreme Court of Oregou
pronounced the use of the general cuuut
in assumpsit to be entire]_,. intonsistent
with the reform ed th eory of pleading, and
expressly refused to follow the decision
made in Allen t'. Patterson . The opinio n
is a dear and very strong argument m
favor of the simple and natural modes of
pleadiug providecl by the corle . .
[ In the recent case of Ifammer 1•.
Downing (1901), 39 Ore. 50-!, G5 Pac. 17,
the court said: "Under the code, n' construed by this court, the mode of ~~atement
employed by the' common counts' kuown
to the common law is iuappropriate and
in sufficient; it being deemed essential to
set out the facts from which the cause of
action ari es, and tlw proofs must extend
to ancl comprehend all the item going to
the establishment of uch accumulation."
In }1inne ota, however, the court does
not take so radical a -po, ition. In Pioneer
Fuel Co. v. Hager (l 94), 57 Minn . 76, 5
N. ,V. 828, the conrt said: "W are of
opinion that the court in the rocl ~tatC's
have sacrificed the principles of cocle
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§ 437. * 543. Use Sanctioned also where Obligation is Express.

Not only have the courts in this manner sanctioned the use of

the coumion counts as appropriate modes of setting forth the

pkintiffs cause of action; they have also held that another rule

of the old practice is still retained by the codes. The rule thus

declared to be in force is the following: When the plaintiff has

entered into an express contract with the defendant, and has

fully performed on his part, so that nothing remains unexecuted

but the defendant's obligation to pay, he may if he please sue

upon the defendant's implied promise to make such payment,

rather than upon the express undertaking of the original con-

tract; and to that end he may resort to a complaint or petition

identical with the ancient common counts; except, as has already

been shown, the averment of a promise may, and according to

pleading more than they ought to have

done iu adopting this common-law formula

at all, and that we should not outdo the

common law itself hy reducing the formula
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still more and making it still more in con-

..f:. . U se S an c t ion ed a ls o w h ere Obligati o n is E x press.
t onl · have th court in thi mann r n ioned the u e f
th
mmon aunt a apr ropriat mode of et ing f rth th
laintiff' au e of action; th y hav al hel hat ~moth r r 1
of th kl I ra ti i till r tained b · h od
The rul th u
declar l t be in force i the following : \Vhen the I lain tiff ha ·
enter l into an expre
on tract ' i th the <l f ndant, and ha
full · p rf rm d on bi part, o that n thing remain un :x: cut l
but th d f ndant obligation to a he may if be pl a
ue
up n the def ndan ' implied promi
o make uch pa
rath r ban up n the expre und rtaking of the rigiual
nract; and to that end he may re rt t a complaint r p iti n
identi al with the ancient common count ; excer t, as ha already
been h wn, the averment of a promise may, and according to
437 .

flict with code ])riuciples. The complaint

must at least be sufficient at common law,

■which it is not."

But iu Nebraska the practice of using

the common counts has been condemned.

The court of that State said iu Penn

Mutual Life Ins. Co. v. Conoughy (1898),

54 \eh. 123, 74 N. W. 422, "The Code of

Civil Procedure (sec. 92) requires a

pleader to state the facts which consti-

tute the cause of action or defence iu or-

dinary and concise language ; and the

practice of adding a common count in a

pleading is one not contemplated by the

code."

Other courts have criticised the use of

tliis form of pleading, but have neverthe-

less adhered to it. Thus the Supreme

Court of California said, in Minor v.

Baldridge (1898), 123 Cal. 187, 55 Cal.

783 : "The mode of pleading is inconsist-

ent with our code, and it may be a matter

of regret that it was ever tolerated, but

the innovation is not so great if sucii

complaint must fall before a special

demurrer, which is like a motion to re-

quire a pleader to make his pleadings

more definite, which practice prevails in

some States."

A similar view was expressed by the

Supreme Court of Wisconsin in Thom-

son V. Town of Elton (1901), 109 Wis-

589, 85 N. W. 425: "At most the com-

plaint was open to a motion to make more

definite and certain. In a complaint for

money had and received under the old

sy!*tem of pleading, the facts were pleaded

according to their legal effect, and it has

been repeatedly held that a statement of

facts good at the common law in actions

like this is sufficient under the code. . . .

It is possible that the framers of the code

did not contemj)late such a result of their

work when tliey said, ' The complaint

shall contain a plain and concise statement

of the facts constituting each cause of

action, without unnecessary repetition ; '

but such construction was adopted by the

courts in the State from which we took the

pleading more than they ought to have
done in adopting thi common-law formula
at all, aud that we boukl not outdo the
common law it elf by red ucing the formula
till more and making it till more in con·
il.ict with code principle . The complaint
mu ta lea t be ufficient at common law,
which it i not."
l3ut iu .l...,.ebra ka the practice of u ing
the common count has been conde mned.
Tl;ie court of that , tate said in P enn
1\lutual Life In . o. v. Conoughy (189 ),
5-!Xeh. 123, 74X W.422, " The Code of
CiYil Procedure ( ec. 9 2) require a
pletlder to tate the fact whi b con titute the cau e of action or <lefence in ordinary and conci e language ; and the
practice of addinO' a common coun in a
pleading i one not contemplated by the
code."
Other court. have critici 'ed the u ·e of
thi , form of pleading. but have nev rthele:-s ailh reel to it. Thu the
ourt of
alifornia
Balclri<lg ( l 9 ), 12
al. 1 7, 55
i '3 : ·Th mode of pl acliu 1 mcon i te1 • with our code, aud it mav be a matter
of r11~ret that it wa ever tolerated, but
the innovation i not . great if . u h
p cial
om ,laiut mu t fall before a
dr-mnrrer, which i. lik a motion to r quirr- a pl<·auer to make hi· pleadin
more •l finit , which practice prevail in
me , tale ."
A imilar '' iew w
expre ed by the

upreme Court of W iscon in in T homv. Town of Elton ( 1901), l 09 W i .
5 9, 85 N . W . 425 : " A t mo t t he complaint wa open to a motion to make more
definite and certain. In a complaint f r
money had and received under the old
sy tern of pleading, the fact were plead d
ace rding to their legal effect, and it ha
been r peatedly held that a tate m nt f
fact good at the common law in acti u
like thi i ufficient under the code . . . .
It i. po ible that the framer of the c cl
did not con tern plate ·uch a re ult f th ir
work when th ey aid, 'The complaint
·hall contain a plain and conci e tatement
of the fact con tituting each cau e of
action, without unnece ary repetition ; '
but uch on truction wa adopted by the
court in the tate from which we took the
cod , before it adop tion here, though at
a time when th re wa a trong in ·linati n to hold on to old form ancl ing ra.ft
them 011 t th new y tern a far
p . ible. That ' a d n , and it i b li v d
he court went bey nd r
ca e.. "
nd in
Kimball r.
011
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sup-

the better opinion sJiould, be omitted. ^ This doctrine is sup-

J Farrou v. Slierwood, 17 N. Y. 227,

229 ; Hosley v. Black, 28 N. Y. 438 ; Hurst

I). Litchfield, 39 N. Y. 377 ; Atkinson v.

Collins, 9 Abb. Pr. 353 ; Evans v. Harris,

19 Barb. 416; Green r. Gilbert, 21 Wis.

395, an action to recover for the part pei--

formance of an express contract, the plain-

tiff having been prevented by sickness

from completing; Carroll v. Paul's E.x.,

16 Mo. 226 ; Brown v. Perry, 14 Ind. .3^2 ;

Ker.stetter i'. Raymond, 10 Ind. 199; Stout

V. St. Louis Tribune Co., 52 Mo. 342 ; Fri-

ermuth v. Friennuth, 46 Cal. 42 ; Ray-

mond V. Hanford, 6 N. Y. S. C. 312; Fells

V. Vestvali, 2 Keyes, 152; Ashton v. Shep-

herd, 120 Ind. 69. In Sussdorf v. Schmidt,

55 N. Y. 319, 324, the complaint alleged
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an agreed compensation for services ; but,

at the trial, the plaintiff was permitted to

prove their value as upon a quantum me-

ruit, and this was held no error, or at most

an immaterial variance ; but, pei- contra, in

Davis V. Mason, 3 Ore. 154, it was held

that in an action for services, the complaint

stating an express contract to pay a stipu-

lated sum, the plaintiff cannot prove and

recover their value i\Y>ona.(/ua7ttum vieruit.

In Farron v. Sherwood, which is, perhaps,

the leading case, the doctrine was thus an-

nounced by Strong J. (p. 229) : " The case

is therefore within the well-settled rule,

that when there is a special agreement,

and the plaintiff has performed on his

part, the law raises a duty on the part

of the defendant to pay the price agreed

upon, and the plaintiff may count either

upon this implied assumpsit, or on the ex-

press agreement. A new cause of action,

upon such performance, arises from this

legal duty in like manner as if the act done

had been done upon a general request,

without an express agreement. This rule

is not affected by the code. The plain-

tiff might, as he has done, rest his action

on the legal duty, and his complaint is

adapted to and contains every necessary

element of that cause of action." In Ker-

stetter v. Raymond, the Supreme Court

enumerated the instances in which the

general or common count was a proper

means of suing upon an express contract

between the parties, and declared that they

were all retained by the codes. These in-

stances are, (1) when the plaintiff has

fully executed, and the time of payment is

passed, the measure of damages being the

stipulated price; (2) when the sjjecial con-

tract lias been altered or deviated from by

common con.sent; (3) when the plaintiff

has performed a part, and has been pre-

vented from performing the whole by

the act of the defendant, or by tlie act of

the law; (4) when the plaintiff has not

fully complied witli the terms of the con-

tract, but, professing to act under it, has

done for or delivered to the other party

something of value to him which he haa

Farrou v. , herwood, 17 N. Y. 227,
i -. Black, 2 i: . Y. 43 ; Hur t
' · Litchfi hi, 39 N. Y. 377; Atkin on v.
f:ollin , 9 Abb. Pr. 35:3; Evan v. Harri ,
19 Barb. 416; Green v. Gilbert, 21 Wis.
39.), an action to re ·over for the part performance of an expr e co ntract, the plaintiff haYing been prevented by sickn ·
from comple tin g; arroll v. Paul':s Ex.,
16 Mo. 226; Brown v. Perry, l..i. Ind. 3'2;
Kertetter v. Raymond, I 0 Ind. 199 ; tout
v. ' t. Loni Tribune Co., 52 Mo. 342 ; Frierm uth v. Friernmth , 46 Cal. 42 ; Raymond v . Hanford , 6 N. Y . . C. 312; Fell
v. ,~ estvali, 2 K eyes, 152; Ashton v. Shepherd, 120 Ind. 69. In Sus dorf v. Schmi dt,
55 N. Y. 319, 324, the complai nt alleged
an agreed compen ation for ·ervice ; but,
at the trial , the plaintiff was permitted to
prove their value a upon a quantum meruit, and this was h eld no error, or at m ost
an immaterial variance; but, per contra, in
Davi v . .Ma on, 3 Ore. 154, it was h eld
that in an a ct ion for service , the complaint
·tatin g an ex pres contract to pay a tipulateJ sum, the plaintiff canuot prove and
recover their value upon a quantum meruit.
In Farron v . , herwood, which is, perhaps,
the leading ca e, the doctrine wa thus announ ced by trong J. (p. 229) : "The ca e
i therefore wi th in the well-settled rule,
that when th ere i a pecial agree ment,
and the plaintiff has performed on hi s
part, the law raises a duty on the part
of the defe ndant to pay the price agreed
upon, a nd the plaintiff may count eithe r
upon thi" implied a sump it, or on the expre ·s agreement. A ne w cau e of ~ct i on,
npou suc h performance, arises from this
legal Jury in like manner a if the act done
had been done upon a general r eque t,
without an expr es agr eeme nt. Thi rule
i · not affected by th e code. The plaintiff might, as h e has done, r est his action
on the legal d uty, and his omplaint is
adapted to and contains every neces a ry
e lement of that cause of action." In K er~ tetter v. Ray mond , the Suprem e Court
enumerated the in -tance in which the
general or co mmon connt wa a proper
m eans of uing upon au expres contr act
between the parties, and declared that they
were all r etain ed by the codes. The e intan ce are, (1) when the plaintiff ha
l

229; Ho. ley

fully ex cut cl, and the time of paym nt is
pas eel, th m a ·ure of damage being the
ti pulated pri ·e; ( 2) whe11 the peeial contract ha:; b en alter d or d viaterl fro111 hy
common co1rent; (:3) when th plaintiff
ha performe1l a part, and ha b u pre·
veut cl from p rforining the \\ho! by
the act of the defcudant, or by the act of
the law; (4) when the plaintiff ha not
fully complied with the term. of the ·on.
tract, but, profe ing to act under it, ha
done for or <lelivere<l to the other party
omethiug of value to him which he has
accepted. Thi: la t cl0ctrine i not uni ver ally accepted in the broad term hero
tated; but it i · the ettled rule in Indiana.
See Lomax v. B a iley, 7 Blac k£ 599.
[Held, in J enney Electric Co. t'. Bran.
ham ( 1896 ), 145 Ind. 3 14, 41 N. E. 44 ,
that a recove ry may be had upon the com.
m on counts notwithstanding the ev id ence
shows a spec ial contract. Bu t in Dun can
i-. Gray (1 99 ), IO Ia. 599, 79 1 . W . 362,
no recovery wa allowed where an implie<l
promi e wa alleged and an ex pre promise proved. So in R oche i• . Ba ldwin (1902 ),
135 Cal. 522, 65 Pac. 459 , where a complain t was drawn upon a quan/11111 meruit,
and ev idence produced upon the t ri al e ·
tablished a contract whereby certain perons named were to fix the amount to be
paid fo r the se n ·ices re11clered, it was held
a fatal variance. Th e probata aml rdlegata
do not at all corre. pon<l.
ee al ·o, to the
same effect, 1\IcCorrnick i•. Inter;:tate, etc.
Ry. Co. (1900), 154 :Vfo. 191 , 55 . \Y .
252; Burton v. R o emary Co. ( 1903 ), 132
N. C. 17, 43 S. E. 480.
In accord with Jenney Electric Co. v.
Branham (supra), it was held in We t i· .
Eley (1901), 39 Ore. 461, 65 Pac. 7<J , that
wher e a comphtiut i founded upon a 'f!WI!·
tum rneruit, the only effect of proving au
ex pre s contract fixing the price is that
the stipulated price become· the quantum
meruit in the ca e. It i not a que tion of
variance, but only of the mode of proof of
the a llegation of the pleading . Th
am rule wa applied in Vanderb k i·.
Frauci. (1903). 75 011n. 467, 53 Atl. 1015;
H ecla Gold Mining .o. v. Gi born (1 99).
21 Utah, 68, 59 Pac. 51 ; R ober t v. L eak
(1 99), 10 Ga. 06, :33 . E. 995.
Where au ex pre · contract i · alle()'ed in
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ported by numerous decisions in various States, and it seems to

be regarded as still operative in all the circumstances to which it

was applicable under the former S3-stera.

§ 438. * 54-4. Criticism of Doctrine. In the face of this over-

whelming array of authority, it may seem almost presumptuous

even to suggest a doubt as to the correctness of the conclusions

that have been reached with so much unanimity. I cannot,

however, consistently with my very strong convictions, refrain

from' expressing the opinion that, in all these rulings concerning

the use of the common counts, the couits have overlooked the

fundamental conception of the reformed pleading, and have

abandoned its essential principles. This position of inevitable

opposition was clearly, although unintentionally, described by

one of the judges in language already quoted, when he says,

" We are inclined to sanction the latter view, and to hold that

ihe facts which, in the judgment of the law, create the indebted-

ness or liability, need 7iot be set forth in the complaint." Now,

the "facts which create the liability" are the "facts constituting

the cause of action " which the codes expressly require to be
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alleged; tlie two expressions are synonymous; and the direct

antagonism between what the court says need not be done, and

what the statute says must be done, is patent. But the objection

to the doctrine of these decisions does not chiefly rest upon such

verbal criticism; it is involved in the very nature of the new

theory when contrasted with the old methods. In every species

of the common count, the averments, by means of certain pre-

scribed formulas, presented what the pleader conceived to be

the legal effect and operation of the facts instead of the facts

themselves, and the most important of them was always a pure

conclusion of law. The count for money had and received well

illustrates the truth of this proposition. In the allegation that

" the defendant was indebted to the plaintiff for money had and

received by him to the plaintiff's use," the distinctive element

the pleading, and the proof shows only an (1895), 98 Ky. 186, 32 S. AV. 623 ; Price i-.

implied contract, no recovery can he had : Price's Executor (1897), 101 Ky. 28, 39

I'ear.sou v. Switzer (1898), 98 Wis. 397, S. W. 429; Ilu.'ston v. Tyler (1897), 140

74 N. \V. 214 ; Walker v. Irwin (189.5), 94 Mo. 252, 36 S. W. 654 ; Maddox v. Wag-

la. 448, 62 N. W. 785; Harrison v. Puste- iier (1900), 111 Ga. 146, 36 S. E. 609,

oska (1896), 97 la. 166, 66 N. W. 93; Bir- Coiiira, Burge.ss v. Helm (1898), 24 Nev.

lant V. Cleckley (1896), 48 S. C. 298, 26 242, 51 Pac. 1025; Livingstone v. Wagner,

S. E. 600; Newton's Executor v. Field 23 Nev. 53, 42 Pac. 290.J

ported b · num r ou deci i n in Yariou
tate ' and it em to
be r gardecl a· ill operati e in all the circum tance to which it
wa applicable under the former system .
438. * 5-±-±. Crit icis m of Doctrine. In the face of thi o-ver'Y helming arra · of au horit , it may eem almo t pre umptuou
yen t o ugge t a doubt a to the corr ctne of the conclu ion
that have been reached with so much unanimity. I cannot,
however, con i tently with my very ·trong conviction , refrain
from expre ing the opinion that, in all the e rulings concerning
he u e of th e common count , the courts have overlooked the
fu ndamental con ption of the reform ed I 1 acling and ha Ye
abandonPd it e ential principle . Thi po ition of ineYitable
oppo iti n wa ·learly, although unintentionally, de cribed by
oue of th e judg s in language already quoted, when he ay ,
" \Ye are inclined to sanction t he latt r -view, and to hold that
the fact " hich in the judg ment of the law, create the indebtedne or liability, need n ot be et for th in the complaint.' Now,
the " fact which create th e liability ' are the "fact con tituting
the cau e of action ' which the co 1 s expre ly require to be
alleged; th e t wo expre ion are ynonymou ; and the direct
antagoni m between what the court ·ay need not be done and
what t he statute ays must be done, i patent. But the objection
t o the doctrin e of these deci ions doe not chiefly re t upon uch
verbal critici. m; it is involved in the very nature of the new
theory when contrasted with the ol l method . In ever3 species
of the common count, the averment ', by mean of c rtain precribed formulas, pre ented ' hat the plead er conceiYed to be
the 1 gal effect and operation of th fact in tead of the fact
them elves, and the most important of them wa al way a pure
conclu ion of law. The count for mone3 ha 1 and receiv cl well
illu trate th truth of tbi I ror o ition. I n the allega ion that
' the cl f ndant wa indebt cl to th 1 laintiff f r mon y had and
l'eceivecl by him to the plaintiff u e, ' the di tinctiv element
the plea<lin rr, an<l the proof how only an
irnpli ecl ('Ont ract, no recovery caii he harl:
P ear <J u 1· • • 'witlr> r ( 1 9 ), 9 Wi ' ..'39 7,
74 . '. W . :d4 ; Walk •r r . Irwin ( l 95), 94
fj :? • '. 'V. i 5; Harri " OU c. Pu:-;teo ka ( I !l6) , 97 Ia. 1 Ii . 66 ,,_. \V . 93; Birlaut t•. 'l<'c kley ( I % ). 4
. 29 , 26
, . E . 00 ;
Ex ec utor 1: . 1''i lcl

Ia. 44

( 1 9.>), 9 K y. 1 6 32 . W . 623 ; P ri e v.
Pri ce '. Executor (1 9i ), 10 1 K~·. 2c, 39
·. W. 429; Ilu ton v. Ty ler (1 9i ), UO
.l\lo . 252, 36 ·. W . 65 + ; ?.lacldox c. 'Vagu er ( 1900), 111
a. 146, 3 6 •·. E. 609.
Contra, Burge .. 1•. II l m (1 9 ), 24 Xn.
242, 51 Pac. 1025 ; T,i,•ing ton t•. \Y arru r,
23 ~ · ,.. 53 , 42 l'ac. 290.J
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was the phrase "money had and received to the plaintiff's use."

This technical expression was not the statement of a/aci, in the

sense in which that word is used by the codes; if not strictly a

pure conclusion of law, it was at most a symbol to which a cer-

tain peculiar meaning had been given. The circumstances under

which one person could be liable to another for money had and

received were very numerous, embracing contracts express or

implied, and even torts and frauds. The mere averment that

the defendant was indebted for money had and received admitted

any of these circumstances in its support, but it did not disclose

nor even suggest the real nature of the liability, the actual cause

of action upon which the plaintiff relied. The reformed theory

of pleading was expressly designed to abrogate forever this general

mode of averment, which concealed rather than displayed the

true cause of action ; it requires the facts to be stated, the facts

as they exist or occurred, leaving the law to be determined and

applied by the court. The same is true of the common count in

every one of its phases. A careful analysis would show that the

important and distinctive averments were either naked conclu-
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sions of law, or the legal effect and operation of the facts

expressed in technical formulas to which a particular meaning

had been attached, and which were equally applicable to innu-

merable different causes of action. The rule which permitted the

general count in assumpsit to be sometimes used in an action

upon an express contract was even more arbitrary and technical,

and was wholly based upon fictitious notions. The conception

of a second implied promise resulting from the duty to perform

the original express promise has no foundation whatever in the

law of contract, but was invented, with great subtlety, in order

to furnish the ground for a resort to general assumpsit instead

of special assumpsit in a certain class of cases. All the reasons

in its support were swept away by the legislation which abolished

the distinctions between the forms of action, since it was in such

distinctions alone that those reasons had even the semblance of

an existence. My space will not permit this discussion to be

pursued any farther, although much more might be added to the

foregoing suggestions. If the principles of pleading heretofore

developed in the text are true expressions of the reformed theory,

the legislature certainly intended that the facts constituting each

cause of action should be alleged as they actually happened, not

was the phrase "money had and receiv d to the plaintiff' use."
This technical ex pre sion was not the ·ta i m nt f a fact, in the
sen e in which that word i used by the cod,·; if not ·trictly a
pure conclusion of law, it was at mo ta ymbol to whi h a rtain peculiar meaning bad be n given. The circum ·tance under
which one person could be liable to another for money had and
receiYed were very numerous, embracing contract expre or
implied, and even torts and frauds. The mere avermcnt that
the defendant was indebted for money had and receiv cl adrnitt cl
any of these circumstances in its support, but it did not disclose
no.,1.' even suggest the real nature of the liability, the actual cause
of action upon which the plaintiff relied. The reformed theory
of pleading was expressly designed to abrogate forever this general
mode of averment, which concealed rather than clisplayed the
true cause of action; it requires the facts to be stated, the facts
as they exist or occurred, leaving the law to be determined and
applied by the court. The same is true of the common count in
every one of its phases. A careful analysis would show that the
important and distinctive averments were either naked conclusions of law, or the legal effect and operation of the facts
expressed in technical formu las to which a particular mea11ing
had been attached, and which were equally applicable to innumerable different causes of action. The rule which permitted the
general count in assumpsit to be sometimes used in an action
upon an express contract was even more arbitrary and technical,
and was wholly based upon fictitious notions. The conception
of a second implied promise resulting from the duty to perform
the original express promise has no foundation whatever in the
law of contract, but was invented, with great subtlety, in order
to furnish the ground for a resort to general assumpsit instead
of special assumpsit in a certain class of cases. All the reasons
in its support were swept away by the legislation which abolished
the distinctions between the forms of action, since it was in such
distinctions alone that those reasons had even the semblance of
an existence . 1\Iy space will not permit thi discussion to be
pur ued any farther, although mu ch more might be added to the
foregoing suggestion s. If the principles of pleading heretofore
developed in the text are true expressions of the reformed theory,
the legislature. certainly intended that the facts constituting each
cause of action should be alleged as they actually happened, not
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by means of any technical formulas, but in the ordinary language

of narrative; and it is, as it appears to me, equally certain that

the use of the common counts as complaints or petitions is a

violation of these fundamental principles.

i$ 439. * 545. Further Rules of Pleading to be considered. Out-

line of Discussion. From the few general principles which thus

constitute the simple foundation of the reformed pleading, there

result as corollaries certain subordinate doctrines and practical

rules, to the development and illustration of which the remaining

portion of the present section will be devoted. The immediate

object of these special rules is to enforce in complaints or peti-

tions and answers a conformity with the essential principles upon

which the system is based, and at the same time to procure a

decision of judicial controversies upon their merits, and not upon

any mere technical requirements as to form and mode. They

relate to the practical methods which must be pursued in setting

forth the causes of action and the defences; and the particular

subjects with which they deal are (1) insufficient, incomplete,

or imperfect allegations, (2) immaterial and redundant allega-
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tions, (3) the doctrine that the cause of action or the defence

proved must correspond with the one alleged. Connected with

and subsidiary to these topics are the remedies j^rovided for each,

and particularly that of amendment, which the codes expressly

authorize with the utmost freedom, and also the power of elect-

ing between the two modes of setting forth the same cause of

action under certain circumstances either as ex contractu or as ex

delicto. Preliminary, however, to the discussion thus outlined,

I shall state and very briefly explain a principle which will

necessarily affect its whole course, and largely determine its

results, — the principle of construction as applied to the pleadings

themselves.

§ 440. *546. Strict Construction of Pleadings Superseded by-

Liberal Construction. It was a rule of the common law firmly

established and constantly acted upon, — that, in examining and

deciding all objections involving either form or substance, every

pleading was to be construed strongly against the pleader; noth-

ing could be presumed in its favor; nothing could be added, or

inferred, or supplied by implication, in order to sustain its suffi-

ciency. This harsh doctrine, unnecessary and illogical in its

original conception, and often pushed to extremes that were

by mean of any technical formula but in the ordinary langu.age
of narrative; and it i , a it appear ' to m , equally certain that
the u e of the common counts a complaint or petition ' i ' a
violation of t he ·e fundamental principl .
439. * 5-±5. Further Rules o f Pleading to be considered. Outline of Discussion. From th fe,y general prin cipl
which thu
con titute t he imple foundation of th e r formed pleadi11g, there
re ult a corollarie certain ubordin at loctrin · and practical
r ule to tbe deYelopment and illu tra tion of which th remaining
portion of the pre nt ection " -ill be de,·oted. The immediate
object of the e pecial rul e is to enforce in complaint or p tition and an wer a conformity with the essential principle upon
whi ch the y ·tern i based, and at the same time to procure a
deci ion of judjcial controversie upon their merit , and not upon
any mere technical requirement as to form and mode. They
relate to the practical methods which mu t be pursued in etting
forth the causes of artion and the defences; and the particular
ubjects with which they deal are (1) insufficient, incomplete,
or imperfect allegations, (2) immaterial and redundant allegation , (3) the doctrine that the cause of action or h defence
proved mu t corre pond with the one alleged . Connected with
and subsidiary to these topics are the remedie provided for each,
and particularly that of amendment, which the codes expre ly
authorize with the utmost freedom, and also the power of 1 cting between the two modes of tting forth the same cau e of
action under certain circum tance either as ex contractu or a' ex
delicto . Preliminary, however, to the di cu ion thus outlined,
I hall state and very briefly explain a principle which will
nece arily affect it whole cour e, and largely determine its
re ult , - the principle of construction a, applied to the pleading
h m elve .
440. * 5-±6. S trict Constru c tion of. Pleadings Superseded by
Liberal Constructio n.
It was a rule of the common law firmly
tabli he l an l c n tantly a •t l upon, - that, in xaminin and
cleci lin all b jec ti n in olving itber f rm or ub tan
pl ading wa' t b
n tru l tr n ·ly again t th pl a<l r · noth111
·oul<l 1> r um d in it f
nothin
uld b
ld l r
inf rrf'd, or uppli l by impli
rd rt u tain it uffi Thi bar h d ctrin unn
ary and ill
one ption and ft n pn h
to extr m

LIBERAL CONSTRUCTION OF PLEADI 'GS.

591

LIBEKAL CONSTRUCTION OF PLEADINGS. 591

simply absurd, was the origin of the technicality and excessive

precision, which, more than any other features, characterized the

ancient system in its condition of highest development. All

the codes contain the following provision, or one substantially

the same : " In the construction of a pleading, for the purpose of

determining its effect, its allegations shall be liberally construed

with a view to substantial justice between the parties."^ The

evident intent of the legislature in this clause was to abrogate

at one blow the ancient dogma, and to introduce in its place the

contrary principle of a liberal and equitable construction; that

is, a construction in accordance with the general nature and

design of the pleading as a whole. This mode of interpretation

does not require a leaning in favor of the pleader in place of the

former tendency against him; it demands a natural spirit of fair-

ness and equity in ascertaining the meaning of any particular

averment or group of averments from their relation and connec-

tion with the entire pleading and from its general purpose and

object. The courts have uniformly adopted this view of the

provision ; and although in particular instances they may some-
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times have departed from it, yet, in their announcement of the

theory^ they have unanimously conceded that the stern doctrine

of the common law has been abolished, and that, instead thereof,

an equitable mode of construction has been substituted. From

the multitudes of decisions which maintain this position with

more or less emphasis I select a few examples, and other illus-

trations will be subsequently given.

§ 441. * 547. Judicial Approval of Liberal Construction. The

New York Court of Appeals, while construing a complaint, said:

" The language is clearly susceptible of this interpretation ; and

if so, that interpretation should be given in preference to [another

which was stated]. If the language admits of the latter inter-

pretation, it may be said to be ambiguous, and that is all. It is

not true that under the code, if there be uncertainty in respect to

the nature of the charge, it is to l)e construed strictly against the

pleader. By § 159, in the construction of a pleading, its allega-

tions must be liberally construed with a view to substantial jus-

tice."^ The language used by the Supreme Court of Wisconsin

in a similar case is still stronger: "Contrary to the common-law

rule, every reasonable intendment and presumption is to be made

1 [^See § * 434, note 1 r\ - Oleott v. Carroll, 39 N. Y. 430, 438.

simply absurd, was the origin of the technicality and exces ive
preci ion, which, more than any other f atur s, hara t riz d the
ancient system in it con lition of highe t dev lopment. All
the codes contain the following provi 'ion or one 'Ub 'tantially
the same: "In the con truction of a pleading, for th purpo e of
determining its effect, its allegations hall be liberally onstruecl.
with a view to sub tantial justice between the partie . " 1 The
evident intent of the legislature in this clau e vrns to abr gate
at one blow the ancient dogma, and to introduce in its place the
contrary principle of a liberal and equitable construction; that
is, a con truction in accordance with the general nature and
design of the pleading as a whole. This mode of interpretation
does not require a leaning in favor of the pleader in place of the
former tendency against him; it demands a natural spirit of fairness and equity in ascertaining the meaning of any particular
averment or group of averments from their relation and connection with the entire pleading and from its general purpose and
object. The courts have uniformly adopted this view of the
provision; and al though in particular instances they may sometimes have departed from it, yet, in their announcement of the
theory, they have unanimously conceded that the stern doctrine
of the common law bas been abolished, and that, instead thereof,
an equitable mode of construction has been substituted. From
the multitudes of decisions which maintain this position with
more or less emphasis I select a few examples, and other ill ustrations will be subsequently given.
§ 441. * 54 7. Judici a l Approval of Liberal Construction. The
New York Court of Appeals, w bile cons truing a complaint, said :
"The language is clearly susceptible of this interpretation; and
if so, that interpretation should be given in preference to [another
which was stated]. If the language admits of the latter interpretation, it may be said to be ambiguous, and that is all. It is
not true that under the code, if there be uncertainty in respect to
the nature of the charge, it is to be construed strictly against the
pleader. By § 159, in the construction of a pleading, its allegations must be liberally construed with a view to substantial justice." 2 The language used by the Supreme Court of Wisconsin
in a similar case is still stronger: "Contrary to the common-law
rule, every reasonable intendment and presumption is to be made
1

[ See § * 43-1, note l.]

2

Olcott v. Carroll, 39 N. 1. 436, 43 .
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in favor of the pleading."^ The same interpietr.tion is g'ven

to the provision in Iowa; the old dogma of leaning against the

pleader is abandoned, and a liberal and equitable construction is

now the rule.^ The practical force and operation of this prin-

ciple, and liow much effect it actually' produces in the judicial

process of construing pleadings, can best be seen by an examina-

tion of the decisions in which it has been invoked. A few of

them have therefore been selected, and placed in the foot-note."

1 Morse v. Oilman, 16 Wis. 504, 507.

See also Hazletou v. Union Bk. of Colum-

in fayor of th pleading.
The ame interpn~~~tion i g) en
to th I rovi ion in Iowa; the old dogma of l aning again t the
pl ad r i abandon d arnl a liberal an l equitable con truction is
now the rule. 2 The practice 1 force , and operation f thi princi1 le and how much e ect it actually produc s in the judicial
proce of con truing pleading.:;, can b t be seen by an examinl tion of he deci ions in which it ha been invoked. A few of ,
them have therefore been ~e lected, and placed in the foot-note. 3

bus, 32 Wis. 34, 42, 43, wliicli holds that

greater latitude of presumption is ad-

mitted to sustain a complaint, when objec-

tion to it is not made until the trial, after

issues have beeu formed by an answer.

•2 Shank v. Teeple, 33 Iowa, 189, 191 ;

Foster v. Elliott, 33 Iowa, 216, 223 ; Gray

?•. Coan, 23 Iowa, 344 ; Doolittle v. Green,
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32 Iowa, 123, 124.

" McGlasson v. Bradford, 7 Bush, 250,

252 ; .joubert v. Carli, 26 Wis. 594 ; Clay v.

Edgerton, 19 Ohio St. 549 ; supra, § * 535 ,

Gunn V. Madigan, 28 Wis. 158, 164; Rob-

son V. Comstock, 8 Wis. 372, 374, 375 ;

Morse v. Gilraau, 16 Wis. 504. As further

examples, see Bushey v. Reynolds, 31 Ark.

657 ; Thompson v. Killian, 25 Minn. Ill ;

Ferguson v. Va. & T. R. Co., 13 Nev. 184 ;

Chiiders v. Veruer, 12 S. C. 1 ; Wilkins v.

Moore, 20 Kan. .538 ; Strong v. Hoos, 41

Wis. 659 ; Whitman v. Watry, 44 id. 491 ;

Evans i\ Neale, 69 Ind. 148 ; ]\Ioore v.

Moore, 56 Cal. 89; Wilcox v. Hausch, 57

id. 139; McAllister i'. Welker, 39 Minn.

535 ; Isaacs v. Holland, 1 Wash. 54.

[^Construction of Pleadittf/s.

Pleadings are to be construed libei-ally

with a view to substantial justice between

the parties: Guy v. McDaniel (1897), 51

i More v. Gilman, 16 Wi . 50-t-, 507.
ee al o Hazleton v. uion Bk. of Columbus, 32 Wi . 34, 42, 43, which hold · that
greater latitude of pre umpt ion i admitted to u tain a complaint, when objection to it i n ot made until the trial, after
i -- ue:s haYe been fo rm ed by an an wer.
2
han k v. T eeple, 33 Iowa, I 9, 191;
F o ter v. Elliott, 33 Iowa, 216, 223; Gray
i•.
oau, 23 Iowa, 344; Doolittle v. Gree n,
32 Iowa, 123, 124.
ii
IcG lasson v. Bradford, 7 Bu h, 250,
252; Joubert v. Carli , 26 W i . 59-!; Clay v.
Edgerton, 19 Ohio St. f>49; supra, §* 535;
Gunu i·. ~Iadiga n, 2 Wis. 15 , 16.J, ; Rob'Vi . 372, 374, 375;
oo v. om tock,
:\lor· e v. ilmau, 16 Wi s. 504 . A furth er
example , ee Bu hey v. Rey nold , 3 1 Ark .
6:i 7 ; Thomp on v. Killian, 25 Minn. 111;
Fergu n v. Va. & T. R. Co., 13 Jev. 184;
Ch ilder: v. V erner, 12 . C. l ; Wilkin v.
foore, 20 Kan. 53 ; ~ trong v. Hoo , 41
Wi . 659; Whitman v. Watry, 44 id. 491;
E'·an v. Neale, 69 I nd. 148 ; :Moore v .
Moore, 56 Cal. 9; Wilcox v. Hau ch, 57
id. 139; Mc llister v. Welker, 39 Minn.
535 ; I aacs v. H olland, 1 Wash. 54.

S. C. 4.36, 29 S. E. 196; Cone v. Ivinson

(1893), 4 Wyo. 203,31 Vac. 31 ; McArthur

V. Clarke Drug Co. (1896), 48 Neb. 899, 67

N. W. 861; ilart7xll r. McClurg (1898).

54 Xeb. 313, 74 N. W. 625 ; Miller v.

Bayer (1896), 94 Wis. 123, 68 N. W. 869;

South Bend Chilled Plow Co. v. Geo. C.

Cribb Co. (1897), 97 Wis. 2.30, 72 N. W.

749 ; Benolkin i\ Guthrie (1901), 111 Wis.

554, 87 N. W. 466 ; S.age v. Culver (1895),

147 N. Y. 241, 41 N. E. 513; Dailey r.

Burlington, etc. Ry. Co. (1899), 58 Neb.

396, 78 N. W. 722; Roberts v. Samson

(1897), 50 Neb. 745, 70 N. W. 384 ; Wenk

V. City of New York (1902), 171 N. Y. 607,

64 N. E. 509 ; Coatsworth v. Lehigh Valley

Ry. Co. (1898), 156 N. Y. 451, 51 N. E.

301 ; Kain v. Larkin (1894), 141 N. Y. 144,

39 N. E. 9 ; United States Saving Co. v.

Harris (1895), 142 Ind. 226, 40 N. E. 1072 ;

Strong V. Weir (1896), 47 S. C. 307, 25

S. E. 157; Waggy v. Scott (1896), 29

Ore. 336, 45 Pac. 774 ; Hood v. Nicholson

(1896), 137 Mo. 400, 38 S. W. 1095 ; Vogel-

gesaug V. City of St. Louis (1897), 139 Mo.

127, 40 S W. 653 ; Baird v. Citizens' Ry.

Co. (1898), 146 Mo. 265, 48 S. W. 78;

Ingraham v. Lyon (1894), 105 Cal. 254,

38 Pac. 892 (but see California cases cited

[Construction of Pleadings.

396, 7
J. W. 722; Robert
v. am on
{l 97), 50 Te o. 745, 70 . W . 384; Wenk
v. City of New York (1902), 171 . Y. 607,
6-t- N. E. 509; Coat w r th v . L eh igh Valley
R y. Co. (189 ), 156 N. Y. 451, 51 .i: . E.
301; Kain i·. Larkiu (1894), 141 l: • Y. 144,
39 N. E. 9; Uuited tate Saving C . v.
Harris (1 95), 142 Ind. 226, 40 N. E. 1072;
trong v. Weir (1 96), 47 . C. 307, 25
. E. 157; W aggy u. Scott (1896), 29
Ore. 3 6, 45 Pac. 774; Hood L'. icho l ou
{1896) , 137 Mo . 400, 38 S. W. 1095; Vogelge ang v . ity of t . L ou i (1897), 139 Mo.
127, 40 S W . 653; Baird v. itizen ' .'' ·
Co. ( 1898), 146 Mo. 265, 4
. W. 7 ;
Ingraham v. Lyon (1 94), 105 Cal. 25+,
3 Pac. 92 (but see Californill. case cited
infra, holding that pleading are to be c ntrued mo t trongly against the pleader);
Hall v. Woolery (1 9 ), 20 Wash. 440, 55
Pac. 562, holding that in the ab ence of a
demurrer, a complaint i entitled to a
li beral construction; Blumenthal v. Pacific
Meat Co. (1 95), 12 Wash. 331, 41Pac.47,
to same effect.
The ca e of Cone v. Ivin on (supra), 4
Wyo. 203, ha a Yery elaborate di u ·ion
of theque tion f con tru tiou. Pomer y,
Bli. , wan , and Maxwell are all copiou ly
quoted, and the autboritie are thoroughl)
r view cl, a trong di ·euting pinion b ing
fil ed. Upon a rehearing being granted,
the ca e wa thoroughly r argu d, the
·ourt adh rin g to it original po ition.
ple{'Lciing mu. t be h Id t all eg all
the fact that an be implied b fair an<L
r a onable int ndm ut from th fact xpr ly tated: age v. ulver (1 95), 147
. Y . 241, 41 . E. 513; Kaiu v. Larkin
( l 94), 141 . Y. 144, 39 N. E. 9; oat w r h v. L high
alley Ry. Co. (1 9 ),
156 N. Y. 451, !il N. E. 301; W enk t·.
ity of ew Y rk {1902), 171 T. Y. 6 7,
64 . E. 509; H berts v. ams n (1897) ,
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I n a very small numb r of cases, however, th court seem to
have overlooked this chang made by the statut , and hav

have overlooked this change made by the statute, and have

50 Neb. 745, 70 N. W. 384 ; Dailey v. Bur-

lington, etc. R.R. Co. (1899), 58 Neb. 396,

78 N. W. 722 ; Miller v. Bayer (1896), 94

Wis. 123, 68 N. W. 869.

Where a pleading i.s assailed for the

first time by a demurrer ore tenus, it will

be construed liberally : National Fire Ins.

Co. r. P'astern Building & Loan Ass'n

(1902), 63 Neb. 698, 88 N. W. 863 ; First

Nat. Bank v. Pennington (1899), 57 Neb.

404, 77 N. W. 1084; Holtz v. Hanson

(1902), 115 Wis. 236, 91 N. W. 663 ; Werner

V. Ascher (1893), 86 Wis. 349, 56 N. W.

869; Phillips v. Carver (1898), 99 Wis.

561, 75 N. W. 432; Winkler v. Kacine

Wagon, etc. Co. (1898), 99 Wis. 184, 74
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N. W. 973.

A pleading attacked for tlie first time

in the Supreme Court on the ground that

it does not state a cause of action, will be

liberally construed : Omalia Nat. Bank v.

Iviper (1900), 60 Neb. 33, 82 N. W. 102;

F'owler v. Phoenix Ins. Co. (1899), 35 Ore.

559, 57 Pac. 421 ; Roseburg Ry. Co. v.

Nosier (1900), 37 Ore. 299, 60 Pac. 904.

See also First Nat. Bank v. Tompkins

(1903), — Neb. — , 94 N. W. 717.

When a complaint is attacked after

judgment for want of facts to state a cause

of action, it must be liberally construed :

Mosher v. Bruhu (1896); 15 Wash. 332,

46 Pac. 397; Cobb v. Lindell Ry. Co.

(1899), 149 Mo. 135, 50 S. W. 310; Mer-

rill V. Equitable Farm & Stock, etc. Co.

(1896), 49 Neb. 198,68 N. W. 365; Ameri-

can Fire Ins. Co. v. Landfare (1898), 56

Neb. 482, 76 N. W. 1068. A decree lor

plaintiff will cure tlie inadvertent omission

of the won! " not " in a complaint : Wyatt

V. Wyatt (1897), 31 Ore. 531, 49 Pac. 855.

See also Montesano v. Blair (1895), 12

Wash. 188, 40 Pac. 731 ; State ex rel. v.

Renshaw (1902), 166 Mo. 682, 66 S. W.

953; Milner v. Harris (1903), — Neb. —,

95 N. W. 682.

Imperfect allegations have frequently

been held to be aided by verdict or judg-

ment. See Hall v. Southern Pac. Co.

(1899), Ariz., 57 Pac. 617; Ades y. Levi

(189.3), 137 Ihd. 506, 37 N. E. 388 ; Philo-

math V. Ingle (1902), 41 Ore. 289, 68 Pac.

803 ; Clian Sing v. City of Portland (1900),

37 Ore. 68, 60 Pac. 718; Mass. Benefit

Ass'n V. Richart (1896), 99 Ky. 302, 35

S. W. 541 ; Louisville, etc. R. R. Co. v.

Lawes (1900), Ky., 56 S. W. 426 ; Hill v.

Ragland (1902), — Ky. — , 70 S W. 634 ;

Salmon Falls Bank v. Leyser (1893), 116

Mo. 51, 22 S. W. .504; People's Bank?;.

Scalzo (1894), 127 Mo. 164, 29 S. W. 1032 ;

Nicolai v. Krimbel (1896), 29 Ore. 76, 43

Pac. 865; Miller v. Ilirschberg (1895),

27 Ore 522, 40 Pac. 506. But it has been

held that such aider does not take place

where the complaint is radically defective :

Nye V. Bill Nye Min. Co. (1903), 42 Ore.

50 Neb. 745, 70 N. W. 3 4; Dailey v. Bur- 37 Ore. 6, 60 Ia. i l ; l\fa . Ben fit
lington, etc. R.H. Co. (1899), 58 Neb.396, A 'u v. Hichart (I 96), 99 Ky. 302, 35
78 N. W. 722; l\1iller v. Bayer (1806), 94
. W. 541; Loui ·ville, tc. R. R. Co. v.
Wi . 123, 68 . . . W. 869.
I,awe. (1000), Ky., 56 '. ·w. 426; Ilill z"
Where a pleading is as ailed for the lhglantl (1H02), - Ky. - , 70
W. 634;
first time by a demurrer ore teuus, it will
almou .Falls 13ank v. Ley er (1 93), 116
be con trued liberally: National Fire Ins. Mo. 51, 2:2 . W. 50-1; l'eople' Bank v.
Co. v. Ea tern Building & Loan As 'n Scalzo (1894), 127 Mo. 164, 29 . W. 1032;
(1902), 63 Neb. 698, 88 N. W. 863; First
icolai v. Krirnbel (1896), 29 Ore. 76 , 43
Nat. Bank v. Pennington ( 1899), 57 :Neb. Pac. 65 ; Miller l'. Ilir ·chbe1·g ( 1 95 ),
404, 77
. W. 1084; Holtz v. Han on 27 Ore 522, 40 Pac. 506. But it ha been
(1902), 11 5 W is. 236, 91 N. W. 663; Werner held that such aider does not take place
v. A cher (1893) , 86 W is. 349, 56 .N. W. where the complaint i:; ratlically defective:
869; Phi llips v. Car ver (1898), 99 Wis. Nye v. Bill Nye Min. Co. (1903), 42 Ore .
.56 1, 75 N. W. 432; Winkler v. Hacine 560, 71 Pac. 104-3. Compare Gustin v.
Wagon, etc. Co. (1898), 99 W is. 184, 74 Conco rdia In . Co. (1901 ), 164 Mo. li2,
6-1 s. w. 128.
N. W . 973.
A plead in g attacked for the first time
When objection is made for the fir t
iu the Supreme Co ur t on the ground that time on the trial that the complaint does
it does not state a cause of action, will be not tate facts constituting a cause of
l iberally constrned: Omaha Nat. Bank v . action, the plead ing will be sustained if
Kiper (1900) , 60 Neb. 33, 82 N. W . 102; .possible: Johnston v. Spencer (1897), 51
Fowler v. P hoon ix In s. Co. (1899), 35 Ore. Neb. 198, 70 N. W. 982; Chicago, Burling559, 57 Pac. 42 1 ; Roseb urg Ry . Co. v. ton, etc. R.R . Co. v. Spirk ( 1897), 51 Neb.
Nosler (1900), 37 Ore. 299, 60 Pac. 904. 167, 70 N. W . 926; Peterson i·. Ilopewell
See also F irst Nat . Bank v. Tom pkins (1898), 55 Neb. 670, 76 N. W. 451; Butts
(1903), - Neb. - , 94 N. W . 717.
i·. Killgmau & Co. (1900), 60 Neb. 224, 2
When a complaint is attacked after N. W. 854; Anderson v. Alseth (1 95), 6
j udgment for want of facts to state a cau e
. D. 566, 62 . W. 435 ; Whitbeck v.
of action, it must be liberally constrned: Sees (1898), 10 S. D. 417, 73 N. W. 915;
Mosher v. Bruhn (1896); 15 Wash. 332, Broyhill v. Norton (1903), 175 ~lo. 190, 74
46 Pac. 397; Cobb v. Lindell Ry. Co. S. W. 1024; Seibert v. l\linneapoli ~, et<'.
(1899), 149 Mo. 135, 50 S. W. 310; Mer- Ry. Co. (189-1), 58 Minn. 39, 59 N. W. 822;
r ill v. Equitable Farm & Stock, etc. Cb. Commonwealth Title Ins. Co. v. Dokko
(18,96), 49 Neb. 198, 68 N. W. 365; Ameri- (1898), 71 Minn. 533, 71 N. W. 8!) 1.
<:an Fire Ins. Co. v. Landfare ( 1898), 56
When objections are made to the introNeb. 4 2, 76 N. W . 1068. A decree for duction of evidence on the ground that the
plaintiff will cure t.he inadYertent omission petition fails to state a cause of action,
of the word "not" in a complaint: vVyatt the pleading will be liberally construed:
v. Wyatt (1897 ), 31 Ore. 5.31, 49 Pac. 855. Zug v. Forgan (1902), Neb., 90 N. W.
See al o Montesano v. Blair (1895), 12 1129; Fire Ass'n of Philadelphia v. Ruby
Wash. 188, 40 I'ac. 731; State ex rel. i:. (1900), 60 reb. 216, 82 N. W. 629; Norfolk
Renshaw (1902), 166 Mo. 682, 66 S. \V . Beet Sugar Co. v. Ilight (1898), 56 Neb.
953; Mil ner v. Harris (1903), eb. - , 162, 76 N. W. 566.
Under the li beral rule of con tructiou
95 N. W. 682.
Imperfect allegations have frequently the word "wages" wa · con trued as
been held to be aided by verdict or juclg- though it r ad" damage " when the latter
ment. See Hall v. Southern Pac. Co. should ha"e been u ed: Tiffin Gia Co. v.
( 1899), Ariz., 57 Pac. 617; A<'lesv.Levi Stoehr (l 96), 54 0. t. 157, 43 N. E.
( l 93), 137 Ind. 506, 37 N. E. 388; Philo- 279; the word "pain'' wa con true<l to
math v. In g le ( 1902), 41 Ore. 289, 68 Pac. mean "paid : " Coimor 1·. Becker ( 1901 ),
803 ; Cl1an Si ug v. City of Portland ( 1900), 62 Neb. 856, Si X. W . l OG5 ; the eom plaint
38
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expressly declared that the construction must be adverse to the

pleader, thus recognizing the ancient rule as still in force ;^

xpre ly 1 clared tha the con tructi n mu t b ad
o the
till
m
for
·1
lea ler thu recognizing th an i nt rul a

and reply were read togetlier to determiue

the intent of tlie pleader : Lavery v. Arnold

(18J9), 36 Ore. 84, 58 Pac. 524 ; " where a

complaint contains words which, if properly

arrangcMl, might state two causes of action,

it will be construed as stating only the one

principally intended : " Santa Fe, etc. Ky.

Co. r. Hurley (1894), Ariz., 36 Pac. 216;

where a complaint may be treated as set-

ting out a cause of action either ex con-

tractu or ex delicto, anil the action would

be barred if treated as ex delicto, it will be

treated as ex contractu : St. Louis, etc. R. R.

Co. V. Sweet (1897), 63 Ark. 563, 40 S. W.

463 ; the words " entered into " were con-

strued to equal " executed," and the alle-
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gation of the execution of a bond was

held to include the performance of every

act essential to the making and approval

of the bond : Fire Ass'n of Pliiladelphia v.

Ruby (1900), 60 Neb. 216, 82 N. \V. 629;

an allegation that a child was six years of

age, held to include an allegation tliat said

child was unmarried, in an action for the

death of an unmarried minor diild : Baird

V. Citizens' Ry. Co. (1898), 146 Mo. 265,

48 S. W. 78; facts not conclusions control

in construction of pleading: Spargur v.

Komine (1893), 38 Neb. 736, 57 N. W. .523 ;

where it is not clear whether the action is

legal or equitable, it should be so con-

stru<^d as to maintain the jurisdiction of

tlie court: Adams v. Hayes (1897), 120

N. C. 383, 27 S. Iv 47 ; a pleading in the

form of an indictment will be considered

as a complaint if the necessary facts are

alleged : St. Louis, etc. K. R. Co. v. State

(1901), 68 Ark. 561, 60 S. W. 654.

The Supreme Court of Missouri, in the

case of Hood v. Nicholson (1896), 137 Mo.

400, 38 S. W. 1095, used the following

language resrecting the limits applicable

to the liberal construction of pleadings ;

" Courts, to prevent delays and avoid hard-

ships, will disregard all defects in plead-

ings whicl) do not affect the substantial

rights of the adverse party, and will dis-

regard form and look to the substance and

at all times give .such interpretation to

language used iis fairly appears to have

been intended by its author; yet it is not

authorized to rob, by construction, lan-

guage of its plain and obvious moaning, or

of the fair, reasonable, and obvious conclu-

sion to be deduced therefrom, to enable its

author to relieve himself from a position of

embarrassment wliere by its use he has

voluntarily placed himself."

In Chicago, etc. R. R. Co. r. Haywood

(1897), 102 la. 392, 71 N. W. 358, the court

said : " Where the right of recovery is based

upon a written contract, as in tliis case, and

the averment of facts constituting another

cause of action is necessary to bring the

remedy sought within the terms of the con-

tract, then it will be assumed that only

ant! r ply were read together to deter mine
the inLeut of the pleader: Lav r u. Arn old
( l 9), 36 re. 4, 5 Pa . 524 · "wher a
complaintcout· in word which, if properly
arranaed, might tate two cau e of action,
it will be ou tru tl a tatina onl the ne
principally intended:" anta
tc. Ry.
o. t'. Hurley (1 94). Ariz., 36 Pac. 216;
where a mplaiut may be treated as ettiug out a ca e f actio::i either x conlmctu or ex delicto, and the a tion would
be han-ed if treated a ex delicto it will be
tre:ltetl ex contractu: 't. Loui , etc. R.R.
, o. v. "eet (1 97), 63 Ark. 563, 40 •. W.
. rn.3 ; the wor(l " entered into" were on· trued to equal " executed," and the allegation of the execution of a bond wa
hel<l to include the performance of every
act e ential to the making and approval
uf the bond: Fire A 'u of Philadelphia v.
Ruby (1900), 60 eb. 216 2 . W. 629;
an alleaation that a child wa ix year of
ao-e, held to include an all gation that. aid
hild wa unmarried, in au ac ion for the
death of an unmarried minor child : Baird
'L'. C'itizeu ' R y.
o. {l 9 ), 146 Io. 265,
4 '. W. 7 ; fact not conclu ion· ontrol
in r:o11 truction Of pl ading: pargur L' .
Homine (1 93}, 3 ,.'eb. 736, 57 °N. W. 523;
where it i not lear wheth r the action i
legal or equitable, it hould be . o c n·
. 1w~d a to maintain the juri diction of
tlte court: Adarn v . Hay e (1 97), 120
J.· . C. 3 3, 27 '. E. 47; apl ading in the
. f 1rm of an indi ctm nt will be con idered
a a. complaint if the nece ar y fact are
alleged: t. Loui , tc. K R. o. v. tate
(1901),6 Ark.5 61,60 .W.654.
The upreme ,ourt of 1i ouri, in the
ca e f Hood v. ichol on (t 96), 137 Mo.
400, 3 , . W. 1095, used the following
language re ecting the limit applicable
to the liberal on. tru tion of pl ading :
" Court , to prevent delay and avoid hardf'hip , will di regard all defect in pleadiug. which do not affe t the ub tantial
right of the ad,·er e party, and will di
regard form and look to the ub tanc and
a. all time give . u h interpr t, tion t
lan,,.uage u. ed a fairly appear to have
l1ePn intewled by it: author ; y t it i not
autlwrized to rob, IJy on tructioa, lan-

guage of it lain and bviou: m aning, or
of the fair, rea onable, and obYiou
u Inion to be deduc d th r from, to nable it
author to relieve him elf from a po iti n of
embarra m nt wh re by it u e he ba
volu ntarily placed him elf."
In hicago tc. R. R. Co. v. B ayw od
( l 97), 102 Ia. 392, 71
. W . 35 , the court
said: "\Vhere the right of recoY ry i ba ed
upou a written contract, a in thi:; ca e, and
the averment f fact ou tituting au ther
cau e of action i nece ar • to brina the
remedy ought within the term of the ontract, then it will be a urned that nly
one cau e of action w intended. In ther
word , partie are pre urned to follow the
r equirement f tatut in preparing their
pleading and a sino-le count r divi ion
of a petition will not be con tru d o tate
two cau e of a tion unle the purpo e of
the pleader o to do clearly appear
1 Commonwealth u. Cook,
Bu ·h 220,
224; Wright v. McCormick, 67 N. . 27.
And ee Roger v. hannon, 52 Cal. 99 ;
Henley u. \\ il on, 77 N. C. 216 (commonlaw rule applied; ambiguon language
stricLly con trued aga.in ·t tue pleader;
no inten<lm nt iu hi favor); Jaffe v. Lilienthal, 6 al. 91 ; Loehr v. Murphy, 4f>
Mo. App. 519 .
[I n th followina ca.e it i heltl hat
th pleading are to be on tru d mo t
trongly aaain t the pleader : May 11.
arman ( 1902), Ky., 66
. W. 1019;
Fri nd v. Allen (1900), K >., 56 . W . 41 ;
off v. ~far den o. (1900), Ky., 56,. W .
66 7 ; Fox v. 1\lackey (1 99). 125 al. 54,
57 ac. 672; alifornia avigation o. v.
nion Tran p. o. (1 9 ), I 22 al. 641,
55 I ac. 59 1; i ki on Lumber
. i.
Ro tel (19),121 al. 511 53 Pac. 111 ;
Heller v. D ·erville Hg. o. ( 1 97) 116
al. 127 , 4 7 ac. 1016; Callahan v . L u hrau (l 94), 102 al. 476, 36 Pac. 35 (but
ee In raham v. yon (I 94) 10
al.
254, 3 Pa . 92, where the liberal vi w i
announced); Holt v. Pear n (1 95), I Z
tah 63, 41 Pac. 56 (ex pr ly v rrul d
in fangum v. Bullion, tc. o. (1 97)
15 ,.tah, 5.'34, 5 Pac. 34); J ohn ton 1: .
[ arr)u (I
7 , 14 ·tah, 426, 47 Pa . 61,
holding that, n d murrer, pleading ar
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while in some others the judicial action was clearly based upon

that old doctrine, although it was not formally announced in the

opinions. 1 Under the light of this beneficent but new principle,

that pleadings are to be construed fairly, equitably, and liberally,

with a view to promote the ends of justice, and not enforce any

arbitrary and technical dogmas, I shall proceed to consider, in

the order already indicated, the several practical rules mentioned

above, which regulate the manner of setting forth the cause of

action or the defence.

§ 442. * 548. I. InsufiBcient, Imperfect, Incomplete, or Informal

Allegations, and the Mode of Objecting to and Correcting them.

Distinction between Imperfect and wholly Deficient Allegations.

The codes clearly intend to draw a broad line of distinction

between an entire failure to state any cause of action or defence,

while in me otb rs th ju<licial acti n wa 1 arly bas d upon
that old d trine, alth ugh it ' as n t formally announ d in the
opinion . 1 Un<ler the light f tbi · b n fie nt but n w principl
that pleading are t be c n tru d fairly, qui ta ly and lib rally,
with a vi w to l romote th nd ' of ju ' tic , and not nforce any
arbitrary and t chnical dogmas, I shall procee l to
nsicler, in
the ord r alr ady in licatecl, th sev ral practical rules m ntion d
above, which r gulate the manner of setting forth the cau e of
action or the clef nee.
§ 442. * 5-± • I. Insufficient, Imperfect, Incomplete, or Informal

on the one side, which is to be taken advantage of either by the

general demurrer for want of sufficient facts, or by the exclusion

of all evidence at the trial, and the statement of a cause of action

or a defence in an insufficient, imperfect, incomplete, or informal

manner, which is to be corrected by a motion to render the
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pleading more definite and certain by amendment. The courts

have, in the main, endeavored to preserve this distinction, but

not always with success ; since averments have sometimes been

treated as merely incomplete, and the pleadings containing them

have been sustained on demurrer, which appeared to state no

cause of action or defence whatever; while, in other instances,

pleadings have been pronounced wholly defective and therefore

bad on demurrer, or incajDable of admitting any evidence, the

allegations of which appear to have been simply imperfect or

incomplete. It is undoubtedly difficult to discriminate between

to be construed most strongly against the Co. (1900), 24 Mont. 178, 61 Pac. i;

pleader, but, after trial, in the pleader's Fidelity & Casualty Co. d. Vandyke (1896),

favor ; Oregon & Cal. R. R. Co. v. Jack- 99 Ga.'542, 27 S. E. 709.

sou County (1901), 38 Ore. 589, 64 Pac. In Blumenthal v. Pacific Meat Co.

.307, holding that, when tested by demur- (1895), 12 Wash. 331, 41 Pac. 47, the

rer, the allegations of a pleadiug are to court seems to favor a somewhat strict

be construed most .strongly against tlie construction when the pleading is attacked

]ilea(ler, but after pleading over all in- by motion or demurrer.^

tendments must be indulged in favor of i For examples, see Hathaway v.

its sufficiency ; Mellott y. Downing (1901), Quinby, 1 N. Y. S. C. 386; Doyle v.

39 Ore. 218, 64 Pac. 393 (to the same Phcenix Ins. Co., 44 Cal. 264; Scofield

effect); Patterson v. Patterson (1902), 40 v. Whitelegge, 49 N. Y. 259, 261 ; Holmes

Ore. 560, 67 Pac. 664 (to same effect); y. Williams," 1 6 .Minn. 164, 168.

Allegations, and the Mode of Objecting to and Correcting them.
Distinction between Imperfect and wholly Deficient Allegations.

The code clearly intend to draw a broad line of di tinction
between an entire failure to state any cause of action or def nee,
on the one side, which is to be taken advantage of either by th
general demurrer for want of ufficient facts, or by the exclu ion
f all evidence at the trial, and the statement of a cause of action
or a lefence in an insufficient, imperfect, incomplete, or informal
manner, which is to be corrected by a motion to render the
pleading more definite and certain by amendment. The courts
have, in the main, endeavored to preserve this distinction, but
not always with success; since averments have sometimes been
treated as merely incomplete, and the pleadings containing them
have been sustained on demurrer, which appeared to state no
cause of action or defence whatever; while, in other instances,
pleadings have been pronounced wholly defective and therefore
bad on demurrer, or incapable of admitting any evidence, the
allegations of which appear to have been simply imperfect or
incomplete. It is undoubtedly difficult to discriminate between

Conrad Nat. Bank i\ Great Northern Ry.

to be construed most stl'ongly against the
pleader, but, after trial, in the pleader's
favor; Oregon & Cal. R. R. Co. v. Jackson County {1901), 38 Ore. 589, 64 Pac.
307, holding that, when tested by demurr er, the allegations of a pleading are to
lie construed mo t strongly against the
])le:.tcler, but aftel' pleading over all in tendments must be indulged in favor of
its sufficiency; Mellott v. Downing (1901),
39 Ore. 218, 64 Pac. 3()3 (to the ame
effect) ; Patterson v. Patterson (1902), 40
Ore. 560, 67 Pac. 664 (to same effect);
omad Nat. Bauk r. Great Northern Hy.

Co. (1900), 24 Mont. 178, 61 Pac. 1 ;
Fidelity & Casualty Co. v. Vandyke (1896),
99 Ga. 542, 2i ·. E. 709.
In Blumenthal v. Pacific Meat Co.
(1 895), 12 Wash. 331, 41 Pac. 47, the
court eems to fan>r a omewhat strict
construction when the pleading is attacked
by motion or demurrer.]
l For
example ,
ee Hathaway v.
Quin by, 1 N. Y . ._ . . 3 6; Doyle v.
Pham ix Ins. Co., 44
al. 264; ._ cofield
v. \Vhitel egge, 49 N. Y. 2f>9, 261; Holme
v. William , IG ~lion . 164, 16 .
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these two conditions of partial and of total failure; and it is

utterly impossible to frame any accurate general formula which

shall define or describe the insufficiency, incompleteness, or ini-

perfectness of averment intended by the codes, and shall embrace

all the possible instances within its terms. B}- a comparison of

the decided cases, some notion, however, may be obtained of the

distinction, recognized if not definitely established by the courts,

between the absolute deficiency which renders a pleading bad on

demurrer or at the trial, and the incompleteness or imperfection

of allegation which exposes it to amendment by motion; and in

this manner alone can any light be thrown upon the nature of

the insufficiency which is the subject of the present inquiry.

§ 443. * 549. Motion the Proper Method of Attackins Pleadings

which are merely Imperfect. The true doctrine to be gathered

from all the cases is, that if the substantial facts which constitute

a cause of action are stated in a complaint or petition, or can be

inferred by reasonable intendment from the matters M'hich are

set forth, although the allegations of these facts are imperfect,

incomplete, and defective, such insufficiency pertaining, how-
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ever, to the form rather than to the substance, the proper mode

of correction is not by demurrer, nor by excluding evidence at

the trial, but by a motion before the trial to make the averments

more definite and certain by amendment.^ From the citations in

1 People V. Ryder, 12 X. Y. 43.3 ; Prin- v. Hall, 43 Cal. 191 (objection that a coni-

dle V. Caruthers, 15 N. Y. 425; Flauders plaint is ambiguous cannot be rai.scd

V. McVickar, 7 Wis. 372, 377 ; Kobson v. under a general demurrer) ; Blasdel v.

Comstocli, 8 Wis. 372, 374, 375; Kuehn Williams, 9 Nev. 161; Smith v. Dennett,

V. Wilson, 13 Wis. 104, 107, 108; Morse c. 15 Minn. 81; Lewis c. Edwards, 44 Ind.

Oilman, 16 Wis. 504, 507 ; Kimball iv Dar- 33;5, 336; Snowden i'. Wiias, 19 Ind. 10;

ling, 32 Wis. 675, 684 ; Keeve v. Fraker, Lane v. Miller, 27 Ind. 534 ; Johnson

32 Wis. 243; Hazleton v. Union Bk. of v. Kol)insoD, 20 Minn. 189, 192; Mills

Columbus, 32 Wis. 34, 42, 43; Horn i-. v. Rice, 3 Neb. 76, 86, 87; School Trs. r.

Ludin<j;ton, 23 Wis. 81, 83 (a motion made Odlin, 8 Ohio St. 293, 296. A (juotation

and granted, — a good illustration of de- from a few of these cases will show the

of partial and o£ t tal failur ; ancl it i
o fram any a curate g n ral formula whi l
crib th i1 uffici n y, in rnpleten
r irn of aY rm nt in n 1 1 by t.h otl
and ball mbra
ible
within it t rm . By a com1, ri · n of
m n ti n h we er ma - be obtain d £ th
cli tin ion reco 0 nize l if n t 1 finitel
t::ibli h cl by th
urts,
b tw n th ab olute l ficiency which r ncler a pleac.1in 0 b l on
d mmrer or at the trial an l th incornpl t ne '
r imperf ction
f alle ·ation which expo
it to amendm nt by motion; and m
thi manner alone can any li ht be thrown upon the nature f
th in uffi ci n y wbich i::s th ubject f th e pre ent inquir .
§ 4 43 . * 5-±9. Motion the P rope r M eth od of Atta cking P l e a dings
which are merely I mperfect. The true d ctrine t
ga h r cl
from all th ca e i , tha.t if the substantial facts which n titute
a au e of action are stated in a complaint or petiti n, or can be
inferre l by reasonable intendrnent from the matters whi h are
et fo rth, although the all gations of these facts a.re imp rfect
incomplete and defectiv , uch insuffi iency pertaining, hen ver to the form rather than to he s ib tance, the proper mode
f correction i not by demurrer, nor by xcluding
id n e at
th rial but by a motion before the trial to make the a erm nt
more definite and certain by amendm nt. 1 From the cita ion in
h '

fective allegations added to); Clay v. exact position taken by the courts in refer-

Edgerton, 19 Ohio St. 549 ; Winter v. ence to the extent of defect which can

Winter, 8 Nev. 129 (statement of a ma- and must be cured by motion ; and I select

terial fact by way of recital); Saulslniry from among tho.se which have discussed

/•. Alexamler, .50 Mo. 142, 144 ; Corpenny the sul)ject in the most general manner.

V. Sedalia, 57 Mo. 88 (a motion in arrest In Prindle v. Caruthers, 15 N. Y. 425, the

of judgment not proper when a cause complaint set out a copy of a written

of action is stated however defectively); contract made by defendant, and reciting

Pomeroy v. Benton, 57 Mo. 531, 550; that, "for value received," he " promised

Hale c.Omaha Nat. Bank, 49 N. Y. 626, to i)ay II. C. or E. C," etc.; but it did

6.30; 15artiiol v. Blakin, 34 Iowa, 452; not, in any other manner, allege a con-

liussell c. Mixer, 42 Cal. 47.'); Mattery sideration. It also stated that "the cou-

1 People v. Ryder, 12 ~. Y. 433 ; Prindl v. Caruther· , 15 N. Y. 425; :Flander
v. i\fc ickar, 7 \Vi . 372, 371 · Rob on v.
'om tock,
Wi . 372, 3/4, 375; Kuehn
v. Wil on, 13 Wi. 104, 107, 10 ; Ior ev .
ilman, 16 \Vi · . 504, 507; Kimba11 v. I a rling 32 Wi . 675, 6 4; HeeYe v. Fraker,
32 \Vi
243; Hazleton v. -r nion Bk. of
olumbu::;, 32 ' i . 34, 42, 43; IIoru z:.
Ludin gto n, 2 Wi . 1, 83 (a motion mad
and granted, - a good illu. tration of <le-

fecti 1·e allegations added to) ; lay .
E<lgertou, 19
hio , 't. 549; \Y int r v.
\Viu ter,
~ev. 12 . ( tatement
f a material fact by way of re ·ital); aul;;bury
r. Alexa111ler, :10 .\Io. 14-2, 1+4; 'orp•nny
11• • e lalia, 57 .\Io.
(a motion in , rre:t
uf ju1l1rment not prop r wh n , "au ·e
of a ctiu11 i: "tatcil how 1"r cl ·f '"ti\' l.v ) ;
J'ornnov !'. n utou, 57
lo. 531, 550;
Hal e 1 .·Omaha Nat. Bank, 4 .T. Y. 26,
:w; Barthol v. Blaki11, :3-1- Iowa, 452;
l u.. <'11 v . .\lixer, 4~ 'al. +i.i; , la L r

v. Hall, 43 al. 19 1 (objection that a oruplaint i ambiguou cannot be rai d
un d r n general demurrer ); Bla del
William , 9 Nev. 161; mith v. D nn tt,
1 .\liun. l; Lewi v. Edward. , 44 l1Hl.
333, 336; n wden v. vYila, 19 Jn I. 10;
Lane t'. Mill r , 27 I nd. 534; J lrn on
i-. Hobin on
20 l\linn. l 9, 192; l\lill
i-. Rice, 3 1' b. 76, 6,
7; t:hoo l Tr . r.
tll in, Ohio t. 293, 296. A quotati 11
from a few f the e ca
will . h w the
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the foot-note, it is clear that the courts have, with a considerable

degree of unanimity, agreed upon this rule, and have in most

th f
(lcgr

t -n t , it is cl ar that th c urt · hav with a con id rahl
£ unanimity, agr l upon thi' rul , aml hav m mo t

tract is, and was prior to, etc., the property

'of the plaintiff by purchase," but did not

disclose from whom the transfer was

made, nor the consideration. The de-

fendant demurrin<r for want of sufficient

facts, the court held that the copy of the

contract as set fortli contained a sufficient

allegation of a consideration, and added :

" The remedy for all defects of this

nature is by motion to make the faulty

pleading more definite and certain ; that

])roceeding has taken the place of demur-

rers for want of form." liobson v. Com-

stock, 8 Wis. 372, waa an action for

malicious prosecution. The complaint

merely alleged that the defendant, mali-
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ciously and without probal)le cause, pro-

cured the plaintiff to be arrested and to

be imprisoned, to his damage, etc., but did

not state the nature of the indictment,

nor in what the charge consisted, nor

even that it was false, nor that there had

been a trial, nor that the plaintiff had

been discharged or acquitted. The de-

fendant answered by a general denial;

and, at the trial, the plaintiff had a ver-

dict. On appeal from the judgment, the

court, by Cole J., held (pp. 374, S?.")) that

the complaint was exceedingly defective

and informal in its manner of setting out

the cause of action ; but it was cured

by the verdict. The plaintiff must have

jnoved a discharge or acquittal, or else

he could not have obtained a verdict.

The code requires a liberal construction ;

and the defendant should have moved

that the pleading be made definite and

certain by supplying the omitted aver-

ments. In Morse v. Gilmau, 16 Wis. 1)04,

tlie complaint alleged that defendant

entered into a written contract with one

Merrick for grading at a specified price

per cubic yard ; that the work had

been completed by M. according to the

agreement ; that there was due thereon

a certain named, sum ; and that the de-

mand had been assigned by M. to the

plaintiff ; but it did not to any further

extent state the provisions of the contract.

At the trial, all evidence on the part of

the plaintiff was excluded, and the com-

plaint was dismissed. In reversing this

ruling, the court, by Dixon C. J., said

(p. .')07): "That the contract between M.

and the defendant is not set out, as it

undoubtedly sliould have been, is not an

objection which can be taken in this way.

'I'he remedy of the defendant for this de-

fect is by motion to require the complaint

to be made more definite and certain

by amendment. A complaint to be over-

thrown by demurrer, or by objection to

evidence, must be wholly insufficient. If

any portion of it, or to any extent it pre-

sents facts sufl[icient to constitute a cause

of action, or if a good cause of action caii

ruling, the onrt, hy J)ixon
. J., said
(p. 507): "That Lh' ('Olltraet betw e11 :\!.
dis ·lo e from whom the transfer was aud th dC'f>i1clant iH 11ot ·et out, a iL
nirtcl , n r the consid rati on. The tl - uncl ouhtcd ly r-;honlcl hnve been, i not an
fe ndant d murri11g for want of sufficient obj cti n which C"a11 b tak n in this way.
faC"tH, th ourt held that the copy of t h
Th remedy of th <lefcndaut for thiH deco ntra t a· ct forth contained a ·uffici nL f ct is Ly motion to require the complaint
allegation f a consideration, and adcled: to Le made more tlcfinitc and certain
" Th e r medy for all defects of this by amendm nt. .A complaint to be ov r11ature i by motion to make the faulty thrown by demurrer, or by objection to
pleading more definite and certain; that evid nee, must be wholly insufficient. If
pr eeediug ha taken the place of demur- any portion of it, or to any xtent it prerers for want of form." Hob on v. Com- sent facts sufficient to constitute a cau. e
stock, 8 Wi s. 3i2, was an action for of aC'tion, or if a good cau. c of action ca·u
ma licious prosecution. Th e complaint be gathered from it, it will stand, howm erely alleged that the defendant, mali- eYer in artifi cially the. e fact may be preciously and without probable cau ·e, proeuted, or how ver de£ectiYe, uncertain,
cured the plain t iff to Le arrested and to or redundant may be the mode of thei r
be impri oned, to hi - damage, etc., but did t reatm ent. Contrary to the common-law
not state the nature of th e indi ctment, ruie, eve ry reasonable intendment and
nor in what the charge consisted , nor presumption is to be made in fa\•or of the
even that it was false, nor that t here had pleading; and it will not be et aside on
oeen a t ri al, nor that the plaintiff had de murrer nnl ss it be so fatally defective,
Leen di charged or acquitted. Th e de- that, taking all th e facts to be admitted,
fe ndant an swered by a general denial ; the court can say they fnrni h no cause
and, at th e tri al, the plaintiff had aver- of action whatever ;" citin g and approvdict . On appeal from the judg lll ent, the ing Cudlipp v. Whippi e, 4 Duer, 610 ;
co urt, by Cole J., held (pp. 374, 3 75) that Graham u. Cam man , 5 Duer, 697; Broderthe complaint was exceedin g ly d efective ick v. Poillon, 2 E. D. Sm ith, 554; Elfrank
and informal in its mann er of setting out v. Seiler, 54 Mo. 134; Rn sell v. State In .
the cause of actio!l ; but it was cured Co., 55 Mo. 585; Biddle v. Ham ey, 52
by the verdict. The plaintj.ff mu t have Mo. 153. The court, in Mill t•. Hice,
proved a discharge or acquittal, or el e 3 Neb. 76, 86, 87, said that when a
he co uld not have obtain ed a verdict. pet ition is un cer tain or ind efinite in its
The code req uire a li beral conf't ruction ; all egations, wh en it attempts to set up
and th e defendant should have mov ed a good cause of action, but the defect
that the plead ing be made definite and does not go to the lengt h of omitting to
ce rtain by supplyin g t he omitted aver- state any cau e of action, th defendant
ments. In Mor el'. Gilman, 16 Wis. 504, mu t move to correct ; he canuot take
th e complaint alleged that defendant ad\'antage of it by demurrer. The fo lentered into a written contract with one lowing cases are additional example , and
Merrick for grading at a specified price they generally sustain the di tinction
per cubi c yard; that the work had stat d in the text and the rule there laid
been completed by M. according to the down . Ball v. Fn)ton Cy., 3 l r\ rk. 379 (the
agreement; that there was due thereon ruk of the text, § ;;c !i49, quoted, approved,
a certain nam ed sum ; and that the de- and followed); Kalckhoff '" Zoehrlaut, 40
mand had been assigned by M. to the Wi s. 427 ; Lash 1J. hri Lie, 4 Neb. 262;
plain tiff; but it did not to any forth& ,_urginer v. I'aclclock, 31 Ark. 52 ; Aull
extent state the provi ions of the contract. t'. .Jone , 5 Neb. 500; Farrar v. Triplet,
At the t rial, all eYidence on the part of 7 id . 237; Dor,ey u. Ifoll, 7 icl. 460; tate
the plain t iff was excluded, and the com- v. orth. Belle 1\lin. o., 15 Te\'. 3 5;
plaint was dism issed. In r ever sin g this Coon Di ·t. Tp. v. Providence Di t. Tp.
tra('(. i , and wn prior to, etc., the prop rty

'of the plaintiff by purcha e," but did not

59

CIVIL REMEDIE •

598 CIVIL REMEDIES.

instances applied it to defects and mistakes having the same

general features, and have sometimes severely strained the doc-

trine of liberal construction in order to enforce it. Thus, if

instead of alleging the issuable facts the pleader should state the

evidence of such facts, or even a portion onlj- thereof, unless

the omission was so extensive that no cause of action at all was

indicated, or if he should aver conclusions of law, in place of

fact, the resulting insutficiency and imperfection would pertain

to the form rather than to the substance, and the mode of cor-

rection would be by a motion, and not by a demurrer. It is

virtually impossible, however, to lay down a dividing-line, so

that on the one side shall fall all the errors which are venial, and

on the other all those which are fatal. While in most instances

the courts have held that a motion is the only means of removing

the defect, and therefore that a neglect to make a motion waives

all objection without any reference to the stage of the cause, yet

in some cases a considerable stress has been laid upon the effect

of a verdict in curing the error. ^ And in certain decisions the

language of the judges tends to create an unnecessary confusion,
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and to incorporate an additional element of doubt into the rule,

Dir , 52 Iowa, 287 ; XlcCormick v. Basal, called for trial) ; Sukforth /;. Lord, 87 Cal.

46 id. 235 ; Bradley c. I'arkhurst, 20 Kan. 399 ; Bush v. Cella, 52 Ark. 378 ; Sweet v.

462; Walter v. Fowler, 85 N. Y. 621; Desha Lumber, etc. Co. (Arl:. 1892), 20

Marie c Garrison, 83 id. 14, 23; Calvo r. S. W. Rep. 514; Newport Light Co. v.

Davies, 73 id. 211 ; Raster v. Raster, 52 Newport (Ry. 1892), 19 S. W. Kep. 188;

Ind. 531 ; BrookviUe & C, Turnp. Co. v. Sheeks v. Krwin, 130 lud. 31 ; De Hart i-.

Pumphrey, 59 id. 78 ; U. S. Expre.ss Co. v. Etuire, 121 Ind. 242 ; Cockerill v. i?tafford,

Reefer. 59 id. 263; Evansville v. Thayer, 102 Mo. 571.

59 id. 324; Pennsylvania Co. v. Sedwick, i See Robson v. Comstock, 8 Wis. 372,

i1rtance applied it to lefect::; and mi tak s ha\ing the ame
general featur
and ha e sometim s ·ever 1 trained h doctrine of liberal con truction in order to enforc , it. Thu if
in teacl of alle ing the i uable fact· the pleader hould ·tate the
e idence of such fac
or e en a por ion only thereof, unl
the omi 10n wa' o xten ive that n cau e 0£ ac ion at all \Ya
indicate or if be hould aver conclusions of law, in place of
fact the resulting in ufficiency and imperfecti on would per ain
to the form rather than to the sub tance, and the mode of correction would be by a motion and not by a demurrer. It i
vir uall; im po sible, h owever, to lay down a dividing-line o
that on the one ide ball fall all the errors which are venial, and
n the other all those which are fatal. 'While in mo t instance,
the cour have held that a motion i the only mean of removin g
tbe defect, and therefore that a neglect to make a motion waiYe
all objection without any reference to the stage of the cau
yet
in ome ca es a con iderable stress has been laid upon the effect
f a verdict in curing the error. 1 And in certain deci ion the
language of the judge tend to create an unnece sary confu ion
and to incorpora e an additional element of doubt into the rul

59 id. 336 ; Rees v. Cupp, 59 id. 566 ; Shaw 374, 375 ; Hazleton v. Union Bk. of Colum-

V. Merchants' Nat. Bk., 60 id. 83 ; Boyce bus, 32 Wis. 34, 42, 43 ; Clay v. Edgerton,

r. Brady, 61 id. 432; Sebbitt v. Stryker, 19 Ohio St. 549 ; Saulsbury r. Alexander,

62 id. 41 ; Barrett v. Leonard, 66 id. 422; 50 Mo. 142, 144; Corpenny v. Sedalia, 57

Wiles V. Lambert, 66 id. 494; Proctor r. Mo. 88; Pomeroy r. Benton, 57 Mo. 531,

Cole, 66 id. 576; Dale v. Thomas, 67 5.50; Blasdel c' Williams, 9 Nev. 161;

id. 570; Earle v. Patterson, 67 id. 503; Smith v. Dennett, 15 Minn. 81. In Mis-

Milroy v. Quinn, 69 id. 406 ; Lee r. Davis, souri, and in a few other States, a motion

70 id. 464; Smith v. Freeman, 71 id. 229; in arrest of judgment is permitted by the

Trayser Piano Co. v. Kerschner, 73 id. practice under some circumstances, and

183; Ohio & Miss. R. Co. v. CoUarn, the above cases, cited from that State, hold

73 id. 261; Snyder t-. Baber, 74 id. 47; that such a motion is not proper when the

Gentz V. Martin, 75 id. 228; Drais r. petition is simply defective and imperfect

Hogan, 50 Cal. 121 ; Jameson v. Ring, 50 in its statement of the cause of action, and

id. 132; Lo.s Angeles v. Signoret, 50 id. should only be made when it wholly fails

298; St. Louis & S. F. Ry. Co. v. Snave- to set forth any cause of action ; the mere

ley, 47 Kan. 637 (motion generally too imperfection is cured by the verdict,

late wlien not made until after the case is

Dir , 52 Iowa, 2 7 ; ·M:cCormick v. Ba al,
46 id . 235; Bradley u. Parkhur t, 20 K an.
462; Walter v. Fowler, 85 .. . Y. 621;
)farie r. Garri~on, 3 id. J 4 23; Calvo v .
a,· je ~ , 73 id. 211 ; Kaster v. Ka ter 52
Ind. 531; Broohille & C, Turnp. Co. v.
Pumphrey, 59 id. 7 ; . . Expre Co. v.
Keefer. 59 id. 263 ; Evan Yille v. Thayer,
59 i1l. 32+; Penn ylvania Co. v. edw ick,
59 id. 3.'36 ; Ree t·. upp, 59 id. 566; haw
v . ~lerchant ' Sat. Bk. 60 id. 83; B oyce
v. Brady, 61 iJ. -t.3:2; ebbitt v. t ryker,
62 id . 41 ; Barrett v. Leonard , 66 id. 422;
Wile t•. Lambert, 66 id. 494 ; Proctor v.
Cole, 66 id. 576 ; Dale v. Thoma , 67
id. 570; Earle v. Patter"on , 67 id. 503;
Milroy v. uinn, 69 id. 406 ; L ee v. DaYi ~ ,
70 id. 464; mith v. Freemau, 71 id. 229;
Tray ·er Piano Co. v. Ker chner, 73 id.
I 3;
hio & I i . R.
o. v.
ollarn,
73 id. 261; , nyder v. Baber, 74 id. 47;
entz v. Martin, 75 id. 22 ; I rai v.
Hogan, 50 Cal. 121 ; J ame on v. Kin g, 50
id. 132; Lo. Angele v. ignoret, 50 id.
29 ; • t. Loui & , . F . Ry. o. v. nave) y, 47 K an . 63i (motion gen rally too
J:ite wh ~ n not made until after the ra e i

called fo r trial);

ukforth

Lord, 7 al.
weet L'.
De ha Lumber, etc. Co. (A rk . 1 92), 20
. W. R ep. 514; :rewport Li o-ht o. 1·.
Newport (Ky. l 92) 19 ' . W. Hep. l ;
beeks v. Erwin, 130 Ind. 31 ; De [fart v.
Etnire, 121 Ind. 242; Cockerill v. taffor<l,
102 Mo. 571.
i
ee R ob on v. Comstock, 8 Wi . 372,
374, 375; Hazleton v. nion Bk. of Columbu" 32 Wi . 34, 42, 43; lay v. Edgerton,
1 Ohio t. 549 ; aul bury v. Alexander,
50 Mo. 142, 144; orpenoy v. edalia, 57
l\fo. 8 ; Pomeroy v. B enton, 57 Io. 531,
5:)0; Blasdel 1:. William , 9 :reY. 161;
mith v. D ennett, 15 Minn . 1. In l\fi ouri, and iu a few other tate , a motion
in arre t of judgment i permitted by the
practice un d r ome circum tance , and
the above ca e , cited from that tate, hold
that . uch a motion i not proper when the
petition i imply defective and imp1>rfect
in it Latem nt of the cau e of action, and
bould only be made when it wholl y fail
to s t forth any cause of a tion; th 111er
imperfect.ion is cured by the ver Ii ·t.
11.

399; Bu h v. Cella, 52 Ark. 37 ;
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which is not at best, from its very nature, capiible of absolute

certainty. In the cases referred to, the courts have declared

that if the defendant omits to move to make the pleading more

definite and certain, or to deviur, but answers and goes to trial,

the objection is waived.^ This form of expression is a plain

departure from the rule as given above, and is self-contradictory.

The very distinctive feature of the class of defects under consid-

eration is, that they do not render a pleading demurrable, but

only expose it to amendment by motion. A failure to demur is

therefore entirely immaterial ; it does not waive anything, because

the demurrer if resorted to would have accomplished nothing.

Doubt and obscuritj^ alone as to the true meaning and the exact

force of the rule can arise from this careless use of language. ^

1 Pomeroyr. Benton, 57 Mo. 531, 550;

Blasdel v. Williams, 9 Nev. 161 ; Smith v.

Dennett, 15 Minn. 81 ; Johnson r. Robin-

son. 20 Minn. 189, 192.

which is uot at best, from its ery nature, capabl of aL olute
certainty. In the cases referred to, the court hav d clared
that if the defendant omit to m ve to make the I 1 ading more
definite and certain, or to demur, but answer and go s to trial,
the objection is waived. 1 This form of expre sion is a plain
departure from the rule as given above, and i ::;elf-contradictory.
The ery distinctive feature of the cla of defects under consideration is, that they do not render a pleading <lemurrable, but
only expose it to amendment by motion. A failure to d mur is
therefore entirely immaterial; it does not waive anything, because
the demurrer if resorted to would have accomr lished nothing.
D oubt and obscurity alone as to the true meaning and the exact
force of the rule can arise from this careless use of language. 2

2 ^Imperfect , Incomplete, and Infor-
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mal Allegations.

Indefiniteness and uncertainti/ in a pe-

tition are properly reached by motion and

not by demurrer : McAdam v. Scudder

(1894), 127 Mo. 345, 30 S. W. 168; Guth-

I Pomerov v. Benton , 5i Mo. 531, 550;
Blasdel v . Williams, 9 Nev. 161; Smith v .
Dennett, 15 Minn. 8 1; Johnson t'. Robinson, 20 ~linn. 189, 192.

rie v. Shaffer (1898), 7 Okla. 459, 54 Pac.

698 ; Seaboard Air Line Ry. Co. v. Main

2

[Impe1·fect, Inconiplete, and Infor1nal Allegations.

(1903), — N. C. — , 43 S. E. 930; Allen

V. Carolina Cent. Ry.Co. (1897), 120 N. C.

548, 27 S. E. 76; Rutherford v. Johnson

(1897), 49 S. C. 465,27 S. E. 470; Garrett

V. Weinberg (1897), 50 S. C. 310, 27 S. E.

770 ; State ex rel. v. Jeter (1901), 59 S. C.

483, 38 S. E. 124 ; Lockwood v. Bridge Co.

(1901), 60 S. C. 492, 38 S. E. 112; Smith

r. Bradstreet (1902), 63 S. C. 525, 41 S. E.

763 ; Sheeks v. State (1900), 156 Ind. 508,

60 N. E. 142; Coddington v. Canaday

(1901), 157 Ind. 243, 61 N. E. 567; Frain

V. Burgett (1898), 152 Ind. 55, 50 N. E.

873 ; Clow v. Brown (1897), 150 Ind. 185,

48 N. E. 1034; Garard i'. Garard (1893),

135 Ind. 15, 34 N. E. 442 ; Cleveland, etc.

Ry. Co. V. Berry (1898), 152 Ind. 607, 53

N. E. 415; Olson ?•. Phoenix Mfg. Co.

(1899), 103 Wis. 337, 79 X. W. 409;

Johnston v. Northwestern Live Stock Ins.

Co. (1896), 94 Wis. 117, 68 N. W. 868;

Allen V. Chicago & Northwestern Ry. Co.

(1896), 94 Wis. 93, 68 N. W. 873 ; Fitch

V. Applegate (1901), 24 Wash. 25, G4 Pac.

147; Fares v. Gleason (1896), 14 Wash.

657, 45 Pac. 314; Stewart v. Bole (1901),

61 Neb. 193, 85 N. W. 33; Kyd ;;. Cook

(1898), 56 Neb. 71, 76 N. W. '524 ; First

Nat. Bank y. Smith (1893), 36 Neb. 199,

54 N. W. 254 ; Street Ry. Co. v. Stone

(1894), 54 Kan. 83, 37 Pac. 1012 ; Sanford

V. Lichtenberger il901), 62 Neb. 501, 87

N. W. 305; Murrell I'. Henry (1902), 70

Ark. 161, 66 S. W. 647 ; City of Santa

Barbara v. Eldred (1895), 108 Cal. 294,

41 Pac. 410.

Where a material fact can be only

vaguely inferred from the allegations of a

complaint, a motion to make more defi-

nite and certain will lie: McFadden v.

Stark (1893), 58 Ark. 7, 22 S. W. 884 ;

City of Santa Barbara v. Eldred (1895),

108 Cal. 294, 41 Pac. 410.

I ndefiniteness and u11certaint.1J in apetition are properly reached by motion aud
not by demurrer : McAdam v. ~cudder
( 1894), l 2i Mo. 345, 30 S. W . 168; Guth rie i:. Shaffer (1898), 7 Okla. 459, 54 Pac.
698; eaboard Air Line Ry. Co. v. Main
( 1903), J _ C. - , 43 s. E. 930; Allen
v . Carolina Cent. Ry. Co. (1897), 120 N. C.
5..J.8, 2i S. E. 76; H u therford v. Johnson
(189 7), 49 . C. 465, 27 S . E. 470; Garrett
t'. W einberg ( 1897), 50 S . C. 31 O, 2i S. E.
770; tate ex rel. v. Jeter (190 1), 59 S. C.
483, 38 S. E. 124; Lockwood v. Bridge Co.
(1901 ), 60 S. C. 492, 38 S. E. 112; Smith
1'. Brad treet (1902), 63 S. C. 525, 41 S. E.
763 ; Sheeks v . State (1900), 156 Ind. 508,
60 .i: • E. 14-2; Codd ington v. Canaday
( 190l}, 1J7 Incl. 2..J.3 , 61 N. E. 56i; Frain
v. Burgett (1898), 152 Ind. 55, 50 N. E.
873; Clow v. Brown (189 7) , 150 Ind. 185,
48 N. E. 1034; Garard v. Garard ( 1893),
135 Ind. 15, 34 r. E. 442; Cleveland, etc.
Ry. Co. v. Berry ( 1898), 152 Ind . 607, 53
N . E. 415; Olson l'. Phcenix Mfg. Co.
(1 99), 103 Wi . 337, 79 N. W. 409;
Johnston v. Northwestern Live Stock Ins.
Co. {1896), 94 Wis. 117 , 68 N. W. 868;
Allen u. Chicago & i orthwestern Ry . Co.
(1 896 }, 94 Wis. 93 , 68
. W. 873; Fitch
v. ,\pplegate (1901 ), 24 Wasll . 25, 64 Pac.

147; Fares v. Gleason (1896), 14 Wash.
657, 45 Pac. 314; ' tewart v. Bole (1901),
61 Neb. 193, 85 N. \V. 33; Kyd v. Cook
(189 ), 56 Nch. il, 76 N. W. 524; First
Nat. Bank v. Smith (1893), 36 Neb. 199,
54 N . \V. 254; Street Ry. Co. v. Stone
( 1 94 ), 54 Kan. 83, 3 i Pac. l 012; "anford
t'. Lichtenberger (1901}, 62 Neb. 501, 87
N. W.305; Murrell v. H enry (1902), 70
Ark. 161, 66 S. W. 6.J.7 : City of Santa
Barbara v. Eldred ( 189 5), I 08 Cal. 294,
41 Pac. 410.

Where a material fact can be only
vaguely inferred from the allegations of a
complaint, a motion to make more definite and certain will lie: McFadden v.
Stark (1 893), 58 Ark . 7, 22 S. W. 84;
City of ... anta Barbara v. Eldred {1895},
10 Cal. 294, 41 Pac. 410.
D emurrer H eld Proper in . 0111e ,_tales.
By statute in California, Colorado, Idaho,
Montana, Nevada, and Utah, it is made a
ground of demurrer that the complaint is
ambiguous, unintelligible, and uncertain.
See note to§ *433. where the statutes are
given . As to the fo rm of the demurrer, it
''"a held in Jacob Sultan Co. v. nion Co.
(1 95), 17 Mont. 61, 42 Pac. 109, that a
demurrer which merely states in the language of the statute that the complaint is
ambig uous, unintellig ible, and uncertain,
should be di regarded. It oug ht to ~pecify
wherein the ambiguity, etc. consi ts.
'ee
also Herbst Importing Co. v. Hogan (1895),
16 Mont. 384, 41 Pac. 13 5.
In California, in Greenebaum v. T aylnr
(1894) , 102 Cal. 624, .% Pac. 95 7, it "as
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Demurrer, or Dismissal of Petition at the Trial,

S 444. * 550. Demurrer, or Dismissal of Petition at the Trial,

Proper when Allegations are wholly Deficient. It has even been

Prop er when Allegations are wholly Deficient.

I has even b n

held that a demurrer to a comphiint on

the ground that it is ambiguous, unintel-

ligible, and uncertain, for the reasou that

it does not contain a sulfioieiit description

of the property sued for; should be over-

ruled. The complaint was clearly neither

unintelligible nor ambiguous, aud if uu-

certain merely the demurrer did uot reach

it. But see Field v. Andrada (1895), 106

Cal. 107, 39 Pac. 323, where a demur-

rer was filed on these three grounds con-

junctively, but the only specifications were

on the ground of uncertainty, and the

court sustained the demurrer as one on

the latter ground only. See also Henke

V. Eureka Endowment Ass'n (1893), 100
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Cal. 429, 34 Pac. 1089, where it was said

that allegations which constitute matters of

inducement cannot render a complaint

bad on demurrer on the ground that the

complaint is ambiguous, uncertain, or

unintelligible.

In Georgia, where no such statute

exists, uncertainty is held to be a ground

for special demurrer : McClendon i;. Her-

nando Co. (1 896), 100 Ga. 219, 28 S. E. 152 ;

East Georgia R. li. Co. v. King (1893),

91 Ga. 519, 17 S. E. 939; Mayor w. Came-

rgn (1900), 111 Ga. 110, 36 S. E. 462.

Objections going to Formal Defects in a

pleading cannot be raised by demurrer,

but must be raised by motion : Grant c.

Commercial Nat. Bank (1903), — Neb. —,

93 N. W. 185 ; Forbes v. Petty (1893), 37

Neb. 899, 56 N. W. 730 ; Cone v. Ivinson

(1893). 4 Wyo. 203,33 Pac. 31 ; Living-

stoue V. Lovgren (1902), 27 Wash. 102, 67

Pac. 599 ; Street Ry. Co. v. Stone (1894),

54 Kan. 83, 37 Pac. 1012; Johnson v.

Douglass (1894), 60 Ark. 39, 28 S. W.

515. But in Connecticut a question of

formal defects must be raised by de-

murrer : Levy v. Metropolis Mfg. Co.

(1900), 73 Couu. 559, 48 Atl. 429.

Alternative Allegations. It is provided

by statute in Kentucky that " a party

may allege alternatively the existence of

one or another fact, if he states that one

of them is true and that he does not know

which of them is true." But the general

rule is that a jileading in the alternative is

subject to attack by motion : Daniels v.

Fowler (1897), 120 N. C. 14,26 S. E. 635;

Pender v. Mallett (1898), 123 N. C. 57,

31 S. E. 351. In construing the Kentucky

statute, in Brown v. 111. Cent. R. R. Co.

(1897), 100 Ky. 525, 38 S. W. 862, the

court held that it applies solely to alleging

facts in the alternative, uot parties, and

does not authorize an allegation that the

loss and damage occurred " by reason of

the negligence of one or the other of de-

fendants, or of both defendants, aud as to

which plaintiffs are unable to say as to

whether one or the other, or both, but one

of these alternatives is true." Such aver-

held that a demurrer to a complaint on
th gr ound that it i ambiguou , unintellig i bl , au<l uncertain, fo r the rnasou that
it doe u t couta.in a nfficient de. cription
f the property ued for; hould be overruled. 'l he complaint wa clearly n ither
uuiut llig ible nor am biguou. , and if uncertain mer ly the demurrer did uot reach
it. But e Field v. Andrada (1 95), 106
al. lOi, 39 Pa . 323 where a demurr er wa fil d on the e three ground. conjun tiY ly but th e only pecificati n were
on the rr und of uncertainty, and the
ourt u tained th demurrer as one on
the latter ground only.
'ee al o Henke
v. Eureka En lowrnent A 'n (1 93), 100
' al. -1-29 3-1- Pac. 10 9, where it was ·aid
that allegation which con titute matter of
indu cement cannot render a complaint
bad on demurrer on the ground that the
coruplai11t i ambiguou , uncertain, or
unintelligible.
In
eorgia, where no such tatute
exi t , uncertainty i held to be a ground
for pecial demurrer: McClendou 1;. Hernando o. (1 96}, lOOGa. 2·19, 28 S. E. 152;
East Georgia R. R. Co. v. King (1893},
91 Ga. !'>19, 17 . E. 939; Mayor v. Camer9n (1900}, 111 Ga. 110, 36 S. E. 462.
Objections going lo Formal D efects in a
pleading cannot be rai ed by demurrer,
but mu t be rai ed by motion : Grant v.
CommerciaL:rat. Bank (1903}, - Neb.-,
93 . W. l 5; Forb v. Petty (1 93}, 37
Neb. 99, 56 N. W. 730; Cone v. Ivin on
( 1 93) . 4 Wyo. 203, 33 Pac. 3 1 ; Livingsto ne v. Lovg r n (190:2), 27 Wa h. 102, 67
}Jae. 599; ' treet Ry. Co. v. tone (1 94},
5-1- Kan. ;~, 37 Pac. 1012; John on v.
Doug la. (I 94), 60 Ark. 39, 28 . W .
onnecti cut a que tion of
515. Bu t in
formal d feet must be rai ·ed by demurrer : L vy i'. :\Ietropoli Mfg. Co.
( 1900), 73 onn. 5 59, 4 A t l . 429 .
.Altenwtire A ll gatio11s. It i provid d
Ly . tatute in K 11 t ucky that "a party
may allc·gc altern atiY ly the exi tencc of
<me or auo her fact, if he . ta te that one
of th 111 i true a nd t hat he doe not kn ow
which of them i true. ' But th e g neral
r nll' i. I.hat a pl •ad in g in the alt ruaLi,-e i
ulijcct t o a ttack by motion: Daui 1 v.

. E. 635;
. c. 57,

tatute, in Brown v. 111.
(1 97), 1 0 Ky. 525 3
62, the
c urt h ld that it applie ol ly to alleging
fact in the altemati,·e, not partie , and
doe. u t authorize an all gatiou that the
lo and damag e occurred 'by r a on of
the negligeut;e f one or th oth r of defendant , or of both defendant. , and a to
whi h plaintiff are unable t ·ay a to
wheth r one or the other, or both, but ne
of the alternati,·e i true."
uch av rm ut i in ·uffkient again t ither of the
def udant . To ame effect ee L oni vill , etc R R. o. v. Ft. Wayne ]~lee. o.
(1900), 10 Ky. 11 3, 55 . W. 91 . Each
alternative pleacled hould be a complete
cau e of action: Cumberland Valley
Bank'. A signee v. ln her (1 9i), 102
Ky. 415, -1-3 . W . 472; Wehrnhoff v. Rutherford (1 95), 9 K y. 91, 32 . W. 2
Cl ,.;cal Error. An obviou
lerical
error in a pleadi ng will be di regarded:
Gibbs v. · outhern (1893), 116 Mo. 204, 22
s. w . 713 .
Form of Motion. It is not error to overrule a motion to make a pleadin more
certain when it does not point ut wherein
the uncertainty con ists: Grime v. Culli on (1 95), 3 Okla. 26 , 41 Pa . 355;
Jae b ultan o. v. Union Co. (1 95 }, l i
font. 61, -*2 Pa . 109 ( pecial demurrer);
Wortham v. in lair (1 96), 9
a. 173>
25 . . 414 ( pecial d murrer); Brown v.
Baker (190 1 }, 39 r . 66 6!5 Pa . 799.
Limitation on se of JIotion.
motion
to make a pl a<ling. more d finit and
ertain ann t be u ed to c mp 1 th party
t pl ad hi vid n : Bower v. ·hul r
(1 93), 54 Minu. 99 55 1 . W. l 7. A moti on t . trik "ill not lie wh re a pleadiud fi11it and un rtaiu, but the
i b.v mo ion
ma.k m re dempu ino- cal
o.
finit aud c ~ rtaiu:
v. Lon a- (1903},- . . - , 4-1- •. <. 9

e1Ju<:nce of l • ailu re to 1aake J!ot ion.
pir
v. outh Bound I . I . o.
(I 96}, 47
. 2 , 24 . <. 992; tho
aid: " When a complaint i gen ral
all gation of neglio- nc , and he
'0 11

In
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o 1 f ctively set out that a

held that where a cause of action is so defectively set out that a

defendant desires to know upon what

particular acts of negligence tiie plaintiff

relies to sustain his action, it is the duty

of the defendant to make a motion to have

the conij)laiut made more definite and

certain ; and, when this is not done, the

plaintiff has the right to introduce any

competent evidence tending to sliow neg-

ligence on the part of the defendant."

Hijpothetical Pleading. It was held in

Emison v. Owyhee Ditch Co. (1900), 37

Ore. 577, 62 Pac. 13, that hypothetical

pleading is bad, but whether the objection

should be taken by motion to make more

definite and certain (6 Ency. PI. & Pr.

269) ; or by motion to strike out (Bliss on

Code PI. § 317) was not decided. See

Generated for facpubupdates (University of Michigan) on 2014-06-17 15:33 GMT / http://hdl.handle.net/2027/uc2.ark:/13960/t02z1c23b
Public Domain / http://www.hathitrust.org/access_use#pd

also Daniells v. Fowler (1897), 120 N. C.

14, 26 S. E. 635, and Pender v. Mallett

(1898), 123 N. C. 57,31 S. E. 351. where it

is held that motion, not demurrer, is the

proper remedy.

Facts should be alleged positively. The

material facts of a cause of action or

defence should be alleged unequivocally,

and will not be considered sufficient where

they are stated as contingent or conjec-

tural : Atchi.son, T. & S. F. Ry. Co. v.

Atchison Grain Co. (1902), — Kan. — , 70

Pac. 933.

General Pleading. In Chicago, St.

Louis, etc. R. R. Co. v. Wolcott (1894), 141

Ind. 267, 39 N. E. 451, the court held that

in civil cases it is the rule that where a

subject comprehends multiplicity of mat-

ter, and a great variety of facts, there, in

order to avoid pi'olixity, the law allows

general pleading. Quoted from 1 Chitty's

Pleading 235, and approved. And it was

held in Equitable Ins. Co. v. Stout (1893),

135 Ind. 444, 33 N. E. 6-23, that a general

allegation is ordinarily sufficient when

the matters to be pleaded tend to in-

definiteness and multiplicity, but the

complaint must show by allegation the

extended and complicated character of

the books, accounts, etc., or other allega-

tions from which the rule may be applied.

Although a general averment may be

sufficient, if the pleader alleges, in addi-

tion thereto, specific facts, the latter will

control the general averment : Louis-

ville, etc. Ry. Co. v. Kemper (1896), 147

Ind. 561, 47 N. E. 214; Fitzpatrick

V. Simonson Bros. (1902), 86 .Minn. 140,

90 N. W. 378; Carlson i-. Presbyterian

Board (1897), 67 Minn. 436, 70 N.'w. 3;

Gowan v. Bensel (1893), .W Minn. 46, 54

N. W. 934 ; Chesapeake, etc. Ry. Co. v.

lianmcr (1902), Ky., 66 S. W. 375; Sebree

Deposit Bank v. Moreland (1894), 96 Ky.

150, 28 S. W. 153.

Necessity of Motion. In Sidway v. Mis-

souri Land, etc. Co. (1901), 163 Mo. 342,

63 S. \V. 705, the court said : " In order

to raise the question of the indefiniteness

of a pleading, however, it is by no means

cl fendant d ire to know upon what
particulal' a ·t of negligenc the plaintiff
relies to sustain hi action, it i the duty
of the def ndaut to make a motion to have
tlie ·0111plaiut made more definite ancl
ertain ; and, wh 11 thi i not do11e, the
plaiut,iff ha the right to introuuce any
comp tent eviJence teuding to how negligence on the part of the defendant."
ll.1Jpothetical Pleading. It wa held in
Emi on 1:. Owyhee Ditch Co. (1900), 37
Ore. 5i7, 62 Pac. 13, that hypoth et i ·al
pleading is bad, but whether the objection
hould be taken by motion to make more
definite and certain (6 Ency. l'l. & Pr.
269); or hy motion to ·trike out (Bli on
Code Pl. § 317) was n ot decided. See
al o Daniells v. Fowler ( 1897 ), 120 . C.
14, 26 S. E. 635, and Pender v. Mallett
(1898), 123 N. C. 57, 31 S. E. 351. where it
is held that motion, not demurrer, is the
proper remedy.
Pticts should be alleged positively. The
material facts of a cause of action or
defence shoulcl be alleged unequivocally,
and will not be con idered sufficient wh ere
the,v are stated as contingent or conjectural: Atchison, T. & S. F. Ry. Co. v.
Atchison Grain Co. (1902), - Kan. - , 70
Pac. 933.
General Pleading. In Chicago, St.
Louis, etc. R.R. Co. v. Wolcott (1894), 141
Ind . 267, .'39 N. E. 451, the court held that
i11 civil ca es it is the rule that where a
subject comprehends multiplicity of matter, and a great variety of facts, there, in
ortler to avoid prolixity, the law allows
general pleading. Quoted from I Chitty's
})lead ing 235, and approved. And it was
held in Equitable In s. Co. v. Stout (1893),
135 Ind. 444, 33 N. E. 623, that a general
allegation is ordinarily sufficie nt when
the matters to be pleaded tend to indefiniteness and multiplicity, but the
complaint must show by allegati on the
extended and complicated character of
the books, account , etc., or other allegations from which the rule may be applied.
Although a general averm ent may be
sufficient, if the pleader alleges, in addition thereto, specific facts, the latter will
control th e general averment : L oui ville, etc. Ry . Co. v. Kemper (I 96}, 147
Ind. 5G l, 47 N. E. 214; Fitzpatri ck

imon ou Bro . (1902}, 86 ~Iiun . 140,
arl on v. Prcsbvterlau
90 N. W. :31 ;
B oard (I 9i), 67 l\1in11. 436, 70 x.\V. 3;
Gowan v. B u!'el ( l 93), 53 i\linu . 46, 54
. W. 934; Cli ·apeake, etc. Hy . o. v.
Hanm er ( 1902), Ky., 66 '. W. 375; l·hr c
D epo ·it Bank v. Morclaud (1 894), 96 Ky.
150, 2
. w. 153.
Necessityof.Jlotion. In, idwnyv. lisouri Land, etc. Co. {1901), 163 ~Jo. 342,
63 . \V. 705, th <'Ollrt . aid: "Jn ortlcr
to raise the qncstiou of the indefiniteness
of a pleading, howeYer, it is by no means
necessary to file a motion to make it more
definite and certain; ;i,nd this is so fu r two
r ea ons : " 1st. The duty of requiring the
pleadings to be definite and certain devolve on the court; 2d. The onus of making the pleading <lefiuite and certain ls on
the party drawing it.
Plead mg by Way <!f Recital. It is a.
well-recogn ized general rule that matorial
facts, essential to the cause of action,
should be alleged directly and not by way
of recital. In Berry v . Dole ( 100~). 87
Minn. 471, 92 N. W. 334, it was held that a
pleading which offended against thi rule
was bad on general demurrer. The same
doctrine was announced by the Supreme
Court of Indiana, in Erwin v. Cent. Union
Tel. Co. (1897), 148 Ind. 365, 46 N. E.
667. The rul e was very in tructively applied, in McElwaine-Hichards Co. v. Wall
(!902) , 159Ind.557, 65 .E.752,toacomplaint by a servant for an injury uffered
from a fall consequent upon hi being
ent to work in an in ecure and un afe
place. Also in L eadville Water Co. v.
L eadville (1896}, 22 Colo. 297, 45 Pac.
362, it wa held that allegation by way
of recital are insufficient, and objection
thereto may be taken by general demurrer, for the rea on that an allegation by
way of recital cannot be denied, and no
issue concerning it can ever be rai ed.
The court cite the text, §§ 549, * 550.
]for the contrary doctrine ee
ity of
.. anta Barbara v. Eldred (1 95), 10 Cal.
294, 41 Pac. 410 .
Pleading on b!fonnation and Beliff
In l\li souri allegation upon information
and 11elicf are not deemed proper. In
Nichols & , hep:i.rd o. v. Hubert (1 , 9<1 ,
150 l\10. G20, 51 S. ,V. 10.3 1, th e ('IUl't
ii.

*
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t1 m urr r f r want of sufficient fact would have been u tained,

demarrer for want of sufficient facts would have been sustained,

said : " \Vhile the first four paragraphs of

t.'is j)Ctiiio!i state and aver facts, the form

of averine!;t is changed iu the fifth, and

the pleader tiieii alleges that he is in-

formed and l)elie»-es the facts therein re-

cited, and ixs these recited facts are

essential to plaintiff's cause of action tlie

defect is fatal unless this form of aver-

ment is permis3il)le under the code. The

statute requires in a petition a plain and

coucise statement of the facts constituting

the cause of action. A statement of iu-

fornia'ion and belief as to facts is not

within the meaning of this statute."

In Iowa, however, iu the case of Robin-

son i.'. Ferguson (1903), — la. — , 93 N. W.

350, t'aey were held sufficient in the ab-

Generated for facpubupdates (University of Michigan) on 2014-06-17 15:33 GMT / http://hdl.handle.net/2027/uc2.ark:/13960/t02z1c23b
Public Domain / http://www.hathitrust.org/access_use#pd

sence of a motion attacking the pleading

on tliat ground. In Minnesota the court

has gone still further. In State ex rcl.

V. Co.. ley (1894), 58 Minn. 514, 60 N. W.

33S, after referring to the statute requiring

that the verification of pleadings shall be

to thft effect that the same are true to the

knowledge of the person making them, ex-

cept as to those matters stated on informa-

tion and belief, and, as to those matters,

that he believes them to be true, the court

said : " This language is not confined

merely to the denials in the answer of the

controverted allegations in the complaint,

but applies to all pleadings, including

matters stated in the complaint on infor-

mation and belief. Why else should the

party be required or allowed to verify the

matters stated in the complaint upon in-

formation and belief, unless he is allowed

to insert such matters in that form ?

Evidently, this section of the statute con-

templates that such allegations may be

inserted in any of the pleadings ; and we

believe that such has been the usual pr.ac-

tice in this State ever since its admission

into the Union in 1858. It would be a great

misfortune for us now to declare that prac-

tice invalid, and we refuse so to do."

The objection that the averments in

a complaint are made on information and

belief is not a ground for demurrer : Car-

penter V. Smith (1894), '20 Colo. 39, 36

Pac. 7.39 ; Jones v. Pearl Min. Co. (1894),

20 Colo. 417, 38 Pac. 700.

Pifdicating Error as to Formal Defects.

Tipton Light, etc. Co. v. Newcomer

(1900), 156 Ind. 348, 58 N. E. 842: It is

the right of a defendant to have the plain-

tiff state sjjecifically the facts constituting

alleged negligence, and where the motion

to make more specific is well taken the

court has no discretion. Failure to su.s-

tain such a motion when properly made is

reversible error.

But see Chicago, B. & Q. R. Co. v.

Oy.ster (1899), 58 Neb. 1. 78 N. W. 359 :

" One cannot predicate error on the re-

fusal to recjuire the pleading of the op-

posite party to be made more tiefinite and

aiu: " ' 'hile the fir t four paragraph of
tl pt• tl Liv!I t:ite and , ''er fact , the form
of \"Crll :.t i · hn,ncved in the fifth, and
t he plc , er t i e n all g s that he i infvrmetl ::l.lld b ·lie1· the fa t therein r citeJ, aud n.s th • e recited fa t are
e sectial t plaintiff' cau e of action the
d feet i fatal unle ' thi · form of avermeut i pcrmi ihl under the code. The
t:i.tntc require in a petition a plain and
co :.h..i:e :,tat ment of t.he fact coo tituting
t'1c e~·n e of action.
tatemeut of inform ·ion and b lief a
\Vil ·n them anino- of thi tatute."
ln Iowa, howe,·er, in the ca e of Robinson u. Fcrnu ·on( I903), - Ia. -, 93N. W.
350, they were held sufficient in the abse· ce of a motion attacking the pleading
o that gr und. In Minnesota the court
bas gone till furthe r. In tate ex rel .
v. Co.iley (1 94), 5 i\linn. 514, 60 N. W.
33,',. ft r r •ferring to the tatute requiring
that t!ie verification of pleadings hall be
t t ~ off ct tha.t the ame are true to the
kno vl d.,.e of the per on making them, except a. to th•J e matter tated on informati n and belief, and, as t those matters,
that he believes them to be true, the court
aiJ . " Thi' language is not confined
merely t the den ial in the an wer of the
controv rted alleo-ations in the complaint,
but applies to all pleadings, including
matter tatecl in the complaint on information and belief. Why el e sho uld the
party be required or allowed to verify the
matt r tated in the complaint upon informati n and belief, unles he i allowed
to in ert uch matter. in that form ~
Evid ntly, this ection of the tatute ·ontemplate that uch allegation may be
in erted in any of the pleading ; and we
believe that :u h has be n the u ual practice in thi .'tate e,·e r ince it. admi .. ion
into th
u ion in 1 5
It would be a gr<'at
mi ~ rLune for u now to declar that practice iuvalid, and w refu
o to do."
The objection that th a,· rm n in
a complaint are m d ou information and
beli f i not. a ground f r demurrer : arp ot r v . • "m i th (I !14), 2
ol . 39, 36
Pac. 7.'3 ; Jone v. P arl Min. o. (1 94),
20 Cl . 417, 38 Pac. 700.
nidicating Error as to Formal efects.
Tipt n Light, etc.
o. v. Newcomer
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but the adverse party answers instead, and goes to trial, tlie

objection to the pleading is thereby waived, and evidence in its

but the ach· rse party an w rs in tea.cl, and go ' to trial, tli '
obj ction t the pleading i ther by waiv cl, an
viclenc in it~

V. Missouri Land, etc. Co. (1901), 163 Mo.

342, 63 S. W. 705.

Test of Dejiniteness. In American Book

Co. V. Kini^clom Publishing Co. (1898),

71 Minn. 363, 73 N. W. 1089, the court

said : " If the court can see the meaning

of the different allegations, and the cause

of action or the defence intended to be set

forth by them, the pleading is not indefi-

nite." See also City of Logausport v.

Kihm (1902), 159 Ind. 68, 64 N. E. 595,

where a complaint is instructively ana-

lyzed and shown not to set forth the facts

constituting tlie cause of action in such a

manner as to enable a person of common

understanding to know what was intended.
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Waiver of Formal Defects. Larsen v.

Utah Loan & Trust Co. "(1901 ), 23 Utah,

944, 65 Pac. 208 : Where allegations of

fraud are general and no objection is made

thereto in the trial court, the defect is

waived. Bennett v. Minott (1896), 28

Ore. 339, 44 Pac. 283: The objection of

uncertainty in a complaint comes too late

after judgment. Holman ;;. De Lin (1 897),

30 Ore. 428, 47 Pac. 708: A motion to

strike out parts of an answer is waived by

the subsequent filing, hearing, and deter-

mining of a demurrer thereto. Graves v.

Barrett (1900), 126 N. C. 267, 35 S. E.

539 : A defective statement of a good

cause of action is waived when it is ap-

parent from tlie answer that the defendants

were fully apprised of the subject-matter

of the suit. See also Mizzell v. Ruffin

(1896), 118 N. C. 69. 23 S. E. 927. Ash-

ton V. Stoy (1895), 96 la. 197, 64 N. W.

804 : Overruling a motion for more specific

statement is not waived where no subse-

quent pleading is filed. Zion Church v.

Parker (1901), 114 la. 1, 86 N. W. 60: A

defect appearing on the face of the plead-

ings is waived if no objection is taken in

the lower court.

Warthen v. Himstreet (1900), 112 la.

605, 84 N. W. 702 : The court said : " We

have held that a defendant may be con-

cluded by a default when the facts stated in

the petition do not state a good cause of ac-

tion at law, or when the petition is so defec-

tive as to be vulnerable to a demurrer.

Fred Miller Brewing Co. v. Capital Ins.

Co., Ill la. 590, and ca.ses cited. Doubt-

less, if no cause of action is stated, a de-

fault has no such effect. Bosch v. Kassiug,

64 la. 312. But Himstreet did state a cause

of action. The defect in his petition was

in matter of form only, and this the de-

fendants could waive, and by tlicir non-

appearance did waive." Fenuer v. Crips

(1899), 109 la. 455, 80 N. W. 526:

Where defendant asks an instruction

based on a fact not averred with sufficient

di.stinctness in plaintiff's petition, he

thereby waives the defect. Van Etten

I'. Medland (1898), 53 Neb. 569, 74 N. W.

v. Mi. ouri Land, etc. Co. (1901) 163 Io.
w . i05.
Test of 1Jefinile11ess. In American Book
'o. v. Kin gdom Publi hing 'o. ( 1 9 ),
71 Minn. 363, 73 N. W . 10 9, the court
said : " If the court can ee the meaning
of the different allegation , and the cau e
of action or the defence intended to be et
forth by them, the pleading i not indefinite." See also City of Logansport v.
I\ihm (1902), 159 Ind. 68, 64 N. E. 595,
where a complaint is in tructively analyzed and hown not to set forth the facts
con tituting the cau e of action in such a
manner a to enable a per on of common
unden;tanding to know what was intended.
Waiver of FormaL Defects . Lar en v.
Utah Loan & Trust Co. (1901), 23 Utah,
944, 65 Pac. 208 : Where allegations of
fraud are general and no objection is made
thereto in the trial court, the defect is
waived. Bennett v. Minott {1896), 28
Ore . 339, 44 Pac. 283 : The objection of
uncertainty in a complaint comes too late
after judgment. Holman v. De Lin (1897),
30 Ore. 428, 47 Pac. 708: A motion to
strike out part of an answer is waived by
the ubsequent filing, hearing, and determining of a demurrer thereto. GraYes v.
Barrett (1900), 126 N. C. 267, 35 S. E.
539: A defective statement of a good
cause of action is waived when it is apparent from the answer that the defendants
were fully apprised of the ubject-matter
of the uit. See also ~1izzell v. Ruffin
(I 96), 11
r. C. 69. 23 S. E. 927. A hton v. toy (l 95), 96 Ia. 197, 64 N. W.
04 : Overruling a motion for more specific
statement i not wai,·ed where no subsequent pleading is filed. Zion Church v.
Parker (1901), lU Ia. 1, G .... W. 60: A
defect appearing on the face of the pl eadings is waived if no objection i' taken in
the lower court.
Warthen v. H imstreet ( 1900), 112 Ia.
605, 4 :N'. ,V. i02: The court aid: "We
have held that a defendant may be concluded by a defau lt when the fa<'t . tated in
t he petition do not tate a good cause of action at law, or when the petition i o defective as to be vul ne rab le to a de murrer.
Fred Miller Brewing Co. v. Capital Ins.
342, 63 ' .

o., 111 Ia. 590, and ca e cited. Doubt
le , if no cau. e of a tion i tated, a default ha no ·uch effect. Bo ch v. Ka iug,
64 Ia. 312. But IIim~treet di<l . tate a an.:
of action. The cl feet iu hi petiti n was
in matter of form only, and thi th defendant could wai,·e, and by their nonappearance did waive." Fenner v. rips
(1899), 109 Ia. 455,
o N. W. 5~6:
\iVhere defendant a ks an in trnction
ba ed on a fact not ay rred with ufl1cie11t
distinctnes in plaintiff's petition, he
thereby waives the d feet. Vau Etten
v. Medland (1 9 ), 53 Neb. 569, 74 N. W .
33 : "The filing of a demurrer to a petition is a waiver of the right to in. i t that
the allegations of the pleading . hall be
made more definite and certain."
langum v. Bullion, etc. Co. (1 97), 15 Utah,
534, 58 Paa. 834: Failure to allege, !-;pecific
facts con tituting causes of action or pecial defences is wai,·ed by failure to demur or object to evidence, hence cannot
be taken advantage of after judgment.
Same rule adhered to in Maynard v.
Locomotive, etc. A s'n (1897), 16 tah,
145, 51 Pac. 259.
Young v . Se,·ery (1 97), 5 Okla. 630,
49 Pac. 1024 : Au allegation, though indefinite and un certain and otherwise de·
fective, of a material matter, i sufiicieut
wh en first questioned by an obj ction to
the introduction of any testim ony th reund er.
o, in Frobi:ber v. Fifth A vc.
Tran p. Co. (1 97), 151 N. Y. 431, 45
N. E. 839, it was held that an objection
to the introduction of any evidence because the allegat ions of the co mplaint
were too general, wa not available on
appeal, when the defendant failed to rnoYe
to make more specific. Whitlock v. Chle
(1903), 75 Conn. 423, 5:3 Atl. 891: Wh re
a complaint assert · necessary fact in an
in ufficient manner, the defect cannot be
taken advantage of, iu the ah ence of demurrer, after trial and judgment on the
merits.
City of South B nd v. Turner (1900),
156 Ind. 418, 60 N. E. 271: Mer uncertainty or inadequa y of aver ment will be
deemed waived by proceeding to trial
without objection. Courts do not look
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support must be admitted.^ Other cases are directly opposed

to this position, and expressly declare that if the complaint or

petition fails to state any cause of action the objection is not

waived, and all evidence should be excluded at the trial, even

though the defendant has answered; and this ruling is in exact

conformity with the provisions of all the codes regulating the

use of demurrers. 2 The doctrine first stated is clearly erroneous,

and the dicta or decisions which sustain it ought to be wholly

disregarded; it violates the section of the codes which enacts

that the absence of sufficient facts as a ground of demurrer is not

abandoned by an omission to demur; and it utterly ignores the

established distinction between a failure to state any cause of

action and tlie statement of a cause of action in an imperfect and

defective manner. It is only when the answer itself by some of

its averments supplies the omission in a complaint or petition

otherwise demurrable, that the fault is cured and the objection

waived by answering; mere answering instead of demurring

with favor on the practice of attack-
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ing pleadings at the trial : Ilaseltiue

V. Smith (1900), 154 Mo. 404, 55 S. W.

633

By filing an answer defendant waives

all objections of form in the petition :

u
r mu t b
to th i · po ition
iti 11 fail' t

aclmi tted . 1
th r ca
are
ncl xpr 1 - c1 clar that if
tate an}

pp ed
m laint or
ti 11 i' DO
trial
Yen
an '"\Yered; an l hi ruling i in exact
f all th
le r ula ti11 0 the
fi r t ta d i · cl arl · rro n ou ,
u
and
it ought o b wb lly
f th
ode whi ·h na t
i n t fact a n. r und f l mulT r i no
abc n lone l by an omi
l mur · an l it u t erly i n r e the
e tabli b ed di tincti n
n a failur t
tate any ca u ., e f
ac i n and th
a tement of a au e of a tion in an imp rf ·t and
d f ctive rnann r . It i · nl wh n th an wer it elf by me of
it a erment supplie th
mi ion in a
mphtin or petition
oth rwi e d emurrable, that the fault i cur d and th
bjec ion
waived by an wering ; mere answering in t ad of l murrmg

.

Gelatt V. Ridge (1893), 117 Mo. 553, 23

S. W. 882; McCall v. Porter (1903), 42

Ore. 49, 71 Pac. 926; Hughes v. McCol-

lough (1901), 39 Ore. 372, 65 Pac. 85;

Lovejoy v. Isbell (1900), 73 Conn. 368. 47

Atl. 682 ; Welsh v. Burr (1898), 56 Neb.

361, 76 N. W. 905 (reply). But defendant

may, in his answer, expressly reserve the

right to insist on a motion to make more

definite and certain when duly noticed :

Whaley v. Lawton (1898), 53 S. C. 580, 31

S. E. 660.

Cases where Pleadings have been held

Uncertain. Dodds v. McCormick Har-

vesting Mach. Co. (1901), 62 Neb. 759,

87 N. W. 911 : a petition declaring on a

promissory note; Kyd v. Cook (1898), 56

Neb. 71, 76 N. W. 524 : a petition in an

action for wrongful attachment; Olson v.

Pluiiuix Mfg. Co. (1899), 103 Wis. 337,

79 N. W. 409 : a complaint against three

contractors for negligence ; Buist c. Mel-

chers (1894), 44 S. C. 46, 21 S. E. 449: a

complaint against several successive boards

of directors of a corporation for omission

of duty; Koboliska v. Swehla (1898), 107

la. 124, 77 N. W. 576 : petition in action

for money paid at request of defendant;

Hall V. Law Guarantee, etc. Co. (1900), 22

Wash. 305, 60 Pac. 643: complaint in

replevin ; Union Nat. Bank v. Cross ( 1 898),

100 Wis. 174, 75 N. W. 992: answer in

action on promissory note; Koepke v.

Milwaukee (1901), 112 Wis. 475, 88 X. W.

238 : complaint against city for negligent

injury; McFadden v. Stark (1893), 58 Ark.

7, 22 S. W. 884 : complaint in action to en-

force a mechanic's lien ; Maine ;•. Chicago,

etc. H. R. Co. (1899), 109 la. 260, 80 N. W.

315: petition in action for negligent in-

juries ; Atchison, etc. Ky. Co. v. Potter

(1899), 60 Kan. 808, 58 Pac. 471 : petition

inaction for personal injuries; Hastings

r. Anacortes Packing Co. (1902), 29

Wa.sh. 224, 69 Pac. 776: complaint in an

wi th fa vor on the practice of atta k·
ing pleading a t t he trial : Ha eltine
v. ruith (1900 ), 154 Mo. 404, 55 . W.
633
B y fili ng an an wer defendant waive.
all obj ecti on of fo rm in the peti tion :
elat t i. Ridge ( l 93 ), 11 7 Mo. 553, 23
. W.
2 ; l cCall v. P or ter (1903 ), 42
Or e. 49, 71 Pac. 926 ; Hughe v. 1c l·
l ough ( 1901 i, 39 re. 372, 65 Pac. 5;
L ovejoy v. J bell (1900) " 3 onn. 36 , .n
A tl. 6 2 ; W ei. h u. Burr (1 9 ), 56 ~eb .
36 1, 76 •.1. W . 9 5 (reply ). But defendaut
mar in h i an w r, x pre. ly r e rv t he
ri ght to in, i t on a motion to make mor
definite aud certain when duly not ic d :
Whaley v. L awton (I 9 ), 53 . . 5 O 3 1

.·. E. 660.
ases where Pleadwgs lia ve been lzeld
ncertain.
I o<l<l · v. McCormi ·k H arn ting l\Ia·b. 'o. ( 190 1), 62 .1.J b. 759,
7 "T. ,V. 11 : a petition cledar ing n a
promi :ory 1J1Jte; Kyd i·. ook (l 9 ), :'i6
. . 'eb. i I, 76 •. ,V. 524: a petition in an
acticm for wr•mgful attnchm ut · )Ison 1·.
J>ho•11i · :\If~. ('o. (I 99), 103 W i.. 3:Ji,
"!J .... W. 40!J: a complaint agaiu t th r e
c·outra<'t<ir for 11c·<rlig •111· · ; Bui t 1·. :'I I ld1<·r (I ~1+), +4
' -J.6, ~l ,'. E. 44 : a
r·oin11lai11t again t f•\ ral. u c .: jy board·
uf clir ·c·tor of a 1·or1ioration fur omi · iuu

of duty; Koboli ka v. wehla ( I 9 ), 107
la. 124, i 7 N'. W. 576: petition in acti n
for money paid at reque t of d fendant;
Hall v. Law uarante , tc. o. (1900), 22
W as h . 305 , 60 Pac. 6-J.3: comp laint in
r ephn·in; lJnion Nat. Bank t•. r o . (1 9 ),
JOO Wi . l i 4, 75
. W. 9 2: a11 wer in
a ction n p romi ory n te ; K oe pk e v.
Milwauk e (190 1), 112 Wi . 475, , .. T. W.
23 : mpla in t again t city for negli o-ent
injury; McF a ude n v. tark (1 93), 5 Ark.
7, 22 . '
4: complaint in action t o enforce a m hanic li n · Ma in 1.•. hi a ,
etc. I . R.
. (1 99), 109 Ia. - 60,
X . W.
3 15 : petiti on in a ction for n g li "eut inju r i ; At hi on, tc. Hy. o. i·. P otter
(1 9 ), 60 K a n. Oc , 5 P a . 4-1: p tition
in a t iou fo r p r onal in j uri ; Ha ti n
i-. Ana ort
Packin g
. (1 2 ), 29
W a h. 224, 69 P ac. 776 : om plaint in an
a tiou fo r po e ion of a fi shiIJ" · it ;
Di.Im u v.
wton (lc9:'i}. 1 Wi. 199,
64 ... ·. , Y. 79: complaint a"ain. t :-ure.
tie~ Oil .heriff'· uoud (h Iii .uffici ntl'
. pc ·ific).]
l Tr , clwav v. " "'ilcl r
X ,., 91.
2 ;al"lJ r I:.
f Ull ough, -J. • l o. 3 J";
• cufiehl t'. W hit legge, 49 .. Y. 259, 2 I,
26:2; aul bu ry v. Alexancl r, 50 ~l o. 142.
144.
T.
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cannot produce tliat effect.^ If the averments are so defective, if

the omission of material facts is so great, that, even under the

rule of a liberal construction, no cause of action is stated, it is

not a mere case of insufficiency, but one of complete failure; and

the complaint or petition should be dismissed at the trial, or a

judgment rendered upon it should be reversed. A few examples

are placed in the foot-note.

While the general doctrine before

1 Scofield V. Whitelegge, 49 N. Y. 259,

261, 262 ; Bate v. Graham, 11 N. Y. 237 ;

Louisville & P. Canal Co. v. Murpliy, 9

Bush, 522, 529.

^ Autisdel v. Chicago & N. W. Ey. Co.,

26 Wis. 145, 147 ; Toinlinsou v. Mouroe,

41 Cal. 94 (an ambiguous and unintelli-

gible complaint); Holmes v. Williams, 16

Minn. 164, 168. The case described in

the text is that of a cause of action, good
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if properly pleaded, which the plaintiff

intended and attempted to set out, but

which he failed to set out by reason of

omissions and defects in the material alle-

gations ; and it is to be distinguished

from a cause of action entirely bad in

law, no matter how complete and perfect

may be tlie averments by which it is

•stated. In the first case a pure question

of pleading is involved, and the complaint

or petition is demurrable because the

rules of pleading have been essentially vio-

lated ; in the second case a pure question

of law is involved, and the complaint or

petition is demurrable, although the rules

of pleading have been in every respect

complied with.

[Wholly Deficient Pleadhigs.

Waiver of Defects of Substance.

The objection that a pleading does not

state facts constituting a cause of action

or defence is never waived, but may be

raised at anv stage of the proceedings :

O'Toole ('. Faulkner (1902), 29 Wash. 544,

70 Pac. 58 ; Jones v. St. Paul, etc. Ry. Co.

<1896), 16 Wash. 25, 47 Pac. 226; Hoff-

man V. McCracken (1902), 168 Mo. 337,

€7 8. W. 878; Lilly v. Menke (1894), 126

Mo. 190, 28 S. W. 643; McPeak v. Mo.

Pac. Ry. Co. (1895), 128 Mo. 617, 30

S. W. 170; State ex rel. r. Thompson

(1899), 149 Mo. 441, 51 S. W. 98; Epper-

.son V. Postal Tel. Co. (1900), 155 Mo. 346,

50 S. W. 79.5.; Wells v. Mutual Benefit

Ass'n (1894), 126 Mo. 6.30, 29 S. W. 607,

holding that even a stipulation by the par-

ties as to tlie issues in a case does not waive

the question of the sufficiency of a petition ;

State ex rel. v. Moores (1899), 58 Neb.

285, 78 N. W. 529; Lateuser v. Misner

(1898), 56 Neb. 340, 76 N. W. 897 ; Tracy

V. Grezaud (1903), — Neb. — , 93 N. W.

214; Hudelson v. first Nat. Bank (1897),

51 Neb. 557, 71 N. W. 304; Sage v. City

of Plattsmouth (1896), 48 Neb. 553, 67

N. W. 455; Kemper v. Renshaw (1899),

58 Neb. 513, 78 N. W. 1071 ; Dufrene v.

Ander.son (1903), — Neb.— , 93 N. W. 139;

City of South Bend v. Turner (1900), 156

Ind. 418, 60 N. E. 271 ; Galvin i: Britton

cannot produc that eff ct. 1 If the a.verm nt are o defectiv , if
th omi ion of material facts is o gr < t, that, vcn under the
i·ule of a lib ra.l con ·truction, no au ·e of action i stated, it is
not a mere ca ·e of in uffici ncy, but one of complete failure; an<l.
the complaint or p titian hould be dismis d at the trial, r a
judbment rend.er cl upon it hould be rev rscd. A few xampl s
arn placed in_ the foot-note. 2 \Vhile the general <l.octrine before
i
cofiPhl v. Whitelegge, 49 N. Y. 259,
261, 262; Bate v. Graham, 11 N. Y. 237 ;
Loui ville & P. Canal Co. v. Murphy, 9
Bu h, 52:l, 529.
2 Anti clel v. Chicago & N. W. Ry. Co.,
26 y1,•1s. 145, 1-t 7 ; Tumlinson v. i\Ionroe,
41 Cal. 94 (au ambiguous and unintell igible complaint); Holmes v. William , 16
Minn. 164, 168. The ca e de cribecl in
i;he text i that of a cause of action, good
if properly pleaded, which the plaintiff
intended and attempted to set out, but
whieh he fail ed to set out by rea, on of
omissions and defects in the material allegations ; and it i to be distingui heel
from a cause of action eutirely bad in
law, no matter how complete and perfect
may be the avermeuts by which it is
tated. In the fir, t case a pure que tiou
of pleading i invohed, and the complaint
or petition i demurrable because the
rule of pleading have been essentially violated ; in tbe seeond case a pure question
of law is involved, and the complaint or
petition i clenmrrable, although the rules
of pleaLling have been in every re pect
complied with.

holding that even a tipulatiun by the partie a to the issue in a case docs 11ot wa1 ve
the que tion of the ufficiency of a petition;
'tate ex rel. v. Moores ( 1 99), 58 'e b.
2 5, 78 N. W. 529; Lateu er t'. l\li ·n r
(1898), 56 Neb. 340, 76 N. W. 97; Tracy
v. Grezaucl (1903), - Neb. - , 93 ' . W.
214; Rud el 011 v. Fir:>t rat. Bank {l ~7),
51 Neb. 5:'!7, 71 N. W. 304; age v. ity
of Platt mouth (1 96), 4
,.eb. 553, 67
N. W. 455; l\emper v. Hen haw (1 99),
58 Neb. 513, 7 N. W. 1071; Dufrene v.
Anr!er OU (1903),-Neb. - , 93 N. vV. 139;
City of South Bend v. Turner ( 1900), 156
Ind. 418, 60 N. E. 271; Galvin v. Britton
(1898), 151 Ind. l, 49 N. E. 1064; In urance Co. v. Bonner (1 97 ), 24 olo. 220,
49 Pac. 366; ~chool Dist ri ct L'. .Flanigan
(1901 ), 28 Colo. 431, 65 Pac. 24; Mizzell
v. Ruffin ( 1896), 118 N. C. 69, 23 S. K
927; City of Guthrie L'. Nix ( l 95), 3 Okla.
136, 41 P ac. 343; De Loach .Jlill Co. i·.
Bonner (1897), 64 Ark. 510, 43 S. W. 504;
Warn er v. H e (1899), 66 Ark. 11 3, 49
S. W . 489; Buckman v. Hatch ( 1903), I :39
Cal. 53, 72 Pac. 4-t5 ; l\Ioore v. Ilalliday
(1903), 43 Ore. 243, 72 PM' ilOl.
But see Queen City Printing Co. v.
[Wholly Deficient Pleacliugs.
McAden (1902), 131 N. C. 17 ~, 42 , ' , E.
Waiver of Defects of ubstunce.
575, and O'Donohoe v. Polk (l 95), 45
The objection that a pl a.ding does not Neb. 510, 63 :N. W. 829, where it wa. held
tate fact con titutiug a cause of action that the want of a material allegation i ·
or defence is never waived, but may be wa ived by failure to demur. .'ee also
raised at any tage of the proceeding : Cook v. Am. Ex. Bank (1901 ), 129 r. C.
O'Toole z" :Faulkner ( 1902), 29 Wash. 544, 149, 39 S. E. 746; Duer t 1'. t. Loni
tamping Co. (1901), 163 Mo. 607, 5:3
70 Pac. 5 ; Jone v. St. Paul, etc. Rv. Co.
', w. 827.
(1 96), 16 Wah. 25, 47 Pac. 226; Hoffman v. McCracken (1902) , 16 1\Io. 337,
Pleading over after demurrer for want
67 S. W. i8; Lilly v. Menke (1894), 126 of facts has been overrnletl i ' not a waiv r
Mo. 190, 28 . W. 643; McPeak v. l\lo. of the objection: Epper on v. Postal T l.
Pac. Ry. Co. (1 95), 12 Mo. 617, 30 Co. (1900), 155 l\[o. 346, 50 . W. 795;
. W. l iO; State ex rel. r. Thomp.ou Hoffman v. McCrack n (1902), 16 l\l o.
(1 99), 149 :.\lo. 441, 51 S. W. 9 ; Epper- 337, 67 S. W. 7 ; Jone - v. St. Paul, ete.
• on v. Po ta! Tel. Co . (1900), 155 Mo. 346, Ry. Co. (1 96), 16 Wash. 25, 47 Pac. 226
50 ' . W. 795; Wells v. Mutual Benefit (but see Hardin v. [ullin (1 9i), 16 Wa h.
As 'n (I 94), 126 l\Io . 630, 29 '. W. 607, 647, 48 Pac. 349, where it i, held that au
0
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to the nature of in uffici nt an l lefecti e av rm nts,
uni\er all.r approved in . . . he ab tract, it ha om tim

CIVIL REMEDIES.

stated, as to the nature of insufficient and defective averments,

has been universally approved in the abstract, it has sometimes

affirmative waiver of the demurrer waives

the ubjcctiou) ; Cox v. Yeazel (1896), 49

>'cl.. .'U'?, 68 N. W. 483 ; Hopewell v. Mc-

Grew (1897), 50 Neb. 789, 70 X. W. 397

(but see Palmer r. Caywood (1902), 64

Neb. 372, 89 N. W. 1034, apparently con-

tra); Henderson v. Turngren (1894), 9

Utah, 432, 35 Pac. 495 ; Seckinger v.

Philibert Co. (1895), 129 Mo. 590, 31

S. W. 957 ; Thompson v. Brazile (1898),

65 Ark. 495, 47 S. \V. 299.

An objection to the sufficiency of a

pleading made for the fir.«t time in the

Supreme Court is not favored, and the

jdeadiug will be liberally construed :

Brothers v. Brothers (1901), 29 Colo. 69,
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66 Pac. 901 ; Colorado Fuel & Iron Co. r.

Four Mile Ry. Co. (1901), 29 Colo. 90, 6G

Pac. 902; Sciiool District v. Fianigan

(1901), 28 Colo. 431, 65 Pac. 24; Insur-

ance Co. V. Bonner (1897), 24 Colo. 220,

49 Pac. 366; Latenser v. Misner (1898),

56 Neb. 340, 76 N. W. 897.

In South Carolina the court has held

that tlie statute which provides that the

objection that facts are not stated sufficient

to constitute a cau.se of action is not waived

by failure to demur, applies only to the

Circuit Court and not to the Supreme

Court. Hence the objection cannot be

raised for the first time in the Supreme

Court, but is waived if not rai.se<l below :

Green r. Green (1897), 50 S. C. 514, 27

S. E. 952 ; Garrett v. Weinberg (1897), 50

S. C. 310, 27 S. E. 770; Hillhouse v. Jen-

nings (1901), 60 S. C. 373, 38 S. E. 599.

In Iowa it is lield, in a long line of

decisions, that tlie question whether a

pleading states a cause of action is waived

unless it is raised by demurrer or motion

in arrest of judgment : Alexander v. Grand

Lodge (1903), — la. — , 93 N. \V. 508;

Enix V. Iowa Cent. R. R. Co. (1901), 114

la. 508, 87 N. W. 417 ; Osborne r. Metcalf

(1900), 1 12 la. 540, 84 N. W. 685 ; Dubuque

Lumber Co. v. Kimball (1900), 111 la. 48,

82 N. \V. 458 ; Pier.son v. School District

(1898), 106 la. 695, 77 N. W. 494; Haden

affirmati\• waiY r f th demurrer waives
th
bj cct'ou ) ; ox v. Yeazel (1 96 ), 49
~ • b ..'3 .J.:J, 6
. ,V, 4 3; Hopewell v. Mc·
Gr w (1 9i ), 50 .·eb. 7 9 i O ~. \Y. 397
(hut e Palmer i" a ·wood (1902), 6-1
... eb. 372. 9 )l. W . 1034 apparently contra ; H oder on i-. Tnrno-ren (l 9.J.), 9
"Ltah , 4.'32 35 Pac. 495;
ecking r i:.
Ph1lib rt Co. (1 95), 129 Io. 590, 31
. \V. 95 7 ; Thompon v. Brazile (1 9 ),
65 .\rk. 495 , -17 . W. 299.
An olijec ion to the ufficiency of a
pl ading made for the fir t time in the
upreme ourt i not favored, and the
pl ead iug will be liberally con ·trued :
Broth er i:. Brother (1901), 29 Colo. 69,
66 Pac. 901 ; olorado Fuel & Irou Co. v.
F our :\1ile Ry. Co. (1901 ), 29 Colo. 90, 66
P ac. 902 ·
chool Di -trict v. Flanigan
( 1901 ), 2 Colo. 431, 65 Pac. 24; In uran ee Co. v. Bonner (1 97 ), 2-! Colo. 220,
43 I ac. 366; Laten. er v. :M i ner ( 1 9 ),
56 'N"eb. 340, 76 X. W. 897 .
In outh Carolina the court ha held
t hat the . tatu te which pro\'i de- that the
objection that foe are not tated ufficient
t eo n titute a cause of action i not waiYed
by failure to demur, applie only to the
ircuit Court and not to the Supreme
ourt. Hence the objection cannot be
rai eel for the fir ·t time in the Supreme
ourt, Lut i waived if not rai ·ed below:
Green v. reen (l 97), 50 . C. 5 14, 27
. E . 952; Garrett v. Weinberg (1 9i), 50
'. C. 310, 2i . E. iiO ; Hillh u e v. J en. E. 599.
11ing (1901 ), 60 . . 373, 3
In Iowa it i held, in a long line of
deci ion , that the que ·t ion whether a
pleading tate a cau e of action i wai ,·ed
unl
it i rai ed by demurrer or moti u
in arre t of judgm nt: Alexander v. rand
L dg ( 1903), - Ia. -, 93 . \V. 50 ;
Enix v . Iowa Cent. R. R. o. (1901), 114
Ia. 50 , 7 • . W. 41 7 ;
borne v. l\letcalf
(1900), 112 Ia. 540, 4 I . W. 6 5; ubuque
Lu m be r o. 1:. Kimball (1900) , 111 Ia. 4 ,
2 , ~. W . 45 , ; Pi r. on 1'. , chool Di trict

V. Sioux City, etc. R. R. Co. (1896), 99 la.

735, 68 N. \V. 733 ; Zundeiowitz v. Web-

ster (1896), 96 la. 587, 65 N. W. 835;

Fulmer v. Mahaska County (1894), 92 la.

20, 60 N. W. 207 ; McCorkcU v. Karhoff

(1S94), 90 la. .545, 58 N. W. 913 ; Manwell

V. Burlington, etc. R. R. Co. (1894), 89 la.

708, 57 N. W. 441.

lu Washington it was lield in State ex

ri'l. V. Indemnity Ass'n (1898), 18 Wash.

514, 52 Pac. 234, tliat a motion for a non-

suit on the grouud that the complaint

failed to state a cause of action w:is prop-

erly- denied, where tliere was no denmrrer

and the defect had been cured by the ad-

mission of proof without objection. And

in Mosher v. Bruhu (1896), 15 Wash. 332,

46 Pac. 397, it was held tliat where the

( 1 9), l Oli

v. , ioux

Ia. 6 5, 77 N . W. 494; ITacl n

ity, tc. . l . Co . (l 96), 9. Ia.
• •. \V. 7.'3 3 ; Znntl lowitz v. W b-

t ' r {I <G), 96 fa. 5 7, 5
. W. 35 ;
Fulmer r. :\!aha. ka Con11ty (1 94), 92 , .
!.:!O, GO .1. 1 • W. 207 ; ).JcCorkdl v. Karhoff

( 1 94), 90 la. 545, 5
. W. 9 13; l\Ianw 11
v. Burlingt n, tc. R.R. C . (1 94),
Ia.
7 ' - 7 . w. 441 .
lu \V ash iuo-tou it wa · h Id in tate x
rel. v. Intl nrnity A 'n ( l 9 ), 1 \Va h.
514, 52 Pac. 234, that a moti on for a nonuit on he gronnd that th
omplaint
failed t tate a cau e of ac ion wa , proprly denied where th re wa no demurrer
and the lefect bad been ured by the ad mi ion of proof without objecti 11. \n d
in :\Io h r v. Bruhn (I 96) 15 \\'a h. 3:32,
46 Pac. 397, it wa held that where the
obj ction that a complaint did n t tat a
cau -e of action wa rai d by cl murr r,
ancl then abandoued, it an11 t be i'Uu equently rai ed. To the am effect i
Hardin r. i\lullin ( l 97), 16 \Ya h. 6-!i , 4
Pac. 3.J.9.
\Vi co11 in, also, eem to hold that a
failure to ea onably object to a fatally
defective complaint i a waiYer of he defect. •' ee Bigelow v. Town of \ a hburu
(1 9 ), 9 Wi . 553, i 4 N . W . 362 · \'\~ 11
v. W e tern Pa ing & upply o. (l 97 ),
96 \Vi . 11 6, 70 N. W. 1071.

Form of Obj ction .
An object ion to the in tr od uction of a ny
evidence, on the ground that the mplaint
doe not tate a cau e of a tion, need not
pecify wherein the complaint i in uffi.cieut: Wylly v. Grig by ( 199 ),11 . D .
49 1, i
. W. 957. Bu t a motion t d ir ct
a ;-ertli t for defendant becau e the viden

IMPERFECT OR

I~FOR1\1

L ALLEGATIO 'S.

607

IMPERFECT OR INFORMAL ALLEGATIONS.

607

been departed from, and pleadings have been wholly condemned,

which, according to the criterion established by numerous cases,

been departed from, and pl a.ding hav been wholly condemned,
which, according t the cri erion e tabli hed by numerous cases,

151 IiuL 1, 49 N. E. 1064, that where the

sufficiency of a complaint is attacked for

the first time on iippeal, it must be on the

grountl that it does not state facts suffi-

cient to constitute a cause of action, and

an attack on the ground that it tloes not

state facts sufficient to entitle plaintiff to

the relief prayed will not be considered.

Methods of Raising Question.

The failure of a complaint to state a

cause of action may l)e availed of by de-

murrer, by objection to evidence, by mo-

tion for judgment on tlie pleadings, by

motion in arrest of judgment, or on mo-

tion for a new trial : Consolidated Canal

Co. V. Peters (1896), Ariz., 46 I'ac. 74.
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After failure to demur, the method of

raising the question of the sufficiency of

the pleading to state a cause of action or

defence, which is not waived, is by motion,

either for judgment on the pleadings or

for new trial : James River Bank v. Pur-

chase (1900), 9 N. D. 280, 83 N. W. 7.

Held in the following cases that a judg-

ment on the pleadings was properly given

where they are fatally defective : Finley

V. City of Tucson (1900), Ariz., 60 Pac.

872; Goldwater v. Bowen, (1900), Ariz.,

62 Pac. 691 ; Hutchison v. Myers (1893),

.52 Kan. 290, 34 Pac. 742. Nothing out-

side the pleadings can be cousidered in

passing on such a motion : McCoy t\

Jones (1899), 61 0. St. 119, 55 N. E. 219.

A judgment on tlie pleadings is the equiva-

lent of the common-law judgment non

obstante veiedicto : Crew v. Hutcheson

(1902), 115 Ga. 511, 42 S. E. 16.

In Boyer v. Commercial Building Co.

(1900), 110 la. 491,81 N. W. 720, the court

said : " When the case came on for trial,

defendant objected to the introduction of

any evidence, because no cause of action

Avas stated in the petition. This objection

was entered of record and overruled.

The first assignment of error is based

upon this action of the court. This sort

of oral demurrer has no place in our prac-

tice, and we think the trial court was

fully justified in so disposing of it." To

snme effect, see Van Sickle v. Keith

(1893), 88 la. 9, 55 N. W. 42. Held,

in Sackman r. Sackman (1898), 143 Mo.

576, 45 S. \V. 264, that such an objection

would bo sustained only where the plead-

ing was so defective that a motion in

arrest would lie.

The legal sufficiency of facts alleged in

a complaint must be tested either by de-

murrer before trial or by motion in arrest

of judgment after verdict, but cannot be

tested by a motion for nonsuit during the

trial: Cook v. Morris (1895), 66 Conn.

196, 33 AtL 994.

In Georgia, it was held, in Fleming v.

Roberts (1901), 114 (}a. 634, 40 S. E. 792,

that tlie question of the sufficiency of a

151 Ind. 1, 49 N. E. 1064, that where the

in

uffi ciency of a complaint i attacked for
the fir. t t im on :1ppeal, it must be on the
ground that it does not state fact su fficieut to co nstitute a cause of actiou, and
an attack on the ground that it does not
state fact -ufficient to entitle plaintiff to
the r eli ef prayed will not be considered.

576, 45

ackman v. , ackman ( l 98), 143 Mo.
. \V. 2G4, that u h an objection
woultl be su ·tained only where the pleading wa
o defective that a motion in
arre t w uld lie.
The legal sufficiency of facts alleged in
a complai11t nm t Le t ted ither by demurrer before trial r by motion in a~re ·t
of judgment after verdict, but cannot be
Methods of Raising Question.
te. ted by a motion for non. nit during the
The failure of a complaint to state a trial: Cook v. Morris (I 95), 66 Conn.
cause of action may be availed of by de- 196, 3.3 Atl. 994.
murrer, b_v objection to ev id ence, by moIn Georgia, it '"a held, in Fleming i-.
tion for judgment on the pleadings, by Roberts ( 190 1), 11 4 Ga. 634, 40 S. E. 792,
motion in arrest of j udgment, or on rno- that the question of the sufficiency of a
tiou for a new trial : Cousolidatetl Canal petition cannot be raisetl by objection to
Co. v. Peter ( 1896 ), Ariz., 46 Pac. H. evidence. "If a petition is not good in
After failure to elem ur, the method of · sub. tance, that is, taking every allegation
rai sing the question of the sufficiency of to be true, it fails to set forth a cause of
the pleading to state a cause of action or action, objection must be made either bv a
defence, which is not waived, is by motion, general demurrer. or motion to di mi,s the
either for judgment on the pleadings or ca. e before verrlict, or by a motion in arrest
fo r new trial: James River Bank v. Pur- of judgment, or a motion to :<et asicle the
judgment after verdict. \Ve know of no
chase (1 900), 9 N. D. 280, 83 N. W. 7.
Held in the following cases that a judg- other way in which the leg-al sufficienc:m ent on the pleadings was properly given of a petition can be properly brought
wh ere they are fatally defective : F inley before the court." But this ease was
v. City of Tucson (1 900), A1•iz., 60 Pac. overruled in K elly v. Strouse ( 1903) , 11 6
872; Goldwater v. B owen, (1900), Ariz., Ga. 872, 43 S. E. 280. The rule in Crew
62 Pac. 691; Hutchison v. Myers (1893), v. Hutcheson ( 1902), 11 5 Ga. 511, 42 S. E.
!52 Kan . 290, 34 Pac. 742. Nothing out- 16, in which it was held that it was not
side the pleadi ngs can be consideretl in error to refuse to allow a defendant to suspassing on such a motion: McCoy v. t ain by evidence the allegations of a plea.
Jones (1899), 61 0. St. 119, 55 N. E. 219. which set forth no defence, was extended
A judgment on the pleadings is th e equ irn- to cover the petition as well as the plea.
It is not the office of a motion to cure
lent of the co mmon-law judgment non
obstante veredicto : Crew v . Hutcheson fatal defects. Such objections shoul d be
made by demurrer: Chicago, R. I. & Pac.
(1902), 115 Ga. 511, 42 S. E. 16.
"" In Boyer v. Commercial Building Co. Ry. Co. v. Shepherd (1894), 39 eb. 523,
(1900), 110 Ia. 491 , 81 N. W. 720, the court 58 N. W. 189 ; Holgate v. Downer (1899) ,
said: " When the case came on for trial, 8 Wyo. 334, 57 P ac. 918.
defendant objected to the introduction of
In California it is held that pleading
any evid ence, because no cause of action evidence is a fatal defect, and hence the
was stated in the petition. This objection objection may be rai ed by a general dewas entered of r ecord and overruled. murrer for want of facts: McCaughey v.
Th e first assi/:\nment of error is based Schuette (1897 ), 117 Cal. 223, 46 Pac.
upon this action of the court. Thi s sort 666, 48 Pac. 1088.
of oral demurrer has no place in our pracQuestion Raised by Court on its own
tice, and we think the trial court was Motion. In Thomasv. Franklin (1894), 42
full y justified in so disposing of it. " T o Neb. 310, 60 N. W. 568, the court said:
same effect , see V an Sickle v. K eith "This court in an action at l aw or equity
(1893 ), 88 Ia. 9, 55 N. W . 42. H eld, will, on its own motion, look into the
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set forth a cause of action, although in an incomplete and imper-

fect manner. Some illustrations of this strict method of decision

are given in the note.^

e f r h a cau e £ ac ion al thou ·h in an incomplete and irnperfec manner.
ome illu trations of this rict meth d of deci ion
re giY n in then te. 1

record of a case brought on appeal or

error, for the purpose of detenniuiug

whether tlie petition upou which the ac-

tion is founded states a cause of action,

and whether the court has jurisdiction of

the subject-matter of the action."

Predicating Error on Ruling on Demurrer.

record of a case brought on appeal or
error, for the purpo e of d terminiog
whether the petition upon which th action i founded tate a cau
f action,
and wheth r the court ha juri ·diction of
the ubject-matter of th action."

A defendant who pleads over after

a demurrer is sustained to his answer,

waives the right to have such ruling con-

sidered on appeal : Frick i\ Kabaker

(1902). 1 16 la. 494, 90 N. W. 49S ; Nystuen

V. Hanson (1902),— la. —,91 N. W. 1071.

A statute in Iowa (Acts 25th Gen. Assem.,

ch. 96) reads as follows: '"When a de-
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murrer shall be overruled, and the party

demurring shall answer or reply, the rul-

ing on the demurrer shall not be consid-

ered an adjudication of any question

raised by the demurrer ; and in such case

the sufficiency of the pleading thus at-

tacked shall be determined as if no de-

murrer had been filed." Construing this

statute, the court, in Frum v Keeney

(1899), 109 la. 393, 80 N. W. 507, said':

" It was not designed to permit a review

of the ruliug on a demurrer wiiich had

been overruled, where the party demur-

ring had afterwards filed an answer or

reply, but to provide that the ruling

should not have tlie effect of an adjudi-

cation, and to permit the party demurring

unsuccessfully to cjuestion the sufficiency

of the pleading in other ways during tlie

progress of the trial, as by a motion to

direct the verdict ur in arrest of judgment.

In other words, in such a case the party

waived his right to complain of tlie over-

ruling of the demurrer by pleading over,

but did not waive his right to attack the

pleading on the grounds upon which his

demurrer was founded at any subsequent

time in the progress of the case ; for the

statute expressly ])rovi(ied that where a

demurrer was overruled tiie sufficiency of

the pleading was to ' be determined as if

no demurrer had been filed.' " See the

following cases in whicli this statute lias

been discussed; Adams v. Holden (1900),

111 la. 54, 82 X. W. 408; Buchanan v.

Blackhawk Coal Works (1903), — la. — ,

9;5 N. \V. 51 ; Krause r. Lloyd (1897), 100

la. 660, 69 N. W. 1002; Long ?'. Mellet

(1895), 94 la. 548, 63 N. W. 190. See

also VVyland v. (iriffitli (1895), 96 la. 24,

64 N. W. 673; Cook v. Doty (1894), 91

la. 721, 59 N. \V. 35.

By answering after his demurrer to tiie

complaint is overruled a defendant waives

an exception to tlie decision on the de-

murrer: Cook V. Kittson (1897), 68 Minn.

474, 71 N. W. 670; Thompson i-. Ellcnz

(1894), 58 Minn. 301, 59 N. W. 1023.

Filing an amended pleading after a

demurrer thereto has been sustained, is a

Predicating Error on Ruling on Demurrer.
A defendant who plead~ over after
a demurrer i ~ u tained to hi . an wer,
waive the right to ha;-e uch ruling conidered on appeal: Frick v. Kabaker
( l 902), 116 Ia. 494, 90 N. W. 49 ;
tuen
v. Han on (1902), - Ia.-, 91 . W. 1071.
A tatute in Iowa ( \ct. 25th Gen. A em.,
ch. 96) read as follow : •· When a demurrer hall be OYerruled, and the party
demurring hall an wer or reply, the ruling on the demurrer . hall not be on idered an adjudication of any que tion
rai ed by the demu r rer ; and in such ca e
the ufficiency of the pleading thu attacked hall be determined a if no demurrer had been filed. ' Con truing thi
tatute, the court, in Frum 1..· Keeney
(1 99), 109Ia.393, 0 r.W. 507, aid:
"It wa not de igned to permit a review
of the ruling on a demurrer which harl
been oYerruled, where the party demurring ltad afterward filed an a nswer or
reply, but to pr ,·ide that the ruling
should not have the effect of an adjudication, and to permit the party <l murring
un ucce fully to que tion the uffi iency
of the pleading in othe r way,, <luring the
progres of the trial, a" by a motion to
direct the verdict or in arre t of judgment.
I n other words, in uch a a e t h party
wai,·ed hi right to complain of the overrulino- of the demurrer by pleading over,
hut <lid not wai \'e hi. right to attack the
pleading on the ground upon whi h hi
<lernurrer wa founded at an
ub equent
ti me in the progr . · of th ca e ; for the
·tatute expre ly provi<l d that whcr a
de•nurrer wa overrul d the uffici ncy of
the plea<linrr wa to 'be determined a· if
n1> <lcmurrrr had b e n fil d.'"
, · e the
following ca. e · iu which th i · tatute ha
l1eeu 1li ·us. ed: Adam v. IIol<l n ( l900),
1 l l Ia. 54, 2 ~ ~. '"\r. 4G ; Buchanan v.

Blackhawk Coal Work (1903), - Ia. - ,
:J N. W. 51 ; Krau e v. Ll yd (1 97), 100
Ia. 666, 6 T. \ \ • 1062; Long v. Mell t
(l 95), 94 Ia. 54 , 63 N. W. 190.
ee
al o Wylan I v. Griffith {l 95) 96 Ia. 24,
6+ . W. 673; Cook v. Doty (1 894) , 9 1
Ia. i21, 59 N. W . 35.
y an wering after bi demurrer to the
complaint i v rruled a. defendant waiYe
au exception to the de i ion on the <lemurr r: Cook v. Kitt ou ( I 9i) , 6 Mi on.
474- , 'i l N. W . 670; Tho mp on i·. E llenz
(1 94), 5 Minn. 30 1, 59 N. W. 1023.
Fil ing an amended pleading a f t r a
demurrer thereto bas been u tained, i a
wa.iver of erro r in u taining the demu rrer: Heman v. Glann (l 95), 129 i\1 .
325, 3 1 S. W. 5 9; Ganceart v. H enry
(I 93 ), 9 Cal. 28 1, 33 Pac. 92 ; B erry v.
B a r ton (1902), 120kla.221, 71 Pac. 1074.

P leading Con trued on General Demur rer: J arrell v. Hailroad Co. ( 1900) , 5
. C. 49 1, 36
. E . 910 (negli gence);
Morri on v. City of Eau laire (19 2),
115 Wi . 53 , 92 N. W. 2 O (n gl igenc ) ;
Andrew v.
hool D i tri ·t ( 1896) , 49 'eb.
420, 6
. W. 63 1 (a tion by a firm in
partner hip name); Aurora Water
. v.
Aur ra (1 95), 129 Mo. 540, 31 . W. 946
(action again t city to recoYer hydrant
rentals); Duryee v. F r iar ( 1897), l
Wash. 55, 50 lac. 5 3 (action to njoin
city from i uino- bond ) ; De Baker i-.
outhern
al. Ry.
o. {1 95), 106 al.
257, 39 Pa . 610.J
1
cofi el<l. v. WhitelegO' , 49 N. Y. 259,
261; IIathawa.r t·. Quinb.\·, l
. Y.
3 6; D oyle v. Phrenix In . o., 44 al.
- 64, 26 ; H lm . v. v~tilliam .. 16 l\fiun.
164, 16 .
cofi l<l. v. Whi elegge wa.- an
action to r e over po e ~ iou f a 1 attel.
'l h om plaint alleo-ed that he defendant
ha<l become po e ed of and wr ngfull r
detained from th plaintiff a piano of the
value of, t ., and d m ncl d the u · ual
judgment. The an w r cl uied the po h
.,'on of any pr perty b longing
pl a intiff, d ui d the wr ngful tal ing, and
denied the plaintiff' own r hip.
The
om plaiut wa. rli mi .. <l at the tri, 1, on
th· grou nd that it tated nc cause of ac-
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60~)

KEDU.XDANT OR IRRELEVANT ALLEGATIONS.

60 :)

§ 445. *551. II. Redundant, Immaterial, and Irrelevant Allega-

tions, and the Mode of Objecting to and Correcting them. Dis-

4 45.

* 551.

t io ns, a n d t he

II. R edundant, Immaterial, and Irrelevant A llegaM ode of O bjecting to and Correcting them.

Dis-

tinctions. In a lewal action all matter stated in addition to the

tiou. The opinion of the New York

t in c tions.

I n a 1 gal action all matt r stat d in ad<liti n to th

Court of Appeals, by Folger J., after re-

citing; the common-law rule in replevin,

that the action could only be maintained

by one who had the general or a special

pro])erty in the chattel, that this property

must have been averred in the declara-

tion, that the action under the code takes

exactly the place of the old replevin, and

that the plaintiff in it must have a prop-

erty in the chattel, proceeds as follows

(p. 261): "Nor is it less nece.ssary now

than then for- the plaintiff to aver the facts

which constitute his cause of action. He

must allege the facts, and not the evi-
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dence ; he must allege facts, and not con-

clusions of law. The plaintiff here alleges

that the defendant wrong/ally detains from

liiiii tlie chattel. If, indeed, this be true,

then it must be that the plaintiff has a

general or special property in the chattel

and the right of immediate possession.

But uidess he has that general or special

property and right of immediate posses-

sion, it cannot be true that it is wrongfully

detained from him. The last — the wrong-

ful detention — grows from the first, —

the property and right of possession. The

last is the conclusion. The first is the

fact upon which that conclusion is based ;

it is the fact which, in a pleading, must

be alleged. Is not the statement of a

conclusion of law, without a fact averred

to support it, an immaterial statement 1 "

This decision is certainly technical to the

last degree when tested by the standard

established in the codes and in other

cases. The complaint was undoubtedly

imperfect ; but it set forth a cause of ac-

tion, although in an incomplete manner.

The learned judge concedes that the aver-

ment " the defendant wrongfully detains

from the plaintiff " necessarily presupposes

and implies a property and right of pos-

session in the plaintiff. The only defect,

therefore, consisted in an allegation of

the evidence, or perhaps of the legal con-

clusion, instead of the issuable fact. The

defendant was not misled ; his answer

shows that he understood the claim, and

it raised all the issues upon which he re-

lieil. The complaint is, indeed, a striking

illustration of a defective pleading, which

shohld be corrected by motion, and not

attacked by demurrer; and the opin-

ion is a clear and convincing argument

showing why such a motion ought to be

granted ; but it violates the liberal ])rin-

ciple of construction, and returns to the

common-law rule requiring a strict inter-

pretation against the pleader. The facts

and opinion in Hathaway v. Quinby,

which is quite similar in its general

character, and in Doyle v. Phoenix Ins.

Co., may be found supra, §§ *5.'}1, *5.35.

tion . The opinion of th
~e w York
Court of App als, by Folger J., after reciting the common-law rule in replevin,
that the action could onl.v be maintained
by one who had the general or a pecial
propc rt!' in the chattel, that thi. proper ty
mnst have been averred in the declarati oc, that the action under the code take
exactly the place of the old repleviu, and
that the plaintiff in it mu.t ha,·e a property in the chattel, proceeds as follows
(p. 26 1) : " or i it less ncce~ ·ary now
than then for. the plaintiff to arnr th e facts
whirh constitute hi cause of action. He
mu t allege the fact , and not the evidence; he mu · t all ege farts, and not conclusion of law. The plaintiff here all eges
that the defendant wrongfit!{y detains from
him the chattel. If, incleed, thi be true,
then it mu ·t be that th e plaintiff ha a
general or special property in the chattel
and the right of immediate pos e ion.
But unlc s he has that general or pecial
property and rig ht of immediate pos es.·ion, it cannot be true that it is wrongfu ll y
detained. from him. The last - the wrong·
ful detention - grows from the first, th e proper ty and right of po e ion. T he
la t i- the conclusion . The fi rst is the
fact u pon which that conclusion is based;
it is the fact which, in a pleading, mu t
be alleged. I s not the statement of a
conclu. ion of law, without a fact averred
to suppurt it, an immater ial statement'!"
This deci ion is certainly technical to the
last degree when tested by the standard
establi hed in the codes and in other
ca es. T he complaint wa undoubtedly
imperfect; but it set forth a cause of action, although in an incomplete manner.
The learned judge concedes that the averment " the defendant wrongfully detains
from the plaintiff" necessarily presuppo cs
~nd implies a property and right of posse ion in th e plaintiff. The only defect,
therefo re, con isted in an allegation of
the evidence, or perhap. of the legal con·
du ion, in tead of the is uable fact. T he
defendan t was not m isled; his answer
hows that he understood the claim, and
it raised all the issues upon which he re-

lied. The complaint i ',indeed, a trik in g
illu tratiou of a defecti\• pl adiug, whitl1
shohld be corr cted by motion, and not
attacked by demurrer; and the opinion i- a clear anti convincing argumen t
howin g why uch a motion ought to be
granted; but it violate. the liberal principle of con truction, aud returns to the
comm on-law rule requiring a strict interpretation against the pleader. The fact
and opinion in H athaway v. Quinhy,
which is quite imilar in it general
character, and in Doyle v. Phrenix Iw.
Co., may be found supra, §§ * 5~1, * 535.
The following ca e give further illu tra tion s of the rul e as tated in the text, that defects of form merely are waived
by go ing to trial without objection and
are cured by verd ict, while defects which
go to the cause of action itself are not
thus waived nor cured. There i not,
however, an ab. olute unanimity on this
poin t among the deci ion ; . ome of them
cannot be reconciled with the general curr ent of auth ority, nor, in my opinion,
with the letter and spirit of the code .
J efferson v. Hale, 31 Ark. 286; P eople v.
Sloper, 1 Idaho, 158 ; Haw e v. Burgmere, 4 Colo. 313 ; Re\·elle's Heir v.
Claxon's Heirs, 12 Bush, 558; Thomp on
v. Killian, 25 Minn. l l l; Reed v. Pixley,
25 id. 482; Chestersou v. Mun on, 27 id.
498 ; International Bk. of t. Louis v.
Franklin Cy., 65 l\Io. 105; State v . Bartlett, 68 id. 581; Ri chardson v. H oole, 13
N ev. 492; Youngstown v. Moore, 30 Ohio
St. 133; State v. Cason, 11 S. C. 392 ;
Edgerly v. Farmers' lns. Co., 43 Iowa, 587;
:Meyer t'. Du buque C}'., 43 id. 592; Pol ter
v. Rucker, 16 Kan. 11 5; Moody v. Arthur,
16 id . 4 19; Castle v. Hou ton, 19 id. 417;
Sheridan v. Jack on, 72 T. Y. 170, 172,
173; treeter v. Chicago, etc. R Co., 40
Wis. 294, 301; niv. of Xotre Dame v.
Shanks, 40 id. 352; , mith v . Barron Cy.
Sup., 44 id. 6 6; Va ar v. Thomp on,
46 id. 345; .. tetler v. hicago &
. \V.
Ry. Co., 49 id. 609; Gander v. State, 50
I nd. 539, 541; Green v . Louthain, 49
id. 139; Donellan v. Hardy, 57 id. 393;
Galvin v. W oollen, 66 id. 464; Indian39
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allegations of issuable facts, and in an equitable action all such

matter in addition to the averments of material facts atfecting the

remedy, is unnecessar}', and therefore immaterial and redundant.

Whenever, therefore, the issuable facts constituting a legal cause

of action, or the material facts upon ^vhich the right to equitable

relief is wholly or partially based, are pleaded, all the details of

probative matter by which these facts are to be established, and

all the conclusions of law inferred therefrom, are plainly embraced

within this description. It would not be strictly correct to say

that statements of evidence or of legal conclusions are, under all

circumstances, redundant. If a complaint or petition should, in

violation of the principles established by the reformed procedure,

allesre the evidence of some issuable or material fact instead of

the fact itself, or should state a conclusion of law in place of the

proper fact or facts which support it, these averments would be

irregular, imperfect, insufficient, and liable to correction by a

motion; but they might not be necessarily redundant. If the

pleading was not reformed, and if the defect was not so serious

as to render it demurrable, it would be treated on the trial as
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sufficient; and the statement of probative matter or of legal

conclusions would take the place of the issuable or material facts

which ought to have been averred, and would thus become mate-

rial. It is self-evident, however, that if the essential doctrines

of pleading are complied with, and the proper facts constituting

the cause of action, or affecting the equitable relief, are all set

forth, then any detail of evidence or any conclusion of law is

necessarily surplusage, and redundant. An allegation is irrele-

vant Avhen the issue formed by its denial can have no connection

with nor effect upon the cause of action. ^ Every irrelevant

allegation is immaterial and redundant: but the converse of this

proposition is not true; every immaterial or redundant allegation

is not irrelevant. This general description can only be explained

and illustrated by an examination of individual cases, of which a

few have been collected in the note as examples. ^

apolis & V. Ti. Co. V. McCaffery, 72 id. i CSmith r. Smith (1897), 50 S. C. 54,

294; Parker v. Clayton, 72 id. 307 ; New- 27 S. E. 545, quoting the text. See also

man v. Perrell, 73 id. 153; Charlestown Ragsdale v. Railway Co. (1901), 60 S. C.

Sch. Dist. V. Hay, 74 id. 127; Smock v. 381, 38 S. E 609.]

Harrison, 74 id. 348; Lewi.s y. Bortsfield, ^ Bowman r. Sheldon, 5 Sandf. 657,

75 id. 390; King v. Montgomery, 50 Cal. 660; Fasnacht v. Stehn, 53 Barh. 650;

1 15 ; Hanlin v. Martin, 53 id. 321. Hunter v. Powell, 15 How. Pr. 221 ; Fab-

alleg tions of i suable fact and in an quitable action all such
matter in addition to th averment of mat rial fa ts affectin , the
r medy i unn ce ar • and th ref r immaterial and redundant.
"'\ h never therefor , the i uable fact con tituting a legal cau e
of action or th material fact upon which he right to quitable
reli f i wl ally or partially ba ed are pl c <l d, all the d ail f
prohatiYe ma ter by which h e fact are to be stabli be 1 and
all the conclu i n of la inf rred therefrom are plainly mbra e
within thi description. It would not be trictly correct t ay
that tatements of evidence or of legal onclusions are, under all
1rcum tances, redundant. If a complaint or petition should, in
Yiohl.tion of the principles establi heel by the reformed proc <lure,
allege the evidence of ome i uable or material fact in t ad f
he fact it elf, or should tate a conclusion of law in place of th
prop r fact or facts which support it, th . averments would be
irregular, imperfect, in ufficient, and liable to correctjon by a
motion; but they might not be necessarily redundant. If the
pleading was not reformed, and if the defect was not so se1fou
as to render it demurrable, it would be treated on the trial as
ufficient; and tbe statement of probative matter or of 1 gal
conclu ion would take the place of the i uable or material fact
which ought to have been averred, and would thus become material. It is self-evident, however, that if the es ential doctrines
of pleading are complied with, and the proper facts con tituting
the cau e of action, or aff cting the eq aitable relief, are all set
forth then any detail of evidence or any conclu ion f law is
necessarily surplu age, and r dundant. An allegation i irr levant when the is ue form d by it denial can have no conn ction
with nor effect upon the cau e of action: 1 Ev ry irr 1 vant
allega i n i immaterial and redundant: but th conver
f tl i
pr p ition i not true; v ry immaterial r re iundant all gation
is not irr levant. Thi ger eral d crip i n can only be xplain d
, ntl i1lu trated y an examination of individual ca es, of which a
few hav been collected in th note a exampl . 2
apoli & V. R.
. v. McCaffery, 72 id.
29+; 1 arker 1·. Jayton , 72 id. 307 ; ewrn au 1J. l' rrell, 73 id. 15.'.3; harle t wn
. ·c- h . Di. t. v. Ila •, 74 id. 127; mo k 1.
Harri . on, 74 id . .'.34 ; L wi. v. Bort ·ti ld,
i5 i<l . .'.390; King v. fontgomer , 50 al.
l 15 ; Hanlin v. Martin, 53 id. 321.

l [
mith v. mith ( l 97), 50 . C. 54,
27 . E. 545, qu ting the text.
e al o
Rag dale v. Railway o. (1901), 60 . •
3 l , 3 ' . h . 609. J
2 Bowman L'h ldon, 5 andf. 657,
660; Fa oa ht . tehn, 53
arb. 650;
Hunter v. P well, 15 How. Pr. 221 ; •a.b-
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:\DA:T OR IllRELEVAXT ALLEGATION .

§ 446. * 552. Motion, not Demurrer, Proper Methocl of Objecting

to Superfluous Allegations. The rule is established by the unani-

§ 44 6. * o -2.

Motion, not D emurrer, Proper Method

of

Objecting

mous decisions of the courts, as well as by the provision found in

the codes, that the proper and onl}^ method of objecting to and

correcting redundant, immaterial, or irrelevant allegations in a

pleading, is a motion to strike out the unnecessary matter, and

not a demurrer, nor an exclusion of evidence at the trial. ^ The

new procedure thus furnishes, by means of these motions in cases

of insufficiency, redundancy, or irrelevancy, a speedy and certain

mode of enforcing the fundamental doctrines of pleading which

it has established, and of causing the complaints or petitions and

answers to present single, clear, and well-defined issues. At the

same time it prevents a sacrifice of substance to form, and a

decision of controversies upon technical points not involving the

merits, by requiring these objections to be taken before the trial,

and by regarding them as waived if the j^rescribed mode of

remedy is not resorted to. The courts have it in their power,

by encouraging these classes of motions, and by treating them

as highly remedial and important, to shape the pleading into an
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harmonious and consistent system, constructed upon the few

natural and j)hilosophical principles which were. adopted as its

foundation ; or they may, on the other hand, by discouraging a

resort to these corrective measures, and by treating them as idle,

unnecessary, or vexatious, suffer those principles to become for-

gotten, and to be finally abandoned, and may, thereby, lose all

ricotti V. Launitz, 3 Sandf. 743 ; Lee Bank prise Ins. Co., 45 Ind. 43, 55 ; Hynds v.

r. Kitching, 7 Bosw. 664; 11 Abb. Pr. Hays, 25 Ind. 31 ; Smith v. Countryman,

435; Cahill v. Palmer, 17 Abb. Pr. 196; 30 N. Y. 655; Simmons v. Eldridge, 29

Decker r. Mathews, 12 N. Y. 313 ; Gould How. Pr. 309 ; 19 Abb. Pr. 296; Cahill v.

V. Williams, 9 How. Pr. 51 ; St. John v. Palmer, 17 Abb. Pr. 196. See also Vliet

Griffith, 1 Abb. Pr. 39 ; O'Connor w. Koch, v. Sherwood, 38 Wis. 159: allegations

56 Mo. 253 ; Clague v. Hodgson, 16 Minn, stating a good cause of action should not

329, 334, 335 ; King v. Enterprise Ins. Co., be struck out on the objection that they

45 Ind. 43, 55 ; Hynds v. Hays, 25 Ind. 31 ; are irrelevant and redundant ; if they are

Booher r. Goldsborough, 44 Ind. 490, 498, improperly in the complaint, this is not

499 (duplicity) ; Loomis v. Youle, 1 Minn, the mode and ground of relief. Magee

175; Clark v. Harwood, 8 How. Pr. 470; v. Waupaca Cy. Sup , 38 Wis. 247 ; Biggs

Th rul is e ·tabli ·li cl l;y th unanimous deci ions of th court , a w ll as by th provi:-;ion found in
th cocles, that the proper and only method of objecting to aml
correcting r dundant, immat rial, or irreleYa11t aJlega.ti m; in a
pl ading, i a motion to strike out the mm c ::-;ary matter an<l
not a d murr r, nor an exclu ion of vidence at i.l1e trial. 1 Th
n w procedure thus furnishes, Ly rn ans of the motions in cas s
of insufficiency, redundancy, or irrelevancy, a speedy and certain
mode of enforcing the fundamental doctrines of pleading which
it ha established, and of causing the complaints or petitions and
answers to present single, clear, and well-d efined issues. At the
ame time it prevents a sacrifice of substance to form, and a
decision of controversies upon technical points not involving the
merits, by requiring these objections to be taken before the trial,
and by regarding them as -vv aived if the prescribed mode of
remedy is not resorted to . The courts have it in their power,
by encouraging these classes of motions, and by treating them
as highly remedial and important, to shape the pleading into an
harmonious and consistent system, constructed upon the few
natural and philosophical principles which were .adopted as its
foundation; or they may, on the other hand, by discouraging a
resort to these corrective measures, and by treating them as idle,
unnecessary, or vexatious, suffe.r those principles to become forgotten, and to be finally abandoned, and may, thereby, lose all
to Superfluous Allegations.

Edgerton v. Smith, 3 Duer, 614 ; Sellar v. v. Biggs, 50 id. 443 ; Hoffmann v. Kop-

Sage, 12 How. Pr. 531 ; 13 How. Pr. 230; pelkora, 8 Neb. 344; Johns v. Potter, 55

Lee V. Elias, 3 Sandf. 736 ; Lamoreux v. Iowa, 665 ; Cooper v. Frencdi, 52 id. 531 ;

Atlantic Mut. Ins. Co., 3 Duer, 680. See Schoonover v. Hinckley, 46 id. 207 ; Davis

also the additional cases cited in the next r. C. & W. W. R. li., 46 id. 389 ; Gabe v.

following notes. McGinnis, 68 Ind. 538; Harris v. Todd, 16

1 Loomis u. Youle, 1 Minn. 175 ; O'Con- Hun, 248; Smith v. Summerfield, 108

nor i: Koch, 56 Mo. 253 ; King v. Enter- N. C. 284.

ricotti v. Launitz, 3 Sand£. 743; L ee Bank
v. Kitching, 7 Bosw . 664; 11 Abb. Pr.
435; Cahill v. Palmer, 17 A bb. Pr. 196;
Decker i·. Mathews, 12 N. Y. 3 13; Gould
v. William , 9 How. Pr. 51; t. J ohn v.
Griffith, 1 A bb. Pr. 39; O'Connor v. Koch,
fi6 Mo. 253; Clag ue v. Hodgson, 16 Minn.
329, 334, 335; King v. Enterpr ise Ins. Co .,
45 Ind. 43 , 55; Hynds v. Hays, 25 Ind. 31;
B ooher r. Goldsborough, 44 Ind. 490, 498,
499 (duplicity); Loomis v. Youle, l l\Iinn.
175; Clark v. Harwood, 8 H ow. Pr. 470;
Edgerton 1• . Smith, 3 Duer, 614; Sellar v.
Sage, 1:2 How . Pr. 53 1 ; 13 How. P r . 230;
Lee v. E li a , 3 Sandf. 736; Lamoreux v.
Atlantic Mut. Ins. Co., 3 Duer, 6 O. See
ah;o the additional cases cited in the next
following notes.
1 Loomisv. Youle, l Minn . 175; O'Connor r . Koch, 56 Mo. 253; King v. Enter-

pri e Ins. Co., 45 Ind. 43, 55; Hynds v.
Hays, 25 Ind. 3 1 ; Smith v. Countryman,
30 N. Y. 655; Simmons v. Eldridge, 29
H ow. Pr. 309 ; 19 A bb. Pr. 296; Cahill v.
Palmer, 17 A bb. Pr. 196. See also Vliet
v. Sherwood, 38 Wis. 159: allegations
stating a good cause of act ion should not
be struck out ou the objection that they
are irrelevant and redundant; if they are
im properly in the complaint, this i not
the mode and ground of reli ef.
fagee
v. Waupaca Cy. up, 3 ·w is. 247; Bigg
v. Bigg , 50 id. 443; H offmann v. Koppelkora, 8 ~ eb. 344-; J ohu v. Potter, 55
Iowa, 665; Cooper i•. Fr nrh, 52 id. 531 ;
, choonover v. Hinckl ey, 46 id. 20i ; Davis
v. C. & W. \V. R.H., 46 id . 3c9: Gabe v.
McGinnis, 68 Ind. 538; Harri. v. Todd, 16
Hun, 248; Smith v. Summerfield, 108

N. C. 284.

6 :2

CIVIL RE:\IEDIES.

ev2

CIVIL REMEDIES.

the benefits which were designed, and \\hich could have been

obtained from the reform.^

th henefit which were l igned, and '' hi ch could ha e b en
btain d from the reform . 1

^ r Jiciliindnnt, Itntnntcrial , and Irrel-

l
evant Alleyatious.

[R edundant I1nniat e1•ia1 ancl Ir1'elevan t Allegations.

Motion Proper Remedi/. " A demurrer

is not a pruuiug hook, and canuot be used

to trim out immaterial aud irrelevant

matter. This must be done by motion:"

In re Estate of McMurray (1899), 107 la.

648, 78 N. W. 691. To the same effect

see Bolt v. Gray (1898), 54 S. C. 95, 32

S. E. 148; Duke f. Brown (1901), 113

Ga. 310, 38 S. E. 764; City of Butte v.

Peasley (1896). 18 Mont. 303, 45 I'ac. 210;

McGiliivray v. McGiilivray (1896), 9 S. D.

187, 68 N. W. 316 ; Campbell v. Equitable

Loan & Trust Co. (1901). 14 S. U. 483,

85 N. W. 1015.
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Form of Motion. A motion to strike

out portions of a pleading should desig-

nate with particularity tlie averments

which it attacks: Stuht v. Sweesy (1896),

48 Xeb. 767, 67 N. \V. 748; Keairnes v.

Durst (1899), 110 la. 114, 81 N. W. 238;

State ex inf. v. Fleming (1898), 147 Mo.

1, 44 S. W. 758. If the motion is too

broad, so that it cannot be sustained as

made, it must be overruled, thougli a

narrower motion might have been well

taken : Smith v. Meyers (1898), 54 Neb. 1,

74 N. W. 277 ; Chicago, B. & Q. R. R.

Co. v. Spirk (1897), 51 Neb. 167, 70 N. W.

926; Gilbert v. Loberg (1894), 86 Wis.

661, 57 N. W. 982.

lV/i<it may be stricken out as Surplusage.

A paragraph of a complaint which does

not allege any fact essential to the plain-

tiff's cause of action, should be stricken

out upon motion : Pitkin i'. New York &

New England K. R. Co. (1894), 64 Conn.

482, 30 Atl. 772. The court may, on its

own motion, strike out scandalous matter :

Morrison v. Snow (1903), 26 Utah 247, 72

Pac. 924. Averments of oral conversa-

tions between plaintiff and defendant prior

to the making of the written contract set

out in the pleading, are properly stricken

out on motion l)ecause merged in the

written instrument : Jordan v. Coulter

(1902), 30 Wa.sh. 116, 70 Pac. 257. It is

unnecessary to plead facts of which the

court will take judicial notice: George v.

State (1899), 59 Neb 163,80 N. W.486.

C'l/useifitencc of Retaining Surplnsaqe.

While unnece.ssfiry averments in a plead-

ing need not be proved (Kerr v. Topping

(1899), 109 la. 1.50, 80 N. W. 321), yet

they may be supported by evidence if

allowed to remain, and such evidence

should not be ruled out on objection :

Dentr. Hailroad (1901), 61 S. C. 329,39

S. E. 527; Hicks c. Southern Ry. (1902),

63 S. C. 559.41 S. E. 753; Smith v. Meyers

(1898), .54 Neb. 1, 74 N. W. 277.

In Kelly v. Clark (1898), 21 Mont. 291,

53 Pac. 959, the court said : " If a plaintiff

aver more than is necessary, and fail to

sustain immaterial aud redundant aver-

.\lotion Propel· R medlJ. "
demurrer
i not a pruuiu hook, aml cannot be u eel
o trim out immaterial antl irr l vant
matter. Thi mu t be done by motion:"
!11 re E · tate of ~Ic~Iurray ( 1 9), lOi la.
6-L, 7" .N. W. 691. To the ame ffect
see B olt t. Gray (1 98) 5-!
. 95, 32
s . E. 1-1-' · Duke t'. Brown (190 1), 113
a . 310, 3
. E. i64;
ity of Butte v.
Pea ler ( l 96), l :\font. 30.'3, 45 p, c. 210;
~Ic ilii\Tay 1:. ~lcGillivray (l 96), 9 . D.
l /, 6 N. W . 316; an1pbell v. Equitable
Loan & Tru t Co. (1901), 14 . D. 4-83,
5 x. \ . 1015.
Form of Jl otion . A motion to ctrike
out portion of a pleauing hould de ignate with particularity the averments
which it attack : 'tuht v. wee y (1 96) ,
4
b. 76i , 6i N. W. 74 ; Keairne v.
Dur t (1 99), 110 Ia. 114, 1 . W . 238;
tate x i1~f v. Fleming (1 9 ), 147 ::\fo.
1, 44 . W. 75 . If the motion is too
broad,
that it cannot be u tained a
made, it mu t be overru le l, though a
IJarrower motion might harn been well
takeu : mi th v. ::\leyer · ( 1 9 ), 54 eb. 1,
74- X. W. 277 ; Chicago, B . & Q. R.R.
Co. i·., pirk ( 1897), 51 Neb. 167, 70 N. W .
926; Gilbert v. L oberg (1 94), 6 \Vi .
w. 9 2.
661 , ; j
HT/w t may be stricken out a Surplusage.
A paragraph of a complaint which doe
not alleo-e any fact e eutial to the plaintiff' - cau e of action, hould be tricken
out upon motion: Pit kin v. N'ew Y ork &
ew England H . . Co. ( l 94), 64 Coon.
4 2, 30 Atl. 772. The court may, on it
owu motion, trike out candal ou matter:
Morri on v. now (190.3), 26 l'tah 2-17, 72
Pac. 924. Averment of ral ·onver ation between plaintiff and cl fendant prior
to the making of the written ontract et
out in the pleading, are prop rly tri ken
out on motion be au
m rged in the
writt ·u iu. t rum nt: .Jorda11 v.
oulter
(l!l02 ), 30 W'a ·h 11 6, 70 Pa. 217. I t i
u11u ece. ary to pl ad fact. of which the
court will take jurli •ial noti : ,eor~ v.
. 'tat (I 9!l), 59 N h l 63, 0 . W.4 6.
('1111;;eq11mcP qf R etaini11.9
urp/11. 11ge.
"W hile unu .ce ry averments in a pleadT

4T •

ing need n t b proved (Kerr v . T oppi ng
(1 99), 109 l a. 150, O ' . W. 321), yet
ther may be upported by evidence if
allowed to r ma in and uch evi euce
houltl not be ruled out on obje tion:
]) nt v. Ha ilr ad ( 1901), 61 S. C. 32 , 3
. E . 52i; Uick v . 'o uthern Ry. (1902),
63 8. . 559 , 41 . E. 753; mi th v. Meyer..;
(1 9 ), 54 Keb. l , 74 . W. 277.
IuKellyv. lark (189 ),21 Mont.291,
53 Pac. 95 , the co urt aid: "If a plaintiff
a\·er more t han i. nece. ary, and fail t
u t ain immat rial and r ed undant ~we r
ment , but doe· pro\ e all the 111aterial
fact upon which a right to r eli ef i. ba eu,
and no motion t correct the pleadino- ha
been mad , it will be treatetl a uffi ·ient.
and the urplu allegation di regarded."
And in Smith v . M eyer (1 9 ), 54 'eb.
1, 74 N. vV. 277, the court a id: "A
defendant who by au ·wer pleaded new
matter , which the c urt r efu ed to trike
out a in materia l, cannot be h eard to
complain that th e cou r t erred in
fn ·ing
to trike fr om the r eply allegation tra\··
er ing tho e of the an wer."
I t wa held in ampbell v. l\[ . J=>a .
R y. Co. {l 93), 121 l\lo. 3-tO, 25
W.
936, that th fact that the petition uunece sarily charged ne rrli genc <lid u t
prevent a r ecove ry under th e tatute without proof of n o-ligencc, the tatu e making railroad compauie liable without p roof
of n eglig nee for proper ;.- injur cl nr d troyed by fire et by their locomotin .
And in Og le by i·. fo. Pac. Ry . C'n.
(1 99), 150 Io. 13 , 37 . W. 29, it wru
held that if a petitio n f und ecl on negligence tat . two act , ea h · n ·titntinrr
negligenC' and e ith r uffi ci n in it lf
to su tain the au
of a t i n, if th r be
proof to . u. ta in one alld no pr of to
u tain th other, th a ction will not. fail
aft r v rdi ·t.
!neon i-tent 1lle.9ati'ons. If a complaint
tat
a o-oorl au e of action , additional
all gation in on i t nt with nch t atrment do not r end r it d murrabl : H o:
v.
harl ton, tc.
o. ( l 9-1 ), -t2 , . ('.
44 7, 2 •. E. 2 5.
ut wh r<' :i comp lnint
tat
a good au se of action and als•i
fat. c u ·titutin a cl fe 11 c th re o,
it is bad on demurrer: R bert v. I udian·

ALLEGA TION>:::> AND PROOFS MUST CORI ESPO:\D.
ALLEGATIONS AND PROOFS MUST COKKESPOND.
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§ 447. * 553. III. The Doctrine that the Cause of Action Proved

§ 447. * 553.

III. The Doctrine that the Cause of Action Proved

must correspond with the One Alleged. Degrees of Variance

must

correspond with the One Alleged.

Degrees of Variance

between Allegations and Proof. The cocles describe three grades

of disagreement between the proofs at the trial and the allega-

tions in the pleadings to which such proofs are directed : namely,

(1) An immaterial variance, where the difference is so slight and

unimportant that the adverse party is not misled thereby, and in

which case the court will order an immediate amendment without

costs, or will treat the pleading as though amended, permitting

the evidence to be received and considered; (2) A material

variance, where although the proof has some relation to and con-

nection with the allegation, yet the difference is so substantial

that the adverse party is misled by the averment, and would be

prejudiced on the merits, in which case the court may permit the

pleading to be amended upon terms ; ^ (3) A complete failure of

proof, where the proofs do not simply fail to conform with the

allegation in some particular or particulars, but in its entire

scope and meaning, or, in other words, the proof establishes
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something wholly different from the allegations. In this case

apolis St. Ry. Co. (1902), 158 lud. 634,

C4 N. E. 217.

Where an answer contains allegations

of fraud and other allegations absolutely

contradictory of and inconsistent with

them, the latter may be stricken out on

motion : State ex rel. v. Dickerman (1895),

16 Mont. 278, 40 Pac. 698,

The code d crib thr e gra<l ·
of di agre m nt betw en th pro f at the trial and th all gation in the pleadings to which uch proofs ar dir ·ted: nam ly,
(1) An immaterial variance, wh re the clifferenc i: 'O light ancl
unimportant that the adverse party ]s not misled th r by and in
which case the court will ord ran imm ediate amendm nt ·without
co ts, or will treat the I leading as though amend d, permitting
the evidence to be received and considered; (2) A material
variance, where although the proof has some relation to and connection with the allegation, yet the difference i: ,·o ub tantial
that the adverse party is misled by the averment, and would be
prejudiced on the merits, in which case the comt may permit the
pleading to be amended upon terms; 1 (3) A complet failure of
I roof, where the proofs do not simply fail to conform with the
allegation in some particular or particulars, but in its ntire
scope and meaning, or, in other words, the proof e tablishes
something wholly different from the allegations. In this ca e
between Allegations and Proof.

It was held in Raming r. Metropolitan

St. Ry. Co. (1900), 157 Mo. 477, 57 S. \\.

268, that a petition which states acts as

being both negligent and wanton or wilful

at the same time is self-contradictory. A

claim by a bank of a general lien on a

debtor's securities for a balance due by

the debtor is not inconsistent with its

claim of a lien thereon by special contract :

Cockrill V. Joyce (1896), 62 Ark. 216, 35

S. W. 221. Nor is an allegation in a

complaint on a promissory note that the

iiidorser waived notice inconsistent with

allegations showing that the holder was

excused from giving notice by the subse-

<jUGiit action of the iudorser: Loveday i'.

Anderson (1897), 18 Wash. 322, 51 Pac.

463.

Predicating Error on Piuling on Motion.

Tlie refusal of the court to strike out

redundant and irrelevant matter is not

reversible error unless it affirmatively aj)-

pears that the rights of the moving party

are thereby prejudiced : Lincoln Mortgage

& Trust Co. V. Hutchins (1898), 55 Neb.

158, 75 N. W. 538; Hudelson v. First Nat.

apolis St. Ry. Co. (1902), 158 Ind. 63-J.,
6-J. N. E . 217.

\Vh ere an answer contains allegations
of fraud aud other allegations ab olutely
eon tradictory of and inconsistent with
th em, the latter may be stricken out on
motion: State ex rel. v. Dickerman ( 1895 ),
16 ;.\lont. 2i8, 40 Pac. 698.
I t was held in Raming- 1• . Metropolitan
St. R_v. Co. (1900), 157 Mo. 47i , 57 S. W.
26 , that a petition which state acts as
being both negligent and wanton or wilful
at the same time is self-contradictory. A
claim by a bank of a general lien on a
debtor's securities for a balance due by
th e debtor is not inconsistent with its
claim of a lien thereon by special contract:
Cockrill v. J oyce (1896), 62 A rk. 216, 35
S. W. 221. Nor is an all egation in a
complaint on a promis ory note that th e
in dor er waived notice in consistent with
all egations showing that th e holder wa
E>xcused from giving notice by the su bseq uc 11 t action of the i11d orser: Loveday i-.
And er on {1897), 18 W ah. 322, 51 Pac.

Bank (1898), 56 Neb. 247, 76 N. W. 570;

State Bank v. Showers (1902), — Kan.

463.
Predicating Error on Ruling on

~11otion.

— , 70 Pac. 332; Pfau v. State ex rel.

(1897), 148 Ind. 539, 47 N. E. 927; Cod-

dington v. Canaday (1901), 157 Ind. 243,

61 N. E. 567 ; Atchison, etc. Ry. Co', v.

Marks (1901), 11 Okla. 82, 65 Pac. 996.

Waiver of Objection. It is too late

after verdict to raise the objection that a

petition contains redundant and immate-

rial matter: Bradley v. Chicago, etc. Ry.

Co. (1896), 138 Mo". 293, 39 S. W. 763.

And it was held in Bright v. Ecker (1896),

9 S. D. 192, 69 N. W. 824, that a com-

plaint containing redundant matter and

The r efusal of the court to stri ke out
redundant and irrelevant matter is not

r eversible error unless it affirmatiYely appears that the right of the moYing party
are thereby prejudiced: Lincoln Mortgage
& Trust Co. v. Hutch i11s ( 1898 ), 55 Neb.
158, 15 N. W. 53 ; Hudelson 1: . Fir t Nat.
Bank (1898), 56 Neb. 247, 76 N. W. 510;
State Bank v. Showers '(l 902), - Kan.
- , 70 Pac. 332; Pfau v. State ex rel.
(1 897), 148 Ind. 539, 4i .... K 92 1 ; Coddington v. Canaday (1901). 157 Iud. 243,
61 N. E. 567; Atchison, etc. Ry. o. v.
Marks (1901), 11 Okla. 82, 65 Pac. 996.
lVaiver <if O ~jection . I t i" too late
after verd ict to raise the objection that a
petition contains redundant and immateri al matter: Bradley v. Chicago, etc. Ry.
Co. (1 896), 138 Mo. 293, 39 S. W. 763.
And it was held in Bright v. Ecker (l 96),
9 S D. 192, 69 J. W. 24, that a comp1aint containing redundant matter and
a11egation relating to more than one
cause of action, will be held ufficient in
the Supreme Court in the ab. ence of an
attack by motion, if the fact alleged
how any cause of aetion.J
1 [See Ol ' on v. Snake River Yalley
R. R. Co. (1900), 22 Wa 11. 139, 60
I>ac. 156.J
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110 amendment is permitted, but the cause of action or defence

is dismissed or overruled.^ In these statutory provisions the

doctrine that the proofs must correspond with the allegations is,

in a somewhat modilied form, united with the subject of amend-

ment, by which the minor grades of 'the variance may be obviated.

In the present subdivision I shall consider only the former of

these two topics, and shall discuss the scope and effect of the

general rule, that the cause of action, or the defence as proved,

must correspond with that averred in the pleading.'-^

§ 448. * 554. Consequences of Different Degrees of Variance.

The very object and design of all pleading by the plaintiff, and

of all pleading of new mattar by the defendant, is that the ad-

verse party may be informed of the real cause of action or defence

relied upon by the pleader, and may thus have an opportunity of

meeting and defeating it if possible at the trial. Unless the

petition or complaint on the one hand, and the answer on the

other, fully and fairly accomplishes this purpose, the pleading

would be a useless ceremony, productive only of delay, and the

parties might better be permitted to state their demands orally
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before the court at the time of the trial. The requirement,

therefore, that the cause of action or the affirmative defence

must be stated as it actually is, and that the proofs must estab-

1 See these provisions quoted supra, Ass'n (1894), 42 Neb. 439, 60 N. W. 881 ;

§ *4.35. Omaha Consolidated Co. r. Burns (1895),

2 The following cases will illustrate 44 Xeb. 21, 62 N. W. 301; Matthews v.

this rule : Bishop r. Griffith, 4 Colo. 68; O'Shea (1895), 45 Neb. 299,63 N. W.820;

Burd.'^all v. Waggoner, 4 id. 256; Board- Cannon v. Smith (1896), 47 Neb. 917, 66

man u. Griffin, 52 Ind. 101 ; Long i-. Doxey, N.W.999; Carter c.Gibson (1896), 47 Neb.

50 id. 385 ; Baker v. Dessauer, 49 id. 28; 655, 66 N. "VV. 631 ; Esterly Ilarv. Mac!i.

Stroup V. State, 70 id. 495 ; Jeffersonville, Co. v. Berg (1897), 52 Neb. 147, 71 N. W.

M. & I. R. Co. I,'. Worland. 50 id. 339; 952; Solt r. Anderson (19U2), 63 Neb. 734,

Arnold y. Angell, 62 N. Y. 508 ; Vrooman 89 N. W. 306; Elliott v. Carter White-

;;. Jackson, 6 Ilun,326; Moudran v. Goux, Lead Co ( 1898), 53 Neb. 458, 73 N. \V. 948;

51 Cal. 151 ; Hopkins v. Orcutt, 51 id. 537 ; Smith v. Building, etc. Ass'u (1895), IIG

Bolen V. San Gorgouio Fl. Co., 55 id. 164 ; N. C. 102, 21 S. E. 33 ; McMahan t. Cana-

McCord V. Scale, 56 id. 262. dian Ry. Co. (1901), 40 Ore. 148, 66 Pac.

QA plaintiff must recover according to 70S; Crawford v. Aultmau & Co. (1897),

the allegations of his complaint, or not at 139 Mo. 262, 40 S. W. 952; Ilite v. Metro-

all: Thompson i-. Citizens' St. Ry. Co. politan St. Ry. Co. (1895), 130 Mo. 132, 31

(1898), 152 Ind.46l, 53 N.E. 462; Southern S. W. 262; Chitty v. St. Louis, etc. Ry.

Kansas Ry. Co. f. Griffith (1894), 54 Kan. Co. (1899), 148 Mo. 64, 49 S. W. 868;

428, 38 Pac. 478; Imlioff >-. House (1893), Rumsey v. People's Ry. Co. (1898), 144

36 Neb. 28, 53 N W. 1032; Thomp.sou r. Mo. 175, 46 S. W. 144*; Solt i'. Anderson

Wertz (1894), 41 Neb. 31, 59 N. W. 518; (1903), —Neb. — . 93 N. W. 205.

Luce r. Foster (1894), 42 Neli. 818, 60 And this is so uotwitli.standing that evi-

N. W. 1027 ; Lewis v. Scotia Bldg. & Loan deuce to support a judgment may have been
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lish it as stated, is involved in the very theory of pleading. ^ It

frequently happens, however, and from the very nature 'of the

case it must happen, that the facts as proved do not exactly agree

with those alleged. To determine the effect of such a disagree-

ment we must recur to the reason and object of the rule, and

they furnish a certain and equitable test. If the diJBference is so

slight that the adverse party has not been misled, but, in prepar-

ing to meet and contest the case as alleged, he is fully prepared

to meet and oppose the one to be actually proved, then no effect

whatever is produced by the variance; to impose any loss or

penalty on the pleader would be arbitrary and technical. ^ In

admitted without objection : New Idea

Pattern Co. v. Whelan (1903), 75 Conn.

445, 53 Atl. 953; Central R. R. Co. v.

Cooper (1894), 95 Ga. 406, 22 S. E. 549;

lish it as stated, i' involved in the very the ry of plea,<ling.1 It
frequently happen , however, and from th very nature •of the
case it must happ n, that the facts as prov tl tlo not exactly agree
with those alleged. To determine the ffcct of such a disagre ment we must recur to the reason antl object of the rul , a11<.1
they fumish a certain aud equitaLle test. If the diff r nee is so
light that the adverse party has not been misled, but, in preparing to meet and contest the case as alleged, he is fully prepar cl
to meet and oppose the one to be actually prnvetl, then no effect
whatever is produced by the variance; to impose any loss or
penalty on the pleader would be arbitrary and technical. 2 In

McMahan r. Canadian Ry. Co. (1901), 40

Ore. 148, 6G Pac. 708 ; Christian v. Conn.

Mut. Ins. Co. (1898), 143 Mo. 460, 45
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S. VV. 268 ; Greenthal v. Lincoln, Seyms,

& Co. (1896), 67 Conn. 372, 35 Atl. 266;

Box Butte County r. Noleman (1898), 54

Neb. 239, 74 N. W. 582 ; Schmidt v. Ore-

gon Gold Min. Co. (1895), 28 Ore. 9, 40

Pac. 406, 1014; Coughanoury. Hutchinson

<1902),41 Ore. 4 19, 69 Pac. 68; McGavock

V. City of Omaha (1894), 40 Neb. 64, 58

N. W.'543; Purbush v. Barker (1894), 38

Neb. 1, 56 N. W. 996; Brown v. Railway

Co. (1898), 59 Kan. 70, 52 Pac. 65 ; Whit-

ing V. Koepke (1898), 71 Conn. 77, 40 Atl.

1053; Moran v. Bentley (1897), 69 Conn.

392, 37 Atl. 1092; Daly v. New Haven

(1897), 69 Conn. 644, 38 Atl. 397. See

also McLaughlin v. Webster (1894), 141

N. Y. 76, 35 N. E. 1081.

Contra, Morrow v. Board of Education

(1895), 7 S. D. 553, 64 N. W. 1126; Brady

V. Nally (1896), 151 N. Y. 258, 45 N. E. 547 ;

Gillies V. Improvement Co. (1895), 147

N. Y. 420, 42 N. E. 196; Schoepflin v.

Coffey (1900), 162 N. Y. 12, 56 N. E.502;

Bassett v. Haren (1895), 61 Minn. 346, 63

N. W. 713 ; Ro.senberger v. Marsh (1899),

108 la. 47, 78 N. W. 837 ; Smith v. Phelan

(1894). 40 Neb. 765, 59 N. W. .562.]

1 [[But the issues may, by written stipu-

lation, or agreement in open court, be nar-

rowed so as to be confined to one point :

Grauby Mining Co. v. Davis (1900), 156

Mo. 422, 57 S. W. 126. And the issues

may be broadened by stipulation. In Mc-

Elwaine v. Hosey (1893), 135 Ind. 481, 35

N. E. 272, it was held that where the

parties to an action agree before entering

upon a trial " that all facts relating in any

way to the case in hand, or affecting the

merits of the controversy on either side,

may be introduced in evidence under the

pleadings now on file," such agreement

precludes all insistence that the relief

granted is broader than the pleadings

authorize.3

2 [[A party cannot complain of a mere

variance between pleading and proof un-

less he has been actually misled to his

prejudice: Kuhn v. McKay (1897), 7 Wyo.

42, 49 Pac. 473 ; and such prejudice must

be shown to the court : Meldrum v. Keue-

admitted without objection: New Idea
Pattern Co. v. Whelan (1903), 75 Conn.
445, 53 At!. 953; Central R. R. Co. v.
Cooper (1894), 95 Ga. 406, 22 S. E. 549;
Mdinhan v. Canarl ian Ry. Co. (1901), 40
Ore. 148, 66 Pac. 708; Christian v. Conn.
Mut. In . Co. (1898), 143 Mo. 460, 45
. W. 268; Greenthal v. Lincoln, eyms,
& Co. (1 96), 67 Coun. 3i2, 35 Atl. 266;
Box Butte County v. Noleman (1898), 54
Neb. 239, 74 K. \Y . 582; Schmidt i:. Oregon Gold .Min. Co. ( l 95), 28 Ore. 9, 40
Pac. 406, 1014; Cougbanour v. Hutchinson
{1902),41Ore.419,69Pac.68; McGavock
v . City of Oniaha ( l 94), 40 eb. 64, 58
N. W. 543; Furbush v. Barker (1894), 38
Neb. 1, 56 N. W. 996; Brown v. Railway
Co. (1898), 59 Kan. iO, 52 Pac. 65; Whiting v. Koepke {1898), 71 Conn. 77, 40 Atl.
1053; Moran v. Bentley (1897), 69 Conn.
ew Haven
392, 37 Atl. 1092; Daly v.
(1897), 69 Conn. 644, 38 Atl. 397. See
also McLaughlin v. Webster (1894), 141
N. Y. 76, 35 N. E. 1081.
Contra, Morrow v. Board of Education
(1895), 7 S. D. 553, 64 T. W. 1126; Brady
v . Nally (1896), 151 N. Y. 258, 45N. E. 547;
Gillies v. Improvement Co. (1895), 147
:N. Y. 420, 42 N. E. 196 ; Schoepflin v.
Coffey (1900), 162 N. Y. 12, 56 N. E. 502;
Bassett v. Haren (1895), 61 Minn. 346, 63
N. W . 713; Rosenberger v. Marsh (1899),
108 Ia. 47, 78 N. W. 837; Smith v. Phelan
(189+). 40 Neb. 765, 59 N. W. 562.J
1 [But the issues may, by written stipulation, or agreement in open court, be narrowed so as to be confined to one point:
Granby Mining Co. v. Davi (1900), 156
l\Io . 422, 57 . W. 126. Aml the is ues

may be broadened by tipulation. In McEJ waine v. Hosey (1893), 135 Ind. 481, 35
N. E. 272, it was held that where the
parties to an action agree before entering
upon a trial "that all facts relating in any
way to the ca ·e in hand , or affecting the
merits of the controversy on either si<le,
may be introduced in evidence under the
pleadings now on file," such agreement
precludes all in istence that the relief
granted is broatler than the pleadings
authorize.]
2 [A party cannot complain of a mere
variance betwee n pleading and proof unless he has been actually mi sled to hi~
prejudice: Kuhn v. McKay ( 1897), 7 Wyo.
42, 49 Pac. 473; and such prejudice must
be shown to the court: Meldrum v. K enefick (1902), 15 S. D. 370, 89 N. W . 863;
Chicago House Wrecking Co. v. Lumher
Co. {1902), - Neb.-, 92 N. W. 1009;
People's Xat. Bank v. l\Jyers (1902), 65
Kan. 122, 69 Pac. 164.
Variances between allegations and proof
which are immaterial or not prejudicial, do
not call for a reversal of the judg ment:
Knight v. Finney (1 9!J), 59 Neb. 2i4, 80
N. W. 912; Salazar v. Taylor {1893), 18
Colo. 538, 3.3 Pac. 369; Lubker v. Grand
Detour Plow Co. (189i), 53 Neb. 111, 73
N. W. 457; Kuhn v. l\kKay (1 9i'), 7 Wyo.
42, 49 Pac. 4i3. A variance will not he
deemed material unless it has mi ·led th e
adverse party to his prejudice: Toy v. 1\k Hugh (1901), 62 ~eb. 820, Si K \Y. 1059;
Post-Intelligencer Co. v. Harris (1835), 11
Wash. 500, 39 Pac. 965; Dudley l'. nu, al
(1902), 29 \Yash. 52 , iO Pac. 68; l\Idclrum v. YeLefi ck {1902), 15 S. D. 370, 89
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the second place, the difference, while it does not extend to the

entire cause of action or defence, may be so great in respect to

some of its particular material facts as to have misled the adverse

party, so that his preparation in connection with that particular

is not adapted to the proofs which are produced. In such cir-

cumstances an amendment is proper because the variance is par-

tial, but it is obviously equitable that terms should be imposed.

Finally, if the divergence is total, that is, if it extends to such

an important fact, or group of facts, that the cause of action or

defence as proved would be another than that set up in the

pleadings, there is plainly no room for amendment, and a dis-

missal of the complaint or rejection of the defence is the only

equitable result. It should be noticed that, in order to constitute

this total failure of proof, it is not necessary for the discrepancy

to include and affect each one of the averments. A cause of

action as stated on the pleadings might consist, say, of five dis-

tinct issuable or material facts ; on the trial four of these might

be proved as laid, while one so entirely different might be sub-

stituted in place of the fifth that the cause of action would be
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wholly changed in its essential nature.

§ 449. * 555. Instances -where Variance has been held Immate-

rial. The conclusions reached in the foregoing analysis, and the

reasons which support them, are fully sustained by the decided

cases which constantly discriminate between the immaterial

variance which is disregarded, and the total failure of proof

which is fatal to the cause of action or defence.^ It is of course

impossible to give any comprehensive formula which shall deter-

mine these two conditions; the scope and operation of the doc-

trine can only be learned from the decisions which have applied

it, of which a few are selected as illustrations. In the following

instances the variance was held to be immaterial : In an action

upon a written contract which was properly set out in the com-

plaint except that one material stipulation was omitted, but a

correct copy of it had been served upon the defendant's attorney ;2

in an action against a city for injuries done to the plaintiff's

house and grounds by the unlawful construction of sewers, side-

N. W. 8f)3 ; Wilcox Lumber Co. v. Ritte- Wilcox Lumber Co. v. Ritteman (1902), 88

niiui (1902), 88 Minn. 18, 92 N. W. 472. Minn. 18, 82 N. W. 472.]

Where a variance i.s immaterial the court ^ QSee Dudley v. Duval (1902), 29

■will eitlier disregard it altogether or order Wash. 528, 70 Pac. 68.]

an immediate amendment without costs: ^ Fisk i-. Tank, 12 Wis. 276, 301.

the second place, the difference, while it does not extelld to the
entire cause of action or defence, may be o gr at in resp ct to
ome of it particular material fact as to hav misled th adverse
I ar y, so that hi preparation in connection with that particular
i not adapted to the proofs wLich are produced. In uch circum tances an amen lment is proper because the variance is part ial, but it is obviously equitable that terms should be imposed.
Finally, if the divergence is total, that i , if it extends to such
an important fact, or group of facts, that the cau e of action or
defence as proved would be another than that et up in the
pleading , there is plainly no room for amendment and a di missal of the complaint or rejection of the defence is the only
equitable result. It should be noticed that, in order to constitute
t hi total failure of proof, it is not necessary for the discrepancy
to include and affect each one of the averments. A cause of
action as state l on the pleadings might consi t, say, of five di tinct issuable or material facts; on the trial four of these might
be proved as laid, while one so entirely different might be substituted in place of the fifth that the cause of action would be
wholly changed in its essential nature.
& 449. * 555. Instances where Vahance has been held Immaterial. The conclusions reached in the foregoing analysis, and the
reasons which support them, are fully sustained by the decided
cases which constantly discriminate between the im~aterial
variance which is disregarded, and the total failure of proof
which is fatal to the cause of action or defence. 1 It is of course
irnpos ible to give any comprehensive formula which hall determine these two conditions ; the scope and operation of the doctrine can only be learned from the decisions which have applied
it, of which a few are selected as illustrations. In the following
in t ances the variance was held to be immaterial: In an action
up n a written contract which wa prop rly et out in the complaint except that one material tipulation wa omitted, but a
orr ct cor y of it had been serv d up the defendant' attorney; 2
in an a ti n again. t a city f r injuri done t the plaintiff s
hou. ·e and grounds by the unlawful onstruction of wers, sideT. W.
f>.3; W ilcox Lumber Co. v. Rittem a11 (1H02),
~1i u n . 18, 92 N. W. 472.
' h ·r · a rnrian · i. im material the court
"i ll ith r <li r gar<l it altor th r or ortl r
a n im rnc<liatc anienilme11t wit hout costs:

Wil ox Lumber Co. v . Ritteman (1902),
Minn. 1 , 2 N . W. 472.J
1 [ . ee Dudl y u.
uval (1902), 29
Wa h. 52 , 70 Pac. 6 .]
2 }' i k v. Tauk, 12 Wis. 276, 301.
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walks, etc., it was held that, if the manner of constructing the

works was unlawful, the failure to allege negligence in the

complaint was not material, and might be either disregarded or

amended at any stage of the proceeding ; ^ in an action upon a

warranty given in a sale of horses, where the complaint stated in

general terms that the defendant warranted them to be sound,

while the proof was that he warranted them to be sound as far as

he knew; that they were unsound, and that he knew them to be

so, the court saying that an amendment if necessary should be

made at any time even by the appellate court ;2 in an action

upon a warranty of quality, where the complaint set forth an

express warranty, and on the trial facts were proved from which

a warranty would be implied;^ in an action against two defend-

ants to recover damages for injuries done to the plaintiff's sheep

by the defendants' dogs, the petition alleging that "a certain

pack or lot of dogs owned by the defendants worried, etc., cer-

tain sheep of the plaintiff," while the proof showed that one of

the defendants owned a portion of the dogs, and the other

defendant the remainder, but there was no joint ownership;^ in
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an action by a husband and wife against a husband and wife for

an assault and battery by the female defendant upon the female

plaintiff, the petition alleging that the plaintiff Mary D. is the

wife of the plaintiff, James D., and the defendant, Martha H.,

is wife of the defendant, Aaron H., and proof was admitted that

the parties were respectively man and wife at the time of the

affraj^ ; ^ in an equitable action brought to set aside a conveyance

of land made to the defendant, on the ground of his alleged

fraud, and the plaintiff failed to make out a case of fraud, but

did prove one of mutual mistake;^ in an action for work and

labor stated in the complaint to have been done for an agreed

compensation, but at the trial the j^laintiff proved the value as

upon a quantum meruit.' The Supreme Court of North Carolina

1 Harper r. Milwaukee, 30 Wis. 365, * McAdams v. Sutton, 24 Ohio St.

377, 378. " The alleged variance did not 333.

change the gravamen of the action." ^ Dailey v. Houston, 58 Mo. 361,

2 Chatfield v. Frost, 3 N. Y. S. C. 366.

357. •> Montgomery v. Shockey, 37 Iowa,

3 Giffert v. West, 33 Wis. 617, 621; 107, 109; Sweezey v. Collins, 36 Iowa,

Leopold V. Vankirk, 27 Wis. 152, 155; 589,592.

s. c. 29 Wis. 548, 551. At the common " Sussdorff v. Schmidt, 55 N. Y. 319,

• law, this was the only mode of alleging 324.

an implied warranty.

walks, etc., it was held that, if the manner of con tructing the
works was unlawful, the failure to allege negligence in the
complaint was not materia l, and might be eith r disregarded or
amended at any stage of the proceeding; 1 in an action upon a
warranty given in a sale of horses, where the complaint stated in
general terms that the defendant warranted them to be sound,
while the proof was that he warranted them to be sound as far as
he knew; that they were unsound, and that he knew them to be
so, the court saying that an amendment if necessary should be
made at any time even by the appellate court; 2 in an action
upon a warranty of quality, where the complaint set forth an
express warranty, and on the trial facts were proved from which
a warranty woµld be implied; 3 in an action against two defendants to recover damages for injuries done to the plaintiff's sheep
by the defendants ' dogs, the petition alleging that "a certain
pack or lot of dogs owned by the defendants worried, etc ., certain sheep of the plaintiff," while the proof showed that one of
the defendants owned a portion of the dogs, and the other
defendant the remainder, but there was no joint ownership; 4 in
an action by a husband and wife against a husband and wife for
an assault and battery by the female defendant upon the female
plaintiff, the petition alleging that the plaintiff Mary D. is the
wife of the plaintiff, J ames D., and the defendant, Martha H .,
is wife of the defendant, Aaron H., and proof was admitted that
the parties were respectively man and wife at the time of the
affray; 5 in an equitable action brought to set aside a conveyance
of land made to the defendant, on the ground of his alleged
fraud, and the plaintiff failed to make out a case of fraud, but
did prove one of mutual mistake; 6 in an action for work and
labor stated in the complaint to have been done for an agreed
compensation, but at the trial the plaintiff proved the value as
upon a quantum meruit. 7 The Supreme Court of North Carolina
1 Harper v. Milwaukee, 30 Wis. 365,
377, 378. "The alleged variance did not
change the ,gravamen of the action."
2 Chatfield v. Frost, 3 N. Y. S. C.

3~7.

a Giffert v. W est, 33 Wis. 617, 621;
L eopold v. Vankirk, 27 Wis. 152, 155;
s . c. 29 Wis. 548, 551. At the common
' law, thi was the only m ode of alleging
an implied warranty.

4

McAdams

t.'.

Sutton, 24 Ohio St.

333.
5

Dailey v. Houston, 58

Mo. 361,

366.
6

Montgomery v. Shockey, 37 Iowa,

107, 109; Sweezey v. Collins, 36 Iowa,

589, 592.
7 Sussdorff v. Schmidt, 55 N. Y. 319,
324.
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has gone so far as to hold in one case where the complaint set up

a cause of action for the conversion of chattels, and the proof at

the trial showed only a liability upon an implied promise for

money had and received, that the plaintiff could recover, since

all distinction between forms of action had been abolished, and

amendments were freely allowed.^ This decision, as will be

seen, stands opposed to the whole current of authority in other

States. The objection that the proof varies from the allegation

ha one o ft. r a o hol in one ca e where the complaint
up
a cau 'e of acti n for the con er i n f cha t l and th proof at
he trial how l nl - a liabilit u on an impli
promi e for
money ha an r cei·rnd that the pb:i.intiff c uld rec Yer mce
all 1i ~tinction bet~een form of action ha b n aboli bed 11 l
amendm nt
ere freely allow l. 1 T hi deci ion a will b
een tand oppo ed to the whole current of authori in her
tat
The objection that the proof Yari from he all ation
mu t be taken at the tri·~l; if omitt d then i._ c nnot be aft rward rai ed on appeal. 2 The rea on
obviou ; when m de
r

must be taken at the trial ; if omitted, then it cannot be after-

wards raised on appeal.^ The reason is obvious; when made

1 Gates V. Kendall, 67 N. C. 241.

But see Parsley i'. Nicholson, 65 N. C

207, 210, which maintains the general

doctrine.

•- Speer v. Bishop, 24 Ohio St. 598.

See, also, as further examples of imma-

terial variance, Chamballe v. McKenzie,

31 Arli. 155 ; Bruguier r. U. S., 1 Dak.
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5; McMahan v. Miller, 82 N. C. 317;

Gaines v. Union Ins. Co., 28 Ohio St.

418 ; Sibila v. Bahney, 34 Ohio St. 399 ;

Dodd V. Denney, 6 Ore. 156; Miller v.

Hendig, 55 Iowa, 174; Peck i'. N. Y. &

N. J. Ry. Co., 85 N. Y. 246 ; Duruford v.

Weaver, 84 id. 445 ; Thomas v. Nelson,

69 id. 118; Lifler y. Sherwood, 21 Hun,

573; Clayes v. Hooker, 4 id. 231 ; Cody

V. Berai.s 40 Wis. 666 ; Flanders v. Cot-

trell, 36 id. 564 ; Giffert v. West, 37 id.

115; Chunot u. Larson, 43 id. 536; Rus-

sell V. Loomis, 43 id. 545 ; Aschermann

V. Brewing Co., 45 Wis. 262 ; Union Nat.

Bk. I'. Roberts, 45 id. 373 ; Dolaplaiue v.

Turuley, 44 id. 31 ; Ryan v. Springfield

F. & M. Ins. Co., 46 id. 671 ; Wilier v.

Bergenthal, 50 id. 474 ; Galloway v.

Stewart, 49 Ind. 156; Glasgow v. Hobbs,

52 id. 239, 242; Wright i\ Johnson, 50 id.

454 ; Stroup v. State, 70 id. 495 ; Hunting-

ton I'. Mendenhall, 73 id. 460 ; Tliigpen

1-. Staton, 104 N. C. 40 ; Merkle v. Ben-

nington, 68 Mich. 133 ; Thalheimer v.

Crow, 13 Colo. 397.

[^Gillies V. Improvement Co. (1895),

147 N. Y. 420,42 N. E. 196; Brady v.

Naliy (1896), 151 N. Y. 258, 45 N. E. 547 ;

Ashe V. Beasley (1896), 6 N. D. 191, 69

N. W. 188; yEtiia Iron Works i-. Firmen-

ich Mfg. Co. (1894), 90 la. 390, 57 N. W.

904; Dean u. Goddard (1893), 55 Minn.

290, 56 N. W. lOGO; Adams v. Castle

(1896), 64 Minn. 505, 67 N. W. 637 ; Lind-

say V. Pettigrew (1894), 5 S. D. 500, 59

N. W. 726 ; Chouquette v. Southern Elec.

R. R. Co. (1899), 152 Mo. 257, 53 S. W.

897. The party whose proof varies from

his allegations cannot complain : Williams

V. Williams (1899), 102 Wis. 246, 78 N . W.

419.

In Schirmer v. Drexler (1901), 134

Cal. 134, 66 Pac. 180, the court said:

" The findings and decree seem to be en-

tirely outside of the case made by the

pleadings. The said findings and decree

contradict the material allegations of

plaintiff's complaint, and there seem to be

no allegations at all in the complaint to

which the findings and decree can be held

I Oate
v. Kendall 67 i,.. C. 241.
But ee Par. ley l.'. Nicho I on, 65 N. C
207, 210, which maintain the general
doctrine.
2
peer v. Bi hop, 24 Ohio t. 59 .
ee, al'o, a further example of immaterial· variance, Chamballe v. McKenzie,
31 Ark. 155; Bruguier 1-. U. ., 1 D ak.
5 · ~Ic;,\Iabau v. Miller, 2 ~ . C. 31i';
Gaine v.
nion In . o., 28 Ohio t.
41 ; ibila v. Bahney, 34 Ohio t. 399 ;
D oud v. Denney, 6 Ore. 156; ;,\filler v.
Bendig, 55 Iowa, 174; Peck v. "· Y. &
..:. J. Ry. Co., 5 i\. Y. 246 · Durnford v.
Wea"Ver, 4 id. 445; Thoma v . ._'el on,
69 id. 11 ; Lifler v. herwood, 21 Hun,
5-3; laye v. Hooker, 4 id. 231 ; Cody
v. Berni., 40 Wi . 666; Flander v. Cottrell, 36 id. 564 ; Giffert r. We t, 37 id.
115 ; Chunot v. Lar on, 43 id. 536; Ru sell 1'. Loomi~, 43 id. 545 ; A chermann
v. Brewing o., 45 Wi . 262; tJnion at.
Bk. v. Robert', 45 id. 3- 3 ; Delaplaine v.
'·urnley, 44 id. 3 1; Ryan v. pringfield
F. & 1\I. In . Co. 46 id. 671 ; Willer v.
Bergeothal, 50 id. 4- 4; Galloway v.
tewart, 49 Ind. 156; Gia gow i;. Hobb ,
52 id. 239, 242; \ rio·ht l'. John ou, 50 id.
45+; troup r·. tate, 70 id.495; Huntington v. Iendenball, 73 id. 460 ; Thigpen
v.
taton, 104 N. . 40; Merkle v. Bennington, 6 l\fich. 133; Thalheimer v.
Crow, 13 olo. 39 - .
[ illie v. lmpro>ement Co. ( 1 95 ),
147 ~r. Y. 420, 42 J.?. E. 196; Braly v.
•.'ally (I 96). 151 .T. Y. 25 , 45 . E. 54-i;
A~he l'. Be: ley (l 96), 6 ...
1 I,
W. 1 ; ..Et?1a Iron Work v. irmeuich - IC!!, o. (l ( 4), 9 Ia. 39 ) 5i
W,
!J04; J> au v. 'oclda.rd {I 93), oo Minn.
2~0 56 -T· W. l 'iO · Adam
v. a tle
T.

•

•

T.

T'

96). 64 l\Iinn. 505, 6; N. W. 637; Linday v. Pettigrew ( 1 94), 5 . D. 500, 59
N. W. 726 ; Chouqnette v. outhern Elec.
R.R. Co. {l 99). 152 Mo. 25 - , 53 . ''·
97. The party \~ho e proof 'arie from
hi" allegation cannot complain: William
v. William {1899), 102 Wi . 246, 7 N. \\.
419 .
In Schirmer v. Drexler (1901) , 134
Cal. 134, 66 Pac. 1 0, the court aid:
"The fin ding and decree eem to b
utirely out ide of the ca
made by t:.
pleading . The . aid findin O' and decree
contradict the material allegatiou: of
plaintiff' complaint, and there eeru to be
no allegation at all in the complaint t
which the finding and decree can be 11eld
to be material r pertinent. The whole
theory of the complaint is that th plaintiff'· right are tho e of an owner, acquired by adverse u e of the ditch an the
water. The finding and decree proce cl
upon an entir ly different theory, and xpre ly tate that the u e of the ' ater and
of the ditch by the plaintiff and hi prec.lece" or in intere t therein wa had with
the con~ent of the owner thereof and
under au oral liceu e or a_crreement therefor. The llecree attempts to nfor the
pecific performance of ::i ontract whi h
is not only uot t up in tlH" omplaint, but
to which uo ref rence i marle anywh re in
the pleading . We know that there are
ca e which hold a
ont nded b r pondent, that where a que tion i treated
hy both partic a an i , n in the
e,
and e,·idence i taken thereon with ut obj ction, the appellant " ·ill not thereafter
L heard to ay that th c1ue tion wa uot
rn 1"' u . That i" a alutary g ueral rul ,
and we do not wi ·h o oYerturu it. Dut
(1
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at the trial, there is an opportunity for removing it at once by

amendment.^

at the trial, there
amendment. 1

an opportunity for rem Yin 0 it at once by

iu noue of those cases, tliat we have been

ahle to find, were the findings and decree

clear outside of the case as made by the

pleadings, but in each and all of them the

findings, taken altogether, have some re-

lation to the issues as framed ; but here

the issues as made by the pleadings sus-

tain no degree of kinship whatever to the

findings and decree, and are, besides, iu

direct conflict with the allegations of the

complaint. It would be going too far to

hold that such a variance as this should

be deemed to be waived by failure to ob-

ject to evidence at the trial. If the bur-

den was on the plaintiff to establish tlie

case made by his complaint, why should
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the defendants object to evidence, as long

as it went to show that the case as thus

made did not exist ? If this kind of a

judgment can be upheld on this kind of a

record, theu written pleadings are no

louirer neiessary, and may well be dis-

pensed with altogether." Cases cited.]

1 l^lii :lie following cases the variance

was held immaterial: In an action against

a national bank on its double lial)ility as

a stockholder in another corporation, an

allegation that it acquired the stock in a

particular manner and proof that it ac-

quired it in another manner not ultra

vires: Bank v. Bank (1902), 64 Kan. 134,

67 Pac. 458; error m the description of

tlie name of the obligee in a bond : I'ost-

Intelligencer Co. v. Harris (1895), II

Wash .500, 30 Pac. 965; a mistake iu the

description of a house upon which a lien is

sought to be foreclosed, when the mistake

is so slight that the house is still capable

of identification : Griffith v. Maxwell (1 898),

20 Wash. 403, 55 Pac. 571 ; error in the de-

tails of personal injuries suffered by an

insured by reason of a fall : ilercier v. Trav-

elers' Ins. Co. (1901), 24 Wash. 147, 64 Pac.

158; an allegation that defendant signed

a note as principal, and evidence that he

signed as surety : Hermiston v. Green

(1898), 11 S. D. 81, 75 N. W. 819; an

allegation that defendant and another

were partners until the other's death in

1893, and proof that the partnership was

dissolved by consent iu 1885, without the

knowledge of the plaintiff ; an allegation

that defendant executed a separate prom-

issory note, and proof that it was a joint

and several note of defendant and another :

Nichols & Shepard Co. i-. Dedrick (1895),

61 Minn. 513, 63 N. W. 1110.

In the following cases it was held that

there was no variance between the plead-

ings and proof: an allegation of a money

indebtedness for services rendered, and

proof of an agreement to pay in specific

articles of property: New York News

Publishing Co. v. Steamship Co. (1895),

148 N. Y. 39, 42 N. E. 514; an allegation

that promissory notes were signed by de-

iu none of tho e ca e , that we have been
able to finJ, were the findiuo- and decree
dear out·ide of the ca e a· made by the
pleading , but in each and all of them the
nn<ling ' taken altogether, ha,·e ome rela.tiou to the i ue a framed ; but here
the i ue a made by the pleading· su tam no degree of kin hip whateYer to the
:finding· and decree, and are, be i<l e , in
direct conflict with the allegation of the
complaint. It would be going too far to
hold that uch a rnriance a, thi
houhl
be deemed to be wai,·ed by failure to object to eYideuce at the trial. If the burden wa · on the plaintiff to e tabli·h the
case made by his complaint, wh~- hould
the defendaut · object to eYidence, as long
a - it went to show that the case a thu
made did not exi·t ? If thi kind of a
judgment can be upheld on thi· kind of a
r ecord, then written pleading are no
lon!!er neee ·~ary, and may well be dispen ed with altogether." Case cited.]
1 [ Iu the following ca e the Yariance
was held immaterial : In an action again t
a national bank on its double liability a
a tockholrler in another corporntion, an
~\!legation that it acquired the tock in a
particular manner and proof that it acquired it in another manner not ultra
i·ires: Bank v. Bank {1902 ), 6-! Kan. 13-!,
6i Pac. -!5 ; error ,in the description of
t he name of the obligee in a bond: Po_tIntelligencer Co. v. Harri· (1 95) 11
\\a·h 500, 3!) Pac. 965 · a mi·take in the
de cription of a hon e upon which a lien is
ought to be foreclo:::ed, when the mistake
i o lio-ht that the hon e i till capable
of identification : Griffith v. ~Iaxwell (189 ),
20 Wa h. -!03, 55 Pac. 571; error in the details of per onal injuri es uffered by an
i n- ured byrea onofafall::\Iercierv. TraYeler·' I1r. Co. (1901), 2-! \\a b. 1-t-'i, 6-! Pac.
15 ; an allegation that defendant igned
a note a· principal, and evidence that he
igned a- · urety: Hermi ton 1:. Green
{l 9 ), l l ... . D. 1, 'i 5 N. W. I 9 ; an
allegation that defendant and another
were partner· until the other's death in
I 93, and proof that the partner hip wa
di ohed by con ent in 1 5, without the
knowledge of the plaintiff ; an allegation

that defendant executed a eparate promi. ory note, and proof that it wa a joint
and ~Heral uotc of defcudaut aud another:
Nichol & hepard lo 1·. Dedrick (l..95),
61 ~lion . 513, 63 ~~. W. 1110.

In the following ca es it wa held that
there wa no variance betweeu the pleading - anJ proof: au allegation of a money
ind ebtetlue·s for ~en·ice· rendered, and
proof of an ao-reemeut to pay in ' pecific
artirles of property: X ew York X ew
Publi hing o. t'. team-hip Co (1 95),
1-! X. Y. 39, 42 X. E. 51-1; an allegation
that promis ory note were icrned b\• defendant a m;ker, and proof that ·they
were ig11ed b.\· defendant and other
under a e,·eral liabilit\·: Hinchman v.
Point Defiauce Ry . Co. (1 96), 1-! Wa h.
3-!9, -!-! Pac. 152; an allegation that tbe
place of injury was a iJewalk, and proof
that it wa a cro walk: Piper 1·. City of
pokane {1900), 22 Wah. 147, 60 Pac.
13 ; an allegation, in an a ction for tre, pa • of owner -hip of property in fee, and
proof of an equitable intere t onl.'· : 01 on
v. City of eattle (190.3), 30 Wah. 6 7,
71 Pac. 201; an allegation that plaintiff
stumbled over the nail· projectino- from a.
walk, and proof that he caught her foot
between two plank : Bell v. City of
Spokane {1902), 30 Wa ·b. 50 , ;1 Pac. 31 ;
proof of intere t upon a balance of au account, where there i no allegation of intere, t due in the complaint: ~-Orth 2tar
Boot Co. 1.1. tebbins (1..93), 3 ~. D. 540,
5-! X . W. 593; an allegation ofs'anderon·
word , and proof of the u::;e of word only
·ub tantially the _ame : Emer:on i:. :.Hille:
{1902), l 15 Ia. 315,
X. 'Y. 03; an allegation of defendant' liability a a common carrier, and proof of liability a,.; a
warehouseman: Ca,·allaro v. Texa , et .
Ry. Co. (1..,95), 110 Cal. 3-! , 42 Pac. 9L
( ee contra, ~ -ormile 1·. regon, etc. Co.
{1902),41 Ore Ii;. 69 Pac. 92); an al.e·
gation that plaintiff, in an action for
fraud, wa· mentally weak and incompetent, and proof that ~he wa weak-minded
and far below the a,·erage in intellect :
Haye v. Candee (1902}, 75 onn. 131, 52
Ati.

26.]

6... 0
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§ 450. * OoG. Instances of Complete Failure of Proof. The fol-

lowing are examples of a complete failure of proof. In all these

cases one cause of action Avas alleged by the plaintiff, and another

one was proved or attempted to be proved at the trial, but was

rejected by the court. The New York Court of Appeals, while

passing upon the admissibility of evidence which made out a

liability under implied contract, in order to sustain a complaint

that charged a fraudulent transaction and sought to recover the

money obtained by means of such fraud, used the following

language in a recent case: "It is insisted that, under the code,

forms of action are abolished, and that the facts showing the

right of action need only be stated. This is correct, but it does

not aid the plaintiff. The plaintiff had a cause of action against

the defendant upon an account for moneys advanced for him.

Instead of stating this cause of action, the allegation is in sub-

stance that he paid him money as the price of stocks fraudulently

sold by defendant to plaintiff, which contract has been rescinded

by the plaintiff, and a return of the money demanded, which has

been refused by the defendant. These causes of action differ in
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substance. The former is upon contract, the latter in tort; and

the law will not permit a recovery upon the latter by showing a

right to recover upon the former. " ^ It is the settled rule under

the codes, contrary to that prevailing in the common-law system,

that when a cause of action depends upon the performance of

some act, but under certain circumstances the performance may

1 Degraw v. Elmore, 50 N. Y. 1. The recover on breach of implied contract or

following cases give further examples of of common carrier's legal duty to traus-

a material or fatal variance, or a failure port in a reasonable time) ; Hinkle v.

of proof : Bishop v. Griffeth, 4 Colo. 68 ; San Francisco & N. P. R. Co., 55 Cal. 627 ;

Proctor V. Rief, 52 Iowa, 592; Burns v. and cases cited aitte, under § *553. See

Iowa Homestead Co., 48 id. 279 ; York v. also Ehrlich v. yEtna L. Ins. Co., 103 Mo.

Wallace, 48 id. .305; Fauble r. Davis, 48 231 (allegation of performance does not

id. 462 ; McKoon t". Ferguson, 47 id. 636; lay foundation for evidence excusing non-

Arnold V. Angell, 62 N. Y. 508 (partner- performance) ; Daley v. Russ, 86 Cal. 114

ship) ; Harris c. Kasson, 79 id. 381 ; (same) ; Reed v. AlcConnell, 133 N. Y.

Stowell V. Eldred, 39 Wis. 614; Cowles 425; Clark r. Sherman (Wash. 1893). 32

§ 4 50. * 5u . I n s tances of Com plet e F ailu r e of Proof. T he fol l win 0 are xampl of a omplete failur f pro f. I n all the e
of ac ion wa all ge 1 y he plain iff, and ano her
n n a. pro cl or att mpt d t be Ir ve 1 at th trial ut \\a
t d y the court. Th
ew ork
urt f
peal wbil
pa ing upon the admi ibility of e i len e which ma l
ut a
lia ili t under impli d contract in order to u tain c 1111 laint
that charge l fraudulent tran action and ugh to re °' r th
m ney obtained by mean of uch frau 1 u. ed th follon ing
le nguage in a rec nt ca e : It is in i te 1 hat, under the code
form of action are ab lished, and hat the fact howin the
rii::;ht of action ne d only be tat d. Thi i c rrect but it cl e
not ai th plaintiff. The plaintiff had a ca 1 ' of action c gain. t
the lefendant upon an account for mon ys ad anc d f r him.
In tead f tating thi' cau e of action he all gation i in ub·tance that b I aid him money a the price of tock frau lulently
old by defendant to plaintiff, which contra t ha been r cind cl
by the plaintiff, and a return of the money demande l which has
b n refused by the defendant. These cau es f action differ in
ub tance. The former i upon contract, the latter in tort; an l
the law will not permit a recover upon the latter by howino- a
right to reco' er upon the former." 1 It i the settl d rule under
the code , contrary to that prevailing in the ommon-la
tern
that when a cau e of action depend upon the performance of
some act, but under certain circum tanc the performance ma·

r. Warner, 22 Minn. 449; Cumniings v. Pac. 771 (complaint being for money had

Long, 25 id. 337 ; Vrooman v. Jackson, 6 and received, plaintiff cannot recover on

Hun, 326 (ejectment) ; Southwick r. First an express contract) ; Distler v. Dabney,

Nat. Bk. of Memphis, 84 N. Y. 420; Gas- 3 Wash. 200 (same) ; Wcrnli r. Collins

ton I'. Owen, 43 Wis. 103; Streeter v. (Iowa, 1893), 54 N. W. 365 (complaint

Chicago, etc. Ry. Co., 44 id. 383; Jefferson- being on an express contract, plaintiff

ville, M. & I. R. Co. v. Worland, 50 Ind. cannot recover on a quantum meruit) ;

339 (complaint sets forth special con- Woolsey i\ Ellenville V. Trs. (Supreme,

tract for transportation of goods ; cannot 1893), 23 N. Y. Suppl. 411.

upreme,
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be excused and the cause of action still remain in force, the facts

showing the excuse must be alleged if the plaintiff intends to

rely upon it, and not upon the performance. The plaintiff is no

longer permitted to aver the performance of the required act,

and on the trial prove the circumstances which excuse such per-

formance, or prove any other alternative than the one specially

alleged.^ Thus where, in an action against indorsers, the com-

plaint stated a demand at maturity, and notice thereof to the

defendants, and on the trial the plaintiff offered to prove facts

which would excuse any demand, the evidence was held inad-

missible, and the action was dismissed ;2 and in a similar case

under a statute which required that, in order to make an indorser

liable, due diligence must be used by the institution of a suit

against the maker, or else that such a suit would be unavailing,

the petition alleged that due diligence had been used by com-

mencing a suit against the maker, in which judgment had been

recovered, and an execution had been issued and returned un-

satisfied ; and it was held that the other alternative, the maker's

insolvency, and the consequent unavailing character of a suit
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against him, could not be shown on the trial ; ^ and in a similar

action against the drawer of a bill or the indorser of a bill or

note, when the petition avers the demand and notice in order to

charge the defendant, a waiver of these steps cannot be proved,

— for example, a subsequent promise by the defendant to pay the

note when the steps necessary to charge him had been omitted.^

§ 451. * 557. Examples of Fatal Disagreement between Cause of

Action Pleaded and Proved. The following are miscellaneous

instances of a fatal disagreement between the cause of action

pleaded and that proved on the trial. In an action to recover

damages for trespass to lands, the complaint alleging that the

plaintiffs were possessed of the premises ; on the trial, however,

it appeared that they were remainder-men not yet erititled to the

possession, while the defendants were rightfully in possession,

but had committed acts of waste for which they would be liable

^ I^See subject "Waiver" in note on Pac. 1.56; New England Loan & Trust Co.

Kecessity and Form of Particular Allega- v. Browne (1900), 157 Mo. 116, 57 S. W.

tions, p. 689, where cases are cited in 760.3

support of, and in opposition to, the rule '■' Pierr. Ileinrichoffen, 52 Mo. 333,335.

stated in the text. See also Omaha Con- ^ Woolseyu.Willian)s,3-4 Iowa,413,415.

solidated Co. v. Burns (1895), 44 Neb. 21, * Lumbert v. Palmer, 29 Iowa, 104,

62 N. W. 301 ; Olson r. Snake River 108. See also Hudson i'. McCartney, 33

Valley R. R. Co. (1900), 22 Wash. 139, 60 Wis. 331, 346, and cases cited.

be x. ·u l ancl tli aus f acti n still r main in fc re tl1 · fads
h wing th
xcu ·e mu t b all g <l if tli plaintiff int 11lh; to
rely u1 on it, and not up n th p rfornuw · . Th plaintiff is 11
lonb r permitted t av .,r the p rf rmanc of th
an l on th trial prov th circum ' tanc s wlii ·h xcu ·
formance, or prove any oth r alt rnativ than th on
all ged. 1 Thus wh re, in an action against incl r, r ,
plaint tated a demand at maturity, and notic th r
defen lants, and on the trial the plaintiff offer cl t pr v fa t
which would excuse any demand, the eviclence was held imvlmi ~~ ible, and the action wa dismissed; 2 and in a similar ·a ·e
under a statute which requir d that, in ord r to make an indon; r
liable, due diligence must be used by the institution of a uit
against the maker, or else that such a suit w uld be unaYailin ,
the petition alleged that due diligence had been used by c mmencing a suit against the maker, in which judgment had been
recovered, and an execution had been issued and returned unsatisfied; and it was held that the other alternative, the mak r's
in olvency, and the consequent unavailing ch aracter of a suit
against him, could not be shown on the trial; 3 and in a similar
action against the drawer of a bill or the indorser of a bill or
note, when the petition avers the demand and notice in order to
charge the defendant, a waiver of these steps cannot be prov d,
- for example, a subsequent promise by the defendant to pay the
note when th e steps necessary to charge him ha<l been omitted. 4
§ 4 51. * 557. Example s of F atal D isagreement betw een Caus e o f
Acti o n Pleaded and P rov ed. The following are miscellaneou
instances of a fatal disagreement between the cau e of action
pleaded and that proved on the trial. In an action to recover
damages for trespass to lands, the complaint alleging that the
plaintiffs were possessed of the premises; on the trial, howev r,
it appeared that they were remainder-men not yet ntitled to the
possession, while the defendants were rightfully in po es ·ion
but had committed acts of waste for which they would b liable
1 [See
ubje t " \Vaiver " in note on
. . ~ ece ity and Form of l'articular A llegatious , p. 689, wh ere ca es are rited in
support of, and in oppo ition to, the rul e
stated in the text. 'ee also Omaha Conolidated Co. v. Burns (1 95) , 44 Neb. 21,
62 N. W. 301 ; 'o ison 1:. Snake Ri ver
Valley R . ~·Co. (1900) ,22 Wash.1 39,60

Pac. 156; New En gland Loan & Tru t Co.
v . Browne (1900) , 157 ::\fo. 116, 57 ' . W.
760.J
!! Pier v. IIeinrichoffen, 52 Mo. 333, 335.
s W oolseyv.W illiam ,341 wa,413,415.
4 Lumbert v. Palmer, 29 Iowa, l 04,
108.
ee al. o Hud on L' . McCartney, 33
Wis. 331, 346, and cases cited.
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in an action properly brought. This cause of action being

wholly different from that alleged, the complaint was dismissed.^

The petition in an action of forcible entry and detainer stating

that the defendant was holding over af cer the expiration of his

lease, the plaintiff was not permitted to show that he obtained

possession through fraud ; since this would be the averment of

one material fact, and the proof of another, ^ When the com-

plaint set forth a contract, and on the trial the plaintiff proved

without objection a materially different one, and was thereupon

nonsuited, the nonsuit was sustained, the court adding that the

admission of the evidence Avithout objection made no difference

with the operation of the rule.^ And if a complaijit sets forth

a cause of action for a nuisance of a certain specified kind, an

essentially different one cannot be proved; as, for example, in

an action by a lower riparian owner for increasing the flow of a

natural watercourse by draining other streams into it, the plain-

tiff was not permitted to prove a nuisance which consisted solely

in the fouling of such watercourse by the defendant.^ A written

contract having been set out in the petition, the plaintiff cannot
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in place of it prove facts going to show that the defendant is

estopped from denying such contract.^ When a iDetition stated

a cause of action for work and labor done by the plaintiff for the

defendant, but the proofs showed that defendant had only guar-

anteed the payment by other persons for services rendered to

them, a recovery was held impossible.^ An allegation that the

defendant erected a fence across a highwaj-, and thereby ob-

structed it, cannot be sustained by proof that the defendant built

a stone fence fifteen rods from the road, and thereby caused Avater

to flow upon and obstruct the same, for the causes of action are

different;' and upon an allegation that the plaintiff did work

and labor for defendant on his milldam, proof that the services

were performed in harvesting grain is a fatal variance.^

1 Tracv i: Ames, 4 Lans. 500, 506. 6 Packard v. SncU, 35 Iowa. 80, 82.

2 Goldsmitli V. Boersch, 28 Iowa, 351, 7 Hill r. Supervisor, 10 Ohio St. 621.

354. B Thatcher v. Heisey, 21 Ohio St. 668.

3 John.'ion v. Moss, 45 Cal. 515.

* O'Brien I'. St. Paul, 18 Minn. 176, 181. QlrtrJawce.

^ Phillips V. Van Scliaick, 37 Iowa, In the following eases it was held that

229,237. It was added that if the plain- there was a variance between pleadings and

tiff wishes to avail himself of an estoppel proof: —

it must be specially pleaded, citing Kan- Niglujence. An allegation that the en-

som f. Stanberry, 22 Iowa, 334. gineer of the train which struck plaiutiff

CIVIL

E.\lEDIES .

in an ac i n prop rly brou ht. Thi cau
of acti n b ing
wh 11 lifferent fr m tha all , l tl
omplaint wa ii mi cl. 1
h p
n i· , and d tain r ating
that the clef mlant '"a h lding OYer aft r th
xpirati n of 1 i.'
lea e, th
laintiff wa no 1 rmitt 1 t
how bat he btaine
p ·e ,ion through fraud· in e hi w ul l be th a ' rm nt
n material fa t aml th pr of f an ther. 2 \Yhen th cornplain t . . et f rth a con ra t and on h trial th plaintiff l roved
,,,.ithout bj ction a materially cliff rent on , and wa th r upon
non ui ted the non ui t wa
u tainecl th court a lding that the
aclmi ion f the Yiden e with it obj ction mad no lifference
with the op ration of the rul . 3 And if a comr laint t for h
a au of action for a nui ance of a certain p ·ified kind an
e entiall different on cannot be pro eel; a f r exam1 l m
an ac ion by a low r riparian owner for increa in the fi w of a
na ural watercour e by draining other tr am into it, th plaintiff wa not permitted to pro e a nui an e which con i ted olely
in the fouling of 1ch watercour e by the defendant. 4 A written
contract having been et out in th petition, the plain iff cannot
in place of it prove fact going to how that the defendant i
e oppe l from den3 ing such contract. 5 \Vh en a petition tated
a cau of a tion for work and labor done by the plaintiff f r the
defendant, but the proofs showed that cl fendant had onl guaranteed the paym nt by other per on for ervic
render d to
6
them, a recovery wa held impossible.
n all gation tha he
defendant erected a fenc aero s a highway and thereby obstructed it, cannot be u tained b proof that th defendant built
a stone fence fift en rod from the road, and thereb au d wat r
to fl.ow upon and ob true h ame, for the can
f ac ion are
7
lifferen · and upon an all gation that the plaintiff did work
and labor f r defendant on hi milldam, proof hat the ervice
were perform d in harve ting grain i a fatal variance. B
1
2

Traer i·. Ame , 4 Lan . 500, 506.
'ol<l. mith v. Bo r ch, 2 Iowa, 351,

0, 2.
't. 62 l.

35~.

a .John:on v. i\lo , 45 al. 515.
• ( 'Brif'u i-. t. Paul, l !\linn. l i6, l l.
r. Phillip. v. Van , chaick, 37 Iowa,
22!:1, :.!:{7. It wa. acld tl that if th plaintiff wi. h" to av il him· ·lf of an topp 1
it rnu t IJP p cially pl ad d, citing l anom v. tauu ·rry, 22 Iowa, 334-.

[Vnrian

In the following a.
it wa held that
th re wa a varianc b tw n pleading aud
proof:~ egl~qenc .
n 11 gati n that th ngiueer of the traiu whi ch trn ·k plaintiff

ALLEGATIONS AND I'ROOFS MUST

OlUlE ' PUND.
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ALLEGATIONS AND PROOFS MUST CORIIKSPOND.

§ 452.

623

* 55

.

Variance Fatal where

§ 452. * 558. Variance Fatal where Cause of Action in Tort

Alleged and one in Contract Proved. By far the most important

distinction directly connected with tliis doctrine is that which

Cause of Action in T ort

I y far th most imp rtant
onn ct cl wi th this <loctrin i tlrnt whic..: h

Alleged an d one in Contract Prove d.

tli. tinction directly

discovered plaintiff in time to prevent the

injury, and proof that it was the tirenian

and not the engineer wlio saw plaintiff

(not curable by amendment) : Chun v.

Jveceivers (1901), Ky., 64 S. W. 649; an

allegation of negligence in running de-

fendant's cars, and proof tliat defendant

did not provide plaintiff with a safe place

in which to work : Thompson v. Citizens'

St. Ry. Co. (1898), 1.52 Ind. 461, 53 N. E.

462; an allegation that plaintitf injured

herself by stepping into a hole caused by

a missing board in a sidewalk, and proof

that she stepped upon a loose hoard, which

"rocked," turning her foot and causing
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it to go into the hole : Gagan v. City of

Janes ville (1900), 106 Wis 662, 82 N. W.

.5.'<8 ; an allegation of an injury to a pas-

senger by reason of defendant's negligence,

and ])roof of injury to a trespasser by

reason of gross negligence : Fitzgibbon v.

Chicago, etc. Ry. Co. (1899), 108 la. 614,

79 N. W. 477 ; an allegation that defend-

ant was negligent in failing to stop its

train at a station while plaintiff was

getting off, and proof that defendant was

negligent in not showing plaintiff the

safe way to go from one train to another :

Moss y." North Carolina R. R. Co. (1898),

122 N. C. 889, 29 S. E. 410; an allegation

that the gripman pushed plaintiff from

the car, and proof that plaintiff fell in

trying to dodge a hlow aimed at him by

the gripman : Raming v. Metropolitan

St. Hy. Co. (1900), 157 Mo. 477, 57 S. W.

268 ; an allegation that fire was negli-

gently taken from defendant's threshing

engine and placed in the stubble where it

communicated to plaintiff's property, and

evidence that defendant was negligent in

not properly extinguishing the fire after

having properly taken it from the engine :

Lieuallen v. Mosgrove (1898), 3.3 Ore. 282 ;

54 Pac. 200 ; an allegation of joint negli-

gence and proof of negligence of defend-

ants severally : Chetwood v. California

Kat. Bank ('l896), 113 Cal. 414, 45 Pac.

704 ; an allegation of negligence in opera-

tion of railroad and proof of negligence in

use of defective spark arrester : Missouri,

etc Ry. Co. v. Garrison (1903), — Kan. — ,

72 Pac. 225 ; location of accident : Dolau

1-. City of Milwaukee (1895), 89 Wis. 497,

fil N. W. 564; Kolb v. City of Kond du

Lac (1903), 118 Wis. 311, 95 N. W. 149.

Common Carriers, Actions against.

Plaintiff having sued defendant on its

common-law liability as a common carrier,

cannot recover on proof of a special con-

tract limiting the common-law liability :

Normile v. Oregon, etc. Co. (1902), 41 Ore.

177, 69 Pac. 928; where a complaint is

drawn on the theory of defendant's lia-

bility as a common carrier, a recovery

cannot be had against defendant as a

di covered plain t iff in tim e to prevent the
injury, antl proof t hat it wa · the fi reman
and not th e eng ineer who saw plaintiff
(not curable by am en dme nt) : Ch un l '.
H, teiYe r (1 901), Ky., 64 ' . \V. 649 ; an
a llegation of negligence in running <1efe nda nt', car . , aud proof that defemlant
did not proYitle plai ntiff wit h a afe vlaee
in whi ch to work: Thomp on v. Citizen ' '
~· t. R y. Co . (1 9 ), rn2 Jud . 461, 5,3 .cT. E.
462; an allegat ion that pl ain tiff injured
Ji r elf by . t pping into a hole cau ·ell by
a mi. ing board in a sid ewalk, and proof
that he stepped upon a loose board, wh ich
"rocked," turning her fo ot and cau ib g
it to go into the h ole: Gag an v. ity of
Jane yi1Je (1900), 106 Wi 662 82 N . W.
55 ; an allegation of an injury to a pa nger by reason of defendant's n egligence,
and proof of injury to a trespa er by
rea ' On of gro s negligence: Fitzgibbon v.
Chicago, etc. Ry. Co. (1899), 10 Ia. 614,
79 N. W. 477; an allegation that defendant wa negligent in failing to stop its
train at a station while plaint.iff was
getting off, and proof that defendant was
negligent in not showing plaintiff the
safe way to go from one train to another:
Mo. s v. North Carolina R. R. Co. (189 ),
122 N. C. 889, 29 S. E. 410; an allegation
that the gri pman pu hed plaintiff from
the car, and proof that plaintiff fell in
trying to dodge a blow aimed at him by
the gripman: Raming v. M etropolitan
t. Ry. Co. (1900), 157 Mo. 477, 57 S. W.
268; an allegation that fire wa negligently taken from defendant's threshing
engine and placed in the tubule where it
communicated to plaintiff's property, and
ev idence that defendant was negligent in
not properly extinguishing the fire after
havin g properly taken it from th e eng in e :
Li euallen v . .Mosg rove ( 1 98), 33 Ore. 2 2 ;
54 Pac. 200; au all egati on of joint negligen ce and proof of irngli ge nce of defendant · . eYerallv: Chetwood v. California
Nat. Rank (1896), 113 Cal. 414, 45 P ac.
704; an all egation of neg ligence in operation of railroad and proof of neg ligence in
u e of defective park arrester: 1\Ii souri,
etc. Hy.Co. v.Garrison(1903),-Kan. - ,

72 Pac. 2~5 ; loC'ation of accident: D ol:lu
'ity of ~ l il waukco ( l !Jj ), !:I \\Ti·. 4!:11,
fi l .'. \\' . !il.i4; Kol!, 1·.
itv of Fontl du
L ac (1903), 11 Wi . . 3 11 , 95 .lT . \ \ ' . 149.
Common Car,.ius, ~lctions ag11111st .
P laintiff having . uccl <lcfrudaut ou it
c n1mo11-la \\' lia.liilit} a. a co111rno11 carrier,
cannot ret: o' er 011 proof of a pccial contract lim itiug the commou-law liabilit\·:
onn ile c. Oreg-o n, te. o. (1902), 41 O;e.
177, 69 P ac. 92 ; wher e a complaint i
dr a wn ou the theory of defendant' liability as a common carrier, a reco' ery
cann ot be had agai n t defendan t a~ a
warehou e ma n : Same ca e. But ee,
con tra , Cavalla ro v. Texas, etc. R y . Co.
(1 95 ), llOCal. 34 ,42Pac.91.
Fraud. In au acti on to set a ide a
sal e as fraudul ent, allegations of actual
fraud are not supported by proof of contructive fraud. The court aid: " If t he
vice which renders th e sale null a t o
them [defendants] was th e existence of
actual fraud, the complaint must, as this
complaint does, charge it presence. If
the vi ce was constructive fraud , then it is
incumbent npon the plaintiff to state the
matters which constitu te that cau e of
action. Of course, both actual and constructive fraud may be pleaded in the
same complaint, but if actual fraud only
be set up, then, althoug h proof of contructi ve fraud may be e'·id ence, having
a tenden cy to support the alleg a ti on of
actual fraud , yet the findin g of con tructive fraud is not of it elf ufficient t o
support a judg ment, for t he allega tions
and proof must corre pond : " Finch i:.
Kent (1900) , 24 Mont. 26 , 61 Pac. 653.
See also Kl ey v. H ealey (I 96) , 149 N. Y.
346, 44
E. 150, wh ere allegation of
fraud wer e h eld not to be supported by
th e proof.
T itle. A pa r ty r a nnot plead ab olnte
owner hi p of p roperty and prove a li en
upon it merely, nor i·icf' vu. a : Randall 1'.
P er.on (l 94), 42 ~ eb. 607 , 60 X W . 9 .
ee Ti tle, p. 6 i . But ee 1 on t'. ity
of , ea ttle (1903), 30 Wa L. 6 i , 71 P ac. 201.
p . 619, uote I . H ele!, in mith v. Ru nnel
(1 896), 97 Ia. 53, G5 N. \\. 1002, t hat
t'.

6'.?-±
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CIVIL REMEDIES.

subsists between causes of action ex contractu and those ex delicto.

Cl ·11 UE.\IEDI S.

ub i t. bet ·een c, u e of c ion ex contractu, and those ex delicto.
It i, ettl d by< n almo t unanimou · erie of 1 ci ion in an u

It is settled by an almost unanimous series of decisions in various

plaintiff ia a suit to partition land, who

claims in the petition tu have a life estate

therein, is not entitled to relief on the

ground that she has an estate in fee

simple. See, however, the following cases :

Where the complaint alleges title and

right of possession in the plaintiff, a re-

covery may be had on proof tliat plaintiff

owns the equity of redemption : Arritigton

V. Arrington "(1894), 114 N. C. 116, 19

S. E. •!'%. In an action to recover lami,

plaintiff may allege title by inheritance

and prove title by possession ; Davis v.

Leeper (1900), Ky", 56 S. W. 712. In an

action to quiet title there is no variance

between an allegation of title in fee and
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proof of an equitable title : Oliver i'.

Dougherty (1902), Ariz., 63 Pac. 553.

Ex}iiess and Implied Contract. Where

the complaint alleges an express contract

and proof shows an implied contract, and

vt':e versa, no recovery can be had : Buell

V. Brown (1900), 131 Cal. 158, 63 Pac.

167 ; Morrow v. Board of Education (1895),

7 S. D. 553, 64 N. W. 1 126. Contra, Hecht

V. Stanton (1895), 6 Wyo. 84, 42 Pac. 749.

See also on this general question. Gillies

V. Improvement Co. (1895), 147 N. Y. 420,

42 N. E. 196 ; Columbus, etc. Ry. Co. v.

Gaffney (1901), 65 0. St. 104, 64 N. E.

152.

Rescission. Where a breach of contract

is alleged, the pleader cannot on the trial

elect to rescind the contract and recover

the portion of the price paid : Detroit

Heating Co. v. Stevens (1897), 16 Utah,

177, 52 Pac. 379.

Mortgage. Where a complaint is predi-

cated on the theory of lack of mental

capacity to execute a deed, no recovery

can be had on theory that the deed i.s

in reality a mortgage : Swank i'. Swank

(1900), 37 Ore. 439, 61 Pac. 846.

Trust. In an action to enforce a trust,

an allegation that a husband i.s trustee of

property alleged to belong to his deceased

wife's estate, is not supported by evidence

that he had received money from his

wife's separate property : Elmore i-. El-

more (1896), 114 Cal. .516, 46 Pac. 458.

Insurance. A complaint upon a con-

tract of insurance for ?500 upon a certain

building i.-* not supported by evidence of

a contract for $600 insurance upon two

buildings on the same lot : Waldron r.

Home Mutual Ins. Co. (1894), 9 Wash.

534, 38 Pac. 136.

Nuisance. Where, in an action against

the city for damages caused by a nuisance,

the petition char<res that the city origi-

nated the nuisance, proof that it continued

it only will not sustain a recovery, since

in tiie latter case a request to abate is

necessary : Kychlicki i\ City of St. Louis

(1893), 115 Mo. 662, 22 S. W. 908.

Account and Account Stated. Where

pl intiff in a uit to partition land, who a contract for 600 in urance upon tw
me lot: Wah.i ron v.
cl, im· in the petition to have a life e· tate built.ling. on the
therein, L nut entitl ed to relief on the Home Mutual In . o. (1 94), 9 Wah.
ground that h ha au e tate in fee 534, 3 Pac. 136.
impl . ee howe,·er , the follow io o- ca e :
ui ance. Where, in an action again~t
\Yh ere the complaint all o-e title and the cit for damage au·ed by a nui tmce,
ri ht of po e ion in the plaintiff, a r e- the petiti n I arcr
that the city origicovery may be had on proof that plaiULiff nated the nui au ·e, pr of that it coutiu u d
own · the equi y of re<lem ption : Arrington it only will not ustain a r ecovery, ince
i•. Arrin ton (1 9.+ ), 1 J-t N.
. 116 19 in the latter a e a request to abat i
. E. :r . In an action to recover lan<l, nece._ ary: I ychlicki v. 'ity of t. Loui ~
plaintiff may alleo-e title by inheri tance (1 93 ), 115 J\lo. 662, 22 . W. 90 .
and prove title by po e . ion: DaYi v.
Accou11t and Account taled. Where
Leeper ( 1900 ), Ky ., 56 . W. 712. ln an the petition ·et up a au e of action on
action to quiet title th r i no Yariauce an open a count, plaintiff cannot reco er
between an allegation of title in fee and upon proof of an account ·tated a the
proof of an equitable title: Oli,•er v. two are di tinct and incon i ·tent : Mc·
Dougherty ( 1902 ), Ariz., 6 Pac. 553.
ormick v. Inter tate, etc. Ry. Co. (1900),
Expr sand Implied Contract. \YherP- 154 ::\fo 191, 55 ' . w. 252.
the complaint allege an expre
ontract
T respas . Where one act of tre pa i
am.l proof how an implied contract, and alleged to have been committed at a de igvi1:e versa, no recover y can be had: Buell nated time and place, no recover can be
i-. Brown (1900), 13.l
al. 158, 63 Pac. had for a different act hown to haYe
16i; Morrow v. Board of Ed ucation {l 95), been committed at a different time : La
. Y. 428, 4 7
7 ·. D. 553 , 64 "'. W. 1126. Contra, Hecht Rue v. mith ( l 97), 153
i·.
tanton (1 95), 6 Wyo. 84, 42 Pac. 749. N. E. 796.
,'ee al·o on thi general que tion, illie
Co11tract. Plaintiff cannot allege one
r. Improvement o. (1 95), 147 N. Y. 420,
pecial contract and recover on proof
42 ...-. E. 196; Columbu, etc. Ry. o. v. of a different contract:
remer v. t iller
Gaff ney (1901 ), 65 0 . t. 104, 64 N. E. (1893), 56 Hon. 52, 57 N. W. 31 ; Win15~.
che ter v. Jo~lyn {1903), olo. - 72
R e ci sion. Where a breach of contract ljac. 1079. But und r an allegati n that
i alleged, th e plea<ler cannot on th e trial plaintiff performed ervice ford f ndaot
elect to re cind the contract and recove r "at hi in tan e and r que. t," evi<l nee
the portion of the price paid : D etroi t may be intro<lu ed howing fact givin
Heating Co. v. teveu (1897), I 6 -Utah, l'i e to an implied ontract only: olumbus, etc.
y.
. v. Gaffney ( 190 1), 65
Iii, 52 Pac. 379.
. t . 104 , 61 . E. 152.
oder an alleJlorlgage. Where a complaint i predicated on the theory of lack of mental gation that a grantee orally a reecl t
capacity to execute a deed, no recovery a • ume a mortgage "and thcreb,r an
can be had on theory that the d d i, otherwi e becam e legalh· and equitably
iu reality a mortgao-e: wan k v. , wauk bound to the O'rantor and to he mort( 1900), :r; re . 43 , I Pac. 46.
ga~ee to pay th
am ," vi<len e that tbe
Trust. I n au action to euforce a t ru.-t, g rantee exec ut d a bond to pay th d an allegation that a lm ·band i. tru. t , of ficiency if any, i admi · ible: Woger V·
pr1Jperty alleg r1 t lieloug to hi de a · d Liuk (1 96), 150 r. Y. 549, 44 . E. 1103.
wife ' e tate, i · uut upported by vid n l:e Tb re i ~ a variance between an all gati n
that he had r
i,·ed monev from hi
that a bond u d on wa in the p nal um
wife'· :'epar t prop rty: El~1 or r. El- of. 2,500 aud
id u that it w
in the
more ( I 96), 114 al. 51 , 46 Pac. 45 .
um of. 1,500: hi ag , K & W. Hy.
f n urance.
complaint upon a
n- v. F,,·an ( 1 96). 5i Kan. 2 6, 46 Pa .. 303.
e for ~: 00 upon a c rtain
.lliscellun ou . An allegation that plainupporte<l Ly evide uce f tiff i indebted to defendant i not up-
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States, that if a complaint or petition in terms alleges a cause of

tate , that if a complaint or petition in terms all ge a caus of
action ex delieto, for fraud, conversion, r any oth r kind of tort,

action ex delicto, for fraud, conversion, or any other kind of tort,

ported by evidence that plaintiff's assignor

is indebted to defendant : Anderson v.

Alsetii (1895), 6 S. D. 566, 62 N. W. 435.

There is a fatal variance between an alle-

gation that a contract was made bv all the

heirs of a named intestate and evidence

that it was made by a portion only :

Thompson v. Fenn (1896), 100 Ga. 2.34, 28

S. E. 39. Where suit is brouglit on a

sheriff's bond for damages alleged to have

been sustained by the failure of the sheriff

to properly perform his duties, the plaintiff

cannot recover on account of breaches of

duty not alleged in the declaration : Hall

& IJrowu Co. V. Barnes (1902), 115 Ga.

945, 42 S E. 276. If the pleading is of
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allowed claims and the proof is of claims

presented but not adjusted, there is a

variance: Hofmanu v. Tucker (1899), 58

Neb. 457, 78 Jv. W. 941. A petition alleg-

ing that a certain sum had come to the

husband by reason of the marriage, is not

supported by evidence that the money was

voluntarily allowed to the husband by the

■wife after marriage : Dillon v. Stariu

(1895), 44 Neb. 881, 63 N. W. 12.

The fact that acts of negligence are

alleged conjunctively does not require that

all of them must be proved : Duell v.

Chicago & N. W. Ry. Co. (1902), 115 Wis.

.516, 92 N. W. 269*; Stern v. City of St.

Louis (1901), 161 Mo. 146, 61 S. W. 594;

Terre Haute, etc. R. R. Co. v. Sheeks

(1900), 155 Ind. 74, 56 N. E. 434; Came-

ron V. Bryan (1893), 89 la. 214, 56 N. W.

434.

And in general, if one alleges more

than is necessary, such additional alle-

gations need not be proved : Young v.

Gormley (1903), 119 la. 541, 93 N. W. .565 ;

Kaline r. Stover (1893), 88 la. 245, 55

N. W. 346; Reizensteiu i\ Clark (1897),

410 la. 287, 73 N. W. 588; Harwood v.

Davenport (1898), 105 La. 592, 75 N. W.

487 ; Anderson v. Union Terminal Ry. Co.

(1901), 161 Mo. 411, 61 S. W. 874; Meyer

V. Koehring (1895), 129 Mo. 15, 31 S. "w.

449; Gannon v. Laclede Gas Co. (1898),

145 Mo. 502, 46 S. W. 968. But see, how-

ever, Botkin V. Cassody (1898), 106 la.

334, 76 N. W. 722, which appears incon-

sistent with this rule.

Evidence Held Admissible under Particular

Allegations.

In general, the proof must be confined

to the issues as made by the pleadings:

Thompson v. Wertz (1894), 41*Neb. 31,

.59 N. W. 518; Callen i'. Rose (1896), 47

Neb. 638, 66 N. W. 639 ; Avers i-. Wolcott

(1902), — Neb. — , 92 N. "w. 1036. See

the following cases for specific illustra-

tions of this rule : —

Acr.ejitance : Thompson v. Perkins

(1896), 97 la. 607, 66 N. W. 874. Agree-

ment to dtliver : Central R. R. Co. v. Has-

selkus (1893), 91 Ga. 382, 17 S. E. 838.

ported by evidence that plaintiff' a ignor
Evidence Ileld Admis ible under Particular
i indebted to defendau t :
nder ou 1·.
Afl,,gatio11s.
Al ' eth (1 95), 6 . D. 566, 62 .r. W. 435.
In general, the proof mu t be confined
There i a fatal variance b tw en an allegation th:-it a contract wa made by all the to the i. ·ue a: made by the pleading :
heir of a named iute tate and evidence Thomp on v. Wertz (1 94), 41 Neb. 31,
that it wa mafle bv a portion only : 59 .J. \V. 51 ; Callen v. Hoe (l 96}, 47
Teh. 63 , 66 N. W. 639; .Ayer v. Wolcott
Thompon v. Fenn {l 96), 100 Ga. 234, 2
. E. 39. Where suit i brought on a {1 902), - ~eb. -, 92 . W . 1036. • 'ee
heriff' bond for damage all ged to have the followiug ca e for specific illu traheen • u tained by the failure of the sheriff t ions of this rule : .J.cce7itance : Thomp 011 v. Perkins
to properly perform his dutie., the plaintiff
cannot recover on account of breaches of (1896 J, 97 Ia. 60i, G6 N. W. Si 4. .Agreeduty not alleged in the declaration: Hall ment to deliver : Central R. R. Co. v. Ha & Brown Co. v. Barnes {1902), 11 5 Ga. selku (1893), 91 Ga. 3 2, 17 S. E. 83 .
945 , 42
E. 2i6. If the pleading is of .Agreement to pay for en•ices : Owen v.
allowed claim and t he proof is of claims ~Ieade (l 94), 104 Cal. 179, 37 Pac. 923.
pre ented but not adjusted, there is a Breach of warranty: Snowden v. Watervnriance: Hofmann i-. Tucker (1899) , 58 man (1897), 100 Ga. 5 8, 28 S. E. 121.
Neb. 457, 78 . W. 941. A petition alleg- Contract: Duval v. Am. T. & T. Co.
ing that a cer tain sum had come to the (1 902), 113 Wis. 504, 89 ~ . W. 482.
hu band by reason of the marriage, is not D escription of property: B oyd's Adm'r v.
supported by evidence that the money was Farmers' Bank {1902), Ky., 69 S. W. 964;
voluntarily allowed to the husband by the Barnhart v. Ehrhart {1898), 33 Ore. 274
wife after marriage : Dillon v. S ta rin 54 Pac. 195. Employment: Holton
Waller (1895) , 95 Ia. 545, 64 N. W. 633.
{1895), 44 Neb. 88 1, 63 N. W. 12.
T he fad that acts of negligence are E xtre me cruelty: Winterburg v. Winteralleged conjunctively does not require that burg {1893), 52 Kan. 406, 34 Pac. 971.
all of them must be proved : Duell v. Finding purchaser: Clark v. Allen ( 1899),
Chicago & N. W. Ry. Co. {1902), 11 5 Wis. 125 Cal. 276, 57 Pac. 985. Fraud: Fir t
516, 92 N. W. 269; Stern v. City of St. Nat. B ank v. McKinney (1896), 47 Teb.
L ouis (190 1) , 161 Mo. 146, 6 1 S. W . 594; 149, 66 . W. 280. Goods sold and deT erre Haute, etc. R. R. Co. v. Sheeks livered: Gaar, Scott, & Co. v. Brundage
{1900), 155 Ind. 74, 56 J . E. 434; Came- (1903), 89 i\linn. 412 , 94 :\. W.1091. Illegal
ron 1:. Bryan (1893), 89 Ia. 214, 56 N. W. voting: McLainr. i\larad e (HJOO), 60 ~eh.
359, 83 N. W. 829. Indebtednes : Klein434.
And in general, if one allege8 more schmidt v. Kleinschmidt (1893), 13 l\lunt.
than i nece sary, such additional alle- 64, 32 Pac. 1. 1Jloney loaned: Clarkson
gations 11eed not be proved : Young v. v. Kennett {1895), 17 Mont. 563, 44 Pac.
Gorm le.v ( 1903), 119 Ia. 54 1, 93 N. W. 565; 88. Negligence: Dickey v. Northern Pac.
Raline v. Stover ( 1893), 88 Ia. 245, 55 Ry. Co. (1898), 19 Was11. 350, 53 Pac. 347;
N. \\. 3{6; Reizenstein v. Clark ( l 89ij, McClellan v. Chippewa Valley E lec. Ry.
410 Ia. 287, 73
. W. 588; Harwood z:. Co. (1901), llO Wis. 326, 85 N . W. 1018;
Davenport {1898), 105 Ia. 592, i5 N. W . Brown v. Ben on {189i}, 101 Ga. 753, 29
4 7 ; Ander on v. Union Terminal Ry. Co. S. E. 215; Kelly v. Cable Co. {I 93), 13
(1901), 161 Mo. 41 1, 61 S. W . SH; Mever Mont. 411, 34 Pac. 611; paulding v. C.
v. Koeh ring (1895), 129 Mo. 15, 31 S. ·w.
t. P. & K. C. Ry. Co. (1 96), 9 Ia. 205,
44 9; Gannon v . L aclede Gas Co. {l 98), 67 N . W . 227; Lewi v. chultz (1 96),
14 5 Mo. 502, 46 S. W. 968. But see, how- 98 Ia. 341, 67 N. W . 266; J en kiu v. Mcever, Botkin v. Cassady {1898), 106 Ia. Carthy (1895), 45 . C. 27 , 22 . E. 3 ;
334, 76 r. W . i22, which appears incon- Neville v. St. Loui , etc. Ry. Co. ( 1900),
158 Mo. 293, 59 . W . 123; Schwartzschild,
si tent with this rule.

v'.
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and the proof establishes a breach of contract express or implied,

no recovery can be had, and the action must be dismissed, even

though by disregarding the averments of tort, and treating them

as surplusage, there might be left remaining the necessary and

sufficient allegations, if they stood alone, to show a liability upon

the contract. 1 While this doctrine is firmly established, and

Avhile there is no difficulty in its application, when it is once

ascertained that the cause of action is for a tort, it is not so easy,

in the absence of any specific facts, and in the careless mode of

pleading which is too prevalent, to determine whether the cause

of action stated by the plaintiff is ex delicto or ex contractu.

Under the former system, the presence or absence of certain

etc. Co. V. Weeks (1903), 66 Kan. 800, 72

Pac. 274 ; Nolaiid v. Great Northern Ry.

Co. (190.3), 31 Wash. 430, 71 Pac. 109S;

CIVIL RE. EDirS.

an l the proof e tabli he a br ach of ontract expre or impli cl.,
no r co ery can be had and the action mu t e i mi' ed,
en
thou 5 h b3 di r garding the avermen of tort, and trea in 0 th m
n. nrplu a e, there might be left r maining the nece ary and
uf ci nt a1le 0 ation , jf they stood alon , to how a liability up n
the contract. 1 vVhile this doctrine i firmly e tabli h d, and
while th re i n difficulty in it application, when it i once
rvcertain d that the can e of action i.· for a tort, it i not
a y,
jn th ab ence of any pecific fact and in the carel
mode of
pleading "hich i too preval nt to determine whether tl.e can e
of action tat d by the plain tiff i · ex delicto or ex contractu .
"C"ncler the former y tern, the pr sence or absence of certain

Wolf v. Hemrich Bros. Co. (1902), 28

Wash. 187, 68 Pac. 440. .Notice and

knowledge: De Lay v. Carney (1897), 100
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la. 687, 69 N. W. 1053 ; Hunt v. City of

Dubuque (1895), 96 la. 314, 65 N. W.

319; King v. Howell (1895), 94 la. 208,

62 N. W. 738. Ownership: Darnall v.

Bennett (1896), 98 la. 410, 67 N. VV. 273.

t^ereices rendered : Bean v. Fercival Cop-

per Mining Co. (1901), 111 Wis. 598, 87

N. W. 465. Validity of lev)/: Chapman ;;.

James (1895), 96 la. 233, 64 N. W. 795.

Votes cast at election : Furguson v. Henry

(1895), 95 la. 439, 64 N. W. 292.]

1 From the great number of cases

which maintain this doctrine I have se-

lected those which are the most recent

and important, and which discuss it with

tlie greatest fulness. Walter v. Bennett,

16 N. Y. 250; Ro.«s v. Mather, 51 N. Y.

108; De Graw r. Elmore, 50 N. Y. 1 ;

Sager v. Blain, 44 N. Y. 445, 448 ; Moore

V. Noble, 53 Barb. 425 ; Rothe v. Rothe,

31 Wis. 570, 572; Anderson r. Case, 28

Wis. 505, 508 ; Kewaunee Cy. Sup. v.

Decker, 30 Wis. 624; Johannesson w.

Borscheniu.s, 35 Wis. 131, 135; Dean

r. Yates, 22 Ohio St. 388, 397 ; Watts v.

McAllister, 33 Ind. 264. See, per contra.

Dates V. Kendall, 67 N. C. 241 ; Gulp v.

Steere, 47 Kan. 746. See also Barnes v.

Quigley, 59 N. Y. 265 ; Matthews r. CadV,

61 id. 561 ; Lane »\ Cameron, 38 Wi.s. 613 ;

Pierce v. Carey, 37 id. 232 ; Goss v. Boul-

der Cy. Com'is, 4 Culo. 468; Neudeckerv.

Kohlherg, 81 N. Y. 296, 299,301; People

V. Deiiisoii, 84 id. 272 ; 80 id. 656 ; Neftel

V. Lightstone, 77 id. 96; Lockwood v.

Quackenbush, 83 id. 600 ; Lindsay v. Mul-

queen, 26 Hun, 485; Front r. Hardin, 56

Ind. 165 ; Hachett v. Bank o^ Cal., 57 Cal.

335 ; Freeman r. Grant, 132 N. Y. 22 ;

Mea V. Pierce, 63 Hun, 400. These cases,

as well as others, show that an action can-

not be changed from tort to contract by

amendment at the trial.

[^Sce also, to same effect, Noble v. Atchi-

son, etc. R. R. Co. (1896), 4 Okla. 534,

46 Pac. 483 ; A, F. Shapleigh Hardware

Co. V. Hamilton (1902), 70 Ark. 319, 68

S. W. 490; Miller v. Ilirschberg (1895),

27 Ore. 522, 40 Pac. 506 ; Brooke v. Cole

(1899), 108 Ga. 251, 33 S. E. 849; Holl-

etc. Co. v. Week (1903), 66 Kan. 800, 72
l)ac. 2i4; Toland v. Great Northern Ry.
('o. (1903), 31 Wah. 430, 71 Pac. 109 ;
Wolf i·. Hemrich Bros. Co. (1902), 28
\\ra h. 1 7, 6 Pac. 440.
J.Votice and
knoll'iPdge: De Lay v. Carney (1 ~Ii), 100
Ia. 6 7 69 . W. l 053; Hunt v. City of
Dubuque ( l 95), 96 Ia. 314, 65 N. W.
:H 9; King '!:. Howell {l 95), 94 Ia. 20 ,
Ownership: Darnall v.
62 ~. \V. i3 .
Bennett (l 96), 9 Ia. 410, 67 N. W. 273.
, 'en•ices rendered: Bean v . Percival Copper Mining Co. {1901), 111 Wis. 598, 87
N. W. 465. Validity <?f levy: Chapman v.
James (1895), 96 Ia. 233, 64 N. W. 795.
Vote cast at election : Furguson v. Henry
(1 95), 95 Ia. 439, 64 N. W. 292.J
1 From the great number of cases
which maintain thi doctrine I have . elected tho e which are the most recent
and important, and wh ich di cu sit with
the greate t fulne . Walter v. Bennett,
16 X Y. 250; R o. 1• . Mather, 51 N. Y.
10 ; De Graw v. Elmore, 50 N. Y. 1 ;
•·ager v. Blain, 44 N . Y. 445, 44 ; Moore
v . ... oble, 53 Barb. 42fi; Rothe v. Rothe,
31 \Vi . 570, 5i2; Auder on v. Ca e, 2
Wi . 505, 508 ; Kewaunee y.
up. v.
Decker, 30 Wi . 624; Johanne son v.
Bor cheniu , 35 Wi . 131, 135; Dean
t'. Yate , 22
hio, t. 3 , 397; Watt v.
.11cAlli ter, 33 Ind. 264.
ee, per cont1·a,
Oate v. Kendall, 67 1 . . 2+1; ulp v.
, 'teere, 4 7 Kan. i4-6.
ee al o Barn l'.
Qui~lioy, 59 •. Y. 265; Iatthew v. acly,
Jl id. 5Fjl; Lane ''· ameron, 3 'Vi.. 613;
Pinre c. nrey, 37 id. 2.'32; o v. Boul<l ·r y. om'r , 4 'ol . 46 ;

Kohl berg. 81 .N. Y. 296, 299, 301; P ople
v. Deui -u n, 4 id. 272; O id. 656; Teft 1
v. Li g htstoue, 77 id. 96; Lockwood v.
Qnackenbu h , 3 id. 600; Lind. ay v. Mulq u u, 26 Hun, 485; Front v. Hardin, 56
Jud. l 65 ; Hachett i•. Bank of al., 5 7 Cal.
335; Freemau !'. Grant, 132
. Y. 22;
J\Iea v. Pierce 63 Hun, 400. The e ca e ,
a "·ell as other , how that an action cannot be chaugeu from tort to contract hy
amendment at the trial.
[ ce al o, to ame effect, Noble v. At hion, etc. H. R. Co. (1896), 4 Okla. 534,
46 Pac. 4 3 · A . F. Shapleigh Hardware
Co. v. Hamilton {1902) , 70 Ark. 319, 6
. W . 490 ; .: \liller v. Hir ch hero- ( 1 95),
27 Ore. 522, 40 Pac. 506 ; Brooke v. Cole
{l 99), 10 Ga. 251, 33 . E. 49; Hollmann v. Lange (! 9 ), 143 Mo. 100, 44
. W. 752 ; W e tinghouse o. v. Tilden
(189 ), 56 Neb. 129, i6 N. W. 416; Peay
v. alt Lak
ity {1 94), 11 tah, 331 40
Pac. 206 · Elli v. Flaherty (1902), 65
Kan. 621, 70 Pac. 5 6 (an importan ra e) .
ompare the ra. e of \\ il on 1:. Fuller
(1 94) 5 Minn. 149, 59 N. W. 9
in
whi h it i held that where a party all ge
that certain r pre en tation , amounting to
a warranty, w re frau lul n ly mad , and
proY the warranty and it br ach, but
fail. t prove the fraud, he may recover
for th br a h f the warranty. The
court ob. l'\' that the ntrary i h ld in
Ro.: r. i\father, 51 1r. Y. 10 . F llowecl
in Brown 1 Doyle (l 97), 6. l\fi11n. 54;,
72 1 ' . \V. 14. And. , in thi c nn ctiou,
Iliggiu "·Hayden (1897), 53
b. 61, 73
N. \V. 2 o.]
1•
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technical formulas removed all doubt; but as these arbitrary

means of distinction have been abandoned, and as pleadings fre-

([uently, in violation of true principles, combine charges of fraud,

of guilty knowledge, of taking, carrying away, and conversion,

and the like, with averments of undertakings and promises and

their breach, it is sometimes impossible to decide which class of

allegations constitute the gravamen of the action, and which is

to be regarded as surplusage. The decided cases will not give

us much aid, for pleadings with substantially the same averments

have received diametrically opposite constructions. There is

thus a conflict among the decisions in reference to this subject

irreconcilable upon principle, and only to be evaded by pronounc-

ing one set of them to be erroneous. Although it is simply

impossible to develop any general rule of interpretation from

these cases, a few are selected as examples.

§ 453. * 559< How Nature of Cause of Action is determined.

Illustrations of Causes ex contractu. It may be considered a

settled point, on principle and on authority, that the nature of

the cause of action is determined by the allegations of the com-
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plaint or petition,! so that the inquiry need never extend beyond

this first pleading in the suit. I shall first cite illustrations of

causes ex contractu. In an action by a vendee to recover damages

arising on the sale of a horse to him, the complaint, after setting

forth the sale, and that the horse was in fact "wind-broken,"

stated that the defendant knew of this defect, and " fraudulently

concealed the same with intent to deceive " the plaintiff, giving

the circumstances in unnecessary detail; and that, "further to

mislead and deceive the plaintiff, the defendant falsely repre-

sented and warranted to the plaintiff that the horse was sound,

etc. ; that by reason of the premises the plaintiff was deceived,

and was induced to purchase and pay for the horse ; " concluding

with an allegation of damages and a prayer for judgment. The

1 Welsh V. Darragh, 52 N. Y. 590. 564; Graves ;•. Waite, 59 id. 156; Green-

Although the immediate question was tree v. Roseustock, 61 id. 58-3; Sheahan

whetiier the cause was a referable oue, v. Shanahan, 5 Hun, 461 ; Harden v. Cor-

yet the reasoning and conclusion are gen- bett, 6 id. 522 ; Loomis v. Mowry, 8 id.

eral. Some of the cases lay some stress 311 ; Harrington v. Bruce, 84 N. Y. 103;

upon the kind of summons used as in- Sparman v. Keira, 83 id. 245, 249; Harris

dicative of the pleader's intention. The v. Todd, 16 Hun, 248; Westcott i;. Aius-

following are further examples of actions worth, 9 id. 53; Stitt v. Little, 63 N. Y.

held to be on contract: Freer w. Denton, 427, 432; Bishop v. Davis, 9 Hun, 342;

PI N. Y. 492; Vilmar v. Schall, 61 id. Slutts r. Chafee, 48 Wis. 617.

technical formulas remov l all doubt; but a th e arbitrary
rneans of E tinction have b n abandon l, and a pleading frequ ntly, in violation of true princir 1 s, combine charg of fraud,
of guilty knowledge, of taking, arrying away, and conv r~ion,
and the like, with averments of un d rtaking · an<l promise and
their breach, it is sometimes impos ible to d cide which clas of
allegations constitute the gravam en of the action, and which is
to be regarded as surplusage. The decid ed cas s will not giv
us much aid, for pleadings with substantially the sam av rments
have received diametrically opposite constructions. There is
thus a conflict among the decisions in reference to this subject
irreconcilable upon principle, and only to be evaded by pronouncing one set of them to be erroneous. Although it is simply
impossible t o develop any general rule of interpretation from
these cases, a few are selected as examples.
§ 453. * 559, How Nature of Cause of Action is determined.
Illustrations of Causes ex contractu. It may be considered a
settled point, on principle and on authority, that the nature of
the cause of action is determined by the allegations of the complaint or petition, 1 so that the in quiry need never extend beyond
this first pleading in the suit. I shall first cite illustrations of
causes ex contractu. In an action by a vendee to recover damages
arising on the sale of a horse to him, the complaint, after setting
forth the sale, and that the horse was in fact "wind-broken,"
stated that the defendant knew of this defect, and "fraudulently
concealed the same with intent to deceive " the plaintiff, giving
the circumstances in unnecessary detail; and that, "further to
mislead and deceive the plaintiff, th e defendant falsely represented and warranted to the plaintiff that the horse was sound,
etc.; that by reason of the premises the plaintiff was deceived,
and was induced to purchase and pay for the horse;" concluding
with an allegation of damages and a prayer for judgment. The
1 W elsh v. Darrag h, 52 N. Y. 590.
56-i; Grayes v. Waite, 59 id. 156; GreenAlth ough the immed iate question was tree v. R osenr;toc k, 61 id. 583; Sheahan
whether the cause wa · a referable oue, v. Shanahan, 5 Hun, 461 ; Harden v. Coryet the rea onin g and conclusion are gen- bett, 6 id. 522; Loomis v. Mowry, 8 id.
eral. Some of the ca es lay some stress 311; Harrin gton v. Bruce, 84 N. Y. 103;
upon t he kind of summons used as in- , Sparman v. Keim, 83 id. 245, 249; Harris
dicative of the pleader's intention. The v. Todd, 16 Hun, 248; We tcott v. Aiosfollowing are further examples of actions worth, 9 id . 53 · Stitt v. Little, 63 N. Y.
helu to be on contract: Freer v. Denton, 427, 432; Bir;hop v. Davi , 9 Hun, 342;
fl l N. Y. 492; Vilmar v. Schall, 61 id. Slutts v. Chafee, 48 Wis. 6li.
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Superior Court of New York City held that this complaint stated

a cause of action on contract for the breach of a warrant)-, and

that all the averments of fraud must be treated as surplusage.^

A complaint contained the following averments : that the defend-

ants, having in their possession certain securities, the property

of the plaintiff, entered into an agreement with him, whereby

they promised to deliver up said securities to him ; that he had

demanded the same, but the defendants wrongfully refused to

deliver them, and wrongfully disposed of and converted them to

their oivn use. The New York Court of Appeals pronounced

this cause of action to be on contract, and not for a tort.^ In

another quite similar case the complaint stated that the plaintiffs,

at, etc., consigned to the defendants, who were commission-

merchants at, etc., certain specified articles, to be sold by them,

and the net proceeds thereof remitted; that the defendants re-

ceived the goods, and sold them for a sum named; and after

deducting all expenses, there was due to the plaintiffs the sum

of, etc., which they demanded of the defendants, who omitted

and refused to pay the same, and have converted the same to
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their own use, to the damage of the plaintiffs of, etc. This cause

of action was also held by the same court to be on contract, and

not for a tort.^ In a more recent action, brought for the price of

certain bonds that had been sold to the plaintiff, and which had

turned out to be null and void, the claim to recover was put at

1 Quintard v. Newton, 5 Robt. 72. The See also Sheahan v. Shanahan, 5 Ilun,

plaintiff, at the trial, proved the warrauty, 461; Harden v. Corbett, 6 Iliin, 522;

but gave do evidence of the scienter, and Greentree v. Rosenstock, 61 N. Y. 583,

the complaint was dismissed. The Gen- per Dwight, C. ; Harlow i-. Mills, 58 Hun,

eral Term held that he should have re- 391.

covered, putting their decision upon the ^ Conaughty v. Nichols, 42 N. Y. 83.

allegation of a warranty. As this aver- The complaint was dismissed at the trial,

ment stood alone, it would seem that it on the ground that the cause of action

ought to have been rejected as surplusage- proved was on contract, while the one

This decision, in the ligiit of more recent pleaded was for tort. Tliis ruling was

ones, must be regarded as erroneous : it is reversed, the appellate court s.niying that

Superior Court of New York City held that this complaint stated
a cau e of action n contract for the breach f a warranty, and
that all the averments of fraud must be trea ed as surplusag . 1
complaint contained the following averm nt : that the def rdant , having in their po se ion certa.in s curities, the property
of th plaintiff, en ered into an agr em nt with him, wher by
hey promised to deli r up said securi tie to him; that he had
demanded the same, but the d·efendant.s wrongfully refu ed to
deli v r them, and wrongf11,lly disposed of and converted them to
their own use. The New York Court of Appeals pronounced
this cau e of action to be on contract, and not for a tort. 2 In
another quite similar case tbe complaint stated that the plaintiffs,
at, etc., consigned to the defendants, who were commis ionmerchant at, etc., certain specified articl , to be sold by them,
and the net proceeds thereof remitted; that the defendants received the goods, and old them for a sum named; and after
deducting all expenses, there was due to the plaintiffs the sum
of, etc., which they demanded of the defendants, who omitted
and refused to pay the same, and have converted the same to
their own use, to the damage of the plaintiffs of, etc. This cause
of action wa also held by the same court to be on contract, and
not for a tort. 3 In a more recent action, brought for the price of
certain bonds that had been sold to the plaintiff, and which had
turned out to be null and void, the claim to recover was put at

not, however, opposed to the leading doc- the single concluding averment of a con-

trine stated in the text. version should be treated as surplusage.

2 Austin V. Rawdon, 44 N. Y. 63, 68, The opinion contains an elaborate discus-

69. The statement of a wrongful dis- sion of authorities. This and the preced-

position and conversion was said to be ing case are substantially alike. See also

merely the averment of a breach. There Byxbie v. Wood, 24 N. Y. 607, 610, 611,

can be no doubt as to t!ie correctness of in which certain averments of fraudulent

this decision. The central fact of the practices were held to be surplusage, and

complaint was made to be the promise, the cause of action to be on contract.

and the breach was iuartificially cliarged.

1 Quintard v. Newton, 5 Robt. 72. The
plaintiff, at the trial, proved the warranty,
l:ut gave no evidence of the scienter, and
the
mplaint wa di ·mi ed. The General Term held that he hould have r ecovered, putting their decision upon the
a1leo-ation of a warranty. A t hi" a\•erment ·to rl alone, it would seem that it
ought to h~we bee n rejected a urplui:;age·
Thi deci ion, in t he light of more r ecent
one , mu t be regard la. erronc n. : it i
not, howev r, oppo d to the 1 adiug doctrine tat d in the t xt.
2 Au tin v. Rawdon, 44 r. Y. 6.'3 6 ,
69. The tat meut of a wron gful di po ition aurl conve r ion wa. !'aid t be
merely th averment of a IJrea h. There
can b u doubt a to th corr tu s of
thi cleci ·ion. The entral fa t f the
complai11t wa ma<l to h tl1 pr mi. e,
and the ureach wa iuartificially charged.

See also Sheahan v. Shanahan, 5 Hun,
46 1 ; Harden v . Corbett, 6 Hnn, 522;
Greentree v. R o en tock, 61 N. Y. 5 3,

per Dwight, C.; Harlow 1:. Mill , 5 Hun,
391.
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the trial on the ground of implied contract, — a warranty of title.

The defendant moved to dismiss the complaint, because it was

based upon the theory of fraud, that its allegations were of deceit

and false representations. The reporter does not think best to

disclose the nature of the complaint, although the entire decision

turned upon it. The court held that the cause of action was on

contract.^

§ 454. * 560. Illustrations of Causes ex delicto. The following

are instances of actions ex delicto. In a suit growing out of the

sale of a horse bought by the vendee, the complaint was, " That

on, etc., at, etc., the plaintiff purchased a certain horse of the

defendant for the agreed price of $120, and paid defendant said

sum ; that the defendant, to induce the plaintiff to buy the said

horse, falsely and fraudulently represented the said horse worth

and of the value of $120, and guaranteed the said horse to be

sound in all respects, and wholly free from disease; that said

horse was not sound or free from disease, but was unsound and

diseased in this (describing), which said disease was well known

to defendant at the time of the sale," etc., to the plaintiff's
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damage, etc. This cause of action was held by the New York

Supreme Court to be for deceit, and not on a warranty. ^ The

1 Ledwich I'. McKim, 53 N. Y. 307, 316. of action on contract by which the tort

As to the allegations which must be made damages were liquidated. 3

and proved in order to establish a cause of ^ Moore v. Noble, 53 Barb. 425. The

action for deceit, see Meyer v. Amidon, 45 following are additional examples of ac-

N. Y. 169; Oberlander y. Spiess, 45 N. Y. tions held to be ex delicto: Barnes v.

175 ; Marsh v. Talker, 40 N. Y. 562 ; Mar- Quigley, 59 N. Y. 265 ; Matthews v. Cady,

shall y. Gray, 57 Barb. 414; Weed r. Case, 61 id. 561; Peck v. Root, 5 Huu, 547;

55 Barb. 534 ; Gutchess v. Whiting, 46 Lane v. Cameron, 38 Wis. 603 ; Pierce v.

Barb. 139 ; Stitt v. Little, 63 N. Y. 427, Carey, 37 id. 232 ; Keudecker v. Kohlberg,

432; Westcott v. Ainsworth, 9 Hun, 53. 31 N. Y. 296, 299, 301 ; People v. Denison,

^A complaint averring the delivery 84 id. 272 ; 80 id. 656 ; Lockwood v.

of merchandise by plaintiff to defend- Quackenbush, 83 id. 600; Stitt r. Little,

ants, under an agreement that defendants 63 id. 427, 432 ; Bishop v. Davis, 9 Hun,

should sell the same, and account for the 342 ; Westcott v. Ainsworth, 9 id. 53.

proceeds, less expenses and a certain com- ^Where negligence is clearly the grava-

mission, but that defendants "wrongfully men of the complaint, the allegations of

and unlawfully retained and converted to a promise to repair defective machinery,

tlieir own use" an excess over the agreed merely to negative any presumption that

commission, declares upon a contract plaintiff had assumed the risk of the de-

rather than upon a tort. Hutchcroft v. fective machinery by continuing in the

Herren (1898), 33 Ore. 1, 52 Pac. 692. employment after the defect became

See also Mcintosh v. Rankin (1896), known to him, does not warrant defend-

134 Mo. 340, 35 S. W. 995, for an inter- ant in assuming at the trial that the

esting case involving allegations indicative action is. for breacli of contract to repair

both of contract and tort, where the court defects : Manuum v. Bullion, etc. Mining

held tliat the petition stated a single cause Co. (1897), 15 Utah, 534, 50 Pac. 834.]

the trial on the groun<l. of implied contract, - a warranty of title.
The defendant moved to dismiss t he complaint, because it was
based upon the theory of fraud, that its all gatiom; w r of d ceit
and false representations. The reporter does not think b t to
disclose the nature of t he complaint, although the entire de ision
turned upon it. The court held t hat the cause of action was on
contract. 1
§ 454. * 560. Illustrations of Ca uses ex d elict o . The following
are instances of actions ex delicto . I n a suit g rowjng out of th
sale of a horse bought by the vend ee, the complaint wa , "That
on, etc., at, etc., the plaintiff purchased a certain horse of the
defendant for the agreed price of $120, and pajd defendant aid
sum; that the defendant, t o induce the plaint iff to buy the said
horse, falsely and fraudulently represented t he said horse wor th
and of the value of $120, and guarantee d the said h orse to be
sound in all respects, and wholly free from disease; that said
horse was not sound or free from disease, but was unsound and
diseased in this (describing), which said disease was well known
to defendant at the time of the sale, " etc., to the plaintiff' s
damage, etc. This cause of actiou was held by the New York
Supreme Court to be for deceit, and not on a warranty. 2 The
1 L edwich v. McKim, 53 N. Y. 307, 316.
As to the allegations which must be made
aml proved in order to establish a cause of
aetion for deceit, see Meyer v. Amidon, 45
N. Y. 169 ; Oberlander v. Spiess, 45 N. Y.
1 i5; Marsh v. Falker, 40 N. Y. 562; Marshall v. Gray, 57 Barb. 414; Weed v. Case,
55 Barb. 534; Gutchess v. Whiting, 46
Barb. 139; Stitt v. Little, 63 N. Y. 427,
432; W estcott v. Ainsworth, 9 Hun, 53.
[A complaint averriug the delivery
of merchandise by plaiutiff to defendants, under an agreement th at defendants
should sell the same, and account for th e
proceeds, less expeuses and a certain commissi on, but that defendants " wrongfull y
and unla wfully retain ed aud converted to
th eir own use " an excess over the ag reeu
commission, declares upon a contract
rather than upon a tort. Hutchcroft v.
H erren {1898), 33 Ore. 1, 52 Pac. 692.
See also Mcintosh v. Rankin (1896 ),
134 Mo. 34-0, 35 S. W . 995, for an interesting case involving allegations ind icative
both of contract and tort, where the court
held t ha t the petition stated a siugle cause

of a cti on on contract bv which the tort
damages were liquidated.]
2 Moore v. Noble, 53 Barb. 42 5.
The
following are additional exampl es of actions held to ' be ex delicto: Barne v.
Quigley, 59 N. Y. 265 ; Matthews v. Cady,
61 id. 561 ; Peck v. R oot, 5 Huu , 547 ;
Lane v. Cameron, 38 Wis. 603; P ierce v.
Carey, 37 id. 232 ; Neudecker v. Kohl berg,
3 1 N. Y. 296, 299, 301; People v. D enison,
84 id . 2i2 ; 80 id. 656; L ockwood v.
Quackenbush, 83 id. 600 ; Stit t 1-. Little,
63 id . 427, 432 ; Bi hop v. Davi s, 9 Hun,
342; Vv es tcott v. Ain worth, 9 id. 53.
[Where uegligeuce .i clearly t he g ravamen of the complai ut. the allegati ons of
a prom ise to repair defectiYe machi ne ry,
merely to negative any pre umption that;
plaio tiff had a · urned the ri k f the defecti,·e machin ery by continui ng in the
employment after thfl defect became
known to him, does not warrant defendant in a,;suming at the trial that the
actiou i:; for breach of contract to repair
defects : l\Iau '.!;um i•. Bullion, tc. l\Iiuing
Cq. ( 1897), 15 Utah, 534, 50 Pac. 34.]
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following case is even still stronger ; for although it was conceded

that a contract was fully set forth in the pleading, yet the aver-

ments of fraud were held to fix the true character of the action.

The claim was for damages arising from the sale of a horse, and

sustained by the purchaser. The complaint alleged the sale;

that at the time thereof the horse was lame in cue leg ; that de-

fendant warranted and falsely and fraudulently represented that

this lameness resulted from an injury to his foot, and nowhere

else ; that when his foot grew out he would be well, and that he

had only been lame two weeks ; that plaintiff, relying upon this

warranty and representation, and believing them to be true,

bought the horse, and paid the price (the representations were

then negatived); that the horse was lame in his gambrel joint,

and had been so for a long time, all which the defendant, at the

time of the sale and the making such warranty and representa-

tions, well knew ; that by reason of the premises the defendant

falsely and fraudulently deceived him, — to his damage of $500.

The cause of action thus stated was held to be for deceit, and

not for a breach of warrant}-.^
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§ 455. * 561. Further Examples of Variance where Tort is Al-

leged and Contract Proved. The doctrine that a cause of action

ex contractu cannot be proved at the trial when the complaint or

petition states one ex delicto has been applied to the following

classes of cases: where the complaint alleged improper, careless,

and negligent conduct, and concealment of material facts by the

defendant;^ where the complaint was for the conversion of goods

or moneys, and the plaintiff, at the trial, relied upon the breach

of an implied contract for money had and received ;3 where the

1 Ross V. Mather, 51 N. Y. 108; Mar- allegations of fraud were irrelevant and

shall V. Gray, 57 Barb. 414; McGoveru v. non-issuable; also that the summons cau-

Pavn, 32 Barb. 8.3, all of which hold the not be used to interpret the jjleadings.

causes of action therein stated to be fraud, Graves v. Waite, again, was distinguished

and that the plaintiff must prove a sc/>»/e;-; in Barnes <;. Quigley, 59 N. Y. 265, and

AValter v. Bennett, 16 N. Y. 2.50 ; Belknap Mattlicws r. Cady, 61 N. Y. 651. See also

I'. Sealey, 14 N. Y. 143. Conaughty v. I'eck v. Root, 5 Hun, 547 (fraud) ; Pierce

Xiciiols, 42 N. Y. 83. Ross v. Mather was v. Carey, 37 Wis. 232 (fraud),

distinguished in the ca.se of Graves r. - Hothe v. Rothe, 31 Wis. 570, 572.

Waite, 59 N. Y. 156, and it was held in The court furtlier held that the rule mu.st

the latter ca.se tliat, the gist of the action be applied, even though the allegations of

beiuo' upon contract, allegations of fraud- tort failed to state a sufficient ground for a

f ll win · ca e i eYen till strong r; f r although it w~ on d d
that a ontra t \Va fully. et forth in the pleading, y th av rm nt of fraud were held to fix th true character of th a tion .
The laim wa for damage ari ing from the ale f a h r e, an l
u ta.in cl by the purchas r . Th complaint all eged the al ;
that at the ime thereof th horse wa lame in en 1 g; that def ndant warranted and fal ly and fraudulently repre ent d that
thi lamene resulted from an injury t hi foot, and no h re
el · that wh u hi foot grew out he would be well, and that he
had only been lame two week ; hat plaintiff, relying upon hi
warranty an l representation, and believing th m to be true,
bought the hor e, and paid the price (the representations were
then negativ d); that the horse was lame in his gambrel joint,
and ha l been o for a long time, all which the defendant, at the
time of the sale and the making such warrant., and repre ntation well knew; that by reason of the premise the defendant
fal ely and fraudul ently deceived him, - to hi damage of $ 00 .
The cau e of action thus stated wa held to be for deceit , and
not for a breach of warranty. 1
§ 4 55. * 561. Fur the r Exa mples of V a riance wher e Tort is A l l e ged an d Con t ract Proved. The doctrine that a cau e of action
ex contradu cannot be proved at the trial when tl e complain or
petition states one ex delicto has been applied to the f llowing
cla es of cases : where the complaint all eged improper, car 1 . ,
and neglig nt conduct, and concealment of material fact by the
defen ant; 2 where the complaint wa for the conver ion f good
or money , and the plaintiff,' at the trial, relied upon th br a h
of an implied contract for money bad and received; 3 wb r the

ulent representations inducing the plaintiff recovery, if they were enough to determine

to enter into tlie contract and a demand of the nature of the cause of action,

judgment for damages for the same did •* Anderson v. Case, 28 Wis. 505, 508;

not change the action to tort ; that the Kewaunee Cy. Sup. v. Decker, 30 Wis.

1 Ro . v. Mather, 51 N. Y . 10 ; Mar, hall i:. Grav, 57 B a rb. 414 ; McGovern v.
Payn, 32 arb. 3, all of which hold the
can e of a tion ther in tatecl to be fra.ud,
and that the plaintiff mu t pro,·e a sci nler;
'\'\,.alter v. Benn ett, 16 "N . Y. 250; B lknap
1•.
ealey, 14 T. Y. 143.
onaughty v .
... "ichol \ 42 ,, .... Y. 3. Ro i• . .\lath r wa
di ti1wui ·heel in the case of
rav
r.
'\\~aitc, :"!)-:-\ Y . 156, an<l it wa. held in
th latter ·a e that, the gi t of th action
lJ iug upon ontr ac , allega.tion. of fraucl·
ul •nt r pre. entatiou inducing the plain iff
t ent r int the contra t :tnd a demand f
judgm 11t for dama"'e for the ame did
not ·h nge the a ti n. to tort; that the
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suit was brought to recover the possession of personal property,

and the cause of action as proved was for money had and re-

ceived, or money due upon a general indebtedness ; ^ and finallj^

where a case of deceit and fraudulent representations was stated,

and the proof established the breach of a contract. ^ In addition

to the general doctrine, that a party should be fully and truly

apprised of the nature of the claim set up against him, there is

a special reason why the plaintiff cannot recover for a breach of

contract when the cause of action stated in the record is for

deceit or any other tort. In many actions of tort the defendant

maybe taken on a body execution, issued upon the judgment;

while a simple breach of contract never exposes him to that

liability. If, therefore, a cause of action on contract could be

proved and judgment thereon recovered when one for tort was

alleged, the record might show a case for arrest on final process,

although the issues actually tried involved no such consequence.''

[§§ * 562, *563, * 564. These sections, consisting of quota-

tions from the Wisconsin case of Supervisors v. Decker, are given
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below in the note.*]

€24 ; Johannesson v. Borschenius, 35 Wis.

131, 13.5 ; Walter v. Bcnuett, 16 N. Y. 250.

1 Sager v. Blain, 44 N. Y. 445, 448, 450.

■•2 De Graw v. Elmore, 50 N. Y. 1 ;

Ross V. Mather, 51 N. Y. 108; Moore r.

Noble, 53 Barb. 425; Watts v. McAllister,

33 Ind. 264 ; Dean v. Yates, 22 (Jhio St.

388, 397. When a complaint sets out a

suit was brought to recover the posses ion of personal property,
and the cause of action as pr v d was for mon y had. and received, or money due up n a general incl btedn ·s; 1 and finally
where a case of deceit ancl fraudulent r pre ntation · wa' ta e<l,
.and the proof established the br ach of a ·ontra t. 2 In addition
to the general doctrin , that a party bould be fully and truly
apprised of the nature of th
laim set up again ·t him, ther i ·
a 'pecial reason why the plaintiff cannot r cov r for a br ach of
contract when the cause of action stated in the record is for
deceit or any other tort. In many actions of tort the defendant
may be taken on a body execution, issued upon the judgment;
while a simple breach of contract never exposes him to that
liability. If, therefore, a cause of action on contract could be
proved and judgment thereon recovered when one for tort was
.alleged, the record might show a case for arrest on final proces .
although the issues actually tried involved no such consequence. 3
[§§ * 56~, * 563, * 564. These sections, consisting of quotat ions from the .Wisconsin case of Supervisors v . Decker, are given
below in the note. 4]

cause of action upon contract, and not for

tort, as, for example, to recover money

had and received by the defendant to the

plaintiff's use, any averments as to the

nature of the defendant's employment

showing that it was of a fiduciary char-

acter, and the like, are wholly immaterial ;

they form no part of the cause of action,

and are not issuable. Prouty v. Swift, 51

N. Y. .594, 601.

•^ This special reason for the rule is

alluded to in several of the foregoing

cases.

■* § 562. I shall conclude this sub-

division 'by quoting some passages from

the most able and practically instructive

opinion of Mr. Chief Justice Dixon in the

case of [^Kewaunee Sup. v. Decker, 30

Wis. 624, 626. The action was brought

to recover money of the county alleged

to have been converted by the defend-

ant to his own use, he being Clerk of the

Board of Supervisors. The complaint

contained averments of fraud, of negli-

gence, of conversion, and of contract. A

demurrer to it having been overruled, the

defendant appealed.] The whole theory

of pleading is discussed in this elaborate

judgment ; but it is peculiarly api)ropriate

in connection with the subjects of insuffi-

ciency, redundancy, and immateriality of

allegations. " It would certainly," he said,

" be a most anomalous and hitherto un-

known condition of the law of pleading,

were it established that the plaintiff could

file a complaint, the particular nature and

object of which no (me could tell, but

which might and should be held good as

a statement of two or three or more dif-

ferent and inconsistent causes of action,

as one in tort, one upon a money demand

u24; Johannesson v. Borschenius, 35 Wis.
131 , 1:35; Walter v. Bennett, 16 N. Y. 250.
1 Sager v. Blain, 44 N. Y . 44 5, 448. 450.
2 De Graw v. Elmore, 50 N. Y. 1 ;
Ross v. Mather, 51
. Y. 108; Moore v .
Noble, 53 Barb. 425; Watts v. McAllister,
33 Ind. 264; Dean v. Yates, 22 Ohio St.
388, 397. 'Vhen a complaint sets out a

cau ·e of action upon contract, and not for
tort, a , fo r example, to r ecover money
had and received by the defendaut to the
plaiutiff's use, any averments as to the
nature of the defendant's employment
showing that it was of a fiduciary character, and the li ke, are wholly immaterial;
they fo r m no part of the cause of action,
aud are not issuable. Prouty v. Swift, 51
N. Y. 594, 60 1.
3 This
pecial reason for the rule is
allUtled to in several of the foregoing
case ..
4 § 562.
I shall conclude thi
ubdi vi ·ion by quoting some pa sages from
-the mo t able and practically in tru tive
opinion of Mr. Chief Justice Dixon in the
rase of [ Kewaunee Sup. v. D ec ker, 30
Wis. 624 , 626. The action was broug ht
to reeove r money of the county alleged

to have been converted by the defendant to hi s own use, he being Clerk of the
Board of Supervisors. The complaint
contained averments of fraud, of negligence, of conversion, and of contract. A
demurrer to it having beeu overruled, the
defendant appealed.] The whole theory
of pleading is discussed in thi elaborate
judgment; but it is peculiarly appropriate
in conuection with the , ubjects of iusufticiency, red nudancy, and immateriality of
allegations. "It would c rtainly," he aid,
"be a most anomalou aud hitherto unknown condition of the law of pleading,
were it established that the plaintiff could
file a complaint, the particular nature and
object of which no one could tell, but
which might and honld ue held good as
a statement of two or three or more different and incou istent au e of action,
as one in tort, one upon a money demand
upon contract, and one in equity, all <'ombined or fu ·ed and mould d into one
count, o that the d f nt1ant mu t await
the events of the trial, and until the plaintiff's proofa a re all in , before being informed with any re rtainty or rlefinite11f'!'S
what he was called npou to meet. Tli
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56 . Amendme nts A llowed by the Code. The new
proce ure from it dread 1 t th roper requirement a to form
456. •

§ 456. * 565. Amendments Allowed by the Code. The new

procedure, from its dread lest the proper requirements as to form

proposition tliat a compliiint or any single

count of it may be so framed with a double,

treble, or any number of aspects, looking

to so many distinct and incongruous

causes of action, in order to hit the

exigencies of the plaintiff's case or any

possible demands of his proofs at the trial,

we must say strikes us as sometiiing ex-

ceedingly novel in the rules of pleading.

We do not tliiuk it is tlie law, and, unless

the legislature compels us by some new

statutory regulation, shall hereafter be

very slow to change this conclusion. The

defendant supposes the complaint herein

to be intended to be one in trover,

charging or seeking to charge the de-
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fendant with the wrongful conversion

of certain moneys which came into his

hands a.s a public officer, and which be-

longed to the plaintiff; and acting upon

such supposition, he has demurred to the

complaint as not stating facts sufficient

to constitute that cause of action. In an-

swer to this view, the plaintiffs rather

concede than otherwise that the complaint

is and was intended to be one in tort for

the conversion ; but at the same time they

insist, that, if it is not good as a complaint

of that kind, it is sufficient as a complaint

or count in an action for money had and

received ; and, being sufficient for that

purpose, they argue that the demurrer

was properly overruled. In other words,

their position is, that it is a question now

open to speculation and inquiry on tliis

demurrer, whether upon all or any of the

facts stated in the complaint taken col-

lectively or separately, or even by severing

the allegations themselves so as to elimi-

nate or discard certain portions of them

as surplusage, a cause of action of any

kind is or can be made out ; and if it

be found that it can, then the demurrer

should be overruled. To show tliat the

complaint may be upheld as one for money

had and received for the use of the plain-

propo ition that n omplaint or an ingle
count of it may be framed with a double,
treble, or any numlier of a pect , looking
to o many di tin t and incongr uou
cau
of acti n, in order to hit the
exigencie of the plaintiff' ca e or au y
po ~. ibl demand
f bi proof at the trial,
we mu t ay trik u a
m thing exeedi1 aly u vel in the rule of pleading.
We d not think it i th law, and, unle s
the l i. lature ompcl u by ome new
tatutory regula i n, hall hereafter be
v ry low to change thi conclu i n. The
defend, nt uppo~e the complaint herein
to he in ended to b one in trover,
charging or eek ing to charge the defemlaut with the wrong ful
onver ion
of certain money which came into his
han d a. a public officer, and wh ich belong d to the plaintiff; and acting up on
uch uppo ition, he ha demurred to the
co mplaint as not tating fact
ufficient
to con titute that cau e of action . In anwer to thi view, the plaintiff rath er
cone de than otherwi e that the om plaint
i and was intended to be one in tort for
the conver ion; but at the same time they
in ·i t, that, if it i not ood as a complaint
of that kind, it i uffici ent a a complaint
or count in an action for money had and
r eceived; and, being sufficient for that
purpo e, they argue that the demurrer
wa properly ove rruled. In other wor d ,
thei r p ition i , that it i a que tion now
open to peculation and in quiry on this
dem urrer, whether upon all or any of the
fact
tated in the complaint tak n collectively or eparatel , or even bv everin
the allegation them lves o a t eliminate or di card certain portion of them
a. urplu age, a can· of a ction of any
kinrl i
r can be made out; and if it
he found that it can, then the d murrer
. houlcl b O\'errul d. To . h w that th

tiff, and the action considered as one of

that kind, counsel gravely contend tliat

the averments that the defendant made

fraudulent representations, and acted

falsely, fraudulently, and wrongfully in

claiming and withholding the money.s,

and that he converted the same, etc., may

be disregarded, and rejected as surplusage.

§ .563. "In support of this position,

counsel cited several New York decisions,

and .some in this court where after trial

and judgment, or after issue has been taken

on the merits, or after the trial has commenced

and the plaintiff's case is closed, it has

been held that such allegations may be

disregarded. The decisions were in ac-

tions like the present, aud others involv-

ing a somewhat similar question under

the circumstances above stated, and were

made in favor of a good cause of action

fra11dulP11t rPJlfP ntation , a11c1
fal. r·ly, fran1lul nlly, a111l wnmgfnlly in
clai111iug aud witlJhol<liug the mone '•,

and that he conv rted the same, etc., ma
b di regarded, and rejected a urplu ·age.
563. "In upport of thi po ition,
c un el cited ,·eral 'ew York deci ion ,
an l :ome in thi · court where afier trial
andJudgment, or afier i ue ha been taken
on the merits or a.fl r the trial ha commenced
and tlie plaintiJf' case is close·d, it ha
b en held that uch all gation may be
tlisr garded. The deci ions w re in action like the pr ·ent, and other involving a om what similar que tion under
the circum tan · above tated, and were
made in favor of a good cau e f action
proved or propo ed to be, and which by a
fair and rea onable interpretation of the
pleading could b aid to be within the
cope of them. or to he fairly mapped out
and deli neated by th averment , o that
the defendant wa appri eel of the demand
made again t him and of the fac t reli ed
upon to e tabli h it. Th e great liberality
of the code and th e broad power of
amendment conferred and enforced upon
the courts und er uch circum tances are
well known [ citing provi i n in reference
to amendment , va.riance , and the interpretation of plead ing ]. The e provi ion
for the mo t part, if not enti rel.v, relate to
th e proceedings in an acti on after is ue
joined on the m rit upon or after trial, or
aft r judgment on the merit , when the
fact are made to appear, and the ub tanti al right of the partie are , hown. They
are enacted in amplification and enlargement of the rule of the ommon law on
the same u bj t, l y which it is well under tood that th re w r man y def ct ,
imperfection , and omi ion ·on>;tit u t iu g
fatal objection on dem urr r, which wer
waived after i ue joined, and a trial of
verdi t. and judg ment on the merit . The
a e cited by oun 1 ar all of them
mani~ tly uch a fall within th e proYi i m and rul . and n ne f them tou h
or have an)' b ariug upon the qu tion
r a. e h r
r i:;ent d. No ca e ari. ing
UJ on d murr r t the c mplaint i it. d,
and i i lJ li ' cl none can b , holding
any ·uch doctrin a that ontencled for."
'l'h 1 arn cl jn1lgc it
the f 11 win
a es a illu trations: Bar! w v. cott, 24-
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should degenerate into mere technicalities, and from its opposi-

tion to the decision of controversies upon points not involving

should d generate into mere technicaliti
and from it opposition to the decision of controv r i s upon points not involving

N. Y. 40 ; Byxbie v. Wood, 24 N. Y. 607 ,

Austin V. Kawdou, 44 N. Y. 63 ; Greason

V. Keteltas, 17 N. Y. 491 ; Emory v. Pease,

20 N. Y. 62 ; Couauglity v. Nicliols, 42

N. Y. 83; Wright v. Hooker, 10 N. Y.

51; Walter v. Bennett, 16 N. Y. 250;

Strocl)e V. Fehl, 22 Wis. 347 ; Hopkins

V. Oilman, 22 Wis. 481 ; Tenney v. State

Bk. of Wis., 20 Wis. 152; Leonard v.

Kogan, 20 Wis. 540; Samuels v. Blau-

chard, 25 Wis. 329 ; Vilas v. Ma.son, 25

Wis. 310, 328. It is certain that the

decision in some of these cases is not

based upon the doctrine stated by the

judge, — that is, upon any ground of

amendment or of waiving the objection
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by answering, etc. ; but it is put upon the

broad and fundamental principle, that,

under the codes, equitable and legal re-

liefs may be granted in the same action,

or one may be granted when the other

is demanded : the other cases, however,

fully sustain the position taken by the

opinion.

§ 564. " It thus appears that the au-

thorities relied upon do not sanction the

position that a complaint in the first in-

stance, and when challenged by demurrer,

may be uncertain and ambulatory, pur-

posely so made, now presenting one face

to the court and now another, at the mere

will of the pleader, so that it may be re-

garded as one in tort or one on contract or

in equity, as he is pleased to name it, and

as the necessities of the argument may

require, and, if discovered to be good in

any of the phases which it may thus be

made to assume, that it must be upheld in

that aspect as a proper and sufficient plead-

ing by the court. As already observed,

the opinion of the court is quite to the

contrary. We have often held that the

inherent and essential differences and

peculiar properties of actions have not

been destroyed, and from their very na-

ture cannot be. Howland v. Needham, 10

Wis. 495, 498. These distinctions con-

tinuing, they must be regarded by the

courts now as formerly ; and now no more

than then, except under the peculiar cir-

cumstances above noted, can any one com-

plaint or count be made to subserve the

purposes of two or more distinct and dis-

similar causes of action, at the option of

the party presenting it. If counsel dis-

agree as to the nature of the action or

purposes of the pleading, it is the province

of the courts to settle the dispute. It is a

question, when properly raised, which can-

not be left in doubt; and the court must

determine with precision and certainty

upon inspectiim of the pleading to what

class of actions it belongs, or was intended

to belong, whether of tort, upon contract,

or in equity ; and if necessary and mate-

rial, even the exact kind of it within the

N. Y. 40; Byxbie v. Wood, 24 N. Y. 607,
Au tin v. Ra vdon, 44 N. Y. 63; r a on
v. K telta , 1 i N . Y . 491; Emory v. Pea e,
20 N. Y. 62; Conaug hty v. Nichol , 42
r. Y. 3; Wright v . H ooker, 10 ~ . Y.
51; Walter v. Bennett, 16 N. Y. 250;
tro be v. Fehl, 22 Wi . 347; Hopkin
v. ' ilmau, 22 Wis. 481; T enneyv. tate
Bk. of Wis., 20 Wi . 152 ; L eonard i:.
Rogan, 20 \\'i s. 540; Samuels v. l:H::mchard , 25 \Vis. 329; V ilas v. Mason, 25
Wi . 3 10, 32 . It i certain that the
deci ion iu some of th ese cases is not
based upon the doctrine stated by the
judge, - that i , upon any ground of
amendment or of waiving the objection
by answ ering, etc.; but it is put upon th e
broad and fundamental principle, that,
under the cod s, eq uitable and legal reliefs may be granted in the sam e action,
or one may be granted wh en the other
is demanded : the other cases, however,
fully sustain the position taken by the
opinion.
§ 564. " It thus appears that the authorities relied upon do not sanction the
position that a complaint in the first instance, and when challenged by demurrer,
may be uncertain and ambulatory, purposely so made, now presenting one face
to the court and now another, at the mere
will of the pleader, so that it may be regarded as one in tort or one on contract or
in equity, as he is pleased to nam e it, and
as the neces ities of the argument may
r equi re, and, if discovered to be good in
any of the phase which it may thus be
made to assume, th at it must be upheld in
that aspect as a. proper and sufficient plea.ding by the court. As already observed,
the opinion of the court is quite to the
contrary. \Ve have often held that the
inherent an<l es ential differences and
peculiar properties of action have n ot
been destroy ed, and from their very nature cannot be. H owland v . Needham, 10
\Vi s. 495, 49 . These <li tiuctions continuing , they mu st be reganle<l by the
courts now as fo rmerly ; and now uo more
than then, except under the peculiar circum tances above noted, can any one complaint or count be mad e to sul.Jserve the

purpo es of two or more di tinct and di imilar cau s of action, at the option of
the party pre. enti11g it. If ouu el disagree as to the nature f the action or
purpo, e of the pleading, it i the provinc
of the court to settle the dispute. It i a
que tion, when properly rai e<l, which cannot be left in doubt; and the court rn u t
determine with precision and ·ertainty
upon inspection of the pleadiug to what
cla. s of a ·t ions it belong , or wa intend d
to belong, whether of tort, upon contract,
or in equity; aucl if nece a ry ancl material, even the exact kind of it within the
class must al o be determined. ee Clark
v. Langworthy, 12 Wis. 441; Gillett v.
Treganza, 13 \Vis. 4i2. Thi is not only
in harmony with the d cisions above referred to, but with all the deci ions of this
court bearing upon the ques tion , and we
know of none elsewhere in confli ct. It is
in harmony with these decisions whi ch
have been mad e, that a n appli cation to
amend should be denied which profes es
to entirely change the cause of acti on ued
upon, or to introduce a new one of a different kind."
Cit ing Newton v. Alli , 12 Wis. 378;
Sweet v. Mitchell, 15 Wis. 641, 664, 19
Wi . 524; Larkin v. Noonan, 19 Wis.
82; Stevens v. Brooks, 23 Wis. 196.
The opinion proceeds to show that the
conclusion thus reached is in harmony
with the deci ions made in Scheunert v.
Kaehler, 23 Wis. 523; And erson ii . Case,
28 Wis. 505; L ee v. imp on, 29 Wis.
333 ; Ragan v. Simpson, 27 Wis. 355 ;
Samuels v. Blanchard , 25 Wis. 329. It
also declares that in determining upon
demurrer the true nature of the complaint, its object, and what parti cular
kind or cause of a tion i tated in it, the
character of the su mm ous may be taken
into con ideration in connection wi th the
form of the allegations in the complaint;
and tbi particular conclusion i al o ustained b~' the recent de i. ion made by the
New York Court of Appeal , before cited.
Havin g thu8 laid dowu the general princi ples, the 1 am d judge applie them to
the case before him. The ummou · i. for
relief, "liid1 in dicates the 1 l uder's iuten-
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the merits, has made most ample and liberal j)rovision for amend-

ments. The sections of the codes are quoted at large in a former

paragraph.^ So far as they relate to the pleadings, amendments

are separated into two general classes, — those made before the

trial, and those made during or after the trial. The first of these

classes is again subdivided into (1) the amendments of course,

without any application to the court, which each party is allowed

to make once in his own pleading within a specified time after it

is filed or served; (2) the amendments which are made by per-

mission of the court as the result of a special motion or applica-

tion for that purpose, iiicluding those which the party is generally

suffered to make in his pleading after a demurrer to it has been

sustained. The amendments of the second class are for the

purpose of conforming the pleadings to the facts which have

been proved, or which are proposed to be proved, at the trial.

They are all made by permission of the court, frequently upon

an oral application during the trial or during the argument on

appeal; often by the court itself on its own suggestion. Some-

tii\ies, however, the trial is suspended, and the party desiring an
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amendment is driven to a formal motion in order to obtain it.^

It is not within the scope of this work to -describe the practice in

reference to amendments; nor to discuss the particular cases in

which they have been or will be allowed. I shall simply state

the general principles which have governed the courts in the

exercise of the discretion conferred upon them by the statute.

§ 457. * 566. Conflict of Authority on Right to amend by Sub-

stituting Different Cause of Action. In giving a practical inter-

pretation to the clauses of the codes, a conflict of decision has

tiou to bring an action of tort, and not one The nature of the reformed pleading

on implied contract for money had and and its essential principles are here stated

received. The complaint itself is pro- in a most clear and accurate manner,

nounced insutficieut in its averments ; while the description of the improper

the charges of fraud and conversion are modes wliicli prevail to such an extent

in the form of general legal inferences, in actual practice is equally grajjhic and

without the necessary statements of facts, correct. The one explains the intent and

■* A general charge that a party acted design of tlie reform ; the otlier shows how

fraudulently, faLsely, or wrongfully, or that design has been ignored, and that

that he made fraudulent representations intent frustrated,

or statements, amounts to nothing; there ^ See supra, § *4.35.

must be a specificatiort of facts to justify ^ This particular instance strictly ba-

h merits ha made mo t ample and lib ral provi ion £ ram nd·
m n ' . The cction of th cod ' ar quoted a larg in a f rmer
0 far a the r lat
parc.l raph. 1
0 th
r leaclin ' am ndm nt
ar 'eparat cl int two g neral cla e , - tho made b for the
trial and tho· made duri1w or aft r th trial. The fir t of the e
cla
i again u b ivitletl in o (1) th amendment f c ur e,
with ut any appli ation t the court, which each party i allowed
to make once in hi own pleading within a I ecifietl tim after it
i · fil cl or rved · (2) the amendment wh i h are made by p rmi ·ion of the court a the re ult of a pecial motion or application for that purpo , includ ing tho'e which the party i generally
uffered t make in his pleading after a d m urr r to it ha been
'U 'tained.
The amendment of the econd la
are fo r t he
purp e of conforming the pleading to the fact which have
been proved or which are propo eel to b proved at the trial.
They are all made by permi ion of the court, freque ntly upon
an or;.tl application during the trial or during the arg ument on
appeal; often by the court it elf on it wn sugge tion.
om ti1 rn however, the trial i su pended, and the party d mng an
am nclment i driven to a formal motion in order to obtain it . 2
It i , not within the scope of thi work to -describe the prac tice in
reference to amendments ; nor to discu the particular ca e in
which they have been or will be allowed. I hall imply tate
the general principles which have governed the cour in the
ex rci ' e of the di 'cretion conferred upon them by the tatut .
y

457 .

* - 6.

Con flict of Aut hori ty o n Right to amend by Sub -

I n giving a practical interpretation to the clause of the code , a conflict of deci ion ha

stituti ng D iffere nt Cause of Ac ti o n.

it" (p. 6.34). The foregoing quotations longs to tlie first general class, since it is

form a small part of this exceedingly in- virtually an amendment before the trial,

structivc opinion.

tion to bring an action of tort, and not one
on implied contract for mone.v had and
recei,·ed.
The c mplaint it elf i prouounced in. utncieut in it. a,·ermeut. ;
the• har.,.e
f fra.uil and conv r ion are
in the form of general legal inf r ·nee-,
witlwut the nece ary tatemen t of fact .
· A general ·harrre that a part)· act <l
fraudulen l_v, fal. ly, or wron<Yfully, or
that he ma<l fraudul nt repre entation
or. tatcment , amount· to tJOthi11g; there
mu. t b a pecification of fact to ju tify
it" (p. 634). Th for going quotation
form a mall part of this xceedingly intructive opinion.

The nature of the reformed plead in
and it·
ential principle ar h r . t.ated
in a mo t clear and ac ur, t.
while the de criptiou of th improp r
mod
which pr vail to . uch nu xt. nt
in actual 1 ractiee i. equally graphi aucl
corr ct. Th one xplaiu the int. ut and
de igu of the r form; th other h w. how
that d ·ign ha been ignored, and that
intent fru trat cl.
1
ee supra § · 435.
2 Thi
particu lar in tance stri ctly belong to the fi r t e ner al cla. , in c it i
vi r tually au a mendment before the tria l.
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arisen among the tribunals of the different States, and sometimes

among those of the same State, which it is utterl}^ impossible to

reconcile. The rule is established b}- one class of cases, and

prevails in certain States, that in all the voluntar}' amendments

which a party may make as a matter of course in his own plead-

ings, and in all amendments before trial for which the party

applies to the court by motion, including those rendered neces-

sary by the sustaining of a demurrer to his pleading, he cannot

under the form of an amendment change the nature and scope

of his action; he cannot substitute a wholly different cause of

action in place of the one which he attempted to set up in his

original pleading. ^ A very different rule is laid down by another

class of cases. It is settled in New York by a carefully consid-

ered decision of the Court of Appeals, which overrules a number

of contrary decisions made by inferior tribunals of that State,

that a complaint may be amended voluntarily and of course, by

substituting an entirely different cause of acticm for the one

originally alleged, provided the summons continues to be ap-

propriate. It is not necessary that the new cause of action
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should be of the same general nature or class as the first one ;

but the plaintiff may, by omitting a cause of action, substitute

another iu its stead of an entirely different class and character,

if the change does not require an alteration in the summons. A

like rule, it was held, also applies to answers and to defences

contained therein.^ In some States this liberal interpretation

1 Kewaunee Sup. v. Decker, 34 Wis. be added to an answer by an amendment

378 ; Rutledge v. Vanmeter, 8 Bush, 354, of course. McQueen v. Babcock, 13 Abb.

356; McGrath v. Balser, 6 B. Men. 141. Pr. 268; 3 Keyes, 428; Wymau v. Re-

See also Vliet v. Sherwood, 38 Wis. 159; mond, 18 How. Pr. 272; although the

Spinners v. Brett, 38 Wis. 648 ; North- Court of Appeals, in Brown v. Leigh,

western Union Packet Co. v. Shaw, 37 pointed out a difference between the terms

Wis. 655 (an amendment may change the of the section which permits amendments

action from one on express contract to one of course and of that which allows amend-

for money had and received on implied ments upon ap))lication to the court before

contract). trial, yet it did not hold tiiat the latter

■^ Brown v. Leigh, 12 Abb Pr. x. s. 193 were to be any more restricted in their

arisen among the tribunal of the di.ff r nt ~ tatcs, and som tim •·,;
am ng those of the same tate, which it is utt rly impo sibl to
reconcile. The rule i established by OIJ
la..·s of cases, and
prevail in certain State , that in all the Y luntary ameu<lm nti:;
which a party may make as a matter of courne in hi own pl adings, and in all amendment before trial for which the party
applies to the court by motion, including those r ndered nece ·ary by the sustaining of a demurrer to his pleading, he cannot
under the form of an amendment change the nature and scope
of his action; he cannot substitute a wholly different cause of
action in place of the one which he attempted to set up in his
original pleading . 1 A very different rule is laid down by another
cla s of ca es. It is settled in New York by a carefully considered decision of the Court of Appeals, which overrules a number
of contrary decisions made by inferior tribunals of that Stat ,
that a complaint may be amended voluntarily and of course, by
substituting an entirely different cause of action for the one
originally alleged, provided the summons continues to be appropriate . It is not necessary that the new cause of action
should be of the same general nature or class as the first one;
but the plaintiff may, by omitting a cause of action, substitute
anoth er in its stead of an entirely different class and character,
if the change does not require an alteration in the summons. A
like rule, it was held, alRo applies to answers and to defences
contained therein. 2 In some States this liberal interpretation

(1872). See also, to the same effect, scope and extent than the former.

Mason v. Whitely, 1 Abb. Pr. 85 ; 4 Duer, [Deyo v. Morss (1894), 144 N. Y. 216,

611 ; Prindle v. Aldrich, 13 How. Pr. 466; 39 N. E. 81.

Troy & B. R. Co. v. Tibbits, 11 How. Pr. In South Carolina, it was held in Jen-

168; Watson v. Rushmore, 15 Abb. Pr. nings r. Parr (1898), 54 S. C 109,32 8. E.

51 ; Hall v. Woodward, 30 S. C. 564, 575. 73, that the limitation on the power to allow

Some of these cases apply the same doc- amendments found in sec. 194 of tlie code,

trine to amendments made upon motion, viz., that they shall not substantially

By this rule, an entirely new defence may change the claim or defence, has no appli-

l

Kewaunee Sup. v. D ecker, 34 Wis.

378; Rutledge v. Vanmeter, 8 Bnsh, 354,

356; :\1cGratb v. Balser, 6 B. Ylon. 14l.
See al o Vliet v. Sherwood, 38 Wis. 159;
Spinners v. Brett, 38 Wis. 648; Northwestern U uion Packet Co. v. Shaw, 37
Wis. 655 (au amendment rnay change the
action from one on express contract to one
fo r money had and received on implied
contract).
2 Brown i:. Leigh , 12 Abb. Pr. N. s. 193
{1872).
ee also. to the same effect,
Mason v. Whitely, 1 Abb. Pr. 85 ; 4 Duer,
61 l; Priudle v. Aldrich, 13 How. Pr. 466;
Troy & B. R. Co. v. Tibbit , 11 How. Pr.
168; Watson v. Ru hmore, 15 Abb. Pr.
51 ; Hall v. Wood ward , 30 S. C. 564, 575.
Some of these cases apply th e same doctrin e to amendments made upon motion.
By this rule, an entirely new defence may

be added to an answer by an amendment
of course. McQueen v. Babcock, 13 Abb.
Pr. 268 ; 3 Keyes, 42 ; W yrnau v. Remond, 18 How. Pr. 272 ; although the
Court of Appeals, in Brown v. Leigh,
pointed out a difference between the term
of the section which permits amendment.
of course and of that which allows amendments upon application to the co urt before
trial, yet it did not hold that the latter
were to be any more restricted in their
scope and extent than the former.
[Deyo v. l\for {l 94), l..J.4 N. Y. 216,
39 N . E. 81.
In South Carolina, it was held in Jennin gs v. Parr (1 9 ), 54 . C. 109, 32 . E.
73, that the limitation on the power to allow
am endmeuts fou nd in ec. 194 of the code,
viz., that they hall not ub tantially
change the claim or defence, has no appli-
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of the code has been expressly extended to those amendments

which require the consent of the court granted upon a motion,

and the rule is settled that even in that class the cause of action

or defence may be entirely changed.^ In respect to the amend-

ments made at the trial, or on appeal, or by the court upon its

own motion, great freedom is used, provided the paities are not

misled and surprised, and the issues to be decided are not wholly

changed. When evidence has been received without objection

making out a cause of action, and especially after a favorable

verdict upon such evidence, the utmost liberality is shown by

the courts iti conforming the averments of the pleading to the

case as proved, if the ends of justice will be subserved thereby.^

cation to amendments made before the

trial. Tiie only limitation in such cases is

that the amendment shall be in further-

ance of justice. The same rule seems to

of the code ha been expressly extended to those amendments
whi h r quire the con ent of the court grant d upon a motion,
and the rule i ' settled tLat
n in that clas th cau of action
or d f nc may be ntir ly hangecl.1 In r I t t the am ndm nt made at the trial or n apr eal or by the court upon its
own m tion, gr at freed m is u 'e 1, I ro ided h partie are not
mi led and urprised, and the i ue t b d ci led are not w] olly
hanged. When evidence has been r c iv d without bjection
making out a cau e of action, and e pecially after a favorable
verdict upon such eviden e, the utmost liberality is hown by
tb e courts in onforming the averments of th pleading to the
ca ea proved, if the ends of ju tice will be sub erved thereby. 2

be followed in Oregon. In Talbot v. Gar-

retson (1897), 31 Ore. 256, 49 Pac. 978,
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the court said : " It is within the power of

the trial court to allow, before trial, an

amended complaint to be filed containing

a new cause of action or suit muterial to

the subject-matter of the controversy then

before the court. A plaintiff cannot, of

course, abandon his original cause of

action or suit, and substitute an entirely

new and different one, because in such

case the new pleading would hot be an

amendment, but a substitution for the ori-

ginal. But so long as the amendment is

germane to the subject-matter of the con-

troversy, we can see no objection to the

court, in the exercise of a sound discretion,

allowing the pleadings to be amended in

the furtherance of justice by inserting new

and additional allegations material to such

controversy, although they may, in effect,

constitute a uewcause of action or defence."

This decision is opposed to Board of

Supervisors i". Decker, 34 Wis. 378, which

it cites, and in harmony with Brown

V. Leigh, 49 N. Y. 78 ; Hatch v. Central

Bank, 78 N. Y. 487 ; Freeman v. Grant,

132 N. Y. 22, all of which it cites. See

also Lieuallen v. Mosgrove (1900), 37 Ore.

44G, 61 Pac. 1022; McMalian i'. Canadian

Ky. Co. (1901), 40 Ore. 148, 66 Pac. 708.

See, in this coimection, Mulhall v. Mulhall

(1895), 3 Okla. .304, 41 Pac. 109.

In California it was held, in Frost v.

Witter (1901), 132 Cal. 421, 64 Pac. 705,

that a plaintiff may, by amendment,

change the nature and scope of his action,

but that he may not introduce in that way

" a wholly different cause of action."

Citing the text, § * 566.]

1 This is particularly tlie case in North

Carolina, where the greatest liberality of

amendment prevails. Robinson v. Wil-

loughby, 67 N. C. 84 ; Bullard v. Johnson,

65 N. C. 436. In the first case the action

was brought to recover possession of land

under a deed absolute on its face (eject-

ment). The court, on appeal, held that

this deed was in fact a mortgage, and re-

versed a judgment obtained by the plain-

tiff, ordering a new trial. Before the

second trial, an amendment was per-

cation to amendment. made before the
t rial. The only limitation in such cases i
tha t the amendm ent hall be in furtheran ce o:f ju tice. The ame rule seem to
be followed in Oregon. In Talbot v. Garret on (1897), .'31 Ore. 256, 49 Pac. 978,
the co urt said: "It is within the power of
the trial court to allow, before trial, an
am ended complaint to be fi led containing
a ne w cau e of action or uit material to
the n bject-matter of the controver y then
before the court. A plaintiff cannot, of
cour e, abandon bis original cause of
a ction or nit, and ubstitute an entirely
new and different one, because in such
case the new pleading would not be an
amendm ent, but a ub titution for the original. But o long as the am endment is
germane to the subject-matter of the controver y, we can ee no objection to the
court, in the ex erci e of a sound di cretion,
allowing the pleadings to be amend ed in
t he furth erance of ju tice by in erting new
a nd additional allegation material to uch
controver y, al t houg h they may, in ffect,
con t it ut a ne wcau e of action or defen ce."
Thi d i ion i. oppo d to Board of
•'upervi or t'. l ec ker, 34- Wi . 37 , whi ch
it cite, , and iu ha rm ony with
r wn
1" L igh, 49 N. Y . 7 ; Hat h L'.
n tral
Hauk, 7 ... r . Y. 4 7 ; Fr e ma n v. Gra nt,
1.'32 ~ '. Y. 22, all of wh ic·h it ite .
e
al.·o Lieuallen t'. t\ fo gr ''e (19 ), 3 7 r .
H G, Gl Pa" 102~; Mc:\Iahan . an ad ia n
Hy. ('<J. (l!lOI), 40 Jre. 14 , 66 P ac. iO .
. · '" iu thi conn ctiou, :\Iul hall L' . Mul hall
(1 '5),.'30kla.304,4l Pa·. JO .
I u 'alifornia it was held, in ~ r o t v.

Witter (190 1) 132 Cal. 421 , 64 Pac. i05,
that a plaintiff may, by amendment,
chano-e the nature and cope of hi action,
but that he may not introduce in that way
"a wholly different au e of action."
Citing the text, § * 566.J
1 This is particularly the ca e in North
Carolina, where the greate t liberality of
amendment prevails. Robinson v. Willoughby, 67 N. C. 84; Bullard v. John on,
65 N. C. 436. In the fir t case the action
was brought to recornr pos es ion of land
nuder a deed absolute on it face (ejectment) . The court, on appeal, held that
thi deed was in fact a mortgage, and reversed a judgment obtained by the plaintiff, ordering a new trial.
Before the
econd trial, an amendment wa
permitted changing the can e of action from
its original form to one for the foreclo ure
of thi mortgage. See al o Culp v. te re,
47 Kan. 746 (change from actiou for fal ·e
repre~entatiou
in a ale to action for
breaGh of expre
warranty); Hopf v.
U. . Baking o. (Buf. uper. t. 1 92), 21
N. Y. . 5 9 (plaintiff allowed to amend
by changing a cour e of a ti n ounding
in tort to one ounding in con ract).
2 K ewaune
up. L'. D k r 34 Wi .
37 ; Hod e v. awy r, 34 ·wi . 397; B wma n r . an Kuren, 29 Wi . 209, 21 ·
mith v. Whitn y, 22 Wi . 43 ; R bin on
v. ·willoug hh.'·, 67 N. . 4 · Bull a rd v.
J ohn · n 65 N . . 436;
67
. 241 ; Fla nd er v .
W i ·. 564 · Li ttle v. a. &
., () N ,.. 317. Th e r port r' h ad-note
is much b roau r tha n th e dec i ion act ual ly
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The plaintiff cannot, however, have his summons and complaint

amended during the trial by substituting a different defendant for

the single one who was sued, and who had appeared and defended.^

The plaintiff cannot, however, have his summon and complain t
amended during the trial by substituting a cliff rent defendant for
the single one who was sued, and who had app ar d and <lefende<.l.1

made, and is manifestly erroneous. The

following cases illustrate the general rules

concerning amendments, and the extent

to which amendments are permitted. It

^eems to be settled by a very decided pre-

ponderance of authority that amendments

at the trial caunot change the nature of

the cause of action or of the defence ; but

that the court may at its discretion per-

mit amendments on motion before trial

which change the cause of action or de-

fence, add a new cause of action or defence,

and the like (see additional cases cited

under § * .558). Johnson v. Filkington, 39

Wis. 62 (cannot amend at trial so as to
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substitute a new cause of action) ; Vliet

V. Sherwood, 38 id. 159; Spinners v.

Urett, 38 id. 648; North West. Union

P. Co. r. Shaw, 37 id. 655 ; Flanders v.

Cottrell, 36 id. 564 ; Tormey v. Pierce, 49

Cal. 306 ; Blood v. Fairbanks, 48 id. 171 ;

Lottman v. Barnett, 62 Mo. 1 59 ; . Jeffree

V. Walsh, 14 Nev. 14.'J; Almance Cy.

Comm'rs v. Blair, 76 N. C. 136 ; Scott v-

•Chickasaw Cy., 54 Iowa, 47 ; Spink v.

McCall, 52 id. 432 ; Newell r. Mahaska

Cy. Sav. Bk., 51 id. 178; Peck v. Shick,

50 id. 281; Hammond v. S. C. & P. R.

Co., 49 id. 450 ; O'Connell v. Cotter, 44 id.

48 ; Hobson v. Ogden's Ex., 16 Kan. 388 ;

Beyer v. Reed, 18 id. 86 ; Leavenworth,

L. & G. R. Co. ;;. Van Riper, 19 id- 317 ;

Harris v. Turubridge, 83 N. Y. 92, 97;

Reeder v. Sayre, 70 id. 180; Weston v.

McMuUin, 42 Wis. 567 ; Tauguay v. Felt-

houser, 44 id. 30 ; Tewsbury v. Brouson,

48 id. 581 ; Graham v. Chicago, etc. Ry.

Co., 49 id. 532; Oro Fino, etc. Min. Co.

V. CuUen, 1 Idaho, 113; Read v. Beards-

ley, 6 Neb. 493; Page v. Williams, 54

Cal. 562 ; Nichols v. Scranton Steel Co.,

137 N. y. 471 ; Dexter v. Ivins, 133 N. Y.

551 ; Miner v. Bacon, 131 N. Y. 677 ; Free-

man V. Grant, 132 N. Y. 22 ; Davis v. N. Y.,

L. E. & W. R. Co., 110 N. Y. 646 (test

proposed, whether recovery on the origi-

nal complaint would be a bar to recoverv

on the amended complaint) ; Bockes r.

Lansing, 74 N. Y. 437 ; Lustis v. N. Y.,

L. E. & W. R. Co., 65 Hun, 547 ; Mea v.

Pierce, 63 Hun, 400 ; Bowen v. Sweeney,

63 Hun, 224; 22 Civ. Pro. R. 79; Ager-

singer v. Scorr, 54 Hun, 613 ; Hopf v.

U. S. Baking Co. (Buf. Super. Ct. 1892),

21 N. Y. Suppl. 589 (plaintiff allowed to

amend by changing a cause of action

sounding in tort to one sounding in con-

tract) ; Zoller r. Kellogg, 66 Ilun, 194

(change from legal to equitable cause of

action not allowed) ; Sleeman ;;. Ilotch-

kiss (Supreme, Jan. 1891), 13 N. Y. S. 98

(change from equitable to legal cause of

action not allowed) ; Cumber v. Schoen-

feld, 16 Daly, 454 (change from malicious

prosecution to false imprisonment not

made, and i m an ife tly erroneou ·. The
following cases illustrate the geDeral rules
concerning amendments, and the extent
t o which amendments are permitted. It
seems to be ettled b.v a Yery <lecicletl preponderance of authority that amentlmeuts
at the trial caun ot change the nature of
the cause of action or of the defence ; but
that the court may at its discretion permit am endm ents Oll motion bef re t rial
which chan ge the cau e of action or defence, add a new cause of action or defence,
and the like (see additional ca es cited
under § * 558). Johnson v. Filkington, 39
W -i.. 62 (cannot am end at trial so a to
s ub titute a new cause of action) ; V liet
v. Sherwood, 38 id. 159; Spinner v.
Bret t, 38 id. 648; North \'Vest. U ni on
P . Co. r . Shaw, 37 id. 655 ; :Fla nd ers v.
<;ott rell, 36 id. 564; Tormey v. Pierce, 49
Cal. 306 ; Blood v. Fairbanks, 48 id . l 71 ;
Lottman v. Barnett, 62 Mo. 159 ; Jeffree
v. \Valsh, 14 Nev. 14.'3; Almance Cy.
Comm'rs v. Blair, 76 N. C. 136; Scott v.
·Chicka aw Cy., 54 Iowa, 47; Spink v.
McCall, 52 id. 432; Newell v . Mahaska
Cy. Sav. Bk., 51 id. l 78; P eck v. Shick,
-50 id. 281; Hammond v. S. C. & P. R.
·Co., 49 id. 450; O'Connell v. Cotter, 44 id.
48; H obson v. Ogden's Ex., 16 Kan. 388;
Beyer v . Reed, 18 id. 86; L eavenworth,
L . & G. R. Co. v. V an Riper, 19 id. 317;
Harri v. Turnbridge, 83 N. Y. 92, 97;
Reeder v. ayre, 70 id. 180; ·we ton v.
McMulliu, 42 Wis. 56 i ; T anguay v. Felthouse r, 4-1- id. 30; Tewsbury v. Bronson,
4 8 id. 581; Graham v. Chicago, etc. Ry.
Co., 49 id. 532; Oro Fino, etc. Min. Co.
v. Cullen, l Idaho, 11 3; Read v. Beardsley, 6 Neb. 493; Page v. Williams, 54
Cal. 562;
ichols v. Scranton teel Co.,
137 N. Y. 47 1; Dexter v. Ivins, 133 N. Y.
55 1 ; Miner 1·. Bacon, 13 1 N. Y. 6ii; Freeman v. Grant, 132 N. Y. 22; Davi v. N. Y. ,
L. E. & W. R. Co., 110 N. Y. 646 (te t
proposed, whether r ecovery on the ori g inal co mplaint would be a bar to recovery
-0n the amended complaint) ; Bockes v.
L ansing, 74 N. Y. 437; Lustig v . N. Y.,
L . E . & W.R. Co., 65 Hun, 547; Mea v.
Pierce, 63 Hun, 400; Bowen v. Sweeney,

i'·· Pro. R. 79; Ageringer v. corr, 54 Hun, 613; Hopf v.
U. S. Baking Co. (Buf. ur er. t. l 92),
21 N. Y. Suppl. 5 9 (plaintiff allowed to
amend by changillg a cau e of action
sounding in tort to oue OUllding in contract) ; Zoller 1·. K llogg, G6 11 un, I 94
(change from l gal to quitable cau, e of
action not allowed); Sleeman v. llotchki ( upr me, Jan. 1891 ), 13 N. Y. 8. 9
(change from equitable to legal cau e of
action not allowed); Cumber v. ' choenfeld, 16 Daly, 454 (c·hange from mali ·iou
prosecution to fal e imprisonment not,
allowed); Chamberlain v. Mensino- (S. .),
51 Fed. Rep. 5 1 l; E ch v. Hom e Iu -. Co.
of N. Y., 78 Iowa, 3a4; Plumer v. C larke,
59 Wi s. 646 ; Continental In . Co. v. Phillips (Wis., Nov. 1892) ,53 . W. R ep. 774;
Carmi chael v. Dolan, 25 ~eb. 335; McNider v. irrine (Iowa, Oct. 189 1), 50
N. W. Rep. 200 ; Barnes v. Hekla F . Ins.
Co., 75 Iowa, 11 ; Hughe v. McDivitt,
102 Mo . 77; Bradley v. Phcenix Ins. Co.,
28 Mo. App. 7 (amendment before answer or reply); M i ouri Lumber, etc.
Co. v. Zeitinger, 45 Mo . App. 114 (cannot
change from statutory action for treble
damage for cutting timber, into action of
trover for the timber); Gourley v. St. L.
& S. F. Ry. Co., 35 Mo. A pp. 87; Caldwell v. Meshew, 53 Ark. 263; Jackson v.
Jackson, 94 Cal. 4--l-G; McKeighan v. Hopkins, I 9 Neb. 33. A to amcmlmeut enlargin g tbe amount of recover.'-, see 'Vork
v. Tibbits, l .33 N. Y. 5i4; Schuttler v.
King (Mont., May, 1892), .30 Pac. Rep. 25;
Cain v. Cody (Cal., April, 1892), 29 Pa .
Rep. 778; Guidery v. Green, 95 Cal. 6.30
(amendment by defendant during trial
must be allowed, when no new i ue presented). That answering the amencled
complaint is a waiver of the objection
that it state a new cause of action, see
Witkowski v. Hern, 82 Cal. 60--l-.
63 Hun, 224; 22

1

[Aniendnients.

The question of the right to file amended
pleadings during the trial is one within
the sound discretion of the trial court,
and its rulin gs will not be disturbed

63
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CIVIL REMEDIES.

§ 458. * 567. Election betw^een Actions ex delicto and Actions

CI VIL RE>lEDIES .

§ 458. * 567.
ex contractu.

Election between Actions ex delicto and Actions

Intimately connected with the que tion

la t

ex contractu. Intimately connected with tlie questions last

nnless the record shows an abuse of

discretion .

Arizona : Brady v. Pinal County (1903),

Ariz., 71 Pac. 910.

California: Bean v. Stoneman (1894),

104 Cai. 49, 37 Pac. 777.

Connecticut : Kenuenberg v. Neff

(1901), 74 Conn. 62, 49 Atl. 853; Gulliver

V. Fowler (1894), 64 Conn. 556, 30 Atl.

852.

Indiana: Burnett i\ Milnes (1897), 148

Ind. 230, 46 N. E. 464.

Iowa: Aultman v. Shelton (1894), 90

la. 288, 57 N. W. 857 ; Guyer v. Minn.

Thresher Co. (1896), 97 la. 132, 66 N. W.

83; Greenlee v. Home Ins. Co. (1897),
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103 la. 484, 72 N. W. 676 ; Rosenberger

V. Marsh (1899), 108 la. 47, 78 N. W. 837;

Smith V. City of Sioux City (1903), 119

la. .50, 93 N.'W. 81.

Kansas: Laird v. Farwell (1899), 60

Kan. 512, 57 Pac. 98.

Minnesota: Reeves & Co. v. Cress

(1900), 80 Minn. 466, 83N. W.443; Burke

r. Baldwin (1893), 54 Minn. 514, 56 N. W.

173 ; Minneapolis.etc.Ry. Co. I'. Firemen's

Ins. Co. (1895), 62 Miiiu. 315,64 X. W.

902.

Missouri: Evans ?•. Fulton (1896), 134

Mo. 653, 36 S. W. 230.

Nehrask-a : Chicago, B. & Q. R. R. Co.

r. Martelle (1902), — Xeb. — , 91 N. W.

364 ; Scherar v. Prudential Ins. Co. (1902),

63 Neb. 530, 88 N. W. 687 ; Chicago, R. I.

& P. R. R. Co. r. Shaw (1901), 63 Neb.

380, 88 N. W. 508 ; Gage v. West (1901),

62 Neb. 612, 87 N. W. 344; Dunn v. Bo-

zarth (1899), 59 Neb. 244, 80 N. W. 811 ;

Harrington r. Connor (1897), 51 Neb.

214, 70 N. W. 911 ; Murray v. Loushmau

(1896), 47 Neb. 256, 66 N. W. 413 ; Kleck-

ner v. Turk (1895), 45 Neb. 176, 63 N. W.

469; Central City Bank v. Rice (1895),

44 Neb. 594, 63 n' W. 60 ; Barr v. City of

Omaha (1894). 42 Neb. 341, 60 N.'w.

591 ; Home Fire Ins. Co. v. Murray

■ (1894), 40 Neb. 601, 59 N. W. 102 ; Man-

ning V. Viers (1594), 38 Neb. 32. 56 N. \V.

719 ; Omaha & R. V. R. R. Co. v. Mos-

cliel (1893), 38 Neb. 281, 56 N. W. 825;

Commercial Nat. Bank v. Gibson (1893),

37 Neb. 750, 56 N. W. 616; Ledwith v.

Campbell (1903), — Neb. — , 95 N. W.

838.

North Carolina : Barnes v. Crawford

(1894), 115 N. C. 76, 20 S. E. 386.

North Dakota : Martin v. Luger Fur-

niture Co. (1898), 8 N. D. 220, 77 N. W.

1003 ; Q. W. Loverin-Browne Co. v. Bank

(1898), 7 N. D. 569, 75 N. W. 923.

Oklahoma : Tecumseh State Bank v.

Maddox (1896), 4 Ukla. 583, 46 Pac. 563 ;

Consolidated Steel & Wire Co. i'. Burn-

ham (1899), 8 Okla. 514, 58 Pac, 654.

Oregon: Clemens v. Hanley (1895), 27

Ore. 326, 41 Pac. 658; Hume v. Kelly

unle
the record shows an abuse of
di cretion .
Arizona : Brady v. Pinal County (1903),
Ariz., 7 l Pac. 910.
Cal!fornia : B ean v. toneman (1 94),
104 al. .J.9, 37 i~ac . 7i7.
Connecticut: Kennenberg v. N eff
(1901),74Conn.62,49 tl. 53; Gulliver
v. Fowler ( 1894), 64
onn. 556, 30 Atl.
52.
I ndiana : Burnett v. :Milne (1897) , 148
I ncl 230, 46 :r. E. 464.
Lowa : Aultman v. helton (1894), 90
Ia. 2 , 57 N. W . 57 ; Guyer v. Minn.
Thre:her Co. (1 96}, 97 Ia. 132 66 . W .
3 · Greenlee v. Home In·. Co. (1 97},
103 Ia. 4 4, 72 N. W. 676; Rosenberger
v. ~Iar~h (1899), 108 Ia. 47 , 7 X W. 37;
, 'mi th r. City of ioux City ( 1903 ), 119
fa. 50, 93 N. W. I.
Kansas: Laird v. FarweU (1899), 60
K an. 512, 57 Pac. 9 .
Ji irme . ota : R eeve & Co. v. Cre,
(1900), O:\Iinn.466 3.J.:. W.443; Burke
t'. B aldwin (1 93), 54 Minn. 514, 56
. W.
173; .Minneapoli , etc. Ry. Co. v. Firemen'
I n .. Co. ( l ~5 ), 62 M iun. 315, 64 N. W.
902.
,..fissouri : Rvan. v. Fulton (1 96), 134
1\Io. 653, 36 . w. 230.
i\ ebmska : Chicago, B. & Q. R. R. Co.
v. l\fartelle (1902}, :reb. - , 91 N. W .
364; cherar v. Prudential Ins. Co. (1 902),
N. W . 6 7 ; Chicago, R. I.
63 ~Teb. 530,
& P. R. R.
haw {1901 ), 63 Neb.
3 o,
N . W. 50 ; Gage v. We t (1901),
62 Teb. 612, Si T. W. 344;
unn v. Bozarth (1 99), 59 .r",.eb. 244-, 0 . W. 811;
Harrington l. Connor (1 97), 51 "eb.
214, 70 N. W. 911 ; Murray v. L u ·hman
(1 96), 47 Xeb. 256, 66 . W . 4 13; Kleckner v. Turk {1895) 45 Jeb. 176, 63 N . W.
469; entral ity Bank v. Rice (1 95 ),
44 .Teh. 594, 63 X W. 60; Barr t•. ity of
l>malta ( 1 9-l-), 42 -reb. 341, 60 ... :r. W.
5!ll ; Home Fire In .
o. v. Murray
· (I 4),40 "'eb. 601, 59 "T· W. 102 ; :.rauJJiug t'. Yier· (1 94), 3 ~·eb. 32, 56 J..'. \V.
71g: >maha & R. V. R. R. o. v. ~I chel (1 93), ,3
eu. 2 1, 56
ommereial ...Tat. Bank v. iu. on (l 3),
3i ' b. i50, 56 .... W. 616; L dwit.h v.

Campbell (1903) , -

Neb. - , 95

. W.

3 .

N orth Carolina : Barne v. Crawford
{l 94), 115 N. C. 76, 20 . E. 3 6.
"ill orth D akota : fartin v. Luger Furniture o. (1 9 ), 8 iii. D . 220, 77 N. W.
1003 ; . ·w. LoYerin-Browne o. v. Bank
(1 9 ), 7 ~ . . . D. 569, 75 . W. 923.
Oklahoma : Tecum. eh tate Bank ti.
1addox (1 96), 4 Okla. 5 3, 46 Pac. 563;
Con olidated , teel & Wire Co. v. Burnham {I 99), Okla. 514, 58 Pac. 654.
Oregon: lem en v. Hanley (1 95) , 27
Ore. 326, 41 Pac. 65 ; Hume v. Kelly
(1 96), 2 Ore. 39 , -13 Pac. 3 .. 0 ·
mun
v. Win ters (1 96), 30 Ore. 1 i7 46 Pac.
7 0.
S outh D akota : Heegaard 11, Dakota
Loan & Tru t Co. (1 93), 3 . D . 569, 54
. W. 656.
W ashington : Long v . Ei enbei (I 901),
23 Wa~ h. 556, 63 Pac. 249; Hart Lnmber
Co. v. Rucker ( l 9 ), 20 Wa. h. 3 3, 55
Pac. 320 · Bi hop v. Averill (1 9 ), 19
W a h . 490, 5,3 Pac. 726 ; eward v. Derrick on (I 95), 12 'Va h. 225 40 Pac.
939; Hulbert v . Brackett (1 94), "'ah.
43 , 36 Pac. 264; ~tate ex rel. i·. 'uperior
Court (189-1-), 9 Wa h. 366, 37 Pac. 45-L
Wisconsin: Illinois teel o. v . Budzi z (1900), 106 Wi . 499, 2 . . . W . 534;
Matthie on v. chomberg (1 96), 94 \ i . I ,
6
. W. 4 16; S tudebaker Bro . Mfg. Co.
v. Lang on ( 1 95), 9 Wi . 200, 61 . W .
7i3.
T he question whether, under the particular facts, the ruling of the ourt
. howed an abuse of di cretion , wa
onidered in the following ca e : California : chaake v. Eagle A utomatic Can o. (l 902), 135 al. 472, 63
Pac. 1025.
l daho : J one v. toddart ( 1902), I daho,
67 Pac. 650.
l bu:u : lough v. B enn tt ( 1 96) 99
Ia. 69, 6 ..,,., ''. 5i ; An krum v. itr of
l\far halltown {l 9 ), 1 5 Ta. 493, 75 ... 1 • W.
~60; Burkhard t i: . Burkhardt (1 99), 107
la. 369, 77 N. W. l 069 .
X ntucl·.11 : Brady v . Peck (1 96) 99
Ky. 42, 34 . \Y . 906 · F elt n v. Dnnn
{190 1), Ky., 60 . W . 29 ; Metr p litau

ELEUTIO.i.

BETWEE.· A.CTI XS.

li39

ELECTION BETWEEN' ACTIONS.

G39

discussed, as to the proper forms of actions and tlic correspond-

ence between the allegations and tlie proofs, is the subject indi-

c1is us 'ed, as to the proper form of action and the orr ponclence between the allegations and the proof..., i: the ·nbj ct indi-

Life Ins. Co. v. Smith (1900), Ky., 59

S. W. 24.

Minnesota: Smith v. Prior (1894), 58

Minn. 247, 59 N. W. lOlG; Minneapolis

Stockyards Co. v. Cunningham (1894), 59

Minn." .325, 61 N. W. .329.

Montana: York v. Steward (1898), 21

Mont. 515, 55 Pac. 29; Hanpt v. Inde-

pendent Tel. Co. (1900), 25 Mont. 122, 63

Pac. 1033.

Nebraska: Donovan v. Kibbler (1902),

Neb., 92 N. W. 637; Hubenka v. Vach

(1902), 64 Neb. 170, 89 N. W. 789;

Dufrene v. Anderson (1902), Neb., 90

N. W. 221 ; Chicago, R. I. & Pac. K. R.

Co. V. Young (1903), — Neb. — , 93 N. W.
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922; Missouri, etc. Trust Co. v. Clark

(1900), 60 Neb. 406, 83 N. W. 202;

Schlageck v. Widhalm (1900), 59 Neb.

541, 81 N. W. 448; Welch v. MiUiken

(1898), 57 Neb. 86, 77 N. W. 363; Hor-

bach V. Marsh (1893), 37 Neb. 22, 55

N. W. 286 ; Western Assurance Co. v. Dry

Goods Co. (1898), 54 Neb. 241, 74 N. W.

592 ; Perkins County v. Miller (1898), 55

Neb. 141, 75 N. W. 577.

North Dakota : Anderson i\ Bank,

(1895), 5 N. D. 80, 64 N. W. 114.

Oregon: Wade i-. City Railway Co.

(1900), 36 Ore. 311, 59 Pac. 875 ; Nosier

I'. Coos Bay R. R. Co. (1901), 39 Ore. 331,

64 Pac. 644 ; Tillamook Dairy Ass'n v.

Schermerhorn (1897), 31 Ore. 308, 51 Pac.

438.

South Dakota : Brown v. Edmunds

(1896), 9 S. D. 273, 68 N. W. 734.

Utah: Ruffatti v. Lexington Mining

Co. (1894), 10 Utah, 386, 37 Pac. 591.

Washington : Norris Safe & Lock Co.

V. Clark (1902), 28 Wash. 268, 68 Pac.

718; Newman v. Buzard (1901), 24 Wash.

225, 64 Pac. 139; State v. Lorenz (1900),

22 Wash. 289, 60 Pac. 644 ; Price Baking

Powder Co. w. Rinear (1897), 17 Wash.

95, 49 Pac. 223 ; West Seattle Land Co. v.

Herren (1897), 16 Wash. 665, 48 Pac. 341 ;

Van Lehn r. Morse (1897), 16 Wash. 672,

48 Pac. 404 ; McDonough v. Great North-

ern Ry. Co. (1896), 15 Wash. 244, 46 Pac.

3.34; Price v. Scott (1896), 13 Wash. 574,

43 Pac. 634; Maney v. Hart (1895), 11

Wash 67, 39 Pac. 268 ; Barnes v. Pack-

wood (1894), 10 Wash. 50, 38 P.ac. 857 ;

Morgan v. Morgan (1894), 10 Wash. 99,

38 Pac. 1054 ; Gould v. Gleason (1895), 10

Wash. 476, 39 Pac. 123.

Wisconsin : Jacobson v. Tallard ( 1 903 ) ,

116 Wis. 662, 93 N. W. 841 ; Whereatt v.

Worth (1900), 103 Wis. 291, 84 N. W.

441 ; Sullivan v. Collins (1900), 107 Wis.

291, 83 N. W. 310; Carroll v. Fethers

(1899), 102 Wis. 436, 78 N. W. 604 J St.

Clara Female Academy i-. Northwestern

Nat. Ins. Co. (1899), 101 Wis. 464, 77

N. W. 893; Rock v. Collins (1898), 99

Wis. 630, 75 N. W. 426 ; Schaller v. Chi-

Life In . Co. v. mith (1 900), Ky., 59
. w. 2-1.
.Minnesota : Smith v. Prior (1 94 ), 5
Minn. 247, 59 J. W . 1016; Minneapoli
tockyarcls Co. v. Cunningham {l 94), 59
Minn. 325, 61 . W. 329 .
1vfontana: York v. Steward (l '9 ), 21
M ont. 515, 55 Pac. 29; Haupt v. In<le·
pendent Tel. Co. (1900), 25 Mont. 122, 63
Pac. 1033.
Nebraslai: Donovan v. Hibbler (1902),
N eb., 92
. W. 637; Hubenka v. Vach
( 1902), 64 Neb. 170, 89 N. W. 7 9;
Dufrene v. Anderson (1902), Neb., 90
. W. 221; Chicago, R. I. & Pac. R. R.
Co. v . Young {1903), - Neb.-, 93 N. W.
922; Missouri, etc. Tr ust Co. v. Clark
{1900), 60 Teb. 406, 83 N. IV. 202;
chlageck v. W idhalm {1900), 59 Keb.
541 , 8 1 T . W. 448; Weich v. l\Iillikeu
{1898), 57 Jeb. 86, 77 N. W . 363; IIorbach v. 1\far ·h (1893), 37 Neb. 22, 55
. W. 286 ; Western Assurance Co. v. Dry
Goods Co. (1898), 54 Neb. 241, 74 . W.
592; Perkins County v. Miller (1898), 55
Neb. 141, 75 N . W. 577.
North Dakota : Anderson t'. B ank,
(1895) , 5 . D . 80, 64 N. W. 11 4.
Oregon: Wade v. City Railway Co.
( 1900), 36 Ore. 311, 59Pac.875; Nosler
v. Coos Bay R. R Co. (1901), 39 Ore. 331,
64 P::tc. 644; Tillamook Dair y Ai-s'n v .
Sch ermerhorn (1897 ), 31 Ore. 308, 51 Pac.
438.
So uth Dakota : Brown v. Edmunds
{1896), 9 S. D. 273, 68 N. W . 734.
Utah: Ruffatti v. Lexington Mining
Co. (1894), 10 Utah, 3 6, 37 Pac. 591.
Wa shington: orris Safe & Lock Co.
v. Clark {1902), 28 Wah. 268, 68 Pac.
ewman v. Buzard {1901), 24 Wash.
718;
225 , 64 Pac. 139; State v. L or enz {1900) ,
22 Wa h . 289, 60 P ac. 644; Price B ak ing
P owder Co. v. Rinear {1897), 17 Wah.
95, 49 Pac. 223; We t eattle L aud Co. v .
H err en {1897), 16 \Va h. 665, 48 Pac. 34 1;
Van Lehn v. 1\Iorse {1897), 16 Wash. 672,
48 P ac. 404; McDonough v. Great orthern Ry. Co. (1896), 15 Wa h. 244, 46 Pac.
334 ; Price v. Scott {1896), 13 W ah . 574,
43 Pac. 634; )faney v. Hart (195),11
Wash 6'i, 39 Pac. 268; Barnes v. PackT

wootl (1 94), 10 Wa. h. 50 .'3< Pa<'. 5'i;
Morgan v. l\lorgan (1 94), JO Wah. 99,
3 Pac. 1054; ould v. lea on (l 95), 10
Wah. 4i6, 39 l'ac. 123.
TVisconsin : Jacob on r. Tallard ( 1903),
l 16 Wi . 662, 9:3 KW. 41; \\'her att 1'.
Worth (1900), JO _ Wis. 201, 84 ~·. W.
441; , ullivan v. Colli11 · {1900), lOi \Yi .
291, 3 N. \V. 310; Carroll v. Fether
(1 99), 102 \'is. 436, 7 ~·. W. 604; . t.
Clara Female Academy 1:. ·ortlme teru
Xat. Ins. Co. (1 99), 101 Wi: 464, 'i7
N. \V. 93; Rock l'. Collins (1 9 ), 99
Wi .. 630, 75 ;~. W. 426; 'challer t'. Chicago & Xorthwe;;tern Ily. Co. (1 _9i), 97
Wi . 31, 71 N. W. 1042; egelkc & I-~ohl
hans ~Ifg. Co. v. Hulberg (I 96), 94 \Yi ..
106, 6 X. W. 653; O' onnor v. Chicago
& .Xorthwe tern Ry. Co. (1 96), 92 Wi .
Gl2, 66 i · . W. 195; Geer u. Holcomh
(1 96),92\Vi .ti 61,66N . W.793; Thompson v. Caledonian Fire In ·. Co. ( 1896), 92
Wis. G6-J., 66 N. W. 801 ; Kennan v. Smith
{1902), 115 \Vi . 463, 91 N. W. 986.
In the following ca' e it i · held that a
new aud distinct cause of action or defence
cannot Le introduced by ameudment: .Arkansas : Freeman v. Lazarn ' (l 95),
61 Ark. 247, 32 S. W. 6 0; Sarber v.
McCounell {1897), 64 Ark. 450, 43 . W.
395 .
Cal[fornia: Fro t v. Witter {1901), 132
Cal. 421, 64 Pac. 705 (an important ca e).
Colorado: Anderson v. Groe. beck
(1 99), 26 Colo. 3, 55 Pac. 10 6.
Connecticut: Pitkin v. New York, etc.
R. R. Co. ( 1 94), 64 Conn . 4 2, 30 AtL
772.
Ida ho: Hallett v. Larcom (1 97), I daho,
51 Pac. 108.
I owa: B oos v. Dulin (l 97), 103 Ia.
331, 72 N. W. 533; Denzler v. Rieckhoff
(1 896), 97 Ia. 75 , 66 'S. W. 147; William
v. Williams (1902), 115 Ia. 520,
N. W.
1057.
Kansas : Ellis v. Flaherty (1902), 65
Kan. 621, 70 Pac. 5 6; tate v. Krau e
{1897), 5 Kan. 651, 50 Pac. 82.
Kentucky: Greer v. Loui Yille, etc.
R. R. Co. ( l 93), 94 Ky. 169, 21 . IY.
649; L oui$ville, etc. R. R. Co. 1:. Beau- .
champ (1900), 108 Ky. 47, 55 . W. 716;
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cated by this heading: that is, the power held by the plaintiff,

cated b - this heading: h t
urnl r ert in circum anc

i
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the power h ld by the plaintiff,
of cl oo ing whe her he will tre t

under certain circumstances, of choosing whether he will treat

DuckwaU V. Brooke (1901), Ky., 65 S. W.

357 (allowing the addition of another

cause of action, when the two might have

been originally joined).

Minnesota: U'Gonuan r. Sabin (1895),

62 xMinn. 46, 64 X. W. 84.

Missouri: Hemau v. Glami (1895), 129

Mo. 325, 31 S W. 589 ; Chance v. Jen-

nings (1901), 1.59 Mo. .544, 61 S. W. 177.

Nebraska: Western Cornice, etc. Works

«. Mever (1898), 55 Neb. 440, 76 N. W.

23; Undeland v. Stanfield (1897), 53 Neb.

120, 73 N. W. 459; Stratton v. Wood

(1895), 45 Neb. 629, 63 N. W. 917 ; Scrog-

gin V. Johnston (1895), 45 Neb. 714, 64

N. W. 236; Scott i\ Spencer (1895), 44
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Neb. 93, 62 N. W. 312 ; Dietz i: City Nat.

Bank (1894), 42 Neb. 584, 60 N. W. 896.

JVorth Carolina : King v. Dudley

(1893), 113 N. C. 167, 18 S. E. 110; Miz-

zell i: Ruffin (1896), 118 N.C. 69, 23 S. E.

927 ; Parker v. Harden (1898), 122 N. C.

111,28 S. E. 962; Goodwin v. Fertilizer

Works (1898), 123 N. C. 162, 31 S. E.

373 ; Board of County Commissioners i\

Candler (1898), 123 N. C. 682, 31 S. E.

858 ; Nims Mfg. Co. v. Blythe (1900), 127

N. C. 325, 37 S. E. 455 ; Martin v. Bank

(1902), 131 N. C. 121, 42 S. E. 558.

North Dakota: Mares v. Wormington

(1899), 8 N. D. 329, 79 N. W. 441.

South Carolina : Pickett v. Fidelity Co.

(1901), 60 S. C. 477, 38 S. E. 160.

Wisconsin : Gates v. Paul (1903), 117

AVis. 170, 94 N. W. 55 (a valuable case);

Klipstein v. Ra.schein (1903), 117 Wis.

248, 94 N. W. 63.

Wyominrj': Sowin v. Pease (1895), 6

Wyo. 91, 42 Pac. 750.

That an amended pleading changes

the cause of action is ground for motion

to strike but not for demurrer : Beattie

Mfg. Co. r. Gerardi (1901), 166 Mo. 142,

65 S. W. 1035; Williams v. Williams

(1902), 115 la. 520, 88 N. W. 1057.

In the following cases the question is

considered whether, under the particular

facts, the amendment offered amounted to

a change in the cause of action or ground

of defence.

For ca.«es holding that it did not change

the cause of action or defence, see : —

Colorado: Messenger v. Northcutt

(1899), 26 Colo. 527, 58 Pac. 1090.

Connecticut : Mechanics' Bank v. Wood-

ward (1902), 74 Conn. ti89, 51 Atl. 1084.

Georyia: Dinkier v. Baer (1893), 92

Ga. 432, 17 S. E. 953 ; Colley v. Gate City

Co. (1893), 92 Ga. 604, 18 S. E. 817; Mc-

Candless v. Inland Acid Co. (1902), 115

Ga. 968, 42 vS. E. 449 ; Craven v. Walker

(1897), 101 Ga. 845, 29 S. E. 152; Causey

I'. Causey (1898), 106 Ga. 188, 32 S. E 138.

loa-a : Sachra v. Town of Manilla

(1903), 120la. 562, 95 N. W. 198 ; Thoniitson

V. Brown (1898), 106 la. 367, 76 N. W. 819.

Duckwall t·. Brooke (1901), K ., 65 . W.
35; (alluwing the addition of another
cau"e of action, when the two wight have
been origim lly joined.).
Jl111n e ·ota : ' ormau 1: . abin ( l 95),
62 ~linn. 46, 64 ...-. W. 4 .
.lli ouri : Heman v. Glan.u (1 95), 129
Io. 3 25, 31
W. 5
hance v. Jennin<r (1901), 159 ~Io. 5-!4, 61 . W. 177.
l\ Pbra ·ka: \ e tern ornic
tc. W or v. )!eyer (I 9 ), 55 Neb. HO, 76 N. W.
23; l:ndeland v. tanfielcl (1 97), 53 -eb.
120, 73 .1.. W. 459;
tratton v. Wood
(l 95), -t.5 Neb. 629, 63 N. W . 917; 'croggin v. John ton (1 9!1), 45 £\eb. 714, 64
-. W. 236; cott v. pencer (1 95) 44
Neb. 93, 62 •. W. 312; Dietz v. ity Nat.
Bank (1 94) 42 ..-eb. 5 4, 60 N. W. 9ti.
\Torth Carolina: King v. Dudley
l 93), 113 N. C. 167, l S. E.110; Iizzell v. Ruffin ( l 96), 118 . C. 69 23 . E .
927; Parker v. Hartlen (! 9 ), 122 N. C.
111, 2
. E. 962; Goodwin v. Fertilizer
Work
t 9 ), 1:23 N.
. 162, 31
E.
3i3; Board of County om1ni !Oner v.
andler (1 9 ), 123 N. C. 6 2, 31 . E.
5 ; Nims l\If<T. Co. v. Blythe (1900), 127
... -. . 325, 37 . E. 455 ; ~Iartin v. Bank
( 1902), 131 X. C. 121, 42 . E. 55 .
.._\ orth Dakota: t\1 are v. Wormington
(I 9 ), K D. 329, 79 X. W. 441.
outh Carolina : Pick tt v. Fidelity Co.
{19 t), 60 . . 477, 3
. E. 160.
W i consiu: Gat. v. Paul {1903) 117
Wi ~ . 11 , 94
-. \\'. 55 (a valuable ca e);
Kliµ -tein i·. Ra chein (1903), 117 Wi.
2-1- , 94 K. n'. 63.
Wyoming:· owin v. Pea e (1 95), 6
W\·o. 91, 42 Pac. 750.
·That an amend d pleading change
the au e of action i gr und for motion
t o trike but not for cl murrer: B attie
_ lfg. Co. v. erardi (1901), 166 ~Io. 142,
5 .'. W. 1035; William v. William
(l ~I J2 , 115 fa. 520,
I . W. 1057.
111 th following ca e th qu tion i
con--i 1 red wh ther, under the particular
fac.:l , the am ndment ffer <l amount <l t
a ·hauge in the cau e of actiou or grouud
of defen c .
Ii or t'a . e. hold in that it did not hange
the cau e of action or def nee, ee : -

Colorado :
Ie eng r v.
orthc.:utt
( l 99 ), 26 Colo. 527, 5 Pac. 1090.
(,"u1111ect icul: ~ el:hanic 'Bank v. \ oo<lward (l 02), i-1- Conn. fl 9, 51 Atl. 10 4.
Ceurgia : Dinkler v. Baer (1 93), 92
Ga. 43:2, 1i ' . E. 953 ; alley v. ate City
Co. (1 93), 9~ ' a. 6G4, 1 ::3. E. 17; J\IcCaudle · u. Inlan d Acid Co. (19 2) 115
Ga. 96 , 42 ·. E. 44 ; Cra,·en v. Walk r
(l 97 ), 101 Ga . ..J.5, 29 ·. E. 152; Can ey
v.Cauey(l 9 ),106Ga.l ,32 '.E 13.
Iowa:
acbra v. Town of Ianilla
(1903),120Ia.562,95N.W.19 ; Thomp n
v. Brown (1 9 ), 106 la. 367, - 5 N.' . 19.
Kansas:
t. Loni & an Franci o
Railway o. v. Ludlum (1901 }, 63 Kan.
719, 66 Pac. 1045.
Kentuck.IJ: Adam Oil o. v. Chri tma (1 97), 101 Ky. 564, 41 . W . 5..J.5 ;
Ford Lumber Co. v. Clark (1902), Ky.,
6
. W. 443; cotti h nion In . Co. v.
Strain (1902), Ky., 70 . W . 274
°l11issouri: Courtney v. Blackwell (1 99),
150 Mo. 245, 51 . W. 66 .
~lontana:
1urra_· v. Tingley (1 97),
20 l\font. 260, 50 Pac. 723.
~ ebraska: fa illon Engine & Tlire her
Co. v. Prouty (1902), - Neb. - , 91 "· W.
3 4; Ball v. Beaumont (1902), 63 'eb.
215, 92 .1.. w. 170 .
orth
urolina : Cra>en i;. Ru ll
(I 96), 11
. C. 564, 24 . E. 361.
Oklahoma: 1yer v. Fir t Pr byterian Church (1901), 11 Okla. 544, 69 Pac.
H.
outh Carolina : Booth v. Langl y ,o.
(1 97), 51
. 412, 29 . E. 204; "hitmire v . Bo d (1 9 ), 53 . C. 315, 31
. E. 306.
Utah: onnor v. Raddon (1 9 ), 16
l:tah, 41 , 5:. Pac. 764.
For ca e · holdio<T that the am ndmcnt
dicl introdu e a new cau e f a tion or
ground of def nee, ee: .d rizona : l\Iote u. ila alley Ry. o.
( 1902) Ariz., 6 lac. 532.
Arkan a : Hobin on v.
nited Tru t
(1903) - Ark. -, 72 . W. 992.
amhert v. • 1 Kenzie
alifornia :
(19 l}, 135 al. 100, 67 Pac. 6; tr rt:.
Au ·tin (10-),136 al. 5 , 69 Pa. 277.
Colorado: Anthony u. layden (1900),
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his cause of action as arising from tort or from conti-act. Tliis

right of election sometimes occurs M'hen the contract is express ;

his cause of action as arising from tort or from contract. Tlii;-;
right 0£ election sometimes occurs when the c ntra ti xpr ,b!::i;

27 Colo. 144, 60 Pac. 826 (an important

case).

Georgia : Georgia R. II. Co. v. Hough-

ton (1899), 109 Ga. 604, 34 S. E. 1026;

Charleston, etc. Ry. Co. v. Miller (1901),

113 Ua. 15, 38 S. E. 338; Cox v. Henry

(1901), 113 Ga. 259, 38 S. E. 856 ; Ilorton

V. Smitli (1902), 115 Ga. 66, 41 S. E. 253 ;

Glaze V. Bogle (1898), 105 Ga. 295, 31

S. E. 169; Franklin Bank-Note Co. v.

Augusta, etc. Ry. Co. (1897), 102 Ga. 547,

30 8. E. 419.

Indiana: Cohoou v. Fisher (1896), 146

Ind. 583, 44 N. E. 664.

Kansas : Mo. Pac. Ry. Co. v. Ilenrie

(1901), 63 Kan. 330, 65 Pac. 665; Kan.sa.s
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City V. Hart (1899), 60 Kan. 684, 57 Pac.

938"; Jewett v. Malott (1899), 60 Kan. 509,

57 Pac. 100.

Missouri: Bricken v. Cross (1901), 163

Mo. 449, 64 S. W. 99.

Nevada: Schwartz v. Stock (1901),

Nev., 65 Pac. 351.

North Carolina: Sams v. Price (1897),

121 N. C. 392, 28 S. E. 486.

Oregon : Foste i\ Standard Ins. Co.

(1894), 26 Ore. 449, 38 Pac. 617 ; Bailey v.

Wilson (1899), 34 Ore. 186, 55 Pac. 973.

Cases in which particular amendments

have been allowed or disallowed are classi-

fied and cited as follows : —

Arkansas : Bank of Malvern v. Burton

(1900), 67 Ark. 426, 55 S. W. 483.

California : Porter v. Fillebrowu (1897),

119 Cal. 235, 51 Pac. 322; County of

Mono V. Flanigan (1900), 130 Cal. 105, 62

Pac. 293.

Georgia : Baldwin Fertilizer Co. v.

Carmichael (1902), 116 Ga. 762, 42 S. E.

1002; Allen v. Stephens (1899), 107 Ga.

733, 33 S. E. 651 ; Norton v. Scruggs

(1899), 108 Ga. 802, 34 S. E. 166; Mad-

dux V. Central of Georgia Ry. Co. (1899),

1 10 Ga. 301,34 S. E. 1036; Mutual Life

Ins. Co. V. Presbyterian Church (1900),

111 Ga. 677, 36 S. E. 880; Equitable

Building, etc. Ass'n v. Holloway (1901),

114 Ga. 780, 40 S. E. 742; Smith v.

Columbia Jewelry Co. (1901), 114 Ga.

698, 40 S. E. 735 ; Wood (•. Bewick Lum-

ber Co. (1897), 103 Ga. 235, 29 S. E. 820 ;

Williams V. Hall (1898), 103 Ga. 796, 30

S. E. 660; Roush v. First Nat. Bank

(1897), 102 Ga. 109, 29 S. E. 144 ; Malono

V. Kelly (1897), 101 Ga. 194, 28 S. E. 689 ;

Atlantic Brewing Co. v. Bluthentlial

(1897), 101 Ga. 541, 28 S. E. 1003 ; King

V. McGhee (1896), 99 Ga. 621, 25 S. E.

849 ; Carey v. Cranston (1896), 99 Ga. 77,

24 S. E. 869 ; Ford v. Williams (1896), 98

Ga. 238, 25 S. E. 416; Carson v. Feara

(1893), 91 Ga. 482, 17 S. E. 342; Purity

Ice Works v. Rountree (1898), 104 Ga.

676, 30 S. E. 885 ; Thompson v. Mallory

Bros. (1898); 104 Ga. 684, 30 S. E. 887.

Indiana : Chapman v. Jones (1897),

27 olo. 144, 60 Pac. 826 (an important
. E. 660;
oush 1•. I<'ir t Tat. Bank
ca e).
(1 97), 102 Ga. 109, 29 '. E. l-1-4; Malo11e
<leorgia: Georgia R. R. Co. v. Rough- v. Kelly (1 97), 101 Ga. 194, 2
. E. 689;
ton (1899), 109 Ga. 604, 34 . E. 1026; Atlantic Brewing Co. v. Bluthenthal
Charle ton, etc. Ry. Co. v. Miller (1901), ( l 97), 101 Ga. 541, 2
. E. 1003; Kin~
113 Ga. 15, 3
. E. 338; ox v. Henry v. l\IcGhee (I !J6}, 99 Ga. 621, 25 . E.
{1901), 113 Ga. 259, 38 . E. 56; Horton
49; arey 1·. Cranston (l 96),99 a. 77,
t". 'mith (1902), 115 Ga. 66, 41
'. E. 253; 24 S. E. 869; Ford t'. Williams (I 96), 9
Glaze v. Bogle (1898), 105 Ga. 295, 31 Ga. 23 , 25 ' K 416; Carson v. .Fear~
. E. 169; Franklin Bank· ote o. v. (1 93), 91 Ga. 482, 17 '. h. 342; Purity
Augu ta, etc. Ry. Co. (1897), 102 Ga. 547, Ice Works v. Hountree (1 98), 104 a .
.30 S. E. 4 19.
676, 30 . E. 8 5; Thomp on v. Mallory
Indiana: Cohoon v. F isher (1896), 146 Bros. (1 9 ); 104 Ga. 6 4, 30 . E. 8 7.
Ind . 5 3, 44 N . E. 664.
Indiana: Chapman v. Jones (I 97),
Kan as: Mo. Pac. Ry. Co. v. Henrie 149 Ind. 434, 47 N. E. 1065.
(1901), 63 Kan. 330, 65 Pac. 665; Kansas
Io wa : Clapp v. Greenlee (1 97), 100
City v. Hart (1899), 60 Kan. 6 4, 57 Pac. Ia. 5 6, 69 . '\V. 1049; Kreuger v. yl93 ; Jewett v. Malott (1899), 60 Kan. 509, Yester (1897), 100 Ia. 647, 69 .1... W. 1059;
57 Pac. 100.
Renn er Bros. i•. Thornburg (l 900), 11 l
Jlis ouri: Bricken v. Cross ( 1901), 163 Ia. 515, 82 r. ·w. 950.
Mo. 449, 64 S . W . 99.
Kansas: Chandler v. Parker (1902), 65
1Vevada : Schwartz v. Stock ( 1901 ), Kan. 860, 70 Pac. 368; .Mc:\fan us v. '\ValNev., 65 Pac. 351.
ters (1901}, 62 Kan. 128, 61 Pac. 686;
Sorth Carolina: Sam v. Price (1897), Emporia Nat. Bank v. Layfeth (1901), 63
Kan. 1 7, 64 Pac. 97 3.
121 N. C. 392, 28 S. E. 486.
Oregon: Foste v. Standard Ins. Co.
Kentuck.IJ: Traders' Depo it Bank v.
( l 94), 26 Ore. 449, 38 Pac. 6 17; Bailey v. Day (1 99), 105 Ky. 219, 4 S. W. 9 3;
Wilson ( 1899), 34 Ore. 186, 55 Pac. 973.
Bright v. First Nat. Bank (1899), 106 Ky.
C'a. e in which particular amendments 702, 51 S. W. 442; H. Feltman Co. v.
have been allowed or disallowed are classi- Thompson (1900), Ky., 58 . W. 693;
Town of Latonia v. Hopkins (1 9 ), l o.i
fied and cited as follows : .Arkansas: Bank of Malvern v. Burton Ky. 419, 47 S. W. 248; City of ~Tewport;
v. Commonwealth (1 99), 106 Ky. 434,
(1900), 67 Ark. 426, 55 S. W. 483.
California: Porter v. Fillebrown ( 1897), 50 S. W. 845 ; Leonard v . Boyd ( 1903),
119 Cal. 235, 51 Pac. 322 ; County of Ky., 71 S. W. 508; Joue 'Admr. v. Ill.
1\Iono v. Flanigan (1900), 130 Cal. 105, 62 Cent. R. R. Co. (1902), Ky., 66 . W.
609; Cincinnati Tobacco '\Varehou·e o.
Pac. 293.
Georgia : Baldwin Fertilizer Co. v. v. Matt hews (1903), Ky., 74 . W. 2-4-2.
J.llinnesota: Swank v. Barnum (1896),
Carmichael (1902), 116 Ga. 762, 42 S. E.
1002; Allen i:. tephens (1899), 107 Ga. 63 Minn. 447, 65 N. W. 722.
733, 33 S. E. 651 ; Norton v. Scruggs
Alissow·i·: Hahel '" 'Cnion Depot o.
(l 99), 108 Ga. 802, 34 S. E. 166; Mad- (1897), 140 Io. 159, 41 . W. 459; Barth
dox v. Central of Georgia Ry. Co. (1899), v. Kansas City Ry. Co. (I 97), 142 :i\Io.
11 O Ga. 301, 34 S. E. 1036; Mutual Life 535, 44 S. 'YY. 77 ; Le~xenworth, etc. Co.
Ins. Co. v. Presbyterian Church (1900), v. Atchison (1896), 137 1\10. 2 1 , 37 '. '\V.
111 Ga. 677, 36 S. E. 8 O; Equitable 913; Harlan v . l\[oore ( l 95), 132 Mo.
Rnildiug, etc. Ass'n v. Holloway ( 190 1 ), 4 3, 34 S. W. 70; Clark v. t. Loui
114 Ga. 7 0, 40 S. E. 742 ; mith v. Transfer Co. ( 1 94), 127 Mo. 255, 30 . '\Y.
Colu mbia Jewelry Co. (190 1 ), 114 Ga. 121.
Montana: Merrill v. l\liller (1903), 698, 40 S. E. 735; W ood v. Bewick L um·
her Co. (1 897 ), 103 Ga. 235, 29 S. E. 820 ; Mont. -, 72 Pac. 423.
Nebraska : Pekin P low Co. v. Wilson
Williams v. Hall (1 898), 103 Ga. 796, 30
41
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but, on account of the tortious acts of the defendant, the plaintiff

may disregard it, and sue directly for the wrong. In the great

(1902),— Neb.— ,92 N. W. 176; Norfolk

ut on account of the tortiou act of the defendant, the plaintiff
I n the great

may di regard it, and ue lirectl for the wrong.

Beet Sugar Co. v. Might (1899), 59 Neb.

100, 80 N. W. 276; Security Nat. Bank v.

Latimer (1897), 51 Neb. 498, 71 N. W. 38;

Hanover Fire Ins. Co. v. Stoddard (1897),

52 Neb. 745, 73 N. W. 291 ; Burlington

Voluntary Relief Dept. v. Moore (1897),

52 Neb. 719, 73 N. W. 15 ; Real t-. Honey

(1894), 39 Neb. 516, 58 N. W. 136 ; Omaha

Bottling Co. V. Theiler (1899), 59 Neb. 257,

80 N. W. 82; Grotte v. Nagle (1897), 50

Neb. 363, 69 N. W. 973; Rosewater v.

Horton (1903), — Neb. — , 93 N. W. 681.

NewYork: Lyman r. Kurtz (1901), 166

(1902) - Neb.-, 92 X \\ . 176; ..._Torfolk Wah. 252 71Pac.1014; Owen . t. Paul,
Beet u ar Co. v. Hight (I 99), 59 eb. etc. Ry. o. (1 95), 12 Wah. 313, 41 Pac.
af & Lo k
o. v.
lark
100, ON. W. 276; 'ecurit: :Sat. Bank v. 44 · Norri
Latimer (1 97 , 51Neb.49 , 71 N. W. 3 ; (1902), 2 Wa<h. 26, 70 Pac. 129.
TVi con in:
Erner on v.
chwindt
Hanover Fire In . 'o. v. toduard (1 97),
52 ~eb. 'i 45, 73 . ._T. W. 29 l ; Burlington (1902), 114 Wi. 12-!, 9 . \ r . 22; Jani
V luntary Relief D pt. v. i\Ioore (1897), v. X r thw e tern 1\1 utual Relief A~ 'u
52 ... eb. ~19, i3 N. W. 15; eal v. Honey (l 99}, 10:2 "i . 5-!6, 7
. ". 10 9;
), 99
(1 94), 39 Neb. 516, 5
. W. 136; Omaha Char] Baumback o. v. Laube (1
Ilottling Co. v. Theiler (1 99), 59 Neb. 257, Wi . 171, 7-! J. • W. 96; Hubbard 1;. Haley
o X. W. 2 · Grotte v . .i:Jagle (1 97). 50 (l 97), 96 Wis. 57 , 71 . W. 1036; Pot
5
~"'eb. 363 69 ...
W. 973; Roewater t . v. ampbell (1901), 110 Wi. 3
1032; Hobiu ·on v. Eau laire ..,tationenr
Horton ( 1903), - Neb. - , 93 T . W. 6 1.
l\ ew York: Lyman v. Kurtz (1901), 166 Co. (1901), 110 "Ti . 369, 5 N. \\. 9 3.;
N. Y. 274, 59 .N". E. 90.3; "McLaughlin v. John H. DaYi Lumber o. v. Fir, t :Sat.
. W. 743.
Web ter (1 94), 141 . Y. 76, 35 N. E. Bank (I 94), 7 Wi . 435, 5
The que tion of the right t amend a
10 l ; ~Iartin v. Borne Bank (1 99), 160
related to the operation of the tatute of
X Y. 190, 54 .r. E. 717.
orth Carolina: Tillery v. Candler limitati ons wa con idered in the following
(1896), 118 N. C. 8 8, 24 '. E. 709 ; hell ca e : Arizona: Mote v. Gila
alley, etc.
v. We ·t (1902), 130 N. C. 171, 41 . E. 65.
North Dakota: Power v. Bowdle (1 93) , R.R. Co. (1902), 6 Pac. 532.
Georgia: Knox v . Laird (1 93), 92
3 N. D. 107, 54 N. W. 404.
Ohio: Raymond v. Railway Co. (1897), Ga. 123, 17 . E. 9 ; Beaty v. Atlantic,
57 0. t. 271, 4 N. E. 1093.
etc. R. R. Co. (1 96), 100 Ga. 123, 28
. E. 32.
Oklahoma: Armour Packing Co. v.
Orrick (1 96), 4 Okla. 661, 46 Pac. 573;
Indiana : Peerle s Stone Co. v. Wray
Lookabaugh v. La Vance (1897), 6 Okla. (1 , 9 ), 152 Ind. 27 , 51 N. E. 326.
Iowa: Curl v. Foehler (1901), 113 Ia.
35 , 49 Pac. 65 ; wope v. Burnham, etc.
o. (1 9 ), 6 Okla. 736, 52 Pac. 924; 597, 85 N . W . 11; Taylor v. Ta lor
Smock v. Carter (1897 ), 6 Okla. 300, 50 ( 1900), 110 Ia. 207, 81 N. W. 4 72.
Pac. 262.
Kansas: Mis ouri Pac. Ry. o. v. Moffat
Oregon: Tillamook Dairy A 'n v. {l 99), 60 Kan. 113, 55 Pac. 37 · Huckelchermerhorn (1 97), 31 Ore. 30 , 51 Pac. bridge v. Atchi on, etc. Ry. o. (19 3), 66
43 , Fo ter v. Bender on ( l 96), 29 Ore. Kan. H3, 71 Pac. 14; 1i ouri, K. & T.
210, 45 Pac. 89 ; Ko bland v. Fire A 'n Ry. v. Bageley (1902), 65 Kan. 1 , 69 Pac.
( 1 97), 31 Ore. 362, 49 Pac. 65; Farmer ' 1 9.
Bank v. ' aling (1 9 ), .33 re. 394, 54 Pac.
K entuck.IJ: Loui ville, etc. R. R. o. t.
190;
hri ten on v. Nelon (1901), 3
Pointer'
dmr. (1902), - Ky. -, 69
. w. 110.
Ore. 4 73, 63 Pac. 64 .
Mi ouri: Bricken v. ro
(1901), 163
oulh
arolina: Baker t•. Hornick
(1 97). 51 ._ . . 313, 2
. •. 941; tewart l\fo. 449, 64 . W. 99.
v. Walterboro Ry. o. (1902), 64 . . 92,
ebra ka: N rfolk B eet ugar o. v.
41 . E. '27; lennv.
rald(l902) ,64 Hight (I 9), 59 N b. 100
o N. W .
27 6 ; hicag R. I.
Pac. . R. Co. v.
E. 155.
. 2'.i ' 42
-oung (1903), 93 N. W.
tali: :l \Iurphy v.
aney (1901), 23
Utah, 633, 6 Pac. 190; Pugmire v. I ia· 92::!.
7orlh
arolina :
illam v. Lif In .
mond oal & oke o. (1903), 26 tah,
11:-, 72 l'ar. 3 .5.
Co. ( 1 97), 121 , . C. 369, 2
. E. 470.
klalwma: Butt v. Car on (1 96), 5
1Va4iington: Morri. ey t'. Faucett
Ida. I 60, 4 Pac. 1 2.
(1902), 2 Wn h. 52, 6 Pa· 352; Dal ' l'.
En·rr•Lt Pulp & lap r
o. (1903), 31
outh Carolina: Mayo v. partanburg,
T.

N. Y. 274, 59 N.E. 903 ; McLaughlin v.

Webster (1894), 141 N. Y. 76, 35 N. E.
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1081 ; Martin v. Home Bank (1899), 160

N. Y. 190, 54 N. E. 717.

North Carolina : Tillery v. Candler

(1896), 118 N. C. 888, 24 S. E. 709; Shell

V. West (1902), 130 N. C. 171,41 S. E. 65.

North Dakota : Power v. Bowdle (1 893),

3 N. D. 107, 54 N. W. 404.

Ohio : Raymond v. Railway Co. (1897),

57 0. St. 27l', 48 N. E. 1093.

Oklahoma : Armour Packing Co. v.

Orrick (189G), 4 Okla. 661, 46 Pac. 573;

Lookabaugh v. La Vance (1897), 6 Okla.

358, 49 Pac. 65 ; Swope v. Burnham, etc.

Co. (1898), 6 Okla. 736, 52 Pac. 924;

Smock V. Carter (1897), 6 Okla. 300, 50

Pac. 262.

Oregon : Tillamook Dairy Ass'n v.

Schermerhorn (1897), 31 Ore. 308, 51 Pac.

438, Foster v. Henderson (1896), 29 Ore.

210, 45 Pac. 898 ; Koshland v. Fire Ass'n

(1897), 31 Ore. 362, 49 Pac. 865 ; Farmers'

Bank v. Saling (1898), 33 Ore. 394, 54 Pac.

190; Christenson v. Nelson (1901), 38

Ore. 473, 63 Pac. 648.

South Carolina : Baker i\ Hornick

(1897), 51 S. C. 313. 28 S. E. 941 ; Stewart

r. Walterboro Ry. Co. (1902), 64 S. C. 92,

41 S. E. 827 ; Glenn i;. Gerald (1902), 64

S. C. 236, 42 S. E. 155.

Utah: Murphy v. Ganey (1901), 23

Utah, 633, 66 Pac. 190; Pugmire v. Dia-

mond Coal & Coke Co. (1903), 26 Utah,

115, 72 I'ac. 385.

Washington : Morrissey r. Faucett

(1902), 28 Wash. 52, 68 Pac 352; Daly c.

Kvr-rett Pulp & Paper Co. (1903)," 31

Wash. 252, 71 Pac. 1014 ; Owen v. St. Paul,

etc. Ry. Co. (1895), 12 Wash. 313, 41 Pac.

44; Norris Safe & Lock Co. v. Clark

(1902), 28 Wash. 268, 70 Pac. 129.

]Visconsin : Emerson v. Schwindt

(1902), 114 Wis. 124. 89 N. W. 822 ; Jarvis

V. Northwestern Mutual Relief Ass'n

(1899), 102 Wis. 546, 78 N. W. 1089;

Charles Baumback Co. *;. Laube (1898), 99

Wis. 171, 74 N. W. 96 ; Hubbard r. Haley

(1897), 96 Wi.s. 578, 71 N. W. 1036; Post

t'. Campbell (1901), 110 Wis. 378, 85 N. W.

1032 ; Robinson v. Eau Claire Stationery

Co. (1901), 110 Wis. 369, 85 N. W. 983;

I
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majority of instances, however, the contract invoked, and made

tlie basis of the suit, is implied. The theory of the implied

ma jority of irn~tan c , h ow v r , the ·ontra ·t i1wok d and rnatl'
th ba is f t he uit, is impli cl. Th tli ory of tli irnpli <l

etc. R. R. Co. (1894), 43 S. C. 225, 21

S. E. 10.

etc. R. R. Co. (l 94), 43
South Dakota: Ilouts v. Bartle (1901),

C. 225, 21

66 N. W. 69; Longley l.J. McY y (l !J!l),
109 Ia. GG6, I ... r. W. 150.

South Dakota: Houts v. artle (1901 ),
. D. 322, 5 N. W. 591.
W a ftinglon : McClaine v. Fairchiltl
{1901), 23 Wash. 75 , 63 Pac. 5li; l\lorgan
v. Morgan ( 189-!), 10 W"a h. 9!l, 38 Pac.
1054 .
Wisconsin: W hereatt v. Worth (1900),
108 ·w is. 29 1, 84 N. W. 44 1 ; Sullivan v.
Collins (1900), 107 \Vi .. 291, 83 N. W .
3 10 ; Kennan v. Smith (1902), 115 Wi .
463, 91 N. W . 986; Boyd v. Mutual Fire
A s' n (1903), 11 6 Wis. 155, 94 N. W.
171.
Wh en an amended pleading is filed, the
orig inal ceases to be a part of the record
or to perfo rm any function as a pleading:
La Societe Fra n c;aise v. W eidman n (1 893),
97 Cal. 50 7, 3 2 Pac. 58.3; Mowry v. W a r eha m (1897) , 101 Ia. 2 , 69 N . W . 11 28;
T own of W h itin g v. D oob (1 898), 152 Ind.
157, 52 N . E. 759 ; W estern Union T el.
Co. v. Stat e ( 1896) , 146 In d. 54, 44 N. E.
793 ; A y delott i-. Colling (1 895) , 144 I nd .
602 . 43 N. E. 86 7 ; City of Hun t ington v.
F olk (1 899) , 154 Ind . 91 , 4-1- N . E. i 59;
Indi anapolis, et c. R y . Co. v. Center T ownship (1 895) , 143 Ind. 63 , 40 N. E. 134 ;
Bol and v. O' Neil (1 899) , 72 Conn. 21 7, 44
Atl. 15 ; Raymond v. R ailway Co. (1 897 ),
57 0 . St. 271, 48 N. E . 1093 ; R alphs v.
H ensler ( l 896), 114 Cal. l 96, 45 P ac.
l 062 (holding that the ori g in al cann ot
even be used as eviden ce against th e
pleader.)
But see, on th e other hand, Threadgill
v. Commi ssion.ers (1 895 ), 116 N. C. 6 16, 21
S. E. 425, wh er e it is held t h at the rule
th at where there is an a mended pl eadi ng
fil ed the case must be tri ed in t he a men ded
pleadin g, a n<l n ot in the orig inal, does not
obtain in thi State. T he defendant is not
li mited to his amended answer, and may
have t~e benefit of t he allegations in the
original an \\'er .
A nd it has been held that abandoned
pleud ings areadmissible in evidence again t
the p leader: Spurlock v. Mo. Pac. Ry. o.
(l 89-l-) , 125 Mo. 404, 28 S. W . 634; Lu dwig v . Blackshere (1 9 7) , 102 Ia. 366, 71
N. W. 356; J,each v. Hill (1 896), 97 Ia. 81,

Wh ere a defendant cuu. ut to the tiliug
of au am n<kd complaint, he wain~.· his
right to a default for plaiHtiff' · failure to
r eply tu the au ·wer tu the origiual l'OIJlplaint: I:adfonl 1:. Ga ·kill (I !17), 2U :\lout.
293, 50 Pac :J-t.
An abancloued iii adiug caunot furrn
the basis for n judgmeu~ on the pleadings·
Cumming v. H offman (I 93), 113 ~T.

S. E . 10.

14 S. T). 322, 85 N. W. 591.

Washington : McClaiue v. FaircliilJ

14

(1901), 23 Wash. 758, 63 Pac. 517 ; Morgan

V. Morgan (1894), 10 Wash. 99, 38 Pac.

1054.

Wisconsin : Whereatt v. Worth (1900),

108 Wis. 291, 84 N. W. 441 ; Sullivan v.

Collins (1900), 107 Wis. 291, 83 N. W.

310; Kennan v. Smith (1902), 115 Wis.

463, 91 N. W. 986 ; Boyd v. Mutual Fire

Ass'n (1903), 116 Wis. 155, 94 N. W.

171.

When an amended pleading is filed, the
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original ceases to be a part of the record

or to perform any function as a pleading :

La Societe Frauyaise v. Weidmann (1893),

97 Cal. 507, 32 Pac. 583 ; Mowry v. Ware-

ham (1897), 101 la. 28, 69 N. W. 1)28;

Town of Whiting v. Dooh (1898), 152 Ind.

157, 52 N. E. 7.'i9; Western Union Tel.

Co. V. State (1896), 146 Ind. 54, 44 N. E.

793 ; Aydelott v. Collings (1895), 144 Ind.

602, 43 N. E. 867 ; City of Huntington v.

Folk (1899), 154 Ind. 91, 44 N. E. 759;

Indianapolis, etc. Ry. Co. ;;. Center Town-

ship (1895), 143 Ind. 63, 40 N. E. 1.34;

Boland v. O'Neil (1899), 72 Conn. 217, 44

Atl. 15 ; Raymond v. Railway Co. (1897),

57 O. St. 271, 48 N. E. 1093; Ralphs v.

Hensler (1896), 114 Cal. 196, 45 Pac.

1062 (holding that the original cannot

even be used as evidence against the

pleader.)

But see, on the other hand, Threadgill

V. Commissioners (1895), 116 N. C. 616, 21

S. E. 425, where it is held that the rule

that where there is an amended pleading

filed the case must be tried in the amended

pleading, and not in the original, does not

obtain in this State. The defendant is not

limited to his amended answer, and may

have the benefit of the allegations in the

original answer.

And it has been held that abandoned

pler.dings are admissible in evidence against

the pleader: Spurlock v. Mo. Pac. Ry. Co.

(1894), 125 Mo. 404, 28 S. W. 6.34 ; Lud-

wig V. Blackshere (1897), 102 la. 366, 71

N. W. 356 ; Leach v. Hill (1896), 97 la. 81,

66 N. W. 69; Longiey v. McVey (1899),

109 la. 666, 81 N. W. 150.

Where a defendant consents to the filing

of an amended complaint, he waives iii.s

riglit to a default for plaintiff's failure to

reply to tlie answer to the original com-

plaint : Radford v. Gaskill (1897), 20 Mont.

293, 50 Pac. 854.

An abandoned pleading cannot form

the basis for a judgment on the pleadings:

Cummiugs v. Hoffman (1893), 113 N. C.

267, 18 S. E. 170.

As to the time when an amendment

may be made, see the following cases: —

'.

267, 1
. E. 170.
A to the time when an amendment

may be made, ee the following c:asc : After t/11° euidence is in: l\.Ietropolitan
Life Ins. Co. v. mith (1900), Ky., 59
S . W. 2-4-; Carter t'. Dilley {1902), 167 l\Io.
56-!, 6i •. W. 232; Hock v. ,'prangers
{1902), 113 Wi . 123, 7 Pac. 1101 ; All ud
1;. Spokane Falls, etc. Ry. Co. {l 99), 21
\Va ·h. 32-!, 5 Pac. 244. After verdict:
Walker v. O'Connell (1 9 ), 59 Kan. 306,
52 .Pac. 94; Raymond v. Wathen (I 95),
1-1- 2 Ind. 367, 41 N. E. 815. After 11leading to ori_r;inal : Goodwin v. Caraleigh,
etc. Co. (1 897), 121 N . C. 9 1, 28 . E. 192.
A.ft.er motion for change of venue: Kay v.
P ruden (189 7), 101 Ia. 60, 69 N . \\ . Ll37.
I n the Appellate Court : tJre v. Bunn
(19 02), Neb., 90 N. W . 904 ; Privett v.
R ailroad Co. ( 1899), 54 S. C. 9 , 32 . E.
75; Ma r tin v. Shan non (1897), 101 Ia. 620,
iO N. W . 720; Evan v. Hughes County
(1 893 ), 4 S. D. 33, 54 N. W. 1049; Greely
v. McCoy (1893), 3 . D. 624, 54 N. W .
659; Smit h v. Wetmore ( 1901), 167 "'. Y .
23-1-, 60 . E. 4 19. During trial: :\Ioore
v. H arrod ( 1897), l 01 Ky. 24 , 40 . W.
675. P ending motion for non-suit: Earl
Or chard Co. v. Fava (1902), 13 Cal. 76,
70 P ac. 1073. P ending molion for judgment
on pleadings : Bryant v. Davi (1 99), 22
Mont. 5.34, 57 Pac. 143. While jury is
being empanelled: Jor"'eu on r. Butte o.
( l 93), 1.3 l\Iont. 2 8, 34 Pac. 37.
As to ,...-hen the ,_ upreme Court will
consider as made amendments which
might ha,·e been ma.de in the conrt b low, see Evan. vill , etc. R. H.
o. '"
Maddox (1 93), 134 Ind. 5il, 33 X. E.
345; Helphrey 1:.
trobach (1 95), 13
W ash. 12 , 42 P ac. 537; R ichard on v

644
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promise, and its invention in order that certain classes of liabili-

ties might be enforced by means of the action of assumpsit, have

promi.. e and it invention in order that certain clas es of liabilities might be enforced by mean of the action of a sumpsit, have

Moore (1902), 30 Wash. 406, 71 Pac. 18;

Scholey v. Demattos (1898), 18 Wash.

504, 52 Pac. 242.

A complaint which states no cause of

action cannot he amended : Whaley v.

Lawton (1900), 57 S. C. 2.56, 35 S. E. 558 ;

Ruberg v. Brown (1897), 50 S. C. 397, 27

S. E. 873; Jacobs v. Gilreath (1893), 41

S. C. 143, 19 S. E. 308; Mizzell v. Ruffin

(1896), 118 N. C. 69, 23 S. E. 927.

Tests to determine whether an amend-

ment introduces a new cause of action,

have been given by some courts. The

Supreme Court of Oregon, in Hume v.

Kelly (1896), 28 Ore. 398, 43 Pac. 380,

has given the following : " A general test
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as to whether a new cause of action would

be introduced by a proposed amendment

is to inquire if a recovery had upon the

original complaint would bar a recovery

under the complaint if the amendment

was allowed, or if the same evidence

would support both, or the same measure

of damages is applicable, or both are sub-

ject to the same plea." The rule given

by the Supreme Court of Missouri is as

follows : " There are two tests by which

to determine whether a second petition is

an amendment or a sub.stitution of a new

cause of action : First, whether the same

evidence will support both petitions, and,

second, whether the same measure of

damages will apply to both. If these

questions are answered in the aflBrmative,

it is an amendment ; if in the negative, it

is a substitution : " Liese v. Meyer (1898),

143 Mo. 547, 45 S. W. 282. See also

Grigsby v. Barton County (1902), 169

Mo. 221, 69 S. W. 296, Avhere the test

suggested is whether the same evidence

AviU su]>port both and the same judgment

can be rendered under both.

Miscellaneous Rules respecting Amendments.

"A party cannot answer an amended

:\foore (1902) , 30 Wah. 406, 71 P ac. 18;
He holey v. Dematto ( 189 ) , 18 Wa h.
504, 52 Pac. 2.i2.
A co mplaint which . tates no cause of
action cannot be amended: Whaley v.
Lawton (1900), 57 S. C. 2!'>6, 35 . E. 55 ;
Ruberg v. Brown ( 1 97), 50 . C. 397, 27
S. E. 873; Jacobs v. Gilreath (1 93), 41
S. C. 143, 19 . E. 30 ; fi zzell v. Ruffin
(1 96), 118 N. C: 69, 23 S. E. 92i.
Tests to determine whether an amendment introduces a uew cau e of action,
have been giYen by some courts. The
upreme Court of Oregon, in Hume v.
Kelly (1 96), 2 Ore. 39 , 43 Pac. 380,
ha given the following: "A general te t
as to whether a uew cau e of action would
be introduced by a propo ed amendment
i to inquire if a recovery had upon the
original complaint would bar a recovery
under the complaint if the amendment
was allowed, or if the same evidence
would upport both, or the same measure
of damage is applicable, or both are subject to the same plea." T he rule given
by the Supreme Court of 1i ouri i as
follows: "There are two tests by whi ch
to determine whether a econd petition is
an amendment or a sub titution of a new
cau e of action: First, w.\lether the same
evidence will support both petitions, and,
second, whether the same measure of
damage will apply to both. If the ·e
que tion are an wered in the affirmative,
it i an amendment ; if in the negative, it
is a ub titution:" Liese v. Meyer (1 9 ),
1-!3 Mo. 547, 45 S. W. 282. See also
Gri<rby v. Barton County (1902), J 69
~Io. 221, 69 S. W. 296, where the te t
sng<>'e ted is whether the same evidence
will · upport both and the same judgment
can be rendered uuclcr both.

petition, and, when evidence is offered to

maintain its allegations, object for the

,1Jiscellaneous Rules respecting Amendments.

first time on the ground that tlie amend-

ment is a departure from the original : "

Bender v. Zimmerman (1896), 135 Mo.

53, 36 S. W. 210. Enlarging the issues

by amendment, if properly made, does

not release the surety for costs even for

the costs accruing after the amendments.

Schawacker v. McLauglilin (1897), 139

Mo. 333, 40 S. W. 935. A motion to

strike out a third amended petition

should not be sustained if the cause of

action stated in the original and last peti-

tion is the same : Sanguinett v. Web-

ster (1900), 153 Mo. 343, 54 S. W. 563.

" The rule is well established and is not

in conflict with our statute regulating

amendments to pleadings, that, where a

complaint to which an answer has been

filed is amended in substantial manner,

the defendant has an alisolute right to

''A party cannot an wer an amended
petit ion, and, when evirlellce i. offer d to
maintain it alleg:ation , ohje ·t for the
fir t time on the ground that the amendmeut i · a ti parture from the ori ginal:"
B ende r v. Zimmerman (1 96), 135 l\fo.
53, 36 . W . 210. Enlarging the i ue
by amendment, if yroperly made, doe

not release the surety for co ts even for
the co t aceruing after the amendments.
S chawacker v. iVlcLaughlin (189i), 139
Mo. 333, 40 . W. 935. A motion to
strike out a third amended petition
should not be u tained if the cau e of
action stated in the original and la t petition is the same: Sa ng uinett v. Webster (1900), 153 Mo. 343, 54 S. W. 563.
"The rule is well e tabli ·bed and i no t
in conflict with our statute regulating
amendmeut to pleading , that, where a
complaint to which an answer ha been
filed i amended in ub:tantial manner,
the defendant has an ab olute right to
plead de nouo : " Schwartz i-. Stock (l 90 1 ),
Nev., 65 Pac. 351.
vVhere an answer denies the allegations of the original complaint, and an
amended complaint is fi led containing a
mere r epetition of the allegations in the
original, it need not be answered: Brosarcl v. forgan (1900), Idaho, 61 Pac.
103 1 ; Schmidt 1. Mitchell (1897), 101 K.'-.
570, 41 . i;v _ 929. Wher e an '' ameuded
complaint " is identical with the original
to which a demurrer has been -u tained,
no demurrer can be heard to such so-called
amended complaint, ·in ce it is out of the
record. The rulin g on the original complaint applies equally to the unchauged
amended complaint : Ellis v. City of Indianapolis (1897), 148 In d. 70, 47 . E.
218. "Prejudicial error cannot be predicated on an order allowing a pleadinCY to
be amended when the amendment d es
not change the issues, nor affect the quau-.
tum of proof a to any material fact :"
Cate v. Hutchinson (1899), 5 Neb. 232, 78
N. W. 500. "It i not reversible error to
refu e to permit a petition to be amended
n the trial, when uch amendment, tak n
in connection with the other avcrmen ts
of the peti ion, did not tate a cau e of
actiou:" Bartlett v. "cott (189 ), 55 .,.eb.
4i7 , 75 N. W . 1102. "Court very properly
r efu e affirmatively to direct what language mu t be emplo ·ed in drafting
pleading : "
maha F ire In ·. .o. v B rg
(1 95), 44 , eb. 523 62 . W. 62. " '' hrrc,
u pon the trial 0£ an a ·tion, t timony i
admitted without objection, it i not error

ELECTION BETWEEN ACTION '.
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been already explained. As the fictitious promise was implied

or inferred by the law from acts or omissions of the defendant

been already explained. As the :fictit,ious promise was implie<l
or inferred by the law from act or omissions of the d fendant

for the court to permit the pleadings to

be amended to conform to the proof:'"

Whipple V. Fowler (1894), 41 Keb. 675, 60

N. W. 15.

After the filing of an amended com-

plaint, the defendant has the choice of

filing a new answer or letting the old one

stand as his answer to the amended com-

plaint, but after his election to file a new

answer the old one cannot be resorted to

to save a default, and judgment may he

taken against him if he neglects to file his

new answer : Gettings i'. Buchanan ( 189G),

17 Mont. 581, 44 Pac. 77 ; Ermentrout v.

Am. Fire Ins. Co. (1895), 63 Minn. 194,

65 N. W. 270. Where an amendment is
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allowed, eitiier a copy of the amendment

or of the pleading as amended, may be

filed and served, though the latter is the

better practice : Holter Hardware Co. v.

Ontario Mining Co. (1900), 24 Mont. 184,

61 Pac. 3. The filing of an amended

]ileading waives any error committed in

rulings upon such pleading: State ex rel.

V. Jackson (1895), 142 Ind. 259, 41 N. E.

534; Gowen v. Gilson (1895), 142 Ind.

328, 41 N. E. 594; Weaver v. Apple

(1896), 147 Ind. 304, 46 N. E. 642. An

amendment made not to show but to con-

fer jurisdiction is not allowable : Gillam v.

Life Ins. Co. (1897), 121 N. C. 369, 28

S. E. 470. But see Boyd r. Roanoke

Lumber Co. (1903), 132 N. C. 184, 43

b. E. 631, where sucli an amendment was

allowed.

" To strike out a pleading which is sus-

ceptible of being amended by a statement

of fticts known to exist, and which consti-

tute a cause of action or defence to an

action, is a harsh proceeding, and should

only be resorted to in extreme cases : "

Burns r. Scooffy (1893), 98 Cal. 271, 33

Pac. 86. A so-called amendment to a pe-

tition may be stricken out on motion when

the matters alleged are not in support of

the cause of action but in reply to matters

alleged in appellee's cross-petition : Wood

V. Brown (1897), 104 la. 124, 73 N. W.

608. A material amendment, itnverified,

to a verified complaint, renders it neces-

sary to treat the complaint as unverified :

Brown r. Rhinehart Bros. (1893), 1 12 N. C.

772, 16 S. E. 840. The validity of an at-

tachment is not affected by the filing of an

amended complaint which does not change

the cause of action : Meyer r. Brooks

(1896), 29 Ore. 203, 44 Pac. 281. " Great

liberality, it is true, should be exercised iu

allowing amendments to pleadings; but

that liberality should only be displaved in

furtherance of justice. This is always the

controlling consideration before the trial

court : " Bank of Woodland v. Heron

(1898), 122 Cal. 107, 54 Pac. .537.

" When a judgment is reversed and

cau.se remanded, it stands the same as if

for the court to permit the pleadings to
be amended to conform to th e proof : "
Whipple v. Fowler (1 894), 41 eb. 6i5, 60
N. W. 15.

After the filin g of an amend ed. complaint, the defenuant has the choice of
filing a new answer or letting the old oue
stand as his answer to th e amended complaint, but after his election to file a new
answer the olJ one cannot be resorted. to
to save a default, and judg ment may be
taken against him if he neglects to fil e his
11ew answer: Gettin gs v. Buchanan ( 189G),
1 i :Mont. 581, 44 Pac. 77 ; Ermentrout v.
Am. Fire Ins. Co. (1895), 63 Mi nn. 194,
65 N. W. 270. Wh ere an am ell(lm ent is
allowed, either a copy of th e amendmeut
or of the pleading as amended, may be
filed and served, thou gh the latter is the
lietter practice: Holter Hardware Co. v.
Ontario Mining Co. (1900), 24 :\fon t. 18-t.,
61 Pac. 3. The filing of au amended
pleading waiYes any error co mmitted iu
rulings upon such plead ing: State ex rel.
1•. Jackson (1895), 142 Intl. 259, 41 N. E .
534; Gowen v. Gilson (1895), 142 Ind.
328, 41 N. E. 594; Weaver v. Apple
(1896), 147 Ind. 304, 46 N . E. 642. An
amendment made uot to show but to confer jurisdiction is not allowable: Gillam v.
Life Ins. Co. (1897), 121 :N. C. 369, 28
S. E. 470. But see Boyd v . Roanoke
Lnmher Co. (1903), 132 N. C. 184, 43
~- K 631, where such au amendment was
allowed.
" To strike out a pleading whi ch is su ceptible of being a111en<led by a statement
of facts known to exist, and which constitute a cause of action or defence to an
action, is a harsh proceeding, and should
only be resorted to in extreme cases : "
Burns i:. Scooffy (1893), 98 Cal. 271, 33
Pac. 86 . A so-called amendment to a petition mav be stricken out on moti on w·Jien
the matt~rs alleged are not in support of
the cause of action but in reply to matters
alleged in appellee's cross-petition : 'Vood
i;. Brown (189i), 104 Ia. 124, i3 N. W.
608 . A material amendm ent, unverified,
to a verified complaint, renders it necessary to treat the complaint as unverified :
Brown 1·. Rhinehart Bros. (1893), l 12 N. C.

'i'72, 16 S. E. 840. T he validity of an attarhment i not affected by the filing of an
ameJHled complaint which does not change
the cau e of action : l\Jever t'. Brook!"
(1896), 29 Ore. 203, 44 Pac~ 2 1. "Great
liberali ty, it i true, should be exerci ed in
allowing amendments to pleading ; but
that liberality should 011]_1' be displayed in
furtherance of ju. tice. Thi" is always the
coutrolling consideration Lefore the trial
court:" Bank of \Voocllaud v. Heron
(1898), 122 Cal. 107, 54 Pac. 53i.
" When a judgm ent is rever~etl and
cau e remanded, it stands the .ame a if
no trial had been hacl, and pleading. may
he amended, supplemental pleading. filed,
and new issues formed, und er proper restrictions, except that an i ne determined
upon an agreed ~taten1eut of fact eannot
generally be r eopeuetl : " Con olitlated
Steel & Wire Co. v. Burnham (1899}, 8
Okla. 514, 58 Pac. 654. "The trial cou rt
may well refuse to permit the amendment
of a clefectiYe plea in abatement, the only
purpose of which is to prevent the court
from determining on its merits a cause
properly before it:" Mitchell v. Smith
(1901 ), 7-t. Conn. 125, 49 Atl. 909. "Where
the objection that a complaint fail to
state a -cause of action becau e of the
omission of a material allegation is not
taken by demurrer , but by a motion to
dismiss at the trial, the conrt may in it
di scr etion re. erve its decision until possef'sed of the ca e upon the merits and
then permit an amendment when the substantial rights of th e defendant will not
be i11jurionsly affected th ereby:" National
Bank of D eposit v. Roge rs (1901), 166
N. Y. 380, 59 N. E . 922. An oral deci ion
allowing an amend ment of the complaint
is 1mfficient: Findlay v. Kni kerbocker Ice
Co. (1899) , 104 Wis. 3 i5, o N. W. 436.
A pleadin g will not be allowed to be
amended to conform to the proof when
the facts proYed are aclm i ·ible under the
orig inal pleading : Duxton v. argent
(1 898), i
. D. 503, 75 N. W. 11. The
sufficiency of an amendment to cure the
defec t in the pleading i. not a que. tion to
be passed on in determining wh ether or
not it should be allowed : Freeman v.
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which created a liability ex cequo et bono, it sometimes happened

that these acts or omissions were tortious in their nature. In

such a case, tlierefore, the liability could be regarded in a double

aspect; namely, as directly springing from the tort committed

by the wrong-doer, or as arising from the promise to make com-

pensation which the law implied and imputed to him. As the

single liability thus resulting from the given acts or omissions

was considered under these two different aspects, the common

law provided two distinct means or instruments for enforcing

it, — one by the form of action appropriate for the recovery of

damages from the tort, the other by the form of action appropri-

ate for the recovery of damages from the breach of an implied

promise. In what instances — that is, in what classes of tortious

acts or omissions — the right of action existed had been deter-

mined by the courts, although there was not a complete uniform-

ity of decision among the tribunals of the several States.

^ 459. * 568. New Procedure makes no Change in Doctrine of

Election. The doctrine of electing between an action ex delicto

and one ex contractu, or, to speak more accurately, between
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treating the cause of action as arising from tort or from con-

tract, has been retained under the new procedure ; and it is ap-

plied in the same classes of cases, and is governed by the same

general rules, as in the former system.^ The courts, without

Brown (1902), 115 Ga. 23, 41 S. E. Where a new defence is introduced on

385. the trial by amendment, the plaintiff is en-

Where evidence is admitted whicli is titled to a continuance : Dunn v. Bozarth

not in conformity to the pleadings, the (1899), 59 Neb. 244, 80 N. W. 811.

latter will be treated as amended to agree " The mode of amending pleadings in

with the proof : Nicklace v. Dickerson this State is by rewriting the pleading,

(1898), 65 Ark. 422, 46 S. W. 945 ; Davis leaving out such allegations and inserting

V. Goodman (1896), 62 Ark. 262, 35 S. W. such other allegations, as may be desired,

231. so that all parts of the pleading shall be

The prayer for relief may be amended : in one instrument complete in itself:"

which created a liability ex cequo et bono, it sometime happened
that these act or omi ions were tortiou.. in their nature. I n
uch a ca e, therefore, the liability could be regarded in a doubl
a pect; namely as directly pringing from the tort committed
by the wrong-doer or a arising from the promi e to make corn pen ation which the law implied .and imputed to him. A the
ingle liabilit) thu re,ulting from the given act or omis ion
wa con idered under the e t\YO different a p t , the common
law proYide two distinct mean or instrument for enforcing
it - one by the form of action appropriate for the recovery f
damage from the tort the other by the form of action appropri ate f r the recovery of damages from the breach of an implied
promi e. In what instances - that i , in what cla es of tortiou
act or omi ions - the right of action existed bad been determined by the court' al thou h the re wa not a complete uniform ity of deci ion among the tribunals of the several tates .
459 . * 568. New- P r o cedure makes n o Change in Doctrine o f
E lectiou. The doctrine of electing between an action ex d elicto
and one ex contractu, or to peak more accurately, between
treatina the cause of action as ari ing from tort or from contract, has been retained under the new procedure; and it is applied in the same clas es of cases, and is governed by the same
general rule a in the former system . 1 The court , without

Hogueland'i-. Arts (1901), 113 la. 634, 85 Satterlund v. Beal (1903), — N. D. — , 95

N. °VV. 818; Slater v. Estate of Cook N. W. 518.]

Brown {1 902), 115 Ga.

23, 41

S. E.

(1893), 93 Wis. 104,67 N. W. 15; Liese v. i [J.n Downs v. Finnegan (1894), 58

3 5.

Meyer (1898), 143 Mo. 547, 45 S. W. 282. Minn. 112, 59 N. W. 981, the court said:

V. Kiesel (1894), 9 Utah, 397,35 Pac. 488. by waiving the tort the demand may be

Where evidence i admitted which i
not in conformity to th e pleading the
latter will be treated a amended to agree
with the proof: 'icklace v. Dicker on
(l '9 ), 65 Ark. 422, 46 . W. 945; Da\'i
v. Goolman (1 96), 62 Ark. 262, 35 . W.

Contra, Service i-. Bank (1900), 62 Kan. counterclaimed against a plaintiff's cause

231.

In the last case it was held that such an "It being established that an injured party

amendment did not change the cause of may elect between the two forms of re-

action, medial proceedings, — may sue in tort for

An amendment substituting the real the wrong done him, or in assumpsit as

party in interest is not allowaljle : Wilson upon an implied contract, — it follows that

857. 62 I'ac. 670; Hud.son i;. Banitt (1901), of action arising on anotlier contract, or,

62 Kan. 137, 61 Tac. 737. where itself set up l^y a plaintKf as aiiMi.g

The prayer for relief may be amend d :
Ilogu land i·. Art. ( I 90 l), 113 Ia. 634, 5
W. 1 ;
later v. E tate of ook
(l 93), 9.'3 \Vi .. 104, 67 N. W. 15; Lie.e v.
~Ieyer l 9 ),143l\ Io.547,45 .·.·w.2 :?.
1n the la. t ca e it wa held that uch an
amendment did not change the cau ·e of
action.
An amendment ub tituting the r al
party 111 inten"t i: uot allowable: \Yil. on
l'. Kie,..el 1 l 9-t), 9 •tab, 397, 35 Pac. 4
.
Conlrri, en· ice t'. Bank ( 1900), 62 Kan.
57,G2 l'n.r.670; Ilulhrnv.Baratt (190 1),
G2 K:rn. 1:3 7, 61 l'a 73i.
... T.

Wher e a new defence i introduced on
the t rial by amendment, the plaintiff i en titled to a continuance : Dunn 1 . Bozarth
(1899), 59 i\eb. 244, O ....:r. W. 11.
"The m ode of amending plead in g in
thi
tate i by r ewriting the plea<liu~,
lea\·in(Y out uch alle(Yation and in erting
• uch other allegation , a may be d ire<l ,
so that all part' of the pleading hall be
in one in trument complete in it lf:"
'atterlund v. Beal ( 1903), - ..T . • - , 95
N. \\. 51 .]
1 [In Down
v. Finnegan (l 94), 5
:\linn. 112, 59 . W. 9 l the court . aid:
"It bein<Y e tabli he<l that an injur d party
may I ct between th two f rm of remedial proceeding , - may u in tort for
the wrong d ne him, or iu a :;ump it a
upon an implied contract, - it foll w that
by waiYin(Y the tort th d man<l may be
count rcbim 1[ a~ain t a plaintiff' :rn.e
faction ari i11 g on ano h r 1111tract, nr,
where it · If et up liy a plaintiff as ari-i1.g
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perhaps appreciating the full extent of the changes, and the

effect of abolishing all distinctions between forms of actions,

decided that the power of choice between the two modes of

enforcing demands, of waiving the tort and suing upon an im-

plied promise, still exists; and these early decisions have been

followed by so many others without an expression of dissent,

that the rule is as firmly established in the reformed as it was in

the common-law pleading. The single principle upon which the

entire doctrine rests is very simple, and should — and would, if

the courts were always consistent in acting upon it — afford a

ready and plain solution of every question, new or old, which

can be suggested. This single principle may be thus formulated:

From certain acts or omissions of a party creating a liability to

make compensation in damages, the law implies a promise to pay

such compensation. Whenever this is so, and the acts or omis-

sions are at the same time tortious, the twofold aspect of the

single liability at once follows, and the injured party may treat

it as arising from the tort, and enforce it by an action setting

forth the tortious acts or defaults ; or may treat it as arising

Generated for facpubupdates (University of Michigan) on 2014-06-17 15:33 GMT / http://hdl.handle.net/2027/uc2.ark:/13960/t02z1c23b
Public Domain / http://www.hathitrust.org/access_use#pd

from an implied contract, and enforce it by an action setting

forth the facts from which the promise is inferred by the law.

It should be remembered that different promises may be inferred

from different acts or omissions: thus, in one case, the jDromise

might be to pay over money had and received to the use of the

injured party; and in another, where no money had been actually

received, the implied undertaking might be that the Avrong-doer

would pay the value or price of goods taken by him. This dis-

on contract, it may be opposed by a coun- might be maintained. That the doctrine

terclaim arising out of another contract, has been greatly developed and extended

. . . The right to waive the tort and to in application is apparent, and that in

recover on an implied assumpsit is an ex- cases wliere property has been severed

ception to the principles of code pleading, from real estate by a wrongdoer, carried

and there must be no extension beyond from tiie freeliold, and converted to his

what is allowed at common law. . . . Cer- own use, tlie riglitf ul owner may sue and

tain it is that the rule has been extended recover its value as on implied contract, is

to cases wliere there has been a wrongful tlioroughly established, although it may

conversion of property of one person to not be in harmony with the reformed sys-

the use of another, whether sold or not by teni of pleading. No reason exists why,

perhaps appreciating the full extent of the change , and the
effect of abolishing all distinctions betw en forms of actions,
decided that the power of choice betw 11 the two m des of
enforcing demands, of waiving the tort and suing upon an implied promise, still exists; and these early decisions have been
followed by so many others without an expression f di sent,
that the rule is as firmly e tablishe<l in the reformed as it 'va..; in
the common-law pleading. The single principle upon which the
entire doctrine rests is very implc, ancl should - and would, if
the courts were always consistent in acting upon it- afford a
r eady and plain solu tion of every question, new or old, which
can be suggested . This single principle may be thus formulated :
From certain acts or omissions of a party creating a liability to
make compensation in damages, the law implies a promise to pay
such compensation. Whenever this is so, and the act or omissions are at the same time tortious, the twofold a pect of the
single liability at once follows, and the injured party may treat
it as arising from the tort, and enforce it by an action setting
forth the tortious acts or defaults; or may treat it as ari ing
from an implied contract, and enforce it by an action setting
forth the fa cts from which the promise is inferred by the law.
It should be remembered that different promises may be inferred
from different acts or omissions: thus, in one case, the promise
might be to pay over money had and received to the use of the
injured party; and in another, . where no money had Leen actually
received, the implied undertaking might be that the wrong-doer
would pay the value or price of goods taken by him. This dis-

the latter, and also to cases where a tres- if permissible at all, it should not include

passer has severed trees from land in pos- cases arising out of trespass, to the extent

session of the owner, or has quarried stone that the property carried away is beneficial

thereon, and has afterwards taken the to the trespasser, except where it would

trees or stone away, converting the same involve a trial of title to real estate."]

to his own use, so that trover or replevin

on contract, it may be opposed by a count erclaim arising out of another contract.
. .. The right to wai1re the tort and to
r ecover on an implied a sumpsit is an exception to the principles of code pleading,
and t l1ere must be no extension beyornl
what is allowed at common law . . . . Certain it is that the rule ha been extended
to ca es where there has been a wrongful
conYersion of property of one per on to
th e use of another, whether sold or not by
th e latter, and also to cases where a trespasser has sernred trees from land in possession of the owne r, or has quarried stone
thereon, an<.l has afterwards taken the
trees or stoue away, converting the same
to his own use, so that trover or replevin

might be maintained. That the doctrine
has been greatly developed and extended
in application is apparent, and that in
cases where property has been sel'ered
from real estate by a wrongdoer, carried
from the freel1ol<.l, ancl converted to hi
own use, the rightful owner may ue and
r ecover its Yalue as on implied contract, i
thoroughly esLablishe<l, although it may
not be in harmony with the reformed sy tern of pleadiug. No rea on exi ' t why,
if pennis ible at all, it hould ?Ot inclu<.le
ca es ari ing out of trespa , to the extent
that the property carrie<.l away i beneficial
to the trespas er, except where it would
inv olve a trial of title to real estate."]
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tinction, so palpable and commonplace, seems to have been

overlooked in some classes of decisions.

§ 460. * 569. Classes of Cases -w^here Election is allcwed.

Conversion. Conflict of Authority. Having thus formulated the

tinction, so palpable and commonplace, seems t o have been
verl oked in ome classes of deci i n .
460.

* 569.

Classes

of

C a s es

w h ere

Elec tion

is

allowed.

general principle which prevailed in the former procedure, and

which has been adopted to its full extent in the present, I shall,

in its further illustration, state the various classes of cases to

which it has been applied by the courts, and shall thus ascertain

the particular instances — the kinds of wrongful acts and omis-

sions — in which the right of election exists. To this will be

added a few observations upon the mode of indicating the fact

that an election has been made by the pleader, that a tort has

been waived, and a cause of action upon contract has been

chosen. The most common classes of tortious acts, in respect

of which the right of election has been invoked, are the wrongful

taking or conversion of chattels, or things in action, or money;

the wrongful use of land, and appropriation of its rents and

profits ; sales of goods on a credit procured by the fraud of the

purchaser; frauds and deceits generally by which money or
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things in action, or chattels, are obtained; and certain cases of

express contract, in which, from the policy of the law, the lia-

bility is regarded as resulting from a violation of general duty

as well as from a breach of the stipulations of the agreement.

These classes will be considered separately. It is a firmly estab-

lished rule, from which no dissent has been suggested, that when

goods or things in action have under any circumstances been

wrongfully taken or detained or converted, and have been sold

or disposed of by the wrong-doer, the owner may sue in tort to

recover damages for the taking and carrying away or the conver-

sion, or he may waive the tort and sue on the implied promise

to refund the price or value as money had and received to the

plaintiff's use.^ When, however, the chattels or things in action

have been simply taken or converted, but not sold or disposed of

by the wrong-doer, a conflict of opinion exists in respect to the

power of the plaintiff to elect between the two forms of action.

1 McKuight r. Dunlop, 4 Barb. 36, 42 ; Evans, 43 Cal. 380; Gordon v. Bruner,

Hinds V. Tweddle, 7 How. I'r. 278, 281 ; 49 Mo. 570, 571 ; Putnam v. Wise, I Hill

Harpendiiig v. Shoemaker, 37 Barb. 270, (N. Y.), 234, 240, and the reporter's note ;

291 ; Cliainbers v. Lewis, 2 Hilt. 591 ; Berly v. Taylor, 5 Hill, 577, 584, and the

Leach i;. Leach, 2 X. Y. S. C. 657 ; Tryon reporter's note.

V. Baker, 7 Lan.s. 511, 514; Roberts v.

Having thu formulated the
gen ral principle which prevaned in tl e form r procedur , and
'.vhich ha been adopted to it full extent in the present, I haU,
in it further illu tration, state the various cla ·e of ca e to
which it has been applied by the court , and shall thu a certain
the particular instances - the kinds of wrongful acts and omi ,'ion - in which the right of lection exi t' . To this will be
added a few observations upon the mode of indicating the fact
that an election has been made by the pleader, that a tort has
bee n waived, and a cause of action upon contract has been
cho ·en. The most common classes of tortious acts, in respect
of which the right of election has been invoked, are the wrongful
taking or conversion of chattels, or things i.n action, or mone ·;
the wrongful use of lancl, and appropriation of it rents and
profits; sales of goods on a credit procured by the fraud of the
purchas r; frauds and deceits generalJy by which money or
things in action, or chattels, are obtained; and certain c~se of
expre s contract, in which, from the policy of the law, the liability is regarded as resulting from a violation of general duty
as well as from a breach of the stipulations of the agreement.
The. e cla ses will be considered separately. It is a firmly estabJished rule, from which no dissent has been suggested, that when
goods or things in action have under any circumstances been
wrongfully taken or detained or converted, and have been sold
or dispo el of by the wrong-doer, the owner may sue in tort to
recover damages for the taking and carrying away or the conversion, or he may waive the tort and sue on the implied promi e
t refund the price or value as money had and received to the
laintiff's us . 1 ·when, however the chattel or thing in action
have been simply taken or onverted, but not old or di pos d f
y the wrong-d er, a conflict of opinion exi ts in resp ct to the
power f the plaintiff to elect between the two forms f action.
Conversion.

Conflict of A u thority.

1 McKnight v. Dunlop, 4 Barb. 36, 42;
Ilinds v. Tweddle, 7 How. J>r. 27 , 2 1;
Harpendiag v. , ' hoemaker, 37 Barb. 2i0,
2!.I l ;
hamb r v. Lewi. , 2 Hilt. 591 ;
Leach v. Leach, 2 .. Y. ·. C. 657 ; Tryon
v. Baker, 7 Lau . 511, 5l.t.; IluL rts v.
T.

Evan , 43 al. 3 O;
ordon v. Bruner,
49 Mo. 570, 571; Putnam v. \\ i e, 1 Hill
(..... Y.), 234, 2-10 and the r porters no e;
Berly v. Ta lor, 5 Hill, 577, 5 4, and the
r porter's note.
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Certain cases deny this power. This ruling is rested upon the

ground that the goods remaining in the hands of the wrong-doer,

and no money having in, fact Leen received Ly him, an implied

promise to pay over money had and received by the defendant to

the plaintiff's use does not and cannot arise. ^ In this country,

however, the weight of authority is strongly tlie other way.

The cases generally admit an election, under the circumstances

described, between an action based upon the tort, and an action

based upon the implied promise to pay the price or value of the

goods. The tort is waived, and the transaction is treated as a

sale, and not as an instance of money had and received. This

distinction is certainly supported by the plainest principles, if

the doctrine of implied promises and election is to be admitted at

all. 2 If money has been converted, the right of election exists

1 McKnight v. Duiilop, 4 Barb. 3G, 42 ;

Henry v. Marvin, 3 E. D. Smith, 71 ;

Tryou v. Baker, 7 Lans. 511, 514. [Held,

iu Brittain v. Payne (1896), 118 N. C. 989,
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24 S. E. 711, that when jjroperty is tor-

tiously taken and sold, the owner may

Certai_n cases deny thi power. This ruling i r ·t <l upon th
ground that the goods remaining in the hand f th wron<r-do r
b
'
aud no money having in . fact L cnr cei cl Lyl1im an impli tl
promi e to pay over mon y hacl and r c iY cl by th <l 1fendant to
the plaintiff's use does not an l cannot ari · .1 In tl1i · country,
however, the weight of authority is strongly the other wa ·.
The cases generally admit an el ction, under th circum ·tanc s
described, between an action bas d upon the tort, and an acti ·n
based upon the implied promise to pay the price or value of th
goods. The tort is waived, and the transaction is tr ated as a
sale, and not as an in tance of money had and r ceive<l. Thi:
distinction is certainly supported by the plaine L principle·, if
the doctrine of implied promises and election is to be admitted at
all. 2 If money has been converted, the right of el ction exi ·t
1

waive the tort and sue in assumpsit.]

2 Hinds V. Tweddle, 7 How. Pr. 278,

281 ; Chambers v. Lewis, 2 Hilt. 591 ;

Putnam v. Wise, 1 Hill (N. Y.), 234, 240

(and see note of the reporter) ; Berly i-.

Taylor, 5 Hill, 577, 584 (and note of "the

reporter) ; Roberts v. Evans, 43 Cal. 380.

Gordon v. Bruner, 49 Mo. 570, 571 : " In

Massachusetts, in Jones v. Hoar, 5 Pick.

285, to which there is a note to a former

opinion reviewing the English cases, it

was held that no contract could be implied

unless the goods were sold and converted

into money, and the same doctrine was held

in Pennsylvania, in Willett v. Willett, 3

Watts, 277, and in Morrison v. Rogers, 2

111. 317. But such lias not been the uni-

form ruling. In Putnam v. Wise, 1 Hill,

240, the court holds that, ' according to

the well-known right of election in such

cases, the plaintiff might have brought

''assumpsit" as for goods sold and de-

livered against those who had tortiously

taken their property.' To this the re-

porter, Mr. Hill, adds a note, reviewing

the cases, and disapproving the doctrine

of Jones V. Hoar. (See Hill v. I^avis,

3 N. H. 384 ; Stockett v. 'Watkins's Adm.,

2 Gill & J. 326, and cases cited.) " Quot-

ing early Missouri decisions to the same

effect, — Floyd v. Wiley, 1 Mo. 430, 643 ;

Johnson v. Strader, 3 Mo. 359, — the

learned judge adds : " It may be treated,

then, as the doctrine in this State, that

one who has converted to his own use the

personal property of another, when sued

for the value of that property as sold to

him, will not be permitted to say in de-

fence that he obtained it wrongfully."

See also Small v. Robinson, 9 Hun, 418 ;

Cushman v. Jewell, 7 id. 525, 530 (an un-

supported dictum) ; Loomis v. Mowry,

8 id. 31 1 ; Freer v. Denton, 61 N. Y. 492 ;

Fields V. Bland, 81 id. 239 ; Comstock v.

Hier, 73 id. 269 ; Kalckhoff v. Zoehrlaut,

40 Wi.s. 427; Chamballe v. McKenzie, 31

Ark. 155; Huston v. Plato, 3 Colo. 402 ;

Brady I'. Brennan, 25 Minn. 210; Logan

1 McKnight v. Dunlop, 4 Barb. 36, 42;
H enry v. Marvin, 3 E. D. Smith, i i ;
Tryon v. Baker, 7 Lans. 511, 514. [Held,
in Brittain v. Payne (1896), 1 J :N. C. 989,
2-! S. E. 711, that when property i tortiously taken and sold, the owner may
waive the tort and sue in assumpsit.]
2 Hinds v. Tweddle, 7 How. Pr. 278,
281; Chambers v. Lewis, 2 Hilt. 591;
Putnam v. Wise, l Hill (N. Y.), 234, 240
(and ee note of the reporter); Berly v.
Taylor, 5 Hill, 577, 584 (and note of the
reporter); Roberts u. Evans, 43 Cal. 380.
Gordon v. Bruner, 49 1\10. 570, 571 : "In
Ma sachusetts, in Jones v. Hoar, 5 Pick.
2 5, to which there is a note to a former
opiuion reviewing the English cases, it
was held that no contract could be implied
unless the goods were sold and converted
into money, and the same doctrine was held
in Pennsylvania, in Willett v. Willett, 3
Watts, 2i7, and in Morrison v. Rogers, 2
111.317. But such has not been the uniform ruling. In Putnam v. Wise, 1 Hill,
240, the court holds that, 'according to
the well-known right of election in such
a e , the plaintiff might harn brought
"assumpsit" as for goods sold and delivered against those who had tortiously
taken their property.' To this the reporter, l\Ir. Hill, adds a note, reviewing
the cases, aud disapproving the doctrine
of Jones v. Hoar. (See Hill v. Davi ,
3 N. II. 384; Stockett v. 'Yatkins's Adm.,
2 Gill & J. 326, and cases cited.)" Quot-

ing early Misso uri deci iou to the ame
effect, - Floyd i·. \Yiley, l Mo. 430, 643;
John. on v. Strader, 3 Mo. 359, - the
learne<l judge adds : "It may be treated,
then, as the doctrine in this . tate, that
one who has converted to his own u. e the
personal µroperty of another, when sued
for the value of that property as sold to
him, will not be permitted to say in defence that he obtained it wrongfully."
See also Small v. Robinson, 9 Hun, 41 ;
Cu hman v. Jewell, 7 id . 525, 530 (an unsupported dict11rn); Loomi. v. fowry,
8 id. 31 l; Freer v. Denton, 61 N. Y. 492;
Fields v. Bland, 81 id. 2.39; Com, tock t'.
Hier, 73 id. 269; Kalckhoff v. Zo hrlaut,
40 Wis. 427; Chamballe v. McKenzie, 3 1
· Ark. 155; Huston v. Plato, 3 Colo. 402 ;
Brady v. Brennan, 25 Minn. 210 · Logan
v. Wallis, 76 N.C.416; L oomi v.O'N al,
73 Mich. 582; Lehmann v. chmidt, 7
Cal. I!'>; Terry v. Munger, 121 N. Y. Hi 1 ;
Abbott v. Blossom , 66 Barb. 353, .'3!'>6;
Starr Cash Car Co. v. l einhardt ( om.
Pl. 1 92), 20 N. Y. Suppl. 72.
[To the same effect are Galvin v. Mac
Mining Co. (1894), 14 !\font. 50 , 3i Pac.
366; Cragg v. Arendale (1901), 113 Ga.
1 l, 38 S. E. 399; Crown Cycle o. v.
Brown {1901), 39 Ore. 2 5, 46 Pac. 4;) 1;
Braithwaite v. A kin (1 93), 3 N. D. 36;),
56 ~. W. 133; Anderson v. Bank (I 96),
5 N. D. 451, 6i N. W. 21.
In Anderson t'. Bank (supra), it was
held that where an agent, authorized to
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under the operation of either rule, since the actual receipt of

money by the defendant brings the case exactly within the reason

and operation of the doctrine as first stated.^ The same choice

between the actions may sometimes be possible when the liability

is connected with a claim to land, or grows out of its use, al-

though the instances are much fewer than those of the preceding

class. Thus, when the owner agreed to lease certain premises

to the plaintiff for a term of years commencing at a future day

named, but before that day actually leased them to another per-

son who took possession, and when the time arrived the plaintiff

demanded possession, tendered the rent, and on refusal brought

an action for damages, it was objected on the trial that his only

remedy was ejectment against the tenant in possession. The

court held, that, while the plaintiff might have maintained

ejectment, he could also bring an action against the lessor,

which could be either upon the agreement express or implied,

or in tort for the violation of the duty arising from the relation

of lessor and lessee between the parties.^ It is settled in Wis-

consin, after a careful consideration and an exhaustive analysis
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and comparison of the conflicting decisions, that when the de-

fendant had committed a wilful trespass upon the plaintiff's land

by deliberately turning his cattle thereon, in order that they might

feed upon the grass, the plaintiff might waive the tort, and sue

upon an implied contract for the price and value of the pasturage.^

§ 461. * 570. Actions against Common Carriers for Loss or In-

jury to Goods. Other Cases. It is a familiar rule, that the action

against a common carrier for a loss or injury of goods may either

be in tort for the violation of his general duty, or on the contract

which he expressly or impliedly enters into. The owner has his

election which of these remedies he will pursue ; but his choice

cannot alter the extent of the carrier's liability.^ P"'raud in its

sell at a given price, sells to himself, and ' Norden v. Jones, 33 Wis. 600, 604,

the principal waives the tort and sues in 605. The opinion of Dixon C. J. is a full

assumpsit, this does not constitute a ratitt- and most instructive examination of the

cation of the agent's act so as to limit tiie doctrine.

recovery to the price at which the agent * Campbell v. Perkins, 8 N. Y. 430,

had been authorized to sell. The suit is 438; Brown v. Treat, 1 Hill (N. Y.), 225;

purely one in general a.ssumpsit.] People v. Kendall, 2.5 Wend. 399 ; Wallace

1 Tryon v. Baker, 7 Lans. 511, 514. t;. Morss, 5 Hill, 391 ; Campbell v. Stakes,

2 Trull V. Granger, 8 N. Y. 115. See, 2 Wend. 137.

however, Carpenter v. Stilwell, 3 Abb. QSee Poly r. Williams (1894), 101 Cal.

Pr. 459. 648, 36 Pac. 102, where a counterclaim

un ler the oper tion of eith r rul , since he actual r ceipt of
mon , b he def ndant brir g the a e xactly within the reason
an l 01 eratiou of the doctrine a fir t ated . 1 The ame choic
bet\Teen th action may ometim be po ible when h liabilit
i
onne t d i h a ct im to land, or grm ou of it u e, alf he preceding
th ugh the in ta.n c are much few er than tho
cla -. . Thu when the o' ner agreed
1 a e ertain premi
to the plainti for a t rm of years commencing at a futur day
nam d, but before that day actually lea ed them to another peron who took po
ion, and when the time arri eel th plaintiff
demande l pos e ion, tendered the rent, and on r fusal br ught
an action for damages, it wa bj cted on the trial that his nly
remedy was ejectment again t the tenant in pos es i n. 1he
court held, that, while the plaintiff might have maintained
ejectment, he could al o bring an action again t the le sor,
which could be either upon the agreement expre s or implied,
or in tort for the violation of the duty arising from the relati on
of les or and lessee between the parties. 2 It is settled in vVi con in, after a careful consideration and an exhaustive analy i
and compari on of the conflicting deci ions, that when the defendant had committed a wilful trespass upon the plaintiffs land
by deliberately turning his cattle thereon, in order that they might
feed upon the gra s, the plaintiff might waive the tort and u
up on an implied contract for the price and value of the pa turag .3
· 461. * 70. Actions against Common Carriers for Loss or Injury to Goods. Other Cases. It i a familiar rul , tha the ac i n
again. ta common carrier for a los or injury of good may i her
be in tort for the i la ion of his general duty, or on the contract
which be xpres ly or impliedly enter into. The wn r ha 1 i
election which of th
r rnedies he will p u u ; but his boi
cannot alter the extent of the carrier liabilit . 4 Fraud in it ,
sell at a g iven price, eU to him elf and
the principal waiv the tort and ue in
a . ump ·it, thi doe not on titnte a ratifia t limit the
cation of the agent'. act
r ec<J\'ery to th e pri ·e at whi h th agent
hail been a uthorized to ell. The uit i
vurely one in gen ral a ump it.]
l Tryuu v. Baker, 7 L a n . 511, 514-.
2 Trull v.
ra nger ,
. Y. 115. , e ,
how r r, 'aq1enter v. tilwell, 3 Abb.
Pr. -t:; .

rden v. J ones, 33 Wi . 6
604,
605. Th opinion of Dix n . J. i a full
and mo t in tructive examination f th
doctrin .
4 Campbell v. P rkin . 8
. Y. 430,
43 ; Brown v. Tr at, l ill { . Y.), 225;
People v. K ndall, 25 Wend. 399 ; Walla e
v. Mor , 5 Hill, 391; ampb 11 v. take ,
2 ·w end. 137.
[ ee Poly v. illiam (1 !J4), I 1 Cal.
64 , 36 ac. 102, where a counterclaim
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various phases also furnishes many occasions and opportunities

for the exercise of an election between actions. One of the most

common is the case of a sale upon a credit procured by the false

and fraudulent representations of the vendee as to his pecuniary

responsibility. Upon discovering the fraud, even before the

expiration of the credit, the vendor may rescind the sale and

immediately bring an action in form of tort either to recover the

goods themselves, or damages for their taking and conversion;

or he may waive the tort, and sue at once on contract for the

price. ^ And when money has been obtained by false and fraudu-

lent representations, or by fraudulent practices of any kind, the

plaintiif has the option to sue either in tort for the deceit, or

in contract for money had and received by the defendant to his

use. 2

§ 462. * 571. Principle -which determines -when a Promise is

Implied. The conflict which has existed to a certain extent

among the decisions in reference to the right of election, and the

classes of tortious acts and omissions embraced within it, can

only be put to rest by determining with certainty the occasions
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and circumstances in which a promise will be implied by the

was filed to recover upon an account for son, 77 N. Y. 400 ; Western Assur. Co. r.

nunsery stock, consisting of fruit-trees and Towle, 65 Wis. 247; Farmers' Nat. Bk.

£;rape-vines eaten up and destroyed by v. Fonda, 65 Mich. 533 ; Hurt v. Barnes,

hogs, cattle, and horses of the plaintiff. 24 Neb. 782.

A demurrer to this counterclaim was over- > - Byxbie v. Wood, 24 N. Y. 607, 610;

ruled. So in Monroe v. Cannon (1900), Union Bk. of N. Y. v. Mott, 27 N. Y. 633,

24 Mont. 316, 61 Pac. 863, an action in 636. It will be noticed that these two

assumpsit for the value of the pa.sturage cases were alike in all their essential

was allowed in the case of a wrongful facts, and that in one of them the tort

herding of sheep on plaintiff's land. See Avas held to have been waived, and in tlie

various phases also furnishes many occa ion and opportunitie
for the exer is of an election b tw en action .
n of the most
common i ' the case of a sale upon a cre<lit procur d by the fol.
and fraudulent representation of the v rn..1 as to hi p ·uniary
responsibility. l pan disco ering the fraud, eY u b for the
expiration of the credit, the vendor may r scirnl th sal and
imm ediately bring an action in form of tort either to r cover the
good themselves, or damage for their taking and onvernion;
or he may waive the tort, and sue at once on contra t for the
price. 1 And when money has been obtained by false and fraudulent repre entations, or by fraudulent practices of any kind, the
plaintiff has the option to sue either in tort for the deceit, or
in contract for money ha.cl and received by the defendant to his
use. 2
§ 462. * 571. Principle which determines when a Promise is
Implied. The conflict which has existed to a certain extent
among the decisions in reference to the right of elec6on, and the
classes of tortious acts and omissions embraced within it, can
only be put to rest by determining with certainty the occasions
and circumstances in which a promise will be implied by the

in this connection Tanderup ik Hansen other not to have been waived ; and this

(1894), 5 S. D. 164, 58 N. W. 578; Zander distinction was in fact made, not upon

V. Valentine Blatz Brewing Co. (1897), 95 any difference in the allegations, but be-

Wis. 162, 70 N. W. 164. cause it subserved the ends of justice, and

But it was held in Commonwealth defeated an objection of mere form. A

Title Ins. Co. v, Dokko (1898), 71 Mijm. peculiar instance of fraud was presented

533, 74 N. W. 891, that "if defendant was in the recent case of Booth v. Farmers'

a trespasser plaintiff could not waive the & Mech. Bk. of Rochester, 1 N. Y. S. C.

tort, and sue him on contract as his ten- 45, 49. See the opinion of Mullen J.,

ant." Same holding in McLaue c. Kelly given in full, snpra, § *539.

(1898), 72 i\Iinn. 395, 75 N. W. 601. ] " l^lt was held in Kansas City, etc. R. K.

1 Roth V. Palmer, 27 Barb. 652, and Co. v. Becker (1899). 67 Ark. 1, 53 S. W.

cases cited ; Kayser v. Sichel, 34 Barb. 406, that a servant of a railroad company

84 ; s. c. on app. sub nom. Wigand v. wiio is injured when in the service of liis

Sickel, 3 Keyes, 120, approving Roth v. employer, has an election to recover dam-

Palmer. See Claffin v. Taussig, 7 Hun, ages either by an action on the express

223 ; National Trust Co. of N. Y. v. Gleu- contract or by an action ex delicto ]

wa fil ed to recove r upon an account for son, 7i N. Y. 400; W estern Assur . Co. 1·.
nursery stock, consisting of fruit-trees and T owle, 65 Wis. 247; Farmers' Kat. B k.
grape-vines eaten up and destroyed by v. Fonda, 65 Mich. 533; Hurt v. Eames,
hog , cattle, and horse of the plaintiff. 24 Keb. 782.
2 Byxbie v. Wood, 24 J. Y. 607, 610 ;
A demurrer to thi. counterclaim wa over- .
ruled. So in Monroe v. Cann on (1900), Union Bk . of N. Y. v. Mott, 27 N. Y. 633,
2-l Iont. 316, 61 Pac. 863, an action iu 636.
I t will be noticed that the e two
as ump it for th e val ue of the pasturage ca es were alike in all their e. sential
was a llowed in the case of a wrongful facts, and that in one of them the tort
herding of sheep on plaintiff's lan d. See wa held to have been waived, and in the
iu this connection Tanderup v. Hansen other not to have been waived; and this
(189-i), 5 S. D. 164, 58 N. W. 578; Zander distinction was in fact made, not upon
i: . Valentin e Blatz Brewing Co. (1 897), 95 any differeuce in the allegations, but beWis. 162, 70 N. W. 164.
cause it sub ervecl the ends of ju ti cc, and
But it was h eld in Commonwealth defeated an objection of mere form. A
Title Ins. Co. v . Dokko ( 1 98), 71 Minn. peculiar instan ce of fraud was pre ·entetl
533, 74 N. vV. 89 1, that " if defendant was in the recent case of Booth v. Farmers'
a tre pa ser plaintiff could not waive the & Mech. Bk. of Rochester, 1 N. Y. :. '.
tort, and ue him on contract as his ten- 45, 49. See the opiuion of l\fullen J.,
ant." SamE' holding iu McLane v. K elly given in full, supra,§* 539 .
(1898), 72 Minn. 395, 75 N. W. 601 .J
[It was held in Kan a City, etc. R. r.
1 R oth v. Palmer, 27 Barb. 652, and
Co. v. Becker (1899), 67 Ark. l, 53 .'. W .
cases cited ; Kay er v. ichel, 34 Barb. 406, that a servant of a railroad company
r vice of hi
84; . c . on app. sub 11om. Wigand v . who is i11jured when in the
Sickel, 3 K eyes, 120, approving Roth v . employer, has au election to recover damPalmer. See Claffin v. Taussig, 7 Hun, ages either by an action on the ex pres ·
223; Natioual Trust Co. of N. Y. v. Glea- contract or by an action ex delicto J
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law. It is very clear that whenever the promise will be implied,

if the acts or omissions from which it is inferred are at the same

time tortious, the election to sue for the tort or for a breach of

the contract must necessarily exist, or else it must be denied on

some mere arbitrary and insufficient ground. The whole discus-

sion is thus reduced to the single question, When is a promise

implied by the law? The comprehensive principle which fur-

nishes a definite answer to this inquiry, applicable to all circum-

stances and relations, has been well stated by the courts in the

following terms : " When a promise is implied, it is because the

party intended it should be, or because natural justice plainlt/

requires it in consideration, of some benefit received. ^^^ It was also

said by a very able English judge, that " no party is bound to

sue in tort, when by converting the action into an action on

contract he does not prejudice the defendant; and, generally

speaking, it is more favorable to the defendant that he should be

sued in contract."^ If these quotations are correct statements

of the general principle, it is plain that the rule maintained by

some decisions, which would restrict the right of election to
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those cases in which the wrong-doer has actually received money

equitably belonging to the plaintiff, is erroneous.^

^ 463.. * 572. Method of Indicating Election. Averment of

Promise as a Test. The foregoing examJ3les sufficiently illustrate

the scope and extent of the doctrine under consideration, and

the class of liabilities to which it is applied. It remains to

inquire how, under the new procedure, the plaintiff shall indicate

in his pleading the fact that he has actually made his election,

and has brought his action in tort or on contract, as the case may

be. Under the old system no such question could arise. The

election was disclosed by the form of the action itself. If the

liability was to be treated as arising from contract, assumpsit

was of course the action selected; if from tort, trover or case

1 Web.ster v. Drinkwater, 5 Greenl. where the plaintiff would have been al-

322 ; also per Beardsley J. in Osborn v. lowed to pursue liis remedy in tort." See

Bell, 5 Denio, 370. also the following eases : Centre Turiip.

2 Young V. Marshall, 8 Bing. 43, per Co. v. Smith, 12 Vt. 217; Cummings v.

Tindal C. .1. Vorce, 3 Hill, 282 ; Osborn i-. Bell, 5

'^ It wa.s said V)y Hogeboom J., while Denio, 370; Camp v. Pulver, 5 Barb,

commenting upon this narrow rule in 91; Butts ?;. Collins, 13 Wend. 139, 154;

Roth V. Palmer, 27 Barb. 6.52: "Our Lightly u. Clon.ston, 1 T.aunt. 113 ; Hilly,

courts recognize no such distinction. Perrott, 3 Taunt. 274 ; Young i>. Marshall,

They allow the election in all cases 8 Bing. 43.

law. I i v ry lear that hene r the promi e " -ill be implied,
if th e act or omi i n from whi h it i inf rr d are at th ame
irn
torti u , the lection to ue for the t rt or for a breach f
ntract mu t n c arily exi t, r ls it mu t b deni d n
th
· m m r arbitrary and in uffici nt roun l. The whole di cu i n i thu r due d to the ingl qu tion, vVhen i a P' mi e
im1 lied by the law? The compreh n i e principle whi h furni he a Llefinit an wer to thi inquiry applicable to all ircumtance and r lation , ha been w 11 tat d by the court in the
f ll win t rm : Wh n a pr mi , i · irnpli d, it i becau e he
party intended it hould be, or becau. e n atural }ustice plainly
requ ire it in con ·ideration of orne benefi,t received . ' 1 It wa al o
said by a very able Engli h ju 10 , that no party is bound to
,'ue in tort when by converting the acti n into an action on
c ntract he doe not prejudice the cl f ndant; and, gen rally
·1 aking it is more favorable to the defendant that he houl l b
ued in contract. ' 2 If the e quotations are correct stat ments
f the general principle, it is plain that th rule maintain d by
·ome cl cision , which would re ' trict the right of election to
tho e ca e in which the wrong-doer ha actually received money
guitably b longing to the plaintiff, i enoneou . 3
463 .. •°!'.· 57 ""· M ethod of Indicating Election.
Averment of
Promise as a Test. The foregoing example ·ufficiently illu trate
the ·cope and extent of the doctrine under considerati n and
th
la
of liabilities to which it i applied. I t remain to
inquire how, under the new procedure, the plaintiff hall in licate
in hi pleading the fact that he has actually made hi election,
and ha brought hi action in tort or on ontract, as the ca e may
be. Un er the 1 y tern no uch que tion could ari e. The
lection wa E.'clo ed by the form of th action it elf. If th
liability wa to be tr ated a ari in 0 from ontract, as um 'it
was of cour e the action selected; if from tort, trov r r ca e
1 W eb ter v. Drinkwater, 5 Gre nl.
322; al o per Beard 1 y J. in
born v.
11, 5 Deni , 370.
2 Young v. :\far hall,
Bing. 4-3, p r
Tiudal C'. ,J.
3 It wa. ~ ai1l hy II0geboom J., whil
·cJmm .nting upon thi. narrow rul in
I •ith 1•. Palm r, 27 Harli. 52 : "Our
·ourt. rc c u rrnL~e 1w
u ·h di stin ct,ion .
They allow th e ·le ·tiou in all ca ·es
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or replevin, or sometimes trespass, was the proper instrument.

Since these forms have been abolished, and all the technical

phrases which distinguished one proceeding from another are

abandoned, it is only by the substantial nature and contents of

the allegations themselves — the facts which they aver — that

the election can, if at all, be now indicated. In other words,

as the pleader can express his design by means of no arbitrary

symbols in the complaint or petition, he must show that he has

chosen to sue either in tort or on contract by the very substance

of the averments which constitute the cause of action. In a

recent case the New York Supreme Court proposed a certain

test, and declared that when the plaintiff claims to have waived

the tort, and to have sued upon an implied contract, the only

possible mode of showing this election is by expressly alleging a

promise to have been made by the defendant ; that in no other

manner can the design of making the action one ex contractu^ and

of distinguishing it fi'om one ex delicto^ be disclosed on the face

of the pleading.^ It has already been shown that this conclusion

is directly opposed to the fundamental principles of the reformed
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pleading, and that it is a return to the most technical and purely

fictitious dogmas and distinctions of the common-law system.

It is also opposed to decisions and judicial dicta in relation to

this very question which declare that such a mode of stating the

cause of action is inadmissible, and that the facts alone which

constitute it must be averred as they actually took place. '^ •

§464. *573. No Difficulty -where Promise i.s Express. Sum-

mons Suggested as Means of Indicating Election in Case of Implied

Promise. Whenever the contract relied upon is express, there

can be no difficulty in showing the election upon the face of the

1 Booth V. Farmers' & Mech. Bk. of that a party by its use may shut himself

Tlochester, 1 N. Y. S. C. 45, 49. See the out from the remedy which his facts

opinion of Mullen J., supra, § * 539. would give hipi." As the court were

- Byxbie v. Wood, 24 N. Y. 607, 610; here discussing the doctrine of election,

Chambers i'. Lewis, 2 Hilt. 591. In and as they held that the complaint

Byxbie v. Wood, the learned judge pro- stated a cause of action on contract, and

ceeds as follows : " Under the code, this not one on tort, alt/ionrj/i no promise was al-

implied promise is treated as a fiction, letjed, this language, and the decision upon

and the facts out of which the prior law it, are entirely inconsistent with the posi-

or replevin, or sometim s trespa s, was th proper instrum nt.
Since these forms have be n abolished, and a.11 th t hnical
phrase which distingui hed on proc edin 0 fr m another are
abandoned, it is only by the substantial natnr and ontent · of
the allegations themselves - the facts whi h th y av r - that
the election can, if at all, be now incli.cateJ. In oth r word·,
a the pleader can expre s his design by mean of n arbitrary
symbols in the complaint or petition, he must show that he has
chosen to sue either in tort or ou contract by the very sub tanc
of the averments which constitute the cause of action. In a
recent caf'e the New York Supreme Court proposed a certain
test, and declared that when the plaintiff claims to ha e waiv cl
the tort, and to have sued upon an implied ontract, the only
pos ible mode of showing this election is by expressly alleging a
promise to have been made by the defendant; that in no other
manner can the design of making the action one ex contractu, an l
of distinguishing it from one ex delicto, be disclosed on the face
of the pleading. 1 It has already been shown that this conclusion
is directly opposed to the fundamental principles of the reformed
pleading, and that it is a return to the most technical and purely
fictitious dogmas and distinctions of the common-law system.
It is also opposed to decisions and judicial dicta in relation to
this very question which declare that such a mode of stating the
cause of action is inadmissible, and that the facts alo11e which
constitute it must be averred as they actually took place. 2 ·
S

464.

* 573.

No Difficulty where Promise is Express.

Sum-

raised the promise are to be stated without tion taken and the test suggested by the

am/ designation of a form of action ; and Supreme Court in Booth v. Farmers' &

the law gives such judgnjent as, being Mech. Bank. In Chambers v. Lewis, the

asked for, is appropriate to the facts. Of courtsimply said that whether a waiver has

course we cannot now say that a particular been made must now be shown by the fact.s

phrase makes a particular form of action, so averred in the complaint and by the prayer.

mons Suggested as Means of Indicating Election in Case of Implied
Promise. ·whenever the contract relied upon is express, there
can be no difficulty in showing the election upon the face of the
1 Booth v. Farmers' & Mech. Bk. of
Rochester, 1 N. Y. S. C. 45, 49. See the
opinion of MuUen J., supra, § * 539.
2 Byxbie v. Wood, 24 N. Y. 607, 610;
Chambers v. Lewis, 2 Hilt. 591. In
Byxbie v. ·w ood, the learned judge proceeds a follows : "Under the code, this
implied promise is treated as a fiction,
and the facts out of which the 71rior law
raised the promise are to be stated without
an.11 designation qf a form qf action; and
the Jaw give such judgn;ient as, bei ng
asked for, is appropriate to the fact~. Of
course we cannot now say that a particular
phrase makes a particular form of action, so

that a party by its u c may shut him elf
out from the remedy which his facts
would give him." As the court were
here discussing the doctrine of el ctio11,
and as they held that the omplaint
stated a cause of action on contract, and
uot one on tort, altho11gh no promise was alleged, this language, and the deci ion upon
it, are entirely incou i. tent with the po~i 
tion taken and the te t uggested by the
Supreme Court in Booth v. Farmet·s' &
Mech. Bank. In Chamber v. Lewis, th
court simply said that whether a ·waiver has
been made must now be hown by the facts
averred in the complaint anti by the prayer.
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pleading. If the plaintiff chooses to bring an action ex contractu,

his complaint or petition will simply state the terms of the agree-

ment, and the facts which constitute the breach thereof. If he

chooses to bring an action ex delicto for a violation by the de-

fendant of his general duty, his complaint or petition will set out

the facts showing his own primary right and the defendant's

duty, disregarding the contract, and will then allege the tortious

acts or omissions by which that right and duty were violated. ^

Although the same actual transaction between the parties would

be stated in either case, the form and manner of the statement

would be entirely and plainly different. An ordinary claim

against a common carrier for the loss of goods furnishes a familiar

example of these two modes. But when the contract relied upon

is implied, and is simply the fictitious promise which the law

infei-s from the tortious acts themselves, it may be doubted

whether it is possible, in accordance with the true principles of

the reformed pleading, to frame a complaint or petition in all

cases which shall show on its face that the plaintiff has elected

to bring his action either in tort or on contract. In one class
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of liabilities it is certainly possible to do so; namely, in those

which result from the defendant's fraudulent representations and

deceits. The allegation of a scienter is indispensable in the

action ex delicto based upon such a liability, and distinguishes it

in a marked manner from the correlative action based upon the

implied promise. But when the liability results from the v.rong-

ful taking or conversion of chattels, from trespasses, negligences,

or other similar kinds of wrongs, the very facts which are alleged

in the action of tort are the facts from which the promise is in-

ferred ; and, according to the true theory of pleading, these facts

must also be stated in the action ex contractu, without any legal

inferences or conclusions. It conclusively follows, that, in this

general class of liabilities, as the facts which constitute the cause

of action are the same in each, the averments of the complaint or

petition must be the same in each kind of action, if the essential

principles of the reformed S3'stem are complied with, so that it

is impossible to indicate upon the face of the pleading alone the

election which the phiintiff has made.^ The form of summons

1 [^See Fordvce r. Nix (1893), 58 Ark. ^ Qin Braithwaite i". Akin (1893), 3

136, 23 S. W. 967, where a somewhat am- N. 1). 365, 56 N. W. 133. tlie court said :

l.igiions complaint was held to declare on " To establish a cause of action in as-

a tort."] sunipsit ilie waiver must be averrfd either

1 adina . If tl
lain i:ff ho
to bring an acti n x contractu,
hi complaint or petiti n will impl · tate h term f h aO'r ment, and th fa t which
n itut th brea h th r of.
cho e t Lring an action ex delicto for a Yi la ion b ·
femlant of bi· g neral dut bi
mplaint r p titi n will t out
the fact b in hi
wn I rimar · ri ht and th def ndanf
dnt.· clisre 0 arding the ontract and " ·ill h n all 0 e the tortiou
act · or omi , ion Ly which that righ , ncl duty wer
iola ecl. 1
... lthou 0 h the me actual tran action b tw en th l ar i woul
be tit eel in eith r ca
he form an l manner of th
tatem nt
woul 1 b entir ly and plainly different. An rclinar claim
a O'ain t a mm on carri r f r he lo of goo 1 · furni h a familiar
example f the e two mode . But when th contract r li l upon
i im1 li cl and i impl the fictitio 1 prorni whi h the law
infer from the torti u act them elve it may be doubt l
whether it i · po' ible in ac orclance with the tru prin ir 1 of
the reformed pl ading to fra.me a complaint r I etiti n in all
ca e ·w hich hall show on it face hat the plR-intiff ha elect d
to brio bi action either in tort or on contract. In one cla
of liabilitie it i' certainly po ible to do o · namely in tho e
which re ult from the defendant. frau lulent repr entation and
deceit . The all gati n of a cienter i incli pen able in the
action ex delicto ba ' eel ur on . uch a liability, and di ingui be it
in a marked mann r from th corr lative a ion ba · l u n the
impli d I romis . But when the liability r ult fr m th wrongful taking or conv r ion of chattel from re pa e~, n glig nee ,
or other irnilaT kind of wrong l v ry fac wbi b ar alleg d
in the action of tort are the fact from which the ronu e i inferred; and accor ling to the true th ory of leading, b
fact
mu t also be tated in the action ex contractu without an legal
inf r nc
r con ·lu ion . It onclu ively f llow
in thi
gen ral ·la of liabiliti
a the fact, wbi h on titu
he au e
of action are the ame in ach th averment of the omplaint r
petition mu. t L h am in a h kind f acti n if th
' ntial
J_Jrinciple of the r form cl · tern ar compli 1 with
that it
i: imJ_Jo, ·ible
indicat up01 th fa.
f tl pl a lin ·
2
c·lec tion which th plaintiff ha ma l . Th form f
1 [
ee Fordyre v. ~ix (1 93), 5 \rk.
136, 2:J . w·. 967, where a
mewha amhiu111rn complaint wa h Id t d ·lnr on
a t u rt.]

"

ELECTION BETWEEN ACTIO S.

G55

ELECTION BETWEEN ACTIONS.

G55

adopted would therefore seem to be the only certain test, in this

class of cases, by which the nature of the action can be deter-

mined, and the fact of an election can be made known to the

adverse party. The only other alternative is, to insert in the

complaint certain legal conclusions or descriptive phrases which,

in reference to the statement of the cause of action, are purely

immaterial and redundant.^

express!}' or by t^ie manner of stating the

cause of action, for without the waiver no

adopted would therefor se m to be the only certain t t, in this
cla s of ca e , by which the nature of the action can be determined, and th fact of an 1 ction can be made known to the
ad.verse I arty. The only oth r alternative i., to in rt in the
complaint certain legal conclusions r d scriptive phra s which
in ref rence to the statem nt of the cause of action, are purely
immaterial and redundant. 1

cause of action in assumpsit arises. It is

not the wrong which gives the injured

party the right to sue on contract ; it is

tiie wrong coupled with the waiver of the

tort." But see Lenhardt v. French (1900),

57 S. C. 493, .35 S. E. 761, where the

court said, respecting an election to waive

a tort and sue in contract, " the code re-

quires no specific words claiming that
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such an election has been made. It is

enough if it appears to be made in effect

in the pleadings."

It was held in Tanderup v. Hansen

(1894), 5 S. D. 164, 58 N. W. 578, that

where plaintiff sets out facts showing a

cause of action in trespass, and then pro-

ceeds to allege that he waives the tort

aforesaid, and for further cause of action

alleges a fictitious promise to pay based

on the same facts as set out in the tres-

pass, the fictitious averments of promise

will be disregarded as surplusage, and the

cause of action as appearing in the facts

shown will not be considered vitiated by

the subsequent averments.^

^ ^Election.

In regard to the general subject of elec-

tion, it is a well recognized rule that in

order to apply the doctrine of election of

remedies the party must actually have at

expre ly or by the manner of stating the
cau e of action, for without the waiver no
cau e of action in a·, ump it ari es. It is
not the wrong whi ·h gives the injured
party the right to sue on contract; it is
the wrong coupled with the waiver of the
tort." But see Lenhardt v. :French (1900),
57 S. C. 49.'3, 35 . E. 761, where the
court aid , respecting an election to waive
a tort and !me in contract, "the code requires no specific words claiming that
such an election has been made. It is
enough if it appears to be made in effect
in the pleading ."
It was held in Tanderup v. Hansen
(1894), 5 S. D. 164, 58 N . W. 57 , that
where plaintiff sets out facts showing a
cause of action in trespa s, and th en proceeds to allege that he waives the tort
aforesaid, and for furth er cause of action
all eges a fi ctitious promise to pay ba ed
on the same facts as set out in the trespass, the fictitious averments of promise
will be disr egarded as snrplusage, and the
cause of action as appeari ng in the facts
shown will not be considered vitiated by
the subsequent averments.J
1

[ E lection.

command inconsistent remedies: Elliott

r. Collins (1898), Idaho, 55 Pac. 301;

Easton v. Somerville (1900), 111 la. 164,

82 N. W. 475 ; Austin Mfg. Co. v. Decker

(1899), 109 la. 277, 80 N. W. 312; City of

Omaha v. Redick (1901), 61 Neb. 163, 85

N. TV. 46 ; State v. Bank of Commerce

(1900), 61 Neb. 22, 85 N. W. 43 ; Fuller-

Warren Co. V. Harter (1901), 110 Wis.

80, 85 N. W. 698; Marshall v. Rugg

(1896), 6 Wyo. 270, 44 Pac. 700.

An election, to be bindinir, must be

made with full knowledge of the facts :

Blaker v. Morse (1898), 60 Kan. 24, 55

I'ac. 274 ; City of Earned v. Jordan

(1895), 55 Kan. 124, 39 Pac. 1030 ; Deere,

Wells, & Co. V. Morgan (1901), 114 la.

287, 86 N. W. 271 ; Jones Co. v. Daniel

(1899), 67 Ark. 206, 53 S. W. 890. Where

the court orders an election the ruling

will not be disturbed on appeal except in

case of an abuse of discretion : Phillips

V. Carver (1898), 99 Wis. 561, 75 N. W.

432.

An election once made is conclusive:

Wright, Barrett, etc. Co. v. Robinson

(1900), 79 Minn. 272, 82 N. W. 632;

Blaker v. Morse (1898), 60 Kan. 24, 55

Pac. 274 ; City of Earned v. Jordan

In regard to the general subject of election, it is a well recognized rule that in
order to apply the doctrine of election of
remedies the party must actually have at
command inconsistent remedies: Elliott
1" Collins ( 1898), I daho, 55 Pac. 301;
Easton v. Somerville (1900) , 111 Ia. 164,
82 N. W. 475; Au tin Ifg. Co. v. Decker
(1899), 109 Ia. 277 , 80 N. W. 312; City of
Omaha v. Redick {1901), 61 eb. 163, 5
N. W. 46; State v. Bank of Commerce
(1900), 61 Neb. 22, 85 N. \\ . 43 ; FullerWarren Co. 11. Harter (1901 ), 110 Wis.
80, 85 N. W. 698; Marshall v. Rugg
(1 896), 6 Wyo. 270, 44 Pac. iOO.
An election, to be bindi ng, must be

made with full knowledge of the facts:
Blaker i·. i\Ior e ( l 9 ), 60 Kan. 24, 55
Pac. 274 ; City of Larned v. J ordan
(l 95), 55 Kan. 124, 39 Pac. l 030; D eere,
Well , & Co. v. ::'IIorgau (1901), 114 Ia.
287, 86 N. W. 2il; J ones Co. v. Daniel
(1899), 67 Ark. 206, 53 '. W. 890. Where
the court orders an election the ruling
will not be di turbed on appeal except in
case of an nbuse of discretion: Phillips
v . Carver (1898), 99 Wis. 561, 75 N. W.
432.

An election once made is conclu ive:
Wright, Barrett, etc. Co. v. Robinson
(1900), 79 Minn. 272, 82 N. W. 632;
Blaker v. Morse ( 1898), 60 Kan. 24, 55
Pac. 274; City of Larned v. J ordan
(1895), 55 Kan. 124, .~9 Pac. 1030 ; Carroll
v. Fethers (1899), 102 Wis. 436, 78 N. W.
604-; Theusen v. Bryan ( 1901 ), 113 Ia.
496, 85 N. W. 802; Remington v. Hudson
( 1902), 64 Kan. 4~, 67 Pac. 636.
Where a complaint contains inconsistent counts, the remedy is a motion to
strike: Keller v. Strong (1898), I 04 Ia.
5 5, 73 N. W . 1071; Fox v. Graves (1896),
46 eb. 812, 65 N. W. 887. A motion to
require plaintiff to elect is also proper:
Fox v. Graves (1896), 46 Neb. 812, 65

N. W. 887.
Cases in which remedies were held to
be inconsistent: Iissouri Pac. Ry. Co. v.
Henrie (1901 ), 63 Kan. 330, 65 Pac. 665,
damages for refusal to issue railway passes
in consideration of right of way, and action for value of land appropriated ;
Franey r. ·w auwatosa Park Co. (189 ),
99 Wis. 40 , 74
. W. 548, rescis ion of
contract and damages for fraud in obtaining it; Limited Inv. Co. v. Glendale Inv.
Ass'n ( 1898), 99 Wis. 54, 74 N. W . 633,
same ; R ildebrand v. Tarbell ( 1897), 97
Wis. 4-!-6, i 3 N W. 53, in i ting on ri ght~
und er an a .• ignment an<l hrin g i11 g ?.ct;nT .
to haYe i" ~nt :t: id e ;, T~n<lin p; tcrn 1' r ~ · . · ~
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SECTION FOURTH.

THE FORM OF THE COMPLAINT OR PETITION.

FOUR' H.

E TI

§ 465. * 574. Introductory. Having thus discussed and de-

termined the fundamental principles and general doctrines of the

THE FORM OF THE

reformed pleading, which apply to all causes of action, and to

MPLAINT 0 R PETITION.

(1901), 111 Wis. 208, 86 N. W. 571, action

on contract for damages and action to

rescind ; First Nat. Bank i-. Tootle (1899),

59 Neb. 44, 80 N. W. 264, action on con-

tract on account for goods sold under

*

~

-!. Introductory. Having thu di cu ed and determine l the fundamental principl and general doctrine of the
reformed pleading which apply to all au e of action and t
465.

fraudulent representations, and rescission

of sale ; First Nat. Bank v. McKinney

(1896), 47 Neb. 149. 66 N. W. 280, same;

Hargadiue-McKittrick Dry Goods Co. r.

Warden (1899), 151 Mo. 578, 52 S. W. 59.3,

same ; City of Cincinnati ^^ Emerson

(1837), 57 0. 8t. 132, 48 N. E. 667, con-

testing validity of assessment on a ground
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common to plaintiff and all other owners

of abutting lots, and on a ground pertain-

ing to plaintiff's lot alone; MacMurray-

Judge, etc. Co. v. City of St. Louis (1896),

138 Mo. 608, 39 S. W. 467, damages for

injury to property and injunction re-

straining such injury ; Davis v. Tubbs

(1895), 7 S. D. 488, 64 N. W. 534, action

on express contract and on implied con-

tract; Hackettr. Louisville, etc. R. R. Co.

(1894), 95 Ky. 236, 24 S. W. 871, damages

for death and for suffering; Thomas's

Adm'r V. Maysville Gas Co. (1900), 108

Ky. 224, 56 S. W. 153, same; Owensboro

& Nashville Ry. Co. v. Barclay's Adm'r

(1897), 102 Ky. 16, 43 S. W. 177, same;

Seymore v. Rice (1894), 94 Ga. 183, 21

S. E. 293, fraud and breach of warranty ;

Vaule V. Steenerson (1895), 63 Minn. 110,

65 N. W. 257, damages for refusing to

make a levy by virtue of an execution,

and damages for levying another execu-

tion issued ou the same judgment and

appropriating the pnjceeds.

Cases in which remedies were held

uot to be inconsistent : Bent v. Barnes

(1895), 90 Wis. 631, 64 N. W. 428, re-

ydevin for portion of goods and ecjuitable

action to enforce a trust in funds derived

fr<jni tlie remainder ; Simons v. Fagan

(1901), 62 Neb. 287, 87 N. W. 21, damages

for maliciously attaching property and

action ou the attachment bond ; Eastou

V. Somerville (1900), 111 la. 164,82N. W.

475, conversion against a guardian for

buying a mortgage with funds of the ward

and an action against one who received

these funds with knowledge of the facts ;

Savage v. Savage (1899), 36 Ore. 268, 59

Pac. 461, action on a note and on the

original indebtedness ; Johnsou-Brink-

man Co. »;. Mo. Pac. Ky. Co. (1894), 126

Mo. 344, 28 S. W. 870, attachment against

a vendee and replevin ; Saunders v. United

States Marble Co. (1901), 25 Wash. 475,

65 I'ac. 782, action on express contract

and on retaining benefits from such con-

tract ; Humphrey i;. Kingler (1895), 94 la.

182, 62 N. W. 685, prayers in the alterna-

tive that a deed be set aside for fraud, or

(1901), Ill Wi. 20, 6 . W. 571 acti n
on ontract for damao-e~ aml action to
re -eind; Fir. t ,_'at. Bank v. Tootle (1 99),
59 Xeb. -a, 0 ... -. W. 264, action on contract on account for good
old under
fraudulent repre ntation , and re ci , ion
f ale;
ir t Nat. B ank v. McKinney
( 1 96), ..p :Neb. l-19 66
. W. 2 0, ame;
Hargadine-McKittrick Dry Good
o. v.
Warden (l 99), 151l\Io.57 52 . W. 593,
~ ame;
City of
iucinnati v. Erner on
(1 7) 57 0. 't. 132, 4 N. E. 667, conte·tino- Yalidity of a e ment on a ground
common to plaintiff and all other owners
of aLutting lot , and on a ground pertainiu~ to plaintiff' lot alone; MacMurrayJ ud e, etc.Co.v. ityof,t.Loui (1 96),
13 ~lo. 60 , 39 . W. 467, damages for ·
injury to property and injun~tion retrainiuo- uch injury; Davis v. Tubb
(l 95), 7 . D. 4 , 64 . W. 534, action
on expre contract and on implied contract; Hackett v. Loui 1'ille, etc. R. R. Co.
(l 94) 95 Ky. 236, 24 . W. 71, damage
for death and for uffering; Thoma '
AJm'r v. :\fay ville a Co. (1900), 10
Ky. 224, 56 . W. 153, ame; Owen boro
& Xa h,·ille Ry. o. v. Barclay's dm'r
(1 97), 102 Ky. 16, 43 . W. 177, same;
S eymore v. Rice (1 94}, 94 Ga. 1 3, 21
. . E. 293, fraud and br ach of warranty ;
uule v. teener on (1 95) 63 i\Iinn. 1l0,
G:> .. •. ,Y. 257, damage for refu ing to
rua ke a le''Y by virtu of an exe ution,
and rlamage for le,'ying auother executiou i. ,;ued ou the ame judgment and
app ropriating the proceed .
( ·a ... e. in which remedie were held
wit t <J be incon i tent: Bent v. Barne
( I 'J5/ , !JO Wi . 631, 64 1T. W. 42 , rep Je ,·in for portion of good aud quitable
acti•m to enforce a tru t in fund~ cl riv d
fom1 the remainder;
imon v. Fagan
(I 01 ), 62 .·eb. 2 7, 7 ~·. W. 21,damages

'T

for maliciou l attaching property and
action on the attachment bond; Ea tou
v. omerville (1900), 111Ia.164, 2 . W.
475 conver ion ao-ainst a guardian for
buying a mortga e with fund of the ward
and an action again t one wh rec~ived
these funds with knowledge of the fact ·
avage v. avage {1899 ), 36 Or . 26 , 59
Pac. 461, action on a note and on the
original in<lebtedne. ; John on-Brinkman o. 1;. Mo. Pac. Hy. o. (l 94), 12
Mo. 344, 2
. W. 870, attachment again t
a vendee and repleYin ; aunder v. nited
State Marble Co. (1901), 25 '
65 Pac. 7 2, action on expre
and on retaining benefit from uch contract; Humphrey v. Ringler (1 95), 94 Ia.
1 2, 62 . W. 6 5, prayer in the alternative that a deed be et a ide fo r fraud, or
that contract price be recovered.
1'l1eory of Case.
A complaint mu t proceed upon ome
definite theory and mu t be good upon
that theory : Yorn v. Bra ken (1 99) 153
Ind. 492, 55 ~ . E. 25 ~ ; Terre Haute, etc.
R . R. 'o. v. Mc orkle (1 4), 14-0 Ind.
613, 40 . E. 62; Pitt burg, etc. Ry. o.
v. ullivan (I 94), 141 Ind. 3, 40 . E.
13 ; itizen ' treet Ry.
. v. Willoeby
(I 93), 134 Ind. 563 33 . E. 627; r ntner v. F hren chield 1902 , 64 Kan. 764,
6 I ac. 619; od<liug 1>. Iun on (1 97),
52 Neb. 5 0, 72 r. W. 46 · Tru dell v.
Bourke (1 95), 145 . Y. 612, 4 N . E .
3.
A party cannot try hi c e upon one
theor_v and on appeal adopt another :
Lebcher v. Lambert (1900), 23
tah, 1,
6:3 Pac. 62 ; ray v. Wor t {l 95), 129
fo. 122, 3 1 . W. 5 5; Ander n
Fo tr (1 9 ), 105 Ga. 56~, .'.32 . i. 373;
hrop hire v. Ryan {1900), Ill Ia. 677,
2 . W. 1035; McIIale v. falone (1903) ,

FORM OF THE CO IPLAINT OR PE TITION.
FORM OF THE COMPLAINT OR I'ETITION. 057

all defences by way of confession and avoidance or of affirmative

relief, I shall now briefly consider the rules wliich pertain to the

form of the complaint or petition, and which regulate the manner

of stating and arranging its allegations. These rules are few

and simple ; and their object is to render the issues single and

certain, and to present the cause of action for a decision upon

its merits, and not upon any technical, incidental, or collateral

questions. In one important feature the new system stands in

marked contrast with the old, — the entire absence of all special

phrases or formulas by which the kinds of actions are distin-

guished, or by which the pleadings or any parts of them are

characterized.

§ 466. * 575. Separate Statement of Different Causes of Action.

Inducement and Prayer need not be repeated. When a complaint

or petition contains two or more causes of action, all the codes

require that they shall be distinctly and separately stated and

numbered ; and the method by which a violation of this require-

ment is to be corrected has already been explained. ^ It is a

settled rule, that if the pleading is of this kind, each separate
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division or count must be complete by itself, and must contain all

the averments necessary to a perfect cause of action. ^ Defects

and omissions in one cannot be supplied by the allegations found

in another; nor can the pleader, by merely referring to material

facts properly set forth in a former count, incorporate them into

and make them part of a subsequent one. In other words, all

the issuable or material facts constituting the ground for a re-

covery must be stated in each cause of action, even though some

repetition might thereby become necessary. ^ This requirement,

— Neb. — , 9.3 N. W. 677; Lansing v. Relief Ass'n (1894), 87 Wi.s. Ill, 58 N. W.

Commercial Union Assurance Co. ( 190.3), 76; Moore v. Ilalliday (1903), 43 Ore. 243,

— Neb. — , 93 N. W. 7.56. 72 Pac. 801. But a failure to allege that

Want of a definite theory is not ground they are separate is not ground for de-

fer a demurrer, but for a motion to make murrer: Gunderson v. Thomas (1894), 87

more definite : Scott v. Cleveland, etc. Ry. Wis. 406, 58 N. W. 750.

Co. (1895), 144 Ind. 125, 43 N. E. 133. "If any one count of a petition or any

See also, upon the general subject of separate defence set up in an answer is

theory of complaint. Mark v. North (1900), adjudged insufficient, such ruling does not

155 Ind. 575, 57 N. E. 902; Cleveland, affect the other counts of the petition or

etc. Ry. Co. !.'. Gray (1897), 148 Ind. 266, the other separate defences:" Munford

46 N. E. 675.] v. Keet (1900), 15-i Mo. 36, 55 S. W.

all d f nc by way of onf s ion and aY idan or of affirmatiY
r lief, I hall now bri fl y con i ler the rul s whi h p rtain to the
form of the complaint or petition, and whi ·hr gulate the manner
of tating and arranging its all gations. Th s rul s ar f w
and imple; and their obje t i to render the i · u
ingle and
certain, an l to I resent the a use of action for a dcci ·ion upon
its merjt , and not upon any technical, incillental, or collat ral
que tion . In one important feature the new sy tern tancl · in
marked contra t with the olcl, - the entire ab ence of all special
phrn es or formulas by which the kinds of actions are distinguished, or by which the pleadings or any parts of them are
characterized.
S 466. * 575. Separate Statement of Different Causes of Action.
Inducement and Prayer need not be repeated. \Vh en a complaint
or petition contains two or more c~uses of acfaon, all the codes
require that they shall be distinctly and separately stated and
numbered; and the method by which a violation of this requirement is to be corrected has already been explained·. 1 It is a
settled rule, that if the pleading is of this kind, each separate
divi8ion or count must be complete by itself, and must contain all
the averrnents necessary to a perfect cause of action. 2 Defects
an<l. omi sions in one cannot be supplied by the allegations found
in another; nor can the pleader, by merely referring to material
facts properly set forth in a former count, incorporate them into
and make them part of a subsequent one. In other words, all
the issuable or material facts constituting the ground for a recovery must be stated in each cause of action, even though some
repetition might thereby become necessary. 3 This requirement,

1 See supra, §§ *447, *450. 27 1.]

2 [Clark V. Ross (1895), 96 Ta. 402. 65 3 j^In McKay v. McDougal (1897), 19

N. W. 1.340; Johns v. Northwestern Mut. Mont. 488, 48 Pac. 98S, the court said-
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- Neb. -, 93 N. W. 677; Lansing v.
Commercial Union Assurance Co. ( 1903),
- Neb.-, 93 I . \.V . 756.
·want of a definite theory is not ground
for a demurrer , but for a motion to make
more definite: Scott v. Cleveland, etc. Ry.
Co. (1895), 144 Intl. 125, 43 N. E. 133.
See al o, upon the general subject of
theory of complaint. Mark v. North (1900),
l 55 Ind . 575, 57 N. E. 902; Cleveland,
etc. Ry. Co. i•. Gray (1897), 148 Ind. 266,
46 N. E. 675.J
1 Ree supra, §§ * 447, * 450.
2 [ Clark v. Ros (1895) , 96 Ia. 402 . 65
r_ W . 13-10 · J ohn t". Northwestern l\fut.

Relief Ass'n (1894), 87 Wis. 111, 58 N. W.
76; Moore v. Ifalliuay (1903), 43 Ore. 243,
72 Pac. 01. But a fai lure to allege that
they are separate is not ground for uemurrer: Gunder~on i-. Thomas (1894), 87
Wis. 406, 58 N. W. 750.
"If any one count of a petition or any
separate defence set up in an answer is
adjudged insufficient, such ruling does not
affect the other counts of the petition or
the other separate defences:" Munford
v. Keet (1900), 15-1 Mo. 36, 55 S. W.
271.J
3
[In McKay u. McDougal (1 97), 19
Mont. 488, 48 Pac. 988, the court said:

42
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however, applies only to the material and issuable facts which

constitute the cause of action. Matter which is simply introduc-

tory or by way of inducement, and not part of the gravame'n,

after having been once set out at the commencement of the

pleading, need not be repeated in each paragraph, but should be

referred to merel3^ And this introductory matter includes all

descriptions of the character, capacity, or particular right in

respect of which the plaintiffs and defendants are made parties

to the action, as executors, trustees, public officers, and the like;

These and similar statements properly form the commencement

or introduction of the complaint, distinct from the several causes

of action, and equally applicable to all of them. Whenever,

therefore, a cause of action is attacked by a demurrer directed

either against it alone or against the entire pleading, it must

stand or fall by its own averments, and cannot be helped out by

any facts, however sufficient in themselves, alleged in anothei

paragraph or count. ^ But the particular sum of damages claimed

" Each separate division or count of the
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coniphiint must be complete in itself, and

tlie ])lcader, by merely referring to ma-

terial facts properly set forth in a former

count, cannot incorporate them into and

make them part of a subsequent one.

This rule should not be extended to the

howev r applie onl to the material and 1 uable fac
hich
con titut th cau of acti n . 1\Iat r whi h i impl , in roduct ry r by way of inducem n
an l not part f the grai amen
aft r ha ring be n on e t ut at th
rnmenc ment f he
p adin ne tl not b r peated in ach paragraph, but b ul l b
ref rr d to merel . And thi intro lu to1y matter inclu l · all
cl rip ion of he character, capacity or l arti ular right in
re pect of which tb plaintiff and lef n lant ar ma l parti
o th acti n a xecutor
rust e , public ffi er and the lik
The e an
imilar -tat m nts pro1 erly form he ommenc m nt
or introducti n of th omplaint, di in t from th everal cau
of , ction, and qually applicable to all of them . \Vhen Yer
ther fore a cau e f action i attacked by a cl rnurrer lirecte
eith r again t it alone or against the entire I 1 a ling, it mu t
:tancl or fall by its wn avennents, and cannot be help l out by
an facts, however sufficient in th m lv , allege l in an the1
paragraph or count. 1 But the particular sum of damage claim d

inclusion of a descrij)tion of the property

itself, nor to a point requiring exhibits to

he repeated, but it should be held to em-

Ijrace tliose material and issuable facts of

ownership which constitute the plaintiff's

action."

In support of this view, see Cooper

V. Portlier Brewing Co. (1900), 112 Ga.

894, 38 S. E. 91 ; Aulbach v. Dahler

(1896), Idaho, 43 Pac. 322; Corbey v.

Kogers (1898), \h2 Ind. 169, 52 N. E.

748.

But in other States it is held that ma-

terial facts alleged in one count may be

made a part of another count by appropri-

ate reference. To this effect see Treweek

I'. Howard (1895), 105 Cal. 434, 39 Pac.

20; Hopkins j;. Contra Costa Co. (1895),

106 Cal. 566, 39 Pac. 933; Uamsey v.

Johnson (1897), 7 Wyo. 392, 42 Pac. 1084;

Hut.son V. King (1894), 95 Ga. 271, 22

S. E. 615; Realty lievenue, etc. Co. v.

Farm, etc. Co. (1900), 79 Miun. 465, 82

N. W. 857. In this la.st ca.se the court

held the allegation that " plaintiff realleges

and reaffirms all the allegations of para-

graphs 1, 2, and 3 of plaintiff's cause of

action," a sufficient reference.]

1 Abeudroth v. Boardley, 27 Wis. 555 ;

Durkee i'. City Bk. of Kenosha, 13 Wis.

216, 222; Curtis v. Moore, 15 Wis. 134;

Sabin v. Austin, 19 Wis. 421, 423; Catlin

V. Pedrick, 17 Wis. 88, 91 ; Barlow v.

Burns, 40 Cal. 351, 353 ; Potter v. Earnest,

45 Ind. 416; Mason v. Weston, 29 Ind.

561 ; Day v. Vallette, 25 Ind. 42; Leabo

V. Detrick, 18 Ind. 414 ; Nat. Bk. of Mich.

V. Green, 33 Iowa, 140 (answer) ; Silvers r.

Junction R. Co , 43 Ind. 435, 446 (reply).

See also Scott v. Robards, 67 .Mo. 289 ;

State V. Yellow Jacket S. Min. Co., 14

Nev. 220; Birdsall v. Birdsall, 52 Wis.

208; McCarnan v. Cochran, 57 Ind. 106;

Killian r. Eigenman, 57 id. 480; Barnes

" Each separate divi ion or count of the
c mplaint mu t be complete in itself, and
the pl ader, by merely referring to mnterial fact· properly set forth in a form r
couut, annot incorporate them into and
mak them part of a sub quent one.
Thi rule should not he extended to the
iuclu ion of a d cri1 tion of the property
it lf, nor to a point requirin g exhibit. to
he repeated, but it houid be held to embrace those material and i uuble fact of
ow11er hip which con titute the plaintiff's
action."
ln support of thi view, ee Cooper
1'. P rtn r Brewing Co. (1900), 112
a.
!J-1-, 3
. E. 91; Aulbach v. Dahler
(1 96), Idah, 43 Pa. 322; Corbey v.
Hoger (189 ), 152 Ind. 169, 52 N . E.
74
But in other tate: it is helu that material facts alleged in one c unt may be
made a part f auoth r count by appropriate reference. To thi eff ct ee Treweek
t'. Howard (1 95), 105
al. 434, 39 Pa .
20; fiopki1. v. Contra
o. (1 95),
106 al. 566, 39 Pac. 933 ; J am v v.
.Tobu on (1 9i), 7 W_vo.392,42 Pa .10 4;
llut.·1m t'. King (I 94), 95 'a. 271, 2:...
•·. E. 615; Healty l ev nue, tc. o. v.
}'ar111, •tc. 'o. (1900), 79 iimL 465, 2
. \ . 8:>7. In thi · la ·t ca:e t.he ourt

held th allegation that" plaintiff r allege
and reaffirm all th allegation of paragraph l , 2, and 3 of plaintiff' cau e f
action," a uffi ient ref rence.J
1 Abendroth v. Boardley, 27 Wi . 555;
Durkee v. City Bk. of Keno ha, 13 Wi .
216, 222 · Curti v. Moore, 15 Wi . 134;
Sabin v. Au. tin, 19 Wi . 421, 423; atlin
v. Pedri ·k, 17 Wi .
, 91 ; Barlow v.
Burn 40 a). 351, 353; Potter v. Earne t,
45 Ind. 416; Ma on v. We ·ton 29 Ind.
561 ; Day v. Vallette, 25 Ind. 42 ; Leabo
v. Detrick, 1 Ind. 414; Nat. Bk. of Mich.
v. Green 33 Iowa, 140 (an ·wer); ilver v.
Junction R. o , 43 Ind. 435, 446 (reply).
ee al o cott v. Ro bard , 6 7 ?\lo. 2 9 ;
tate v. Y II w Jack t . I in . o., 14
Nev. 220; Bird all v. Bird all, 52 Wi .
20 ; M · aruan v. ochrau, 57 Iud. 106;
Killian v. Eigenman, 57 irl. 4 · Barn
v. teph n , 2 id. 226; P nn ylrnnia o.
v. Holderman, 6 id . l ; Ha k 11 v. Ha kell, 54 al. 262; haq v. illill r, 54 id.
329; e al ·o Ja per v. Hazen, 2 . Dak.
401; N ier v. l\li.: uri Pac. R:. o., 12
l\Io. App. 35; ull av. Bk. v. L xin rton,
74 l\[ . 104 ; B ·Ider v. !\Io. Pac. l _r. ' ..
10 ~Io. App. 44 ; Farri v. Jon , 112
lnd. 49 ; Bidw ll v. Babe ck 7 al. 29;
Yo t v. om111 r ·ial Bk. of , an ta Ana,
94 al. 494 ; r n v. lifford, 94 al. 49;
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in each cause of action need not necessarily be given at its close;

it is sufficient if the aggregate amount is alleged and demanded

at the end of the complaint. ^

§ 467. * 576. Rule as to Statement of Same Cause of Action in

Different Counts. Since the reformed pleading requires the facts

to be averred as they actually took place, it does not in general

permit a single cause of action to be set forth in two or more

different forms or counts, as was the familiar practice at the

common law. The rule is undoubtedly settled, that, under all

ordinary circumstances, the plaintiff who has but one cause of

action will not be suffered to spread it upon the record in differ-

ing shapes and modes, as though he possessed two or more dis-

tinct demands; and when he does so without special and sufficient

reason, he will be compelled, either by a motion before the trial

or by an application and direction at the trial, to select one of

these counts, and to abandon the others. ^ It is certain that

different causes of action in the complaint or petition must, as

Pennie v. Hiklreth, 81 Cal. 127 ; but see
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St. Louis Gas Light Co. v. St. Louis, 86

Mo. 495. As to what are not separate

causes of action, so that they mai/ be

stated, in one count, see Rayan v. Day,

46 Iowa, 239 (two promissory notes, sed

qu.) ; State v. Milwaukee, L. S. & W. Ry.

m ea h cau e of a tion n cl not n e arily be giv n at it ·lo.
it i. uffi i nt if th aO' r gat amount i' all g tl and 1 man<l d
at th nd of the c mplaint. 1
~ 467. * 576. Rule as to Statement of Same Cause of Action in
Different Counts.
ince th reform cl I leading r quir s th fact
to be averred a th y actuaJly to k pla'"' , it doe not in g n ral
permit a single cau e of a tion to b set forth in tw or mor
(lifferent forms or counts, a was the familiar pra ·ti
at the
common law. The rule i uncloubt <lly s ttl cl, that, und r all
ordinary circumstan es, the plaintiff who ha::; but one carn;e of
action will n t b suffered to pread it upon the record in differing shapes an l modes, as though he possessed two or mor distinct demands; and when he does so without ·pecial and uffici nt
reason, he will be compelled, either by a motion before the trial
or by an application an<l direction at the trial, to select one of
these counts and to abandon the others. 2 It is certain that
different causes of action in the complaint or petition must, as

Co., 45 Wis. 579 (distinct grounds of for-

feiture).

1 Spears v. "Ward, 48 Ind. 541 ; Blan-

chard v. Jefferson, 28 Abb. N. Cas.

236.

[]It is held in Connecticut that good

pleading requires the claim or claims for

relief, no matter how many couuts there

may be, to be set out at the end of the

entire complaint : Goodrich v. Stanton

(1899), 71 Conn. 418, 42 Atl. 74; Baxter

V. Camp (1898), 71 Conn. 245, 41 Atl. 803.

In support of the rule stated in the text

see H. B. Clafliu Co. v. Simon (1898), 18

Utah, 153, 55 Pac. 376.]

■^ [^In support of this proposition, see

Reed v. Poindexter (1895), 16 Mont. 294,

40 Pac. 596; Leonard v. Roberts (1894),

20 Colo. 88, 36 Pac. 880 ; Bas.sett v. Shares

(1893), 63 Conn. 39, 27 Atl. 421 ; Palmer

V. Hartford Dredging Co. (1900), 73 Conn.

182, 47 Atl. 125 ; Finken v. Elm City Brass

Co. (1900), 73 Conn. 423, 47 Atl. 670;

Brown v. Wilcox (1900), 73 Conn. 100, 46

Atl. 827; Goodrich v. Stanton (1899), 71

Conn. 418, 42 Atl. 74; Freeman's Appeal

(1899), 71 Conn. 708, 43 Atl. 185 ; Oley i'.

Miller (1901), 74 Conn. 304, 50 Atl. 744 ;

Wehmhoff v. Rutherford (1895), 98 Ky.

91, 32 S. W. 288.

The practice of setting out the facts in

different form in the several couuts to

meet the exigencies of proof, has been

held proper in the following cases: Es-

trella Vineyard Co. v. Butler (1899), 125

Cal. 232, 57 Pac. 980; Rucker v. Hall

(1895), 105 Cal. 425, 38 Pac. 962; Bern-

stein V. Downs (1896), 112 Cal. 197, 44

Pac. 557 ; Stockton, etc. Works v. Glens

Falls Ins. Co. (1898), 121 Cal. 167, 53

Pac. 565 ; Rinard v. Omaha, etc. Ry.

Co. (1901), 164 Mo. 270, 64 S. AV. 124;

Willard i\ Carrigan (1902), Ariz., 68 Pac.

538; Armstrong v. Penn (1898), 105 Ga.

Pennie · v. Hildreth, 81 Cal. 127 ; but see
St. Loui Gas Light Co. r . St. Louis, 86
Mo. 495. A. to what are not separate
causes of action, o that they may be
·tated. in one count, see Rayan v. Day,
4fi Iowa, 239 (two promissory n otes, sed
qn .) ; State v . i\lilwaukee, L. S. & W. Ry.
Co., 45 Wis. 579 (distinct grounds of forfeiture).
1 Spears v. Ward, 48 Ind. 541; Blanchard v. Jefferson, 28 Abb. N. Cas.
236.

[It is held in Connecticut that good
pleading requires the claim or claim for
relief, no matter how mauy count there
may be, to be set out at the end of the
entire complaint: Goo<lrich v. tanton
{1899), 71 Conn. 418, 42 Atl. 74; Baxter
v. Camp (189 ), il Conn. 245, 41 Atl. 803.
In support of the rule stated in the text
see H. B. Claflin Co. v. Simon (1 98), 18
Ttah, 153, 55 Pac. 376.J
2 [In support of this proposition, . ee
Heecl v. Poindexter (1 895), 16 Mout. 294,
40 Pac. 596 ; Leonard v. Robert (1 94),
20 Colo. 88, 36 Pac. 8 0 ; Bas ett v. Shar s
(1893), 63 Conn. 39, 2i Atl. 421; Palmer
1'. Hartford Dredging Co. (1900), 73 Conn.
182, 47 Atl. 125; Finken v . Elm City Bras
Co. (1900), 73 Conn. 423, 47 Atl. 670;
Brown v. Wilcox ( 1900), 73 Conn. I 00, 46

Atl. 27; Goodrich v. Stanton (1899), 71
Conn. 418, 42 Atl. 74; Freema11' Appeal
(1899), 71 Conn. 708, 43 Atl. 185; Oley v.
Miller (1901 ), 74 Conn. 304, 50 Atl. 744;
Wehmhoff v. Rutherford (1895), 9 Ky.
91, 32

s. w.

288.

The practice of setting out the facts in
different form in the se\·eral counts to
meet the exigencies of proof, has been
held proper in the following ca e : Estrella Vineyard Co. v. Butler ( l 99), 125
Cal. 232, 57 Pac. 980; Rucker v. Hall
{1895), 105 Cal. 425, 38 Pac. 962; Bernstein v. Downs (1896), 112 Cal. 19i 44
Pac. fi57; Stockton, etc. Work v. Glens
Falls Ins. Co. (1 98), 121 Cal. 167, 53
Pac. 565; Rinard 1>. Omaha, etc. Ry.
Co. {1901), 164 Mo. 270, 64 S. W. 124;
Willard v. Carrigan (1902), Ariz., 6 Pac.
538; Arm trong v. Penn ( l 9 ), 105 Ga.
229, 31
E. 158; Cawker City Bank
v . Jeu11ings (15393), 89 Ia. 230, 56 I . W.
494.

Cawker City Bank v. Jennings (1 93),
9 Ia. 230, 56 N. W. 494: The fir t count
of plaintiff's petitio11 declared on a promi so ry note executed by defendant to plaintiff. The second count ex pres. ly purported
to set up the ame can e of action, and declared on money advanced and loaned to
the defendant. Hel<l, that the econd
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a general rule, imply as many distinct causes of action actually

held or claimed to be held by the plaintiff.^ It cannot be said,

however, that this rule is absolutely inflexible. As it is one of

convenience simply, it must sometimes yield to the demands of

justice and equit}-. Under peculiar circumstances, when the

exact legal nature of the plaintiff's right and. of the defendant's

liability depends upon facts in the sole possession of the defend-

ant, and which will not be developed until the trial, tlie pLaintiff

may set forth the same single cause of action in varied counts

and ^\ ith differing averments, so as to meet the possible proofs

which will for the first time fully appear on the trial. This

proposition is plainly just and right, and is sustained by the

authority of able courts. ^

§ 468. * 577. Effect of Demurring to Entire Complaint -when

Made up of Several Counts. Joint Demurrers by Two or More

Defendants. When a complaint or petition contains two or more

distinct causes of action, a demurrer to it as a whole, or to all or

some of the causes of action jointly, must fail and be overruled if

any one of the separate causes of action included in the demurrer
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is good; and the same rule applies to separate defences in an

answer.^ The defendant should never demur to an entire corn-

count (lid not set up a new cause of in his complaint two distinct causes of

a gen ral rule impl a many di 'tinct cau e of acti n actu lly
held or claim d to e h ld by the plainti .1 It cannot b aid
it i on f
however that thi rule i ab olutel infl xibl .
con-rnnience simpl · it mu t ometime yi ld to the d mand of
Tn l r peculiar cir um tance wh n th
ju tice and equit ·.
exact 1 gal nature of th plaintiff right and. of th def ndant s
liability depend upon fa t in be ole po s ion of the d .f nd, nt an l \Vhich will not b level p d until the trial th plaintiff
may
forth the am single au e of action in varied count
n l with differing averments, o a o m et the po ible r of
which will for the fir t time fully appear on the trial. Thi
propo ition i plainly ju t and right, and is su tain d by the
au horitj of able ('Ou rt . 2

§ 468. * 577 .

Effect of D emurring to Entire

Made up of Several Counts .

Complaint when

Joint Demurrers by Two or More

action. action — (1) aj^ainst the defendant as a

Where two causes of action are iden- common carrier, and (2) against defeud-

tical, the remedy is not a motion for an ant as a wajehousemau — for the negli-

election but a motion to strike out as sur- gent loss of the goods. This manner of

pi usage : Pollock v. Whijiple (1895), 45 pleading was held proper under the cir-

Neb. 844, 64 N. W. 210.J cnm.^ances, and the plaintiff could not be

1 Sturges V. Burton, 8 Ohio St. 215; compelled to elect on the trial. The sub-

Muzzy V. Ledlie, 23 Wis. 445 ; Lackey ject is exhaustively discussed by Di.xon

r. Vanderbilt, 10 How. Pr. 155; Nash v. C. J., pp. .340-.342. See also Smith t;.

When a complaint or petition contains two or more
distinct causes of action, a demurrer to it 2.s a whole, or to all or
ome of the cau es of action jointly, mu t fail and be overruled if
any one of the separate cause of action included in the demurr r
good; and the same rule applie to separate defences in an
an wer. 3 The defendant should never demur to an en ire comDefendants.

McCauley, 9 Abb. Pr. 159; Sippcrly r. Douglass, 15 Abb. Pr. 266; Jones v.

Troy & R. Tl. Co., 9 How. Pr. 8.3 ; Hillman Palnier, 1 Abb. Pr. 442. And as further

I'. Hillman, 14 How. Pr. 456; Churchill v. examples, Van Brunt r. Mather, 48 Iowa,

Churchill, 9 How. Pr. 552; Ford v. Mat- .503; Pearson v. Milwaukee, etc. R. Co.,

tice, 14 How. Pr 91 ; Dunning v. Thomas, 45 id. 497 ; La Pofnte T. Sup. v. O'Malley,

11 How. Pr. 281; Bishop v. Chicago & 46 Wis. 35; Brinkman r. Hunter, 73 Mo.

N. W. Ry. Co., 67 Wis. 610. 172 ; Cramer v. Oppenstein, 16 Colo. .504 :

2 Whitney r. Chicago &N.W.Ry. Co., Manders v. Craft (Colo. App. 1893), 32

27 Wis. 327,340-342. The plaintiff had Pac. Rep. 836 ; Plummer v. Mold, 22

shipped wool on defendant's road for Minn. 15; Hawley y. Wilkinson, 18 Minn.

Chicago, and it was never delivered. He 525.

did not know whether it had been lost in * Curtis r. Moore, 15 Wis. 134; Jif-

the transit, or had been burned at a fire fersonville, M. & L R, ("o. v. Vaiicant, 40

which had consumed defendnnt's ware- Ind. 233 ; Heavenridge v. Mondy, 34 Lid.

house in Chicago. He therefore set forth 28 ; Hale i;. Omaha Nat. Bank, 49 N. Y.

count <lid not set up a new cau ·e of
action.
Wh ere two cau e of action are identical, the remedy i not a motion for an
election but a motion to trike out a surplu~age: I ollock v . Whi] ple (I 95), 45
)fob. H, 64 . W. 210.J
1
turge v. Burton,
Ohio t. 215;
:.\fozzy r. Le<llie, 23 Wi . 445; Lackey
v. y ·anderbilt, 10 How. Pr. 155 ; ash i>.
McCauley, 9 Abb. Pr. 159; 'ipperly 1-.
Troy & B. R. ~o., 9 How. Pr. 3 · Hillman
t'. Hillman, 14 How. Pr. 456;
hurchill t'.
C'hurchill, 9 How. Pr. 552; Ford v. i\fattice 14 Ilow. Pr. 91; Dunning v. Thoma ,
11 How. Pr. 2 l; Bi hop r. hicago &
-'"· W. Ry. 'o., 67 Wi . 610.
2 Whitney t:.
hicago & . W. Ry. Co.,
27 Wi . 327, 340-342. The plnintiff haJ.
hipped wool ou cl f uclant.' roacl for
hicago, anil it was never del jy r tl. II
did not know whe her it ha<l h n Jo t in
the tran . it, or had Li en liurn <l at
fire
which had on um d d f ndnut' warehou.e in 'hicago. lfo therefore et Lorch

in his complaint two di tinct cau e of
action - {l) a"'ain t the defendaut a a
common carrier, and (2) again t def udant as a w~ehou eman - for the negligent lo of the good . Thi manner of
pleading wa held proper under the circum. tance , and the plaintiff could not be
compelled to le t on the trial. The ubject i exhau tively di cu ed by Dixon
. J., pp. 3~0-342.
ee al o mith v.
D ouglas , 15 Abb.
r. 266; J one v.
l: al mer, l A hb. Pr. 442. And a~ further
example , an Brunt r. Mather, 4 fo,va,
503; Pear on v. Iilwaukee, etc. R.
.,
45 id. 497; La Pointe T. up. v. 'Mall y,
46 \Vi . 35; Brinkman v. Hunter, 73 l\10.
172 ; ra111 r v. ppen t in, 16
Jo . 504:
fander v. raft ( ol . A pp. 1 93), 3:2
l: a . Rep. 3 ; l lu mmer v. Mold, 22
Iino. 15; llawley v. Wilkin ·on, l l\1iuu .
525.
8
urti v. foore, l :fer onville, M. & I. R.
Ind. 2:3.3; Il eav nridg v.
2 ; Hale v. maha Nat.

Wis. 134; Jef. l..'. au ant, 4
Moncly, 34 Iu l.
Bank, 49 . Y.
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plaint or petition consisting of several distinct causes of action,

nor to two or more causes of action jointly, unless he is certain

that they are all insufficient; and, under all circumstances, it is

the better and safer practice to demur in express terms to each

separately, for each will then stand or fall upon its own merits.^

The same rule also applies to a demurrer for want of sufficient

facts by two- or more defendants jointly ; it will be overruled as

to all who unite in it if the complaint or petition states a good

626, 630 ; Ward v. Guyer, 3 N. Y. S. C. 58 ;

Alexander ?•. Thacker, 30 Neb. 614 ; Pin-

kum V. P]au Claire, 81 Wis. 301 ; Silvers v.

JuDCtiou K. Co., 43 lud. 435, 442, 445. In

plaint or petition con isting of everal di tin t cau
of action,
n r to tw or more cau ' of action jointly, unl ·
is ·ertain
that th y are all insuffici nt; and, under all ircum tanc , it is
the better ?-n<l af r I ractice to demur in expr ss term to each
eparat ly, for ach will then stand or fall upon it own m rits. 1
The ame rule al o appli to a demurrer for want of ufficient
facts by two• or more def ntlants jointly; it will b oy rruled a
to all who unite in it if the complaint or petition tates a good

•

the last case the question arose on a

reply which contained several paragraphs

or defences. The defendant demurred

as follows ; '"Now conies the defendant

and demurs to the second, third, and

fourth paragraphs of the plaintiff's reply,

Generated for facpubupdates (University of Michigan) on 2014-06-17 15:34 GMT / http://hdl.handle.net/2027/uc2.ark:/13960/t02z1c23b
Public Domain / http://www.hathitrust.org/access_use#pd

upon the following grounds: Fiisl, said

second paragraph does not ^ state facts

sufficient, etc. ; second, said third para-

graph does not state facts, etc. ; third, said

fourth paragraph does not," etc. This

demurrer was held to be joint, and not

several ; and the rule of the text was en-

forced. The opinion carefully discusses

the question, what language makes a de-

murrer or an answer joint, and what sev-

eral, citing on this topic Lane v. State,

7 Ind. 426 ; Earner v. Morehead, 22 Ind.

354 ; Jewett !-. Honey Creek Draining

Co., 39 Ind. 245; Parlier v. Thomas. 19

Ind. 213 ; Fankboner v. Fankbouer, 20

Ind. 62 ; Aiken v. Bruen, 21 Ind. 137 ;

Hume V. Dessar, 29 Ind. 112. The follow-

ing cases are further illustrations of both

branches of the rule, — a demurrer to all

the causes of action or defences, and a de-

murrer by the defendants jointly : Collier

V. Erwin, 2 Mont. 335 ; Dann v. Gibson,

9 Neb. 513; Hyde r. Kenosha Cy. Sup,

43 Wis. 129; American Button-hole, etc.

Co. I'. Gurnee, 44 id. 49 ; Lamon >•. Hackett,

49 id. 261 ; Schiffer v. Eau Claire, 51 id.

385 ; Stanford v. Davis, 54 Ind. 45 ; Wil-

kerson 2\ liust, 57 id. 172; Romine v.

Romine, 59 id. 346; Price v. Sanders,

60 id. 310; Carter v. Zenblin, 68 id. 436 ;

Parman u. Chamberlain, 74 id. 82 ; Shafer

V. State, 49 id. 460, and cases cited ; Kelsey

V. Henrv, 48 id. 37.

[^Raymond v. Wathen (1895), 142 Ind-

367, 41 N. E. 815 ; Palmer v. Breed (1896),

Ariz., 43 Pac. 219; Mayors. Smith (1900),

111 Ga. 870, 36 S. E. 955 ; Harris County

V. Brady (1902), 115 Ga. 767, 42 S. E. 7l";

Pryor v. Brady (1902), 115 Ga. 848, 42

S. E. 223 ; Kearney Stone Works r. Mc-

Pherson (1894), 5 Wyo. 178, 38 Pac. 920;

Florence v. Pattillo (1898), 105 Ga. 577,

32 S. E. 642 ; Brake v. Payne (1893), 137

Ind. 479,37 N. E. 140; Rownd v. State

(1898), 152 Ind. 39. 51 N. E. 914; A. E.

Johnson Co. v. White (1899), 78 Minn.

48, 80 N. W. 838; Barbre v. Goodale

(1896), 28 Ore. 465, 43 Pac. 378 ; Asevado

V. Orr (1893), 100 Cal. 293, 34 Pac. 777;

Hurst V. Sawyer (1894), 2 Okla. 470, 37

626, 630; Ward v. Guyer, 3 N. Y. . C. 5 ;
[Raymond v. Wathen (I 95), 142 Ind·
Alexander v. Thacker, 30 :reb. 614; Pin- 367, 4 1 N. E. 15; Palmer r. Breed (1896),
k um v. Eau Claire, 81 Wis. 301; Silvers v. Ariz., 43 Pac. 219; Mayor v. rnith (1900),
Junction K Co., 43 lud. 435, 442, 4-1-5. In 111 Ga. iO, 36 S. E. 955; Harri· Cou ntv
the la t ca e the question arose on a v. Brady (1902), 115 Ga. 767, -1-2,. E. 71. ;
reply which contained everal paragraphs Pryor 11 . Brady (1902), 115 Ga. 4 , 42
ur defences. The defendant demurred S. E. 22.'3 ; Kearney t:ltone W ork r. Mcas follo ws: " 'No w comes the defendant Pherson ( 1 9-1-), 5 Wyo. 178, 3 Pac. 920;
and demurs to th~ second, third, and Florence v. Pattillo (1 98), 10- Ga. 577,
fo urth paragraphs of the plaintiff's reply, 32 S. E. 642; Brake v. Payne (1 '93) , 137
upon the following g round : Fi:rst, said Ind. 4i9, 31 N. E. 1-10; Rownd v. tate
econd paragraph does not , tate facts (l 98), 152 Ind. 39, 51 N. E. 914; A. E.
. uffieient, etc.; second, aid third para- J ohnson Co. v. White (1899), 78 Minn.
graph does not state facts, etc.; third, said 48, 0 N. W. 838; Barbre v. Goodale
founh paragraph does not," etc. This ( 1896), 28 Ore. -165, 43 Pac. 378; Asevado
demurrer was held to be joint, and not v. Orr ( 1893), I 00 Cal. 293, 34 Pac. 77 i ;
several; and the rule of th e text was en- Hurst v. Sawyer (1894), 2 Okla. 470, 37
forced. The opinion carefully di cu . es Pac. 817; Hanenkratt v. Ha mil (1900). 10
the que tion, what language makes a de- Okla 219, 61 Pac. 1050; Carter v. Wann
murrer or an answer joint, and what sev- (1 899), Idaho, 57 Pac. 314; Corns v.
entl, citing on this topi c Lane v. State, Clouser (1893), 137 Ind. 201, 36 N. E.
7 Tnd. 426; Barner v . Moreh ead, 22 Intl. 8-1-8; Lake Erie & W. R. R. Co. i·. Char354; Jewett i-. Honey Creek Draining man (1903), - Ind.-, 67 . E. 923.
It was held in Maynard i. ·waidlich
C'o., 39 Ind. 245; Parker v. Thomas, 19
Ind. 213; Fankboner v. Fankboner, 20 (1900), 156 Ind . 562, 60 N. E. 348, that a
Intl . 62; Aiken v. Bruen, 21 Ind. 137; demurrer as follows: "The defendant,
Hume v . D essar, 29 Ind. 112. The follow- Harriet Maynard, demurs to the econd,
ing case are further illustration of both third, and fonrth paragraphs of plaintiff'~
branches of the rule, - a elem urrer to all r eply to the second paragraph of the anthe cause of action or defences, and a de- swer of the said defendant, and say that
murrer by the defendants jointly: Collier neither of said paragraphs of said reply
v. Erwin, 2 Mont. 335; Dann v. Gibson, states facts sufficient to avoid said an wer,"
9 Neb. 513 ; Hyde v. Ken osha Cy. Sup, is joint and not several.]
1 Durkee v. City Bk. of Keno ha, 13
43
i . 129; Am erican Button-h ole, etc.
Co. n. Gurnee, 44 id. 49; Lamon 1• . Hackett, Wi s. 216, 222; Terre Haute & L. R. Co. v.
49 id. 261 ; Schiffer v. Eau Claire, 51 id. Sherwood, 132 Ind. 129; Gla v. Murphy
3 5; Stanford v. Davis, 54 Ind. 45; Wil- (Ind. App. 1892), 30 N. E. Rep. 1097.
ker.on 1•. Hut, 57 id. 172 ; Romine v .
[Bu t a demurrer doe not lie to a single
Romin e, 59 id. 346; Price v. Sanders, paragraph of a com plaint unle sit purports
60 i<l. 310; Carter v. Zenblin, 68 id. 436; to present a complete cause of action :
Farman v. Chamberlain, 7-! id. 82; hafer Lowman v. We t (1 94}, 8 Wa h. 355,
v. tate, 49 id. 460, and cases cited ; Kelsey 36 Pac. 268.]
v. Henry, 48 id. 37.
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cause of action against even one of tliem.^ A different rule,

however, prevails in some States. ^

§ 469. * 578. Admission by Failure to deny. It is expressly

provided in all the codes, that material allegations of the com-

plaint or petition not controverted by the answer are admitted,

and they need not be proved; the same is of course true of aver-

ments expressly admitted. A denial of the legal conclusion,

such as the indebtedness, while the answer is silent with respect

to the i-ssuable facts from which the conclusion follows, is a mere

nullity, and raises no issue. ^ What averments are material, and

are thus admitted unless controverted, is a question of law to be

decided by the court, and not by the jury.* The result just

mentioned does not arise from a failure to deny immaterial alle-

gations ; such statements are not issuable, and their truth is not

conceded for the purposes of the trial l)y the defendant's neglect

1 McGonigal r. .Colter, .32 Wis. 614;

Webster v. Tibbits, 19 Wis. 438; Shore v.

Taylor, 46 lud. 34.') ; Owen v. Cooper, 46
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Ind. 524. See al.so Benedict v. Farlow,

lud. App. 160; Couant v. Barnard, 103

N. C. 315; Murdock v. Cox, 118 Ind. 266.

([Hirsheld i-. Weill (1898), 121 Cal. 13,

au e f acti n agarn t even on of them. 1 A different rule,
howeYer preYai ~ in om
tate . 2
469. * -7 . Admission by Failure to deny.
It
pr ly
pro ·ided in all he code , th t material all gation of th complaint or p ti t i n not c ntroverted by the an ~ er ar' admitted
' and they need not be proved; the ame i of cour e tru of a erxpre 1. a lmitted .
enial f th l gal nclu ion
men
uch a th ind btedne , while he an wer i sil nt wi.th respe t
which the conclli i n f llow , i a mere
to th i Uc bl fact fr
nullity an 1 ra.i ' no i ue. 3 vVha averment are material, and
are t hu admitted unles controv rt d, is a question of law to be
decided by the c urt, and not by the jury. 4 The result ju t
mention d d e not ari e from a failure to deny immaterial all gation ; uch tatements are not is uable an l their truth i not
conceded for the purpo e of the trial by the d fendant s n gle t

m

53 Pac. 402 ; Dalrymple v. Security Loan

Co. (1900), 9 N. D. 306, 83 N. W. 245;

Mark Paine Lumber Co. v. Improvement

Co. (1896), 94 Wis. 322, 68 N. W. 1013 ;

Miller V. Rapp (1893), 135 Ind. 614, 34

N. E. 981; Frankel v. Garrard (1903), —

Ind. — , 66 N. E. 687; Evans v. Fall

River County (1896), 9 S. D. 1.30,68 N. W.

195 ; Palmer v. Bank of Zumbrota (1896),

65 Minn. 90, 67 N. W. 893 ; Burr r. Brant-

ley (1893), 40 S. C. 538, 19 S. E. 199;

Stahn V. Catawlia Mills (1898), 53 S. C.

519, 31 S. E. 498; Asevado v. Orr (1893),

100 Cal. 293, 34 Pac. 777 ; Rogers v.

Scbulenburg (1896), 111 Cal. 281,43 Pac.

899, citing tiie text ; Stiles i'. City of

Guthrie (1895), 3 Okla. 26,41 Pac. 383 ;

Neal V. Bleckley (1897), 51 S. C. 506, 29

S. E. 249.

And similarly, a joint motion, if not

good as to all, should be dismi.ssed : Leon-

hardt v. Citizens' Bank (1898), 56 Neb. 38,

76 N. W. 472; Cortelyou i-. McCarthy

(1898), .53 Neb. 479, 73 K W. 921 ; Car.son

V. Fears (1893), 91 Ga. 482, 17 S. E. .342.

Where several defendants demur

" jointly, as well as separately and sever-

ally, to tlie first, second, and third para-

graphs of the complaint, and to each of

them separately," licld, that it is a sepa-

rate demurrer as to the paragraphs of the

complaint but joint as to the parties, cit-

ing Carver v. Carver, 97 Ind. 497 : Arm-

strong L\ Dunn (1895), 143 Ind. 433, 4L

N. E. 540.

A separate demurrer by one of several

joint defendants must be considered as

though the demurrant were the sole de-

fendant : Frankel ;•. Garrard (1903),—

Ind. — , 66 N. E. 687 ; Cummings ;•. Town

of Lake Realty Co. (1893), 86 Wis. 382,

57 N. W. 43]

2 Wood V. Olney, 7 Nev. 109. Tlie de-

murrer was sustained as to some, and

overruled as to the others.

3 Skinner v. Clute, 9 Nev. 342 ; Jen-

1 :\lcGonigal t• .• Colter, 3 2 Wi . 614 ;
ally, to the fir t, econd, and third paraWeb. ter v. Ti bbit, 19 Wis. 43 ; hore v. g raph of the co mplaint, ancl to ach of
T aylor, 46 Ind. 345; Owen 1:. Cooper, 46 th em ~epara t ly," held, th at it i a epaInd . 524 .
ce a l ·o Benedict v. Farlow, rate demurrer a to th e parag raph of the
Ind. App. 160; onant v. Barnarcl, 103 complaint but joint as to the parti , cit. C. 3 l 5 ; Murdock v. Cox, 11 Ind . 266. ing arv er v. Carver, 97 Ind. 497: Arm[ flir held v . Weill (1 9 ), 121 Cal. 13, ·rroog v . Dunn ( 1895), 143 Ind. 433, 4l
53 Pac. 402 ; Dalrymple v. ecnrity L oan N. E . 540.
Co. (1900), 9 N. D . 306, 3 N. W. 245;
A eparate demurrer by oue of everal
Mark Pain e Lu mber Co. v. Improvement joint defen dant mu t be con ider cl a
Co. ( 1 96), 94 Wi . 322, 6
. W. 1013; though the demurrant wer the ole d ·
Miller v. Rapp (1 93), 135 Ind. 614, 34 fendant: Frankel v . Garrard (1903), . E. 9 l ; Frankel v. Garrard (1903), Ind. -, 66 . E . 687; umming v. Town
I ncl. - , 66 X. E. 6 7 ; E van v. F all of Lake R ealty Co. (1 93), ti Wi . 3 2,
R iver County ( 1 96 ), 9 . D. 130, 6 N. W. 57 . w. 43.J
195; Palmer v. Bank of Zumbrota (l 96},
2 Wood v. Olney, 7 Nev. 109. The de65 ~[i un. 90, 67 ... W . 93; Bur r v.Brant- murrer was u tain ed a to ome, ancl
ley {l 93 ), 40
. 53 , 19 . E. 199; overruled as t o the others.
3
kinn er v. lute, 9 -e,·. 342 ; J entahn v. atawba Mill (189 ), 53 . C.
519, 31 . E. 49 ; Aseyado v. rr ( 1893), kins v. . 0 . re Dr ing Co., 6 •
al. 293, 34 Pac. 77 ; Roger v. 563.
ec al o T rapnall v. Hill, 31 Ark .
100
•'chulenLuro- ( 1 96), 111 al. 2 1, 43 Pa . 345 ; 1ohr v. Barn ., 4 ol. 350; Dole v.
99, citing the text;
ti le. v. City of
urceig h, l Da le 22 7 ; Kan
ity Ilot 1
o. r;. auer, 65 l\[o. 279; Bonham t• .
Guthrie {1 95), 3 Okla. 26, 41 Pac. 3 3;
... -eal v. Bleckley (1 97), 51 . C. 5013, 29 Craig, 4
. 224 ; Ben ley v. M. ~Iil
•• . E. 249.
lan, 49 Io wa, 517; Al ton v. Wil on,. 44
.And imilarly, a joint motion, if not id. 130; ' llows v. Web b, 43 id. 133;
good a to all, l1ould be cl ismi ·ed: Leon- Blake v J ohn. on y. om'r. , etc., 1 Kan.
har<lt i• . itizeu 'Bank ( 1 9 ), 56 eb. 3 , 266; Wand v . cl10 1 Di t ., 19 id . 2 4;
7 6 _'. W. 47 2 ;
ortelyo u v. .de arthy Murray v. N. Y . L. Iu .
., 5 . Y . 2:rn ,
( 1 9 ), 53 ... Teb. 479 , 7.'3 . W. 921 ; ar on 239; Lange v. en t!i t, i3 id. 12 ; fad1
v. •ear {l 9:3), 9 1 a. 4 2, 17 . E . .342.
. Pug h, 43 Wi . 507; Tracy v . raig, 55
W' h re
·everal defe udants demur
al. 91.
"jointly, as well as eparately and sever4 Becker v. Crow, 7 Bu h, 19 .
T.

FORM OF THE COMPLAINT OR PETITION. 663

#

to controvert them. In this class are included all species of im-

material and non-issuable matter, such as details of evidence,

conclusions of law, and averments of time, place, value, amount,

and the like, in all ordinary circumstances.^ An important

question presents itself in this connection as to the effect of a

qualified admission contained in the defendant's answer, and the

decisions in respect to it are somewhat conflicting. The rule is

settled by one group of cases, that when the answer expressly

admits certain material averments of the complaint or petition,

but at the same time accompanies this concession with the state-

ment of affirmative matter in explanation and qualification by the

way of defence, the plaintiff may avail himself of the admissions

without the qualifications ; he is not bound to take the defend-

ant's entire statement; he is freed from the necessity of proving

his own averments that are admitted, while the defendant must

prove those which he sets up.^ Other cases seem to lay down

a different rule, denying to the plaintiff the full benefit of the

admission, and requiring him to accept it, if at all, with the
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defendant's qualifying matter.^ When different defendants have

put in separate answers, an admission by one cannot be used

against the others ; * and the same doctrine extends to separate

defences of one party in a single answer; the admissions in a

defence of confession and avoidance do not overcome the effect

of a denial contained in another.^

§ 470. * 579. Defective Complaint Aided by Averments in

Answer. A defective complaint or petition may be supple-

mented, and substantial issues may thus be presented by the

answer itself.** When the plaintiff has failed to state material

1 Doyle V. Franklin, 48 Cal. 537, 539 ; 19 Wis. 350 ; Farrell v. Heuuesy, 21 Wis.

Gates V. Salmon, 46 Cal. 361, 379 (evi- 632.

dence) ; Chicago & S. W. R. Co. v. N. W. » Troy & R. R. Co. v. Kerr, 17 Barb.

U. Packet Co., 38 Iowa, 377, 382 (value 581. As to the effect of admissions, see

of goods) ; People y. Marlboro' H. Com'rs, also Simmons v. Law, 8 Bosw. 213; 3

54 N. Y. 276, 279 (conclusion of law). Keyes, 217 ; Paige y. Willett, 38 N. Y. 31 ;

See also Sands v. St. John, 36 Barb. 628 ; Tell v. Beyer, 38 N. Y. 161 ; Robbins v.

23 How. Pr. 140 ; Fry v. Bennett, 5 Sandf. Codman, 4 E. D. Smith, 325.

54 : Newman r. Otto, 4 Sandf. 668 ; Oechs * Swift v. Kingsley, 24 Barb. 541;

r. Cook, 3 Duer, 161 ; Harlow v. Hamil- Troy & R. R. Co. v. Kerr, 17 Barb. 581,

ton, 6 How. Pr. 473 ; Connoss v. Meir, 2 599.

E. D. Smith, 314 ; Mayor, etc. of Albany ' ^ Vassear i'. Livingston, 13 N. Y. 256;

^. Cunliff, 2 N. Y. 165,171. . 4 Duer, 285 ; Ay res v. Covill, 18 Barb.

- Dickson v. Cole, 34 Wis. 621, 626, 264; 9 How. Pr. 573.

€27 ; Sexton v. Rhames, 13 Wis. 99 ; Hart- ^ QState ex rel. v. Thum (1898), Idaho,

well V. Page, 14 Wis. 49; Orton v. Noonan 55 Pac. 858. But a complaint demurred
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facts, so that no cause of action is set forth, but these very facts

are supplied by the averments of the answer, the omission is

immaterial, and the defect is cured. ^ This rule should properly

be confined to the case where the answer affirmatively alleges the

very fact that is missing from the complaint ;2 but it has in some

instances been enforced, although the answer simply contained a

denial of the necessary fact which should have been averred by

the plaintiff.3 ^ statement in the reply, however, of a fact which

to ore tenns at the trial cannot be aided by

the answer : Wisconsin Lakes Ice Co. v.

Ice Co. (1902), 115 Wis. .377, 91 X. W. 988.

i

l>
y

hat no cau e of ac ion · s t forth, but th se Yery t t
of th an w r, the omi i n i
Thi rul hould r l rl
wh r the an w r affirmati ly all ;
mi ' in fr m the c m._laiot; 2 but it has in me
nforced although h an wer simply contain cl a
nece ary fact which haul 1 hav b en a rr d by
1, intiff.3 A ta ement in the r I ly, hm eyer of a fact which

In Shute v. Austin (1897), 120 N. C.

440, 27 S. E. 90, the conrt said : " The doc-

trine of aider can only be invoked in aid

of a defective statement of a good cause

of action ; but cannot be used to aid the

statement of a bad or defective cause of

action." See also Harrison v. Garrett
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(1903), 132 N. C. 172, 43 S. E. 594.

1 I^Ricketts v. Hart (1899), 150 Mo. 64,

51 S. W. 825; Doerner v. Doerner (1901),

ICl Mo. 407, 61 S. W. 802 ; Casler v. Chase

(1901), 160 Mo. 418, 60 S. W. 1040; Og-

den V. Ogden (1894), 60 Ark. 70, 28 S. W.

796; Ware v. Long (1902), Ky., 69 S. W.

797 ; Louisville, etc. R. R. Co. v. Pittman

(1901), Ky., 64 S. W. 460; Daggett v.

Gray (1895), 110 Cal. 169, 42 Pac. 568;

Shively v. Semi-Tropic Land Co. (1893),

99 Cah 259, 33 Pac. 848, quoting the text ;

Crowder v. McDonnell (1898), 21 Mont.

367, 54 Pac. 43; Beebe v. Latimer (1899),

59 Neb. 305, 80 N. W. 904; Hess v. Adler

(1900), 67 Ark. 444, 55 S. W. 843; Rail-

way Officials, etc. Ass'n. v. Drummond

(1898), 56 Neb. 235, 76 N. W. 562.

Wiiere a material fact is omitted from

a complaint, and such fact is found in a

special finding, this will not cure the com-

plaint: Goodwine f. Cadwallader (1901),

158 Ind. 202, 61 N. E. 939; Cleveland,

etc. Ry. Co. v. Parker (1899), 154 Ind. 153,

56 N. E. 85.

Where a complaint states facts only

infereutially, an admission of such facts

in the answer will be considered, for juris-

dictional purposes, in aid of tlie complaint :

Lockhart v. Hear (1895), 117 N. C. 298,

23 S. E. 484. Wiierc defendant, by its

answer, shows tliat it understands the

nature of a claim set forth defectively in

tlie c<jnij)laint, tliere is no reason why it

should be surpri.«ed or injured by trying

the issues raised by tlie pleadings : White-

ley V. Southern Ry. Co. (1896), 119 N. C-

724, 25 S. E. 1018.]

2 {In Vanalstine v. Whelan (1901), 135

Cal. 232, 67 Pac. 1 25, a material averment

was omitted in the complaint, and a denial

of the saitl omitted averment was con-

tained in the answer. It was claimed l)y

the jdaintiff that the defect was cured by

the answer. The court said : " The prin-

ciple is, that an omission of a material

fact is cured by the express averment of

that very fact in the defendant's pleadings.

But there is nothing of the kind in the

case at bar. The contention of respon-

hould be urpri ed r injur d by trying
to ore tenr1 at the trial cannot be aided by
the an wer : 'Yi con in Lake Ice o. v. the i ue rai ed by the pl ading : WhiteIc
. {1902) 115 Wi. 3'ii, 91 N. W. 9 . ley v. outh ru Ry.Co.(196), 119L.
Iu hue v. u tin (1 97), 120 N. C. 724, 25 ' . E. 101 .]
2 [In anal tine v. Whelan (1901), 135
440, 27 . E. 90, the court aicl: 'The doctrine of aid r can only be inYoked in aid Cal. 232, 67 Pa·. 1 :2:) a material a erm nt
of a d fe tive tatement of a good cau e wa omitted iu the roroplaint, aud ad uial
of a tion; but cannot be u ed to aid the of the aid omitt d averment wa ontatemeut of a bad or defective cau e of tain d in the an wer. It wa · claim tl by
action. '
ee al o Harri on v. Garrett th plaintiff that the defect wa ur d by
the an w r. The ourt aid: "The prin(1903), 132 . l . C. 172, 43 S. E. 594.
ciple i , that au omi ion of a material
i [Rickett v. Hart {1899), 150 Mo. 64,
51 . \V. 25; Doerner v. Doerner (1901), fact i cured b the expre averm nt of
161Mo.407, 61 S. W. 802; Caler v. Chase that very fact in the defendant' pl adiug .
(1901), 160Mo. 41, 60S. W. 1040; g- But there i · nothing of the kind in the
a
at bar. The contention of r ponden v. Ogden {1894), 60 Ark. 70, 28 S. W.
796; Ware v. Long (1902), Ky., 69 . W. dent r t on the fact that defendant ,
797; Loui ville, etc. R. R. Co. v. Pittman iu their an .. wers, ay, among other thing ,
(1901), Ky., 6-t S. W. 460; Daggett v. that the plaintiff was not the owner or enGray (1 95), llO Cal. 169, 42 Pac. 568; titled to the po s ion of the good at th
, hively v. emi-Tropic Land Co. ( 1893), time all ged in the omp1aint, 'or at any
99 al. 259, 33 Pac. 848, quoting the text; other tim ,' which, it is aid, included the
Crowder v. McDonnell (1898), 21 Mont. time of the commencement of the a ti n.
36 7, 5-i Pac. 43; Beebe v. Latim er {l 99), But that i · the very conver e of the av r59 Neb. 305, O N. W. 904; He v. Adler ment whi h re pondent ought t ha,·e
(1900), 67 Ark. 444, 55 S. W. -13; Rail- made in hi complaint, - namely, that at
way fficial , etc. A s'n. v. Drummond the time of the omm ncement of the ac( l 9 ), 56 Neb. 235, 76 N. W. 562.
tion he was the owner, etc. The judgWhere a material fact i omitted from ment mu t therefore be r ver ed for the
a complaint, and uch fact is found in a in ufficiP.ncy of the complaint."
al o
pecial finding , tbi. will n t cure the com- Wind or v. Miner (1 99) 12+ al. 492, 57
plaint: oodwine v. adwallader (1901), Pac. 3 6. Both the e ca e
em at vari15 lad. 20- 61 . E. 939; Cleveland, ance with Vance v. nder on ( 1 96), 113
tc. Ry. o. v. Park r (1 99), 154 Ind. 153, Cal. 532, -!5 ac. 16. In N e u. Bill ye
5G ~ . E. 6.
1ining o. (1903) 42 Ore. 560, 71 Pac.
'• her a complaint states facts only 1043, it wa held that an an wer con i ti.1ferentially, an aclmi i n f uch fa ts ing f p cific deni l only ·annot aid a
111 the au wer will b
·on id red, for juri - complaint.]
clictioual purpos . , in aid of the c mpl int:
a ayton In .
v. K lley, 24 Ohio
Lockhart v. Bear (I 95 ), 117 N. C. 29 ,
t. 345, 357; :[ill r v. \\bit , 6 . Y.
23 , ·. E. 4 4. Wh ere d fendaut, by it
. C. 255; Garr tt v. Tr tt r, 65
an:w r, show that it uncler tand the 430 432; Bat v.
raham, 11 . Y. 237;
JHltur of a ·laim et forth d fectively in J,oui vill &
anal
v. Murph ' 9
th complaint, th re is no re on hy it Bu h, 522, 5-9 (a simpl <l nial iu tho
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ought to have been alleged in the complaint or petition, is not

sufficient, and does not cure the defect.^

§ 471. * 580. Prayer for Relief.^ The prayer for relief is gen-

erally regarded as forming no part of the cause of action, ^ and as

having no effect upon it, and as furnishing no test or criterion

answer) ; but see Scofield v. Whitelegge,

49 N. Y. 259, 261, which expres.sly holds

ought to have been alleg d in the complaint or p titian, is not
suf-ftcient, and does not cure th d fect. 1
§ 471. * 5 0. Prayer for Relief.2 The prayer for reli f i g nerally regard d as forming no part of the cau c f action, 3 an<l as
having no ff t ur on it, and as furnishing no test r criterion

that a denial merely in the answer is

not sufficient; Shartle v. Minneapolis, 17

Minn. 308, 312. See also De la Mar v.

Hurd, 4 Col. 442; Herschficld v. Aiken,

3 Mont. 442 ; Haggard v. Wallen, 6 Neb.

271 ; Worthley's Adm. v. Hammond, 13

Bush, 510; Quaid i'. Cornwall, 13 id. 601 ;

Howland Coal, etc. Works v. Brown, 13

id. 681; Grigsby v. Barr, 14 id. 330;

Pearce v. Mason, 78 N. C. 37; Goff v.

Outagamie Cy. Sup., 43 Wis. 55 ; Kretser
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(". Carey, 52 id. 374 ; Wiles v. Lambert,

66 Ind. 494; Allen v. Chouteau, 102 Mo.

309 ; Donaldson v. Butler Cy., 98 Mo. 163 ;

Henry v. Sneed, 99 Mo. 407 ; Cohen v.

Knox, 90 Cal. 266 ; Hegard v. Cal. Ins.

Co. (Cal., June, 1886), II Pac. Rep. 594 ;

Schenk v. Hartford F. Ins. Co., 71 Cal.

28; Cohu v. Husson, 113 N. Y. 662;

Sengf elder v. Mut. Ins. Co. of N. Y., 31

Pac. Rep. (Wash., 1893) 428.

[^Vance v. Anderson (1896), 113 Cal.

532, 45 Pac. 816; City of Louisville v.

Snow's Adm'r (1900), 107 Ky. 536, 54

S. W. 860; Main v. Ray (1900), Ky., 57

S. W. 7 ; Western Union Tel. Co. v. Par-

sons (1903), Ky., 72 S. W. 800. An an-

swer which assumes that the complaint

contains an allegation, supplies tlie omis-

sion of it: Lynch v. Beciitel (1897), 19

Mont. 548, 48 Pac. 1112. And where a

complaint is merely ambiguous, an answer

which clears up the ambiguity cures the

defect: Hamilton v. Great P'alls Ry. Co.

(1895), 17 Mont. 334, 42 Pac. 860]

1 Webb V. Bidwell, 15 Minn. 479,

485.

^But where plaintiff omitted certain

essential allegations from his petition, and

defendant alleged the absence of such

omitted f.acts, and plaintiff filed a reply

denying the averments of the answer, an

issue was thereby raised as to the omitted

facts : Chesapeake & Ohio R. R. Co. v.

Thieman (189.5), 96 Ky. 507, 29 S. W. 357.

So, also, a reply may aid a defective coun-

ter-claim: Gaskins r. Davis (1894), 115

N. C. 85, 20 S. E. 188.

But in Water Supply, etc. Co. v. Lari-

mer, etc. Co. (1898), 25 Colo. 87, 53 Pac.

386, the court said : " A defective com-

plaint may be aided, and omissions sup-

plied, by the answer, or an allegation in

the replication, if acquiesced in."]

- ^Farwell Co. v. Lykins (1898), 59

Kan. 9C), 52 Pac. 99 ]

^ [[Therelief to be granted depends upon

the facts alleged and proved and not upon

the prayer for relief : Dennison v. Chap-

man (1895), 105 Cal. 447, 39 Pac. 61 ; Ru-

tenic V. Hamaker (1902), 40 Ore. 444, 67

answer) ; but ee cofield v. Whitelegge,
4-9 r . Y. 259, 26 1, which exp ressly l1ulds
that a denial merely in the a11swer is
not uffici en t; hartl e v. Minneapolis, 1 7
Mino. 30 , 3 12. See al o De la Mar v.
Hurd, 4 Col. 442; Hersc hfi eld v. Aiken,
3 Mont. 4-4-2; Haggard v . Wallen, 6 1 eb.
271; Worthle.y's Adm. v. Hammond, 13
Bush, 510; Quaid v. Cornwall, 13 id . .60 1 ;
Howland Coal, etc. Works v. Brown, 13
id. 681; Grigsby v. Barr, 14 id. 330;
Pearce v. Mason, 78 N. C. 37; Goff v .
utagamie Cy. Sup., 43 Wis. 55; Kretser
c. arey, 52 id. 374; Wiles v. Lambert,
66 Ind. 494; Allen v. Chouteau, 102 Mo.
309 ; Donaldson v. Butler Cy., 98 Mo. 163 ;
Henry v. need, 99 Mo. 407 ; Cohen i•.
Knox , 90 Cal. 266 ; H egard v . Cal. Ins.
Co. (Cal.,.Tune, 1886 ), 11 Pac. Rep . 594;
Schen k v . Hartford F. Ins. Co., 71 Cal.
28; Cohu v. Husson, 113 N. Y. 662;
Sengfelder v. Mut. Ins. Co. of N. Y ., 31
Pac. Rep. (Wash., 1893) 428.
[Vance v. Anderson (1896), 113 Cal.
532, 45 Pac. 816; City of L ouisYille v.
Snow's Adm'r ( 1900), 107 Ky. 536, 54
S. W. 860; Main v. Ray {1900), Ky., 57
S. W . 7; W estern Union T el. Co. v. Parsons (1903), Ky., 72 S. W. 800. An answer which assumes that the co mplaint
con tains an allegation, supplies th e omis·ion of it : Lynch v. Bechtel ( l 97 ), 19
Mont. 548J 48 Pac. 1112. And wh ere a
complaint is merely ambiguous, an answer
which clears up the ambiguity cu res the
defect: Hamilton v. Great l?alls R y. Co.
( 1895 ), 17 Mont. 334, 42 Pac. 86 0.J
1 Webb v. Bidwell, 15 Minn. 4 79,
485 .

[But where plaintiff omitted certain
e. ential allegati ons from his petition, and
defendant alleged the ab ence of such
omitted facts, and pl aintiff filed a r eply
denying the arnrments of the answer, an
issue was thereby raised as to the omitted
facts : Chesapeake & Ohio R. R. Co. v.
Thieman (1895), 96 Ky. 507, 29 S. W. 357.
So, also, a reply may aid a defective coun-

ter-claim: Ga kin
(l 94), 115
'. 85, 20 ~- E. l
But in Water upply, etc. o. v. Larimer, etc. Co. ( t 9 ), 25 olo. 7, 53 Pac.
3 6, the court said: "A defective complaint may be ailled, anll omi · ions upplied, by the answ r, or an allegation in
the replication, if a ·qui e:ce<l in."]
2 [ Farwell
o. v. Ly kins ( 1898), 59
Kan. 96, 52 Pac. 99 J
a [ The r elief to be granted depends upon
the facts alleged and proved and not upon
the prayer for relief: D enni on v. Chapman {1895), 105 Cal. 447, 39 Pac. 61 ; Rutenic v. Hamaker (1902), 40 Ore. 444, 67
Pac. 192; Hendon v. orth Carolina R. R.
Co. (1900 ), 127 N. C. 110, 37 S. E. 155 ;
Adams v. H ayes ( l 89i), 120 N. C. 383, 27
S. E. 47 ; Gilla m v. Life Ins. Co. ( l 97),
121 N. C. 369, 28 S. E. 470; Stubblefield
v. Gadd {1901) , 112 Ia. 681, 84 N. W. 917;
McClure v. La Plata Co unty (1 896), 23
Colo. 130, 46 Pac. 677; Miller v. Happ
( 1893 ), 13.5 Ind. 614, 34 N. E. 981; State
ex rel. v. Horton , etc. Co. (1 90 1), 161 Mo.
664, 61 S. W. 869; Sherrin v. Flinn (1900),
15 5 Ind. 422, 58 N. E. 549 ; French v.
W oodruff (1898), 25 Colo. 339, 54 Pac.
1015; J ohn son v. P olhemus (1893), 99 Cal.
240, 38 Pac. 908 (in an equity ca e); Kleinschmidt v . Steele (1894), 15 Mont. 18 1, 38
Pac. 82 7 (in an eq ui ty case); State ex rel.
v. Tooker (1 896), 18 Mont. 540, 46 Pac.
530 (in a n equity ca e); T oy v. McHugh
(1901 ), 62 Neb. 820, 87 N. W. 1059; Topping v. Parish (1 897), 96 Wis. 3 78, il
N. W. 367.
A general prayer for relief i sufficient
to warrant th e court in granting any relief
consistent with the pleadings and evidence: Mackay v. Smith ( 1902), 27 Wash.
44 2 ; 6 7 Pac. 982 ; Dormitzer v. German
Savin gs Bank (1900), 23 Wash. 132, 62
Pac. 62; Yarwood v. Johnson (1902) , 29
W ah . 643, 70 Pac. 123; Kelley v. Wehn
(1 902), 63 Neb. 410, 88 N. W. 6 2; Hees
v. Shepherdson (1 95), 95 Ia. 431 , 64
.1. • W. 286 (in an equi ty ca e) ; H ession v.

,.'.

6
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bv which its nature may be determined. ^ This prevailing view

by which its nature may be deterrninvd. 1

Thi prevailin , v1 w

Liiiastnitli (1895), 96 la. 483, 65 N. W.

399 (ill an equity case) ; McHugli v. Louis-

ville Bridge Co. (1901), Ivy., 65 S. W. 456.

See, iiowever, Sclimitt c. Schueider (1899),

109 Ga. 628, 35 S. E. 145; Ilairalson v.

Carsou (1900), 111 Ga. 57,36 S. E. 319;

Steed V. Savage (1902), 115 Ga. 97, 41

S. E. 272.

A defective prayer for relief is uot a

ground for demurrer : McGillivray v. Mc-

Gillivray (1896), 9 S. D. 187,68 N. W. 316 ;

Levy V. Noble (1902), 135 Cal. 559, 67 Pac.

1033.

The entire omission of any prayer for

relief would not subject the petition to a

general demurrer: Fox i-. Graves (1896),

46 Neb. 812, 65 N. W. 887. But in
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Chicago, B. & Q. R. R. Co. v. Martelle

(1902), —Neb.—, 91 N. W. 364, the court

suggested a qmcre whether such a com-

plaint would sustain a verdict and judg-

ment. " A prayer for judgment is only a

matter of form :" Carson v. Butt (1896),

4 Okla. 133. 46 Pac. 596.

A complaint is not demurrable when

its allegations show that the plaintiff is

entitled to some relief, thougli not to the

relief prayed for : Conner i;. Ashley (1897),

49 S. C. 478, 27 S. E. 473 ; Keuaston v.

Lorig (1900), 81 Minn. 454, 84 N. W.

323; Morey v. City of Duluth (1897), 69

Minn. 5, 71 K W. 694 ; Whitehead v.

Sweet (1899), 126 Cal. 67, 58 Pac. 376.

But not so when only nominal damages

could be recovered and a judgment for

nominal damages would not carry costs :

Kenyon r. West. Union. Tel. Co.'(1893),

100 Cal. 4.54, 35 Pac. 75. Contra, Copelaud

V. Cheney (1902), 116Ga. 685, 43 S. E. 59,

The amount in controversy is deter-

mined by the allegations of the complaint,

not by the prayer for judgment : Town of

Central City v. Treat"(1897), 101 la. 109,

70 N. W. 110. And, similarly, the alle-

gations, not the prayer, determine the

question of jurisdiction : Sams Car Coupler

Co. V. League (1898), 25 Colo. 129, 54 Pac.

642; Lchuhardt v. Jennings (1897), 119

Cal. 192, 48 Pac. 56 ; Prince v. Takash

(1903), 75 Conn. 616, 54 Atl. 1003.

A prayer for excessive relief does not

remier the coraplaint demurrable: Siegel

V. Town of Liberty (1901), 111 Wis. 470,

87 N. W. 487 ; Citizens' Loan & Trust Co.

V. Witte (1901), 110 Wis. 545, 86 N. W.

173; Allen v. Frawley (1900), 106 Wis.

638, 82 N. W. 593 ; Howard v. Seattle Nat.

Bank (1894), 10 Wash. 280, 38 Pac. 1040;

Laird-Norton Co. v. lierker (1895), 6 S. 1).

509, 62 N. W. 104 ; Level Land Co. i-.

Sivyer (1901), 112 Wis. 442, 88 N. W. 317;

Hudson V. Archer (1893) 4 S. 1). 128, 55

N. W. 1099; Crossen r. Grandy (1902), 42

Ore. 282, 70 Pac. 906. Contra, Seals /•.

Augusta Ry. Co (1897), 102 Ga. 817, 29

S. E. 116.

In Brown v. Iowa Legion of Honor

Lina·trutll (1 95), 96 Ia. 4 3, 65 J . W.
quity ca e); ~IcHugh v. Loni Yille Bridge o. (190 1), Ky., 65 . W. 456.
ee, however, 'ch mitt v. chneider (1 99},
10
a. 2 , 35 ". E. 145; Hairal OD v.
ar OD (1900), ll 1 a.. 57, 36 . E. 319;
2t <l t>. ·a,·a e (1902), l 15 Ga. 97, 41
. E. 272.
A t.I fecti,·e prayer for relief i not a
ground for demurrer: :\IcGillivray t' . Mcillina.r ( 196) 9 '.D.l 7,6 X.W. 316;
Le,·yi'..~oble (190~), 135 Cal.559,6- Pac.
1033.
The ntire omi· ion f any prayer for
r li ef would not , ubject the petition to a
general demurrer: .Fox v. Graves (1896),
. W.
7.
But in
46 ~~eb. 12, 65
Chicago, B. & Q. R. R. Co. v. ::\lartelle
(1902 ), - Neb. -, 91XW.364, the court
ugo-e ted a qurere whether uch a complaiut would u·tain a verdict and judgprayer for judgment i only a
meut. '
matter of form : " ar on v . Butt ( l 96),
4 Okla. 133, 46 Pac. 596.
A complaint i. not demurrable when
it all ·ation
how that the plaintiff i
entitled to some relief, though not to the
r elief pray dfor : Connerv.Ashley( l 97),
4
'. C. 47 , 27 S. E. 473; Kenaston v.
Lorig (1900), 1 Minn. 454, 84 . W.
3:23; Morey v. City of Duluth (1897), 69
Minn. 5, 7 l N. W. 694 ; Whitehead v.
weet (1 99), 126 Cal. 67, 5 Pac. 376.
But not o when only nominal damages
could be r covered and a judgment for
n om inal damage would not carry co 't :
Kenyon v. We t. Union. T el. Co. ( 1 93),
J 00 al. 454, 35 Pac. 75. Contra, Copeland
v. Cheney (1902), 116 Ga. 6 5, 43 S . E. 59.
The amount in controver )' i determined by the allegation· of he complaint,
not by the prayer for judgment: Town of
entral City v. Treat (1 97), 101 Ia. 109,
70 i.T. W. 110. And, imilarly, the allegation , not the prayer, determine the
qne ·tion of juri diction: ams ar oupler
C1J. i-. Leao-uc (1 9 ), 25 Colo. 129, !54 Pac.
642; Lehnhardt v. Jenning· (1 97), 119
al. 19:l, 4 Pac. 56; Prince v. Taka h
(I 03), 75 CtJnn. 616, 54 Atl. 1003.
A prayer for xce: ive reli f doe not
render the cora.plaint demurrable: . ieg l
v. Town of Lib rty (1901), 111 \Vis. 4 70,
7 . W. 4 7 ; , itiz 11 ' Loan & Trust Co.

3 9 (iu an

v. Witte (190 1), 110 Wi . 545, 6 N. W .
173; Allen u. Frawley {1900), 106 Wi .
63 , 2..: . \V. 593; Howard i·. eatLl
at.
Bank (1 4-), 10 Wah. 2 0, 3
ac. 1040;
Laird- orton o. v. Ilerker ( l 95 ), 6 . D .
50 , 62
. W. 104; Le\·el Land o. i•.
ivyer (1901), 112 Wi .442,
. W . 317;
Hud on v. Archer (1 93} 4 . D. 12 , 55
L '. "·· l
9; ro en v. Grandy (19 2), 4~
Or . - ~ 2, iO Pa . 906.
011tra,
al r.
Anguta Ry. o. ( l 97), 101 a. 17, 29
. E. 116.
I n Brown v. Iowa Legion of H onor
(l 99), 10- Ia. 439, 7 J. W. 73, it wa
held that a relief not in luded in t he
prayer mu t be denied.
ee al o N ichol
& hepard
o. v. W iedemann ( 1 9 ), 72
Minn. 344, 75 N. W . -08, where the ame
rule ub taULially wa applied, though th&
court ought to make a di tin tion .
ee
al ~o Bank of Cal ifornia v. Dyer ( 1 96), 14
W ash. 279, 44 Pac. 534; Over treet v.
itizen ' Bank {1903), 12 Okla. 3 3 , 72
P ac. 379.
ost need not be a ked fo r in the petiorrigan {1901 ), 114 Ia.
t ion: Reed v.
638, 87 .c. W . 676. The prayer of th
complaint in Johns v. orthwe tern Reli ef
A 'n (1894), 87 W i . 111 , 5 .l. • W . 76,
was held o amb ig uous as to be ubj ct
to a motion to make m ore defini te a nd
certain. A lternative r elief may be prayed
for: Gr ant v. Grant (l 93), 53 Minn. l 1,
54 N. W. 1059 .J
I Goodall v. Mopley, 45 Ind. 355, 359;
Lowry v. Dutton, 28 Ind. 473; Bennett v.
Pre ton, 17 id. 291 ; Cincinnati & . R.
Co. v. W a hburn 25 id. 259 ; Hale v.
Omaha Jat. Bank, 49
. Y. 626, 63 1.
T hi doctrine annot, of cour e, be true
in the one or two tate wh
c d
provide for a demurrer when the fact
alleged how that the plaintiff is not entitled to the reli~j' demanded in !ti p titio11
or complaint. For further illu trati n of
the general rule that the rel ief a tually
granted after a trial d pend. u po n t he
fuels proper] all g d, and uot u po n the
prayer, ee hilling v. Rominger, 4 ol.
100; Radford v. o. .i\Iut. L. In . o., 12
Buh, 434; i ir t Div. t. aul & l a. R.
o. v. ic , 25 l\Ii un. 27 ; alioe o. i-.
appington, 64 Mo. 72 ; Io. all y La.nil
o. v. B u huel l, 11 Neb. 192 ; ilm a u 1.
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was well expressed by a recent decision of the New York Court

of Appeals in language which I quote: "The relief demanded by

no means characterizes the action, or limits the plaintiff in respect

to the remedy which he may have. If there be no answer, the

relief granted cannot exceed that which the plaintiff shall have

demanded in his complaint. But the fact, that after the allega-

tion of the facts relied upon the plaintiff has demanded judgment

for a sum of money by way of damages, does not preclude the

recovery of the same amount upon the same state of facts by way

of equitable relief. The relief in the two cases would be pre-

cisely the same; the difference would be formal and tcclinical.

If every fact necessary to the action is stated, the plaintiff may

even, when no answer is put in, have any relief to which the

facts entitle him consistent with that demanded in the com-

plaint."^ Although this theory has been accepted by most of

the courts, and is approved in numberless cases, at least one

tribunal of high character has suggested that the prayer for relief

may be properly appealed to as the test by which the nature of

the action can be determined in all cases where the pleader has,
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by his mode of alleging the facts, left his intention in doubt.^

I have thus discussed and stated those fundamental principles

Pilmore, 7 Ore. 374; Balle v. Mossley, ^ Gillett z;. Treganza, 13 Wis. 472, 475,

13 S. C. 439; Dawsoa v. Graham, 48 per Dixon C. J. :" Under our present sys-

lowa, 378; Herring v. Hely, 43 id. 157; tem, the test by which we are to deter-

Mackey ?;. Auer, 8 Hun, 180; Benedicts, mine the character of actions in those

Benedict, 85 N. Y. 625; Tewksbury v. cases where the facts stated indicate two

Schulenberg, 41 Wis. 584; Gibson r. Gib- or more actions must be the relief de-

son, 46 id. 449 ; Acker v. McCullough, 50 manded. We may, at least, safely adopt

Ind. 447 ; Rogers v. Lafayette Co., 52 id. this rule in cases of doubt, and in cases

297; Bonnell v. Allen, 53 id. 130; Sohn like the present, where the pleader, cou-

V. Marion, etc. Co., 73 id. 78 ; Carpenter ceiviug himself entitled to prosecute sev-

V. Brenham, 50 Cal. 549 ; Hall v. Lonkey, eral actions, has so stated his facts as to

57 id. 80. See also State v. Boone, 108 leave it uncertain which he intended to

N. C. 78; Sannoner i;. Jacobson, 47 Ark. pursue."

31; Korrady v. L. S. & M. S. liy. Co., []See also O'Brien r. Fitzgerald (1894),

131 Ind. 261 ; Alworth v. Seymour, 42 143 N. Y. 377, 38 N. E. 371, where the

Minn. 526; Crosby r. Farmers' Bk., 107 court hold that the prayer for relief may

Mo. 436 ; Ross v. Purse, 17 Colo. 24. In be looked to in determining whether the

judgment by default plaintiff can have action is legal or equitable, where the

no greater relief than is demanded by the facts alleged would support equally an

prayer: Maxwell i'. Dudley, 13 Bush, 403 ; action at law or in equity. In Georgia it

Hansford v. Holdam, 14 id. 210; Peck i;. is held that the prayer for relief should

N. Y. & N. J. Ry. Co., 85 N. Y. 246 ; Bui- generally be considered as indicating the

lard V. Sherwood, 85 id. 253. ' nature of the action, whether legal or

1 Bradley v. Aldrich, 40 N. Y. 504; equitable: Steed v. Savage (1902), 115

Hale V. Omaha Nat. Bank, 49 N. Y. 626, Ga. 97, 41 S. E. 272.]

631, per Allen J.

wa well expr eel by a r
nt cl
T w York C urt
of Apr als in languag whi h I quote: ' Th r li f lcman<l d by
no m an ha.ra t rize th acti n, r limit th plaintiff in r~ p ct
t th r m dy which he may hav . If th r b n answ r, the
r lief o-rant d annot xc cl that which th plaintiff . lmll ha e
demand cl in hi c mplaint. But the fact, that a.fL r th all gation of the fact relied upon the plaintiff has clemand cl juclgm nt
for a sum of mon y by way of damages, does not precl ucl the
recov ry of the same amount ur n the sam state of fact by way
of equitable relief. The relief in the two cases would be precisely the sam ; the difference would be formal and technical.
If every fact necessary to the action is stated, the plai11tiff may
even, when no answer is put in, have any relief to which the
facts entitle him consistent with that demanded in the complaint. ' 1 Although this theory has been accepted by most of
the court , and is approved in numberless cases, at least one
tribunal of high character has suggested that the prayer for relief
may be properly appealed to as the test by which the nature of
the action can be determined in all cases where the pleader has,
by his mode of alleging the facts, left his intention in doubt. 2
I have thus discussed and stated those fundamental principles

.

Filmore, 7 Ore. 374; Balle v. Mossley,
13 S. C. 439; Dawson v. Graham, 48
Iowa, 378; Herring v. Hely, 43 id. 157;
Mackey v. Auer, 8 Hun, 180; Benedict v.
Benedict, 85 N. Y. 625; T ewksbury v.
Schulenberg, 41 Wis . 584; Gibson r. Gibson, 46 id. 4-19; Acker v. McCullough, 50
Ind. 44 7 ; Rogers v. Lafayette Co., 52 id.
2U7; Bonnell i-. Allen, 53 id. 130; Sohn
v. Marion, etc. Co., 73 id. 78; Carpenter
v. Brenham, 50 Cal. 549; Hall v. Lonkey,
57 icl. 80. See also State v. Boone, 108
N. C. 7 ; Sannoner v. Jacobson, 47 Ark.
31; Korrady v. L. S. & M. S. Ry. Co.,
131 Ind. 261; Alworth v. Seymour, 42
Minn. 526; Crosby v. Farmers' Bk., 107
Mo. 436; Ro " u. Pur e, 17 Colo. 24. In
judgment by default plaintiff can have
' no greater re.li ef than is demanded by the
prayer: Maxwell v. Dudley, 13 Bu h, 403;
Hansford v. Holdam, 14 id. 2 10 ; Peck v.
N . Y. & N. J. Ry. Co., 85 N. Y. 246; Bullard v. Sherw.ood, 85 id. 253.
1 Bradley v. Aldrich, 40 N . Y. 504 ;
Ha.le v. Omaha Nat. Bank, 49 N. Y. 626,
631 , per Allen J .

2 Gillett v. Tregaoza, 13 Wis. 472, 4 75,
per Dixon C. J. : "U uder our present sys·
tern, the test by which we are to determine the character of actions in tho e
cases where the facts stated iudicate two
or more action must be the relief demanded. We ma_v, at lea t, safely adopt
this rule iu cases of doubt, and in cases
like the present, where the pleader, conceiving himself entitled to pro ecute several actions, has so stated his facts as to
leave it uucertain which he intauded to
pursue."
[ See also O'Brien v. Fitzgerald (1894),
143 N. Y. 377, 38 N. E. 371, where the
court hold that the prayer for relief may
be looked to in determining whether the
action is legal or equitable, where the
facts alleged would support equally an
action at law or in equity. In Georgia it
is held that the prayer for relief hould
generally be con idered as indicating the
nature of the action, whether legal or
equitable: Steed v. Savage {1902), 11 5
Ga. 97, 41 S. E. 272.J
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and general doctrines of the reformed pleading which are common

to all causes of action. The more special rules which prescribe

the nriuner and form of averring particular facts, and which

determine the mode of alleging the various causes of action con-

sidered separately and individually, must be omitted from the

present volume.^ They will find their appropriate place in the

1 rSecvssiti/ anil Fortn of I'articiiliir

Allftfdtious.

rme £ tl reform 1
action.
h m r p
which 1 r
fact an l
r n l form f a rrma
of acti
1 t rmin th mo l of all ging th v ri u · au
i1 r d
para tel and indi vidu( ll r mu t b omi te fr
1 r ., n v lum .1 They will find th 1r ar propriate plac

rib
whi h
n I m th
in the

The author did not undertake to dis-

cuss this subject, and the editor has not

1

[s

ce

aimed to treat it at all exhaustively in

this note. But the cases dealing with it

which have appeared during the period

covered by this revision have been classi-

fied and briefly summarized as follows : —

Account.

Statutes in many of the States allow

an account to be pleaded by copy thereof.

The author did not undertake to di <'ll - thi- ubj ct, antl the editor ha not
aim u to treat it at all exhau tively in
thi note. But the a e dealing with it
which have appeared durinn- the period
cov r tl by thi re,·i ion have b en cla ifietl aud briefly ummarized a follows : -
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See p. 438, note 2. See McArthur r.

Clarke Drug Co. (1896), 48 Neb. 899, 67

N. W. 861, construing one of these stat-

utes. In Fletcher r. Co-Operative Pub-

lishing Co.' (1899), 58 Neb. 511, 78 N. W.

1070, it was held that the statute was

merely permissive, and it was still proper

to plead the facts.

As to method of pleading an account

when payments have been made upon it,

see Hammer r. Downing (1901), 39 Ore.

504, 65 Pac. 17, where the court said:

" If any payment has been made upon the

account, good pleading, under our prac-

tice, requires that the gross .sum be stated

as the amount in which the defendant is

indebted, and also the payments, if any, at

least in the aggregate, so that tlie amount

due becomes a matter of deduction ap-

parent upon the face of the complaint.

This brings into the investigation the en-

tire account, and the balance, when ascer-

tained, is the amount subject to recovery."

Account Stated.

It is unnecessary, in an action upon an

account stated, to set forth in the com-

plaint the subject-matter of the original

debt : Schutz v. Murctte (1895), 146 N. Y.

Mo. E. 7 o.

ity anrl Fm·m, of Pa1•ticular
.d..lle(Jations.

ccounl.
tatute in many of the State allow
an account to be pleaded by copy thereof.
ee McArthur t:.
, ee p. 43 , note 2.
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~. ' . 61, con,truiug one of thee statutE' . In Fletcher 1•. o-Operative Publi. hing o: (1 99), 5 . _ eb. 511, 7
. W.
l OiO, it wa h ld that the statute wa
m r ly p rmi. ive, and it. was till proper
to pleatl the fact ..
· to method of pleading an account
when payment have been made upon it,
ee Hammer v. Downing (1901 ), 39 Ore.
504, 65 Pac. 17, where the court aid :
" If any payment ha been made upon the
a count, good pleading, under our practi e, r quire that the gro
um be tated
the amount in which the defendant i
indebted, and al o the payment , if any, at
lea t in the aggregate, o that th amount
due become a matter of deduction. appar nt upon the face of the complaint.
r hi
bring into the inve tigation th en·
tire account, and the balance, when a certained, i the amount ·ubject to recovery."

Accounting.
n t tate a
action for an acrounting which doe n t
·how the nature of the dealing b tw en
the parti and pre ent a py of th
<'Oun a an exhibit: Gi e v. Cook (1
A complaint doe

152 Ind.

5, 52

. E. 454.

Action for Price.
In order to upport an action for an
agreed price there mu t have b en uch a
deli very a will pa title to the pur h r ;
and if title r emain in the ell r, and the
buyer r nounce his contract, the law requir th
eller to treat th prop rty a
hi ' own and to u . if at all, f r th damag he bas su tained : Mc ormi k Harve ting 1a h. o. v. Belfany (1 99), 78
Minn. 370, 1 N. W . 10.
Agency.
Whereacontract wa made orotheract
done b_

l.'J7, 40 N. E. 780.

An account stated is a new and inde-

pendent contract, behind which one cannot

go: Conver.se i;. Scott (1902), 137 Cal.

2.39, 70 Pac. 13; Haley. Hale (1901), 14

S. D. 644, 86 N. W. 650; Schutz v. Mo-

rette (1895), 146 N. Y. 137, 40 N. E. 780.

See Xodine v. First Nat. Bank (1902), 41

Ore. 386, 68 Pac. 1109, and Bailey v.

Wilson (1899), 34 Ore. 186,55 Pac. 973,

for good discussions of tlie subject of ac-

count stated.

Accounting.

A complaint does not state a cause of

action for an accouuliug whicli does not

show the nature of the dealings between

the parties and present a coj)v of the ac-

count as an exhibit: Gise v. Cook (1898),

152 Ind. 75, 52 N. E.454.

Action for Price.

In order to support an action for an

agreed price there must have been such a

Account lated.
It i unnece ary, in an a tion up n an
a count tated, to et forth in h complaiut the ubject-matt r of th oriuinal
cleLt : chutz v. l\Iorette (1 95), 146.1.. Y'.
l:J7, 40

.~ .

E.

~

O.

n a
p ·nd nt

count tated i an w and inde·ontract, behind whi hone cannot
go: Ccm\·er:e .• cott (190-, 137 al.
3 ,70lac. 13; !Ialev. Hale (1901), 14-
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second part of the work, which will treat cf the different remedies

themselves that may be obtained by means of the civil action. ^

s cond part of the work, which will treat d the diff r nt rem di s
them elves that may be obtained by means of th civil action. 1

recovery can be had on a petition alleging

that they were drawn on and accepted by

the principal : Wiuburn i\ Fidelity, etc.

Ass'n (1900), no la. 374, 81 N. W. 682.

In an action brought under § 1816 a,

L. & B. Ann. St , for injuries sustained by

cue employee through the negligence of

another, the complaint must clearly allege

the relation between the negligent servant

and the company : Albrechc v. Milwaukee,

etc. Co. (1894), 87 Wis. 105, 58 N. W. 72.

Altered Contract.

"Where a corporation employed the

recovery can be had on a peti t ion alleging
that th 'Y were drawn on and accepted by
the principal: Winburn l). Fidelity, etc.
A 'n (1900), 11 0 Ia. 374, l N. W. 6 2.
In an action brought under § l 16 a,
L . & B. Ann. t , for injuries u tainetl by
one employee through th e neg ligence of
anothe r, the complain t mu ·t clearly allege
the relation between the negligent ervant
and the co mpany: Albrecht v. Milwaukee,
etc. Co. (1 894), 87 Wis. 105, 58 J: • W. 72.

plaintiff under an agreement to pay what

Altered Contract.
his services were worth, and the rate of

wages was afterwards fixed by the parties,
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it was proper to allege in declaring on the

contract that the company agreed to pay

the wijges fixed in tlie adjustment, and

under such allegation proof of the original

contract and the subsequent adjustment is

admissible : Sandberg v. Victor Mining

Co. (1901), 24 Utah, 1, 66 Pac. 360.

Altered Instrument.

A written instrument which has been

altered by a stranger may still be used as

Wh ere a corporation empl oyed th e
-plaintiff und er an ag ree ment to pay what
his ervices were worth, and the rate of
wages was afterwards fix ed by the part ies,
it wa proper to allege in declaring on the
.contract that the company ag reed to pay
th e wc_iges fixed in the adju tm ent, and
und er uch allegation proof of the origiual
contract aud the subsequent adjustment is
:admissible: Sandberg v. Victor Mining
Co. (1901), 24 Utah, 1, 66 Pac. 360.

1 [^Verijication : The verification is no

part of the pleading : Johnson v. Puritan

Miu. Co. (1896), 19 Mont. 30, 47 Pac-

337; Bryant v. Davis (1899), 22 Mont.

A ltered In strument.
A written instrument which has been
altered by a stranger may still be u:-ec.l as

a ba i for a recovery, but it should be
pl a<led ar!cor<ling to it original term
and not according to its term;- a alt r d :
Perkins "Windmill & Ax o. v. Tillmau
(189 ), 55 Neb. 652, 75 X. W. 109
Anticipating Defences.
A pleader i not required to anticipate
defences: Larson v. First Nat. Bauk
(1902), Jeb. - , 92 N. W. 729; Sawyer
v. W abash Ry. Co. (1900), 156 1\lo. 46 ,
57 N. W. 108; Hamilton v. Love ( l 9 ),
152 Ind. 641, 53 N. E. 181; Romer 1•.
Conter (1893), 53 Minn. 1 il, 54 N. \\r .
1052; Trotter v. Mutual R e erve Life
A ss' n (1897), 9 S. D. 596, 70 N. W. 843;
Indianapolis St. Ry. Co. v. Robinson
(1901), 157 In d. 414, 61 N . E. 936; W estern Union T el. Co. v. H enley (1901), 15i
Ind. 90, 60 N. E. 682; Massillon Engine
& Thresher Co. v. l'ruuty (1902), - Neb.
- , 91 N. W. 384.
A rticles of I ncorporation.
It is sufficient to plead articles of incorporation anu by-laws by stating their
substance and legal effect, without set
ting them out in hrec verba : Seal i•.

.534, 57 Pac. 143. But where a verifica-

tion is required, and is omitted, the plead-

ing may be stricken out on motion or

judgment may be had on the pleadings :

Hearst v. Hart (1900), 128 Cal. 327, 60

Pac. 846. In Bryant v. Davis (1899), 22

Mont. 534, 57 Pac. 143, it was held that

judgment could not be rendered on the

pleadings on account of a defective verifi-

cation. Verification by one co-plaintiff or

co-defendant is suificient : Butterfield v.

Graves (1902), 138 Cal. 155, 71 Pac. 510;

Claiborne i-. Castle (1893), 98 Cal. 30, 32

Pac. 807.

Want of a verification subjects a plead-

ing to attack by motion but not to a de-

murrer: Scott-Force Hat Co. v. Ilombs

(1894), 127 Mo. 392, 30 8. W. 183; Butter-

field ?•. Graves (1902), 138 Cal. 155, 71 Pac.

a basis for a recovery, but it should be

pleaded according to its original terms

and not according to its terms as altereil :

I'erkius Windmill & Ax Co. v. Tillman

(1«98), 55 Neb. 652, 75 :N. W. 1098.

Anticipating Defences.

A pleader is not required to anticipate

defences : Larson v. First Nat. Bank

(1902), — Neb. — , 92 N. W. 729 ; Sawyer

V. Wabash Ry. Co. (1900), 156 Mo. 468,

57 N. W. 108; Hamilton v. Love (1898),

152 Ind. 641, 53 N. E. 181 ; Eomer v.

Conter (1893), 53 Minn. 171, 54 N. W.

1052; Trotter v. Mutual Reserve Life

Ass'n (1897), 9 S. D. 596, 70 N. W. 843;

Indianapolis St. Ry. Co. v. Robinson

(1901), 157 Ind. 414, 61 N. E. 936; West-

510. U nless mad e before trial the objec1 [ Verijication : The verification is no
part of the pleading: J ohnson v. Puritan tion is waived: Myers v. Douglass ( 1896),
Min. Co. (1896), 19 Mont. 30, 47 P ac. 99 K y . 267, 35 S . W. 917. A verification
.337; Bryant v. Davi · (1899), 22 Mont. may be amended in the discretion of the
534, 57 Pac. 143. But where a verifica- trial court: Cantwell v. H erring (1900),
ti on is req uirell, and is omitteu, the plead- 127 N. C. 81, 37 S . E. 140; Steidl v. State
in g may be stricken out on moti on or (1902) , 63 Neb. 695, 88 N. W . 53 .
As to wh en a Yerification is necessary,
judgment may he had on th e pleadings:
H earst v. H art (1900), 12 Cal. 32 7, 60 see Butte & Boston Co. v . ~Iontana Co.
I)ac. 846. In Bryant v. Davis ( 1899), 22 (1900), 24 Mont. 125, 60 Pac. 10.39; Fisher
Mont. 534, 57 Pac. 143, it was held that v. Patton (1895), 134 Mo. 32, 33 S. W.
jncl gment could not be r enrlered on th e 451; Cady v. Case (1895), 11 Wash . 124,
plead ings on account of a defective verifi- 39 Pac. 375; H eichert !'. Lonsberg {1894 ),
cation. Verification by one co-plaintiff or 87 Wis. 543, 58 N. W. 1030.
And see th e following cases for fo rm
co-defendant is sufficient : Butterfield v .
Gra,·es {1902) , 138 Cal. 155, 71 Pac. 510; of verification ; Phifer v. TraYelers' In .
Claiborne v. Castle (1893), 98 Cal. 30, 32 Co. (1898) , 123 N. C. 410, :n S. E. 71 6;
Cole v. B oyd ( 1899), 125 . C. 49 6, 34
Pac. 07.
Want of a verification subject a plead- S. E. 557; Payne v. Boyd (1899); 125 N. C.
ing to attack by motion but not to a de- 499, 34 S. E. 63 1 ; Martin v. Martin ( 1902),
murrer: Scott-Force Hat Co. v. Hombs 130 N. C. 27, 40 S. E. 822; Roosevelt 1•.
(1894) , 127 Mo.39 2,308. W. 183 ; Butter- Ulmer (1898), 98 Wis. 356, 74 N. W. 124.]
-field 11. Graves (1902) 138 Cal. 155, 71 Pac.
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Br ach n.f C'orennnts.
of the u ual
A -ignment.
covenant accompauying the tran fer of
l and , the general rule i that th pl ad r
An allegation that a thin a wa
im plie on d murrer that th a ignment may a . io-n th m generally, uole _ uch
wa valitl: Guud r on !'. Thoma· {1 94), a ignment doe not amount to a breach .
; \Yi · . 406, 5 X. W. i50 . , ee al"o Rol- ... But uot. o a' it respect. the o uant
lin i .. Humph rey (I 9i), 9 Wi . 66, 73 against incumbrances, the covenaut f
warranty, and ti.at for quiet njoyment,
...... \ . 331.
a the arantor doe not co1·enam aaain t
.A signmentfor Benefit of Creditors.
all po ible in nmbrance or all interrupAn allegation that A. wa duly ap· tion or claim- or ou ter-, and it th r fore
pointed as ignee of the firm of B. & Co. liecome. necc ary to p if r the incumantl thereafter duly qualifi d a uch a.- brnnce r itle paramount by rea. on of
ignee an l entered into the di charge of whi ch the co1•enantee or hi a ian · have
hi· tru.t, cannot be con idered a an alle- b en ou t d or di turbed in th p "e-gation that B. & Co. made a general a - ion: ' Jenning v. Kiernan (l 9 ), 35
re. 349, 55 Pac. 413. It wa heltl in
ignment to A. for the benefit of creditor :
Evan
v. Fult u (1 96), 134 Mo. ·3, 36
" lier v. Fir t Pre. byterian Church
. Yv. 230 that a br ach of a c veuant ii
{l 95), 91 Wi . 32 , 64 . . ". W. 1031.
well a. icrn d by negativing the word ' of
the covenant.
Attorne!J, Qualifications of

ameron (1901 ), 24 W a b . 62, 63 Pac.

Cameron (1901), 24 Wash. 62, 63 Pac.

"In a i .uing lireache

110:3.

110.3.

Assif^nmenl.

An allegation that a thing was assigned

implies on ilemnrrer that the assignment

was valid: (Juuderson v. Thomas (1894),

87 Wis. 406, .58 N. W. 750. See also Rol-

lins i: Humphrey (1897), 98 Wis. 66, 73

N. W. 331.

Assignment /or Benefit of Creditors.

An allegation that A. was duly ap-

pointed assignee of the firm of B. & Co.

and thereafter duly qualified as such as-

signee and entered into the discharge of

his trust, c;uinot be considered as an alle-

gation that B. & Co. made a general as-

signment to A. for the benefit of creditors :

Sellers v. First Presbyterian Church
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(1895), 91 Wis. 328, 64 N. W. 1031.

Attorney, Qualifications of.

In a suit for services rendered by an

attorney, it is not necessary to allege that

he is an attorney admitted to practice:

Miller v. Ballerino (1902) 135 Cal. 566,

67 Pac. 1046, 68 Pac. 600.

Where an action is brought by a county

and the petition is signed by reputable at-

torneys in its behalf, there is no necessity

tiiat their authority to so act should ap-

pear on the face of the petition : Hickory

County y. Fugate (1898), 143 Mo. 71, 44

S. W. 789.

An allegation that an attorney of a

corporation was appointed and held under

said appointment for two years is a suffi-

cient allegation that his term was for two

years : Germania Spar & Bau Verein v.

Flynn (1896), 92 Wis. 201, 66 N. W. 109.

Bond.

In an action on an official bond brought

against the principal and sureties, an alle-

In a uit for service r endered by an
attorney, it i not nece. ary to allege that
he i an attorney admitted to practice:
::.\lill er i'. Ballerino ( 1902) 135 Cal. 566,
; Pac. 1046, 6 Pac. GOO.
'Yhere an action i brought by a county
and the petition i igned by r eputable attorney in it behalf, there i no nece ity
that ih ir authority to o act liould appear on the face of the petition : Hickory
ouuty v. Fugate (1 9 ), 143 Mo. 71, 44
. w. i 9.
An allegation that an attorney of a
corporation was appointed and held under
aid appoiutment for two year i a uffiient allegation that hi term wa for two
year :
ermania par & Bau Verein v.
Flynn (l 96), 92 Wi . 20 1, 66 N. W . 109.

gation that tlie bond was approved is not

necessary: Fire Ass'n v. Ruby (1900), 60

Neb. 216, 82 N. W. 629. Nor is it neces-

Bond.

In an action on an official bond brought

sary to separately state the several items

of defalcation : State v. McDonald (1895),

4 Idalio, .343, 40 Pac. 312. See also State

ex rel. v. Tittmann (1896), 134 Mo. 162,35

S. W. 579. Compare witli this last case,

Pryor v. Kansas City (1899), 153 Mo.

135, 54 S. W. 499, which seems inconsis-

tent therewith.

Breach of Covenants.

" In assigning breaches of the usual

covenants accomjianying tiie transfer of

lands, tlie general rule is that the pleader

may assign them generally, unless such

assignment does not amoufit to a breach.

. . . But not so as it respects the covenant

against incumbrances, the covenant of

warranty, and tliat for (piiet enjoyment,

as the grantor does not covenant against

all possible incumbrances, or all interrup-

tions or claims or ousters, and it therefore

becomes necessary to specify the iucum-

br.ance or title paramount by reason of

which the covenantee or his assigns have

been ousted or disturbed in the posses-

again t the principal and uretie , an allegation that the bond wa approved i not
uece ary: Fire A . 'n v. Ruby (1900), 60
. . eu. 216, 2 .l.:T. Vf. 629. L"or i it]) ce,ary to eparately tate the everal item
of defalcation : tat v. -;\foDonal<l ( l 9; ),
4 Idaho, 343 , 40 Pac. 312. , ee al o tate
r n:l. t'. Ti ttmann ( l 96), 134 ~Io. 162, 35
. ,V, 5i9.
'umpare with thi la t ca e,
l'ry or i•. Kan a:
ity (I 99) 153 Io.
135, 54 •. \V. 499, which eem
tent thnewith.

Breach qf Promise to Jlarry.
In an action for breach of promi e to
marry, alleaation of eduction by m an
of u ·h promi ·e may be pleaded merely
in aagravat.ion of damage., and d n t
ubj ·t the complaint to the hara of
embracing tw cau e of action:
v . .Payne (l 97), 102 Ia. 5 I, 69
554, 71 N. W . 571.
Breach of Warranty.

The character and extent of the warranty and the nature and particular of the
br a h mu t be alleged: hirk v. Mitchell {l 93), 137 Ind. l 5, 36 N. E. 50. It
i nece ary to allege that the purcha er
relied upon the warranty and wa thereby
decei,· d, in an action for it breach:
Abilene Nat. Bank v. N dine (1 94), 26
re. 53, 37 Pac. 47. The p itiou mu t
allege that the plaintiff wa evi ted by
title paramount : Hampton v. ' Veb te r
(1 9 ), 56

J

b. 62 ' 77

.

w. 50.

Capacity .
The uffix "tru. t e" in th
apti n of
a omplaiut will be reat d a m r d criptio persona, wb re &hr i uo a1· rm nt in the complaiut that the plaiutiff i
tru. t e £ an xpres r oth r tru~ or i
uiug for th beu fit of anoth r. " Wh n
an action i liron!!ht by a tru t , th om]JlaiHt houhl <li ' Clo e the ua.me of th
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cestui que trust, so that an issue, if neces-

sary, may be formed upon that allegation,

and also that the cestui (jue trust may be

bound hy the judgment or decree :" Marion

Bond Co. V. Mexican Coffee Co. (1902),

— Ind. — , G.5 N. E. 748.

An allegation "that the jilaintiff is the

duly apjiointed, qualified, and acting ad-

ministrator of the estate of Julia Collins,

deceased," is good, in the absence of a spe-

cial demurrer: Collins v. O'Laverty (1902),

136 Cal. 31, 68 Pac. 327; Willis v. Tozer

(1894), 44 S. C. 1, 21 S. E. 617, in the ab-

sence of any other objection than oral de-

murrer at the trial. A general averment

of cajjacity is sufficient : Sparks v. Nat.

Accident Ass'u (189r)), 100 la. 458, 69

N. W. 678.
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A complaint is good against a general

demurrer which in its title and body desig-

nates plaintiff as administrator of decedent,

though tlie complaint contains no allega-

tion of decedent's death and the issuing

of letters to plaintiff : Toner v. Wagner

(1901), 1.58 Ind. 447, 63 N. E. 8.59.

Where a plaintiff sues as executor or

administrator, he should allege that he is

such b}^ virtue of letters issued out of

a probate court, giving the name thereof,

and the term at which such letters were

granted : Hamilton v. Mclndoo (1900), 81

Minn. 324, 84 N. W. 118.

An allegation that a cause of action

was sold and assigned to plaintiff as ad-

ministrator of a decedent's estate for a

valuable consideration, sufficiently alleges

plaintiff's legal capacity to sue : Brossard

V. Williams (1902), lu' Wis. 89, 89 N. W.

832.

tjWhere a guardian sues on behalf of

minors it is necessary for him to allege

facts showing his representative capacity,

and if he does not do so, the complaint is

demurrable on the ground of want of

capacity to sue : Dalrymple v. Security

Loan Co. (1900), 9 N. D. 306, 83 N. W.

245. Mere description held sufficient :

Bennett i'. Bennett (1902), — Neb. — , 91

N. W. 409. Where plaintiffs seek parti-

tion in behalf of an unincorporated church

association, they should aver that they, as

trustees of the church, " sue for themselves

and all other members of said church : "

Lillv V. Menke (1894), 126 Mo. 190, 28

S. W. 643.

" Where the pleadings disclose a cause

of action against defendant personally,

superadded words, such as ' agent,' ' ex-

ecutor,' or ' director,' should be rejected

as dc.srrlptio perso/ue : " Andres v. Kridler

(1896), 47 Neb. 585, 66 N. W. 649.

Conditions Precedent.

Performance of conditions precedent to

liability on the part. of defendant must be

pleaded by the plaintiff: Albers v. West-

ern Union Tel. Co. (1896), 98 la. 51, 66

N. W. 1040; Root v. Childs (1897), 68

Minn. 142, 70 N. W. 1078; Ary v. Ches-

ce tui quc tru t, o that an i ue, if nece - of action a()"ainst defcnclant per onally,
sary, may b formed upon that allegation, . uperncldcd word:,;, uch a • ag 1 t,' 'exand also that the ce tui 4u tru ·t may be ecutor,' or 'di rector,' hould be rejected
bound by the j ucl()"ment or d er : " Marion as desr·ri11tio 11rr1ifJ11<r:" .1\ 111lres v. Kridler
Bond
. v. Mexican offee o. {1902), (1 96), 47 ~eb. :; 5, 6G . W. 649.
- Jud.-, 65 N. E. 74- .
011ditio11s Precedent.
An allegation "that the plaintiff i the
Performance of condition precedent to
duly appointed, qualifi d, and acting admiui trato r of thee. tate of Julia Collin , li ability on the part.of defendant mu t be
deceased," i good, in the ab ence of a spe- plead tl uy the plaintiff: .Aluer v. \Ye tcial demurrer: Collin · v. 'Laverty (1902), ern nion Tel. C'o. (l %), 9 Ia. 51, 66
. \V. 10-1-0; Root v. hilcl ( 1 97), 6
136 al. 31 6 Pac. 327; Willi v. Tozer
(1 94), 44 . C. l, 21 . E. 617, in the ab- l\Iiun. 142, 70 N. \V. 107 ; Ary t•. he ence of any other objection than oral de- more (1901), 11.3 Ia. G3. -1- N. \V. 965;
murrer at the trial. A general aYerment Mauaud::t 1·. Ileilner (1 96). 29 Ore. 222,
of capacity i · ·ufficient : Sparks i:. l'\at. 45 Pac. 75 ; Weeks v. O'Brien (1 9-1-),
Accident As. 'u (1896), 100 Ia. 4-58, 69 HJ N. Y. 199, 36 N. E . 1 5; Boden i·.
l\Iah er (1 97), 95 Wi . 65, 69 N". \V. !I O;
N. W. 67.
A complaint i good against a general l\Ioody 1'. Ius. o. ( l 94 ), 52 0. t. 12, 3
demurrer which iu it title and body de ig- N. E. 1011; Milburn v. Glynn County
nate plaintiff a ad mini. trator of decedent, (I 99), 109 Ga. 473, 3-1- S. E. 4 ; Cope
though the complaint contain no allega- v. Type Foundry o. (1 97 ), 20 Mont. 6i,
tion of decedent's death and the i suing 49 Pac. 3 7; Long Creek Bldg. A 'n 1·.
of letters to plaintiff: Toner v. Wagner State Ins. Co. (l 96), 29 Ore. 569, -1-G Pac.
366; Closz v. ;\liracle (I 97), 103 fa. l !.) ,
(1901) , 15 8 Incl. 4-H, 6.'3 r. E. 8:19.
. W. 502; Charle Baumbach
o.
Where a plaintiff snes as executor or 72
. W.
admini. trator, he should allege that he is v. Laube (189 , ), 99 \Vis. 171, 7-1such by virtue of letter i. ued out of 96; l\IcGlauflin l'. \Vormser (1903), a probate court, giv in g the name thereof, Mont. - , 72 Pac. 428.
and the term at which such letters were
The performance of conditions preC'egranted : Hamilton v. lfclndoo ( 1900), 81 dent may be alleged generally: 1\liles v.
Mutual Resen'e Fund Life A s'n (1900) ,
Minn. 324, -1- N. W. 118.
An allegation that a can. e of action 108 Wi. 421,84 N. W. 159; l\IcGaunon
was sold and assign ed to plaintiff as ad- v. Miller'-'- at. Ins. Co. (190~), 171 l\lo.
ministrator of a decedent' e tate for a 143 , 71 S. \V. 160 ; Kenney v. Bevilheimer
(1902), 158 Ind. 653, 64 N. E. 215; Mcvaluable consideration, sufficiently allege
plaintiff's le.gal capacity to ue: Bro ard Cullough v. Colfax County (1903),"- Neb.
v. Williams (1902), 114 Wi . 89, 89 N. W. - , 95 N. W. 29 (only in ca e of a contract).
Thi rule is prescribed by statute in a num832.
ber of States, a in l\Ioutana, Indiana,
~Where a guardian sue· on behalf of
minors it is necessary for him to allege Missouri, South Carolina, and other .
facts showing his repre entative capacity, But the e statute are permis ' ive only,
and if he does not do o, the complaint is and pe.cific averment are equally proper:
demurrable on the ground of want of Kenn ey v. Bevilheimer (1 902), 158 Ind.
capacity to ue: Dalrymple v. Security 65.'3 , 64 N. E. 215; Grand Lodge v. Hall
Loan Co. (1900), 9 . D ..'306, 83 N. W. (1903}, - Ind. App . - , 67 . E. 272;
245. M ere description h eld ufficient : Brock v. Des Moine Ins. Co . (1895 ), 9&
Bennett v. Bennett (1902), - Neb. -, 91 Ia. 39, 64 N. W. 68;); Hart v. Accident
N. W. 409. Where plaintiffs seek parti- A 'n (1 9 ), 105 Ia. 717, 75 ~- W. 50 .
tion in behalf of an unincorporated church
A a te t to determine whether a conassociation, they hould aver that they, as dition is precedent or subsequent, the
trustee of the ch urch," sue for themselves Rupreme Court of i\Jinne ota, in Root r.
and all other member of airl church : '' Child~ (1897), 6
Iiun. 14-2, 70 N. W.
Lill.v v. Menke (1894}, 126 Mo. 190, 2
107 , said: "Where the obligation of a.
s. w. 643.
part.v to a contrnct i to pay only upon
"Where the pleadings di clo e a cau ·e the happening of a contingency, e. g., the

crnL
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return of an instrument duly recorded,

such contingency is in the nature of a

condition precedent, and its occurrence

must he alleged in the complaint. But,

if payment is not to be made if a con-

tingency liapj)ens during its continuance,

e. y., if the piirty is enjoined from using

the article which is the subject-matter of

the contract, he is not to pay tlie purcha.se

price until the iujnuctiou is dissolved, tiie

contingency is in che nature of a condition

subsequent, and it is not necessary to allege

in the complaint the non-happening or

non-continuance of the contingency." For

a further discussion of the same question

see Moody v. Ins. Co. (1894), 52 O. St. 12,

38 N. E. ion.

In Montana, in Kent i'. Tuttle (1897),
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20 Mont. 203. 50 Pac. 559, and Zion Co-

operative Ass'n V. Mayo (1898), 22 Mont.

100, 55 Pac. 915, it was held that where

the statute prescribes certain acts on the

part of a foreign corporation a.s conditions

precedent to its right to do business in the

State, its complaint must allege perform-

ance or that the business done, out of

which the cause of action arose, was inter-

state commerce. But in American Shoe

Co. V. O'Rourke (1900), 23 Mont. 530, 59

Pac. 910, it was held tliat such allegations

■were unnecessary.

Where performance of conditions prece-

dent is not alleged by the plaintiff, the

defendant may raise the objection by de-

murrer, or by answer, or he may raise it

on the trial: Weeks v. O'Brien (1894),

141 N. Y. 199, 36 N. E. 185. See also

Duff V. Fire Ass'n (1895), 129 Mo. 460, 30

S. W. 1034.

Where a demand and refusal are con-

ditions precedent to plaintiff's case, and

defendant in his answer denies all liability

so that it is apparent a demand would have

been met by a refusal, defendant cannot

complain that such demand was not shown :

Thompson v. Whitney (1899), 20 Utah, 1,

57 Pac. 429.

Conditions Subsequent, Negativing.

r eturn of an in trumen duly record ed,
uch c ntinu ncy i · in the nature of ,
couJirion precedent, and it· o ·currence
mu·t lie allerred in the c1Jmplaint. But,
if p. yment i· not to be made if a contiuaency hap1 en duri1w it continuance,
e. 9 .. if the 1nrty i 'lljoined from u·ing
the article which i the ·ubject-matter of
the contra t, he i not to pay th purchase
price until tie injnnctio i · di:·oh·ed, the
contino-eucy i in i;he nature of a condition
~ ub equent, and it i not nece ary to alleo-e
in the complaint the uon-happ ning or
non-continuance of the ontiugeu y." For
a further di cu ion of the ame que tiou
ee .Moody i·. In , Co. (1 94), 52 0. 't. 12,
3 :N. E. 1011.
In Montana, in Kent v. Tuttle (1 97 ),
20 Mont. 203, 50 Pac. 5·9, and Zion CoopP,rative A 'n v. l\Iayo (1 9 ), 22 .Mont.
100, 55 Pac. 9L5, it wa held that wher e
the tatute pre. cribe certain act on the
part of a foreign corporation ru condition.
precedent to it right to do bu ine in the
tate, it complaint mu t all ge performance or that the bu iue · done, out of
which the cause of action aro e, w, intertate commerce. But in American hue
o. v. O'Rourke ( 1900), 23 "Mont. 530, 39
Pac. 910, it was held that such allegation
were unnece ary.
\Vhere performance of condition precedent i not alleged by the plaintiff, the
defendant may rai e the objection Ly demurrer, or by an wer, or he may rai ·e it
on the trial: Week v. O'Brien (1 94),
141 .T. Y. 199, 36 .rT. '. 1 5.
ee al o
uff v. Fire As 'n ( l c95}, 129 Mo. 460, 30
. \Y. 1034.
\Vhere a demand an<l. refu al are condition prece<lent to plaintiff' ca e, and
defendant in hi an wer denie all liabilit~
. o that it i apparent a demand would have
IJ en met by a refu al, d £encl nt cannot
complain that uch d mand wa not :hown:
'I homp·on v. Whitney (1 99), 20 Ttah, 1,
s; Pac. 429.

pleaded or pro>en by plaintiff . . . . They
were each and all matter of defence, but,
not con tituriug a pa.re of the plaintiff.
a e, the bur en did not re t upon him
either to plead r prove the ab enre of
them, in the fir t iu tauce. And not u iucr
requir d to m:gativ thc'e ondition , if h
doe o in hi pleadincr ·uch aYerment ar
uunece ary and need n t be prov d:"
Jone' v. \ e ideut ~\ · 'n (1 4) 92 Ia. 652,
ee, in upport of the rul
61 .-. \ . 4 5.
above inclieated, :\fodern \Yoodm n v.
oye ( l 01 }, 15 Incl. 503, 64- . E. 2 L;
Wallace v.
yau (1 94), 93 Ia. 115, 61
W . 395 · JEtna In . o. v. Gla. ·gow
Elec. o. (1 99), IOi Ky. ~7, 52 . \V.
9i5;
!etcher v. erman-American In .
o. (1900), i9 :Minn. 337, 2 ........ W. 47;
chrepfer v. 1{o kford In . Co. ( l 99), i7
Minn. 291, 79 . W. 1005; ' ouner l'.
City of Fond du L ac (1 9 ), lOL Wi . 3,
76 . W. 1116; Little Ne tucca Road C .
v. Tillamook County ( 1 9 ), 3 1 re. l 4
P ac. 465.
" Generally, a plaintiff is only required to
bring hi ca e within the term appearing
on the face of the contract in uit, and
need not negative condition and ex eption endor ed thereon:" Railway ffiial , etc.
'n v. Drummond ( l 9 ) , 56
Teb. 235, 76 J, w. 562.
W here an in urance policy pro,·i<l e
that if the in u red i killed in c rtain
extra-hazardou occupation , the b neficiary hould g t a reduced um, t!.e
complaint hould allege that be wa not
o killed, el e he court cannot r net r
judo-ment for the um which i due under
the policy : American .i\.C id nt
. v.
aron (1 96), 99 Ky. 441, 36 . W. 169.
But in In urance .o. 1. McLeod ( 1 96},
57 Kan. 95, 45 Pac. i3, it wa held that
wher a policy allowed concurrent iu urauce, and provitl d for prora ing in -u ·h
c, e, nch oncurrent in~urauce need n t
be alleged in th petition .
T.

Con ideration.

" Must the conditions or exceptions,

the existence of which may relieve the

defendant from liability, be pleaded by

plaintiff, <jr are they so far matters of

defence that the burden is upon the de-

fendant to plead and prove them ? In our

judgment tliey were not required to be

pleaded or proven by plaintiff. . . . They

were each and all matters of defence, but,

not constituting a part of the plaintiff's

case, the burden did not rest upon him

either to plead or prove the absence of

tliein, in the first instance. And not being

required to negative these conditions, if he

does so in his pleading such averments are

unnecessary and need not be proved : "

Jones V. Accident Ass'n (1894), 92 la. 652,

61 X. W. 485. See, in support of the rule

above indicated. Modern Woodmen v,

Noyes (1901), 1.58 Ind. 503, 64 N. E. 21 ;

'onditions 'ubsequent,

egaliving.

"~fu t the condition
or ex ption ,
the exi teoce of whieh may reli ve th
<l f ndaut from liability, b pleaded by
pl iutiff, <Jr are they
far matter of
defence that the lrnrcl n i upon th Je!cndaut to plead an<l prove th m ? Jn our
j111l~rnent tl1 y w re not r quir d to be

v.

. w.

... ' r i. it n
ary to 11 i:r con. id rati n in an aetion
again t a commnu carri r up n a contr, ·t
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for the carriage of poods : Davis v. Jack-

sonville, etc. Line (1894), l:>t; Mo. 69, 28

iS. \V. 965. Au assignee of a chose in

action need not show that he paid a con-

sideration for it because the complaint

avers a sale as well as an assignment to

him, for the allegation of sale may be

treated as surplusage : Gregoire v. Rouriie

(18115), 28 Ore. 275, 42 Pac. 996.

The word " consideration " need not

appear in a pleading: Ramsey v. Johnson

(1897), 7 Wyo. 392, 42 Pac. 1084. An

allegation that a contract was made " upon

sufficient consideration " is sufficient :

Oslin V. Telford (1899), 108 Ga. 803, 34

S. E. 168; Pattillo v. Jones (1901), 113

Ga. 330, 38 S. E. 745.

f r the c::trriage of good, : Da\·is v . .fack01n·ille, tc. Liu (l 94), 1:!6 l\lo. 69, 2
·. W. 965. Au a· ignee of a cho e in
action ne cl not show that he paid a cou1dcratiou for it becau e th complaint
aver a al a well a au a ·igument to
l1i111, for the all gation of . ale may be
treated a urplu age: regoir v. Hourk
( l .J.3 ), 2 Ore. 275, 42 Pa . 996.
The word " ·on ideratiou " need not
appear in a pleading: Ramsey i-. John on
( l 97), i Wyo. 392, 42 Pac. 1084.
An
all gation that a ·ontract wa made" upon
utticieut consideration" i
uffici nt:
Jin v. Telford (1899), IO Ga. 803, 34
. E. 16 ; Pattillo v. Jone (1901) , 113
Ga. 330, 38 . K 745.

Contrihutorij Nei^iigence.
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Contributory negligence is a matter of

defence and need not be negatived in the

complaint : Reading Township v. Telfer

(1897), 57 Kan. 798, 48 Pac. 134 ; Whitty

V. City of Ushkosh (1900), 106 Wis. 87,

81 N. W. 992; Randall v. City of Ho-

quiam (1902), 30 Wash. 435, 70 Pac. 1111 ;

Walker c. McNeill (1897), 17 Wash. 582,

50 Pac. 518; Johnson v. Bellingham Bay

Co. (1896), 13 Wash. 455, 43 Pac. 370;

Thompson c. Great Northern Ry. Co.

(1897), 70 Minn. 219, 72 N. W. 962;

House V. Meyer (1893), 100 Cal. 592, 35

Pac. 308; Boyd v. Oddous (1893), 97 Cal.

510, 32 Pac. 569 ; Tucker v. Northern Ter-

minal Co. (1902), 41 Ore. 82, 68 Pac. 426.

In Indiana, a long line of decisions lield

that it was necessary for the plaintiff to

negative contributory negligence in his

complaint as part of his cause of action :

Gartiu v. Meredith (1899), 153 Ind. 16, 53

N. E. 836 ; Cleveland, etc. Ry. Co. v. Klee

(1899), 154 Ind. 430, 56 N. E.234 ; Sale v.

Aurora, etc. Co. (1896), 147 Ind. 324, 46

N. E. 669 ; Baltimore, etc. Ry. Co. v.

Young (1896), 146 Ind. 374, 45 N. E. 479 ;

Evansville, etc. R. R. Co. i-. Krapf (1895),

143 Ind. 647, 36 N. E. 901. But the legis-

lature, by the act of 1899, Burns' Rev. St.,

1901, § 359 a, changed this rule, making

such allegation unnecessary. See Indian-

apolis St. Ry. Co. r. Robinson (1901), 157

lud. 232, 61 N. E. 197, holding the act

constitutional. Also see Aspy r. Botkins

(1903), — Ind. — , 66 N. E. 462, construing

the act.

In Iowa, the rule is firmlv established

that freedom from contril)ul()ry negligence

must be pleaded and ])roved l)y the plain-

tiff: Rabe v. Somuierbeck (1895), 94 la.

656, 63 N. W. 458 ; Gregory v. Wood-

worth (1895), 93 la. 246, 61 N. W. 962 ;

Stuber v. Gannon (1896), 98 la. 228,67

N. W. 105; Kleiueck v. Reiger (1899), 107

la. 325, 78 N. W. 39 ; Elenz v. Conrad

(1901), 115 la. 183, 88 N. W. 337; De-

catur V. Simp.son (1902), 115 la. 348,88

N. W. 839. Same rule held in Idaho:

Hauer v. Northern Pac. Ry. Co. (1900),

62 Pac. 1028.

Contributory .Ne_qligence.

that freedom from contribuLor,v negli ge nce
Jilli ·t be plea<l <l and prove<l li_v th e plaintiff : Hab v. '0111111erl1cck ( l 95), 94 Ia.
656, 63 . \V. 45 ; Gr gory v. Woodworth (l !L> ), 93 Ia. 246, 61 N. W . 962;
tuber v. Gannou (I 9ti), 9 Ia. 228, 67
N. W. 105; Kl<'in eck v. H i" r (1 99), lOi
Ia. 325, 7 N. \V. 39; 1'Jenz v. oorad
(1901), 115 Ia. 1 3,
N. W. 337; Deatur v. ' imp on (L902) , 115 Ia. 34,
N. Yv. 839. , ame rule heltl in Idaho:
Haner v. Northern I ac. Ry. Co. (1900),
62 Pac. 1028 .
In New York, also, due care must be
affirmatively hown by the plaintiff:
Whalen v. Citizen 'Ga Light Co. (1 96),
151 N. Y. 70, 45 N. E . 363.
In onnecticut it wa held in Brockett
v. Fairhaven, etc. R. R. Co. (1900), 73
Conn. 42 , 47 Atl. 763, that a direct allegation that an injury wa caused by the
negligent act of another neces arily involves the allegation that plaintiff's negligence did not contribute to it, and a
separate averment to that effect i not
necessary.
In l\Iontana it i held that plaintiff's
freedom from contributory negligence need
be alleged only when the complaint shows
that the proximate cause of the injury was
plaintiff's own act: nook v. City of Anaconda (1901), 26 Mont. 128, 66 Pac. 756;
Cummings v. Helena, etc. Smelting Co.
(1902) , 26 Mont. 434, 68 Pac. 52.
Where a petition hows such contributory negligence as would bar a recovery
if pleaded as a defence, the petition is demurrable: Stillwell' Adm'r v. Land Co.
(1900),.Ky., 5 S. W. 696.
In actions for wilful injury, no showing of freedom from contributory uegligence need be made: Clevelaud, etc. Hy.
Co. v. Miller (1897), 149 Ind. 490,49 N. E.
445.
Freedom from contributory negligence
need be pleaded only in general terms:
Gregory v. Woodworth (1 95), 93 Ia. 246,
61 N. W. 962; Stuber v. Gannon (L896),
98 Ia. 228, 67 N. W. 105; Kleineck v.
Reiger ( l 99), 107 Ia. 325, 7 N. W. 39 ;
Carter v. Seattle (189 ), 19 Wash. 597, 53
Pac. 1102.

Contributory negligence i a matter of
-defence anJ need not be negatived in the
<:omplaint: Reading Township v. Telfer
(1897), 57 Kan . 798, 48 Pac. 134; Whitty
v . City of 0 hk sh (1900), 106 Wi ·. 1,
81
. W. 992; Handall v. City of Hoquiam ( 1902), 30 Wash. -135, 70 Pac. 1111 ;
Walker i-. i\lcNeill {1897), 17 Wa. h. 5 2,
50 Pac. 51 ; John on v. Bellingham Bay
Co. (1 96), 1.3 vVa h. 455, 43 Pac. 370;
Thomp on c. Great Korthern Ry. Co.
{I 97), iO Minn. 219, i2 i:J . W. 962;
Hou e v. Meyer (I 93), 100 Cal. 592, 35
Pac. 308 ; Boyd v. Oddo us ( 1893), 9 7 Cal.
MO, 32 Pac. 569 ; Tucker v. Northern Terminal Co. (1902), 41 Ore. 82, 6 Pac. 426.
In Indiana, a lou~ lin e of decisions held
that it was neces ary fo r the plaintiff to
negative coutributory uegligeu ce in hi
<:omplaint a part of his cause of action:
Gartin v. Meredith (1899), 153 Ind. 16, 53
N. E. 36; Clevt>land, etc. Hy. o. v. Klee
(1899), 154 Ind. 430, 56 . E. 234; ale v.
Aurora, etc. Co. (1896) , 147 Ind. 324, 46
N. E. 669; Baltimore, etc. Ry. Co. v.
Young (1896), 146 Ind. 374, 45 N. E. 479;
Evansville, etc. R.R. Co. v. Krapf (1895),
143 Ind. 647, 36 N. E. 901. But the legi lature, by the act of 1899, Burns' Rev. St.,
190 l, § 359 a, changed thi rule, making
uch allegation unnece ary. See Indianapolis t. Hy. Co. v. Robinson (1901), 157
Iod. 232, 61 N. E. 197, holding the act
con. titutional. Also ee A py v. Botkins
Conversion.
(l903), - lnd. - , 66 N. E. 462, construing
tho act.
An averment that defendant converted
In Iowa, the rule i firmly e tablished the property to his own use is a sufficient
43
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averment of the fact of conversion : Lowe

V. (Jznaun (1902), 137 Cal. 257, 70 Pac. 87 ;

Sauford V. Janseu (1896), 49 Neb. 766, 69

N. W. 108; First Nat. Mank r. Gaddis

( 1903), 31 Wash. .')96, 72 Pac. 460 ; Stevens

f. Curran (1903), 28 Mout. 366, 72 Pac.

753 (ill the absence of a special demurrer) ;

Cordill I'. Minn. Elevator Co. (1903), 89

a•erment of he fact of conver ion: Lowe
v. zmun (1902 ), 137 al. 25 i 70 Pac. 7;
auford v . Jan ·en (1 96), -1-9 N b. - 66, 69
X. \'\. l O ; Fir t ~ at. Bank i:. addi
t l 03) 31 Wa h. 596, 72 Pac. 460 · teven
i: .
urran ( 1903) 2 )font. 366, i2 Pac.
i53 (in th ab. nee of a pecial d murr r);
orJill v. )lion. Elevator o. (19 3), 9
)Iiun. 442, 95 N . W. 306.

Minn. 442, 95 N. W. 306.

Corporate Existence.

" It is not necessary for a plaintiff

corporation, in bringing suit, to allege

that it is a corporation. Its legal capacity

to sue will be presumed in law until tlie

contrary is made to appear; and, unless it

affirmatively appears from the face of the

petition that the plaintiff has no legal

capacity to sue, such question cannot be
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raised by demurrer. The point that

plaintiff is not a corporation should be

raised by a special plea iu the nature of a

plea in abatement. If it is not so raised

before pleading to tiie merits, the question

is waived. By pleading to the merits, a

defendant admits plaintiff's capacity to

maintain the action : " Leader Printing

Co. V. Lowry (1899), 9 Okla. 89, 59 Pac.

242.

In support of the proposition that

corporate existence need not be averred,

except where the gist of the action in-

volves the corporate existence, see How-

land V. Jeuel (1893), 55 Minn. 102, 56

N. W. 581 ; Holden v. Great Western

Elevator Co. (1897), 69 Minn. 527, 72

N. W. 805 ; Brady v. Nat. Supply Co.

(1901), 64 O. St." 267, 60 N. E. 218;

Fletcher v. Cooperative Pub. Co. (1899),

58 Neb. 511, 78 N. W. 1070 ; German Ins.

Co. V. Frederick (1899), 57 Neb. .538, 77

N. W. 1106; Barber v. Crowell (1898),

55 Neb. 571, 75 N. W. 1109.

A petition by a corporation for the re-

moval of a cause to the federal court by

reason of diverse citizenship, must spe-

cifically aver that it is a corporation

created under the laws of another State,

and it is not enough to allege that it is a

citizen of another State, for corporations

are not strictly citizens. Many federal

decisions cited : Springs v. Southern Ky.

Co. (1902), 1.30 N. C. 186, 41 S. E. 100.

orporate Exi tence.
"It i not nece ary for a plamtiff
corporation in bringing uit, to allege
that it i. a orporati 11. It legal capacity
to ue will be pre nmed in law until the
contr ry i made to appear; and, uole · it
affirmati ,-ely app ar from the face of the
petition that the plaintiff ha no legal
apacity to ue , uch que tion cannot be
rai ed b demurrer. The point that
plaintiff i not a corporation hould be
rai ed b · a pecial plea in the nature of a
plea in abatement. If it i not o rai ed
before pleading to the merit , the que tion
i waived. By pleading to the merit , a
defendant admit plaintiff's capacity to
maintain the action:" Leader Printing
o. v. Lowry (1 99), 9 Okla. 9, 59 Pac.
242.

I n upport of the propo ition that
corporate exi tence need not he averred,
except where the gi t of the a tion involve the corp rate exi tence, ee Howland v. J euel (1 93), 55 Minn. 102, 56
N. W . 5 1; H olden v. Great We tern
Elevator o. (1 97) 69 Minn. 527, 72
N. W. 03; Brady v. Nat. upply Co.
(1901),

64

t. 267, 60

. E. 21 ;

Fletcher v. Co-operative Pub. o. ( 1 99),
58 Neb. 5 11 , 7
. W. 1070; erman I n .
Co. v. Frederick (1 99), 57 eb. 53 , 77
rowell (1 9 ),
. W. 11 06; Barber v.
55 Neb. 57 1 75 N. W. 1109.
A petition hy a corporation for the removal of a cau e to the federal court by
rea on of diver e citizenship, mu t pecifically aver that it i a c rp ration
reat d und r th law f another tate,
and it i n t enough to allege that it i a
citizen of ano her tate, for corporati n
are not trictly itizen . Man ' f <leral
deci ion cited : pring v. outhcrn H .

In some cases, however, it is held

o. (1902), 1.30

~

.

. 1 6, 41

. E. 1 O.

necessary to plead coryiorate existence.

See Carpenter v. McCord Lumber Co.

(1900), 107 Wis. fill, 83 N. W. 7G4 ; State

I'. Chicago, etc. Ky. Co. (1893), 4 S. D.261,

56 N. W. 894. In tlie last case it was held

that sec. 2908, Comp. Laws, providing

that " in all -civil actions brought by or

against a corporation, it shall not be nec-

essary to prove on the trial of the cause,

tlie existence of such corporation, unless

the defendant shall, in the answer, ex-

pressly aver that the plaintiff or defendant

is not a corporation, " does not avoid the

necessity of pleading corporate existence

in the complaint. Such defect can be

In some ca e , how v r, it i h Id
necessary to pl ead corporate e i tenc .
• e
arpenter v. 1cCord Lumb r Co.

(1900}, lOi \Vi . 11, 3 X. \Y. 164; tat
hicago, tc. Hy. o. (1 3) -1- '. D. 6 1,
56 :r. \ . 9-1-. In the last ca e it wa h ld
that sec. 29 , omp. Law , pr viding

v.

that
in all ·civil a tion br ught by or
n,gain t a orp ration, it hall n t be nece ary o pro,•e ou th& trial of th cau e,
th e.·i teuce f uch corporati n, unles
the defendant ball, in the an swer, xpre ~1y aver hat the plaintiff or <l fendant
i. not a ·orporation,' doe not aYoid the
nece ity of pleading corporate exi tence
omplaint. ' uch d feet can be
in th
reached nly b.v general demurrer.
"That the defendant the Pa ific redging ,ompany i a corporation, or aniz d
and exi ting by virtue of th law, and
doing bu ine in Lemhi county," held a
uffici nt allegation of in orporation :
Jone v. Pacific Dredging o. (1903),
I daho, 72 Pac. 956.

us tom.
" A cu tom, pecial to a particular
cla of bu ine operation , to b availed
of, mu t be pleaded, and if put in i. u ,
proved : " Fir t i: at. Bank v. Farmer. '
Merchant ' Bank (1 9 ), 56 . . b. 1-1- ,
77
. W . 50.
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for future paiu and surfcring : Schultz v.

(iriffitl; (1897), 103 la. 150, 72 N. \V. 445 ;

in au action for damages to Ijuildiugs re-

moved from laud coudemueil for jjublic

use, the cost of raisiug the huildiuLTs after

removal: Lamb v. Elizabeth City (1902),

131 N. C. 241, 42 S. E. G0.'3 ; iu an action

for personal injuries, an allegation that

the i)laintiff has been permanently dis-

abled from labor, held insulHcient to admit

proof of such loss of earnings ; Coontz v.

Missouri Pac. Ky. Co. (1893), 115 Mo. 669,

22 S. W. 572 ; in an action for breach of

a contract of sale, an allegation of what

the profits would have been : Singer Mfg.

Co. V. Potts (1894), 59 Minn. 240, 61 N. W.

23 ; in an action to set aside a conveyance

cf real property on account of fraud, an
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allegation tliat the defrauded party was

damaged: Srader v. Srader (1898), 151

Ind. 339, 51 N. E. 479; eacli item of

damage sought to be recovered : Negley

V. Cowell (1894), 91 la. 2,56, 59 N. W. 48 ;

in an action for personal injuries, an al-

legation that the bi-each of dut}- was the

cause of the injury : Bodah v. Town of

Deer Creek (1898), 99 Wis. 509, 75 N. W.

75; consequential damages : Omaha Coal,

Coke & Lime Co. v. Fay (1893), 37 Neb.

68, 55 N. W. 211 ; in an action for wrong-

ful levy, special damages for loss of pi'ofits :

Bradley v. Borin (1894), 53 Kan. 628, 3G

Pac. 977 ; in an action for ])ersonal inju-

ries, diseases not naturally resulting from

the nervous shock alleged : Kleiner v.

Third Ave. R. R. Co. (1900), 162 N. Y.

193, 56 N. E. 497.

Special damages, which must be spe-

cially pleaded, were defined to be all such

damages or elements of damage as do not

naturally and necessarily flow from the

wrongful acts constituting a trespass, and

such as the trespasser and wrongdoer is

not bound to know must necessarily and

inevitably result from his acts: Rauma v.

Bailey (1900), 80 Minn. 336, 83 N. VV. 191.

" Special damage " has a technical mean-

ing when used in respect to the rules of

pleading, and merely distinguishes the

damages which must be pleaded from

those which need not be pleaded : Piatt r.

Town of Milford (1895), 66 Conn. 320, 34

Atl. 82.

In an action for tort, where the alleged

wrongful act does not in itself imply mal-

ice, the plaintiff must, if he intends to

claim cxcmj)lary tlamages, allege in his

complaint facts entitling him tliereto : Vine

V. Casmey (1902), 86 Minn. 74, 90 N. W.

158. And when both actual and exem-

plary damages are claimed, defendant is

entitled to know how mucli is claimed for

each: Lamb v. Ilarbaugh (1895), 105

Cal. 680, 39 Pac. 56.

It is not necessary that the petition

should allege the measure of damages, as

that is a matter to be regulated by the

court iu its instructions : St. Louis Trust

fo r fu t ure paiu and uffc rinO': Schultz v.
'riffit h ( l 97), 103 Ja. 150, 7'2 I . \V . 4-15;
in an a ·iion fo r damage to buildiug remov d from land ·o ndemned for public
u e, the co t of ra ising the bui lding· after
removal : Lam b v. E lizabeth ity (1902),
1:31 N. C. 2-1- 1, 42 . K 603; in au a tiou
for personal inj urie" au all gati n that
the plain tiff has beeu p r man nLly di abled from labor, held in uiticieut to admit
] r of of u h lo s o( earu ings: oontz v.
Mi so uri Pa . Ry. o. (1 93),115 Mo.669,
22 . W . 572 ; in a u action fo r breach of
a contract of ale, an allegation of what
the pro fi ts would have been: iuger Hg.
Co. v. P ot t (189-1), 59 M inn. 240, 61 1 . W.
23; in an action to set. aside a conveyance
d r eal pr oper ty 0 11 acco un t of fraud, a n
allegation that the defrau<led par ty was
damaged: Srader v. Srader (1898), 151
Ind. 339, 51 J. E . 479; eaclt item of
damage so ug ht to be recov red : Negley
v. Cowell (1 89.t) , 91 Ia. 256, 59 N. W. 48;
irl a n acti on fo r personal in juries, a n allegation that the breach of duty was the
cause of the inj ury: Bodah v . T own of
D eer Creek (1898), 99 Wis. 509, 75 N. W.
75; consequential damages: Oma ha Coal,
Co ke & Lim e Co. v. F ay (1 893 ), 37 Neb.
68, 55 N. W . 211 ; in a n a ction fo'r wrongfu l levy , special da mage· for lo of pr ofi t :
Bradley v. B orin (1 894) , 53 K a n. 62 , 36
P ac. 977; in an action fo r p ersonal injuri es, diseases not n atura ll y res ul t ing from
th e n ervous shock alleged: Kl ein er v.
Third Ave. R. R. Co. (1900) , 162 N. Y.
193, 56 N. E. 497 .
Special damages, whi ch must be specially pleaded, were defin ed to be all such
damages or elements of dam age as do not
natura lly and n ecessarily flow from t h e
wrong ful acts con stituting a t re pass, a nd
suc h a~ the trespasser a nd wrongdoer is
n ot bo un d to k now must n eces arily and
inev itably r e u lt fro m hi · acts : lfa uma v.
Bail e.v (1900). 80 .Miun . 336, 83 ~. W . 191.
" S pecial damage" has a tech ni cal mean ing when used in respect to t he rules of
plead ing, and merely di sting uish es the
damages which m us t be pleaded from
th ose which need not be pl eaded: P latt v.
Town of .Milfor d (1895), 66 Conn. 320, 34
Atl. 82.
I n an action for tort, where the alleged
w r ongful act doe not in itself imply malice, the plaintiff m ust, if he intends to

laim ex mplary damage , allege in his
complaint fact · ntiLling him thereto: in
v. am y (1902), G l\liuu. 74, 90 . \V.
15
.And wh n both a ·tual an<l exemplary damag ar
laim <l, <l fe1rclant is
utitled to kuow liow mu ·h i claim <l for
ach: Lamb v. Harbaugh (l 95), 105
al. 680, 39 Pac. 56.
It i not n ce, ·ary ihat the petition
. hould all g the m a ure of damag s, a
that is a matter to be regulat <l by the
ou r t in it iu tructions: St. Loui 'fru t
o. v. Bambrick ( 1899), 149 Mo. 560, 51
. w. 706.
Where it i sought to recov er liquidated <lam ages, it is nee ssary to both plead
and prove that th e ca ·e falls within the
terms of the exceptiou in Civ. Cone,
§§ l 6i 0, 1671, declaring all contracts for
li qui dated damages voiu except in certain
ca es: Long Beach, etc. District v. Dodge
(1902), l .'35 Cal. 40 1, 67 Pac. 499.
·where pla intiff a\•ers, in his petition in
a n action to r ecover personal pr operty,
that the property i worth at 1 ast a certain amount, an<l thi is admitted by t he
a n wer, t he p lead ings fix the amount for
the purposes of the ·ase: State Bank v.
F elt (1895) , 99 fa. 532, 68 N. W. 818. In
a n action to r ecover damages for t he
wrongful deteution of personal proper ty,
it is not necessary to all ege unusual condi tions whi ch in creased its val ue, where
the g ro s value is all eged: H ill 1. Wilson
(1 899), 8 N. D. 309, 79 N. W . 150.
" In a civil action fo r a. sault aud batt ery it is unnecessary to specially a!Jege
such da mages as are the nece ·sary an d
usual co nsequence of t he act complained
of :" H arsh man v. R ose (1897), 50 Ne b.
11 3, 69 N. W. 755. In an action to foreclose a mor tgage, taxes can not be r ecovered where plaintiff does not allege th at
he paid th em , but me rely alleges that defendant neglected to pay them and prayed
judgment fo r principal, interest au d costs;
Willia.m v. Williams (1903), 11 7 Wi s.
125, 94 N. vV. 24. Loss of time in an
action for illegal arrest i. sufficiently
pleaded by an allegation that plaintiff wa
depr ived of his liberty: Young v. Gormley
(1903), 120 Ia. 372, 94 N. W. 922.

Debt D11e.
A com plaint in an action to foreclose a
mortgage honld expressly allege that the

CfflL RK\IEDIE .
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debt is due. But where facts are ])leadcd

and sup[>lied in an exiiibit which show

that tlie debt was due before the action

was instituted, the iutinnity of the plead-

ing in this respect is thereby cured : Bald-

win r. Boyce (1898), 152 Ind. 46,51 N. E.

.•J.34.

tl bt i· tine. But wh er e fact are pleaded
anu -up pli etl in au exhibit wbich how
du e before the a tiou
t hat the de bt \V
w as in t it ute<l, the infirmity of the pleatlio O' in t hi · re pect i th r by cured: Baldwin i·. Boyce ( 1 9 ), 152 Ind. 46, 51 N. E.
:J34.

Delive1·y.

Delivery.

An allegation that an instrument was

executed includes the idea of delivery,

aud it is not necessary to allege delivery

in terras: Smith v. Wait.- (1894), 103 Ca'l.

372, 37 Pac. 232 ; Jacobs v. Hogan

(1900), 73 Conn. 740, 49 Atl. 202; Top-

ping v. Clay (1896), 65 Minn. 346, 68

N. W. 34.

Demand.

An allegation that an in trument wa
executed include the idea of delivery,
amt it i n t nece arr to all ge deliver
in term· : mith i:. Waitt• (l 94) 103 al.
372, 3i J:>ac. 232; Jacob t'. Hogan
(1900), 73 ,onn. 40, 49 Atl. 202 · Topping v.
lay (1 96 ), 65 Minn . 3+6, 6
.... w. 34.

Demand.

Where defendant, in his answer, de-
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nies plaintiff's title, it is not necessary for

plaintiff to allege and prove demand pre-

vious to bringing an action for conversion :

Kosenau v. Syriug (1894), 25 Ore. 386, 35

I'ac. 845; Buffkins i'. Eason (1893), 112

N. C. 162, 16 S. E. 916; Rich v. Hobson

(1S93), 112 N. C. 79, 16 S. E. 931. See

also Gross v. Scheel (1903), — Neb. — , 93

N. W. 418.

An allegation of defendant's refusal to

pav is equivalent to an allegation of de-

mand, for he could not refuse unless he

had been asked to pay : Worth v. Whar-

ton (1898), 122 N. C. 376, 29 S. E. 370 ;

Brossard c Williams (1902), 114 Wis. 89,

89 N. W. 832.

Description.'

The descri[)tion of land in a complaint

Where defendant, in his an wer, denie · plaintiff' title, it i not n ece ary for
plaintiff to allege and pro,·e demaud previou to bringing ao action for conver. ion:
Ho enau i: . yring (1 94), 25 Ore. 3 6, 35
Pac. 45; Buffkin v. Ea on (1 3), 112
.J. C. 162, 16 ,. K 916; Rich v. Hob on
(l 93 ), 112
. C. 79, 16 ' . E. 93!.
ee
al o Gro v. 'c heel ( Ul03), eb. - , 93
.i:. w . 41.
Au allegation of defendant' refu al to
pay i equi1·aleot to an allegation of demand, for he could not refu e unle be
bad been a ked to pay: Yvorth v. Wharton (I
),122 r .C.376,29 .E.370;
)3ro ar<l '" \ illia m (1902), 114 Wis. 9,
9
32.
LT•

\\' ,

Description. ·

should be such that the land can be ascer-

tained and located from the allegations

alone: Kiernan v. Terry (1894), 26 Ore.

494, 38 Pac. 671 ; Scheffer v. Hines (1897),

149 Ind. 413, 49 N. 10. 348; Swatts v.

Bowen (1894), 141 Ind. 322,40 N. E. 1057 ;

Tracy v. Harmon (1895), 17 Mont. 465, 43

Pac. 500.

In Shefferr. Hines (supra), a description

employing solely the numbers of the sec-

tions, townships and ranges, without ref-

erence to any object from which a location

in the state could be inferred, was held

bad. But see Citizen's Bank v. Stewart

(1894), 90 la. 467, 57 N. W. 957, where

Buch a description in a decree was held

sufficient. A particular description by

courses and distances must control the

general description when the two are in

conflict: Ilaggia r. Lorenz (1895), 15

Mont. 309, 39 Pac. 285.

In actions of trover for the conversion

of money it is not necessary to describe

the money, but it is sufficient to state the

aggregate amount taken : Salem Traction

Co. V. Anson (1902), 41 Ore. 562, 69 Pac.

675.

Doing Equity.

In an action for equitable relief, a com-

plaint is demurrable which does not allege

facts showing that plaintiff has done or is

ready to do equity : Buena Vista, etc. Co.

The de cription of laud in a complaint
hould be uch that the laud can be a certained and located fr m the allegation
alone : Kiernan v . Terry ( l 94), 26 Ore.
494, 3 Pac. 671; c heffer v . Hine (l 97),
. E. 34 ; , watts v.
149 Ind . 413, 49
B o wen ( l 94), 141 Ind. 322, 40 . E. 1057;
Tracy v. Harmon ( 1895), 17 Mont. 465, 43
P ac. 500.
In hetfer v. Hine ( upra), a de cription
em ploying olely the number of the ecti on , to wn. hip. and range. , withont r efre nc to any ohject from which a location
in he t te could be iuferred, was held
l1a1l. But . ee itizen' Bank t·. tewart
( I 9+ ), 90 Ia. 467, 57
. W. 95 , where
n h
de cription in a decree wa.'i held
uffic i nt.
particular description by
our ·e and di ·tance mu t control th e
general d cription when the two are in

conflict : Tfaggia v. T.1 orenz (1 9-) , 15
M ut. 309 39 Pac. 2 5.
In a tion
f trover for the conv r ion
of money it i not nee ary to de ribe
the money, but it i suffi ient to ·tate the
aggr gate amount taken: ' alem Traction
o. v. n on {l 902), 41
re. 562, 69 ac.
675.

Doing Equity.
In an action fo r equitable relief, a complaint i demurrable which doe· not all ge
fact how inCY that plaintiff ha don e or i
r ady to do quity: Buena Vi ta, etc. Co.
v. Tuohy (189!'i), 107 a l. 24.'3 , 40 Pac.
3 6.

Dut.IJ·
The a verment of duty i but a. l egal
conclu ion, and i therefore improper aud
unavailing : ity of Ft. Wayne u. hri tie
(1900), 156Ind. l 72,59N.E.3 5; McPeak
v. Mo. Pac. Ry . .o. (1895), 128 fo. 617,
30 . W. 170; Lang v. Brady (1900), ~3
onn. i07, 49 Atl. 199; Martin v. h r wood (1902), 74 Conn. 475, 50 tl. 564 .
In ome cru e , however, an allegation of
du~y ha been con idered an allegati n of
fact: Berry v. Dole (190:.), 7 Minn. 471,
92 . W. 33-t.; Burnett t'. tlantic oa t
Line Ry. Co. (1903), 132 . C. 26 1, 43 . E.
797.
In Iowa it i heltl that in an action for
n gligence the particular duty neglect d
mu. t be declared upon: Humpton u. nterkircher (1 96), 97 Ia. 509, 66 N. W.
776; citing Railroad
o. v. · tark, 3
'lich. 714.
Thi rule seem to obtain al o in Wi con in. See Greenman v. hicago orthwe tern R. R.
o. (l 9 , 100 Wi . 1
75 N. W. 998; Lago v. Wal h ( l 9 ), 9
Wis. 348, 74 . W. 212. But ee, holl'ever, Jon v. Burti ( 1 94), 88 Wi . 47 ,
60 . w. 7 5.

Election Conte t.

In an a ti o to conte. t an electi n the
c mplaint mu t et f rth pecifi aJJy tbe
parti ular far t count d upon
invalidatiug th el ti n : B rders v. Williams
(1 00), 155 Ind. 36, 57 N. 4. 527.
Estoppel.
An e t ppel mu t be pleaded if i i o
be availal 1 : loud v. Mal in (I 99) l

Ia. 52, 75
w. 645, 7
. \ . 791,
ickum v. Bur khardt (l 97) , 30 re. 464,
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47 Pac. 888. See also note 4, p. 815, where

many cases are cited to tliis proposition.

Hut " a party is not bound to plead au es-

toppel where lie is without knowledge that

liis demand must ultimately rest upon

it:" Donnelly v. San Francisco Bridge

Co. (1897), 117 Cal. 417, 49 Pac. .5.59.

See Plumb v. Curtis (1895), ttG Conn.

154, 33 Atl. 998, for interesting discussion

of estoppel as a substantial ground of

recovery.

Exception to Rule of Law.

Where a party relies upon an exception

to the rule that a servant assumes tlie risk

of defective machinery, he must first plead

the exception : Malm v. Thelin (1896), 47

Neb. 086, 66 N. W. 650.

Exceptions in Statutes.

47 Pac. 88.

See also note 4, p. 15, wh re
many ca es are citec.1 t o thi . prop . ition.
But " a party is n ot bound to plea<.! an est1,p pel wh er he i with out knowledge tha t
hi demaud mu t ultimatel.1' r e. t upon
it: " Donnelly v. , an Franei:<co 13 ridge
Co. (1897), 117 Cal. 4l7 , . J. 9 Pae. 559.
ee Plumb 1·. C ur ti~ (1 89:5), 66 onn.
154, 33 Atl. 99 , for intere tin g d i cus ion
of e toppel as a substantial g rounc.l of
recovery.

Exception to Rule of Law.
Wh ere a party reli es upou an ex epti on
to the rule that a servant ass umes th e ri sk
of defective machin ery, h e mu t first plead
th e exce ption: Malm v. Thelin (1 896 ), 47
Neb. 686, 66 . W. 650.
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In stating a cause of action arising upon

an enacting clause of a statute containing

an exception, such exception should be

negatived ; but where the proviso is con-

tained in another clause it need not be

negatived: Rowell i'. Janvriu (1896), 151

N.Y. 60, 45 N. E. 398 ; Walker v. Chester

County (1893), 40 S. C. 342, 18 S. E. 936;

Cleveland, etc. Ry. Co. v. Gray (1897), 148

Ind. 266, 46 N. E. 675 ; City of Kansas City

V. Garnier(1896),57 Kan. 41 2, 46 Pac. 707 ;

Larson v. First Nat. Bank (1902), — Neb.

— , 92 N. W. 729 ; Hale v. Mo. Pac. Ry.

Co. (1893), 36 Neb. 266, 54 N. W. 517 ;

Central Kentucky Asylum i\ Penick

(1898), 102 Ky. 533, 44 S. W. 92. In

Wolff V. Lamann (1900), 108 Ky. 343. 56

S. W. 408, it was held that in alleging

a statutory cause of action for injuries due

to the bite of a dog, it is not necessarv to

negative the exceptions of the statute, viz.,

tliat the injury did not occur upon the

premises of the owner after night or that

plaintiff was not engaged in some unlaw-

ful act in the daytime. These are matters

of defence.

Execution of Instrument.

An allegation that a mortgage was made,

executed, and delivered includes the sign-

E xceptions in Stat1ttes.
In stating a cau. e of action a ri in g upon
an enacting cla use of a stat ute co ntainin g
a n exception, such exception should be
11 °gat ived; but wh ere the proviso is contain ed in anoth er clause it need n ot be
11 egatil'ed: Rowell v . Janvrin (1896), 151
N . Y. 60, 45 N. E . 398 ; Walk er v. Chester
Co unty (1893), 40 S. C. 342, 18 S. E. 93 6;
levelaud, etc. Ry. Co.1•. Gray (1 897 ), 148
Ind. 266, 46 . E. 675 ; City of Kansas City
v . Garnier (1896), 57 Kan . 412, 46 Pac. 707;
J,ar on v. First Nat. Bank (1902), - Neb.
- , 92 N. W. 729; Hale v. Mo. Pac. Ry.
Co. (1893) , 36 Neb. 266, 54
. W. 517;
Central Kentucky Asylum v. Penick
( 1898), 102 Ky. 533, 44 S. W. 92. In
Wolff v. Lamann (1900), 108 Ky. 3-!3. 56
8. W. 408, it was h eld that in alleging
a Rtatutory cause of action for injuries du e
to the bite of a dog, it is not necessary to
nega.tive the exceptions of the stat ute, viz.,
that the injury did not occur upon the
premises of the owner after night or that
plaintiff was not engaged in some unlawful act in the daytime. These are matters
of defence.

ing, sealing, attesting, and acknowledging :

E:recution of Instrument.

Laurent v. Banning (1897), 32 Ore. 11, 51

Pac. 80.

Execution, Issuance and Return of.

A sufficient showing that a legal execu-

tion was issued on a judgment and re-

turned unsatisfied is made by au allegatlDn

that on a day named an execution was, in

An allegation that a mortgage wa made,
executed, and delivered includ es the signin g, sealing, attesting, and acknowledging:
I . aurent v. Lanning (1897), 32 Ore. 11, 51
Pac. 80.

Execution, Issuance and R eturn of.

due form of law, issued upon a certain

judgment, to the slieriff, and that such

execution was duly returned by saiil slieriff

wholly unsatisfied: I'ierstoff )•. Jorges

(1893), 86 Wis. 128, 56 N. W. 735.

Forcible Entrij and Detainer.

A complaint in the words of tlie statute

is sufficient: Locke i;. Skow (1902), Neb.,

91 N. W. 572. The rule requiring the

pleader to state the facts constituting his

cause of action or defence should not be

applied to this action : Blachford v. Fren-

zer (1895), 44 Neb. 829, 62 N. W. 1101.

A sufficient showing that a legal execution was issued on a judgment anc.l re-

tnrn e<l un ati. fi <l i. made by au allega t ion
that on a dav nam 1! an ex cution was, in
du form of Jaw, is ued upon a certain
judgment, to the sh riff, and t'.1at su~h
' xecntion was clulv returned by a id, heriff
wholl v un atisfied : Pierstoff 1'. J org s
(1 893J, 6 \Vi . 12 , 56 N. W. ~ 35.

Forcible Entry and Detainer.
A complaint in the wurd of the tatute
is ufficien t: Locket'. Skow (1902), ,.'eb.,
91 N. W. 572. The rule requiring the
pleader to state the fact co natitutin g hi s
cause of action or <l fence should not be
appli ed t o this action: Blachford 1·. Frenzer (1 895), 44 Neb. 829, 62 N. W. 1101.
For complaint helc.l suffic ient, see Moore v.
Parker (1899) , 59 Neb. 29, 80 N. W . 43 .

Foreclosure.
In an action to foreclose a mortg age
plaintiff need not set out th e nature of, or
facts constitutin g, the claim of another
li en hold er, but may allege generally that
such defendant claim some interest in
the mortgaged premises, ad vi ing him that
hi s lie n will be barred if he fails to appear
and di sclose it: Winemiller v. Laughlin
(1 894) , 51 0. St. 421 , 38 N. E. 111. A
co mplaint in a suit to enforce a mortgage
on a widow 's dower interest must show
the fact · from which th e portion of the
mortgage debt properl y chargeable to
such dower interest can be ascertained :
Fowle v. House (1896), 29 Ore . 114, 44
Pac. 692.
For the construction of a r.omplaint in
an act ion to forecl o:oie a mechani c' lien
upon several piece of property, not conti guous and n ot of similar character, see
Big Blackfoot Co. v. Bluebird Co. (1897) ,
19 Mont. 454, 48 Pac. 778.
But one action may be maintained for
the recovery of any debt secured by mortgage, under C. L. 1888, § 3460: alt L ake
Loan & Trust Co. v . Millspaugh (1898), 18
Utah, 283, 54 Pac. 893 .

F oreign Laws.
A fo r eign law must be pl eaded like any
other fact: L owry v. Moore (1897) , 16
W~1 s h. 476, 48 P ac. 238; Thomp on-Ho ust on E lec. Co. v. Palmer ( 1893), 52 Minn .
174, 53 N. \V. 11 37 ; Dunham v. H olloway
(1 895), 3 Okla. 244, 41Pac.140; ~fyers1·.
Chicago, etc. Ry. Co. (1897), 69 Minn. 476,

err
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72 N. W. 694 ; McDonald v. Bankers' Life

Ass'u (1900), 154 Mo. 618, 55 S. W. 999;

Showaher i\ Uickert (1902), 64 Kau. 82,

67 Pac. 454; Smith v. Mason (1895), 44

Neb. 610, 63 N. W. 41. A foreign statute

should be set out, not pleaded by its legal

effect: Lowry n. Moore (1897), 16 Wash.

476, 48 Pac. 238. In pleading a foreign

statute it is sufficient to allege its sub-

stance : Minneapolis Harvester Works r.

Smith (1893), 36 Neb. 616, 54 N. W. 973;

Showalter v. Rickert (1902), 64 Kan. 82,

67 Pac. 454. The law of another State

cannot he pleaded by chapter only, but the

terms, tenor, and effect of the statute are

to be set out: McDonald v. Bankers' Life

Ass'n (1900), 154 Mo. 618, 55 S. W. 999.

In pleading the common law of another
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State it is sufficient to state as a fact what

the law is, without setting out decisions of

the courts : Crandall v. Great Northern

Ry. Co. (1901), 83 Minn. 190,86 N. W. 10.

In the absence of allegations to the con-

trary, the laws of a foreign state will be

presumed the same as those of the State of

the forum : Greenville Nat. Bank r. Evans

Co. (1900), 9 Okla. 353, 00 Pac. 249 ; Man-

.•^ur-Tebbetts Co. i-. Willet (1900), 10 Okla.

383, 61 Pac. 1066; Smith v. Mason (1895),

44 Neb. 610,63 N. W. 41.

F}-atid.

Fraud is never presumed, and must

he alleged and proved to be available :

Hampton v. Webster (1898), 56 Neb. 628,

77 N. W. 50; Nat. State Bank v. Nat.

Bank (1895), 141 lud. 3.52, 40 N. E. 799.

And in order to be available it must have

resulted in injury or damage to the party

pleading it : Carrington r. Omaha Life

Ass'n (1899), 59 Neb. 116, 80 N. W. 491.

A general allegation of fraud is not

sufficient, but the facts constituting the

fraud must be alleged : Murray v. Shoudy

(1896), 13 Wash. 33, 42 Pac." 631; Cade

V. Head Camp W. 0. W. (1902), 27

Wash. 218, 67 Pac 603; Crowley r.

Hicks (1898), 98 Wis. 566, 74 N. W. 348;

New Bank v. Kleiner (1901), 112 Wis.

287, 87 N. W. 1090; James v. Kelley

(1899), 107 Ga. 446, 33 S. E. 425 ; Keni-

per V. Renshaw (1899), 58 Neb. 513, 78

N. W. 1071 ; Johnston v. Spencer (1897),

51 Neb. 198, 70 N. W. 982; Crosby v.

Ritchey (1896), 47 Neb. 924, 66 N. W.

1005; Rockford Watch Co. v. Manifold

(1893), 36 Neb. 801, 55 N. W. 236; Knox

V. Pearson (1902), 64 Kan. 711, 68 Pac.

613; Ladd v. Nystol (1901), 63 Kan. 23,

64 Pac. 985; Gem Chemical Co. v. Young-

blood (1900), 58 S. C. 56, 36 S. E. 437;

Beaman v. Ward (1903), 132 N. C. 68, 43

S. E. 545; Leasure v. Forquer (1895), 27

Ore. 334, 41 Pac. 665; Schiffnian v.

Schmidt (1900), 154 Mo. 204, 55 S. W.

451 ; Goodson v. Goodson (1897), 140 Mo.

206, 41 S. W. 737; Burnham v. Boyd

(1902), 167 Mo. 185, 66 S. W. 1088;

Clough V. Holden (1893), 115 Mo. 336, 21

94; 1 IcDonald v. Banker Life (1 93) 36 Neb. 01, 55 :S. \ . 236; Kn ox.
Mo. 61 , 5:- '. W. 999; v. Pear on (1902 ), 64 Kan. 711, 6 Pac.
howalcer v. l ickert ( l 902), 64 Kan. 2, 613; Ladd v. Ny tol (1901), 6' K an. - 3,
Pac. 454; mith v. ~I on (1 95) 44 64 P c. 9 5; em hemical o. v. ) ung~Teb. 61 , 63 N. W. 41.
A foreign tatute bl od (1900), 5
. 56, 36 . E . 43 ;
. 6 , 4:3
. houlJ be ·et out, not pleaded by it l gal Beaman v. Ward (1903), 132
. E. 545 ; Leasure v. Forquer ( l 95), 27
ffect: ow ryv.Moore(l 97), 16 Wah.
re. 334, 41 Pac. 665;
chiffman i-.
4i6, 4 Pa . 23 . In pleading a forei.,.n
chmidt (1900), 154 Mo. 204, 55 . W .
tatut it i "ufficient to allege it ubt nee: Minneapoli Harvester W ork r. 451; ood.o n v. Good on (1 97), 140 Mo.
mith (1 93), 36 Neb. 616, 54 N. W. 973; 206, 41 ·. W. 737; Burnham i-. Bo.nl
h walter v. Rickert ( 1902), 64 Kan. 82, (1902), 167 Mo. l 5, 66 . W . 108 ;
67 Pac. 454. The law of another State Clough v. Holden (1893 ), 115 Mo. 336, 21
cannot he pleaded by chapter only, but the
• W. 1071; County of Cochi e v. Copper
term , tenor, and effect of th tatute are Queen Iin. Co. (1903), Ariz., 71 Pac.
to be et out: McDonald v . Banker ' Life 946; Guy u. Blue (1896), 146 Ind. 629, 45
'n ( 1900 ) 154 Mo . 61 , 55 . W . 99 .. N. E. 1052 ; Stroup v. troop (1 94), l-lcO
In pleading the ommon law of another Ind . 179, 39 . E. 64; T olbert v. Caletate it i ufficien t to state as a fact what don ian In. Co. (1897) 101 Ga. 741. 2
. E. 991; Peckham v. City of Wat onthe law i without etting out deci ion f
the court : randall v. Great ~ ortbern yiJle (1902), 13 Cal.24:..,71Pac.169; MorRy. Co. (1901}, 83 Minn. 190, 86 r. W . 10. rill c. Little Falls Co. (1893}, 53 Minu.
In the ab ence of allegation to the con- 371, 55 . w . 547.
trary, the law of a fo reio-n state will be
But in Pelly v. Na lor (1893), 139 N. Y.
pre urned the ame a tho e of the tate of 59 , 35 ... . E. 317, it eem to be held that
the forum: Greenville Nat. Bank v. Evans the fact constituting the fraud need not
'o. ( 1900), 9 Okla. 35.'3, 60 Pac. 249 ; Man- Le et out.
rnr-Tebb tt Co. r. Willet ( 1900), 10 Okla.
A complaint is good which allege
3 .3, 61 Pac. 1066 ; mit h i· . Ma on (1 95), fact con tituting fraud wh ether fraud i
H _Teb. 610, 63 :r. W. 41.
alleged in term or not : Worth v. t wart
{l 9 ), 122 N. C. 263, 29 . E. 41:3;
Fraud.
Rathbone v . Frost (1 94), 9 W ah. 162, 37
F raud is never pre urn ed, and must Pac. 29 . ·
he alleged and proved to be available :
Ha.mpton v. W eb ter (1898}, 56 eb. 628,
77 .... W. 50 ; Nat.
tate Bank v. at.
Bank (1 95), 141 Ind. 352, 40 ~. E. 799.
nd in order to be available it mu t have
re ultcd in injury or damage to the party
pleading it : a rrington v. Omaha Life
J\ . 'n (1 99), 5 Neb. 11 6, ON. W. 491.
A general allegation of fraud i. not
ufficient, but the fact co n tituting the
fraud mu t be alleged: Murray v. houdy
(1 96), 13 Wash. 33, 42 Pac. 631; Cade
v. H ad
amp W.
. W. {1902 ), 27
Wa b. 21 , 67 Pac. 603; Crowley t.
Hick ( l 9 ), 9 Wi . 566, 74 .r . W. 348;
Bank v. Kleiner (190 1 ), 112 \Y i .
• '. W. 1090; Jame v. K 11 y
(I
), lOi a . 446, 33 . E. 425; Kemp r 11. I en haw {l 99), 5 .r'"eb. 513, 7
. W. !Oil; John ton r. , p nc r (1 97) ,
51
•IJ 19 , 70
. W. 9 2; rosby .
I itch y (I 96), 47
h. 924, 66 . W.
J 0 5; 1 ockfor<l Watch
o. v. Manifold
72 r.

- 'u ( 1900), 154

T
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sufficient); Leasure i'. Forquer (1895),

27 Ore. 334, 41 I'ac. 663 (held insutii-

cient) ; Schiffman v. Schmidt (1900), 154

Mo. 204, 55 S. W. 451 (held insufficient) ;

Kuh, Njvthan & Fisher Co. v. Glucklick

(1903), 120 la. 504, 94 N. W. 1105.

The general rules as to pleading fraud

do not apply to ejectment and replevin :

Phoenix Iron Works v. McEvouy (1896),

47 Neb. 228, 66 N. W. 290.

ufficient) ; L easure v. Forquer ( l 95) ,
27 Or . 334, 41 Pac. 66 5 (h eld in ufficient); ' chiffman v. chmidt ( 1900) , 154Mo. 204-, !'>5 • W. 451 (held in uffi cient) ;
Kuh . :ra,than & Fi h r Co. v. lu kli ck
(190.3) , 1:.0 Ia. 504, 94 . w. ll 5.
The general rule as t pleading fraud
do not apply to ejectment and replevin :
Phrenix Iron Work v. McEvony (1896),
47 Neb . 22 , 66 N. W. 290.

Injur I/.

A formal allegation of injury is not

necessary when facts are stated from

which loss or injury is implied: Green

Bay, etc. Canal Co. v. Kaukauna, etc. Co.

(1901), 112 Wis. 323, 87 N. W. 864.

Injury.
A formal allegation of IDJury is not
necessary when facts are stated from
whi ·h loss or injury is implied : Green
Eay, etc. Canal Co. v. Kaukauna, etc. Co.

The plaintiff is not required to aver

(1901) , 112 Wis. 323, 87 N. W. 864.
all the physical injuries which he has sus-
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tained or which may have resulted from

the wrongful act complained of, if they

are such as may be traced to or naturally

follow from the act : Williams v. Oregon

Short Line 11. K. Co. (1898), 18 Utah

210, 34 Pac. 991 ; Croco i-. Oregon Short

Line R. R. Co, (1898), 18 Utah, 31 1 , .34 Pac

985; Youngblood v. Railroad Co. (1901)

•60 S. C. 9, 38 S. E. 232; Curniu v. A. H

Stauge Co. (1898), 98 Wis. 598, 74 N. W,

,377 ; Hanson v. Anderson (1895), 90 Wis

195, 62 N. W. 1055.

A claim made in a complaint for a spe

-cific injury and "other injuries" is indefi

iiite and uncertain, but is sufficient to

admit evidence of what the other injuries

were : Mauch v. Hartford (1901), 112 Wis.

40, 87 N. W. 816.

Injury to the Person.

The court held, in Hutcherson v. Bur-

den ( 1901 ), 1 13 Ga. 987, 39 S. E. 495, that

the expression " injuries to the person,"

as used in the statute of limitations, was

not confined to physical injuries, but em-

braced all actionable injuries to the in-

dividual himself, as distinguished from

injuries to his property.

Innocent Purchaser.

Where a plaintiff is required to allege

that he is an innocent purchaser, he must

aver the facts, showing all the elements

necessary, viz., that he is a purchaser in

good faith, without notice, and for a valu-

able consideration, and each of these ele-

ments must be apjjropriately amplified :

Young V. Schofield (1895), 132 Mo. G50,

34 S. W. 497.

Interest.

Where debts or claims bear interest as

a matter of law, interest may be recovered

upon them under a general prayer for the

amount of the debt or claim and interest,

without any allegation that it is due:

Peterson v. Mannix (1902), Neb., 90 N. W.

210. In Ormond v. Sage (1897), 69 Minn.

523, 72 N. W. 810, it was held unneces-

sary to demand interest where a party is

entitled to it by way of damages on money

due on contract, and in Brown v. Doyle

(1897), 69 Minn. 543, 72 N. W. 814, the

The plaintiff is not required to aver
all the phy ical injuries which he has sustained or which may have resulted from
the wrongful act complained of, if they
are such as may be traced to or naturally
foll ow from the act : Williams u. Oregon
Short Line R. R Co. (1898), 18 Utah,
210, 54 Pac. 991 ; Cr oco v. Oregon hort
Lin e R.R. Co. (189 ) , 18 Utah , 3 11 , 5-t Pac.
98 5 ; Youngblood u. Railroad Co. (1901),
60 , . C . 9, 38 S. E. 232; Curran v. A. H .
tange Co. (1 98 ), 98 Wis. 59 , 74 N. W.
.377 ; H anson v . Anderson (1895 ), 90 Wis.
195, 62 N. W. 1055.
A claim made in a complaint fo r a spe·
.cific injury and "other injuries" is indefi·
nite an d un certain , bu t is suffi cient to
admit evidence of what the other injuries
were : Mauch u. Hartford ( 1901), 112 Wis.
40, 87 N. W . 816.

ments mu. t be approp ri ately amplified :
Young u. r.hofi ld (1 95), 132 1\lo. 650,
34 ' .

w . 497.

I nterest.
Where debts or claims bear interest as
a matter of law, interest may be recovered
upon th em under a general prayer for the
amount of the debt or claim and interest,
without any allegation that it is due:
Peterson v. Mannix (I 902 ), Neb., 90 N. W .
210. Io Ormond v. Sage {1897), 69 Minn .
523, 72 N. W. 810, it was held unnecessary to demand interest where a party is
entitled to it by way of damages on money
due on contract, and in Brown v. Doyle
(1897), 69 Mino. 5-t3 , 72 N. W. 814, the
court said that it need not be specially
pleaded.
lo suing on a promissory note it is not
necessary to tate how much interest i
due, if th e rate fr om a given day is alleged, yet if a cer tain sum is named a
larger sum cannot be recovered : King u.
W estbrooks ( 1902) , I 16 Ga. 753, 42 S. E .
1002.
The exhibit being part of th e
complaint, a prayer asking for interest
accordin g as the same may appear to be
due from the items 0£ said exhibit at seven
per cent per annum is sufficient to suppor t
a verdict for such interest: Dunham v.
H olloway (189 5 ), 3 Okla. 244, 41 P ac.
140 .

Invalid ity

ef Statute or

Ordinance.

"When it is claimed t hat a statute or
ordinance is invalid because it is in it,
substance vi olat ive of th e fund amental
law,
the inference of invalidity being on e
Injury to the P erson.
followin g from the fun dam ental law as
The court held, in Hutcherson v. Dur- compa red with th e act in question, it i ·
den ( 1901 ), 113 Ga. 987 , 39 S. E. 495, that sufficient to generally allege t hat it is inthe expression "injuries to the person," valid. \Vh en the claim is that su h a ct
as used in the statute of limitations, was or ordinance is invalid, not becau e of
not confined to physical injuries, but em- jts substance, but becau e not regularly
braced all actionable injuries to the in- pa ·sed or ad opted, the defect in the prodi vidual himself, as distinguished from ceedings must be specifically pleaded. It
injuries to his property.
is insufficient to allege generally that it
was not legally adopted : " City of Y ork
Innocent Purchaser.
v . Chicago, B . & Q. R. R. Co. (1898) , 56
Wh ere a plaintiff is r equired to allege Neb. 57 2, 76 N. W. 1065. Where it is
that he is an innocent purchaser, he must claim ed th at a statute is unconstitutiona ve r the facts, showing all the elements al, a g eneral alle<Yation to that effect i
nece sary, viz., that he i a purchase r in not suffic ient, but the specific provi ion of
good faith , without notice, an d for a valu- th e constit ution infringed upon must be
able con ideration, and each of th ese ele- pointed out in the pleadings : Ash v. City
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of Indepeiulence (1902), 169 Mo.

S. W. 888.

f Jn dep u<lence ( 1902), 169 )fo. I 7 6

. w.

juri di tion f a jn tic ' cou rt: Willit v.
Walter (1 9") 3:. re. 4ll 52 Pa. :.14 .

68 jurisdiction of a justice's court: Willits v.

Irreparable l11j ury.

.Turi·diction.

Walter (1898), 32 Ore. 411, 52 Pac. 24.

A court will re,· r:-e a jndcrm nt for
want f juri di tiou, not nly 'in ca es
wher it l huwn 11 gati\' ly that juri di tiou do not xi t, lrnt e,·en when it do
not appear affirmativ "ly that H do
xi ·t:
My r v. B rry (J 95), 3 kla. 612, 41
Pac. 5 0.

Irreparable Ivjury.

A mere allejrJition, in a complaint, of

great or irreparable injury to the j)laintiff

and his property, without the facts show-

ing,' it, is not sufficient in an action for an

injunction: Brass i'. Kathbone (1897), 153

N. V. 435, 47 N. E. 905 ; Wabaska Elec-

tric Co. r. City of Wyraore (1900), 60 Neb.

Lib l and

199, 82 N. "W. 62C; Burrus v. City of

lander.

Columbus (1898), 105 Ga. 42, 31 S. E.124;

Schuster v. Myers (1899), 148 Mo. 422,

50 S. W. 103. See al.so Placke v. Union

Depot R. R. Co. (1897), 140 Mo. 634, 41

S. W. 915.
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A stockholder's allegation that he " has

{rood reason to fear and does fear" that

the directors will sell the franchise, with-

out any averment that they threaten to

do so, is not sufficient : Qnin v. Havenor

tockholcler' allegation that he "ha
<l r ason to fear and doe fea r" that
th uirector will ell the franchi e, without an ' av rment that the) threaten to
do o, i:; ll•>t :-;uffiC'i nt: Quin v. Havenor
(1903), ;3 W i . 11 , 94 X. \ . 642.
A

~o

(1903), .53 \Vi.s. 118, 94 X. W. 642.

Judgment.

In an action npon a judgment of an-

other State rendered by a court of general

jurisdiction, it is unnecessary to allege

jurisdictional facts. Want of jurisdiction

is matter to be set up by answer: Trow-

bridge V. Spinning (1900), 23 Wash. 48,

62 Pac. 125; Kunze v. Kunze (1890), 94

Wis. 54, 68 N. W. 391 ; Bennett v. Bennett

(1902), — Neb. — , 91 N. W. 409. In

Gude V. Dakota Fire Ins. Co. (1895), 7

S. I). 644, 65 N. W. 27, a complaint

alleging jurisdictional facts relative to a

foreign judgment was considered and lield

sufficient. But see Angle i'. Manchester

(1902). — Neb. — , 91 N. W. 501.

In ])leadiug a judgment it is only neces-

sary to follow § 456 of the Code of Civil

Procedure, and aver that the judgment

was "duly given:" Edwards v. Hellings

(1893), 99 Cal. 214, 33 Pac. 799; Buck-

man V. Hatch (1903), 139 Cal. 53, 72 Pac.

445. Same holding in Wisconsin, in Pier-

stoff V. Jorges (1893), 86 Wis. 128, 56

N. W. 735, as to judgment of a court of

limited jurisdiction. Same holding in

Oregon, in Fisher v. Kelly (1896), 30 Ore.

1, 46 Pac. 146, also as to judgment of

court of limited juri.sdiction.

But ill pleading a judgment of a jus-

tice's court it is essential to show that the

cause of action was one f;!!!!!!!; under the

Jurisdiction.

A court will rever.<e a judgment for

want of jurisdiction, not only ui cases

where it is shown negatively that jurisdic-

tion does not exist, but even wlien it does

not appear affirmatively that it does exist :

Myers c. Berry (1895), 3 Olda. 612, 41

Pac. 580.

Libel and Slander.

See the following cases dealing with

vari(jus phases of the subject : Sharpe v.

Larson (1897), 70 Minn. 209, 72 N. W.

Judgm ent.
In an action npon a judgment of another tate r end red by a court of general
juri ·diction, it i unnece. ·ar:· to allege
juri dictional fact . Want of juri diction
i matter to be et up by answer: 'I rowbridge v. pinning (1900), 23 Wah. 4 ,
62 Pac. 125; Kunze v. Kunze (1896), 94
Wi .. 54, 6
. W. 391; Bennett v. Bennett
(1902), Neb. - , 91 J. W. 409 . In
u le v. Dakota Fire Ins. Co. ( 1 95), 7
. D. 644, 65 N. W . 27, a complaint
alleging juri dictional fact relative to a
for ign juugrnent wa con ·idered and held
nfficient. But ee Angle v. Manche ter
(1902), - Neb.-, 91 .i:. W . 501.
Iu pleading a judgm nt it i only nece sar to foll w § 456 of th Code of iYil
Proced ur , and aver that the judgm nt
wa "duly given:" Edward v. Helling
(1 93), 99 al. 214, 33 Pa . 99; Buckman v. Hatch ( l 903). 139 al. 53, - 2 Pa .
4-1-5.
ame holding in Wi con in, in Pier• toff u. •Jorg
(l 93),
6 iVi . 12 , 56
~ •. W. 7.35, a to judgment of a court of
limited juri. di ti n. , ame holding in
<Jr gon. in Fi, her 11. Kelly (l 96), .3
r
l. -1-6 Pac. 146, al o a. to judgment of
court of lirnit cl jnri. clic·tir n.
But i11 pleadill~ a judgm nt of a ju Li<'e'. 1·1rnrt it is f' ·i;eatial t1> • how hat th
· u ·e of action wa . un falling und r the

ee the following ca e . dealing with
variou pha e · of the ul.ij ct: 'harpe v.
Lar on (l i) 70 l\Iinn. 209, ~2 .J. W.
961; Ri hmond ii. P :::t (1 97 ), 69 1inn.
457, 72 -"-. W . 704; r clri k·on v. Johnon (1 9-1) GO :\Iinn. 337, 62 N. \' . 3
Am rican Book Co. v. Kingdom Publi hinO' o. (1 98), i l lfinn. 363, 13 N. W.
10 9 ; Heeney v. Kilbane (l 99), 59 0. t.
499, 53 N. E. 262;
rand v. Dreyfu.
(1 9 ), 122 Cal. 5 , 54 Pac. 3 9; chubert
v. Ri hter (1 96), 92 Wi .. 199, 66 . \ .
107; Davis v. Hamilton (1902), 5 ilfinn.
209,
X W . 744; \ illiam 1.:. Fuller
1 eb. - , 94
(1903), . W. 11 ; Grubb
v. Elder (1903), - Kan. - , 72 Pac. 790.

Names of Parties.
Par ti

hould ue and be ued in the ir
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Louisville, etc. R. R. Co. v. Rloyd (1900),

— Ky. — , 5.5 K. W. G94.

The objectiou that the full name is not

given may be made at any time before

judgment: Small v. Sandall (1896), 48

Neb. 318, 67 N. W. l.')6; but not there-

after: Shoemaker i\ Goode (1902), Neb.,

92 N. W. 629 ; Scarborough v. Myrick

(1896), 47 Neb. 794, 66 N. W. 867 ; Schrci-

ner v. Stanton (1901), 26 Wash. 563, 07

Pac. 219 ; Fisk v. GuUiford (1903), — Neb.

— , 95 N. W. 494. Demurrer is not the

proper remedy : McColgan v. Territory of

Oklahoma (1897), 5 Okla. 567, 49 Pac.

1018. But where an action was brought

by " Heath, Morrow <& Co.," and this is

the only description given of the plaintiffs

in tlie summons or complaint, a demurrer
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w^as held proper: Heatli r. Morgan (1895),

117 N. C. 504, 23 S. E. 489. Such objec-

tion is waived by pleading to the merits:

Bell V. Peterson (1900), 105 Wis. 607, 81

N. W. 279.

It is sufficient to correctly state the

names of the parties in tlie title, and they

may thereafter be referred to merely as

plaintiff or defendant : Chicago, etc. R. H.

Co. V. Thomas (1896), 147 Ind. 35, 46

N. E. 73; Eisely v. Taggart (1897), 52

Neb. 658, 72 N. W. 1039; First Nat. Bank

V. Hattenbach (1900), 13 S. D. 365, 83

N. W. 421.

" Where the petition or complaint

states a cause of action in favor of the

plaintiff personally, superadded words,

such as 'agent,' 'executor,' or 'trustee,'

will be regarded as descriptio persona.

merely:" Thomas v. Carson (1896), 46

Neb. 765, 65 N. W. 899. Where a peti-

tion states facts constituting a cause of

action against the defendant individually,

a general demurrer should not be 'sus-

tained because in the caption of the

petition the defendant is designated as

guardian: Clift v. Newell (1898), 104 Ky.

396, 47 S. W. 270. "A defendant known

indiscriminately by either of two names

may properly be designated by both in

the title of the action, if they are used in

such a manner as to indicate clearly that

but one person i.s sued : " O. L. Packard

Machinery Co. r. Laev (1898), 100 Wis.

644, 76 N. W. 596. " Where the caption

of the petition gives the individual names

of the members of a copartnersliip as de-

fendants, and references in the pleadings,

finding,'*, and judgment to the defendants

are generally in tlie plural, the action will

be held to be one against the individuals

nameil, even tliough the petition charges

that the plaintiff contracted with the de-

fendants as jiartners : " Burke v. Unique

Printing Co. (1901), 63 Neb. 264, 88 N. W.

488.

In Turner v. Gregory (1899), 151 Mo.

100, 52 S. W. 2.34, the court said : " In all

proceedings the Christian and surname of

botli the jilaintiff and defendant should be

J,ou isYille, tc. R. R.
-

o. v. Bloyd (19-00),

Ky . - , 55 ...'. W . 694.

The objection that the full name is not
giv n may b mad at any time before
judgm nt: , mall v. Sandall {I 96), 4
_.. b. 318, 67 . W. 156; but not th reaft r: Sho mak r v. Goode (1902), Nb.,
92
. W. 629; Scarbo rough v. Myri k
(I 96), 47 N b. 794 , 66 I . W. 67; Schreiner v. Stautou (1 90 1), 26 W ah. 563, G7
Pa .219; Fi k11. ullifon l (190:3), - ~ b.
- , 95 . W. 494. Demnrrer is not the
proper remed y: McColgan v. Territory of
Oklahoma (1897) , !i Okla. 567, 49 Pac.
1018. Bnt where an action was brought
by "Heath, Morrow & Co.," and this is
th e oul y descripti on g iven of the plaintiffs
in the ummons or omplaint, a demurrer
wa held proper: H eat h v. Morgan (1895),
nch objec117 N . C. 504, 23 S. E. 4 9.
tion is waived by pleading t o th e merit :
B ell v. Peterson (1 900), 105 Wi s. 607, 81
N . W. 279.
It is sufficient to correctly state th e
names of the parties in t he title, and they
may th ereaf ter be referred t o merely as
plaw tiff or defe ndant: Ch icago, etc . R H.
Co. v. Thomas (1 896 ), 147 Ind. 35, 46
N. E. 73; Eise ly v. Taggart (1 89 i), 52
eb. 65 8, 72 N. W.1039; First at. Bank
1
v. Hattenbach ( 1900), 13 S. D. 365, 83

'. w.

421.

" Where the petition or complaiut
states a cause of action in favor of the
plaintiff personally, superadded words,
such as 'aµ;ent,' 'executor,' or 'trustee,'
will be regarded as descriptio p ersona;
merely : " Thomas v. Carson ( 1896), 46
Neb. 765, 65 N. W. 899. Where a petition states facts constituting a cause of
a ct ion again t the defendant individually,
a general demurrer should not be ·sustained because in the caption of the
petition the defendant is designated as
guardian: Clift v. Newell (1898), 104 Ky.
396, 47 S. W . 270. "A defendant known
indiscriminately by eith er of two na mes
may properly be designated by both in
the title of the action, if they are used in
uch a manner as to indicate clearly that
but one person is sued:" 0. L . Packard
Machin ery Co. P . Laev (1898), 100 Wis.
644, 76 N. W. 596. " Wh ere the caption
of the petition gives the indivi dual nam es
of the mem hers of a copartn ershi p as defendants, and references in the plead ing ,

finding~, ancl jnclgm nt to the def ndant.
ar g 11 rally in t h plural, tl1e action will
b held t.o be 011e again t the individuals
nam cl, \'C n though the p tition charg s
that the plaintiff contra ·te<l with th cl f nclau ts a' partners:" Burk v. niqu e
Printing 'o. (1901), 63 ... 'eb. 26-1-, SR T. ,V.

48 .
In Turner v. Gregory (1 99), 151 Mo.
100, 52 S. W. 234, th
onrt said: "In all
proceed in g: the Cini. tian and urname of
both the plaintiff and def ndant should be
· t forth in the pleading and proces ·
with accuracy . . .. 011e general rule ha

b en to hold the first Chh tian name ag
essential, an<l to hold that the middle
name is 110 part of a man 's uame, or at
least not necessary to hi designation."
Citing Mis ouri case .
Negatii·e Averments .

"A negative all egat ion is to be proved
only where it co nstitutes a part of the
orig inal substantive cause of action upon
whi ch the plaintiff reli es, and this is an
exception to the general rule that a party
is not called upon to prov e his negative
a,·erments, although they may be necesary in hi s pleading:" Dirks v. California
Safe Deposit Co. (1902), 136 Cal. 8-1-, 6
Pac. 487 .
Negligence.
Negligence cannot be presum ed but
must be pleaded and proved: Vansyoc t•.
Free water Cemete ry Ass'n (1901), 63 eb.
143, 88 N. W. 162; First Nat. Bank v.
Zeims (1894) , 93 Ia. 140, 61 N . W . 483.
A g eneral allegation of negligence i
sufficient to r epel a demurrer for want of
facts : House v. Meyer (1893), 100 CRL
592, 35 Pac. 308; Stephenson v. Southern
Pac. Co. (1894), 102 Cal. 143, 36 Pac. 407;
Omaha & R. V. Co. v. Wri g ht (1896), -1- 9
N eb. 456, 68 N. W. 618 (overruling same
case, 47 Neb. 886, 66 N. W. 8-1-2); Omaha
& R. V . Co. 11. Crow (189 ), 54 Neb. i47 ,
i-1- N. W . 1066 ; Collett v. _.. orthern Pac.
R y. Co. (1900), 23 Wash. 600, 63 Pac. 225;
Traver 11. Spokane St. Ry. Co. (1 901 ), 25
Wash. 225, 65 Pac. 284; Con rad v. De
Montcourt ( 1896), 13 Mo. 311, 39 S. W .
805; :F oster v. Missouri Pac. Ry. Co.
(1 893), 115 Mo. 165, 21 . W. 916 ; f'onuell
v. Chesapeake, etc. Hy. Co. (1900) , Ky .. 58
S. W. 3i4; Baltimore, etc. Ry. Co. 1•.
Young (1896), 1-1-6 Ind. 3 74, 45 N. E. 479 :
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Sale V. Aurora, etc. Co. (1896), 147 Ind.

324, 46 N. E. 669 ; Cleveland, etc. Ry. Co.

V. Berry (1898), 132 Ind. 607, .53 N. E. 41.5 ;

Rodgers v. Baltimore, etc. Ry. Co. (1897),

150 Ind. 397, 49 N. E. 453; Citizens' St.

R. R. Co. V. Sutton (1897), 148 Ind. 169,

46 N. E. 462 ; Louisville, etc. R. R. Co. v.

Bates (1896), 146 Ind. 564, 45 N. E. 108;

Louisville, etc. R. R. Co. v. Berkey (1893),

136 lud. 181, 35 N. E. 3 ; Rogers v. Trues-

dale (1894). 37 Minn. 126, 38 N. W. 688;

McGonigle v. Kane (1894), 20 Colo. 292, 38

Pac. 367; Walker v. McCauU (1900), 13

S. I). 312, 83 N. W. 378; .lones v. City of

Portland (1899), 35 Ore. 312, 38 Pac. 637 ;

Chaperon c. Portland Electric Co. (1902),

41 Ore. 39, 67 Pac. 928; Pittsburgh, etc.

Ry. Co. I'. Wilson (1903),— lud. —, 66

Generated for facpubupdates (University of Michigan) on 2014-06-17 15:34 GMT / http://hdl.handle.net/2027/uc2.ark:/13960/t02z1c23b
Public Domain / http://www.hathitrust.org/access_use#pd

N. E. 899 ; Cederson v. Oregon Nav. Co.

<1900), 38 Ore. 343, 62 Pac. 637 ; Chicago,

B. &Q. R. R. Co. r. Oyster (1899), 58 Nel).

1, 78 N. W. 359.

The rule that a general allegation of

negligence is sufficient to repel a demurrer

for want of facts, '' means, not that the

pleadinj; is good by charging that the

plaintiff was injured ' by the negligence of

the defendant,' but that it is sufficient if

the act, .stated us the cause of t!ie injury,

is alleged to have been ' negligently '

done : " Cleveland, etc. Ky. Co v. Berry

<1898), 152 Ind. 607, .33 N.' E. 415.

Negligence is an ultimate fact, and not

illegal conclusion : House v. Meyer (1893),

100 (";al. 592, 33 Pac.SOS; Stephenson v.

Southern Pac. Co. (1894), 102 Cal. 143, 36

Pac. 407 ; McGonigle v. Kane (1894), 20

Colo. 292, 38 Pac. 367 ; Chaperon v. Port-

land Elec. Co. (1902). 41 Ore. 39, 67 Pac.

923; Rogers v. Truesdale (1894), 37 Minn.

126, 58 N. W. 688 ; Chicago, B. & Q. R. R.

Co. !•. Grablin (1893), 38 Neb. 90,56

N. W. 796; Hill v. Fairhaven, etc. R. R.

Co. (1902), 73 Conn. 177, 32 Atl. 725 (hold-

ing it a mi.xed question of law and fact) ;

Doolittle V. Laycock (1899), 103 Wis. 334,

79 N. W. 408 (mixed question of law and

fact).

Where a petition contains but a general

allegation of negligence it is subject to a

motion to make more definite and certain :

Price V. Water Co. (1897), .38 Kan. 551, .50

Pac. 450 ; Jones v. City of Portland (1899),

,35 Ore. 312, 58 Pac. 657 ; Walker v. Mc-

Caull (1900) , 13 S. D. 512, 83 N. W. 378 ;

Louisville, etc. R. R. Co. v. Berkey (1893),

136 Ind. 181, 33 N. E. 3; Louisville, etc.

R. R. Co. V. Bates (1896), 146 Ind. 364,45

N. E. 108; Louisville, etc. R. R. Co. v.

Lynch (1896), 147 Ind. 163, 44 N. E. 997 ;

Conrad v. De Montcourt (1896), 138 Mo.

311, 39 S. W. 805 ; Omaha & R. V. Co. v.

Crow (1898), 54 Neb. 747, 74 N. W. 1066.

Where a general averment of negli-

gence in a petition is followed by an enu-

meration of specific facts of negligence,

the j)laintiff will l)e restricted to proof o£

the facts so specified : McManamee i'. Mo.

ale v. urora, etc. Co. ( l 96}, 147 Ind. 136 Intl. 1
.3:2-i, 46 .... E. 669 ; leYeland, etc. Ry. o. R. R.
~·.Berry (1 9 ), 152 Ind. 607, 53 . E. 415;
Rodg r i·. Baltimore, etc. Ry.
. ( l 97),
150 Ind. 9 , 4 N. E. 453; itizen ' t.
M .
. v. utton (l 97), 14 Ind. 16 ,
R. R.
46 ~ . E. 462; Loui ,·ille, etc. H.. R. o. v.
Bate (1 96), 1-!6 Ind. 564, 45 . E . 10 ;
Loui viii , t . R. H. o. v. Berkey (l 93),
136 Iml. l 1, 35 .... . . 3; Roger" u. True dal ( ! 94), -7 Minn. 126, 5 N. W. 6
i\fo nigl v. Kan e (1 94), 20 Colo. 292, 3
Pac. 367; Walker v. Mc aull (1900), 13
. D . 512, 3 1\. W. 57 ; Jone v. ity of
Portland ( l 99}, 35 r . 512, 5 Pac. 657;
haperon v. Portland Electric 'o. ( 1902),
41 Or . 39, 67 Pac. 92 ; Pitt bur h, etc.
Ry.
o. v. Wil on ( 1903 ), - Iod. - , 66
..... E. 99; Ced r on u. Oregon Nav. o.
{1900), 3
r . 343, 62 Pac. 6:r; hicago,
B. & . R.R. o. v. Oy ter (1 99), 5 Teb.
1, 7
. w. 359.
The rule that a general alle()'ation of
ue ligence is ufficie:1t to repel a demurrer
for want of fat:t-, ' mean , not that the
11leadiug- i O"Ood by char O"i11g that the
plaintiff wa injured · hy the negligeuce of
the defendaut,' but that it i ·ntlicient if
th net, : aterl a· the cau-e of thf' injury,
i~ al)eO"ed to ba,·e l.J en '11co-ligently'
d111:e:" 'leYeland, etc. Hy. Co v. Berry
{I :l ), 152 Incl. 607, 5:~ '. E. 415.
< • .,.lig uce i, an ultimate fact, and not
egligence neerl not be harg d in
.. le,.., al <.:onclu ion : House v. Meyer ( 1893), term if the fact alleged how a pri'ma
I 00 Cal. 5 2, 35 Pac. 30 ; •'tephen on v. facie ca e f uegligence: Baltim r & Ohio
'outhern Pac. 'o. (1 9-!), 102 Cal. 143, 36 Ry. o.v.Krea.,.er (l 99), 1 . .t.312,56
. E. 203; City of Geneva v. Burnett
Pac:. 4 7; Mc onigle r. Kane (1 94 ), 20
Colo. 292, 3 Pac. 367 ; haperon t•. Port- (I 902), - Tcb. - , 9 1 T. W. 275. "If the
land Elec. , . (1902), -1-l Ore. 39, 67 Pac. complaint i. found to be uffici nt in th
9:l ; I o.,. r v. True rlale (1 94), 57 ;\1inn.
tatem nt of ne()'ligence in one re pect, it
120, 5
. W. 6
hicago, B. & Q. R. R. i go cl. a. again t a gen ra l d murrer,
rablin (1 93), 3
Jeb. 90, 56
Co. 1-.
v n if deficient in the tat mcnt of anoth r
. \V. 796; H ill u. Fairhaven, etc. R. R. in tanc
f want of are:" Hough v.
o. 190:.), 75 'onn. 177, 52 Atl. 725 (holrlrant'. Pa . P wer o ( 1902), 41
r .
ing it a mixed que tion of law aod fact) ; 53 1, 6 Pac. 655.
Do little v. Laycock (l 99), 103 Wi,. 334,
7 .... W. 40 (mix d qu tiou of law and
fact).
Where a petition contains but a general
all ~ation f negligenc it i ubject to a
molion to mak more clefinite and ertaiu:
l'ric ,._Wat r o. (1 97), !'l K n. 551, 50
a(•. 450; .Jon v. ity f 1' rtland (l 9),
:35 re. 511, 5 Pac. 657; Walk r v. Mcaull (190 ) , 13 '. D. 51-, 3 T. W. 57 ;
Loui ·ville, etc. I. I. o. i·. Berk y (l 93),
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YouDg (1896), 14G IikI. 374, 45 N. E. 470 ;

Chicago, B. & (.1 R. R. Co. v. Kellogg

(IS98), 55 Neb. "48, 76 N. W. 462 ; Kelly

V. Town of Darlington (1893), 86 Wis.

432, 57 N. W. 51.

lu an action for damages based on Lord

Caniphell's Act, the coni])laiut must show

that the persons for whose benefit the suit

was instituted had a pecuniary interest in

the life of the deceased; Chicago, R. I.

& Pac. R. R. Co. r. Young (1899), 58 Neb.

678, 79 N. W. 556 ; Orgall v. Chicago, B.

& Q. R. R. Co. (1895), 46 Neb. 4, 64 N. W.

450; Union Pac. Ry. Co. v. Roeser (1903),

— Neb. — , 95 N. W. 68. But in Chicago,

etc. R. R. Co. V. Thomas (1900). 155 Ind.

634, 58 N. E. 1040, it was held that an

averment that decedent left surviving him
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a wife and infant son carried with it the

presumption that both were entitled to his

services, and that such seryiceswere valu-

able, and a failure to allege that actu.al

damages were sustained was not fatal

against a demurrer.

It is not necessary for plaintiff to allege

that he has suffered pecuniary loss : Haug

v. Railway Co. (1898), 8 N. D. 23, 77

N. W. 97."

" A petition under Lord Campbell's

Act should disclose the names of all the

beneficiaries, but if the names of the sur-

viving minor children of the decedent who

were dependent upon him for support are

averred, the omissi(^n to allege whether or

not he left a widow will not render the

pleading bad on demurrer : " Chicago, B.

& Q. R. R. Co. V. Oyster (1899), 58 Neb. 1,

78 N. W. 359.

In the following cases the allegations

of negligence were passed upon by the

court and held sufficient or insufficient, as

indicated : Redford v. Spokane St. Ry. Co.

(1894), 9 Wash. 55, 36 Pac. 1085 (insuffi-

cient) ; Washington v. Spokane St. Ry.

Co. (1895), 13 Wash. 9, 42 Pac. 628 (suffi-

cient) ; Croft V. Northwestern Steamship

Co. (1898), 20 Wash. 175, 55 Pac. 42

(sufficient); Hanson i'. Anderson (1895), 90

Wis. 195, 62 N. W. 1055 (sufficient) ; Ean

V. Chicago, M. & St. P. Ry. Co. (1897), 95

Wis. 70, 69 N. W. 997 (insufficient) ;

Borchsenius v. Chicago, St. P., etc. Ry. Co.

<1897), 96 Wis. 448, 71 N. W. 884 (suffi-

cient); Anderson v. Haves (1899), 101 Wis.

519, 77 N. W. 903 ("sufficient) ; City of

Aurora r. Cox (1895), 43 Neb. 727, 62

N. W. 66 (sufficient) ; Chicago, B. & Q.

Ry. Co. V. Grablin (1893), 38 Neb. 90, 56

N. W. 796 (insufficient to admit certain evi-

dence) ; liunnell v. Berlin Iron Bridge Co.

(1895), 66 Conn. 24, .33 Atl. 5.33 (sufficient).

It was held in Southern Ry. Co. v.

O'Bryan (1900), I12(Ja. 127, 37 S. E. 161,

that a i)laiuti£E " m.ay bring suit in the

county where the failure on the part of tlie

railroad company to discharge its duty to

the passenger originated, and use tlie trans-

actions occurring in the other counties as

Y onnO' {1 !l6) , l.+ 6 Intl. 374, 45 N . E . 479 ;
Chicago, 13 . & (~. R. ]{. Co. v. K ellogg
(1 9 ), 55 S e b. i-! , 76 . W. 462 ; K elly
v . T o'\\·n of Darlington (1 93 ), 6 Wi .
432, 57 N. W. 5 l.
In an action for damage ba ed on Lord
ampbell' Act, the com pla in t mu t how
that the per on for whose b nefit th e uit
wa in tituted had a pecuniary intere tin
the life of the deceased: Chicago, R. I.
& Pac. R.R. Co.'" Youn er (1 99 ), 5 Neb.
67 , 79 N. W. 556; Orgall v . Chicago, B.
& Q. R.R. Co. (1 95 ), 46 reb. 4, 64 N. W.
450; Union Pac. Ry. Co. v. Hoeser (1903).
- ,.eb. -, 95 N. W . 68. But in Chicago,
-etc. R.R. Co. v. Thomas {1900), 155 Ind .
634, 58 N. E. 1040, it was held that au
averm ent that decedent left surviving him
.a wife and infant son carried with it the
µre umptiou that both were enti tled t o his
ef\'i ce , and that such seryice were valu.able, an d a failure to allege that actual
dam ages were su tained was not fatal
a gain ·ta demurrer.
I t i not necessary for plai ntiff to all ege
t hat he ha , uffered pecuniary los : Ha ug
~" Hnilway Co. {l 98), 8 N. D. 2.3, 77
N . W. 97.
" A petiti on un der Lor d Campbell'
Act , hould tli sclo ·c th e nam es of all t he
beneficiaries, but if th e nam es of th e survivi ng min or childr en of th e decede nt ·who
were depend ent up on him for suppor t ar e
averred, t he omi ssion to all ege wheth er or
n ot he left a widow will not render th e
pleadi ng bad on demurrer:" Chicago, B .
& Q. H. R. Co. v. Oyster (18 99), 5 Neb. 1,
7 .l.. w. 359.
In t he following cases th e allegati ons
of negligence were pa sed upon by th e
court a nd held sufficient or insuffi cient, as
indi ca ted : Redford v. Spokane St. R y. Co.
(1894 ), 9 Wash. 55, 36 Pac. 1085 (insuffi.cient); Washington v. pokane St. R y .
Co. {1895), 13 Wash. 9, 42 Pac. 628 (suffi~ i e n t ); Croft v. Northwestern Steam ship
o. {1898), 20 Wash. 175, 55 Pac. 42
(suffic ien t); Hanson v. And erson {1895) , 90
Wi s. 195, 62 N. W. 1055 (sufficient); Ban
v. Chicago, M. & St. P. Ry. Co. (1897 ), 95
Wis. 70, 69 N. W. 997 (in uffi cient);
Borch euiu s v. Chi cag o, St. P ., etc. Ry. Co.
{l 9i), 91) W i ~ . 448, 71 . W. 8 4 ( nffide nt): Anderson v. Hayes (1 99), 101 Vli s.
.5 19, 77 .. ~. W . 903 ( uffi cient ); City of
Au rora i• . Cox ( 1 95), 43 eb. 727 , 62

W . 66 (. uffi ·ient ) ; h i ago, R . & Q.
Ry.
. v . ' rablin (1 3 ), 3 Nb. 90, 56
N . W. 796 (in ·ufficient to ad mi t cer tain ev idence ) · Bu nne ll v. B erlin Iron Bridge Co.
(1 95 ),66 Conn .24,33 Atl.5:33 ( uffi cieut).
It was helu in ' out hern Ry. o. v.
O'Bryan (1 900) , 11 2 1a. 127 , 37 • . E. 161 ,
that a plaintiff " may brin g uit in the
c nuty where th e failure on t he pa rt of the
railroad company to <li charge it duty to
the pa enger originated, and m;e the tran actions occurring in the other counties as
mere matters of aggravation." Aud in
Senn v. Southern Ry. Co . {1896), 135 Mo.
512, 36 S. W. 367, which was an action to
recover fo r the death of a per on due to
the negligen ce of a treet car driver, recital · in the petition of a city ordinance
regulating the runnin g of street cars and
prescribing the duti es of those in charge
of th em, with an allegati on that th e death
of the deceased ,.,.. as caused by a failure to
observe • uch ordinan ce, do not co nst itute
a separate cause of action on t he violation
of the ordin a nce, but are to be co n iderecl
merely as affordin g ev ide nce of the negli g ence of th e driver.
Wh ere plaintiff pred icates the actioanhle negligence on which he reli es on a
course of conduct in th e prog ress of whi ch
are several acts, all closely con nected togeth er, and leadin g u p t o and culmina ting
in the accident, the allegat ion as. to each
act, that it was improperly and negligently
done , does not make eac h act ~ setiarate
cause of action , which must be suffi cient
in itself: Hill v. F airh aven, etc. R. R. Co.
(1902), 75 Conn. 177, 52 Atl. 725.
T.

N Pw P romise.
·w her e an acti on is broug h t upon a new
promise to pay a debt barred by th e statut e
of limitation , th e petition hould allege
every fact necessary to a r ecovery on th e
original liability and in addition thereto a
promise to pay : Meyer v. Zotel's Adm'r
(1895), 96 Ky. 362, 29 S. W . 28.

1Von-pa,11ment.
"Where th e pl aintiff has proved the
exi t ence of a debt sued on - at lea t
within the period of tatutory limitation, th e burden of p ro1·ing payment i on t he
def endant . . . . The averm nt of non-payment, whil e neces a ry to ma ke th e co mplai nt perfect upo n it face, need not be
proved by tl e plaintiff:" Hurley v. Ryan
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(1902). 137 Cal. 461, 70 Pac. 292. See

also Hurley r. Ryan (1897), 119 Cal. 71,

51 Pac. 20, au<i Dodge c. Kimple (1898),

121 Cal. 580, 54 Pac. 94, where the want

of allegation.? of non-payment in actions

on contract for money demands, were held

fatal on general demurrer. See, to the

same effect, Stanton r. Keurick (1893),

135 Ind. 382, 35 N. E. 19, citing Smythe i:

Scott, 106 Ind. 245, Higert v. Trustees, 53

Ind. 326; Wheeler, etc. Co. v. Worrall, 80

Ind. 297; and Brickey v. Irwin, 122 Ind.

51. In Baldwin v. Boyce (1898), 152 Ind.

46. 51 X. E. 334, facts alleged were held

al. 461, ;o Pac. 292.
ee
al o Hurley i·. Ryan (l 9;), 119 al. 71,
51 Pac. 20, ancl DoJCl"e 1;. Kimple (1 9 )
121 al. 5" 0, 54 Pal·. 94, where the want
of allegation. of non-pa~·ment in action
on contract for money <lemand , were heltl
fatal on general <lemurrer.
' e, to the
. aM effel't
canton i·. Kenrick ( 1 93},
135 Ind. 3 2 3~ ••. E. 19, citing 'm:·the t'.
:· cott, 106 Ind. 245, Higert v. 'I rustee , 53
Intl. 326; Wheeler, tc. o. v. Worrall , 0
Ind. 2 i; au Brickey v. Irwin, 122 Ind.
51. In Baldwin 1.·. Boyce ( l 9 ), 152 Ind.
46. 51
E. 334 fact alleged were held
to con titut an inferential howing of
non-payment, aud were held uffici nt.
ee ah) HudeLon t·. Fir t .r at. Bank
(L. . 97). 51 .1..'eb. 55i il ... W. 304, fo r an
excellent di~cu~ ion of the ubject, holding
that nou-paymeut mn. t be alleged, although
pa.rment i an affirmative defence.
(1902). 13;

L ••

to constitute an inferential showing of

non-payment, and were held sufficient.

See also Hudelson r. First Nat. Bank

(1897), 51 Neb. 557, 71 N. W. 304. for an

Generated for facpubupdates (University of Michigan) on 2014-06-17 15:34 GMT / http://hdl.handle.net/2027/uc2.ark:/13960/t02z1c23b
Public Domain / http://www.hathitrust.org/access_use#pd

excellent discussion of the subject, holding

tliat non-payment must be alleged, altiiough

payment is an affirmative defence.

Ortlimmces.

A municipal ordinance may be pleaded

by stating its substance and legal effect,

without referring to its title or the date of

its passage: Decker v. McSorley (1901),

111 Wis. 91, 86 N. W. 554; Moberly v.

Hogan (1895), 131 Mo. 19, 32 S. W. 1014;

Hirst /•. Kingeu Keal Estate Co. (1902),

169 Mo. 194, 69 S. W. 368; Seattle v.

Pearson (1896), 15 Wash. 575, 46 Pac.

1053. In Village of Fairmont v. Meyer

(1901), 83 Minn. 456, 86 N. W. 457, held

sufficient to describe the ordinance by its

title and date of passage.

Partneiship.

Where an action is brought in the name

of the partners, and it is alleged that they

jointly furnished the goods, it is not neces-

sary to allege tlie partnership : Clark r.

Wick (1894), 25 Ore. 446, 36 Pac. 165.

In an action by or against partners,

it is not necessary that the title describe

the parties as partners, and give the part-

nership name, if the facts appear in the

complaint : Van Brunt & Co. v. Harri-

gan (1895), 8 S. T). 96, 65 N. W. 421. A

statement in the bill of particulars that

plaintiff is a partnership is sufficient:

Biddle V. Spatz (1903), — Neb. — , 95

N. W. 357.

Under G. S. 1894, § 5177, an action will

lie against the partners by their common

T.

their common name nor against the part-

nership by the common name : Dimond v.

Minnesota Sav. Bank (1897), 70 Minn. 298,

73 N. W. 182.

An allegation that a certain firm is a

partnership organized and doing business

in the State of Nebraska, is sufficient to

authorize carrying the action under the

firm name, under § 24 of the Code, and it

need nut be alleged that it is a Nebraska

firm: Chamberlin Banking Mouse v. Noyes

(1902), —Neb. — , 92 N. W. 175. See

also Winters v. Means (1897), 50 Neb. 209,

69 ...- . \ . 753.

Wh ere uit i broua-ht in the partner• hip name, under
5011 an a\•erment a to who the partner are i m re
urplu age: Phrenix In . Co. v. arnahan
( 1900), 63 0. t. 5 , 5 N. E. 05, citincr
Winter v. ~lean , 50 Neb. 20 ; Dimond
v. Bank, 70 linn. 29 .

Ordinance .
Passenger, Relation of.
A municipal ordinance may be plP.aded
An allegation in a petition again t a
by tatinu it ub tance and legal effect,
treet railway company for injurie~, tha
wjthout referring to it title or the date of plaintiff boarded a car with he intention
it· pas. age: Decker v. illc.'orley (1901), of becoming a pas enuer, i not equiYalent
lll \Yi·. 91, 6 X. W. 554· ~loberl_v v. to an allegation that he wa a pa encrer,
Houan (1 ' 95),131.Jfo.19, 32 .
. 1014'
ince the law doe not concern it elf with
llir t r. Hiua-en Real E~tate Co. {1902), mere intent not e'·idenced by au outward
169 ).lo. 194, 69
. W. 36 ;
eattle r. act: Raming 1:. Metropolitan t. Ry. Co.
Pear on (1 96), 15 Wa,$. h. 575, 46 Pac. (1900), 157 fo. 47 , 57 . W . 26 .
ee
1053. In Villa e of Fairmont v. Meyer al o Southern R" o. v. Dr on (l 99),
(1901 ), 3 Minn. 456, 6 . W. 457, held 109 Ga. 103, 3-i . E. 997, which hold that
ufficient to de cribe the ordinance by it
the icket hould be et out with ufficien
title and date of pa age.
"fulne to how that plaintiff was lawfully
a pa enger.
Partnership.
Where an action i brought in the name
of the partner , and it i alleged that they
jointly forni heel the good , it i not nece ·, ary to allecre the partner bip: Clark v.
Wick (l 94), 25 Ore. 446, 36 Pac. 165.
In an action by or again t partner ,
it i not nee ~ ary that the title de. cribe
th partie a partner , and give the partner bip name, if the fact appear in the
complaint:
an Brunt .,. Co. v. Harrigan (1 95),
. D. 96, 65 ........ W . 421. A
·tatem nt in the bill of particular· that
plaintiff i a partn r hip i
utiki nt:
Biddle: i.
patz (1903), - L.,. b. - , 9~
~'.

\'V . •'357.

name, though this statute does not author-

ize & salt to be brought 6// the partners in

their common name nor again~ the partner ·hip b~· the ·ommo11 name: Dimond i;.
~linne ota 'aY. Bank (l 91) iO .Minn. 29.,
73 ... " . l 2.
An allegation tha a certain firm i- a
partnel'. hip organiz cl and doing bu-ine
in the rate of ... ·ebra-ka i
ufficiem; to
authorize carrying the action under the
firm name, under : 24 of th
ode, and i.t
need nu be • Jl rr cl that it i a K br k
firm: harnl.J rlin Bankiug !Jou e 1.-. ..-oye
(1902), - ...-eb. - , 92 N. \Y'. i;5,
ee
al o Winter v. 1\Iean {l 9i}, 50 ~:eb. 209,

-n<l«r G. . 1 94, § 51 ii, an acti n will
lir- a9(li11st the partner by their common
na111r , thr1ugh thi ,tatute doe not authorize~. nit tfJ be hronght O•/ h partners in

Penalties, Actions for.
A complaint in an action for a tatutory
penalty, in the word of th tatute, · ufficieot. The court aid: 'To
t the complaint in que tion in rder to determine
whether it tat a au e £ action, we mw;t
look to the tatute reatin the remedy,
and not to the rnJe under the code which
ontrol pleading in action of common
l w origin:" Lat haw v. tat (1900) 156
Ind. 194, 59 :::\'. E. 471. In uch an action
the complaint hould at 1 a t contain a
r f r ll e to the tatute c:rea"ting and
ing uch pe11alt.r: Kirby t'.
t ru Guion
Tel. o. (1 94), 6 . . l, 60 X. W. 152.

nx-

'V

P r.formanr .
In an action on a ·ontra t a complaint
which

et~

out tlie contract mu

t

all g
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plaintiff's performance of its conditions:

Ball r. Doud (1894), 26 Ore. 14, 37 Pac.

70. But a general allegation of j)erforra-

ance is sufficient : Culbert.son, etc. Power

Co. V. Wildman (1895), 45 Neb. 663, 63

N. W. 947.

Possession.

In an action of forcible entry and de-

tainer, au allegation that plaintiff was the

owner of the fee of the property is not a

sufficient allegation that plaintiff was in

actual possession : McGrew v. Lamb (1903),

31 \Vash.485, 72 Pac. 100. An allegation

that plaintiff and defendant were tenants

in common of certain property is not an

averment that they were in possession :

Sterling v. Sterling (1903), 43 Ore. 200, 72

Pac. 741.
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An allegation " that the plaintiff is now,

and for more than fifteen years next prior

to the date of this complaint has been, the

owner in fee simple absolute, and in the

actual, notorious and open possession of

the following lands " (describing them), is

a sufficient allegation of actual possession :

Maggs V. Morgan (1903), 30 Wash. 604, 71

Pac. 188.

Quieting Title.

plaintiff's performan ce of it cond itions:
Ball t". D oud ( l 94), :26 Ore. 14, 37 Pac.
iO. But ·t general all gation of performauce i ~ufficient: Culbert. on, etc. l wer
Co. i•. Wildman (1 895), 45 Neb. 663, 63
N. W. 947.
Po session.
In an action of fo rcible ent ry and detainer, an allegation that plaintiff wa the
owner of tlie fee of the proper ty is not a
ufficient allegation that pla in tiff wa in
actual po- ession: McGrew v. Lamb (1903),
3 1 Wa h. 4 5, i2 P ac. 100. An allegation
that plaintiff and defendant were teuant
iu common of certain property i not an
averment that th ey were in possession:
:::)terling v. terling (1903),43 Ore. 200, 72
Pac . 741.
An allegation "that the plaintiff is now,
and for more than fifteen years next prior
to the date of this complaint ha been, the
ow ner in fee simple absolute, and in the
a tual, notorious an d ope n pos e. ion of
the following lands" (describing t hem) , i ·
a ufficient allegation of actual po~se. sion :
Magg v. Morgan(l903),30 Wa h.604, 71
Pac. 18 .
Quieting T itle.

Plaintiff must allege that he is in actual

possession of the laud, the title to which

is sought to be quieted : Cornelisou v.

Foushee (1897), 101 Ky. 257, 40 S. W.

680. A complaint was construed in

Deacon v. Central la. Inv. Co. (1895),

95 la. 180, 63 N". W. 673, and held to

state a cause of action to quiet title.

Facts must be alleged showing that

title is m the plaintiff : Chapman v. Jones

(1897), 149 Ind. 4.34, 47 N. E. 1065;

Cooper V. Birch (1902), 137 Cal. 472, 70

Pac. 291. In the last case it was held

that an allegation that plaintiff is the

owner of a right to purchase is not equiv-

alent to an allegation that plaintiff is

owner of the laud.

Ratification.

Plaintiff must allege that he is in actual
possession of the land, th e title to which
i soug ht to be quieted : Corneli on v.
Foushee (1897), 101 Ky. 257 , 40 S. W .
680.
A complaint was const ru ed in
Deacon v. Central Ia. Inv. Co. (1 895),
95 Ia. 180, 63 N . W. 673, and held to
tate a cause of action to quiet title.
Fact mu t b e alleged showing that
title i 10 the plaintiff: Chapman v. Jones
{1897), 149 Ind. 434, 47 N. E. 1065;
Cooper v. Birch (1902) , 137 Cal. 472, 70
Pac. 291. In the last ca e it was held
that an allegation that plaintiff is the
owner of a right to purchase is not equivalent to an allegation that plaintiff is
owner of the land.

" We are of the opinion that, when the

unauthorized agreement of an agent has

been ratified by his principal, an action

may be brought thereon, as though origi-

nally made by due authority, and that it

is not necessary, in the first instance, to

allege in the pleading the ratification, but

that it may be shown in proof of the

agreement :" Long v. Osborn (1894), 91

la. 160, 59 N. W. 14. See also Smith v.

Des Moines Nat. Bank (1899), 107 la. 620

78 N. W. 238.

Receiver, Cajiacitij of.

An averment " that said Luther Cum-

miugs was duly appointed and (jualified as

receiver of said association, and, among

other things, was then and there, by said

court, duly empowered, ordered, and di-

rected to collect by suit, if necessary, all

the claims due said association," was held

a sufficient averment of the authority of

tiie receiver to sue: Hatfield v. Cummings

Ratification.

" We are of the opinion that, when the
unauthorized agreement of an agent has
been ratified by his principal, an action
may be brought thereon, as though originally made by due authority, and that it
i not necessary, in the first in tance, to
allege in the plead ing the ratification, but
that it may be shown in proof of the
agreement : " Long v. Osborn ( 1894), 91

Ia. 160, 59 N. W. 14. , ee al o , mith 1•.
D es M ines at . Bauk (1 99), 107 Ia. 620
78 .. . \V. 23 .
R eceiver, apucit!J o.f
An averm ut " that . aid Luther urnmiugs wa <luly appo inted and qualified as
receiver of ai<l a so iati on, and , among
other thing , wa th en and there, by a id
ourt, duly e1Hpowered, order ed, and dir cted to collect hy ui t, if nece . ary, all
the claims due ·aid as o iation," wa held
a ufficient averment of the authority of
the receiver to sue: H atfield v. C ummings
(1898), 152 Ind. 280, 50 T. E. 217 . ~ee
also Hagerman v. Thomas (1901), - Neb.
- , 96 N. W. 631.
Wh ere a recei1·er bri ngs an action in
his own name, he must show by direct and
positive averments that leave of court to
instit ute and prosecute th e a ction was fi rst
obta in ed: Hatfield v. Cummin g (supra ).
See also Rhorer v. Middlesboro, etc. Co.
(1898), 103 Ky. 146, 44 S. W . 448.
R~j'ormation

of lYritten Instrument.

In a s ui t to reform a written instrument, the plaintiff must set forth t he
terms of the original agreement, a11cl also
the agreement as reduced to writing, a nd
point out clearly wherein there was a mistake: Citi zens' Nat. Bank v. Ju dy (1896),
146 Ind. 322, 43 N. E. 259; Osborn v.
Ketchum (1 894), 25 Ore.352, 35 Pac.972;
ellwood v . Henneman (1900),36 Ore. 575,
60 Pac. 12.
A general averment of mistake is in , uffi c:ient: Kn ox v. Pear on (1902), 64 Kan.
ill, 68 Pac. t:il3.
Replevin.
This a ction is not controlled. bv the ordinary rules of pleading: Wood bridge P.
De Witt (1897), 51 Neb. 98, 70 N. W.
506. As to allegations of ownership in
this action see suLject "Ti tle," infra, in
this note. R eplevi n is a local action aud
the place should be alleged : Byer v. Ferguson ( 1902), 41 Ore. 7i, 68 Pac. 5. An
averment of wrongful pos'ession implies an
averment of right to po session : Grever
& Sons v. Taylor (1895), 53 0. St. 621, 42
N. E. 829. It is not necessary to allege a
right to immediate po ession : Smith v.
Wi's. Inv. Co. (1902), 114 Wis. 15 1, 89
N. W. 829. Special damages must be al·

6
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leged: Kosecrans r. Asay (189G), 49 Neb.

Co.

i.

104G; Powder 11i1·cr Li1·e , tock
Lamb {I 93), 3 Neb. 339, 56 N. W.

512. 68 N. W. 627; Armagost v. Rising

1019.
(1898), 54 Neb. 763. 75 N. W. 534. lu

Bridges c Thomas (1899), 8 Olila. 620,

58 Pac. 955. the court said : " While, un-

der certain conditions, replevin will lie to

recover possession of a building, a peti-

tion in replevin for the recovery of a

building, in order to state a good cause of

action, should specifically aver such a state

of facts as will clearly show that sucli

building is personal property, and that

the plaintiff has a right to maintain the

action. It is not suilicient to aver gen-

erally that such building is personal prop-

erty." Syllabus by the court.

Seduction.

In Anthony v. Norton (1899), 60 Kan.
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341, 56 Pac. 529, it was lield, that under

the general code provisions abolisliing the

old system of pleading, \vith its fictions

and feigned issues, " a parent may main-

tain an action for the seduction of the

daughter without averment or proof of

loss of services or e.xpenses of sickness."

See also Snider i: Newell (1903), 132 N. C.

614, 44 S. E. 354.

Statute of Frauds, Contracts within.

It is not necessary, in suing on a cou-

tract within the statute of frauds, to al-

lege that it is in writing, as it will be

presumed to be written : Sowards r. Moss,

(1899), 58 Neb. 119, 78 N. W. 37.3 ; Dra])cr

V. Macon Dry Goods Co. (1898), 103 Ga.

661,30 S. E. 566; Bluthenthal r. Moore

(1898), 106 Ga. 424, 32 S. E. 344 ; Walker

V. Edmundson (1900), 111 Ga. 454, 36

S. E. 800 ; Taliaferro v. Smiley (1900), 112

Ga. 62, 37 S. E. 106; Sundback v. Gilbert

(1896), 8 S. D. 359, 66 N. W. 941 ; Kuth

V. Smith (1901), 29 Colo. 154,68 Pac. 278 ;

Kilpatrick-Koch Dry Goods Co. v. Box

(1896), 13 Utah, 494, 45 Pac. 629 ; Brad-

ford luv. Co. (.'. Joo.st (1897), 117 Cal.

204, 48 Pac. 1083; Suber v. Eichards

(1901), 61 S. C. 393, 39 S. E. .540; Mat-

thews V. Matthews (1897), 154 N. Y. 288,

48 N. E. 531 ; York Park Bldg. A.ss'n v.

Barnes (1894), 39 Neb. 834, 58 N. W. 440.

But see, for the contrary doctrine,

Lowe V. Turpie (1896), 147 Ind. 652, 44

N. E. 25; Horner v. McConnell (1902),

158 Ind. 280, 63 N. E. 472; Morgan v.

Wickliffc (1901), no Ky. 215, 61 S. W.

13 ; Graves i-. Clark (1897), 101 la. 738, 69

N. W. lOJG; Powder River Live Stock

Co. V. Lamb (1893), 38 Neb. 339, 56 N. W.

1019.

Statnl(s.

Public .statutes need not be pleaded, as

courts are bouml to take judicial notice of

them: Ervin v. State ex rel. (1897), 150

Ind. 332, 48 N. E. 249. But private

statutes must be pleaded : Nichols v.

Bardwell Lodge ^1898), 105 Ky. 168, 48

S. W. 426.

It is not necessary to formally con-

clude a complaint with the words, " against

kla. 620,
" Whil e und r c rtaiu condition , r plevin ' ill li to
ion of a building, a petir co,·er po
tion in repleYin ~ r the r
v ry of a
buildinO', in rder t tat a good au e f
a ti n, hould pecifi ally aver uch a. tate
of fact a. will )early how that uch
building i per nal property, and that
th plaintiff ha a right to maintain the
a tiou. lt i not ufficieut to av r genrally that nch buildino- i p r onal property."
yllabu by the court.

talutr . .

Public tatute::; need not be ple:ided, a
court are b und
take ju licial noti of
them : Ervin 1·. tate ex rel . ( l 97), I 50
Iud. 332 + X. E. 2.t9. But priYate
~tat ut " mu t be pleaded :
'T ich I v.
Bardwell Lodge (1 9 ), 105 l\y. 16c, +
i..:. W . +2G.
I is not n c arv to formallv oncludea complaint with.the word ··~gain t
the form of th
atute in U('h ca e made
and proYid d,' in ca e f a general tatut : ~'tate v. ( w ley (1 95) 17 Mont. 94,
42 Pac. Io.- .
Seduction.
In l.\I Culloug h i-.
olfax
ount.1'
In Anthony v. rorton {1899), 60 Kan .
(1903), - Neb. - , 95 N. W. 29, the court
34 l , 56 Pac. 529, it wa · held, that under
aid: " \Vh ere the tatute gi1·e a new
the general code provi ions aboli ·hing the
remedy and pre cribe prer qui ite condiold v tem of pl ading, 'Yith it fi ction
rt. in cla •
tion , or if an aC'tion of a
and feign d i sues, "a parent may mainagain t certain partie be authorized only
tain an action for the sed uc.:tion of the
after the performance f im ilar condidaughter without averment or proof of
tions, th e perf rmancc of the e ondition ,
lo of servic or expen e of ickness. "
whet.her the right of action exi ·t at comee al o uider v. rTewell ( 1903), 132 N.
mon law or i er ated by tatute, mu t be
614, 44 . E. 354.
alleg d in the complaint and proved at
tatute of Frauds, Contract within.
the trial. And wb re the plaintiff wi·he
It is uot nece ar,v, in . ning on a con- to avail him elf of a tatutory priYilege or
tract within the tatute of fraud , to al- right founded upon particular fact , he
l ge that it is in writincr, a it will be must tate tho fact in hi complaint.
presumed to be written: Soward 11 . Mo,s, . . . Pleading the tatute i . tatino- the
( 1899), 58 eb. 119, 78 ~. W. 373; Dra1 r fact which bring the ca:e wit.hin it, and
v. Macon Dry Good· Co. {l 9 ), 103 >a. counting upon it, in the . trict Jan ·uage
661, 30 . E. 566; Blutbenthal v. Moore of pleading, i making expr . referen e
(1 98), 106 a. 424, 32 . E. 344; Walker to it by apt term to show th
ourc of
v. Edmund on (1900}, 111 Ga. 454, 36 rigb relied on . . . . A gen r l averment
. E. 00; Taliaferro v. miley (1900), 112 of th p rformance of condition prece- ·
a. 62, 37 . E. 106; undback v. Gilbert dent i
ufficient in ca e of
ntract, but
(1896),
. D . 359, 66
. W. 941; Ruth in all other ca
the fact h wing a p rv. mi th (19 01) , 29 Colo. 154, 68 Pac. 27 ; formanc mu t be pecially pl aded."
Kilpatrick-Koch
ry Good
o. v. Box
tockholders, Action again t.
(1 96), 13 tah, 494, 45 Pa . 629 ; Bradford Inv. , o. v. Joo -t {l 9i), 117
al.
For e ential allegation ee Hir hf ld
204, 4 Pac. 10 3 ;
u ber v.
ichard
v. Bopp (1 95), 145
. Y. 4, .39 N. E.
17.
(1901), 61 .'. . 393, 39 . E. 540; fat.
thew v. Matthew (I 97 ), 154 . Y. 2 ,
4
. E. 5.'31 ; York Park Bldg. A 'n v.
A v t riuary urgeon in suing for
Barne (1 94), 39 eb. 34 5 J. W. 440.
erYic , ne cl not all g that h wa
But see, for th contrary doctrine, licen d a a v t riuar.v urgeon: Lrford
Lowe v. Turpie {l 96), 147 Ind. 652, 44 v. fartin (1900), 79 l.\Iinn. 24-3, 2 N. W.
. E. 25; Horner v. icConn 11 (1902), 479.
T, nder.
. E. 472; Morgan r.
15 Ind . 2 0, 63
Wickliff· (1 01), 110 K .v. 215 GI .'. W.
In an a.cti u to r , train the rollc>cLion
J3;
rav ·s v. lark (l 9i), 101 Ia. 7.3 , 69
f taxe n th ground that h<>y arc ex-
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ceasive, aii allec;ation that plaintiff ten-

dered to the tax collector a certain amount

conceded by him to be due, which the col-

lector refused to receive, is insuflScieut

without a further allepjation that such

tender was kept good by depositing the

money in court: Welch v. City of Astoria

(1894), 26 Ore. 89, 37 Pac. 66. See, to

same effect, Jacobs v. Oren (1897), 30

Ore. .593, 48 Pac. 431. See also Angier

V. Equitable Bldg. Ass'n (1899), 109 Ga.

625, 35 S. E. 64 ; Underwood v. Tew

(1893), 7 Wash. 297, 34 Pac. 1100.

Time.

c il ive, an allegation that plain ti ff ten·
d ' red to Lli t<lX ·oll ector a certain amoun t
cone ded by him to b du , which the coll ctor reiu. d to rccei v , is in uffici n t
without a furth er a ll gation that u h
te nd r wa. kept good by depositing the
money in court: \\T l h v. ity ( J\ toria
(1 89-q, 26
r . 9, 37 P ac. 66 . • e, to
am effect, Jacob v. Oren (1 97), 30
Or . 593, 48 Pac. 431.
ee al. o Angier
v. Equitable Bldg. A s'n (1 99), 109 Ga.
625, 35 . E. 64; Und rwood v. Tew
(1 "93), 7 Wa-h. 297, 34 lac. 11 00.

Tim e.

" Generally, the time at which a ma-

terial fact occurred is unimportant, and

therefore need not be averred. In sucli

cases the fact only is essential, and the
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date of no importance ; but there are

cases where time is vital to the right to

recover, and in such exceptional cases the

fact is unimportant, unless cou])led with a

statement of the date of its occurrence.

In such cases it is elementary that an

averment of time is essential, and the

time must be truthfully stated : " Clyde r.

Johnson (1894), 4 N. D. 92, 58 N. W. 512.

For cases where it was held that the

time was immaterial, and need not be

proved as laid, see p. 569, note 1.

Title.

"Generally, the time at which a ma·
t erial fact occu rred is unimportant, and
th erefore need not be averred. In such
case · t he fact only is e sential, ancl the
<late of n o importance; but there are
case where tim e i vital to the ri ght to
r eco ver, and in such exceptional cases the
fact is unimportant, unless co upl ed with a
statement of the date of its occurrence.
In such cases it is elem ent ary that an
averm en t of time is essential, and th e
time must be truthfully stated : " Clyd e u.
John son (1894 ), 4 N. D. 92, 58 N. W. 512.
For cases where it was held that the
time wa immaterial, aud need not be
proved as laid, see p. 569, note 1.

A general allegation of ownership is

sufficient as against a general demurrer :

Fisher v. Bouisson (1893), 3 N. D. 493, 57

N. W. 505; Shannon v. Grind.staff (1895),

11 Wash. 536, 40 Pac. 123; Reedy.

McRlll (1894), 41 Neb. 206, 59 N. W. 775 ;

Kavanaugh v. Oberfelder (1893), 37 Neb.

647, 56 N. W. 316 ; Bennett i: Lathrop

(1899). 71 Conn. 613, 42 Atl. 634; Carter

V. Wakenmn (1902). 42 Ore. 147, 70 Pac.

393 ; Hague v. Niphi Irrigation Co. (1898),

16 Utah, 421, 52 Pac. 765; 0.sborne & Co.

V. Stevens (1896), 15 Wash. 478, 46 Pac.

1027 ; Peoria, etc. Ry. Co. v. Attica, etc.

Ry. Co. (1899), 154 Ind.218, 56 N. E. 210;

First Nat. Bank v. Ragsdale (1900), 158

Mo. 668, 59 S. W. 987 ; Duzan r. Meserve

(1893), 24 Ore. 523, 34 Pac. 548 ; Atwater

V. Spalding (1902), 86 Minn. 101, 90 N. W.

370; McA^-thur v. Clark (1902), 86 Minn.

165, 90 N. W. 369.

While a plaintiff in ejectment need not

plead her title, if she chooses to do so she

is hound by her pleading and cannot prove

a title from a different source : Utassy v.

Giediughagcn (1895), 132 Mo. 53,33 S. W.

444.

An allegation that at a certain past time

plaintiff was the owner of certain prop-

erty, is not equivalent to an allegation of

present ownership: Ryan v. Spieth (1896),

18 Mont. 45, 44 Pac. 403; Irish v. Sunder-

haus (1898), 122 Cal. 308, 54 Pac. 1113.

In the last case it was held that the pre-

sumption of continuance is a rule of evi-

dence and not of pleading.

An allegation that ]daintiff owns the

T itle.
A general allegation of ownership is
sufficient as against a general demurrer :
Fisher v. Bouisson (1893), 3 N . D . 493, 57
N. W. 505 ; Shannon v. Grindstaff ( l 895 ),
11 Wa h. 536, 40 Pac. 123; R eed v.
McRill (1894), 41 Neb. 206, 59 N. W . 775 ;
Kavanaugh v. Oberfelder (1893), 37 Neb.
647 , 56 N. W. 316; Bennett v. L athrop
( 1899). 71 Conn. 613, 42 Atl. 634 ; Carter
v. Wakeman (1902). 42 Ore. 147 , 70 Pac.
393; Hagu e v. Niphi Irrigation Co. (1898),
16 Utah, 421 , 52 P ac. 765 ; Osborne & Co.
v., teven (1 896 ), 15 Wah. 478, 46 Pac.
1027 ; P eoria, etc. Ry. Co. v. Atti ca, etc.
Ry. Co. (1899) , 154 Ind. 218, 56 N. E. 210;
First Nat. Bank v. Ragsdal e (1 900) , 158
Mo. 668, 59 S. W. 98 7 ; Duzan i-. l\fe erve
(l 893), 24 Ore. 523, 34 Pac. 548; Atwater
v. Spaldi ng (l 902), 86 Minn. 101 , 90 N. W.
370 ; McArthur v. Clark ( 1902), 86 Minn.
165, 90 N. W. 369.
While a plain tiff in ej ctment need not
plead her title, if she choo es to do so she

i. hound by h er plrncling a.nd cannot prove
a title from a diff r •nt ourc : tns y v.
iedinghagcn ( 1895), 1 3~ .:\Io. 53, 3:3 . \\'.
444.
An allegation that at a · rlai u pa. t time
plaintiff was the own r of c rtaiu µroprty, is not quival 11t to au all •gatiou of
pr entownership: Hyanv. ,'pi th ( 1 96),
l Mont. 45, 44 Pa . 40:3; Iri h i·. ' underhaus (1 9 ), 122 al. 30 , 54 Pac. 1113.
In the la.. t ase it wa. h ld that the presumption of coutinuan ce is a rule of evideu ce and not of ]JI a<ling.
An allegation that plaintiff own the
right to purcha e certain land. is not
eq uiva.len t to au allegation that h is the
owner of the laucls : Cooper 1•. Birch
(1902 ), 137 Cal. 472, 70 Pac. 291. In an
action by th ind orsee of a promissory note
payable to order, an allegation that th
note was " old, a signed and deli,·ercd"
to plaiutiff was held sufficient to admit
evidence that it was in dorsed to him: Red
River Val ley Inv e tment Co. v. Cole
(1895), 62 Minn . 457, 64 N. W. 11 49. An
allegation " that the store or place of
busin ess of plaintiffs is situated ou" a
named street, held a sufficieut allegation
of ownership as against a general demurr er: Brunswick & W estern R. R. Co. v.
Hardey ( 1900), 112 Ga. 604. 37 S. E . 888.
An allegation that plaintiff "has lawful
title" to the described premises, is an a ll egation of fact and not a conclu sion:
Liviugstone v. Ruff ( 1903), - S. C. - ,
43 . E. 678. An allegation that county
warrants wer e i s ued and delivered to a
certain p erson, is sufficient to show that
he is the present owner of them : Dorothy
v. Pier ce (1895), 27 Ore. 373, 41 Pac. 668.
An allegation that certa in land on a certain date "wa th e property of 0. D.
Parry," i · a su fficient avenne11t of ownership in fee simple: Grace v. B allou ( 1893),
4 S. D. 333, 56 N. W. 107 5. An allegati on that certain land " is held a nd claimed
by her as her own, and wa o held and
claimed by her prior to the institution of
this action" is not a sufficient allegation
of title: DeHaveu v. DeHaven's Adm'r
(1 898), 10.t K y. 41, 46 S. W. 215.
"Where a note ha passed through the
hands of several uccessive tran fe rees, a
plain tiff may ignore all intermediate
transfers not nece ary to show hi title,
and allege n transfer by the payee directly

6 ")
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to himself:" Crosby v. Wright (1S97), 70

Minn. 251, 73 N. w". 162.

Defect of title is not sufficiently alleged

by the statement that the grantors '' were

not seized in fee or possessed of the right

to sell and convey " the premises in con-

troversy : Decker v. Schulze (1895), 11

Wash. 47, 39 Pac. 261.

In an action on a promissory note pay-

able to the order of a third party, a mere

allegation that the plaintiff " is now the

owner and holder" is not a sufHcient alle-

gation of title in the plaintiff. The court

said : " We have frequently held that,

where a party does not attempt to set up

the source of his title to chattel or real

proi)erty, a general allegation of owner-

ship is sufficient, and will be deemed an
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allegation of an ultimate fact, and not of

a mere conclusion of law. Bnt we have

never held that, if he alleged title to have

been in a third party, it would be sufficient

to then allege that he was now the owner,

witliout alleging a transfer from such

partv to himself : " Topping i-. Clay (1895),

62 Minn. 3, 63 N. W. 1038.

'• Where a party relies upon his title, as

obtained by prescription, he must allege

the facts showing the existence of the

to him elf:" ro by i·. Wright ( l -. 9i), 70
~ Iiu n 2:-1, 73 N. W. 162.
Def ct of title i not ufficiently all getl
by the. tatemeut that the grantor '·were
not s i1. d in fee or po e etl of th right
t i ~ 11 and onvey" the pr mi e iu co nee k r v. chulze (1 93), 11
t ro,· r y:
h. 47 , 3 Pa . 261.
In an action n a pr mi ory note payabl to th ortl r £ a third party, a m re
a.llegatio n that th plaintiff · i now the
o wner and h lder" i n t a uffi ·iPnt allef!:l.tion of title in the plaintiff. The court
sai.l: " We have frequ ntly h eld that,
where a party doe not a tte mpt to et up
the
ur
of hi title to hattel or real
prop rty, a u neral all gati on of own r· hiµ i · :uJficieut, a ncl will be dee med au
nll eu, ti n of an ul t imate fact, and n t of
a m re on lu iou of law. But w have
11 v r held that, if he alleged title to ha1·e
he u in a t hird part~', it would be uffic:i ent
t th u all g that he wa· n w th owner,
without all giug a tran fer from · uc:h
party to him If:" 'foppin a 1:. Clay (1 95),
62 ~lion. 3, 63 . W . 103 .
" Where a party reli e upon hi ti tle, a
btain <l by pr , Tiption, he mu, t allege
the fact
howinu the ex i, ten e of the

1 ck ( I
trahl

,,r,

v.

be

right, or plead the prescriptive right, aver-

ring that the existence of the right was

under a claim of right, was peaceable, with-

out interruption, and open, notorious and

exclusive:" Larsen v. Onesite (1900), 21

Utah, 38, 59 Pac. 234 ; Coleman v. llines

(1902), 24 Utah, 360, 67 Pac. 1122.

The word " owner " includes any person

who has usufruct, control or occupation of

real estate, and such a person may prop-

erly allege himself to be the owner of the

property in an action of ejectment : Par-

ker I'. Minneapolis, etc. R. R. Co. (1900),

79 Minn. 372, 82 N. W. 673.

Where plaintiff in replevin relies upon

a special ownership, the facts showing it

must be alleged : II ill v. Campbell Coni-

mi.ssion Co. (1898), 54 Neb. .59, 74 N. W.

388; Raymond v. Miller (1897), 50 Neb.

506, 70 N. W. 22 ; Thompson & Sons Mfg.

Co. V. NichoUs (1897), .52 Neb. 312, 72

N. W. 217; Paxton v. Learn (1898), 55

Neb. 459, 75 N. W. 1090; Meyer v. First

Nat. Bank (1902), 63 Neb. 679, 88 N. W.

867 ; Mus.ser v. King (1894), 40 Neb. 892,

59 N. W. 744; Sharp i-. John.son (1895),

44 Neb. 105, 02 N. W. 466; Camp v. Pol-

lock (1895), 45 Neb. 771. 04 N. W. 231 >

Strahle r. First Nat. Bank (1896), 47 Neb.

319, 66 N. W. 415; Norcross r. Baldwin

(1897), 50 Neb. 885, 70 N. W. 511 ; Griffing

V. Curtis (1897), 50 Neb. 3.34, 69 N. W.

904; Hudelson v. First Nat. Bank (1897),

51 Neb. 557, 71 N. W. 304; Elliott i\

First Nat. Bank (1902), 30 Colo. 279, 70

Pac. 421 ; Lovell v. Hammond Co. (1895),

66 Conn. 500, 34 Atl. 511; Kennett i\

Peters (1894), 54 Kan. 119, 37 Pac. 999 ;

Suckstorf V. Butterfield (1898), 54 Neb.

Trespas .
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the trespass was committed, and the ex-

tent ol' the injury, under the rule that a

series of uuhxwful acts, all aimed at a sin-

gle result, and contributing to the injury

complained of, may be averred in the

complaint without violating the rule

against duplicity : " Bingham i: Lipinan

(1902), 40 Ore. 363, 67 Pac. 98.

tho tre. pa s was committed , aml the extent of th e injury, und r th rnl th at a
eries of uulawful act , all aime<l at a ·iugl e r ult, an<l contributin g to th e injury
co mplain ed of, may b av rred in th e
rule
co mplaint without vi olating th
again t duplicity:" Bingham v. Lipman
(1902), 40 Ore. 363, 67 I ac. 9

Value.

Allegations of value are not considered

true by failure of defendant to deny them :

Derrick v. Cole (1894), 60 Ark. 394, 30

S. W. 760; Campbell v. Brosius (1893),

36 Neb. 792, 55 N. W. 215.

In a petition to recover the value of

shares of stock, an allegation that the

cori)oration stock "is divided into 100,000

shares of the par value of one dollar each,"
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is not an allegation of the value of the

stock: Mining Co. v. Huff (1901), 62

Kan. 405, 63 Pac. 442. And the allega-

tion "that the actual cost of making such

wharf was 82,745, said sum being the

value thereof as contemplated by the

contract," is not a sufficient allegation

of value, the words " as contemplated by

the contract " rendering it defective : Hart

Lumber Co. v. Everett Land Co. (1898),

20 Wash. 71, .54 Pac. 767. See also Plumb

V. Griffin (1901), 74 Conn. 132, 50 Atl. 1.

Waiver.

Waiver of conditions precedent must

he specially pleaded iu order to be avail-

able : Burlington Ins. Co. v. Campbell

(1894), 42 Neb. 208, 60 N. W. 599; An-

ders V. Life Ins. Co. (1901), 62 Neb. 585,

87 N. W. 331"; Hartford Fire Ins. Co. v.

Landfare (1902), 63 Neb. 559, 88 N. W.

779; Gillett v. Ins. Co. (1894), 53 Kan.

108, 36 Pac. 52; Hannan v. Greenfield

(1899), 36 Ore. 97, 58 Pac. 888; Long

Creek Bldg. Ass'n v. State Ins. Co. (1896),

29 Ore. 569, 46 Pac. 366 ; Closz v. Miracle

(1897), 103 la. 198, 72 N. W. 502; Hen-

sinkveld v. St. Paul, etc. Ins. Co. (1895),

96 la. 224, 64 N. W. 769; Heusinkveld

V. Capital Ins. Co. (1895), 95 la. 504, 64

N. W. 594.

On the other hand, it is held in some

States that waiver need not be pleaded,

but may be shown under an allegation of

full performance : Foster v. Fidelity, etc.

Co. of New York (1898), 99 Wis. 447, 75

N. W. 69; Stephens r. Union Assurance

Co. (1897), 16 Utah, 22, 50 Pac. 626 ; Duff

V. Fire As.s'n (1895), 129 Mo. 460, .30 S. W.

1034; James v. Mutual Life Ass'n (1899),

148 Mo. 1, 49 S. W. 978 ; Nickell v. Plianix

Ins. Co. (1898), 144 Mo. 420, 46 S. W. 435 ;

McCullough V. Plioenix Ins. Co., 113 Mo.

606 ; West v. Norwich Union Fire Ins.

Co. (1894), 10 Utah, 442, 37 Pac. 685.

See also Reisz v. Supreme Council

(1899), 103 Wi.s. 427, 79 N. W. 430, hold-

ing that the introduction of evidence of

waiver where same is not pleaded is not

material error. Also Deuster v. Mittag

(1900), 105 Wis. 459, 81 N. W. 643.

Va lue.
Allegati n of value are not con id ered
true by failure of defendant to d n,v them:
D erri k v. Cole (I 9-1), 60 Ark . 394, .'30
. W. 760; Campbell v. Brosiu (l 93),
36 Neb. 792, 55 T . W. 215.
In · a petiti on to reco,·er t.he value of
hare of stock, an allegation that th e
co rporation stock cc i. di\'id ed into 100,000
hare. of th e par value of one dollar ea ch,"
i · uot an all egation of th e value of th e
. tock: Miuiu g Co. v. Huff {1901) , 62
K a n. 405, 63 Pac. 442. And th e allegation "that the actual co t of makin g uch
wh arf w a "2,/.1.5, ·a id s um bein g th e
value t hereof as conte mpl ated hy t he
c~ ntrac t," is not a ·uffi eient allegation
of value, the wor ds "as conte mplated hr
the contract" r end erin g it defecti,·e: Hart
Lumber Co. v . Everett Lan <l Co. (1 898),
20 W ash. 71, 54 P ac. 767. See al o Plum b
v. Griffin (1901), H Conn. 13 2, 50 Atl. 1.

Co. (1 9 7), l G rtah, 22, 50 P ac. 626; Du ff
v. Fire Ass' n ( 1 95), 12!J M o. 460, 30 '. W.
103-!; ,James t'. l u tnn.l L i f A • ' 11 ( 1 99),
14 >Io. l , 4!J S. \Y. 9 7 ; 1 iekell v. Ph renix
In . o. ( 1 9 ), U -! M o. 4:W, 4 6 . W . 435;
M Cuilong h '" J> hornix Jn . o., 11 3 1o.
606; 'Ye t v.
or wi h nion Fire In .
Co. ( l 94) , 10 Ttah , 442, 3i Pac. 6 5.
, ee al ' O R ei 'Z v. ' u pre me oun cil
( 1 99), 103 Wis. -!2i , 79 . W . 430, hold in g that the in trocl uction of e\' ide nce of
wai1·er where ame is not pleaded i not
ma terial error. Al o D euster v. 1ittag
( l 900), 105 Wi s. 459, l N . W . 64:3 .
It i pro per to plead a wai ver a i:;uch
rath er than to set np th nrntters whi ch
g ive rise to it by way of esto ppe l : Jlu g hes
v. Lansin g (1 898), 3-! Ore. 11 8, 55 P ac. 95.
nffi cient if not
A ge nernl allegati on i
ohj e ·ted to seasonably : Barrett t" Des
::'lfo in es , Ptc. Tn s. Co. (1903) , 120 fa . 184,
9 4 ~ . \\' . 47 3.

lVanton11ess .
Thi , as d istin o-uished fro m n egligence,
mu st be all eged i11 order to adm it proof
of it: H olwer on ,., S t. L o ui ~ , ete. R y . Co.
( 1900), 157 Mo. 21 6, 57 S. W . 770 ; l\lcClellan v. Chippewa Y alley Elec. R y. Co.
(1901 ), 110 Wis. 3 26, 85 r .• W. 1018. See
Ullrich v. Clevelaud, etc. Ry. Co. (1 98 ),
151 Iutl. 358, 51 N. E. 95, fo r a full di ·cussion of the facts nece sary to constitute a
Waiver.
good compla int on the ground of wilful
Waiver of conditions precedent must killing. See also Proctor v. South ern Ry.
be specially plead ed in 01:der to be avail- Co. (1901) , 61 S. C. 170, 39 S. E. 351;
able: Burlington Ins. Co. v. Camp hell S chumpert v. Southern Ry. Co. ( 1903),
(1894), 42 Neb. 208, 60 N. W. 599; An- - 8. C. - , 43 . E . 813; Stembridge 1·.
ders v. Life Ins. Co. {1901), 62 Neb. 5 5, Southern Ry. Co. (1903) , - S . C. - , 43
87 N. W. 331'; Hartford Fire Ins. Co. v. S. E. 968; all of which are ba'ed on th e
Landfare (1902), 63 Neb. 559, 88 N. W. act of 1898, which allows the commingling
779; Gillett v. Ins. Co. (1894), 53 Kan. in one rount of acts of negligence and
108, 36 Pac. 52; Hannan v. Greenfield wilful wrong.
(1899), 36 Ore. 97, 58 Pac. 888; Long
In Stembridge v. S outhern Hy. Co.
Creek Bldg. Ass'n v. State Ins. Co. {1896), (1903), - S. C. -. 43 S. E. 96 , the
29 Ore. 569, 46 Pac. 366; Clo z i:. Miracle court said: cc A cause of action for puni(189i), 103 Ia. 198, 72 N. W. 502; llen- tive or exemplary dam ages doe not at all
inkveld v. St. Paul, etc. Ins. Co. (1895), consist in claiming uch damages eo 11ominP,
96 Ia. 224, 64 N. W. 769; Heusinkveld but consists in a tat ement of such act of
v . Capital Ins. Co. (1895 ), 95 Ia. 50-!, 64 wanton or wilful wrongs a would ju tifr
N. W. 594.
the imposition of such damages within
On the other hand, it is held in some the sum demand ed in the complaint."
State that waiver need not be pleaded,
Wr itte11 Instru ment.
but may be shown under an allegation of
full performance : F oster v. Fidelity, etc.
" If the written statem nt was the ba is
Co. of ' ew York (1 98 ), 99 Wi s. 4-!7, 7!'> of t he appellan t' · ri g ht , a co ntende<l in
N. W. 69 ; S tephen v. nion 1\ ssura nce hi b13half, we kn ow of no rea ·o u fo r ad44
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mittiug it without pleading it, either in

the form in which it was written, or fur

enforcenieut iu a reformed condition : "

Durrtinger v. Baker (1897), 149 Ind. 375,

49 N. E. 276.

" Where a contract consists of an oral

agreement, a part of which only has been

reduced to writing, it is proper to allege

iu the complaint, as a basis for the re-

covery of damages resulting from its

breach, the execution of a parol agree-

ment : " American Contract Co. f. Bullen

Bridge Co. (189G), 29 Ore. 549, 46 Pac.

138.

" Where the allegations in a pleading

vary from the provisions of the instru-

ment upon wiiich it is founded, the pro-

visions of such instrument control, and
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such allegations will be disregarded : "

Citing Stengel i-. Boyce, 143 Ind. 642;

Harrison Bldg. Co. v. Lackey (1897), 149

Ind. 10, 48 N. E. 254.

See cases cited under Statute of Frauds,

supra, in this note.

mitring it without pleading it, eith r in Bridcre Co. {l 96), 29 Ore. 549 46 Pa~
the form in which it wa written or for 13 .
• \Yhere the allegation in a pleadincr
nforceruent iu a r formed condition : "
f the in truurflincrcr 1:. Baker (1 9i), 149 Ind. 3i5, vary from th provi ion
49 ~y. E. 276.
m nt upon whi h it i found d, th pro• 'Yhere a. contract con i t of an oral vi ion of u h in trum ot control, aud
uch alleuation will be di -regarded : "
acrreemeot, a part of which onl_v ha been
iting teogel v. Boyce, 143 Ind. 642;
r duced to writino- it i proper to all ge
in the omplaiot a - a ba i for the re- IIarri on Bldg. o. t·. Lackey (1 97), 149
Ind. 10, 4 N. E. 254.
covery of damage re ultiog from it
e ca e cit d under tatute of Fraud ,.
brea b the execution f a parol acrreemen t:" American ontract Co. v. Bullen
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CHAPTER FOURTH.

THE DEFENSIVE SUBJECT-MATTER OF THE ACTION: THE

FORMAL PRESENTATION OF HIS DEFENCE, OR OF HIS

CLAIM FOR AFFIRMATIVE RELIEF, BY THE DEFENDANT.

SECTION FIRST.

STATUTORY PROVISIONS CONCERNING MATTERS OF DEFENCE.

§472. *581. Statutory Provisions Relating to Answers. I CoUect

together in one group all the sections of the various codes relating

to the nature and contents of the answer, including denials,

new matter, counter-claims, set-offs, affirmative relief, and cross-

complaints. The clause defining the answer, and describing its

contents, is substantially the same, Avith some unimportant varia-

tions, in all the codes ; the principal, and indeed only, material

differences are found in the provisions relating to counter-claims

and cross-demands generally. The following are the sections

which determine generally the nature of the answer as a pleading.

" The answer of the defendant must contain, 1. A general or

specific denial of each material allegation of the complaint con-

troverted by the defendant, or of any knowledge or information
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thereof sufficient to form a belief ; 2. A statement of any new

matter constituting a defence or counter-claim in ordinary and

concise language, without repetition." In a few States the

foregoing description is employed, with slight verbal changes,

and to it is added another subdivision. The sections, as found

in these codes, are given at large in the foot-note.^

1 [^Arizona. "The defendant in his sue, (7) Denying the facts constituting

answer may plead as many defences as he the cause of acti(jn, (8) Set-off and coun-

may have; but such pleas must be sepa- ter-claiin." Rev. St., 1901, § 13.50.

rately stated in one answer, filed at the Arkansas. " The answer shall contain:

same time and in the following order: (1) The style of the court and the style of

(1) Denying the jurisdiction of the court, the action, followed by the word ' answer.'

(2) In abatement of the suit, (3) To But where there are several plaintiffs and

strike from the complaint irrelevant, re- defendants, it shall only be necessary to

dundant or uncertain matter, (4) To give the one first named of each class, with

make the complaint definite and certain, the words ' and others.' (2) A denial of

(5) Demurrer, (6) In bar of the right to each allegation of the complaint coutro-

9:2

CI\IL RDIEDIE ·.

692

CIVIL REMEDIES.

The provisions relating to the union of various defences, legal

8~. Statutory Provisions Respecting Union of Defences .

473.

^ 473. * 582. Statutory Provisions Respecting Union of Defences.

' h

pr n

i

u~

rela in 0 t

the uni n of vari u

verted by the defendant, or of any knowl-

edge or information tliereof, sutiicieiit to

form a belief. (3) A statement of any

new matter constituting a defence, coun-

ter-claim or set-off, in ordinary and concise

language, without repetition. (4) The de-

fendant may set forth in his answer ;is

many grounds of defence, counter-claim

and set-off, whether legal or equitable, as

he siiall have. Each shall be distinctly

stated in a separate paragraph, and num-

bered. The several defences must refer

to the causes of action which tliey are in-

tended to answer in a manner by which

they may be intelligibly distinguished."

Sand. & kill's Dig., § .')7"22.
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CalifoiHin. " The answer of the de-

fendant shall contain: (1)A general or

specific denial of the material allegations

of the complaint controverted by the de-

fendant, (i) A statement of any new

matter cmistituting a defence or counter-

claim. If the complaint be verified, tlie

denial of each allegation controverted

must he specific, and be made positively,

or according to the information and belief

of the defendant. If the defendant has no

information or belief upon the subject suffi-

cient to enable him to answer an allegation

of the complaint, he may so state iu his

answer, and jilace his denial on that

ground. If the complaint be not verified,

a general denial is sufficient, but only puts

in issue tiie material allegations of the

complaint." Code Civ. Pro., § 4.37.

Colorado. " The answer of the defend-

ant shall contain : First, a general or

specific denial of each material allegation

in the complaint intended to be contro-

verted by the defendant; second, a state-

ment of any new matter constituting a

defence, or counter-claim, in ordinary and

concise language, without unnecessary

repetition. In denying any allegation in

the complaint not presumptively witliin

the knowledge of the defendant, it shall

be sufficient to put sucli allegations in

issue, for the defendant to state, as to such

allegation, that he has not and cannot

obtain sufficient knowledge or information

upon which to base a belief." Code, 1890,

§ •'•)6.

Connertiad, " The defendant in his an-

swer shall specially deny such allegations

of the complaint as he intenils to contro-

vert, admitting the truth of the other

allegations, unless he intends, in good

faith, to ccmtrovert all the allegations, in

wliich case he may deny them generally,

as follows : ' The defendant denies the

truth of the matters contained in the

plaintiff's complaint.' He may also, iu

his answer, state special matters of de-

fence, and shall not give in evidence matter

in avoidance, or of defence, consistent with

the truth of the material allegations oftiie

of action which thP.,. are inwer in a manner by which
intelligibly <li ·ti1wui hed."
Dig.,§ 5i22.
al~fumi11. "The an ·wer of the defendant -hall contain : (I) A general or
p ci fie d nia,J of the mntcrial all 1Yation
f th complaint controverted hy th <lef udnut. (:2) A tatement of anr new
matter l'Oll,..titutinO' a defen ce or coumerdaim. 11 the complaiut be Yerified, the
d nial of each allegation ·ontro,· rteu
mu. t he ~pccific, and be made positi,·ely,
r a cor1liiw ru the information and belief
of th <lefendant. If the defendant ha. no
i o formation r belief upon the ubject uffici 11t to enable him to an w ran allegation
f the complaint, he may o rate in hi
au wer, and pl a e hi· denial on that
ground. If the complaint be not Yerified,
a gen ral denial i ufficient, but only put·
in i ue the material allegation
f the
complaint."
ode i'·· Pr ., § 43i.
'o/orado. " The an wer of the defendant . hall contain : Fir t, a general or
p cific denial of each material allegation
in the omplaint intended t o be controvert cl by the defendant; second, a tatem nt of any n w matter on tituting a.
d f nc >, or count r· laim , in ordinary and
'QUCi~
languag •, without uuue ·e.. ar.v
repetition. In denying any allegation in
th romplaint not pre umpti,·ely within
the knowledge of the def u<ln.nt, it hall
lie ;ufticient to put uclt all aatiou iu
i: ·uc, for the rl fen<la.nt to tat , a to ueh
allegation, that h ha not and canuot
,,ht.nin ..:ufficient kuow]pdg or information
upon which to base a belief."
ode, l 9 ,
to the ·au-e
tend d to au
they ma_,. h
aUtl. · Hill'

5

l f n

1 0 ·al
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or equitable, or botli, and of various counter-claims, in the same

answer, are similar in all the codes, with unimportant variations,

pleaded." Code, 1895, §§ 5047, 5051,

or quifabl . . or b th ancl f variou, count r- ·laims, in th ame
a.nswer, are ·imilar in all th o l s, with unimporL, nt variations,

5053.

Idaho. Identical with the California

Statute. Code Civ. Pro., I'.lOl, § 3211.

Indiana. " The an.swer .shall contain —

First. A denial of each allegation of the

complaint controverted by tlie defendant.

Second. A statement of any new matter

constituting a defence, counter-claim or

set-off, in plain and concise language.

Third. The defendant may set forth in

his answer as many grounds of defence,

counter-claim, and set-off, whether legal

or equitable, as he shall have. Each shall

be distinctly stated in a separate para-

graph, and numbered, and clearly refer
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to the cause of action intended to be an-

swered." Burns' St , 1901, § 350.

Iowa. " The answer shall contain :

(1) The name of the court and county,

and of the plaintiffs and defendants, but

when there are several plaintiffs and de-

fendants it sliall only be necessary to give

the first name of each class, with the words

' and others ; ' (2) A general denial of

each allegation of the petition, or of any

knowledge or information thereof sutH-

cient to form a belief ; (3) A special denial

of each allegation of the petition contro-

verted by the defendant, or of any knowl-

edge or information thereof suthcient to

form a belief; (4) A statement of any new

matter constituting a defence; (5) A .state-

ment of any new matter constituting a

counter-claim. The defendant may set

forth in his answer as many causes of de-

fence or counter-claim, whether legal or

equitable, as he may have. " Code, 1897,

§ 3566.

Kansas. " The answer shall contain :

First, A general or specific denial of each

material allegation of the petition con-

troverted by the defendant. Second, A

statement of any new matter constituting

a defence, counter-claim or set-off, or a

right to relief concerning the subject of

the action, in ordinary and concise lan-

guage, and without repetition. Third,

When relief is sought, the nature of the

relief to which the defendant supposes

himself entitled. The defendant may set

forth in his answer as many grounds of

defence, counter-claim, set-off, and for re-

lief, as he may have, whetiier they be sucli

as have been heretofore denominated legal

or equitable, or both. Each must be sep-

arately stated and numbered, and they

must refer in an intelligible manner to the

causes of action wliicli they are intended

to answer. " Code, 1901, § 94.

Kentucki/. " The answer may contain

— (1) A traverse. (2) A statement of facts

which constitute an estoppel against, or

avoidance of, a cause of action stated in

the petition. (3) A statement of facts

which constitute a set-off or counter-claim.

pleaded."

ode, l 95, §§

defence, counter-claim, . t- ff, and for relief, a · h may hav , wh ther they b nch
Idaho. Identical with the California a have b eu herctofote d uominateu l ·gal
.. ·tatute. Cod Civ. Pro., 1901, § 321 1.
or equitable, or liorh. Ea ·h mu. t b sepIndiana. "The an wer hall contain arately stated and numbered, and they
First. A denial of each all gation of the must refer iu an iutelligible mnun r to the
complaint contrornrt ·d by tlie defendant. causes of action which th y are intended
econd. A . tatement of any new matter to an wer."
ode, 1901 , § 94.
·on titutiug a defen ·e, counter-claim or
K ntucky. "The an wer may contain
. et-off, in plain and conci e language. - ( I ) A traverse. (2) A tatemeut of facts
Third. The defendant may set forth in whi ch con.titnte au e.toppcl again t, or
his an wer as many grounds of defen ce, a\·oidan ·e of, a cause of action stated in
counter-claim, and set-off, whether legal the petition. (3) A tatement of facts
or equitable, as he shall have. Each .. hall which constitute a set-off or counter-claim.
he distin tly ·tated in a separate para- (4-) A cro s-petition." Cod , 1 95, § 95.
graph, and numbered , and clearly refo r
,l/ i1111esula. " The answer of the <leto the ·ause f action intend 1 to be an- fendant . hall contain: Ji ir t. A <leuial of
. wered." Burns' St, 1901, § 350.
ach allegatiou of the complaint controI owa. "The answer shall contain : Yerted by the defendant, or of any knowl(1) The name of the court and co nuty, edge or information thereof ufficient to
a11<l of th e plaintiff.> and defendantH, but fl'rm a belief; Second. A statement of anv
when th ere are everal plaintiffs aud de- 11ew matter constituting a defence o-r
fendants it hall ouly lie nec:e sary to give co uuter-claim, iu ordinary and conci e lanthe first name of each cla. s, with the words guage, without repetition. Third. All
' aml others;' (2) A general denial of equitie. exi ting at the time of the coml':tl' h allegation of the petition, or of any mencement of any action, in favor of a
knowledge or information thereof uffi- defendant thereiu, or discovered to exist
c:ient to form a belief; (3) A special deuial after such commencement, or iutervening
of each allegation of the p etition contro- before a final decision in such action.
ve rted by the defeudant, or of any knowl- And if the same are admitted by the
edge or information thereof ufficient to plaintiff, or the issue thereon is determined
form a belief; (4) A statement of any new in favor of the defendant, he shall be enmatter con ti tu ting a defence; ( 5i A .state- titled to such relief, equitable or otherment of any new matter con tituting a wise, a the nature of the ca e demands,
connter-claim. The defendant may set by judgment or otherwise." St.. 1894,
forth in his an ~ wer as many causes of de- § 5236.
"Alissouri. Sarne as the provisions
fence or counter-claim, whether legal or
equitable, as he may ha\·e." Code, 189 7, quoted in the text. Hev. St., 1899, § 604.
,1J onlana. "The answer of the de3566.
Ku.11sus. "The an ·wer shall contain: fendant must contain : (1) A general or
First, A general or specific denial of each specific denial of each material allegation
material allegation of the petition con- of the complaint coutro\·erted ty the detroverted by the defendant. Second, A fendant, or of any knowledge or informa:;tatement of any new matter constituting tion thereof suffic.:ient to form a belief, or
a defence, counter-claim or et-off, or a a pecific admis ion or denial of some of
right to relief concerning th e subject of the allegati ons of the complaint, and also
the action, in ordinary and conci e lan- a general denial of all the allegations of
guage, and without repetition. Third, the complaint uot spec:ifically admitted or
When relief is sought, the nature of the denied in the answer. (2) A tatement
relief to which the defendant suppo es of any new matter con ·tituting a defenc.:e
orle, 1 95 , § 690.
himself entitled. The defendant may set or counter-claim."
:Nebraska. "The an wer shall contain:
forth in his an wer a many grounds of
5053.

s

5047, 5051,

694:
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and are as follows : " The defendant may set forth, b}- answer, as

many defences and counter-claims as he may have, \Yhethcr they

First — A general or specific denial of

• n are a f 11 w :
any def nc an coun

each material allegation of the petition

controverted by the defendant. Second —

A statement of any new matter constituting

a ilefeuce, counter-claim or set-off, in or-

dinary and concise language, and without

repetition." "The defendant may set

forth in his answer as many grounds of

defence, counter-claim and set-off as he

may have. Each must be separately

stated and numbered and they must refer

in an intelligil)le manner to the cause of

action which they are intended to answer."

Code, 1901, §§99, 100.

Nevadn. " The answer of the defendant

shall contain: First — If the complaint
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be verified, a special denial of each alle-

gation of the complaint, controverted by

the defendant, or a denial thereof accord-

ing tolas information and belief; if the

complaint be not verified, then a general

denial to each of such allegations ; but a

general denial shall only put in issue the

material and express allegations of tlie

complaint. Second — A statement of any

new matter or counter-claim, constituting

a defence, in ordinary and concise lan-

guage." Comp. Laws, 1900, §3141.

New York. Identical with the provis-

ions quoted in the text. Code Civ. Fro.,

§500.

North Carolina. Identical with the

provisions quoted in the text. Code, § 100.

North Dakota. Identical with the pro-

visions quoted in the text. Rev. Codes,

1899, %:y2-3.

Ohio. " The answer shall contain —

(I) A general or specific denial of each

material allegation of the petition contro-

verted by the defendant. (2) A statement

of any new matter constituting a defence,

counterclaim, or set-off, in ordinary and

concise language. (3) When a defendant

seeks affirmative relief therein, a demand

for the relief to which he suppo.ses him.self

entitled." "The defendant may set forth

in his answer iis many grounds of defence,

counter-claim, and set-off as he may have,

whether tliey are such as have heretofore

ticen denominated legal or equitable, or

both ; but tlie several defences nmst be

consistent with each other, and each must

refer in an intelligible manner to the

cause of action which it is intended to an-

swer." " When tiie answer contains more

tlian one defence, counter-claim, or set-off,

they must be separately stated and consecu-

tively numbered." Bates' St., 1903, §§ 50GG,

5067, 5068.

Oklahoma. Identical with the Kansas

statute. St., 1893. §3972.

Oregon. " The answer of the defendant

shall contain, — (I) A specific denial of

each material allegation of the complaint

controverted by the defendant, or of any

knowledge or information thereof suffi-

F irst - A g neral or

p cific denial of
a h m te rial all gation f the p tition
coutrov r Le<l b th d f ndant.
econdA ta meut f any new matter con ituting
:\ d feuc , c unter- lai m r et-off, in ordinary and ouci • langua e, and without
r p titi n. " ' The defendant may et
forth in hi an w r a many ground of
defeut , ount r-rl im and ~ et- off a he
may ha'' . Ea h mu t be eparately
tated and numbe red and th ey mu ·tr fer
in an int lligible mann er to the cau e of
action ' hi h they ar intended to au we r."
od e, l901, § 99, lOO .
N vadn. "Th an. wer of the defendant
hall c ntain: • ir 't - If the comp laint
be verified, a p ial denial of each alleati on of th complaint, controverted by
the defendant, or a denial thereof a c rdiug t hi information and belief; if the
com plaint be not verifi d , then a CYeneral
den ial to each of uch allegations; but a
gener al denial hall only put in is ue the
material and expre . all gations of the
·omplaio t.
econd- A tatementof any
ne w matter or counter-claim, con ·titutiug
a defente, in ordinary and conci e langu ag e.' J mp. Law. , 190 , § 3141.
... ew York. Identica l with the provision · quoted in the text. Code Civ. Pro.,
500.

orth

Identical with the

w r." "vVhen th
than on defenc ,
nt r- laim, r
they m t be eparnte
tiv ly numbered."

5067, 506 .

Oklahoma. I denti •al with the Kan a
statute.
t., 1 93.
972.
regon. 'The an wer of the def ndant
ball · ntain, - (1) A pecifi d nial of
each material allegation of the c mplaint
cont ro,rerted by the defendant, or of any
kuowl dg or information ther of uffiient to form a beli £. (2) A tateme11t of
any n w matter con tituting ad fen or
counter-claim, in rdinary and u i e language without r epetiti n." Hill's Law ,
§ 72.
oulh 'arolina. Identical with th provi ion quoted in th text.
ode, I 3,
§ liO.
outh Dakota. Id
th provi ion quoted in the
t., l !) 1,
§ 6l20.

tah.

Montana
the pr
ode,
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be such as have been heretofore denominated legal or equitable,

or both. They must each be separately stated, and refer to the

causes of action which they are intended to answer, in such

manner that they may be intelligibly distinguished." Another

form found in several codes is, " Tlie defendant may set forth, by

answer, as many grounds of defence, counter-claim, or set-off, as

he may have, whether legal or equitable, or both." ^

1 \^Arizona. See note to § * 581 , supra.

Arkansas. See note to § * 581, supra.

California. " The defendant may set

b such as hav b
h r t for den minat <l l gal r equit l>l •,
parat ly ·tat d, an<l r fer to the
or b th. They must ach b
auscs f action whi h th y ar int nd '-'d i an ·w r, in uch
Anoth r
mann r that they m< y b int lligibl li ·tingui ·h <l.
form found in ev ral od l ' The <lcf n lant ma · t forth, Ly
an wer, as many ground f defence, ount r-claim, or et-off, a
.he may have, whether l gal or equitabl , or both.' 1

forth by answer as many defences and

counter-claims as he may have. They

[Ar izona . See note to§ * 581, supra.
A,·kansas. See note to § ~ 581, supm.
California. "The defendant may set
forth by answer as many defences and
counter-claims as he may have. They
mu t be eparately stated, and the several
defen es mu t refer to the cause of action
which they are intended to answer, in a
manner by which they may be intelli gibly
di tinguished. The defendant may also
answer one or more of the everal causes
of acti n stated in the complaint and demur to the residue." Code Civ. Pro.,
1

must be separately stated, and the several

defences must refer to the causes of action

which they are intended to answer, in a

manner by which they may be intelligibly

distinguished. The defendant may also

answer one or more of the several cau.ses
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of action stated in the complaint and de-

mur to the residue." Code Civ. Pro.,

§441.

Colorado. " The defendant may set

forth by answer as many defences and

counter-claims as he may have, whether

the subject matter of such defences be

such as was heretofore denominated legal

or equitable, or both, they sliall be sep-

arately stated, and the several defences

shall refer to the causes of action which

they are intended to answer in a manner

by which they may be intelligibly distin-

guished." Code, 1890, § 59.

Connecticut. See note to § * b%l, supra.

Also Gen. St., 1902, § 612. These pro-

visions differ widely from those in most

of the code States ; Georgia. See note to

§ 581, s«/)ra,- Idaho. Identical with the

California statute. Code Civ. Pro., 1901,

§ 3215; Indiana. See note to § *581,

supra.

Iowa. See note to §*581, supra.

"Each affirmative defence shall be stated

in a distinct division of the answer, and

must be sufficient in itself, and must intel-

ligibly refer to that part of the petition to

which it is intended to apply." Code,

1897. § .3568.

Kansas. See note to § *581, supra.

Kentnckij. " (2) A pleading may con-

tain statements of as many causes of ac-

tion, legal or equitable, and of as many

matters of estoppel and of avoidance.

legal or equitable, total or partial ; and

may make as many traverses ; and may

present as many demurrers, as there may

be grounds for in behalf of the pleader.

(3) If there be more than one, eacli must

be distinctly stated in a separate, num-

bered paragraph; and either, which is

intended to respond to part only of an

adverse pleading, must show to what part

it is responsive. It is the duty of the

court, upon or without motion, to enforce

these provisions ; and for that purpose, to

dismiss an action without prejudice, or to

strike a pleading, or any part thereof,

from the case, or to allow a new pleading.

(4) If, however, a party file a pleading

§ 441.

Colorado. ''The defendant may set
forth by answer as many defences and
counter-claims as he may have, whether
the uhj ct matter of such defence be
sur.h a wa heretofore denominated legal
or equitable, or both, they shall be separately tated, and the several defences
s hall refer to the causes of action which
they are intended to an wer in a manner
by which they may be intelligibly distinguished." Code, 1890, § 59.
Co1111ecticut. See note to§* 581, supra.
Also Gen. t., l 902, § 612. These provisions differ widely from tho e in most
of the code tates; Georgia.
ee note to
§ 581, upra · Idaho. Identi cal with the
California statute. Code Civ. Pro., 1901,
§ 3215; Indiuna.
See note to § * 5 1,
supra.
ee note to § * 5 1, s1tpra.
Iowa.
"Each affirmative defence shall be stated
in a di tinct diYision of the answer, and
must be, ufficient in itself, and mu t intelligibly refer to that part of the petition to
which it i intended to apply." Code,
l 97. § 356 .
Kansas. See note to § * 581, supra.
Kentucky. "(2) A pleading may contain statements of as many causes of action, legal or equitable, and of as many
matters of estoppel and of avoidance,

legal or equitable, total or partial; and
may make as many traverses; and may
present as many demurrers, as there may
be grounds for in behalf of the pleader.
(3) If there be more than one, each mu t
be distinctly . tated in a separate, numbered paragraph; and either, which is
intended to respond to part only of an
adverse plending, must show to what part
it is responsive. It is the duty of the
court, upon or without motion, to enforce
these provisions; and for that purpose, to
dismiss an action without prejudice, or to
strike a pleading, or any part thereof,
from the ca e, or to allow a new pleading.
( 4) If, however, a party file a pleading
·which contains inconsi tent statements, or
. tatements incon i tent with those of a
pleading previously filed by him in the
action, he shall, upon or without motion,
be required to elect which of them shall
be stricken from hi pleading. But a
party may alleo-e, alternatively, the existence of one or another fact, if he state
that one of them is true, and that he does
not know which of them is trne . . . .
( 7) A trnverse is a denial, by a party, of
facts alleged in au ad verse pleading, if
they be presumptively within his knowledge; or a denial of them, or a denial
that he has sutlicient knowledge or information to form a belief <'Oncerning them,
if they be not presumptively within his
knowledge." Code, 1895, § 113.
llfinnesota. Identical, with very slight
verbal changes, with the California statute. St., 1894, § 5239.
~Mis 011ri.
"The defendant may set
forth by an wer a many defences and
counter-claim as he may have, whether
they be uch as have heen heretofore cl uominated legal or quitable, or both.
They must each be eparatel.v stated. in
such manner that they may be intelligibly
distinguished, ant! refer to the cause of ac
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§ 474. * 583. Same Subject. Most of the cocles are in substan-

tial agreement as to the nature and object of the counter-claim.

In a few, however, there is a departure from this common type ;

and in some there are special clauses relating to set-off as a form

of defence different from the counter-claim. All these statutory-

provisions are collected in the text or in the notes. The following

definition has been adopted in a majority of the States : " The

counter-claim mentioned in the last section must be one existing

in favor of a defendant and against a plaintiff between whom a

several judgment might be had in the action, and arising out of

one of the following causes of action: 1. A cause of action aris-

ing out of the contract or transaction set forth in the complaint

as the foundation of the plaintiff's claim, or connected with the

subject of the action; 2. In an action arising on contract, any

other cause of action arising also on contract, and existing

at the commencement of the action."' The corresponding

sections in the codes of Indiana and of Iowa are, however,

quite different, and are given at length in the foot-note. It
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will be seen that they enlarge the scope of the counter-claim,

tion which they are intended to answer."

Part of § 605, Rev. St., 1899.

Montana. " A defendant may set

forth, in his answer, as many defences or

counter-claims, or both, as he has, whether

they are such as were formerly denomi-

nated legal or equitable. Each defence or

counter-claim must be separately .stated

*5

3. Same Subject. .l I t f the cod are m ub tanial gr em nt a to the natur and obj t of the c unt r- laim.
I n a f w h w er there i a lepar ur fr m th ·
and in · m th r are pe ial clau' r l· in
f l f nee cliff r nt fr m he oun r-claim.
Ir
· 11 t cl in th t xt r in tl note .
l fini i n ha b en adopt d in a maj rity of th
counter- laim m nti ned in the la t ction mu t b n
mg
in favor f a 1 fendant and again ~ t a pl in tiff be we n
m a
v ral jud ment might be had in th acti n and ari in ut of
of a tion: 1.
cau e of action ri ne f th f 11 ing au
on ract or tran ac ion t forth in the complaint
in 0 nt
a th f undation of the plain iff' claim or conn ·t cl wi h the
'nbject f the action · 2. In an a tion ari ing on c ntra t any
th r cau e £ acti n arising al o n c ntra t, and
at the commencement of the a ti n." · The
ction in the ·ode of Indiana and f Iowa ar
er
iuite different and are given at 1 ngth in the foot-n t .
" ·ill be een that they enlarge the cope of the counter- laim
474.

and numbered. Unless it is interposed as

an answer to the entire complaint, it must

distinctly refer to the cause of action

wbich it is intended to answer." Code,

1895, § 699.

Nebraska. See note to § *581, su/ira.

Nevada. Identical with the first two

sentences of the California statute. Comp.

Laws, 1900, § 3144.

New York. Identical with the Montana

statute. Code Civ. Pro., § 507.

North Carolina. Identical with the pro-

vision first quoted in the text. Code, § 102.

North Dakota. Identical with the pro-

vision first quoted in the text. Rev. Codes,

1899, § 5274, subdiv. 2.

Ohio. See note to § *581, supra.

Oklahoma. See note to § *581, supra.

Oretjon. Iilentical, except for very slight

verbal changes, with the first two sen-

tences of the California statute. Hill's

Laws, § 73, subdiv. 2.

South Carolina. Identical with the pro-

vision first quoted in the text. Code, 1893,

§171, subdiv. 2.

South Dakota. Identical with the pro-

vision first quoted in the text. Ann. St.,

1901, § 6121, subdiv. 2.

Utah. " The defendant may set forth

b}' answer as many defences and counter-

claims, legal or equitable, or both, as he

may have. They must be separately

stated, and the several defences mnst re-

fer to the causes of action whicii they are

intended to answer in a manner by which

they may be intelligibly distinguished.

Thedefendant mayalso answer one or more

of the several causes of action stated in

the complaint and demur to the residue,

or may demur and answer at the same

time." Rev. St., 1898, § 2972.

tion 'vhich they are intended to an wer."
Part of 605, Hev. t., I 99.
Jl!onlana.
"A defendant may
forth, in hi an wer, a many def n e r
counter-claim , or both, as he has, whether
th y are u ·h a w r e formerly denominated 1 gal or equitable. Each defence or
counter- ·laim mu t be eparately , tated
and numbered.
nlc it i interpo ed a
an an wer to the entire complaint, it mu t
d1 tinctly refer to the ran e of action
which it i intended to au wer. "
ode,
I 95, § 699 .
• ebra ka.
ee note to § * 5 1, supra.
evada. I d ntical with the fir t two
. ent nee of the California tatute.
omp.
Law. , 1900, ~ 31H.
New Y ork. I dentical with the M ontana
ode iv. ro., 507.
orllt arolina. I dentical with the pro·
viionfirtquoted inth txt.
ode, 102.
ort!t Dakota. Id ntical with the provi. ion fir t quoted iu the text.
ev. od ,
1 99, § 527 4, ubdiv. 2.
Oltio. . ee note to §' 5 l, upra.
Oklrihom". , ' e not to§ 5 l , supra.
Or<>9on. J1l euti ·al, ex<'ept for v ry light
verbal ·ha11gr:" with the fir t two en-

Hill '~
of thP. California tatute.
73, ubdiv. 2.
011lh Carolina. I dentical with th provi i n fir t quoted in the text. Cod , l 93,

Law ,

§ 171 , ubdiv.2.
outh D akota.

Identical with the proon. t.,
vi ion fir t quoted in the text.
1901, § 6121 , ubdiv. 2.
Ulalt. "The defendant may et forth
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and that, in Iowa, the restriction as to parties is very much

inoditied. ^

1 l^Arlzona. See Rev. St., 1901, §§ 1360,

and that, in Iowa, the r striction a
modified. 1

to

arties i

very much

13(j3, 1365, 1366, which relate to couuter-

claiins, but differ radically fi'oiu tiie pro-

visiou.s quotetl iu tlie te.xt.

Aikimsus. " Tiie counter-claim meh-

tioucd iu this chapter must be a cause of

actiou iu favor of the defendants, or some

of them, against the plaintiffs, or some of

tiiem, arising out of the contract or trans-

action set forth in the complaint, as the

foundation of the plaintiff's claim or con-

nected with the .subject of the action."

Sand. & Hill's Dig., §' 5723.

California. Identical with the provis-

ions ([uoted in the text. Code Civ. Pro.,

§ 438.
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Colorado. " The counter-claim men-

tioned in the last .section .sliall be one ex-

isting in favor of the defendant or plaintiff,

and against a plaintiff or defendant be-

tween whom a several judgment might be

had in the action, and arising out of one

of the following causes of action : First, a

cause of actiou arising out of the transac-

tion set forth in the complaint or answer,

as the foundation of tlie plaintiff's claim

or the defendant's defence, or connected

with tlie subject of the action. Second

[|same as subdivision 2 of text]" Code,

1890, §57.

Connecticut. " In cases where the de-

fendant has either in law or in equity, or

in both, a counter-claim, or right of set-

off, agaiust the plaintiff's demand, he may

have the benefit of any such set-offs or

counter-claims by pleading the same, as

such, in his answer, and demanding judg-

ment accordingly ; and the .same shall be

pleaded and replied to, according to tlie

rules governing complaints and answers ;

provided that no counter-claim, set-off, or

defense, merely equitable, shall be available

in actions before justices of the peace."

Gen. St., 1902, § 612.

Idaho. Identical with the provisions

set out in the text. Code Civ. Pro., 1901,

§ 3212.

Indiana. " A counter-claim is any mat-

ter ari.sing out of or connected with the

cause of action which might be the subject

of au action in favor of the defendant, or

whicii woulil tend to reduce the plaintiff's

claim or demand for damages." Burns'

St., 1901, § 353.

Iowa. " Kach counter-claim must be

stated in a distinct count or division, and

must be : (I) When the action is founded

on contract, a cau.se of action also arising

on contract, or ascertained by the decision

of a court; (2) A cause of action in favor

of the defendants, or some of them, against

the plaintiff's, or some of them, arising out

of the contracts or transactions set forth

in the petition or connected with the sub-

ject of the actiou ; (3) Any new matter

constituting a cause of action in favor of

1 [Arizona. See Rev.
t., 1901, §§ 1360,
1363, 1365, 1366, which relate to counter-

·lai111" but differ radically from the provi ·ion· quot <l iu the text.
.1frka11sas. "The counter-claim mention Li in thi chapt r must lJe a cau e of
a tion iu favor of the d feu<laut\ or some
of them, against the. plaintiff , or "-Orne of
them, ari iug out of the contract or tran action ·et forth in the complain t, as the
foundation of the plaintiff's claim or connected with the ubject of the action."
Sand. & Hill' Dig., § 5723.
Calffornia. I dentical with the provisions quoted iu the text. Code iv. Pro.,
§ 438.
Colorado . "The counter-claim mentioned in the la t section hall be one existing in favor of the defendant or plaintiff,
and agaiust a plaintiff or defendant between whom a e,·eral judgment might be
had in the action, and ari ing out of one
of the following cau es of action : Fir:;t, a
cause of action ari ing out of the transaction et forth in the complaint or answer,
as the foundati on of the plaintiff's claim
or the defendant's defence, or counectetl
with the ubject of the action. Second
[ ame as ubdivision 2 of text] ." Code,
1890, § 57.
Connecticut. "In ca e where the defendant has either in law or in equity, or
in both, a counter-claim, or right of etoff, against the plaintiff's demand, he may
have the benefit of any such set-offs or
counter-claims by pleading the same, as
such, in his answer, and demanding judgment accordingly; and the same ball be
pleaded and replied to, accordin g to tl1e
rules governing complaints and answers;
provided that no counter-claim, et-off, or
defense, merely equitable, shall be available
in actions before justices of the peace."
Gen. St., 1902, § 612.
Idah o. Identical with the provisions
set out in the text. Code Civ. Pro., 1901 ,
§ 3212.
Ind iana. "A counter-claim is any matter ari ing out of or connected with the
cau e of action which might be the subj ect
of an action in favor of the defendant, or
which would tend to reduce the plaintiff's

claim or demand for damage ." Burn '
' t., 1901, § 353.
Iowa.
"Each counter-claim mu t b
t:i.ted in a di tinct co unt or clivi ion, and
mu t be: (I) When the action i founded
on contract, a cau e of action al o ari iug
on contract, or a certaiu etl by the deci ion
of a court; ( 2) A cans of action in favor
of the defendant , or some of them, again t
the plaintiff , or ome of them, ari iug out
of the coutra<;t or trau actions set forth
in the petition or connected with the ubject of the at:tiou; (3) Any new matter
constituting a cau e of action in favor of
the defemlant, or an of the defendants if
more than one, against the plaintiff, or all
of the plaintiff· if more than one, and
which the defendant or defendants might
have brought wh en suit was commenced,
or which was then held, either matured or
not, if matured when so plead." Code,
1897, § 3570.
J{a11sa s. "The counter-claim mentioned
in the last section mu ·t be one exi ting in
favor of a defendant and against a plaintiff lJetween whom a everal judgment
might be had in the action, and ari ing
out of the contract or transaction set forth
in the petition as the foundation of the
plaintiff's claim, or conuected with the
subj ect of the action. The right to relief
concerning the subject of the action mentioned in the same ectioo must be a right
to r elief necessarily or properly involved
in the action fur a complete determination
thereof, or settlement of the que -tion involved therein." C-0de, 190 I, § 94.
K entack.1;. "A counter-claim is a cause
of action in favor of a defendant against
a plain tiff, or against him and another,
which arises out of the contract, or tran action, stated in the petition a the foundation of the plaintiff's claim, or which is
connected with the subject of the action."
Code, 1895, § 96.
;.lf i11nesota. I dentical with the proviion quoted in the text. St., 1894, § 5237.
Missouri . Identical with the provisions
quoted in the text. Rev. St., 1 99, § 605.
Jlontana. "The counter -claim pecified in the last section mu t tend, in ome
way, to dimini. h or defeat the plaintiff's

<39

698

CIYIL RK\IEDIE .

CIVIL REMEDIES.

§475. * 584. Statutes Providing for Set-off. The " Set-off," well

known prior to the new system of procedure, and which had been

defined and regulated by previous statutes, English and Ameri-

can, is clearly embraced within the second subdivision of the sec-

tion, as stated in the text, and as found in the codes of New York

and of the States which have closely followed that original type.

In certain States, however, a special provision is inserted in the

codes defining the "set-of¥," of which the following is the common

form : " A set-off can only be pleaded in an action founded on

contract, and must be a cause of action arising on contract, or

recovery, and must he one of the following

causes of action against the plaintiff, or,

in a proper case, against the person whom

he represents, and iu favor of the defend-

5 -!.

Tbe
et- ff well
knom1 pri r to the new
m of procedure, an l which ha b en
d ned and r 0 ulated by pr vi.au
tatute Engli h and Am rian i · clearl r
ra.ced wi hin th
c nd ubdi vi
f the
i n, ,
. tat
he text, a.nd a f und in he c d
and f th
clo ly f 11 w d that ri 0 inal ty1
In
tat --, however a pecia.l provi ion is in rted in the
c de cl tininCY th
t-off' f which the following i th c mmon
form : ·A t- ff can only be lead d in an action foun d n
contr,
mu t be a can e of action ari ing on contract, or
475.

;,.

Statutes Providing for Set-off.

ant, or of one or more defendants, between

•whom and the plaintiff a separate judg-

ment may lie had in the action. [^The re-

mainder practically identical with the two

Generated for facpubupdates (University of Michigan) on 2014-06-17 15:34 GMT / http://hdl.handle.net/2027/uc2.ark:/13960/t02z1c23b
Public Domain / http://www.hathitrust.org/access_use#pd

subdivisions quoted iu the text.]" Code,

1895, § 691.

Nebrask-a. " The counter-claim men-

tioned in the last section must be one e.x-

istiiig in favor of a defendant, and against

a plaintiff, between whom a several judg-

ment might be had in the action, and

arising out of the contract or transaction

set forth in the petition as the foundation

of the plaintiff's claim, or connected with

the subject of the action." Code, 1901^

§ 101.

Nevada. Identical with the statute

set out in the text. Comp. Laws, 1900,

§3142.

New York. Identical with the Mon-

tana statute. Code Civ. Pro., § .'iOl.

North Carolina. Identical with the

statute set out in the text. § 101.

North Dakota. Identical with the stat-

ute set out in the text. Rev. Codes, 1899,

§ 5274.

Ohio. " A counter-claim is a cause of

action existing in favor of a defendant, and

against a plaintiff or another defendant, or

both, between whom a several judgment

might be had in the action, and arising out

of the contract or transaction set forth in

the petition as the foundation of the plain-

tiff's claim, or connected with the subject

of the action." Bates' St., 1903. § 5069.

Oklahoma. Identical with the Kansas

statute. St., 1893, § 3973.

Oregon. " The counter-claim mentioned

in section 72 must be one existing in favor

of a defendant, and against a plaintiff,

between whom a several judgment might

be had in the action, and arising out of

one of the following causes of action :

(1) A cause of action arising out of the

contract, or transaction set forth in the

complaint as the foundation of the plain-

tiff's claim; (2) In an action arising on

contract, any other cau.se of action arising

also on contract, and existing at the com-

mencement of the action." Hill's Laws,

§ 73.

South Carolina. Identical with the

.statute set out in the text. Code, 1893,

§ 171.

recovery , and must he one of the followi ng
<:au e. of actiuu again . t the plaintiff, or,
in a prop r ca- , :irrai11 ·t the per on wh om
he repre. nt-, and in favor of the defendant, or of on r m re defendant , betw en
whom aud the fJlaiutiff a eparate judgment may Ii had i11 the action. [The remainder pra ·tically identical with the two
ode,
ubdi1·i ion · quoted in the text.]"
l 95, & 6 I.

Oregon. "The counter-claim mentioned
in section 72 mu t be one existing in fa rn r
of a defendant, and again t a plaintiff,
between whom a ·evera l judgm nt mig ht
be ha l in the action, and ari iug out of
one of the following can · of action :
(1) A cau ·e of action ari incr ut of the
coutra t, ot· tran action et forth in the
com plaiut a the fouudation of the plaintiff' claim; (2) In an action ari iug 11
contract, any other can. e of action ar· ing
al o on contract, and exi ting at the commencement of the action." Hill's Law -,
§ 73.
outh Carolina . Identical with the
tatute et out in the text.
oue, 1 93,

~Y~bra ska.
"The counter-claim mentioued in the la t ectiou mu · t be one exi ·riug in favor of a defendant, and against
a plaintiff, between whom a everal ju dgment mio-ht be had in the action, and
ari iug out of the contract or tran action
et forth in th e petitiou as the foundation § n .
of the plaintiff' claim, or connected with
011/h Dakota. Identical with th
tatthe ubject of the action." Code, 1901, ute set out in the text. Ann. t., 19 l •
§ 101.
§ 6121.
N evada. Identical with the tatute
tah. I dentical with the tatute , et
t out in the text.
omp. Law , 1900,
2969.
31-!2.
N"ew York. I dentical with the Montana tatute.
ode iv. Pro., ;,01.
J..Yortlt
arolina. Irlentical with the
tatute et out in the text. § l 0 l.
orth Dakota. Identical with th e tatnte et out in the text. Rev. ode , l 99,
§ 527.J..
Ohio . "A ounter-c1aim i a cnu. f' of
acti n exi ting in fav r of a def nda11t, aud
agaiu t a plaintiff or anoth rd fend ant, or
l> th, betw en whom a
v ral jndo-ment
n io-ht be ha<l in th a tion, and ari~irw out
of the co ntract or tran acti n . et forth in
the peti ti•rn a the f undation f th plai uti ff '. ·l im, r onn ct rl with th
uhj ·t
of thP action." Ba ' ' t ., 1 03 , . 5069 .
() k/u lw111u. Id ntical with the Knu a
tatute.
't., 1 93, · 3!>-3.
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ascertained by a decision of tlie court." ^ There are additional

special clauses in several of these codes regulating the procedure

in respect to " set-off " and " counter-claim," particularly in their

relations with the parties to the action. These sections provide

for the bringing in of new parties found necessary to the deter-

mination of the issues raised by the defendant's aflfirmative plead-

ing, or for the extending the benefits of a set-off or counter-claim

existing in favor of a principal debtor, to his sureties, or existing

in favor of one of two or more joint debtors, to the others. These

sections are copied in the note.^

1 {^Arkansas, Sand. & Hill's Dig.,

§ 5725; Indiana, Burns' St., 1901, § 351 :

" A set-off .shall be allowed only in actions

for money -demands upon contract, and

must consist of matter arising out of debt,

ascertained by a decision of the court." 1 There are additional
'Pe ial clauses in sev ral of the e codes regulating the I rocedm
in r spect t o " et-off " and " unt r-claim," particularly in th ir
rnlations with the parti s to the a tion. The ·
ction , pr vid
for the bringing in of new parti f und n essary t the determination of the is ues raised by the defendant'· affirrnativ pl ading, or for the extending the benefits of a s t-off or ount r-claim
exi ting in favor of a principal debtor, to his sureties, or existing
in favor of one of two or more joint debtors, to the others. These
sections are copied in the note. 2

duty, or contract, liquidated or not, held

by the defendant at the time the suit was

commenced, and matured at or before the
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time it is offered as a set-off; " Kentucky,

Code, 1895, § 96, subdiv. 2 : "A set-off

is a cause of action arising upon a con-

tract, judgment or award in favor of a

defendant against a plaintiff, or against

him and another ; and it cannot be

pleaded except iu an action upon a con-

tract, judgment or award ; " Kansas,

Code, 1901, § 98; Nebraska, Code, 1901.

§ 104; Ohio, Bates' St., 1903, § 5071 : " A

set-off is a cause of action e.xisting in favor

of a defendant, and against a plaintiff, be-

tween whom a several judgment miglit be

had in the action, and arising on contract

or ascertained by the decision of a courti

and can only be pleaded iu an action

founded on contract." Oklahoma, St., 1893,

§ 3976 ; Wisconsin, St., 1898, §§4258-4264,

where the subject of set-off is treated

•with considerable detail ; Wyoming, Rev.

St., 1899, § 3548.]

^ \_Arkansas. " When it appears that

a new party is necessary to a final decision

upon the counter-claim, the court may

either permit the new party to be made

by a summons, to reply to the counter-

claim in the answer, or may direct that it

be stricken out of the answer and made

the subject of a separate action." Sand. &

Hill's Dig., § 5724. " Where it appears

that a new party is necessary to a final

decision upon the set off, the court shall

permit the new party to be made, if it also

appears that, owing to the insolvency or

non-residence of the plaintiff, or other

cause, the defendant will be iu danger of

losing his claim, unless permitted to use it

as a set-off." § 5729.

Indiana. " In all actions upon a note

or other contract against several defend-

ants, any one of whom is principal and

the others sureties tlierein, any claim u])on

contract in favor of the principal defend-

ant, and against the plaintiff or any former

holder of the note or other contract, may

be pleaded as a set-off by the principal or

any other defendant." Burns' St., 1901,

§ 352.

Iowa. " When a new party is necessary

to a final decision upon a counter-claim,

1 [Arkansas, Sand . &
Hill's Dig.,
§ 5725; Indiana, Burns' St., 1901 , § 351 :
"A set-off shall he allowed only in actions
for money-demands upon contract, and
must consist of matter arising out of debt,
duty, or contract, liquidated or not, held
by the defendant at the time the suit was
commenced, and matured at or before the
time it i offered as a set-off;" K entucky,
Code, l 95, § 96, subdiv. 2: "A set-off
i a can e of action arising upon a contract, ju dgment or award in favor of a
d efendant against a plaintiff, or again t
him and another ; and it cannot be
pleaded except iu an action upon a contract, judgment or award;" [{ansas,
Code, 1901, § 98; N ebraska, Code, 1901.
§ 10-1-; Ohio, Bates' St., 1903 , § 5071: "A
set-off i' n cause of actiou exi8ting in favor
of a defendaut, and against a plaintiff, between whom a se,·eral judg ment might be
had in the action, and ari ing on contract
or a ·ce rtaineu by the decision of a court,
and can only be pleaded in an action
founded on contract." Oklahoma, St., l 893,
§ 3976; Wisconsin, St., 1898, §§ 4258-4264,
where the subject of set-off is treated
with considerable detail; lYyomin,q, R ev.
St., l 99, § 3548.J
2 [Arkansas .
" When it appears that
a new party is necessary to a final decision
upon the counter-claim, tile co urt may
e ither permit the new party to be made
by a ummons, to reply to the counterclaim in the answer, or may direct that it
be st ricken out of the answer and mad e
the ubj ect of a eparate action." Sand. &
Hill' Dig., § 5724 . " Where it appear
that a new party is n ecessary to a final
<lecision upon the set-off, the court shall

permit the new party to be made, if it al o
appears that, owin g to the insolvency or
non-residence of the plaintiff, or other
cause, the defendant will be in danger of
lo ing his claim, uuless permitted to use it
as a set-off." § 5729.
Indiana. " In all actions upon a note
or other contract against everal defendants, any one of whom is principal and
the others sureties therein, any claim upon
contract in favor of the principal defendant, and against the plai ntiff or any former
holder of th e note or other co ntract, may
be pl eaded as a set-off by the principal or
any other defendant." Burns' St., 190 I ,
§ 352.
Iowa . " Wh eu a new party is nece sary
to a final decision upon a co unter-claim,
the court may either permit such party to
be made, or direct that it be stricken out
of the an wer and made the ubject of a
separate action:" Code, l 97, § 3573 . "A
co-maker or surety, when sued alone, may,
with the consent of his co-maker or principal, avail himself by way of coun terclaim of a debt or liquidated demand due
from th e plain t iff at the commencement
of the acti on to s uch co-maker or principal, but the plaintiff may meet s uch
co unter-claim in the same way as if made
by the co-maker or principal himself:"
Code, § 35i2.
f{ansas. Code, 1901, §§ 97, 99, identical, respectively, to the Arkan as tatutes,
§§ 5724, 5729.
111ontana. Th e provisions of this code,
which were taken from the New York
Code of Civil Procedure, are verv detailed
respectin crcounter-claims. See§§ 692-697 .
Nebraska. Code, 1901 , §§ 103, 105,

00
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§ 476. * 585. Statutory Provisions as to Cross-Complaints and

476.

*5

5.

Statutory Provision s as to Cross-Complaints and

Sham Answers. A cross-petitioii or complaint is expressly au-

thorized and its purposes defined [in several of the State codes] ;^

as, for example, in that of Iowa. A section found in most of the

codes provides that " sham and irrelevant answers and defences

may be stricken out on motion, and upon such terms as the court

may in their discretion impose." ^

identii-al, respectively, to the Arkansas

statutes, §§ 5724, 5729.

Aeic Yurk. See Code Civil Procedure,

A cro -petition or compl int i expre ly auth rized and its purpo e lefin d [in e eral of the tate code J ; 1
a , for _ample in that of Iowa.
ec i n f und in mo:s of the
cod ' prov id · that ham and irrele an an wer' and defence
~ay be tricken out on m tion, and upon uch term a the court
may in their di er tion impo e. 2
Sham A ns wers.

§§ 502-506, for very detailed statutory

provisions relative to counter-claims.

Ohio. Bates' St., §§ 5070, 5072, iden-

tical, respectively, except for sli<^ht verbal

ciianges, with the Arkansas statutes,

§§ 5724, 5729.

Oklahoma. St., 1893, §§ 3975, 3977,

identical, respectively, except for a slight
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verbal change in the former, with the

Arkansas statutes, §§ 5724, 5729.

Wisconsin. See St., 1898, §§ 4258-

4264, for detailed statutory provisions

relative to set-off. J

1 \_Arkansiis. " When a defendant has

a cause of action against a co-det'eudaut or

a person not a party to tlie action, and

affecting the suhjectinatter of the action,

he may make his answer a cross-complaint

against the co-defendant or other person."

Two other subdivisions provide how the

defendant to such cross-coin])laint shall

be summoned, how defence shall be made

thereto, and that the trial shall not be

delaved thereby. Sand. & Hill's Dig.,

§ 5712.

California. " Whenever the defendant

seeks affirmative relief against any party

relating to or depending upon the contract

or transaction upon which the action is

brought, or affecting the property to whicii

the action relates, he may, in addition

to his answer, file at the same time, or

by permission of the court subsequently,

a cross-complaint. The cross-complaint

must be served upon the parties affected

thereby, and such parties may demur or

answer thereto as to the original com-

plaint." Code Civ. Pro , § 442.

Idaho. Identical with the California

statute. Code Civ. Pro., 1901, § 3216.

Iowa. " When a defendant has a cause

of action affecting tlie subject-matter of

the action against a co-defendant, or a

person not a party to the action, he may,

in the same action, file a cross-petition

against the co-defendant or other person."

The remainder of the section provides for

notifying the defendants, and that the

trial shall not be delayed. Code, 1897,

§ 3574.

Kentackij. " A cross-petition is the

commencement of an action by a defend-

ant against a co-defendant, or a person

who is not a party to the action, or against

both; or by a ])laiutiff against a co-plain-

tiff, or a person who is not a party to the

action, or against both ; and is not allowed

to a defendant, except uj)oii a cause of ac-

identical re pectively, to he Arkan as
tatute , · · 5- 2.i., 5729.
New York. :e Code ivil Procedure,
§§ 502-506 for very detailed tatutor
pro i ion relative to counter-claim .
Ol1io. Bate ' t., §~ 5070, 5072, id ntical, re pectively, except for light verbal
chan e , with the Arkansa
tatute ,
§ 5i24, 5-29.
Oklahoma.
t ., 1 93, § 3975 3977,
identical, re pectively, except for a light
verbal change in the former, with the
Arkan a tatute , §§ 572-1-, 5729.
lViscon. in.
ee t., l 9 , §§ 42584264, for detailed tat utory provision
relative to ·et-off. J
1 [A rkansas.
''When a defendant has
a cau e of action again t a ·o-defen<laut or
a per on not a party to the action, and
affecting the suhject-matter of th e action,
he may make hi an wer a cro s-complaint
again~t the co-defendant or other per on."
Two other ubdivi ion provide how the
defendant to uch cro s-complaint hall
be ummoned, h w defence I all be ma le
thereto, and that the trial hall not be
and. & Hill's Dig.,
dela.yed thereby.
§ 5712.
California. "Wb never the defendant
seek affirmative relief again t an~· party
relating to or depending upon the contract
or transaction upon which the action i
brought, or affecting the prop rty to which
the action relat , he ma , in addition
to hi an wer, fil at the ame time, or
by permi ion of the court ub equently,
a cro . -c mp lain t. The cro -complaiut
mu t be erved upon the parti affe ted
thereby, aud uch partie may demur or
an w r thereto a t the original omplaint."
ode , h-. Pr , § 442.
Jr/oho. Iden ical with the alifornia
tatnt .
ode iv. Pro., 1901, , 3216.
I owa. "\ h n a l fondant ha a au e
of action affecting tl1
uhje t-matt r of
ti.le actiou agaiu t a co-defendaut, or a,

per ou not a part to the action, he may,
iu the ame action, file a cro -petitiou
again t the co-defeudant or other per on."
The remainder of the ection provide for
notifyin the defendant , and that the
trial . ball n t be delayed . Cod , l 9 ,

§ 35i 4.
"A cro' -p titi n i the
Kentuck.!f.
commencement of an action by a cl fondant against a co-d f ndant, or a per on
who i not a party to the acti n, or aO'ain t
both; or by a plaiutiff again t a c -plain tiff, or a per on who i ' not a. party to the
action, or again t both; and i no allow d
to a defendant, except up u a cau e of action which affe<'t , or i aff cted by, the
original can e of action; nor to a plaintiff
excepr. up on a cau e of action which affe t ,
or i affected by a ~et-off or c un ter- ·laim ."
ode, 1 95 ~ 96, ubdiv. 3.
tali. " Wh en a defendant ha· a cau e
of action affecting the ul>j cf-matt r of
th action agaiu ta o-defendant, h may,
in the ame a tion, file a er - ·omplaint
again t the co-defendant." T he remainder
of the ·e tion provide for erving the defendant and that the trial hall not be
2974.
delayed.
ev. t., 1 98,
Wiscons in. "A defendant or a peron interpleaded or interv ning may have
affir matiYe relief again t a o-defendant,
or a co-defendant and th plaintiff, or a
part of the plaintiff , or a co-defendant and
a person not a party, r again t u h peron 'alone, upon hi beinO' brought in· but
in all uch a e uch reli £ mu t involve
mann r a:ff t the

u

aliforni<, 453;
[.\.rizumi, l Y.
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§ 477. * 586. Statutes Allowing Demurrer to Entire Answer or

to Separate Defence or Counter-Claim. All the codes permit the

plaintiff to demur to the entire answer, or to any separate defence,

therein containing new matter, or to any counter-claim therein, on

the ground that the same is insufficient, or that the facts therein

stated do not constitute a defence or a counter-claim.^

§ 478. * 587. Code Provisions Respecting Reply. In respect to

the mode of raising an issue of fact upon the allegations of the

answer which are not mere denials, the codes are .separated into

two classes, — those which require an additional pleading by the

plaintiff in order to raise such issues in all instances, and those

which require such additional pleading only in response to counter-

claims. In the first class, a reply by the plaintiff is needed to all

answers or defences that set up new matter, whether as counter-

claims or as defences simply, which reply may consist either of

denials or of other new matter by way of avoidance. As a conse-

quence of this requirement, every allegation of new matter in the

answer, whether by way of defence or of counter-claim, not contro-

verted by a reply, is, in such States, admitted to be true. The reph^
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is the last pleading of fact ; the defendant may demur to it, but not

rejoin any defence of fact. ^

rado, Code, 1890, § 60 ; Idaho, Code Civ. 1893, § 174 ; South Dakota, Ann. St., 1901,

Pro., 1901, § 3224; Indiana, Burns' St., §6124; Utah, Rev. St., 1898, §§ 2976,

1901, § 385, in quite different form; Iowa, 2977; Washington. Bal. Code, § 4916;

Code, 1897, § 3618 ; Kentucky, Code, 189.5, Wisconsin, St., 1898, §§ 2658, 2659; Wy-

§ 113, subdiv. 8; Minnesota, St., 1894, oming. Rev. St., 1899, §§ 3.541, 3542.]

§ 5240; Missouri, Rev. St., 1899, § 611; 2 ["Colorado, Code, 1890, §60; Connecti-

Montana, Code, 1895, § 742; North Da- cut. Gen. St., 1902, § 610 ; Indiana, Burns'

kota. Rev. Codes, 1899, § 5276; South St., 1901, § 360 ; Iowa, Code, 1897, § 3576.

Carolina, Code, 1893, § 173 ; Soutli Da- requires a reply in case of counter-claim,

kota, Ann. St., 1901, § 6123; Utah, Rev. and also when plaintiff wishes to avail him-

St., 1898, § 2987 ; Washington, Bal. Code, self of matter in avoidance ; Kansas, Code,

§ 4915 ; Wisconsin, St., 1898, § 2682.] 1901, § 4536; Kentucky, Code, 189.5, § 98;

1 New York, § 153 (494, 514, 516); Minnesota, St., 1894, §5241; Missouri,

Kansas, §102; Nebraska, § 109 ; Oregon, Rev. St., 1899, §607; Nebraska, Code,

§ 76: California, §§ 443, 444; North 1901, §109; New York, Code Civ. Pro.,

Carolina, §§ 105, 176 ; [^Arkansas, Sand. §§514,516, provides for a reply in case

& Hill's Dig., § 5730 ; Colorado, Code, of a counter-claim and also, in the discre-

1890, § 60; Idaho, Code Civ. Pro., 1901, tion of the court, on defendant's applica-

§§ 3217, 3218; Indiana, Burns' St., 1901, tion, where new matter in defence is set

§360; Iowa, Code, 1897, §3575; Minne- up in the answer; North Dakota, Rev.

sota, St., 1894, § 5241 ; Missouri, Rev. St., Codes, 1899, § 5277, .same as New York ;

1899, § 607 ; Montana, Code, 1895, § 710 ; North Carolina, § 105, same as New York ;

Nevada, Comp. Laws, 1900, §3145; North Ohio, Bates' St., 1903, § 5078; Oklahoma,

Dakota, Rev. Codes, 1899, § 5277; Ohio, St., 1893, §3980; Oregon, Hill's Laws, § 76;

Bates' St., 1903, §§ 5076, 5077 ; Oklahoma, South Carolina, Code, 1893, § 174, same

St., 1893, § 3980; South Carolina, Code, as New York; South Dakota, Ann. St.,

CI\IL RE)IEDIES.
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§ 479. * 588. Same Subject. Ill the secoiicl class of codes, a

reply is only necessary to a comiter-claim, ^Vlienever an answer

contains new matter by way of defence, and not constituting a

counter-claim, an issue of fact is raised by operation of law, and

the plaintiff may prove, in response thereto, any facts by way of

denial or of confession and avoidance. If a counter-claim is

pleaded, the plaintiff must reply thereto either by denials or by

confession and avoidance ; and in the absence of such reply, the

allegations of the counter-claim are admitted to be true. Xo plead-

ing is permitted in response to the reply except a demurrer, which

mav be used to raise an issue of law.^

1901, §6124, same as New York; "Wash-

ingtou, Bal. Code, § 4917 ; Wyoraiug, Rev.

St., 1899, §3553.

Cases Concerning these Provisions.

In the secon cla s of code a
T ply i only nee
ary o a count r-claim. \Vl ne r an an
r
contain ne - matter b way of defence, and not on itutin a
counter-claim an i ue f fc ct · rai ed b operati n of law and
the I laintiff may prov in r spon e th r +- , any f ct by way f
cl n· al r of onfe, ion and avoidan e. If a counter-claim i:
pl ad l tl plaintiff mu t reply thereto ither by denial' or b conf i n and avoidance · and in the ab ence of uch reply the
all ati n of the counter- laim ar adrni t cl to be true. .No pleading i p rmitted in re pon to the r ply ex er t a demurrer, which
mar be u ed to rai e an issue of la' .1
479.

. Same Subject.

See Nat. Lumber Co. v. Ashby (1894),

41 Neb. 292, 59 N. W. 913; Burnet v.

Cavanagh (1898), 56 Neb. 190, 76 N. W.
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578; Peaks -•. Lord (1894), 42 Neb. 15,

1901, 6124, ame a ...-ew York; \Va hin ton Bal. Code,§ 4917; Wyoming, Rev.
't., l 99, § 3553.

60 N. W. 349; Sullivan v. Traders' Ins.

Co. (1901), 169 N. Y. 213, 62 N. E. 146;

Solt V. Anderson (1901), 62 Neb. 153, 86

N. W. 1076 ; Grant v. Bartholomew (1S99),

57 Neb. 673, 78 N. W. 314 ; Beagle v.

Smith (1897), 50 Neb. 446, 69 N. W. 956;

Phoenix Ins. Co. v. Bachelder (1894), 39

Neb. 95, 57 N. W. 996 ; Mollyneaux v.

Wittenberg (1894), 39 Neb. 547*, 58 N. W.

205; Meeh v. Railway Co. (1900), 61 Kan.

630, 60 Pac. 319 ; Davis v. Crookston, etc.

Co. (1894), 57 Minn. 402, .59 N. "W. 482;

Smith V. L. & N. R. R. Co. (1893), 95 Ky.

11, 23 S. W. 652; Stapleton v. Ewell

(1900), Ky., 55 S. W. 917 ; Girard v. St.

Louis Car Wheel Co. (1894), 123 Mo.

358, 27 S. W. 648; Wade v. Strever

(1901), 166 N. Y. 251, 59 N. E. 825 ; Kear-

ney Stone Works c . McPherson (1894),

5 Wyo. 178, 38 Pac. 920 ; Sexton v. Shriver

(1903), — Neb. — , 95 N. W. 594; Hib-

bard v. Trask (1903), — Ind. — , 67

N. E. 179.] See Kimberlin v. Carter, 49

Ind. HI; Payne v. Briggs, 8 Neb. 75 ;

Scofield V. State Nat. Bk. of Lincoln, 9

id. 499; Williams v. Evans, 6 id. 216;

Ridenour v. Mayo, 29 Ohio St. 138 ; Titus v.

Lewis, 33 id. .304 ; Hixon y. Gurge, 18 Kan.

253; Netcott v. Porter, 19 id. 131 ; Kirk

V. Woodbury Cy., 55 Iowa, 190; Clapp

V. Cunningham, 50 id. 307 ; Cassidy v.

Caton, 47 id. 22; Davis v. Payne, 45 id.

194.

1 [Arkansas, Sand. & Hill's Dig., § 5732 ;

California provides for no reply in any

case. Code Civ. Pro., § 422 ; Idalio provides

for no reply in any case. Code Civ. Pro..

1901, §3202; Iowa, Code, 1897, §3576,

requires a reply in case of counter-claim

and also when plaintiff wishes to avail

himself of matter in avoidance; Montana,

Code, 1895, §720; Nevada provides for

no reply in any case, Comp. Laws, 1900,

§ 3133 ; New York, Code Civ. Pro., §§514,

516, provides for a reply in case of coun-

ter-claim and also, in the discretion of

court, on defendant's application, where

new matter in defence is set up in the an-

swer; North Carolina, § 105, same as New

Gas

Concerning these Provi ions.
ee :rat. Lumb er o. v. A hby (1 94),
-eb. 292, 59 .i: • W. 913; Burnet v.
arnnagh (1 9 ), 56 .i..~P-b . 190, 76 . W.
57 ; P eak 1·. Lord (1 94), 42 Xeb. 15,
60 1'\. W. 349; ullirnn v. Trader ' In .
o. (1901), 169 X. Y. 213, 62 ~- E. 146;
'olt v. Ander on {1901 ), 62 N"eb. 153, 6
~~- W.10i6; Grantu.Bartholomew (1 99),
5- .-eb. 673, i8 N. W. 314; Beagle v.
~mith (l 97 ), 50 Neb. 446, 69 N. W. 956;
Phoonix Ins. Co. v. Bachelder (! 94), 39
eb. 95, 57 N. W. 996; Mollyneaux v.
Wittenberg ( I 94), 39 eb. 547, 5 N. W .
205; M eh v. Railway Co. (1900), 61 Kan.
630, 60 Pac. 319; Davi v. rook -ton, etc.
Co. (1894}, 57 Minn. 402, 59 N. W. 4 2;
mith v. L. & N. R.R. Co. (1893}, 95 Ky.
tapleton v. Ewell
11, 23 . W. 652;
(1900), Ky., 55 . W. 917; irard v. t.
Loui Car Wheel Co. ·(l 94), 123 Mo.
trever
35 , 27 . W. 648; Wade v.
( 190 1), 166 N. Y. 251, 59 . E. 25; Kearney tone Works i·. McPher on {I 94),
5 Wyo. 17 , 3 l'ac. 920; Sexton v. hriver
(1903), eb. - , 95 N. W. 594; Hibbard v. Tra k (1903), - Ind. - , 67
N. E. 17 .]
ee Kimberlin v. Carter, 49
Ind. 111 ; Payne v. riggs,
N b. 75;
, cofi Id v. tate . . at. Bk. of Lin oln, 9
id. 216;
id. 499; William v. Evan ,
id n ur . Mayo, 29 hio 't. 13 ; Ti tu v.
L wi , 33 id. 304; Hixon v. urge, l Kan.
253;
tcott v. ort r, 19 id. l~l ; Kirk
v. \ oodbury y., 55 I wa, l 0;
Japp
v.
unningham, 50 id. 307; a · idy v.

Caton, 47 ic.l. 22; Davi v. Payne, 45 ic.l.
194.
l [Arkan a, anc.1.&IlilJ'~DiO'.
5732;
California provide for no reply in any
ca e, ode Civ. Pro.,§ 422; Idaho pro\"ic.l
for no reply in auy ca e, ode Ci\'. Pro .•
1901, §3202; Iowa, Code, l 97, §3576.
r equire a reply iu ca e of counter- laim
and al o when plaintiff wi, he to avail
him elf of matter in avoidauce; lonta.na.,
Code, 1 95, § 720; Xevada provid for
no reply in any ca. e, omp. Law , 1900,
§ 3133; New York, Code Civ. Pro.,§ 514,
516, provide for a reply in ca. e of counter-claim and al o, in the di cretion of
court, on defendant' application, where
uew matter in defence i et up in the auwer; :~forth Carolina, § l 05, ame a Ne'
York; North Dakota, Rev. Code , l 99,
§ 5277, .ame a
ew York; ou h arolina, Code, l 93,§174, amea N'ewYork;
outh Dakota, Ann. St., 1901, § 6124, ame
a New York;
tah, R ev.
t. I 9 ,
§ 29 O; ·w i cou in, t., l 9, § 2661.
Ca s Concerning th

P rovisions.
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7o:

§ 480. * 589. Miscellaneous Statutory Provisions. Tlie fore-

going is the genenil scheme of pleading as set forth, with sHght

§ 480. * 589 .

T he foregoing i the general scheme of pleading as s t forth, with light
Mis c ellaneous S tatutory P rovisions .

(1893), 113N. C. 4.58, 18S. E. 387; Askew

V. Koonce (1896), 118 N. C. 526, 24 S. E.

218;" James v. Western N. C. R. li. Co.

(1897), 121N. C.530, 28S. E. .537; Strause

V. Ins. Co. (1901), 128 N. C. 64, 38 S. E.

256; Parno v. Iowa, etc. Ins. Co. (1901),

114 la. 132, 86 N. W. 210; Parsons v.

Grand Lodge, etc. (1899), 108 la. 6, 78

N. W. 676 ; Trezona v. Chicago, etc. Ry.

Co. (1898), 107 la. 22, 77 N. W. 486;

Rowe V. Barnes (1897), 101 la. 302, 70

N. W. 197; Runkle v. Hartford Ins. Co.

(1896), 99 la. 414, 68 N. W. 712; Smith

V. Griswold (1895), 95 la. 684, 64 N. W.

624 ; Nichols v. Chicago, etc. Ry. Co.

(1895), 94 la. 202, 62 N. W. 769; Schulte
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V. Coulthurst (1895), 94 la. 418, 62 N. W.

770; McQuade v. Collins (1894), 93 la. 22,

61 N. W. 213 ; Brown v. Baker (1901), 39

Ore. 66, 65 Pac. 799 ; Sims v. Mutual Fire

Ins. Co. (1899), 101 Wis. .586, 77 N. W.

908; 'Coleman v. Perry (1903), 28 Mont.

— , 72 Pac. 42.

General Rules as to Reply. '■

It is not the office of a reply to intro-

duce a new cause of action: Merrill v.

Suing (1902), — Neb. — , 92 N. W. 618;

Plummer, Perry & Co. v. Rohman (1900),

61 Neb. 61, 84 N. W. 600; Wigton v.

Smith (1895), 46 Neb. 461, 64 N. W. 1080;

Piper V. Woolman (1895), 43 Neb. 280, 61

N. W. 588; Collins v. Gregg (1899), 109

la. 506, 80 N. W. 562 ; Ellis v. Soper ( 1 900),

110 la. 631, 82 N. W. 1041; Olmstead c.

City of Raleigh (1902), 130 N. C. 243, 41

S. E. 292; Osten v. Winehill (1894), 10

Wash. 333,38 Pac. 1123.

New matter in a reply constituting a

departure will be stricken out on motion :

Merrill v. Suing (1902), — Neb. —, 92

N. W. 618; Maddox f. Teague (1896), 18

Mont. 512, 46 Pac. 535 ; Hunt v. Johnston

(1898), 105 la. 311, 75 N. W. 103; Wil-

liams V. Ninemire (1901), 23 Wash. 393, 63

Pac. 534; Snyder v. Johnson (1903), —

Neb.— ,95 N. W. 692. The objection

may be raised by demurrer : Brown v.

Baker (1901 ), 39 Ore. 66, 65 Pac. 799.

But a departure may be waived : Farm-

ers' & Merchants' Ins. Co. v. Dobney

(1901 ), 62 Neb. 213, 86 N. W. 1070 ; Con-

solidated Kansas City, etc. Co. v. Osborne

(1903), — Kan. — , 71 Pac. 838; Asplund v.

Mattsou (1896), 15 Wash. 328, 46 Pac.

341 ; Gregory c. Kaar (1893), 36 Neb. .533,

54 N. W. 859. Or it may be avoided by

an amendment of the complaint : Whitney

V. Priest (1901), 26 Wasli. 48, 66 Pac. 108.

As to what constitutes a departure, see

Shaw V. Jones (1900), 156 Ind. 60, 59

N. E. 166; Wilcke i'. Wilcke (1897), 102

la. 173, 71 N. W. 201 ; Hunt v. Johnston

(1898), 105 la. 311, 75 N. W. 103 ; Minne-

apolis, etc. Ry. Co. v. Home Ins. Co. (1896),

64 Minn. 61, 66 N. W. 132 ; James v. City

of St. Paul (1898), 72 Minn. 138, 75 N. W.

(1 893), l l 3 N. C. 458, 1 .E.38 7 ; A ke w solillatecl Kan a City, tc. o. v. 0 borne
v. K oonce (1 96), 11 N. C. 526, 24 . E. (1903), -Kan.-, i l Pac. 3 ; \ ·plunu v.
21 ;· James v . Western . C. R. R Co. )laLtson ( l 96), 15 \Va h. 32 , 46 Pac.
(1 97), 121 N. C. 530, 2 S. E. 537; trau e 341; Gregory c. Kaar (1 93), 36 l'eb. 533,
v. Ins. Co. (1901) , 12 N . C. 64, 38 '. E . 54 . W. 59. Or it may be avoiuecl by
256 ; Parno v . Iowa, etc. In . Co. (1901), an amendment of the complaint: Whitney
l 14 Ia. 132, 86 . ,V. 210; Parsons v. v. Prie t ( 1901),26 Wash.4, 66 Pac. 10.
Grand Lodge, etc. (1 899 ), 108 Ia. 6, 78
A to what con t itute a departure, see
N. W. 676; Trezona v. Chicago, etc. Ry. Shaw v. J ones (1900), 156 Jud. 60, 59
Co. ( 1898), 107 Ia. 22, 77 N. W . 4 6 ; N. E. 166; Wilcke v. Wilcke (1 9i}, 102
Rowe v. Barnes (1 97 ), 101 Ia. 302, 70 Ia. 173, 71
W. 201; Ilunt i-. John ton
N . W . 197 ; R unkle v. Hartford Ins. Co . (1 898 ), 105 Ia. 311, 75 . W. 103; Minne(1896), 99 Ia. 41 4, 68 N. W . 712 ; 8 mith apol is, etc. Ry. Co. v. H ome Ins. Co. ( l 96),
v . Griswold (1895) , 95 l a. 684, 64 N. W. 64 Miun. 61 , 66 N. W . 132; J ame v. City
624; Nichol v. Chi cago, etc. R y. Co. of St. P aul (1 98), 72 Minn . l 3 , 75 . W .
(1895) , 94 la. 202, 62 r . W. 769 ; Schulte 5; H oxsie v. Kempton (1 99 ), 77 Minn.
v . Coulthurst (1895), 94 Ia. 41 , 62 N. W . 462, 80 N. W. 353; V an Bibber v. Field
770 ; McQuade v. Collins (1 894 ), 93 Ia. 22, (1 894), 25 Ore. 527, 36 Pac. 526; Maye v.
61 N. W . 213; Brown v. Baker (1901) , 39 St ephen (1901 ), 38 Ore. 512, 63 Pac. 760;
Ore. 66, 65 Pac. 799; Sims v. Mutual F ire Crown Cycle Co. v. Brown (1 901), 39 Ore.
lns. Co. (1899), 101 Wis. 586, 77 . W. 285, 6+ I ac. 451 ; H ammer v. Downiug
908; ·coleman v. Perry (1903 ), 28 Mont. (1901) , 39 Ore. 504, 64 Pac. 651 ; Kiernan
v. Kratz (1902) , 42 Ore. 47 4, 69 P ac. 102 i ;
- , 72 Pac. 42.
Ori ent Ins. Co. v. Clark (1900), Ky., 59
General Rules as to R eply . '
S. W. 863; Massillon Eug ine & Thr esher
It is not the office of a reply to intro- Co. v. Carr (1 903 ), K y., 71 . W. 859;
duce a new cause of a ction : Merril l v. Coombs Commi sion Co. v. Block (1895 ),
S uing (1 902 ), - Neb. - , 92 . W. 618; 130 Mo. 668, 32 S. W. 1139 ; t . J oseph
Plummer, P erry & Co. v. R oh man (1900), Un ion Depot Co. v. Chicago, etc. Ry . Co.
61 Ne b. 61, 84 . W. 600 ; Wi gton v . (1 895), 13 1 Mo. 291 , 31 S . W . 908 ; Com.
S mith (1 895) , 46 Neb. 46 1, 64 N. W . 1080; E lec. Light & Power Co. v. Tacoma (1897 ),
l'i per v. W oolman (1895 ), 43 Neb. 280, 61 17 Wash. 661, 50 Pac. 592 ; Ross v . Howard
N . W. 588 ; Collins v. Gregg ( 1899), 109 (1901 ),25 Wash . 1, 64 Pac. 794 ; McCorkle
Ia. 506, 80 N. W . 562; Ellis v. Soper ( 1900), v. Mallory (1 903), 30 Wash. 632, 71 Pac.
110 Ia. 631, 82 N. w . 1041; Olmstead z:. 186 ; Dudley v. Duval (1902 ), 29 Wash.
City of Raleig h (1902), 130 N. C. 243, 41 528, 70 Pac. 68 ; B rown v. Baruch (1901),
S. E. 292 ; Osten v. W inehill ( 1894), l 0 24 Wash . 572, 64 Pac. 789; Fulton z:.
R yan (1 900), 60 Neb. 9, 82 N. W . 105 ;
Wash. 333, 38 P ac. 1123.
New matter in a reply constituting a F oley v. Holtry (1894-), 43 Neb. 133, 61
departure will be stricken out on motion : N. W . l 20; Union Casualty & Surety Co.
Merrill v . Suin g (1902),- Neb. - , 92 v. Bragg (1901 ), 63 Kan. 291, 65 Pac. 272;
N . W . 61 8; Maddox v. T eague (1 89 6), 18 J oh nson v. Bank ( 1898), 59 Kan. 250, 52
Mont. 512, 46 P ac. 535 ; Hunt v. J ohn ton P ac. 860; Rain sford v. Ma en gale ( 1 93) ,.
(1 898), 105 Ia. 311 , 75 N. W . 103 ; W il- 5 Wyo. 1, 35 P ac. 774 ; Union St. Ry . Co.
liams v. Ninem ire (1901) , 23 W ash . 39.'3, 63 v. First Nat. Bank (1903 ), 42 Ore. 606, 7Z
P ac. 586 ; Child. Lumber Co. v. Page
P ac. 534; Snyder v. J oh nson (1 903), Neb. - , 95 N. W. 692 . T he objection (1902) , 28 W ash . 12 , 68 Pac. 373; Gleckler
m ay be raised by demurrer: B rown v. v . Slaven (1894 ), 5 . D . 364, 59 N.W. 323.
Th e r eply may be waived by proceedB aker (1 901), 39 Ore. 66, 65 Pac. 799.
But a departure may be waived: Farm- ing to t rial as tho ug h it had been filed:
ers' & Mer chants' Ins. Co. v. Dobney Killm anv. Gregory( l 95), 91 Wis. 47 8,65
(1901 ), 62 Neb. 213, 86 N . W . 1070; Con- N. W. 53; Mi onri P ac. R y . Co. v. P almer
.!..
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variations of form, and with no real variations of principle, in

all the codes. A few additional provisions are found in some of

the codes which do not in any manner affect the common theory,

but which were evidently inserted for purposes of exactness, or

to put at rest some doubts as to the construction of the statute.

These clauses I have collected in the note.^

§ 481. * 590. Liberality of the Codes in Furtherance of Justice.

While the very central principle of the reformed ^jrocedure is,

that all causes of action, and all defences, except those of

general denial, must be specially pleaded, — that is, pleaded

in accordance with the actual facts, — and while, as a neces-

sary consequence, there must be . an agreement between the

facts proved and the facts alleged, yet the codes are careful to

prevent any failure of justice by reason of a mere failure to

comply with this rule. Ample means of correcting mistakes are

(1898), 55 Neb. 559, 76 N. W. 169; Mer-

chants' Nat. Bauk v. Barlow (1900), 79

Minn. 2.34, 82 N. W. .364 ; Lvford v. Mar-
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tin (1900), 79 Minn. 243, 82 N. W 479;

Minard v. McBee (1896), 29 Ore 225, 44

Pac. 491 ; North St. Louis Bl.lo-. Ass'n v.

Yariation of form and "ith no r al variation of principle, in
all the code . A few additional pr vi ion ' are found in me of
the code which do not in any mann r affect the common theory,
but which were vidently in erted for purpo e of exactne s, or
to put at re't ome doubts as to the con truction of the tatute.
The e cl u e
have collect din the note. 1
481. * 5 0. L iberalit y of the Codes i n Furtherance of Justice.
·while the very central principle of the reformed proc·e ur i ,
that all causes of action, and all defences, xce t th se of
general denial, mu t be specially pleaded, -that i , pleaded
in accordance wi h the actual fact , - and while, a a nece sary con equence, there mu t b . an agreement between the
fact proved and the facts alleged, yet the codes are car ful to
prevent any failure of justice by reason of a mere failure to
comply with this rule . Ample means of correcting mistake. are

Obert (1902), 169 Mo. 507, 69 S. W. 1044;

Ferguson v. Davidson (1899), 147 Mo. 664,

49 S. VV. 879 ; Turner r. Burler (1894), 126

Mo. 131, 28 S. W. 77 ; Chicago, R. L &

Pac. Rv. Co. r. Frazier (1903), — Kan. —,

71 Pac. 831; Elder v. Webber (1902), —

Neb. — , 92 N. W. 126.

Complaint and repl_v are to be construed

too;ether when not repugnant : Molino v.

Blake (1898), Ariz., 52 Pac. 366. A bad

reply is good enough for a bad answer :

Peden v. Cavins (1892) 134 Ind. 494, 34

N. E. 7. It is not error to strike out so

much of a reply as has already been al-

leged in the petition : West v. West

(1898), 144 Mo. 119. 46 S. W. 139. In

Connecticut a pleading entitled a " Reply

and demurrer " may be filed, raising issues

of law as to part of a defence and issues

of fact as to the residue : Church r. Pearne

(1 903 ), 75 Conn. 350, 53 Atl. 955. See Davis

V. Ford (1896), 15 Wa.sh. 107, 45 Pac. 739,

for a reply which was held to constitute

what at common law was designated a new

assignment.] See Johnson v. White, 6

Hun,. 587; Dambman v. Schulting, 4 id.

50 ; Claflin v. Taussig, 7 id. 223 ; Metrop.

L. Ins. Co. V. Meeker, 85 N. Y. 614;

Colton L. & W. Co. V. Raynor, 57 CaL

588.

1 Missouri, R. S., 1899, § 613: '' Dnpli-

cili/ is a substantial objection to the peti-

tion or other pleading, and shall, on motion,

be stricken out." § 624 : " In all actions

founded on contract, and instituted

against several defendants, the plaintiff

shall not be nonsuited by reason of his

failure to prove that all the defendants

are parties to the contract, but may have

judgment against such of tliem as he shall

prove to be parties thereto." Kansas,

§ 104 : " When the answer contains new

matter constituting a right to relief against

a co-defendant, concerning the subject of

the action, such co-defendant may demur

or reply to such matter in the same man-

ner as if he were plaintiff, and subject to

(1 98), 55 eb. 559, i 6 J. W. 169; Merchant Nat. Bau k v . Barlow ( 1900), 79
Minn. 234-, 2 1T. W . :364; Lyford i-. i\Iartin (1900), 79 1\Iinn. 2-1-3, 2 N. "\\r 479;
.L linard v.1\fcBee ( 1 96), 29 Ore. 225,44
Pac. 491 ; Korth , t. Loui · Bldg. A: 'n v.
O bert (1902), 169 Mo. 507. 69 S. W . 1044;
Fergu on v. David on (1 99 ), 147 .Mo. 664,
49 . W. 79; Turner 1-. Butler (1894), 126
Mo. 131, 2
. W. ":7 ; Ch icago, R. I. &
Pac. Ry. Co. v . Frazier (1903 ), - Kan. -,
71 Pac. 31; Elder v. Webber (1902), Neb. - , 92 N. W. 126.
Com plaint and reply are to be con trued
together when not r epugnant : Molino v.
Blake (1 98), Ariz., 52 Pac. 366. A bad
reply i good enough fo r a bad an wer :
P eden v. av in {l 92) 134 Ind . 49-t, 34
N. E. 7. It i not error to t rike out o
much of a r eply a ha already been alleged in the petition : West v. W e t
(l 9 ), 144 fo . 119, 46 . W. 139. In
Con necticut a pleadin g entitled a "Reply
and demurrer" may b filed, raising is ues
of law as to part of a defence and is ues
of fact a to the r e idue: hurch 1. P earne
(1903),75 onc .350,53 Atl.955.
e avi
v. Ford (1 96), 15 Wa h . lOi 45 Pac. 739,
for a r ply which wa held to coo titute
what at omm n law wa de ignated anew
a ignment.J
ee John on v. Whit , 6
Hun, . 5 7 ; Dambman v. , 'chulting, 4 id.
50; laflin u. Tau ::; ig, 7 id. 223; Metrop.
L In. o. L'. :\Iee ker, 5 ~ . Y. 614;

olton L. & W. Co. v. Raynor, 57 al.
588.
1 Mi ouri, R . ., 1899, § 613: "Duplicit.11 i a sulrtantial objectiou to the petition or otherpleacli11 g, and hall, on motion,
be stricken out.'
624: " In all a tion
fo un ded on contract, and i usti tu t <l
a o-ainst several defendant , t11e plaiu tiff
shall not be nonsuite<l by reaso u of hi.
failure to prove that all the def nclant
are partie t the contract. but may have
judg ment against such of them as he hall
prove to be parties theret ." Kan a ,
§ 104: "When the answer outain new
matter con tituting a right tor lief ao-ain . t
a co-defendant, concerning the ubje t of
the action, uch co-defendant may demur
or reply to such matter in th e ame manner a if he were plaintiff, and ubj ct to
the same rules o far a applicabl ."
Iowa, § 3578: "Any n umber f d fen e',
n g-ative or affirmative, ar pl adable to
a counter- ·laim; and each affirmative matter of d f n e in the reply hall be ufficient in it elf, and mu t intelligibly refer
to the part f the an. wer to whi h it i
int nded to apply." Indian a,§ 359: " 11
defence , x pt th e mer denial of th e
fact all eged by the plain tiff, hall be
pleade I sp ially.' .' 3 0: " nd r a mere
denial f any all ga ion n
,·i<l n
hall
be in troclu d whieh cl · not t 11d to
negativ what h party makiug the allegati on i bound to prove."
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provided. Tlie utmost liberality in this respect runs through

them all, and the provisions are the same in substance, and

almost identical in language. As these clauses apply alike to

the pleadings by the plaintiff and by the defendant, they have

already been stated in the preceding chapter.'

§ 482. * 591. Outline of Treatment of Code Theory of Defence.

Upon the basis of the foregoing citations, I am prepared to pre-

sent the theory of the defence as formulated in tlie codes, and as

w^rought out by the judicial interpretation thereof. The funda-

mental principles of pleading adopted by the reformed American

system, and applicable alike to the allegations made by the plain-

tiff and by the defendant, have already been discussed in the

preceding chapter; and I shall, therefore, confine myself to

matters purely defensive. Following an order suggested alike

by the mode of arrangement pursued in the statute, and by the

logical development of the subject-matter itself, the chapter will

be separated into sections, which will treat respectively, I.. Of

the general requisites of an answer, and of the general rules

applicable to all answers; II. Of answers or defences consist-
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ing of denials either general or specific; III. Of answers or

defences consisting of new matter; IV. Of the union of differ-

ent defences, whether legal or equitable, in one answer; V. Of

counter-claims, and other affirmative relief. -

SECTION SECOND.

THE GENERAL REQUISITES OF AN ANSVfER, AND THE GENERAL

RULES APPLICABLE TO ALL ANSWERS.

§ 483. * 592. Introductory. Before examining the different

kinds of defence possible under the codes, and the particular

rules relating to each, I shall state and explain the few doc-

trines and rules which apply to all forms of answer, and which

have not been already embraced in the discussion of the general

principles of pleading contained in the preceding chapter. There

are a few doctrines, practical rather than theoretical, pertaining

to the answer considered as an independent pleading, which

should be investigated before proceeding with the mass of detail

which will make up the bulk of the present chapter.

1 Supra, § * 435.

45
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§ 484. * 593. Tw^o Kinds of Ans-wer — Denials and New Matter.

Answers are separated by the codes into two classes, — those

which consist of denials, and therefore serve the sole purpose

of raising a direct issue upon the plaintiff's allegations ; and

those which state what the codes call "new matter," — that is,

facts different from those averred by the plaintiff, and not em-

braced within the judicial inquiry into their truth. The latter

class is again subdivided into those in which the " new matter "

is simply defensive, and, if true, destroys or bars the plaintiff's

right of action; and those in which the "new matter" is the

statement of an independent cause of action in favor of the

defendant against the plaintiff, which is to be tried at the same

time with that set up by the plaintiff, to the end that a re-

covery upon it may be used in opposition to the recovery upon

the plaintiff's demand, by either diminishing, equalling, or ex-

ceeding the same. It is plain, from this brief description, that

the answers included in the latter subdivision are not, in any

true sense of the word, defences; they do not defeat or bar the

plaintiff's right of action. They are, in truth, independent causes
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of action in favor of the defendant, — cross-demands, — which,

for purposes of convenience merely, are tried and determined at

one and the same time. There are two suits, to neither of which,

perhaps, exists any defence, litigated and decided in the one judi-

cial proceeding; and the final balance in favor of one party is

awarded to him by the single judgment of the court. This is

the true theory of the answers embraced in the last subdivision ;

and it is fully approved and adopted by decisions of authority

which will be cited in the subsequent section, which treats of the

"counter-claim."

§ 485. * 594. Two Kinds of Questions. Those of Form. Two

kinds of questions may arise in reference to all answers, —

namely, (1) those of substance and (2) those of form. The

first class relates to the sufficiency of the pleading, assuming

that its allegations are correct in respect to their merely formal

character; the second class relates exclusively to the form and

external mode of setting forth the facts, assuming that, if prop-

erly stated, they would be sufficient to constitute a valjxl answer.

It is difhcult to conceive that a question of substance should

arise upon an answer consisting only of denials. Such an an-

swer might be insufficient: it might raise no complete issue,

484.

Two Kinds of Answer -

Denials and New Matter.
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because its denials were too liniitetl, and were interposed to a

part only of the plaintiff's allegations, thus admitting by their

silence other averments to such an extent that a cause of action

in his favor was conceded upon the record; but here the question

of substance would not arise from the matter contained in the

answer, but from the absence of matter therein. The questions

that can arise upon an answer of denials must, therefore, be

those of form, — questions whether the denials themiSelves are

in such a form that the averments of the complaint, or some of

them, are sufiiciently negatived in order to ],)resent an issue or

issues for trial and decision. If the answer falls within the

second class, — that is, if it sets up new matter, either by way

of defence, or by way of counter-claim, set-off, or cross-demand,

— the questions arising upon it may be either of substance or

of form.

§ 486. * 595. Questions of Substance. What Can be the pos-

sible nature of these questions of substance ? The section of the

codes enumerating the grounds of demurrer to the complaint or

petition contains a complete list of such questions. As found in
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most of the codes, they are six in number, — namely, (1) want

of jurisdiction in the court over the person of the defendant, or

the subject-matter of the action; (2) want of legal capacity to

sue in the plaintiff; (3) the pendency of another action between

the same parties for the same cause ; (4) defect of parties plain-

tiff or defendant; (5) a misjoinder of causes of action; (6) failure

to state facts constituting a cause of action. To these there is

added, in one or two codes, (7) a misjoinder of parties plaintiff

or defendant. It is very plain that, except in a special case to

be mentioned hereafter, only one of these species of substantial

questions can possibly arise in respect to the answer, namely,

the sixth, whether the facts stated are sufficient to constitute

a defence. Objections as to the jurisdiction of the court, the

legal capacity of the plaintiff to sue, the pendency of another

action, and the misjoinder of causes of action, must necessarily

be confined to and be decided by the complaint or petition. If

the plaintiff's pleading is free, the answer can in no manner be

exposed to any of them. It may, of course, set up these objec-

tions as matters of defence; but the objection would still inhere

in tlie plaintiff's cause of action and pleading, and would not

be involved in the answer itself. The same is true in respect to

b .can e it l nials w r too limit <l, and 'i r int rpo ,cl to a
pal't only f th plain iff aJl gati irn, thu, a<lmitting Ly th ir
sil n oth r av rm nts t such an xt nt that a am; of a ti n
in hi favor wa con cl d upon th r
rd; but h r th qu stion
0£ ub tance woul l not ari from th matt r ontainecl in the
answer, but from th ab enc f matter th rein. Th qu stions
that can ari e upon an an w r of cl nial mu t, th r for ,
those of form, - q ue tions wheth r the denials them elv · ar
in such a form that the averments of the complaint, or some of
them, are sufficiently negatived in order to pr sent an issue or
issues for trial and decision. If the answer falls within th
econd clas , - that i , if it sets up new matter, eith r by way
of defence, or by way of counter-claim, set-off, or cross-demand,
- the questions arising upon it may be either of substance or
of form.
§ 486. * 595. Questions of Substance. What can be the possible nature of these questions of substance? The section of the
codes enumerating the grounds of demurrer to the complaint or
petition contains a complete list of such questions. As found in
most of the codes, they are six in number, - namely, (1) want
of jurisdiction in th e court over the person of the defendant, or
the subject-matter of the action; (2) want of legal capacity to
sue in the plaintiff; (3) the pendency of another action between
the same parties for the same cau e; (4) defect of parties plaintiff or defendant; ( 5) a mis joinder of ca uses of action; (6) failure
to state facts constituting a cause of action. To th ese there i
added, in one or . two codes, (7) a misjoinder of parties plaintiff
or defendant. It is very plain that, except in a special case to
be mentioned hereafter, only one of these species of substantial
questions can possibly arise in respect to the answer, namely,
the sixth, whether the facts stated are sufficient to constitute
a defence. Obj ections as to the jurisdiction of the court, the
legal capacity of the plaintiff to sue, the pendency of another
action, and the misjoinder of causes of action, must neces arily
be confined to and be decided by the complaint or petition . If
the plaintiff's pleading is free, the answer can in no manner be
exposed to any of them. It may, of course, set up these objections as matters of defence; but the objection would still inh re
in the plaintiff 's cause of action and pleading, and would not
be involved in the answer itself. The same is true in respect to
1
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the nonjoinder or misjoinder of parties in all cases where the

answer is simply defensive. It may certainly aver a nonjoinder

or a misjoinder as a defence ; but the question thus raised would

still depend upon the complaint or petition ; the answer could

not by itself, as the initiative, create a nonjoinder or misjoinder

of parties. There is one special case, however, in which the

answer may, for the first time, involve the question as to the

proper joinder of parties. Where it sets up a counter-claim or

set-off, and the defendant thus makes himself, in respect to such

demand, a plaintiff in fact, though not in name, the answer may

be governed by the same rules which govern the complaint or

petition. The cause of action thus alleged may be of such a

character that the original parties to the record are either too

few or too many. An answer of this class may therefore, in

itself, and by means of its own averments, independently of

the plaintiff's pleading, raise and involve questions of sub-

stance relating to the proper joinder of parties to the action.

The codes of several States recognize this fact, and expressly

provide for the bringing in of additional parties made neces-
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sary by the allegations of a counter-claim or set-off. With this

single exception, it is plain that the only questions of substance

which can arise in respect to any answer must relate to the suffi-

ciency of the facts alleged to constitute a defence, or counter-

claim, or set-off. Upon this assumption, the language employed

by the legislature in some of the States permits a demurrer to

the answer on the ground of "insufficiency;" in others, "where,

upon its face, it does not constitute a counter-claim or defence ; "

and, in others still, " where the facts alleged do not constitute

a defence or counter-claim." And recognizing the further

fact, that these questions of substance cannot arise upon an-

swers which consist only of denials, the language of several

codes confines the demurrer to "new matter," set up in the

answer by way of defence or counter-claim,

§ 487. * 596. Purpose of Demurrer.^ Special Demurrer Abol-

ished. Motion Substituted. Under the common-law system of

1 ^^Oeneral Hales as to Demurrers. Centerville Light Co. (1896), 100 la. 245,

jrr, , n J v C9 N. W. 541 ; Graham v. Marks (1895),

Wnat a Demurrer admits. ^ ' v /.

98 Ga. 67, 25 S. E. 931 ; Smith v. Usher

A demurrer to a pleading admits all (1899), 108 Ga. 2.31, 3^ S. E. 876; Crew v.

facts well pleaded therein: Good.son (•. Hutcheson (1902), 115 Ga. 511. 42 S. E.

Goodson (1897), 140 Mo. 206; Peatman v. 16; Stedman v. City of Berlin (1897), 97

th non joinder or mi joinder of parti m all ca e wher he
a.n \V r i imply defen i
It may rtainly aver a nonjoind r
or a mi joinder a a defenc · but the qu tion thu rai ed would
till lepen upon the complaint; or p titi n · the an wer could
n t by it elf, a the initiative, r ate a nonj ind r or mi joinder
f partie . Ther i one special ca e, how ver, in which the
n wer may for the fir t time, invol e the question a to th
r per joinder of partie . \Vh r it et up a ounter-claim or
et-off and the defendant thus make him elf, in re pect to uch
demand, a plaintiff in fact, thou 0 h not in name, the an wer may
by th same rules which govern the omplaint or
be govern
p titian. The cau e of action tbu~ alleged may b of su h a
character that the original parties to the rec rd are either too
few or too many. An an wer of tbi
lass may therefor , in
itself and by means of its own av rment , indep ndently of
the plaintiff's pleading, raise and involve question of subta nce relating to the proper joinder 0£ parties to the action.
The codes of several States recognize this fact, and expres.Jy
provide for the bringing in of additional parties made n ce ' sary by the allegations of a counter-claim or et-off. With thi
·i1w le exception, it is plain that the only questions of substance
which can arise in respect to any answ r must relate to the ·ufficiency of the facts alleged to constitute a defence, or counterclaim or set -off. Upon this a umption, the language employed
bj the lebi lature in some of the States permit a demurrer to
the an w r n the ground of "insufficiency;" in others, "wher ,
up n it face, it doe not con titute a counter-claim or defenc ; '
and, in others till, "where the fact alleged do not con titute
a d fence or counter-claim."
And recognizing the further
fac t that the e question of substance cann t ari
up n an . w r which con i t only of d nial , th Jan uaO'e of ev ral
code confin
the demurr r t "new matt r ' set up in th
an ·wer by way of defen c
r counter-claim.
1
487. * 5 . Purpose of Demurrer.
Special Demurrer Abolis hed. Motion Substituted.
nder the
mm n-law ystem f
1

[ General Rule

a

to De'tnurre1• .

TVhat a Demurrer adm it .

demu rr r to a pleading admi t all
fact well pl ad <l ther in:
o d:ou v.
'oou. on (1 9i), 140 Mo . 206; Peatman u.
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procedure, the questions of substance in the defendant's pleas,

if the objection a[)peared on their face, were raised by a gen-

eral demurrer, while those of form were raised by a "special

demurrer." The reformed procedure retains the general de-

murrer for the same purpose which it subserved at the common

law. Where the answer, as in some States, or the new matter

in the answer, as in others, does not state facts constituting

a defence, or counter-claim, or set-off, as the case may be, a

demurrer, on the ground of insufficiency, is the proper mode

of raising and presenting the question for decision to the court.

Special demurrers, however, are utterly abolished. If the defect is

one merely of form ; if the denials, for example, — although suffi-

ciently addressed to the plaintiff's allegations to indicate the in-

Wis. 505, 73 N. W. 57 ; Allen v. Chicago

& N. W. Ry. Co. (1896), 94 Wis. 93, 68

N. W. 873; Hand v. City of St. Louis

(1900), 158 Mo. 204, 59 S. "w. 92 ; Shields

V. John.son County (1898), 144 Mo. 76, 47
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S. W 107 ; Blaine v. Kuapp & Co. (1897),

procedure, t he qu tion
f sulrtance in th d f ndant· s pleas,
if the obj ction appear d on th ir foe , w re rai <l by a g neral demurrer, while those of form wer raised Ly a "Hp cial
<lemu rrer. " The reformed pr ellur retain' the g neral <l murrer for th same p upo.' which it 'UUS rved at ihe comrr on
law. W here the answ r, as in om
tates, or tb new matter
in the answer, a in other , does not tatc facts con titnting
a defence, or counter-claim, or set-off, as the ·ase may Le, a
demurrer, on the ground of insufficiency, is the proper mode
of raising and presenting the question for decision to the court.
pecial demurrers, however, are utterly aboli 'hed. If the defect i
one merely of form ; if the denial , for example, - although ufJiciently addressed t o the plaintiff's allegations to indicate the in-

140 Mo. 241, 41 S. W. 787; McArthnr v.

Clarke Drug Co. (1896), 48 Neb. 899, 67

N. W. 861 ; State v. Porter (1903), — Neb.

— , 95 N. W. 769.

But the demurrer admits the truth of

the allegations of the pleading attacked

oul\' for the purpose of determining their

legal effeft: Jacobs v. Vaill (1903), —

ivan. — , 72 Pac. 530.

A demurrer does not admit conclusions

of law : Longshore Printing Co. v. Howell

(1894), 26 Ore. 527, 38 Pac. 547; Kankin

r. Railroad Co. (1900), 58 S. C. 532, 36

S E. 997 ; American Water Works Co. v.

State (1895), 46 Neb. 194, 64 N. W. 711 ;

State ex rel. v. Aloe (1899), 152 Mo. 466,

54 S. W. 494 ; State ex rel. v. Withrow

(1900), 154 Mo. 397, 55 S. W. 460; John

D. Park & Sons Co. v. Druggists' Ass'n

(1903), 175 N. Y. 1, 67 N. E. 136.

A demurrer does not admit the con-

clusions of the pleader : Southern Hy. Co. y.

Covenia (1896), 100 Ga. 46, 29 S. E. 219;

Eliot's Appeal (1902), 74 Conn. 586, 51

Atl. 558; State ex rel. v. Archibald (1894),

52 O. St. 1, 38 N. E. 314.

But see Standard Oil Co. v. Hoese

(1899), 57 Neb. 665, 78 N. W. 292, where

a demurrer was held to admit a conclusion

reasonably inferable from the facts alleged.

In passing upon a demurrer for mis-

joinder of causes of action, it will be as-

sumed that the facts alleged in each count

constitute a cause of action : Vaule v.

Steenerson (1895), 63 Minn. 110, 65 N. W.

257.

Searching the Record.

A demurrer searches the record, and

should be carried back to the first pleading

which is insufficient: Tribune Printing Co.

i: Barnes (1898), 7 N. D. 591, 75 N. W.

904; Barr v. Little (1898), 54 Neb. 556, 74

N. W. 850; State ex rel. v. Stuht (1898),

52 Neb. 209, 71 N. W. 941; State v.

Moores (1897), 52 Neb. 770, 73 N. W, 299;

West Point Water, etc. Co. v. State (1896),

49 Neb. 223, 68 N. W. 507 ; Hawthorne v.

State (1895), 45 Neb. 871, 64 N. W. 359;

Oakley v. Valley County (1894), 40 Neb.

W i . 505, 73 N. W . 57; A llen v. Chi1·ago
& N. W. Ry . Co. (1896), 94 W is. 9.3, 68
N. W . 873 ; Hirn d v. City of St. Lo uis
( 1900), 158 Mo. 204, 59,. W . 92; Shi elds
v. Johns n Cou nty (1 98), 1.t-4 Mo. 76, 47
S. W . 107 ; Bla ine v. Kuapp & Co. {'1 89 7),
140 Mo. 241, 4 1 S . W. 78 7 ; McA r thur v.
Clarke D rug Co. (1896) , 48 Neb. 899, 67
N. W. 86 1 ; Statev.Porter {1903), - Neu.
- , 95 N. W . 769.

In passing upon a demurrer for misjoin<ler of cau es of action, it will be assumed that the facts alleged i_n each count
coustitute a cause of action : Vaule v.
Steenerson ( 1895), 63 1inn. 11 O, 65 N. W.
257.

Searching the Record.
A demurr er searches the record, and
shou ld be carried back to the first pleading
wh ich is insufficient: Tribune Printing Co.
v. Barnes ( 1898), 7 N. D. 591, 75 N. W.
90-t- ; B arr v. Li ttle (1898), 54 Neb. 556, 74
N. W. 850 ; State ex rel. v. S tuht (1898),
52 Neb. 209, 71 N . W. 94 1 ; State v.
Moores (1 89 7), 52 Neb. 770, 73 N . W, 299;
W est P oint Wat er, etc. Co. v. State (1896),
49 Neb. 223, 68 N. W. 507; Hawthorn e v.
State (1 895), 45 Neb. 87 1, 64 N. W. 359;
Oakl ey v. Valley Co un ty (1894), 40 Neb.
900, 59 N . W. 368; J ohnson v. Wynne
( !.902), 64 Kan. 138, 67 Pac. 549; Baxter
v. McDonn ell (1 897), 154 N. Y. 432, 48
N . E . 816; Alkire 1:. Alkire ( 1892), 134
Jud . 350, 32 N. E. 57 1 ; Gilreath v. Furman ( 1898), 53 S. C. 463, 3 1 S. E. 29 1 ;
C hesapeake, etc. Ry. Co. v. Riddle's Adm'x
(1903), Ky., 72 S. W. 22; H oskins v.
Southern Nat. Bank {l!l03), Ky ., 73 S. W .

Bu t th e demurrer admi ts t he tru th of
the all egati ous of the plead ing attacked
ouly for t he purpo e of determinin g their
l egal effec t : Jacobs v . Vaill ( 1903 ), K an . - , 72 Pac. 530.
A demurrer doe not admit con cl u ions
of Jaw : Lon gshore Printin g Co. v. Howell
(1894), 26 Ore. 527, 38 Pac. 547 ; Ha nki n
v. Railroad Co. (1900) , 58 S. C. 53:2, 36
S E. 997; Am eri can W ater Work s Co. v.
State {1 895), 46 eb. 194, 64 N. W . 711 ;
State ex rel. 1'. Aloe (1 899) , 152 Mo. 466 ,
54 S. W. 494; State ex rel. v. ·w i t hro w
(1900), 154 Mo . 397, 55 S . W . 460 ; J ohn
D. Park & Sons Co. v. Dru ggists' Ass'n
{1903) , 17 5 . Y. l , 67 N. E. 136.
A demur rer does not a dmi t the conclusions of the pleader : ou t hern Hy. Co. v.
C'ovcnia (1896 ), 100 Ga. 46, 29 . E. ~1 9; 786.
See Goldsmith v. Chipp (1899), 154
F:liot's Appeal ( 1902), 74 Conn. 586, 51
Atl. 558; State ex rel. v. A rchibald (1894), Jud. 28, 55 N. E. 855, where the court
. aid: "A demurrer to an au wer in abate52 0. St. 1, 3 N. E. ~ 1 4.
Rnt see Standard O il Co. v . H oese . ment does not search the record, anu can(I L99), 57 eb. 665, i 8 . W. 292, where not be carried back and sustained to the
a demurrer was held to ad mit a concl usion complaint."
reaso11al>ly iuferable from the fact· alleged.
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tended issues, — are so formally defective that it is a question

whether the denial or denials attempted to be made do in fact ac-

complish the purpose for which they were designed ; or if the aver-

ments of new matter in some sort embrace or refer to facts which,

if properly pleaded, would amount to a defence or counter-claim,

but are stated in such an uncertain, ambiguous, inferential man-

ner, that it is a question whether they can avail to the defendant,

— in such cases it is settled that the demurrer is not the proper

mode of reaching the defect. Instead of the special demurrer,

the codes have substituted the motion to make the pleading

more definite and certain.^ If no such motion is made, and

Where au answer purports to auswer

only a part of a complaint, a demurrer to

such answer cau only be carried back and

sustained to so much of the comphiint as

t nl
i u , - ar o f rmally d f cti e that it i a que ti n
wh ther the d nial or d ni 1 att mpte l to b mad do in fact acmpli h b purp e f r whi h th ' r de ibn l; or if the averm nt of n w m tt r in ome ort embrace or r fer to fact wbi h,
if pr erly pl ad d would am unt t a defence or c unt r-clairu,
but ar tated in uch an uncertain, ambiguou , infer ntial manner, th t it i a que tion wheth r th y can avail to th defendant,
- in uch ca e it i ettled that the demurrer i not he prop r
mode of r aching the def ct. In tead of the pecial demurrer,
the co
ha
sub tituted the motion to mak the pleading
more
fini e and certain. 1 If n ·uch motion i made, nd

it assumes to answer : State ex rel. v.

Halter (1897), 149 Ind. 292, 47 N. E. 665.

Ruling on Demurrer as Res Judicata.
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If a demurrer is sustained on the ground

that a complaint fails to state a cause of

action, a judgment of dismissal thereon is

no bar to a subsequent action in which

there is a good complaint : Swausou v.

Great Northern Ry. Co. (1898), 73 Minn.

Where an an wer purport to an w r
nly a part of a co mplaint, a de murr r t o
uc h a n. w r can only be carried ba ck an d
su tain ed to so mu h of th e co mpl ain t a ·
it a ume t o an wer : State ex r l . v .
H alter (I 7), 14-9 Ind. 292, 4 7 N. E. 665.

Ruling on D emurrer a R es J udicata.

103, 7.1 N. W. 1033; Watson v. St. Paul

City Ry. Co. (1899), 76 Minn. 358, 79

N. W. 308; Potter v. Beuge (1902), Ky.,

67 S. W. 1005, citing Pepper v. Donnelly,

87 Ky. 260; Taylor v. Matteson (1893),

86 Wis. 113, 56 N. W. 829; State ex rel.

V. Cornell (1897), 52 Neb. 25, 71 N. W.

961; O'Hara v. Parker (1895), 27 Ore.

156, 39 Pac. 1004.

If the judgment determined the merits

of the case, it is res judicata : Wilson v.

Lowry (1898), Ariz., 52 Pac. 777; Klein-

schmidt v. Binzel (1893), 14 Mont. 31, 35

Pac. 460; Fain v. Hughes (1899), 108 Ga.

.537, 33 S. E. 1012; Plant v. Carpenter

(1898), 19 Wash. 621,53 Pac. 1107; Day

V. Mountin (1903), 89 Minn. 297, 94 N. W.

887.

A judgment on the sole ground tliat

the action is premature is not a bar to a

1 ^Conversely, a motion cannot be used

to raise questions of substance : Armstead

V. Neptune ( 1 896), 56 Kan. 750, 44 Pac. 998 ;

Wattels V. MincJien (1895), 93 la. 517, 61

N. W. 915; Gjerstadengen c. Hartzcll

subsequent suit for the same cause : Peck v.

Easton (1902), 74 Conn. 456, 51 Atl. 134.

If a demu rrer i u tai ned on the g round
that a complaint fail. to state a cau e of
action, a judgment of di mi al thereon i
no bar to a u b equent action in whi ch
there i a o-ood comp laint:
wau on v.
reat .. ~ rthern Ry . Co . (1 9 ), 73 Mi nn.
103, 75
. W. 1033; W at on v . t. l'a ul
it_v Ry. Co. (1 99), 76 Min n. 35 , 79
X W ..30 ; Potter v. Benge (1902) Ky.,
67 . W . 1005, citing Pepper v. Don n lly ,
7 Ky. 260; Tay lor v. Matte on ( l 93),
6 W i '. 11 3, 56 N. W. 29; tate ex rel.
oroell ( l 7), 52 Teb. 25 , 71 N. W.
61 ;
'H ara v. Par ker (! 95), 27 re.
156, 39 Pac. 100+.
If th judgm n t determined the merit
of the a e, it i res judicata : \Vil on 1-.
Lowry (1 9 ), A r iz. 52 Pac. 7-7 ; Kleinhrnidt v. Binzel ( 1 93) 14- 1\1 nt. 3 1, 35
Pac. 460; Fain v. Hughe (I 99 ) , 10
a.
53 7, 33
. E. 10 12; P lant v. a r penter
( I 9 ), 19 Wa h. 62 1, 53 P ac. l lOi ; l ay
v. Mountin ( 1903),
Minn. 29 7, 9+ . W.
7.

.A judgment Oil the ole ground that
the action i premature i not a bar t a

A demurrer on the ground that a com-

plaint does not state a cause of action,

having been once made and overruled,

cannot be renewed at any subsequent trial

on the same or auy other specifications:

Turner v. Interstate Ass'n (1897), 51 S. C.

33, 27 S. E. 947; Burrows v. McCalley

(1897), 17 Wash. 269, 49 Pac. 508. But

see Roche v. Spokane County (1900), 22

Wash. 121, 60 Pac. 59.

The court is not bound by its own rul-

ing, and when a demurrer has been sus-

tained to a petition, and an amended

petition is filed essentially like tlie origi-

nal, to which also a demurrer is filed, the

court may sustain or overrule it as it sees

fit. If the defendant wished to hold the

I

[

m1v r · ly, a moti n cannot be u erl

to rai e <1u ,.'tiOll.' r uh tance: Arm tead
v ... ptune (! 6), 56 Kan . 750, 4+ Pac. 99 ;
\ ttel. "· ~linch 11 (I 5). 93 Ia. 5 l 7, 6 1
'. W. ~ l :J; Gjcr ·taueugen u. Hartz 11

ub equent uit for the ·ame cau e: Peck v.
Ea t on (1902), 74 Conn. 456, 51 Atl. 134.
A d e murrer on the g round that a omplaint does not tate a au e of action ,
ha,ring been once made and OYerruled,
a nnot be r enewed at auy ub equent tri al
on t.he a me or a ny oth r • pe i fl.cation s :
Turn er 1:. Inter ta te A "n ( l 7), 51 . .
3:J, 2i . E. 947 ; Burrow v. M Calley
(l 9 7), 17 Wa h . 269 , 49 P a c. 50 . Bu t
ee R oche v. pokan e County ( 1900) , 2W a h . 121, 60 l:'ac. 59.
T he co urt is no t bo un d by it
wn ruling, a nd when a dem urr r ha· b en u taiu d to a petition , a nd an am end ed
p etit ion i filed e sent ially li k th e or iginal, to w hi ·h al o a demurr r i filed, th
ourt may u. tain or overrul it a it C'
fi t. If t he defend ant wi ·hed to h old the
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the plaintiff goes to trial upon the answer as it stands, he will

People V. Stevens, 51 How. Pr. 235, whicli

the plaintiff goes to trial upon the answer as it tands, he \vi°ll

held the presumption to be that the de-

murrer was sustained upoti all the grounds.

lu Gregory v. Woodwortli {189'J), 107

la 151, 77 N. W. 837, it was held that

where a plaintiff failed to amend his peti-

tion by adding a material averment, and a

demurrer thereto had heen sustained by

the lower court and by the Supreme Court,

the judgment on the demurrer was a final

adjudication which bars another action for

the same cause, under Code, 1873, § 26,54,

■which provides that on the decision of a

•demurrer, if the unsuccessful party fails

to amend or plead over, the same conse-

quences shall ensue as though a verdict

had passed against the plaintiff, or the de-

fendant had made default. Given J. dis-
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sented on the ground that the omission of

the averment, being in fact a doubtful

question, was not negligence, and hence

plaintiff ought to be allowed to commence

a second suit under Code § 2537, which

provides that " If, after the commence-

ment of an action, the plaintiff shall fail

therein for any cause, except negligence

in its prosecution, and a new suit shall be

brought within six moutlis thereafter, the

second suit shall, for the purpose herein

contemplated, be deemed a continuation of

the first."

Error in overruling a demurrer for mis-

joinder of causes of action is harmless :

Coddington v. Canaday (1901), 157 Ind.

243, 61 N. E. 567.

The statute providing tliat " but one

motion and one demurrer assailing such

pleading shall he filed, unless such plead-

ing be amended after the filing of a mo-

tion thereto," does not prohibit filing a

demurrer after a motion to the same plead-

ing, even though the pleading has not

been amended in the mean time : Gross i'.

Miller (1894), 93 la. 72, 61 N. W. 385.

Demurrer as '' Answer."

A demurrer is a sufficient "answer" to

warrant the granting of relief not prayed

for, under R. S , § 2886 : Viles v. Green

People v. teven , 51 How. Ir. 235. whi h
held the pre umption to he that the demurrer was u tained upon all the ground .
In Gregory v. Woodworth {l 99), 107
Ia 151, 77 N. W. 837, it wa held that
where a plaintiff failed to amend hi petition by adding a material averment, and a
demurrer thereto had been u tained by
the lower court and by the upreme Court,
the judgment ou the demurrer wa a final
adjudication which bars another action for
the ame cause, under Code, 1873, § 2654,
which provides that on the deci ion of a
<lemurrer, if the unsuccessful party fails
to ameud or plead over, the same consehall ensue as though a verdict
-quence
had passed against the plaintiff, or the defendant had made default. Given J. disentcd on the ground that the omis ion of
the averment, being in fact a doubtful
question, wa · uot negligence, and hence
plaintiff ought to be allowed to commence
a econd uit under Code § 2537, which
pruvides that "If, after the commeucemeut of an action, the plaintiff hall fail
therein for any cause, exeept negligence
in its prosecution, and a new suit shall be
brought withiu six mouth~ ther after, the
econcl uit hall, for the purpo, e herein
~outemplated, be deemed a continuation of
-the first."
Error in overruling a demurrer for misjoinder of can es of action is harmless:
Coddington v. Canaday (1901), 157 Ind.
~.t-3, 61 ~. E. 567.
The tatute providing that "but one
motion and one demurrer as ailing uch
pleading shall be filed, unless uch pleading be amended after the filing of a motion thereto," does not prohibit filing a
demurrer after a motion to the same pleading, e1·en though the plead ing has not
been amended in the mean time: Gross v.
Miller (1894), 93 Ia. 72, 61 N. W. 385.

(1895), 91 Wis. 217, 64 N. W. 856. See

Demurrer as "Answer."

also Wagener v. Boyce (1898), Ariz., 52

Pac. 1122. But there is no such pleading

a,s a " demurrer by way of answer : "

Smith V. Kibling (1897), 97 Wis. 205, 72

N. W. 869. See also Quayle v. Bayfield

Co. (1902), 114 Wis. 108, 89 N. W. 892,

where an answer contained a demurrer

but the defect was held to be waived.

Predicating Error on Ruling.

Where a demurrer is sustained generally,

the ruling will be sustained if any of the

grounds of the demurrer are well taken :

Krause v. Lloyd (1897), 100 la. 666,69

N. W. 1062 ; Crittenden v. Southern Home

Ass'n (1900), 111 Ga. 266, .36 S. E. 643.

An order su.staininga demurrer, if right,

will be sustained, even if the reasons

given by the trial court were erroneous :

Hughes V. Hunner (1895), 91 Wis. 116, 64

A demurrer is a sufficient "an wer" to
warrant the granting of relief not prayed
for, under R. S , § 2886 : Vile v. Green
(1 95), 91 Wis. 217, 64 N. W. 56. See
.also Wagener v. Boyce ( l 9 ), Ariz ., 52
Pac. 1122. But there is no such pleading
s a "demurrer by way of answer:"

mith v. Kibling (I 97), 97 Wi . 205, 72
. W. 69. · al
uayle v. Bayfield
Co. ( 1902), ll-t Wi . IO , 9 . W. 892,
where au answer contaiued a demurrer
but the defect wa held to b waived.
Predicalin,q Error on Ruling.
Where a demurrer i u tained generally,
the ruling will be U!;tained if any of the
grounds o( the demurrer are well taken:
Krau e v. Lloyd (I 97), 100 Ia. 666, 69
N. W. 1062; Crittenden v. outhern Home
Ass'n (I 900), l l I Ga. 266, 36 S. E. 643.
An order u taiuiog a demurrer, if right,
will be su tained, even if the rea ons
given by the trial court were erroneous :
Hugh es i·. Runner (I895), 9I \Vi. 116, 64
N. W. 887.
Error, if any, in ruling upon a demurrer
will not be considered on appeal where
the alleged defect ha been obviated by an
amenclment on the trial : Mari v. Cle1·enger (I 902), 29 Wa. h. 395, 69 Pac. IO 9;
I\:ingman v. Pixley (I 9 ), 7 Okla. 351,
5-! Pac. 494. Co11lra, Corcoran v. onora
Min. & Mill. Co. (1902), Idaho, 71 Pac. I27.
When a demurrer has been su tained to
a complaint, and plaintiff fails to apply
for an amendment, he must l>e held to
have elected to stand on hi pleading:
Iowa, etc. Tel. Co. v. Schamber (1902), 15
S. D. 588, 91 . W. 78.
Pleading over is a waiver of any error
in overruling a demurrer: 'Vheeler v.
Barker ( 1897 ), 51 eb. 46, 71 N. \V. 730;
Citizens' Bank v. Pence {1900), 59 Neb.
579, 81 N. W. 623; L ederer v. Union av.
Bank (I897), 52 Neb. 133, 71 N. W. 954;
Hardin v. Emmon {1898), 24 Ne\'. 329, 53
Pac. 85.J-; Shroeder v. Webster (1893),
Ia. 627, 55 N. W. 569; First Nat. Bank
v. Farmers' & Merchants' Bank (1903),
Neb., 95 . W. 1062. Contra, Mechanics Bank v. Woodward {1902), 74 Conn.
689, 51Atl.10 4; Thelin v. Stewart ( l 93),
100 Cal. 372, 34 Pac. 861; Hunter's Appeal (1898), 71 Conn. 189, 41 Atl. 557.
A party cannot complain of a ruling in
hi own favor: Pritchett v. McGaughey
(189 ), 15I Ind. 638, 52 N. E. 397.
A general demurrer to a complaint put
in by stipulation after answer and treated
by the parties and the trial court a an

CI\IL
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no be ufferecl to rai e the objection th re f r the fir

tim

and

not be suffered to raise the objection there for the first time, and

ordinary demurrer will be so treated on

appeal :' McCord v. Hill (1899), 104 Wis.

437, 80 N. VV. 735.

" A judgment will not be reversed on

account of the sustaining of an informal

<lenmrrer to an answer that does not state

facts sufficient to constitute a cause of de-

fence:" BoUraan v. Gemmill (1900), 1.53

Ind. 33, 57 N. E. 542 ; Hanson v. Cruse

(1900), 155 Ind. 176, 57 N. E. 904.

An order sustaining a demurrer is ap-

pealable although no final judgment was

entered or rendered by the court : Brad-

ley V. Miller (1896), 100 la. 169, 69 N. \V.

426.

An appeal will lie wherever a writ of

error could be sustained : O'Donnell v.
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Sargent & Co. (1897), 69 Conn. 476, 38

Atl. 216.

The overruling of a demurrer to one

paragraph of a complaint will not be re-

viewed on appeal when the case was tried

and judgment rendered for plaintiff on

another paragraph : Robinson v. Dickey

(1893), 143 Ind. 205, 42 N. E. 679.

Nor can error be predicated on the

court's action in sustaining a demurrer

to an answer when the facts averred in

the answer were admissible under a gen-

eral denial pleaded : Troxel v. Thomas

(1900), 155 Ind. 519, 58 N. E. 725; Xow-

lin ('. State ex rel. Board of Commission-

ers (1903), — Ind. — , 66 N. E. .54; Smith

V. Pinnell (1895), 143 Ind. 485, 40 N. E.

798. See Clause Printing Co. v. Chicago,

etc. Bank (1896), 145 Ind. 682, 44 \. E.

256, where same rule was announced in

respect to a counter-claim and answer in

bar.

Where two defences are pleaded, one

good and the other bad, the error in over-

ruling a demurrer to the latter defence is

not available, the former constituting a

complete bar to the action : Fire Extin-

guisher Co. V. City of Perry (1899), 8

Okla. 429, 58 Pac. 635.

Where it clearly appears that no injury

resulted to defendant by rea.son of tlie

in proper overruling of a demurrer for

misjoinder, the judgment sub.sequently

rendered npon the complaint will not be

reversed; Theliu r. Stewart (1893), 100

Cal. 372. 34 Pac. 861 ; A.sevado v. Orr

(ISO.)). UK) r-.d liM, 34 Pac. 777.

" Wliere a demurrer to a petition which

states no ground for substantial damages

is sustained, this court will not reverse

the decision merely because tiie facts

stated would entitle plaintiff to nominal

damages: " Cook v. Smith (190'5), — Kan.

— ,72 Pac. 524.

Scope of Demurrer.

A demurrer will not lie to a portion of

a statement of a cause of action : McCana

V. Penniell893), 100 Cal. 547, 33 Pac. 138;

Lewis V. Town of Brandenburg (1898),

105 Ky. 14. 47 S. W. 862; Sloan v. Rail-

ordinary demurrer will be o treated on
t'. Hill (1 99), 104 \Vi .
4-7, 0 .... . \V. 735.
ju<lU'rnent will not b rever ed on
a cco un t of th e u. taiuing of au i11form· 1
dem urrer to an an wer that doe not tate
fa ct · uffici ent to con t it uce a cau"e of def nee:" Bollman v. emmill (1900), 155
Ind. 33, 5i ~. E. 542; Hau on v. Cru e
(1900), 155 Ind. 1 i6 57 ' . E. 90-L
n order u taininO' a demurrer i appealable altbouO'h no final ju<lO'meut wa
entered or rendered by the court : Bradley 1. filler (1 96), 100 Ia. 169, 69 ~- \V.
426.
An appeal will lie wherever a writ of
error could be u tained : O'Donnell v.
arO'ent & o. (1 9i), 69 Conn. 476, 3
Atl. 216.
The overruling of a demurrer to one
paraO'raph of a complaint will not be reviewed on appeal when the ca e was tried
and judgment rendered for plaintiff on
another paragraph : Robin on v. Dickey
(1 95), 143 Ind. 205, 42 N. E. 679.
'or can error be predicated 011 the
court' action in u taining a demurrer
to an an wer when the fact averred in
the answer were admi ible under a general denial pleaded: Troxel v. Thomas
(1900), 155 Ind . 519, 5 r . E. 725; Nowl in v. tate ex rel. Board of Commi . ion er (1903),- In d. - , 66 ~. K 54; mith
v. Pinnell (1 95), 143 Ind. 4 5, 40 . E.
79 .
ee lau e Printing o. v. Chicago,
etc. Bank (1 96), 1-! 5 Ind. 6 2, 44 N. E .
256, where ame rule was announced in
re pect to a counter-claim and an wer iu
bar.
Where two defence a re pleaded, one
good and the other b·ad, the error in overruling a dP-murrer to the latter defence i
not available, the forme r con tituting a
complete bar to the action: F ire Exti ngui · her Co. v.
ity of Perry {1899),
kla. 429, 5 Pac. 635.
Where it clearly appears that no injury
r ulte<l to def ndant by reason of the
ir: proper O\" rruling of a d murr r for
mi.jfJ in der, th
judgm at ub ~ equently
reu d<'rrrl upou th e complaint will not be
r n>r ·pi): '1 heliu1-. , t wart {I 3), I
C'al. :r;- :!, 34 P ac
61 ;
. eva<lo v. rr
( 1 :J), JOO ('al 2!13 , 34 Pac. 777.

a peal :. -:\le or<l

"Where a demurr r to a p tition which
tate uu rouud for . ub..:tantial damageu ·taine<l, thi ·ourt will not rev r e
the fact
deci"ion m rely becan
.ta ted would utitle J1laintiff to n minal
damage· : ' o k v. ' mitb (19 "3), - Kan.
72 Pac. 524.
'cope of D emu rr r.
A demurrer will not lie to a portion of
a tatement f a cau e of action : Mc ann
v. Pennie (l 93), 100 al.5-!7,3- Pac.If> ;
Lewi v. Town of Brand nburg 1 9 },
105 Ky. 14. 47 . W. 62; loan v. Railway o.(1902 ,64 . . 3 9,42 .E.197;
Bui t v. alvo (1 94), 44 . C. 143, 21
. E. 615 ; teener on v. Great orthern
Ry. o. (I 96) , 64 Minn. 216. 66 . W.
723;
el on v. Merced Couuty (1 9 ),
122 Cal. 6-14, 5 Cal. 4:21. But e Freeman · A ppeal (1 99), 71
onn. 70 , 43
Atl. 1 5.
" \Yhere a pleading i tested by demurrer it mu t tand or fall by it own
averment . It can find neither w akne s
nor trength from other par t of the
record : " Pitt burgh tc. Ry. Co. 1J.
foo re (1 9 ), 152 I nd. 345, 53 . E. 290.
'ee al o D avidson 1'. Gregory (1903), 132
N. C. 3 9, 43 S . E. 916; t rawhac ker v.
I ve ( 1901 ), 114 Ia. 661, 7 . W . 669;
nder on v. Hil ton & D odge Co. (1 99),
110 Ga. 263 34 . E. 365.
B ut ee Chica o Bldg. Co. v. Creamer y o. (1 9 ), 106 Ga. 4 , 31 . E. 09 .
Held in l ougla v. Coonl ey ( 1 98 ), 15&
'N. Y. 521, 51 N. E. 2 3, that wh re an
an wer i d murred to, all the allegati n
of the complaint r ferred to in t he an wer
are to be taken as incor porat d in it .
Wb re a dem urrer i
p cifi ally directed to the e ond cau e of action contained in a cro . -bill, and the oth r a u es
of action therein are u b tantially t he
ame a the econd, the d murrer ,;ill be
con idered as if it went to the ntir cro bill: Hughe v.Pratt( 1900),3 7 re.45, 60
Pac. 707.
Form of D emurrer.
A demurrer in' the word of th
i . uffi ie11t:
' ourke v. i .\' I . i ux
Fall (1 93 ), 4 , . D. 47, 54 :r. W. 1044;
Yan I yke v. D herty (1 96),
J.
. 263,
9 • T. \Y. 200. Th ~ ction of th code
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to exclude evidence of the defence or counter-claim on the ground

that it is informally pleaded.^

to excluue evidenc of th <l fence or counter-claim on the ground
that it i informally pl a<le L 1

requiring that tho demurrer sliall dis-

tinctly specify the grounds of the objection

to the complaint held to mean only that

" when the first ground is relied on the

demurrer must specify whether the want

of jurisdiction is as to the person or sub-

ject-matter ; and when the fourth is relied

on the parties must specify whether the

defect is in parties plaintiff or defendant, "

but in other cases it is sutiicieut to specify

which ground is relied ou as the statute

names them : Hudson v. Archer (1893), 4

S. D. 1 28, 55 N. VV. 1 099.

A demurrer to au answer generally

on the ground that it " does not state

facts sufficient to show that the ])laintiff
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is estopped from maintaining the said

action," does not state a ground for de-

murrer under the code, and should be dis-

regarded : Hill V. Walsh (1894), 6 8. D.

421, 61 N. W. 440. See also Tootle v.

Berkley (1896), 57 Kan. lll,45Pac. 77,

where the demurrer was held iusufficient,

not stating a ground for a demurrer under

the code.

But in Iowa a general demurrer in the

words of the statute is not sufficient in a

law action under Code § 3562, which pro-

vides that " A demurrer must specify and

number the grounds of objection to the

1 This general rule is illustrated by the

following cases, which also furnish exam-

ples of insufficient aud imperfect allega-

requiring that the d murrer hall di tin tly specify th ground of th objection
to th
omplaint held to mean only that
"when the fir t grounJ is r lied on the
demurr r mu ·t sp cify whether the want
of juri. cli tion i a· to th per ou or ubject-matt r; and when the fourth is relied
on the partie mu t p cify whether the
defect i in partie plaintiff or defendant,"
but in other ca e it is nfficient to f'pecify
whi ·h ground i relied on a , the tatute
names them : Hudson v. Archer ( l 93), 4
'. D . 128, 55 I . w. 1099.
A demurrer to au an ·wer general ly
on the ground that it "does not tate
facts sufficient to how thg,t the plain tiff
i estopped from maintaining the said
action," does n ot state a gro und for demurrer under th e code, and should be disregarded: Hill v. Walsh ( 1894), 6 S. D.
421, 61
. W. 440.
See al o Tootle v.
Berkley (l 96), 57 Kan . 111 , 45 Pac. 77,
whern the demurrer was held insuffici ent,
not stating a ground for a demurrer under
the code.
But in Iowa a general demurrer in the
word of the statute is not sufficient in a
law action under Code § 3562, which provides that "A demurrer must specify and
number the grounds of objection to the

pleading , an<l it. hall not be ufficient to
tat the obje tion in th term of th
pr ceding sectiou, except that a demurrer
to an equitable petition for the fifth rea on
of . aid ection may be tated in th t rm
th er of." · e ~toke !'. 'p rague ( l 99),
110 Ia. 9, l N. W. 195. H eld, in In re
l!>tate of McMurray (1 99), 107 Ia. 64 ,
78 . 'V. 691, that a demurrer in a p cial
proceeding mu t pecify the ground of
obj ction. And in Miller v. Cros (I 900),
73 Conn. 53 , 4 Atl. 213, a demurr r
which did not point out the insufficienC'y
wa~ held radically defecti re.
In South Carolina, by Circuit Court
Rule 18, the demurrant mu t state in writing "wherein the pleading objecteJ to i
insufficient;" and it was held a uffici ent
comp1iance with this rule to demur in the
words of the tatute and on the hearing
submit the specific grounds of objection
in writing: Hi ggs v. Home Fire A s'n
(1901) , 61 s. c. 448, 39 s. E. 614.
A demurrer to nn answer in the e
words, " It does not state facts sufficient
to make a good answer to the complaint,"
is not sufficient to present any question
upon the answer. The demurrer bould
state that the an wer does not state facts
sufficient to constitute a cause of defence.

tions : Becker v. Boon, 61 N. Y. 317;

West U. Tel. Co. v. Fenton, 52 Ind. 1 ;

Jones V. Frost, 51 id. 69; Langsdale r.

Girton, 51 id. 99 ; Ready v. Sommer, 37

AVis. 265 ; Bushey v. Keynolds, 31 Ark.

657 ; Simpson Cent. Coll. i'. Bryan, 50

Iowa, 293 ; Penn. Coal Co. v. Blake, 85

N. y. 226, 235; Holcraft v. Mellott, 57

Ind. 539; State v. Newlin, 69 id. 108;

White V. San Rafael, etc. R. Co., 50 Cal.

417 ; Spiers v. Duane, 54 Cal. 176 ; exam-

ples of defective answers, Indianapolis,

B. & W. R. Co. V. Risley, 50 Ind. 60;

Shipman v. State, 43 Wis. 381 ; Nys v.

Biemeret, 44 id. 104; Elmore d. Hill, 46

id. 618 ; Coltzhauser v. Simon, 47 id. 103 ;

nature and effect oisham answeis, Womble

pleadings, and it shall not be sufficient to

state the objection in the terms of the

preceding sectiou, except that a demurrer

to an equital)le petition for the fifth reason

of said section may be stated in the terms

thereof." See Stokes r. Sprague (1899),

110 la. 89, 81 N. W. 195. Held, in In re

Estate of McMurray (1899), 107 la. 648,

78 N. W. 691, that a demurrer in a sjiecial

proceeding must specify the grounds of

objection. And in Miller v. Cross (1900),

73 Conn. 538, 48 Atl. 213, a demurrer

which did not point out the insufficiency

was held radically defective.

In South Carolina, by Circuit Court

Rule 18, the demurrant must state in writ-

1 This general rule is illustrated by the
following cases. which also furnish examples of insufficient and imperfect allegations: Becker v. Boon, 61 N. Y. 317;
West U. Tel. Co. v. Fenton, 52 Ind. 1 ;
Jones v. Frost, 51 id. 69; Langsdale t'.
Girton, 51 id. 99; Ready v. Sommer, 37
Wis. 265; Bushey v. Reynolds, 31 Ark.
657; Simpson Cent. Coll. v. Bryan, 50
Iowa, 293 ; Penn. Coal Co. v. Blake, 85
N. Y. 226, 235; Holcraft v. Mellott, 57
Ind. 539 ;
tate v. Newlin, 69 id. 108;
· White v. an Rafael, etc. R. Co., 50 Cal.
417; Spiers v. Duane, 54 Cal. l 76; examples of defective answers, Indianapolis,
B. & W. R. Co. v. Risley, 50 Ind. 60;
Shipman v. State, 43 Wis. 381 ; Nys v.
Biemeret, 44 id. 104; Elmore v. Hill, 46
id. 61 ; Coltzhauser v. imon, 47 id. 103;
nat ure autl effect of sham answers, Womble

Fraps, 77 N. C. 198; Ranson v. Anderson, 9 S. C. 438; Greenbaum v. Turrill,
57 Cal. 285 ; of frivolous answers, Munger
v. Shannon, 61 N. Y. 251 ; Cottrell v
Cramer, 40 Wis. 555; Hemme v. Hays,
55 Cal. 337; Fay v. Cobb, 51 id. 313;
Dail v. Harper, 83 N. C. 4; Hull v. Carter,
83 id. 249; Brogden v. Henry, 83 id. 274;
Larimore v. Wells, 29 Ohio St. 13; argent v. Steubenville, etc. R. Co., 32 id.
449 ; Ross v . Ross, 25 Hun, 642 ; Lerdall
v. Charter Oak Ins. Co .. 51 Wis. 426 .
[Where a defence i irrelernnt it may
be stricken out on motion : Nat. Distilling
Co. v. Cream City Co. (1 93 ), 86 Wi .
352, 56 N. vV. 864. A motion does not
reach back, like a demu rrer, to the first
defective pleading:
mith i-. Kibling
( 1897), 97 Wis. 205, 72 N. W. 869.J

1'.
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§ 488. * 597. Conflict of Decisions. This general rule is well

settled; Ijut there has been some conflict of decisions in its

488.

*

et l Ll · bu

7. Conflict of Decisions. Thi gen ral rul
here ha b n ome c nfli t of d

w 11
in it

Citing Tliomas v. Goodwine, 88 Ind. 458 ;

Dawson v. Eads (1894). 140 Ind. 208, 39

N. E. 919.

Issues which may be raised by Demurrer.

Whether the allegations of the com-

Citing Thoma v. oodwine,
In d. 45 ;
aw n i•. ad {l 94) 14-0 Ind. 20 , 39
N. E. 919.

plaint entitle the plaintiff to equitable re-

which may be raised by Demurrer.
lief : Devereux i: McCrady (1895), 46

S. C. 133, 24 S. E. 77 ; Meyer v. Gar-

thwaite (1896), 92 Wis. 571, 66 N. W.

704 ; Glover r. Hargadiue-McKittrick Co.

(1901), 62 Neb. 48.'J, 87 N. W. 170 (gen-

eral demurrer) ; GuUickson v. Madsen

<1894), 87 Wis. 19, 57 N. W. 965 (general

demurrer).

But tiiis issue cannot be raised by de-

murrer ore tfiius at the trial : Meyer r.
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Garthwaite (1806), 92 Wi.-;. 571, 66 N. W.

704; Picrstoff v. .Jorges (1893), 86 Wis.

128, 56 N. W. 735; Bigelow v. Town of

Washburn (1898), 98 Wis. 553, 74 N. W.

362 ; Lederer v. Union Sav. Bank (1897),

52 Neb. 133, 71 N. W. 954.

Whether a claim is too stale for equity

to recognize it: Wilson v. Wilson (1902),

41 Ore. 459, 69 Pac. 923. Whether an

action is prematurely brought : Dicker-

mau V. New York, etc. R. R. Co. (J899),

72 Conn. 271, 44 Atl. 228 ; Fiore v. Ladd

(1896), 29 Ore. 528, 46 Pac. 144.

Whether suit is brought in the name

of the real party in interest : J. I. Case

Threshing Co. ;;."Pederson (1894), 6 S. D.

140, 60 N. W. 747 ; Smith v. Security Co.

<1899), 8 N. D. 451, 79 N. W. 981 ; Meyer

V. Barth (1897), 97 Wis. 352, 72 N. W. 748.

Jurisdiction. Cannot be raised by

general demurrer : Woods v. Sheldon

(1896), 9 S. D. 392, 69 N. W. 602.

Corporate capacity, when plaintiff fails

to allege it : Calnan Construction Co. r.

Brown (1899), 110 la. 37, 81 N. W. 163,

citing Sweet v. Ervin, 54 la. 101, and

Andre v. Railway Co., 30 la. 107. But a

general demurrer will not raise this issue :

Sly V. Palo Alto Mining Co. (1902), 28

Wash. 485, 68 Pac. 871.

Authority to sue. Cannot be raised by

denmrrer : Milwaukee v. Zoehrlaut Co.

(1902), 1 14 Wis. 276, 90 N. W. 187.

Whether the facts stated entitle the

plaintiff to any relief: George v. Eduey

(1893), 36 Neb. 604, 54 N. W. 986; West-

ern Union Tel. Co. v. MuUins (1895), 44

Neb. 732, 62 N. W. 880.

Statute of frauds : Wiseman v. Thomp-

son (1895), 94 la. 607, 63 N. W. 346;

Powder River Live Stock Co. v. LamI)

(1893), 38 Neb. 339, 56 N. W. 1019;

Graves r. Clark (1897), 101 la. 738, 69

N. W. 1046; Crane v. Powell (1893), 139

N. Y. 379, 34 N. E. 911 ; Tyuou r. Des-

pain (1896), 22 Colo. 240, 43 Pac. 1039;

Mendelsohn i-. Bauov (1900), 57 S. C 147,

35 S. E. 499. Contra, Hemmings v. Doss

(1899), 125 N. C. 400, 34 S. E. 511.

In Wi'tzteiu v. Boston & M. Min. Co.

th r the allegations of the complaint ntitle the plaintiff to equitable relief : Devereux v. Mc rady {l 95 ), 46
. 133, 24 . E. 77; Ieyer v. arthwait (1 96), 92 \Vi • . 571 , 66 N. W.
704- ; lover i·. Hargadine-l\I Kittrick o.
{l 01}, 62 Neb. 4 3, 7 N. W. 17 (general demurr r);
ullick on v. Madsen
( l 94),
Wi . 19 , 57 N. W. 965 (general
<lemurrer).
But thi i ue annot be rai ed by lemurrer ore tenus at the trial: Meyer t'.
arthwaite {l 96), 92 \Vi;'. 571, 66 N. ~r.
'704- · Pier toff v. Jorge · ( 1 93), 6 Wi .
12 , 56 . \V. 735; Bigelow v. Town of
Wa hburn (1 9<:), 9 Wi . 553, 74 . W.
362 · Lederer v. nion av. Bank (1 97),
52 Neb. 133, 71 . W. 954.
Whether a ·laim i too stale for equity
to recognize it: Wil on v. Wil on ( 1902),
41 Ore. 459, 69 Pac. 923. Whether an
action is prematurely brought: Dickerman v. New York, etc. R.R. Co. (1 99),
72
nn. 271, 44 Atl. 228; Fiore v. Ladd
(1 96), 2
re. 52 , 46 Pac. 144.
Whether uit i brought in the name
of the real party in inter t: J . I. a e
Thre. hing o. v. Peder on (1894), 6 . D.
HO, 60 . W. 747; mith v. ecurity Co.
(1 9 ),
. 451, 79 i:T. W. 9 1; Ieyer
v. Bar h (l 97), 97 Wi . 352, 72 N . W. 74 .
annot be rai 'ed by
J uri diction.
general demurrer: \Vood v.
heldon
(l 96), 9 . D. 392, 69 N. W. 602.
orporate c·apacit , when plaintiff fails
to all O"e it: alnan on traction o. v.
Brown (199), 110 Ia. 37, 1 . W.16:3,
c1t100" weet v. Ervin, 54 Ia. 101, and
ndre i·. Hailway o., 30 Ia. 107. But a
gen er 1 demurrer will not rai:e thi i ·ue:
'ly r. Palo Alto Mining o. (1902), 2
Wa b. 4 5, 6 Pac. 71.
Authority t sue.
annot be rai 'ed by
demurr ·r : )lilwaukee v. Zoehrlaut
o.
(192),114 Wi. 2i6, 90 :r. W. l 7.
' h ther the fa ·t
tated en itle he
plaintiff to Ull!J relief: George v. • dney

Pro dure proYide that a d murrer may
be int rp0. ed to a complaint upon th
fo ll owing grnund: '( 3) Tl at th re i anoth r actiou pending betw en th
ame
partie· for the . arne cau, e.' In order to
inv ke. u c . fully thi ·ground of demurr r, it mu· t appear from th fac of th
complaint ( l) that anoth r a· i n i. pending, (2) that it i b tween th
ame partie, and (3) that iti for the am a u.e."
Each ne of the e r equi ite i arefu ll y
on idered in relation to the pleading in
the a e."

Tenus.
The

of

in
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practical application, and judges have occasionally made use of

very inaccurate language while invoking it, which has tended to

add confusion to a matter which should be kept clear and certain.

Thus, judges of great learning and ability, and who are usually

guarded in their choice of expressions, in discussing the char-

acter of pleadings, both complaints or petitions and answers,

when the objection to them was presented for the first time at

the trial, and evidence in support of the cause of action or

defence was opposed on the ground then first stated, that the

allegations were insufficient, have said, that although the plead-

ing was in fact defective, and even though it zvas so defective as to

be demurrable^ yet, as the adverse party had not demurred, nor

moved to make it more certain, but had gone to trial upon it, he

had thereby waived all objection to its sufficiency.^ This lan-

templation of the statute. lu practice,

this objectiou is properly made upon tlie

trial when evidence under the coin{)laint

is first offered. The ruling upon the ob-
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jection is a mere ruling upon the trial, to

be preserved in the bill of exceptions."

practi al application, an l judg s ha
oc a i nally mad us of
v ry inaccurate language while inv king ii, whi h a t nded to
add confusion t a matter which h ul l b k I t cl ar and c rtain.
Thu , judges of great 1 arning and ability an wh are u ually
guarded in their choice of x r s ion , in
ing th character of pleading , both com lajnts or etiti n and an wers,
when the objection to th m wa presente.d for the fir t time at
the trial, and evidence in upport of the cau
£ action or
-defence was opposed on the ground then fir t tat d, that the
allegations were insufficient, have said, that although the pl ading was in fact defective, and even though it was o defective as to
be demurrable, yet, as the ad verse party had not demurred, nor
moved to make it more certain, but had gone to trial upon it, be
had thereby waived all objection to its sufficiency. 1 This lan-

Speaking Demurrer.

A demurrer which introduces a new

averment or assumes that the ])leadiug

demurred to contains an allegation which

it does not contain, is a speaking demur-

rer, and should be overruled : Clarke v.

East Atlanta Land Co. (1901), 11-3 Ga.

21, 38 S. E. 323; Mathis r. Fordham

templation of the statute. In practice,
this objection is properly made upon the
trial when evidence under the complaint
is first offered. The ruling upon the objection i a mere ruling upon the trial, to
be preserved in the bill of exceptions."

(1901), 114 Ga. 364, 40 S. E. 324; Woods

Speaking De111urre1-.

V. Colony Bank (1901), 114 Ga. 683,40

S. E. 720; Teasley v. Bradley (1900), 110

Ga. 497, 35 S. E. 782 ; Beckner v. Beckner

{1898), 104 Ga. 219, 30 S. E. 622.

Demurrer Exclusive.

Defects which appear on the face of

the pleading and which are grounds for

demurrer, cannot be raised by answer:

Bender v. Zimmerman (1896), 135 Mo. 53,

36 S. W. 210; Medland v. Walker (1895),

96 lia. 175, 64 N. W. 797 ; Clark v. Ross

(1895), 96 la. 402, 65 N. W. 340; Griffith

V. Cromley (1900), 58 S. C. 448, 36 S. E.

738.

A demurrer whi ch introduce· a new
averment or assumes that the pleading
demurred to contain· an allegation which
it does not contain, is a speaking demurrer, and should be overruled: Clarke v.
East Atlanta Land Co. (1901), 113 Ga.
21, 38 S. E. 323; Mathi i•. Fordham
(1901), 114 Ga. 364, 40 S. E. 32-!; Woods
v. Colony Bank (1901), 114 Ga. 6 3,40
S. E. 720; Teasley v. Bradley (1900) , 110
Ga. 497, 35 S. E. 7 2 ; Beckner v. Beckner
(1898), 104- Ga. 219, 30 S. E. 622.
D em urrer E xclusive.

A plaintiff may demur to an answer on

the ground that it does not state a de-

fence, and also move to have it struck

out as frivolous : Badhaiu v. Brabham

(1899), 54 S. C. 400, 32 S. E. 444. A de-

murrer and motion to dismiss are in legal

effect the same, and proceed upon sub-

stantially the same grounds : Cofer v.

Riseling (1900), 153 Mo. 633, 55 S. W.

Defects which appear on the face of
t he pleading and which are grounus for
demurrer, cannot be raised by answer:
Bender v. Zimmerman (1896), 135 Mo. 53,
36 . W. 210; Medland v. Walker ( 1895),
96 fa. 175, 64 N. W. 797 ; Clark v. Ro ·s
(1 95), 96 Ia. 402, 65 . W. 3 -W; Griffith
v. Cromley (1900), 58 S. C. 44- , 36 . E.

235. A demurrer on the ground of an-

73 .

other action pending cannot be sustained

A plaintiff may demur to an an wer on
the ground that it does not tate a defence, and also move to hav e it struck
out a frirnlous: Badham v. Brabham

where there is nothing in the complaint

indicating the pendency of such other

action: Jackson v. McAuley (1895), 13

Wash. 298, 43 Pac. 41.

Frivolous Demurrer.

The Supreme Court of Minnesota, in

Olsen V. Cloquet Lumber Co. (1895), 6i

Minn. 1 7, 63 N. W. 95, said : " A demur-

rer should not be struck out as frivolous

unless it is manifest, without argument,

from a mere inspection of the pleading,

that there was no reasonable ground for

interposing it. It should not be struck

out where there is such room for debate

(1899) 54- S. C. 400, 32 . E. 444. A demurrer and motion to di mi are in legal
effect the same, and proceed upon ubtautially the ame grounds: Cofe r v.
Ri seling (1900), 153 Mo. 633, 55 . W.
235. A demurrer on the ground of another action pend iu g cannot lie sustainetl.
where there is nothin g in the complain t
indicating the peml ency of uch other
action: Jacks on v. McAuley (1895), 13
Wash. 298, 43 Pac. 41.

F rivolous Demurrer.
The Supreme Court of Minn e ota, in
Olsen v. Cloquet Lum ber Co. ( 1 95), 6 l
Minn. 17, 63 N. W. 9.5, aid: "A demurrer should not be struck out a frivolous
unle s it is manifest, without argumen t,
from a mere inspection of the pleading,
that there was no reasonable grouud for
interposing it. It should not be truck
out where there is such room for debate
as to the sufficiency of the pleading demurred to that an attorney of ordinary
intelligence might have interpo ed a demurrer in entire good faith."
ee al o,
Littlefield v. Wm. Bergenthal Co. (l 94) ,
87 Wis. 394, 58 N. W. 743; Geilfu v.
Gales ( 1894-), 8 7 Wi . 395, 5 N. W . 742.J
1 [In First Nat. Bank v. Zeim (1 9!),
93 Ia. 140, 61 X \V. 4 3, the court aid:
"l£ matter plea led a a defence i uot atta ked by motion or demurrer , and th re
i te tim ony to n taill it, it will defeat the
action, although it m:ty uot have amounted

t-1
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giiage is certainly inaccurate, and unnecessarily confuses a subject

wliicli is in itself not free from difficulty. It is, beyond a doubt,

true, that if the answer or other pleading is defective in such a

manner, and to such an extent only, that the proper method of

correction is a motion to make it more definite and certain, and if

the adverse party omits to make the motion, but goes to trial, lie

therebv waives the objection, and cannot raise it by attempting

to shut out evidence of the cause of action or defence. But if

the defect is of such a nature that a denuirrer is pro})er, and the

pleading would be held insufficient upon a demurrer, it is equally

certain that the adverse party does not waive the objection by

going to trial without demurring.^ If the pleading was a com-

plaint or petition, the ground of demurrer would necessarily be,

that it did not state facts sufficient to constitute a cause of action ;

and, by an express provision of all the codes, this ground is not

waived by answering and going to trial. If the pleading was

an answer, the ground of demurrer would still be that the facts

stated did not constitute a defence or counter-claim; and if it did

not, in fact, allege a defence or counter-claim none could be

Generated for facpubupdates (University of Michigan) on 2014-06-17 15:34 GMT / http://hdl.handle.net/2027/uc2.ark:/13960/t02z1c23b
Public Domain / http://www.hathitrust.org/access_use#pd

proved under it at the trial. ^ The rule, with its proper limita-

tions, is a correct one, and operates in the interests of justice

and good faith: but if acted upon in the broad manner as above

recited, it would tend to destroy all certainty and accuracy in

pleading. If the deficiencies are such that a motion is the proper

mode of cure, they are necessarily of form, and not of substance ;

the adverse party is not in fact misled ; and a neglect on his part

to apply the remedy in an early stage of the cause ought to be

and is a waiver of all objection, so that the cause of action or

defence, as the case may be, can be proved, notwithstanding the

ambiguity and indefiniteness of the averments.

§ 489. * 598. Same Subject. Adopting the rule in this re-

stricted scope, there are still cases of doubt and of conflict in

its application. In some answers a defect of substance is plain ;

to a legal defence." CitingConger i-. Cral)- 2 [^See Wintrode v. Reiibarger (1898),

tree, 83 la. 53G, .5.') N. W. 335; Linden r. L50 Ind. 5.50, 50 N. E. 570, where it was

Green, 81 la. 365, 46 N. W. 1108 ; Benja- held that a demurrer on the ground that

niin V. Veith, 80 la. 149, 45 N. W. 731.] facts were not stated " sufficient to cousti-

' [^See note on Waiver of Defects of tute a good answer to the complaint of the

Suhstance, p. 605. But see also Wilson c jdaintifF" does not raise the question of

Abenleen (1901), 25 Wash. 614, 66 I'ac. tlie sufficiency of the answer to state a

9.-. ; Klcjtz V. James (1896), 97 la. 337, 66 defence.]

N. W. 190.]

gu e i " certainl inaccur, t
' hich i in it 1 n t fr fr
ru that jf th e " n "w r r

uch a
m.urner, cUl t
x
1 r l er m h l f
c rr d ion i < moti n
mak it more <l ni an l c rtain and if
th ac.1v r par omit to mak: th moti n, but
t trial h
th r b ' \Ye i ' th
bj ti n and
t
hut out vi lenc f the au ,
h l f ct i of u h a n t ur that a l murr r i
ro1 r and th
pl adin w uld be h 11 insuffici nt u n , l murr r, it i quall
c rtain tl a he a lv r
part cl es not waiv
bje ti n by
1
gom
tria.l ' ithout d murring.
l£ th pl a ling ' a a ' mplc int r p titian th gro und of demurr r ' uld ne
arily b ,
that it lid not tate fa t uffici nt o con t itut a u
f a t i n;
and b an expr
provi ion of all th ode this gr un l i n t
waived by an w ring and going t trial. If the pl adin wa ·
an an. w r the ground of cl murrer would still b that th fact
tat d <lid noL con t itute a d fence or counter-claim; and if it did
n t in fa , all ge a cl fence or ounter-claim none could be
proved uncl r it at the trial. 2 Tl e rul with it pr per limit ti n i .. a correct one, an l op rat in the intere t of ju ice
, nd good fai h · but if act d u on in the broad manner as ab e
r cite 1 it would tend t d troy all certainty and accurac in
pl a<lin . If the deficien •i ar u h that a motion i the prop r
mo le of cure they are n c arily f form, and not of ub tan
th adv r
art is not in fact mi ' l d; and a negl ct on his part
t apply th r medy in an early stage of the cause ought to
and i a wai r of all obj ction, so that the au of action r
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a the ca e may be, can be pro d, n twitbs anding the
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. Same Subje ct. A<lop ing th
rul
r th re ar
ill
of d u t
nflict in
In m an
t
lain;
ti

in

DEFECTIVE ANSWERS.

DEFECTIVE ANSWERS. 717

717

the facts alleged clearly constitute no defence: in others the

delicicncies are as plainly formal; the necessary facts are all

mentioned; no doubt can exist as to the actual intent and mean-

ing, hut still some requirements as to form and method have

not been complied with. Between tliese two extremes there are

cases bordering upon the dividing-line, in which it is difhcult

to determine with certainty whether the defect is one of form

merely, or whether it passes the limit, and is one of substance.

In such instances we shall naturally find a conflict of decision

among different judges, and we shall even discover the same

court vacillating, in one case applying the liberal doctrine and

holding the objection waived, and, in another not essentially

different, enforcing the stricter rule, pronouncing the answer

entirely bad, and wholly rejecting it. In some of the decisions

to which I shall refer, it would seem that able courts have neg-

lected their own precedents, and forgotten the rule imposed upon

them by the statute, which abrogates the inequitable common-

law doctrine of an interpretation adverse to the pleader, and

requires a liberal construction with a view to substantial justice
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between the parties. It is only by a comparison and analysis of

these decisions that a practical result can be reached, and a gen-

eral principle deduced ; and I shall therefore cite, either in the

text or in the notes, the leading cases which have passed upon

this important question.

§ 490. * 599. Defects of Form are Curable by Motion. The

authorities are uniform that a mere defect of form, as it has

been already described, must be cured by a motion, and not by

a demurrer.^ In an action to foreclose a purchase-money mort-

1 ^General Rules as to Motions. appealable. If to the latter, it can only

The determination of a motion is not be considered on appeal from the final

res judicata, so as to prevent parties from judgment. " Allen v. Church (1897), 101

drawing the same matters in question la. 116, 70 N. W. 127. A motion to strike

again in an action : Heidel v. Benedict out a pleading and the ruling of the court

(1894), 61 Minn. 170, 63 N. W. 490. The thereon can only be made a part of the

test as to whether the ruling on a motion record by bill of exce])tions or by order of

is appealable before judgment is this: court: Allen v. Hollingshead (1900), 15.5

"Does the part of the pleading assailed Ind. 178, 57 N. E. 917. A pleading which

show a distinct cause of action, or is sets up the proper facts will be considered

it a mere incident thereto ? Does the as a motion although not so designated :

ruling go to the plaintiff's right to re- Waldo v. Thweatt (1897), 64 Ark. 126, 40

cover, or merely to the amount of his re- S. W. 782.

th fa ts all ged clearly onsti tu te no d f nc : in other the
deficienci s are a plainly formal; the nee ssary fa ts ar all
mentioned.; no doubt can exi t a to the a tual intent and m aning, but still some requirern nts a to form and m th d hav
not b en complied with. Betw n these two extr m .s th r are
cases bordering upon the dividing-line, in whi h it i difficult
to determine with c rtainty wh th r th defect is one of form
merely, or whether it passes the limit, and is one of sub tauc .
In such instances we shall naturally find a conflict of d cision
among different judges, and we shall even discover the same
court vacillating, in one case applying the liberal doctrine and
holding the objection waived, and, in another not es entially
different, enforcing the stricter rule, pronouncing the answ r
entirely bad, and wholly rejecting it. In some of the decisions
to which I shall refer, it would seem that able courts have neglected their own precedents, and forgotten the rule impo ed upon
them by the statute, which abrogates the inequitable commonlaw doctrine of an interpretation adverse to the pleader, and
requires a liberal construction with a view to substantial justice
between the parties. It is only by a comparison and analysi of
these decisions that a practical result can be reached, and a general principle deduced; and I shall therefore cite, either in the
text or in the notes, the leading cases which have passed upon
this important question.
§ 490. * 599. Defects of Form are Curable by Motion. The
authorities are uniform that a mere defect of form, as it has
been already described, must be cured by a motion, and not by
a demurrer. 1 In an action to foreclose a purchase-money mort-

covery on a ground otherwise pleaded ^ Pleading over after a motion has been

If the order relates to the former, it is overruled waives objection to tlie ruling :

1

[ Gene1·al Rules as to Motions.

The determination of a motion is not
res .fiidicata, . o as to prevent parties from
drawing the same matters in question
again in an action : Heidel 1i. Benedict
(1894), 61 Minn . 170, 63 N. W. 490. The
test as to whether the ruling on a motion
is appealable before judgment i thi :
"Does the part of th e pleading assailed
:how a distinct cau, e of action, or is
it a mere in cid ent thereto~
Does the
ruling go to the plaintiff's right to recover , or merely to the amount of hi recovery on a ground otherwi. e pleaded '1
If the order relates to the former, it is

appealable. If to the latter, it can only
be considered on appeal from the final
judgment ." Allen v. Church (189i), 101
Ia. 116, 70 N. W. 127. A motion to strike
out a pleading and the ruling of the court
thereon can only be made a part of the
record by bill of exceptious or by order of
court: Allen v. Hollingshead (1900), 155
Ind. 178, 57 N. E. 917. A pleading which
sets up the proper facts will be considered
as a motion although not o de ig-nated:
Waldo v. Thweatt (1 97), 64 Ark. 126, 40

s. w.

782.

Pleading over after a motiou ha. been
O\'erruled waives objection to tile ruling :
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f 1 nd con eyed by the plai ntiff to the defendant, be an-

gage of land convej^ed by the plaintiff to the defendant, the an-

swer set up covenants in the deed of conveyance, and a breach

of them, namely, "that the plaintiff was not seised of the

premises, as of a good and indefeasible estate in fee," etc.,

negativing all the covenants. To this the plaintiff replied,

and instead of averring "that he was seised," etc., said, "And

the i)laintiff denies that at the time, etc., he was not seised in

fee of the said premises," etc., and in this manner met all the

allesrations of the answer. The defendant demurred for insuffi-

ciency. It was held by the court that " insufficiency " as a ground

of demurrer implies that the allegations do not constitute any

defence or denial to the adverse pleading. The insufficiency

relates to the substance of the averments as a whole, rather

than to the form of the expression. The reply in this case

was defective in form, but the substiince thereof was good;

that is, it stated a denial in an improper manner, and the

remedy therefor was not by demurrer, but by motion to render

the allegations more definite and certain. ^ Although this de-
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cision was made in reference to a reply, the principle applies

equally to an answer.

Walser v. Wear (1897), 141 Mo. 443, 42

S. W. 928 ; Sprinfrfield, etc. Co. v. Dono-

van (1899), 147 Mo. 622, 49 S. W. 500;

Buugenstock v. Nishnabotna Drainage

Dist. (1901), 163 Mo. 198, 64 S. W. 149.

A motion which cannot be sustained

substantially as made must be overruled :

Palmer v. Bank of Ulysses (1899), 59

Neb. 412, 81 N. W. 303 ; First Nat. Bank

.\ r et up cov nan ts in th le cl of com eyance and a bre ch
that the plaintiff wa n t sei ed of be
f them namel
l remi
a of a good and indefea ible estate in f e ' etc.
n gativinO' all the covenant . To this the laintiff repli d,
and instead of averring that he wa ei ed ' etc. aid, ' An
the lain tiff denie that at the tim e etc ., he was not sei ed in
fee of the said premise
etc. and in thi manner met all tbe
all gation of the an wer. The def ndant demurred for insufficienvy. It was held by the court that insufficiency 'a a ground
of demurrer implies that the allegations do not con titute any
defence or denial to the adverse pleadin 0 • The in u:fficiency
r la e to the substance of the averments a a whole, rather
than to the form of the expres ion. The reply in this case
wa defective in form, but the substftnce thereof wa good ·
that is, it stated a denial in an improper manner and the
remedy therefor was not by demurrer, but by moti n to render
the allegations more definite and certain. 1 Although thi dec1 10n wa made in reference to a reply the principle applies.
qually to an answer.

V. Engelbercht (1899), 58 Neb. 639, 79

N. W. 556 ; Dobry r. Western Mfg. Co.

(1899), 58 Neb. 667^79 N. W. 559 ; Draper

V. Taylor (1899), 58 Neb. 787, 79 N. W.

709; lludelson v. First Nat. Bank (189S),

56 Neb. 247, 76 N. W. 570; Beebe v. Lati-

mer (1899), 59 Neb. 305, 80 N. W. 904.

A motion to strike another motion is

not proper practice : German Savings

Bank v. Cady (1901), 114 la. 228, 86

N. W. 277; Long v. Ruch (1897), 148

Ind. 74, 47 N. E. 156; Bonfoy r Goar

(1894), 140 Ind. 292, 39 N. E. 56. Nor is

it proper to demur to a motion : Bonfoy

I'. Goar (1894), 140 Ind. 292, 39 N. E. 56.]

' Flanders i^. McVickar, 7 Wis. 372,

377. See, to the same effect, Speuce r.

Spence, 17 Wis. 448, 454; Hart i;. Craw-

ford, 41 Ind. 197; Snowden v. Wilas, 19

lud. 10 ; Fultz V. Wycoff, 25 Ind. 321 ;

l'h(enix v. Lamb, 29 Iowa, 352, 354; First

Nat. Bk. of New Berlin v. Church, 3

N. Y. S. C. 10. The answer averred that

defendant " had no knowledge or infor-

mation thereto," which was held to be an

improper form of denial : but the plain-

tiff '.s remedy was by motion, and the de-

fect liad been waived. Seeley v. Engell,

13 N. Y. .542, 548, per Denio J.: "The

alleged mistake was set up in the answer,

and denied by the reply. If the allegation

in that respect was too general in its

terms, the remedy of the plaintiff was by

motion, under § 160, to compel the de-

fendant to make it more certain." See

also Stringfellow r. Alderson, 12 Kan.

112; Lathrop i-. Godfrey, 6 N. Y. S. C. 96 ;

Hutchiugs i". Castle, 48 Cal. 152 ; Jackson

Sharp Co. v. Holland, 14 Fla. 384, 389 ; a

Walser v. Wear (1897 ), 141 Mo. 443, 42
. W. 92 ; pringfield, etc. Co. v. D ono·
vau (1899), 147 Mo. 622, 49 S. W. 500;
Bungen tock v.
ishnab otna Drainage
Di 't. ( 1 01 ), 163 Mo. 198, 64 S. W. 149.
A motion which cannot be sustained
substantially a made mu t be overruled:
Palmer v. ·Bank of Ulysses {1899), 59
eb. 412, l N. W. 303; Fir. t Nat. Bank
v. Engelbercht ( l 99), 5 Neb. 639, 79
. W. 536; Dobry r . We tern Mfg. Co.
(l 99), 5 Neb. 667 , 79 N. W. 559; Draper
1. T aylor (1 99), 5
eb. 7 7, 79 . W.
709; Hudel on v. Fir t .i. Jat. Bank (1 9 ),
56 eb. 247, 76 N. W. 57 0 ; Beebe v. Lati·
mer (1 9 ), 59 Neb. 305, 80 -. W. 904.
A motion to trike another motion i
not proper practice : G rman
aYin g s
a nk v. Cady (1901), 114 Ia. 22, 6
. W. 277 ; Long v. Ruch ( 1 9~) , 14
Iu d. 74, 47
. E . 156; Bonfoy v Goar
( 1894}, 140 Ind . 292, 39 N. E. 56 . Nori
it proper to demur to a motion : onfoy
1
oar (1 94), 140 Ind. 292, 39 . E. 56.J
t Flander v. Mc ickar, 7 Wi . 372,
3 7.
e, to the a me effe , p n e v.
'pence, 17 '\Vi . 44 , 454; Hart v. raw1•

ford, 41 I nd. 197 ; ~nowden v. Wilas, 19
Ind. 10 ; F ultz v. Wycoff 25 Intl. 321;
l he.en ix v. Lamh, 29 Iowa, 352, 354 · Fir t
... at. Bk. of New Berlin v.
hurch , 3
. Y. . C. 10. The au wer averr <.I that
defendant " had no know le<lg or information thereto," whi ch wa h!'lld to be an
improper form of denial· but th e plaintiff ' remedy wa, by motion, and tbe defect had been waived.
eeley v. Engell
13 N. Y. 542, 548, per Denio J. : ' The
alleged mi take wa et up iu the an wer,
and deni d by the reply. If the allegation
in that respect wa too er neral in it
term , the r emedy of the plaintiff was by
motio n, und r § 160 to comp I the defendant to make it mor certa in ."
ee
al o trin gf 11 w 1•.
ld r on 12 Kan.
112 ; r~athr p v. odfrey 6 :N . 1: . . . 96;
Hutching v. a tle, 4 Cal. 152; Ja k on
harp o. v. Holland, 14 Fla. 3 4, 3 9 ; a
fortiori u h an an w r cann t b objected
to for the fir t tim n app al.
Lake up. & a . Fu e
. 46
, e al.
[c own t'. 1 , w n, 29
130; Ilagely v. Hag ly, 6 ,al. 34 .
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§ 491. * 600. Defects of Form are v/aived by Neglect to move,

and Going to Trial. Test of Formal Defects. That all objections of

mere form to the answer are waived by a neglect to move, and

by going to trial thereon, is sustained by numerous cases ; ^ and

some of them apply the rule to answers in which the deficien-

cies were very considerable, even so great as to have rendered

the pleading demurrable in the opinion of the court pronouncing

the decision. In White v. Spencer, ^ which was an action for

flowing plaintiff's lands, the answer set up facts showing a

user and enjoyment by defendant of the easement for more than

twenty years, but did not aver that this user was adverse. The

plaintiff replied a general denial, and on his objection all evi-

dence in support of the answer was excluded at the trial. On

appeal from the judgment rendered in favor of the plaintiff,

the New York Court of Appeals held that the user must be

adverse, and that the plaintiff might have successfully de-

murred to the answer, because an averment of such adverse

user was omitted; but that, by replying, and going to trial, he

had waived the objection. Denio J. said: "I am of opinion
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that the plaintiff, having treated the allegation in the answer as

a sufficient statement of defence by replying to it, and by going

to trial without objection, is precluded from objecting to evi-

dence to sustain it." He cited cases showing that the same rule

prevailed under the old system,^ and added: "We have decided,

it is true, that it is the duty of the judge on the trial to reject

evidence offered in support of immaterial issues.^ But an issue

is not immaterial, within the meaning of this rule, on account of

the omission of some averment in a pleading which is essential to

the full legal idea of the claim or defence which is attempted to

be set up. If the court can see, as in this case, what the matter

really attempted to he pleaded is, the issue is not immaterial,

though it may be defectively stated." In this last sentence

Mr. Justice Denio has given a very clear and accurate descrip-

tion of mere defects in form, which are waived by a neglect to

1 [^See note on Imperfect, Incomplete, - White v. Spencer, 14 N. Y. 247, 249,

and Informal Allegations, p. 599. See also 251.

Barrett v. Baker (1896), 136 Mo. 512,37 3 Meyer v. McLean, 1 Johns. 509; 2

S. W. 130. " A bad answer is good enough id. 183; Reynolds v. Lounsbury, 6 Hill,

for a bad complaint : Hiatt c. Town of 534.

Darlington (1898), 152 Ind. 570, 53 N. E. * Corning v. Corning, 6 N. Y. 97.

825.3

§ 491. * 600 .

D efects of Form are waived by Neglect to move,

Thal all oLj Li un · of
m r form to the an w rare waiY cl by a n gl' ·t tc mu\· .u1d
by g ing to trial thereon, i u tain d Ly num ·r u a · .· : 1 an<l
some of them apply the rul to an w I" in wbi h th d ·fi ienci s were very consid rabl , ven ·o gr at a · to ha.
r ·nd r cl
the pleading demurrabl in the opinion of th court pronouncing
the decision . In White v. 'penc r, 2 which wa an acii n for
flowing plaint iff'.:; land , th an wer
t up facts howin 0 a
user an<l en joyment by defendant of the easem nt for more than
twenty years, but did not av r that this u er was adverse. The
plaintiff replied a general cl nial, and on hi· objection all c i<lence in support of the answ r wa exclud d at the trial.
n
appeal from the judgment rendered in favor of the laintiff
the New York Court of Appeals held that the u er mu t b
adverse, and that the plaintiff might have successfully demurred to the answer, because an averment of such adYer
user was omit ted; but that, by replying, and going to trial, he
had wai ved the objection. Denio J. said : "I am of opinion
that the plaintiff, having treated the allegation in the answer as
a sufficient state ment of defence by replying to it, and by going
to trial without objection, is precluded from objecting to evidence to sustain it. " He cited cases showing that the same rule
prevailed under the old system, 3 and added: "We have decided,
it is true, that it is the duty of t he judge on the trial to reject
evidence offered in suppor t of immaterial issues . 4 But an is ue
is not immaterial, within the meaning of this rule, on account of
the omission of some averment in a pleading which is es ential to
the full legal idea of the claim or defence which is attempted to
be set up. If the cr;;urt can see, as in this case, what the matter
really attempted to be pleaded is, the issue is not immaterial,
though it may be defectively stated." In this last sentence
Mr. Justice Deni o has given a very clear and accurate description of mere defects in form, which are waived by a neglect to
and Going to Trial.

Test of F ormal Defects.

1 [
ee note on Imperfect, Incomplete,
and luformal Allegations, p. 599. See al o
13arrett 1•. Baker {1896), 136 Mo. 512, 37
·. W. 130. " A bad answer is good enough
for a bad complaint: Hiatt v. Town of
Da rlington (1898), 152 Ind. 570, 53 N. E.

825 .]

2

\Vhite

1

i:.

Srencer, 14 N. Y. 24i, 249,

251.
3 feyer v. McLean, l Johns. 509 ; 2
id. 183 ; Reynold v. Lonn bury, 6 Hill,
534.
4 Corning v. Corning, 6 N. Y. 97.
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correct them by motion. Whether the principle was properly-

applied to the case before him, is, as it seems to me, more than

questionable. The answer did not attempt to state an adverse

user, and simply fail to state it with accuracy; it omitted any

such averment entirely; it therefore set up no defence at all.

When it is said that, if the court can plainly see what the matter

really attempted to be pleaded is, the deficiency is formal, it is

not intended that the court may be able, from their knowledge

as lawyers and their experience as judges, to guess with reason-

able certainty what the pleader designed ; they must be able to

gather from the legal import of the facts which are alleged —

although improperly alleged — the nature of the defence relied

on; in other words, the substantial facts which constitute that

defence must, in some manner, appear on the record. A defence

of fraud could hardly be considered sufficient at the trial, from

which all averments of the scienter had been omitted ; and yet a

fact was here wholly left out of the answer which was as essen-

tial in making up the defence as the guilty knowledge is to con-

stitute the fraud. Although the reasoning of Mr. Justice Denio
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is admirable in its definition of the general rule, his conclusion

cannot be reconciled with some subsequent decisions of the same

court.

§ 492. * 601. Case of Simmons v. Sisson. In Simmons v.

Sisson, the subject was discussed at large both upon principle

and upon authority. ^ The reasoning of the court, and the

1 Simmons v. Sisson, 26 N. Y. 264, in his own wrong. On the trial, the

271. The action was brought by the referee held that this answer admitted

plaintiff, treasurer of a corporation, the allegations of the complaint, that the

against the defendants, as stockholders, plaintiff had expended the sum mentioned

The complaint alleged that the plaintiff over and above the earnings, and had

had. by order of the directors, advanced done this by order of the directors. On

orrect them by motion. ""Whe her he principle wa properly
J?li d t the ca e before him, i a it eem to m , m r than
qu ionable. The answer did not attempt to state an adver e
u er an
imply fail to tate it with accuracy; it omitted any
uch av rment entirely; it therefore et up no defence at all.
When it is aid that, if the court can plainly see what the matter
really attempted to be pleaded i , the deficiency is formal, it is
not intended that the court may be able, from their knowledge
a lawyers and their experience a judge , to guess with rea onabl , certainty what the pleader de::;igned · they must be able to
gather from the legal import of the facts which are alleged although improperly alleged - the nature of the defence relied
on; in other words, the substantial fact which constitute that
d fence must, in some manner, appear on the record. A defence
of fraud could hardly be con idered sufficient at the trial, from
which all averments of the scienter had been omitted; and yet a
fa ct was here wholly left out of the answer which was as es ential in making up the defence as the guilty knowledge i to conti tute the fraud. Although the reasoning of Mr. Justice Denio
i admirable in its definition of the general rule, his conclu ion
cannot be reconciled with some subsequent decision of the same

and e.xpended a certain sura more than :ippeal from the judgment rendered in

he had received from its funds, and that favor of the plaintiff, Selden J., who de-

the corporation was indebted to him livered the opinion of the court, declared

therefor. The answer contained two de- that the fir.st defence was the exact equiv-

fences, — 1. It denied that the corpora- alent of «// (/e/)ef at the common law, and

tion was indebted to the plaintiff in said was a good general denial under the

c~:mrt.

s 492. * 601.

In Simmons v.
i son, the subject was discussed at large both upon principle
and upon authority. 1 The reasoning of the court, and the
Case of Simmons v . Sisson.

sum, or in any other sum ; 2. It alleged code, and tlien proceeded as follows :

that the plaintiff had been directed by " But whether the preceding position ia

the corporation to expend the earnings correct or not, it was too late to object at

thereof, and no more ; that with knowl- the clo.se of the trial that this divi.sion of

edge of such direction, and of the amount the answer did not put the fact of indebt-

of such earnings, he had expended more edne.ss in issue. Under the former sy.s-

than said amount, contrary to the wishes tem of pleaiiing, nil (lelmt to an action of

and instructions of the corporation, and debt on bond or judgment was bad ou

immons v. i son , 26 N. Y . 264,
The action wa brought by the
plain t iff, t rea urer of a corpornti on,
ag ain t t he defendants, as tockh older .
The complaint alleged that the plaintiff
had, by ord er of th e directors, advan ced
and ex pended a certain sum more than
he had rece ived from its fund s, and th a t
t he co rporation wa indebted to him
therefor . T he a n wer co ntained t wo defence , - l. It deni d that th e co r poration wa in de bted t o t he plaintiff in a id
um, or in any other sum ; 2. It all egP<l
that t he plain t iff had been directed hy
th co r po rat ion to expen d the earnin g
th reo f, and no more; that with knowledge of uch d irecti on, and of the amount
of ·nch earni ngs, h had exp nd ed more
than '>:lid am oun , ontrnry to th e wi. h s
a ud i11 ' t raction of t he corporation, aud
27 l .

in his own wrong.
n the trial, the
referee held that this an wer admitt d
the allegation of the complaint, that the
plaintiff had expended the um mention cl
over and above the earning , and had
done thi uy order of the director .
n
appeal from the judgment render d in
favor of the plaintiff, el<len J ., who deli v red the opini n of the court, declared
that the fir t defence wa the exact equiv·
al nt £ nil debet at the common Jaw, and
wa a ood ge neral denial und r the
c de, and tl1 n proceed d a foll w :
" But wh ether the preceding po ition i
corr t or not, it wa too late to obj rt at
the clo e f th e trial that thi divi i n of
th e an w r <lid n t put th f t f ind utedn . in i ·. u .
nd r th form r y::.t m of pl a<l ing, nil d bet t an a tion o(
debt ou uoou or judgment was bad u
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decision upon it, are, in the main, in perfect accord with the

spirit and letter of the codes, and well express the liberal design

of the reformed procedure. The only criticism which must be

made upon the opinion — and it is a most important one — is

upon that portion which draws analogies from the common-law

system. Certainly none of the special common-law rules which

distinguished the cases in which a particular form of general

issue could be used, and which defined the office of a demurrer

either general or special as applied to such pleas, are preserved ;

they have all been swept away, and any trace of them only serves

to obscure the clear principles which find an expression in the

codes. 1

§ 493. * 602. Additional Cases. In an action upon a promis-

sory note, the defendant, an accommodation -maker, pleaded the

defence of payment by the payee, and on the trial proved, under

objection, a delivery of lumber by said payee to the plaintiff, and

the receipt thereof by him in full satisfaction of the demand.

general demurrer ; but if, instead of de-
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murring, tlie plaintiff went to trial on that

issue, it was always held to put him to

proof of his cause of actiou. Starkie on

Ev. 140; 2 Phil. Ev. Cow. & H.'s ed.

168; I Ch. PI. (Springfield ed. 1844)

4.33; Meyer v. McLean, 2 Johns. 183;

decision upon it, are, in the main, in perfect accord with the
spirit and letter of the code , and w ll xpress th liberal d ign
of the reformed procedure. The only criiici m which must b
made upon the opinion - and it is a most important one - is
upon that portion which chaw analogi s from the common-law
system. Certainly none of the special common-law rul whi h
distinguished the cases in which a particular form of general
issue could be used, and which defined the office of a demurrer
either general or special as applied to such pleas, are pre erved;
they have all been swept away, and any trace of them only serves
to obscure the clear principles which find an expression in the
codes. 1
§ 493. * 602. Additional Cases. In an action upon a promissory note, the defendant, an accommodation-maker, pleaded the
defence of payment by the payee, and on the trial proved, under
objection, a delivery of lumber by said payee to the plaintiff, and
the receipt thereof by him in full sati faction of the demand.

Push V. Cobbett, 2 Johns. Cas. 256, per

Radcliff J. ... I think, therefore, that

under the strictest rules of special plead-

ing, the first defence of the answer, if not

objected to as insufficient before trial by

demurrer, would always have been held

sufficient, ou tlie trial, to put in issue the

cause of action ; and that, in view of the

provisions of the code in reference to

the construction of pleadings, tlie referee

erred in holding that the defendants had

admitted the indebtedness of tlie corpo-

ration, when they expressly denied it.

There are, I think, much stronger rea-

sons now for holding such an answer suf-

ficient, on the trial, to put the question of

indebtedness in issue than there were

when the decisions were made to which

I have referred. Parties are now pro-

vided with short and cheap methods by

motion to compel defective pleadings to

he amended, stricken out, or that judg-

ment be pronounced upon them summa-

rily ; and they can have no excuse fur

reserving such objections until the close

of the trial. I am of opinion, that, when

that course is taken, the party must

stand u])on the pleadings and evidence

together ; that the judgment must be such

as tlie whole case, pleadings and evidence

united, demands; and tliat it would be

the duty of the court, under § 176, to dis-

regard defects in the pleadings not before

noticed, or to order the required amend-

ments under §§ 170, 173. If, however,

the case should be such as to satisfy tlie

court tliat neither party had been misled

by defects in the pleadings, it should be

disposed of under § 169."

1 Even though the general issue nil

debet, when improperly pleaded in debt

upon a specialty, might be reached by, a

general demurrer, it is very clear that the

first defence in the case above mentioned

general demurrer; but if, instead of demurring, t he plaintiff went to trial on that
issue, it was always held to put him to
proof of his cause of action. Starkie on
Ev. 140; 2 Phil. Ev. Cow. & H. 's ed.
16 8; 1 Ch. PL ( 'pringfield eu. l 44)
433; Meyer v. McLean, 2 Johns. 183;
Hush v. Cobbett, 2 Johns . Cas. 256, per
Radcliff J . . . . I thi11k, therefore, that
under the strictest rules of special pleading, the first defence of the answer, if not
objected to as immfficient before trial by
demurrer, would always have been held
sufficient, on the trial, to put in issue the
cause of action ; and that, in view of the
provisions of the code iu reference to
the construction of pleadin gs, the referee
€rred in holding that the defendants had
.admitted the indebtedness of the corporation, when they expre sly denied. it.
There are, I think, much stronge r reasons now for holding such an answer sufficient, on the trial, to put the question of
indehted ne s in issue than there were
when the decisions were made to which
I have referred. Parties are now provided with short and cheap method · by
motion to compel defe<.:ti ve pleadings to
he amended, stricken out, or that judgment be pronounced upon them summarily ; and they can have no excuse for

reserving uch objections until the close
of the trial. I am of opinion, that, when
that course is take n, the party must
stand upon the pleadings and evidence
together; that the judgment must be such
as the whole ca e, pleadings and. evidence
united, demands; and that it would be
the duty of the court, under § 176, to disregard defects in the pleadings not before
noticed, or to order the required amendments under §§ 1 iO, 173. If, however,
the case should be such as to satisfy the
court that neither party had been misled
by defects in the pleadings, it should be
disposed of und er§ 169."
1 Even though the general issue nil
debet, when improperly pleaded in debt
upon a specialty, might be reached by a
general demurrer, it is very clear that the
first defence in the case above mentioned
was not denmrrable upon any true construction of the provi iou found in the
codes. It was an allempted denial, and it
actually contained denials : its real defect was that it denied the legal conclusion from the facts alleged by the plaintiff,
and not the facts themselves. The only
proper mode to correct it would h::i 1·e
been a motion. All that was said of its
resemblance to 11il dehPt wns utterly outside of the que tions before the court.
46
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The- New York Court of Appeals, after holding that the answer

was good, and that under a defence of payment the defendant

may prove a payment in cash or in any other manner, added:

" If the particulars of the transaction between the payee and the

plaintiff were not sufficiently disclosed b}' the answer, the plain-

tiff's remedy was a motion under § IGO of the code. He could

not accept the plea, and go to trial upon it, and then interpose

the objection for the first time that it was not sufficiently de-

scriptive of the particulars relied on as constituting payment."^

In Chamberlain c. Painsville, etc. R. R.,- the Supreme Court of

Ohio applied the rule sanctioned by Simmons v. Sisson to an

answer equally faulty with the one in the latter case in its denial

of legal conclusions rather than of issuable facts. The action

being upon a promissory note, the answer was, " That the said

note in said petition mentioned was and is wholly without con-

sideration, and void." No motion was made to compel more

specific averments, and the parties went to trial. The court,

after saying that the defendant might have been required to

make the defence more definite and certain, added : " Under
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the broad issue thus chosen by the parties, any evidence would

have been admissible which tended to impeach or sustain the

consideration of the note."' The answers in this case and in

Simmons v. Sisson closely resembled each other in their defects

and in their violation of the principles of pleading introduced by

the codes. In both, the defendants designed to raise an issue of

fact which would go to the whole cause of action. The defect

was not a misconception of the defence, nor a reliance on matters

which constituted no defence ; it was only an imperfect manner

of stating a defence which was in itself perfect. Under a true

construction of the codes, neither of these answers was demur-

rable. If the plain distinction established by the statutes is

to be preserved, it is clear that a motion to make the plead-

ing more definite and certain is the only mode of curing defects

of this kind. I am aware that demurrers have been sustained

to such defences, on the ground tliat they were conclusions

of law, and not allegations of fact; but the courts have some-

times overlooked the distinctions in this respect created by the

legislature.

1 Farmfirs' &, Cit. Bk. v. Sherman, 33 - Chamberlain i.-. Painesville & H. R.

N. V. 69, 79. Co., 15 Ohio St. 2'->5, 251.

' he· ... -ew York Court of ppeal af er holding hat tbe an n er
"
gootl and 1 at under a lefence of pa m nt h <l f nclant
may proYe a payment in ca h or in any other manner a Id d:
·If the particular of the ran action between th paye and the
plaintiff w r not uffici ntly di clo"e l b ~ the answer th plaintiff remedy wa a motion under lGO of the co<le. H ·ould ,
not accept h plea, and g o trial upon it, and then int rpo e
the objection for the fir t time that it wa not ufficien ly decrip i e of he par iculars relied n a constituting payment. 1
In hamberlain v. Pain iJle, etc.
. 2 the
ourt of
Ohio applied the rule sanctioned by immon v. i on o an
an wer equally faulty with the one in the latter ca e in i denial
of 1 gal concln ion rather than of i uable fact . The ac ion
bein 0 upon a promi ory note, the an wer wa ' That the aid
not in aid pe i ion mentioned was and i wholly without con
ideration, and void." No motion was made to comp 1 more
specific averments, and the partie went to trial. The court
after aying that the defendant might have be n required to
make the cl fence more definite and certain, ad<l d :
Tnder
the broad issu thus chosen by the parties, an e id nee would
have been admis ible which tended to impeach or n tain the
con ideration of the note . ' The an wers in this case and in
immon v. Si on clm,ely resembled each other in their defect
and in their violation of the principle of pleading introduc d by
the code . In both, the defendants de igned to raise an i ue of
fact which would go to the whole cau ·e of action . T he defec
was not a mi conception of the defence, nor a reliance on matter
which con ti tut d no defence; it wa only an imperfect manner
of ta ing a def nee which wa in i elf perfect. Under a rue
con truction of the code , neither of the e answer wa d murrable. If the plain distinction establi bed by the statut
i
to be pre. erved, it is clear that a motion to make the pleading more definite and certain i' the only mode of curing d fee
of hi kind.
am aware that demurrer hav be n u tain d
to uch d f nc , on the ground hat the w re
of law and n t allegations of fact· but th court
m r the
tim
v rlooked the di tinctions in tbi r pe t er
1 gi ·lature.
1

Farm er ·' &

N. Y. 9, 79.

it. Bk. v.

herman, 33

2

hamberlain

o., 15 Ohio

L'.

Paine ville & H. R.

t. 225, 2."'l.
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§ 494. * G03. Doctrine that Defects of Substance are Tvaived by-

Failure to demur. I repeat, the doctrine would be an anomaly that

';) 494.
an answer may be demurrable because it fails to set up any defence

or counter-claim, and still become a sufficient pleading so as to

admit proof of the defence or counter-claim from the plaintiff's neg-

lect to demur or to object in some other manner prior to the trial.

This proposition has, nevertheless, been expressly sanctioned b}'

the courts in certain cases, although it is not supported by the

weight of judicial authority, and is certainly not sustained by

principle.^ Roback v. Powell ^ is an example of these decisions.

This case goes farther than any of those before cited, and cer-

tainly farther than the rule invoked will warrant. A counter-

claim is an independent cause of action, in which the defendant

becomes the actor, and assumes the character of a plaintiff. The

occasions and purposes in and for which it may be set up are

carefully prescribed, and it was conceded that this answer did

not come within the statutory definition. If the decision be

correct, on the same principle it ought to be held that a de-

fendant waives all objection to the sufficiency of a complaint or
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petition which does Jiot state facts constituting a cause of action,

when he answers it and goes to trial.

§ 495. * 604. Liberal Rule of Construction not always Follow^ed.

Notwithstanding this array of cases in which the liberal rule of

construing the pleadings has been sometimes pushed even to an

unwarrantable extreme, there are others in which the courts have

entirely disregarded the doctrine, have overlooked their own

precedents, and have gone to as great a length in the opposite

direction. In Manning i\ Tyler, an action was brought upon

a promissory note against R. as maker, and T. as indorser.^

1 ^See note on Waiver of Defects of ter-claim having been excluded, the Su-

Substance, p. 605.J prenie Court of Indiana held, upon the

2 Roback v. Powell, 36 Ind. 51.5, 516. defendant's appeal, that as the action was

The action was upon an injunction bond on a contract, and the counter-claim was

given by Mrs. Roback. The injunction for an alleged tort, the latter was in every

had restrained the plaintiff from taking way improper, and could not be sustained

down a house which stood upon her land, had it been j>roperly objected to ; but

She pleaded, 1, a general denial, and, 2, as that all objection to it had been waived

a counter-claim, that Powell entered upon by the replying and going to trial, and

her land in her possession, and tore down therefore the evidence in its support

her house, and carried the same away, to should have been received.

iier damage $2,000, for which sum she ^ Manning v. Tyler, 21 N. Y. 567. See

demanded judgment. The plaintiff re- also Gaston v. McLeran, 3 Ore. 389, 391 ;

plied by a general denial, and went to Taggart r. Risley, 3 Ore. 306; Freitag i'.

* 603.

Doctrine that Defects of Substance are waived by

Failure to demur. I r peat, th d trine woulcl be an anomaly that
an an w r may be clemunabl b a.us it foils to st>t up any def uc
or counter- la.im, an 1 till be m a uflici nt pleac.1i11g ·o a to
admit proof of the cl fenc r c nnter-claim from th' ph inti ff' · n glect to d mur or to obj ct in ome oth r mam1 r prior to th trial.
This propo ition has, ncverthel ·, been e, pr ssly sanctionec1
the court in certain ca , although it i not upport <l by th
weight of judicial authority, and is certainly not . ustain d h ·
principle. 1 Roback v. Powell 2 is an example of th s deci ion·.
This case goes farther than any of those before cited and ertainly farth er than the rule invoked will ·w arrant. A count rclaim is an independent cause of action, in which the defen lant
becomes the actor, and a sumes the character of a plaintiff. Th
occasions and purposes in and for which it may be s t up are
carefully prescribed, and it was conceded that this answer did
not come within the statutory definition. If the decision be
correct, on the same principle it ought t o be held that a defendant waives all objection to the sufficiency of a complaint or
petition which do~s not state facts constituting a cause of action,
when he answers it and goes to trial.
§ 495. * 604. Liberal Rule of Construction not always Followed.
Notwithstanding this array of cases in which the liberal rule of
construing the pleadings has been sometimes push ed even to ari
unwarrantable extreme, there are others in which the courts have
entirely disregarded the doctrine, have overlooked their own
precedents, and have gone to as great a length in the opposite
direction. In Manning v. Tyler, an action was brought upon
a promissory note against R. as maker, and T. as indorser. 3
1

trial. All evidence in support of thecoun- Burke, 43 lud. 38. 40.

1

[See note on Waiver of Defects of ter-claim having been excluded, the Supreme Court of Indiana held, upon the
Substance, p. 605.J
2 Roback v. Powell, 36 Ind. 515, 516.
defendant's appeal, that as the a ction was
The action was upon an injunction bond ou a contract, and the counter -claim was
given by Mr . Roback. The injunction for an alleged tort, th e latter was in every
had restrain ed the plaintiff from taking way improper, and could not he su tained
down a house which stood upon her land. had it been properl.1· objected to; bnt
S he pleaded, 1, a general denial, and, 2, as that all objection to it had bee n waived
a co unter- claim, that P owell entered upon by the replying and going to trial, and
her land in lier po ession, and tore down therefore the evidence in its upport
her house, and carried the same away, to should have been received.
her damage $2,000, for which ·um he
3 Manning i•. T yler, 21 N. Y. 56i.
ee
t.!emandecl judgment. The plaintiff re- al o Gaston v. l\IcL ran, 3 Ore. 389. 391;
plied by a general denial, and went to Taggart v. Risley, 3 Ore. 306 ; Freitag t".
trial. All evidence in support of the conn- Burke, 45 Intl. 3S. 40.
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Althougli the answer of the defendants was held to be frivolous,

yet the dissenting opinion of ]\Ir. Justice Denio, rather than that

of the court, seems to express the rule established by the code.

The deficiencies in this answer were certainly no greater than

those in other pleadings to which the liberal mode of construc-

tion had been applied by the same court. The pleader did

allege something more than the broad conclusion that the note

was usurious, and the criticism of the court in this respect was

without foundation in fact: he detailed the issuable facts with

such minuteness and certainty, that no one could be misled as to

the exact nature of the defence. The narrative was undoubtedly

incomplete, and it should have been perfected upon the plaintiff's

motion; but this is all that can be objected to it. Tlie court

may have been unconsciously influenced in their decision by a

feeling of distaste for the defence of usury, and thus led to

apply a stricter rule of coiistruction than they would have

enforced in respect to other defences.

§ 496. * 60.5. Case of Lefler v. Field. The case of Lefler V.

Field ^ is in yet stronger contrast with the general course of
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authorities, and with the express requirement of the codes that

the pleadings must be construed liberally with a view to substan-

tial justice between the parties, and not adversely to the pleader.

The action was for the price of barley bargained and sold. The

lanswer set up that the barley was contracted for by an agent of

the defendants, who agreed to buy it if it was good and mer-

chantable; that the plaintiff represented said barley to be a

good, first quality, merchantable article; that the agent relied

on such representations ; that the barley was not merchantable,

which fact was known to the plaintiff, and therefore the defend-

ants refused to accept the same. No demurrer was interposed,

nor i_iOtion made ; and the parties went to trial on the pleadings

as they stood. The Court of Appeals held that no evidence

was admissible to establish the defence ; that the answer did

not allege a defence of fraud, since it omitted to state two neces-

sary elements thereof: (1) that the plaintiff made the representa-

tion with the intent to deceive, and (2) that the defendants or

their agent were in fact deceived.

§ 497. * 606. Pleadings by Joint Defendants. When two or

more defendants are sued and unite in one responsive pleading,

1 Lefler v. Field, 52 N. Y. 621. Compare Hutching v. Castle, 48 Cal. 152.

. . 1 hough the an wer of he d fendants a held to be frivolous,
enio, ra her than that
et the di en inO' opinion of l\Ir. Ju tic
f the court, eem to expre
he rule tabli h d by the code .
T he deficiencie in thi answer were c rtainly no gr ter than
those in oth r pleading to which the liberal mode of con ·truction hGd been applied b the ame court. The pl ader did
allege omething more than the br ad conclusion that the note
was u uriou , and the critici m of the c urt in thi re pect was
with ut foundation in fact : he detailed the i uable facts with
uch minutene s and certainty, that no one could be misled as to
the exact nature of the defence . T he narrative was und ubtedly
inc mplete, and it should have been perfected upon the plaintiff s
moti on; but this is all that can be objected to it . T he court
may have b en unconsciou ly influenced in their decision by a
f ling of di ta te for the defen ce of usury, and tlrn led to
apply a s tricter rule of con truction than they would have
enforced in re pec t to other defenc es.
§ 496 . * 605 . Case of Lefl er v . F ield . The case of Lefler v.
Field 1 i in y t tronger con tra t with the general c urse of
authoritie , and with the expre s requirement of the codes that
the pleading must be construed liberally with a iew to ~ ub ·tantial ju tice between the parties, and not adversely to the pleader.
The action was for the price of barley bargained and sold. T he
answer set up that the barley was contracted fo r by an agent of
the defendants, who agreed to buy it if it was good and merchantable ; that the plaintiff represented said barley to be a
good, first quality, merchantable article ; that the agent relied
on such repre entations ; that the barley was not merchantable,
which fact was known to the plaintiff, and therefore the defendants refused to accept the same. No demurrer wa inter osed,
nor u otion made ; and the parties went to trial on the pleading
a they stood. The Court of App als held that no evidence
was admi sible to establish the defen ce; that the answ r dicl
not allege a defence of fraud, ince it mitt d to state two nee sary elements thereof: (1) that the plaintiff made the r presentation with the intent to dee iv , and 2 that the defendant r
t eir agent were in fact d cei ed.
§ 497. * 606 . Pleadings by Joint Defendants. When t o r
more ef ndants are ued and unite in n r ponsive pl ading,
1

Lefter

L'.

Fiel<l, 52

~~.

Y . 6:? 1.

omp r e Hutchin v.

a tle, 4

a l. 152 .
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it must be good as to each and all of these parties, or it will be

wholly bad.^ This is the rule which prevails almost universally.

Thus, if the defendants join in an answer which on demurrer

proves to be insufficient as to one, it will be adjudged bad as to

all; but the result will, of course, be otherwise if they plead the

same answer separately.^ On the same principle, if two or more

defendants unite in a demurrer to the complaint or petition, and

a good cause of action is stated against one or some of them, the

demurrer will be wholly overruled.^ The rule is extended by

analogy to pleadings containing two or more separate defences or

causes of action. If a demurrer is interposed to an entire answer

containing two or more separate defences, or to an entire com-

plaint containing two or more causes of action, it will be over-

ruled if there is one good defence or one good cause of action.'*

In an action for a joint and several tort against several defend-

ants, where the answer of one is a complete justification of the

alleged wrong as to all, and the others either suffer a default or

plead different defences, if the issues raised by this answer are

found against the plaintiff, the verdict will operate for the
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benefit of all the defendants, and he cannot recover a judg-

ment against those even who made default.^

§ 498. * GOT. Partial Defences. It was an inflexible rule

under the common-law system that every plea in bar must go

to the whole cause of action, and must be an entire answer

thereto on the record: with pleas in abatement the rule was

different, for they did not purport to answer the cause of

action. The spreading of a partial defence upon the record

was unknown. Whenever such defences were to be relied

upon, — as, for example, mitigating circumstances, — they were

either proved under the general issue, or under a special plea

setting up a complete defence which the pleader knew did not

1 [[Wliitcomb r. Hardy (1897), 68 Washington Tp. v. Bonney, 45 Ind. 77;

Minu. 2G5, 71 N. W. 26.3.J Silvers v. Junction R. Co., 43 lud. 435,

'■^ Morton i'. Morton, 10 Iowa, 58. 442-445. See also Bruce v. Benedict, 31

3 McGonigal v. Colter, 32 Wis. 614 ; Ark. 301 ; Everett v. Waymire, 30 Ohio

Webster r. Tib bits, 19 Wis. 438. St. 308; Nichol v. McCallister, 52 Ind.

4 Jeffersonville, M. & I. R. Co. v. Van- 586; Roberts v. Johauuas, 41 Wis. 616.

cant, 40 Ind. 233; McPhail v. Hyatt, 29 See also § * 577, ante.

Iowa, 137 ; Modlin v. N. W. Turnp. Co., ^ Williams v. McGrade, 13 Minn. 46.

48 Ind. 492; Excelsior Draining Co. v. See also, to the same effect, Devyr v.

Brown, 47 Ind. 19; Towell ;•. Pence, 47 Schaefer, 55 N. Y. 446.

Ind. 304; Davidson v. King, 47 Ind. 372;

it must be good as to ea h ::m<l all of the e parti s, r it will b
wholly bad. 1 This is the rul which prevails alm st universally.
Thus, if the defendants join in an answer which on demurrer
proves to be in ufficient as to on , it will be adjudged bad a to
all; but the re ult will, of course, be otherwise if they plead th
ame answer separately. 2 On the ame principle, if two or more
defendants unite in a d murrer to the complaint or petition, and
a good cause of action is stated against one or some of them, th
demurrer will be wholly overruled. 3 The rule is extended by
analogy to pleadings containing two or more separate defences or
causes of acti.on. If a demurrer is interposed to an entire answ r
containing two or more separate defences, or to an entire complaint containing two or more causes of action, it will be overruled if there is one good defence or one good cause of action. 4
In an action for a joint and several t ort against several defendants, where the answer of one is a complete justification of th e
alleged wrong as to all, and the others either suffer a default or
plead different defences, if the iseu es raised by this answer are
fo und against the plaintiff, the verdict will operate for the
benefit of all the defend ants, a11d he cannot recover a judgment against those even who made default. 5
§ 498. * 607. Partial Defences. It was an inflexible rule
under the common-law system that every plea in bar must go
to the whole cause of action, and must be an entire answer
thereto on the record: with pleas in abatement the rule was
different, for they did not purport to answer the c::rnse of
action. The spreading of a partial defence upon the r ecord
was unknown.
Whenever such defences were to be relied
upon, - as, for example, mitigating circumstances, - they were
either proved under the general issue, or under a speci al plea
setting up a complete defence which the pleader knew did not
1 [Whitromb 1· . Hardy
(189i ), 68
Minn. 265, 71 N . \V . 263.J
2 Mor ton v. Morton, 10 Iowa, 58.
3 McGoui gal v . Colter , 3 2 Wi s. 614;
W eb ter v. Ti bbit , 19 \Vi . 438.
4 J effer onville, M. & I R. Co. v. Vancan t, 4 0 In d. 233 ; McPha il v. H yatt, 29
Iowa, 137; Iod1in v. N . \ V . Turnp. Co.,
4 Ind. 492; E xcelsior D rainin g Co. v .
Brown . 47 Ind. 19; T owell v. P ence, 47
Ind . 30!; D avidson v. King, 47 Ind . 372 ;

W:t hington Tp . v. B onney, 45 Ind. 77;
Silvers v . ,Junction R . Co., 43 Iud . 435,
442-445. S ee a]so Bruce L'. Bened ict, 3 L
Ark. 301 ; Everett i·. Waymire, 30 Ohio
St. 308; ' ichol v. M alli. ter, 52 Ind.
586; Roberts r. J ohan na. , 41 \Vi . 616.
See a l o § * 5ii , ante.
5 Wi lliams t•. M cG rade, 13 Minn . 46 .
See a]so, t o th e same effect, D evyr v.
Schaefer, 55 N . Y . 446.
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exist. The code has certainly abolished this doctrine and the

practice based upon it. Several features of the new procedure

are utterly inconsistent with it. In the first place, the general

or special denials of the code are not so broad as the general

issues of the common law most in use had become ; and, as will

be particularly shown in the following section, they admit of no

evidence not in direct answer to the plaintiff's allegations. In

the second place, the verification of pleadings introduced by the

codes cuts off all averment of tictitious defences. In the third

place, the statute expressly authorizes the defendant to set forth

"as many defences as he may have;" and this has been very

properly construed as a direct permission, and even requirement,

to plead partial as well as complete defences.^ Notwithstand-

ing this express statutory provision, there has been some conflict

of opinion among the courts in respect to the pleading of miti-

gating facts and circumstances. Certain judges have found it

impossible to forget the technical methods of the old procedure,

and have seemed determined to treat them as still existing in

full force and effect ; while others have readily adopted the spirit
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as well as the letter of the reformed system. I shall therefore

postpone the discussion of this particular subject — the plead-

ing of mitigating circumstances — •until the sections are reached

which treat of the "general denial " and of "new matter."

§ 499. * 608. Partial Defences should be pleaded as such.

While partial defences are to be pleaded, it is well settled that

they must be pleaded as such. If a defence is set up as an an-

swer to the whole cause of action, while it is in fact only a partial

one, and even though it would be admissible as such if properly

stated on the record, it will be bad on demurrer: the facts al-

leged will not constitute a " defence ; " which word, when thus

used alone, imports a complete defence. ^ The practical result

of this doctrine is, simply, that the pleader must be careful to

designate the defence as partial ; he must not content himself

with simply averring the facts as in an ordinary case, as if

they constituted a full answer to the cause of action, but he

must expressly state that the defence is partial. In the absence

1 QCovle V. Ward (1901), 167 N. Y. Saving Co. v. Harris (1895), 142 Ind. 22o,

240, 60 N. ?:. 596.] 40 N. E. 1072. See al.-io Bowman v. Fur

•^ HBreyfoglei-. Stotsenburg (1897), 148 Mfg. Co. (1895), 96 la. 188, 64 N. W. 775,

lud. 552, 47 N. E. 1057 ; United States construing the Code, § 2682.]

exi t. The code ha cer ainly aboli bed thi doctrine an the
ractic b cl upon it.
ral feat ur
f th n w proce ure
re utt rly incon i tent witl it. In the fir plac the g n ral
or peci£ 1 d ni( 1 f he code re not
bro, cl as the g n ral
i ue of he common law mo t in u e ha become; an a will
par icularl
n in the following ection the admit f n
evid nee n t in irect an er to the plain iff all g- ti n . In
the econd place the verificati n of pl adin introduce by the
co e en off all a erment of fictitiou def n e . In the hird
place the
tute expre ly autb rize the ef ndant t
t f rth
a many def nee
he may h..: e · and thi has been v ry
pro erly c n true a a dir ct permi i n, an e en r quirement,
to pl ad partial a well as complete def nee .1 N otwith tanding thi expre
tatutory pr vi i n, there ha b en ome confli t
of opinion among the courts in respect t the pleading of mi ·gating fact and circum tances. Certain judge hav foun it
impo ible to f rget the technical methods f he old procedure
and have eemed determinecl t treat them as still exi ting in
full force and effect; while others have readily adopted the ·pirit
a well a the letter of the reformed sy tern. I shall therefore
po tpone the discussion of this particular subject - the pl ading of mitigating circumstances - until the section are reached
which treat of the "general denial " and of "new matter. "
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one, and even though it would be admissible as such if pr p rl
stated on the record, it will be bad on demurr r: the fact allege will not constitute a ' defence· " which word when bus
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■of such statement, it will be assumed that he intended the de-

fence to be complete.^

§ 500. * 609. Criticism of Foregoing Rule. This rule Seems tO

be well established, but it is certainly one which may often work

injustice. It is a remnant of the old system, and does not har-

monize with the central design of the new, which is to elicit the

truth and to decide controversies upon all the actual facts. When

the defendant has set up a defence as if to the entire cause of

action, which is, however, only partial, and when, if described

as partial, it would have been perfectly regular, the plaintiff

could not be prejudiced by allowing it to stand for what it is

worth as a partial defence. He knows that it is, in fact, par-

tial, for the very objection assumes that knowledge. If accurately

named, he would be obliged to meet and answer it on the trial ;

and he would only be compelled to make the same preparation if

it were suffered to remain on the record, and to fulfil its intended

purpose. In short, the plaintiff could not be misled by such a

proceeding; and to strike out the pleading altogether would, if

its allegations were true, be depriving the defendant of certain
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relief to which he was in justice entitled. I repeat, the rule is

nothing but a remnant of the ancient technicalit}', the old devo-

1 Fitzsimmons v. City F. Ins. Co. of the code. If a party has a partial defence

New Haven, 18 Wis. 234 ; Tra.ster v. Snel- to an action, he should set it up, and rely

son's Adm., 29 Ind. 96 ; Sayres v. Link- on it as .such, and not as a complete and

hart, 25 Ind. 14.5; Conger v. Parker, 29 entire defence." See also, to the same

Ind. 380; Stone v. Lewman, 28 Ind. 97; effect, Adkins v. Adkins, 48 Ind. 12, 17;

Sanders r. Sanders, 39 lud. 207 ; Yancy Allen v. Randolph, 48 Ind. 496 ; Alvord

V. Teter, 39 Ind. 305 ; Bouslog v. Garrett, v. Essner, 45 Ind. 156 ; Curran v. Curran,

39 Ind. 338 ; Summers i;. Vaughan, 35 Ind. 40 Ind. 473; Jackson v. Fosbender, 45

•323, and cases cited. In Fitzsimmons v. Ind. 305 ; Beeson v. Howard, 44 Ind. 413,

City F. Ins. Co., supra, it was said by 416; Gulick i;. Conndy, 42 Ind. 134, 136.

of such statement, it will be assum d that he intended the <l fence to be c mpl t .1
§ 500. * 09. Criticism of Foregoing Rule. This rule seems to
be well establi bed, but it is certainly one which may oft n work
infu tice. It is a remnant of the kl system, and does not harmonize with the central de ign of the new, which is to elicit the
truth and to decide controversies upon all the actual facts. When
the defendant has et up n. defence as if to the entire cause of
-action, which is, however, only partial, and when, if described
as partial, it would have been perfectly regular, the plaintiff
could not be prejudiced by allowing it to stand for what it is
worth as a partial defence. He knows that it is, in fact, partial, for the very obJection a.c;;sumes that knowledge . If ·accurately
named, he would be obliged to meet a~d answer it on the trial;
and he would only be compelled to make the same preparation if
it were suffered to remain on the record, and to fulfil its intended
purpose. In short, the plaintiff could not be misled by such a
proceeding; and to strike out the pleading altogether would, if
its a1legations were true, be depriving the defendant of certain
relief to which he was in justice entitled. I repeat, the rule is
nothing but a remnant of the ancient technicality, the old devo-

Cole J., at p. 240: "The appellant con- But this rule does not extend to an an-

tends that, if this answer is not good as swer .simply pleading a set-off le.ss than

a total defence, it is good as a partial de- the pLiiutiff's demand, since a set-off is

fence to the action. The difficulty with not strictly a defence. Mulleudore v.

this position is that this answer professes Scott, 45 Ind. 1 13 ; Dodge v. Dunham,

and assumes to answer -the entire cause 41 Ind. 186. See also, as examples of the

of action. It is not relied on as a partial, rule stated in the text, Jones v. Frost, 51

but as a complete defence, and we have Ind. 69 ; McMahan v. Spinning, 51 id.

seen that for this purpose it is insufficient. 187 ; Keller v. Boatman, 49 id. 104; Put-

Now, under the old system, when a plea nam v. Tennyson, 50 id. 456 ; Peet i\

professed in its commencement to answer O'Brien, 5 Neb. 360; Peck v. Parchin, 52

the whole cause of action, and afterwards Iowa, 46; McDaniel v. Pressler, 3 Wash,

answered only a part, the whole plea was 636 ; Thompson v. Halbert, 109 N. Y. 329 ;

bad. This rule was elementary; and, Shortle v. Terre Haute & I. Ry. Co., 131

upon general principles, we do not see Ind. 338 ; Indianapolis, E. R. & S. W. R.

why it is not applicable to pleadings under Co. v. Hyde, 122 Ind. 188.

1 Fitzsimmons v. City F. Ins. Co. of
New Haven, 18 Wis. 234-; Traster v. Snelson's Adm., 29 Ind . 96; Sayres v. Linkhart, 25 Ind. 145; Conger v. Parker, 29
Ind. 380; Stone v. Lewman, 28 Ind. 97;
'Sanders v . Sanders, 39 Iud. 20i; Yancy
v. T eter, 39 Ind. 305; Bou log v. Garrett,
.39 Ind. 338; Summers v. Vaughan, 35 Ind.
-223, and cases cited. In Fitz ·immons v.
City F. Ins. Co., supra, it was said by
-Cole J., at p. 240: "The appellant contends that, if this answer is not good as
a total defence, it is good as a partial de:fence to the action. The difficulty with
this position is that thi answer profe ses
.and as1mmes to answer . the entire cause
<>f action. It is not relied on as a partial,
but as a complete defence, and we have
seen that for this purpose it is insufficient.
Now,' under the old system, when a plea
professed in its commencement to answer
the whole cause of action, and afterwards
answered only a part, the whole plea was
bad. This rule was elementary; and,
upon general principles, we do not see
-why it is not applicable to pleadings under

the code. If a party has a partial defence
to an action, he should set it up, and rely
on it as such, and not as a complete and
entire defence." See also, to the same
effect, Adkius i·. Adkins, 48 Ind. 12, 17;
Allen v. Randolph, 48 Ind. 496; Alvord
v. Essner, 4-5 Ind. 156; Curran v. Curran,
40 Ind . 4i3; Jackson v. F osbender, 45
Ind. 305; Beeson v. Howard, 44 In d. 413,
416; Gulick v. Connely, 42 Ind. 134, 136 .
But this rule does not extend to an answe r simply pleading a set-off Jes than
the plaintiff's demand, since a set-off is
not strictly a defence. Mullendore v.
Scott, 45 Ind. 113 ; D odge v. Dunham,
41 Ind . 186. See al o, as exam ple of the
rule stated in the text, J ones v. Frost, 5 l
Ind. 69; McMahan v . Spinning, 51 id.
187 ; Keller v. Boatman, 4-9 id. I 04; Putnam v. Tennyson, 50 id. 456; Peet v.
O'Brien, 5 Neb. 360; Peck v . Parch in, 52
Iowa, 46; McDaniel v. Presler, 3 Wash .
6.36; Thompson v. Halbert, 109 N. Y. 32 9;
Shortle v. Terre Haute & I. Ry. Co., 131
Ind. 33 8; Indianapolis, E. R. & S. W. R.
Co. v. Hyde, 122 Ind. 18 .
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tion to external forms of logical precision which marked the

common-law procedure, and which made it anything but a

practical means of eliciting and applying the truth in judicial

controversies.

SECTION THIRD.

THE DEFENCE OF DENIAL.

§ 501. * 610. Species of Denial. The various species of denial

tion to ex ernal fo rm of logical preci ion which marked the
ommon-law procedur , and whi h mad e i anything bu a
praetical means of eliciting and appl ing the t rut h in ju icial
contra ersie .

provided for in the codes are "general" or "specific," and posi-

tive or a denial of " knowledge or information of the matter suffi-

ECTION T HIR .

cient to form a belief." In most of the codes, it is expressly

permitted that the denials may be either "general" or "specific."

THE DEFENCE OF

ENIAL.

In a few, no provision is in terms made for the general denial,

and only those that are "specific '' or "special" are mentioned.

In one or two, the language simply speaks of "a denial."^

According to a large majority of the codes, the denial, whether

general or specific, may be either positive, or a denial of "knowl-

edge or information thereof sufficient to form a belief;" but in a

very few of them the latter form is omitted. The defendant is

universally allowed to deny only such allegations of the com-
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plaint or petition as he controverts, and this permission is usually

given whether he employs the "general" or the "specific" form

of denial; but in the latest revision of the Iowa Code [1897], it

is said with more accuracy that the general denial must be " of

each allegation of the petition," while the specific denial is to be

"of each allegation of the petition controverted " by him.

1 In Minnesota, although the code is the same as that in New York, expressly

silent respecting the general denial, and authorizes the general denial, the general

speaks only of "a denial of each allega- denial in the ordinary form, as used in

tion," it is settled by repeated decisions other States, is held to be a nullity, and

that the ordinary form of the general an answer containing it will be struck out

denial is a compliance with the statute, as sham : an altogether different constrnc-

and is entirely proper: hence the general tion is placed upon the language of the

denial is in constant use in that State ; statute from that given in any other State,

and such, I believe, is the practice in most Schelian v. Malone, 71 N. C. 440, 443 ;

of the States. Leyde v. Martin, 16 Minn. Flack r. Dawson, 69 N. C. 42 ; Woody v.

38; Becker f. Sweetzer, 15 Minn. 427, 434 ; Jordan, 69 N. C. 189, 195. In California

Kingsley v. Oilman, 12 Minn. 515, 517; and a few other States, the general denial

Bond V. Corbet, 2 Minn. 248 ; Caldwell v. is not permitted when the complaint or

Bruggerman, 4 Minn. 270 ; Starbuck v. petition is verified ; in such a case, there-

Dunklee, 10 Minn. 173 ; Montour d. Purdy, fore, a general denial raises no issue, and

§ 501. * 610. Species of Denial. T he vari ou s species of d enial
pr id d for in the ode are "ge~er 1' or ' sp cific," and p o iive or a denial of k nowl dge or informa ion of the matter sufficient to form a belief.' In mo t f th code it is xpr ly
permitte that the denials may b ith r ' 0 en ral" or " pecifi c."
In a few no provi ion i in terms made f r the g neral d nial
and nly tho e that are
p cific : or ' p cial are m n ion d.
In one or two, the language simply speaks of "a denial." 1
ccording to a large majorit of the cod , the denial wh ther
general or specific may be ither positive, or a denial of " k nowledge or informati n thereof uffi ient to fo rm a beli f · but in a
very few of them the latter form is omitted. The defen dant is
uni er ally allowed to deny only such allegation of the complaint or petition as he controvert and thi per mis ion is usually
given whether he employs the "gen ral" or the " pecific ' form
of denial; but in the latest revision f the Iowa ode [1897] , it
is said with more accuracy that the general d nial must be ' of
each allegation of the petition, " while the pecific denial is to be
of each allegation of the petition controv r ted" by him.

11 Minn. 401. On the other hand, in will be struck out on motion. People r.

North Carolina, notwithstanding that the Ilagar, 52 Cal. 171.

language of the code, which is exactly

1 In ~innesota. although the
ode i
ilent re pecting the general denial, and
peak only of " a denial of each allegation," it i' ettled y repeated deci ions
that the ordi nary form of the g nera l
denial i · a compliance with the tatute
and i entirely proper: hence the general
denial i in ou taut u e in that 'tate;
and u h I believe, i the practice in mo t
of the tate . Le,vde v. Martin, 16 Minn.
.3 ; Becker v. weetzer, 15 Minn. 427, 434;
King. ley v. Gilman, 12 il1inu. 515, 517;
Bond v. orbet. 2 Minn. 2-i ; aldwell v.
Bruggerman, 4 :\linn. 2i0;
tarbuck v.
Dunklee, 10 :\Iino. 173; :\Ion tour v. urdy,
11 Miun. 401. On the other hand, in
·l)rth C'arolina. notwith ·tanding that the
1aHguage of the c:u<le, which is exactly

the ame as that in New York, expre ly
authorizes the general denial the general
denial in the ordinary for m, as u ed in
other tate , i h ld to be a n ulli t and
an au. wer containing it will be truck ut
a ham: an alt gether differeut o tr ue·
tion i · placed up n the Ian uage of the
tatute from that giveu in any other tate.
chehan v. Malon , 71
. 440, 443 ;
Flack v. aw on, 69 N. C. 42; Woody v.
Jordan 69 . . l 9, 195. In alifornia
and a few oth r tate , the g neral denial
i not permitted when the omplaint or
petition i v rifi d; in uch a ca e, therefor , a gen ral d nial rai e no i ue, and
will be t ruck out on motion. People v.
Hagar, 52 al. 171.
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§ 502. * 611. Outline of Proposed Treatment. In actual prac-

tice, the "general denial," wherever permitted, is only employed

when the defendant desires to put the whole complaint or peti-

tion in issue, and " specific " denials when he wishes to take issue

merely with certain allegations thereof. It is very plain, that in

the former case the "general denial," in its brief and comprehen-

sive form, is as efficacious as a particular traverse of each aver-

ment separately. Nothing is gained by filling the record with

specific denials, when one sweeping denial of the entire pleading

will answer the same purpose and admit the same proofs. I

shall distribute the subject-matter of this section under the fol-

lowing heads, assuming in the first instance, for convenience of

the discussion, that the denial is " positive : " I. The form of the

"general denial," and of the "specific denials; " II. The nature

of "specific denials," and what issues they raise; III. Allega-

tions admitted by omitting to deny ; IV. Denials in the form of

negatives pregnant; V. Argumentative denials, and specific de-

fences equivalent to the general denial; VI. General denial of

all allegations not otherwise admitted or explained; VII. What
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allegations must be denied, — issuable facts, and not conclusions

of law; VIII. Denials of information or belief, when proper,

and their effect; IX. What can be proved under denials either

general or specific ; X. Some special statutory rules in reference

to denials.

§ 503. * 612, Same Subject. The discussion which follows, and

the practical rules deduced therefrom, are based in the first place

upon the assumption that the denials, whether general or specific,

are positive in their nature. The conclusions which are reached

apply, however, with equal force and effect, to those cases in

which the denials are of information or belief. The only object

of the latter form is, that the defendant may be enabled to put

the plaintiff's allegations in issue when he is obliged to verify his

answer, and cannot do so from his own personal knowledge:

the effect and efficacy of the traverse are not diminished nor in

any manner altered by the use of this method when it is

properly employed.

§ 504. * 613. External Form of Denials, General and Specific.

Under the common-law system there were several distinct species

of the "general issue" and of particular traverses, each appro-

priate to and only to be used in some one of the different forms

§ 502. * 611. Outline of Proposed Treatment. In actual practice, the "general denial," wherever permitted, is only mployed
when the defendant desires to put the whole c mplaint or petition in issue, and "specific" denials when he wi:sh s t tak issue
merely with certain all gations thereof. It i v ry plain, that in
the former case the "general denial, " in its brief and comprehensive form, is as efficacious as a particular tra ver e of each avermen t separately. Nothing is gained by filling the record with
specific denials, when one sweeping denial of the entire pleading
will answer the same purpose and admit the same proofs. I
shall distribute the subject-matter of this section under the following heads, assuming in the first instan ce, for convenience of
the discussion, that the denial is "positive:'' I. The form of the
"general denial," and of the "specific denials; " II. The nature
of "specific denials," and what issues they raise; III. Allegations admitted by omitting to deny; IV. Denials in the form of
negatives pregnant; V. Argumentative denials, and specific defences equivalent to the general denial; VI. General denial of
all allegations not otherwise admitted or explained; VII. What
allegations must be denied, - issuable facts, and not conclusions
of law; VIII. Denials of information or belief, when proper,
and their effect; IX. What can be proved under denials either
general or specific; X . Some special statutory rules in reference
to denials.
§ 503. * 612. S ame Subject. The discussion which follows, and
the practical rules deduced therefrom, are' based in the first place
upon the assumption that the denials, whether general or specific,
are positive in their nature. The conclusions which are reached
apply, however, with equal force and effect, to those cases in
which the denials are of information or belief. The only object
of the latter form is, that the defendant may be enabled to put
the plaintiff's allegations in issue when he is obliged to verify his
answer, and cannot do so from his own personal knowledge:
the effect and efficacy of the traverse are not diminished nor in
any manner altered by the use of this method when it is
properly employed.
§ 504. * 613. E x ternal Form of Denials, General and Specific.
Under the common-law sy tern there were several distinct species
of the "general issue " and of particular traverses, each appropriate to and on ly to be used in some one of the different forms
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of action, or to put in issue certain classes of allegations; but all

these have been abolished in the reformed procedure. One form

of the general denial is sufficient for all actions and for all issues ;

and although it may undergo slight and unimportant variations,

it is substantiall}' the same in all the States, and in the hands of

all members of the bar. The material averment, modified doubt-

less in its phraseology, is that the defendant "denies each and

every- allegation of the complaint or petition." The form in

common use is, " The defendant, for answer to the complaint

herein, denies each and every allegation thereof."^ It is of

course impossible to describe the forms of any specific denial.

From its very name and nature, it is the special traverse of some

particular averment found in the plaintiff's pleading, and must

therefore depend to a very great degree upon the matter and

shape of the statement which is thus controverted. How far it

should merely follow and negative the exact language of the

allegation to which it is directed, will be considered under the

subsequent head of the section which treats of denials in the form
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of a negative pregnant. ^ It will there be shown that such an

1 This form is slightly varied in the

standard text-books upon pleading, and

in the actual practice of the bar : but this

is entirely sufficient ; any additional mat-

ter would be superfluous. Examples of

irregular forms held to be sufficient,

Moen V. Eldred, 22 Minn. 538; Jones

I'. Ludlum, 74 N. Y. 61 ; Brothington

V. Downey, 21 Hun, 436; Hoffman v.

Eppers, 41 Wis. 251 ; but an answer

" that no allegation of the complaint is

true," is wholly nugatory, — raises no

issue.

^The following variations have been

held sufficient. A denial of " each and

every allegation of new matter : " City of

Crete v. Hendricks (1902), Neb., 90 N."\V.

215; a denial of "all the allegations of

each paragraph of both counts of the peti-

tion :" Ocean Steamship Co. v. x\nderson

(1900), 112 Ga. 835, 38 S. E. 102; an an-

swer that defendant "states and alleges

that he denies each and every allega-

tion of the petition :" lieiss v. Argubright

(1902), Neb.. 92 N. W. 988; an answer

that defendants "say that they deny each

and every allegation:" Town of Denver

V. Spokane Falls (1893), 7 Wash. 226, 34

Pac. 926.

In State ex rel. v. Butte Water Co.

(1896), 18 Mont. 199, 44 Pac. 966, the

court said : " We shall follow the Cali-

fornia cases, and hold that the statutory

form of denial was the only one to be

sustained." To the same effect see Ro.ssi-

terv. Loeber (1896), 18 Mont. 372, 45 Pac.

560.

The alleged insufficiency of a general

denial cannot be raised for the first time

on appeal : King r. Pony Gold Miu. Co.

(1903), 28 Mont. 74, 72 Pac. 309.

A general denial is not rendered bad by

immaterial matter alleged in connection

therewith: Ralya r. Atkins (1901), 157 Ind.

331, 61 N. E. 726.3

- [_" A denial of the very words of the

allegations of the petition, without deny-

ing their substance and effect, tenders no

issue:" Knight r. Denman (1902), 64

of ac ion or to pu1.i in i ·ue certain cla ses of allegations; but all
the e ha"'\'"e been aboli ·hed in the reformed procedure. One form
of t e general denial is ufficient for all actions and for all issues;
and althou bit may undergo slight and unimportant variations,
it is ub tan ially the same in all the tates and in the bands of
all members of the bar. The material averment, modified doubtle s in its pbra eolog ', is that the defendant ' denies each and
every allegation of the complaint or petition. ' The form in
common use is, The defendant, for answer to the complaint
herein denies each and every allegation thereof." 1 It is of
cour e impossible to describe the forms of any pecific denial.
From its ery name and nature, it is the special traverse of some
particular averment found in the plaintiff's pleading, and must
therefore depend to a very great degree upon the matter an l
shape of the statement which i thus controverted. How far it
should merely follow and negative the exact language of the
allegation to which it is directed, will be considered under the
subsequent head of the section which treats of denial in the form
of a negative pregnant. 2 It will there be shown that such an
1 This form is slightly varied in the
tandard text-books upon pleading, and
in the actual practice of the bar : but this
is entirely ufficient; any additional matter would be uperfluous. Examples of
irregular form h eld to be sufficient,
Moen u. Eldred, 22 Minn. 53 ; Jones
v. Ludlum, 74 N. Y. 61; Brothingto n
t:. Downey, 21 Hun, 436; Hoffman v.
Eppers, 41 Wi . 251 ; but an an wer
"that no allegation of the complaint i
true," i wholly nugatory, - rai e no
is ue.
[ The following variation have been
held ufficient. A denial of "ea h and
every allegation of new matter:" ,ity of
rete v. Hendri k (1902), eb., 90 N. W.
215; a denial of 'all th allegat,ion of
each paragraph of both count of the p tition : " cean team hip o. v. And r. on
( 1900), 112 a. 35, 3
. E. 102; an an. wer that defendant " tate and all g
t at he deuie
ea h and every all g at i m of the petition:" l i. v. Argubright
(1 902 ), .._'e b., 92
. W . 9 ; an an · w r
that de fendants ' ay that they <leny each
and very all rrati oo : " Town of Dem·er
r . p kane Fall (l !)3 ), 7 \ a h. 226, 34
ac. 926.

In tate ex rel. v. Butte Water o.
(1896), 18 Mont. 199, 44 Pac. 966, the
court said: " We hall follow the alifornia ca ·es, and hold that the statutory
form of denial was the only one to be
sustained." To the same effect ee Ro" · iter v. Loeber (1896), 18 Mont. 372, 45 Pac.
560.
The alleged insufficiency of a general
denial cannot be rai ed for the fir t time
on appeal : King v. Pony old Min. o.
{l 903), 2 font. 74, i2 Pa . 309.
A general denial i not rendered bad by
immaterial matter alleged in co nne ti n
therewith: Ralyav. Atkin (1901), 157 Ind.
331, 61 . E. i26.J
2 ["A d nial of the very word of the
allegation of th p tition, without denyin" th ir ub tan · and ff ct, tender no
i,.: ·u :" l\nig-ht i:. Deuman (1902), 6-1. _ 'eb. 814, 90 . W. 63. It i not nece ary that a trav r e • hould be expre ed
in n gative word : tet · n v. Brigg
(l 96), 114 al. 511, 46 Pa. 603; Gl or
1 . Evan
(1 94), Ariz., 36 Pac. 21-.
ee aL ,tate x 1·l. u. Adam. (1901 ),
161 :w . 349, 61 . w. 94.
\Vh re nit i brotwht n a not payable conditionally, and the defendant denies
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exact adherence to the text of the adverse averment may be

dangerous, as the result may be an admission of the substantial

fact intended to be put in issue.

§ 505. * 614. Issuable Facts as Distinguished from Evidentiary

Facts and from Conclusions. The object of all denials is to put

in issue the allegations of the complaint or petition. As will be

shown hereafter under the head of the proofs which may be ad-

mitted in support of a simple denial, it is only the issuable facts

which need to be controverted, and which are in fact controverted,

by the defendant's traverse. It frequently, and indeed generally,

happens that the cause of action depends upon the existence

of a succession or group of facts. Each of these must be es-

tablished in order to make out the right of action, and all are

therefore "issuable facts." In addition thereto, the plaintiff's

pleading will often contain other averments which must be

stated, but which need not be proved as stated, among which are

those of time, place, number, quantity, value, and the like.

Finally, it happens too frequently, that besides the statements

of these strictly "issuable facts," which are all that the plead-
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ing should comprise, the plaintiff has unnecessarily, and in

a certain sense improperly, introduced averments of matters

which are really the details of evidence from which the ex-

istence of the "issuable facts" is to be inferred by the jury

or the court. It is not always easy to distinguish in a com-

plaint or petition between the main conclusions of fact, —

the issuable or material facts, — all and each of which are indis-

pensable to create the right of action, and the mere details of evi-

dence which must be proved at the trial in order to establish the

essential "issuable facts; " and the careless mode of pleading

which has grown up in some States, contrary to the true intent

and spirit of the reformed procedure, results chiefly from a dis-

regard of the distinction here mentioned, and is shown in a con-

fused admixture of evidentiary matter, allegations of substantial

facts, and conclusions of law, in the same complaint or petition.

§ 506. * 615. Function of the Specific Denial. When the Series

of issuable facts 'which would make up the plaintiff's cause of

that the conditions have been performed, S. W. 212. "A denial, though coupled

and specifies tlie particulars in regard to with an allegation showing a lack of

■which there has been non-compliance, the knowledge of the matters denied, is suflB-

defendant waives all grounds not specified : cient to raise an issue:" Smith v. Allen

Coffin V. Black (1899), 07 Ark. 219, 54 (1901), 63 Neb. 74, 88 N. W. 155.]

Bxact adheren ce to the tex t of the adverse averment may be
dangerous, as the result may be an admission of the sub tantial
fact intended to be put in issue.
§ 505. * 614. Issuable Facts as Distinguished from Evide nti ary
Pacts and from Concl usions. The object of all denials is to put
in issue the allegations of the complaint or petition. As will be
shown hereafter under the head of the pro fs which may be admitted in support of a simple denial, it is only the issuable facts
which need to be controverted, and which are in fact controverted,
by the defendant's trav:erse. It frequentl y, and indeed generally,
happens that the cause of action depends upon the existence
of a succession or group of facts. Each of these must be established in order to make out the right of action, and all are
therefore "issuable facts. " In addition thereto, the plaintiff's
pleading will often contain other averments which must be
stated, but which need not be proved as stated, among which are
those of time, place, number, quantity, value, and the like.
Finally, it happens too frequently, that besides the statements
of these strictly ''issuable facts," which are all that the pleading should comprise, the plaintiff bas unnecessarily, and in
a certain sense improperly, introduced averments of matters
which are really the details of evidence from which the existence of the "issuable facts" is to be inferred by the jury
or the court. It is not always easy to distinguish in a complaint or petition between the main conclusions of fact, the issuable or material facts, - all and each of which are indispensable to create the right of ac6on, and the mere details of evidence which must be proved at the trial in order to establish the
essential "issuable· facts; " and the careless mode of pleading
which has grown up in some States, contrary to the true intent
and spirit of the reformed procedure, results chiefly from a disregard of the distinction here mentioned, and is shown in a confused admixture of evidentiary matter, allegations of substantial
facts, and conclusions of law, in the same complaint or petition.
§ 506. * 615. Function of the Specific Denial. When the series
of issuable facts •which would make up the plaintiff's cause of
that the cond itions have been perfo rmed,
and specifies the particulars in r egard to
which there ha been non- complian ce, the
defendant waives all gro unds not spec: ified :
Coffin v. Black (1899), 67 A rk . 219, 54

S . W. 212. "A denial, though coupled
with an allegation show ing a lack of
k nowledge of the matters denied, is sufficient to rai e an issue : " Smith v. Allen
(1 901) , 63 Neb. 74, 88 N . W. 155.]
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action are properly stated, it will frequently happen, especially

if the pleadings are verified, that the defendant cannot deny them

all. Some of them may be true, so that an issue upon them is

impossible. But if one or more are not true, and can therefore

be controverted, and if tlie existence of all is indispensable to

the right of action, a denial of that particular allegation, or of

those particular ftllegations, may be as complete a defence as

though the entire series was traversed and disproved. The

forming such an issue upon some one or more particular aver-

ments out of the whole number contained in the complaint or

petition is the legitimate and proper office of the "special

denial," and by its use in this manner an ample defence may

be placed upon the record. A "specific denial *' is therefore a

denial of some particular averment in the complaint or petition ;

and whether or not it alone raises a material issue, and consti-

tutes a sufficient defence, depends upon the question, whether

the particular allegation thus traversed is in itself essential to

the maintenance of the cause of action.^ There may, of course, be

several such specific denials inserted in the same answer, directed
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to distinct averments of the adverse pleading, and together con-

stituting a defence differing from that raised by the "general

denial " in the single circumstance, that by the latter all the

issuable facts are put in issue, while by the former only a portion

of them are controverted. As each specific denial is aimed at a

particular averment, it should expressly and unmistakably point

out the statement of fact intended to be traversed ; it should

deny that allegation fully and explicitly, so that the plaintiff

may be forced to establish it by proofs ; and it should leave no

doubt as to the matter at which it is aimed, and as to the issue

intended to be made.^

^ QWhere the deuial in an answer re- ground, itissaid, thatmere matterof aggra-

lates solely to an averment which presents ration, not froing to tlie cause of action, or

no ground for relief, such denial will be niereinducenicntorexplanatory matter, not

treated as surplusage : Chicago, etc Ry. Co. in itself essential to, or the substance of, the

r. Phillips (1900), 111 la. 377, 82 N. W. 787. case, should not be traversed. "3

In Bowman v. Bowman (1899), 153 ~ QTo deny an averment specifically

Ind. 498, 5.5 N. E. 422, the court .said : "If it must be singled t)Ut and denied apart

an allegation in the opposite pleading be from others in the same paragraph with

altogether immaterial, it cannot be trav- which it is connected : Woronieki v. Paris-

ersed ; otherwise the object of pleading, kiego (1901), 74 Conn. 224, 50 Atl. 562.

viz., the bringing the parties to an issue See also Boyle i'. McWilliaras (1897), 69

upon a matter or point decisive of the Conn. 201, 37 Atl. 501.

merits, would be defeated. And, upon this Where an answer contains a ilenial of

ac ion are roperly stated, it will frequently happen e peciall
if the pleadin 5 are erifi d that the defendant cannot den ' them
all.
ome f them ma be true o that an i ue u on them i
imp ible.
ut if one or more are not tru , and an therefore
be on troverted and if the exi tenc
f all i in di en able to
the right of action a d ni 1 of that par icular allegati n or of
those particular allegation , may be a compl te a defence a
though the ntire serie was traver ed and di pr ved. Th e
forming such an i sue upon some one or more particular a erm nt out of the whole number contL ined in the com plaint or
petition i the legitimate and proper office of the
pecial
deni 1 and by its u e in thi manner an ample defence may
be placed upon the record. A ' pecific denial i therefore a
denial of some particular averment in the complaint or petition·
and whether or not it alone raises a material i ue, and c n titute a sufficient defence, depends upon the que tion whether
the particular allegation thus traversed i in it eJf e ential to
the maintenance of the cau of action. 1 There may: of cour e be
several uch specific denials inserted in the same an " r directed
to clistinct averments of the adYer pleading and together contituting a defence differing from that rai d b the
eneral
denial" in the single circumstance that by the latter all the
i suable facts are put in issue, while by the former only a portion
of them are controverted. As each specific denial i aimed at a
particular averment, it should expre ly and unmi takably point
out the statement of fact intended to be trav rsed; it hould
deny that allegation fully and expli itl;, so that the plai ntiff
may be forc ed to establi sh it by proofs; and it shoul l lea Ye no
doubt as to the matter at which it i aimed, and as to the issue
intended to be made . 2
1 [W here the denial in an answ er r elate solely to au a\·erment which pre ents
no ground for relief, such denial will be
treated as urplu age: bicago,etc. Ry. o.
v. Phillip (1900), 111 Ia. 377, 82 . W. i i .
In Bowman t:. Bowman (1 99), 153
Ind. 498, 55 .... E. 422, the co ur . aid: "If
au allegation in the opposite pl adiug be
altogeth r immaterial, it cannot be trav· rsed; otherwi e the obj et of pl ading,
viz., the bringing the parties to an ist'ue
uprm a m; ttPl' or point de<'i. iv of the
rncrit;i, woultl Le def ·atcd. ~\ud, upou t.hi:

grou nd it is said, that m ere matter of aggravation, not going to the ·au e of action, or
mere inducement r explanato ry matter, not
in it elf e sential to, r the ub tance of, the
ca c, hould not b traYer d."J
2 [To deny an averment
pecifically
it mu t be in gl d ut and d nied apart
from other in the ame paragraph with
which it i coon cted : ·w roni ki v. Pari kicg o (190 1), 74 onn. 224, 50 At!. 562.
ec al o Boyle v. M William (1897), 69
onn. 201, 37 Atl. 5 1.
'Ylierc an au w r outain a denial of
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§ 507. * 616. Illustrative Case. The object of this kind of

denial, cand the rules which govern its use, were accurately

stated in a recent case : " To determine whether an allegation

has been properly denied or not, we must examine the answer

to the particular allegation which it is designed to controvert.

If, taken by itself, an issue is fairly made, and there is no

admission inconsistent with the answer, the denial is suffi-

cient. . . . Each denial must be regarded as applying to the

specific allegation it purports to answer, and not as forming

part of an answer to some other specific and entirely independ-

ent allegation."^ A single case, an abstract of which is placed in

the foot-note, will serve to illustrate the object and effect of the

specific denial.^ As the defendant in this action could not con-

trovert his signature to the instrument, the pleader evidently

supposed that it was impossible for him to deny the execution

in the answer since the pleadings were verified; he therefore

traversed but one issuable fact, — the delivery. Success in

this issue was as complete a defence as though the execution
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any material allegation, a general de-

murrer to the entire answer cannot be

sustained: Hill v. Walsh (1894), 6 S. D.

421, 61 N. W. 440; Lee v. Mehew (1899),

8 Okla. 136, 56 Pac. 1046; City of Guthrie

V. Lumber Co. (1897), 5 Okla. 774, 50

Pac. 84.3

1 Racouillat v. Rene, 32 Cal. 450, 453,

§ 507. * 616.

The object of thi kind of
denial, and the rules which govern it us , w re accurately
stated in a r cent case: "To determine whether an all ati n
has been properly <l nied or not, we must xamine th an w r
to the particular allegation which it i de, igned to con tr vert.
If, taken by it elf, an issue is fairly made, and there i no
admission incon ' i tent with the an wer, the denial is sufficient. . . . Each denial mu t be regarded as applying to the
specific allegation it purport to answer, and not as forming
part of an answer to some other pecific and entirely indep ndent allegation." 1 A single case, an ab tract of whi ·h is placed in
the foot-note, will serve t o illustrate the obj ct and effect of the
specific denial. 2 As the defendant in this action could not controvert his signature to the instrument, the pleader evidently
uppo ed that it was impossible for him to deny the execution
in the answer since the pleadings were verified; he therefore
traversed but one issuable fact, - the delivery. Success in
this issue was as complete a defence as though the execution
Illustrative Case.

455, per Sawyer J. ; and see AUis v.

Leonard, 46 K Y. 688.

2 Sawyer r. Warner, 15 Barb. 282, 285.

The complaint, in an action upon a prom-

issory note, alleged the making of the

note by the defendant, the delivery thereof

by the defendant to the plaintiff, the

present ownership of the plaintiff, non-

payment, and indebtedness of the de-

fendant thereon in the amount specified

therein. The answer merely denied that

the defendant ever " gave " the said note

or any other note to the plaintiff, and

denied all indebtedness. On the trial, the

plaintiff proved the signature of the note

to be in the defendant's handwriting, and

his own possession. The body of the in-

strument was in the plaintiff's handwrit-

ing. The defendant then proved facts

tending to show that he never executed

the instrument as a note, and never de-

livered it to the plaintiff, but that he had

some time written and left his name on a

blank paper, and the plaintiff had fraud-

ulently added the body of the note over

such signature. The jury rendered a

verdict for the defendant ; and, upon the

plaintiff's appeal, the court said: "TJie

allegation in tlie answer that the defend-

ant never gave the note to the plaintiff is

a denial of the allegation in the complaint

that the defendant made the note, so far

as making includes delivery ; and also of

the further allegation, that the defendant

delivered the note to the plaintiff. The

question to be tried on the.se allegations

was, whether or not the note was delivered

to the plaintiff as alleged by him. . . .

The plaintiff made out this fact prima

facie. . . . But the defendant was at lib-

erty, in support of his side of the issues,

independent of other modes, to prove facts

any material allegation, a gener_a l de- livered it to the plaintiff, but that he had
murrer to the enti re answer cannot be some time written and left his name on a
u tained: Hill v. Walsh (1894), 6 S. D. blank paper, and the plaintiff had fraud421 , 61 N. W. 440; Lee v. Mehew (1 899), ulently added the body of the note over
8 Okla. 136, 56 Pac. 1046; City of G uthrie such signature.
The jury rendered a
v. Lumher Co. (1897) , 5 Okla. 774, 50 verdict for the defendant; and, upon the
plaintiff's appeal, the cour t said: "T}le
Pac. 4-J
l Racouillat v. R ene, 32 Cal. 450, 453 ,
allegation in the answer that the defend455 , per Sawyer J. ; and see Allis v. ant never gaYe th e note to the plaintiff is
a denial of the allegation in the complaint
Leonard, 46 N. Y. 688.
2 Sawyer v. Warner, 15 Barb. 282, 285.
that the defendant made the note, so far
The complaint, in an action upon a prom- as making includes deli very ; and al o of
i sory note, alleged the making of the the further allegation, that the defendant
note by the defendant, the delivery thereof delivered the note to the plaiutiff. The
by the defendant to the plaintiff, the question to be tried on the e allegations
present owner hip of the plaintiff, non- was, wheth er or not the note was delivered
payment, and indebtedness of the de- to the plaintiff as alleged by him . . . .
fendant thereon in the amount specified The plaintiff made out this fact prirna
therei n. The answer merely denied that fac ie . . . . But the defendant was at libthe defendant ever "gave" the said note erty, in support of his ide of the i ue ,
or any other note to the plaintiff, and independent of other modes, to prove facts
denied all indebtedness. On the trial, the inducing a coutrary presumption, and, in
plaintiff proved the sig nature of the note that way, overcome the pre umption from
to be in the defendant's handwrit ing, and th e plaintiff's proof; and he was entitled
hi own pos e ion. The body of the in- to give in ev idence any fact calculated to
trument wa in the plaintiff' handwritati fy the jury by fai r and direct inferin g. The defendant then proYed facts ence that the note was never delivered by
tendiug to . how that he neYer executed him."
the in trument as a note, and never de-
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had also been disproved. It is plain, however, that the "gen-

eral denial"' might have been pleaded; for, if the defence was

true, there had never been any execution or delivery of the note

in the legal sense of these terms. ^

^ 508. * G17. Allegations Admitted by Failure to deny. All

the codes provide that material allegations in the complaint or

petition, not controverted by a general or specific denial, are

admitted to be true for the purposes of the action. ^ It follows

1 See Higgins v. Germaine, 1 Mont.

230 ; also Van Dyke r. Maguire, 57 N. Y.

429 (denial of value alone in action for

b a<l al o been di pr oved. I t is plain howe er, that th
gencr 1 d nial ' migh ha Ye been pleaded ; fo r if the defence wa
true there had never been an execution or delivery of the no
in the legal ense of th ese terms. 1
508 . * 617. Allega t io n s A d m it t ed b y F ailure to deny. All
the codes provide that material allegati n in the compl int 1·
eti ion not con troverted b a eneral or specific denial, ar"'
, dmitted to be rue for the purposes of the action. 2 I t follow

labor and materials) ; Dunning !•. Rum-

baugh, 36 Iowa, 566, 568 (denial of exe-

cution only in an action on a note). For

further illustrations of the text, see Trap-

nail v. Hill, 31 Ark. 346 ; Rabbage v. Sec.

Bap. Church of Dubuque, 54 Iowa, 172;

Koberts v. Johannas, 41 Wis. 616; Miller
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V. Brigham, 50 Cal. 615 ; Lowell v. Lowell,

55 id. 316.

^Denials of specific allegations : Juris-

dictional facts, Aultman v. Mills (1894),

9 Wash. 63, 36 Pac. 1046 ; consideration,

Frank v. Jenkins (1895), 11 Wash. 611,

40 Pac. 220 ; seizin and po8se.«<sion, Ray-

mond V. Morrison (1894), 9 Wash. 156,

37 Pac. 318; signification of alleged slan-

derous words, Barr v. Birkner (1895), 44

Neb 197, 62 N. W. 494; corporate exist-

ence, Davis V. Nebraska Nat. Bank (1897),

51 Neb. 401, 70 N. W. 963; ownership.

Central City Bank v. Rice (1895), 44

Neb. 594, 63 N. W. 60 ; execution of

promissory note, Topeka Capital Co. r.

Remington (1900), 61 Kan. 6, 59 Pac.

1062; same, Kimble v. Bunny (1900), 61

Kan. 665, 60 Pac. 746; partnership, Craig

r. Chipman (1900), Ky., 57 S. W. 244;

title, Sprigg v. Am. Cent. Ins. Co. (1897),

101 Ky. 185, 40 S. W. 575; execution,

Marshall Field Co. v. Oren Ruffcorn Co.

(1902), 117 la. 157, 90 N. W. 618 ; corpo-

rate existence. Law Trust Society v. Hogue

(1900), 37 Ore. 544, 62 Pac. 380; that

money is due, Parsons r. Wright (1897),

102 la. 473, 71 N. W. 351; that defend-

ants were and still are doing business

under the name of the C. agency, Nolan v.

Hentig (1903). 138 Cal. 281, 7rPac. 440.

Evidence admissible under specific

denials : A denial that a note had been

materially altered dues not raise tlie i.^sue

that the note was so negligently drawn

that the alteration could be made without

exciting the suspicions of an ordinarily

prudent business man : Bank of Com-

merce c. Ilaldeman (1900), 109 Ky. 222, 58

S. W. 5S7. In an action to recover for

value of services rendered, tlie defendant

cannot, under a denial of tlieir value,

prove that the services were not rendered,

but is confined to proof of value : Buddress

V. Sciiafer ^1895), 12 Wash. 310, 41 Pac.

43. To .same effect see Galliers v. Chicago,

etc. Ry. Co. (1902), 116 la. 319, 89 N. W.

1109. Under a denial of title evidence of

abandonment may be given : Trevaskis

V. Peard (1896), 111 Cal. 599, 44 Pac. 246.

ee Bigain

1: .

Germaine, l M ont.

230 ; al o an D y ke v. l\Iaguir e, 57 N . Y.
429 (denial of value alone in acti on for

la bor and mater ial ) ; Du nning v. Hurnbaug h , 3 6 Iowa, 566, 56 (denial of ex ecution only in a n a ction on a note). F or
fu r t he r illm;trations of th e t ext, ee Tra pnall v. Hill, 31 Ark. 346; Bab bage v. ec.
Bap. hurch of D u buque, 54 Iowa, 172;
R obert v. J ohanna , 4 1 Wi . 616; Miller
v. Brigham , 50 al. 615; L owell v. L owell,
55 id. 3 16.
[Denial of sp ecifi.., allegations : Juri dictional fact , A ultman v. Mill ( 189-l. ),
9 Wa h. 6 , 36 P ac. 1046; consideration,
Frank v. Jenkin {l 95); 11 \Vash . 611 ,
40 Pac. 220 ; seizin and posses ion, Raym ond v. Morrison '( 1894 ), 9 W ash . 156,
37 Pac. 3 18; signi fi cation of alleged slanderou wor d , Barr u. Birkner ( 1895 ), 44
Neb. 19 i , 62 . W . 4 9-! ; corp orat e existence, D avis v. Nebraska Nat. -Ba nk ( l 897),
51 Neb. 401 , 70 N. W. 963; ownership,
Cent ral
ity Bank v. Rice (1 895) , 44
N eb. 594, 63
. W. 60 ; execution of
p romi so ry note, Topeka Capital Co. v.
R eming ton (1 900} , 61 Kan . 6, 59 ac.
1062; same, Kimble v. Bunny ( 1900) , 61
K an. 665, 60 P ac. 746 ; partnership, raig
v.Chipm a n (1 900) , K y., 57 . W . 244 ;
ti tle, prigg v. A m. ent. In s. Co. ( l 89 i ),
101 K y . 185, 40 . W . 575; executi on ,
M arshall ' ield o. v . ren Ruffcorn Co.
{1902), 11 7 Ia. 15 , 90 N . W . 61 8; cor porat e ex i tence, Law T r u t ociety . H ogue
( 1900) , 3 i
re. 5-!4, 62 Pac. 380 ; that
m oo y i due , Pa r ~ on . v. Wria ht ( 1 9i ),
102 Ia. 47 3, il 'N . \V . 351 ; th a t defendant w r a nd .till are d oing bu in e
u nd r the name of t he . agency Tolan u.
Ilentig (1903), 13 ,al. 2 ~ . 71 Pa . 44.
Evid nee ad mi ible und er
peci fi c
den ial. : A denial t hat a not lia<l been
mat r iallv altered <l ue iwt rai ·e the i. ~u

t hat the note wa so negligently drawn
tha t the alterat ion co uld be ma<l e without
exciting t he_ u. picion of au ordinarily
prud ent bu ine s man :
ank of
ommerce v. IIalueman (1 900) , 10'.J Ky. 222, 5
. W . 5 i . In an acti on t r ecoYer for
-ral ue of e r vices render ed , the defend ant
cann ot, und er a den ial o-f their value,
prove tha t the ervi ce wer e not r ndered,
bu t i confi ned to proof of Yalue : I3 ud<lr
v. 'cha fer tl 95), 12 W a b . 3 10 41 Pac.
43. T o . am e effect see Ga llier v. hi ca o,
etc. Ry. Co. ( 190:2) , 116 Ia. 319, 9 N . \\~.
11 09 . U nder a denial of titl e evidence of
a baudonm ent may be g iv en: Treva ki
v. P eard ( 1 96 ), Ill Cal. 599, -!4 P ac. 2-!6 _
In Law T r u t ociety v. Hogue (1 900 ),
3 7 Or e. 544, 62 Pac. 380, t he court itiu ~
" A plea of nul tiel co rpora t ion i mpo e
npon t he pl ain t iff t he burd n of prov ing
its corporate exi stence, but wh th r it
should be con ider ed a plea iu a batem n t
or in bar has been th e ·u bject of mu ·h
controver y . . . . nch pl a does n t sugg e t a be tter writ, ther eby lacking one of
t he es ent ial el ement of a plea in a batement; an d as it tend t o defea t, an d n t
postpone, the action , we t hi nk he better
rea on upport the theor.v that a plea of
nul ti l cor porati on goe to t he meri t , and
is a plea in bit r, aml , thi be i n ~ o H g ue
and hi · wi fe d id n t waiYe nch defen ce b.

. 352 ,

~o

n (l!JOO), 22

E . 4 14 ;
' t ah, 43, GI
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that the plaintiff need not prove any material allegations so con-

ceded to be true; evidence in contradiction of them cannot be

received; and a finding of fact in opposition to such admission

will be disregarded or set aside on appeal. i The important

question is, What facts or allegations are "materiar"? The

answer has already been indicated. The allegations of the

" issuable facts " mentioned in the last preceding subdivision,

and described at large in Chapter Third, are the material alle-

gations, which are admitted by a neglect to deny them. It

follows that the two other classes of averments found in com-

plaints and petitions, viz., those of time, place, quantity, value,

amount, and the like, and those of unnecessary evidentiary mat-

ter, or of legal conclusions, are not thus admitted. They need

not be denied, and are not the subject-matter of proper issues

upon the pleadings. The allegations of time, place, amount,

value, amount of damages, and the like, are not, except in

very special cases, matters of substance so as to require a

denial; and they may, in general, be contradicted or modified
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Pac. 213; Merguire v. O'Donnell (1894),

103 Cal. 50, 36 Pac. 1033 ; Pitzer v. Terri-

tory of Oklahoma (1896), 4 Okla. 86, 44

Pac. 216; Boles v. Bennington (1896),

136 Mo. 522, 38 S. W. 306 ; Parke v.

Boulware (1901), Idaho, 63 Pac. 1045;

Capitol Lumbering Co. j;. Learned (1899),

that the plaintiff n ed not prov any mat rial all gation so conceded to be true; evidence in contradiction of them an not be
received; and a finding of fact in oppo iti n to such admi ion
will be disr· garded or set a id on app al. 1 Th important
question i, What fact· or all gations are "mat rial'''? 'Th
answer has alr ady been indicated.
The all 'gations of th
' issuable facts " mentioned in th last preceding subdivi ion,
and described at large in hapter Third, are the material all gations, which are admitted by a neglect to deny them. It
follows that the two other clas es of averments found in complaints and petitions, viz., those of time, place, quantity, value,
amount, and the like, and tho e f unnecessary evidentiary matter, or of legal conclusions, are not thus admitted. They need
not be denied, and are not the subject-matter of proper issues
upon the pleadings. The allegations of time, place, amount,
value, amount of damages, and the like, are not, except in
very special cases, matters of substance so as to require a
denial; and they may, in general, be contradicted or modified

36 Ore. 544, 59 Pac. 454 ; Harlan County

V. Hogsett (1900), 60 Neb. 362, 83 N. W.

171 ; Davis v. First Nat. Bank (1899), 57

Neb. 373, 77 N. W. 775 ; Baker v. Peter-

sou (1899), 57 Neb. 375, 77 N. W. 774;

Lonergan v. Lonergan (1898), 55 Neb.

641, 76 N. W. 16 ; Equitable Trust Co. v.

O'Brien (1898), 55 Neb. 735, 76 N. W.

417 ; Hartzell v. McClurg (1898), 54 Neb.

313, 74 N. W. 625; Stewart v. Am. Ex.

Bank (1898), 54 Neb. 461, 74 N. W. 865;

Rohman v. Gaiser (1898), 53 Neb. 474, 73

N. W. 923 ; Van Etten v. Kosters (1896),

48 Neb. 152, 66 N. W. 1106; Scofield v.

Clark (1896), 48 Neb. 711, 67 N. W. 754 ;

Maxwell v. Higgins (1893),38 Neb. 671,

57 N. W. 388; Smith v. Coe (1902), 170

N. Y. 162, 63 N. E. 57; Bouscaren v.

Brown (1894), 40 Neb. 722, 59 N. W.385 ;

Douglas County v. Bennett (1901), 61

Neb. 660, 85 N. W. 833 ; White v. Costi-

gan (1903), 138 Cal. 564, 72 Pac. 178 ; Her-

ring-IIall-:Marviu Co. y. Smith (1903), 43

Ore. 315, 72 Pac. 704. But allegations of

value and damages are not admitted by

failure to deny them : Baker v. Peterson

(1899), 57 Neb. 375, 77 N. W. 774 ; Hart-

zell V. McClurg (1898), 54 Neb. 313, 74

N. W. 625; Grant v. Clarke (1899), 58

Neb. 72, 78 N. W. 364.

Admissions in pleadings are conclu-

sive: Nugent V. Powell (1893), 4 Wyo.

1 73, 33 Pac. 23 ; Gadsden v. Thrush (1898),

56 Neb. 565, 76 N. W. 1060. Facts ad-

mitted in the pleadings need not be

proved : Johnson v. Reed (1896), 47 Neb.

322, 66 N. W. 405; Bradfield v. Sewall

(1899), 58 Neb. 637, 79 N. W. 615; Knight

t'. Finney (1899), 59 Neb. 274, 80 N. W.

912. But a party is not bound by admis-

sions in abandoned pleadings: Mahoney v.

Hardware Co. (1897), 19 Mont. 377, 48

Pac. 545. But they must be proved as

Pac. 213 ; Merguire v. O'Donnell (1894 ),
103 Cal. 50, 36 Pac. 1033; Pitzer v. Territory of Oklahoma (1 896), 4 Okla. 86, 44
Pac. 216 ; Boles v. Bennington {1 896),
136 Mo. 522, 38 S. W . 306 ; Parke v.
B oulware ( l 90 l) , Idaho, 63 Pac. l 045 ;
Capitol Lumbering Co. v. Learned (1 899),
36 Ore. 544, 59 Pac. 454; Harlan County
v. Hogsett (1900), 60 Neb. 362, 83 N . W .
171; Davis 11. First Nat. Bank (1899), 57
Neb. 373, 77 N. W. 775; Baker v. Peterson (1899) , 57 Neb. 375, 77 N. W. 774;
Lonergan v. Lonergan (1898), 55 Neb.
641, 76 N . W. 16; Equitable Trust Co. v.
O'Brien (1898), 55 Neb. 735, 76 N. W.
417 ; Hartzell v. McClurg (1898), 54 Neb.
313 , 74 N. W . 625; Stewart v. Am. Ex.
Bank (189 8), 54 Neb . 461, 74 N. W. 865;
Rohman v. Gai er {1898), 53 Neb. 474, 73
N. W. 923; Van Etten v. Kosters (1896),
48 Neb. 152, 66 N. W. 1106 ; Scofield v.
Clark (1896), 48 Neb. 711, 67 N. W. 754;
Max well v. Higgins (1893),38 Neb. 671,
57 N. W. 388; Smith v. Coe (1902), 170
N . Y. 162, 63 N. E. 57; Bouscaren v.
Brown (1894), 40 Neb. 722, 59 N. W. 385;
Douglas County v . Bennett (1901) , 61
Neb. 660, 85 N. W. 833 ; White v. Co tigan ( 1903), 138 Cal. 564, 72 Pac. 178; Herrin g-Hall-Marvin Co. v. Smith (1903), 43

Ore. 315, 72 Pac. 704. But allegation' of
value and damage ar not admitted by
failure to deny them : Baker v. Peterson
(1899) , 57 Neb. 375, 77 N. W. 774; H artzell v. McClurg (1898), 54 Neb. 313, 74
N. W . 625; Grant v. Clarke (1899 ), 58
Neb. 72, 78 N. W. 364.
Admissions in pleadings are conclusive: Nuge nt v. Powell (1893), 4 Wyo.
173, 33 Pac. 23; Gadsden v . Thrush (1898),
56 Neb. 565, 76 N. W. 1060. Facts admitted in the pleadings need not be
proved: J ohnson v. Reed {1896), 47 Neb.
322, 66 N. W. 405; Bradfield v. Sewall
{1899), 58 Neb. 637, 79 N. W. 615; Knigh t
v. Finney (1899), 59 Neb. 274, 80 N. W.
912. But a party is not bound by a dmissions in abandoned pleadings: Mahoney v.
Hardware Co. {1891), 19 Mont. 377, 4
Pac. 545 . But they must be proved as
against infant defendants, under Code,
§ 126: Leslie v. Maxey {1902), Ky., 6i

. w.

839.J

Morton v. Waring's H eirs, 18 B.
Mon. 72, 82; Brad bury v. Cronise, 46
Cal. 287 ; Howard v. Throckmorton, 4
Cal. 482, 490.
[ Goldwater v. Burn id (1900 ), 22
Wah. 215, 60 Pac. 409.J
1
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without a denial. Thus, in actions of trover, trespass, or

replevin, it was not necessary to traverse the averments as to

the value of the chattels, and as to the amount of damages;

and the same rule prevails in all actions brought for a similar

purpose under the new system.^ "The defendant is not bound

to answer all matters of evidence which the plaintiff chooses to

allege. The office of the complaint is to aver the material, issu-

able facts which constitute the cause of action, and not the evi-

dence to prove these facts. It is only material allegations that

are admitted when not specifically controverted by the answer. "^

" The scope of the general denial is merely to put in issue such

averments of the complaint as the plaintiff is bound to prove in

order to maintain his action: it does not controvert redundant

allesrations."^

1 Jenkins v. Steanka, 19 Wis. 126.

2 Racouillat r. Kene, 32 Cal. 4.50, 4.5.5,

per Sawyer J. ; Siter v. Jewett, 33 Cal. 92.

[[Gattisf. Kilgo (1901), 128 N. C. 402,
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38 S. E. 931. And only such facts are

ithou a denial.
Thus m action of trover tre pa s, or
replevin it wa not nece sary to traver e the a erment a to
the yalue of the chattel , and as to the amount of damages;
an the ame rule prevail in all actions brought for a ·imilar
pur o e under the new ystem. 1
The defendant i not bound
to answer all matter of e idence which the plaintiff cho es to
allege. The office of the complaint i to aver the material, issuable facts which constitu e the cau e of action, and not the evidence to prove the e facts. It i only material allegation that
are admitted when not pecifically controverted by the an wer. " 2
The cope of the general denial i merely to put in i ue such
averment of the complaint a the plaintiff is bound to prove in
order to maintain his action : it does not controvert redundant
alleg ti ns. ' 3

admitted as are properly pleaded : Doud

r. Duluth Milling Co. (1893), 55 Minn. 53,

56 N. \V. 463-3

^ Adams Exp. Co. v. Darnell, 31 Ind.

20, 22, per Prazer J. ; Baker v. Kistler, 13

Ind. 63. For an example of immaterial

denial, see Newman v. Springfield F. &

M. Ins. Co., 17 Minn. 123, 133. Further

illustrations of the text, Bounellf. Jacobs,

36 Wis. 59 ; Katzhausen v. Koehler, 42 id.

232 ; State v. Russell, 5 Neb. 211; Cook v.

Smith, 54 Iowa, 636 ; Fargo v. Ames, 45

id. 494; Stair v. Cragin, 24 Hun. 177;

Thompson v. Thompson, 52 Cal. 154.

^^Miscellaneous Rules Respecting

Admissicms.

"Imperfect and defective denials, if

acted upon as sufficient at the trial, are in

no sense admissions of the allegations of

a pleading which are attempted to be

denied:" Loftus v. Fischer (1895), 106

J en kin. v. tea nka, 19 Wis. 126.
Racouillat v. Rene, 32 Cal. 450, 4 55,
per awyer J.; iter v. Jewett, 33 al. 92.
[Gatti v. KilO'o (1901), 12
. . 402,
3
'. E. 931. And only uch fatt are
admi tted a are properl.\· pleaded : Doud
v. uluth lllilling Co. (1 93), 55 ~I inn . 53,
I

2

56 ...

w . 463.J

a Adam Exp. Co. v. Darnell, 31 Ind .
20, 22, per Frazer J. ; Baker v . Kistler, 13
Ind. 63. For an example of immaterial
denial, ee Newman v. c pringfield F. &
M. Jn . o., 17 Minn. 123, 133. Further
illu tration of the text, Bonnell v. J acobs,
3 6 Wi . - ; Katzhau en v. K oehler, 42 id.
232; rate v. Ru ell, 5 Neb. 211 ; Cook v.
mith, 54 Iowa, 6.36 ; :F argo v. A me , 45
id. 494; tair v. Cragin, 24 Hun, l 77;
Thom pson v. Thompson, 52 Cal. 154.

Cal. 616, 39 Pac. 1064. Where a defend-

ant admits a bond pleaded by plaintiff, his

denial of certain of its plain and specific

provisions is unavailing: Aikens v. Frank

(1898), 21 Mont. 192, 53 I'ac. 538. In an

action of ejectment by a tenant in com-

mon against liis co-tenant, a denial in the

answer of the plaintiff's title and right of

entry is equivalent to an ouster, as of the

date of tlie commencement of the action,

and the ouster is therefore admitted on

the pleadings: Plass v. Plass (1898), 121

Cal. 131, 53 Pac. 448. In an action to ob-

tain an accounting of a partnership, where

plaintiff alleges that no settlement of tiie

partnership affairs has been had and tiie

defendants specifically deny this allega-

tion, an admission in the answer that an

error was made in preparing the balance

sheet on which the settlement was founded,

is pro tanlo a limitation upon tlie denial

that there had been no settlement ; Rankin

i: Newman (1895), 107 Cal. 602,40 Pac.

1024. " Where the answer admits ma-

terial allegations of the complaint, but ac-

com])anies the concession with a state-

ment of affirmative matter in explanation

by way of defence, ' the plaintiff may

[ ,ltfisc:ellaneous R ule Respectin_q
Admi sio11 .
' Imperfect and defective denials, if
acted upon as ufficient at the trial are in
no en e admi ion of the allegations of
a pleading which are attempted to be
denied:" L oftu v. Fischer (1 95), 106
al. 616, 39 ac. 1064. Where a d fend·
ant a<lmit a bond plead d by plaintiff, his
denial of certain of it plain and specific
pro,•i ion. i unavailing: Aiken v. Frank
(l 9 ), 21 Mont. 192, 53 Pac. 53 . In an
action of j ctment by a tenant in ommon again t hi o-tenant. a denial in the
:1r1 w r of th plaintiff' title and ri ght of

entry i equivalent to an ou ter, as of the
date of the commen cement of t h action,
and the ou ter i therefore admitted on
th pleading ·: Pla v. Pla · (I 89 ), 12 l
al. 13 l 53 Pac. 44 . In an a ction t obtain an accounting of a partner hip, wb re
plaiutiff alleges that no ettlemeut of the
partner hip affai r ha been hacl and the
defendant
pe ifically deny thi allega·
tion, au admis ion in the an wer th at an
error wa made in preparing the balance
sheet on which the settlement wa founded,
i pro tanto a limitation upon the denial
that there had been no ettlement: Rao kin
i:. Newman (1895), 107 Cal. 602 40 Pa .
1024. "Where the an wer admits material allegation of the complaint, but accompaoie the conces ion with a tateruen t of affirmative matter in explanati n
by wa.v of defence, 'the plaintiff may
avail him elf of the admi ion without
the qualifi ation : '" Cook v.
uirkin
(1896), 119 T.
• 13, 25
. E . 715 . ' If
during the trial of ao a tion . new matter
plead d in the au wer i treated by the
parti as denied or pla ed in i ue, it will
be o con id r d in thi cour . alth ugh no ,
or ao imperfet t, r ply wa.c; fi.I cl : " .Miuz r
U, 'W illma n r r ·antile Co. ( I 99), 59
b.
410 , I
. W. 307. While a part. may
withd raw hi pl ading , h ann t hv, u h
withdrawal ar-oid th
ff c
f th ad hb '! ( l 00),

t d nie:d, are
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§ 509. * 618. Negatives Pregnant. How they may arise. Such

a denial is one pregnant with an admission of the substantial fact

which is apparently controverted ; or, in other words, one which,

although in the form of a traverse, really admits the important

fact contained in the allegation. As an illustration: If the aver-

ment was that the defendant on the first day of January made a

note, and the answer should deny that the defendant on the first

day of January made the note, this might be construed as an

admission that he made the note on some other day: or if the

complaint stated that " the defendant wrongfully and forcibly

entered the plaintiff's close," and the answer should deny "that

the defendant wrongfully and forcibly entered the plaintiff's

close," the fact of entering the close might be considered as

admitted. Of course, a denial to produce this result must of

necessity be specific ; for the general denial of "each and every

allegation in the complaint " cannot be pregnant with any admis-

sion.^ Denials in the form of a negative pregnant arise (1) when

the allegation is of a single fact with some qualifying or modify-

ing circumstance, and the traverse is in ipsis verbis, using exactly
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the same language, and no more ; and (2) when the allegation is

of several distinct and separate facts or occurrences connected by

the copulative conjunction, and the traverse is in ipsis verbis of

the same facts and occurrences also connected by the same con-

junction. In most of the reported decisions, the courts have held

such forms of denial to be insufficient, and have declared that

they raised no issues, treating the statements of the complaint or

petition as actually admitted. This was the universal rule under

the old system ; and as it was not based upon any merely techni-

cal reasons, or doctrine of pleading, the same rule is properly

followed under the codes. ^

treated as in issue on the trial, the omis- 194; Dean v. Leonard, 9 Minn. 190. The

sion of a denial will be deemed waived : following cases furnish illustrations of

Albion Milling Co. v. First Nat. Bank the text : Dole v. Burleigh, 1 Dak. 227 ;

(1902), 64 Neb. 116, 89 N. W. 638; Cross- Hanning v. Bassett, 12 Bush, .361 ; Mor-

land V. Admire (1899), 149 Mo. 6.50,51 gan v. Booth, 13 id. 480; Harden v.

S. W. 463; Conant v. Jones (1893), '.Idaho, Atchison, etc. R. Co., 4 Neb. 321 ; Crane

32 Pac. 2.50 ; Missoula Co. v. O'Donnell v. Morse, 49 Wis. 368 ; Norris v. Glenn,

(1900), 24 Mont. 65, 60 Pac. 594.] 1 Idaho, 590; Lorney i'. Cronan, 50 Cal.

1 German Am. Bk. of Hastings v. 610; Prior v. Madigan, 51 id. 178; Le-

White, 38 Minn. 471, overruling earlier roux v. Murdock, 51 id. 541 ; Argard ?•.

Minnesota cases. Parker, 81 Wis. 581 ; Pullen v. Wrigiit, 34

'^ See Pottgieser v. Dorn, 16 Minn. Minn. 314; James w. McPhee, 9 Colo. 486.

204, 209; Ljnd v. Picket, 7 Minn. 184, QCurnow r. Phcenix Ins. Co. (1895), 46

47
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§ 510. * 619. Illustrations. A few examples will illustrate the

nature of these denials, and the decisions of the courts thereon.

In an action upon a promissory note against the indorser, the

answer, copying the exact language of the complaint, said: "That

whether or not, upon the maturity of the said note, the same was

duly presented to the makers for payment, and payment thereof

demanded and refused, and thereupon said note was duly pro-

tested for non-payment and notice of such presentment, refusal,

and protest, given to the defendant, the defendant has no knowl-

edge or information sufficient to form a belief. " This denial was

pronounced bad as a negative pregnant, and was disregarded.^

In an action upon a fire policy against the insurers, the defend-

ants moved for leave to file an amended answer. In denying

this motion, the court said: "The denials are all liable to the

objection that they are negatives pregnant. The complaint avers

that on a particular day the property was all destroyed by fire.

The answer denies this in the very words of the complaint. Such

a denial is a negative pregnant with the admission that it may

have been destroyed on some other day, or that a part may have
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been destroj^ed on the day named. Such denials have always

been held insufficient. "^ A complaint alleging that "the proofs

of loss were filed with the secretary of the defendant on the 31st

of March, 1866," the denial was, that the proofs were filed "as

alleged in the comjjlciint." This was declared to be pregnant with

the admission that they were filed on another day within the time

required.^

§ 511. * 620. Illustrations. When a verified complaint con-

tained many distinct allegations conjunctively stated, and the

S. C. 79, 24 S. E. 74, quoting the text ; the 'defendant, an answer denying that

Columbia Nat. Bank v. Western Iron & he performed such work and labor at

Steel Co. (1896), 14 Wash. 162, 44 Pac. the request of the defendant admitted

145. But a negative pregnant does not the performance of the services by the

operate to prevent an expre.is denial of plaintiff.

the same fact from putting it in issue: ■* Schaetzel v. Germantown, etc. Ins.

Kennedy v. Dickie (1902), 27 Mont. 70, 69 Co., 22 Wis. 412. See also Robbins v.

Pac. 672.] Lincoln, 12 Wis. 1. In McMurphy v.

1 Young V. Catlett, 6 Duer, 4.37, 44.3, Walker, 20 Minn. 382, 384, the complaint

per Woodruff J. on a note alleging that it was delivered on

2 Baker v. Bailey, 16 Barb. 54; Salin- the 10th of September, 1868, an answer

ger V. Lusk, 7 How. Pr. 430. See Brad- stating that it "was not delivered until

bury V. Cronise, 46 Cal. 287, where, the after Sept. 10, 1868," was held to raise no

1 . Illustrations.
few example will illu trate the
nature of these denials, and th deci ion of the courts th reon.
In an action upon a pro mi ory note again t the ind or er, the
an wer copying the exact language of the complaint sai : Tha
whether or not, upon the maturity of the said note, the same wa
duly pre ented to the makers for pa ment, and payment thereof
demanded and refu ed, and thereupon a1 note was dul protested for non-payment and notice of uch presentment, r fu al
and prate t, giv n to the def ndant the defendant ha no knowledge or informa ion ufficient to form a belief." Thi d nial was
pronounc d ba l a a negati ve pregnant and was di r garded.l
In an action upon a fire policy again t the in urers, the d fendan moved for leave to file an amended an wer. In d nying
this motion the court said : ' The denials are all liable t the
objection that they are negatives pregnant. The complaint avers
that on a particular day the property was all destroy d by fire.
The an wer denies this in the very word of the complaint.
uch
a denial i a negative pregnant with the admis ion that it may
have been destroyed on some other day, or that a part may have
been destroyed on the day named.
uch denials have al wa s
been h eld in ufficient. ' 2 A complaint alleging that the roof
of lo s were filed with the secretary of the defendant on the 31 t
of March, 1866," the denial was, that the proofs were filed a as
alleged in the complaint ." This was declared to be pregnant with
the admi ion that they were filed on another day within the time
required. 3
§ 511. * 620. Illu str a t ions. When a verified complaint contained many distinct allegation conjunctively stated, and the
510.

·

complaint alleging that the plaintiff did issue.

certain work and labor at the request of

S. C. 79, 24 . E. 74, quoting the text;
Columbia at. Bank v. Western Iron &
teel Co. (1 96), 14 Wa. h. 162, 44 Pac.
145. But a negative pregnant does not
operate to prevent an expr e. denial of
the ame fact from puttino- it in i ue :
Kennedy v. Dickie (1902), '27 Moot. iO, 69
Pac. 6i-.]
1 Young v.
atl tt, 6 Duer, 437, 443,
per Woodruff ,J.
2 Baker l'. Bailey, 16 Barb. 54;
alioger v. Lu k, 7 How. Pr. 430.
ee Bradbury i· C'roni e, 46 al. 28i, where, the
omplaint alleging that the plaintiff did
certain work and labor at the reque.:t of

the "defendant, an an wer denying that
he performed uch work and lab r at
the reque t of the defendant admitted
the performance of the ervice. by the
plaintiff.
a cha tzel v. Germantown tc. Ins.
o., 22 '\ i . 412.
ee also Robbin v.
Lin ol n, 12 Wi . l. In ~I ~Iurphy v.
\ alker, 20 ~[inn. 3 2, 3 4 , th omplaint
on a no allegin that it wa d liv red on
the 10th f ' pt mL r, 1 6 , an au . wer
tating that it "wa not d livered until
after ept. 10, 186 ," wa held to rai e no
i ·ue.
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mswer consisted of denials of these averments m ipsis verbis

ilso conjunctively stated, following in this manner the exact

anguage of tlie entire complaint, the court ordered a judgment

or the plaintiff on the pleadings, saying: "This mode of an-

iwering is in violation of the principles of common-law pleading,

md not less so of the statute which provides that the defendant's

mswer to a verified complaint shall contain a specific denial of

;ach allegation controverted, or a denial thereof according to

;he defendant's information and belief."^ The complaint in

m action to recover possession of chattels alleged that "de-

'endant unlawfully and wrongfully seized and took said prop-

erty into his possession from said plaintiff;" and the answer

lenied " that he wrongfully and unlawfully seized and took

said property," etc. This answer, it Avas held, admitted the

making. 2 It is the settled rule in California that conjunctive

lenials, in the very language of conjunctive allegations, raise

10 issues.^

§ 512. * 621. Illustrations. In an action to foreclose a mort-

gage given to secure a bond, the complaint alleged the execution
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)f the bond for SI, 000, with a provision in it, that, if default

should be made in the payment of interest for thirty days, the

ivhole principal sum should become due at the option of the

plaintiff; and set out the mortgage, averring that it contained

:he same provision, that interest had been due more than thirty

lays, and that plaintiff made his election to regard the whole

principal as due. The defendant in his answer admitted the

execution of the bond and mortgage, "but he denies that the

said bond and mortgage contained any condition or clause

whereby, in case of a default in payment of interest for the

space of thirty days, the principal sum was to become due and

payable immediately, as alleged in said complaint, as by refer-

ence to said mortgage will more fully wppear.'''' This defence was

1 Fish V. Redington, 31 Cla. 185, 194. to pay, the words "assume" and "agree"

- Woodworth v. Knowlton, 22 Cal. being synonymous, and a denial that they

164. See also Feeley v. Shirley, 43 Cal. "assumed and agreed" to pay the debt

369; Harris v. Shoutz, 1 Mont. 212, 216; was sufficient.

Toombs V. Hornbuckle, 1 Mont. 286. On s Blankman v. Vallejo, 15 Cal. 638 ;

the other hand, it was held in Jones v. Kuhland v. Sedgwick, 17 Cal. 123; Caul-

Eddy, 90 Cal. 147, that an allegation in field v. Sanders, 17 Cal, 569; Landers v.

the complaint that defendants " assumed Bolton, 26 Cal. 393 ; Busenius v. Coffee,

and agreed" to pay a debt, amounted 14 Cal. 91.

merely to an allegation that they " agreed "

.nswer con isted of denials of th e avcrm nts in ipsis verbis
1 o conjunctively stat d, f 11 wing in this manner the exact
anguage of the entire complaint, the court order d a judgm nt
or the plaintiff on the pl ading sa ing: "Thi mod of anwering is in violation of the principles of common-law pl ading,
:nd not les so of the statute which provides that the defendant'
.nswer to a verified complaint shall contain a specific denial of
ach allegation controverted, r a denial thereof according to
be defendant's information and belief." 1 The complaint in
,n action to recover possession of chattels alleged that "deendant unlawfully and wrongfully seized and took said proprty into his possession from said plaintiff; '' and the answer
lenied "that be wrongfully and unlawfully seized and took
aid property," etc. This answer, it was held, admitted the
aking. 2 It is the settled rule in California that conjunctive
lenials, in the very language of conjunctive allegations, raise
10 issues. 3
§ 512. * 621. Illustrations. In an action to foreclose a mort;age given to secure a bond, the complaint alleged the execution
>f the bond for $4, 000, with a provision in it, that, if default
hould be made in the payment of interest for thirty days, the
vbole princ1pal sum should become due at the option of the
Jlaintiff; and set out the mortgage, averring that it contained
.he same provision, that interest had been due more than thirty
lays, and that plaintiff made his election to regard the whole
)rincipal as due. The defendant in his answer admitted the
ixecution of the bond and mortgage, "but he denies that the
:aid bond and mortgage contained any condition or clause
;vhereby, in case of a default in payment of interest for the
;pace of thirty days, the principal sum was to become due and
)ayable immediately, as alleged in said complaint, as by refermce to said mortgage will more fully appear." This defence was
Fish v. Redington, 31 Cla. I 5, 194.
·w oodworth v. Kn owlton, 22 Cal.
l64. See also Feeley v. Shirley, 43 Cal.
mg ; Harris v . Shontz, 1 Mont. 212, 216;
foombs v. Hornbuckle, 1 Mont. 286. On
;he other hand, it was held in Jones v.
Eddy, 90 Cal. 14 7, that an allegation in
;he complaint that defendants "a sumed
md agreed" to pay a debt, amounted
merely to an allegation that they" agreed"
1

2

to pay, the words "assume" and "agree"
being ynonymous, and a denial that they
"a sumed and agreed" to pay the debt
wa ufficient.
a Blankman v. Vallejo, 15 Cal. 638;
Ruhland v. Sedgwick, 17 Cal. 123; Caulfield v. Sanders, 17 Cal. 569; Lander v.
Bolton, 26 Cal. 393; Bu enius v. Coffee,
14 Cal. 91.
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struck out as frivolous, the court saying : " This is a denial that

both of the instruments contained the clause in question. It is

not a denial that one of them contained it. The bond and the

raortsrasre tosrether constituted but one instrument. The latter

refers to the former as affording particular evidence of the

terms of payment. Such reference incorporates into the mort-

gage all the terms and conditions of the bond. The only denial

was of their joint effect. This was an admission as to the bond."

The defence, therefore, did not put in issue the allegation of the

complaint, tliat the whole amount was due.^

' Kay v. Whittaker, 44 N. Y. 565,

571.

^Examples of Negatives Pregnant

Held to raise no Issue.

A denial "that for a great number of

struck ou as frivolous the court saying : This is a denial that
both of the in truments contained the clause in ques ion. It is
not a denial that one of them contained it. The bond and the
mortgage to ether con tituted but one instrument. The latter
refer" to the former a affording particular evidence of the
term of payment.
uch reference incorporates into the mortga all the term and condition of the bond. The only denial
was of their joint effect. This was an admission as to the bond.
The defence therefore, did not put in issue the allegation of the
complaint, that the whole amount was due. 1

years, previous to the time alleged in the

plaintiff's complaiut, it had laid out and

maintained, and used as a highway, the road
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described in the plaintiff's complaint:"

Grimm v. Town of Washburn (1898), 100

Wis. 2-29. 75 N. W. 964. A denial that de-

fendant directed decedent " to go down and

do certain work in an excavation which the

defendant had caused to be made : " Stuber

V. McEntee (1894), 142 N. Y. 200, 36

N. E. 878. A denial that plaintiff " is a

corporation duly organized as a national

bank under the Act of Congress of June 3,

1864, or any other act: " First Nat. Bank

V. Gibsou (1900), 60 Neb. 767, 84 N. W.

259. A denial that plaintiff's testatrix on

a date named " was the owner in fee

simple and entitled to the possession " of

the land in controversy : Knight r. Den-

man (1902), 64 Neb. 814, 90 N. W. 863.

A denial that notes were lost " as alleged

in })laintiff's |)etition : " Storey v Kerr

(1902), Neb., 89 N. W. 601. An allega-

tion " that whether said warrant came

into the hands of plaintiff as alleged, this

defendant has no knowledge, etc. : " Se-

attle Nat. Bank v. Meerwaldt (1894) 8

Wa.sh. 630, 36 Pac. 763. The allegation,

" further answering said complaiut as to

paragraph VIII. thereof, these defendants

and neither of them have knowledge or

information sufficient to form a belief as

to the truth of the allegations therein

contained and therefore deny the same

and each and every part thereof:" Cole

I' Noerdl'iugiir (1900), 22 Wash. 51, 60

Pac. 57. An allegation of want of knowl-

edge or information to form a belief as to

whether the road was a legally laid out

liighwav, or whether defendant was in

duty bound to keep it in repair, and

therefore a denial of the same : Carpenter

r. Town of Rolling (1900), 107 Wis. 559,

83 N. W. 953. A denial that defendant

took and carried away the goods : Bach v.

Montana Co. (1894), 15 Mont. 345, 39

Pac. 291. A denial that "the amount of

stock" sold by plaintiff to defendant was

ever delivered : EdgerCon v. Power (1896),

13 Mont. 3r,0, 45 Pac. 204. A denial

tiiat plaintiff's claim "was assigned to

defendant for collection as alleged in

the answer : " Maliouey v. Hardware Co.

• Kay v. Wh ittaker, 44 N. Y. 565,
571.

[Examples of N egat,.ves Pregnant
e no bsue.
H eld to
A denial "that fo r a great number of
year , previous to the time alleged in the
plaiutiff' complaint, it had laid out and
maintained, and used asa highway, the road
de cribed in the plaintiff' complaint:"
Grimm v. Town of \Va.shburn (1 9 ), 100
Wi . 229 . i5 N. W. 964. A deuial that clefondaut directed det'eden t "to go down and
do certain work in au ex carntion which the
defendant had caused to he made:" Stuber
v . McE ntee (1894), 142 N. Y. 200, 36
r . E . i . A denial that plaintiff "is a
corporation duly organized as a national
bank under the Act of Congre of June 3,
l 64, or an y other act:" Fir t at, Bank
v . Gib on (1900 ), 60
eb . 767, 4 N. W.
25 9. A de nial that plain tiff' testat rix on
a date named "was the owner in fee
imple an d entitled to the po e ion" of
the la nd in controver y: Knig ht v. Denman ( l 02), 64 iTeb. 14, 90 . _ ' , W . 63 .
A denial t hat note were lo-t " as alleged
in plaintiff' peti ti n : " torey v Kerr
( 1902), Neb., 9 r. W. 601. An allegati on " that whether aid warra nt came
int the haod of plain tiff a a lleged , t hi
defendant h
u kn owledg- , etc. : " eattle
t. Bank v. Meerwaldt (1 94)
W a h. 63 0 , 36 P ac. :' 63. The all gation,
"fur ther a u wering aid co mplain t a to
parag raph VIII. th reof. the'e defendant
a nd neither of them have knowled<T or
info rma tion ufficient to form a beli f as
to t he t ru th of th e allegation therein
contai ned aud therefore deny the ame
au cl ach aud every part thereof:" ole
v ... Tue r 1 ing~ r ( 1900 ), 22 \Va h. 51, 60

m,.

1

Pac. 5i. An allegation of want of knowledge or information to form a belief as to
whether the road was a legally laid out
highway, or whether defendant was in
duty bound to keep it in repair, and
therefore a denial of the same: Carpenter
r. Town of Polling ( 1900), 107 Wi . 559,
3
. W. 953 . \. denial that defendant
took und carried away the good s : Bach v.
Montana Co. (1 9-!), 15 t\font. 345, 39
Pac . 291. A deni a l that "the amouut of
tock" . old by plaintiff to defeudao t wru
ever delivered : Edgerton v. l'owe r (I 96) ,
l
Moot. 350, 45 Pac. 204. A den ial
that plaintiff's claim "was
igned to
defendant for collection a alleged in
the an wer :" Mahoney v. Hardware Co.
( l 97), 19 Mont. 3i7, 4 Pac. 545. A
denial of a wrongful or unlawful taking
or withholding: Proctor v. Irvin {I 99),
22 i\Iont. 5-!7, 57 Pac. l 3 . A denial of
certain allegation "a alleged in the
petiti on : " Board of Education v. P rior
(1 9 ), 11 . D. 292, 7i N. W. 105. A
denial that uch eonveyance wer executed " as operated to conv y perp tu al or
non-as e a ble water right : " rand alley Irrigation Co . i·. Le~ her (1901), 2 0ol.
2i3, 6:1 Pa . 44. A d nial that plaintiff
i a corporation organized "under or by
virtue of th e law of the tate of Illin i : "
i\fc ormi ck :\fach . o. i: . Hovey ( 1 99),
36 re. 259, 59 P a . l 9. A denial that
the d fendaut " till ontinue to hold or
occ upy aid premi 'e , or any portion
. P . Lol r : "
th ereof, as tenant of
Kn wle v. 1urphy ( l 95 ), 107 Cal. lOi,
40 ac. 11 l. A copulative denial of four
di tinct matter : Wi e v. Ro e (1 95 , 110
al. 159, 42 al. 569. An alle.g-ati un
"that · id defendant did not xecute aoJ
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§ 513. * 622. Conflict of Authority as to whether a Negative

§ 513.

Pregnant raises an Issue. There is not, however, an absolute

Confli ct o f Auth o rity as to whether a Negative

Pregn':lnt raises an

courts, avowedly rejecting the common-law rule of strict con-

struction, and applying the requirement of the codes that plead-

ings must be liberally construed with a view to substantial justice,

have held that such denials did raise an issue, although their

character as negatives pregnant was fully acknowledged. It

will be seen from the decisions to be cited, that no line of dis-

tinction can be drawn which separates them from those which

precede, and reconciles their conflicting results : different courts

have simply pronounced in an opposite manner upon substan-

tially the same facts or circumstances. A petition stated the

cause of action in the following manner: "Plaintiff claims of

defendant sixty-four dollars, and for a cause of action states that

on the 15th day of October, 1867, the defendant set fire to prairie

land, and allowed the fire to escape from his control, whereby

said fire spread to and consumed sixteen tons of hay, the prop-

erty of the plaintiff, to his damage," etc. The answer denied

" that defendant did on the 15th day of October, 1867, set fire
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* 622.

Th re is not, how v r, an ab ·olute
unanimity among the decided ases . In some in tanc
th
courts, avowedly r ejecting tbe common-law rul of strict contruction, and applying the requirement of the codes that pleadings must be liberally con trued with a view to sub ·tantial ju tice,
have held that such denials did raise an issue, although their
character as negatives pregnant wa, fully acknowledged. It
will be seen fro m the decisions to be cited, that no line of distinction can be drawn which separates them from those which
precede, and reconciles their conflicting results: different courts
have simply pronounced in an opposite manner upon substantially the same facts or circumstances. A petition stated the
cause of action in the following manner : "Plaintiff claims of
defendant sixty-four dollars, and for a cause of action states that
on the 15th dt;ty of October, 1867, the defendant set fire to prairie
land, and allowed the fire to e..,cape from his control, whereby
said fire spread to and consumed sixteen tons of hay, the property of the plaintiff, to his damage," etc . The answer denied
"that defendant did on the 15th day of October, 1867, set fire
to prairie land by which the hay of the plaintiff was consumed."
The Supreme Court of Iowa, in pronouncing judgment, said that
defendant's denial "was perfectly consistent with his doing the
act on the 14th or the 16th, or on any other day than the 15th."
Yet, in view of the rule of liberal construction imposed upon the
judges by the code, it held that this answer, though conceded to
be a negative pregnant, was not a nullity, but raised an issue. 1
The Supreme Court of Missouri applied a like lenient method in
an action u pon a bill of exchange executed by the National
Insurance Company. The petition alleged that the company,
"by its draft in writing signed by its secretary," made the obli-

unanimity among the decided cases. In some instances the

to prairie land by which the hay of the plaintiff was consumed."

The Supreme Court of Iowa, in pronouncing judgment, said that

defendant's denial " was perfectly consistent with his doing the

act on the 14th or the 16th, or on any other day than the 15th."

Yet, in view of the rule of liberal construction imposed upon the

judges by the code, it held that this answer, though conceded to

be a negative pregnant, was not a nullity, but raised an issue.-'

The Supreme Court of Missouri applied a like lenient method in

an action upon a bill of exchange executed by the National

Insurance Company. The petition alleged that the company,

"by its draft in writing signed by its secretary," made the obli-

deliver at Fairfield, Iowa, to the plaintiffs, S; W. 405. A denial that an execution

or either of them, the note, etc. : " Spencer was duly returned : St. Paul Fire Ins. Co.

r. Turney (1897), 5 Okla. 683, 49 Pac. v. Dakota Land Co. (1897), 10 S. D. 191,

1012. A denial that defendant " negli- 72 N. W. 460. An allegation " that Helen

gently and carelessly set fire to the V. W. Knight on and prior to the 25th of

depot:" Cincinnati, etc. R. R. Co. v. April, 1898, was the owner in fee simple

Barker (1893), 94 Ky. 71,21 S. W. 347. A and entitled to the possession" of the

denial " that the killing was done through premises in controversy : Knight v. Den-

the carelessness or negligence of defend- man (1903), — Neb. — , 94 N. W. 622. ^

ant to the damage of the plaintiff:" i Doolittle v. Greene, 32 Iowa, 123,

Rogers v. Felton (1895), 98 Ky. 148, 32 124.

-

I ssue.

deliver at Fairfield, Iowa, to the plaintiffs,
or either of them, the note, etc.:" Spencer
v. Turney (1 89i) , 5 Okla. 683, 49 Pac.
101 2. A denial that defendant " negl igently and car eles ·ly ·et fire t o the
depot:" Cin cinnati, etc. R. R. Co. v.
Barker (1 893), 94 Ky. 71, 21 S. W. 347 . A
denial "that the killing was done throug h
th e carelessness or negli gence of defendant to the damage of the plaintiff:"
nogers v. Felton {1895) , 98 Ky. 148, 32

S: W. 405. A denial that an execution
was duly return ed: St. Paul Fire In . Co.
v. Dakota Land Co. (1 897), 10 S. D. 191,
72 N. W . 460. An allegation "that Helen
V . W . Knight on and prior to the 25th of
April, 1898, was the owner in fee imple
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premises in controversy: Knight v. Denman (1903), - Neb.-, 94 N. W. 622.J
l Doolittle v. Greene, 32 Iowa, 123,
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gation; and the answer in turn denied, "that the compan}-, by

its draft in writing signed by its secretary," made the obli-

gation. This answer, it was held, raised an issue. Construing

it freely and favorably to the pleader, it could not be treated

as a nullity, although its character as a negative pregnant was

undoubted.^

§ 514. * 623. The Better Doctrine. If the requirements of the

codes as to the mode of forming issues by specific denials are not

to be a dead letter, the doctrine supported by the series of deci-

sions first above cited is clearly correct, and the practical rule

drawn from them is in every respect superior to the slipshod

method of treatment adopted by the other class of cases. To

say the least, a denial in the form of a negative pregnant is

such a glaring violation of logical and legal principles, that it

exhibits on the part of the pleader either the ignorance which

does not comprehend the nature of an issue, or the astute cun-

ning which is able to conceal the want of a defence under the

appearance of a direct answer. In either instance it should be

condemned by the courts.
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§ 515. * 62-1. Denials cannot properly contain Ne-w Matter. It

has been shown that all defences are either (1) denials of all,

some, or one of the plaintiff's allegations ; or (2) afiirmative new

matter which assumes that the allegations of the complaint or

petition cannot be disproved, but at the same time establishes

other facts which defeat the right of action. The general denial,

we have seen, is a brief and comprehensive formula, denying

'• each and every allegation of the complaint or petition ; " and

the special denial is based upon and negatives the single aver-

ment against which it is directed. It is utterly impossible,

therefore, that a denial, either general or special, if properly

framed, should contain any affirmative matter, any allegation

of facts in a positive and direct manner as though they consti-

tuted new matter and a defence by way of confession and avoid-

ance. A defence consisting in the narrative of facts, stated under

1 First Nat. Bank v. Ilogan, 47 Mr). [In Feldmann ?'. Shea (1899), Idaho, 59

472. See also EIl.s v. Pacific R. Co., 55 Pac. 5.37, it was lield that the words "sold

Mo. 278, 286 ; and Wall v. Buffalo Water and delivered" as used in a complaint for

Co., 18 N. Y. 119, in whicli it wa.s held goods sold and delivered, constitute but

that the answer should have been cor- one act, and a denial of that act in the

rected on motion, and that, in the absence conjunctive raises an issue.^

of such motion, an issue was raised.
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the form of "new matter," which were not, liowever, new matter,

but could all be properly proved under a denial, would be a vio-

lation of the true theory of pleading, and of tlie classification and

description of defences contained in all the codes.

§ 516. * 625. Pleading New Matter Equivalent to a Denial. It

sometimes happens that the pleader, either mistaking the nature

of the facts which will be proved by the defendant, and thinking

them to be new matter when in truth they are only the evidence

which can be offered in support of a denial, or supposing for some

reason that his case will be strengthened by spreading all these

details upon the record, sets up a defence either alone or joined

vrith others which is in form "new matter." It consists of

affirmative allegations, stated as though they confessed and

avoided the plaintiff's cause of action: and yet the facts thus

averred are not new matter; they are simply the evidence which

can be offered in support of a denial. The defence altogether is

therefore the same as a denial : if it goes to the whole complaint

or petition, it is equivalent to the general denial; if it goes to

some particular allegation or allegations, it is equivalent to one
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or more specific denials. It is plain that the defendant has

gained nothing by such a mode of pleading; he has not added

anything to his case ; he has not stated a fact which he could

not have proved under a simple answer of denial. On the

contrary, in limiting the scope of his proofs at the trial to the

particular matter which he has pleaded, he may have weakened

his defence by shutting out the consideration of other facts which

he could have given in evidence under a proper denial. At all

events, he has unnecessarily disclosed his case to the adverse

party.

§ 517. * 626. Same Subject. This is clearly an unpractical as

vv^ell as unscientific mode of pleading. Such a defence is an

"argumentative denial." The same fault which I have thus

indicated, sometimes existed under the old procedure. A plea

in the form of a special plea by way of confession and avoid-

ance, which contained no matter of that character, but only

matter which could be proved under a traverse, and which was

therefore equivalent to a traverse, — to the general issue perhaps,

— was generally bad on demurrer. The objection was, not that

the facts thus set up constituted no defence at all, — for the

very assumption was that they did constitute a defence by way

the form of "new matter,'' which w re not, h w ver, new matter,
but could all be properly proved un ler a denial, w uld be a violation of the true theory of pl ading, and of the clas ification and
de cription of defences con tain ed in all the code .
§ 516. * 625. Pleading New Matter Equivalent to a Denial. It
sometimes happens that the pleader, either mistaking the nature
of the facts which will be proved by the defendant, and thinking
them to be new matter wb n in truth they are only the evidence
which can be offered in support of a denial, or supposing for some
reason that bjs case will be strengthened by spreading all these
-details upon the record, sets up a defence either alone or joined
with others which is in form "new matter." It consists of
.affirmative allegations, stated as though they confes ' ed and
avoided the plaintiff 's cause of action: and yet the facts thus
averred are not new matter; they are simply the evidence which
can be offered in support of a denial. The defence altogether is
therefore the same as a denial: if it goes to the whole complaint
·o r petition, it is equivalent to the general denial; if it goes to
some particular allegation or allegations, it is equivalent to one
m more specific denials. It is plain that the defendant has
gained nothing by such a mode of pleading; he has not added
anything to his case; · he has not stated a fact which b e could
not have proved under a simple answer of denial. On the
contrary, in limiting the scope of bis proofs at the trial to the
particular matter which he has pleaded, he may have weakened
'bis defence by shutting out the consideration of other facts which
be could have given in evidence under a proper denial. At all
events, he has unnecessarily disclosed his case to the adverse
party.
§ 517. * 626. Same Subject. This is clearly an unpractical as
well as unscientific mode of pleading. Such a defence is an
"argumentative denial." The same fault which I have thu
indicated, sometimes existed under the old procedure. A pl ea
in the form of a special plea by way of confession and avoidance, which contained no matter of that character, but only
matter which could be proved under a traverse, and which was
therefore equivalent to a traverse, - to the general issue perhaps,
- was generally bad on demurrer. The objection was, not that
the facts thus set up constituted no defence at all, - for the
very assumption was that they did constitute a defence by way
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of traverse, — but the external forms of the system were con-

sidered to be of such importance, and this faulty pleading so

completely violated them all, that it was held to be worthless for

any purpose.

of raY
of the y t m w re conid red
of such importance,
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The plaintiff' r m d i
y motion to make th defence more c rtain ancl defini , nd o
trike out redundant and uperfluous ma er. 2 If such motion
wa more fr quently resorted to, and wa favored by the court
it would soon produce the effect of working a mark d im ro
ment in pleadings. It is not mer ly a scientific blemish but a
great practical e il, to have the re ord incumbered b a ma of
unnece sar allegations, and matters purely e identiar · when a
hort and comprehen ive denial would the better ub r
the
ri ht f the partie , and more clearly bring out and exhibit the
is ues designed to be raised by he an wer. 3
§ 519. * 62 . Illustrations of Argumentative Denials. An example or two from among the d cided cases will be sufficient
to illustrate the kind of defence which is equivalent to the
d nial and the rulings of the courts thereon. An action was
brought by the University of Vincennes against one Judah to
recover certain bond alleged to be the property of the in tituT

§ 518. * 627. Remedy for such a Denial is by Motion under the

Codes. The same rules of order and classification are violated

by such defences at the present day ; but as the new procedure

looks rather to the substance than to the form, and as a demurrer

to the answer is only allowed on the ground of insufficiency, —

that is, when the facts stated do not constitute a)iy defence, — the

pleading which I have described as an " argumentative denial "

is not considered bad on demurrer.^ The plaintiff's remedy is

by motion to make the defence more certain and definite, and to

strike out redundant and superfluous matter.^ If such motion

was more frequently resorted to, and was favored by the courts,

it would soon produce the effect of working a marked improve-

ment in pleadings. It is not merely a scientific blemish, but a

great practical evil, to have the record incumbered by a mass of

unnecessary allegations, and matters purely evidentiary, when a
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short and comprehensive denial would the better subserve the

rights of the parties, and more clearly bring out and exhibit the

issues designed to be raised by the answer.*^

§ 519. * 628. Illustrations of Argumentative Denials. An ex-

ample or two from among the decided cases will be sufficient

to illustrate the kind of defence which is equivalent to the

denial and the rulings of the courts thereon. An action was

brought by the University of Vincennes against one Judah to

recover certain bonds alleged to be the property of the institu-

1 QOren v. Board of Commissioners denial by defendant is sufficient to give

(1901), 157 Ind. 158, 60 N. E. 1019; Hiatt the plaintiff the right to open and close:

V. Town of Darlington (1898), 152 Ind. 570, Sorensen v. Sorensen (1903), — Keb. — ,

53 N. E. 825; Boos i;. Morgan (1896), 146 94 N. W. 540]

Ind. Ill, 43 N. E. 947; State ex rel. v. » n has been held in New York that

Osborn (1895), 143 Ind. 671, 42 N. E. 921 ; an affirmative defence inconsistent with

Childers i;. First Nat. Bank (1896), 147 the allegations of the complaint, but not

Ind. 430, 46 N. E. 825 ; Nat. Wall Paper coupled with a denial of such allegations,

Co. V. Mcl'herson (1897), 19 Mont. 355, raises no issue, under the provision of the

48 Pac. 550.] code that material allegations in the com-

2 QOren v. Board of Commissioners ))laint not controverted bv the answer,

(1901), 157 Ind. 158, 60 N. E. 1019. But must be taken as true. Beard v. Tilgh-

T

see LuiKixshire Ins Co. v. Monroe (1897), man (Supreme, 1892), 20 N. Y. Suppl.

101 Ky 12, 39 S. W. 434, where theallega- 736; Fleischman v. Stern, 90 N. Y. 110;

tions were held not to amount even to an QSmith v. Coe (1902), 170 N. Y. 162, 63

argumentative denial. An argunientative N. K. 57.]

l

[

ren

i:.

Board of

omm1 10ners

(1901), 157 Ind. 15 , 60 N. E. 1019; Hiatt
v. Town of Darlington ( l 9 ), 152 Ind. 5i0,
53 . E. 25; Boo u. M rgan (1 96), 146
Ind. 111 , 43
. E. 947; tate ex rel. v.
born {l 5), 143 Ind. 67 L, 42 N. E. 921;
hil<l r u. J.<'ir ·t l at. Bank (1 96) 147
Ind . 4.'JO, .+6 ~. E . 25; :Nat. Wall Paper
o. v. McPherson ( l 97), 19 Mont. 355,
4 P ac. 550 J
2 [ )r n u. B oard of
mmi. ·10ncr
( 19 1), 1; 7 Iu <l. 15 , 60 . E. 1019. Bu t
.c La11ca.ldr Iu.
o. v. :\T nro (l !l7 ),
1OJ K y 12, 39 '. \V. 4 3 +, where th

all craions w ·re helcl not to a m o un t ev n to au
argum ·11tati' c deuia l.
u a rgu rn eutatiY

denial by d fendant i ufficient t give
the plaintiff the right to open and clo e:
oren en v. oren en (1903), - Neb. - ,
94 N. W. 540.J
8

It ha been held in N w York that

ARGUME.'TATI\'E DENIAL .
ARGUMENTATIVE DENIALS. 745

745

tion, which the defendant had converted to his own use. His

answer set up, that the university was indebted to him in a large

amount for professional services, and that the board of trustees

had passed a resolution allowing him to retain and have these

bonds as compensation for his services and in settlement of his

claim. The reply, instead of denying this answer, averred that

Judah had been secretary of the board of trustees; that he fraud-

ulently entered this resolution in the books of record of the uni-

versity; that no such resolution was ever passed; and it set out

the resolution which was actually passed, and which was very

different from that alleged in the answer. To the paragraph of

the reply containing this matter the defendant demurred ; the

demurrer was overruled, and he appealed. In disposing of the

question thus raised, the court said : " Now, this reply is simply

a denial of so much of the answer as alleges the adoption of the

resolution, or, in other words, the making the contract by the

trustees. It is argumentative, and it needlessly explains how a

resolution never made by the trustees comes to be found on their

records. This is surplusage. But neither argumentativeness
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nor surplusage justifies a demurrer under our system of plead-

ing. There was, therefore, no error in overruling the appellant's

demurrer to the second paragraph of the reply." ^ It is plain

that a general denial of this answer would have admitted in

evidence all the facts specially pleaded in the reply under the

form of new matter; and the reply was, in fact, nothing more

than a denial.

§ 520. * 629. "Where Answer contains General Denial and also a

Special Defence of New Matter Equivalent to General Denial. When

the answer contains two or more defences, viz., 1st, a general

denial, and, 2d, a special defence in the form of new matter, but

in fact equivalent to the general denial, and a demurrer to the

latter has been sustained, no material error is thus committed,

and the judgment will not be reversed ; for the same facts which

were averred in the special defence could be fully proved under

the general denial, and the defendant's whole case would thus

be available under the issue which remained upon the record.^

In an action for goods sold and delivered, the answer in each of

1 Judah V. University of Vincennes, 23 ^ Chicago, Cin. & L. R. Co. r. West, 37

Ind. 272, 277. See also Clink u. Thurston, Ind. 211, 215; Waggoner t'. Liston, 37

47 Cal. 21, 29. Ind. 357.

tion, which the d fondant had convertrd to hi . . own u e. Hi
answ r et up, tlrnt the univ r ity was intl bted t him in a large
amount fo r pr f s ional rvi c , and. that the b ard of tru.'t
had pa ' cl. a. re'olution allmYing hjm to retain and. have the ·e
bond a ompen ation f r his , rvic and in ·ettl rnent of l1i
laim. The r I ly, instead. of cl. nying this answer, av rr d that
Jud ah had been secretary of the board. of tru tee ; that he fraudulently nt reel. this resolution in the book of r cord. of the unier ity; that no uch r olution wa · ev r pa sed; and it set out
the res olution which was actually pas ed, and which wa v ry
different from that alleged in the answer. To the paragraph of
the reply containing this matter the defendant demurred; the
demurrer was overruled, and he appealed. In disposing of the
question thus rai ed, the court said : "Now, this reply is simply
a denial of so much of the answer as alleges the adoption of the
resolution, or, in other words, the making the contract by the
trustees. It is argumentative, and it needlessly explains how a
resolution never made by the trustees comes to be found on their
records. This is surplusage. But neither argumentativeness
nor surplusage justifies a demurrer under our system of pleading. There was, therefore, no error in overruling the appellant's
demurrer to the second paragraph of the reply." 1 It is plain
that a general denial of this answer would have admitted in
evidence all the facts specially pleaded in the reply under the
form of new matter; and the reply was, in fact, nothing more
than a denial.
§ 520. * 629. Where Answer contains General Denial and also a
Special Defence of New Matter Equivalent to General Denial. When
the answer contains two or more defences, viz., 1st, a general
denial, and, 2d, a special defence in the form of new matter, but
in fact equivalent to the general denial, and a demurrer to the
latter bas been sustained, no material error is thus committed,
and the judgment will not be reversed; for the same facts which
were averred in the special defence could be fully proved under
the general denial, and the defendant's whole case would thus
be available under the issue which remained upon the record. 2
In an action for goods sold and delivered, the answer in each of
1 Judah v. Univer ity of Vincen ne , 23
Ind. 272, 277. See also Clink v. T hur ton,
47 Cal. 21, 29.

2 Chicago, Cin. & L. R. Co. v. We t, 37
Ind . 211, 215; Waggoner v. Liston, 37

Ind. 35i.
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three separate defences set up the same facts with immaterial

variations: viz., that the goods were sold to the defendant's

wife without his knowledge or consent; that she had at the

time wrongfully abandoned him, and was living apart from

him, and for these reasons he was not liable for the price. A

demurrer to these defences having been sustained in the court

below, the Supreme Court on appeal held that they were all

argumentative general denials: " their effect was simply to aver

that the goods were not sold to the defendant, and all the matters

relied upon could have been proved under a general denial." It

was further said, that a motion was the proper remedy to correct

such faulty pleading, and the demurrer was irregular; but the

irregularity in this instance was merely technical, and the error

committed was immaterial, and had not prejudiced any rights of

the defendant; for, as he had pleaded the general denial in addi-

tion to the special defence mentioned, his entire case was prov-

able under that part of the answer. ^

§ 521. * G30. Combination of General and Argumentative De-

nials. This leads me to the second branch of the present
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subdivision; namely, the combination of the general denial

with other defences equivalent thereto in the same answer.

The argumentative denial described above is frequently in prac-

tice used in connection with the general denial inserted in the

same answer. It would seem as though the pleader, after he

had written the brief general denial, could not be satisfied with

its efficacy, and considered it necessarj^ to add in separate divi-

sions of the answer a further statement of the very facts which

he knew would constitute the defence, and which could all be

proven under the general denial. This mode of pleading is

faulty in the extreme ; it has not a single reason in its favor,

not an excuse for its existence; it overloads the record with

superfluous matter, and produces nothing but confusion and

uncertainty. In a few States the courts have struggled to

correct this vicious departure from the true theory of pleading,

and have enforced the rules and remedies which the codes amply

provide. It is unnecessary to argue that this species of answer

1 Day V. Wamslev, .33 Ind. 145. true, necessarily shows that the allegation

£ln Burris v. People's Ditch Co. (1894), of the complaint as to the same matter is

104 Cal. 248, 37 Pac. 922, the court said : untrue, is a good traverse, and sufficient as

•' It may be said, generally, that any alle- a denial." See also Phillips v. Hagart

gation in an answer which, if found to be (1896), 1 13 Cal. 552, 45 Pac. 843.]
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uncertainty. In a few tates th
ourt ha e truggl
to
correct his vicious departure from the true theory of leading,
and have enf reed the rule and remedies wbi h the cod s amply
provide. It is unnece ary to argue that this pecie
f an wer
1

Day v. W am ley, 33 Ind . 145.
[In Burris v. People'
itch
. ( l 9-i},
104 al. 24 , 37 Pa . 922, the cour t aid:
·'It may be said, generally, that any allegation in an an wer which, if found to be

true, nece arily how that the allegati n
of th complaint a to th a.me matt r i
untrue, i a good traver · , a nd uffi ient a
a denial."
e al o hillip
. Hag art
(l 96). 11 3 al. 552, 45 Pa . 43.]
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is in direct conflict with tlie plainest principles and the most

express requirements of the codes. Those statutes permit only

"denials " and statements of "new matter," that is, matter whicli

is truly a coiifeasion and avoidance ; they do not authorize aver-

ments of matter which is not new, but which is simply a detail

of evidence going in support of a denial. While this reformed

system constructed by the codes is perfect in its scientific char-

acter, — far surpassing in that respect the loose notions intro-

duced by the common-law courts in relation to the function of

the ordinary "general issues" of the old procedure, — it is at

the same time in the highest degree practical. If the advantages

which ought to be derived from the great reform are to be ob-

tained, it is clearly the duty of all the courts to insist upon a

return to the simple methods which the codes so clearly prescribe,

concerning which, indeed, they do not leave the slightest doubt

or uncertainty.

§ 522. * 631. Practice in Indiana in Respect to Argumentative

Denials. In Indiana, a practice has become settled, which might

well be borrowed by the courts of all the other States. I know
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of no single rule of procedure, which, if uniformly adopted and

rigidly enforced, would work out a happier result in bringing the

forms and modes of pleading back to the simple and scientific

theory embodied in the codes, than the rule which prevails in

Indiana, and which I shall now explain and illustrate. I dwell

on it at some length, not because it can now be regarded as pan

of the universal practice throughout the States in which the new

system has been established, but because it ought to become so ;

and I hope that, by introducing it to the attention of the bench

and bar in other commonwealths, its merits may be at once rec-

ognized, and its methods followed.

§ 523. * 632. Same Subject. When the answer contains the

general denial, and, in addition thereto, a separate defence or

separate defences equivalent to the general denial, — that is,

mere argumentative denials as above described, — such addi-

tional defences, it is settled, are irregular, and will be over-

ruled and expunged from the record. The remedy is not by

demurrer, for the reasons already given, but by motion to strike

out as redundant and superfluous. If, however, a plaintiff, in-

stead of moving to strike out, should demur to the vicious

defences, and that demurrer should happen to be sustained by

js in dir ct onflict with the plainest principles and the most
expre ' r quir ments of the code . Tho e statutes permit only
"denials "and statements of "new matt r," that i , matter which
is truly a confe · ion and avoidance). they do not authorize averments of matter which is not new, but which is simply a detail
of evidence going in support of a denial. While this reform cl
:system constructed by the codes is perfect in its scientific character, - far surpassing in that respect the loose notions introduced by the common-law courts in relation to the function of
the ordinary "general issues " of the old procedure, - it . is at
the same time in the highest degree practical. If the adrantages
which ought to be derived from the great reform are to be obtained, it is clearly the duty of all the courts to insist upon a
return to the simple methods which the codes so clearly prescribe,
concerning which, indeed, they do not leave the slightest doubt
or uncertainty.
·
§ 522. * 631. Practice in Indiana in Respect to Argumentative
Denials. In Indiana, a practice has become settled, which might
well be borrowed by the courts of all the other States. I know
of no single rule of procedure, which, if uniformly adopted and
rigidly enforced, would work out a happier result in bringing the
forms and modes of pleading back to the simple and scientifi ;
theory embodied in the codes, than the rule which prevails in
Indiana, and which I shall now explain and illustrate. I dwell
on it at some length, not because it can now be regarded as pa~t
of the universal practice throughout the States in which the new
ystem has been established, but because it ought to become so ;
.and I hope that, by introducing it to the attention of the bench
and bar in other commonwealths, its merits may be at once recognized, and its methods followed.
§ 523. * 632. Same Subject. When the answer contains the
general denial, and, in addition thereto, a separate defence or
separate defences equivalent to the general denial, - that is,
mere argumentative denials as above described, - such additional defences, it is settled, are irregular, and will be overruled and expunged from the record. The remedy is not by
demurrer, for the reasons already given, but by motion to strike
out a redundant and superfluous. If, however, a plaintiff, instead of moving to strike out, should demur to the vicious
defences, and that demurrer should happen to be sustained by
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the lower court, no material error would have been committed,

for the same result would have been reached which would be

attained by a motion : the record would be cleansed of its re-

dundancy, and the general denial would remain, under which

all the facts constituting the defence, and which had been set

forth at large in the rejected paragraphs, could be given in evi-

dence at the trial. This practice, I say, is thoroughly settled

the lowe col rt no ma erial error would ha\ 1 een c mmitted
for the • n e re ult woul b· ve ee reached which · uld le
attained b · a rnotio · the r cord ould be cl a e of i redundancy, nd the O'eneral enial oul rem rn under hich
11 the fac con tituting the defence nd · ic
a be n et
forth a 1 r e in the rejected
ragn h could be
denc · t the tri 1. Thi
ctice I ay, i. thorough!
in Indian. · 'n the re ult is , ·'tern of plead.in in
which far ur
e , in i brevit and it a erence to th pu1
of the c de th t pre ·ailing in an oth r
ate . T he ca
col lec e i the note illu rate man form of ple ding to w ich
the rul h been applied and exhjbit i practical orkin-=> in
a Yer com lete manner. 1 The me doc rine an pr ctice ha
een occ· ion.ally foll owe in other
te . 2 T hi u ject ·i 1
be a in referred to in he ub,equent ection which deal "i h
the union of defence . It i very lain tha the faulty me bod
de cribed and critici ed proceed in a very gre t mea ure from
n uncertain y in the mind of the leader a to he matter which
ma be girnn in vidence under the general denial: whate-rnr. then. will r moYe h uncertain y wi 11 ai in producing
a reform in the m nner of ta ing defence in be an wer.
524 . * 633 . G eneral D enial s of all A lle gatio ns not o t herw is e
A dmitte d or R eferred t o . A practice ha recently grown up of
framing an an wer in the following manner : To admit uch of
l

in Indiana ; and the result is a system of pleading in that State

which far surpasses, in its brevity and its adherence to the spirit

of the codes, that prevailing in any other State. The cases col-

lected in the notes illustrate many forms of pleading to which

the rule has been applied, and exhibit its practical workings in

a very complete manner.^ The same doctrine and practice has

been occasionally followed in other States. ^ This subject will

be again referred to in the subsequent section which deals with

the union of defences. It is very plain that the faulty method

described and criticised proceeds in a very great measure from

an uncertainty in the mind of the pleader as to the matter which

may be given in evidence under the "general denial:" what-
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ever, then, will remove that uncertainty, will aid in producing

a reform in the manner of stating defences in the answer.

§ 524. * 633. General Denials of all Allegations not otherw^iae

Admitted or Referred to. A practice has recently grown up of

framing an answer in the following manner : To admit such of

1 Adams Ex. Co. v. Darnell, 31 Ind. ern Union Tel. Co. v. Meek, 49 id. 53;

20 ; Indianapolis, etc. R. Co. v. Rutherford, Smith r. Denman, 48 id. 65, 70; Milford

29 Ind. 82; Jeffersonville. etc. R. Co. v. Sch. T. v. Powner, 126 Ind. 528; Wallace

Dunlap, 29 id. 426; Rhode v. Green, 26 r. Exch. Bk. of Spencer, 126 lud. 265;

id. 83; Bondurant v. Bladen, 19 id. 160; Craig v. Frazier, 127 Ind. 286; Wickwire

Butler I'. Edgerton, 15 id. 15; Westcott r. Angola (lud. App., 1892), 30 N. E. Rep.

r. Brown, 13 id. 83; Garrison v. Clark, 11 917; Hoosier Stone Co. r. McCain (Ind.

id. 369; Cain v. Hunt, 41 id. 466, 471; Snpr., 1892), 31 N. E. 956.

Ferguson i\ Ramsey, 41 id. 511, 513; 2 i^ggt v. Harris, 12 Abb. Pr. 446, per

Chicago, etc. R. Co. r. West, 37 id. 211; Bosworth J.; Radde i-. Ruckgaber, 3

Urton V. State, 37 id. 339; Port i-. Rus- Duer, 684 ; Simpson r. Mc Arthur, 16 Abb.

RcU, 36 id. 60; Day v. Wnmsley, 33 id. Pr. 302 (n.), per Brady J.; Bruck v.

145 ; Allen i-. Randolph, 48 id. 496 ; Trog- Tucker, 42 Cal. 345 ; Page v. Merwin, 54

den r. Deckard, 45 id. 572 ; Wolf v. Bcho Conn. 426. It is held iu Florida that the

field, 38 id. 175; Widener f. State, 45 id. court may strike out such a special de-

244 ; Sparks v. Heritage, 45 Ind. 66 ; fence or not as it pleases, and neither

Lewis V. Edwards. 44 id. 3.33; Ohio & ruling will be error. Davis i. Shuler, 14

Miss. R. Co. r. Hemberger.43 id. 462, 464 ; Fla. 438, 445. See also Colorado Cent.

Wilson v. Root, 43 id. 486, 493. See also R. Co. i-. Mollanden, 4 Colo. 154. A denial

Lowry i-. Megee, 52 id. 107; Watts r. which is a mere inference from facts al-

Coxen, 52 id. 155; Bannister i-. Grassy leged is not a good denial. Wright v.

Fork Ditch A.ss'n, 52 id. 178, 184; Wes^ Schmidt, 47 Iowa, 233.

1 Adam
Ex. Co. v. arnell 31 Ind.
0; Indianapoli , e c. R. Co. v. Rn her ford
29 Ind. 2 · Jeffe onville, etc. R. Co. 1:.
Dunlap, 29 id. 426; Rhode . Green, 26
id.
· Bond nrant v. Bladen, 19 id. 160 ;
Bn ler v. Ed erton, 15 id. 15 ; W e cott
r. Brown 13 id. 3 · Garri on v. lark, l l
id. 369; Cain v. Hnnt, 41 id. 466 4il ;
Ferga on v. Ramey 41 id . 511, 513;
hicago, etc. . Co. t· . We t, 3 id. 211 ;
Trton i:.
ate, 3i i . 339; P or t v. R
ell, 36 id. 60:
ay v.
am ley 33 id.
145; lien •. andolph, 4 id. 496 ; Tro eek rd, 45 i . 5 ;2;
olf i·. choden t
field, 3 id. l 15 ; Wi lener v. tate 4.5 i .
244 · . par· t'. Herita,,.e, 45 I nd. 66;
L w1 1 Edward . 44 id. 333; >hio &
• Ii ... TI Co. r. Hem her er, 43 id. 462, 464 ·
'jJ ... un r. I ot, 43 id. 4 6, 4!>3 . , e r.J o
Lo
t.'. • Ieuee, 52 id. 1Oi ; \\" att
t'.
oxen, oi2 id. 155; Bauni t r t·.
r. ~y
ork itch A. 'n, 52 : . I; , l 4; W e t·

ern nion Tel. o. v. feek 49 id. 53;
mith v. D enman , 4 id. 65 iO; 11lford
allace
ch. T. v. Powner, 126 Ind. 52 ;
v. Exch. Bk. of pencer, 126 In d. 265;
rai 1:. Frazier 12i Ind. 2 6 ; Wi ckwire
i·. Angola (Ind. App. 1 92 ) 30 .... E . Rep.
917; H oo~ie r tone o. v. ~fcCain (Ind.
npr., I 92). 31 .... E . 956.
H t v. Harri 12 .A.bb. Pr. 446, per
Bo worth J. · Radde v. Rnck ab r, 3
Duer, 6 4 · imp on i: . • Ic · rthn r 16 Abb.
Pr. 30 (n. , per Brady J.; Brack v.
Tucker, 42 al. 346; a e •.. l erwin, 54
onn. 426. It i held in Florid that the

vr:

le,.. l i u t a good denial.
... chm id , 4i Iowa, 233.
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the plaintiff's averments, if any, as the facts of the case require ;

to deny others wholly or partially ; to explain and modify others

if thought necessary ; in short, to unite in one answer or division

thereof a mass of special admissions, denials, explanations, and

aflirmative statements, and to conclude the whole with a sweeping

clause somewhat in this form : " As to each and every other alle-

gation in said complaint not herein expressly admitted or denied

or mentioned, the defendant hereby denies the same ; " or, " And

the defendant denies each and every other allegation in said

complaint not hereinbefore expressly admitted or denied or men-

affi nu a ti v
1. u

tioned." Although a somewhat similar mode of putting in issue

the averments of a bill in equity was occasionally resorted to by

r • Ancl
ery th r all gati n in aicl
ly admitt d r deni d r rn n-

chancery pleaders under the former system, the codes give no

countenance to, nor authority for, such a mongrel form of answer.

The true spirit and intent of the theory introduced by the re-

formed procedure plainly demand certainty, precision, and defi-

niteness in the allegations of both parties, and especially in the

t

denials by which the defendant places on the record the exact

by

issues intended to be tried. In this respect the new method was
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to be a complete departure from the vagueness and uncertainty

chan er

resulting from the broad effect given to the general issues in " as-

sumpsit," "debt," and "trover" by the common-law courts, and

also from the loose and incomplete manner of presenting the

issues which necessarily characterized the answer in chancery.

This design of the codes would, however, be utterly defeated if

the vicious style of defence thus described should become com-

mon ; and the courts, it is submitted, ought to have pronounced

most emphatically against it when it first made its appearance.

§ 525. * 634. Proper Distinction to be observed between General

and Specific Denials. The codes require either a general denial,

or specific denials, or defences in confession and avoidance ; and

also that each defence must be separately stated, so that the issue

raised by it may be perceived at once. The "general denial " is

evidently intended to be an answer to the entire complaint or pe-

tition, — to negative all its averments. The design of the legis-

lature and the understanding of the bar upon this point were

l

u

t b a ompl t d par ur
r ultin 5 from th broad ff
ump it," "d bt," and "tr
al ·
which ne

in "as-

shown by the immediate adoption of the form in use through-

out all the States. The code of Iowa expressly enacts that the

general denial is interposed to the whole petition ; and this

provision is plainly a statutory construction of the universally

525.

and Specific Denials.

r p cific d nial ', or d f nc
al o that a h d f n e mu t b

g n ral d nial i int r o
pr
n is plainly a tatut ry

n tructi n

and hi:
uni r all,,·
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prevailing doctrine : a specific denial, on the other hand, must

be addressed to some single, particular allegation, and must

distinctly indicate the portion intended to be controverted by it.

I am of opinion that each specific denial ought to be a single and

separate defence by itself, so that, if the issue upon it should be

decided in favor of the defendant, the cause of action would be

defeated. In this respect, I think, the specific denials of the

codes were intended to be analogous to the special traverses pro-

vided for by the English judges in their new rules of pleading

adopted in 1834. Certain it is that the codes do not, by any

stretch of their language, contemplate an answer consisting of

a general denial directed to a part only of the complaint or peti-

tion, and connected with other admissions, partial denials, and

explanations.

§ 526. * 635. DifiBculty Arising from this Form of Answer.

Again : this form of answer makes it extremely difficult, and

often impossible, to determine what allegations are denied, and

what are passed by in silence, and therefore admitted. If the

complaint or petition contains numerous averments, and the an-
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swer is such a mass of express admissions, partial explanations,

and statements of matter which is merely evidentiary, and con-

cludes with the formula above quoted, we have all the evils

which can result from the most vicious system or no-system that

can possibly be conceived. The object of pleading is to ascertain

and present the issues of fact between the litigants, so that they

can be readily perceived and decided by the court and jury. The

special boast of the common-law methods was, that they brought

out these issues singly and clearly. I am confident that the the-

ory of the reformed procedure, when lived up to and accurately

followed, will give much better practical results than were ever

obtained as a whole from the former system. The kind of an-

swer which I have described violates every principle of this

theory, and is a contrivance of ignorance or indolence.

§ 527. * 636. This Form Sanctioned by some Courts. Notwith-

standing the foregoing considerations, which appear to be such

plain and necessary inferences from the language as well as the

intent of the codes, the courts of New York and of some other States

liave given a seeming approval to this most slovenly manner of

stating the defence of denial. So far as their decisions have

passed upon tlie sul)ject, they seem either to approve such an-

prevailing doctrine : a pe ific denial on th o her hand m u t
b a ldre ed t some ingle, particular a.11 0 a ion and mu
i tinctl - indicate he portion int nd d to b
n trovertecl b i .
I a of opinion that each pecific lenial ught to b
ino·l and
pc ratB defence b i elf,
that, if the i ue u p n it haul be
lecided in favor of the def ndant the cau e of action would be
d fo ted. In thi re pect, I think, the p cific cl nial of he
c d were intended to be analogou to the special tr erse provided for by the Engli h judges in their new rules of pleading
ado ted in 1 34. Certain it is that the codes do not by ny
tretch of their language, contemplate an answer consisting of
neral denial direct d to a part only of the compla.int or petiti n and connected wi h other admissions, partial denial' and
explanation .
526. * 635. D ifficulty Arising from this Form of Answer~
Again : his form of answer makes it extremel d ifficult and
often impossible, t o determine wh~t allegations are d enied, and
what are passed by in silence, and therefore admitted. If the
complaint or petition con tains numerous averments and the anwer is uch a mass of expre s admissions, p artial explanations,
and tatements of matter which i merely evidentiary, and conclu e with the formula above quoted , we have all the evils
which can re ult from the most vicious system or n o-7stem that
can possibly be conceived. T he object of pleading i to ascertain
ancl prese11t the issues of fact between t he litigan t
o that the
can be readil perceived and decided b the court and jury. The
special boa t of the common-law methods as that t he brought
out the e i sue singly and clearly. I am confident hat th theory of the reformed procedure, when lived u p t o and accurately
f llowed, will give m uch better practical re ult than were ver
btained as a whole from the former y tern . T h kind of an. w r which I have d escrib d violates ev ry principle of t hi
f ignorance or ind 1 nee .
theory, and i a contrivanc
. 527. * 36. T his For m Sanctione d by some Cour ts. Not ithtanding the f r g ing
nsid rati n
hi h p ar t b u h
I lain and nece ary inf ren
from the languag a well
the
in ntofthe d. t} e ur . f
wYork a d f · m ther tat
ha e given a . e min appr nil t thi mo t 1 v nl ' mann r f
.·tati H<r the defe1 ce f cl nic 1.
far as h ir d ci ion ha e
pa: ·cd ipou be ·nl j ct th y e m i her to a prov
uch an-
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swers, or at most to hold that, if improper, the only mode of cor-

rection is by a motion to make them more definite and certain;

in other Avords, they are sufficient to raise the intended issues.

It cannot be said, however, that the question has been settled by

authority, or that this species of denial has become an establislied

method of pleading wherever the reformed procedure prevails.

The few cases which touch upon the matter will now be cited.

In an action upon a policy of life insurance, the answer was of

the kind mentioned, and concluded as follows : that " the defend-

ant denied each and every allegation of the complaint not therein

expressly admitted or denied." The Court of Appeals said of

this answer: " It is clear, both upon principle and authority, that

under a general or sj)ecific denial of any fact which the plaintiff

is required to prove to maintain the action, the defendant may

give evidence to disprove it.^ If an answer containing denials of

the allegations of the complaint, except as thereinafter stated, is

rendered indefinite, uncertain, or complicated, the remedy is by

motion to make the answer more definite, and not by exclusion
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of evidence on the trial." ^ A similar answer, endinor with a de-

nial of " each and every allegation of the complaint except as

herein admitted or stated,'" was held by the same court to be

good and to raise an issue.^

1 Wheeler v. Billings, 38 N. Y. 263.

2 Greenfield v. Mass. Mut. L. Ins. Co.,

47 N. y. 430, 437, per Grover J. An

expression in this quotation indicates a

certain misconception on the part of the

learned judge. A general denial of a fact

is something unknown in the system of

pleading established by the codes. See

also Leyde v. Martin, 16 Minn. 38; Becker

V. Sweetzer, 15 Minn. 427, 434 ; Kingsley

swer , or at m t t holcl that, if imprnper the only m cl f orrection i by a motion o make them m r cl •fini an<l certain;
in other word , they are uilici nt to rai. e h int u<letl i ·ue .
It cannot be saicl, how er, that the q u i n has b en ·ettl d by
authority, or tl at this peci
f cl nial ha becom an e tal lisli d
method of pleading wh rever the r formed proc dur prevail .
The few cases which touch upon the matter will n w be cited.
In an action upon a policy of life insurance, the answer was of
the kind mentioned, and oncluded as follow : that "the d fondant denied each and every allegation of the complaint not th rein
expressly admitted or denied. ' The ourt of Appeal saicl of
this answer: " It is clear, both u pon principle and authori y that
under a general or specific denial of any fact which the plaintiff
is required to prove to maintain the action, the defendant may
give evidence to di prove it. 1 If an answer containing deninJs of
the allegations of the complaint, except a thereinafter stated, i '
rendered indefinite, uncertain, or complicated, the remedy i by
motion to make the answer more definite, and not by xclu ion
of evidence on the trial." 2 A similar answer, ending with a denial of " each and every allegation of the complaint except as
herein admitted or stated," was held by the same court to be
good and to raise an issue. 3

V. Gilman, 12 Minn. 515, 517, 518, which

show that this form of denial is fully

approved by the Minnesota court.

3 youngs V. Kent, 46 N. Y. 672 ; and

see AUis v. Leonard, 46 N. Y. 688. That

this form of denial is proper, and suffi-

ciently raises issues upon the allegations

not admitted, seems to be now settled, at

least in several of the States. Walsli v.

Mehrback, 5 Hun, 448 ; Calhoun v. Hal-

len, 25 id. 155; Pen n. Coal Co. v. Blake,

85 N. Y. 226, 235 ; St. Anthony Falls Co.

V. King Bridge Co., 23 Minn. 186; Ingle

V. Jones, 43 Iowa, 286 ; Barley v. Ger-

man-Am. Bk., Ill U.S. 21 6; Griffin r. L.I.

R. Co., 101 N. Y. 348; Crane v. Crane, 43

Hun, 309 ; Owens ?•. R. Hudnot's Phar-

macy, 20 Civ. Pro. Rep. 145 ; see Clark v.

Dillon, 97 N. Y. 370; Davenport v. Ladd,

38 Minn. 545.

[[The following forms of general denial

have been held sufficient : " lilach and

every material allegation, statement,

matter, fact, and thing in said complaint

contained, and not hereinafter admitted :"

Althouse V. Town of Jamestown (1895),

91 Wis. 46, 64 N. W. 423. " Every alle-

gation in the complaint not admitted in

the answer : " Childers v. First Nat. Bank

(1896), 147 lud. 430,46N. E. 825. "Each

and every allegation and averment con-

tained in ]>laintifrs complaint herein wliich

is not hereinafter specifically admitted or

qualified : " Mattoou v. Fremont, etc. R. R.

Co. (1894), 6 S. D. 301, 60 N. W. 69.

" Each and every allegation therein con-

Wheeler v. Billings, 38 N. Y. 263.
Greenfield v. Mass. Mut. L . Ins. Co.,
47 N. Y. 430, 43i, per Grover J. An
expression in this quotation indi cates a
~ertain misconception on the part of the
Jearned judge. A general den ial of a fact
is something unknown in the system of
pleading established by the codes. See
also Leyde v . Martin, 16 Minn. 38; Becker
v. Sweetzer, 15 Minn. 427, 434; Kingsley
v. Gilman, 12 Minn . 515, 51 i, 518, which
show that this form of denial is fully
approved by the Minnesota court.
3 Youngs v. Kent, 46 N. Y. 6i2; and
see Allis v. Leonard, 46 N. Y . 688. That
this form of denial is proper, and ufficiently raises issues upon the allegations
not admitted, seems to he now settled, at
least in several of the States. Wal h v.
Mehrback, 5 Hun, 44-8 ; Calhoun v. Hallen, 25 id. 155; Penn .. Coal Co. v. Blake,
85 N. Y. 226, 235; St. Anthony Falls Co.
v. King Britlge Co., 23 Minn. 186; Ingle
v. Jones, .J3 Iowa, 286; Burley v. Ger1
2

man-Am. Bk., 111 U.S. 216; Griffin v. L . I.
R. Co., I 01 N. Y. 348; Crane v. Crane, 43
Hun, 309; Owens 11. R. Hudnot's Pharmacy, 20 Civ. Pro. Rep. 145; see Clark v.
Dillon, 97 N. Y. 3i0; Davenport v. Ladd,
38 Minn. 545.
[The following forms of general deuial
have been held sufficie nt: "Each and
every material allegation, statement,
matter, fact , and thing in said complaint
coutaine<l, an d not liereiuaf"er adm itted:"
Althouse v. Town of Jame ·town {I 95 ),
91 Wis. 46, 64 N. W. 423. "Every allegation in the complaint not admitted in
the auswer:" Childers v. Fir t Nat. Bank
(1896), 147 Ind. 430,46N.E. 25. "Each
anJ every allegation and averruent contained in plaintiff's complaint herein which
i not hereinafter specifically admitted or
qualified : " l\Iattoon v. Fremont etc. R. R.
Co. ( l 94), 6 S . D. 301, 60 N. W. 69.
"Each and every allegation therein con·
tained, and not hereinafter specifically
denietl, admitted or explained:" tate

75'.;,,
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§ 528. * 637. Facts, not Conclusions of Law, should be denied.

The complaint or petition, in addition to the facts from which the

right of action arises, sometimes contains the conclusions of law

which result from those facts, such as the indebtedness of the de-

fendant, his liability in damages, and the like. It is a fundamen-

tal principle of the pleading authorized by the codes, that these

averments of fact must be denied, and not merely the legal con-

clusion therefrom ; a traverse of the latter without one of the

former is a nullity, and creates no issue.^ When the issuable

facts are denied, a denial of the conclusions of law is unnecessary,

but would certainly be harmless. In this respect, the reformed

procedure has introduced a new feature into the science of plead-

ing. It is often said, I am aware, by writers of authority even,

that, under the common-law methods, the facts were always, and

the legal conclusions were never, to be traversed. But this state-

ex rel. V. City of Pierre (1902), 15 S. I).

559, 90 N. W. 1047. " Each and every

material allegation : " Nix v. Gilmer
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(1897), 5 Okla. 740, 50 Pac. 131.

In Hardy v. Purington (1894), 6 S. D.

382, 61 N. W. 158, the court said: "An

528.

* 637.

Facts, not Conclusions of Law, should be denied.

The omplaint or petition, in addi ion o the facts from hi h the
right of. action arise., sometime contain the conclu ion f law
whi h re ult from those fact , uch a t!ie indebtedne of th defendan , hi liability in damages, and the like. It i a fundamental principle of he pleading authorized by the codes, that the e
averment ' of fact mu t be denied, an not merely the legal conclu ion therefrom; a traverse of the latter without one of the
former i a nullity, and creates no issue. 1 When the i uable
fact are denied a denial of the onclu ion of law is unnece ary,
but would certainly be harmles . In this respect, the reformed
procedure ha introduced a new feature into the science of pleading. It is often said, I am aware, by writer of authority even,
that, under the common-law methods, the facts were always, and
the legal conclusions were never, to be traversed. But thi state-

answer [in maudamu.s], which denies

' each and all the alle<,'ations in the affi-

davit contained, except such as are here-

inafter admitted or qualified, ' though

not a form of pleading to he encouraged,

has grown into such frequent use that it

would be unwise and unfair to litigants and

attorneys for this court to hold, without

premonition, that such an answer, unas-

.«ailed by motion or otherwise, constitutes

no denial. If such an answer leave the

plaintiff in doubt as to what allegations of

Ills complaint are intended to be denied and

what admitted, the answer is subject to a

motion to make more definite and certain."

A reply denying "each and every

allegation of new matter " is good after

verdict : Western Mattress Co. v. Potter

(1903), — Neb. — , 95 N. VV. 841.

A reply denying " each and every al-

legation of new matter set up in defend-

ant's answer " and " each and every other

part of same, except such allegations

of such answer as may be admissions of

plaintiff's petition," unless attacked by mo-

tion to strike out or to make more definite

and certain, is gooil : I'echa v. KastI

(1902j, 64 Neb. 380, 89 N. W. 1047.

" Where a general denial in an answer

is qualified by the pleading of special

defences in the nature of confession and

avoidance, evidence of other defences of a

like nature is inadmissible, although, in

the absence of such pleading, such evi-

dence would have been admissible under

the general denial : " Ball c Beaumont

(1901), 63 Neb. 215, 88 N. W. 173.

On the other hand, the following forms

have been held insufficient : " Every

material allegation of the complaint : "

Mead y. Pettigrew (1899), 11 S. U. 529,

78 N. W. 945 ; Burke v. Inter-State Sav-

ingsAss'n (1901), 25 Mont. 315, 69 Pac.

879; Hamilton v. Huson (1898), 21 Mont.

9, 53 Pac. 101. " Each and every allega-

tion and statement therein which is and

are in any way inconsistent with the alle-

ex rel. u. City of Pierre {1902), 15 . D.
559, 90 N. W . 1047. "Each and every
material allegation : " Nix v. Gilmer
(1 97}, 5 kla. 740, 50 Pac. 131.
In Hardy v. Purington (1 94), 6 S. D.
• 3 2, 61 N. W . 158, the court said: "An
an wer [in mandamu ], which denies
'each and all the allegation in the affidavit contained, except such as are hereinafter admitted or qualified,' though
not a form of pleading to he encouraged,
has grown into such frequent u e that it
would be unwi e anti unfair to litigants and
attorney fo r th i co urt to bolt!, without
premonition, t hat uch an answer, una ailed by motion or otherwise, con titutes
n denial. If uch an answer leave the
plaintiff in doubt a to what allegations of
hi complain are intended to be deni ed and
wbat admitted, the an wer i subject to a
motion t rnak m re defin ite and certain."
A reply de nyin g "each and very
allegation of n w matter" is good after
verdict : Weste rn l attre"s Co. v . P otter
{190.'.3}, - N b. -, 95 N. W. 841.
A reply denying "each and every allegation of new matter et up in defendant' an wer" and " each and eve ry other
part of ame, exc pt uch allegation
of u h an wer as may be admis ions of
plain tiff' p tition," nnl e attacked by moion to ri ke out or to make more defiuite
a n<! r r ain, iR good: P cha u. Kastl
(l!J 21. ti+ • b. 3 0, 9 ~~. w . 1047 .

" Where a general denial in an answer
is qualified hy the pleading of special
defences in the nature of confe ion an d
a voidan ce, ev idence of other defences of a
like nature i inadmi sible, although, in
the ab ence of uch pleading, uch evidence w uld have been admis ible und er
the general denial: " Ball 1 . Beaumont
(1901 ), 63 Neb. 215, 88 N. W. 173.
On tbe other hand, the followin forms
have been held insufficient : " Every
material allegation of the co mplaint: "
M ad. u. Pettigrew {18 99), 11
. 529,
78 N. W. 9-!5 ; Burke u. Inter- tate avings A s'n (190 1), 25 Mont. 3 15, 69 Pac.
879; Hamilton u. Huson (189 ), 21 Mont.
9, 5.'.3 l: ac. 101. "Each and every all gation and statement therein whi h i and
are in any way inconsi tent with the allegati on in the petition" and " pecially
denie all new matter pleaded" in the
answer : Young u. Schofield ( 1895), 132
Mo. 650 , a4 S. W . 497 . "Ea h and v ry
all egation contain d in the an w r in oui tent with the tatement!s in plaintiff'
petition:" ro v. ch el {1903), - Neb.
- , 93
. W. 4 1 ; ezell v. Fid lity &
asualt
o. (1903), 176 Mo. 253, 75 . W.
1102 : an an wer denying "ea h and
eve ry other all gati n in said petition not
sp cifically admitta . '']
l [H yd nf ldt v. Jacobs {1895), 107
al. 373, 40 l'a.c. 492.]
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ment is clearly inaccurate. In some of the most common forms of

declaration in constant use, the leading averment was that " the

defendant is indebted,'' a mere inference of law ; and the general

issue might be, " he is not indebted," or " he was never indebted,"

which was certainly nothing but the denial of a legal conclusion.

All this has been swept away by the codes, and every trace of it

left in the modern practice is in direct opposition both to the

spirit and to the letter of the statute. A denial of indebtedness

or of liability, without denying the allegations of fact from which

the indebtedness or liability is claimed to have arisen, is a nullity ;

it raises no issue, and will be held bad on demurrer, as is shown

by the subjoined cases : In an action upon a promissory note, the

answer admitted the execution of the note, and denied that the

defendant owed the debt to the plaintiff. A demurrer to this an-

swer was sustained, the court saying : " This answer under the

former mode of pleading would have amounted to a plea of nil

debet, and would not have been good, as the suit was brought

upon a note in wiiting having the dignity of a specialty ; and we

are of opinion that the answer was not sufficient under the
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present practice. It was not sufficient to state that defendant

did not owe the debt." ^ All the cases, with hardly an exception,

are to the same effect : as in an action on a note, an answer saying

that " the defendants do not owe and ought not to pay the note,

for they do not admit the regular protest thereof and notice,"

raised no issue ; ^ also where, in an action for goods sold and de-

livered, the answer " denies that the defendant is indebted to the

plaintiff as stated in the petition ; " ^ and where, in an action on

a note, the answer simply denied indebtedness to the plaintiff as

claimed in the petition, or in any other sum or amount whatever.^

1 Haggard i;. Hay's Adm., 13 B. Mon. monwealth, 13 Bush, 435 ; Louis v. Brown

175. 7 Ore. 326 ; Indianapolis, B. & W. K. Co.

2 Clark V. Finnell, 16 B. Mon. 329, 335. v. Ilisley, 50 Ind. 60; Hunter i;. Martin,

3 Francis v. Francis, 18 B. Mon. 57 ; 57 Cal. 365 ; Hintrager I'. Richter (Iowa,

and see Nelson v. Murray, 33 Cal. 338; 1892), 52 N. W. Rep. 188; Carpenter v.

Curtis v. Richards, 9 Cal. 33 ; Wells v. Ritchie, 2 Wash. 512. Denials of in-

McPike, 21 Cal. 215 ; Higgins v. Germain, debteduess: Bullert-. Siddell, 43 Fed. Rep.

1 Mont. 230; Skinner v. Clute, 9 Nev. 342, 116; Callanan v. Williams, 71 Iowa, 363 ;

* Morton v. Coffin, 29 Iowa, 235, 238. Watson v. Lemen, 9 Colo. 200; Gale v.

For further illustrations of the rule stated James, 11 Colo. 540; Heath y. White, 3

in the text, see Man. Nat. Bank r. Russell, Utah, 474. See McLaughlin i;. Wheeler

€ Hun, 375 ; Starr v. Cragin, 24 id. 177 ; (S. Dak. 1891), 47 N. W. 816, 818.

Murray r. N. Y. L. Ins. Co., 85 N. Y. 236, [Spencer v. Turney (1897), 5 Okla.

239; Kentucky River Nav. Co. v. Com- 683, 49 Pac. 1012; Aultman & Taylor Co

48

ment is clearly inaccurate. In some of the most common forms of
declaration in constant use, the leading averment wa that " the
defendant is indebted," a mere inference of law· an the general
is ue might be, "he is not indebted," or "he was n ver ind ted,"
which was certainly nothing but the denial of a legal conclusion.
All this ha been swept away by the codes, and every trace of it
left in the modern practice is in direct opposition both to the
spirit and to the letter of the statute. A denial of ind btedness
or of liability, without denying the allegations of fact from which
the indebtedness or liability is claimed to have arisen, is a nullity;
it. raise~ no issue, and will be held bad on demurrer, as is shown
by the subjoined cases: In an action upon a promi sory note, the
answer admitted the execution of the note, and denied that the
defendant owed the debt to the plaintiff. A demurrer to this answer was sustained, the court saying: "This answer under the
former mode of pleading would have amounted to a plea of nil
debet, and would not have been good, as the suit was brought
upon a note in writing having the dignity of a specialty; and we
are of opinion that the answer was not sufficient under the
present practice. It was not sufficient to state that defendant
did not owe the debt." 1 All the cases, with hardly an exception,
are to the same effect: as in an action on a note, an answer saying
that "the defendants do not owe and ought not to pay the note,
for they do not admit the regular protest thereof and notice,"
raised no issue; 2 also where, in an action for goods sold and delivered, the answer "denies that the defendant is indebted to the
plaintiff as stated in the petition;" 3 and where, in an action on
a note, the answer simply denied indebtedness to the plaintiff a
.claimed in the petition, or in any other sum or amount whatever. 4
monwealth, 13 Bush, 435; Louis v. Brown
7 Ore. 326; Indianapolis, B. & W. R. Co.
2 Clark v. Finnell, 16 B. Mon. 329, 335 .
v. Risley, 50 Ind. 60; Hunter v. Martin,
a Francis 11. Francis, 18 B. Mon. 57; 5i Cal. 365; Hintrager v. Richter (Iowa,
and see Nelson v. Murray, 33 Cal. 338; 1892), 52 N. W. Rep. 188; Carpenter v.
Curtis v. Richards, 9 Cal. 33; Wells v. Ritchie, 2 Wash. 512. Deuials of iuMcPike, 21 Cal. 215; Higgins v. Germain. debteclnes : Bullerv. Siddell, 43 Fed. Rep.
1 Mont. 230; Skinner v. Clute, 9 Nev. 342, 116 ; 'Callanan v. Williams, 71 Iowa, 363;
4 Morton v. Coffin, 29 Iowa, 235, 238.
Watson v. Lemen, 9 Colo. 200; Gale v.
For further illustrations of the rule stated James, 11 Colo. 540; Heath v. White, 3
in the text, see Man. Nat. Bank v. Russell, Utah, 474. See McLaughlin v. Wheeler
-6 Hun, 375; Starr v. Cragin, 24 id. l 7i; (S. Dak. 1891 ), 47 N. W. 816, 18.
Murray v. N. Y. L . Ins. C'o., 85 N. Y. 236,
[Spencer v. Turney {1897), 5 Okla .
.239; Kentucky River Nav. Co. v. Com- 68.3, 49 Pac. 1012; Aultman & Taylor Co
1

Haggard v. Hay's Adm., 13 B. Mon.

175.

48
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§ 529. * 638. Illustrations. The same is true of any other

upon a note given to the plaintiff, a married woman, and made

expressly payable to her on its face, a defence that the " note is

not her separate property," and a denial that she is the legal

owner and holder thereof, were both held nullities, and struck

out on motion. 1 The defence, in an action to foreclose a mort-

gage, "that D. [the mortgagor] was regularly and duly dis-

charged from all his debts, including that to the plaintiff, under

proceedings in insolvency," was held not to be new matter re-

quiring a reply, " but only a conclusion of law and not of fact,"

and not to create an issue.^ In an action to recover for injuries

caused by the negligence of the defendant, the complaint, after

stating the necessary facts showing the negligent omissions, and

the consequent destruction of the plaintiff's property, concluded,

" to his great damage, to wit, in the sum of $800." The answer

simply denied " that the plaintiff had suffered damage in the sum

of S800." This denial raised no issue. ^

§ 530. * 639. Denial of Conclusions of Law is Unnecessary. The
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converse of the rule illustrated by the foregoing cases is also true.

If the answer denies the material facts averred by the plaintiff, or

alleges material facts constituting a defence of new matter, it

need not deny the plaintiff's conclusions of law, or state any con-

clusions of law as the inference from the facts which it has

pleaded.* Thus, in an action upon a contract, the answer alleged

V. Mead (1901 ), 109 Ky. 583, 60 S. W. 294 ; owner and holder of the note and mort-

'lavlor V. Furcell (1894), 60 Ark. 606, 31 gapes creates no issue: Clemens v. Luce

S. W. .567.] (1894), 101 Cal. 432, 35 Pac. 1032. A de-

1 Frost r. Haford, 40 Cal. 165, 166- nial by defendant in an action of eject-

Felch V. Beaudry, 40 Cal. 439. ment that his possession is wrongful raises

2 Christy f. Dana, 42 Cal. 174, 178. noissue: Rhoades v. Higbee (1895), 21

3 Huston V. Twin & C. C. Turnp. Co., 45 Colo. 88, 39 Pac. 1099. A vali.l denial is

Cal. 550; Higgins r. Wortel, 18 Cal. 330. not vitiated by conclusions of law alleged in

In an action to enforce a lieu upon defeml- connection therewith : Fitzpatrick v. Si-

ant's land, an answer which, without con- nionson Bros. Co. (1902), 86 Minn. 140, 90

trovertingany of the facts alleged, simply N. W. 378.

* 63

. Illustrations. The ame i true of any other
denial of m re inferenc s or conclu i ns f law. Thu in a uit
u n a note i ,. n t the plaintiff a marri d woman, and ma le
x res, 1 payable to her on its face a ef nee that the note i
no her eparate property, and a denial that he is the 1 gal
owner ancl holder thereof were both h ld nullitie and ru ck
u n motion. 1 The defence in an ac ion to foreclo ~ e a mort0age
hat . [the mortgagor] wa regularl and duly di ha to the lain iff un er
bar ed from all hi debt , includin
proceeding in ir ol ency wa h 1 not to be new ma ter r uiring a reply, but onl a conclu ion of law and not of fac
and not to create an i ue.2 In an acti n to recover for injurie
au, d bv the negligence of the d f ndant, the complaint, after
t ing the neces ary facts showing the negligent omissio , and
t he on equent de truction of the plaintiff property, c ncludetl,
"to hi great damage, to wit, in the sum of
00. ' The an wer
imply denied ' that the plaintiff had uffered damage in the um
of 00.
This denial raised no i ue. 3
530. * 63 . Denial of Conclusions of L a w is Unnecessary. The
con er e of the rule illustrated by he f regoing case i al true.
If the an wer denies the material fact averred by th plaintiff or
alle es material facts constituting a defence of n ew matter it
need not deny the plaintiff's conclusion of law, or tate any conclu ions of law as the inference from the facts which it ha
pleaded. 4 Thus, in an action upon a contract, the answer alleged
529.

denials of raere inferences or conclusions of law. Thus, in a suit

denied that the plaintiff had any lien, was A denial that the set-off constituted a.

held to raise no issue. Bradbury v. Cro- defence, raises no issue: Richardson v.

nise, 46Cal. 287. See, however, Simmons Doty (1895), 44 Neb. 73, 62 N. W. 254.

V. Si.^son, 26 N. Y. 264, 270, 273. One who in his pleading has stated a le-

QA mere denial of competency to sue gal conclusion cannot object to a denial

raises no issue of fact: Chamberlin Bank- thereof in the same terms: Baldwin r.

ing House v. Noyes (1902), — Neb. — , 92 Burt (1895), 43 Neb. 245, 61 N. W. 601. 3

N. W. 175. in a foreclosure suit an * (] Abbott v. Caches (1899), 20 Wash,

answer denying that the plaintiff is the 517, 56 Pac. 28.]

v. Mead {1901),109 Ky. 5 3, 60 S. W . 294;
Taylor v. Purcell {l 94), 60 Ark. 606, 31
. \V . 567 .J
1 Fro t v. Haford, 40 Cal. 165, 166.
F 1 h v. Beaudry, 40 al. 43 9.
'
2
h r i ty u. ana 42 Cal. 174, 1 i 8.
a Huston v. Twin & . C. Turnp. o., 45
al. 550; Higgin v. W or tel, 18 Cal. 330.
In an action to enforce a lien upon defenda nt . land , an an ·wer wh i h , without controv rt ing any of the fact alleged, imply
d ni ed that th e plaintiff had any li en, wa.
held t o ra i e no i sue. Bradbury v. roDI e. 46 al. 2 7.
, ee, however, immoos
v . • i. on, 26 .... Y. 264, 270, 2 3.
[A m re denial of competency to ue
rai
no i ue of fact: ham berlin Bao king Hou e v. Noye {1902}, - Neb.-, 92
. W . 17 5.
In a foreclo nre uit an
a n 1 r denying that the plaintiff is the

owner and holder of the note and mortgages creates no i8sne: Clemens v. Luce
(1894 ), 101 Cal. 432, 35 Pac. 1032. A denial by defend ant in an a t ion of j tment that his posse sioo is wrongful rai
no i ue: Rhoades v. Higbee (I 95 ), 21
Colo. , 39 Pac. 1099. A valid denial i
not vitiated by conclusions of law alle ed in
coonecti n therewith : Fitzpatri k " imon on Bros. Co. {1902), 86 Minn. 140, 90

N. W. 37.
A denial that the et-off constitut d a
d f o e, rai e no i ue: Richa r d o v.
oty (1895), 44 J b. 73, 62 . W. 254.
o who in hi pleadin ha tated a l gal conclu ion cannot obj ct to a d nial
th reof in th
ame t rm : Baldwin t.'.
Burt {l 95), 43
b. 245 , 61 . W. 601.J
i [A1bott v.
a hes {l 99}, 20 Wah.
517, 56 Pac. 2 .]

DEXIA LS OF

I ~fO R ~f

\ TIO . . - A.T D BELIE F.

755

DENIALS OF INFORMATION AND BELIEF. 755

all the facts necessary to show that the agreement was illegal as

being in restraint of trade ; but the illegality was not expressly

averred, nor relied upon as a defence by means of any clause

drawing such a conclusion from the facts which were stated.

The defence, however, was hel^ to be sufficient, both in form and

substance : the facts constituting it were all pleaded ; and that was

enough, without adding the legal inferences from them.^

§ 531. * 640. Denials of Kno-wledge or Information. Formula

Prescribed by Statute should be followed. All the denials, either

general or specific, to which the rules stated in the foregoing sub-

divisions apply, may be either positive, or denials of knowledge

or information in respect to the matters alleged by the plaintiff.

When the latter mode is adopted, the formula prescribed by the

statute should be exactly followed, not because there is an}- value

in the form simply as such, but because in no other manner can

the defendant satisfy the demands of the code, and raise a sub-

stantial issue, — an issue which is not a subterfuge and pretence.

When the denial is positive, the defendant is required to negative

directly each and every allegation of the complaint or petition, or
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the particular ones controverted by him if less than all. If this

cannot be done by reason of the defendant's ignorance, and he is

therefore permitted to choose the other alternative, he must deny

that he has any knowledge or information concerning the matters

alleged sufficient to enable him to form a belief respecting them.^

Any other form must of necessity be evasive. And so the cases

all hold ; but a single illustration will suffice. The complaint in

an action to recover the price of gas furnished to a city being

verified, the answer was as follows : " And this defendant says

that the defendant has no knowledge or information in relation to

the allegations of the second count of the said complaint, and

therefore denies the same." On the trial, the averments of the

second count were treated by the court as not denied, and as

therefore admitted to be true ; and this ruling was sustained on

appeal. The answer was held to be a nullity : the only denials

permitted, it was said, are those positive in form, and those which

deny any knowledge or information sufficient to form a belief;

any others raise no issue. ^ The same conclusion was reached in

1 Frost V. More, 40 CaL 347. ^ San Francisco Gas Co. v. San Fran-

2 nCoIby V. Spokane (1895) 12 Wash, cisco, 9 CaL 453.

690, 42 Pac. 112.]

all the facts necessary to . how that th agr em nt wa illegal as
b ing in r straint of tmd ; but the ill gaJity wa n t xpressly
averred, nor relied upon as a defenc by m ans of any clause
drawing such a conclu ion from the fact. whi h w r
hitecl.
Th d fence, however, "a h l<). t o be sufficient, both in fo rm arnl
substanc : the fact con tituting it were all pl aded ; and that was
enough, without adding the lebal inferences from them. 1
§ 531. * 640. Denials of Knowledge or Information. For mula
Prescribed by Sta tute should be followed.
All the denial , ith er
gen ral or specific, to which the rules stated in the foregoing subdivi ions apply, may be either positive, or denials of knowledge
or information in respect to the matters alleged by the plaintiff.
vVhen the latter mode is adopted, the formula prescribed by the
tatute should be exactly followed, not because there is any value
in the form simply as such, but because in no o her manner can
the defendant satisfy the demands of the code, and raise a substantial issue, - an issue which is not a subterfuge and pretence.
\Vhen the denial is positive, the defendant is required to negative
directly each and every allegation of the complaint or petition, or
the particular ones controverted by him if less than all. If this
cannot be done by reason of the defendant's ignorance, and he is
therefore permitted to choose the other alternative, he must deny
that he has any knowledge or information concerning the matters
alleged sufficient to enable him to form a belief respecting them.2
Any other form must of necessity be evasive. And so the cases
all hold; but a single illustration will suffice. The complaint in
an action to recover the price of gas furnished to a city being
verified, the answer was as follows: "And this defendant says
that the defendant has no knO\vledge or information in relation to
the allegations of the second count of the said complaint, and
therefore denies the same." On the trial, the averments of the
second count were treated by the court as not denied, and as
therefore admitted to be true ; and this ruling was sustained on
appeal. The answer was held to be a nullity: the only denials
permitted, it was said, are those positive in form, and those which
deny any knowledge or information sufficient to form a belief;
any others raise no issue.a The same conclusion was reached in
Prost v. More, 40 Cal. 34 7.
[ Colby v. Spokane {1895) 12 Wash.
690, 42 Pac. 112.J
1
2

3 San Francisco Gas Co. v. San Francisco, 9 Cal. 453.
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respect to an answer which stated that " the defendant has not

sufficient knowledge or information to form a belief whether

[certain allegations] are true, and therefore denies the same." ^

1 Curtis 1-. Richards, 9 Cal. 3.3; Ste-

venson V. Flournoy, 89 Ky. 561 ; contra,

r

an an wer whi h ta d hat
he d fendant as no
uffici n knowle
or inform tion to form a b li f wbe b r
[cer m , llegation ] are tru and therefore deni the ame. 1

Cumins v. Lawrence Cy. (S. Dak. 1890),

al. 33 ·

46 N. W. Rep. 182. As to the proper

te-

The followin

form have be

form of such denials, and their effect in

raising issues when thus j)roper, see also

Kentucky, etc. Co. v. Commonwealth, 13

Bush, 436 ; Farmers' & Merch. Bk. of

Baltimore v. Charlotte Bd. of Aid., 75

N. C. 45 ; Sherman v. Osborn, 8 Ore. 66 ;

Ninde v. Oskaloosa, 55 Iowa, 207 ; Claflin

I'. Reese, 54 id. 544 ; Ncuberi^er r. Webb,

24 Hun, 347 ; Meehan v. Harlem Sav. Bk.,

5 id. 439 ; Grocers' Bank v. O'Rorke, 6 id.

18; Wiltmau v. Watry, 37 Wis. 238 ; Peo-
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ple i;. Curtis, 1 Idaho, 753. For further

examples of such denials improper in

form, see Bidwell ',■. Overton, 26 Al)b. N.

Cas. 402; Sheldon r. Sabin, 12 Daly, 84;

Lay Gas Machine Co. v. Neuse Falls Mfg.

Co', 91 N. C. 74 ; Land, etc. Co. of G. U. (•.

Williams (S C. 1892), 14 S. E. Rep. 821,

15 id. 453; Greer r. Covington, 83 Ky.

410; Haney v. People, 12 Colo. 345;

Moody V. Belden, 60 Hun, 582.

QThe following forms have been held

sufficient: — "Whether the matters and

thiu<js set forth [in said paragraph] are

true or false, defendant has no knowledge

or information sufficient wliereof to form

a belief and he therefore denies the same : "

Seattle Nat. Bank v. Mecrwaldt (1894), 8

Wash. 630, 36 Pac. 763. A denial of any

knowledge or information sufficient " to

enable it to form a belief," although the

statute uses the words, " sufficient to form

a belief : " Wilson i». Commercial Union

Ins. Co. (1902), 15 S. D. 322,89 N. W.

649. Plaintiff " denies that it has any

knowledge or information sufficient to

form a belief as to the truth of the alle-

gations contained in said answer," held

good, as against the objection that it

was a negative pregnant, when objec.

tion was first made after trial and verdict ;

Trnstees v. Nesbitt (1896), 65 Minn. 17, 67

N. W. 652. A denial that plaintiff •' has

knowledge or information snflicient, etc.,"

is sufficient without the word "any "before

knowledge, as the statute reads : Gilreath

I'. Furnian (1900), 57 S. C 289, 35S.E.516.

The following forms have been held in-

sufficient : — " Defendant says that be has

not information sufHcient to form a be-

lief:" Sigmund r. Rank of Minot (1894),

4 N. 1). 164, 59 N. W. 966. An averment

that defendant has no knowledge or infor-

mation sufficient to form a belief, since

there must be a direct denial and not

merely an affirmation of a negative : Law

Trust Society r. Hogue (1900), 37 Ore.

544, 63 Pac. 690. A denial that defend-

ant has "any knowledge or information

sufficient to form a belief," since under

the statute he must deny also that he

herman v.
kaloo a, 55 Iowa, 207;
v. ee e, 5-! i<l. 5-14; .. eub r ger l'- W bb,
:.4 Hun, 34 ; :.\leehan v. ll arl m .._av. Rk.,
5 icl. 439;
roe r,' Bank l'. 0'11 rke, 6 id.
l ~; Wil tmau v. \'\ try, 3 Wi ·. 23 ; People ·. urti , l I laho, i 53. For fur t her
xam,,le · of uch denial improp r in
f rm . ee Bi1lwell L'. <h·ertou, 26 Abb ....
-. 402; 'heldon 1·. abin , 12 Daly, 4;
Lay a. :\la ·hine o. v. ~Teu"e F all· ~Ifu.
o , 9 1 ~T· C. 74; L an.J, tc. o of . B. v.
William (
. I 2), 14 :. E. Hep. 21,
i - id. 453; Greer r.
O\'iugton, 3 Ky.
4 l ; Haney v. P e ple, 12
olo. 345;
:.\loorly r:. Belrlen, 60 Hun, 5 2.
[ flie following form h, ve Leen held
uffi ·ient: Whet her the matter and
thin
et forth [in aid paragraph] are
true or fal ·e, defendant ha n knowledge
or informa ion ufficient wit reof to form
a belief and he therefore d nie the ame:"
eattle 'at. Bank v. Meerwaldt ( l 94), 8
Wa h . 630, 36 Pac. i63. A denial f any
knowledge or information nfficient " to
enable it to form a belief,' although the
statute u e the word , " uffi i nt to f rm
a belief : " ' ' il on v.
Jn . 0. (1902), 15
laintiff "den ie
649 .
knowledge or information
f rm a heli f a to the truth
ation cont ined in aid an·wer ," h lei
good,
ag in t the objection that it
w
negati\·e pre,..naut, wh en obj Cti on wa fir t miule aft r trial and v rd ict:
Trn te . v. ·e bitt (l 96 , 65 • !inn . 17, 6
....' W. 652. A <l 11i. 1 that plaiutiff · h
kn o\\ I d~e or information , 11fliri nt,
.,
i ufliri1•ut withou the wo rd "an\·" Ii for
knowl~dge, a the ta.tut r :td. : · Gilr ath
1•. Furman I !JOO), 5i . . (' '.? ~. ;;;
E. 5 16.
~l int!

. 45;
v.

not inf rmati n ufti ·i nt to f rm a belief:"
i mund ·. Baukof Min t (1 4),
4 N. D. 164, 5
. \Y. 9 6. An averment
that defendant ha n knowledg or inf rmation uffi i nt to form a elief, ince
there mu t be a dir ct denial and n t
merely an affirmati n of a negative: Law
Tru t
o iety i-. Hogue (1900), 37
r .
54-4, 63 Pac. 690.
d nial that defendant ha· "any kn wledue or information
uffici nt to form a belief," sin e und er
the tatute he mu t den~· al
that he
could obtain uffi cieut knowledg : J one. z·.
P erot (l 9.'3), l Colo. 141 3-! Pac. -2 .
" 'Thi cl fendant ha not and c:urnot obtain informati n ufficient upon which t'
base a beli £," defective in not tatinu the.
ame a t both knowledge and iuform tion:
rand \all y Irr.
o. 1.:. Le. her
( 1901), 2
olo. 273,65 Pac. H. An all gation that defendant "ha no know led e
of the fa t "alleged in one paragraph of
the om plaint, and "ha no information"
re ·pecting the truth of the allegation in
another paragraph: Wood o k 1. Bo tir
(1901 ), 12
. 24-'3, 3
. E.
1. An
all uati n ' that def ndaut ha not ufficient know] dge or information a to the
claim f the plaintiff, and therefore demand and all f r ·trict legal proof thereof:" ... -ational Life Ju . o. v. Martin (l
),
5 - Neb. 35.0 7 . W . i69. An allegation
that def ndant has no knowledge or informati n cone ruing the matt r all g d
in the petition: Wil on v. Neu ( l 01 ),
Teb. - , 95 ~. w. 502.
"To authorize the denial of an allegation in a p titi n, a want of belief is ufficieut · and it i n t improper to ace mpany
th <l 11ial with a tat m ut that th part:
makiu it ha - n knowl drr
r inform tion on which to form belief:" r Into. h
ity f ma.ha (1 02 ), • -eb, l N. W .
A d ni 1 of kuowled
1
•
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§ 532. * 641. When a Denial of Knowledge or Information is not

allowed. Although the denial of knowledge or information may

be used in respect to every form of traverse, whether general or

specific, yet it cannot be resorted to under all circumstances.

There are occasions in which the defendant will not be permitted

to say that he has no knowledge or information of the matter

sufficient to form a belief, because such a statement would be a

palpable falsehood, a plain impossibility. When the allegation

in the complaint or petition is of a fact which must of necessity

be within the personal knowledge of the defendant; when it

avers an act done or an omission suffered by him personally ;

when, for example, it states a contract entered into, or a deliber-

ate wrong perpetrated, by himself, — he must know whether the

averment is true or false. ^ He will not be suffered to assert a

(1900), 7.3 Conn. 448, 47 Atl. 6.56 ; Savle.s

V. FitzGerald (1899), 72 Conn. 391, 44 Atl.

733; Smith v. Allen (1901), 63 Neb. 74,

83 N. W. 1.55; Jacobs u. Ilognn (1900), 73
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Conn. 740, 49 Atl. 202. The Georc^ia

statute is somewhat different from that

found in most of the code States : Code,

§4961 (1895), "Anj averment distinctly

§

532.

* 641.

When a Denial of Knowledge or Information is not

allowed.
Although the denial of knowledge or information may
be used in respect to every form of tra ver e, whether general or
peci:fic, yet it cannot be resor ted to under all circum tances.
There are occasions in w~ich the defendant will not be permitted
to say that he ha no know ledge or information of the matter
sufficient to form a belief, becau e such a statement would be a
palpable falsehood, a plain impossibility. When the allegation
in the complaint or petition is of a fact which must of necessity
be within the personal knowledge of the defendant; when it
avers an act done or an omission suffered by him personally;
when, for example, it states a contract entered into, or a deliberate wrong perpetrated, by himself, - he rnust know whether the
averment is true or false. 1 He will not be suffered to assert a

and plainly made therein [in the petition],

which is not denied by the defendant's

answer, shall be taken as prima facie true,

unless the defendant -states in his answer

that he can neither admit nor deny such

averment because of the v/ant of sufficient

information." For cases construing it see

Lester v. Mcintosh (1897), 161 Ga. 675, 29

S. E. 7 ; English v. Grant (1897), 102 Ga.

35, 29 S. E. 157 ; Smith v. Champion

(1897), 102 Ga. 92, 29 S. E. 160; Angier

V. Equitable Bldg. Ass'n (1899), 109 Ga.

625, 35 S. E. 64.

Denials upon Information and Belief: —

" The better rule is that a denial made

upon 'information and belief is sufficient

when made in a certain class of cases. In

Btrictne.ss.itistheoiily proper form of denial

in a case where, with reference to the fact

sought to be denied, defendant has certain

information which induces him to believe

that such facts are untrue, and yet has not

absolute knowledge that such facts are un-

true. Having information inducing a

belief which falls short of knowledge,

defendant cannot truthfully deny that he

7ias neither knowledge nor information

sufficient to form a belief as to the fact."

Ku.ssell V. Amundson (1894), 4 N. D. 112,

59 N. W. 477. See also Warburton v.

Ralph (1894), 9 Wash. 537, 38 Pac. 140;

Seattle Nat. Bank v. Meerwaldt (1894), 8

Wash. 630, 36 Pac. 763.]

1 [_Raymond u. Johnson (1897), 17 Wash.

232,49 Pac. 492; Sweet v. Davis (1895),

90 Wis. 409, 63 N. W. 1047 ; Bartow

V. Northern Assurance Co. (1897), 10

S. D. 132, 72 N. W. 1135; Nashville, etc.

R. R. Co. V. Carrico (1894), 95 Ky. 489, 26

S. W. 177; Sioaue t-. Southern" CaL Ry.

Co. (1896), 111 Cal. 668, 44 Pac. 320;

Gribble v. Columbus Brewing Co (1893),

100 Cal. 67, 34 Pac. 527 ; Wickersham v.

Comerford (1S94), 104 Cal. 494, 38 Pac.

101 ; Mills' Estate (1902), 40 Ore. 424, 67

Pac. 107.

(1900), 73 Conn. 448, 47 Atl. 6!56; Sayle·
v. FitzGerald (1 99) , 72 Conn. 391, 4+ Atl.

733; Smith v . Allen (190l), 63 1 eb. 7+ ,
N. W . 155; Jacobs v. Hogan (1900), i3
Conn. 740, 49 A tl. 202. The Georgia

tatute is somewhat different from that
found in most of tha code f;tates: Code,
§ 4961 (1 895), "Any aYermenc distinctly
and plainly made therein [in the petitiou],
whieh is not den ied by the defendant's
anf'.wer, shall be ta.ken as pri1;,u, facie true,
unless the defendant ·states in his answGr
that he can neith er admit nor deny such
averment because of the want of sufficient
information." For case ccnstruing it see
Lester v . l\fcintosb (l89i), 161 Ga. 675, 29
S. E. 7; English v. Grant (1897) , 102 Ga.
35, 29 S. E. 157; Smith v. Champion
(189i), 102 Ga. 92, 29 S. E. 160; Angier
'I! . Equitable Bldg. A ss'n (1899), 109 Ga.
625, 35 s. E. 64.
D enials upon Information and Belief: "The better rule is t ha t a denial made
upon 'i nformation and belief' is sufficient
when made in a certain class of cases. In
strictne s, it is the only prope r fo rm of denial
in a case where, wi th r eference to the fact
sought to be denied, defendant has certain
information which in duces him t o believe
that such facts are untrue, and yet has not
absolu te knowledge that such facts are un~rue .
Having information inducing a
belief which falls short of knowledge,
defendant cannot t ruthfully deny that he
nas neither knowledge nor information

sufficient to form a belief as to the fact ."
Hussell 1J. Amundson (1 94), 4 N. D. 112,
5!) N. W . 477.
See also Warburton v.
Ralph (l8'H), 9 Wash. 537, 38 Pac. 140;
Seattle Na.t. 13ank v. Meer waldt (1894), 8
Wash. 630, 36 l'ac. 763.J
1 [Ray mond v. Johnson ( 1897 ), 17 Wash.
232, 4~ Pac. 4n; Sweet v. Davis (1895),
90 Wis. 409, 63 N. W. 1047; Bartow
v. Northern Assurance Co. (1897), 10
S. D. 132, 72 N. W. 1135; Nashville, etc.
R.R. Co. v. Carrico ( 1894), 95 Ky . 489, 26
S. W. 177 ; Sloane u. Southern Cal. Ry.
Co. {1896), 111 Cal. 668, 44 Pac. 320;
Gribble v . Columbus Brewing Co ( 1893),
100 Cal. 67, 34 Pac. 527; Wickersham v.
Comerford (1894), 104 Cal. 494, 38 Pr.c.
101 ; Mills' Estate (1902), 40 Ore. 424, 67
Pac. 10 7.
Matters of public record are presumptively within the kn owledge of the parties, and de11ials of information and beli ef are insufficient: Thompson i:. Skeen
(1896), 14 Utah, 209, 46 Pac. 1103; Mullally v. Townsend (1897), 11 9 Cal. 47, 50
Pac. 1066; First -at. Bank v. Martin
( 1898), Idaho, 55 Pac. 302; Simpson 1:.
Remin gton (1 99), I daho, 59 Pac. 360;
First Xat. Bank v. Watt (1901), Idaho, 64
Pac. 223; Van Dyke v. Doherty {1896), 6
N. D . 263, 69 . W. 200; Oakes v. Ziemer
(1901), 62 Neb. 603, 87 N. W. 350; . c.
{1900), 61 eb. 6, 4 :N". W. 409.
A denial of knowle<lge or information
that plaintiff is a corporation, i not uffi-
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defective memory, for such a forgetfulness is contrary to the gen-

eral experience of mankind. If his recollection is at fault, the

law affords him ample opportunity and means of refreshing it

during the interval between the service of the adverse pleading

and the time for answering. A denial, therefore, of the form

described, pleaded in answer to allegations of a nature purely

personal to the defendant, will be treated as sham and evasive,

and will be struck out on motion. A demurrer would not be the

proper remedy ; because the objection is not to the sufficiency as

a defence^ but to the bad faith of the party in interposing a plead-

ing of such a character. The rule was accurately stated by Mr.

Justice Field of the California Supreme Court substantially as

follows : " If the facts alleged are presumptively within the

knowledge of the defendant, he must deny positively, and a

denial of information or behef will be treated as an evasion.

Thus, for example, in reference to instruments in writing alleged

to have been executed by the defendant, a positive answer will

alone satisfy the requirements of the statute. If the defendant

has forgotten the execution of the instruments, or doubts the cor-
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rectness of their description, or of the copies in the complaint, he

should, before answering, take the requisite steps to obtain an

inspection of the originals. If the facts alleged are not such as

must be within the personal knowledge of the defendant, he may

answer according to his information and belief." ^

cient to pat in issue the question of the D. Bank, 12 id. 333; Barret v. Godshaw

plaintiff's corporate existence: Stoddard 12 id. 592; Goodell r. Bloomer, 41 Wis

Mfg. Co. V. Mattice (1897), 10 S. D. 253, 436; Union Lumb. Co. v. Chippewa Cy

72 N. W. 891; Board of Education v. Sup., 47 id. 24.5; Collart v. Fisk, 38 id

Prior (1898), II S. D. 292, 77 N. W. 106 ; 238; Hathaway v. Baldwin, 17 id. 616

Iowa Savings, etc. Ass'u v. Selby (1900), see Brotherton v. Downey, 21 Hun, 436

111 la. 402, 82 N. W. 968. Nor will such Further instances of such denials disal

a denial put in issue the execution of a lowed, as concerning matters presump

written instrument : Wiuterfield r. Cream tively within the knowledge of the

City Brewing Co. (1897), 96 Wis. 239, defendant: Buller y. Sidell, 43 Fed. Rep.

71 N. W. 101; Garland v. Gaines (1900), 116; Sherman v. Boehm, 13 Daly, 42;

efecthe memory, for such a forgetfulne i contrary to he gener 1 experi nee of man.kin . If his recollection · at fault the
1. w affor him ample opportunity and mean of refre bing it
urina- he interval between the ervice of the ad erse pleadin
n the time for an wering. A denial ther fore, of the f rm
e cribed pleade in an wer t allegations of a nature purel
per onal to the defendant, will be treated as ham and eva i e,
and will be truck out on motion. A demurrer would not be the
proper remedy · because the objection i not to the sufficiency as
a defence , but to the bad faith of he party in interposing a plea,cling of such a character. The rule was accurately otated by Mr.
Ju tice Field f the California Supreme Court ubstantially a:s
follows: ' If the fact alleged are pre umptively within the
knowledge of the defendant, he must deny positively, and a
denial of information or belief will be treated as an evasion.
Thus, for example, in reference to instruments in writing alleged
to have been executed by the defendant, a positive answer will
alone atisfy the requirements of the statute. If the defendant
has forgotten the execution of the instruments, or doubts the correctne s of their description, or of the copies in the complaint he
hould, before answering, take the requi ite steps to obtain an
in pection of the originals. If the facts alleged are not such as
must be within the personal knowledge of the defendant, he may
answer according to hi information and belief. ' 1

73 Conn. 662, 49 Atl. 19; Moore v. Wheaton r. Briggs. 3.5 Minn. 470; Love-

Holmes (1897), 68 Minn. 108, 70 N. W. laud v. Garner, 74 Cal. 298. Instances of

872.] such denials which did not come within

1 Curtis i>. Richards, 9 Cal. 33, 38. See the operation of the rule, and were thero-

also, to the same effect, Wing v. Dugan, fore allowed : Martin v. Erie Preserving

8 Bush, 583. 586; Jackson Sharp Co. r. Co., 48 Hun, 81; Harvey v. Walker,

Holland, 14 Fla. 384,386. The rule stated 59 Hun, 114; Hall v. Woodward, 30

in the text is also sustained by the follow- S. C. 564 ; Ilagman v. Williams, 88 Cal.

ing cases : Muffaker v. Nat. Bk. of Monti- 146.

cello, 12 Bush, 287 ; Gridler v. Farmers' &

cient to put in i ue the question of the
plaintiff's corporate exi tence: toddard
Mfg. Co. v. Mattice (1897), 10 . n. 253,
72 N. ,V. 91; Board of Education v.
Prior (1 9 ). I l . D. 292, 77 N. W. 106;
Iowa avings, etc. A 'n v. el by (1900),
11 l Ia. 402, 2 N. W. 96 . Nor will uch
a d enial put in i ue the execution of a
wri tten in trument: Wiuterfield t. Cream
ity Brewing o. {l 97), 96 w· . 239,
71 . W. 101; Garland v. Gaines (1900),
73
onn . 662, 49 Atl. 19; Moore v.
Holm e (1 9 ). 6 Minn. 10 , 70 N. W.
8i2.J
1
urti 11. Richard , 9 al. 33, 3 . ee
al o, t the ame effect, Wing v. ugan,
Bu. h, 5 3, 5 6; Jack on harp o. v.
Holland, 14 Fl . :384, 3 6. The rul tated
io t h te xt · a o o tained by tbe followin l"
· : Huffak r v.
at. Bk . of :'>Iontic •ll , 12 ush, 2 7; Gridler v. Farmer' &

D . Bank, 12 id. 333; Barret t'. God haw,
12 id. 592; Goodell v. Bloomer, 41 W i .
436; Union Lumb. Co. v. Chippewa y.
up., 47 id. ~45; Collart v. F i k, 38 id.
23 ; Hathaway v. Bald~ in, 17 id. 616;
ee Brotherton v. Downe , 21 Hun, 436.
Fu rther instances of such denial di allowed, a concerning matter pre ump·
tively within he knowledge of the
defendant: Buller v. idell, 43 F ed. R p.
116; herman v. Boehm, 13
aly, 42;
Wheaton v. Brig{! , 35 Minn. 470; Loveland r. Garner, ; 4 al. 29 . In tao e. of
uch denial which did not come within
the operation of the rule, and were th er fore allow d : 1artin v. Erie Pre rviug
o., 4 Hun, l; Harvey v. Walker,
59 Hun, 114: ; Hall v. W dward , 3
al.
. C. 564; Hagman v. William ,
146.
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§ 533. * 642. Outline of Proposed Treatment of Issues Raised

by Denials. Ill discussing the topics embraced within this subdi-

~ 5 33.

* 642.

vision, the same doctrines apply both to general and to specific

denials. The only difference is in respect to the extent of their

effect and operation.^ The general denial raises an issue witli

the entire complaint or petition, and admits evidence in contra-

diction to all the plaintiff's material allegations ; while the spe-

cific denial raises an issue with the particular allegation alone to

which it is directed, and only admits evidence in contradiction

thereto. The same rules as to the effect of the general denial

upon the issue raised with the whole complaint, and the proofs

admissible under it, apply with equal force to the specific denial

in respect to the narrower issue which it creates and the evidence

which it admits. It will only be necessary, therefore, to discuss

the objects and functions of the general denial, since the results

■of this discussion will be true of specific denials within their

hmited operation. In pursuing this discussion, I shall inquire

into the nature and effect of the general denial and the issues

formed by it ; the general nature of the evidence which may be

Generated for facpubupdates (University of Michigan) on 2014-06-17 15:34 GMT / http://hdl.handle.net/2027/uc2.ark:/13960/t02z1c23b
Public Domain / http://www.hathitrust.org/access_use#pd

admitted, and the defences which may be set up under it ; and I

shall state and classify a number of particular defences, and matters

of defence, which have been held admissible or not admissible,

or, in other words, a number of particular defences which have

been determined to be defences by way of denial, or to be new

matter.

§ 534. * 643. Importance of Questions Suggested. No topic

connected with the whole subject of pleading is, I think, more

important than the questions thus suggested. Undoubtedly,

much of the confusion, redundancy, and unscientific character

of pleadings under the codes is the result of ignorance or uncer-

tainty as to the power of the general denial to admit defences

upon which the defendant relies. In very many instances the

answer is made a long and rambling mass of purely evidentiary

details, when the simple general denial, not exceeding two or

three lines in length, would be fully as efficacious, and would

present the issue in a sharper and clearer manner. The general

denial is in some respects broader in its scope, and in some re-

spects narrower, than the general issues as a whole at the com-

mon law. But little aid can be obtained from the rules which

1 See Coles v. Soulsbj, 21 Cal. 47, 50, per Field C. J.

Outline of Proposed Treatment of Issues Raised

In di cu ing th topic' mbra ed wi hin thi

uLclivi ion, the same doctrine apply bo h to g neml and t , p cific
d nial . The only differ nc i in re pect t the ~' ent of their
effect and opera ion.1 Th g n ral d nial rai e an i ~ ue with
the entire complaint or petition, and admit vi ence in contradiction to all the plaintiff's material all gation ; while the pecific denial raises an i ue with the particular allegation alone to
which it is directed, and only admits evidence in ontradiction
thereto. The same rules as to the effect of the general denial
upon the issue raised with the whole complaint, and the proofs
admissible under it, apply with equal force to the pecific denial
ln respect to the narrower issue which it creates and the evidence
which it admits. - It will only be necessary, therefore, to discu s
the objects and functions of the general denial, since the results
·of this discussion will be true of specific denials within their
limited operation. In pursuing this discussion, I shall inquire
into the nature and effect of the general denial and the issues
formed by it; the general nature of the evidence which may be
admitted, and the defences which may be set up under it; and I
shall state and classify a number of particular defences, and matters
of defence, which have been held admissible or not admissible,
or, in other words, a number of particular defences which have
been determined to be defences by way of denial, or to be new
m atter.
§ 534. * 643. I m porta n ce o f Q u estions Suggested. No topic
connected with the whole ubject of pleading is, I think, more
important than the questions thus suggested. Undo ubtedly,
much of the confusion, redundancy, and unscientific character
of pleadings under the codes is the result of ignorance or uncertainty as to the power of the general denial to admit defences
upon which the defendant relies. In very many instances the
answer is made a long and rambling mass of purely evidentiary
details, when the simple general denial, not exceeding two or
three lines in length, would be fully as efficacious, and would
present the issue in a sharper and clearer manner. The general
denial is in some respects broader in its scope, and in some respects narrower, than the general issues as a whole at the common law. But little aid can be obtained from the rules which
by Denials.

1

See Coles v. Soulsby, 21 Cal. 47, 50, per Field C. J.
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governed the use of the latter traverses, except by way of

contrast.

§ 535. * 657. The General Denial. McKyring v. Bull. In pur-

suing this inquiry, I shall rely upon the judicial opinions found

in decisions which are universally regarded as authoritative, even

using their language instead of my own wherever practicable.

The case of McKyring v. Bull ^ is conceded to be the leading one.

The opinion of Mr. Justice S. L. Selden is so full, accurate, and

able an exposition of the subject, . that other judges have done

little more than repeat his conclusions. The action was brought

to recover compensation for work and labor. The complaint

alleged that the plaintiff entered into the employment of the

defendant at a certiiin date, and continued in such employment

at defendant's request, doing work and labor until another speci-

fied date, and that the services so rendered were worth the sum

of $650 ; and concluded as follows : " That there is now due to

this plaintiff, over and above all payments and offsets on account

of said work, the sum of $134; which said sum defendant refuses

to pay : wherefore the plaintiff demands judgment for the last-
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mentioned sum, and interest from the 4th day of May, 1854."

The answer was only a general denial. On the trial, the defend-

ant offered to prove payment as a defence to the action ; but the

evidence was excluded, on the ground that the defence should

have been pleaded. He then offered to prove part payment in

mitigation of damages ; but this was also rejected for the same

reason. The case thus presented two questions to the Appellate

Court for decision : (1) Whether payment could have been proved

as a defence under the general denial ; (2) whether it could have

l)een proved in mitigation of damages. If the action had been

assumpsit or debt, the evidence would have been admissible in

either aspect.^

[§§ * 658, * 659. These sections of the author's text, con-

sisting of quotations from McKyring v. Bull, will be found in

the note.^]

^ McKyring v. Bull, 16 N. Y. 297, de- in any case be given in evidence as a de-

cided in 1857. fence under an answer containing simply

2 McKyring v. Bull, 16 N. Y. 297, 299. a general denial of the allegations of the

The opinion concludes as follows: "My complaint."

conclusion, therefore, is. that neither pay. •'' § 658. The discussion of the second

ment nor any other defence which con- question presented in this case is so com-

fesses and avoids the cause of action can plete and instructive, that I adopt it as

governed the use of t he 1 tter traver e , except by way of
contra t.
§ 535. * 657. The General D enial. M c K yring v. B u ll. In puruin0 hi inquiry, I shall rely upon the judicial pinion fo und
in
i i ns which are univer ally r gard d a authori ative, even
u in 0 h ir language in tead of my O''\· n wherever rneticable.
TL
f M K rring v . Bull 1 i conceded to be he leading one.
Th
inion f Mr. Ju tice . L . lden is o fu ll, accurate, and
abl an xpo iti n of the ubject, hat ther judge h ave done
li tle mor t1 an repeat his conclu ion . The acti u was broug ht
o r c ~er compen ation for work and labor. The complaint
alle ed that the plaintiff entered into the employment f t he
d f n<lant at a ertain date, and continued in uch mpl ment
at def n an r que t, doing work and 1 bar until another p cified lat , and hat the service so rendered were wor h the um
of $6:50 ; and concluded as follows : " That there i now lue to
tbi plaintiff, over and above all payments and offs ts on ac aunt
of said work, the sum of $134; which said um defendant refu es
to pay : wherefore the plaintiff demands judgment for th la menti ned um, and interest from the 4th da3 of May, 1 -±. '
The an wer was only a general d nial. On the trial, the defendant offered to prove payment as ad fence to the actio n· bu t the
evidence was excluded, on the ground that the defence should
have been pleaded. He then offered to prove part paym n t in
rnitiga i n of damages; but this was also r ejected for the me
rea on. The ca e thus presented wo questi ns to the ppellate
ourt for deci ion : (1) Whether pay nt could have been prove
as a def n e under the general denial · ( "') whether it uld ha e
been pro d in mitiga ion of damages . I£ the action h
been
a ump it or debt, the evidence would have been adrni ibl m
ither a pect.2
[.'. * 5 , * 6 9. T l
s cti n
f th au t hor t xt
n:i ti1 g f qu tati n fr m McK ·ring v. B ull will
foun d m
t h n .3 ]
1
1 K yring v. Bull, 16 N. Y. 297, deided i n l 57.
2 ~fc Kyring v. Bull, 16 N . Y . 297, 299.
he op inion conclud as follow : "My
oocl n. ion, therefor , i , that n ith r pay.
m ent uo r auy other d f nee ' hi h conic .. "· and avoid t he cau of a ction can

in any ca be giv n in evid nee as a def nc uod r an an wer ontaining imply
a gen ral d nial f the all gation of the
complaint."
a 65 . Th e di cu ion of th
cond
qn t i n pr nted io tbi a i
c mJJlete a u<l iu tru ive, that I atl pt it as
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§ 536. * 660. Further Illustrations. The' upr m
urt £
w
York, in an early cas , cl cribed th offi
£ the general d nial

tion is, wliether evidence of payment,

either iu whole or in part, is adniissihle

in mitigation of damages. As the code

contain.s no express rule ou the subject

of mitigation, except in regard to a single

class of actions, this (luestion cannot be

properly determined without a recurrence

to the jirinciples of the common law. By

these principles, defendants in actions

sounding in damages were permitted to

give in evidence, in mitigation, not only

matters having a tendenc^y to reduce the

amount of the plaintiff's claim, but, in

many cases, facts showing that the plain-

tiff had in truth no claim whatever. It
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was not necessarily an objection to matter

offered in mitigation, tliat, if properly

pleaded, it would have constituted a com-

plete defence. Thus, in Smithies v. Harri-

son, 1 Ld. Raym. 727, the truth of the

charge was received iii mitigation in an

action of slander, although not pleaded.

Again : in the case of Abbott v. Chap-

man, 2 Lev. 81, which was an action of

assumpsit, the defendant having given iu

evidence a release. Lord Holt said that ' he

should have pleaded exoneravit, but that

the evidence was admissible in mitigation

of damages.' So too, in the modern case

of Nicholl (;. Williams, 2 M. & W. 758,

which was assumpsit for use and occu-

pation, the defendant, having pleaded

payment to a part of the demand, and non-

(is^umpsit to the residue, was j)ermitted,

upon the trial, to prove payment in full;

but it was held that the evidence could

only go in mitigation, and that the plain-

tiff was entitled to judgment for nominal

damages. It is obvious that this practice

was open to serious objections. It enabled

defendants to avail themselves of their

defences for all substantial purposes with-

out giving any notice to the j)laintiff. . . .

But in regard to payment, release, etc., so

long as they were received in evidence

under the general issue in bar, no objection

could be made to allowing them in mitiga-

tion. As soon, however, as this practice

was abrogated by the rules of Hilary

Term, 4th WiUiam IV., the question as to

the admissibility of payment iu mitigation

at once arose." The learned judge here

traces the course of English decisions upon

this (juestion, citing and reviewing a num-

ber of cases, and referring to certain addi-

tional legislation (Lediard v. Boucher, 7

C. & P. 1, per Lord Denman ; Shirley v.

Jacobs, 7 C. & P. 3, per Tindal C. J. ;

Henry v. Earl, 8 M. & W. 228 ; Rule of

Trinity Term, 1st Vict. 4 M. & \V. 4), and

concludes this discussion as follows : " The

matter is now placed, therefore, in the

English courts, upon a footing of perfect

justice. If the demand for which an action

is brought has once existed, and the defend-

a portion of the text. "The next que - at once al·o e." The learned judg here
tion i., whether evidence of paym nt, trace the our e of Engli h d ci -ion upon
eitbe1· iu whole or iu part, is ad mi - iule thi ' question, citing and reviewing a numin mitigation of damagef:. A the code ber of ca. , and referring to certain addicontains no xpr s rul e ou the ubj ct tional legi lation (Lediard v. Boucher, 7
of mitigatiou, ex ept in regard to a iugle C. & P. 1, per Lord Deum:m; hirley v.
class of acti n ·, thi - question cannot be Jacobs, 7 . & P. 3, per Tindal . J.;
properly determined without a recurrence Henry v. Earl, 8 I. & \V. 22 ; Rule of
to the principles of the common law. By Trinity Term, 1 t Viet. 4 M. & W. 4), and
these principles, defendants in actions concludes thi di cu ion as follows: "The
soundiug in damages were permitted to matter i now placed, th refore, in the
give in evidence, in mitigation , not on ly Engli ·h courts, upon a footiug of perfect
matters havi11g a tendency to r ed uce the justice. 1£ the demaud for which an action
amount of the plaiutiff' · ·laim, but, in i brought ha once exi ted, and th cl f ndmany case , fact howing that the plain- ant relie upon it· ha,·ing been recln ·ed by
tiff ha.d in truth no claim whatever. It payment, he mn t appear aud plead.
was not uece sarily an objection io matter
§ 659. "It is to be determined iu this
offered in mitigation, that, if properly case whether we have kept np with the e
pleaded, it would have constituted a c·im- courts iu our measures of r eform. The
µlete defence. Thus, in Smithies v. Harri- rules of Hilary Term (4 "W illiam IV.) and
son, 1 Ld . Raym. i27, the truth of the the ystem of pleading prescribed by the
charge was rece ived in mitigati on in au code haYe, in one re peer, a common
action of sla11der, although not pleaded. object; Yiz., to prernut parties from surAgain: in the case of Abbott v . Chap- prisiug each other by proof of what their
man, 2 Lev. 81, which was an action of pleadings g i1·e no notice. These rule ,
a sumpsit, the defendaut having g iYen iu acc0rdiug to the con truction put upon
evidence a release, Lord Holt said that ' he them by the courts, were fouud inadeshould have pleaded exoneravit, but that quate, so far :i.s pro1·i11g payment in mitithe evidence was admi sible in mitigation gation is concerned, to accomplish the end
of damages.' So too, in the mod ern case in view; and ii became necessary to adopt
of Nicholl v. Williams, 2 M. & \V. 75 , the rule of Trinity Term ( 1 t "'\ ict.) to
which was assumpsit for u, e and occu- remedy the defect. If the pro,·ision of
pation, the defenda11t, haviug pleaded the code are to receive in this respect a
payment to a part of the demand, and non- construction similar to that girnn to the
lLS umµsit to the re idue, was permitted,
rules of Hilary Term, th en an additional
npon the trial, to prove payment in full; provision will be required to place our
but it was held that the evidence could practice upon the same basi of ju tice
only go iu mitigation, and that the plain- and convenience with that in England.
tiff was entitled to judgment for nominal But is such a construction uece ·ary ~
damages. It is obvious that this practice Section 149 of the code provide that the
was open to eriou objectious. It enabled an wer of the defendant must contain, 1.
defendants to avail them eh·e of their A general or ~ peeific denial of the matedefences for all substantial purposes with- rial allegation of the cum plaint; and, 2.
out giving any notice to the plaintiff .. .. A statement of any n w matter con titutBut in regard to payment, r lease, etc., so ing a defence or counter-claim. The lanlong a they were received in evid ence guage here used is imperative, - 'must
under the general i sue in bar, no objection coutain.' It is not 1 ft optioual with the
could be made to allowing them in mitiga- defendant wheth r he will plead new mattion. As soon, however, as this practice ter or not; but all uch matter, if it conwas abrogated by the rules of Hilary
titutes 'a defence or counter-claim,' must
Term, 4th William IV., the question as to be pl eaded; and thiR i in entire accordthe admissibility of payment iu mitigation ance with the general µriuciples of plead-
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in the following brief but veiy accurate manner : " Under a

denial of the allegations of the complaint, the defendant may

introduce any evidence which goes to controvert the facts which

the plaintiff is bound to establish in order to sustain his action." ^

'• Under the general denial of the code, evidence of a distinct

affirmative defence is not admissible. The only evidence which

the defendant is entitled to give is limited to a contradiction

of the plaintiff's proofs, and to the disproval of the case made

by him." ^

iu^. The word 'defence,' as here used,

must include partial as well as complete

defences; otherwise it would be uo longer

in t e follo mg brief but Y r accura e mann r : Und r
denial of he allegation
f the c m laint he defendant may
introtluc nny ,·iden e \du h o
o con ro ert the fact which
th 1 la.in -· ff i ~ boun t
abli h
rder to u tain hi a ti n.' 1
· Cnder t 1 gener, 1 denia1 f h
de e ,idence of a di 'tinct
a rr atlY defer c i·· n t admi
The only evid nee which
h
fend, nt i eutitle to gi-.;-e i limited to a contradiction
laintiff ' proof· and to tl e d.lliproval of the ca 'e made
of th
b ·him.·~

possible to plead pavineut in part of the

plaintiff's demand, except in connection

•with a denial of the residue ; since section

153 provides that ' the plaintiff may in all

cases demur to an answer containing new

matter, when, upon its face, it does not
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constitute a couuter-claiia or defence.''

Such a restriction would be not only con-

trary to the general spirit of the code in

regard to pleading, but would obviously

couriict with § 244, subdivision 5, which

provides that ' where the answer expressly,

or by not denying, admits part of the

plaintiff's claim to be just, the court may,

on motion, order such defendant to satisfy

that part of the claim,' etc. The question

to be determined, then, is, whether these

provisions are limited in their operation

to cases where the defendant seeks to

avail himself of new matter strictly as

a defence either in full or pio ianto, or

whether they extend to the use of such

matter in mitigation. Were there nothing

in the code to indicate the intention of the

legislature on this subject, we might feel

constrained to follow the construction put

bv the English courts upon the rules of

Hilary Term. But § 246 provides that in

all actions founded upon contract brought

for the recovery of money only, in which

the complaint is sworn to, if the defendant

fails to answer, the plaintiff is entitled

absolutely to judgment for the amount

mentioned in the summons without any

assessment of damaires. It is plain, that,

in this class of actions, defendants who

have paid part only of the plaintiff's de-

mand must appear and plead such part

paymrmt, or they will lose the benefit of it

altogether. Tlie provisions of § 385 afford

no adecjuate remedy in such cases, because

the offer to allow judgment for a part does

not relieve the defendant from the ueces-

sitv of controverting the residue by an-

swer. Section 246 could never iiave been

adopted, therefore, without an intention

on the part of the legislature that § 149

should be so construed as to require de-

fendants, at least in this class of cases, to

set up part payment by answer ; and it is

difficult to suppose that they intended the

section to receive one construction in one

class of actions, and a different one in

another. My conclusion, therefore, is,

that § 149 should be so construed as to

require defendants in all cases to plead

iu~.

The word 'defence,' a here u. e ,
mu ·t include partial a· well a complete
defence · oth rwise it w ultl be JJO longe r
po i le to ple d payment in part of the
phintiff': <l mand, except in connection
with a denial of the re idue; ince ection
153 pro1·ide that 'the plaiutiff may in all
c e · demur to an au wer contaiui1w ne w
matter, when, upon its face, it doe n t
<.·on titute a
ounter-claim or defence.'
uch a re · triction would be not onl.r contrary to the o-eneral pirit of the code in
regard to pleadino-, but would obviously
contlict wiLh
~44, ubdi1·1 10n 5, which
provide that ' where the an wer expre ly,
or by not denying, admit part of the
plaintiff' claim to be ju ·t, the cou r t may,
on motion , order uch defendant to sati, fy
that par t of the claim,' etc. T he que ti on
to be determined, then, i·, ·whether these
provision are limited in thei r operation
to case where the defendant eek· to
avail him elf of new matter trictly as
a defence either in full or pro tanto, or
whether they extend to the u e of i;uch
matter in mitigation. Were there uothiug
in the code to indicate the intention of the
legi lature on this ubject, we mig 11t fe 1
con trained t follow the con 'truction put
by the Engli h cou r t upou the rule of
Hilary Term. But 2-!6 provide that in
all action founded upon coutrac brought
for the recoV"ery of money only, in which
the complaint i worn to, if the defendant
fail to an wer, ti e plaintiff i. entitled
ab olutely t jud~mPut for the amount
mention ed in the ummon. without any
. rnent of damacr . It i · plain that,
in thi cla of a tion , defendant who
hav pai1l part only of the plaintiff' demand mu t, ppear ancl plead u ·h part
payment, or th ·y will lo e the benefit f it

al ogethcr. The provi ion of § 3 5 afford
no adequate remedy in such ca e., becau.e
the offer to allo w ju dgment for a part does
not relieve the defeJJtlant fro m the JJ ece , ity of controverting the r e id ue by answer.
ecti n 246 could never ha ve beeu
a opted, therefo re, witho ut a n intent ion
on the part of the legi lature that .' 149
hould be o con. t rued a to require defeudaut ·, at Jea"t in thi ·b · of ca e , to
et up part payment by au w r ; and it i
difficult t o uppo e that th y intended the
ection to r eceive one con tr uctio n in one
cla. of action , and a di ffere nt ne in
another . My concl u ion, theref re. i~,
that § 149 hould be o constru ed a to
requi re defendants in a ll ca e to pl ead
any new matte r con tituting either an entire or partial defence, and to prohib it
them from giving uch matter in ev idence
upon the , es ment of damage. wh en n ot
et up in the an wer. Not on ly payment,
therefo re, in whole or in part, but rel e,
arbit rament, accord and ati facti on, m ust
here be pl eaded. In thi re pe t, our new
y tern of pleading under th ode i mor
ymmetrical than that pre cribed by the
rule ad pted by the Engli h judge ."
1 Andrew v. Bond, 16 Barb. 633,64 1,
per T. A ..John on J.
[Io 1-ilbank 1 • •Jone (I 94), 14 1 . Y .
340, 36 N. E. 3 , it wa h ld that the def ndant might introduce el'id nc to contro,·ert anything hat plaintiff i bound to
e al o
prove or i permitt cl to pro1·e.
Whitn y 1•. Whitney (1 2), 171 . Y .
176 63 . R
34, r affirming the r ule
quoted in th t xt.J
I! Bea . v. , 'warthout, 32 Ba r b. 293294, p r E. Darwin 'mith J.; and ee
Wh ele r t>. Billing , 3
. Y . 263, 264,
er r ver J.
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7G3

Whenever a reply is made necessary to all new matter contained

in the answer, the question as to tlie nature of a defence has often

arisen upon the plaintiff's failure to reply to allegations which

the defendant insisted were new matter, and therefore admitted

to be true by means of the omission, but which the plaintiff

claimed to be mere argumentative denials, or, in other words, un-

necessary averments of evidentiary facts which could be proved

under a denial. In passing upon such a question, the Supreme

Court of Minnesota fully approved and adopted the general doc-

trine which has been stated in the text.^ In another case before

the same court, the question was examined with great care and

marked ability. The action was upon a contract of sale: the

answer consisted of specific denials of each allegation in the com-

plaint ; and the defendant offered to prove that the contract was

entered into on Sunday, and was therefore illegal and void. [The

conclusion of the court is given in the note.] ^

§ 538. * 662. Anything Tending directly to controvert Allega-

tions in Complaint Admissible under General Denial. In an action
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to recover possession of chattels where the complaint alleged

property in the plaintiff, and the answer was a general denial,

evidence tending to show that the plaintiff was not the owner

was excluded on the trial. This ruling was disapproved on

appeal, the court saying : " The answer is a denial of each and

every allegation of the complaint. The allegation of owner-

ship is therefore denied. In Bond v. Corbett,'^ it was held

that anything which tends to directly controvert the allega-

tions in the complaint may be shown under the general denial.

The defendant might, therefore, introduce evidence to show

that plaintiff was not the owner, nor entitled to possession."^

1 Nash V. St. Paul, 11 Minn. 174, 178 ; upon to be either void or voidable must be

Finley v. Quirk, 9 Minn. 194. affirmatively pleaded. "

2 Finley v. Quirk, 9 Minn. 194, 200, ^ Bond r. Corbett, 2 Minn. 248.

per Wilson C. J. : " We hold, therefore, * CaldvveU v. Bruggerman, 4 Minn.

(1) that an answer merely by way of 270, 276, per Atwater J.

denial raises an issue only ou the facts [^The Supreme Court of Minnesota, in

alleged in the complaint; (2) that the Dodge v. McMahan (1895), 61 Minn. 175,

denial of the sale in this case only raised 63 N. W. 487, stated the rule as follows :

an issue on the sale in point of fact, and " Authorities may be found, even in some

not on the question of the legality of such of the code States, to the effect that, under

sale; (.3) that all matters in confession a mere denial, evidence of any fact may

and avoidance showing the contract sued be given in evidence that would go to the

§ 537. * 661. Necessity of Reply depends upon N ature o f Defence .
.Whenever a reply i · made n e
ary to all n w matt r nt, ined
in the an wer, the que tion a to th nature of ad fenc ha. often
ari en up n the plaintiff failure to reply to all ·ation ' whieh
the cl fendant insi ted were n w matter, and ther fore admitted
to be rue by mean of the omi i n, but which th plaintiff
claime l to be mere argumentative lenials, or, in oth r words, unnec 'ar averments of evidentiary facts which could Le proved
under a denial. In pas ing upon such a question, the upreme
Court of Minnesota fully approved and adopted tl1e general doctrine which has been stated in the text. 1 In another case before
the ame court, the question was examined with great care and
marked ability. The action was upon a contract of sale: the
answer consisted of specific denials of each allegation in the complaint; and the defendant offered to prove that the contract was
entered into on Sunday, and was therefore illegal and void. [The
conclu ion of the court is given in the note. J 2
§ 538. * 662. Anything Tending directly to controvert Allegations in Complaint Admissible under General Denial. In an action
to recover possession of chattels where the complaint alleged
property in the pl~intiff, and the answer was a general denial,
evidence tending to show that the plaintiff was not the owner
was excluded on the trial. This ruling was disapproved on
appeal, the court saying: "The answer is a denial of each and
every allegation of the complaint. The allegation of ownership is therefore denied. In Bond v. Corbett, 3 it was held
that anything which tends to directly controvert the allegations in the complaint may be shown under the general denial.
The defendant might, therefore, introduce evidence to show
that plaintiff was not the owner, nor entitled to possession." 4
1 Nash v. St. Paul, 11 Minn. 174, l i8;
Finley v. Quirk, 9 Minn. 194.
2 Finley v . Quirk, 9 Minn. 194, 200,
per Wilson C. J.: "We bold, therefore,
(1) that an answer merely by way of
denial raises an issue only on the facts
alleged in the complaint; (2) that the
denial of the ale in this case only rai ed
an i ·sue on the sale in point of fact, and
not on the question of the legality of uch
sale; (3) that all matters in confession
and avoidance showing the contract sued

upon to be either void or voidable must be
affirmatively pleaded ."
3 Bond 1.: . Corbett, 2 Minn. 248.
4 Caldwell v. Bruggerman, 4 Minn .
270, 276, per Atwater J.
[The Supreme Court of Minne ota, in
Dodge v. McMahan (1895), 61Minn.175,
63 N. W. 487, stated the rule as follows:
"Authorities may be found, even iu ome
of the code tates, to the effect that, und er
a mere denial, evidence of any fact may
be given in evidence that would go to the
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The same doctrine is maintained by the Supreme Court of

Indiana.^

^ 539. ' GGo. Same Subject. The doctrine thus stated has also

been approved by the Supreme Court of Missouri. ^ "It is clear,

both upou principle and authority, that, under a general or spe-

cific denial of any fact which the plaintiff is required to prove

to maintain the action, the defendant may give evidence to dis-

proA'^e it." ^ The true scope of and limitations upon this form of

traverse were well illustrated in a very recent case decided by

the New York Court of Appeals. The complaint alleged that

the plaintiff was owner of certain shares of stock in a corpora-

tion; that the stock had been transferred to one W. to hold for

the plaintiff; that W., without the plaintiff's knowledge, had

transferred the same to the defendant, in payment, as defendant

claimed, of a debt due from him to defendant; and prayed that

defendant might be compelled to re-transfer and deliver the same

to the plaintiff. The answer was a general denial. The nature

and extent of the issues thus presented were discussed, and the
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original validity of the contract sued on,

— that is, which, altiiough admitting the

making of the contract, wouUl show that,

wlien made, it was, for some reason in-

valid ; as, for example, that it was made

on Sunday, or that it was a gambling or

wagering contract. But this rule is not

The ame
Indiana. 1

octrjne

i

maintained by the Supreme Court of

539. ~

6· . Same Subject. The doctrine thu tated ha al o
been appro . rnd - the upr me Court of Missouri. 2 ' It is clear,
both upon principle and authority, that, und r a general or specitic denial of any fact whi h the laintiff is required to pro e
to m intain the action the d fendant may g iYe evidence to di pro e it. 3 The true scope of and limitations up n his form of
traver e were well illustrated in a very recent c e decide b
the ew York ourt of Appeals.
be complaint all ged that
the plaintiff wa owner of certain hares of tock in a corp ration; that the tock had been tran £erred to one ·w . to hold for
the plaintiff; that W., without the plaintiff' knowle<lge had
tra.n ferred the same to the defendant, in payment, a defendant
claimed, of a debt due from him to defendant; and prayed that
defendant might be compelled to re-tran fer and deliver the ame
to the plaintiff. The answer was a general denial. The na ure
and extent of the issues thus presented were di cu 'Sed , nd the

in accordance with either the spirit of the

reformed ])rocedure or the decisions of

this court. The correct rule is that, under

a denial, the defendant is at liberty to

give only such evidence as tends to dis-

prove the e.xistence of facts, as facts, al-

leged by the plaintiff, but not of any

matter aliunde, which, although admitting

such facts, would tend to avoid their legul

effect anil operation." See also Iselin r.

Simon (1895), 62 Minn. 128, 64 N. W.

143; Fort Dearborn Bank i*. Security

Bank (1902), 87 Minn. 81, 91 N. W. 257.]

1 Wood V. Ostram, 29 Ind. 177, 186.

^ Northrup i'. Miss. Vail. Ins. Co., 47

Mo. 435, 443.

[^Jones 1-. Rush (1900), 156 Mo. 364, 57

S. W. 118 : " Under a general denial any

legal evidence is admissible which tends

to show that the statements in the petition

constituting the plaintiff's cause of action

are not true, and to that end he may affirra-

ativelv show facts inconsistent with the

plaintiff's statements tending to prove

them to be false." In Cunningham v.

I?oush (1900). 157 Mo. 336, 57 S. W . 769,

the rule was stated as follows : — " Where

a cause of action which once existed has

been determined by some matter which

subsequently transpired, such new matter

must, to comply with the statute, be spe-

cially pleaded ; but where the cause of

action never existed, the appropriate

defence under the law is a denial of the

material allegations of the petition ; and

such facts as tend to disprove the contro-

verted allegations are pertinent to the

issue." See also" Pattou j\ Fox (1902),

169 Mo. 97, 69 S. W. 287, containing a list

of special defences which have been held

admissible under the general denial in

Missouri. And in Bolton v. Mo. Pac. Ry.

Co. (1903), 172 Mo. 92, 72 S. W. .53, the

original ;alidity of the contract ued on,
- that i , which, although admittin g the
making of the contract, would show tbat,
when made, it was, for some rea on invalid; a , fo r example, that it wa · made
on 'unday, or that it was a gn.mbling or
wagerino- contract. But this rnle is not
in accordance with either the spirit of the
reformed procedure or the deci io11 of
thi court. The rorrect rule i that, under
a denial, the def ndant i at liberty to
give only u ·h evidence as tend to di prove the exi tence of fact . as fact , alleged by the plaintiff, but not of any
matter aliunde. which, although admitting
uch fa t . would tend to avoid th eir 1 gal
effect and operation."
ee al o I elin v.
Simon (I 95), 6- Minn. 12 , 64
W.
143; Fort Dearhorn Bank 1:. e ·urity
Bank (1902), 7 ~Iino. 1, 9 1 "N. W. 257.J
l W oocl v. 0 tram, 29 Ind. l
, l 6.
2 • or thrup v. • fi . Vall. In .
o., 47
Mo. 435, 4+:3.
[.Jones v. Ru h (1900), 156 :\To. 364, 57
•. W. 11 : " nder a gen ral denial any
]Pgal evidence i admi . ible which end
to how that the . tatement in th petition
con. ituti11g th plaintiff's au e of a tion
nr~ not tru~. and to that end h may affirmatively how fact inconsi tent with the

plaintiff'
tatement tending to prove
them to be false ." In Cunningham v.
Hou;;h ( 1900). 157 Mo. 336, n7 . \Y. 769,
the rule wa ta.ted a follow : - " Where
a cause of action which once exi ted has
b en determined by some matter which
• uh eq n ntly tran pired • u h new m ttermo t , to comply with the . atute, be peciall.v pleaded; but where the cau e of
action never existed, the appropriate
defen e under the law is a denial of the
mat rial allegations of the petition ; and
:uch fact a tend to di prove the controYertP.cl allegation a.re pertinent to the
i .. ue."
ee al o· Patton v. Fox (1902),
169 Mo. 97, 69 . W. 2 7, ntaining a Ii t
of special defence which ha,-e been held
admi i ble un de r the eneral denial in
1i ouri . And in Bol on v. Mo. Pac. Ry .
o. (1903), 172 Mo. 92, 72 S. W . 53, the
court saicl : "Any fact the ffect of which
i to how that an es en ial tatement in
the plaintiff' cau e of action i. untrue may
be proven uod r the general denial, and
tber fore, honld not be . pecially pleaded
and if o pleaded hould be stricken out
a redundant."]
a reenlield v. fa . Mut. L. Ins. o.,
4 7 . Y. 4.'30, 437, p r rover J.; Wheeler
v. Billing , 3 .... Y. 263.
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principle which controlled thera was stated by Mr. Justice

Grover, who pronounced the defence inadmissible.^

§ 540. * 664. Same Subject. A general denial being pleaded

in an action on a non-negotiable note brought against the maker

thereof, evidence designed to show a want of consideration was

rejected at the trial. The New York Supreme Court, in review-

ing this ruling, very properly held that this defence may be proved

under an answer of denial in actions upon all contracts which do

not import a consideration. ^ While the very point decided, that

evidence of a want of consideration could be admitted, is un-

doubtedly correct, the opinion as a whole is very careless and

inaccurate, and the general criterion which it lays down is

clearly erroneous. There are many classes of defences which

show that a cause of action never existed, and which cannot

be proved under the general denial, but must be pleaded; as,

for example, illegality, fraud, duress, and the like. The learned

judge was entirely misled by the analogies drawn from the

ancient practice. The general denial puts in issue the facts,

which, if true, constitute a prima facie cause of action. A
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consideration is, in general, one of these facts in actions upon

contract. When these facts are admitted, but by reason of some

extraneous features or elements affecting them they do not pro-

duce the otherwise necessary result, that element which consti-

tutes the defence, and which destroys the prima facie legal aspect

of the facts, is certainly not put in issue by the general denial :

it is new matter, and must be specially pleaded.

1 Weaver v. Barden, 49 N. Y. 286, bona fde purchaser from W. To meet

297 : " To establish a cause of action, the tiiis case, the defendaut offered to prove

plaintiff was bound to prove that he was in substance that he was a bona Jide pur-

the legal owner of the stock, or was chaser from W. The special term held,

equitably entitled to it as against the against plaintiff's objection, that this

defendant. Under this answer the de- was admissible under the answer. This

fendant had a right to give evidence was error. Under the geperal denial, the

controverting any fact necessary to be defendant could not introduce evidence

established by the plaintiff to authorize a tending to show a defence founded upon

reconveyance, but not to prove a defence new matter, but such only as tended to

founded upon new matter. " Recapitulat- disprove any fact that the plaintiff must

ing the facts actually proved by the prove to sustain his case. " The court,

plaintiff, — namely, those alleged in the however, did not pass upon the question

principle which controlled them wa stat d by Mr. Justice
Grover, who pronounced the defence inadmissible. 1
§ 540. * 664. Same Subject. A general denial being pleaded
in an action on a non-negotiable note brought against the maker
thereof, evidence designed to show a want of consideration wa
rejected at the trial. The New York Supreme Court, in reviewing this ruling, very properly held that this defence may be proved
under an answer of denial in actions upon all contract which do
not import a consideration. 2 While the very point decided, that
evidence of a want of consideration could be admitted, is undoubtedly correct, the opinion as a whole is very careless and
inaccurate, and the general criterion which it lays down is
clearly erroneous. There are many classes of defences which
show that a cause of action never existed, and which cannot
be proved under the general denial, but must be pleaded; as,
for example, illegality, fraud, duress, and the like. The learned
judge was entirely misled by the analogies drawn from the
ancient practice. The general denial puts in issue the facts,
which, if true, con~titute a prima facie cause of action. A
consideration is, in general, one of these facts in actions upon
contract. When these facts are admitted, but by reason df some
extraneous features or elements affecting them they do not produce the otherwise necessary result, that element which constitutes the defence, and which destroys the prima facie legal aspect
of the facts, is certainly not put in issue by the general denial:
it is new matter, and must be specially pleaded.

complaint as above stated, and that W. thus discussed by Grover J. : the decision

held the stock as a trustee for the plain- was placed upon a different ground ; viz.,

tiff, — he continued : " This established that defendant was not a bona Jide pur-

the plaintiff's right to the stock as chaser,

against the defendant, unless he was a 2 Evans i-. Williams, 60 Barb. 346

1 Weaver v. Barden, 49 N. Y. 286,
297 : " To establish a cause of action, the
plaintiff was bound to prove that he was
the legal owner of the stock, or was
equitably entitled to it as against the
defendant. Under this answer the defendant had a right to give evidence
controverting any fact necessary to be
established by the plaintiff to authorize a
reconveyance, but not to prove a defence
founded upon new matter." Recapitulating the facts actually proved by the
plaintiff, - namely, th ose alleged in the
<:omplaint as above tated, and that W.
held the stock as a trustee for the plaintiff, - he continued: "This established
the plaintiff's right to the stock a.s
against the defendant, unless be was a

bona fide purchaser from W. To meet
this case, the defendant offered to prove
in substance that be was a bona fide purchaser from W. The pecial term held.
against plaintiff's objection, that this
was admissible under the answer. This
was error. Under the geyeral denial, the
defendant could not introduce evidence
tending to show a defence founded upon
new matter, but such only as tended to
disprove any fact that the plaintiff must
prove to sustain his case. " The court,
however, did not pas upon the question
thus discussed by Grover J. : the decision
was placed upon a different ground; viz.,
that defendant was not a bona fide purchaser.
2 Evans i:. Williams, 60 Barb. 346
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§ 541. * 665. Construction Adopted in California. The courts

of one State alone dissent from this course of judicial decision,

and give to the general denial of the code something of the com-

prehensive operation which belonged to the general issues of 7ion-

assumpsit and yiil debet at the common law. The construction

adopted in California seems to regard the general denial — cer-

tainly in actions upon contract — as admitting any defences which

show that there is no subsisting cause of action at the time of the

commencement of the suit. At least the defence of payment is

thus held admissible ; and, if it be so, other similar defences, such

as release, accord and satisfaction, and the like, cannot with con-

sistency be rejected. This doctrine of the California courts is

stated and illustrated in the following cases : In an action upon

contract the complaint contained three counts, each in the form of

the common-law indebitatus assumpsit. The answer was a general

denial. Upon these issues the court said: '"In each count of the

complaint there is an averment that on, etc., the defendant was

indebted to the plaintiff in a specified sum, and promised to pay

it, but therein has made default. The answer contained a gen-
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eral denial, which made it incumbent on the plaintiff to prove a

subsisting indebtedness from the defendant to the plaintiff at the

time of the institution of the suit. Under this denial, it would

have been competent for the defendant to prove payment. ^ For

the same reason, it is competent to show that the plaintiff had

transferred the demand, and that the defendant, therefore, was

not indebted to him." ^ In another case upon a promissory note

the complaint was in the usual form, setting out the note, and

alleging that it had not been paid, and that there was due upon

it a specified sum, for which judgment was demanded. The

answer was the general denial. '"The question is," said the

court, " whether the general denial presents any issue of fact.

In Frisch v. Caler, this question was fully considered. The

statute then in force required a replication to new matter in the

answer. The answer averred that the note in suit had been paid

by the defendant: and it was contended that that averment was

admitted because of the failure on the part of the plaintiff to file

1 Frisch v. Caler, 21 Cal. 71 ; Brown 294, 299, 300, per Crockett J.: ami see

I'. Orr, 29 Cal. 120; Davanay v. Eggen- especially Fairchild v. Anisihaugli, 22

hoff, 43 Cal. 395. Cal. 572, 574; Brooks i-. Chilton, 6 Cal.

2 Wetmore v. San Francisco, 44 Cal. 040.

541.
665 . Construction Adopted in California. The court
of one tate alone dis ent from thi cour of judicial deci ,ion
and give o the general d nial of the cod omething of the coruprehen i\e operation which belong d o he generc. l i u of nona ump ·it and nil debet at the common law. The con true ion
ad te in California eem to regard th general de i~tl - certain! - in action upon contract- c admitting any defence which
ow that there i no ub i ting cau of action at the time of th
t lea t the defenc of a ment i
commencement of the uit.
thu hel admi ible ; and if it be o, other imilar d f nee
uch
a release accord and satisfaction and the like, cannot ith coni tency be rejec ted. T hi doctrine f the alifornia c urt · i
tated and illu trated in the following ca e : In n action u on
contract the complaint contained three counts, each in he form of
the common-law indebitatu a sumpsit. The an wer wa~ a eneral
denial. "C pon the e is ues the court said : ' In each count of th
complaint there is an averm ent that on, etc., the defendant wa
indebted to the plaintiff in a pecified sum, and promised to pa~
it but therein ha made default. The an wer contained a general denial which made it incumbent on the plaintiff to prove a
ubsi ting indebtedne from the defendant to the plaintiff at he
ime of the institution of the suit. Under this denial, it would
have been competent for the defendant to prove payment. 1 For
the same reason it is competent to show that the plaintiff had
tran £erred the demand, and that the defendan , therefore wa
not indebted to him. ' 2 In another case upon a promi r no e
the complaint was in the usual form, setting out the no
an
alleging that it had not been paid, and that there wa due upon
i a pecified sum, for which judgment was demand d. The
an wer wa the general denial. • The que tion is," id be
court
whe her the general denial pre ents any issue of fac .
aler, this que ion as full considered. The
n risch v.
sta ute th n in force r quired a replication to new m tter in the
an ;ver. The an wer verred that the note in suit bad been pai
y the defendant; and it a contend d that that av rment " ,
admi ted ecau e of th failure on the part of the pl inti.ff to file
Fri ch v. Caler, 21 al. i l ; Brown
rr, 29 Cal. 120; Davanay v. Eggeohoff, 43 al. 395.
2
tmore v. an ranci co, 4-4 al.
l

294, 299, 300, per rock tt J., anu ee
m b:uwh, 22
pecially Fairchild t•.
al. 572, 5U; Brook L'. hilton , 6 aL
40.
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a replication denying it. But the court held that it was not new

matter; that the failure to pay the note constituted the breach,

and must be alleged ; and that the allegation in the answer —

that it had been paid — was only a traverse of the allegation in

the complaint that it had not been paid. (See also Brown v.

Orr.)i The doctrine then laid down has not since been departed

from, so far as we are aware, except in the case of Hook v.

White ; ^ and that case, so far as it liolds that the allegation in

the complaint that the note remains unpaid is immaterial, and

that a denial of the allegation does not put any fact in issue,

ought, in our opinion, to be overruled. The general denial in

this case puts in issue the averment of the complaint, that the

promissory note remained due and unpaid. "^ This decision

falls far short of sustaining the sweeping doctrine of Mr. Jus-

tice Crockett, in the preceding case of Wetmore v. San Francisco,

as to the eiTect of the general denial. When the opinion of Mr.

Justice Rhodes is analyzed, it does not in fact lay down any prin-

ciple different from that maintained by the cases cited from the

courts of other States. It simply asserts that the general denial
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puts in issue the allegations of the complaint, and that the nega-

tive averment of non-payment, when traversed in this manner,

produces a complete issue, under which evidence of payment

may be offered. This is very far from holding, with Crockett J.,

that the defence of payment is admissible under the general denial

in all cases.

§ 542. * 666. Twofold Office of General Denial. No Exact

Statement Possible of Particular Defences Admissible under it.

The foregoing extracts from the judgments of so many courts

leave little room and little need for any addition by way of com-

ments. The unanimity of opinion in respect to the fundamental

principles of pleading embodied in the codes is almost absolute ;

and this principle has been so clearly formulated by several of

the judges, that no difficulty ought to arise in its practical appli-

cation. The office of the general denial, like that of the old

traverses, is twofold: it forces the plaintiff to prove all the

material allegations of fact contained in his complaint or peti-

tion, and constituting his cause of action, by sufficient evidence

at least to make out a prima facie case ; it also permits the de-

1 Brown v. Orr, 29 Cal. 120. 3 Davanay v. Eggenboff, 43 Cal. 395,

2 Hook i;. White, 36 Cal. 299. 397, per Rhodes J.

a replication den ing it.
ut th court h ld that it wa not 11 w
matt r ; that the failur t pa,y the note c n ·titutecl th br a.ch
and mu t b alleged; an 1 that the all gati 11 in the an w r that it had b en paid - wa' only a traver e of the all ation in
the complaint that it had not b en paid. (Se, < 1 o Br wn i1 .
Orr.) 1 The doctrine then laid down has not ince L end part 1
from, so far a we are awar , exc pt in th . cas of Hook v.
Whit · 2 and that ca e, so far as it holds that the all gation in
the complaint that the note r mains unpaid is immat rial, and
that a denial of the allegation does not put any fact in issue
ought, in our opinion, to be ov rruled. The general denial in
this case puts in is ue the averment of tbe complaint, that the
promissory note remained due and unpaid. ' 3 This deci ion
falls far short of sustaining the sweeping doctrine of Mr. Ju tice Crockett, in the preceding case of Wetmore v. San Francisco
as to the effect of the general denial. When the opinion of l\fr.
Justice Rhodes is analyzed, it does not in fact lay down any principle different from that maintained by the cases cited from the
courts of other States. It simply asserts that the general denial
puts in issue the allegations of the complaint, and that the negative averment of non-payment, when traversed in this manner,
produces a complete issue, under which evidence of payment
may be offered. This is very far from holding, with Crockett J.,
that the defence of payment is admissible under the general denial
in all cases.
§ 542. * 666. Twofold Office of General Denial. No Exact
Statement Possible of Particular Defences Admissible under it.

The foregoing extracts from the judgments of so many courts
leave little room and little need for any addition by way of comments. The unanimity of opinion in respect to the fundam ental
principles of pleading embodied in the codes is almost absolute;
and this principle has been so clearly formulated by several of
the judges, that no difficulty ought to arise in its practical application. The office of the general denial, like that of the old
traverses, is twofold: it forces the plaintiff to prove all the
material allegations of fact contained in his complaint or petition, and constituting his cause of action, by sufficient evidence
at least to make out a prima facie case; it also permits the de1

2

Brown v. Orr, 29 Cal. 120.
Hook v. White, 36 Cal. 299.

3

Davanay v. Eggenboff, 43 Cal. 395,

39i, per Rhode

J.
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fenclant to offer any and all legal evidence which controverts

those averments, and contradicts the plaintiff's proofs.^ It is

clear that no exact statement can be made defining with uni-

versal precision what particular issues the general denial raises

in all possible cases, and what particular defences it admits ; and

in this respect it dil^ers from the general issue. As a result of

the common-law methods of pleading, and the uniformity of

averment necessarily used in all actions of the same class, the

operation of the general issue in every suit was exactly defined ;

and this was especially so after the rules made in 4th William

IV. (1834). Certain averments, and none others, of the decla-

ration, were put in issue by it; certain defences, and none others,

were admissible under it. This precise rule cannot be laid down

in respect of the general denial, because there is no necessary

uniformity in the averments of complaints or petitions in actions

of the same kind brought on the same substantial facts, and seek-

ing the same relief. As the general denial puts in issue all the

material allegations made by the plaintiff, and admits all evi-

dence contradicting them, what issues it actually raises, and
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what defences it actually admits, in a given case, must depend

upon the frame of the complaint or petition, and upon the num-

ber and nature of the allegations which the plaintiff has inserted

therein. It could be said of the general issue in all actions upon

contract, — • assumpsit, debt, covenant, — after the rules of Hilary

Term, 1834. that the defence of payment was never admissible

under it. If we would speak with perfect accuracy, such lan-

guage cannot be adopted as the expression of a universal rule in

respect of the general denial ; for the plaintiff may so shape his

pleading, and introduce into it such a negative averment of non-

payment, that the proof of payment would be simply supporting

the general denials of the answer. Several cases already cited

sufficiently sustain the correctness of this position ; and others,

to be hereafter more particularly referred to in a subsequent por-

tion of this section, and in the next section under the head of

Payment, will furnish various examples of this feature of dis-

1 ^Graves y. Norfolk Nat. Bank (1890), (1900), 23 Wiisli. 615,63 Pac. 539. "A

49 Neb. 437, 68 N. W. 612 ; Am. Bldg. superfluous plea does not render irrele-

& Loan Ass'n v. Rainbolt (1896), 48 vant to a general denial matter wliieh

Neb. 434, 67 N. W. 493 ; Wiedeman v. would have been relevant in the ali.sorico

Hedge.s (1901), 63 Neb. 103, 88 N. W. of a special plea:" Horkey v. Kendall

)"0; Peterson v. Seattle Traction Co. (1898), 53 Neb. 522, 73 N. W. 953.]

fendan
off r an and all 1 gal Yidence -n·hich controvert
tho.,e averme nt and c utradict the plaintiff proof .~ It is
clear th~ t no x.ac ta emen can be made d fining with univer al I r i ion ' ha I articul r i ue h gen ral d ni 1 rai s
in all I
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in re pect of the general denial because there is no nece ary
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of the ame kind brought 011 the same sub tantial fact , an eek in the same r lief. As the general denial put in is, u all the
material allegation made by the plaintiff, and admit all evi<lenc contradicting them, what is ue it actually rai e"', and
what defence it actually admits in a given case, must depen
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therein. It could be aid of the general is ue in all ac ion up n
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pleading, and introduce in o it such a negative averm nt of n npayment that th proof of pa ment woul be impl upporting
the general denial of the an wer.
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H rlge. (1901 ), 63 ... b. 10.'3,
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f a pecial pl :i.:" Horkey . Kendall
( 18 ), 5.'3
h. 522, 73 N. W. 953.J
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tinction between the general denial and the general issue. ^ Ad-

ditional cases, bearing upon the nature and effect of the general

denial, are collected in the foot-note. ^

§ 543. * 667. Only Material Averments Put in Issue by General

Denial. As the general denial forms an issue upon the entire

cause of action set up by the plaintiff, and forces him to prove

the same substantially as alleged, tlie question becomes one of

great practical importance : What are the averments in the com-

plaint or petition which are thus negatived, and which must be

established by sufficient proof on the trial ? The full answer to

this question belongs rather to a discussion of the requisites of

the plaintiff's than of the defendant's pleading, and will be

found in Chapter Third. The universally accepted rule is,

that only those averments of the complaint or petition which

are material and proper are put in issue by a denial either

general or specific in its form. Neither " material " nor " proper "

is, however, synonymous with "necessary." A plaintiff may in-

sert in his pleading allegations which are unnecessary in that

position, and which are not in conformity with the perfect
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logic of the system, but which, when once introduced, be-

come "material," so that an issue is formed upon them by a

general or a specific denial.^ The instance just mentioned, of

an allegation of non-payment in the complaint met by a denial

1 See Quin v. Lloyil, 41 N. Y. 349; of Brouklyii, 63 Barb. 610, 616; Catlin

Marley v. Smith, 4 Kan. 183; Frisch r. v. Guuter, 1 Duer, 253, 26.5; Robinson

Caler, 21 Cal. 71; White r. Smith, 46 v. Frost, 14 Barb. 536, 541; Texier v.

N. Y. 418; Van Gieson v. Van Gieson, 10 Gouin, 5 Duer, 389, 391 ; Dyson v. Ream,

N. Y. 316. 9 Iowa, 51; Scheer v. Keown, 34 Wis.

- Button V. McCauley, 38 Barb. 413; 349, 35S. The conclusions of the text

Schular v. Hudson Riv. R. Co., 38 Barb, as to what allegations in the plaintiff's

653 ; Schermerhorn v. Van Allen, 18 Barb, pleading the general denial puts in i.ssue

29; Hendricks v. Decker, 35 Barb. 298; and compels him to prove, and wiiat evi-

Perkins v. Ermel, 2 Kan. 325 ; Adams dence it admits on the part of the defend-

Exp. Co. V. Darnell, 31 Ind. 20; Lafayette ant, are further illustrated by Paris v.

tinction between the g neral denial and the general i sue. 1 Ac.1<litional case , bearing upon the nature and effect of the general
denial, are collected in the foot-note. 2
S 543. * 67. Only Material Averments Put in Issue by General
Denial. As the general d nial form an i sue upon the entir
cause of action et up by the plaintiff, and force him to prov
the ame substantially a alleged, the qu tion ecomes on
f
great practical importance: 'What are the av rments in the complaint or petition which are thus negatived, and which mu t b
established by sufficient proof on the trial? The full an ·wer to
this que tion belongs rather to a discussion of the requisite ' of
the plaintiff's than of the defendant's pleading, and will b
found in Chapter Third. The universally accepted rule i ,
that only those averments of the complaint or petition which
are material and proper are put in i sue by a denial either
general or specific in its form. Neither" material" nor" proper"
is, however, synonymous with "necessary." A plaintiff may insert in his plea.ding allegations which are unnecessary in that
position, and which are not in conformity with the perfect
logic of the system, but which, when once introduced, become "material," so that an issue is formed upon them by a
general or a specific denial. 3 The instance just mentioned, of
an allegation of non -payment in the complaint met by a denial

& I. R. Co. V. Ehman, 30 id. 83; Watkina Strong, 51 Ind. 339; Stafford v. Nutt, 51

V. Jones, 28 id. 12; Frybarger v. Coke- id. 535; Bate v. Sheets, 50 id. 329 ; Mor-

fair, 17 id. 404; Bingham u. Kimball, 17 gan v. Wattles, 69 id. 260; Mc Williams

id. 396; Norris v. Amos, 15 id. 365; v. Bannister, 40 Wis. 489; Moulton i-.

Hawkins V. Borland, 14 Cal. 413; God- Thompson, 26 Minn. 120; School Dist. v.

dard f. Fulton, 21 CaL430; Evansville r. Shoemaker, 5 Neb. 36; Jones v. Seward

Evans, 37 id. 229, 236; Hier y. Grant, 47 Cy. Com'rs, 10 id. 1.54; Scott v. Mor.se,

N. Y. 278 ; Schaus v. Manhattan Gasl. 54 Iowa, 732 ; Amador Cy. v. Butter-

Co., 14 Abb. Pr. n. s. 371; Hunter v. field, 51 Cal. 526; Elder r. Spinks, 53 id.

Mathis, 40 Ind. 356; Ammerman v. 293.

Crosby, 26 id. 451 ; Johnson v. Cudding- s [;Dillon v. Lee (1899), 110 la. 156, 81

ton, 35 id. 43 ; Brett v. First Univ. Soc. N. W. 245.^
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1 See Quin v. Lloyd, 41 N. Y. 349;
Marley v . mith, 4 Kan. 183; Frisch i· .
.Caler, 21 Cal. 71; White v. Smith, .J6
N. Y. 418; Van Gieson v. Van Gie on, 10
N. Y. 316.
2 Button v. McCauley, 3
Barb . 413;
Schular v. Hudson Riv. R. Co., 38 Barb.
653 ; Schermerhorn v. Van Allen, 18 Barb.
29 ; Hendricks v. Decker, 35 Barb. 298;
Perkins v. Ermel, 2 Kan. 325 ; Adams
Exp. Co. v. Darnell, 31 Ind. 20; Lafayette
& I . R. Co. v. Ehman, 30 id. 83; Watkins
v. Jones, 28 id. 12; Frybarger v. Cokefair, 17 id. 404; Bingham v. Kimball, 17
id. 396; Norri v. Amo , 15 id. 365;
Hawkin. v. Borland, 14 Cal. 413 ; Goddard v. Fulton, 21 Cal. 430; Evansville v.
Evans, ,37 id . 229, 236; Hier v. Grant, 47
N. Y. 278;
chaus v. Manhattan Gasl.
Co., 14 Abb . Pr. N . . 371; Hunter v.
Mathis, 40 lud. 356; Ammerman v.
Cro by, 26 id. 451 ; Johnson v. Cud dington , 35 id . 43 ; Brett v. First Un iv. oc.

of Brooklyn, 63 Barb. 610, 616; Catlin
i:. Guuter, 1 Duer, 253, 265 ; Robinson
v. Fro t, J.1- Barb. 536, 541; Texier i:.
Gouin, 5 Duer, 3 9, 391 ; Dy on v. Ream,
9 Iowa, 51; Scheer v. Keown, 34 Y\' is.
349, 355. The conclusions of the text
as to what allegation in the plaintiff'
pleading the general deuial puts in i sue
and compels him to proYe, and what eYidence it admits on the part of the defendant, are further illu trated by Paris i·.
Strong, 51 Ind. 339; Stafford v. Nutt, 51
id. 535; Bate v. heets, 50 id. 329 ; Morgan v. Wattles, 69 id. 260; Mc Williams
v. Bannister, 40 Wi . 489; Moulton v.
Thompson, 26 Minn. 120; chool Di t. v.
Shoemaker, 5 Neb. 36; Jone· v. , ewarcl
Cy. Com' rs, 10 id. 154; cott v. l\Ior. e,
54 Iowa, 732; Amador Cy. v. Butterfield , 51 Cal. 526 ; Elder v. piu k::i, 53 id.
293.

s [Dillon v. Lee (1899), 110 Ia. 156, 81

N. W. 24-5.J
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in the answer, is a familiar example of such averments, material,

although not necessary. ^

S 544. * 668. Only Issuable Facts are Material. Test to distin-

guish them from Evidentiary Facts. It is au elementary doctrine

of pleading under the new system, that only the issuable facts —

that is, the conclusions of fact which are essential to the exist-

ence of the cause of action, or upon which the right to relief

wholly or partially depends in equitable suits — are material,

and are therefore put in issue by the denial; and the converse

of the proposition is true, that the averments of mere eviden-

tiary facts, if inserted in the pleading, are not thus controverted. •

Although this doctrine is elementary, and appears so simple in

the statement, it is nevertheless sometimes exceedingly difficult

of application in practice ; and the difficulty is enhanced by the

frequent inconsistencies of courts in dealing with it. While the

general principle, as just stated, is constantly affirmed, yet there

are numerous instances of particular causes of action in which

the plaintiffs are required to set out in detail matter which is

plainly evidentiary, and which is only of value as leading the
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mind to a conviction that the final or issuable fact, which is one

necessary element of the right of action, exists. In other words,

the courts have often, while dealing with particular cases, vio-

lated the elementar}' principle which applies, or should apply, to

all cases ; and the result is confusion and uncertainty. It is pos-

sible, however, to distinguish between issuable, material facts,

and evidentiary facts, by an unfailing criterion. In all par-

ticular instances of the same cause of action based upon the

same circumstances, — that is, arising from the same primary

right in the plaintiff, broken by the same delict or wrong on

the part of the defendant, — the material or issuable facts which

are the essential elements of the right of action must be the same :

immaterial circumstances, the time, place, amounts, values, extent

of damages, parties, and the like, will be different; but the sub-

stantial elements of the cause of action, the facts which constitute

it, must in every instance of the same species be the same. On

the other hand, the evidentiary matter, the mass of subordinate

facts and circumstances which must be actually proved, and from

1 [^Riner )-. New Hampshire Fire Ins. 62 Pac. 377; Ball u. Putnam (1898), 123

Co. (1899), 9 Wyo. 81, CO Pac. 262 ; Rob- Ciil. 134, 55 Pac. 773.]

ertson v. Robertson (1900), 37 Ore. 339,

in the an er i a familiar example of uch a erment
al hough n t n c ary.1
544.

*

Facts are Material.

material,

Test to distin-

guish them from Evidentiary Facts.
It is an elementary doctrine
tern that only the issuable facts of plea ling und r the new
that i , th c nclu ion of fact whi h are e en ial to the xi tnce of the cau e of action or upon which the right to r lief
wholly or artially depend in equitable uit - are m terial,
and are therefore put in i sue by the d nial · and the con er e
of the propo ition i true that the averment of mere e identiary fact if in erted in the pleading, are not thus controvert d . .
Although this doctrine is elementar , and appears so simple in
the statement, it is nevertheles ometim s exceedingly difficult
of application in practice; and the difficulty is enhanced by the
frequent inconsistencies of courts ·in dealing with it. Whil the
general principle, as just stated, is constan ly affirmed, yet tb re
are numerous in tances of particular cau e of ac ion in which
he plaintiffs are required to set out in detail ma ter which is
plainly e identiary, and which i only of value a leadin the
mind to a conviction that the final or is uable _fact, which i one
nece ary element of the right of action, exist . In other 1 ords,
the courts have often, while dealing with particular ca e , violated the elementary principle which applies, or should a ply, to
all cases; and the re ult is confu ion an 1 uncertainty. It i posible, however, to distinguish between is uable, material fact ,
and evidentiary facts, by an unfailing criterion. In all articular in tances of the same cau e of action ba ed upon the
same circum tances - that is, ari ing from the same primary
right in the plaintiff, broken by the same delict or wrong on
the part of the defendant, - the material or is uable fact
bich
are thee sential elements of the right of action must be the sam :
immaterial circumstances, the time, place, amounts, values extent
of damages, parties, and the like, will be different · but the ubtantial elements of the cau e of action the fact which c nstitute
it must in every in tance of the same ecie
the a
n
t e other hand, the evidentiary matter the m . of ubordinate
facts an circum tance which must be actually ro e and from
l [Riner v.
w Ilamp hi re Fire Ins.
o. (1 99), 9 Wyo. l, 60 Pac. 262; Robrl on v. Robert on ( 1900), 37 re. 339,

62 Pac. 3 7 ; B all v. Po.tnam (189 ), 123
al. 134, 55 ac. 773.J
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more or less direct, may vary with each particular instance of

the same species of cause of action. The former class of facts

are material, issuable, and, when the theory of pleading in legal

actions is strictly observed, they alone should be averred, and

they alone should be treated as put in issue by the denials,

general or specific : the second class of facts — the proper evi-

dentiary matter — should not be pleaded, and, if improperly

averred, should not be regarded as put in issue by the denials of

the defendant. This is the true theory, and is again and again

commended by the courts ; but, at the same time, it is constantly

violated by the same courts in their requirements in respect to

the pleading in certain species of causes of action. Another

source of difficulty in applying the elementary doctrine is found

in the circumstance, that not infrequently the material, issu-

able fact which must be averred, and which is put in issue,

is identical with the fact which must be actually given in evi-

dence. In respect of such matters there are no steps and

grades, and processes of combination and deduction, by which
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the issuable fact alleged is inferred from the evidentiary fact

proved. The two are one and the same ; and thus matter which

is truly evidence must in such case be alleged, and matter

which is the proper subject of allegation must be directly given

in evidence.

§ 545. * 669. Allegations of Legal Conclusions not Controverted

by General Denial. Another and the final element which should

belong to the averments in the complaint, in order that an issue

may be raised thereon by the denial, is, that they must be of fact,

and not of law. This particular topic has already been treated

of in a former subdivision of the present section. The reformed

system of pleading, unlike that of the common law, authorizes

no issues to be raised by allegations of legal conclusions, and

denials of the same. Although there are traces to be found in

some of the cases of the ancient forms of averment in indebitatus

assumpsit and in debt, and of answers resembling the plea of nil

debet, yet all the decisions of present authority unite in theoreti-

cally condemning such a mode of pleading. I need not, how-

ever, dwell upon this particular rule, nor again refer to cases

which have been so recently cited. An allegation of law, in the

plaintiff's pleading is not controverted by the defendant's denial:

whi h the ab ve-des rib d ss ntial elem nts r sult a inf r •nc
mor
r les direct, may vary with each particular instan e of
the ame specie of cau e of action. The form r la of fact
are material, i8 uable, and, wh n the th ory of pl ading in 1 g. 1
action is trictly ob erve , they alone hould be a erred, and
they alone should be treated a put in i sue by the denial ,
general or specific: the second clas of facts - the proper evidentiary matter - should not be pleaded, and, if improperly
averred, should not be regard d as put in issue by the denials of
the defendant. This is the true theory, and is again and again
commended by the courts; but, at the s~me time, it is con8tantly
violated by the same courts in their requirements in respect to
the pleading in certain species of causes of action. Another
source of difficulty in applying the elementary doctrine is found
in the circumstance, that not infrequ ently the material, issuable fact which must be averred, and which is put in issue,
is identical with the fact which must be actually given in evidence. In respect of such matters ther e are no steps and
grades, and processes of combination and deduction, by which
the is uable fact alleged is inferred from the evidentiary fact
proved. The two are one and the same; and thus matter which
is truly evidence must in such case be alleged, and matter
which is the proper subject of allegation must be directly given
in evidence.
§ 545. * 669. Allegations of Legal Conclusions not Contr overted
by General Denial.
Another and the final element which should
belong to the averments in the complaint, in order that an issue
may be raised thereon by the denial, is, that they must be of fact,
and not of law. This particular 'topic has already been treated
of in a former subdivision of the present section. The reformed
system of pleading, unlike that of the common law, authoriz s
no issues to be raised by allegations of legal conclusion , and
denials of th e same. Al though there are traces to be found in
some of the cases of the ancient forms of averment in indebitatus
assumpsit and in debt, and of answers resembling the I l a of nil
debet, yet all the decisions of present authority unite in theoretically condemning such a mode of pleading. I need n ot, however, dwell upon this particular rule~ nor again refer to ca e
wh ich have been so recently cited. An allecration of law. in the
plaintiff's pleading is not controverted by the defendant's denial:

~.,
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no issue is formed thereby under which evidence can be admitted

from either party.

§ 546. " 670. General Nature of Evidence Admissible under

Denials. The judicial opinions quoted under the preceding

head sufficiently establish the principle which controls all the

questions embraced under the present, and the cases to be

cited in the following one will illustrate the application of that

principle. In fact, it is so intimately bound up with the subject

last discussed, that it has already been stated and explained. I

shall, however, recapitulate and restate this fundamental doc-

trine. The material allegations of the complaint or petition,

when denied either generally or specifically, determine in each

case what evidence and what defences may be given and estab-

lished by the defendant. It is impossible to say of any class of

cases, that such or such evidence can or cannot be offered as a

matter of certain rule, or that such or such a defence can or can-

not be set up. As the plaintiff is bound by no inflexible rule

as to the form of his pleading, and as to the averments he may

choose to introduce into it, so he can widen or contract within
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distant extremes the extent and nature of the evidence and de-

fences which may be interposed by the defendant under a denial.^

As the denial puts in issue all the material allegations of fact

made by the plaintiff, whether originally necessary or not, he

is at liberty to introduce all and ixnj legal evidence which tends

to sustain those allegations. On the other hand, under the same

issue, the defendant is entitled to offer any evidence which tends

to contradict that of the plaintiff, and to deny, disprove, and over-

throw his material averments of fact.^ This is the fundamental

and most comprehensive doctrine of pleading embraced in the

new procedure, and it of course determines the nature of the

defences which may be set up under a general denial. It is

to be observed — although the remark is perhaps unnecessary

— that the defendant may in this manner attack any material

allegation of fact, and thus, if possible, defeat the recovery,

while the others are left unanswered or unassailed. ^

1 SeeCliicagi), Ciu. &L. R.Co. i-. West, 154; Scott v. Morse, 54 Iowa, 7.32 ; Roe

37 Iml 21 1, 215. v. Angevine, 7 Hun, 679; Manning v.

2 QBay View Brewing Co. v. Gruhb Winter, 7 id. 482; Boomer v. Koon, 6 id.

(1901), 24 Wash. 16.3, 63 Pac. lO'JIJ 645; Andrews v. Bond, 16 Barb. r).33 ;

* As further illustrations of the te.xt, Beaty v. Swarthout, 32 id. 293 ; Scher-

Bee Jones i'. Seward Cy. Com'rs, 10 Neb. merhorn i\ Van Allen, 18 id. 29; Siharz

no I ue i formed there y under whi he iden e can be admitted
from ither party.
546.
7 . General Nature of Evidence Admissible under
De nials.
The judicial
imon qu ted under the preceding
head ufficiently e tab1i h th principle which controls all the
qu ti n embraced un er the present and the cases to be
cit cl in th f ll wing ne will illustrat the application of that
principle. In fact, it is o intimately bound u with the u ject
la t di cu ed, that it ha · already been stat d and ex lained. I
hall, however, recapitulate and restate this fundamental doctrine. The material all ations of the complaint or petition,
when deni d either gen rally or specifically, determine in each
ca e what evidence and what defences may be given and e tabli hed by the def ndant. It is impo ible to ay of any clas of
ca e that such or such evidence can or cann t be offered as a
matter of certain rule, or that such or uch a defen e ,an or cannot be set up. As the plaintiff i bound by no inflexible rule
a to the form of hi pleauing, and as to the averments he ma
choo e to introduce into it, so he can widen r c011tract within
i tant extremes the extent and nature of the vidence and defence which may be interposed by the defendant und r a denial. 1
As the denial puts in issue all the material allegations of fact
made by the plaintiff, whether originally n ce ary or no he
is at liberty to introduce all and an legal evidenc~ which t nd
to u tain tho e allegation . On the other hand, under the ame
i sue, the d f ndant i entitled to offer any eviden e which t nd
to contradict that of the plaintiff, and to den;, dispr ve, an
erthrow hi material averm nts of fact. 2 This is the fundam ntal
and most c mprehensive doctrine of pleading rnbrac
in the
new proc ure, and it of course d t rmin
the nature of the
d fence which ma be et u under a gen ral d nial. It i
to e b rve - lthough th r mark is
rhap unne e ary
- that th
efendant may in thi mann r attack any m terial
allegation f fact, and hu if po ible
f at h r c er ·,
while th
th r ar 1 ft unan wer
r una sailed. 3
. v. W t,

154 ;

cott v. Mor , 54 Iowa, 732; Roe

. Angevine, 7 IIun, 679; Maoni11g t'.
Winter, 7 id . 4 2; Boomer 11. K n, itl.
64- ; Andrew
•. B od, 16 Barb. 613;

Beaty l'. 'warthout, .'32 id . 293 ; . ch rmerhoro v. Van All n, l itl. 29; , \:ha.rz
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§ 547. * G71. Evidence Proper under Denials may be Affirmative

or Negative. As the allegations of the complaint or petition

§ 547. * 671.

controverted by the denials of the answer determine the nature

and extent of the evidence admissible under such denials, it

Evidence Proper u n d er Den i a ls m a y b e A ffirm a t ive

As the allegation of th e complaint or petition
controverted by the d nja]s f t he answer determine the natur
and extent of the evid nee admissible un<ler ·uch denial ·, it
follows that this evjdence may be ometimes negativ an l om tim es affirmative. H rein lies the source of much confu ion an 1
uncertainty as to the character of th defendant' proofs and defences, and as to their admissibility under th e general denial.
Evidence in its nature a:ffirmati ve is often confounded with
defences which are essentially affirmative and in avoidance of
the plaintiff' s cause of action, and · is therefore mis takenly regarded as new matter requiring to be specially pleaded, although
its effect upon the issues is strictly negative, and it is entirely
admissible under an an wer of denial. In other words, in order
that evidence may be proved under a denial, it n eed not be in its
own nature negative: affirmative evidence may ofte n be used to
contradict an allegation of the complaint, and may ther efo re be
proved to maintain the negative issue raised by the defendant'
denials. 1 One or two familiar examples will sufficiently illustrate this proposition. In certain actions, property in the plaintiff, in respect of the goods which are the subject-matter of the
controversy, is an essential element of his claim. His complaint,
therefore, avers property in himself: the allegation is material,
and is, of course, put in issue by the general or specific denial.
To maintain this issue on his part, the plaintiff may give evidence
tending to show that he is the absolute owner, or has the requisite qualified property. The defendant may controvert this fact
in two modes. He may simply contradict and destroy the effect
or Negative.

follows that this evidence may be sometimes negative and some-

times affirmative. Herein lies the source of much confusion and

uncertainty as to the character of the defendant's proofs and de-

fences, and as to their admissibility under the general denial.

Evidence in its nature affirmative is often confounded with

defences which are essentially affirmative and in avoidance of

the plaintiff's cause of action, and is therefore mistakenly re-

garded as new matter requiring to be specially pleaded, although

its effect upon the issues is strictly negative, and it is entirely

admissible under an answer of denial. In other words, in order

that evidence may be proved under a denial, it need not be in its

own nature negative : affirmative evidence may often be used to

contradict an allegation of the complaint, and may therefore be

proved to maintain the negative issue raised by the defendant's

denials.^ One or two familiar examples will sufficiently illus-
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trate this proposition. In certain actions, property in the plain-

tiff, in respect of the goods which are the subject-matter of the

controversy, is an essential element of his claim. His complaint,

therefore, avers property in himself: the allegation is material,

and is, of course, put in issue by the general or specific denial.

To maintain this issue on his part, the plaintiff may give evidence

tending to show that he is the absolute owner, or has the requi-

site qualified property. The defendant may controvert this fact

in two modes. He may simply contradict and destroy the effect

r. Oppold, 74 N. Y. 307, 309; Hier r. See also Hess r. Union State Bank (1900).

Grant, 47 id. 278 ; Dunham v. Bower, 77 156 Ind. 523, 60 N. E. 305 ; Jones v. Rush

id. 76; Brown v. College Cor. Gt. Co., 56 (1900), 156 Mo. 364, 57 S. W. 118; Alpert

Ind. 110. V. Bright (1902), 74 Conn. 614, 51 Atl.

1 [In Jeffersonville, etc. Co. v. Riter 521 ; Van Skike v. Potter (1897), 53 Neb.

(1896), 146 Ind. 521, 45 N. E. 697, the 28, 73 N. W. 295; Phelps v. Skinner

court .said: " A defendant, under the (1901), 63 Kan. 364, 65 Pac. 667.

general denial, is not confined to negative This rule was approved by the Su-

proof in denial of the facts .stated in the preme Court of South Carolina in Wil-

comjilaint as a cause of action, hut may, son v. Railway Co. (1897), 51 S. C. 79, 28

upon the trial, introduce proof of facts S. E. 91, where it was held that the de-

independent of those alleged in the com- fence that an injury was caused by a

plaint, but which are inconsistent there- fellow servant w.as admissible under

with, and tend to meet and break down the general denial, quoting the text at

or defeat the plaintiff's cause of action." length. J

Oppold, 74 N. Y . 307, 309; Hier v.
Grant, 47 id. 278; Dunham v. Bower, 77
id. 76; Brown v. College Cor. Gt. Co., 56

1· .

Inc . 110.
1 [In Jeffersonville, etc.- Co. v. Riter

See also Hess v. Union State Bank (1900) ,
156 Ind. 523, 60 N. E . 305; Jones v. Ru h
(1900 ), 156 Mo. 364, 57 . W. 118 ; Alpert
v. Bright (1902), i4 Conn . 614 , 51 Atl.
521; Van Skike v. Potter (1 897) , 53 Neb.
28, 73 N. W. 295 ; Phelps v. Skinner
(1901 ), 63 Kan . 364, 65 Pac. 667.

(1896) , 146 lnd. 521, 45 N. E. 697, the
court said : " A defendant, und er th e
This rule was approved by the Sugeneral denial , is not confined t o negative
p r oof in denial of th e facts stated in the preme Court of Sou th Carolina in Wilcomplaint as a cause of acti on, but may, son v. Rail way Co. (1 897) , 51 S. C. i9, 28
upon th e trial, introduce proof of facts S. E. 9 1, w here it was held that th e deindependent of th ose all eged in the com- fence th at an injury wa caused by a
plaint, but which are inconsistent there- fe llow servant was admi ible under
with . and t end t o meet an d break down th e general denial, quoting' t he text at
or rlefeat the plaintiff's cause of action." length.]
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of the plaintiff's proofs, and in this purely negative manner pro-

cure, if possible, a decision in his own favor upon this issue.

The result would be a defeat of the plaintiff's recovery by his

failure to maintain the averment of his pleading: but the jury

or court would not be called upon to find that the property was

in any other person; the decision would simply be, that the

plaintiff had not shown it to be in himself. On the other hand,

the defendant, not attempting directly to deny the testimony of

the plaintiff's witnesses, and to overpower its effect by directly

contradictory proofs, may introduce evidence tending to show

that the property in the goods is, in fact, in a third person.

This evidence, if convincing, would defeat the plaintiff's recov-

ery. It would be affirmative in its direct nature ; but its ultimate

effect, in the trial of the issue raised by the answer, would be

to deny the truth of the plaintiff's averment. Such evidence,

although immediately affirmative, would still, for the purpose of

determining the issue presented by the pleadings, be negative.

Again: in an action on a promissory note against the maker or

indorser, the complaint might allege title in the plaintiff, and
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the fact that he was the owner and holder thereof. The answer

of denial would put this averment in issue, as it would be mate-

rial, and its truth essential to the recovery. Proof by the de-

fendant, that, prior to the commencement of the action, the

plaintiff had assigned the note to a third person, would be

affirmative in its immediate nature, but negative in its effect

upon the issue; for it would controvert the truth of the plain-

tiff"s allegation. Cases cited under the next subdivision hold

that the evidence which I have thus described in both of these

examples is admissible under the general denial.

§ 548. * 672. Distinction bet^veen General Issue and Plea of

Confession and Avoidance at Common Law not the same as that

between General Denial and New Matter under the Code. The

theory of the general denial is completed by considering what

evidence cannot be given, and what defences cannot be set up,

under it. This subject will be discussed at large in the follow-

ing section: but some reference to it is appropriate in the present

connection. The codes divide defences into denials and new

matter. New matter must be speciall}' j)leaded. Defences at

the common law were separated into traverses general and

special, and j)leas by way of confession and avoidance. The

f the plain iff s proofs and in bi urely n egati e mann r ro cure if pos ·ible, a deci i n in his own favor upon this i sue.
The result would be a defea of th plaintiff reco ery b his
failure to main ain the a ermen of his pleading: but he jury
r court would n t be called upon t find that the property was
in an
ther per-on; the deci ion would simply be, that the
plaintiff had not shown it to be in him elf. On the other hand,
the defendant, not attempting directly to deny the te timony of
the plaintiff 's witnesses, and to overpower its effect by directly
contradictol'y proof , may introduce evidence tending to show
that the property in the goods is, in fact, in a third person.
This evidence, if convincing, would defeat the plaintiff's recovery. It would be affirmative in its direct nature; but its ultimate
effect, in the trial of the is ue raised by the ans w r, would be
to deny he truth of tbe plaintiff's averment.
uch evidence,
although immediately affirmative would still, for the purpose of
determining the issue presented by the pleading , be negative.
Again: in an action on a promissory note again t the maker or
indor er, the complaint might allege title in the plaintiff, and
the fact that he was the owner and holder thereof. The an wer
of denial would put this averment in i sue, a it would be mat rial, and its truth essential to the recovery. Proof by th defendant, that, prior to he commencemen t of the action, the
plaintiff had a signed the note to a third per on, would be
affirmative in its immediate nature, but negati e in its ffect
upon he i sue; for it would controvert the truth of the plaintiff allegation.
a es cjted under the next subdivision hold
that the evidence which I have thu described in both of the e
xamples is admissible under the general denial.
548.
72. Distinction between General Issue and Plea of
Confes sion and Avoidance at Common Law not the same as that

The
th ory of the general denjal is completed b con i ring what
evidence cannot be given and what efence ann t b
t up
under it.
hi subject will b iscu ed at large in th f 11 wing ection : but some reference to it i appropriate in th
connection. The c de divide def nces into denial
matter.
ew matter must b pe i lly plead d.
at
the
mmon law were se r te int traver s general an
'pecial and pleas by way f c nfes ion and avoi a e.
he
between General Denial and New Matter under the Code .
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general traverses were the general issues, and special traverses

were denials of some particular allegation. The common-law

distinction between these classes of defences was generally stated

by the text-writers as follows : The general issue, when used in

accordance with the original theory in those actions which ad-

mitted its full efficacy, put in issue the entire cause of action,

and under it the defendant was permitted to offer any evidence

and set up any defence which showed that the right of action

never, in fact, existed. The plea by way of confession and avoid-

ance, on the other hand, did not deny the facts from which the

cause of action arose. It admitted or " confessed " that a cause

of action once existed as averred, and set up other and subse-

quently occurring facts which showed that the right after it had

occurred had been in some manner discharged, satisfied, or de-

feated. Is it possible to draw the same distinction between the

general denial and the new matter of the code? I answer, It is

not. Such a distinction, although correct in many instances, is

not true absolutely. One reason for this is, that the plaintiff may

so frame his complaint or petition, may insert in it allegations of
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such a sort, that a general denial will admit proof of facts which

would be strictly matter by way of confession and avoidance

under the former procedure. Certain passages in judicial opin-

ions which have identified the "new matter" of the codes with

the pleas by way of confession and avoidance of the common law,

are, therefore, inaccurate : they were written by their authors in

forgetfulness of the inherent difference between the fixed forms

of the common-law declarations, and the varying forms of the

complaints and petitions which may properly, though not perhaps

scientifically, be used under the new system. To illustrate : Pay-

ment after breach of a contract, and therefore after a cause of

action arose, is certainly matter by way of confession and avoid-

ance ; and yet a complaint may be so drawn that payment will

not be new matter, but will be provable under a general denial.

Other examples might be given ; but this single one suffices.

§ 549. * 673. Same Subject. The result is, that the new

matter of the code does not, like the matter in confession and

avoidance of the common law, depend upon the essential nature

of the cause of action and of the defence, but, like the effect of the

general denial, it depends primarily upon the nature of the mate-

rial allegations which are embraced in the complaint. Any facts

general traver es were the general issues, and special traverses
were denials of some particular allegation. The common-law
distinction between these cla ses of defences was generally stated
by the text-writers as follows: The general issue, when used in
ccordance with the original theory in those actions which admitted its full efficacy, put in issue the entire cause of action,
and under it the defendant was permitted to offer any evidence
.a nd set up any _defence which showed that the right of action
never infact, existed. The plea by way of confession and avoidance, on the other band, did not deny the facts from which the
-cause of action arose. It admitted or "confessed " that a cause
of action once existed as averred, and set up other and subsequently occurring facts which showed that the right after it had
-0ccurred had been in some manner discharged, satisfied, or defeated. Is it possible to draw the same distinction between the
general denial and the new matter of the code? I answer, It is
not. Such a distinction, although correct in many instances, is
not true absolutely. One reason for this is, that th e plaintiff may
so frame his complaint or petition, may insert in it allegations of
uch a sort, that a general denial will admit proof of facts which
would be strictly matter by way of confession and avoidance
under the former procedure. Certain passages in judicial opinions which have identified the "new ma.tter " of the codes wi th
the pleas by way of confession and avoidance of the common law,
are, therefore, inaccurate: they were written by their authors in
forgetfulness of the inherent difference between the fix ed form s
of the common-law declarations, and the varying forms of the
complaints and petitions which may properly, though not perhaps
scientifically, be used under the new system. To illustrate: Payment after breach of a contract, and therefore after a cause of
action arose, is certainly matter by way of confession and avoidance; and yet a complaint may be so drawn that payment will
not be new matter, but will be · provable under a general denial.
Oth er examples might be giv en; but this single one suffices.
§ 549. * 673. Same Subject. The result is, that the new
matter of the code does not, like the matter in confes ion and
avoidance of the common law, depend upon the essential nature
of the cause of action and of the def ence, but, like the effect of the
general denial, it depends primarily upon the nature of th e material allegations which are embraced in the complaint. Any fac ts
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which tend to disprove some one of these allegations may be

given in evidence under the denial : any fact which does not thus

directly tend to disprove some one or more of these allegations

cannot be given in evidence under the denial. It follows, that if

such fact is in itself a defence, or, in combination with others,

aids in establishing a defence, this defence must be based upon

the assumption, that, so far as it is concerned, all the material

allegations made by the plaintiff are either admitted or proven

to be true. The facts which constitute or aid in constituting

such a defence are "new matter." In this respect the new

matter of the codes is analogous to the pleas by way of confes-

sion and avoidance of the common law, since it does, in truth,

confess and avoid. The two definitions may now be given, and

their contrast will be plain. A plea by way of confession and

avoidance admitted that the cause of action alleged did once exists

and averred subsequent facts which operated to discharge or sat-

isfy it. The new matter of the codes admits that all the material

allegations of the complaint or petition are true, and consists of

facts not alleged therein which destrog the right of action, and
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defeat a recovery. To sum up these conclusions, the classifica-

tion of and distinction between defences at the common law

depended upon the intrinsic, essential nature of the causes of

action and of the defences. The analogous classification and

distinction Ijetween defences admissible under a denial, and

those which are new matter, in the new procedure, depend,

primarily upon the structure of the complaint or petition, and

the material averments of fact which it contains. All facts

which directly tend to disprove any one or more of these aver-

ments may be offered under the general denial: all facts which

do not thus directly tend to disprove some one or more of these

averments, but tend to establish a defence independently of

them, cannot be offered under the denial; they are new matter,

and must be specially pleaded.^ I shall now apply these general

principles to some particular instances.

§ 550. * 674. Particular Defences Admissible under the General

Denial. In Actions for Compensation for Services. I shall in this

subdivision classify and discuss only those cases in which defences

have been held admissible : those which have been pronounced

inadmissible, for the reason that they fell within the denomina-

1 [IvffMis '•. Ilohertson (1896), 46 Neb. 837, 65 N. W, 897.]

whi h end to di prove ome one of th se allegation may b
i en in vicl nc under the denial; an fact hich lo not thu
direc ly ten l to di prove ome one or more of the, allegati n
ann t be given in evidence uncl r the d nj al. It follovl'
ba if
·ucl fact i in it lf a lefence or in combination with th r
aid~ in
tabli ~hing a lef nc , thi cl fence mu t be ba cl u1 on
th a ump ion that o far as it i
n erned all th material
allegation ma le by the plaintiff are i her admitted or pr
n
t b tru . The fact whi h ·on ·titut or aid in con titutin ~
uch a defence are new matter. ' In thi re pect the n w
matt r of th codes is analogous to the pleas by 'vay of onf 'ion and a oidance of the common law 'ince it do ' in truth
onfe and avoid . The tTI'o 1efinition may now be given nd
their contra t "ill be plain. A plea by way of confe i n and
avoidance admitted. that the cause of action alleged did once exi ·t,
and averred subsequent fact which operated to di barge or ati f it. The new matter of the code. admits that all th e mat rial
allegations of the complaint or petition are true, a d con i ·t of
fact not alleged therein which le ·troy the right of action and
defeat a recovery. To sum up these conclu ion._ he cla ifi ·ati n of and distinction between defences at the common law
depended upon the intrinsic, e"'sential nature of the cau
of
action and of the defence. . The analogous clas. ification and
di tinction between defences admi ·ible under a denial, ar l
tho e which are new matter, in the new procedure dep nd
primarily upon the structure of the complaint or petiti n, and
the material averments of fact which it contain . All fact
which dire tly ten 1 to disprove any one r more of the a erm n
may be offered under the general denial : all fac which
d not thu directly tend to di pro e ome on or more of be e
a erm nt but tend to e tabli h a d f n e independ ntl of
them annot l e offered und r the denial · they ar n w matt r
, nd mn ·t e pecially pleaded. 1 I shall n w a ply th e g n ral
prin ipl
o ome particular i11. tan
· 550.
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tion of "new matter," will be given in the next succeeding sec-

tion. ^ In an action b}' an attorney and counsellor to recover

compensation for professional services, the complaint stating the

retainer, the services and their value, and the answer being a

general denial, the plaintiff proved the services, and gave evi-

dence showing their reasonable value. It was held that the

defendant might, under his denial, show that the services were

rendered upon a special agreement to the effect that the plaintiff

would look to the recover}- of costs from the adverse part}- as his

sole mode of compensation, and Avould make no personal claim

against the defendant.^ And in a similar action under the same

answer the defendant may prove the plaintiff's negligence and

want of skill, by which the value of the services was diminished

or destroyed."^ In general, in actions to recover compensation

for work and labor upon a quantum vuruit the defendants may,

under the general denial, prove that the work was negligently or

unskilfully done, and thus contest its value; * and may prove that

the plaintiff had assigned and transferred the demand before suit

brought, for this controverts the defendant's indebtedness to him.^
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§ 551. * 675. In Actions for Negligent Injuries. In actions for

injuries to person or property alleged to have resulted from the

1 For a summary of recent decisions. The defendant was at lil)erty to prove

see the additions to the hxst note under any circumstances tending to show that

§*682. he was never indebted at all, or that he

2 Schermerhorn v. Van Allen, 18 Barb, owed less than was claimed."

29, per Parker ,1.: "The evidence was s Bridges i'. Paige, 13 Cal. 640, 641.

improperly excluded. Under a general * Kaymond v. Hichardson, 4 E. D.

allegation of indebtedness, the plaintiff Smith, 171. But under a mere deuial of

had proved certain services rendered and the value, the defendant cannot show that

their value. It was surely competent for the services were not rendered. Van

the defendant, under a denial of such in- Dyke v. Maguire, 57 N. Y. 429.

debtedness, to prove that he never in- ^ Wetniore ;;. San Francisco, 44 Cal.

tion of "Il W matter Will b" giYell in tJ1 JI '.·t ~UC·• ntJing , ' Ction.1 In an action by an attorney ancl ('Ullll~L·llor t, Jl· ·<i\' , 1
compensation for prof s 'ional s rvices tlie ·0111plai11t ·tati11g tli
r "ta.in er th services and their Yalue a1Hl tl1 · <lllS\\ l'l' 1J ·11w
a
b
g 11 rc1l cl nial, the plaintiff i rove<l tlie ·n1 · ·: all<l ga' p .,·id nee showing their rea onable valu . It was 11 ·hl that th
clef ndant might, under hi denial, show that tlw erv1 · :-.; \\er
rendered upon a special agr i;1 nt to the ffe ·t that the plaintiff
would look to the r e overy of costs from th advcrn" party a· lii:::t
sole mode of comr ensation, ancl would make no per~cmal ·lairn
against the defendant . 2 And in a similar acbon und 'r tl1e :an. ·
answer the defendant may prove the plaintiff': n gligenc · a11tl
want of skill, by which the value of he r ice , wa · <lirnini.11 <l
or destroyed. 3 In general, in action, to recover com pen a ti on
for work an<l labor upon a quantum meruit the cl fondant· may
under the general denial, prove that the work \Va negligently or
unskilfully done, and thus contest its value; 4 and may prove tha
the plaintiff had assigned and transferre<l the demand befor . nit
brought, for this controverts the defendant's indebt dn
to him. s
§ 5 51. * 67 5. In Actions for Negligent Injuries. In action for
injuries to person or property alleged to have re"'ulted from th

curred or owed the debt. He had a right 294, 299. And in an action for goods sold

to prove that the services were rendered and delivered, the defendant may show

as a gratuity, or that the plaintiff himself that the jdaintiff acted as agent for an-

had fixed a less price for their value than other person, whose name was disclosed,

he claimed to recover. The services and who wa.s the actual vendor. Merritt

being proved, the defendant might show v. Briggs, 57 N. Y. 651.

that they were rendered, not fur him, but j^But evidence showing a contract for

on the credit of some other jierson, or a smaller sum than that alleged by plain-

that the plaintiff himself undertook to run tiff is not admissible : Scholey i\ Demattos

the risk of the litigation. It was not an (1898), 18 Wash. .504, 52 Pac. 242. Nor

attempt to show an extinguishment of can it be shown that the appropriation foi

the indebtedness by payment, release, or the purpose is exhausted : McNnlty r.

otherwi.se; but it was an offer to show City of New York (1901), 168 N. Y. 117

that such indebtedness never existed. 6lN. E. 111.]

1 For a summary of recent decisions,
see the additions to the last note under
§ * 682.
2 Schermerhorn v. Van Allen, 18 Barb.
29, per Parker J . : "The eviden ce wa<>
improperly excluded. Vuder a general
allegation of indebtedness, the plaintiff
had proved certain serYices rendered and
their value. It was surely competent for
the defendant, under a denial of such indebtedness, to prove that h e never incurred or owed the debt. He had a right
to prove that the services were r endered
as a gratuity, or that the plaintiff himself
had fixed a l ess price for their val ue than
he claimed to recover .
Th e ervi es
being proved, the defendant might show
that they were rcud ered, not fur him, but
on the credit of some other per on , or
that the plaintiff him elf und ertook to run
the ri sk of th e liti gation. It was not an
attempt to show an extinguishment of
the inil ehtedness by payment, r lea, e, or
oth erwi se; but it was an offer to • how
that such intlebtedness never existed.

The defendant wa at li b rty to prove
any circumstance tending to show that
he was never ind ebted at all, or that he
owed less than was claimed."
3 Bridges i•. Paige, 13 Cal. 640, 641.
4 1faymond v. Hi chard on, 4 E. D.
Smith, 171. But nud er a mere deuial of
the value, the defendant cannot how that
the service were not rendered.
Van
Dyke v. Maguire, 57 S. Y . 429.
5 Wetmore v. San Franci co, 44
294, 299. And in an action for good
and del ivered, the d fondant may · how
that the plaintiff acted a agent for another person, wh o.e name wa di clo ed,
and who was the actual vendor. M rritt
v. B1·iggs, 57 N. Y. 651.
[B nt vidence ho wi ng a ontrac·t for
a smaller . um than that all ged hy plaintiff i not ad mi . iblc : rholey r. Dema tus
(1 9 ), 1 Wah. 504, 5_ Pac. 242.
nr
can it be hown that the appropriati ou f••l
the pnrpo. e i" exhaust cl: Mc:\'11lty '"
Citv of :rew York (1901), 16 _~. Y. 117
61 N. E . 111 J
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defendant's negligence, he may prove under a general denial

that the wrong was caused by the negligence of third persons

not agents of the defendant, and for whom he was not respon-

sible;^ or may prove contributory negligence of the plaintiff. ^

In accordance with the principle of these decisions, the defence

of non superior is always admissible under a general denial cf

complaints which allege the commission of injuries by means of

defendant's servants, employees, or agents. ^

§ 552. * 676. Assignment, Want of Consideration, etc. In an

action upon a promissory note or other security, the defendant

may under the general denial show an assignment of the thing in

action to a third person before the suit was commenced, since

this directly controverts the averment of title in the plaintiff;*

1 Schular v. Hudson Kiver R. Co., 38

Barb. 653 ; Schaus v. Manhattan Gasl.

Co., 14 Abb. Pr. n. s. 371 ; Jackson v.

Feather Riv. & G. W. Co., 14 Cal. 18 ;

Adams Exp. Co. v. Darnell, 31 lud. 20.

<l fondant'

negli ence, h may prove und r a g en ral d nial
that h wrong " '( cau d by h neglig nee of third per on
not a nt of th defendant, and f r wh m he wa not respon·ible · 1 r ma pro-v contributory n gligen e of the plain ti . 2
n accordance wi h the principl
f the e d ci ion , the defence
f non · tperior i al way admi ' ible under a g neral denial t
complaint which allege the commi ion of in jurie by means of
defendan
ervant , employee , or agent . 3
552 . * 676 . A s signment, Want o f Co n sid eration, etc. I n an
action up on a pr mis ory n te or other e urity, the defendant
m a. under th general denial bow an a ignrnent of th e thing in
action to a third per on before the uit wa commenced, since
t hi directly contro erts the averment of title in the plaintiff; 4
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In this case, proof that the goods were

stolen was admitted in an action against

a common carrier. [^Roemer v. Striker

(1894), 142 N. Y. 134, 36 X. E. 808.]

- Schaus V. Manhattan Gasl. Co., 14

Abb. Pr. N. s. 371 ; New Haven & N. Co.

V. Quintard, 6 Abb. Pr. x. s. 128; Indian-

apolis, etc. R. Co. V. Rutherford, 29 Ind. 82 ;

Jeffersonville, M. & I. R. Co. r. Dnnlap,

29 Ind. 426 ; Hathawa}' v. Toledo, etc.

Ry. Co., 46 Ind. 25, 27. This decision is

placed upon the ground that in Indiana

the plaintiff must allege and prove the

absence of negligence on his part. See

also McDoneU v. Buffum, 31 How. Pr.

154; Evansville & C. R. Co. v. Hiatt, 17

Ind. 102 ; Jonesboro' & F. Turnp. Co. v.

Baldwin, 57 Ind. 86 ; Jones v. Sheboygan,

etc. R. Co., 42 Wis. 306; McQuade c

Chicago & N. W. Ry. Co., 68 Wis. 616.

Contra, Watkins v. So. Pac. Ry. Co., 38

Fed. Rep. 711 ; Kentucky Cent. R. Co. v.

Thomas, 79 Ky. 164; Stone i-. Hunt, 94

Mo. 475 ; Donovan v. Hannibal & St. .1.

Ry. Co., 89 Mo. 147 ; Hudson v. Wabash

W. Ry. Co., 101 Mo. 13 ; Keitel v. St. Lonis

Cable' & W. Ry. Co., 28 Mo. App. 657 ; St.

Clair v. Mo. Pac. Ry. Co., 29 Mo. App.

76 ; South Omaha v. Cunningham, 31

Neb. 316; Grant v. Baker, 12 Ore. .329.

Qlndiana Natural Gas Co. v. O'Brien

(1903), — Ind. — , 66 N. E. 742. It was

held in Kennedy v. Railway Co. (1901),

59 S. C. 535, 38 S. E. 169, that under a

general denial defendant may show that the

injury was caused solely by plaintiff's negli-

gence, since this goes to controvert the

allegations of defendant's negligence con-

tained in the complaint. Otherwise in

case of contributory negligence, since that

admits plaintiff's allegations of negli-

gence and avoids the effect of the same.

Quoting § * 671 of the text.]

3 [[The defence that the injury was

caused by a fellow servant is admissible

under a general denial : Wilson v. Rail-

way Co. (1897). 51 S. C. 79, 28 S. E. 91 ;

Kaminski v. Tudor Iron Works (1902 J,

167 Mo. 462, 67 S. W. 221. But see note

2, p. 817. And under this issue the de-

1
cbular v. Rud on River R. Co., 3
Barb. 653;
cbaus v. fanhattan Gasl.
Co., 14 Abb. Pr. N. . 371; Jack on v .
Feather Riv. & G. W. Co., 14 Cal. 1 ;
Adam Exp. Co. v. Darnell, 31 Ind. 20.
In tbi ca e, proof that the good were
tolen wa admitted in an action again t
a common carrier . [Roemer v. triker

held in K ennedy v. Railway Co. ( 1901 },
. C. 535, 38 . E. 169, that under a
general denial defendant may how that the
injury was cau ed solel.IJ by plaintiff' negligence, since thi goes to controvert the
allegation of defendant ' negligence ontained in th e complaint. Otherwi e in
ca e of contributory negli ence, inc that
(1 94), 142 . Y. 13-!, 36 X. E. 0 .]
admit plaintiff'. allegation of negli2
chau v. Manhattan Ga"l.
o., 14 gence and aYoid the effect of the am .
A bb . Pr. N . . 37 1 ; ew HaYen & N. Co. Quoting § * 671 of the text.]
v. uinta rd, 6 A bb. Pr. N .•. 12 ; Indian3 [T he defence that the injury wa ·
apoli , etc. R. Co. v. Rutherford, 29 Ind. 2; cau ed by a fellow ervant i admi ibl e
Jeffersonville, i\L & I. R. Co. t:. Dunlap, und r a general denial: Wil on v. Rai l29 Ind . 426; Hathaway v. T oledo, etc. way o.(197).5 1 .C.79,2
.91;
Ry. o., 46 Ind. 25, 27. Thi deci ion i
Kamin ki v. Tudor Iron Work ( 1902),
placed upon the round that in In diana 167 Mo. 462, 67 . W . 221. But ee no e
the plaintiff mu ·t allege and prove the 2, p. 17. And under thi i ue t he deab ence f negligence on hi part. "ee fendant may how t hat it xerci ed due
al o :\kDouell v. Buffum, 3 1 How. P r. care: Hunter v. Grande R onde Lumb r
15.J.; Evan ville & . R. Co. v. Hi att, 17
o. (1901), 39 Ore. 44 , 65 Pac. 59 .]
Ind. 102; J one boro' & F. Turnp. o. v.
4 Andrew v. Bond, I 6 B arb. 633.
Aud
Baldwin, 57 Ind. 6: Jone v. heboygan,
ee W etmore v . an Franci · o, 44 al. 29.J.,
etc. 1 . o., 42 Wi . 306 ; [c uade ,._ 299. The xact contrary i held in Br .tt
Chicago &
W. Ry .
., 6 Wi . 616. t . Fir t niv. oc., 63 B arb . 610 61 , p r
Contra, WatHns v. o. P ac. Ry.
L onard J . The opinion in thi
Fed. Rep. 711; Kentucky Cent. R. o. v. how ver, manif ly incorr ct.
Thoma , - 9 K y. 16-! ; tone v. Hunt, 94 denial of " x cution" in an action 011 a
Mo. 415; onovan v. Hannibal - t . .J. n t or oth r writt n ontract, th defendRy. ,o., 9 Mo. 147 ; Hud on v. W ba h ant may pro,·e that hi
ignatnr wa obW. Ry. o., 101 ~fo. 13; Keit 1 v. t. Loui
tain d by fraud: or by t'. W drl l , 57 1\1 .
Cable & W. y.
., 2 Mo. App. 657; t. 452, 459; r that th in trum nt w
n t
Clair c. ~Io. Pac. y.
., 2 Mo. A pp. deliv r <l: ' i. h r r. Hamilto n 4 Ind . 23!J.
76; • outh
maha v. Cunningham, 31
unnin r. Rumbau g h, 36 I wa,
eb. 316; rant v. Bak r, 12 Or . 329.
566, 56 . I n an a tion upon an account
[Indiana • ~atural a Co. v.
Bri n
tated for rvi , th def ndan can11 t,
1903), - Ind. - , 66
. E. 742. It wa
under the general denial, attack an_ of the
T.
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and where the note is non-negotiable, a want of consideration

may be shown. ^ The general denial to a complaint in the oidi-

nary form, for goods alleged to have been sold and delivered by

the plaintiff, admits the defence that a third person who actually

made the sale was himself the owner of the goods, and was not

acting in the transaction as agent for the plaintiff ; for this proof

contradicts the allegation of a sale by the plaintiff ;2 and that

the person who actually bought the goods in the name of the

defendant was not the latter's agent, but that his prior au-

thority had been revoked, and the plaintiff had been notified

thereof; for this proof contradicts the allegation of a sale to

the defendant.'^

§ 553. * 677. In Actions for Conversion. In an action for the

conversion of chattels, the complaint of course averring propert}'

in the plaintiff, the general denial permits the defendant to show

that the property is not in the plaintiff;* as, for example, by

proving that a third person is owner of the goods either by an

absolute or qualified title. "^ This latter proposition is, however,

denied by some of the cases, which hold that the defence of

Generated for facpubupdates (University of Michigan) on 2014-06-17 15:34 GMT / http://hdl.handle.net/2027/uc2.ark:/13960/t02z1c23b
Public Domain / http://www.hathitrust.org/access_use#pd

property in- a third person, or in the defendant, must be specially

items in the account: Warner r. Myrick, Day v. Wamsle}-, 3.3 Ind. 14.5, in whicli tlie

16 Minn. 91. The defence of alteration can defence was admitted that the goods were

be shown under the general denial in an sold to defendant's wife, who had left him

action upon a written contract : Boomer without cause, against his consent, and

V. Koon, 6 Hun, 64.5 ; National Bk. of without his knowledge.

Paris V. Nickell, 34 Mo. App. 295 ; Walton •* Robinson v. Frost, 14 Barb. 536.

Plow Co. V. Campbell (Neb. 1892), 52 [;Kervvood v. Avers (1898), 59 Kan.

N. W. Rep. 883. 343, 53 Pac. 134 ; Hopkins v. Dipert,

[^The defence of no assignment can also (1901), 11 Okla. 630, 69 Pac. 883. So in

be set up: Brown v. Curtis (1900), 128 an action for money had and received, it

and wh re the n ote is non-n gotiaH , a. want of ·on -, ide~:ati1111
maybe hown. 1 The general lenial t a omplaint in the ordinary form, for good alleg d to ha
b n old anJ d li r •cl 1Jy
the plaint iff, admits the defence that a third p rnon who a tually
made the sale was himself the own r f th good , ancl wa not
a cting in the transaction as ag nt for the I laintiff; for thi · proof
contradicts the allegation of a ale by the plaintiff; 2 and that
the person who actually bought the good in the name of the
defendant was n ot the latter:'s agent, but that hi prior authority bad been r evoked, and the plaintiff had been notified
thereof; for t his proof contradicts the allegation of a ale to
the defendan t. 3
§ 553. * 677. In Actions fo r Conversi on. In an action for the
conversion of chattels, the complaint of course av rring property
in the plaintiff, the general denial permits the defendant to how
t hat the property is not in the plaintiff; 4 a , for example, by
proving that a third person is owner of the goods ith r by an
absolute or qualified title . 5 This latter proposition i , however,
denied by some of the ca es, which hold that the defence of
property in.a third person, or in the defendant, must be special1}'

Cal. 193, 60 Pac. TTS.^] may be shown under a general denial that

1 Evans V. Williams, 60 Barb. 346 ; the claim was for money lost by plaintiff

Bondurant v. Bladen, 19 Ind. 160; Butler at the game of ])oker: Frank r. I'ennie

v. Edgerton, 15 Ind. 15. But not when (1897), 117 Cal. 254, 49 Pac. 208 3

the consideration is presumed, as in a ^ Davis v. Iloppock, 6 Duer, 254. He

sealed instrument or negotiable paper: may show title in himself or in a third

Dubois V. Hermance, 56 N. Y. 673, 674 ; person, Sparks v. Heritage, 45 Ind. 66 ;

Eldridge v. Mather, 2 N. Y. 157 ; Weaver Kennedy v. Shaw, 38 Ind. 474 ; Farmer r.

ij. Barden, 49 N. Y. 286. Calvert," 44 Ind. 209, 212; Thomp.son v.

QBut an illegal consideration for a Sweetser, 43 Ind. 312 ; Davis y. Warfield,

promissory note cannot be shown under 38 Ind. 461. See also Jones i-. Ilahilly, 16

this issue : Dillon r. Darst (1896), 48 Neb. Minn. 320, 325 ; Schoenrock v. Farley, 49

803, 67 N. W. 783.] N. Y. Super. Ct. 302 ; Johnson v. Oswald,

2 Hawkins !;. Borland, 14 Cal. 413 ; and 38 Minn. 550 (the plaintiff claiming

see Ferguson v. Ramsey, 41 Ind. 511, through a sale by the defendant, the latter

513. ina,y, under a denial, show fraud to avoid

3 Hier v. Grant, 47 N. Y. 278 ; and see the sale, and a rescission of it).

items in the account: \Varner v. Myrick,
16 Minn. 91. The defence of alteration can
be shown under the general denial in an
acti on npon a written contract: B oo mer
v. Koon, 6 Hun, 645; National Bk. of
Pari v. Nickell, 34- Mo. App. 295; W alto11
Plow Co. v. Campbell (Neb. 1892), 52
N. W. R ep. 883.
[ The defence of no assignment can also
be set up : Brow n v. Curtis {1900), 128
CaL 193, 60 Pac. i73 .J
1 Evans v. "W illiams, 60 Barb. 346;
Bondurant v. Bladen, 19 Ind. 160; Butler
1.,· . Edgerton, 15 Ind. 15.
But not when
the consideration is presumed, a in a
sealed instrument or negotiable paper:
Duboi v. Hermance, 56 r , Y. 673, 674;
E ldridge v. Mather, 2 N. Y. 157; Weaver
v. Barden, 49 N . Y. 286.
[ But an illegal consideration for a
promi sory note cannot be shown under
this issue: Dillon 1:. Darst ( 1896), 48 Neb.
803, 67 N. W. 783.J
2 Hawkins v. Borland, 14 Cal. 413; and
see F ergu ·on v. Ramsey, 41 Ind. 511,

513.
a Hier v. Grant, 47 N. Y. 278; and see

D ay v. Warn ley, 33 In d. 145, in" hich th e
defence was admitted that the goods were
sold to defendant's wife, who had left him
without cause, against his con ent, anrl
with out his knowledge.
4 Robinson v. Fro t, 14 Barb. 536.
[Kerwood v. Ayer, {l 9 ), 59 K an.
3-1,3, 5;{ Pac. 134 ; Hopkin i'. Di pert,
(1901), 11 Okla. 630, 69 Pac.
3. ~ o rn
an action for money had and received, it
may be shown un der a general denial that
the claim was for money lo t by plaintiff
at the g-ame of poker: Frank ,., Penni
{1 897 ), 117 Cal. 254, 49 Pac. 20 J
1> Da,·is v. H oppock, 6 Duer, 254.
He
may show title in him ·elf or in a third
per on, parks i:. R ritage, 45 Ind. 66;
K ennedy v. Shaw, 3 Ind. 474; Farmer 1:.
Calvert, 44 Ind. 209, 212; Thomp. on 1J .
Sweet er, 43 Ind . 312; Davi v. Warfield.
38 Ind . 461. See al o Jone v. Rahilly, Hl
Minn. 320, 325; choen r ock v. Farley, 49
N . Y. Super. Ct. 302; John on v. 0 wal 1,
38 Minn. 550 (the plaintiff
laiming
through a sale by the defendant, the latter
may, under a denial, how fraud to a'·oid
the sale, and a re ci ion of it).

CIYIL RE.\IEDIE .
78.0

CIVIL REMEDIES.

pleaded.^ Under a general denial in the same action, or a specific

denial of the conversion, any facts may he proved in defence

which go to sliow that there was no conversion ; ^ as, for ex-

ample, that the goods were lost without fault of the defendant,^

or were taken under an execution against the plaintiff.^

§ 554. * 078. In Actions to recover Possession of Goods.

pl ad d. 1 Under a general denial in the ame acti n or a pecific
denial of the onv r ion any facts may b pr
whi h g to show that there \Ya n c nver ion· 2 a for Xampl . that the
od w r lo t without faul f tl
fendan 3
4
or ,, r taken under an execu ion a ·ain t th ph in tiff.

When the action is brought to recover possession of goods, the

554.

complaint alleging title or right of possession in the plaintiff, the

defendant may, under the general denial, introduce evidence to

show that the plaintiff is not the owner nor entitled to posses-

sion of the chattels,^ but cannot show that the plaintiff's title is

fraudulent and void as asfainst his creditors.^ Nor can the de-

1 Dyson c. Ream, 9 Iowa, 51 ; Patter-

son V. Clark, 20 Iowa, 429. The doctrine

of these cases is clearly o])posed to the

true theory of tlie general denial.

* 67 .

In

Actions to

recover

P ossession

of

Good s .

Vh n the action i' brouO"ht t rec v r po e ion of good , the
com1 laint all in 0 title or ri 0 ht 0£ po
i n in h plaintiff, the
defencfant may under th gen ral d nial intr due evid nee to
how that the plaintiff i not he own r nor ntitl d to po
sion f the chattel ' 5 but annot show that the plaintiff . title i'
fraudul nt and void as again:t hi er e litors . 6
or can the de-

2 [^Nichols & Sliejjard Co. v. Minnesota

Thresher Co. (1897), 70 Minn. 528, 73
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N. W. 415.]

3 Willard v. Giles, 24 Wis. 319, 324.

* McGrew v. Armstrong, 5 Kan. 284 ;

or that the goods were taken with the

plaintiff's consent. Wallace v. Robb, 37

Iowa, 192, 195 ; and see Phcenix Mut. L.

Ins. Co. V. Walrath, 53 Wis. 669 ; and

the defendant in such action may prove

any facts in reduction of damages ; as,

for instance, that the maker was insolvent

in an action for the conversion of a note

made by a third person, and owned by the

plaintiff, Booth r. Powers, 56 N. Y. 22, 27,

31, 33 ; Quin v. Lloyd, 41 N. Y. 349.

* Caldwell v. Bruggerman, 4 Minn.

270; Woodworth c. Knowlton, 22 Cal.

164. In this case, defendant proved that

the goods were the jiroperty of a third

person. See also Sparks i\ Heritage, 45

Ind. 66 ; Kennedy v. Shaw, 38 Ind. 474 ;

Farmer v. Calvert, 44 Ind. 209, 212;

Thompson ». Sweetser, 43 Ind. 312; Sie-

denboch v. Riley, 111 N. Y. 560; Griffin r.

L. I. R. Co., 101 N. Y. 348; Lane v. Sparks,

75 Ind. 278; Pulliam v. Burlingame, 81 Mo.

Ill; Oe.ster r. Sitlington (Mo. 1893), 21

N. W. Rep. 820 ; Deford v. Hutchin.son,

45 Kan. 318, .332; Gandy v. Pool, 14

Neb. 98; Aultman v. Stichler, 21 Neb.

72 ; Towne v. Sparks, 23 Neb. 142 ; Mer-

rill I'. Wedgwood, 25 Neb. 283 ; Staley v.

Housel (Neb. 1892), 52 N. W. Roj). 888;

Chamberlin v. Winn, 1 Wasli. 501. Under

a general denial of ])laintiff"s title, the

defendant may show that the chattel mort-

gage, upon which the plaintiff relies to

establish his title, is void for usury : Adam-

son V. Wiggins, 45 Minn. 448.

[^Webster c. Long (1901), 63 Kan. 876,

66 Pac. 1032; Street v. Morgan (1902),

64 Kan. 85, 67 Pac. 448 ; Payne v. Mc-

Cormick Co. (1901), 11 Okla. 318, 66 Pac.

287 ; Gila Valley, etc. Ry. Co. v. Gila

County (1903), Ariz., 71 Pac. 913; Cum-

bey r. Lovett (1899), 76 Minn. 227, 79

N. W. 99; Pitts Agricultural Works v.

Young (1895), 6 S. D. 557, 62 N. W. 432 ;

Piano Mfg. Co. v. Daley (1897), 6 N. I).

330, 70 N. W. 277 ; Iowa Sav. Bank r.

Frink (1902), Neb., 92 N. W. 916 ; Jenkins

1
y. on v. Ream, 9 Iowa, 51 ; Patteron v. lark, 20 Iowa, 429. The doctrin e
)early oppo:ed to the
of the e ca e i
true theory of the general denial.
2 [
icbol G' h pard o. v. Minne ota
Thr her
o. (1 97), 70 l\linn. 52 , 73
w. 415.]
a Willard v. Gile·, 24 Wii-. 319, 324 .
4 McGrew v. Arm trong, 5 Kan . 2 4;
or that th good w re ta.ken with the
plaintiff' con ent, \Vallace v. Ro bb, 3Iowa, 192, 195; and ee Phamix Mut. L.
In . o. v. alrath, 53 vVi . 669 ; and
the defendant in uch action may proYe
any fact in redurtion of damage. ; a ,
for in tance, that the ma ker wa iusolv nt
in an action for the conver ion of a uote
made hy a third p er. on, and own d hy the
plaintiff, Booth v. Power , 56 . Y. 22, 27,
31, 33; Quin v. Lloyd, 41 N. Y. 349.
s aldwell v. Bru german, 4 iinn.
270; Woodworth v. Knowlton, 22 Cal.
1 4. In tbi
a e, defendant proved that
the good were the prop rty of a third
person. '· e al o park t'. H ritagc, 45
Ind. 66; Kennedy v. , 'haw, 38 Ind. 4i-1;
Farmer v.
.alvert, 44 Ind . 209, 212;
Thomp on v. we t r, 43 Ind . 312; i <lenb ch v. iley, 111 X Y. 560; 1riffin i·.
L. I. R o., 101 ~ . Y. 34 ; J_,an v., park ,
75 Incl. 27 ; Pulliam r. Burlingam , 1 Jfo.
l 11;
e. t r I'. ,_itlingt n ('Mo. l 3) 21
... W. R p. 20 ·
ford 1:. Hut hin on,
45 Kan. :n , 332 ; Gandy v. Pool, 14
. , h. 9 ; Aultman v . • ti ·hler, 21
li.
72 ; Tow e v. , park. , 23 :r b. 14- ; M t·
rill i" \Yed:!woo1l, 25 J b. 2 3; . tnl .\· u.
Hou el (. 'eb. I 92), 52 ,..,, W. R p.

x.

Chamber lin r . Winn, 1 Wa h. 501. Under
a gen ra1 denial f plaintiff' titl , the
defendant may h w that the chattel mort·
gage, upon which the plaintiff relie to
e tabli h hi. titl , i. void for u ury: Adamon i-. Wigofo 45 Minn . 44 .
[Web ter t. L ong {1901), 63 Kan.
6,
66 Pa . 1032; treet v. Morgan (1902),
64 Ki:t.u. 5, 67 ac. 44 ; Pa. ne v. McCormick C. (1901), 11 ( kla.3 1 , 66 Pac.
2 7 ; Gila Valley, etc. Rr.
o. v.
ila.
County (1903) , Ariz., 71 Pac. 913; umbey I'. Lovett (1 99), 76 Minn . 227, 79
J. \ \ . 99 · Pitt
Agri ultural Work v.
Young (l 95 ) 6 . D. 557, 62 N. W . 432;
Plano Mfg. 'o. v. Dal y ( 1897) 6 . D .
330, 70 N . W. 277; Iowa av. Bank v.
Frink (1902) , Neb., 92 N. W . 916; Jenk in
v. Mitchell (1894), 40 Neb. 664, 59 l . W .
90.J
6 Fri bee v. L angwor thy, 11 Wi . 375.
Contra, ee Young t'. Gla cock, 79 Mo.
5i4 ; , tern Auction et . o. v. Ma on.
16 M . A pp. 473; opri v. Truax, 1
Col. 9.
[ . eeleman v. Hoagland (1 93), 19
231, 34 Pa . 995 .
'ontra, Jat. Bank _
Barkalow (1 94) , 53 Kan. 6 35 a.c. 7 6;
Jone tt.M uen{l96,13 th,17.
45 1 a . 202; Muun. v. Loveland (1 i ),
15 tah, 250, 49 Pa . 74 3; Gallick t'. n or·
deau.· (1 99) 22 1 nt. 470, . 6 Pac. 9 l.
U. nry may h
hown under the g n ral
denial; D a\·i. r . ulv r (1 99) ; , •..,eb
265, 7 ....... \ . 5 4. \Va i1·er of C'onrlitinn.
of l'al may he hown:
ter 1 •• itlington
(1 93), 115 :\Io. 2+ ~ , 21 . w . 20.J
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fendaut in such action, when the record presents the same issue,

justify as sheriff under process against A., and assert that the

goods in controversy were the property of A. fraudulently trans-

ferred to the plaintiff: this defence is new matter, and must be

pleaded.^

§ 555. * 679. In Actions to recover Possession of Laud. In an

action to recover possession of land, if the complaint is in the

usual form, merely averring that the plaintiff is owner in fee of

the premises described and entitled to their possession, and that

the defendant unlawfully withholds the same, the general denial

admits proofs of anything that tends to defeat the title which the

plaintiff attempts to establish on the trial.^ In some States the

defence of the Statute of Limitations may even be relied upon

in this action under a general denial ; ^ but cannot be in the other

1 Glazer v. Clift, 10 Cal. 303. Contra,

Bailey v. Swain, 45 Ohio St. 657 ; Holm-

berg V. Dean, 21 Kaa. 73 ; Merrill v.

Wedgwood, 25 Neb. 283.
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[See in this connection Dobson v. Owens

<1895), 5 Wyo. 325, 40 Pac. 442; Connor

fondant in such action, wh n th rec rel pr s nts th same i sue,
justify as sheriff un<l r pr c " aaain t A., an cl ass rt that the
goods in controv r y w r th l ro1 rty of A. frau<lulently transferr d t the plaintiff: thi ' 1 fence is new matt r, ancl must be
pl ad <.1.1
§ 555. 679. In A ctions to recover Possession of Land. In an
action to recover po ession of land, if th ·omplaint i in the
usual form, mer ly av ning that the plaintiff i ' own r in £ e of
tb prem ise described and entitled to their pos ' sion, and that
the defendant unlawfully withholds the same, the general denial
admit proofs of anything that tends to defeat the title which the
plaintiff attempts to establi h on the trial. 2 In some • tate the
defence of the Statute of Limitations may even be relied upon
in thi action under a general denial; 3 but cannot be in the oth r
,jk

V. Knott (1896), 8 S. D. 304, 66 N. W. 461.

The rules respecting replevin in Connec-

ticut are different from those in most of

the code States. See McNamara v. Lyon

(1897), 69 Conn. 447, 37 Atl. 981 ; Smith

V. Brockett (1897), 69 Conn. 492, 38 Atl. 57.

" A defendant in replevin may, under

a general denial, prove and recover any

items of damage properly allowable to

him in such action : " Schrandt r. Young

(1901), 62 Neb. 2.54, 86 N. W. 1085; Ul-

rich V. McConaughey (1901), 63 Neb. 10,

88 N. W. 150.3

- Lain v. Shepardsou, 23 Wis. 224, 228,

per Paine J. : " Under such a complaint,

the plaintiff is allowed to show any title

he can ; and, from the necessities of the

case, the defendant, under a mere denial,

must be allowed to prove anything tend-

ing to defeat the title which the plaintiff

attempts to establish. He cannot be

bound to allege specific objections to a

title which the complaint does not dis-

close, and which he may have no knowl-

edge of until it is revealed by the evi-

dence at the tri.al." Mather v. Hutchinson,

25 Wis. 27 ; Miles v. Lingerman, 24 Ind.

385 ; Marshall r. Shafter, 32 Cal. 176 ; the

defendant may prove title in himself, and

an allegation to that effect in the answer

is not new matter ; Bruck r. Tucker, 42

Cal. 346, 351 ; Bledsoe v. Simms, 53 Mo.

305, 307 ; Northern Pac. R. Co. v. Mc-

Cormick, 55 Fed. Rep. 601. In several

States, by virtue of the statute, every de-

fence, legal or equitable, may be proved

under the general denial, Vaiiduyn v. Hep-

ner, 45 Ind. 589, 591 ; Franklin v. Kelley,

2 Neb. 79. 113-115 (fraud) ; Hickman 'v.

Link, 97 Mo. 482.

[]Iba V. Central Ass'n of Wyoming

(1895), 5 Wyo. 355, 40 Pac. 527; Macey

1-. Stark (1893), 116 Mo. 481, 21 S. W.

1088; Carkeek r. Boston Nat. Bank

(1897), 16 Wash. 399, 47 Pac. 884; Com-

monwealth Title Ins. Co. i: Dokko (1898),

72 Minn. 229, 75 N. W. 106, quoting the

text; Cheatham v. Young (1893), 113

1 Glazer v. Clift, 10 Cal. 303.
Contrn,
Bailey v. Swain, 45 Ohio St. 657 ; Holmberg v. Dean, 21 Kan. 73; Merrill v.
Wedgwood, 25 Neb. 283.
[ ee in this connection Dobson v. Oweu (1895 ), 5 Wyo. 325, 40 Pac. 442; Connor
v. Knott{l896), 8 S. D.304, 66 N. W.461.
The rules respecting replevin in Connecticut are different from those in mo t of
the code 'tates. See McNamara v. Lyon
(189i}, 6!:1 Conn. 447, 37 Atl. 981; Smith
v. Brockett (1897), 69 Conn. 492, 38 Atl. 57.
"A defendant iu replevin may, under
a g eneral denial, prove and recover any
item of damage properly allowable t o
him in uch action : " Schrandt 1·. Youn g
(1901) , 62 Neb. 254, 86 N. W . 1085; Ulri ch 1· . ~Icf'ouaughey (1901), 63 Neb. 10,
N. W. 150.J
'.! Lain v. Shepardson, 23 Wi . 224, 22 ,
per Pain e J.: "Under such a complaint,
the plaintiff i · allowed to show any titl e
he can ; and, from the necesf;ities of th e
ca e, th e defendant, under a mere denial,
must be ailowed to prove anything te nding to defeat the title which the plaintiff
attempts to e tabli h. He cannot he
bound to allege specific obj ection to a
title which the complaint doe not clLclose, and which he ma.v haYe no knowledge of until it is revealetl hy the evidence at tbe trial." Mather v . II utchi n on,
25 ·v~ri . 27 ; Miles v. Lingerma1~, 24 Ind.
385 ; Marshall v. Shafter, 32 Cal. 176; the
defendant may prove title in him elf, and

an allegation to that effect in the au we t·
i. not new matter ; Bruck v. Tu cker, 42
Cal. 3-i6, 351; Bledsoe v. imms, 53 Mo.
305, 307; Northern Pac. R. Co. v . M cCormick, 55 Fed . Rep . 601. In several
tate , by virtue of the s tatute, every defence, legal or equitable, may be pro,·ed
under the general denial, Valltluyu v. H epner, 45 Ind. 589, 591 ; Franklin v. K elley,
2 Neb . 79, 113-115 (fraud) ; Hickman v.
Link, 97 Mo. 482.
[Iba v. Central As. 'n of Wyoming
{1895), 5 Wyo. 355, 40 Pac. 527; Macey
'tark (1893), 116 Mo. 48 1, 21 S. W .
1088 ; Carkeek l'. Bos ton Nat. Bank
(1897), 1_6 Wash. 399, 47 Pac. 884; Commonwealth Titl e In . Co. r. Dokko ( l 9 ),
72 Minn. 229, 75 ~- '\V. 106, quotin g the
text; Ch eatham v. Y oung (1 893) , 11 3
. C . 161, 18 S . K 92 ; Shelton t'. Wil on
(1902), 131 N . C . 499, 42 S . E. 937 ; ri edges
i>. Pollard (18()9) , 149 Mo. 216 , 50 S . W .
89 . But in K entu cky, nud er Ci''· Cod e,
§ 125, a defendant cannot a. sert his titl e
to land under a ge neral d enial: Brent 1· .
Long (1 96) , 99 Ky. 245 , 35,. W . 640.J
a Nelson v. Broclhack, 44 Mo. 59 6;
Bled oe 11. Simms, 53 Mo. 305, 307; Fulkerson v. Mitchell. 82 Mo. l.'3 ; Fairbank · v.
Long, 91 Mo . 62 ; . _ tock r v. Gr en, 94
Mo. 2 O; Holme v. Kring, 93 Mo. 452.
See also post,§ 714, and note.. [Col eman v. Drane (1893), 116 Mo . 387 , 22
s. w. 801.]

1"

*
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States, whose codes expressly require the statute to be pleaded.^

An equitable defence to the action must, however, as it seems^

be specially pleaded;'-^ and the defence that a deed to the plain-

tiff absolute on its face, under which he claims title, is only a

mortgage.^

:x:pr 1 · r q iir th tau t b
, ' ho
t th a i 11 mu ' t, h '
quitable cl f
2
th, t a 1 d
b ' }J ·iall i l ad d · and th
un
l
r
whi
h
h
htirn titl i '
011
it
f
ce
tiff ab' lu

§ 556. " 680. In Actions in which Malice is an Essential Ingre-

dient. In an action to recover damages for a malicious prosecu-

.

tion, the complaint alleging malice and the want of a probable

cause, the general denial puts these averments in issue, and

admits any evidence going to show a want of malice and the

existence of a probable cause ; as, for example, when the com-

plaint charged that the defendant wrongfully procured the plain-

tiff to be indicted, proof on the part of the defendant that he was

a grand juror, and that all the acts complained of were done by

^ Orton r. Noonaii, 2.5 Wis. 672. A

defence arising after the commoncemeut

of the action cannot be proved, but must

be set up by a supplemental answer.
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McLane v. Bovee, .3.5 Wis. 27, .34.

In Actions in which Malice is an Essential Ingre-

In an acti n
r
r clama0
f r a m li i u pr
ution th
mplaint all ,ging mali < nc.l h ' ant f a pr babl
th g n r 1 denial put ' th
rm nt in i u
and
cau
adm i ' an e idenc
o h w , want f malic and he
xi. ten
of a pr bable
a , f r ' ample, wh n th
mplaint charged that the l £ ndan wr ngfully procur 1 th r lainti o b indicted, pr of n th part of th cl f n<lant tha he a
a gran juror and hat all th act omr lain l of w r l n b
dient.

2 Stewart v. Hoag, 12 Ohio St. 623 ;

Lombard v. Cowham, 34 Wis. 486, 491.

The court, in the last case, held that,

when tlie deed under which the plaintiff

claims is fraudulent and void, tiiat de-

fence may be proved under the general

denial, because it controverts the plain-

tiff's lej/al title. To this effect is Brown

V. Freed, 43 Ind. 253, 254-257, and cases

cited. Under a general denial, defendant

may show that his deed to the plaintiff,

under which the latter claims, was upon

an illegal consideration, and therefore

void, Sparrow v. Rhoades, 76 Cal. 208,

245 ; that an execution sale which was

in
ee

the source of plaintiff's title was void, by

reason of the land having been a home-

.stead, Kipp v. Bullard, .30 Minn. 84; and

see the similar case of Motley v. Griflin,

104 N. C. 112; and where the defend.ant

is not advised by the complaint as to the

source of the plaintiff'.s title, he 7nav in-

troduce evidence of an equitable e.stoppel

against the plaintiff: Parker v. Dacres,

1 Wash. 190.

[Anderson r. Rasmus.sen (1894), 5 Wyo.

44, .36 Pac. 820. But see Travellers' lus.

Co. /;. Walker (1899), 77 Minn. 438, 80

N. W. 618, where the court said : " Where

the complaint in an action of ejectmeut

merely alleges the plaintiffs title generally,

without disclosing the source of liis title

or right of possession, if the defendant

has an equity wliich, as it exists and

without any affirmative relief, defeats

plaintiff's claim to the possession, it may

be proved under a general denial, being

strictly defensive in its nature. But, if

the equity is such that it does not give

the defendant the right of possession as

against the legal title without affirmative

relief enforcing the equity, then the de-

fendant must plead the facts entitling

him to such relief, the matter l)eing in

the nature of a counter-claim." See

also, to the same effect, Pinkham v

Pinkham (1901), 61 Neb. 336, 85 N. W,

285.]

3 Davenport v. Turpin, 43 Cal. 597

[ .\111J r. Oll

I'.

na

mu

44, % J>ac·. ":w. But <' Tray l! Pr:' Im•.
Co . 1·. Walhr (l 99), 77 Minn . .J.:l ,
• •. \'.HI , wJi,.re th court .·ai1!: " " 'her
thP c·fJJnplaiut in an act.ion of j cLrn uL
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him in that capacity, was held proper.^ The same principle must

apply to all cases in which malice is an essential ingredient in

the right of action, and is alleged in the complaint or petition :

all facts tending to disprove the malice are clearly admissible

under the denial.

§ 557, * 681. In Actions for Specific Performance. When the

general denial is pleaded in an action to compel the specific

performance of a contract to convey land, it is held in some

cases that the defence of the Statute of Frauds may be relied

upon, for the answer puts the existence of the contract in

issue ; ^ other cases, however, hold the contrary, and require

the statute to be pleaded. ^ And the Statute of Limitations

may be set up under a general denial in the same action, when-

ever it is not expressly required by the codes, as in certain

States, to be pleaded.*

1 Animerman v. Crosby, 26 Ind. 451 ;

Huuter v. Mathis, 40 lud. 356 ; Kost v.

Harris, 12 Abb. Pr. 446; Radde v. Kuck-

Generated for facpubupdates (University of Michigan) on 2014-06-17 15:34 GMT / http://hdl.handle.net/2027/uc2.ark:/13960/t02z1c23b
Public Domain / http://www.hathitrust.org/access_use#pd

gaber, .3 Duer, 684 ; Simpson v. McArthur,

16 Abb. Pr. 302 (n.) ; Levy v. Brannan,

39 Cal. 485 ; Trogdea v. Deckard, 45 Ind.

572; but see Scheer v. Keown, 34 Wis.

him in that capacity, wa h 11 pr p r. 1 Th am rrincipl mu t
a ply t aJl ca
in wbi h mali
i
an s ential ingrecli nt in
the right f acti n, and i · all g cl in th
mplaint or peti ti 11 :
all facts t ncling to di. prove the malice are cl arly admi · ible
und r the denial.
§ 557. * 681. In A ctions for Specific Performance. vVh n th
general cl nial i pleaded in an a tion to comp 1 th
peci:fic
performance of a contract to convey land, it is held in 0111
cases that the defence of the Statute of Fraud may be r li d
upon, for the answer puts the xi tence of th contract in
issue; 2 other ca es, however, hold the contrary, and r quire
the statute to be pleaded. 3 And the Statute of Limitations
may be set up under a general denial in the same action, whenever it is not expressly required by the codes, as in certain
States, to be pleaded. 4

349, an action for false arrest and im-

prisonment. In an action for malicious

prosecution, under a general denial the

plaintiff's guilt may be shown, Bruley v.

Rose, 57 Iowa, 651 ; and that the defend-

ant acted in good faith, upon the advice

of competent counsel, Sparling v. Conway,

75 Mo. 510. [^Maynard w Sigman (1902),

— Neb. — , 91 N. W. 576 ; Kellogg v.

Scheuerman (1897), 18 Wash. 293, 51 Pac.

344 ; Bowman v. Fur Mfg. Co. (1895), 96

la. 188, 64 N. W. 775 ; McAllister r.

Johnson (1899), 108 la. 42, 78 N. W. 790.

In actions for libel, privilege is provable

under a general denial : Schomberg v.

Walker (1901), 132 Cal. 224, 64 Pac. 290;

also the truth of the alleged libellous

statement : Locke v. Chicago Chronicle

Co. (1899), 107 la. 390, 78 N. W. 49;

Moffittw. Chicago Chronicle Co. (1899),

107 la. 407, 78 N. W. 45.]

2 Hook V. Turner, 22 Mo. 333 ; Wild-

bahn v. Robidoux, 11 Mo. 659; Springer

V. Kleinsorge, 83 Mo. 152, 156; Bernhardt

V. Walls, 29 Mo. App. 206; Popp v.

Swanke, 68 Wis. 364 ; Smith v. Theobald,

86 Ky. 141.

l^Hillhouse v. Jennings (1901), 60 S. C.

373, 38 S. E. 599 ; Bean v. Lamprey (1901),

82 Minn. 320, 84 N. W. 1016; Williams-

Hayward Shoe Co. v. Brooks (1900), 9

Wyo. 424, 64 Pac. 342 ; Hackett v. Watts

(1896), 138 Mo. 502, 40 S. W. 113; Hill-

man V. Allen (1898), 145 Mo. 638, 47 S. W.

509; Boyd v. Paul (1894), 125 Mo. 9, 28

S. W. 171; Bless v. Jenkins (1895), 129

Mo. 647, 31 S. W. 938; Devore u. Devore

(1896), 138 Mo. 181, 39 S. W. 68; Kleia

V. Liverpool & London Ins. Co. (1900),

Ky.,57 S. W. 250 ; Haun v. Burrell (1896),

119 N. C. 544, 26 S. E. Ill ; Thompson v.

Frakes (1900), 112 la. 585, 84 N. W. 703;

Indiana Trust Co. v. Finitzer (1903), —

Ind. — , 67 N. E. 520; Riif v. Riibe (1903),

— Neb. — , 94 N. W. 517.]

3 Livesey v. Livesey, 30 Ind. 398 ; Os-

I Ammerman i Crosby, 26 Ind. 451;
Hunter v. Math is, 40 Ind. 356; Rost v.
Harris, 12 Abb. Pr. 446; Radde v. Ruckgaber, 3 Duer, 684; imp on v. McArthur,
16 Abb. Pr. 302 (n .) ; Levy v . Brannan,
39 Cal. 485; Trogtlen v. Deckard, 45 Ind .
572; but see Scheer v. Keown, 3-! Wis.
349, an action for fal e arrest and imprisonment. In an action for maliciou
prosecution, under a general denial the
plaintiff's guil t may be shown, Bruley v.
Rose, 57 Iowa, 65 1 ; and that the defendant acted in good faith, upon the advice
of competent counsel, Sparling v. Conway,
75 Mo. 510. [ Maynard v . Sigman (1902),
- Neb. - , 91 N. W. 576; Kellogg v.
Scheuerman (1897), 18 Wash. 293, 51 Pac.
344; Bowman v. Fur Mfg. Co. (1895), 96
Ia. 188, 64 N. W. 775 ; McAllister v.
Johnson (1899), 10 Ia. 42, 78 N. W. 790.
In action· for libel, privilege is provable
under a general den ial: Schomberg v.
Walker {1901), 132 Cal. 224, 64 Pac. 290;
also the truth of the alleged libellous
statement: Locke v. Chicago Chronicle
. W. 49;
Co. (1899), 107 Ia. 390, 78
Moffitt v. Chicago Chronicle Co. {1899),
107 Ia. 407, 78 N. W. 45.]
2 Hook v. Turner, 22 Mo. 333; Wildbabn v. Robidoux, 11 fo. 659 ; Springer
v. Kleinsorge, 83 Mo. 152, 156; Bernhardt
v. Walls, 29 Mo. A pp. 206; Popp 1•.
Swanke, 68 Wis. 36-! : Smith v. Theobald,
86 Ky. 141.
1•

[Hillhouse v. J ennings (1901), 60 . C.
373, 38,. E. 599; Bean v. Lamprey (1901),
82 Minn. 320, 84 N. W. 1016; WilliamsHayward Shoe Co. v. Brook {1900), 9
Wyo. 424, 64 Pac. 342; Hackett v. Watts
(1896), 138 Mo. 502, 40 S. W. 11 3; Hillman v. Allen (189 8), 1-!5 Mo. 638, 47 '. W.
509; Boyd v. Paul (1894 ), 125 Mo. 9, 2
S. W. 171; Bless v. Jenkins (1895), 129
Mo. 64 7, 31 S. W. 938 ; Devore u. Devore
{1896), 138 Mo. 181, 39 . W. 68; Klein
v. Liverpool & London Ins. Co. {1900),
Ky., 57 S. W. 250; Haun v. Burrell (rn96),
119 N. C. 544, 26 S. E. 111 ; Thompson v.
Frakes (1900), 112 Ia. 585, 84 'N. W. 703;
Indiana· Trust Co. v. Finitzer (1903), Ind. - , 67 N. E. 520; Riif v. Riibe (1903),
- Neb.-, 94 N. W. 517.J
a Livesey v. Livesey, 30 Ind. 398; 0 borne v. Endicott, 6 Cal. 149; Maybee v.
Moore, 90 ~Io . 340. [ ee case cited in
note 2, p. 718.J
4 Wiswell
v. Tefft, 5 Kan. 263;
Springer v. Kleinsorge, 83 Mo. 152.
[Coleman v. Drane (1893), 116 Mo. 387,
22 S. W. 801 (ejectment). In Bond v.
Bond (1903), 175 Mo. 112, 74 S. W. 975, in
an action for specific performance, defendant, under a general denial, wa allowed
to introduce a bond for title executed by
him to plaintiff's deceased hnsbanrl, conditioned on payment of rertain note , and
introdu ce the notes, unpaid, to show a
forfeiture.]
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^ 558. * 682. In Actions on Covenants and Judgments. When

In Actions on Covenan ts and Judgments.

the complaint in an action upon a covenant of warranty, con-

tained in a deed of land to the plaintiff, alleged the conveyance,

the covenant, and a breach thereof by means of an outstanding

paramount title and a recovery on the same, the general denial

put all these averments in issue, and enabled the defendant to

prove any facts going to show that there was no such paramount

title. ^ In an action upon a judgment recovered in another State,

the complaint set out the recovery of the judgment, and all the

other allegations necessary to constitute the cause of action.

The defendant pleaded (1) the general denial; (2) that there

was no such record ; (3) that the judgment was obtained with-

out any notice given to the defendant, without service of process

on him or appearance by him, he being all the time a non-

resident of the State in which the judgment was recovered.

All the matters alleged in these two special defences were, it

was held, embraced within the general denial, and could be

proved under it: the defences themselves, according to the well-

settled practice in Indiana, were struck out on motion, because
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they were equivalent to the general denial and redundant.^

1 Rhode V. Green, 26 Ind. 83. In a Thompson, 8 Ore. 428; Freser r. Charles-

creditor's suit to set aside the debtor's ton, 11 S. C. 486; Weeks t". Smith, 18

fraudulent transfer of land, the grantee Kan. 508 ; Clayton v. School Di.st., 20 id.

may prove, under the general denial, that 206; Emily v. Harding, ^3 Ind. 102;

the lari<i was a liomestead, for this rebuts Steeple r. Downing, 60 id. 368; Webster

the alleged fraud charged by the plain- v. Bebinger, 70 id. 9; Over v. Shannon,

tiff, Hibben i-. Soyer, .33 Wis. 319, 322; 75 id. 352; in actions of rcjilevui, Branch

also any facts showing absence of fraud, v. Wi.seman, 51 Ind. 1 ; Wilier v. Manby,

Summers v. Hoover. 42 Ind. 153, 156. 51 id. 169; Stowell v. Otis, 71 N. Y. 36;

Wh n

th

rn lain in au ac ion upon a
v nant of warranty,
niu a deed of land to th plain ti , all ed th con e anc
veuant, ancl a brea ·h th reof by
an
f an ou tandin
aram unt itl and a r cornry on tbe ame b general denial
ut all th ' a rm nt in i u and n Ll d the defendant t
I rov any fac going t how that th r
no uch par m unt
1
ti 1
In au acti n up n a jud m ut r
r d in another tat ,
1
mplaint t out h r c ver r of b judgment, and all th
th r all ati
to con i ute the cau e of acti n.
Th l fendant pl ad l (1) the
n ral denial; (""') tl at th re
w
n
u h r
rd; (3) that the judgment wa obtained withut any notice gi n to the defendant, with ut rvice of proc '
n him or appearance by him, he b ing all the time a nonr id nt of he tate in which th judgment was recovered .
. . 11 th matters alleged in the e two pecial defence w re, it
wa h ld, embraced within be g n ral J nial, and could be
I roved und r it : the defence them el e , ::iccording to the w 11ttlecl practice in Indiana, were truck out on m tion, becau e
the were equiYalent to the general denial and redundant. 2

2 Westcott I'. Brown, 13 Ind. 83. The Staubadi v. Rexford, 2 Mont. Ty. 565;

fullowing recent cases show wliat de- Creighton y. Newton, 5 Neb. 100; Ricii-

fences have or have not been admitteil ardson v. Steele, 9 id. 483; Bailey r.

under the general denial in various ac- Bayne, 20 Kan. 657 ; in actions on promin-

tioQs. Some of tliese decisions can iiardly son/ notes, Casad v. Holdridge, 50 Ind.

be reconciled witli the well-settled doc- 529 (illegality of consideration cannot be

trine concerning the office of the general shown) ; Schwarz v. Oppold, 74 N. Y.

denial, especially some cases dealing 307 (alteration may be shown) ; in con

with the actions for the recovery of land, tract for materials, etc.. Read v. Decker, 5

and of chattels, ejectment, and replevin. Hun, 646; contract for services, ^Wr.iArA v.

In actions for conversion, Ontario Bk. r. Applegate, 61 Ind. 368; /'or roif o;i a /ease,

N. J. Steamboat Co., 59 N. Y. 510; Mc- Mack i-. Burt, 5 Hun, 28; on an oral con-

Clelland v. Nichols, 24 Minn. 176; Moul- tract. Bush r. Brown, 49 Ind. 573; to re-

ton V. Thompson, 26 id. 120; Smith v. scind a contract for fraud, Dalrymple v.

i Rhode v. Green. 26 Ind.
1. In a
er uitor'
uit to et a ide the debtor'
frauduleut trau fer of laocl, the grantee
may prove, uoder the general denial, that
the laud wa. a home tead, for this rebuts
the alleg d fraud charged by the plaintiff, Hibben v. oyer, 33 ·wi . 3 19, 322;
al o auy fact' howing ab ence of fraud,
'ummer· v. Hoo,·er, 42 Ind. 153, 156.
2 'Ve tcott v. Brown, 13 Incl. ' 3.
Th
foll win tY recent ca e
how what def n<' ' ha,·e or ha,·e not been admittetl

Hall, 67 N. Y. 48; in actions Cff ejectment. Hunt, 5 Hun, 111 ; to recover a deficiencif

Tracy v. Kelly, 52 Ind. 535; Freeman v. on a wortf/a/je foreclosure, Scofield v. Do.s-

Sprague, 82 N. C. .346 ; Powers r. Arm- cher. 72 N. Y. 491, 495, 490 ; for damages,

Btroug, 35 Ohio St. 357; I'liillippi v. Wandell v. Edwards, 25 Hun, 498; iu

trine cone rniug the oftic-e of th geueral
denial,
pecially omc ca. e
dea li1w
with the actiou ~ f r th r COY ry of land.
a.nd of chatt l , je ·tm nt, anrl reple,•iu.
In action for conversion, ntario Bk. '"
~ •. .J. .'teamboat
o., 59 T. Y . 510; i.\lclelland v . ... Ti hol , 24 Minn. 176; fouloo '" Thompson, 26 id. 120 ; mi th v.
H 11, ,; LT. Y. 4 ; in action. of •ject111e111,
T r cy '" K lly, 52 In d. 535; Fr eman v.
• prag 1 , 2 '. . :34 ; Pow r. l'. \rrntroug;, a:; Ohio 't. 357; Phillippi v.

Thompson,
re. 42 ; Fr ser . Ch:irl . ton, 11
4 6; Vleek v. ' mith, l
Kan. 50 ; .layt n u. , hool Di t., 20 id.
206; Emily t. Harding, 53 Ind. 10-;
St ple v. Downio<Y, 60 id . 36 ; Web. t r
z. Bebinger, 70 i l. 9; ver v. hauu u,
75 id. 352; in action of replevin, Branch
v. Wi eman 51 Ind. 1; Will r v. Manby,
. 1 id. 169; towell v. ti , 71 N. Y. 36 ·
taubach v. R x.ford, 2 M nt. Ty. 565;
r i<Yhton v. ... ewton, 5 N b. 10 ;
i hard on v.
t ele, 9 id. 4 3 ; Bail y 1"
Bayo , 20 Kau. 657; in actions on promi.·sor.'I note , asad t.'. Holdridge, 50 Ind .
52 (ill gality of on ideration aonot he
chwarz v.
ppold, 74
. Y.
s\Jown);
307 (alteration may b
hown) ; i u con
tmct for mat rials, etc., ead v. I k r, 5
Ilnn, 646; contract for r ic s, Blizzard 1:.
..t\ ppl at , l Jud . 36 ·fur rent on a I a e,
Iack L'- Bur, 5 IJun, 2 ; on an oral contrart, u h '" Br wn, 49 Ind . 57 ; L re. ci11d a confrart .for fraud,
lr rmpl L'.
Huut, 5 JJuu, lll ; t r cov r a deJi ie11c.11
011 a 111m·t9a.'Je foreclo 11re, c ti I I v. D o·h r, /:...
Y . 4 l , 4 5, 4
\Yand ll t'. Edward·, 25
; iu
T.
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§ 559. * 683. Special Statutory Provisions as to Denying Exist-

ence of Corporation and Partnership. This discussion will be

ended by a brief reference to some special statutory rules, , pre-

scribing the effect and operation of denials in certain cases, which

have been adopted in various States. These rules do not belong

to the general theory of pleading embodied in the new system ;

they rather break the symmetry of that theory ; but as they are

practically important, they cannot be passed by without notice.

[In New York, a statute, general in its terms, provides that the

corporate existence alleged in the complaint need not be proved

" unless the answer is verified, and contains an affirmative alle-

gation that the plaintiff, or defendant, as the case may be, is not

a corporation,"] and the fact is not put in issue by the general

denial.^ In Indiana a sworn answer is made necessary to put

in issue the legal existence of alleged corporations in actions

brought by them ; but a general denial verified complies with this

statutory requirement, and compels the plaintiff to prove its cor-

porate character.2 In Wisconsin, an answer denying the partner-

ship of the plaintiffs in an action by a firm must be verified, or it
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forms no issue. An unverified denial, therefore, either general

or specific, admits the partnership as averred.^

action for negligence, Jones v. Sheboygan, 78 N. W. 1070 ; Kelley v. Nebraska Exp.

etc. R. Co., 42 Wis. 307; defmce of accord Ass'u (1897), 52 Neb. 355, 72 N. W. 356.

and satisfaction, Looby v. West Troy, 24 Contra, Town of Denver v. Spokane Falls

Hun, 78 ; in action for a divorce, defences (1893), 7 Wash. 226, 34 Pac. 926.^ Water-

in abatement, and the statute of liinita- ville Man. Co. v. Bryan, 14 Barb. 182.

tions, Dutcher v. Dntcher, 39 Wis. 651, '^ Chance y. Indianapolis & W. G. Road

and numerous cases cited. Co., 32 Ind. 472, disapproving a contrary

[|A general denial raises the issue of the doctrine in Cicero Hyg. Dr. Co. v. Craig-

right of a foreign e.xecutor to maintain an head, 28 Ind. 274, and approving Wert v.

action: Stoddard r. Aiken (1899), 57 S. C. Crawfordsville & A. Turnp. Co., 19 Ind.

134, 35 S. E. 501. But this form of an- 242 ; Williams v. Franklin Tp. Acad,

§ 559. * 683.

Special Statutory Provisions as to Denying Exist-

Thi di cus ·ion will Le
end d by a bri f ref renc to orne special tatutory rul , , precril>ing th eff ct and peration f d nials in rtain a ·es, which
ha e b n adopted in variou State . These rule d not bel ng
t th g neral th ory of pl acling m bocliecl in the new yst m ;
they rather break th ymmetry of that th ory; but as they are
practically important, they cannot be pas ed by without notic .
[In New York, a tatut , general in its terms, provide that th
-corporate existence alleged in the complaint need not be proved
"unles the answer i ' verified, and contains an affirmative allegation that the plaintiff, or defendant, as the case may be, is not
a corporation,''] and the fact is not put iu issue by the general
denial.1 In Indiana a sworn answer is mad necessary to put
in i ue the legal existence of alleged corporations in action ·
brought by them ; but a general denial verified complies with thifs
statutory requirement, and compels the plaintiff to prove its coTporate character. 2 In \Visconsin, an answer denying the partnership of the plaintiffs in a11 action by a firm mu t be verified, or it
forms n o i sue. An unverified denial, therefore. either general
or pecific, admit the partnership as averred.3

ence of Corporation and Partnership.

swer does not put in issue the due appoint- Assoc, 26 Ind. 310 ; Adams Exp. Co. v.

meut of a domestic administrator and his Hill, 43 Ind. 157 ; Indianapolis F. & M.

right to sue : llaukiuson v. Charlotte, etc. Co. v. Herkimer 46 Ind. 142, 144. A

R. R. Co. (1893), 41 S. C. 1, 19 S. E. 206. statute in Wisconsin [;requiring a specific

Nor does it raise the issue of an infant's denial], it is held, applies to both foreign

disability to sue: Hicks r, Beam (1893), and domestic corporations, St., 1898,

112 N. C. 642, 17 S. E. 490. Condonation § 4199 ; Williams Mower, etc. Co. v. Smith,

need not be pleaded: Hill r. Hill (1893), 33 Wis. 530; Central Bk. of Wis. v.

24 Ore. 416, 33 Pac. 809.] Knowlton, 12 Wis. 624.

1 [^Code Civ. Pro., § 1776. See also ^ j^St., 1898, § 4197.] Fisk v. Tank,

Standard Sewing Mach. Co. v. Henry 12 Wis. 276, 301; Martin v. Am. Exp.

(1894), 43 S. C. 17, 20 S. E. 790; Cham- Co., 19 W^is. 336.

berlin Banking House y. Kemper, etc. Co. C^^ago v. Walsh (1898), 98 Wis. 348,

(1902), Neb., 92 N. W. 175; Fletcher v. 74 N. W. 212. Contra, McKasy i-. Huber

Co-operative Pub. Co. (1899), 58 Neb. 511, (1896), 65 Minn. 9, 67 N. W. G50.]
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action for negligence, J one ' v. Sheboygan, 78 N. W. 1070 ; Kelley t'. Nebraska Exp.
-etc. R. Co., 42 "\Vi . 307; d~[Pnce of accord Ass'n {1897), 52 Neb. 355, 72 N. \V. 356.
and sati.~fuction, L ooby v. West T r oy, 24 Contra, Town of Denver v. Spokane Fall
Hun , 7 ; in action fur a divorce, defences ( 1893), 7 Wash. 226, 34 Pac. 926.J Waterin abatement, and the statute of limi ta- Yille Man. Co. v. Bryan, 14 Barb. 182.
2 Chance v. Indianapoli & \V. G. Road
tions, Dutcher v . Dutcher, 39 Wis. 651,
.and numerous case cited.
Co., 32 Ind. 4i2, disapproving a contrary
[A general denial raises the i ue of the doctrine in Cicero H yg. Dr. Co. v. Craigright of a fo reig n executor to mainta in an head, 28 Ind. 274, an d approYing Wert v .
.action: Stoddard v. Aikeu (1 99), 57 S. C. Crawfordsville & A. Turnp. Co., 19 Ind.
134, 35 S. E. 501. But thi form of an- 242; Williams v. Franklin Tp. Acad.
swer does not put in issue the due appoint- Assoc., 26 Ind. 310; Adams Exp. Co. v.
meut of a domestic administrator and his Hill, 43 Ind. 157 ; Indianapolis F. & M.
right to ·ue : Hankinson v. Charlotte, etc. Co. v. H erkim er 46 Ind. 142, 144. A
R.R. Co. (1 93), 41 S. C. 1, 19 S. E. 206. statute in Wisconsin [requ iring a specific
Nor does it ra ise the i ue of au infaut's denial], it is held, applie to both foreign
disability to sue: Hicks v. Beam (1 93), and domestic corporations, St., 189 ,
112 N. C. 642, 17 S. E . 490. Condonation § 4199; William Mower, etc. Co. v. mith,
need not be pleaded : Hill v. Hill (1 93), 33 Wis. 530; Cent ral Bk. of Wi . v.
24 Ore. 416, 33 Pac. 809. J
Knowlton, 12 W i . 624.
1 [Code Civ. Pro., § 1776.
See also
3 [S t., 1 98, § 419i.J
Fisk v. Tank,
Standard Sewing Mach. Co. v. Henry 12 Wis. 276, 301; 1\Iartiu v. Am. Exp.
(1894 ), 43 S . C. 17, 20 S. E. 790; Cham- Co., 19 Wis. 336.
berlin Banking House v. Kemper, etc. Co.
[Lago v. Wal h (189 ) 9 Wis. 34 ,
(1902), Neb., 92 N. W . 17 5; Fletcher v. 74 N. \Y. 212.
ontra, McKasy v. Huber
Co-operative Pub. Co. (1 99), 5 Neb. 511, (1896), 65 i\liun. 9, 67 . W. 650.J
50
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^ 560. * 684. Special Statutory Provisions as to Denials iu Actions

560.

6 -±.

Special Statutory Provisions as to Denials in Actions

on Written Instruments. In Tnduiiia, ill actions Upon written in-

struments against the original parties, makers, indorsers, acceptors,

obligors, and the like, an unsworn general denial puts in issue

only the existence of the writing, and requires its production ; but

does not put in issue its execution^ and therefore admits no evi-

dence tending to dispute the signature of the defendant or any

other facts included within the execution. If veritied, the denial

puts in issue both the execution and the existence.^ The rule is

different, however, in actions against the executors or admin-

istrators of deceased parties to written instruments : tlie unver-

ilied general denial pleaded by them raises a complete issue.^ An

unverified general denial also admits the plaintiff's legal capacity

to sue in Indiana.^ A statute of Iowa enacts that, in actions or

defences on written instruments, " the signature or indorsement

thereto shall be deemed genuine and admitted, unless the party

w^hose signature it purports to be shall deny the same under oath

in the pleading." In an action upon a promissory note against

the maker, the defendant pleaded an unverified general denial^
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and under it insisted as a defence that he did not sign the writing

as a note, but executed it with the supposition that it was a simple

receipt. This defence being objected to as inadmissible, the court

held that the statute referred only to the genuineness of the sig-

nature, and did not prohibit the defendant from showing that he

did not execute such a contract as the one in suit, but executed an

entirely different instrument, for example, a receipt, and that the

same had been altered into a note.* In another case upon a note

the petition set it out in hcec verba, averring that it was executed

by the defendant. The answer was verified, but simply denied

knowledge or information sufficient to form a belief whether the

allegations of the petition were true. This form of verified denial^

it was held, did not comply with the requirements of the statute

in question, and raised no issue in respect of the signature.^

i [^Burns' St., 1901, § .367.] Stebbins 8 Downs v. McCombs, 16 Ind. 211;

V. Goldthwaite, 31 lud. 159; Evans i: Jones v. Cin. Type Foundry, 14 Ind. 89;

Southern Turnp. Co., 18 Ind. 101 ; Price Ileaston v. Cincinnati & Ft. W. R. Co.,

i>. Grand Hapids & Ind. R. Co., 18 Ind. 16 Ind. 27.5; Harrison v. Martinsville &

1.37 ; Hicks v Reigle, .32 Ind. .360. F. K. Co., 16 Ind. 50.-5.

2 Cawood's Adm. r. Lee, .32 Ind. 44 ; ■» Lake r. Cruiksliank, .31 Iowa. .30").

Riser v. Snoddy, 7 Ind. 442; Mahon's ^ Hall i\ .Etna Man. Co., .30 Iowa, 21.'),

Adm. V. Sawyer, 16 Ind. 73. 217, 218. Sec Lyun r. Bunn, 6 Iowa, 48.

In I ndiana in action upon written in·trum nt · a ain t the original partie... mak r ', in lor ·er acceptor
bligor an l the lik an un worn o- neral denial put in · ·ue
only the e:ristence of the writing an<l requir it 1 roduction · bu
loe' not put in i ue it e. ·ecution and ther for admit no Yidence t ndin o di pute th io-natur of th
f ndant or an other fa t in lud cl within h x cuti n. If v rifi d he denial
put in i ue bo h he execution and the exi nc .1 The rule i
lifferent howe er, in action again t the ex cu ors or admini trator of d ea ed partie to written in trument : the unverified gen ral lenial pleaded by them rai e a compl e i ue .2 An
un-verified en ral denial also admits the plaintiff legal capacit
to . ue in Indiana.a
tatute of
wa enact hat, in action or
defence on writ en in trument , the signature r indor ement
thereto hall be deemed genuine and admitted, unle ' S the part
-who e ignature it purports to be hall deny the ame under oath
in tl e pleading. ' In an action upon a promi ' or.. note against
the maker the defendant pleade l an um erified
neral denial
and under it insi ted as a defence that he did not ign the wri ing
as a note but executed it with the uppo it ion that it wa a impl
receipt . Thi defence being objected to a iuaclmi ible, the cour
held that he tatute referred only to the genuinene of the ignature, and di no prohibit the lefendant from hawing that he
lid not execute uch a contract a the one in ui but executed an
en irely different instrumen , for example, a receipt, and that the
ame had been altered into a note. 4 In another ase upon a note
the petition et it out in hr,ec verba a erring that it was xecuted
tl e d f ndant. The an wer wa verified, but imply denied
knowledge r information u.fficient to form a b lief whether the
allegati n f b petition er ru . Thi form of v rifiecl denial
it wa h ld did no omply with he requirern n
f he ta u e
in que ti n and rai ed no is ·ue in re pect of he ignature.5
on W ritten Instruments .

1 [Burn '
t., 1901, § 367.J
tebbin
v. Goldthwaite, 3 1 Ind. 159; Evan v.
. 'outbero urnp. o., l In d . I l; l rice
<'. Grand 1 apicl
& Ind. R.
., 1 In d.
137; Ili ck t• Reigl , .32 Incl. .360.
~
a.wood' Adm. i· . Lee .32 Ind. 44;
l'i. er v . . 'uorldy. 7 Jn11. 442; M hon'

.\drn. v. , aw_yer, I · Ind. 73.

own. v. Mc omb , 16 I nd. 211 ;
Jone v. in. Typ
oundry, 14 Ind . 9 ;
H a ton •. incinnati & Ft. W. R
o. ,
16 Ind 275; Harri ou v. Martin ville &
F. . o., 16 Ind. 505.
4 Lak 1•.
ruik hauk . 3 1 I wa, 395.
6 IIall v. JEtna lan.
., 30 Iowa, 215,
· 17, 21 . ' · e Lyon v. unu, 6 I owa, 4 •
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DEFE1r E.' AD.\IITTETl L- Ell A

E 'JAL.

'' I

§ 561. * 685. General Denial cannot be struck out as Sham.

The general denial, at least when verified, cannot be struck out as

sham on motion.^ In accordance with tlie settled rule of tlie

former procedure, the general issue could not be struck out for

such cause ; and in this respect the general denial is its equivalent.

" It gives the defendant tlie same right to require the plaintiff to

establish by proof all the material facts necessary to show his

right to a recovery as was given by that plea [the general issue]." ^

1 [^See Patterson v. Railway Co. (189G),

12 Ohio C. C. 274, and Packet Co. i-.

Fogarty (1895), 9 Ohio C. C. 418, con-

demning the use of a verified general

§ 561. * 6 5. General Denial cannot be struc k o u t as Sham.
T he g ·neral l nial, at lea when vcrifi d ann t b strucl- ont as
ham on motion.1 In a cordan
with th
ltl d ml 1f the
f rm r proc lur , th g neral issn c nld not l>, ·truck out for
"' u ch caus ; and in thi · re 1 e ·t he g neral denial i it· guiYalent.
It gives th defendant th ·am right to req nir th plaintiff to
·tabli h by proof all the material fa.ct nee : ary to ho\Y l1is
right to a recovery a· wa giv n by that plea [the g neral i · ue] . ' 2

denial when the defendant knows tliat

some of the averments denied are true.]

State V. Chamberlin, 54 Mo. .338. See also

Ewen V. Chicago & N. W. Ky. Co., 38 Wis.

G13; Sanford v. McCreedy, 28 id. 103;

Wittman v. Watry, 37 id. 2.38 ; Preston »•.
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Roberts, 1 2 Bush, 570 ; Rauson v. Anderson,

9 S.C.438; Sully f.Goldsniith,49 Iowa, 690.

[^Where the statute requires the denial

of the genuineness of the indorsement or

assignment of a written instrument to be

verified, an unverified plea of denial is an

admission of such matters : Daggs v.

Phoenix Nat. Bank (1898), Ariz., 53 Pac.

201. See also, to same effect, Hardwick

V. Atkinson (1899), 8 Okla. 608, 58 Pac.

747 ; Lux w. McLeod (1893), 19 Colo. 465,

36 Pac. 246. But where the petition al-

leges ownership of a note, but not the

execution of an indorsement, the owner-

ship is put in issue by an unverified general

denial : Southern Kan. Farm, etc. Co. v.

Barnes (1901), 63 Kan. 548, 66 Pac. 638.3

2 VVayland v. Tysen, 45 N. Y. 281, 282.

See also Grocers' Bank v. O'Rorke, 6 Hun,

18; Reynolds v. Craus (Supreme, 1891),

16 N. Y. Suppl. 792; Upton v. Kennedy

(Neb., 1893), 53 N. W. Rep. 1042.

[^Loranger v. Big Missouri Mining Co.

(189'5), 6 S. D. 478, 61 N. W. 686 ; Green

V. Hughitt School Tp. (1894), 5 S. D. 452,

59 N. W. 224. The same rule applies to

any verified denial : King v. Waite (1897),

10"S. D. 1, 70 N. W. 10.56 ; Pfister v. Wells

(1896), 92 Wis. 171, 65 N. W. 1041 ; Pear-

son V. Neeves (1896), 92 Wis. 319, 66

N. W. 357.

In general an answer may be stricken

out as sham when its falsity and insuffi-

ciency are clearly apparent : Dobson v. Hal-

lowell (1893), 53 Minn. 98, 54 N. W. 939 ;

Randall v. Simmons (1902), 40 Ore. 554,

67 Pac. 513; Pfaender v. Winona, etc.

R. R. Co. (1901), 84 Minn. 224, 87 N. W.

618; Fargo v. Vincent (1894), 6 S. D.

209, 60 N. W. 858 ; Sweetman v. Ramsey

(1899), 22 Mont. 323, .56 Pac. 361 ; Swee-

ney I'. Schlessinger (1896), 18 .Mont. 326,

45 Pac. 213 ; McDonald v. Pincus (1893),

13 Mont. 83, 32 Pac. 283; Sifton v. Sifton

(1895), 5 N. D. 187, 65 N. W. 670; Kidder

County V. Foye (1901), 10 N. D. 424, 87

N. W. 984; Wilson v. Burhans (1897), 96

Wis. 550, 71 N. W. 879; Miser i'. O'Shea

(1900), 37 Ore. 231, 62 Pac 491. Under

the statute providing that " sham, frivo-

1 [ ee P atterson v.Railway Co. ( 1 96),
12
hio . C. 2i4-, and Pack t o. v.
F ogarty (1 895), 9 O hi o . C. 41 , co ndemning th e use of ?. v rifi d general
denial when the defe ndant kuows t hat
• ome of th e a \•er ments deni ed are true.]
'tate v . Cham berlin, 5-! ~Io. 338. . 'ee a l ·o
Ewen v. Chicago & . ·w . Hy. 'o., 3 \Y i -.
13; Sanford v . IcCreedy, 2 id. 103;
Vit tman v. Watry, 3i id . 23 ; Pre ton "·
RobertR,12Bush, 5iO ; R a o on i-.Ander on,
9 S. C.438; Sully v. Gold mi t h,49 Iowa, 690.
[Where the tatute req uire t he deni al
of the genuin eness of t he iudorsement or
assig nm ent of a writt en instrument to be
ve rified, an unverified plea of denial is an
a<l mi ion of uch mat ters: Daggs v.
Phcenix Nat. Bank (1 89 ), Ariz., 53 Pac.
'01. See al so, t o same effect, Hardwick
1-. Atkinson (1899), 8 Okla. 608, 58 Pac.
i4i; Lux v. McLeod (1893), 19 Colo. 465,
36 Pac. 246. But where th e pet ition alleg es ownership of a note, but not the
x cution of an ind or ·em ent, the own erhip is put in issue by an unverifierl general
denial: Southern Kan. Farm, etc. Co. v.
B a rn es (1901 ), 63 Kan. 54 , 66 Pac. 638.J
2 Wayland v . Tysen, 45 N. Y. 281, 2 :2.
ee also Grocers' Bank v. O 'Rorke, 6 Hun,
l ; Reynold s v . Craus ( upreme, 189 1},
16 N. Y . Suppl. 792; Upton u. K enn edy
( eb., 1893), 53 N . W. R ep. 1042.
[Loranger v. Big Missouri Minill!~ Co.
(1 95), 6 S. D. 478, 61 N. W. 686; Green
v. Hughitt School Tp. ( 1 94), 5 S. n. 452,
59 N. W . 224. Th e same rule appl ie. to
any verified den ial : King v. Waite (1 97) ,
10 ,. D . l , 70 N. W. 1056; PfUer v. Wells
( l 96), 92 Wi . 171 , 65 N. W . 1041 ; P earon v. Neeves (1896), 92 Wi . 319, 66
N . W . 357.
In g eneral an an wer may be tricken
out as sham when its fal ity and in ufficiency are clearly apparent: Dobson v. Hal-

lowcll ( l 93), .).3 :.liun. 9 , 54 X. \ 939;
Handall i· . ~immon (1902), 40 Ore. 554,
6i Pac. 513 ; Pfaend r v. \Yinona, tc.
R R. o. (190 1 ), 84 l\linn. 224, 7 N. W.
6 1 ; Fargo v. Vin· nt (I 94), 6 . D .
209, 60 N. \V. 5 ; weetman 1:. Ram ey
(1"99), 22 :.\l ont. 323, 56 Pac. 361; • weeue.\' r .• chle~ ingcr ( l ' 96), I .\ lont. 326,
45 Pac. 213 ; McDonald v. Pincu (1 93),
13 Mont . 83, 32 Pac. 2 3; Sifton i-. ..._ ifton
(1 895) , 5 N. D. l 7, 65 N. W. 6i 0; K id der
Couuty v. F oye (1901), 10 1T. D . 42-!, 87
N . W . 984 ; Wilson v. B urhans (1 9i), 96
Wi . 550, 71 N. W . 8i 9; Mi ser v. O' Shea
(1900), 37 Ore. 231, 62 Pac. 491. Under
the tatute providing th a t "sham , fri volou and irrelevant repli es may be stri cken
out" on motion, the entire reply must
be proceederl against: Brown v. Baker
(1901 ), 39 Ore. 66, 65 P,ac. 799. U nder
the express provision of R. S. 1 9 , § 2682,"
matter cannot be stri cken from a verified
pleading on the g round that it i :;ham :
Moore v. May (1903), 117 Wi. 192. 94
N. W.45.
For other cases touching sham and
frivolous answer , see W estern Carolin a
Bank v. Atkinson (1 93 ), 113 . C. 478,
18 S. E. i03; Campbell v. Patton (1893),
113 N. C. 481, 18 S. E. 687; Vass v.
Brewer (1898), 122 N . C. 226, 29 S . E.
352; Bardwell-Robinson Co. v. Brown
(1894), 57 Miun. 140, 5 N. W. 872; Northwestern Cord ag e Co. v. Galbraith (1 !17),
9 . D. 634, 70 N . W. 104 ; Bank of
Comm erce l'. Humphr y (1894), 6 ,. D .
415, 61 N . W . 444 ; Pi t t burg, etc. Ry. Co.
v. Fraze (1 9 ), 150 Ind . 576, 50 . E.
5i6; Brown v. P or te r ( l 93), i W a h.
327, 34 Pac. 11 05; Oak e r. Ziemer
(1 900), 61 Neb. 6 4 N. W. 409; Fir t
at. Bank v. toll (1 99), 57 Neb. 75 , 78
N. W . 25-! ; U pton v. K enn edy (1893), 36
Neb. 66, 53 N. W. 1042.J
T.
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The same rule applies to a denial, general in fonn, of certain

appli

specified allegations constituting a part of the complaint,^ and is

a d nial

g n ral in f m1

applicable as well to equitable as to legal actions,^ and to all par-

tial denials,^ and is not restricted to those which are verified.*

SECTION FOURTH.

THE DEFENCE OF NEW MATTER.

f
r am
f the com lain ,1 and i
1 a ti ns, 2 an t all parwhich are verified.4

§ 562. * 686. Introductory. Much of what might properly be

included in this section has already been necessarily dwelt upon

in discussing the defence of denials. The two subjects so cor-

EOTION FOURTH.

relate and support each other, that the one cannot be explained in

full without, to some extent, explaining the other also. I shall

not repeat the propositions and definitions given in the last sec-

THE DEFEN E

F KEW M A T T E R.

tion, but shall content myself with adding examples and illus-

trations drawn from decided cases. The subject-matter of this

section will be distributed into three subdivisions : I. How de-

fences of new matter should be pleaded ; II. What is new matter

in general, Avith a particular reference to defences in mitigation

and those in abatement ; and, III. Some particular examples of

new matter classified and arranged.
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I. How Defences of New Matter should be pleaded.

§ 563. * 687. Statemeut of New Matter in Answer Governed by

same Rule as Statement of Cause of Action in Petition. A denial

when properly pleaded does not state any facts ; it simply denies

facts.^ A defence of new matter, on the other hand, does not

deny any facts ; it assumes the averments of the complaint or

petition to be true ; and under the ancient system a plea of con-

fession and avoidance must give color to these averments, or it

would be fatally defective. The "giving color " was simply the

absence of any denials, and the express or silent admission that

1 ^Standard Sewing Mach. Co. ;•. Henry '^ Thompson v. Erie R. Co.. 45 N. Y.

(1894), 43 S. C. 17, 20 S. E. 790; State 468. 472.

ex rel. v. King (1894), 6 S. D. 297, 60 3 ciaflin v. Jaroslauski, 64 Barb. 46.3.

*6 .

Much of what might properly be
i n ha alr ad b n nece sarily welt upon
in di u . : in
d f nc f d nial . The two ·ubje t o correlate and up1 ort ach oth r, that th one cann t b xplained in
full without, t
me ext nt, xplaining the other al o. I l 11
n tr p at the pr po ition an definiti ns given in th la t
tion bu hall nt nt my elf with a lding exam pl and ill
tration drawn from decide 1 ca e . The ubj ct-matter f thi ·
ection will be di tributed in o three subd.ivi ions: I. How d fence f n w matt r houl l be plead d · II. What i n w matt r
in en ral, with a particular ref ren e to defenc in miticrati 1
an
ho e in abat m nt; and, III. ome par icular x:ampl of
new matter cla ifi .d anu arranged.
562.

I n troducto r y .

N. W. 75 ; Gjerstaiiengen v. Hartzell * Brooks v. Chilton, 6. Cal. 640.

(1899), 8 N. D. 424, 79 N. W. 872 ; Larson 6 See Venice v. Breed, 65 Barb. 507,

I. How D efences of N ew

V. Winder (1896), 14 Wash. 647, 45 Pac. 603, per Mullin J., for a statement of the

~llfatter

hould be pleaded.

315. But see Upton r. Kennedy (1893), 36 comjiarative effects of denials and of new

Neb r.c, 53 N. W. 1012. J matter in raising issues.

563.

* 687.

S tatement of N ew M a t t er in Answer Governed by

d ni 1
when prop rl; pl ad d do ' n t tate any fac ; it imply deni
fa t .5
f n
f new matt r on the other hand, oe · n t
den any fact ; it a um
th a rm nts of the om laint r
petition t be tru ; and und r h an i nt ystem a pl a of c nf i n an av idanc mu t give color t th
a erment , r it
w uld be fatally
fectiv . The ' i ving c
wa im ly h
ab n e f any d nials, an th
xpr
r il r admi ion he t
same R ule a s S tatement o f C ause o f Action in Petition.

DEFENCE OF KEW MATTER. 7t9

DEFEN 'E OF

'E \V MATTER.

the declaration, as far as it went, told the trutli.^ The defence

of new matter consists, therefore, of facts, — positive facts ; and

these should be averred as carefully and with as much detail as

the facts ^\■hich constitute the cause of action and are allerjed in

the complaint. The defence of new matter depends upon the

existence of facts from which it results as truly as the cause of

action results from other facts.^ The rule for setting forth the

facts which constitute the defence is, therefore, the same as that

for setting forth the facts which constitute the cause of action.^

In each case, all the material, issuable facts which make up the

cause of action or the defence must be averred, while the detail

of mere evidentiary matter should properly be left to be used as

proofs at the trial. I need not further enlarge upon this proposi-

tion, but will illustrate it by a few judicial decisions. Thus it is

a settled rule that, when fraud is relied upon as a defence, a gen-

eral allegation charging fraud or a fraudulent intent will not

suffice: all the facts which the law requires as the elements of

fraud, and all wliicli are claimed to be the constituents of the

fraud in the particular case, must be averred ; and their absence
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may destroy the intended effect of the pleading, and shut out all

evidence in its support at the trial.*

1 Under the new procedure, in every in effect a denial of allegations in the com-

defence of new matter tliere should be, plaint presumptively within defendant's

eitlier expressly or by implication, a con- knowledge: Uisdon r. Davenport (1894),

fession that, but for such new matter, tiie 4 S. I) 555, 57 N. W. 482. See note 1,

action could be maintained ; the defence p. 757.]

must contain no denial; such denial * Jenkins t'. Long, 19 Ind. 28, 29, per

should be pleaded in a separate defence, Frazer J.: "At the common law, fraud

if at all. Moi'gan z\ Hawkeye Ins. Co., could be given in evidence under the gen-

37 Iowa, 359 ; Anson v. Dwiglit, 18 Iowa, eral issue, or under a general plea of

241. This is nothing more than the sim- fraud. But, under the code, fraud must be

pie rule that two distinct defences should specially pleaded ; and the answer of fraud

th <leclaraLion, a' far a· it w nt, told th trnth. 1 Th <l. fen
of n w matter consi , ther f r , £ facts, - p sitiv faet' · an<l.
th ·c ·h uld b averr cl a' car fully an l with a· much l tail a.·
th facts which on~titut th
au· £ a tion and ar alleg d in
th complaint. Th clef n e of new matter d l nds upon th,
xis ten e of fa ts from which it re ' ult a truly a ' the cau e of
acti n r ults from other fact 2 The rule for H tting forth th
facts which constitute th d £ nee is, therefor , th ame a' that
for etting forth the facts whi h constitute the cau e of action. 3
In each case, all t he mat rial, is 'Uable fact::; which make up the
cau e of action or the defence mu t be averred, while the detail
of mere evidentiary matter should properly be left to be u ed a.
proof at the trial. I need not further enlarge upon this propo ition, but will illustrate it by a few judicial deci ions. Thu it i
a settled rule that, when fraud is relied upon as a defence, a general allegation charging fraud or a fraudulent intent will not
suf-fice: all the facts which the law requires as the elements of
fraud, and all ·which are claimed to be the constituents of the
fraud in the particular case, must be aven cl ; and their absence
may destroy the intended effect of the pleading, and shut out all
evidence in its support at the trial. 4

not be mingled together. must contain all the elements necessary

2 ^Where an answer by way of new to be proved to make out the fraud : and

matter alleges conclusions only, it is sub- these are, that the representation must go

ject to general demurrer: Van Dyke v. to a material fact; must be made under

Doherty (1896), 6 N. D. 263, 69 isf. W. such circumstances that the party had a

200.] right to rely on it ; and it mu.st be false

^ Qlnan action for conversion, an answer to a material extent." Keller v. Johnson,

which refers to the " property mentioned 1 1 Ind. 337. In an action on notes, a

and described in the second paragraph in defence, " that he was induced to execute

plaintiff's second cause of action," is suffi- the notes mentioned by tlie fraud, covin,

ciently definite and not demurrable for and deceit of the,'' etc., was held bad on

want of certainty : Spalding v. Allred demurrer. Capuro v. Builders' Ins. Co.,

(1901), 23 Utah, 354, 64 Pac. 1100. 39 Cal. 123; Oroville & Va. E. Co. v.

New matter in the answer may heal- Plumas Cy. Sup., 37 Cal. 354; Kent r.

leged on information and belief where not Snyder, 30 Cal. 666 ; Fankboner v. Fank-

1 Under the new procedure, iu every
tlcfeucc of new matter there should Le,
either expressly or by im plication, a confession t hat, but for such new matter, the
action could be maiuLained; the defen ce
must contain no denial; such deuial
should be pleaded in a separate defence,
if at all. Morgan v. Hawkeye Ins . Co.,
37 Iowa, 359; Anson v. Dwight, 18 Iowa,
241. This is not hing more than the simple rule that two disti11ct defeuce · should
not be mingled together.
2 [Where au answer by way of new
matter alleges cnnclnsions only, it is subject to general demurrer: Van Dyke v.
Doherty (1896), 6 N. D. 26.3, 69 N. W.

in effect a denial of allegations in the complaint presumptively within defendant's
knowledge: Risdon v. Davenport (189-!),
4 S. D . 555, 57 N. W. 482. See note 1,
p . 757.J
4 Jenkins v. Long, 19 Ind. 28, 29, p r
Frazer J.: "At the common law, fraud
could be given in evidence under the g neral i ue, or und er a general plea of
fraud. But, under the code, fraud mu:t be
specially pleaded; and the an wer of fraud
mu. t contain all the elements ne<;e sary
to be proved to make ou~ the fraud : and
the e are, that the representatiou mu t go
t.o a material fact; mu t be made under
such circumstauce that the party had a
right to rely on it; and it must be false
200.J
s [Inan action forconver ion, an an wer to a material extent." Keller v. Johnson,
which refers to the " property mentioned 11 Ind. 337. In an action on note , a
and described in the second paragraph in defence, "that he was iuduced to execute
plaintiff's second cau:;e of action," is suffi- the note m ntion rl by the fraud, covin,
ciently definite and not demurrable for and deceit of the,'' etc., was held bad on
want of certainty: Spalding v. Allred demurrer. Capuro v. Builder.' Ins. Co.,
:rn Cal. 123; Oroville & Va. R. Co. 1•.
(1901) , 23 U tah, 354, 64 Pac. 1100
New matter in the an swer may be al- Plumas Cy. up., 37 Cal. 35-1; Kent 1·.
nycler, 30 Cal. 666; Fankboner v. Fankleged on information and belief where not

r:
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§ 564. * 688. Further Illustrations. Akin tO the defence of

fraud is that of duress : the facts constituting the duress must be

stated, and a mere general averment will not suffice ; as, for ex-

ample, in a suit to foreclose a mortgage given by a married

woman upon her own land, a defence that "she was induced by

the coercion of her said husbtind to execute the said mortgage/' ^

bouer, 20 lud. 62 ; Ham t>. Greve, 34 lud.

18, 21, a defence " tliat his sij^nature was

6

kin to h defen e f
th fac con ituting tl
mu t b
frau l i · ha f dur
ta e an 1 Ill r g neral a rill nt will not ·uffice ; as, f r
foreclo
a. m rtga.e;'e
n by a m rri d
, mpl in , uit
wa indu
by
w man upon h r wn land a defenc that
the c r 1011 f h r aid hu oond to xecute the a: d mor g e.' 1
. 564 .

...

Further Illustrations.

obtained by the fraud of the plaintiff,"

without stating any circumstances, was

held a nullity. Hale r. Walker. 31 Iowa,

344, 355, a defence which simply stated

tliat the contract in suit " was either false

or fraudulently so written or so done by

mistake," admitted no proof of fraud.

" In order to admit evidence of fraud,

there should, under our .system of plead-

ing, be at least a general statement of the
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facts constituting the fraud." Lefler r.

Field, 52 N. Y. 621, action for the price of

barley bargained and sold ; answer, that

the barley was bargained for by defend-

ants' agent ; that he contracted to buy

plaintiff's barley, provided it was mer-

chantable; that plaintiff represented it

good, first quality, and merchantable ;

that the agent relied on such representa-

tions ; that the barley was not merchant-

al)le, which fact was known to the plaintiff.

Alth(iugh the plaintiff went to trial on this

answer without prior objection, the Court

of Appeals held it was worthless, since it

omitted two essential elements of the fraud,

— (1) the plaintiff's intent to deceive, and

(2) that defendants were in fact deceived.

See also Cummiugs v. Thompson, 18 Minn.

246, 250, in which the rule is given as fol-

lows : " A general statement of the matters

of fact constituting the fraud is all that is

reiiuired : it is not necessary to charge

minutely all the circumstances which may

conduce to prove the general charge."

Dubois r. Ilermance, 56 N. Y. 673, 674 ;

Joest u. Williams, 42 Ind. 565, 568 ; Curry

V. Keyser, 30 Ind. 214 ; Leighton ;;. Grant,

20 Minn. 345, 354. See also Mills r.

Collins, 67 Iowa, 164; Specht v. Allen,

12 f)re. 117. In Prall v. Peters, 32 Neb.

832, an action for false representations in

the .sale of a horse, it was held that the

defences that the plaintiff.s sustained no

damage, and that they had full knowledge

of the condition of the horse when they

purchased the same, constituted new

matter.

[Nichols V. Stevens (1894), 123 Mo. 96,

25 S. W. 578 ; Fire Extinguisher Co v.

City of Perry (1899), 8 Okla. 429, 58 Pac.

635; Greiss )'. State Inv. Co. (1893), 98

Cal. 241, 33 Pac. 195; Muldoon ?•. Brown

(1899), 21 Utah, 121, 59 Pac. 720; Wilson

;•. Sullivan (1898), 17 Utah, 341, 53 Pac.

994; H. B. Clafiin Co. v. Simon (1898),

18 Utah, 153, 55 Pac. 376 ; Voorhees /•.

Fi-sher (1893), 9 Utah, 303, 34 Pac. 64;

Smith r. Estey Organ Co. (1897), 100 Ga.

628, 28 S. E. 392 ; I'aving Co. v. Botsford

(1896), 56 Kan. 532,44 Pac. 3 ; Guild r.

b uer, 20 Ind. 62; Ham v. Greve, 3-1 Ind.
l , 21, a def n e that hi . ignature wa.
btain d by th
f th plaintiff,"
without tatiun any circum tau ·e . wa"
h ltl a. nullit.''· Hale . W'alker. 31 Iowa,
. H, 35:-, a defen
which imply tated
that the contra ·t in uit " wa either fal e
r £r11u<luleutly o written or ·o done by
mi take,'' a mitted no proof of fraud.
' In order to admit evidence of fraud,
there hould, under our ystem of pleading, be at le t a general statement of the
f: ct
on. titutiug the fraud." Lefler v.
Field, 52 . Y. 621, action for the price of
barley barO'aiued and old; au wer, that
the barl y wa bargained for by defenda11t ·· agent; that he contracted to buy
plaintiff' barley, provided it was merchantable; that plaintiff repre ented it
good, ffr t quality, and merchantable;
that the agent reli don uch representation. ; that the barl y was not merchantabl , whi ch fa t wa known to the plaintiff.
Alth U"'h the plaintiff went to trial on this
an we r wit hout prior objection, the Court
of A ppc<il held it wa wort It less, ince it
mittet l tw e e ntial element of the fraud,
- {l } the plaintiff' intent to deceive, and
(2) th t de fend11.n were in fact deceived.
ee al
ummin"' o. Thomp- on, 1 Minn.
246, 256, in which the rule i given as follow · : " g u ral tatement of the matter
of fact ou:titutiug the fraud i all that i
required : it i n t nece ary to harg
minutely a ll the circum tance which may
ouduc t
pro'' the g n ral char e."
I uboi r. II rmance, 56 . Y . 673 , 674;
.foe't v. Willi m , 42 Ind. 565 , 56 ; , urry
v I'i>y.er, 30 fnd . 214; L ighton v. Grant,
:\Iin11 :J+!), :35 .
'ee al
1ill 1•.
olliu , G7 Iowa., 164; p cht v. All n,
l:l OP. 117
In Prall 1; . Pt r, 32 ... T b .
.'J:l, a11 aetio n f r fal. r pre ntation in
thr al o f a hor e, it w
h Id hat the
d f ' II ·e' that tit pla.i11tiff . U taio cl 0
<lamag , 11<l tltat th y h d full k1 owledg

of the horse when they
ame, con tituted n w
tev n ( l 94) 123 Mu. 96,

u.

42, 69

I, 5

nn .
5 0.

v. Hitt] ' 31 Ind. 119;
. v. M ormi k. 45 Cal.
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A defence of justification in an action for trespasses and other

torts must by appropriate averments identify the wrongs com-

plained of with the acts described in the answer and justified, or

else it will fail of its purpose and be worthless.^ In Indiana, the

defence of a former recovery for the same cause of action between

the same parties must set out the record of such former suit, or it

will be insuflicient and bad on demurrer.''^ The following are

some further illustrations of the general rule. A defence of jet-

tison by a common carrier on the water should allege all the facts

showing the jettison to have been necessary ; ^ a defence of usury

must narrate all the particulars of the agreement and transac-

tion ; * a defence of long-continued user or prescription should

aver that the possession or user by the defendant was adverse : ^

and the defence that the plaintiff is not the real party in interest

must state all the facts which show that legal conclusion.^

§ 565. * 689. Averments of New Matter as Basis for AfiSrmative

Helief. When the defendant sets out new matter which he relies

upon, not as defensive merely, but as the basis of affirmative re-

lief, either in the form of a strictly legal counter-claim or of an
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-equitable cross-demand, he becomes in truth an actor pro tanto :

his answer is to that extent equivalent to a cause of action

1 Gallimore v. Ammerman, 39 Iiid. 571 (contributory negligence) ; Klais v.

323; Isley v. Huber, 45 Ind. 421 ; Boaz v. Pidford, 36 id. 587 (justification by pub-

Tate, 43 Ind. 60, 71. lie officers) ; Staley v. Ivory, 65 Mo. 74

2 Norris v. Amos, 15 Ind. 365; 2 R. S., (failure of consideration) ; Foy v. Haugh-

p. 44, § 78. ton, 83 N. C. 467 (fraud) ; Hendrix v.

3 Bentley v. Bustard, 16 B. Mon. 643. Gore, 8 Ore. 406 (payment) ; Wallace v.

* Manning v. Tyler, 21 N. Y. 567, 568, Lark, 12 S. C . 576 (illegality); Kendig

and cases cited; Gaston v. McLeran, 3 v. Marble, 55 Iowa, 386 (fraud); Clayes

Ore. 389. v. Hooker, 4 Hun, 231 (usury) ; Lord i-.

A defence of ju. tification in an action for tr spa es and oth r
torts mu t by appropriaL av rments ic.lentify th wrong complain d f with th act de cribed in th answ r and justified, or
else it -vvill fail of its purp e and be worthl ss. 1 In Indiana, the
defence of a form er recov ry for th ame au ·e of action between
the am partie must et out the record f uch former suit, or it
will be in ufficient and bad on d murrer. 2 The following are
ome further illu trations of the general rule. A defence of jettison by a common carrier on the water should alleg all the facts
. bowing the jetti on to have been neces ary; 3 a defence of usury
mu 't narrate all the particulars of the agreement and transaction; 4 a defence of long-continued user or prescription should
aver that the pos ession or user by the defendant was adverse: 5
and the defence that the plaintiff i~ not the real party in interest
must state all the facts which show that legal conclusion. 6
§ 565. * 689. Averments of New Matter as Basis for Affirmative
.Relief. When the defendant sets out n e w matter which he relies
upon, not as defensive merely, but as the basis of affirmative relief, either in the form of a strictly legal counter-claim or of an
-equitable cross-demand, he becomes in truth an actor pro tanto :
his answer is to that extent equivalent to a cause of action

5 White V. Spencer, 14 N. Y. 247. Lindsay, 18 Hun, 489 (duress) ; Jones v.

6 Raymond v. Pritchard, 24 Ind. 318, Frost, 51 Ind. 69 (fraud) ; Young v. Pick-

and cases cited ; Hereth v. Smith, 33 Ind. ens, 49 id. 23 (title) ; Mahoney v. Robins,

514, and cases cited ; Shafer v. Bronen- 49 id. 146 (fraud and failure of title) ; Van

berg, 42 Ind. 89, 90; Harte v. Houchin, 50 Wy v. Clark, 50 id. 259 (fraud) ; Jones v.

Ind. 327. The following recent cases give Shaw, 67 Mo. 667 ; Keim, etc. Co. t. Avery,

additional illustrations of the text, and of 7 Neb. 54 ; Sargent v. Steubenville, etc. 11.

various defences held to have been prop- Co., 32 Ohio St. 449; Stowell ;;. Otis, 71

erlyor improperly pleaded: Becker (-.Boon, N. Y. 36 ; McKissen v. .Sherman, 51 Wis.

61 N. Y.317 (tender); Manufac. Nat. Bank 303. When the defendant must or need

V. Russell, 6 Hun, 375 (mistake) ; Bush v. not negative the exceptions in a .statute

Brown, 49 Ind. 573 (want of consideration on which his defence is based, see Ilarri.s

and duress) ; Zeidler v. Johnson, 35 Wis. v. White, 81 N. Y. 532, 546 ; Clark c.

335 (statute of limitations, hypothetical) ; Clark, 5 Hun, 340; Fleming v. People, 27

Van Trott v. Wiesse, 36 id. 439 (fraud) ; N. Y. 329.

Freeman v. Engelmann Transp. Co., 36 id.

1 Gallimore v. Ammerman , 39 Ind.
.323; Isley u. Huber, 45 Ind. 421; Boaz u.
Tate, 43 Ind . 60, 71.
2 Norris v. Amos, l!'i Ind . 365; 2 R. S .,
p. 44, § 78.
3 Bentley v. Bu tard, 16 B. Mon. 643.
4 Manning v. Tyler, 21 N. Y. 567, 568,

and cases cited; Gaston v. McLeran, 3

Ore. 389.
0

White v. Spencer, 14 N. Y. 247.
Raymond v. Pritchard, 24 Ind. 318,
and cases cited ; Hereth v. Smith, 33 TI:ld.
514, and ca es cited; Shafer v . Bronenberg, 42 Ind. 89, 90; Harte v . Houchin, 50
Ind. 327. The following recent cases girn
additional illustrations of the text, and of
various defences held to have been properly or improperly pleaded : B ecker v. Boon,
61 N. Y. 3 17 (tender); Manufac. Nat. Bank
v. Russell, 6 Hun, 375 (mistake ) ; Bush v.
Brown, 49 Ind. 573 (want of consideration
and duress ) ; Zeidler v. Johnson, 35 Wis.
.a.35 (statute of limitations, hypothetical);
Van Trott v. Wiesse, 36 id. 439 (fraud);
Freeman v. Engelmann Transp. Co., 36 id.
6

571 (contributory negligence); Klais v.
Pulford , 36 id. 587 (justificati on by public officers); Staley v. hory, 65 Mo. 74

(failure of consideration); Foy v. Haughton, 83 N. C. 467 (fraud); Hendrix v.
Gore, 8 Ore. 406 (payment); Wallace v.
Lark, 12 S. C. 576 (illegality); Kendig
v. Marble, 55 Iowa, 386 (fraud) ; Clayes
v. Hooker, 4 Hun, 231 (usury); Lord u.
Lind ay, 18 Hun, 489 (duress); Jones v.
Frost, 51 Ind. 69 (fraud); Yo un g I'. Pickens, 49 i1l. 23 (title); Mahoney v. Robins,
49 ic.l. 146 (fraud and failure of title); Yan
Wy v. Clark, 50 id. 259 (fraud); Jones v.
Shaw, 67 Mo. 667; Keim, etc. Co. v. Avcr.1·,
7 Neb. 54; Sargent v. Steubenville, etc. R.
Co., 32 Ohio St. 449; Stowell v. Otis, 71
N. Y. 36; McKi sen v. S herman, 51 Wis.
303. When the defendant must or need
not negative the exception in a statute
on which his defence is based, see Harris
v. White, 81 N. Y. 532, 546; Clark c.
Clark, 5 Hun, 340; Fleming v. People, 27

N. Y. 329.
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asserted in a complaint or petition, and is to be governed by the

same rnles. It must aver all the material, issuable facts consti-

tutinsr the risrht of action in his favor, and must demand the re-

lief legal or equitable which is sought to be obtained from the

plaintiff.^ The foregoing cases are given as illustrations and

examples of the general doctrine, and not as exhaustive of its

scope and application. The rule applies to all defences of new

matter. The material, issuable facts which constitute the defence

must be averred, so that its sufficiency in law may fully appear

on the record : the facts themselves, and not the legal conclusions

from assumed facts, are to be stated.^

II. The General Nature of New Matter ; Defences in Mitigation

of Damayes, and in Abatement.

§ 566. * 690. Introductory. The cases quoted from in the pre-

ceding section to show the judicial definition of the general de-

nial exhibit also the interpretation put by the courts upon the

a serted in a complain or
ti ion an is o be governed b the
me rule . It mu t a r all the material, i uable f ct con iuting the righ f ac ion in hi fa or, and mu t demand th r li f le al r equitable "hich i ought to be btaine fro th
lainti:fI.1 The f regoing a e ar g1v n a illu tr tion and
. ample of th c eneral doctrin and not a
e of it
cope and applica ion. The rule appli
f n w
ma ter. The m· t rial i uable fact which con ~titu
d fence
m t be a erre
o that it , uffici n y in law may full appe r
n the record: h fact th m el e nd not the legal conclu ions
from a urned fac . , are to be tated.2

term " new matter ; " and the decisions which will be cited in the

next subdivision of this section will show how that interpretation

has been applied in a great variety of particular instances. It

II.
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would be a needless labor to repeat the extracts referred to, or

the general discussion of the nature and properties of new matter.

It is elementary that a defence of new matter should be pleaded ;

and as new matter must of necessity be a distinct defence from a

denial, it follows that it cannot properly be associated or mingled

up with denials general or specific in one paragraph or plea.

For the same reason, each defence of new matter must necessa-

rily be complete and single, as much so as each cause of action, and

should be separately stated in a plea by itself. Tliis subject will

be treated of at large in a subsequent section.

§ 567. * 691. Denials and New Matter Distinguished. The

overwhelming weight of judicial opinion has with almost complete

unanimity agreed upon the principle which distinguishes denials

1 Rose V. Treadway, 4 Nev. 4.'J5 ; Hook fence in action to recover land) ; Heaston

r. Craighead, 32 Mo. 40.5; White i;. Allen, v. Cincinnati & Ft. W. R. Co., 16 Ind.

3 Ore. 103. 275. But it was held in Hunter v. Mc-

- Northrup v. Miss. Vail. Ins. Co., 47 Laughlin, 43 Ind. 38, 45, that the following

Mo. 435, 443, per Wagner .J. ; State c. wa.s a sufficient averment of a want of

Cent. Pac. R. Co., 9 Nev. 79, 87 (pay- consideration; that the notes "were given

xnent) ; Pease v. Hannah, 30 Ore. 301 (de- without any consideration whatever."

The General Nature of New Matter ,. Defence in Mitigation
of IJamagf , and in Abatern nt.

§ 566. * 690. Introductory. The ca e quotecl from in the pree ling ection to show the judicial definition of the general d nial exhibit al o the int rpretation put b r the
urt upon the
term new matter · and he deci.jon whicl will be i ed in the
next ubdivi 'ion of thi ection will how how hat interpretation
ha been applied in a reat variet) of p rticular in tance . I
would be a needl
labor to repeat the xtract r f rred to or
the general discu . ion of the nature and propertie of n w matt r.
It is elementary that a defence of n w matter hould be pleade ·
and a new matter mu t of nece ity be a di tin.ct def n e from
enial, it follow that it cannot properl be a sociat d or mingl d
up with denials general or pecific in one paragraph or plea.
or the ame rea n, each def nee f new matter mu t nece arily be complete and. in 1 , a much o
a h au e of a tion and
hould be separat ly tate in a ple by it lf. Thi
ibj t will
e treated of at large in a ub equ nt c 10n.
567. * 6 1. Denials and New Matter Distinguished.
Tb
verwh lming w ight of judi ial opinion ha with alma t ompl
unanimity agreed up n he rincipl which i in ui h denial
R ose v. Treadway, 4
v. 455; Hook
.32 Ifo. 405; Whit v. All n,
3 re. 103.
2
orthrup 1 • 1i . V all. In . o., 4 7
:\fo. 4-35, 443 per Wagner .J.; tat c.
ent. Pac. . o., 9
"· 79, 7 (pa •
m ·nt); P a e 1:. Hannah, 30 re. 301 (de1

1•. Crai~head,

fence in action ore OYer land); Heaton
'I.'in innati & t. W. R. o., 16 Ind.
275. But it wa h ld in Hunter v. McLaughlin, 43 Ind. 3 , 45, that the followin
w
a uffici nt avermen
f a want of
coo icl ration ; hat then t "wer gi en
without an· con ideratiou whateY r."
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from new matter, and detei-mines the office and function of each.^

The general denial puts in issue all the material averments of the

complaint or petition, and permits the defendant to prove any

and all facts wliich tend to negative those averments or some one

or more of them. • Whatever fact, if proved, would not thus tend

to contradict some allegation of the plaintiff's first pleading, but

would tend to establish some circumstance, transaction, or conclu-

sion of fact, not inconsistent with the truth of all those allega-

tions, is new matter.'^ It is said to be " new,'' because it is not

embraced within the statements of fact made by the plaintiff ; it

exists outside of the narrative which he has given ; and proving

it to be true does 7iot disprove a single averment of fact in the

complaint or petition, but merely prevents or destroys the legal

conclusion as to the plaintiff's rights and the defendant's duties

which would otherwise liave resulted from all those averments

admitted or proved to be true. Such is the nature of the new

matter wliich cannot be presented by means of a denial, but must

be specially pleaded, so that the plaintiff may be informed of its

existence and of the use to be made of it by the defendant.^
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Whether it is " new " in the sense described must of necessity

depend, and depend alone, upon the nature, extent, and variety

of the material allegations which the plaintiff inserts in his plead-

ing. I shall not repeat the observations upon this point contained

in the preceding section, and simply remark that the plaintiff

may, by making unnecessary although material averments in his

complaint or petition, greatly enlarge the scope of the general

denial, and prevent those defensive facts from being in liis case

new matter, which in another case, and from the operation of a

more scientific and correct mode of pleading, would clearly be

1 [^Matter specially pleaded, if adniis- Neb. 436 ; Burlingtou & Mo. Riv. R. Co.

sible under the general deuial, should be r. Lancaster Cy. Com 'rs, 7 id. 33 ; Swenson

stricken out as redundant : Bolton u. Mis- v. Cresop, 28 Ohio St. 668.

souri Pac. Ry. Co. (1902), 172 Mo. 92, 72 [^See Kingsbury v. Chicago, etc. Ry.

S. W. 530; Kirtou v. Bull (1902), 168 Mo. Co. (1897), 104 la. 63, 73 N. W. 477,forau

622, 68 S. W. 927. But it does not render interesting application of this distinction.]

the pleading demurrable : Staten Island, ° C^ady c. South Omaha Nat. Bank

etc. Ry. Co. v. Hinchliffe (1902), 170 N. Y. (1896), 46 Neb. 7.56, 65 N. W. 906; Gran

473, 63 N. E. 545.] v. Houston (1895), 45 Neb. 813, 64 N. W.

2 The following recent decisions illus- 245; Home Fire Ins. Co. ii. Berg (1896),

trate the te.xt : Roe v. Angevine, 7 Hun, 46 Neb. 600, 65 N. W. 780 ; Medland v.

679 ; Read v. Decker, 5 id. 646 ; Douglas Conuell (1898), 57 Neb. 10, 77 N. W. 437 ;

;;. Haber.stro, 25 id. 262 ; Saunders ?;. Cham- Denney v. Stout (1900), 59 Neb. 731, 82

from new matter, and determin the offi. and fun ti n of n.eh. 1
The g n ral denial I ut in i. ·u all th ma rial a rm nt · of th e
complaint r p tition, and l rmi
l f ndant to pro e any
and all fa ts which ten l to negative th · <W"rm nt. rs me on
or m r f th m. Whatever fact, if prov d, would n t thu tend
to ontradict some all gation f the plaintiff's first pl ading, but
would teml to stablish some circumstance, transaction, or conclu'ion of fact, n t inconsistent with the truth of all tho e all gation~ , i n w rnatter.2 It is aid to be "new,., b ause it i not
' embraced within the statements of fact made by th plaintiff; it
' exists outsid of the narrative which he ha given; and proving
it to be true do es not disprove a single averment of fact in the
complaint or petition, but merely prevents or destroys the legal
conclusion as to the plaintiff's right' and the defendant's duties
which would otherwise have resulted from all tho e averment ·
admitted or proved to be trne. Such is the nature of the new
matter which cannot be presented by means of a denial, but mu t
be specially pleaded, so that the plaintiff may be informed of it
existence and of the use to be made of it by the defendant. 3
vVhether it is "new" in the ense described must of necessity
depend, and depend alone, upon the nature, extent, and variety
of the material allegations which the plaintiff inserts in his pleading. I shall not repeat the ob 'ervations upon thi point contained
in the preceding section, and simply remark that the plaintiff
ma,y, by making unnecessary although material averments in bis
complaint or petition, greatly enlarge the cope of the general
denial, and prevent those defensive facts from being in his ca e
new matter, which in another case, and from the operation of a
more scientific and correct mode of pleading, would clearly be

berlaiu, 13 id. 568; Allen v. Saunders, 6 N. W.18.]

1 [Matter pecially pleaded, if aclmiss1ble under the general denial, should be
stricken out a redundant: Bolton v. Mi souri Pac. Ry. Co. (1902), li2 Mo. 92, i2
S. W. 530; l\irton v. Bull (1902), 168 ~Io.
622, 68 . W. 927. But it does not render
the pleading <lemurrable: Staten I land,
etc. Ry. Co. v. Hinchliffe (1902), 170 N. Y.
473, 63 N. E. 545.]
2 The following recent decision illu trate the text: Roe v. Angevine, i Hun,
679; Read v. Decker, 5 id. 646; Douglas
v. Haberstro, 25 id. 262; Saunders v. Chamberlain, 13 id. 568; Allen v. Sauml rs, 6

Neb. 436; Burlington & fo. Riv. R. Co.
v. Lancaster Cy. Com'rs, 7 id. 33; wenson
v. Cresop, 28 Ohio t. 668.
[See Kingsbury v. Chicago, etc. Ry.
Co. ( 1897), 104 Ia. 63, 73 N. W. 477, for an
interesting application of this distinction.]
a [ Cady v. South Omaha Nat. Bank
(1896), 46 Neb. 756, 65 N. W. 906; Gran
v. Houston (1895), 45 Neb. 813, 64 N. W.
245; Home Fire In·. Co. v. Berg (1896),
46 Neb. 600, 65 N. W. 7 0; Medland v.
Connell (189 ), 57 Neb. 10, 77 N. W. 4,37 ;
Denney v. Stout (1900), 59 Neb. i3l, 2
N. W. l .]
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new matter. The criterion under the code system is not, there-

fore, in evert/ case, the intrinsic, essential nature of the defence

itself proposed by the defendant : it is to be found rather in the

frame of the complaint or petition, in the material statements of

fact made by the plaintiff therein. It cannot then be said, for

example, that '• payment " is always new matter ; for tlie plaintiff

may so construct his complaint that facts showing payment will

be directly contradictory of a material averment embraced within

it, and tlierefore plainly admissible under the general denial. It

is impossible for tliis reason to collect, arrange, and classify a

mass of different defences, and sa}^ of them, as could be said

under the old system, that they are all necessarily by way of con-

fession and avoidance, and therefore all of necessity " new matter."

§ 568. * (>92. New Matter as Confession and Avoidance. It fol-

lows from the foregoing discussion, tliat considering the office

and function of the general denial, and the distinction between it

and new matter, the latter confesses and avoids all the material

allegations of the comjylaint or petition; that is, it admits all the

material facts averred therein, and avoids their legal result by
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means of the additional facts which are relied upon as constitut-

ing the defence.! A particular defence may therefore, w\\ei\ set

up in answer to one complaint, be new matter, and require to be

pleaded: the same kind of defence, when set up in answer to

another complaint, may not be new matter, but may ba proved

under the general denial without being specially pleaded. Un-

doubtedly the defence of payment in its various phases is the one

which most frequently assumes this double aspect; but the prin-

ciple plainly applies to other defences, and is general. This de-

scription of new matter and the discussion of its nature will be so

fully illustrated by the cases to be cited in the following subdivi-

sion of the present section, that none need now be quoted in sup-

port of the foregoing positions. There are, however, two special

classes of defences, which, though embraced under the denomina-

tion of new matter, are so peculiar, and so radically different

from all others of that name, that they require a separate mention,

— defences in mitigation of damages, and defences in abatement.

1 QJohnson v. Hesser (1901), 61 Neb. North Neb. Fair, etc. Ass'n v. Box (1899),

631, 85 N. W. 894; Home Fire Ins. Co. v. 57 Neb. 302, 77 N. W. 770; Jack.soii r.

•lohansen (1899), 59 Neb. 349, 80 N. W. School Dist. (1900), 110 la. 313, 81 N. W .

1047; Txiwe r Prospect Hill Cemetery 596.]

Ass'n (1899), 58 Neb. 94, 78 N. W. 488;

The criterion under th ode y tem i n ot h er em very ca e th in rinsi
nti 1 na ure of h def n e
u. b the d f ndant : it i 0 b found ra h r in h e
c mplain or p titi n, in th ma er ial ·tat men t · f
b · th plain iff th r in. It ann t then b
id f r
th.at• · pa ·men ' i alwa ·· n w mat r · for h
may
· n tru(; hi· complaint that fact· h wina l ym
Le <l.ir tly · ntra. li1.; r.T of a mat rial av rment mbr, eel within
it arnl th r f r i lainl · a<lmi · ibl und r th
n n l d ni· 1. It
i · imp
for th. , r ·i on t · 11 t anange, and cl ify a
ma'"' f cliff r n'" l fenc
anu ·a
£ ,_h lJ.1 a
u hl b
id
und r th
bat t h e ar all nece · aril · b way of conf 1011 an
u w m a tt r. '
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allegation. of the complaint or petition; th t i it admit all h
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averred herein and av id their 1 ;al r · ult by
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§ 569. * 693. Defences in Mitigation of Damages. Common-Law

Theory. The theory of the cominoii hiw in respect of full and

partial defences has already been stated. ^ Each defence in bar

by way of confession and avoidance must have been a complete

answer to the whole cause of action. Facts which fell short of

that result, but which constituted a partial answer, were not

regarded as true "defences." As they did not defeat a recov-

ery, but always allowed a judgment for at least nominal dam-

ages, the severe logic of the system did not suffer them to be

pleaded separately in the form of a bar. This logic demanded

a perfect issue upon the record, — an assertion on the one side,

and a complete denial thereof on the other, — or else the record

admitted the plaintiff's right to recover. If the defendant

should plead facts which constituted a partial defence merely,

there would be no issue, and the common-law devotion to logical

forms could not admit such a violation of its theory. As the

partial defences, if pleaded, would raise no issue, the rule was

adopted that they should not be pleaded, but that the general

issue should be interposed, and the facts constituting them
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should be given in evidence under that answer. Matters in

mitigation are partial defences, and it became the settled doc-

trine of the former procedure that they were to be proved under

the general issue. Mitigating circumstances were not confined

to actions for torts, to "trespass," "case," or "trover:" they

were possible and proper as well in actions upon contract, in

"covenant" and "assumpsit." Part payment was of course such

a circumstance ; and even full payment might be proved in miti-

gation, reducing the plaintiff's recovery to nominal damages.

§ 570. * 694. Theory of the Codes as to Pleading Matter in Miti-

gation. The common-law logic does not control the forms of

pleading and of the issues under the present system. The notion

of a partial defence on the record of an answer which does not

go to the whole cause of action, is neither opposed to the spirit

nor to the letter of the codes ; on the contrary, it is in full har-

mony with the spirit, and seems to be demanded by the letter.

The obvious intent of the system — the central conception — is

not an observance of logical forms, but that the facts which con-

stitute the plaintiff's cause of action, and the defendant's resist-

ance thereto, shall be stated in a plain and concise manner, in

1 See supra, §§ * 607, * 008.

569.

* 693.

Defences in Mitigation of Dama ges.

Common-Law

Theory. The theory of the ommon law ·u re 'P ct of full and
partial dd nc · ha alr ady u 11 ' tated . 1 ~ aeh def uc in bar
by way £ onf , ion an l av i<lance mu t have L n a compl te
an w r to th whole au e f a tion. Facts whi h f 11 hort of
that r ult, but which con titut d a partial an wer, were not
regarded as tru 'defence . " A they did not defeat a recovery ut always allowed a judgment for at 1 ast nominal damage the severe logic of the sy tem did not suffer them to be
pleaded separately in the form of a bar. This logic demanded
a perfect i ue upon the record, - an as ertion on the one side,
and a complete denial thereof on the other, - or el e .the record
admitted the plaintiff's right to recover.
If the defendant
hould plead facts which con tituted a partial defence merely,
there would be no issue, and the common-law devotion to logi cal
forms could not admit such a violation of its theory. As the
partial defences, if pleaded, would raise no issue, the r ul e was
adopted that they should not be pleaded, but that the general
is ue should be interposed, and the facts constituting them
hould be given in evidence under that answer. Matters in
mitigation are partial defences, and it became the settled doctrine of the former procedure that they were .to be proved under
the general iss ue. Mitigating circumstances were not confined
to actions for torts, to " trespass," " case," or "trover: " they
were possible and proper as well in actions upon contract, in
"covenant" and "assump it. " Part payment was of course such
a circum:stance ; and even full payment might be proved in mitigation, reducing th e plaintiff's recovery to nominal damages.
§ 570. * 694. Theory of the Codes as to Pleading Matter in Mitigation. The common-l aw logic does not control the forms of
pleading and of the issues under the present system. The notion
of a partial defence on the record of an answer which does not
go to the whole cause of action, is neither opposed to the spirit
nor to the letter of the codes; on the contrary, it i in full harmony with the spirit, and eems to be demanded by the letter.
The obviou intent of the ystem - the central conception - is
not an obt-:ervance of logical forms, but that the facts which contitute the plaintiff's cause of action, and the defendant's resistance thereto, shall be stated in a plain and concise manner, in
l

See supra, §§

* 607, * 608.
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ordinary language, without reference to any technical require-

ments of form or theory. The very primary design of the

procedure is that the truth as it is between the parties must

be first alleged, and then proved. The letter carries out this

spirit, because it requires that the answer must contain (1) the

denials, and (2) a statement of ant/ new matter constituting a

defence and that tlie defendant may set fortli as many defences

as he shall have. No other clauses of the statute limit tlys gen-

eral language, or restrict it to entire defences. From the nature

of the case, when a complaint or petition is in an ordinary form,

containing only the averments necessary to state the cause of

action, facts in mitigation of damages must be new matter

rather than denials. It follows that the fair and obvious in-

terpretation of the codes not only permits but requires that this

class of defences, when they are new matter, should be pleaded.^

It is clearly contrary to the entire theory of the system that ani/

new matter, however incomplete may be its effect upon the plain-

tiff's recovery, should be proved under a denial: there is not the

slightest warrant for such a use to be made of the general denial,
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whatever may have been the function of the general issue in

this respect. In interpreting the language of the codes, all the

common -law notions as to the impossibility of pleading partial

defences should be wholly rejected; for they were based upon

reasons purely technical and arbitrary, — mere formulas of verbal

logic without any real meaning. The statute should be construed

in its own spirit as an independent creation, and not in the light

of ancient dogmas which it was designed to supersede. I need

not collate and compare the various provisions of the code bear-

ing upon the question in order to establish the textual interpre-

tation. Nothing can be added to the demonstration which Mr.

Justice Selden has worked out in the opinion already mentioned

and quoted at length in the preceding section, and that opinion

has not been and cannot be answered.^

1 [[This rule is supported by tlie fol- Matter pleaded in mitigation is not

lowing cases : Reed v. Union Central Life objectionable because it would not justify :

Ins. Co. (1900), 21 Utah, 295, 61 Pac. 21 ; Conley v. Arnold (1894), 93 Ga. 823, 20

Vierling I'. Binder (1901), 113 la. 337, 85 S. E. 762. And matter in justification

N. W. 621, citing the text; Smith v. cannot be available in mitigation unless

Bowers (1902), Neb., 89 N. W. 596; Lati- so pleaded: Jenks v. Lansing Lumber Co.

mer v. York Cotton Mills (1903), 66 S. C. (1896). 97 la. 342, 66 N. W. 2.T1.]

135, 44 S. E. 559. -' McKvring v. Bull, 16 N. Y. 304.

rdinar · languag without reference to an technical requir ment of form or th or .
be ' ry primary
sign of the
proc dure is that the truth a it i bet\ n h partie mu t
b fir t alle e and then
ve l. Th 1 tt r carri s out thi
it r quire
th an w r must ontain (1) th
denial and c..;,J a tat m nt f any n w ma ter c n tituting a
defenc and that th d f n<lant ma. et forth a man ' def nc
a h hall have. No otb r clau ~ of the tatute Ii it tbj. genral lan 0 uag or re trict it to entir d fence . Fr m the na ur
of the a e wh n a complaint r peti ion i in an ordinary form
containing only the averment n e ary o sta
he cau e of
action facts in mitigation f <lamag s mu. t b n w matter
rather than d nial . It follow that the fair and obviou interpretation of the codes not only permit but requir tba.t tbi
cla of defence when t1 ey are new matt r, houlu b plead d. 1
It is clearly contrary to the entire theory of the
t m that any
new mat er however incomplete may be it ffect up n the plain-.
tiff recovery, hould be proved under a denial : th re i not the
·lighte t warrant for uch a use to be made of the gen ral denial
whatever may have been the function of the general i ue in
hi respect. In interpreting th language of th code all be
common -law notion as to the impo ·sibili y of 1 ading partial
l fence hould be wholly rejected · for they w re ba ed ur on
reason purely technical and arbitrary, - mere formula of v rbal
logic without any real meaning. The statut should b con tru d
in it o n pirit a an in lepenuent creation, and not in the light
of ancient dogma which it wa de igned to up r de . I n e
not collate an<l compare the variou provi ion of th
ode b aring up n he qu :tion in or l r to establi h the t xtual interpretation.
thing can be added t the dem n trati n which Mr .
.Ju tice
ld n ha worke l out in th opinion alr ad men ione
and quote at 1 nO'th in th pr c ding c 10n an tha opinion
has not been and cannot be an ered. 2
1 [Thi
rule i . upported by th f }.
lowing ca e : Re d v. Union entral Lif
Ins. Co. (l 900), 21 tah, 295, 61 Pa . 21;
Vierling v. Bind r (1901 ), 113 Ia. 337, 5
W. 621, citing he text; mi th v.
Bower (1902),
b., 9· :r. W. 596; Latim r v. York C'otton ~!ills (1903), 66
1:35, 44
E . 559.
• T.

I

•

[a ter pl ad cl in mitigation i not
bjectionable be au e it would not ju tify :
onl , v. Arn ld (1 94), 93 a. 23 , 20
, . E. 762. And matter in ju tifi ati n
annot b available in mitigation unl
o µl aded: J nk v. Lan ing Lumb r Co.
( 1 96), 97 la. 342, 66 . w. .'31.]
2 ~!cl yring t:. Bull, 16 N. Y. 304
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§ 571. * 695. New York Doctrine as to Pleading Matter in

Mitigation. On principle, then, all defences in mitigation of

damages, when they consist of new matter, should be pleaded,

and cannot be proved, under the general denial. How does the

question stand upon authority? It is, of course, put at rest in

New York by the decision of the tribunal of last resort in

McKyring v. Bull.^ The ratio decidendi of that case is uni-

versal in its application: it is not confined to the defence of pay-

ment; the argument embraces all instances of mitigation, for it

is not based upon the particular nature of any defence, but upon

an interpretation of the language used by the legislature. This

decision has been followed by other courts and in other States,

but the cases are not unanimous: in some, the ancient common-

law dogmas have been appealed to and accepted as controlling.

I will collect the more important of these adjudications. A

defence in mitigation having been pleaded to an action for

false arrest and imprisonment, the Supreme Court of New

York, in denying a motion to strike out the answer, said: "It

has been held in several cases that mitigating circumstances in
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actions of this nature may be proved without being set up, if

admissible in evidence at all. Whatever weight may be given

to these authorities, I am inclined to think that the case of

Foland v. Johnson,'-^ which was decided by the general term of

this district, settles the question in favor of the doctrine that

mitigating circumstances may be set up by way of answer in a

case like the present one. "^ In Foland v. Johnson,* which was

an action for assault and battery and false imprisonment, it was

held that a separate defence in mitigation was proper. McKyring

V. Bull was distinctly recognized as overruling previous cases,

and as laying down the universal rule of interpretation for all

causes of action and defences. It had been said in several early

New York cases that matter in mitigation cannot be pleaded,

but must be proved under a general denial : these decisions were

all pronounced before that made in McKyring v. Bull, and must

1 McKyring v. Bull, 16 N. Y. 304. See - Foland v. Johnson, 16 Abb. Pr. 235,

supra, §§ *6.'i8, *659. See also Wilbour 239.

V. Hill, 72 N. Y. 36, 38 ; Spooner v. Keeler, ^ Beckett v. Lawrence, 7 Abb. Pr. n. s.

nl id. 527; Wachter v. Quenzer, 29 id. 403,405.

547. Compare Wandell r. Edwards, 25 ^ Foland v. Johnson, 16 Abb. Pr. 235,

Hun, 498; Jauch v. Jauch, 50 Ind. 239.

135.
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* 695.

New York Doctrine as to Pleading Matter in

Mitigation. On principle, then, all defences ·in mitigation of
damag , when th y consi t f n w matter, hould be pleaded,
and cannot be proved und r the general d nial. How do s the
que tion stand upon authority? It i , of cour , put at re t in
New 1'. ork by the d ci ion of tbe tribunal of la ' t re ort in
McKyring v . Bull. 1 The ratio decidendi of that ca e i univer al in its application: it i not confined to the defence of payment; the argument embrace all instances of mitigation, for it
is not based upon the particular nature of any defence, but upon
an interpretation of the language u ed by the legislature. Thi
deci ion has been followed by other courts and in other State ,
but the cases are not unanimous: in some, the ancient commonlaw dogmas have been appealed to and accepted a controlling.
I will collect the more important of these adjudications. A
defence in mitigation having been pleaded to an action for
fal e arrest and imprisonment, the Supreme Court of New
York, in denying a motion to strike out the answer, said: "It
ha been held in several cases that mitigating circumstances in
actions of this nature may be proved without being set up, if
admi ible in evidence at all. Whatever wel.ght may be given
to the e authorities, I am inclined to think that the case of
Foland v. Johnson, 2 which was decided by the general term of
thi di trict, settles the question in favor of the doctrine that
mi.tigating circumstances may be set up by way of answer in a
case like the present one." 3 In Foland v. Johnson, 4 which was
an action for assault and battery and false imprisonment, it was
held that a separate defance in mitigation was proper. McKyring
v. Bull was distinctly re~ognized as overruling previous cases,
and as laying down the universal rule of interpretation for all
causes of action and defences. It had been said in several early
New York cases that matter in mitigation cannot be pleade<l,
but must be proved under a general denial: these decisions were
all pronounced before that made in McKyring v. Bull, and must
1 McKyring v. Bull, 16 N. Y. 304.
ee
supra, §§ *65 , *659.
ee al o Wilbour
r . Hill, 72 N . Y. 36, 3 ; Spoon er v. K eeler,
51 id. 527 ; Wachter v. Quenzer, 29 id.
547 . Compare Wandell v. Edwards, 25
Hun, 49 ; Jauch v. Jauch, 50 Ind.

13.5.

2 Foland v. John on, 16 .A.bb. Pr. 235,
239.
a Beckett v. Lawrence, 7 Abb. Pr. N . •
403, 405.
4 lfoland v. John on, 16 Abb. Pr. 235 ,
239.
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therefore be considered as overruled.^ There is a dictum in

Travis v. Barger,^ to the effect that circumstances in mitigation

may be proved under the general denial ; but the facts did not

call for any decision. The proposition was stated by the judge

arc)uendo. and the opinion itself was prior to the announcement

of the contrary doctiine by the Court of Appeals.

§ 572. * 696. Doctrine in Indiana and Kentucky. In Indiana

the common-law dogma is still adhered to. The rule as stated

by the Supreme Court of that State is, that " matter in mitiga-

tion only cannot be specially pleaded or set up by way of answer,

but may be given in evidence under the general denial. We

know of no authority, either at coiumon law or by statute, allow-

ing matters in mitigation only, except in actions for libel and

slander, to be specially pleaded or set up in the answer."^ In

1 Saltus V. Kip, .5 Duer, 646 (Sp. Term) ;

Kneedler v. Sternbergh, 10 How. Pr. 67

(Sp. Term); Dunlap v. Snyder, 17 Barb.

561 ; Anonymous, 8 How. Pr. 434 (Sp.
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Term) ; Gilbert v. Rounds, 14 How. Pr.

46; Lane /•. Gilbert, 9 How. Pr. 1.50.

her fore be con i lered a OY rruled . 1 Th r
a lictum in
2
TraYi v. Barger, to the effect tha circum anceN in miti 0 ati n
may be pr Yecl under the gen ral d nial · but the fact lid n t
all or ariy l
n . Th
r po i ion v.-a tatecl by th ju lge
piuion it elf wa pri r t the ann uncem nt
ctrine • th
urt f ppea1 .
572. *
Doctrine in I ndiana and Kentuc ky. In Indiana
he comm n -lc ;v dogma i ..,till adher d to.
he rul a tat l
hr the upr m
ourt of hat tat i that
tion onl - cannot b p cially plead cl or t np by wa f an ~ · r
l ut may be iY n in vidence under the g neral denial.
know of no authority ith r at ommon law or b tatute, all w·i n matt r in mitiga ion only xcept in a tion for libel · nd
·. . ander to e pecially plead cl r et ur in the an er.'' 3 In

- Travis v. Barger, 24 Barb. 614, 623,

per Birdseye J. There are New York

oases, however, subsequent to McKyring

V Bull, which utterly disregard it, and

might be considered as overruling it,

were it possible for a lower court, an<l a

siugle judge quoting himself as authority,

to overrule tlie decisions of a higlier tri-

bunal. In Harter v. Grill, 33 Barb. 283,

per Morgan J., which was an action for

criminal conversation, it was held that

facts in mitigation could be proved under

the general denial. McKyring v. Bull was

mentioned, and its authority was denied

because the mitigatinu circumstances di<l

not constitute a defence. It was said

that the section requiring new matter to

be pleaxled (§149 of the New York Code)

includes only those cases in which the

facts to be alleged amount to a complete

defence. In short, the entire argument,

the whole cour.se of reasoning approved

by the court of la.st resort, was disregarded.

No analysis or comparison of other sec-

tions and pa.s.sages bearing upon the ques-

tion was made : the results reached by

the Court of Appeals, after a most careful

examination of the text of the statute

aided by the light of experience, were

overturned by a bare assertion. Finally,

in Tompkins'r. Wadley, 3 N Y. S. C. 424.

430, per Morgan J., which was an action

for the breach of a promise to marry, evi-

dence in mitigation was held admissible

under tiie general denial. The same

judge again delivered the opinion, and

1
altu v. Ki p, 5 Duer, 646 ( p. Term)·
Kneedler v. "ternhergh, 10 How. l: r. 67
(. p. T erm); Dunlap v. nyder, 17 Barb.
561; Anonymou ,
Ilow. r. 434 ( , p.
Term); Gilbert v. Round , 14 H ow. Pr.
46 · Lan e r. Gilbert, 9 How. I 1 r. 150.
2 Travi
v. Barger 24 Barb. 61-t, 623,
per Bird eye J . There are -ew York
cru .. howev r, ·ub. equent to l cK yring
v Bull, which utterly cli regard it, and
might be con i<lered a ' overruling it,
were it po ible for a lower court, and a
ingle judge quoting him elf a authority,
t overrule the deci ion of a high er t rih nna1. In Harter v. rill , 33 Barb. 2 3,
per Morgan .J., which was an a tion for
cri minal conver ation, it was held that
fact in mitigation could be proved und r
the general denial.
lcKyring v. Bull wa ·
mentioned, and it authority wa denied
becau e the miti gating ircum tance ditl
not on ·titute a cl fenc . Jt ' a
aid
hat the ction r qu iring n ew matter to
b pleade<l (§ 149 f the
in ·1u<lCJ onl.v tho e n
in whi h the
fac t to I e a11eg cl amount to a omplete
def n<' . In hor , h
ntire argnmeu ,
the whole cour. e f reason in approY rl
Ly the cour of 1ru t r ort, wa di r ard cl.
~o analy i or compari on of oth r
ction and pa age h aring upon th qu tion wa mad · th re ult reached b~
h
cm rt of A pp al , a ft r a m . t ar fol
tatute
xami1Jation of the t x of th

o\·erturnecl by a bare a ertion. Finau~-,
in T ompkin, v . Wadley, 3 N Y. . . -:1-2-!..
430, per i\Iorgan J., which wa an action
for the breach of a promi.e to marry. Yi<lence in mitiga ion was h eld admi· ible
uu <.e r the general denial. The ame
juclue again delfrered the opinion , aud
cited I-farter v. rill , Tra,·i r . Baruer, 24.
Barb. 614, 6:23, and K niffen v. fc onuell,
30 N. Y. 290, in upport f hi p . ition,
l\lcKyrinu v. Bull not b ing menti necl.
The two former ca e ha e air ady be n
omm nte<l u pon. In he h ad-note of
Kn iffen v. Mc onnell, the r porter tate
that' it se ms matter in miti ation may
he pr Y d under the geueral d nial;" but
ther i. nothing in the opinion of the court
which furui he the lighte t warrant for
eY n that guarded tatement. The doctrine of the text i therefore fully w tain d by judicial authority iu Ne\\" Y rk.
The two op ini on of fr. Ju tice 1\f r uan
can hardl.1· be r gard d
overturning
the judgm nt pronounced hy th ril n:ll
f final r . rt; and the argum nt f l\I r .
Ju. ti
, l<len i
ertainly unan wered

E.

cited Harter v. Crill. Travis i\ Barger, 24

Barb. 614, 623, and Kniffen v. McConnell,

30 N. Y. 290, in support of his position,

McKyring v. Bull not being mentioned.

The two former cases have already been

commented upon. In the head-note of

Kniffen v. McConnell, the reporter states

that " /f seems matter in mitigation may

be proved under the general denial ; " but

there is nothing in the ojjiniou of the court

which furuislies the slightest warrant for

even that guarded statement. The doc-

t'.

DEFE ..:'E

IX :m TI -' ATI

....

79

DEFENCES IN MITIGATION. 799

Kentucky it would seem that a partial defence in mitigation

should be pleaded.^ The codes expressly authorize mitigating

circumstances to be pleaded in actions for libel or slander. 2

§ 573. * 697. Defences iu Abatement. Common-Law Doctrine.

At the common law, all pleas were divided into two general

classes, — those "in bar '' and those "in abatement." "When-

ever the subject-matter of the defence is, that the plaintiff cannot

maintain any action at any time, whether present or future, in

respect of the supposed cause of action, it may and usually must

be pleaded in bar ; but matter which merely defeats the present

proceeding, and does not show that the plaintiff is forever con-

cluded, should in general be pleaded in abatement.''' ^ The most

common defences in the present system analogous to the ancient

pleas in abatement are those which set up want of jurisdiction in

the court, or a present want of legal capacity in the plaintiff to

sue, or a defect of parties, or the pendency of another action.

There was a marked difference between these two classes of pleas

at the common law, and certain special rules regulating the use

of those in abatement. Among these rules, the following were
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important. A plea in abatement could not be joined with one

in bar in answer to the same subject-matter; but the former must

be pleaded by way of introduction, and must be disposed of before

a plea in bar could be interposed. As a consequence, the plead-

ing a defence in bar waived all defences in abatement to the same

matter. The judgments rendered upon the two classes of pleas

were different: for the one simply dismissed that suit, and did

not prevent the plaintiff from commencing another; while the

other ended the judicial controversy in respect to the subject-

matter involved.

§ 574. * 698. Formal Distinctions bet^ween Pleas in Abatement

and in Bar Removed by the Codes. There are in the new pro-

Drew (1897), 117 Cal. 305, 49 Pac. 189, erty, 35 Wis. 150, 161, 162; Wilson v.

holding that where, hy the same act Noonan, 35 Wis. 321, 348, 349. See

which causes damage to the plaintiff, Desmond v. Brown, 33 Iowa, 13.

some benefit also results, such incidental - [^See Haynes v. Spokane Chronicle

benefit need not be pleaded by the Pub. Co. (1895), 11 Wash. 503, 39 Pac.

defendant.] " 969 ; Craver v. Norton (1901), 114 la. 46,

1 Hackett v. Schad, 3 Bush, 353, 355, 86 N. W. 54 ; Fenstermaker v. Tribune

per Robertson J. Mitigating facts and Pub. Co. (1895), 12 Utah, 439, 43 Pac.

circumstances must be pleaded in actions 112; s. c. (1896) 13 Utah, 532, 45 Pat

for libel or slander, and cannot be proved 1097 ]

under a general denial. Langtou v. Hag- ^ 1 Ch. PI. 446.

K ntucky it would
em tlrn a partial cl f nc in mitigation
1
·houlcl b plead cl.
Th c l s xpr ly authoriz mitigating
cir um tanc s to be pl ad d in a tion for lib 1 or lan<l r. 2
· 573. * 97. Defences in Abatement. Common-Law Doctrine
At th common law all pl a were clivi<l cl int tw g n ral
la
, - those ' in bar ' and tho e ' in abatem nt.
'\Vl nv r the subject-matter f he cl fe nce i that the plaintiff annot
maintain any action at any time, wh ther pre 'ent or futur , in
r spe t of the supposed cau of action, it may and usually must
be pleaded in bar,· but matter which merely def ats the pre 'ent
proceeding, and does not show that the plaintiff is forev r concluded, should in g neral be pl acled in abatement." 3 The mo t
common defences in the pre ent y tern analogou to th ancient
plea in abatement are those which et up want of juri diction in
the court, or a present want of legal capacity in the plaintiff to
ue, or a defect of parties, or the pendency of another action.
There was a marked difference between these two classes of plea ·
at the common law, and certain special rules regulating the u e
of tho e in abatement. Among these rules, the following were
important. A plea in abatement conld not be 3oined with one
in bar in answer to the same subject-matter; but the former must
be pleaded by way of introduction, and must be disposed of before
a plea in bar could be interposed. As a consequence, the pleading a defence in bar waived all defences in abatement to the same
matter. The judgments rendered upon the two classes of plea
were different: for the one simply dismissed that suit, and did
not prevent the plaintiff from commencing another; while the
other ended the judicial controversy in respect to the subjectmatter involved.
§ 574. * 698. Formal Distinctions between Pleas in Abatement
and in Bar Removed by the Codes. There are 1n the new proDrew (1 897), 117 Cal. 305, 49 Pac. 189, erty, 35 Wis. 150, 161, 162; Wil on v.
holding that where, by the same act Noonan, 35 Wi . 321, 34 , 349. See
which causes damage to the plaintiff, Desmond v. Brown, 33 Iowa, 13.
2 [ See Haynes v. Spokane Chronicle
some benefit also re~mlts, uch incidental
benefit need not be pleaded by the Pub. Co. (1895), 11 Wah. 503, 39 Pac.
defendant.]
969; Craver v. Norton (1901), 114 Ia. 46 ,
1 Hackett v. Schad, 3 Bu b, 353, 355,
6 N. W. 54; Fenstermaker v. Tribune
per Robert on J. Mitigating facts and Pub. Co. (1 95), 12 Utah, 439, 43 P ac.
circumstances must be pleaded in actions 112; . c. (1 96) 13 Utah, 532, 45 Pac.
for li bel or lander, and cannot be proved 1097 J
s 1 Ch. Pl. 446.
under a general denial. Langton v. Hag-
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cedure no such divisions and classes. ^ Defences still exist of

the same essential nature as those which were formerly set up

l)y means of a plea in abatement, and a judgment thereon in

favor of the defendant does not forever bar the plaintiff from the

farther prosecution of his demand. They are governed, how-

ever, by the same rules of procedure that regulate all the other

defences which may be relied upon by a defendant. There is no

difference in the methods of pleading them, of trying them, or

of adjudicating upon them : ^ the only difference is in respect to

the conclusive effects of the judgments rendered upon them.^

In other words, so far as concerns the manner of alleging and

of trial, all distinctions between these two classes of defences

have been abolished, and both have been placed in the same

category.* All defences which are analogous to the ancient pleas

1 Qlt has been held, however, in the

followiug cases that an answer to the

merits waives a plea in abatement : (Cham-

berlain V. Hibbard (1894), 26 Ore. 428, 38
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Pac. 437 ; Fort v. Penny (1898), 122 N. C.

230, 29 S. E. 362 ; Earle'r. Say re ( 1 896 ) , 99

1
uch di Yi i n nd cla
f nee
till exi t of
e en ial natur a. tho whi h w r f rm rly set ur
L} m an
f a pl a in abat m nt nd a judbm nt th r on in
fa.Yor f the d f n an <lo no f rev r b r th plaintiff from the
forth r
f
m nd. Th y ar g v rn d, howpro dur that r gulate all the oth r
r by b am rul
which ma ' b r li d up n by a defendant. Tl re is no
diff ren in the rn th d of pl aclin th m of trying them, or
of a lju i atinb upon them: 2 th only diff rence i · in re 'pect to
the
nclu i e eff ts f the judbm nt r ndered upon them. 3
In h r war l
far
con rn the mann r of all 0 ing an
of d f nces
of trial all di ' tinction b tween th ·e two cla
h e b en ab li ·h d, and hath hav b en placed in the am
cate or . 4 All d f nc which ar analogous to th ancient pl a

n

Ga. 617, 25 S. E. 943; Moore r. Ilarmou

(1895), 142 Ind. 555, 41 N. E. 599; Smith

V. Pedigo (1896), 145 Ind. 361, 33 N. E.

777. Contra, La Plant v. Firemen's Ins.

Co. (1897), 68 Minn. 82, 70 N. W. 856.]

- [3 Need ham ;•. Wright (1894), 140 Ind.

190, 39 N. E. 510. it was held that a plea

in abatement must be certain to a certain

intent in every particular, and it re([uires

the utmost fulness and particularity of

statement, as well as the highest at-

tainable accuracy and precision, leaving

nothing to be su])plied by intendment or

construction. The pleader must not only

answer fully what is necessary to be

answered, but must also anticipate and

1 [It ba
been held, however, in the
following a e that an an , wer to the
merit waiv a pl a in abatem nt: Chamberlain i:. Hibbard (1 94-), 26 Or . 4-~ , 3
Pa . 437; Fort v. Penm' (l 9 ), 122 N. .
230, 29 . E. 362; Earl e v. ayre ( 1 96), 99
Ga. 617, 25 . E. 943; l\Joor v. H a rm on
(1 95), 142 Ind. 555, -!l J.E. :j99; ' mith
I' . p digo (l 96) , 145 fod. 361, 33 N. E.
iii.
onlru, La Plant v. :Fir men' Iu .
Co. (1 97). 6 Minn. 2, iO N. W. 56.J
2 [l'\eedham v. Wri 0 ht ( I 9-!), HO Ind.
190, 39 T . E . 51 . it wa held that a plea
in abatem nt mu t be · rtain to a certain

pleaded ·without waiv ing the rig ht t
plead to th merit al o, and th i i tru
w h ther t he a tion i · on in c ttachm nt
or au ordinary ivil action. O\·errulin r
Fordy v. Ilath rn (1 74 ). 57 Mo . 1- .
\\' hen the ame matter i J lead d Li th
in abatem ut and in bar the latt r \'er-

exclude all such supposable matter, as

would, if alleged on the opposite side,

defeat his plea, citing Chitty, Stephen,

acti n, but it i uffi ie nt if it
uffi ient t abat the a ti n."
Matter in abatem nt of
hould be

and Gould, and declaring the doctrine of

those text writers to be the rule in

Indiana. See also Moore v. Morris (1895),

142 Ind. 354, 41 N. E. 796; Miller r.

Cross (1900), 73 Conn. 538, 48 Atl. 213;

Budd V. Meriden Elec. R. R. Co. (1897),

69 Conn. 272, 37 Atl. 683.

It was held in Coombs Commission Co.

0.

r. Block (1895), 1.30 Mo. 668, 32 S. VV.

1139, that a jilea in abatement may be

y)leaded without waiving the right to

j)lead to the merits also, and this is true

whether the action is one in attachment

or an ordinary civil action. Overruling

Fordyce i-. Hatliorn (1874), 57 Mo. 120.

^\'heu the same matter is pleaded both

in abatement and in bar, the latter over-

rides the former: Crowns ?•. Forest Land

Co. (1898), 99 Wis. 103, 74 N. W. 546.

A plea treated by the parties as one

in abatement is properly so considered :

Saylor v. Commonwealth Banking Co

(1900), 38 Ore. 204, 62 Pac. 652.

Combs ('. Union Trust Co. (1896), 146

Ind. 688, 46 N. E. 16: "An answer in

abatement is not required to state facts

sufficient to constitute a defence to the

action, but it is sufficient if it states facts

sufficient to abate the action."

l'.

nt may

EX AJ'iIPLES OF NEW MATTER.

801

EXAMPLES OF NEW MATTER.

801

in abatement — that is, all which are based upon the same facts

— are evidently new matter: they cannot be proved under the

general denial, but must be specially pleaded.

III. Some Particular Defences of Netv Matter Classified and

in abatement - that i , all which are b e upon h same fa t '
d under the
- ar vidently n w matter: th y ann t be pr
general denial, but must be specially plead

Arranged.

§ 575. * 699. Introductory. In all the following examples in

which it has been held that the defences are new matter, it must

be understood that the complaints or petitions were in the proper

form, containing the allegations necessary to constitute the causes

III. Some Particular Defence of New Matter

las ified and

Arranged.

of action, and no more. Wlien the plaintiff's pleadings deviated

from this usual type, and were so framed that the defences could

be admitted under the general denial, this fact will be particu-

larly mentioned.

§ 576. * 700. Payment. It is the settled rule, except perhaps

in California, that when the complaint or petition is in the cus-

tomary form, not averring the fact of non-payment in so distinct

a manner that an issue would be raised upon it by a denial, the

defence of payment is new matter, and must be pleaded as such.^
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dency of another action) ; Thompson v.

Greenwood, 28 Ind. 327 ; Bond v. Wagner,

28 Ind. 462. The rule stated in the

text, that defences in abatement are new

matter and must be pleaded, is further

illustrated by the following eases : Alli-

son V. Chicago & N. W. R. Co., 42 Iowa,

274; Plath w. Braunsdorff, 40 Wis. 107;

White r. Miller, 7 Huu, 427 ; Dawley v.

Brown, 9 id. 461 ; Levi v. Haversteck, .51

§ 575. * 699. Int rodu ctory. In all the following examples in
which it has been held that the defences are new 11iatter, it mu t
be understood that th complaints or petition were in the prop r
form, containing the allegation nece ary to con titute the cau e ·
of action, and no mor . vVhen the plaintiff's pleadings deviat d
from thi s usual type, and were so framed that the defences coul<l.
be admitted under the general denial, this fact will be particularly mentioned .
§ 576. * 700. Payment. It is the settled rule, except perhaps
in Californ ia, that when the complaint or petition is in the customary form, not averring the fact of non-payment in so distinct
a manner that an i sue would l>e raised upon it by a denial, the
defence of payment is new matter, and must be pleaded as ~mch. 1

Ind. 2.36; Stafford v. Nutt, 51 id. .5.35;

Smith V. Peckham, 39 Wis. 414; Newhall-

House Stock Co (-•. Fliut & F. M. Ry. Co.,

47 id. 516 ; Dutcher i\ Dutcher, 39 id. 651,

and numerous cases cited.

1 McKyriiig v. Bull, 16 N. Y. 297;

Morrell v. Irving Fire Ins. Co., 33 N. Y.

429, 443, per Davies J. ; Te.xier v. Gouin,

5 Duer, 389, 391, per Oakley C. .T. ; Mar-

tin V. Pugh, 23 Wis. 184 ; Phillips v. Jar-

vis, 19 Wis. 204 ; Stevens r. Thompson,

5 Kan. .305, distinguishing Marley v.

Smith, 4 Kan. 183, on the ground that

in the latter case the allegations were

nnusual ; Baker v. Kistler, 13 Ind. 63 •

Hubler r. Pullen, 9 Ind. 273 ; Bassett i\

Lederer, 1 Huu, 274, an action for goods

sold and delivered. The complaint stated

that defendant " had not paid the price,

nor any part tliereof :" the answer was a

general denial. Held, that proof of pay-

ment under the issue was error. This case

certainly goes further tlian any other,

and is inconsistent with those cited in the

next following note. Hall x\ Olney, 65

Barb. 27, an instance of payment after

suit brought. Held, that defendant should

have set up the defence in a supplemental

answer. See also Everett v. Lockwood,

8 Hun, 356 ; Kuapp v. Kunnells, 37 Wis.

135 ; Hegler r. Eddy, 53 Cal. 597 (tender) ;

Johnson v. Tyler, 1 Ind. App. 387 ; Hyde

V. Hazel. 43 Mo. App. 668; St. Louis, Ft.

S. & W. K. Co. V. Grove, 39 Kan. 731 ;

Ellison V. Rix, 85 .N. C. 77 ; and see Lent

V. N. Y. & Mass. Ry. Co., 130 N. Y. 504.

[^Pai/ment : Ferguson v. Dalton (1900),

158 Mo. 323, 59 S. W. 88 ; State ex rel. v.

Peterson (1897), 142 Mo. 526, 39 S. W. 453 ;

Farmers' Nat. Bank v. Hunter (1899) .35

old and delivered. Th e complaint stated
dency of another action); Th ompson v.
Greenwood, 28 I nd. 327; Bond v. Wagner, that defendant " bad not paid the price,
28 Iud. 462. The rule stated in the nor any par t t hereof : " the an wer was a
text, that defence ' in abatement are new gene ral denial. Held , that proof of paymatter and must be pleaded, is further ment und er the iss ue wa error. This case
illustrated by the fo llowi ng cases : A lli- cer tain ly goeR further than any other,
so n i• . Chi cago & N. W. R. Co., 42 Iowa, and is in consi tent with tho ·e cited in the
27 4- ; Plath v. Braunsdorff, 4-0 Wis . I 07 ; next following uote. ll all l'. Olney, 65
White i· . Miller, 7 Hun, 427; Dawley v. Barb. 27, a n instance of payment after
Brown , 9 id . 4-61; Lev i v. Haversteck, 51 suit brought. Held, t hat defendant should
Ind. 236 ; tafford v. Nutt, 51 id. 535; have set up the clefen e in a supplemental
Smith v. Peckham, 39 Wi . 4-14; Ncwhall- an wer. See al o EYerett v. Lockwood,
Hou e tock Co v. Flint & F . M. Ry. Co., 8 Hun, 356; Kn app v. Hunnells, 37 "is.
47 id. 516; Dutcher 1• . Dutc her, 39 id. 651, 135; Hegler v. Eddy, 53 Cal. 597 (tender) ;
Johnson v. Tyler, 1 In d. App. 387; Hyde
and num erou cases cited.
v. Hazel. 43 1\fo. App. 668; St. Louis, Ft.
1 McKyring v. Bull, 16 N. Y. 297;
Morrell v. Ir ving Fire Ins. Co ., 33 N. Y. S. & W. R. Co. v. Grove, 39 Kan. 731;
429, 4-43, per Davies J.; T cxier v. Gouin, Ellison v . Ri x, 85 N. . 77 ; and ee Lent
5 Duer, 3 9, 391, per Oakley C . •J.; Mar- v. N. Y. & Ma s. Ry. o., 130 N . Y . 50-1- .
[Pa_11ment: Fergu on v. Dalton (1900),
tin v. Pugh, 23 Wis. 184- ; Phillips 1: . Jarvi , 19 ''ri . 20.J.; Stevens i:. Thompson, 158 Mo. 323, 59 S. W. 88; tate ex rel. 1·.
5 Ka n. 305, distingui hing Marley i•. Peterson (1 97), 142 Mo. 526, 39 S. W. 453 ;
Smith , 4 Kan. l 3, ou the ground that Farmer' Nat. Bank v. Hunter (1 899) . 5
in the latter case the allegations were Ore. 188, 57 Pac. 42-1; Hopper v. H opp r
un usual ; Bake r v. Ki tier, 13 In d. 63 . {HlOl ), 61 . C. 124, 39 ~ . E . .'J66; MarHub ler v. Pullen , 9 Ind . 27.'3; Ba sett v'. shall & IHe_y Bank v. Child (1899), i6
Minn . l 73, 78 N. \Y. 1048; Mulleu v.
Led erer, l Hun, 274, an ai:tion for good
51
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When, however, the complaint or petition contains negative aver-

ments of non-payment, so that a traverse of them is in fact equiv-

alent to an allegation of payment, an issue is made by the mere

denial general or specific, which admits the defence of payment

to be proved under it.^ This is not an exception to the fore-

going rule ; for an issue upon the very fact of payment is actually

formed by such assertions and denials. The decided cases pre-

sent some differences in respect to the form of the averment in

the complaint or petition, which, by being traversed, permits

the defence to be interposed; but the principle upon which they •

were decided is the same in all. In an action to recover for

work and labor, the complaint stated the agreement, the per-

formance of services at a stipulated price, and that on a certain

day named the defendant " was indebted to the plaintiff in the

sum of $333, being the balance remaining due after sundry pay-

ments made by defendant to the plaintiff." The answer was a

general denial. Evidence offered by the defendant to prove

payments made by him on account, the New York Court of

Appeals held, ought to have been admitted under this issue,
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distinguishing the case from McKyring v. Bull by reason of the

peculiar averinents in the complaint. ^ Where a complaint set

Morris (1895), 43 Neb. 596, 62 N. W. 74; 163, 65 N. W. 909. Contra, Wortham v.

Cady V. South Omaha Nat. Bank (1896), Sinclair (1896), 98 Ga. 173, 25 S. E. 414.

46 Neb. 756, 65 N. W. 906 ; Ashlaud A plea of payment cannot be held bad on,

Land, etc. Co. v. May (1897), 51 Neb. 474, demurrer: Buist v. Fitzsimons (1894), 44

71 N. W. 67; Hudelson v. First Nat. S. C. 1-30, 21 S. E. 610.

Bank (1897), 51 Neb. 557, 71 N. W. 304 ; See the following cases for pleas of

Morehouse r. Throckmorton (1899), 72 payment which were held sufficient : Har-

Conn. 449, 44 Atl. 747 ; Culbertson Irrig., din County v. Wells (1899), 108 la. 174, 78

etc. Co. w. Cox (1897), 52 Neb. 684, 73 N. W. 908; Garrison v. Murphy (1902),

N. W. 9; Hortzell v. McClurg (1898), 54 Nel)., 89 N. W. 766. An insufficient plea

Neb. 313, 74 N. \V. 625 ; Barker y. Wheeler of payment, treated as sufficient by the

(1900), 60 Neb. 470, 83 N. W. 678; s. c. parties, will be deemed amended so as to

(1901), 62 Neb. 150, 87 N. W. 20; Union properly raise the issue in the supreme

Stockyards Nat. Bank v. Haskell (1902), court: Mulhall v. Mulhall (1895), 3 Okla.

Neb., 90 N. W. 2.33 ; Richards v. Jefferson, 252, 41 Pac. 577.]

(1898), 20 Wash. 166, 54 Pac. 1123 ; Moat- ^ [^Bras.sell v. Silva (1897), 50 S. C. 181,

ing r. Tigerton Co. (1902), 113 Wis. 379, 27 S. I-:, 622; State e.r rel. v. Peterson

89 N. W. 152; Clark i-. Wick (1894), 25 (1897), 142 Mo. 526, 39 S. W. 453; Logan

Ore. 446, 36 Pac. 165 ; Nat. Bank v. Quin- County Nat. Bank v. Barclay (1898), 104

ton (1897), 57 Kan. 750, 48 Pac. 20. Ky. 97, 46 S. W. 675. Contra, Columbia

A plea of payment confesses the cause Nat. Bank v. Western Iron Co. (1896),

of action: Lokken v. Miller (1900), 14 Wash. 162, 44 Pac. 145; Barker v.

9 N. D. 512, 84 N. W. 368. "A plea of Wheeler (1901), 62 Neb. 150, 87

payment in full is ordinarily good, without N. W. 20.]

specifying the time, jjlace or manner - (^uinn v. Lloyd, 41 N. Y. 349, 352,

thereof : " Fall v. .lolinson (1896), 8 S. D. jicr Lott J. : " The denial involved an issue
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out an indebtedness by the defendant, and added " that the same

was still due and uni^aid," the general denial was held a suiili-

cient answer to allow proof of payment.^ In an action for work

and labor, the complaint alleged the services to a specified amount

in value, and that there was a balance due the plaintiff, "'' after

deducting all payments made by defendant to plaintiff thereon,

of $175." The general denial, it was held, entitled the defend-

ant to prove all the payments which he had made.''^ This special

rule has been repeatedly acted vipon by the courts of California.

Indeed, as has been before stated,'"^ they have gone much farther,

and have made it a general requisite, in actions upon promissory

notes at least, that the complaint must aver the non-payment as a

breach in a distinct form, or it will fail to state a cause of action;

and that the general denial of such a pleading necessarily admits

evidence of payment. In some of the cases the judges have gone

to the length of declaring that the general denial, like the gen-

eral issue of nil debet or non assumpsit, always admits the defence

of payment.^

§ 577. * 701. What may be shown under the Defence of Pay-
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ment. When a defence of payment is pleaded, it is competent

to show that the payment was actually made in cash, or in some

upon all the facts above stated and denied, ^ Marley v. Smith, 4 Kan. 18.3, 186.

not only of the agreement and of the time Explained in Stevens v. Thompson, .5

which the plaintiff worked, but neces.sarily Kau. 305.

of the different payments made, so as to ^ White v. Smith, 46 N. Y. 418. See

determine what in fact was the balance of also Looby v. West Troy, 2t Hun, 78 (a

the defendant's debt. That balance could special case in which an accord and sati.s-

not be ascertained without an inquiry as faction was allowed to be proved under a

to the amount of the payments, as well general denial),

as the value of the work performed." ^ g *665.

out an ill(lebtedne. s by th d f ndant, and add cl "that the . a.me
wa · still due and un1 aid, ' th g neral 1 nial 'vas h ld a ~mffiient answer to allow pr E f paym nt. 1 In an a Lion f r wol'k
and lab r, th complaint all g l the sel'vi es to a p ified am unt
in valu , and that th re wa a balanc clue th plaintiff, aft r
d ducting all paym nt mad by d f ndant t plaintiff ther on,
of $175. ' The general d nial, it wa h lcl, ntitl d th <l f ndan t to prove all the payment whi h he had ma.cl . 2 Thi pecial
rule ha been rep atedly acted upon by the courts of alifornia.
Ind ed, a has been b fore stated, 3 they have gone much farther,
and have made it a general requisite, in actions upon promi ·sory
notes at least, that the complaint must aver the non-paym nt as a
breach in a distinct form, or it will fail to state a cau e of action;
and that the general denial of uch a pleading nee s arily admit
vidence of payment. In some of the cases the judges have gon
to the length of declaring that the general denial, like the general issue of nil debet or non assumpsit, always admits the defence
of payment. 4
§ 577. * 701. What may be shown under the Defence of Pay. ment. When a defence of payment is pleaded, it is competent
to show that the payment was actually made in cash, or in some

Also per Woodruff J. (p. 354) : " It was * Frisch v. Caler, 21 Cal. 71 ; Fairchild

wholly unnecessary for the plaiutiff to sue v. Amsbaugh, 22 Cal. 572 ; Wetmore

for a balance as such. He might allege v. San Francisco, 44 Cal. 294, 299, per

the contract, performance on his part, and Crockett J. ; Davanay v. Eggenhoff, 43

(daim payment ; and then, if the defendant Cal. 395, 397, per Rhodes J. See also unW,

desired to prove payment, he must allege § * 665 ; Mickle v. Heinlen, 92 Cal. 596.

payment in his an.swer. But where the [[In Bank of Shasta v. Boyd (1893), 99

plaintiff sues for a balance, he voluntarily Cal. 604, 34 Pac. 337, the court said : " It

invites examination into the amount of is well settled in this State that tlie allega-

the indebtedness, and the extent of the tion of non-payment, in a complaint on a

reduction thereof by payment." Further, promissory note, is material to the cause

Knapp V. Roche, 94 N. Y. 329 ; but see of action, as without such an allegation

Dry Dock, E. B. & B. R. Co. v. N. & E. uo breach of the promise would appear,

R. Ry. Co. (Com. PI. 1893), 22 N. Y. and that when the complaint is not verified

Suppl. 556. ([Robertson v. Robertson a general denial puts in is.sue every ma-

(1900), 37 Ore. 339, 62 Pac. 377, citing the terial allegation of the complaint."]

text.]

upon all the facts above stated ami denied,
uot only of the agreemeut and of the tim e
which the plaintiff worked, but nece sarily
of the different payments made, so as to
determine what in fact was the balance of
the defendant's debt. That balance eould
not be ascertained without a n inquiry as
to the amount of the payments, a well
a the value of the work performed."
Also per Woodruff J. (p. 354) : " It was
wholly unnecessary for the pl::iintiff to ue
for a balance a such. H e mig ht all ege
the contract, performance on his part, and
claim payment; and then, if the defendant
desired to prove payment, he must allege
payment in his answer. But where the
plaintiff sue for a balance, he voluntarily
invite examination into Lhe amount of
the ind ebtedness, and the extent of the
reduction thereof by payment." Further,
Knapp v. Roche, 94 N. Y. 329; but see
Drv Dock, E. B. & B. R. Co. v. N. & E.
R. .Ry. Co. (Com. Pl. 1 93), 22
. Y.
Suppl. 556. [Robertson v. Robertson
(1900), 37 Ore. 339, 62 Pac. 377, citing the
lext.J

1 Marley v. Smith, 4 Kan. 183, 186.
Explained in Stevens v. Thomp on , 5
Kan. 305.
2 White v. Smith, 46 N. Y. 418.
See
also Looby v. vVest Troy, 21- Hun, 78 (a
special case in which an accord and ati. faction was allowed to be proved under a
general denial).
3 § * 665.
4 Fri ch v. Caler, 21 Cal. 71; Fairchild
v. Am baugh, 22 Cal. 572; ·w etmore
v. an Francisco, 44 Cal. 294, 299, per
Crockett J.; Davanay v. Eggeuhoff, 43
Cal. 395, 397, per Rhodes J. See also unte,
§ * 665; Mickle v. Heinlen, 92 Cal. 596.
[In Bank of Shasta v. Boyd ( 1 93), 99
Cal. 604, 34 Pac ..'337, the court aid : "It
is well settled in thi Stat that th e allegation of non-pay ment, in a omplaint on a
prom is ·ory note, i material to the can. e
of acti on, as without such a n allegation
no breaeh 0£ t he promi c would appear,
and that wh n the co mplaint i n t verified
a g eneral deni al pu t in i sue eY ry mat eri al allegat ion of the complaint."]
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other manner agreed upon by the parties: as that it was made by

the delivery of chattels, which were received by the creditor in

satisfaction of his demand; ^ or by the giving and acceptance of

anything that is received in the place of money, and in discharge

of the debt."^ But under the answer of payment in an action

upon a note, the defendant cannot prove a want of consideration

for the note, or a mistake in its execution, or an error in the

prior accounting and the ascertaining the balance for which it

was given, or the execution of a contemporaneous writing which

modifies or controls the legal effect of the note; and the same

doctrine is plainly applicable to actions upon any species of

written agreement.^

§ 578. * 702. Arbitrament and Award. Former Recovery. The

defence of an arbitrament and award covering the same matters

in controversy as those stated in the complaint is new matter,

and must be pleaded;* and so also is the defence of a former

recovery for the same cause of action,^ and of a former partial

recovery.®

§ 579. * 703. Actions for the Recovery of Chattels. In an action
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to recover possession of chattels, the complaint alleging property

in the plaintiff, and the answer specifically denying the wrongful

taking and detention of the goods, and no more, the facts relied

upon by the defendant as constituting his actual defence were,

that the plaintiff" and one (>. were partners and the real owners

1 Farmers' Bank v. Sherman, 33 N. Y. arbitrate is new matter : Merchants' Ins.

69. Also, receipt by plaintiff of the Co. i-. Stepliens (1900), Ky., 59 S. W. 511.

proceeds from collaterals in his hands, See also Kahn v. Traders' Ins. Co. (1893),

Wolcott V. Ensign, 53 Ind. 70. [;Kd- 4 Wyo. 419, 34 Pac. 1059.]

munds v. Black (1896), 13 Wash. 490, 43 » Hendricks v. Decker, 35 Barb. 298 ;

Pac. 330.] Piercy v. Sabin, 10 Cal. 22 ; Norris v.

- Hart ('. Crawford, 41 Ind. 197. Amos, 15 Ind. 365. See also Cave v.

[^McLaugiilin v. Webster (1894), 141 Crapto, 53 Cal. 135; Fanning v. Hiberuia

N. Y. 76, 35 N. P:. 1081 ; State Bank v. Ins. Co., 37 Ohio St. .344 ; Muiss y. Gill, 44

Kelly (1899), 109 la. 544, 80 N. W. 520 Ohio St. 253; Lonisville, N. A. & C. Ry.

(ratification of agent's act in receiving Co. r. Cauley, 119 Ind. 142. But see Terry

note) ; Thompson-Houston Elec. Co. r. v. Munger, 49 lluii, 5()0.

Palmer (1893), 52 Minn. 174, 53 N. W. QMcLean c. Baldwin (1902), 136 Cal.

1137 (laws of another State as to legal 565, 69 Pac. 259; Whitcomb v. Hardy

effect of accepting note).] (1897), 68Minn. 265, 71 N. W. 263; Dixon

3 Lowry V. Shane, .34 lud. 495. r. Caster (1903), — Kan. — , 70 Pac. 871 ;

* Brazil ". Isiiam, 12 N. Y. 9, 17. McCarty v. Kinsey (1899), 154 Ind. 447,

I^Kvideiice tending to impeach an award 57 N. E. 108. See the la.st three cases

actually made is not admi.ssible under a al)ove cited for methods of pleading tliis

general denial : Conn. Fire Ins. Co. v. defence.]

O'Fallon (18961,49 Neb. 740, 69 N. W. 6 Mornll c Irving F. Ins. Co., 33 N. Y.

118. The defence of an agreement to 429,443.

d upon by the par i
a hat it wa made by
th
f chattel , which w re r ceived b the r ditor in
n f hi demand; 1 or
th gi ing an l ac ptan e f
hat i r ceived in the pla e of m n , and in di 'charg
bt. 2 But und r the an w r of paym nt in an acti n
t , th d fendant annot prov a want of co iderati n
n te, r a mi tak in it x cution, or an error in th
c unting and ~he a c l'taining tl e balance for whi h it
n or th xecution of a ntempor n u writing whi h
r controls th l gal effect of the n te; and the am
doctrin i plainly applicable to actions up n any pecie.
f
3
writt n agr m nt.
5 78 . * 702. A r bitr ament and Award. Form er Recovery. Tb
f an arbitrament and award
v ring the same m tt I"
in controver y as those tated in th c mplaint is new m tt r
and mu t b pleaded; 4 and o al o i the d f nc of a form r
r covery for the same cau e of a tion, 6 and of a former par ial
rec ver . 6
579. ' 703. A ctio n s fo r t h e R e covery o f Chattels . In an action
t r cov r po e ion of chattel , th om plaint alleging pr I erty
in t he plain iff, and the answer specifi ally denying th wron ful
taking and d ention of the good , and no more, the fa t r li
u pon by th d fendant as constituting hi a tual defenc w r ,
that th plaintiff and one G. were partn r and the real owner
Far mer 'Ba nk v. herman, 33 N. Y.
A L , r c ipt by plaintiff of the
pro eed~ from collate ral in hi hand ,
W ol ott v. E u io-n, 53 Ind. iO . [ Edmund v. Black (1 96), 13 Wa h. 490, 43
l

6 .

a c . 33 .]

Hart v. rawforcl, 41 I nd. 197.
[ .\lcLaughlin v. Web ·ter (1 94), 141
... ,.. Y. i6, 35 ... . E. 10 l ; tate B a nk v.
K llv (1 9 ), 10 Ia. 54-t-, o '. ' . 520
( rati.11c, t ion of agent' act in re ·eivio g
uot ) ; Th m p on-H ouston E lec. o. v.
Palm r ( 1 3), 52 Minn. li4, 53 . \ .
11 37 (law
f another ta te a to 1 gal
eff ·t f a c: · ptin r note) .]
3 Lowry t.' •• 'ha.n , 34 In d. 495.
4
razil v. I ·ham, 12 J. • Y . 9, 17.
[Evi d nee t ndi ag t i mp ach a n awa r d
a ·tu Uy mad is 11 t aclmi ibl und r a
l{" n r al <l n ial :
o nrL :E ire Io ·.
. v.
eb. 740, 6 J.:' . W.
l' f<'allo n ( 1 96) ,
11 . T ho defeuc of a n ag re m ut to
:.l

., 33

. Y.
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of the goods in question, and that G. had bailed tliem to the de-

fendant, who retained them in virtue of such bailment. This

defence, however, was held inadmissible under the pleadings,

because, first, the unqualified ownership of the plaintiff was

admitted on the record by the failure of the answer to deny

the allegation of property contained in the complaint; and,

secondly, the authority conferred by one owner, G., upon the

defendant, to take and retain possession of the chattels, was new

matter, and should have been pleaded.^ And, in a similar action,

a defence that the defendant had loaned money to the plaintiff's

intestate, who was the late owner of the chattels, and had re-

ceived from him the possession thereof, and retained them in pos-

session as security for such advances, is new matter, and cannot

be proved unless specially pleaded ; ^ and the same is true of the

defence, that the plaintiff''s title is fraudulent and void as against

his creditors.^

§ 580. * 704. Actions for Tort. In an action to recover dam-

ages for the conversion of chattels, a justification by the defend-

ant as sheriff, under an attachment, judgment, execution, and
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levy against a third person, charging that the goods were the

property of such judgment debtor, and had been fraudulently

assigned and transferred by him to the plaintiff, so that the

hitter's title was void, cannot be proved under an answer of

denials, but must be pleaded as new matter.* There are cases

which go to the extent of holding that, under the general denial,

— which traverses the indispensable averment of a sufficient prop-

erty in the plaintiff, — the defendant cannot show property in

1 Tell V. Beyer, 38 N. Y. 161. A lien ■* Jacobs v. Remsen, 12 Abb. Pr. 390;

on the chattel or other special property Graham v. Harrower, 18 How. Pt. 144.

therein cannot be shown nnder a general In the latter case, T. R. Strong J. seems

denial: Guille i\ Wong Fook, 13 Ore. 577. to concede, that, under a denial of the

2 Gray v. Fretwell, 9 Wis. 186. allegation of property in the plaintiff, the

QAnd the defence of right of possession defendant may prove general property in

by reason of a lien is new matter: Mellott himself, liut not a justification under judi-

V. Downing (1901), 39 Ore. 218, 64 Pac. cial process. Frisbee v. Langworthy, 11

393.] Wis. 375, an action to recover possession,

^ Frisbee v. Langworthy, 11 Wis. 375. but governed by the same rule as to plead-

Contra, see Young v. Glascock, 79 Mo. ing a justification. Isley v. Ilnber, 45

574; Stern Auction, etc. Co. i'. Mason, 16 Ind. ^21 ; Boaz v. Tate, 43 lud. 60, 71, 72;

Mo. App. 473; Sopris v. Truax, 1 Col. 89 ; Johnson c. Cuddington, 35 Ind. 43 ; Lang-

of t he goods in que tion, an <l t hat G. ha<l bail cl t h m to the defe nd ant, who retained t h m in vir u
f . u h baiha nt. This
tl fe n , however, wa held inadmi sibl uml r th pleadillg ,
L a,u e, first, the u nqualifi cl wn rship of th plaintiff wa
aclmitt d on the re onl Ly tl1 failure of t h an ·wer to d n
th all gation of l ro1 r ty contained in the omplaint; and
:-; condl y, t he authori ty conferred Ly on e owner, G., upon th
def ndant, to tak e and retain possess ion of the chatt 1 , wa · n w
matter, and should have been pleaded . 1 And, in a 'imilar action,
a defence that th e def n<lant had loaned money to the plaintiff 's
intestate, who was th e late owner of the chattels, and had received from him the pos ession thereof, and retained them in po·se sion a,s security for such ad vances, i:s new matter, and cannot
be proved unl ess pecially pl ea ded ; 2 and th e same is true of t he
d fence, that the plaintiff 's title is fraudulent and void as against
his creditors. 3
§ 580. * 70-1-. Actions for Tort. In an action to recover damages for the conversion "f chattels, a justification by tbe defendant as sheriff, under an attachment, judgment, execu tion, and
levy against a third person, charging that the goods were the
property of such juflgment debtor, and had been fraud ulently
assigned and transferred by him to the plaintiff, so that the
latter' s title was void, cannot be proved under an answer of
denials, but must be pleaded as new matter. 4 There are cases
which gG to the extent of holding that, under the general denial,
- which traverses the indispensable averment of a sufficient property in the plaintiff, - the defendant cannot show property in

Bailey V. Swain, 45 Ohio St. 657 ; Holm- ton v. IJagerty, 35 Wis. 1,50, 161. Contra,

berg 0. Dean, 21 Kan. 73; Merrill v. Wedg- see Mason v. Vestal, 88 Cal. 396 ; Tupper

wood, 25 Neb. 283. |[Coos Bay R. R. Co. v. Thompson, 26 Minn. 385.

V. Siglin (1894),26 0re. 387, 38Pac. 192.]

4 Jacobs v. Rem sen, 12 Abb. P r. 390 ;
l Tell v. B eyer, 38 N. Y. 161.
A lien
on the chattel or other special property Graham i·. Harrower, 18 H ow. Pr. 144.
therein cannot be shown und er a general In the latter case, T. R. Strong J . seems
denial: Guille v. Wong Fook, 13 Ore. 577 . to ·oncede, that, und er a denial of the
2 Gray v. Fretwell, 9 \.Vis. 186.
allegation of property in th e plain ti ff, the
[And th e defen ce of rig ht of po se ion defenda ut may pr ove general property in
by rea:on of a lien is new matter: Mellott himself, hut not a justificati on un<l er ju div. D ownin g (1901), 39 Ore. 21 8, 64 Pac. cial process. Frisbee v. L an g worthy, 11
" ris. 375, an act ion to recover po e sion,
393 .]
3 Frisbee v. L ang wor thy, l l vVi . 3 75. hu t governed by the same rule a: to pleadContra, see Young v. Glascoc k, 79 Mo. ing a j ust ifi cation. I ley v. H uher , 45
574 ; Stern Auction, etc. Co . v. Ma on, 16 In d. 421 ; Boaz v. Tate, 43 Ind . 60, 71, 72;
Mo. A pp. 4 73; Sopris v. Truax, 1 Col. 89 ; J oh nson i-. Cudding ton, 35 In d. 43; L angB ailey v. Swain , 45 Ohio t. 657; Holm- t on v. Hagerty 35 \Vi . 150, 161. Con tra,
al. 396 ; T upper
berg v. D ean, 21 Ka n. 73; Merrill v . ·w edg- see Mason i-. V estal,
woo1l , 25 Neb. 2 3. [ Coos Bay R . R . Co. v . Thompson, 26 Min u. 3 5.
u. Sigliu (1804), 26 Ore. 3 7, 3 Pac. 192 .]
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himself: ^ but this ruling seems opposed to the weight of author-

ity; and it is certainl}' contrary to the plainest principles of

pleading, for sucli facts, when proved, merely contradict the

plaintiff's averment of his own title. ^

§ 581. * 70;). Same Subject. In the action for breaking and

entering the plaintiff's premises (trespass qu. cl. fr.^, with the

complaint in the proper form, and without any unnecessary aver-

ments, the general denial does not raise any issue as to the title

to the land, and no evidence attacking such title can be received

except under a separate defence ; ^ nor can any defence of justifi-

cation be proved unless specially pleaded.'* Where two or more

unite as plaintiffs in an action for the taking and carrying away

their goods, a defence that " the plaintiffs are not joint owners

of the goods and chattels mentioned in the complaint " is new

matter.^ To a complaint for an assault and battery committed

by a railroad conductor in forcibly ejecting the plaintiff from

the cars, the general denial was pleaded: under this issue, the

defendant was not permitted to show the regulations of the com-

pany, that they were reasonable, and that he was complying with
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them in doing the act complained of.*^ The defence of recaption,

or its equivalent, in an action against a sheriff for an escape, is

^ Dyson tf. Ream, 9 Iowa, 51. action for false arrest and imprisonment,

2 See supra, §§ * 677, * 678. But the proof of tiie plaintiff's bad character in

defence of title in a third person is new respect to the offence for which he was

matter. Smith v. Hall, 67 N. Y. 48. arrested cannot be proved under the geu-

^ Squires r. Seward, 16 How. Pr. 478 ; eral denial. Scheer v. Keown, 34 Wis.

Ratlibone v. McCounell, 20 Barb. 311; 349. The following defences are further

Althouse V. Rice, 4 E. I). Smith, 347. instances of new matter, — in an action

•• Johnson v. Cuddington,35 Ind. 43. against a sheriff for fal.-;e return, etc., de-

QHauger i-. Beuua (1899), 153 Ind. 642, fence that the property was exempt, Kis-

53N. E. 942; Myers r. Longstaff (1900), kaddeu r. Jones, 63 Mo. 190; in action

him 1f: 1 l>ut hi rulin
rn Pl
d o h ' ight f u h r1 •·
i
i
c rt inly 011 rary t th 1 lain t prin ipl
f
f r u h fa t
wb n pr
d, rn rely ·ontra i t th
f hi
' 11 ti tl 2
7 - . S ame S ubject. In h action f r br akin and
nt rin
h plaintiff pr mi
(tr as qu. cl. fr .) with th
m l, int in th
roper form
with utan unn ce ._ ary a rm n , h g n ral denial d
not rai an I ue a to the title
to h lan , an i no e iden e attacking u h title can be r ceiv
t un r a parate defenc ; 3 nor an any defence of ju tifib pro ed unl s p iall pl ad d. 4 Where two or m r
unite
plaintiff in an action f r the taking and carrying away
th ir g od , a d fence that "th
laintiffs are not j int own r
of th · od and cbatte mentioned in the complaint ' i · n w
ma.tter. 5 T a omplaint for an a a ult and battery c mmitt d
b a r ilroad c nductor in forcibly j cting the plaintiff fr m
the car the general d nial wa pl aded: under thi, i u
h
f ntlant wa not permit ed to ~ w the regulation of h
mny th t th were reasonabl , and that b ' a complying wi h
th m in doin th act complain d of. 6 The d fence of r
ti n,
r it · equivalent, in an action a aiwt a heriff for an . ap , i

14 S. D. 98, 84 N. W. 233 ; Clifton v. against husband and wife for wife's tort,

Lange (1899), 108 la. 472, 79 N. W. 276 ; lier defence of compulsion by her husband,

Raynor v. Wilmington Seacoast Ry. Co. Clark v. Boyer, 32 Ohio St. 299; in action

But the

(1901), 129 N. C. 195, 39 S. E. 821; Fen- for injuries caused by a hole wrongfully

.'itermaker v. Tribune Pub. Co. (1895), 12 made in a sidewalk, defence of license

Utah, 4.39, 43 Pac. 112; Wilken v. Exter- from the city government, Clifford »-. Dam,

kamp(1897), 102 Ky. 143, 42 S. W. 1140; 81 N. Y. !-)2. See, farther, that the de-

Stark V. Publisiiers, etc. Co. (1901), 160 fence of justification is new matter, Ko-

Mo. 529, 61 S. W. 669: Upchurch i'. Rob- nigsberger ?•. Harvey, 12 Ore. 286; Thomas

ertson (1900), 127 N. C. 127, 37 S. E. 157 ; r. Werremeyer, 34 Mo. App. 665 ; Wills.m

Mangold >:. Oft (1901), 63 Neb. .397,88 ?-. Manhattan Ry. Co. (Com. PL, 1892), 20

X. W. 507 ; Barr >: Po.st (1898), 56 Neb. N. Y. Suppl. 852 (inaction for false im-

698, 77 N. W. 123.3 prisoninent) : compare State >•. Reckner

^ Walrod v. Bennett, 6 Barb. 144. (Ind., Jan. 1891), 26 N. E. Rep. 553.

''' Pier r. Finch, 29 Barb. 170. In an

Barli. I-t+ .
Bar!,. 1iO. In au

t, 6
i;

l 'i •r

1.

Fiuch, 2
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new matter. An answer setting up this defence having been

pleaded, the defendant, at the trial, offered to prove, not the

return or the retaking of the prisoner, but that he would have

voluntarily returned, and was intending to do so, had he not

been prevented from accomplishing his purpose by the fraud of

the plaintiff. This defence was held inadmissible under a gen-

eral denial, or under the special answer of recaption, because it

was new matter, and the allegations and proofs must agree. ^

The defence of recoupment of damages is in all cases new mat-

ter, and must therefore be pleaded, although it is often a partial

defence analogous to those in mitigation. ^

§ 582. * 706. Actions Concerning Lands. In the legal action tO

recover possession of land, the complaint or petition being in

the common form, alleging in general terms that the plaintiff is

seised in fee of the premises, and the wrongful taking and with-

holding possession thereof by the defendant, and the answer

consisting merely of denials general or specific, the defendant

cannot, it has been held, prove a prior equitable title in himself

derived from the plaintiff or his grantor, although a legal title
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in himself may be proved, as this would directly contradict the

averment in the complaint that the plaintiff was owner of the

premises.'^ An action was brought by a wife against her husband

1 Richtmeyer v. Eemsen, 38 N. Y. 206, 2 Crane v. Hardman, 4 E. D. Smith,

208, per Grover J.: " The question is 448.

whether these grounds of defence must be ^ Stewart v. Hoag, 12 Oliio St., 623;

set up in the answer; that is. whether the Lombard v. Cowham, 34 Wis. 486, 491 ;

defence offered consists of new matter, Hartley i". Brown, 46 Cal. 201. See SM/)ra,

or whetlier it merely disproves any of the § * 679, as to what defences may be proved

material allegations of the complaint, under the general denial in this action. A

All that the plaintiff must allege and title accruing to the defendant since the

prove to maintain his action is the re- commencement of the action must be

new matter. An an ·w r
ttin 0 u
having b en
pl ade<l, the d £ ndant, at th tri al, off i· cl to proY , not th
return or th retakin 0 of the I ri on r, but that h w ultl have
voluntarily returned, an<l 1va inten<lin to
s , had he not
been pr vented from a ompli hing his purpo ' by the fraud of
the plaintiff. Thi ' <lef nee was h l<l inadmi ible under a g n.eral d nial, or under the pecial answer of recaption, becaus it
wa n w matter, and the allegations and proof mu t agr e. 1
The defence of recoupment of damages is in all ca es new matter, and mu t therefore be pleaded, although it is often a partial
defence analogou to those in mitigation. 2
~ 582. * 706 . Act ion s Con c erning L ands.
In the legal action to
recover possession of land, the complaint or petition being in
the common form, alleging in general terms that the plaintiff i
eised in fee of the premises, and the wrongful taking and withholding possession thereof by the defendant, and the answer
co1r·isting merely of denials general or specific, the defendant
cannot, it has been held, prove a prior equitable title in himself
,d erived from the plaintiff or bis grantor, although a legal title
in himself may be proved, as this would directly contradict the
a.verment in the complaint that the plaintiff was owner of the
premi e . 3 An action was brought by a wife against her husband

covery of the judgment, the issue and pleaded by a supplemental answer. Roper

delivery of execution to the sheriff, the v. McFaddeu, 48 Cal. 346, 348; McLane

■capture of the debtor on the execution, v. Bovee, 35 Wis. 27, 34. The rule as to

and the escape from custody before suic defences in ejectment is further illustratpd

brought against the sheriff therefor. We by Powers v, Armstrong, 35 Ohio St. 357 ;

have seen that the sheriff may defend the Emily v. Harding, 53 Ind. 102; Marks v.

action by proving a recaption of the debtor Sayward, 50 Cal. 57; Manly v. Howlitt,

before suit brought, or facts legally ex- 55 id. 94, and see the recent cases added

cusing him from making such recaption, under § * 682 ; as to other special actions

Proof of such facts does not controvert concerning laws, .see Morenhaut c. Wilson,

any allegations of the complaint. It is, 52 Cal. 263 (abandonment of a mining

therefore, new matter, constituting a de- claim) ; McCreary v. Marstou, 56 id. 403

fence to the action, and, under the (in action of unlawful detainer by a lessor,

code, is inadmissible unless set up in defence that the execution of the lease was

the answer." obtained by fraud or mistake) ; Uigier

Riehtmeyer v. Rem en, 3 ~. Y. 206,
208, per Grover J.: " The question is
wheth er these grounds of defence must be
et up in th e an wer; that i . wh ether the
defence offered con::;ist of new matter,
-Or whether it merely di prove any of th e
material allegations of the complaint .
All that the plaintiff mu t allege and
prove to maintain his action is the r eco very of the judgment, the i ·ue and
deliver_y of executi on to th e sheriff, th e
-capt ure of th e debtor on the execution,
and the e ·cape from cu tody befo re suit
brought against the sheriff therefor. \Ve
have seen that the sheriff may defend the
action by proving a recaption of th e debtor
before uit brought, or fact legally excusin g him from makin g su ch recaption.
Proof of such fact· doe · not co ntrovert
.any allegation of the complaint. It i ,
therefore, new matter, constituting a defen ce to the actiou, and, un<l er the
code, is iuadmi sible unle . set up in
t he an wer. "
1

2

Cran e v. Hardman,

-1-

E. D . Smith,

4-1-8.
3 Stewart v. H oag, 12 Ohio
t., 623;
Lombard v . Cowham, 34 \Yis. 4 6, 491;
Hartley v. Brown , 46 Cal. 201.
ee supra,
§ * 679, as to what defences may be proved
under th e general denial in this action. A
title accruing to the defendant i nee the
commencement of the action mu t be
pl eaded by a supplemental answer. Roper
v. McFaddeu, 48 Cal. 346, 348; McLaue
v. Bovee, 35 Wis. 27, 34. The rule a to
defences in ejectment is further illustratP.d
by P owers v. Arm trong, 35 Oh io St. 357;
Emily v. Ha rding, 53 Ind. 102; Mark v.
Sayward, 50 Cal. 57; Manly v. Howlitt,
55 icl. 94, and ee the r ecent ca e add ed
under § * 6 2 ; a to other pe ial action
concerniu g law , ee Morenhaut c. \Vil on,
52 Cal. 263 (abandon ment of a miuing
claim) ; fcCreary v. l\Iarston, 56 id. 403
( i u action of unla wful detain er by a le ~or,
defence that th e execution of the lea e wa'
obtaiueu by fraud or mi ·take); lligler
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to establish her title to certain lands. The complaint alleged

facts showing that she was the equitable owner of tlie lands,

which had been purchased by the husband with her money under

an understanding that the conveyance was to be made directly to

her, but which he had, in fraud of her rights, procured to be

made to himself: it prayed that she might be declared the

owner, and that a deed to her from her husband might be

ordered. W., a judgment creditor of the husband, was per-

mitted to intervene, and was made a party defendant. He

simply pleaded a general denial. This answer, it was held,

put in issue only the averments of the complaint, and did not

permit the defendant W. to set up and prove his character or

rights as a judgment creditor of the husband. In short, he

could obtain no advantage from his intervention, because no al-

lusion was made in the complaint to his position and claims as

a creditor: that subject-matter was entirely outside of its aver-

ments.^ A widow sued to recover her dower in lands which the

husband had conveyed to the defendant during the marriage with-

out any release from herself, and stated in her complaint the facts
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necessary to make out the cause of action. The answer set up

as a defence that the husband left a last will, in which he devised

and bequeathed to the plaintiff certain property to be received

by her in lieu of dower; that she had elected to take the gift

under the will, and had thus barred her right of dower. This

defence was held to be new matter, and to have been iwlmitted

by the plaintiff's neglect to reply and controvert its statements.^

In an action brought by the owners of lots abutting upon a cer-

tain alley in a city, to restrain the corporation from improving

such alley, on the ground that it was a private passage belong-

ing to the plaintiffs, the complaint contained the averments of

jjroperty in the plaintiffs necessary to show a right of action.

The answer stated facts showing that the original owner of the

land — the grantor or source of title of the plaintiffs — had dedi-

V. Edily, 53 id. 597 (tender since suit reply to all new matter was necessary,

brought). In a creditor's suit to reach a debt due to

^IJut see Oregon Ry. & Nav. Co. v. the judgment debtor as the vendor of land

Hertzberg (1894), ^6 Ore. 216, 37 Pac. from the vendee thereof, both being de-

1019, holding that under Hill's code, fendants, the hitter's an.^wer, that the pur-

§ 319, no estate in defendant or another clui.se-])rice had been fully paid to the

can be proved unless pleaded.] vendor, was held to be new matter, and

1 Watkins c. Jone.s, 28 Ind. 12. to require a reply, in Ohio, Edwards v.

- MtCurty v. Roberts, 8 Ind. 150. A Edwards, 24 Ohio St. 402, 411.

CIYIL RE.\IEDIE .

e bli h her title to
land . Th complaint all g d
fact howing tha h
q uitable o ner f b land ,
whi h had b en pur h
bu band wit] her mone un r
an un r andin that the n eyance wa to b made directly to
h r but which h had in fraud of her right pr cure to be
him elf: it pra d that h might be declar d the
o" n r and that a d ed
her fr m her hu band mi ht be
rrclered. W. a judgment credit r of the bu band wa
inter n an l wa mad a par y defendant. He
mi ted
~imply pl aded a
en ral denial. Thi an w r it wa h ld
put in i . . ue only the a rment of th complaint, and did not
p rmit th def nrlant \V. to t up and prove hi char cter r
ri h a a judgm nt creditor of the hu band. In h rt b
could b ain no advantage from hi in erv ntion becau · n allu ion wa made in th complaint to hi po ition and laims a
a reditor: that ubject-matter wa ntirel out id of it av rment . 1 A wi low ued to recoyer her dow r in land which the
b · band had conveyed to he d fendant during the marriaO'e wi but an relea e fr m her ·elf and ate 1 in her complaint he fa t
nece ·sary to make out the can e of a tion. The an wer et u
a· a def D e that the bu band left a ]a t will, in which he d vi cl
ancl bequeathed to the plaintiff c rtain property to be rec iv d
by her in li u of d°' r; that she had elect d to tak the gif
under the will, and ha l thu" barred her ri ht of dow r . Thi
1
efo ce wa h 11 to b n w matter and to hav been admitt d
b the plaintiff negl t to reply and ontrovert its tatement . 2
In c: n action brought by the owner f 1 ts abutting upon a cer<tin alley in a city to re train the corpora i n fr m im ro ing
·uch alley n th grpund that it wa a riva e pa ag b long the a erm nt of
i:1g t th plain iff the complaint contain
prnper · in he plaintiff n c ar to h w a ri ht f acti n .
Th an ·wer tated fact bowin 0 that th riginal own r of the
llud - he O'rantor r our . f title f he plain iff - had d dit

r. E<l<ly, 53 i<l. 59- (tend er
io ce uit
bronghc) .
[13ut . e
regon
y. & .,.av.
. r.
re. 216, 37 Pa .
H r zherg ( 1 94), ..2
101' holdiug that uuder Ilill' code
. :31g,110 :ta.te in clcfPudant or ano her
<·an lie prm·e1l nr1 le pl ail d.J
I "T:uki11 · c. June., 2 Ind. 12.
· }k 'arty v. Hobert:, Ind. 1:>O. A
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cated this alley to public use, and that it had thus been made a

highway. These facts, it was held, could not be proved under

a general denial : they were new matter, and must be specially

pleaded.^ The defence of long-continued adverse user or pre-

scription in actions affecting the title or possession of lands, or

involving the existence of easements, is, in general, new mat-

ter ; '^ for, in the usual form of such actions, the defence will be

in the nature of a justification of the acts complained of. Thus,

for example, in an action brought to remove a dam maintained

by the defendant, and to restrain his diversion of water from the

stream, and for damages, the defence of a long adverse user or

prescription, by which his right to the dam and to the water had

become perfect, is new matter, and should be pleaded. ^

§ 583. * 707. Actions upon Contract. The defence of Usury

is clearly new matter ; * and the facts showing the usurious agree-

ment and the entire transaction must be stated with fulness and

circumstantiality.^ The general denial in an action to recover

damages for the breach of a promise to marry does not admit

the defence of the improper habits and bad character of the
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plaintiif; as, that she habitually used intoxicating liquors to

excess, and was in the habit of becoming intoxicated. Such

facts, if they amount to a defence in bar, are new matter, and

^ Evansville v. Evans, 37 Ind. 229, 236. ment of the liomestead must be pleaded :

This decision seems to be opposed to the Bealey y. Blake (1900), 153 Mo. 657, 55

well-settled doctrines concerning the office S. W. 288.]

and effect of the general denial. The com- •* Catlin v. Gunter, 1 Duer, 253, 265 ;

plaint alleged a property in the plaintiffs. Fay v. Grimsteed, 10 Barb. 321. Compare

which was the very gist of their action ; Adamson v. Wiggins, 45 Minn. 448, ante,

and a general denial would permit the § * 678 note.

defendant to contradict such allegation. [^Brundage y. Burke (1895), 11 Wash-

Proving a dedication to the public is noth- 679, 40 Pac. 343 ; Bell v. Stowe (1895), 44

ing more nor less than showing title in Neb. 210, 62 N. W. 456 ; Kainbolt v.

at cl this all y to public u , and that it had thu b n mad a
highway. Th se fact , it wa · h lcl, could n ot b proved und r
n, general denial: th y w r n w matt r, and mu t be pecially
pl a<lecl. 1 The clefenc of long- ntin uecl adv r u · r or presci·j ption in actions aff cting th ti tl , or pos ·e ·ion of land
or
bv lving the exi tence of a ements, i , in g n ral, n w matt r; 2 for, iu the usual form of such action , th lefence will be
in the nature of a justification of the act complained of. Thu. ,
for xample, in an action brought to remove a clam maintain d
by the defendant, and to r train his diversion of water from th
tream, and for damages, the defence of a long atlv rse user or
prescription, by which his right to the dam and to the water had
become perfect, is new matter, and should be pleaded . 3
§ 583. * 707. Actions upon Contract. The defence of usury
is clearly new matter; 4 and the facts showing the usurious agreement and the entire transaction mu t be stated with fulness and
circumstantiality. 5 The general denial in an action to recover
damages for the breach of a promise to marry does not admit
the defence of the improper habits and bad character of the
plaintiff; as, that she habitually used intoxicating liquors to
excess, and was in the habit of becoming intoxicated. Such
facts, if they amount to a defence in bar, are new matter, and

the defendant, the city; and this directly Strang (1894), 39 Neb. 339, 58 N. \V. 96;

controverts the material statements of the Campbell v. Linder (1897), 50 S. C. 169,

complaint. 27 S. E. 648; Bird v. Kendall (1901), 62

2[;Newcomb v. Crews (1895), 98 Ky. S. C. 178, 40 S. E. 142; Maize v. Bradley

339, 32 S. W. 947; Wilson v. Wilson (1901), Ky., 64 8. W. 655.]

(1895), 117 N. C. 351, 23 S. E. 272.] & Manning f. Tyler, 21 N. Y. 567, 568;

3 Mathews v. Ferrea, 45 Cal. 51. Rountree v. Brinson, 98 N. C. 107 ; Anglo-

[^The defence of homestead must be Am. Land, etc. Co. v. Brohman, 33 Neb.

pleaded: Marshburn w. Lashlie (1898), 122 409; Lockwood v. Woods, 3 Ind. App.

N. C. 237, 29 S. E. 371. So also the de- 258.

fence that plaintiff, after acquiring title, QRainbolt v. Strang (1894), 39 Neb.

canveyed it to a third party: Kennedy v. 339, 58 N. W. 96; Bell c. Stowe (1895),

McQuaid (1894), 56 Minn. 450, 58 N. W 44 Neb. 210, 62 N. W. 456.]

35. And in a partition suit the abandon-

1 Evansville v. Evans, 37 Ind. 229, 236.
This decision seems to be opposed to the
well-settled doctrine concerning the office
and effect of the general denial. The complaint alleged a property in the plaintiffs,
which was the very gist of their action;
and a general denial would permit the
defendant to contradict such allegation.
Proving a dedication to the public is nothing more nor less than showing title in
the defendant, the city; and this directly
controverts the material statements of the
complaint.
2 [Newcomb v. Crews (1895), 98 Ky.
339, 32 S. W. 947; Wilson v. Wilson
(1895), 117 . c. 351, 23 s. E. 272.J
3 Mathews n. Ferrea, 45 Cal. 51.
[The defence of home tea<l must be
pleaded: Marshburn v. Lashlie (189 ), 122
N. C. 237, 29 S. E. 371. So also the defence that plaintiff, after acquiring title,
cMveyed it to a third party: Kennedy v.
McQuaiu (l 94), 56 Minn. 450, 58 N. W
35. And in a partition suit the abandon-

ment of the liomestead must be pleaded ;
Healey v. Blake (1900), 153 Mo. 657, 55
s. w. 288.J
4 Catlin v. Gunter, 1 Duer, 253, 265;
Fay v. Grimsteed, 10 Barb. 321. Compare
Adamson v. Wiggins, 45 Minn. 448, ante,
§ * 678 note.
[Brundage v. Burke (1895), 11 Wash6 79, 40 Pac. 343 ; Bell v. Stowe (I 895), 441 eb. 210, 62 N. W. 456;
Rainbolt v.
Strang (1 894) , 39 Neb. 339, 58 N. W. 96;
Campbell v. Linder (1897) , 50 S. C. I 69,
27 S . E. 648; Bird v. Kendall (1901) , 62
S. C. 178, 40 S . E. 142; Maize v. Bradley
(1901), Ky., 64- .. W. 655.J
5 Manning v. Tyler, 21 N. Y. 567, 568;
Rouutree v. Brin son, 98 N. C. lOi; AngloAm. Land, etc. Co. v. Brohman , 33 Neb.
409; L ockwood ii. ·w ood , , 3 fod . A pp.
258.
[Rainbolt v. trang (1 94-), 39 Neb.
339, 58 N. W. 96; Bell v. Stowe (1895) ,
44 Neb . 210, 62 . W. 456.J
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must be alleged in the answer. ^ The owner of a building in-

cumbered by a mortgage procured it to be insured against fire,

the policy being made payable to the mortgagee. In an action

on this policy brought by the payee therein, the defence that

the mortgage had been foreclosed, the land sold, and the mort-

gage debt partly discharged out of the proceeds, was held in-

admissible under an answer of mere denials. These facts

constituted a partial defence in the nature of payment, and

were clearly new matter.^ In a suit against a surety, the de-

fence of his discharge from liability by reason of an extension of

the time of payment granted to the* principal debtor, in pursu-

ance of a private agreement made with the creditor, is new

matter, and cannot be proved unless pleaded as such;^ and

also his discharge by reason of any other subsequent agreement

between the principals to the contract.*

§ 584. * 708. Defence of Illegality. The rule is well settled

in strict accordance with the true theory of pleading under the

codes, that all defences based upon the asserted illegality of the

contract in suit, which admit the fact of a transaction between
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the parties purporting to be an agreement, and apparently bind-

ino-, but which insist that l)y reason of some violation of the law

the same is illegal and void, are new matter, and must be set up

in the answer in order to be provable.^ A few examples will

1 Button V. McCauley, 38 Barb. 413. defence of mistake or error in any of its

Compare Tompkins v. Wadley, 3 N. Y. items is new matter, and cannot be proved

S. C. 424, 430, which holds that in such an under a general denial, Warner v. Myrick,

action an act of unchastity committed by l(j Minn. 91 : and the facts which autlior-

tlie plaintiff can be proved in mitigation i/e tlie application of the ".scaling laws "

under the "-eneral denial. in North Carolina to contracts of indebted-

[^Defence by reason of diseased condi- ness, Hank of Charlotte v. Britton, 66 N. C.

tion of y)laintiff held to be new matter: se."). That the defence of rescission or

Vierling v. Binder (1901), 113 la. 337, 8.5 abandonment is new matter, see Reynolds

N. \V. 621.] '• Reynolds, 4.'5 Mo. App. 622; l)ut tliat

mu t b

l in th

an w r. 1

Th own r of a building init to b in. ur d again t fir
h
th m rtg g
In an acti 11
on
e ther in, the def nee that
h
tli lan l
ld, and th mortf th proc d , wa held ina
m re
nial .
The e facts
c
m the natur
f paym nt, and
r. 2 In a suit again t a urety, the deharge from liabilit · by rea on f an ext nsion of
f p 'm nt grant d to th •principal debt r in pur uanc
a pri ate agr m nt mad with th
r clit r, i n w
matt r an l annot be prov d unl
pl aded as u l ; 3 an l
al o his di charge by r ason of any other subsequent agr m nt
betw n tbe principal o the ntract. 4
§ 584. * 7 . Defence of Illegality. Th rul
w 11 ettle
in stri ta ordan e with th tru theory of pl ading un r tl
c d
that all d fenc
ba d u1 on the a rt d ill ality f th
c ntra t in ui t, which admit th fa t f a tran acti n b tw n
th part1
purr rting to h an a r m nt, and ar par ntly binding but whi h in 'ist that by r a ' n f
me viola ti n f tl law
the m i ill al and v id, ar n w matter, and mu t l>
t u
5
in th an ' W r in order to be provabl .
A f w exam11 will

■- Grosvenor v. Atlantic F. Ins. Co., 1 it may be shown under tlic general denial

Bosw. 469. tliat the contract sued upon was condi-

8 Newell V. Salmons, 22 Barb. 647. tional, and, by force of the condition, has

QBishop ". Hart (1901), 114 la. 96, 86 terminated, see Danenbaum v. Person

N. W. 218 (action against guarantor); (N. Y. City Ct. 1888), 3 N. Y. Snppl. 129.

Osborn & Co. v. Evans (1894), 91 la. 13, ^ j^Powell ,-. Flanary (1900), 109 Ky. 342,

58 N. W. 920. So al.so the renewal of a .'59 S. W. 5 ; CuUi.son v. Downing (1903), 42

note extending time beyond day when Ore. 377, 71 Pac. 70; Haddock r. Salt Lake

action was commenced, is new matter: City (1901), 23 Utah, 521, 65 Pac. 491 ;

Californi:i State Bank v. Webber (1895), All" Doon v. Smitli (1893), 25 Ore. 89, .34

110 Cal. .5.38, 42 Pac. 1066.] Pac. 1093; Miller v llir.scbberg (1895^27

« Horton »•. Ruhling, 3 Nev. 498. In Ore. 522, 40 Pac. 506 ; Durham Fertilizer

1 Button
. M auley, 3 Barh. 413.
C mpa.r Tompki11 . v. \ Vadley, 3 N. Y.
. , . 42-i , 430 whi ·h hold that in . uch an
act ion au a ·t f un ha tity com mitt cl by
the plain t iff au b pro,·ed io miti<Yation
unde r the general d >uial.
[Def n e h.'· rea · on f di ·ea ed onditi o n f plaintiff h Id to be new matt r:
Vi rl1n 1: . Bind r (1901), l l3 Ia. 33i, 5

N. \ . 62L .J
2

}r

,. n r

an action ujion an account stated, the Co. c. Pagett (1893), 39 S. C. 69, 17 S. E.

B o w. 4

.

. Atl ntic F. In..

., l
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illustrate this rule.^ In an action against a city upon a contract

made with the plaintiff by the street commissioners, the answer

alleged that these officers did not proceed according to the statute

defining their powers, that they did not publish the proper notice

of the letting the contract prescribed by the city charter, and

that the contract itself was therefore invalid. To this answer

there was no reply; and as the code of Minnesota required a

reply to all new matter, the defendant claimed that these aver-

ments were by reason of the omission admitted to be true. The

court so held, pronouncing the defence new matter which could

not be proved under a general denial. ^ The defence that the

contract in suit was entered into on Sunday, and is for that

reason illegal and void under the statute, is new matter ;3 and

that the demand was for liquors sold by an innkeeper on credit

contrary to statute;"^ and that the plaintiff carried on business

by himself under a firm name, there being no partnership, in

563; Woodbridge v. Sellwood (1896), 65

Miim. 135, 67 N. W. 799; Maitlaiid v. Zauga
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(1896), 14 Wash. 92,44 Pac. 117; McDear-

mott V. Sedgwick (1897), 140 Mo. 172, 39

S. W. 776, overruliug Sprague v. "Rooney,

104 Mo. 360; Horton v. Rolieff (1903), —

Neb. — , 95 N. W. 37. lu School i:)istrict.

illustrate this rule. 1 In an action again t a ity u1 ou a contrnet
made with the I laintiff by the str et c mmissi ners, th an " ' r
alleged that thes of.fie rs did not pr eed accorcling to th ·tatut ·
d efining their p w r , that they did not publi h th pr per noti
-0f the 1 tting the contract pre crib d by the city cLart r, and
that the contra t it elf was therefore invalid. To thi answ r
there wa no reply; and as the code of Minne ota r quired a
rnply to all new matter, the d fondant claimed that the e av rments were by reason of the omission admitted to be tru . The
.court so held, pronouncing the defence new matter which could
not be proved under a general denial. 2 The def nee that the
contract in suit was entered into on Sunday, and is for that
reason illegal and void under the statute, is new matter: 3 and
that the demand was for liquors sold by an innkeeper on credit
contrary to statute; 4 and that the plaintiff carried on business
by himself under a firm name, there being no partnership, in

V. Sheidley (1897), 138 Mo. 672, 40 S. W.

656, the court said : " Tlie rule is that if

a plaintiff, in order to make out his cause

of action, is required to show that the con-

tract sued upon is, for any reason, illegal,

the court sliould not enforce it, whether

pleaded as a defence or not. But when

the illegality does not appear from the

contract itself, or from the evidence neces-

sary to prove it, but depends upon extra-

neous facts, the defence is new matter and

must have been pleaded in order to be

available."]

1 The defence of fraud is new matter,

and must be pleq,ded in all actions, whether

brought upon contract or to enforce al-

leged rights of property in the plaintiff.

Jenkins v. Long, 19 Ind. 28; Farmer v.

, Calvert, 44 Ind. 209, 212 ; Daly v. Proetz,

20 Minn. 411, 417; Jameson v. Coldwell

(Ore.), 31 Pac. Rep. 279 (illegal con-

tract) ; Buchtel v. Evans, 21 Ore. 315

(same) ; contra, Sprague v. Rooney, 104

Mo. 349 ; compare last note but one under

§ * 679, «/(/(.' ; last note under § * 703, ante ;

and § * 704, with notes. As to defences

of fraud and illegality, see I)alryin])lo

V. Hillenbrand, 62 N. Y. 5 ; 2 Hun, 488;

Leavitt v. Catler, 37 Wis. 46 ; Casad v. Hol-

dridge, 50 Ind. 529; Sharon v. Sharon,

68 Cal. 29 ; for other special defences,

see Dalrymple v. Hunt, 5 Hun, 111 (a for-

mer recovery) ; Riggs v. Am. Tract Soc,

84 N. Y. 330, 337, 338 (action to set aside

a contract made by an insane person ;

defence that it was made in good faith

and for his benefit) ; Goodwin v. Mass.

Mut. L. Ins. Co., 73 N. Y. 480, 496 (in ac-

tion on a policy of life insurance) ; Hegler

V. Eddy, 53 Cal. 597 (tender after the suit

was begun). Defence of champerty is

new matter : Moore v. Ringo, 82 Mo. 468 ;

defence that the contract sued upon is a

wagering contract, is new matter: Cum-

misky v. Williams, 20 Mo. App. 606 ;

*

563; Woodbridge v. Sellwood (1896), 65 and § 704, with notes. A s to defence
Minn. 135, 67 .r . W. 799; Maitland v. Zanga of fraud and illegality , see Dalrymple
(1 96 ), 14 ·w as h. 92, 44 Pac. 117 ; McDear- v. Hillenbrand, 62 N. Y. 5 ; 2 Hun, 48 ;
mott v. Sedgwick ( 189 7), 140 Mo. 172, 39 Leavitt v. Catler, 37 Wi s. 46 ; asau v. Ho l·
. \l'l. 776, orerrulin g Sprague v. Rooney, driclge, 50 Ind. 529 ; Sharon v. Sharon,
104 Mo. 360; Horton v. R oheff {1903) , 68 Cal. 29; for other special defen ce:,
Neb. - , 95 N. W. 37. In S chool District see D alrymple v. Hunt, 5 Hun , 111 (a forv. Sheidley (1897), 138 Mo. 672, 40 S. W. mer recovery); Riggs v. Am. Tract Soc.,
656, th e co urt said: " The rule i that if 8-i N . Y. 330, 337, 338 (action to et a ·ide
a plaintiff, in or<ler to make out hi s cause a contract made by :m insan e person ;
of a.ctio n, is req uired to show t hat the con- defence that it was made in good faith
tract sued upou is, for any r eason, illegal, and for his benefit); Goodwin v. Ma s.
the court should not enforce it, whether Mut. L. Ins. Co., 73 N . Y. 480, 496 (in at:pleaded as a defence or not. But wh en ti on on a policy of life insurance ); Hegl r
t he illegality does not appear from the v. Eddy, 53 Cal. 597 (tender after the suit
contract itself, or from the ev iden ce nece - was beguu). Defence of champerty 1s
ary to prove it, but depend s upon extra- new matter : Moore v. Riugo, 82 Mo. 46 ;
11eous facts, the defence is new matter and defence that the contract sued upon is a
m ust have been pleaded in order to be wagering contract, is new matter: Cum mi sky v. W illiams, 20 Mo. App. 606;
a,·ailable."J
contra, H entz v. Miner, 58 Hun, 42 ; that
1 The defence of fra ud is new matter,
and must be pleaded in all actions, whe th er the contract was an attempt corruptly t o
brought upon co ntract or to enforce al- influence legislation: Milbank v. Jone:;,
l eged rights of property in the plaiutiff. 1~7 N. Y. 370.
2 Nash v.
t. Paul, 11 Minn. 174, 17 ;
J enkins v . Long, 19 Ind. 2 ; Farmer v .
. Calvert, 44 Ind. 209, 212 ; Daly v. Proetz, and see Finley v. Quirk, 9 Minn. 194, 200,
20 Minn. 411, 417; Jameson v. Coldwell 203.
3 Finley v. Quirk, 9 Minn. 194, 200, 203.
(Ore. ), 31 Pac. Rep. 279 (illegal con~ Denten v . L ogan, 3 Met. (Ky.) 434.
t ract ); Buchtel v. Evans, 21 Ore. 315
( ame) ; conl m, Sprague v. Rooney, 10-!
[See al o
ha wyer v. Cham uerla iu
Mo. :349 ; co mpare last uote but one un der (1900),113la.U2, 4 . W . 66l;JJillon v.
§ * 67!), a nte ; last note under§ * 703, ante ; Dar-t (1 96) , 4 Ne b. 03, 67 •. W . 7 3.]
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violation of a statute; ^ and that the contract was in restraint of

trade. '-

§ 585. * 709. Further Illustrations of New Matter. In actions

upon instruments which ^;W?;i.rt facie import a consideration, —

that is, upon notes, bills, and other negotiable paper, and writ-

ings under seal, — the defence of a want of consideration is new

matter; ^ but where there is no such presumption in favor of the

contract, the same defence may be proved under the general

denial.'* Where suit is brought for goods sold and delivered, or

bargained and sold, the defence of a warranty, on the sale, and

a breach thereof, is clearly new matter.^ If an action is brought

for the possession or for the value of securities claimed to belong

to the plaintiff , and alleged to have been in some manner wrong-

fully transferred to and detained by the defendant, the defence

that the latter purchased the same in good faith, and is a houa

fide holder thereof, is, in general, new matter.^ It is plain,

however, that the character of this defence will largely depend

upon the form of the complaint. The latter might naturally

contain averments denying the good faith of the defendant's
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possession, or stating a want of consideration in the transfer to

him, so that a mere denial would raise an issue, and admit evi-

dence of the defence. A judgment having been confessed in

which the statement of indebtedness was so informal and in-

1 O'Toole V. Garvin, .3 N. Y. S. C. (1902), 158 Ind. 32.5, 63 N. E. 572, the court

118. said : " A plea which in general terms al-

* Prost V. More, 40 Cal. .347. leges no consideration is good, but one

^ Frybarger y. Cokefair, 17 Ind. 404; which attempts to set up a whole or partial

Bingham v. Kimball, 17 Ind. 396; Dubois failure of consideration must state facts

V. Hermance, 56 N. Y. 673,674; Beeson sufficient to establish .such failure." But see

?; Howard, 44 Ind. 413, 415; Brown v. Shirk t'. Neible (1900), 156 Ind 66, 59 N. E.

Heady (Ky. 1893), 20 S. W. Rep. 1036. 281. Under a plea of no consideration it

^Huntington v. Lombard (1900), 22 cannot be shown that the consideration waa

Wash. 202, 60 Pac. 414; Knight c. Finney illegal: Babcock v. Murray (1894), 58

(1899), 59 Neb. 274, 80 N. W. 912 ; Sharp- Minn. 385, 59 N. W. 1038.]

vi lation of a tatute · 1 and that the contract wa in re traint of
trad . 2
585. * 709. Further Illustrations of New Matter. In action
111 on i11 trument which prinia facie import a con ideration tha i. , upon n t ·, bill , :: n l oth r negotiable paper and writin;:,' uncl r al, - th def nee of a want of con icl ration i. new
matt r; 3 but wh re there i. no u h pr umption inf< Y r of th
ntract, the ame defence may be proved under th general
denial. 4 ..Where uit is brought f r goods old and ieli' ered, or
bargained and old, the defence of a warranty, on the al , an
a breach ther of, is clearl new matter. 5 If an action i brou::iht
for the po e ' ion or for the value of ecuritie claimed to b long
to the plaintiff, . . ancl alleged to have be n in ome mann r wrongfully tran ferred to and detained by the defendant, the defence
that the latter purcha ed the same in good faith, an i i a bona
fide holder ther of, is, in general, new matter. 6 It i plain,
however, that the character of this d fence will largely depend
upon the form of the complaint. Tbe latter might na urally
contain averments denying the good faith of the defendant'
po e ion, or stating a want of consideration in the tran fer to
him so that a mere denial would rai e an issue, and admit e ide11ce of the defence. A judgment having been confessed in
which the tatement of indebtedne wa so informal and in-

less V. Giffeu (1896), 47 Neb. 146, 66 N. W. * See cases cited mpra, § * 676. In the

285; V. L. & T. Co. r. Siefkc (1894), 144 latter class of actions, a consideration

N. Y. 354, 39 N. K. 35S ; Sams v. Der- must be averred in the complaint,

rick (1898), 103 Ga. 678,30 8. E. 668. [^Greer r. Latimer (1896), 47 S. C. 176,

The facts showing want of consideration 25 S. E.136. But failure of consideration

sliould he set out : Port Huron, etc. Co. v. is not raised by a general tlenial : Nunn v.

Clements (1902). 113 Wis. 249, 89 N. W. Jordan (1903)", 31 Wash. 506, 72 Pac. 124 ;

160; (Jriffith (•. Wright (1899), 21 Wash. Murray ?\ Live Stock Co. (1895), 12 Wash.

494, 58 I'ac. 582 ; Duckworth ;;. McKinney 259, 40 Pac. 942.]

(1900), 58 S. C. 418. 36 S. E. 730. But see & Fetherly v. Burke, .54 N. Y. 646.

Taylor v. Purcell (1894), 60 Ark. 606, 31 "^ Weaver v. Barden, 49 N. Y. 286, 297,

S. W. 567. In Osborne & Co. v. Ilanlin per Grover J.

1

O'Toole v. Garvin, 3 N. Y.

. C.

118.
2 Pro t v. More, 40 Cal. 347.
a Frybarger v. Cokefa.ir, 17 lml. 40-!;
Bingham v. Kimball, 17 Ind. 396; Dubois
v. Hermance, 56 N. Y. 673, 674; Bee on
v . Howard, 44 Ind. 413, 415; Brown v .
Ready (Ky. 1 93), 20 . W. Rep. 1036.
[Huntington v. Lombard (1900), 22
Wash. 202, 60 Pa . 414; Knight r. F inney
(1 99), 59 eb. 274, 0 . W. 9 12; harple v. Giffen (1 96 ), 47 Teb. 146, 66 . W.
2 5; F. L. & 'I'. ,o. v . .' iefkc ( 1 94), 144
. Y . 354, 39 . J-,. 35 ; Sam v. D errick (l 9 ), l 03
a . 6i , 3
. E. 66 .
The fact . bowing want of on id ratiou
houlrl he t out: P rt Huron, tc.
lem<·nt ' ( 1902), 113 Wi . 249, 9
l GO; C~riffith '" Wright ( 1 99), 21 \ a h.
494, 5 l'ac. 5 2; Duckworth 1. '.[ Kinn y
(1900). 5 .' ('. 41 . 36 .'. E. 730. But ee
Taylor v. l'urc 11 (1 94), GO Ark. 6 6, 31
". W. 5G i. I Osliorne & Co. v. IT auli n

( 1902), 15 Ind. 325, 63 I . E. 572, the court
said: "A plea which iu general terms alleges no con ideration i · good, but one
which attempts to et up a whole or partial
failure of con ideration must state fa t
sufficient toe tabli h uch failure." But see
hirk v. Neible (1900), 156 Ind 66, 59 N. E.
2 1. Under a plea f uo con icleration it
ann t be howu that the con icleration wa
ille<Yal : Babcock v. Murray (1 9-!), 5
1.inn. 3 5, 59 N. W. 103 .]
~
ee ca es cited supra, · * 676. In the
latter cla s of action , a consid rati u
mu t be averr din the complaint.
[ r er v . Latim r (l 96), 47 ._. . 176,
f n icleration
25 S. E. 136. But failur
unn 1·.
i not rai d by a n ral cl nial :
Jordan (1903), 31 Wah. 50 , 72 Pac. 124;
furray v. Live tock Co. (1 95), 12 \Va h.
259, 40 ac. 942.]
F th rly v. Bnrke, 5-t . Y. 646
G W av r v.
art! n, 49 .•?. Y. 6, · 9'/,
per ' rover J.
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complete that the whole was prima facie void as against other

creditors, an action was brought to set aside the judgment so

confessed. The answer in this action set out in full all the facts

of the original indebtedness, which tended to show that an actual

debt existed, and that the confession was in good faith and valid.

This answer the Supreme Court of California held to be new

matter: it was in avoidance, and not in denial of the case made

by the complaint.^

§ 586. * 710. Nevsr Matter Distinguished from Denials by Supreme

Court of Missouri. The distinction between new matter and

denials was clearly stated in a recent decision by the Supreme

Court of Missouri. In an action upon an attachment bond, the

petition set out the bond, and alleged as a breach that the plain-

tiff in the attachment suit had failed to prosecute the same, and

that the attachment had been abated by a judgment of the court

in that proceeding. The answer admitted the bond, denied the

breach, and asserted that the original suit was still pending by

a motion in arrest of judgment and for a new trial. No reply

having been pleaded, these averments of the answer were held
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at the trial to have been admitted. This ruling was reversed on

error, and the answer was held to be merely a denial. ^

§ 587. * 711. Examples of Defences in Abatement. The non-

joinder of necessary parties cannot be proved under the general

denial; it is new matter, and must be pleaded i^ nor can the mis-

joinder of plaintiffs be relied upon under a denial ; the question

must be raised by a demurrer or by a special answer.* The de-

1 Pond V. Daveuport,45 Cal. 225. The Mo. 385 ; Northrup v. Miss. Vail. Ins. Co.,

correctnessof this decisiou may be doubted. 47 Mo. 435. Tlie allegation in question

The answer is rather an argumentative is merely in denial of facts which the

denial. The complaint in effect charged plaintiff must prove to make out his prima

fraud ; and, if a general denial had been facie cause of action."

pleaded, the same facts would have been * Abbe c Clarke, 31 Barb. 238.

evidence in its support to disprove the [^Johnson v. Gooch (1894), 114 N. C.

fraud. 62, 19 S. E. 62; Cone v. Cone (1901), 61

2 State V. Williams, 48 Mo. 210, 212: S. C. 512, 39 S. E. 748; North Powder

"The general rule is, that any fact which Mill. Co. v. Coughanour (1898), 34 Ore.

avoids the action, and which the plaintiff 9, 54 Pac. 223; Deegan v. Deegan (1894),

complete that the whole was prim a f acie void a against other
creditors, an action was brought to set a ide the judgment s
confe sed. The an wer in this action set out in full all the facts
of the original indebtedness, which tended to show th at an actual
debt existed, and that the confe sion was in good faith and valid.
This answer the Supreme Court of California held to be n w
matter: it was in avoidance, and not in denial of the case made
by the complaint. 1
§ 586. * 710. New Matter Distinguished from Denials by Supreme
Court of Missouri.
The distinction between new matter and
denials was clearly stated in a recent decision by the Supreme
Court of Missouri. In an action upon an attachment bond, the
petition set QUt the bond, and alleged as a breach that the plaintiff in the attachment suit had failed to prosecute the same, and
that the attachment had been abated by a judgment of the court
in that proceeding. The answer admitted the bond, denied the
breach, and asserted that the original suit was still pending by
a motion in arrest of judgment and for a new trial. No reply
having been pleaded, these averments of the answer were held
at the trial to have been .admitted. This ruling was reversed on
error, and the answer was held to be merely a denial. 2
§ 587. * 711. Examples of Defences in Abatement. The nonjoinder of necessary parties cannot be proved under the general
denial; it is new matter, and must be pleaded: 3 nor can the rnisjoinder of plaintiffs be relied upon under a denial ; the question
must be raised by a demurrer or by a special answer. 4 The de-

is«uot bound to prove in the first instance 22 Nev. 185, 37 Pac. 360. The above

in support of it, is new matter; but a fact cases hold that the plea must specify the

which merely uegatives the averments of parties who should have been joined. 3

the petition is not new matter, and need * Gillam r. Sigman, 29 Cal. 637; Mills

not be replied to. Moreover, an answer v. Carthage, 31 Mo. A pp. 141. See also

setting up new matter by way of defence Dutcher v. Dutcher, 39 Wis. 651, and the

should confess and avoid the plaintiff's other additional cases cited ante, under

cause of action. Bauer v. Wagner, 39 § * 698.

1 Pond v. Davenport, 45 Cal. 225.
The
correctne · of this decision may be doubted.
The answer is rather an argumentative
denial. The complaint in effect charged
fraud ; and, if a general denial had been
pleaded, the same fact - would have been
evidence in its support to disprove the
fraud.
2 State v . Williams, .is Mo . 210, 212:
" The general rule is, that any fact which
avoids the acti on, and which the plaintiff
i enot bound to prove in the first instance
in support of it, is new matter; but a fact
'vhich merely negative the averment of
the petition is not new matter, and need
not be replied to. Moreover, an answer
setting up new matter h.v way of defence
should confess and a\'Oid the plaintiff's
cause of action. Bauer v. ' Vaguer, 39

Mo. 385; Northrup v . Miss. Vall. Ins. Co.,
47 Mo. 435. The allegati on in question
is merely in denial of facts which the
plaintiff mu st prove to make out his prima
facie cause of action."
3 Abbe 1>. Clarke, 3 1 Barb. 238 .
[Johnson v. Gooch (1894), 114 N. C.
62, 19 S. E . 62 ; Con e v . Cone (1901), 61
S. C. 512, 39 S. E. 748 ; North Powder
Mill. Co. v. Coug hanour (1898), 34 Ore.
9, 54 Pac. 223; Deegan v. Deegan (1894),
22 Nev. 185, 37 P ac. 360. Tile aborn
cases hold that th e plea mu t pecify the
parties who should have been j'Jined.J
4 Gillam v.1Sigman, 29 Cal. 637; Mills
ii. Carthage, 31 Mo. App. 14 l.
See also
Dutcher v. Dutcher, 39 Wis. 651, and th e
other additional cases cited ante, und er
§ * 698.

814:

IVIL REi\IEDIE .

814 CIVIL REMEDIES.

ha

fence that the plaintiff is not the real party in interest is new

th

r laintiff

i n t th

matter. A general averment, however, to that effect, is not

h

enongh: the facts must be stated which constitute the defence,

r ( 1 par
i

111 int r t i n
that
, i n

and which show that he is not the real party in interest.^ The

objection that the plaintiff has not the legal capacit}' to sue,

unless it appears on the face of the complaint or petition so that

it can be raised by demurrer, is new matter. Being in the nature

of a dilatory defence, like that of a defect of parties, the facts

which constitute it must be stated with certaint}': a mere gen-

eral averment would raise no issue.- In application of this rule,

the objection that the plaintiff or the defendant is a married

woman, when relied on as a defence, cannot be proved under a

general denial, but must be pleaded as new matter;^ and in an

action by an executor or administrator, the general denial does

not put in issue the plaintiff's title to sue.* The defence that

the action was commenced before the cause of action had accrued

cannot, it has been held, be proved under a general denial, but

must be set up in the answer specially.^ Thus in an action for

work and labor on an open account, where the answer was a
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general denial, the defence that the account was not due at the

time the action was commenced according to the terms of a

1 Jackson v. Whedon, 1 E. D. Siiiitli, Joliiison r. Miller, 4" Ind. .376, 377; Lau-

141 ; Savaj^e v. Corn Exch. F. Ins. Co., 4 ders v. Doui^las, 46 Ind. 522 ; McDaniel

Bosw. 1 ; Raymond v. Prichard, 24 Ind. r. Carver, 40 Ind. 250 ; Prison i\ O'Dowd,

.318; Garrison v. Clark, 11 Ind. 369; 40 Ind. 300 ; Van Metre y. Wolf, 27 Iowa,

Swift y. Ellsworth, 10 Ind. 205; Lamson 341; Wagner v. Ewing, 44 Ind. 441;

V. Falls, 6 Ind. 309 ; Curtis v. Gooding, 99 Kennard v. Sax, 3 Ore. 263, 265. The de-

Ind. 45; Hereth v. Smith, 33 Ind. 514; fence of infanry is new matter: Prall v.

Giraldin v. Howard, 103 Mo. 40. Peters, 32 Xeb. 832.

QEsch V. White (1901), 82 Minn. 462, [^Fulton v. Ryan (1900), 60 Xeb. 9, 82

l with rte in · : a m r
2
In applica ion f thi,
h d f nclant
ann t be pr v d und r
' man wh n r li d
g n ral d nial, but mu t be pl al l a n w matt r; 3 ancl in an
a ti n b an xe u or or admini trator, th general cl nial cl
4
not put in i u the plaintiff titl t
The l f n
th
the acti n'
ommenced b
of action ha l a ru i
cann , it ha b en h eld, b pr v d und r a g n ral i nial bu
mu t b
t up in the an wer pe iall . 5 Thu in an acti n f r
work and labor on an open a oun , wh re the an w r " ·a
g neral l nial, the defence that th a count wa not due at th
tim the action wa comm nee l accor ling to th t rm of ·
ta

85 N. W. 238, 7)3; Lesh v. Meyer (1901), N. W. 105; Linton v. Jansen (1903), —

.63 Kan. 524, 66 Pac. 245; Wakeman v. Neb. — , 95 N. W. 675.^

Norton (1897), 24 Colo. 192, 49 Pac. 283 ; * White v. Moses, 11 Cal..69. It is

Nat. Dist. Co. V. Cream City Imp. Co. the rule in some States that a general

(1893), 86 Wis. 352, 56 N. W. 864.] denial admits the corporate existence of the

■•^ Cal. Steam Nav. Co. v. Wright, 8 Cal. ])hiiiitiff, even if that is alleged in the

585; Wade v. State, 37 Ind. 180, 182; complaint: Dietriclis r. Lincoln & N. W.

Wright /;. Wright, 54 N. Y. 437, 441, 59 R. Co., 13 Neb. 43; Nat^ional Life Ins.

Barb. 505 ; Burnside y. Matthews, 54 N. Y. Co. v. Robinson, 8 Neb. 452; Beatty v.

78, 82, " mnst be pleaded specially and with Bartholomew Cy. Agr. Soc, 76 Ind. 91,

certainty to a particular intent;" Barclay and cases cited ; QSparks v. Nat. Accident

V. Quicksilver Min. Co., 6 Lans. 25,30; Ass'u (1896), 100 la. 458, 69 N. W. 678.]

Plia;nix Bk. v. Donnell, 40 N. Y. 410. "" [^Klder v. Rourke (1895), 27 Ore. 363,

Qlnfancy held in Winer r. Ma.st (1896), 41 Pac. 6, citing the text; Southey v.

146 Ind. 177, 45 N. E. 66, to be a defence Dowling (1898), 70 Conn. 153, 39 Atl. 1 13 ;

in bar and not in abatement.] Goodrich r. Bldg. Ass'n (1895), 96 Ga. 803,

1

Jack. on v. Whedon, 1 E. D . ~mith,

141; avag v. Corn Ex h. F. In " Co., 4Bo w. l ; Raymond v. l""richard, 24 Ind.
31 ;
arri on v. lar k, 11 Ind . 369;
wift v. Ell worth, 10 Incl. 205; Lam on
v. :Fall. , 6 Ind . 309 ; urti v. ooding, 99
Inrl. 45; H r th v. mi th, 33 In d. 514;
iraldin v. Howard, 103 Mo. 40.
[E ·h v. Whit (1901), 2 Minu. 462,
5 .1.J . W. 23 , il " ; Le ·h v. Meyer (1901),
. 3 Kan. 524-, 66 Pa·. 245; Wak eman 1• •
.1. ~ orton ( 1 97), 24olo. 192, 49 Pa . 2 3;
at. I i t. o. v. Cr am ity I mp. o.
(I 3), 6 Wi . 352, 56 N . W. 864-.J
2 al. , t am XaY. o. v. Wri gh t,
al.

3 Dillaye v. Parks, 31 Barb. 132; 22 S. E. 585.]

5 5; Wad "· ta t , 37 Ind . I 0, l 2;
Wrig ht 1._ Wri g ht, 54 N. Y. 437, 441, 59
B ru. 505 ; urn . i<le v . .Matth w , 54 . Y.
7 , 2, " mu t b pl cl cl p ially and with
c rt in ty to a par ticular iut nt;" Bar lay
1'. Q uick ·il Y r Min.
o., 6 Lan .. 25, 30;
l' hwn ix k. 1• . Dunnell 4
. Y. 410.
[Iu fau<'y h ld in i in r v. fa t (1 96 ),
14 , In1!. I 77, 4- :3 ~ T. E . 66, to u a d f ·nc·
i11 bar :u11l 11ot in al1atc·mc•ut.]
3 J) illay ·
v. Park , 3 1 Darb. 13 2 ;

D owlin g (1
oodrieh r. Bldg. A
2:2 ,'. 1... 5 5.J
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special contract was excluded on the ground that it should

have been pleaded.^ The defence that another action is pend-

ing for the same cause must be specially pleaded, unless it is

raised by demurrer. ^

§ 588. * 712. Miscellaneous Defences. The defence of license

is new matter, and cannot be proved unless pleaded.^ Accord-

ing to the decided weight of authority, an estoppel in ^:)fa'-s cannot

be proved under a general denial, but is new matter.* An accord

1 Hagan v. Burch, 8 Iowa, 309; Smith

V. Holmes, 19 N. Y. 271.

sp cial ontra t wa
xclu l <l. on the ground that it ·h ul<l.
1
have b n pl ad cl. The tl fen· that anoth r a tion i p 'll<ling for the same cau must be specially pl atl cl, unl
it IS
2
rai, tl by l murrer.
§ 588. * 712. Miscellan eous D efences. The cl f nc of lie n e
is n w matter, antj. ann t be pr ved unl
I 1 ad cl. 3 Ac ordin to the decided weight of authority, an ' topp 1 in pais ann t
be prov d under a general denial, but is new matt r. 4 An ac ord

2 Walsworth ii. Jolinson, 41 Cal. (il.

QWitte V. Foote (1895), 90 Wis. 2.'3.5,

62 N. W. 1044 ; Lowinau v. West (1894),

8 Wash. 355, 36 Pac. 258; Spencer v.

Johnston (1899), 58 Neb. 44, 78 N. W.

482; Monroe v. Reid (1895), 46 Neb. 316,

64 N. W. 983.

The defence must be presented sea-
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sonably to the trial court : Glover v. St.

Louis," etc. Co. (1896), 138 Mo. 408, 40

S. W. 110.

Such a plea cannot prevail unless the

two causes of action are pending in the

same juri.sdiction : Sandwich Mfg. Co. v.

Earl (1894), 56 Minn. 390, 57 N. W. 938;

Rice V. Ashland County (1902), 114 Wis.

130, 89 N. W. 908; Caine v. Seattle &

Northern Ry. Co. (1895), 12 Wa.'^h. 596,

41 Pac. 904.

To give occasion for a plea in abate-

ment, tlie prior action must be the same

cause, between the same parties in the

same interest, the same rights must be

asserted and the same relief prayed for :

Richardson v. Opelt (1900), 60 Neb. 180,

82 N. W. 377. See also Dodge v. Corne-

lius (1901), 168 N. Y. 242, 61 N. E. 244;

Wat.'^on V. Richardson (1900), 110 la. 698,

80 N. W. 416; Beardsley v. Morrison

(1899), 18 Utah, 478, 56 Pac. 303; Pratt

V. Howard (1899), 109 la. 504, 80 N. W.

546 ; Wilson v. Atlanta, etc. Ry. Co. (1902),

115Ga. 171,41S.E. 699; Calteauxu. Muel-

ler (1899), 102 Wis. 525, 78 N. W. 1082;

Koch V. Peters (1897), 97 Wis. 492, 73

N. W. 25; Tacoma v. Power Co. (1896),

15 Wash. 515, 46 Pac. 1043.

The defence of another action pending

may be defeated by a dismissal of the

other action, and a reply to that effect to

the said defence : Carson-Rand Co. v. Stern

"(1895), 129 Mo. 381, 31 S. W. 772.

Matter in abatement is waived if not

pleaded: Lombard v. McMillan (1897),

95 Wis. 627, 70 N. W. 673 ; Webber v.

Ward (1896), 94 Wis. 605, 69 N. W.

349.]

'^ Beaty v. Swarthout, 32 Barb. 293,.

294; Haight v. Badgeley, 15 Barb. 499;

Snowden v. Wilas, 19 Ind. 10; Gilbert r.

Sage, 5 Lans. 287 ; Alford v. Barnum, 45

Cal. 482, 485 ; Cliase v. Long, 44 Ind.

427,^428; [^Cone v. Ivinson (1893), 4

Wyo. 203, 33 Pac. 31.]

* Wood V. Ostram, 29 Ind. 177, 186 ;

Davis !'. Davis, 26 Cal. 23 ; Etcheborne v.

Auzerais, 45 Cal. 121 ; Clark v. Huber,

25 Cal. 593, 597 ; but see Caldwell v.

l Hagan v. Burch, 8 Iowa, 309;
mith
v. Holm es, 19 N. Y . 27 1.
2 Wal worth v. John on, 41 Cal. 61.
[ W itte u. Foote (1 95), 90 Wi . 235,
62 N. W. 1044; Lowman v. We t (1894),
8 W a h. 355, 36 Pac. 258 ; Spencer v.
J oh nston (1 99), 58 Neb. 44, 78 N. W.
482; Monroe v. Reid (1 95), 46 Neb. 316,

64

.

w.

9 3.

The defence must be pre entecl sea.sonably to the trial co urt: Glover v. St.
L ouis, etc. Co. (1 896), 138 Mu. 408, 40
~.

w.

11 0.

S uch a plea cannot prevail un less the
two cause of action are pending in the
same j urisd iction : Sandwich Mfg. Co. u.
Earl (1894), 56 Minn. 390, 57 N. W. 9.3 ;
Rice v. A hland County ( 1902), 114 Wis.
130, 89 N. W . 908; Caine v. Seattle &
N orthern Ry. Co. (1 895 ), 12 Wash. 596,
41 Pac. 904.
T o g ive occasion for a plea in abatement, t he prior action m ust be the same
cause, between th e same parties in the
same interest, the same right mu t be
asser ted and the same relief pray eel f r:
R ichardson v. Opelt (1900), 60 Ie b. 1 0,
82 :N. W. 377 . See a lso Dodge u. Corneli us (1901), 168 N . Y . 242, 61 N. E. 244;
Watson u. Richardson (1900), 110 Ia. 698,
80 N. W. 416; Beard::;ley v. Morrison
(1 899), 18 Utah, 478, 56 Pac. 303; Pratt
v. Howard (1 99), 109 Ia. 504, 80 N. W.
546; W il on v. Atlanta, etc. Ry. Co. (1902),
115 Ga. 171, 41 S . E. 699; Caltea ux v. Mueller (1899), 102 Wi . 525, 78 N. W . 1082;
Koch v. Peters (1897), 97 Wis. 492, 73
N . W. 25; Tacoma v. Power Co. (1 96),
15 Wash. 515, 46 Pac. 1043.
The defence of anoth r action pending
may be defeated by a dismi sal of the
other action, and a reply to that effect to
the said defence: Carson-Rand Co. v. Stern
'( 1895), 129 Mo. 381, 31 . W. 772.

Matter in abatement is waiv tl if
pleaded: Lombard v. McMillau (I
95 Wi s. 627, 70 N. W. 673; W bb
WarJ (1896), 94 Wi . . 605, 69 N.

not
97),
r v.

W.

349.J

a B eaty u. Swarthout, 32 Barb. 293,
294; Haight v. llad geley, 15 Barb. 499;
Snowden u. Wilas, 19 Incl. 10; Gilbert r.
~age , 5 Lan . 2 7; Alford v. Daruum, 4;>
Cal. 482, 485 ; Cha -e u. Long, 44 InJ.
427, ' 42 ; [Cone v. Ivin on (1 93), 4
Wyo. 203, 33 Pac. 31.J
4 ·wood v.0 tram, 29 In<l. 177, 1 6;
Davis u. Davis, 26 Cal. 23; Etch borne 1:.
Auz~rai s, 45 Cal. 121; Clark v. Huber,
25 Cal. 593, 597; but see CalJw 11 v.
Auger, 4 iinn. 217; and Parker r.
Dacres, l vVash. 190; Churchill i·. Baumann, 95 Cal. 541. r\n estoppel by judg-

ment must be pleaded if there i or bas
been any opportunity to do so. Clink u.
Thurston, 47 Cal. 21, 29; Meiss u. Gill,
44 Ohio St. 253; per contra, Larum u.
Wil ner. 35 Iowa, 244, 247; and see ante,
§ * 702. See al o, a to defence of estoppel,
Hanson v. heatovich, 13 Nev. 395; Pugh
v. Ottenheim er, 6 Ore. 231; Remillard
v. Pre cott, 8 id. 37. That e toppel is
new matter, ee Central Nat. Bk. u. Doran,
109 Mo. 40; Bray v. Marshall, 75 Mo.
327; De Votie v. McG err, 15 Colo. 467;
Gaynor v. Clements, 16 Colo. 209; and
that the facts con ·tituting the estopp 1
mn.t be shown, see B eck r. 1ilford, 90
Ind . 291; Stewart u. Beck, 90 Ind. 45 ;
Burlington Iudep. Di t. v. Merchant 'B k.,
68 Iowa, 343; filler u. Anderson, 19 Mo.
App. 71; Page v. mith, 13 Ore. 410;
1\icKeen v. Naughton,
Cal. 462. Contra,
that estoppel may be I roved under the
general deuial, . e Towne ii. p'1rk, , 23
Neb. 142. '-'ta titl e qffrcrnd , ~ h rwood L'.
Saxton, 6.'3 :\Io. 7 ; 'y 11 P. l\Ionihan,
129 :N. Y. 1 GI; Maybee v. l\Ioore, 90 Mo.

r

1
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and satisfaction is also new matter; ^ and a discharge in Lank-^

ruptcy or insolvency ;2 and a defence based upon a statutory

an l
rupt

r

i ·faction i · al' n w nntter; 1 a1.1.tl a i barge m bank ...
or in olven y; 2 n,ncl a defence ba d upon a tatut r3

340; but see Unglish v. Marvin, 128 N. Y.

380 ; Harris v. Frank, 81 Cal. 280. Tender,

liegler v. Eddy, 53 Cal. 597.

[^Hardy Implement Co. v. South Bend

Iron Works (1895), 129 Mo. 222, 31 S. W.

599 ; Jasper County Ky. Co. v. Curtis

(1900), 15-t .\Io. 10, 55 S. W. 222 ; Thomp-

son V. Cohen (1894), 127 Mo. 215, 28

S. W. 984; Cockrill v. Hutchin.son (1896),

135 Mo. 67, 36 IS. VV. 375; Sanders (•.

Cliartraud (1900), 158 Mo. 352, 59 8. W.

95; Throckmorton v. Pence (1893), 121

Mo. 50, 25 S. W. 843 ; Cadematori v.

Gauger (1901), 160 Mo. 352, 61 S. W.

195; Seibert v. liloomtield (1901), Ky.,

63 S. W. 584 ; Excelsior Coal Co. v \'ir-
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giuia Coal Co. (1902), Ky., 66 S. \V. 373;

IJeard-sley y. Clem (1902)", 137 Cal. 328, 70

Pac. 175; Newhall v. Hatch (1901), 1.34

Cal. 269, 66 Pac. 266 ; Reynolds v. Pascoe

(1901), 24 Utah, 219, 66 Pac. 1064; Rio

Grande West. R. R. Co. v. Power Co.

(1900), 2.3 Utah, 22, 63 Pac. 995; Poynter

V Chipman (1893), 8 Utah, 442, 32* Pac.

€90; Bruce v. Phcenix Ins. Co. (1893), 24

Ore. 486, 34 Pac. 16; Bays v. Trulsou

(1893), 25 Ore. 109, 35 Pac." 26; Swank i'.

St. I'aul City Ry. Co. (1895), 61 Minn. 423,

63 N. W. 1088; Stephen.son v. Bankers'

Life A.ss'n (1899), 108 la. 637, 79 N. W.

459; Kahler v. Iowa, etc. Ins. Co. (1898),

106 la. 380. 76 N. W. 734; Spencer v.

Papach (1897), 103 la. 513, 70 N. W. 748,

72 N. W. 665; Sherod v. Ewell (1897),

104 la. 253, 73 N. W. 493; Warder v.

Cuthbert (1896), 99 la. 681, 68 N. W.

917; Golden v. Ilardesty (1895), 93 la.

622, 61 N. W. 913; Hector Min. Co. v.

Valley View Miu. Co. (1901), 28 Colo.

315, 64 Pac. 205 ; Adams v. Adams (1903),

— Ind. — , 66 N. E. 153 ; Taylor v. Patton

(1903), — Ind. — , 66 N. E. 91 ; Dudley r.

Pigg (1897), 149 Ind. 363, 48 N. E. 642;

Frain v. Burgett (1898), 152 Ind. 55, 50

N. E. 873 ; Center Scliool Tp. v. State

ex rel. (1897), 150 Ind. 168, 49 N. E. 961 ;

Kiefer v. Klinsick (1895), 144 lud. 46, 42

N. E. 447; Union Bank v. Hntton (1903),

— Neb. — , 95 N. W. 1061 ; Neb. Mort-

gage, etc. Co. y. Van Kloster (1894), 42

Neb. 746. 60 N. W. 1016; Cobbey 7-. Bu-

chanan (lS9fi), 48 Neb. 39!, 67 X. W. 176 ;

Blue Valley Lumber Co. v. Couro (1900),

61 Neb. 39," 84 N. W. 402 ; Burwell Jrrig.

Co. t'. Lashmett (1900), 59 Neb. 605, 81

N. W. 617; Holmes v. Lincoln Salt Lake

Co. (1899), 58 Neb. 74, 78 N. W. 379;

Henderson v. Keutzer (1898), 56 Neb. 460,

76 X. W. 881 ; German Nat. Bank v. First

Nat. Bank (1898), 55 Neb. 86, 75 N. W.

.531 ; Boales v. Ferguson (1898), 55 Neb.

565, 76 N. W. 18; Gayiord i.-. Neb. Sav.

Bank (1898), 54 Neb, io4,-74 N. W. 415;

City Nat. Bank v. Thomas (1896), 46 Neb.

861, 65 N. W. 895; Scroggin v. Johnston

(1895), 45 Neb. 714, 64 N. W. 236;

J.J.0; but e Cngli h 1:. :Marvin, 12 r. Y.
3 O; Harri v. Frank, l al. 2 O. T 11de1·,
11 aler v. Edd ·, 53 'al. 591.
[Hardy Implement 9. t'.
Iron \\ rk (l 95), 129 :\lo. 222, 3 1
5 9; Ja p r
ouuty H.''·
o. v.
urti
(19 0), 154 .Ho. 10, 55 '. W. 222 ; Thompon t•. ohen (1 4), 12i :\lo. 215, 2
:-\. W. 9 4; o krill v. Hutchin . on (1 96),
13- Mo. 6i, 36 ·. W . 375; 'andcc v.
hartr ud ( 1900), 15 ~I . 332, 59 . \V.
95; Thrnckmorton v. P o e ( l 93), 121
::\Io. 5 , 25 '. W. 43 ; 'adematori v.
Gauger ( 190 1), 160 fo. 352, 61
. W.
195: Sibert v. Bloomti Id ( 1901), J\f,
6 S. W. 5 4; Excel ior oal Co. v Yiral Co. (1902), Ky., 66 ' . \\'. 3i3;
l3 ar<l ·l y v. lem {1902), 137 al. 32 , 70
Pac. li:'i; Newhall v. ll atch (190 1), 134
al. 26 , 66 Pac. 266 ; H eyoold v. Pa co
(1901), 24 Utah, 219, 66 Pac. 106.J. ; Rio
ramie We t. R. R.
o. v. Power o.
(1900), 23 Ttah, 22, 63 Pac. 995; Poynter
v
hipmau (1 93),
' tah, 442, 32 Pac.
C 0; Hru ·e v. Ph renix In . Co. (1 93), 24
Or" 4 6, 34 Pac. 16; .Bay v. Trul 011
{l 3). 25 O re. 109, 35 Pac. 26; 'wauk v .
• 't. l'aul C ity Ry . o. (l 95), 61Miu n.423,
63 ~- \V. 10
teph n.on v. Banker'
Lif A ·'u ( 1 99), 10 Ia. 637, 79 . W.
459; Kahler t· . Iowa, tc. In . o. {l 9 ),
. W. 734; penc r v.
106 Ia. 3 0, 76
l,,apa ·h (l 9i), 103 Ia. 513, 70 N. W. 74 ,
72
. W. 665; herod v. Ewell ( l 97 ),
104 Ia. 253, 73 N. vV. 493; Ward r v.
Cuthb rt (l 96), 99 Ia. 6 1, 6 N. W.
917;
olden v. Harde ty (I 95), 93 Ia.
622, 61 N. W. 913; Hect r Min.
Vall y View Miu. o. (1901), 2
'olo.
315, 64 ac. 205; Adam v. Adam. {1903),
- Iud. - , 66 N. ~. 153; T aylor v . Patt n
(19 3), - Incl . -, 66 N. E. 91; Duel l y t'.
Pia (1 97), 149 Iud. 363, 4
. E. 6.J.2;
Frain v. Burgett (l 9 ), 152 Intl. 55, 50
N . E. 73 ; enter
hool Tp. v . • tal
e:r rtd. ( I 97), 15 Ind. 16 , 49
. E. 961;
Kiefer v. Klin i ·k (1 5 , 144 Ind . .J.6 , 4... '. E. 447; 1Tni n Bank 1•. llutt1>11 (19 3),
- .'Ii -,9.\V. 106 1 ; T h. r rtgage, etc" C'o. v. Yan Kio. trr (1 9.J.), 4_
J..Pb. 716, fiO •'· " . 1016;
obh .'·,._ Buch au u ( l ';), -1 ~·clJ .3 '! ,Gi.-.\\" . 1/6;
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provision prohibiting banks from paying ont notes not received

by them at par;i and a defence founded upon the plaintiff's

failure to perform a contract collateral to the demand set up

in the complaint, and upon which the liability of the defendant

depended. 2

1 Codd V. Rathborie, 19 N. Y. 37.

prov1s10n prohibiting banks from paying out not s not received
by them at par; 1 and a defence found d upon th plaintiff 's
failure to perform a contract collateral to th demand set up
in the complaint, and upon which the liability of the defendant
depended. 2

- Blethen v. Blake, 44 Cal. 117; aud

the defence of irregularity on tiie part of

the arbitrators iu au action upon an award,

Day r. llaiiiniond, 57 N. Y. 479, 484.

[^Defences of New Matter.

The following defences have been

held to be new matter :

Codd v. Rathbone, 19 N. Y . 37.
Blethen v. Blake, 44 Cal. 117; aud
the defence of irreg ularity on the part of
the arbitrators in au actiou upon au award ,
Day v. llarnrn ond, 57 N. Y. 4i9, 484.
1
2

Act of God : Pengra v. Wheeler (1893),

24 Ore. 532, 34 Pac. 354; Chicago, II. I. &

Pac. Py. Co. V. Shaw (1901), 63 Neb. 380,

88 N. W. 508.

Alteration of instrument : Mozley v.
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Reagan (1899),' 109 Ga. 182, 34 8. E. 310 ;

JS'inman v. Suhr (1895), 91 Wis. 392, 64

N. VV. 1035 ; Maguire v. Eichmeier (1899),

109 la. 301, 80 N. W. 395; Wall v.

Muster's Ex'rs (1901), Ky., 63 S. W.

432.

Assumption of risk : Nicholaus v. Chi-

cago, etc. Hy. Co. (1894), 90 la. 85, 57

N. W. 694 ; Faulkner v. Mammoth Min.

Co. (1901), 23 Utah, 437, 66 Pac. 799;

Dorsett v. Clement-Ross Mfg. Co. (1902),

131 N. C. 254,42 S. E. 612.

Bona fides: Maxwell v. Foster (1902),

€4 S. C. 1,41 S. E.776.

Champerty: Disbrow v. Board of Super-

visors (1903), 119 la. 538, 93 N. W. 585 ;

Potter V. Ajax Min. Co. (1900), 22 Utah,

273, 61 Pac. 990 ; Croco v. Oregon Short

Line Co. (1898), 18 Utah, 311, 54 Pac.

985.

Collateral securitij held by plaintiff :

Flint >-. Nelson (1894), 10 Utah, 261, 37

Pac. 479.

Compromise : Pullins' Adm'r r. Smith

(1899), 106 Ky. 418, .50 S. W. 833.

Condition or exception in contract : Rail-

way Officials, etc. Ass'n v. Drummond

(1898), 56 Neb. 235, 76 N. W. 562; Farm-

ers', etc. Ins. Co. V. Wiard (1899), 59 Neb.

451, 81 N. W. 312; Joliuston v. North-

western Live Stock Ins. Co. (1896), 94

Wis. 117, 68 N. W.868 ; P'armers', etc. Ins.

Co. I'. Peterson (1896), 47 Neb. 747, 66

N. W. 847 ; Smith v. Continental Ins. Co.

(1899), 108 la. 382, 79 N. W. 129 ; Latimer

v. Woodmen (1901), 62 S. C. 145, 40 S. E.

155.

Consent and connivance in action for

criminal conversation : Morning v. Long

(1899), 109 la. 288, 80 N. W. 390.

Contract limitimj liabilitij : Register

Printing Co. v. Willis (1894), 57 Minn. 93,

58 N. W.825; Michalitschke Bros. i>. Wells,

Fargo & Co. (1897), 118 Cal. 683, 50 Pac.

847 ; Kansas City, etc. R. R. Co. v. Pace

(1901), 69 Ark. 256, 63 S. W. 62.

Contributor 1) neyliijence : Hughes v. Chi-

cago & Alton R. R. Co. (1894), 127 Mo.

447, 30 S. W. 127 ; McFarland v. Mo. Pac.

Ry. Co. (1894), 125 Mo. 2.53, 28 S. W.

[D efe nces of .JYew Matter.

The following defence have been
held to be new matter:
.Act of God: Pengra v. Wheeler ( 1893),
24 Ore. 532, 34 Pac. 354; Chicago, R. I. &
Pac. Hy. Co. v. Shaw (1901), 63 N'eb. 380,
8 N. W. 50 .
Alteration of instrument : Mozl ey v.
R eagan (1899), 109 Ga. 182, 34 S. E. 310;
Ninmau v. uhr (1 895) , 91 Wi s. 392, 64
N . \V. 1035; Mag nire v. Eichmeier (1899 ),
109 fa. 301, 80 N. W. 395; Wall v.
Mu ter's Ex'rs (1901), Ky., 63 S. W.
432.
Assumpt ion of risk : Nicholaus v . Chi·
cago, etc. Hy. Co. (1 94), 90 Ia. 85, 5i
N. W. 694; Faulkner v. Mamm ot h Min.
Co. (1901), 23 U tah, 437, 66 Pac. 799;
Dorse tt v. Clement-Ros. Mfg. Co. (1902),
131 N. C. 254, 42 S. E. 612.
Bona fidN>: Max. well v. Foster (1902),
64 s. c. 1, 41 s. E. 776.
Clzamperty: Disbrow v. Board of Supervisors (1903), 119 Ia. 538, 93 N. W . 585 ;
Potter v. Ajax Min. Co. (1900), 22 Utah,
273, 61 P ac. 99fl; Croco v. Oregon Short
Line Co. (1 US}, l Utah, 311, 54 Pac.
985.
Collateral secu ril!J h eld hy plaintiff :
Flint 1-. 'elson (1894}, 10 l'tah, 261, 37
Pac. 479.
Compromise : Pullins ' Adm 'r v. Smith
(1899), 106 Ky. 41 , 50 S. W. 833.
C"'1ditio11 or exception in contract : Hailway Officials, etc. A s 'n v. Drummond
(1898), 56 Neb. 235, 76 N. W. 562; Farmers', etc. Ins. Co. v. Wi a rd (1 99) , 59 Neb.
451, 81 N. W. 312; Johnston v. Northwestern Live Stock In s. Co . (1896), 94
Wis.117, 68 N. W.868; F arm ers', etc. Ins.
Co. v . Peterson (1 896), 47 Neb. 747 , 66

mith u. Continental Ins. Co .
Ia. 382, i9 N. W . 129; Latimer
v. Woodmen ( 1901), 62 S. C . 145, 40 S. E.
N. W. 847;

(I 99), 10

155.
Consent and conni1:ance in a ct ion for
crimin al conversation : M ornin g v. L ong
(1899), 109 Ia. 288, 80 .l . w . 390.
Co11tract !imitiny liability: Register
Printing Co. v. Willi (1 94), 5i Miun. 93,
58 N. W. 82f>; Michalit.chkeBro .u.Wells,
Fargo & Co. (1 97) , 11 Cal. 683, 50 Pac.
8-!i; K an safl C ity, etc. R. R. Co. v. Pace
( lDOl), 69 Ark. 256, 6-3 S. W. 62.
Contributor.I/ negli_qence: Hughe v. Chicago & .·\ltou R. R Co. {1894), 127 Mo.
4-!i, 30 S. ·w. 127 ; :VlcFarland v. Mo. Pac.
R.\·. Co. (1 894 ), 125 Mo. 253, 28 '. W.
590; Hill v . Meyer Bros. Drug Co. (1 9i),
UO ~Io. 433, 41 S. , Y. 909; Louis 1·ill e &
Na lwille R. R. Co . v. Copas ( 894), 95
K y. 460, 26 8. W. li 9 (e1·en whl're th e
petition uegati 1·es it); Hu nter v. Grande
Ronde Lumber Co. {1901 ), 39 Ore. 448. 65
Pac. 598; M artin v. Ha il way Co. (1 897),
51 S. C. 150. 28 S. K 30.'3; Ford v. Ch icago, etc. RR. Co. (1 89 ), 106 Ia. 85, 75
N. W. 650; Willi s v. C ity of P erry {1 894},
92 Ia. 297, 60 N. W. 727; U nion Stock
Yards Co. v. Conoyer (1 93), 38 Neb. 48 ,
56 N. W. 1081 ; Ohlwe il er v. Lohmann
(1894} , 88 Wi . 75, 59 N. W. 678; Holland
v. Oregon Short Lin e R.R. Co. {1903) , Utah,--, 72 Pac. 940.
But wh ere co ntributory negligen ce is
negative d in th e complaint the issue is
raised hy a ge neral denial: Denver, etc.
RR. Co. v. Smock (1 897}, 23 Colo . 456,
48 Pac. 681; L ong v. Railway Co. (1897 ),
50 S. C. 49, 27 S. E. 53 1. Contra, L ouisville & Nashvill e R. R. Co. v. Copas
(1 894), 95 K y. 460, 26 S. W. 179.
A genera l averment of contributory
negli gence is sufficient : Cogdell v. Wilmin gton , etc. R.R. Co. (1902), 130 N. C.
313, 41 S . E. 5+1; Ch esapeake & Ohio Hy.
Co. v. Smith (1 97}, 101Ky.104, 42 S. W.
538. But see Cogdell 1•. Wilmin gton &
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§ 589. * 713. Statute of Limitations. Different rules prevail

589.

* '"'1 · .

Different r ul e prevail
m r e p ct t o pl ading th
tatute of

Statute of Limitatio ns.

in the different

tate

in the different States in respect to pleading the Statute of

W. R.R Co. (190.3), 132 N.C. 852, 44 S.E.

Co. (1903), 132

618.

. C. 52, 44 . E .

Corporation bi/-Iaw : Angier v. Equitable

Bldg. Ass'n (1899), 109 Ga. 625,35 S. E. 64.

Custom : Eller v. Loomis (1898), 106

la. 276, 76 N. W. 686.

Damages sustained by defendaut : Ilar-

riugtou V. Folev (1899), 108 la. 287, 79

X. W. 64.

Defect in registration of official bond :

Warren v. Boyd (1897), 120 N. C. 56, 26

S. E. 700.

Double agency : Childs v. Ptomey (1895),

17 Mont. 502, 43 Pac. 714.

Facts Suspending operation of statute:

West V. Bishop (1900), 110 la. 410, 81
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X. W. 696.

Failure to save insured goods : Davis r.

Mutual Fire Ins. Co. (1895), 96 la. 70, 64

X. W. 687.

Fire set by insured : Corkery v. Security

In.s. Co. (1896), 99 la. 382, 68 N. W. 792;

Heideureich v. Aetna Ins. Co. (1894), 26

Ore. 70, 37 Pac. 64.

Forfeiture: Powerv. Sla( 1900), 24 Mont.

243, 61 Pac. 468 ; Pickett v. Fidelity Co.

(1901), 60S. C. 477,38 S. E. 160; Bishop

r. Baisley (1895), 28 Ore. 119, 41 Pac. 937.

Injury by fellow servant : Laying v. Mt.

Shasta Mineral Spring Co. (1901), 135

Cal. 141, 67 Pac. 48, citing numerous

cases: Peters v. McKay (1902), 136 Cal.

73, 68 Pac. 478; Bowling Green Stone

Co. V. Capshaw (1901), Ky., 64 S. W. 507.

See also Chicago, B. & Q. R. R. Co. v.

Oyster (1899), 58 Neb. 1, 78 N. W. 3.59.

But in Missouri it is lield that this defence

may be sliown under a general denial :

Kaminski v. Tudor Iron Works (1902), 167

Mo. 462, 67 S. W. 221. So in Wilson v.

Railway Co. (1897), 51 S.C. 79, 28 S. i:.91-

Laches: Gay v. Havermale (1902), 27

Wash. 390, 67 Pac. 804 ; Town of Fairplay

V. Board of Comni'rs (1901 ), 29 Colo. 57, 67

Pac. 152; French v. Woodruff (1898), 25

Colo. 3.39, .54 Pac. 101.5. It was held in

Wagner v. Sanders (1901), 62 S. C. 73,39

S. E. 950, that laches might be set up by

the court without being pleaded by the

defendant.

Lif/uidnlion : Kirkland v. Dryfus

(1897), 103 (ja. 127, 29 S. E. 612.

Misnomer of defendant: Bird v. St.

John's Episcopal Church (1899), 154 Ind.

138, 56 X. E. 129.

Non-incorporation : Brady v. Nat. Supply

Co. (1901), 64 O. St. 267, 60 N. E. 218.

J'rivilege : Gilman v. McCIatchy (1896),

111 Cal. 606, 44 Pac. 241.

Ratification of altered contract: Erick-

son V. First Nat. Bank (1895), 44 Xeb.

622, 62 N. W. 1078.

Release: Rivers v. Blom (1901), 16.3

Mo. 442, 63 S. W. 812; Frank f. Cobban

(1897), 20 Mont. 168, 50 Pac. 423; Hale y,

Grogau (1896), 99 Ky. 170, 35 S. W. 282.

C'orporatio11 u.11-law : Angier v. Equitable
s n (1 99), 109 Ga. 625, 35 . E. 64.
u tom : Eller v. Lo mis (l 9 ), 106
I· . :2i6 76 N. W. 6 6.
Damages u tained by defendant : Harrin crton v. F oley (1 99 , 10 Ia. 2 7, 79
. . '. w . 64.
D ifect in registration of official bond :
\\ arre n v. Boyd (1 97) 120 . C. 56, 26
... 700.
Double agency : Ch ild v. Ptomey ( l 95) ,
17 Mont. 502, 43 P ac. 714 .
Facts StL pending op ration of statute :
\ e t v. Bi hop (1900), 110 Ia. 410, l
. w. 69 6.
Failure to save insured goods: Davi i: .
Mutual Fire Ins. Co. (1 95), 96 Ia. 70, 64
. w . 6 7.
F ire et by in ured : Corkery v. S ecuri ty
In . o. (196),99 Ia. 3 2, 6 N. W . 792;
Heiden reich v. A etn a Ins. Co. {1894), 26
re. 70, 37 Pac. 64.
F o1feiture : P ower v. la( 1 9 00),2 4 ~1ont.
.d 3, 61 Pac. 46 ; Pickett v . Fi <leli ty Co .
(19 1), 60 . C. 477,38 S. E. 160 ; Bi hop
i: . Bai:ley (1895) , 2 Ore. 119, 41 Pac. 937 .
I njitry by f ellow s rvant : L aying v. Mt.
ha. ta Minera l pring Co. (1901), 135
Cal. 141, 67 Pac. 4 , citing num erous
ca e : P eters v . .tiicKay (1902), 136 Cal.
73, 6 Pac. 478 ; Bowling Green St ne
Co. v. Cap haw (1901), Ky., 64 . W. 507.
al o Ch icago, TI. & Q. R. R. Co. v.
y ter {l 99), 5
eb. 1, 7
. W. 359.
But in Mi souri it i held that thi. defence
may be hown under a general denial :
K a min ki v. Tud or Iron W rk (1902), 167
Mo. 462, 67 . W . 221. So in W il on v.
R a ilway o. (1 97 ), 51 . C. 79, 2 . E. 91L aches : ay v. Haver male (1902), 27
W a h. 390, 67 Pac. 04 ; Town of Fairplay
v. Board of Comm'r (1901 ), 29 olo. 57, 67
a . 152 ; F reuch v. W ood ruff (1 9 ), 25
olo. 339, 54 Pac. l 15. I t wa h ld in
·w agner v. an der (1901 ), 62 . C. 73, 39
. E. 950 that la ·h s mi g ht be t up by
the court without b ing pleade l by t he
ef nda11t.
Dquidation : Kirkland v.
ryfu
(I '7),JO. )a.L7,29 '.E.6 1 .

n do'. A

Jfi nomer ~f defendant : Bird t'. t.
J ohn' 1 pi c pal C hurch (1 99), 154 Ind .
13 '56 ... E. 129.
Non-incorporation: Brady t' . -at. upply
o. (19 l), 64 0. t . 267, 60 N . E. 21
Privil ge : Gilm an i:. l\lc latcby ( 1 96),
111 'al. 606 44 P ac. 241.
R atification of altered contract : Eri ckson v. h r t Nat. B ank (1 95) , 44 r-eb .
622 62 l. • w. 107 .
R elease : River v. Blom {1901 ), 163
Mo. 442, 63 . \V. 12 ; F rank v. obban
(1 97) , 20 M nt. 16 50 Pac. 423; Hale v.
Grogan (1 96) , 99 Ky . 170, 35 . W. 2 2.
R e cission: K ennedy v.
·hoo l D i t.
(1 9 ) 20 W a h. 399, 55 P ac. 567.
ecurit_q held by plaintiff in an acti on
by cred itors bill: O'Brien v. tambach
(1 97 ), 101 Ia. 40, 69
w . 1133.
ettlem nt : Hulbert v. New onpareil
Co. (1900) , 111 Ia. 490, 2 N. W . 92 .
tatute of frau ds : Hillh ou e 11• .J nni ng {1901 ) 60 , .C.3 73,3
. E. 599;
Abba v. ' myth (1899), 21 -tah, 109, 59
P ac. 756; Bean v. Lamprey (1901 ) 2
Minn. 320, 4 N. W. 1016 ; I ver on 1· .
Cirkel (1 94), 56 Minn . 299, 57 N. W. 00 ;
T ynon i. D e pa in (1896), 22 Colo. 240, 43
P ac. 103 ; Crane v. Pow 11 (J 93j, 139
. Y . 379, 34
. E . 911 ; Matthe" s v.
fatth ew (1 897), 154 . Y. 2 , 4
. E.
53 1 ; anger v . French {l 9 ), 157 N. Y .
213, 51 N. i . 979; , t. L ouis, etc. R y . o.
v. Hall ( 1903), - Ark. - , 74 . W. 293;
T homas v. hurchill (1 96), 4 Neb. 266,
67 N. W. 1 2. U nle
the d fe ndant
rai es the defence of t he tatute of fraud
by an wer or demurrer, he waive it:
Crane v. P owell (l 93), 139 . Y . 379, 34N. E. 911 ; Tift v. W ight & W e los ky Co.
E. 503; Wi (1901), 113 a. 6 l , 39
man v. T hompson ( 1 95), 94 Ia. 607, 6.3
N. W. 346.
tatutory bars : McCann v. P enni&
(1 93) , 100 al. 547, 35 Pac. 15 ; 'i. her
v. Metropolitan Life Ins. Co. (1901) , 167
N. Y. 17 , 60 . E. 43 1.
ubrogation: H unter v . H unter ( l 90 ),
5
. 3 2, 36 . E . 743 .
uicide : L atim r . W oodmen (1901 ),
. 145 , 40 . E. l 5 .
/ll'a Vires : L ewi v. lyd
T.

T '
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STATUTE OF LIMITATIONS.

819

Limitations. In some, by reason of an express provision of

their codes, the defence must always be specially set up in the

answer, and can never be raised by demurrer, even though the

averments of the complaint should show that the cause of action

is barred.^ In others it may always be taken advantage of by

demurrer whenever the complaint or petition discloses a cause

of action which appears to be barred by the statute. ^ The courts

(1903), — N. C. — , 44 S. E. 666; Ferst's

Sons I'. Bank of Waycross (1900), 111 Ga.

In some, by r a on of an xpr
prov1 ion of
th ir
, t h def nee mu t al ways L . p · ially et up in the
arn:i wer, and can n ev r be rai.' <.l by demnrr r, v n hough th
av rmcn t of the complaint should how that t h au e of action
i barr cl.1 In oth r it may alway: b' tak n advantage of by
d murr r whenev r th complaint or p titian di ·clo s a au
of action which appear to be barred by t h ta t u t . 2 T he court

229, 36 S. E. 773; Hart v. Phenix Ins. Co.

(1901), 113 Ga. 859, 39 S E. 304; Citi-

zens State Bank v. Pence (1900), 59 Neb.

579, 81 N. W. 623 ; Lewis v. Clyde S. S.

Co. (1902), 131 N. C. 652, 42 S. E. 969;

United States Mortgage Co. v. McClure

(1902), 42 Ore. 190, 70 Pac. 543.

Undue Influence : Kelly v. Perrault

(1897), Idaho, 48 Pac. 45.
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Unreasonableness of ordinance .' Blue-

dorn V. Mo. Pac. Ry. Co. (1893), 121 Mo.

258, 25 S. W. 943.

Waiver: TJasmussen v. Levin (1901),

28 Colo. 448, 65 Pac. 94 ; Swearingen v.

Lahner (1894), 93 la. 147, 61 N. W. 431 ;

McCoy V. Iowa Ins. Co. (1898), 107 la. 80,

77 N. W. 529; Kahler v. Iowa, etc. Ins.

Co. (1898), 106 la. 380, 76 N. W. 734.

Want of funds: Netzer v. Crookston

City (1894), 59 Minn. 244, 61 N. W. 21 ;

McNulty V. City of New York (1901), 168

N. y. 117, 61 N. E. Ill ; Rollings v.

Bankers' Union (1902), 63 S. C. 192, 41

S. E. 90.

Want of jurisdiction : Johnson )'. Det-

rick (1899), 152 Mo. 243,53 S. W. 891 ;

Kahn v. Southern Bldg. Ass'n (1902), 115

Ga. 459, 41 S. E. 648 ; Kyd v. Exchange

Bank (1898), 56 Neb. 557, 75 N. W. 524 ;

Herbert v. Wortendyke (1896), 49 Neb-

182, 68 N. W. 350; Burlington Relief

Dep't V. Moore (1897), 52 Neb. 719, 73

N. W. 15; Hurlburt v. Palmer (1894), 39

Neb. 158,57 N. W. 1019; Anheuser-Busch

Brewing Ass'n v. Peterson (1894), 41 Neb.

897, 60 N. W. 373 ; Eel River R. R. Co. v.

State ex rel. (1895), 143 Ind. 231, 42 N. E.

617.

Objection to the jurisdiction may be

raised by answer in connection with

matters in bar : Herbert i'. Wortendyke

(1896), 49 Neb. 182, 68 N. W. 350; Baker

r. Union Stock Yards Nat. Bank (1902),

63 Neb. 801, 89 N. W. 269; Lowe v. Riley

(1898), 57 Neb. 252, 77 X. W. 758.

The sufficiency of the petition is not a

test of jurisdiction : Dryden r. Parrotte

(1901), 61 Neb. 339, 85 N. W. 287 ; Win-

ningham v. Trueblood (1899), 149 Mo.

572, 51 S. W. 399.]

Work done Inj mrmher of familij in an

action for work and labor : Schroedor v.

Scliroeder (1903), — la. — , 93 N. W. 78.

1 nSatterlund v. Beal (1903), — N, D.

— , 95 N. W. 518.]

- [Ii:verett v. O'Leary (1903), — Minn.

— , 95 N. W. 901 ; Green's Adm'r v. Ir-

vine (1902), Ky., 66 S. W. 278; Motes v.

Gila Valley, etc. Ry. Co. (1902), Ariz.,

N. . - , 44 S. E. 66 6; F r t'
63 Neb. 01, 9 N. W . 269; Lowe t '. R il y
ons v. Bank of ·w aycross (1 900), 111 Ga. (1 9 ), 57 NeL. 252, ii~- W . i 5 .
:229, 36 . E. 773; H art v. Pheni x Jn . . Co.
The snfficieu .v of th e p titi un i. not a
( 1901), 11 3 Ga. 859, 39
E. 304 ; Ci ti- test of jnri. dicti on : Dryden t '. Parrotte
zen State Bank v. P ence (1900) , 59 eb. (1 901) , 6 l Neb. 339, 5 . W . 2 7; Win5i9, 8 1 N. W. 623; Lewis v . Clyde S.
n in g ham v. Tru blood (1899), 149 Mo.
Co. (1902 ), 1.3 1 N. C. 652, 42 . E. 969 ; 572, 51 . w. 399.J
Un ited State Mor tgage Co. v. McClure
TfTor!.: d one by mrmhr>r of .f.1m lfy in a n
( 1902), 42 Ore. l 90, 70 Pac. 543 .
action fo r wo rk and labor : chroed<'l" i >.
U ndue Influence : K elly v. P errault Schroeder (1 903), - la.-- , 93 K. W . 7 .
( 1 97), I daho, 48 Pac. 45 .
1 [
atterlund v . Beal (1 903), - N. D .
Unreasonabl ness of ordi11n11ce : Blue- -:-, 95 N. W. 51 .]
dorn v. Mo. P ac. R y. Co. (1 893), 121 Mo.
!? [E\'erett v. O'L eary (1903), -Minn.
25 , 25 s. w . 943.
- , 95 N. W . 90 1 ; Green's Adm 'r v. IrWaii:er : R asmussen v. L evin (190 1), vine (1902), Ky., 66 S. W . 27 8; Mote' v.
2 Colo. 44 8, 65 P ac. 94 ;
wea rin gen v. Gila Valley, etc. Ry. Co. (1902), Ariz.,
La hner (1 94), 93 Ia. 147, 6 1 N. W. 43 1 ; 68 Pac. 532 ; Wagener v. B oyce (1 98) ,
m1'th v. Martin
::\1cCoy v. Iowa In . Co. ( 1898), 107 Ia. 80, Ariz., 52 Pac. 1122 ;
i 7 N . W . 529; Kah ler v . lowa, etc. I ns. (1 90 1), 135 Cal. 247 , 67 Pac. 77 9; Blis
v . neath (1898 ), 11 9 Cal. 526, 51 Pac.
c . (1 98), 106 Ia. 380, 76 . w. 734.
Want C!f' f unds : Netzer v. Crookston 848; F ullerto n v. Bailey (1 898), 17 U tah ,
Ci ty (1 894) , 59 Minn. 244, 61 N . W. 21 ; 85, 53 Pac. 1020; Smith v. Day (19 01) , 39
McN'ulty v. City of Ne w Y ork ( 1901 ), 168 Or e. 53 1, 65 Pac. 1055; Pass v. Pa
N. Y. 117, 61 N. E. 111 ; H ollin gs v. (1 896 ), 98 Ga. 79 1, 25 S. E. 752 ; CowB ankers' U nion (1902), 63 S. C. 192, 4 1 hi ck v. Shin g le (1 894), 5 W yo . 87, 37
Pa c. 689; Huckel bri dge v. Atchison, etc.
s. E. 90.
Want r!f Jurisdict ion : J ohn son v. D et- Ry. Co. ( 1903), - Kan. - , 71 l'ac. 81-l ;
rick (1 899 ), 152 Mo. 243, 53 S. W . 89 1 ; L ewis v. D un can (1 903), 6fi Kan . ~06, 71
Kahn v. South ern Bldg . As' ' n (1902 ), 11 5 Pac. 5i7 ; B est v. Zutavern ( 1898), 53
Ga. 459, 41 8 . E. 648; Kyd v. E xchange Neb. 604, i' 4 N. W . 64 ; Mi s ouri Pac. Ry.
Bank (1 89 ), 56 e b. 557, i 5 N. W.524; Co. v. H emi ngway {1902) , 63 Neb. 610,
H erbert v. W ortendyke (1 896 ), 49 Neb· N . W . 673; Osborn v. Po rtsmouth Nat.
182, 68 N. W . 350; Burlington R elief B ank (1 899), 61 0. St. 427 , 56 N. E. 197.
But a general dem urrer on the groun d
D ep' t v. Moore (1 897), 52 Neb. 71 9, 73
N. W . 15; H nrlburt v. Palmer (1 894) , 39 t hat no cause of action is tated will not
Neb. l 58, 57 N . W . 1019; A nheuser-Bu ch raise the issue : Fullerton v. Bailey (189 ),
Brewing As 'n v. P eterson (1 894), 41 Jeb. 17 Utah , 85, 5-3 Pac. 1020; Bli v . '- neath
97, 60 N . W. 3 i 3; Eel River R. R. Co. V · (1 898), 119 Ca l 526, 51 Pac. 84 ; Board.
State ex rel. (1895 ), 143 In d. 23 1, 42 N . E. v. First Pre hyterian hurch (l 98), 19
617.
Wash. 45 5, 53 P a " 671 ; J oergen ou v.
Objection to t he j uri diction may be J oergen on ( 1902 ), 2 Wah. 477 , 6 Pac.
r aised by answer in connection with 913.
onlra, Co whick v. Shingle (1894 ),
matt rs in bar: H erbert v. vVortendyke 5 W yo. Si, 37 P ac. 6 9; Eayr v. Na on
( 1896), 49 Neb. 1 2, 68 N. W. 350 ; Bak er (1 9 ), 54 eb. 143, 74 . W . 40 .
In ruling upon a de murrer on th
i:. U nion Stock Yards Nat. Bank (1902),
( 1903), -

:...0
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of still other States occupj^ a middle ground between these ex-

tremes. If the provisions of the statute relied on are not abso-

lute, but contain exceptions or provisos within which the case

could possibly fall, and which might, therefore, prevent the bar

of the statute from applying to the cause of action, the demurrer

is never proper, because, although not so alleged, the case might

come within the exception or proviso : the answer is then the

only mode of presenting the defence. But if the particular

provisions of the statute are absolute, and contain no such

exceptions or provisos within which the case could possibly

fall, a demurrer may be interposed when the objection appears

upon the face of the plaintiff's pleading; but if it does not so

appear, the defence must be set up by answer.

§ 590. * 714. Same Subject. In New York the rule is set-

tled, and applied to all actions whether legal or equitable, that

the effect of the Statute of Limitations as a defence can only

be made available by an answer; that a demurrer can under

no circumstances raise the issue ; ^ and finally, that the defence

is new matter.^ In Indiana, if the provision of the statute in-
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voked contains no exceptions or provisos, and it appears on the

face of the complaint that the cause of action is barred, the de-

fendant can demur; but when there are exceptions or provisos

in the operative clause of the statute relied upon, the defence

can only be set up by a special answer, and cannot be made

ground that the actiou is barred by the 41 ; Hyde v. Lamberson, 1 Idaho, 536.

statute of limitations, the enquiry must be lu the following States, also, the defence

confined to the face of the complaint and cannot be taken by demurrer : in North

the indorsement of the sheriff upon the Carolina, Guthrie v. Bacon, 107 N. C. 3.37 ;

summons cannot be considered: Smith v. in Arkansas, St. Louis, I. M. & S. Ry. Co.

Day (1901), 39 Ore. 531, 65 Pac. 1055. v. Brown, 49 Ark. 2.53 ; in Iowa, State v.

Under the Wisconsin statutes, St., Mclntire, 58 Iowa, 572 ; in Colorado,

1898, §§ 2649, 2651, a demurrer on this Hunt v. Hayt, 15 Pac. 410; Barnes v.

ground must specifically point out the Union Pac. Ry. Co. (C. C. A.), 54 Fed.

particular section of the statute of limita- Rep. 87. It may be taken by demurrer

of till o h r ta
ground b tw n the e xr Ill ' . If h pr
ute reli a on ar not ab
lute but contain
within ' hich the ca ·
coul po ibly f ll, and whi b mi 0 ht
pre nt the bar
of the t tute from ap11 ·in t the cau e f ac i n, the d murr r
r ro r bee u
although n t
all g l tl ca might
co
i hin the exc p i n or pr i o : the an w r i th n the
nly mod of pr nting the defenc . But if the particul r
of the tatut are a lut , and contain no such
ex
tion or provi os within whi h th
a
c uld p ibl ,
fall , a emurrer may be int rpo d wh n th obj ction appe r
up n he face of th plaintiff pleading; but if it
not o
ap ar, the efence mu t be et up by an wer.
590. * 14. Same Subject. In New York the rule
ettl d and applied to all ac ions whether 1 gal or quitabl , th, t
the eff ct of the tatu e of Limita ion a a defence can only
be made available by an an '\\er · that a demurrer can under
n circum tance rai e th i · u ; 1 and .finally that th d fen
i new matter. 2 In I ndiana if the I roYision of the tatute in voked contain no exc ption or proYi o, and it appear n h
f ce of the complaint that the cau of ac ion i barr d, the defendant can d mur; but when there are xception or provi
in the operativ clau e of the tatute reli d upon, the def nc
can only be et up by a pecial an wer, and cannot be ma

tions relied upon : Wlicreatt v. Worth in Ohio, Seymour v. Pittsburg, C. & .St.

(1900), 108 Wis. 291, 84 N. W. 441; L. Ry. Co.,'44 Ohio St. 12; Douglas v.

Crowley f. Hicks (1898), 98 Wis. 566,74 Corry, 46 Ohio St. 349; in Missouri,

N. W. 348.J Ileffernan v. Howell, 90 Mo. 344 ; in Wis-

1 ^To the same effect see King c. cousin, Tucker v. Lovejoy, 73 Wis. 66 ;

Powell (1900), 127 N. C. 10, 37 S. E. 62.] in Minnesota, Humphrey v. Carpenter, 39

2 .Sands V. St. John, 36 Barb. 628; Minn. 115; in Oregon, Sj)aur v. McBee,

Baldwin v. Martin, 14 Abb. Pr. n. s. 9. 19 Ore. 76; Davis r. Davis, 20 Ore. 78;

See also Dezengremel v. Dezengremel, 24 in Washington, Wilt v. Buchtel, 2 Wash.

Hun, 457; Riley v. Corwin, 17 id. 597; Ter. 417.

Long V. Bank of Vanceyville, 81 N. C

41; Hyde v. Lam b r on, l Idaho, 536.
In the following tate , al o, the defence
cannot be taken by demurrer: in North
arolina, uthrie v. Ba on, 107 . C. 33i ;
iu Arkan a , t. L ui , I. M. & . Ry.
i·. Brown, 49 Ark. 253; in Iowa, 'tate i·.
1clntire, 5 Iowa, 572; in
oloradn,
Hun~ t·. Hayt, 15 Pac. 410 · Barne v.
nion Pac. Ry.
. ( . . A. , 54 F d.
Rep . 7. I t m a.v b tak n by d murr r
in hio, eymour r . Pitt bur<>', . & • 't.
( 1900), 10 Wi . 291, 4
« W. 441; L. 1 y. o., 44 hio t. 12 ; oug l, 1·.
rowley v. fli ck (1 9 ), 9
orry, 46
hi
t. 349; in Mi uri,
H eff man v. How ll, 9 ~Io . 344; in Wi ;;- . V\. 34 .]
1 [To the
ame
on~in, Tu ker v. Lo'' joy, i 3 'Vi .
Pow 11 (190),12 ...... I ,3 i .E. 62.J
in :\lino . ota, Humphr y v. arp nter, :J'.J
2 , and
v. , t . .John 36 Barb. 6- ; Miun. 115; in r goo, paur . McJ3 ,
Baldwin v. Martin, 14 Abb. Pr. . . . 19 r . i6 · DaYi v. avi , 20 r . 7 ;
z ngremel, 24 in Wa hington, ' Vilt v. Buch t 1, 2 Wa h.
e al ·o Dezeugr m 1 v.
Hun , 4-5i ; Ril y v. orwin 17 id. 5 i; Tr. 41 .
Lon" 1 Bank of Yau c ydll , l ..:. '

r ound that the actiou i barred by the
tatute of limitation , the enquiry mu t be
confined to the face of the complaint and
the indor emeut of the heriff upon t he
umm on cannot be on id red: mith v.
Day (1901), 39 re. 531, 65 Pac. 1055.
Tnder the Wi on. in . tatut ·, , t.,
, § 264 , 2651, a demurr r on thi
ground mu t le ·ifically point out the
partic-nlar ection of the tatute of limitation r lied upon: Wh reatt v. W orth
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available under a general denial.^ Even in those States wlior

the statute may be taken advantage of by demurrer, as well as

in all tlie others, it is, when set up by answer, new matter, and

can never be proved under a denial, either general or special.''^

1 Perkins v. Rogers, 35 lud. 124, 141,

available under a gen ral <l nial.1 Ev 11 in tho
tat wh~r
t he tatute may be ta.k n ad a11tag of by d rumT r, a· w 11 as
in all the oth r , it i .,, when t u1 by an w r, 11 w matt r, and
can never be prov d u11d ·r a denial ith r g n ral or p ial. 2

and cases cited ; Hanna v. Jeffersouville,

etc. R. Co., 32 Ind. 113; but see Matlock

V. Todd, 25 lud. 128, which seems to hold

that a demurrer is never proper iu lec/ul

actions, but may be used in ecpiitable ac-

tions, according to the former practice in

equity. See McCollister v. Willey, 52

Ind. 382; Cass Cy. Com'rs v. Adams, 76

Ind. 504 ; Devor v. Rerick, 87 lud. 337 ;

Cook V. Chambers, 107 Ind. 67; Shewal-

ter V. Bergman, 123 Ind. 155 ; ]\Iedsker v.

Rogue, 1 lud. App. 197. All these ca.ses

support the rule stated in the text.
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[^Where, however, the complaint shows

that the action is not within any of the

exceptions, a demurrer will lie : Dorsey

Mach. Co. V. McCaffrey (1894), 139 Ind.

545, 38 N. E. 208 ; Swatts v. Bowen (1894),

141 lud. 322, 40 N. E. 1057. Kentucky

follows the same rule : Brandenburg v.

McGuire (1898), 105 Ky. 10, 44 S. W.

9G ; Spalding v. St. Joseph's School

(1899), 107 Ky. 382, 54 S. W. 200.^1

- McKinuey v. McKiuney, 8 Ohio

St. 423 ; Bacivus v. Clark, 1 Kan. 303 ;

1 Perkin v. Roger , 35 Incl. 12-1-, 1-11,
and ca e cit d; Hanna v. J effer onYiUe,
etc. R Co., 32 Ind. 113; b ut ee l\l atlock
v. Todd, 25 Ind . 12 , which ·eem to hold
that a demurrer is neYer proper in legal
action , but may be used in equitable action , according to the for mer practice in
eq uity. See McCollister v. W illey, 52
Ind. 382; Ca Cy. Com'r v. Adams, 76
lud. 504; lJ eYo r v. Herick, 7 Ind. 337;
Cook v. Chambers, 107 Ind. 6i; , hewalter v. Berg man, 123 Ind. 155; ) ledsker v.
Pogue, 1 Ind. App. 197. All these ca es
support the rule stated iu the text.
[Where, howeYer, the complaint shows
that t he action is not within auy of the
exception , a demurrer will lie : Dorsey
:\lach. Co. v. McCaffrey ( l 94), 139 lml.
545, 38 N. E. 20 ; Swatts v. Bowen (1 9-1-),
14 1 Ind. 322, 40 N. E. 1057 . Kentucky
follows the same rul e : Brandenburg v.
McG uire ( 1898) , 105 Ky. 10, 44 S. W.
96 ; S paldiug v. St. J oseph's Rc hool

Howell V. Howell. 15 Wis. 55, 59. Tliis

last case holds that the defeudaut may

elf mar, although the Wisconsiu code enacts

that '■ the objection that the action was

not commencetl within the time limited

can only be taken by answer." R. S. ch.

138, § 1. The court said that "answer"

must be taken in its widest sense of any

defensive pleading including a demurrer.

But see the later case of Tarbox v. Su-

pervisors, 34 Wis. 558, which expressly

holds that the Statute of Limitations can

oiili/ be taken advantage of by answer in

Wisconsin. Hartson r. Hardiu, 40 Cal.

264. The rule is settled in many States,

that when it affirmatively appears on the

face of the complaint or petition that the

cause of action is barred by the statute,

and only then, the defendant may demur;

otherwise he must plead the defence

specially, since it is never admissible

under the general denial, except in the

action to recover possession of land in

certain States by virtue of express pro-

visions of their codes. See cnite, § *679;

and as to the defence in actions for spe-

cific performance, see ante, § * 681. It is

so held in Ohio, Huston v. Craighead,

23 Ohio St. 198, 209, 210; in Minnesota,

Davenport r. Short, 17 Minn. 24, the

coui't saying that they would not extend

the rule laid down in Kennedy r. Wil-

liams, 11 Minn. 314 ; McArdle v. McArdle,

12 Minn. 98; Eastman v. St. Anthony's

Falls W. P. Co., 12 Minn. 137 ; Hoyt i;.

McNeil, 13 Minn. 390; in Kan.^as, Parker

1-. Berry, 12 Kan. 351 ; in California,

Brennan v. Ford, 46 Cal. 7, 12 ; in Iowa,

(l 99), 107 E:Y. 382, 54 S. W. 200.J

McKinney v. McKiun ey, 8 Ohio
St. 423 ; Backus v. Clark, 1 Kan. 303;
Howell i1 . Howell. 15 Wis. 55, 59. This
la t ca -e holds that the clefeudaut may
demur, although the \Visconsin code enacts
that '· the objection that the action was
not comm enced within the time limited
can only be taken by answer." H. ~. ch .
1.38, § l. The court said that "an wer"
mu t be taken in its wid e t seuse of a ny
defen ive plead ing including a demurrer .
But see the later case of Tarbox v. Supervi or., 3-t Wis. 558, whi ch expressly
holcls that thb tatute of Limitations ean
011('/ be taken advantage of by ans wer in
\Visconsin. Hartson i-. Hardin, 40 Cal.
264. The rule is settled in many tates,
t hat when it affirmatively appears on the
face of the complaint or petition that the
cau e of action is barred by the tatute,
and only then, the defendant may demur;
otherwise he must plead the defence
specially, since it i never admi sible
under the general denial, except in the
action to recoYer possession of Janel in
2

certain ... tates hy virtue of expr
provi ion · of their cod s. .' ee ant , § 679;
and as to the defence in action for p cific performance, ·ee ante, § · 6 l. It is
so held in Ohio, Bu ton v. Craigh ad,
23 Ohio St. 198, 209, 210; in Minneota,
Davenport v. ' h~rt, 17 Minn. 24, the
court saying that they would uot extend
the rule laid down in Kenn dy r. ,~i!il
liams, 11 :\li11u. 314; McArdle 1·. McArdle,
12 Minn . 9 ; Ei\ ·tmau 1•. 't. Anthony'
Falls 'Y. P . Co., 1:2 Miuu . 1:37 ; Hoyt v.
Mci\eil, 13 Minn. 390; in Kan . a , Parker
r. Berry, 12 Kan. 351 ; iu Cal ifornia,
Brenuan v. Ford, 46 Cal. 7, l:l; iu Iowa,
Robinson v. Allen, 37 Io~nl, 27, 29;
Sl1earer v. l\lills, 35 Iowa, 499; 1\loulton
1· . Wal. h, 30 Iowa, 361; Springer '" Clay
C,v., 35 Iowa, 241; in ebraska, :\!ill v.
Hice, 3 ~eb. 76, 7 ; in Missouri the
defence can be proved under a general
cleuial, when the action i. for tbe recovery of land, Bledsoe v . Simms, 53 Mo.
305, 30i ; see ante, § 679; Fairbanks v.
Long, 9 1 l\fo. 628; Fulker. on v. l\litchell,
82 Mo. 13; Bird v. ellers () lo. Supr.
1893), 21 S W . Rep. 91; o al o in North
Carolina, Falls of Neuse l\lau. Co. i-.
Brooks, 106 . C. 107; but the defence
mu t be speciall y plend ed i11 other ca e ,
Orr v. Rode, 101 Mo. 387; Bell v. Clark,
30 )fo . A pp. 224; Belleville av. Bk. v.
W inslow, 30 Fed. Rep. 4 8. ,'ee also
t. 22 ;
Combs v . Wat on, 32 Ohio
D utcher v. Dutcher, 39 Wis. 651; Orton
i•. •oonan, 25 id. 672; Heath r. H ath, 3 1
id . 223; Barden v. Columbia Cy. ' up., 33
id . 445; Tarbox v. Adam Cy. up., 34 id.
558; Ward 1•. Waters, 63 Wis. 39.
[Haye L'. Lavagnino ( l 9 ), 1 7 tah,
l 85, 53 Pac. I 029; toddard ounty L'.
Malone (1 93), 115 Mo. 50 , 22 . W.
469; Hawkins v. Douuerberg (1901), 40
Ore. 97, 66 Pac. 691 ; Battery Park Bank
v. Lou gh ran (1 98), 122 N. C. 66 , 30 . E.
17; Oe,·ermannv.Loebertmann (1 97), 68
~lion. l 62, 70 N. W. 10 4; Ea ·ton 11.
Somerville (1900), 11 l la. 164, 2 N. W
475; Goring v. I~ itzgerald (I 9 ) , 105 Ia.

*

*
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When the Statute of Limitations of another State or country is

relietl upon as a defence, the answer must contain all the aver-

507, 75 N. W. 358; Jenks v. Lansing

1 en the t, tu
f Limitatiow f ano h r tat r ountry i
r li
u l on a' a defence, the an w r mu t
ntain all h av r\

7

Lumber Co. (1896), 97 la. 342, 66 N. W.

231 ; Small v. Cohen (1897), 102 Ga. 248,

29 S. E. 430; Coney v. Home (1894), 93

Oa. 723, 20 S. E. 213 ; Stringer v.

Stringer (1894), 93 Ga. 320, 20 S. E. 242 ;

Hanna v. Emerson (1895), 45 Neb. 708,

64 N. W. 229 ; Blair v. Brown (1897), 17

Wasli. 570, 50 Pac. 483 ; Malloy v. Chicago

& Northwestern K. R. fco. (1901), 109

Wis. 29, 85 N. W. 130 ; Waliber r. Wil-

liams (1903), — Wis. — , 93 N. W. 47.

A mere averment in the answer that

the action did not accrue within the time

50i, i5 ."'. W. 35 · J nk v. Lan ing
Lumb r o. (l 6), 97 Ia. 342, 66 . W .
231 · m 11 v. ohen (1 9-), 102 a. 24,
:.9 . , . 430 ; oney v. Horne (1 94), 93
a . 723, 2
. E . 213;
tringer v.
tringer (1 94), 93 a. 320, 20 . E . 242 ;
Haun v. Erner n (1 95 ), 45 Neb. 708,
64 ... \ . 229; Blair v. Brown (197),17
Wa h. 570, 50 Pac. 4 3; Malloy v. Chicago
orthwe tern R. R. bo. ( 1901) , 109
' i . 29, 5 . W. 13 ; Wallber i:. William (l 903), - Wi . -, 93 N. W. 4i.

limited by the statute of limitations is not

suflScient: Dufrene v. Anderson (1903), —
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Neb. — , 93 N. W. 139 ; Pinkham v.

Pinkham (1901), 61 Neb. 336, 85 N. W.

285; Scroggin v. Nat. Lumber Co. (1894),

41 Neb. 195, 59 N. W. 548 ; Jenks v. Lan-

sing Lumber Co. (1896), 97 la. 342, 66

N. W. 231 ; Lassiter i-. Roper (1894), 114

N. C. 17, 18 S. E. 946; Heyer v. Riven-

bark (1901), 128 N. C. 270, 38 S. E. 875 ;

Murray v. Harden (1903), 132 N. C. 136, 43

S. E. 600.

But objection to an insufficient plea

may be waived ; McDonald i\ Bice (1901),

11.3 la. 44, 84 N. W. 985; Kinkead v.

Holmes, etc. Co. (1901), 24 Wash. 216, 64

Pac. 157.

On the other hand, it is held in some

States that such an averment, although a

mere conclusion, is sufficient : Lilly v.

Farmers" Nat. Bank (1900), Ky., 56 S. W.

722; Snow i;. Rich (1900), 22 Utah, 123,61

Pac. 330 ; Thomas v. Glendinning (1896),

13 Utaii. 47, 44 Pac. 652 ; McConnell r.

Spicker (1901), 15 S. D. 98, 87 N. W. 574 ;

Searls r. Knapp (1894), 5 S. D. 325, 58

N. W. 807.

But see, however, Lloyd v. Rawl

(1902), 63 S. C. 219,41 S. E. 312, where

the court said : " It has been held in this

State tliat the statute of limitations may

be proved under the general denial or it

may be pleaded specifically." The rule

was belli to be that wlien the statute is

relied upon merely ;ia a defence, to bar

plaintiff's recovery, it must be specially

j)leaded ; but when it is relied upon to

show title to real property in defendant, it

may be showu under the general denial,

as going to controvert plaintiff's allega-

tion of title. See also Sutton v. Clark

(1901), 59 S. C. 440, 38 S. E. 150.

The statute of limitations can be

pleaded only as a defence, but cannot be

used as tlie basis for affirmative relief:

Johnson v. Wynne (1902), 64 Kan. 138,

67 Pac. 549 ; Corlett v. Ins. Co. (1899), 60

Kan. 134, 55 Pac. 844.

Where an answer pleads a twenty-

year statute of limitations and a fifteen-

year statute is in fact applicable, the

answer will be iield good as a plea of the

mere av rm nt in the an wer that
th acti n did not ac rue within the time
limited by the tatute of limitations is not
uffici nt: Dufr ne v. Ander on (1903), Neb. - , 93 N. W. 139; Pinkham v .
Pinkha.m (1901), 61 Neb. 336, 5 N. W.
2 5; croggin v. Nat. Lumber Co. (1 94) ,
41 Neb. 195, 59 N. W. 54 ; J enks v. Lan·ing Lumber Co. (l 96), 97 Ia. 342, 66
N. W. 23 1 ; La iter v. Roper (1894), 114
N. . 17, 18 . E. 946; Heyer v. Rivenbark (1901), 128 N. C. 270, 38 S. E. 875;
1urray v. Barden (1903), 132 N. C. 136, 43
. 600.

But objection to an in ufficient plea
may be waived: McDonald v. Bice (1901),
113 Ia. 44, 84 N. W. 985; Kinkead v.
Holme , etc. o. (1901), 24 Wash. 216, 64
Pac. 157 .
n the other hand, it i held in ome
• tate that uch an averm nt, although a
mere conclu ion, i ufficient: Lilly v .
Farm r ·Nat. Bank (1900). Ky., 56 . W.
722 · now v. Rich (1900), 22 Utah, 123, 61
Pac. 336 ; Thomas v. lendinning (1 96),
13 Ttah, 47, 44 Pac. 652; McConnell v .
.'pick r (1901), 15 . D . 9 , L. W. 574;
.' arl 1. Knapp (1 94), 5 . D. 325, 5

. w.

07.
v.

Rawl

may lie· hown under the g neral deni( 1,
as o-oiug to
ntrovert plaintiff' alleo-ation of title.
e al o uttou v. lark
(1901), 59 ' .

. 440, 3

S. E. 150.

The tatute of limitation
an b
pleaded only a a defence, but anu t b
u ed a the ba i for affirmative r Ii f:
J ohn on v. Wynn (1902), 64 Kan . 13 ,
. (1 99), 6
67 Pac. 549; orlett v. Ins.
Kan. 134, 55 Pac. 844.
"\Vher an answer pleads a tw utyyear tatute of li mitation and a fifte nyear tatute i in fact applicable, the
answe r will be held good as a plea of th
fifteen-year tatute: Waymire v. Waymire
(1 95). 144 Ind . 329 43 N. E. 267.
"When any tatute of lirnitati n i
pleaded a a defence, if the facts bring the
a e within any of the exc ption t th
tatute, they may be . et up in the repl,v.
Thi i th proper practi ce :" tat .T 1'f4.
v. Par on (1 96) , 147 Ind. 579, 47 N. F.. 17.
Ordinaril.v a third party may u t interpo e. the defence of the tatute: Plummer, Perry & Co. v. Rohman (1900), 61
Neb. 61, 84 N. W. 600 .
In Corb y v . Rogers (1898), 152 Ind.
169, 52 N. E. 748, it wa held that in au
action to f reclo ea mortgage, def ndaut
must aver fact , howing that he ha . u h
an interest in the real e. tate a n ti tl
him to plead the tatute. 'ee al o Lincoln
Iortgag & Tru t Co. v . Parker (1902). 65
Kan. 19, 70 Pac. 92 (in ca e of d murr r).
Th defen e i waiv cl if rai cl neith r
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ments of fact necessary to bring the case within tlie provisions of

such foreign enactment: nothing will be presumed in favor of

the pleader.^

SECTION FIFTH.

m nt of fact neces ary to brina h a ' within th rovi ·ions of
uch foreign enactm nt: nothing will be pr urned in favor of
t he pleader.1

THE UNION OF DEFENCES IN THE SAME ANSWER.

§ 591. * 715. Introductory. All the codes, with some slight

SECTI N FIFTH.

difference in the language, but with none in the meaning and effect

of the clause, provide that the defendant may set up in his answer

as many defences and counter-claims and set-offs as he may liave,

THE UNION OF DEFENCE

IN TUE

AME ANSWER.

whether they be such as have heretofore been denominated legal

or equitable, or both.^ When defences are thus united, they must

each be separately stated, and refer to the causes of action they

are intended to answer. I shall, in the present section, collect

the practical rules which have been adopted by the courts in con-

struing this provision, touching the mode of pleading different

defences in one answer.

I. How the Separate Defences should be stated.

§ 592. * 716. Each Defence must be Complete in itself. The dis-

tinction between partial and full defences has already been pointed
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out. Assuming that the defences are not intended to be partial,

each must of itself be a complete answer to the whole cause of

action against which it is directed, as perfectly so as though it

or from the time that the creditor can, by Minneapolis Harvester Works v. Smith

his own act or of his own volition, become (Neb. 1893), .53 N. W. 973 (statute of

entitled to maintain an action : Winches- foreign State) ; Spanish Fork City v.

ter Turnpike Co. v. Wickliffe's Adm'r Hopper (Utah, 1891), 26 Pac. llep. 293 ;

§ 591.

* 715.

All the codes, with some slight
difference the langua,ge, but with none in the meaning and effect
of the clause, provide that the defendant may set up in his answer
.as many defences and counter-claims and set-offs as he may have,
whether they be such as have heretofore been denominated legal
or equitable, or both. 2 ·w hen defences are thus united, they mu t
each be separately stated, and refer to the causes of action they
are intended to answer. I shall, in the present section, collect
the practical rules which have been adopted by the courts in construing this provision, touching the mode of pleading differe~t
defences in one answer.

in

Introductory.

(1897), 100 Ky. 531, 38 S. W. 866 ; Os- in California, Code of Civil Procedure,

borne v. Lindstrom (1899), 9 N. D. 1, 81 § 458.

N. W. 72.] QValz V. First Nat. Bank (1895), 96

1 Gillett c. Hill, 32 Iowa, 220. See, Ky. 543, 29 S. W. 329; Richardson v.

as to the degree of particularity required Mackay (1896), 4 Okla. 328, 46 Pac. 546.

in pleading the statute. Piper v. Hoard, These cases hold that the foreign statute

107 N. Y. 67 ; Pemberton v. Simmons, must be pleaded. In the absence of

100 N. C. 316; Turner v. Shuffler, 108 pleading and proof the foreign statute

N. C. 642 ; Walker v. Laney, 27 S. C. 150; will be presumed the same as the domes-

Templeton v. Sharp (Ky., Nov., 1888), tic statute : Mowry r. McQueen (1900), SO

9 S. W. Rep. 507 ; Thomas v. Chamber- Minn. 385, 83 N. W. 348.]

I. How th e S eparate IJefenc es should be stated.

§ 592. * 716. Each Defence must be Complete in itself. The distinction between partial and full defences has already been pointed
out. Assuming that the defences are not intended to be partial,
each must of itself be a complete answer to the whole cause of
action against which it is directed, as perfectly so as though it

lain, 39 Ohio St. 112 ; Paine y. Comstock, 2 [[Held in Meugert v. Brinkerhuff

57 Wis. 159; Smith v. Dragert, 60 Wis. (1903), — 0. St. — , 66 N. E. 530, that a

139 ; Ruggles V. Fond du Lac Cy., 63 defendant must plead all his defences, or

AVis. 205 ; Meade v. Gilfoyle, 64 Wis. 18 ; they are waived.]

or from the tim e that the creditor can, by
hi own act or of his own volition, become
€ ntitled to mailltain an action : Winche ter Turnpike Co. v. Wickliffe's Adm' r
(1 97), 100 Ky. 5:n, 38 s. W. 866; Osborn e v. Lindstrom (1809), 9 N. D. l, 81
N. W . 72.J
1 Gillett v. Hill, 32 Iowa, 220.
See,
as to the degree of particularity required
in pleadin g the statute, Piper v. H oard ,
107 N. Y. 6i; Pemberton v. Simmons,
100 N. C. 3 16; Turner v. Shuffler, 108
N. C. 642 ; Walker v. Laney, 27 S. C. 150;
T empleton v. Sharp (Ky., Nov., 1888 ),
9 S. W. Rep. 507; Thoma v. Chamberlain, 39 Ohio St. 112 ; Paine v. Co mstock,
57 Wis. 159; Smith v. Dragert, 60 Wis.
1~9 ; Ruggles v. Fond du Lac Cy., 63
Wis. 205; Meade v. Gilfoyle, 64 Wis . 18 ;

Minneapolis Harvester Works v. Smith
(Neb. 1893) , 53 N. W. 97.'{ (statute of
foreign State) ; Spanish Fork City v.
H op per (Utah, 1891), 26 Pac. Rep. 293;
in California, Code of Civi l Procedure,
§ 458.
[Valz v. First Nat. Bank ( 1895 ), 96
Ky. 543, 29 S. W. 329; Richardson v.
Mackay ( 1896), 4 Okla. 328, 46 Pac. 5-16.
These cases hold that the foreign tatute
must be pleaded. In the abse nce of
pl eading and proof the foreign statute
will be presumed the ame as the dome tic statute: Mowry v. McQueen (1900) , O
Minn. 3 5, 3 N. W. 348.J
2 [Held in Mengert v.
Briu kerhuff
(1903) , - 0. St. - , 66 N. E. 530, that a
defendant must plead all his defence , ur
they a re wai ,·ed.]
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were pleaded alone. It is not necessary that each defence should

answer the entire complaint when that contains two or more dis-

tinct causes of action, because these causes of action may depend

upon separate circumstances, and demand separate answers. If

a defence, however, is addressed to the whole complaint, as such,

it must completely controvert the whole.^ The rule, as stated in

its general form, is, that each defence must be sufficient in itself,

in its material allegations or its denials, to constitute an answer

to. the cause or causes of action against which it is directed, and

thus to defeat a recovery thereon.^ This proposition refers to the

substance of the ilefence. In reference to the form and manner

of stating this substance, it must, either by actual statement in

full, or by a proper reference to and adoption of matter in

another defence found in the same answer, contain averments

of all the material facts or denials which together make up the

defence. Each must in its composition be complete, sufficient,

and full ; it must stand upon its own allegations : it cannot

be aided, nor its imperfect and partial statements helped out, by

matter found in another defence, unless such matter is expressly
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referred to, and in an express manner adopted or borrowed from

that other, and made a part of itself. The reference, however, to

the former defence, and the adoption of its matter, if permitted

at all, must be express ; for otherwise the allegations of one can-

not be treated as incorporated in or helping out those of another.

This rule is well settled by the authorities, although often disre-

garded in practice.^ If the defence is professedly a partial one,

1 QWalker v. Walker (1897), IfiO Ind. tains separate defences, each defence must

317, 50 N. E. 68.] be sufficient in itself: it cannot be aided

2 ^The code requirement tliat each de- by matter in another defence. If not

fence must be distinctly stated in a sepa- thus complete and sufficient, it is demur-

rate paragraph is substantial as well as ruble." Defences should be separately

formal: Taylor r. Purcell (1894), 60 Ark. stated and numbered: but a failure to

60G, .31 S. \V. h&ir\ comply with tliis rule can only be taken

3 Baldwin v. U. S. Tel. Co., 54 Barb, advantage of by a motion to correct ; if

505, 517: "By the well-.settled rules of such motion is jiot made, the objection is

pleading, each answer [defence] must of waived. Truitt v. Baird, 12 Kan. 420,

itself be a complete answer to the whole 423. Each defence must be complete in

w re pleaded alone. I i n t nece ary that ach defenc should
a wer he ntire com plain ' h n that con in two r more i inct au
f acti n b au the
ause · f action may dep nd
upon separate cir um tan , and demand separate an wers. If
a l fence ho e r, i ad lre ' l to h wh le mplaint, as uch
it mu completely ontro ert the whole.1 The rul , as tatecl in
it: ' general form is, that each lefenc mu t be uffi ient in it elf,
in it mat rial allegation r i cl nial , to on titute an an wer
t he au or cau
of action a ain which it i directed, and
thu to def at a recovery hereon .2
his propo ition ref r to the
ub tanc of the defence. In referen e o tbe form and manne1~
of tating thi ub tanc , it mu t either b actual tat ment in
full or b a propei· reference to and adopti n f matter in
a.no her defence found in the same ans er, contain a erment
of all he ma erial fact or d nial wlich together make up tl
defence. Each must in its compo iti n be complete, u:ffi ient,
and full; it mu t stand upon its o n allega.tions : it cannot
be aided, nor its imperfect ancl partial ·tatement helped out, by
matter found in another defence, unl ss uch matter i expre ly
r ferre to, and in an expre s mar ner adopted r borrow d from
that other, and made a part of itself. The reference, however to
the former defence, and the adoption of it m tter, if p rmi d
at all, mu t be expre s; for otherwi e the allegations of one cannot be treated a incorporated in or helping ou ho of another.
This rule i well settled by the authoritie although oft n disregarded in practice.3 If the defence is professedly a partial one,

complaint, as perfectly so a.s if it stood itself, and cannot be aided by reference

alone. Unless it, in terms, adopts or to the allegations in another. Potter v.

raibTS to the matter contained in some Earnest, 45 Ind. 416; Mason v. Weston,

other answer, it must be tested as a 29 Ind. 561 ; Day v. Vallette, 25 Ind. 42 ;

pleading alone by the matter itself con- Leabo i>. Detrick, 18 Ind. 414; Nat. Bk.

tains." Nat. Bk. of Mich. v. Green, .33 of Mich. v. Green, 33 Iowa, 140; Knarr v.

Iowa, 140, 144: "When the answer con- Couaway, 42 Ind. 260, 264. See also, as

1 [ \ alker v. Walker (1 97), 150 Ind.
317, 50 S. E. 6 .]

2 [The code r quirement that ach d feoce mu t be di ·tinctly tated in a eparate paragraph i ub. tar:tial as well a.
formal: Tayl r v. Pure 11 (1 94), 60 Ark.
606, 31
567.J
3 Baldwin v.
. . Tel. Co., 54 Barb.
505, 517: "By the well-s ttled rule of
pleading, each answ r (d f nee] mu t of
it elf be a complete an wer to the whole
complaint, a p rfectly o a if it t od
it, in term , adopt or
alone.
•nle
refor to the matter contained in
me
other an w r, it mu. t ue tested a a
pleacliug al une I y the matter it elf contain .' ' J. ·at. Bk. of Mi ·h. v. Gr en, 33
Iowa, 140, 144 : "Wheu the an wer conI

•

\

•

tain eparate d fence , each defence mu t
be uffi.cieot in it If: it ann t be aided
by matter in ano her def uce. If not
thn complete and ufficient, it i demurrable." Def n ·
honld b . eparatel.\'
tated and number d: but a failure to
comply with thi · rul can only b tak 11
advantage f by a motion to orrect; if
such motion i not mad , th bjecti n i:
waiv d. Truitt v. Baird, 1- Kao. 420,
423. Each def n e mu t be omplete in
it elf, and cannot be aid d by refereu
to the allegati n in an th r, Potter v.
Earn t, 45 lnd. 416; Ma on v. vV too,
29 Ind. 561; Da v. Vallett , 25 Ind. 42;
Leab v. Detri k, 1 Ind. 414; •at. Bk.
f Mi ·h. v. r n, 33 I wa, 140; Knarr v.
Conaway, 42 Ind. 260, 2 4.
e al o, a
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the foregoing rule applies only so far as respects the manner and

form of stating the facts. In a partial as well as in a full defence,

the averments cannot be aided by matter found in another de-

fence, unless the same is expressly referred to and adopted.^ It

should be observed also, that in the case of answers containing

several defences, as well as of complaints containing several

causes of action, certain allegations may be introductory, not

forming a portion of either defence in particular, but belong-

ing alike to all, so that they should be once made at the com-

mencement of the answer before any one of the separate defences

is stated.2

§ 593. * 717. Suggested Method of Pleading Specific Denials.

Common-Law Theory. In this connection I shall offer a few sug-

gestions in reference to the proper mode of pleading specific

denials ; a mode which is perhaps not in terms prescribed by the

codes, but which is, I think, plainly included within the spirit of

the statutory requirements, and which, if universally adopted,

would do much to perfect the practical workings of the theor}-"
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which lies at the foundation of the reformed procedure. The

to completeness of each defence, Frazer

V. Frazer, 70 Ind. 411 ; Lash v. Rendell,

72 Ind. 475 ; and additional cases cited,

ante, under § * 608 ; as to effect of a de-

fence pleaded to one of two separate causes

of action, see Musser v. Cruni, 48 Iowa, 52.

[^But several breaclies of warranty by

the for going rule applie only o far a re pect he manner arnl
f rm of t:ating th fact . In a partial a w 11 a in a full d fence,
the av rments cannot be aid d by matt r found in another def n , unle the same i xpr s ly r f rr d to and adop c1.1 It
shoul l be b erv d al ' o, that in the a of an w rs containing
sev ral d fenc s, as well as of omplaints cont<tining several
cau es of action, certain all gations may be introductory, not
forming a p rtion of either defence in particular, but belonging alike to all, so that th y should be once made at the commencement of the answer before any one of the separate defences
i · stated. 2
§ 593. * 717. Suggested Method of Pleading Specific Denials.
Common-Law Theory. In this connection I shall offer a few ::mggestions in reference to the proper mode of pleading pecific
denials; a mode which is perhaps not in terms prescribed by the
codes, but which is, I think, plainly included within the spirit of
the statutory requirements, and which, if universally adopted,
would do much to perfect the practical workings of the theory
which lies at the foundation of the reformed procedure. The

the insured do not constitute separate de-

fences, and should all be pleaded as a

single defence : Hennessy v. Metropolitan

Life Ins. Co. (1902), 74 Conn. 699, 52 Atl.

490. The same is true where tlie defence

consists of a series of acts which together

constitute one transaction : Hovland v.

Burrows (1893), 38 Neh. 119, 56 N. W.

800.]

1 Qlackson v. Scliool District (1900), 110

la. 313, 81 N. W. 596; Douglass v. Ins.

Co. (1893), 138 N. Y. 209, 33 N. E. 938;

Simonds v. East Windsor Elec. Ky. Co.

(1900), 73 Conn. 513, 48 Atl. 210 ; Weston

V. Estey (189G), 22 Colo.^334, 45 Pac.

367; Harmau v. Harman (1899), 54 S. C.

100, 31 S. E. 881, quoting the text; Gil-

reath v. Furman (1900), 57 S. C. 289, 35

S. E. 516; Hindman V. Edgar (1888), 24

Ore. 581, 17 Pac. 862; Pate v. Alhson

(1901), 114 Ga. 651, 40 S. E. 715 (holding

that words of reference are ineffectual).

Statements made in one defence in a

verified pleading cannot he used as evi-

dence against the party upon issues ten-

dered by other defences : McDonald v.

Southern Cal. R. K. Co. (1894), 101 Cal.

206, 35 Pac. 643. But see Hopkins r. Dipert

(1902), 11 Okl. 630, 69 Pac. 883, where

the court said : " When a general denial

is sufficient to entitle a party to make a

complete defence to an action, it is not

good practice to attempt to set up a state

of facts on defence by way of a second

count, which can be proved under the gen-

eral denial; and unless such second de-

fence does contain averments of facts

which cannot be proven under the general

denial, and which amount to a defence, it

does not state facts sufficient to constitute

a defence to the action, and a demurrer

thereto should be sustained." Where

to completeness of each defence, Frazer
v. Frazer, 'iO Ind. 4 11 ; Lash v. Rendell,
72 Ind. 475; and add itional cases cited,
ante, under § * 608; as to effect of a defenee pleaded to one of two separate causes
of action, see Musser v. Crum, 48 Iowa, 52.
[But several breache of warranty by
the insured do not constitute separate Jefences, and should all be pleaded as a
sin gle defence: Henn essy v. Metropolitan
Life Ins. Co. (1902), 74 Conn. 699, 52 Atl.
490. The same is true where the clefeuce
consio;ts of a series of acts wh ich t ogeth er
con titute one transaction: HovlanJ v.
Burrows {1893), 38 Neb. 119, 56 N. \V.
800. J
1 [ .Jackson v. School D istrict (1900), 110
Ia. 313, 81 N. W. 596; Dougla s v. Ins.
Co. {1893), 138 N. Y. 209, 33 N. E. 938;
Simonds v. East Wincl:or Elec. Ry. Co.
(1900), 73 Conn. 513, 4-8 Atl. 210; Weston
v. Estey (1 96), 22 Colo .• 334, 45 Pac.
367; Harman v. H arman (1899), 54- . C.
100, 31 S. E. 881, quoting the text; Gilreath v. Furman (1900), 57 S. C. 289, 35
S. E. 516; Hindman v. Edgar (1888), 24
Ore. 581, 17 Pac. 862; Pate v. Allison
(1901), 114 Ga. 651, 40 8. E. il5 (holding
that words of reference are ineffectual).

Statements mat.le in one defence in a
verified pleading cannot be used as e\·ideuce against the party upon is ue tendered by other defences : McDonald v.
Southern Cal. R . R. Co. (1894), 101 Cal.
206, 35 Pac.6-!3. But see Hopkins 1;. Di pert
(190:2), 11 Old. 630, 69 Pac. 883, where
the court said: " When a general denial
is sufficient to entitl e a party to make a
co mplete defence to an action, it is not
good practice to attempt to set up a state
of facts on defence by way of a second
count, which can be proYed under the general denial; and unl es such second defence does contain averments of facts
whieh cannot be proYen under the general
denial, and which amount to a defence, it
doe not state facts sufficient to constitute
a defence to the action, and a demurrer
thereto should be ustained." Where
separate defences are not eparately stated
the remedy is by motion:
eaton v.
Grimm {1899), 110 Ia. 145, 81 N. W. 225.
And an in ufficient separate defence may
be stricken out on motion: Harman v.
Harman (1899), 54 S. C. 100, 31 . E.
881.J
2 [ Gardner i:. l\fcWilliams 11902), 42
Ore. 14, 69 Pac. 915.J
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advocates of the common-law pleading have never ceased to urge

that it served to bring out and present to the jury for their de-

cision a single issue, — the affirmation and negation of a single

fact, the verdict upon which determined the entire controversy.

This theory is certainly very beautiful. We know, however, that

in practice the results were far different. Instead of this single

issue, in the actions of assumpsit, of debt on simple contract, and

of trover, the geneiid issue had come to be almost the only an-

swer used, and under it nearly ever}^ possible defence was admis-

.sible. This evil produced the reform of 1834 in England. That

reform consisted in limiting the effect of the general issue in

respect of the defences which could be admitted under it. All

matters in confession and avoidance were required to be specially

pleaded ; and many of the matters stated in the declaration, which

went to make up the cause of action, were required to be spe-

cifically denied by a separate traverse to each. To illustrate : In

the action of assumpsit, if the contract sued on was express,

the general issue of non-assumpsit only denied the making of the

contract, the promise ; if it was im[)lied, the same general issue
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only denied the existence of the facts from which the promise

would by law be inferred. If the defendant desired to deny the

alleged breach, he was obliged to do so by a separate specific

denial, or " special traverse " as it was called. In this manner

the issues were made and kept single ; at least, if there were

several issues formed by the various traverses and pleas com-

prised in the same answer, each was single, — the affirmation and

negation of one material, issuable fact. Each " special traverse "

was a distinct plea by itself, and denied some averment in the

declaration which was necessary to the maintenance of the action,

so that, if the defendant was successful on any one traverse, he

defeated the entire recovery in respect to that cause of action.

This great reform undoubtedly restored the common-law system

of pleading somewhat to its original theory.

§ 594. *718. Objections to the Code Answered. While a sim-

ilar condition of affairs was existing in this country, tlie Reformed

American Procedure was introduced with its radical changes, its

complete departure from the ancient notions. Enemies of the

system, both on the bench and at the bar, have constantly reiter-

ated tlie objection that it made no provision for the development

through the means of pleading, and for the presentiition to juries.

a voe te of the ommon-1 w pl ad.in have n
r cea ed o urge
th t i erv cl to ~rin out and pre n t th jur f r their cl i " 1 n a ·ingle i · ue tl affmna i n nd n gati n
a ingl
fa
th v relict up n "hi h d t r in d the utir contro er T·
hi th ory i
rte inl
ery b utiful. W e know, h w
r, that
in pra · i
he r
'l\·er far diff r nt. In tea'd of his ingl
i · u in h actior · £a ·ump ' it f debt on in: ple contrac an
of rov r h gen ral is ·ue had come t
almo tl e nly an' W r 1 d and under i n ar ly
ery p ibl d f nee w s admi ibl . Tl i e il r lucecl th r form of 1834 in nglan . That
i· f rm
on i ' ted in limi ing the ffect of t. \ general .i ue ir
re p t f he d f nc
which could be admitted uncler it. All
m tter in nfe ion and aYoi ance were required to be pe ially
pl ade l · < nd many of the matter stated in the de laration, whi h
went o make up the cause of action, w re required to be p cifica.11 denied by a eparate trave r e to ach. To illustrate: In
he action of a · ump it, if the on tract ued on -wa
xpre ·,
the general is ue of non-assumpsit only denied the making f the
ontract, the prnmi e ; if it was implied, the sam general i ' ue
only d nied the existence of t1 e facts from which the promi ' e
would by law be inferred. If the defendant de ired to deny he
a ll ged breach, he wa obliged to do o by a eparate specific
<lenial, or ' 4 special tr:wer e " a it wa called. In this manner
the i u s were ma i and ke t single; at 1 ast, if ther wel'
'everal i s ie formed by the ariou traver s and plea ompri din th ·ame an wer, each was ingl , -the affirmation and
n ation of ne material, i uable fact. Ea h spe ial traver e '
wa. a di tinct plea by it 1£, and denied
m a rment in th
declarati n which wa ne e · ary t th maint nanc of the a tion,
ha , if tl defendan wru .-ucces ful on an
ne tra r , he
d f at cl th
ntire r over in re pe t t th t au e f
tion.
Tl1i ' gr at r form undoubtecll r st r d he comm 11-law ' t m
of 1 ding omewhat to i · ri inal tl e r '·
· 594. ;t, 71 . Objections to the Code Answered.
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he
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l n h n
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of single and separate issues of fact. No objection could be more

grossly unfounded. The common-law methods, as wrought out

by the courts, had certainly and notoriously failed to produce

that desired result ; and these objectors, when they assailed the

code and compared it with the former system, obstinately shut

their eyes to what that system actually did in its every -day work-

ing, and only repeated what the theorists asserted that it oiigld

to do. If the spirit and design of the code, as clearly shown

through all of its important clauses and sections, were accepted

and carried out by the courts and the profession, and if its plain

requirements were obeyed to the full extent of their meaning, the

very same beneficial results attained in England by the legislation

cind judicial action of 1834 would be accomplished wherever the

new procedure has been established.

§ 595. * 719. Same Subject. It seems to me to be the evident

purpose of the codes that all issues of fact should be separated

and made single ; and that, if such a practice has not yet been

generally attained, it is because the rules prescribed by the statute

have been violated or ignored; in short, the fault cannot be
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charged to the system itself. The codes expressly prescribe that

each defence must be separate and distinct, and must be so

.pleaded. In respect to defences of new matter, this requirement

is as precise and exacting as any rule of the common law.^ It is

the duty of courts to insist upon a compliance with this statutory

regulation, if juries are to be at all aided in their labors by the

issues as presented upon the records. To combine a defence of

accord and satisfaction, for example, with one of payment, is as

marked a violation of the new procedure as of the common-law

theory. Is there any different principle or rule in reference to

defences of denial? I answer. No. No such difference can be

pointed out in the statute itself ; and this fact alone is sufficient

to show the correctness of the answer. But the proof of its cor-

rectness is positive. The code permits a general denial which

controverts all the material allegations of the complaint or peti-

tion, and thus presents a broad issue, but still an issue which

1 See Rose v. Hurley, 39 Ind. 77, 81. been broken, and of fraudulent represen-

In an action upon a note given for the tations in respect to the article made by

price of an article sold by the plaintiff the seller. This defence was overruled

to the defendant, one defence of the an- on demurrer. The opinion of Downey J.

swer contained mingled allegations of a is valuable and instructive,

warranty given on the sale, which had

of ingl an l ' parate i u
f fact. No obj ti n c uld be mor
gr ly unfoun<l l. Th c mm n-law m th <l ·, a wrought u
by the ourt , had certainly and notoriou ly fail d to pro u c
t hat d ired r ult; and the obje tor ·, wh n th y a ailed th
code and compar it with the former . y tern, obstinat ly ·hut
th ir eyes to what that ystem actually did in it v ry-day w rkin , and only repeated what the theori t ' a erted that it o?.1,ght
to do. If the pirit and de ·ign of the cod , a learly ·hown
through all of its important clauses and ection , were accepted
and carried out by the courts and the profes ion, and if it plain
l'equirements were obeyed to the full extent of their meaning, the
very ame beneficial re ults attained in England by the legi lation
and judicial action of 1834 would be accomplished wherever the
new procedure has been e tablished.
§ 595. * 719. Same Subject. It seem to me to be the evident
purpose of the codes that all is ue of fact should be separated
and made single ; and that, if such a practice has not yet been
generally attained, it is because the rules prescribed by the statute
have been violated or ignored; in short, the fault cannot be
charged to the system itself. The codes expressly prescribe that
each defence must be separate and distinct, and must be so
. pleaded. In respect to defences of new matter, this requirement
is as precise and exacting a any rule of the common law. 1 It i
the duty of courts to insist upon a compliance with thi statutory
rngulation, if jurie are to be at all aided in their labors by tlie
issues as presented upon the records. To combine a defence of
accord and satisfaction, for example, with one of payment, i a
marked a violation of the new procedure as of the common-law
theory. I there any different principle or rule in reference to
defences of denial? I answer, No. No such difference can b
pointed out in the statute it elf; and this fact alone is suffi cient
to show the correctnes of the answer. But the proof of its c rrectness is positive. The code permits a general denial ~hi ·h
controverts all the material all gations of the complaint or petition, and thus presents a broad i · ue, but till an i ue whi h
1 See Ro e v . Hurley, 39 Ind. i7 , 1.
Ia an action upon a note given for the
price of an article sold by the pla in tiff
to the defendant, one defence of the anwer contained mingled allegation s of a
wa rranty given on the ale, which had

been broken, and of fraudulent represcntation in re pect to the article made by
the eller. This defence wa overruled
on Jemurrer. Th e opinion of Downey J.
i valuable and in tructive.
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is not incumbered with any mcitter by way of confession and

avoidance. The code also permits specific denials ; that is, a

separate denial of some material allegation of the complaint or

petition. These specific denials are identical in design and effect

with the special traverses j^rovided for hi/ the English rules of 1834.

Each specific denial should be an entire defence by itself, and

should be so pleaded, because it should be the denial of some

single, materiid, issuable matter averred in the complaint neces-

sary to the existence of the cause of action, so that, if sustained,

it would entirely defeat a recovery on that cause of action. As

the code requires each defence to be separately stated, it follows

that a specific denial should always constitute by itself a distinct

and complete defence, and should be pleaded in such form, as

much, so as any defence of new matter. If the true design and

intent of the code in this respect were fully carried out, two or

more specific denials could never be combined in one and the

same defence. The answer might contain several such denials,

but each would be stated as one entire, independent defence, dis-

tinct from all the others, and thus presenting one issue of fact,

Generated for facpubupdates (University of Michigan) on 2014-06-17 15:34 GMT / http://hdl.handle.net/2027/uc2.ark:/13960/t02z1c23b
Public Domain / http://www.hathitrust.org/access_use#pd

arising from the averment of the complaint or petition and its

traverse.^

§ 596. * 720. Same Subject. If the mode of pleading thus de-

scribed should be generally adopted, —and it seems to be in

strict accordance with both the design and the requirements

of the codes, — the immediate result would be the forming of

single issues on the record for the consideration of the jury, de-

pending upon one afi&rmation and one negation, far more per-

fectly in the actual practice than was accomplished while the

ancient procedure remained in existence. The confused method

of pleading which h.is undoubtedly become too common, the fail-

ure to distinguish and extract the material issues from the over-

lying mass of useless details which frequently incumbers the

record, is, therefore, no fault of the codes ; it is rather in direct

opposition to their intent and their express enactments ; and it

has done far more than all other causes to diminish their useful-

ness, and to hinder tlie complete reform which they were desio-ned

1 QSee, however, Greenthal v. Liucolu, Act distinctly abandoned the professed

Seyms & Co. (1896), 67 Conu. .372, 35 Atl. aim of the common law to bring every

206, where Baldwin J., delivering the legal controversy to an issue upon some

opinion of tiie court, says : " The Practice single, certain, and material poiut.''^

no ineum bered with any matter by ay of confe ion and
a idanc . T
code also permit
peeific denial · hat i a
, para e denial f ome material all ·ati n of th c mplaint r
tition. The e pecific denial ar illentical in d ign and ffect
witli the pecial traoer e ·provided for by the Engli h rule of 1 : -!.
E ch "pecific d nial houlcl L au ntire def nee b it 1£ · 1 d
·h ul l be o plead d beeau ·e it hould b he denial of ·orue
·in 1 material i uable ma er ay rr cl in th complaint nee ar t the xi ten e of the au e of a tion,
that, if su tainecl,
it woul l en ir ly defeat a reco ery on that cau e f action.
l code requires each def n e o be parately tat cl it follow
h, a pecific denial 110uld al wa - owti tut b' • its lf a di 'tin ·t
and omplete defence, and should be 1 lead cl in uch f rm a.
uch. o a any def nee of new matter. If Hie true de 'ign and
int n of the code in thi re "pect wer full arri cl out t'\vo or
more pecific denial " could never be combined in one and the
' ame d fence. The an w r might ontain e eral uc i denial ~
but each would be tated a ne entire independen cl f nee, di tin ·t from all he other', and thus pre en ting one i ue of fact
an ·rn from he averment of the complaint or petition and it
ra er e. 1
596. * 720 . S a me Subject. If the mode of 1 l ading thu de- .
cribed hould be generally adopted, - and it em to be in
trict accordance with both the de io·n an l the requirement
of the codes, - the immediate i·e ult w ul l be the formin of
ingle i u on the record for the ·on ·iderati n of the jury dependino- up n one affirmation and one n ga i n far more perfectly in he actual prac ice than wa ac ompli h d while the
ancient pr c dure remained in exi · ence. Th c nfu ed me hod
of pl acling whi ·h has undoubtedly become
comm n the failure to di. tin u· h and extract the material i u from the overlying ma ·s f u ele detail· whi h fr qu ntl in umb r the
Tecord i" therefor , no fault of the code · it i rnth r in dir ct
o po ·iti n to their int nt and th ir expr · nae m n · and it
ha do1 e far m re ha.n all other caus .. to dimini h th ir u fuln . and to hinder he ompl te reform which th w re de i n d
i '

1

1 [ . e, howe\·cr , ' recn thal v. Lincoln,
•ym · o. ( 1 6), 6i onn. 372, 35 Atl.
~ 6, wli<'r
Balrlwiu J ., d li\·ering the
upiuiou •Jf th· court, ay : "The Practice

A ct di tinctl abandon d the profe d
aim f the ·ommon Jaw to brio<Y v ry
l <ral controver y to au i u upon ome
iogl , certain, and material poiut. '']
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to consummate. To whatever agency this partial failure is to be

attributed, one thing is certain, — that the courts have ample

power to remedy it, and to accomplish all the beneficial objects of

the new procedure which were looked for by its authors.

II. What Kinds of Defences may he joined in one Answer ; those

in Abatement, and those in Bar.

to con ummate. To whatever ag ncy thi partial failure i t be
attribute l, one thing is certain, - that the cour s hav ample
power to remedy it, and to accompli hall the benefici 1 obj ct· f
the new procedure which were looked for by it authors.

§ 597, * 721. Defences in Abatement and in Bar may be joined

in one Answer. It is now settled, in direct opposition to the com-

mon-law rule, that defences which seek only to abate the particular

axjtion in which they are pleaded may be united with those which

II. What J(inds of Defences may be Joined in one An wer · those
in Abatement, and those in Bar.

seek to bar all recovery upon the cause of action.^ Being joined

in the same answer, they are to be tried and determined together

at the one trial. The only possible difficulty in the practical

operation of this rule arises from the different effects of a judg-

ment in favor of the defendant, rendered upon one or the other

of these classes of defences. As such a decision upon the former

class does not destroy the plaintiff's right of action, nor prevent

him from properly commencing and maintaining another suit for

the same cause, while a similar decision upon the latter class does
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produce that final effect upon the right, and as by a general ver-

dict given for the defendant upon all the issues contained in the

record, and a judgment entered thereon, it might be difficult, and

perhaps impossible, to determine which of these results should

follow from the judgment thus pronounced, it is plain that, at

the trial of an action in which the answer unites the two kinds of

defence, the judge should carefully distinguish the issues arising

from them, and should submit them separately to the jury, and

direct a separate and special verdict upon each. By pursuing

this 'course, the record would show exactly the nature of the

decision, and of the judgment entered thereon. This mode of

procedure has been sanctioned by the highest courts. ^

i QWhere facts are i<et up which go to Payson, 5 Sandf. 210; Freeman v. Car-

show a misjoinder but which also go to the penter, 17 Wis. 126; Thompson v. Green-

merits, the answer will not be held to wood, 28 Ind. 327 ; Bond v. Wagner, 28

raise the objection of misjoinder : Leavitt Ind. 462 ; Page v. Mitchell, 37 Minn. 368.

V. S. D. Mercer Co. (1902), 64 Neb. 31, 89 But see, per contra, Hopwood v. Pat-

N. W. 426.] terson, 2 Ore. 49; Fordyce v. Hathorn,

2 Sweet f. Tuttle, UN. Y. 465, 468; 57 Mo. 120; Cannon v. McMauu.s, 17

Gardner !:. Clark, 21 N. Y. 399 ; Mayhew Mo. 345 ; Rippstein v. St. Louis Mut. L.

V. Robinson, 10 How. Pr. 162; Bridge v. Ins. Co., 57 Mo. 86, wliich retain the

~ 597.

* 721.

D e fences in Abatement and in Bar may be joined

It is now settled, in dir ct opposition t the c mmon-law rule, that defences which seek only to abate the particular
action in which they are pleaded may be uni ed with tho e which
'eek to bar all recovery upon the cau e of action.1 Being joined
in the same answer, they are to be tried and determined together
at the one trial. The only possible difficulty in the practical
-0peration of this rule ari es from the different effect of a judgment in favor of the defendant, rendered upon one or the other
-0f these classes of defences. As such a, decision upon the former
da does not de~troy the plaintiff's right of action, nor prevent
him from properly commencing and maintaining another suit for
the same cause, while a similar decision upon the latter cla::>s does
produce that fin al effect upon the right, and as by a general ve1'<lict given for the defendant upon all the jssues contained in the
record, and a judgment entered thereon, it might be difficult, and
perhaps impossible, to determine which of these results should
follow from the judgment thus pronounced, it is plain that, at
the trial of an action in which the answer unites the two kind of
defence, the judge should carefully distinguish the issue' ari ing
from them, and should submit them separately to the jury, and
direct a separate and special verdict upon each. By pursuing
this 'course, the record would show exactly the nature of the
decision, and of the judgment entered thereon. This mode of
procedure has been sanctioned by the highest courts. 2
1n on e Answer.

l [Where facts are et up which go to
how a misjoinder but which also go to the
merits, the answer will not be held to
raise the objection of mi joinder: LeaYitt
v. S. D. ::VIercer Co. (1902), 64 Neb. 31, 89
.J.:~. w. 426.J
2 Sweet v. Tuttle, 14 N. Y. 465, 46 ;
Gardner v. Clark, 21 ~- Y. 399; Mayhew
v. Robinson, 10 How. Pr. 162; Bridrre v.

Payson, 5 Sand£. 210; Freeman v. Car·
p~nter, 17 Wis. 126; Thomp on v. Greenwood, 2 Ind. 327; Bond v. Wagner, 2
Ind. 462; Page v. Mitchell, 37 Mino. 36 .
But ee, per contra, Hopwood v. Patter on, 2 Ore. 49; Fordyce v. Hathorn,
5 7 ?iio. 120 ; Cannon v. l\fc~fanu. , 1:
Mo. 345; Rippstein v. t. Loui ~1ut . L
In . Co., 57 Mo. 6, which retain t!i e
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§ 598. * 722. Inconsistent Defences. Three different questions

are presented under this head : (1) Can inconsistent defences be

united in the same answer? (2) When are particular defences

inconsistent? (3) If a denial and a defence by way of confes-

sion and avoidance are joined, do the atlmissions of the latter over-

come the denials of the former, so that the plaintiff is relieved

from the necessity of proving the allegations denied ? Although

these questions are clearly distinct, yet the two former have

often if not generally been confounded in the same decisions, so

that it will be difficult to keep them entirely separate in the dis-

cussion without much repetition. [Assuming that tlie defences

are utterly inconsistent, the rule is probably established b}' the

weight of judicial authority, that, unless expressly prohibited by

the statute, they may still be united in one answer.^] It fol-

c'ommon-law rule, and liold that a defence

in abatement is waived l>y pleading mat-

ter in bar. The rule in Missouri is now

settled in accordance with the general
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doctrine stated in the text; Little v. Har-

... 22. Inconsistent Defences.
111·
ar r n tecl un l r hi hee: d : (1) an in
united in the 'am an w r? (2 Wh n ar
m
(' If a l nial an l a l f n
wa
:-;ion and a\' iclan · are j in c.l l b aclmi :ion .~ of th latt r v r·om the c1 nial · f the f rm r, o that th i>htinLiff i · r liev cl
from he n
f I r vin the allege tion · d nied? Alth u h
th . e qu tion
1 arly di tint y t th tw f nn r hav
f n if n t g n n lly b n c nfound d in th same l i ion
o
hat i will b difficult t k I th m ntir ly parat in h di u i n wi hout much r I etition. [ · umin0 that the cl £ n
ar utt rl in on i t nt, the rul i probably e abli. bed by th
' ight of ju li ial auth rity, that, unl ' xpre ly prohibi cl by
th
ta ute th
may ·till b united m on an wer. 1 ] It f 1-

rington, 71 Mo. 390 ; Byler v. Jones, 79 Mo.

261 ; Young Men's Chr. Ass'n v. Dubach,

82 Mo. 47.5 ; Cohn v. Lehman, 9.3 Mo. .574 ;

Christian v. Williams (Mo. Supr. 1892), 20

S. VV. Hep. 96; Mclntire v. Calhoun, 27 Mo.

App. 513. In Gardner v. Clark, supra,

Selden J. said (p. 401 ) : " The only serious

inconvenience suggested as likely to result

from this construction of the code is, that

when an answer embraces both a defence

in abatement and one in bar, if the jury

find a general verdict, it will be impossible

to determine whether the judgment ren-

dered upon the verdict should operate as

a bar to another suit for the same cause

of action or not. It would, however, be

the duty of the judge at the circuit, in such

a case, to distinguish between the several

defences in suljuiitting the cause to tlie

jury, and to require them to find sepa-

rately upon these. In that way, it is

probable that the confusion which might

otherwise result may, in most cases, be

avoided. At all events, tlie code a<lmits,

I think, of no otlier construction." See

also Dutcher v. Dutcher, 39 Wis. 651 ;

Hooker !-•. Green, 50 id. 271. In Indiana,

by Rev. -St. 1881, § 365, an answer in

abatement must precede, and cannot be

pleaded witii, an answer in riar.

[[Garretson v. Ferrall (1894), 92 la.

728, 61 N. W. 251 ; Union Guaranty Co.

V. Craddock (1894), 59 Ark. 593, 28 S. W.

424; Trigg r. Kay (1897), 64 Ark. 150,41

S. W. 55. Contra, Carmien v. Cornell

(1897), 148 Ind. 83, 47 N. E. 216. A plea

to the jurisdiction may be coupled with a

plea to the merits : Johnson v. Detrick

(1899), 152 Mo. 243, 53 S. W. 891.

It is lield in some States that a defend-

ant may plead and demur at the same

time to the same cause of action : Arizona,

l{ev. St. 1901, § 1350; Lamb v. Ward

(1894), 114 N. C. 255, 19 S. E. 230; Stahn

V. Catawba Mills (1898), 53 S. C. 519, 31

S. E. 498. But .see Fidelity & Deposit Co.

('. Parkinson (1903), — Neb. — , 94 N. W.

120, holding that a demurrer is not a

proper part of an answer, and should be

ommon-law rule, and hold that a defen e
abat ment i waived liy pl ad in g matt r in bar. The rule in 1i · ouri i now
. ttled in ac rdan ce with the general
d ctrine .tated in the text; Little v. llarrington, 71 Mo. 390; Byler i:. Jone , 79 l\1o.
2 l; Y ung Men'
hr. A u v. Dubach,
2 ~fo. 4 75 ; Cohn v. Lehman, 93 M . 574;
hri tian v. William. (Mo. upr. 1 92), 20
. W. Rep. 96; Mcintire v. alhoun, 27 Mo.
App. 513. In Gardner v. Clark, supra,
el den J. aid ( p. 4-01) : " The only eriou
inconveuience ugge ted as lik ely to re ult
from tbi con truction of the code i , that
wh nan an w r embrace both a defence
in abatement aml one in bar, if the jury
find a general verdict, it will be impo ible
t uetermine whether the judgment rend red upon the verdi t hould perate a
a bar to another uit for the ame cau e

JD

[Garr ton v. Ferrall (1 94), 92 Ia.
72 , 61 N. \V. 251; nion uarant
v. Cracld ck (1 94 ), 59 Ark. 593, 2
4-24; Trigg v. Ray (1 97), 64 Ark . 150, 41
. W. 55.
ontra, armien v.
rn 11
{l 97), 148 Ind. 3, 47 N. E. 216. A pl ,
to the juri diction may be oupl d with a
plea to the m rit!: John on v. Detrick
(1 99), 152 l\ I . 24-3, 53 . W . 91.
It i h ld in ome tate that a defend-
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lows that the defendant cannot be compelled to elect between

such defences, nor can evidence in favor of either be excluded at

the trial on the ground of the inconsistency.^ [But a different

rule prevails in some States.^]

1084; Carlile v. The People (1899), 27

lows that the d f nclant annot b ompell cl to 1 ct b tw 11
uch d f nces, nor an vidence in favor ( ith r be exclud d at
th trial on the gr und of th incon:i ten ·y. 1 [But a differ •nt
rul prevail m me tat .2]

Colo. 116, 59 Pac. 48; Hill v. Groesbeck

(1901), 29 Colo. 161, 67 Pac. 167; Millan

V. Railway Co. (1899), 54 S. C. 485, 32

S. E. .539; Threadgill v. Commission-

ers (1895), 116 N. C. 616, 21 S. E. 425;

McLamb v. McPhail (1900), 126 N. C.

218, 35 S. E. 426; Upton v. Railroad Co.

(1901), 128 N. C. 173, 38 S. E. 736 (but

see Fayetteville Waterworks Co. v. Til-

linghast (1896), 119 N. C. 343, 25 S. E.

960); Miles y. Woodward (1896), 115 Cal.

308, 46 Pac. 1076; Bauta v. Siller (1898),

121 Cal. 414, 53 Pac. 935 (no difference
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between verified and unverified pleadings

in this respect).

In Montana, in the case of Arnold v.

Passavant (1897), 19 Mont. 575, 49 Pac.

400, the court seemed to indicate a willing-

ness to allow inconsistent defences when

no prejudice would result, but it was only

by way of dictum.

In De Lissa v. Coal Co. (1898), 59 Kan.

319, 52 Pac. 886, the court said : " We are

aware that in actual practice objections

are often made and sustained to defences

in answers upon the ground that they are

inconsistent with each other. The ques-

tion of the validity of such objections has

seldom been presented to this court, and

no attempt has ever been made to declare

a general rule upon the subject. Only

the special facts of the cases presented

have been passed upon. However, con-

sidering the numerical weight of the

authorities, it would seem that the objec-

tion to defences in an answer upon the

ground of their inconsistency with each

other could never be sustained." The

court then quotes the text in support of

this proposition, and avoids the necessity

of committing itself by holding that in

the case at bar the defences pleaded were

not inconsistent. But see dictum of John-

son J., in Kansas Nat. Bank v. Quinton

(1897), 57 Kan. 750, 48 Pac. 20, suggesting

the other rule.]

1 Springer v. Dwyer, 50 N. Y. 19;

Buhne v. Corbett, 43 Cal. 264, which

holds directly that a defendant may plead

as many defences as he pleases. Each

must be consistent with itself, but need

not be consistent with the otliers ; and

there is no distinction in this respect

between verified and unverified answers.

Bell V. Brown, 22 Cal. 671 ; Willson v.

Cleaveland, 30 Cal. 192; Mott v. Burnett,

2 E. D. Smith, 50, 52; Hollenbeck v.

Clow, 9 How. Pr. 289 ; Butler v. Went-

worth, 9 How. Pr. 282, 17 Barb. 649;

Smith V. Wells, 20 How. Pr. 158, 167;

Vail V. .Jones, 31 Ind. 467 ; Crawford v.

Adams, Stanton's Code (Ky.), 91 ; Wes-

ton V. Lumley, 33 Ind. 486, 488. Sec also

10 4-; arlile v. The People (1 99), 27
olo. l J 6, 59 Pac. 48; Hill v. Gr beck
(190 1), 29 olo. 161, 67 Pac. 167; Millan
v. Railway Co. (1 899), 54 S. C. 4 5, 32
S. E. 539; Threadgill v. Commi ioners (1 895) , 116 N. C. 616, 21 . E . 425;
i\l Lamb v. McPhail ( 1900), 126 N. C.
21 , 35 S. E. 426; Upton v. Railroad Co.
(1901), 128 N. C. 173, 38 S. E. 736 (but
e Fayetteville Waterworks Co. v. Tillinghast (1 896), 119 N. C. 343, 25 S. E.
960); Mil esv. W oodward (1 896), 115 Cal.
308, 46 P ac. 1076; Banta v. Siller (1898),
121 Cal. 414, 53 Pac. 935 (no difference
between verified and unverified pleadings
in this respect) .
In Montana, in the ca e of Arnold v.
Pa savant ( 1897), 19 Mont. 575, 49 P ac.
400, the court seemed to indicat e a willingness to allow inconsistent defences when
no prejudice would result, but it was only
by way of dictum.
In De Lissa v. Coal Co. (1898), 59 Kan.
319, 52 Pai.:. 886, the court said : " W e are
aware that in actual practice objections
are often made and sustained to defences
in answers upon the ground that th ey are
incon istent with each other. The question of the validity of such objections has
seldom been presented to this court, and
no attempt has ever been made to declare
a general rule upon the subject. Only
the special facts of the cases presented
have been passed upon. However, considering the numerical weight of the
authorities, it would seem that the objection to defences in an answer upon the
ground of their inconsistency with each
other could never be sust,a1ned." The
court then quotes the text in upport of
this propo ition, and avoids the necessity
of committing itself by holdin g that in
the case at bar the defences pleaded were
not inconsistent. But see dictum of J ohnson J ., in Kansas Nat. B ank v. Quinton
(1897), 57 Kan. 750, 48 Pac. 20, uggesting
the other rule.]
1 Springer v. Dwyer, 50 N. Y. 19;
Buhne v. Corbett, 43 Cal. 264, which

hold directly that a defendant may pl acl
a many defence a he plea e . Each
mu t be con i tent with it ·elf, hut n cl
not be con istent with the other:; and
there is no cli ti action in thi. r . p ·t
betw en verifi d and unv rified answers.
Bell v. Brown, 22 Cal. 671; Will on r.
Cleaveland, 30 al. 192; Iott v. Burnett,
2 E. D.
mi th, 50, 52; IIollenbeck 1-.
Clow, 9 How. Pr. 2 9; Butler v. \\"'" ntworth, 9 H ow. Pr. 282, 17 Barb. 649;
Smith 1:. W ell, 20 How. Pr. 15 , 167;
Vail v. Jones, 31 Ind. 467; rawforcl v.
Adams, Stanton's Cotle (Ky.) , 91; We ton v. Lumley, 33 Ind. 486, 48 .
ee also
People v. L othrop, 3 Call, 428, 450; Moor
v. W illamette Co., 7 Ore. 355; Barr v.
Hack, 46 Iowa, 308; Wright v. Bacheller,
16 Kan. 259; Brace v. Burr, 67 N. Y.
237, 240; Amador Cy. v. Butterfield, 51
Cal. 526; Billings v. Drew, 52 id. 565;
Citizen,' Bank v. Clo son, 29 Ohio t. i ;
Pavey v. Pavey, 30 id. 300 (defendant
may be comp lled to elect ); Stebbin v.
Lardner (S. Dak. 1891 ), 48 . W . Rep.
847; Hummel v. Moore (Colo.), 25 F d.
Rep. 380; R eed v. Reed, 93 N. C. 462.
2 D erby v. Gallup, 5 Minn. 11 9, 120,
an action for takin g and carrying away
goods. The answer contained two defences: 1. A general denial. 2. Atlmitted
the taking, and justified it un der proce •
The opinion of Atwater J. is very able,
and difficult to be an swered on principle_
See al o Cook v. Finch, 19 Minn. 407, 411 ;
Conway v. Wharton, 13 Minn. 158, 160 ;
Adams i-. Tri gg, 37 Mo. 141 : "A party
cannot interpo e a denial, and then avair
himself of a confession and avoidance; ,.
Atteberry v. Powell, 2'9 Mo. 4-29, a general denial and justification in lantl rheld in con i tent; F ugate v. Pierce, 4~
Mo. 441, 449; but compare Nel on v.
Brodhack, 44 Mo. 596, which holds that
denials and defences of confession and
avoidance are not nece sarily inconsi tent; Auld v. Butcher, 2 Kan. 135; and
see Baird v. Morford, 29 Iowa, 531, 534,
535. School Di trict v. Holmes, 16 :r b.
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§ 599. * 723. Same Subject. Ill many instances the courts

have simply declared that the particular defences united in

* 723. Same Subject. I n many instance the courts
imply declared that the particular defence united in

599.
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hav

486, a general denial and a defence

of part payment, held inconsistent. The

following New York ciises, mostly at

Special Term, which hold that inconsist-

ent defences cannot be permitted, have

been expressly overruled by the more

recent ones in the same State cited above

in the preceding note. Koe v. Rogers, 8

How. Pr. 356 ; Schneider v. Schultz, 4

Sandf. 664 ; Arnold v. Dimon, 4 Sandf.

680. See also Mclntire i'. Wiegand, 24

Abb. N. Cas. 312 (denial of the making

of the contract sued on, and defence

that it was procured by plaintiff's fraud,

inconsistent, and the denial .should be

stricken out) ; Marx i\ Gro.<s, 58 N. Y.
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Super. Ct. 221 (same).

[|The following cases have held that

inconsistent defences cannot be united in

the same answer : Hatch v. Thompson

(1895), 67 Conn. 74, 34 Atl. 770; Fern-

side I\ Rood (1900), 73 Conn. 83, 46 Atl.

275; Holliugsworth v. Waruuck (1901),

112 Ky. 96, 65 S. W. 163 ; Lane v. Bryant

(1896)", 100 Ky. 138, 37 S. W. 584; -Mur-

phy I'. Russell (1901), Idaho, 67 Pao. 421

(when they are mutually contradictory) ;

Steenerson v. Waterbury (1893), 52 Minn.

211, 53 N. W. 1146 ; " iJlodgett i: Mc-

Murty (1894), 39 Neb. 210. 57 N. W. 985;

Home Fire Ins. Co. v. Decker (1898), 55

Neb. .346, 75 N. W. 841 ; Columbia Nat.

Bank v. German Nat. Bank (1898), 56

Neb. 803, 77 N. W. 346 ; Oakes v. Zienier

(1900), 61 Neb. 6, 84 X. W. 409; Lam-

berton v. Shannon (1896), 13 Wash. 404,

43 Pac. 336 ; Allen v. Olympia Light &

Power Co. (1895), 13 Wash. 307, 43 Pac.

55; Seattle Nat. Bank ;•. Carter (1895),

13 Wash. 281, 43 Pac. 331 ; Davig v. Ford

<1896), 15 Wash. 107,45 Pac. 739; Lord

V. Horr (1902), 30 Wash. 477, 71 Pac. 23 ;

Phoenix Ins. Co. w. Carnahan (1900), 63

O. St. 258, 58 N. E. 805 (the test being

whether all can be verified by oath with-

out swearing fal.sely) ; Dwelling Hou.se

Ins. Co. V. Brewster (1895), 43 Neb. 528,

61 N. W. 746 ; State ex inf. v. Firemen's

Fund Ins. Co. (1899), 152 Mo. 1, 52 S. W.

595.

Oregon follows the same rule, and holds

that where denials and iifhrmative de-

fences, inconsistent with each other, are

united in the same answer, the direct ad-

missions contained in the affirmative de-

fences will be taken as true : Baines r.

Coos Bay Nav. Co. (1902), 41 Ore. 135,

68 Pac. 397 ; Randall r. Simmons (1902),

40 Ore. 554, 67 Pac. 513 ; Veasey v. Hum-

phreys (1895), 27 Ore. 515, 41 Pac. 8;

Maxwell v. BoUes (1895), 28 Ore. 1, 41

Pac. 661. In Veasey r. Humphreys

(supra), the court made the following

suggestion as to pleading deni.ils and

affirmative defences: "It often happens

that new matter directly alleged would be

4 6, a
eneral denial and a defen e
of part payment, held incou i tent. The
following New York c e , mo "tly at
pecial Term, which hold that incon i tent defen c cannot be permitt d, have
be n expre"ly oYerruled by the more
recent on · in the ame ' tate cite<l aboYe
in the preceding note. H oe v. R oger , 8
How. Pr. 356 ; chneider i:. chultz, 4
. andf. 66+; Arnold v. Dimon, 4 a ndf.
6 0.
ee al o folntire v. Wiegand, 2+
Abb. N. Ca . 312 (denial of the making
of the contract
ued on, and defence
that it was procured by plaintiff' fraud,
incon i tent, and the den ial hould be
tricken out); 1\Iarx v. Gro , 5 N. Y.
uper. Ct. 221 ( ame).
[ The following ca"e have held that
inco11 i tent defence cannot be united in
the ame au wer: Hatch v. Tbomp~o n
(1 95), 67 Conn. i4 3-1 Atl. 7i0; Fernide v. Rood ( 1900), 73 Conn. 3, 46 ,\cl.
275; H olling worth v. Warn ock ( l901),
112 Ky. 96, 65 . W. 163; Lane'" B!'yant
(1 96 , 100 K;-. 13 , 37 '. \V. 5 ~ +; ~lur
ph.v v. Ru ell (1901}, I daho, 6 Pac. 421
(when they are mutually contradictory};
, teener on v. Waterbury (1 93), 52 .\linn.
211, 53 i: . W. 1146 ; l5l orlgett i- . Mc~forty (1 9-!), 39 ·eb. 210, 57 X. \V. 9 5 ;
Home Fire In . Co. v. Decker ( 1 9 }, 55
.1. eb. 3-16, 75 ~. W .
-11; 'olumbia Nat.
Bank v.
erman l\at. Bank (1 9 ), 56
Neb. 03, 77 S. W. 346; Oake v. Ziemer
(1900), 61 ~eb. 6, 4 ~. W. 409 ; Lamberton v. hannon (1 96), 13 Wa h. 40+,
43 Pac. 336; Allen v.
lympia Li g ht &
P wer o. ( 1 95), 13 Wa h. 307; 43 Pac.
55; 'eattle 'at. B auk v. arter ( l 95 ),
13 Wa h. 2 l, 43 P ac. 331; Davi . Ford
(1 96), 15 Wa h. 10 , 45 Pac. i 39; Lord
v. H orr (1902), 30 Wa ·h. 477, 71 Pac. 23;
Phrenix In . o. v . arnahan (1 9 ), 63
. 't. 25 , 5
. E. 05 (the te t b ing
whether all can be v rified by oath without wearin fal ely); Dwelling Hou e
In ·. o. v. Brew ter (1 95), 43
b. 52 ,
61 •. W. 746; .'tate ex inf. v. irem n'.·
.Fund In . Co. (1 9 ), 152 1 . l, 52 '. W .
5 5.
regon follow th am rule, and h l<l
that wher d uial · and affirmative de-

fence , in con i tent with ea h other , are
unit cl iu the ame an wer, the dir ct admi "iou coutained in the affirmative defen e will be take n a · t rue : Baines 1'.
o
B ay
av. Co. (1902 ), 41 Ore. 135,
6 Pac. 39 i ; Randall v . immon (1902 },
40 Ore. 55-t, 67 Pac. 513; Vea ·ey i-. Hum phrey ( l 95), 27 Ore. 515, 41 Pac.
Maxwell v. B oll
(l 95), 2 Ore. 1, 41
P ac. 661.
In
ea ey v. Humphreys
(.supra), the court made the followin g
ugge tion as to pleading denial and
affirmative d fence : " It often happeu ·
that new matter directly alleged would Le
incon i tent w ith an ab olute traYer e,
that both could not be verified, an<l, in
·uch ca e , if the pleader de. ire to arnil
him elf of both defence , that i:, to put
the oppo ing party to the proof of hi·
plea, aud at the ame t ime ave to him 1f
au affirmative defence, i t i. e. ent ial that
the allegati us of new matter should be
qualified, or el e hould be preceded by
a qualified traYerse . The e ob ervatiou ·
apply to uch defence a are only apparently incon i tent, but when clearly o it
i doubtful whether the;: can be plead u
in the ame an wer." The quali fka tio a
of the new matter ho uld be a fo uu cl in
the old precedent . "Thu , a fou nd in
hitt , the con tract to be avoided houl u
be alluded to a 'the aid uppo ed coutract,' etc."
The te t of in con i te ncy i whether
proof of one defence would t end to di prove another: R obin on v . Hill (1902),
Ky. , 66 S. W . 623;
mith v. D oherty
(190l), l09Ky.6 16,60 .W.30; ater.
Hutchin on (1 99), 5 1\eb. 232, 7 :'.\l. \\·.
500; P eo ple'~
at. Bank . Gei ·tha r<lt
(L 9 ), 55 eb. 232, i5 N. \ . 5 2; lurphy v. Ru sell (1901), I dah , 67 Pac. 421.
A motion r eq uiring def ndant to le ·t
upon which defen e he will o to trial, i
the proper m thod of obj cting to iu oni. tent d f nc : L ane v. Bryant ( l 9 ),
1 K y. 13 , 3 - , . W. 5 .t · H olling worth
r. Warnock ( l 01), - Ky. -, 65 . W .
163; Dunn 1•. ozarrh ( l 9 , 59 Neb. 244 ,
• •. W . 11 ; Davi. t'. F rd (I 9 ), I.~
y\ a.11. lOi, +5 J'a . 7.39 (moti II to trik
out); De Li " a z·. C'on.1 ' . (1 9 ),
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the answers before them were not in fact inconsistent, and have

not passed upon the question in its general form. In many of

these cases, however, the defences were apparently as inconsistent

as those which have been rejected by other courts in the decisions

last quoted. I have placed in the foot-note a number of examples,

and have indicated the nature of the defences thus suffered to be

united.!

Kan. 319, 52 Pac. 886; McCormick Harv.

Mach. Co. V. Hiatt (1903), — Neb. — , 95

N. W. 627.

the an wers before them w re not in fact incon i:t nt, ancl have
not p ·sed upon th que tion in it· 0 en ral f rm. In many of
these ca e , however, the d f nc were ap arently a. incon istent
a tho e which have b en reject d l>y oth r ourt in the de i i ns
la t quoted. I have placed in the foot-not a numb r of exam le ,
and have indicated the nature of the def nee thu' uffered to be
united. 1

If no motion is made tlie objection will

be deemed waived : Dunn v. Bogarth

(1899), 59 Neb. 244, 80 N. W. 811. Such

a motion comes too late after filing a re-

ply : Vernon v. Union Life Ins. Co. (1899),

58 Neb. 494, 78 N. W. 929. " Where in-

consistent defences are pleaded, and one

is eliminated by an instruction, plain-
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tiff cannot complain : " Green v. Tierney

(1901), 62 Neb. 561. 87 N. W.SSl.]

1 Nelson v. Brodhack, 44 Mo. 596, ac-

tion of ejectment, general denial, and

Statute of Limitations ; holds that gen-

eral denial and confession and avoidance

are not necessarily inconsistent, and over-

rules Bauer i'. Wagner, 39 Mo. 385 ; and

see McAdow v. Ross, .53 Mo. 199, 202;

Cavitt V. Tharp, 30 Mo. App. 131, action

on a note, denial of plaintiffs ownership,

and payment ; Schuchman v. Heath, 38

Mo. App. 280, action on a note, denial

of execution, and Statute of Limitations ;

Kelly V. Bernheimer, 3 N. Y. Sup. Ct.

140, the court will not compel an election

between defences " unless they are so far

inconsistent that both cannot properly co-

exist in the same transaction ; " Kellogg

V. Baker, 15 Abb. Pr. 286, a general de-

nial, Statute of Limitations, and release,

are not inconsistent ; Lansing v. Parker,

9 How. Pr. 288, in assault and battery, a

general denial, self-defence, and defence

of possession of land, are not inconsistent ;

Ostrom V. Bixby, 9 How. Pr. 57, denial

and Statute of Limitations ; Ormsby v.

Douglas, 5 Duer, 665, slander, denial, and

justification ; Hackley v. Ogmun, 10 How.

Pr. 44, action to recover possession of

chattels, general denial, and a justification

of the taking; Booth v. Sherwood, 12

Minn. 426, trespass to lands ; answer,

(1) denies title, and (2) license; Steener-

son V. Waterbury (Minn. 1893), 53 N. W.

Rep. 1146, action for services rendered;

answer, general denial, and payment ;

Pike V. King, 16 Iowa, 49, general denial

and set-off ; Willson v. Cleaveland, 30 Cal.

192, ejectment, denial of title, and Statute

of Limitations.

[Additional instances of defences held

not to be inconsistent are found in the

following cases : George Fowler, Sons &

Co. V. Brooks (1902), 65 Kan. 861, 70 Pac.

— : general denial and contributory neg-

ligence; Leavenworth Light, etc. Co. v.

Waller (1902), 65 Kan. 514, 70 Pac. 365 :

same; Pugh v. Oregon Imp. Co. (1896),

14 Wash. 331, 44 Pac. 689: same; Lord

l\:an . 319, 52 Pac. 886; McCormick Harv.
Mach. Co. v. Hiatt (1903), - Neb.-, 95
N. W. 627.
If no motion is made the objection will
be deemed waived: Dunn v. Bogarth
{1899), 59 Neb. 244, 80 N. W. 811. Such
a motion come too late after filing a reply : Vernon v. Union Life Ins. Co. (1899),
. W. 929. "Where in58 Neb. 494, 78
consistent defences are pleaded, and one
is eliminated by an instruction, plaintiff cannot complain: " Green v. Tierney
(1901), 62 Neb. 561, 7 N. W. 331.]
1 Nelson v. Brodhack, H Mo. 596, action of ejectment, general denial, and
tatute of Limitation ; holds that general denial and confe siou and. avoidance
are not nece arily inconsistent, and overrules Bauer v. Wagner, 39 Io. 385; and
ee McAdow v . Ross, 53 Mo. 199, 202;
Cavitt v. Tharp, 30 Mo. App . 131, action
on a note, denial of plaintiff' owner hip,
and payment; Schuchman v. H eath, 38
Mo. A pp. 280, action on a note, denial
of execution, and Statute of Limitations;
Kelly v. Bernheimer, 3 N. Y. Sup. Ct.
140, the court will not compel an election
between defences " unl ess they are so far
inconsistent that both cannot properly coexist in the same transaction ; " Kellogg
v. Baker, 15 Abb. Pr. 286, a general denial, Statute of Limitations, and release,
are not inconsistent ; Lansing v. Parker,
9 How. Pr. 2 , in as.ault and battery, a
general denial, self-defence, and defence
of possession of land, are not inconsi tent;
0 tr.om v. Bixby, 9 How. Pr. 57, denial
and Statute of Limitations; Ormsby v.
Douglas, 5 Duer, 665, slander, denial, and
justification; Hackley v. Ogmun, 10 How.
Pr. 44, action to recover possession of
chattels, general denial, and a ju tification
of the taking; Booth v. herwood, 12
Minn. 426, trespa
to laud ~; an wer,
( l) denies title, and ( 2) licen e; teener-

son v. Waterbury (Minn. l 93), 53 N. W.
Rep. 1146, action for • ervices rendered ;
answer, general denial, and payment;
Pike v. King, 16 Iowa, 49, general denial
and set-off; Will on v. leaveland, 30 al.
192, ejectment, denial of title, and Statute
of Limitations.
[Additional instance of defences held
not to be in consistent are found in the
following ca e · : George Fowler, on &
Co. 1·. Brook. (1902), 65 Kan. 861, 70 Pac.
- : general denial and contributory negligence; Leavenworth Light, etc. Co. v.
Waller (1902), 65 Kan. 514, 70 Pac. 365:
same; Pugh v. Oregon Imp. Co. (1896),
14 Wash. 331, 44 Pac. 6 9: same; Lord
v. Horr (1902), 30 vYa h. 477, 71 Pac. 23:
in a uit for reformation, that the deed
expres ed the contract and that there was
such a mutual mistake as entitled defendant to rescind; Gate v. Avery ( 1901 ),
112 Wis. 271 , 87 N. W. 1091 : same;
Kline v. Hanke (1894), 14 Mont. 361, 36
Pac. 454: in an action for rent, eviction
by plaintiff and that defendant were only
tenants from month to month; Blodgett
v. McMurty (1894), 39 Neb. 210, 57 N. W.
985: general denial and e toppel; Home
Fire Ins. Co. v. Decker (1 98), 55 Teb.
346, 75
. W. 841: failure to furoi h
proofs of loss and that plaintiff cau. ed
prPmises to be burned; Cate v. Hutchin on
(1899), 58 'eb. 232, 7
W. 500: g neral denial and unrea ouable and unjn ·t
account; Corbitt v . Harrington (1 96), 14
Wash. 197, 44 Pac. 132: a denial of knowledge or information a to the execution
of a guaranty and fraud in it exe ution, if it wa executed; Booco v. Man field (1902), 66 0. t. 121, 64 N. E. 115:
denial of executiou and plea of no con ideration; Smith v. Doherty ( 1901), 109 Ky.
616, 60 . W. 3 0: same; Fir t Nat. Bank
v. Wisdom' Ex'r (1901); 111 Ky. 135, 63
S. W. 461: ame; peucer v. ociet.y of
T.

53
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600.

* 72-±.

Effect of Admissio ns in One Defence upon I ss ues

^ 600. * 724. Effect of Admissions in One Defence upon Issues

Raised in Another. When a denial is pleaded in connection with

a defence of new matter, or two defences of new matter are set

Rais ed in Another.

a d f nee

np, the admissions in the one can never be used to destroy the

effect of the other. The concessions of a defence by way of con-

fession and avoidance do not obviate the necessity of proving the

f ne

When a denial · pl ad d in conn ction wi h
d fenc
f new matt r are e
ma ter or
in th one can n
d to de tr
f

averments contradicted by the denial.^ This rule is universal.

Even in those States where inconsistent defences are not per-

mitted to stand, the remedy is by striking out, or by compelling

an election, and not by using the admissions of one to destroy the

issues raised by the other.^

§ 601. * 725. Facts Pleaded as both Defence and Counter-Claim.

When the facts stated in an answer constitute both a defence and

a counter-claim, and are not twice pleaded in separate divisions,

but are alleged only once with a proper demand for relief as in a

Shakers (1901 ),Ky., 64 S. W. 468: same;

Hausman v. Mulherau (1897), 68 Minn. 48,

70 X. AV. 866: an admission of rent due
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and a counter-claim for repairs made;

Robinson v. Hill (1902), Kv., 66 S. W.

623 : breach of warranty and settlement ;

8.Yerm n
d nial.1
umv
yen in
tate
defen e are n t p r mi t d t
the reme l i b triking out r b omp lling
an el cti n an
u ing the admi ion of one to destr
he
2
ue rai · c1 by he other.
601. * 725. Facts P l eaded as both Defence and Co unter- Claim.
tatecl in an an wer con itu e both a defen e and
a c unter-claim, and are not 1 ice pleaded in eparate divisi n
but are alleged only once wi h a proper demand for relief a in a

Fisher v. Stevens (1898), 143 Mo. 181, 44

S. W. 769 : in ejectment, a general denial

and an equitable defence that defendant

purchased the laud at a trustee's sale ; De

Lissa V. Coal Co. : general denial of con-

tract and fraud ; Bank of Glencoe v. Cain

(1903), 89 Minn. 473, 95 N. W. 308; same.

In the following cases the defences were

held inconsistent : Omaha Fire Ins. Co. j;.

Dierks (1895), 43 Neb. 473, 61 N. W.

745 : that the policy was not in force at

the time of tiie loss and want of notice of

loss; HoUingsworth v. Warnock (1901),

112 Ky. 96, 65 S. W. 163 : accidental shoo^

ing and shooting in self-defence ; Lane v.

Bryant (1896), 100 Ky. 138,37 S. W. 584 :

denial of speaking slanderous words and

justification; Baines r. Coos Bay Xav. Co.

(1902), 41 Ore. 135,68 Pac. 397: denial

of execution of note arid allegations that

it was executed in pursuance of a fraudu-

lent conspiracy; Davis v. Ford (1896), 15

Wash. 107, 45 Pac. 739: an affirmative

defence admitting a contract and a de-

rial of the same; Dwelling House Ins.

Co. i\ Brewster (1895), 43 Neb. 528, 61

N. W. 746 : denial and waiver, estoppel or

avoidance.]

1 [^See, however, Hamill v. Ct)peland

(1899), 26 Colo. 178, 56 Pac. 901, where a

defence of new matter was held to relieve

the plaintiff from proving a contract

Avhich defendant had denied in another

defence. And in several of those States

where inconsistent defences are not al-

lowed, the force of a denial inconsistent

with an admission is destroyed by the

latter.

In Lamberton v. Shannon (1896), 13

Wash. 404, 43 Pac. 336, it was held that

a general denial, "except as herein ex-

pressly admitted, explained or qualified,"

will, in the absence of anything restricting

the application of such qualification, apply

to an afiirmative defence pleaded in the

same answer, and the force of the denial

will be limited by the averments of new

haker (1901),Ky., 64 . W. 46 : ame;
Hau man v. l\Iulherau (1 9- ), 6 Minn. 4 ,
70 ~. ' ' . 66: an ad mi ion of rent due
and a counter-claim for repair made;
Robin on v. Hill (1902), Ky., 66 S. W.
623 : breach of warranty and ettlement ;
Fi her v. teven· 1 9 ), 143 Mo. 1 1, 44
. W. 769: in ejectrnent, a general denial
and an equitable defence that defendant
purcha ed the lan<l at a tru tee' ale; De
Li a v. Coal Co. : general denial of con·
tract and fraud; Bank of Glencoe v. Cain
(1903), 9 l\Iion. 4~3, 95 N. W. 308; ame.
Io th followioa ca e the defence were
maha Fire In . Co. v.
Dierk {l 95 , 43
eb. 473, 61 X W.
745: that th poli y wa not in force at
the time of he lo and want f notice of
lo ; Holling ·worth v. '' arnock (1901 ),
112 Ky. 96, 65 . W. 163: accidental hooting and booting in elf-def nee; Lane v.
Br.rant (l 96), 100 Ky. 13 37 . W. 5 4:
denial of peaking landerou word and
ju. tifi. atiou; Baine v. oo Bay Tav. o.
(1902), 41 Or . 135, 6 Pac. 39i: denial
of ex ution f note and alleaation that
it wa ex f'U ed in pur uance of a fraudulent con piracy; avi· v. ,ord (196),15
\Va h. 107, 45 Pac. 739: an affirmatiYe
def nee admitting a contract and a de"ial of the ame; Dwelling Hou. In .
<>. 1•. Brew ter (1 95), 43
b. 52 , l
, '. \V. 746: denial and wai\' er, e toppel or
avui<lanc .]

1 [ ee, however Hamill v. Copeland
(1 99), 26 olo. 17 , 56 Pac. 901, wher a
defence of new matter wa held to relieYe
the plaintiff from proving a ontrac
which defendant bad denied in another
defence. And in everal of tho e
where incon i tent defence ar n t allowed the force of a denial incon i tent
with an admi sion i destroyed by the
latter.
In Lamberton v. hannon (1 96), 13
W a h. 404, 43 Pac. 336, it wa held that
a general denial, "except a h rein expre ~ly admitted, explained or qualified,''
will, in the ab ence of anything r tricting
the application of uch qualifi ation, appl
to an affirmative defence pleaded in the
ame an w r, and the f rce of bed nial
will be limited by the averment of new
matter th re · ntain d.J
2
uigley v. 1 rritt, 11 Iowa 14 ;
hann n v . ar on, 10 Iowa, 5 · Gr h
v. ater, 6 Iowa, 301; it r v. Jew tt, 33
al. 92 · Judd . Thomp on, 34 Cal. 39,
47 · Buhn t1.
rhett, 4,3 al. 264.
e
ui e v. Breed 65 arb. 59i 603 per
~IuUin J.
e al o mad r y. v. utt rfield, 51 al .. 26; Billing v.
r w
52 id. 565; Lawrence v. Pe k ( . Dak.
l 93) 54 . W. R p. o .
[Dougla v. In.. o. (1 3), 13 ". Y.
_o 33 . ' . 9;3 ; bur b 1•. arne
(l(l03), 75 ono. 350, 53 tl. 55.]
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counter-claim, the defect, if any, can only be reached by motion.

If not so remedied, the defendant may at the trial rely upon the

answer in both of its aspects.^

SECTION SIXTH.

COUNTER-CLAIM, SET-OFF, CROSS-COMPLAINT, AND CROSS-

DEMAND.

§ 602. * 726. Statutory Provisions. Two Groups. Special Pro-

visions of Indiana and low^a Codes. Similarity of Code Provisions.

A reference to the statutory provisions collected at the com-

niencement of section first of this chapter shows that some im-

portant differences exist among the various codes in respect to

the matters stated in the above title. Most of the codes may

be separated into two groups, each following a certain w^ell-

defined type. The first group contains those which provide for

a " counter-claim," and for no other sort of cross-demand, and

which adopt the following formula in defining it : " The counter-

claim must be one existing in favor of a defendant and against a

plaintiff between whom a several judgment might be had in the

action, and arising out of one of the following causes of action:
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1. A cause of action arising out of tlie contract or transaction

set forth in the complaint as the foundation of the plaintiff's

claim, or connected with the subject of the action ; 2. In an

action arising on contract, any other cause of action arising also

on contract, and existing at the commencement of the action." ^

1 Lancaster, O., Man. Co. w. Colgate, 12 - [[Northern Trust Co. v. Hiltgen

Ohio St. 344; but per contra, see Camp- (1895), 62 Minn. .361, 64 N. W. 909: A

bell V. Routt, 42 Ind. 410, 415, which holds counter-claim to be admi.«sible under G. S.

that the .same pleading cannot be both a 1894, § 5237, subd. 2, must exist in favor of

" defence" and a counter-claim ; if it pur- a defendant and against a plaintiff at the

ports to be a counter-claim, and sets up a time the action is commenced. And fur-

cause of action, and prays for relief, the ther, such demand is not available as a

defendant cannot treat it as a defence in counter-claim when it is acquired by de-

bar merely. fendaut long after the insolvency of the

[^See Farmers' Nat. Bank v. Hunter party against whom it exists. Wigmore

(1899), 35 Ore. 188, 57 Pac. 424, where c. Buell (1897), 116 Cal. 94, 47 Pac. 927:

the court intimates the opinion that Hill's In an action of ejectment to recover cer-

Ann. Laws, § 73, giving defendant the tain lands, defendant cannot plead a coun-

right to set forth as many defences as he ter-claim for damages to an adjacent tract

may have, applies to matters which are of land owned by him, caused by plain-

defensive only, and does not sanction join- tiff's cattle running upon the said tract,

ing a counter-claim with other defences.] Said action for damages neither arises out

836
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The second group embraces those in which the " counter-claim "

is substantially identical with the first subdivision of the section

just quoted, and in which a "set-off" is also defined in substan-

tial agreement with the second subdivision. The following are

the formulas adopted in this group : " The counter-claim must

be one existing in favor of a defendant and against a plaintiff

between whom a several judgment might be had in the action,

and arising out of the contract or transaction set forth in the

complaint as the foundation of the plaintiff's claim, or con-

nected with the subject of the action." " A set-off can only be

pleaded in actions founded on contract, and must be a cause

of action arising upon contract, or ascertained by a decision of

the court." The codes of Indiana and of Iowa cannot be re-

ferred to either of these two general groups : their provisions

are quite different in language from the common type, and much

broader in meaning. They will be found quoted at large in sec-

tion first of this chapter.^ In several of the States a special pro-

vision is made for the introduction of new parties made necessary

by the pleading of a " counter-claim " or " set-off." ^ The counter-
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claim in the ordinary form must be in favor of a defendant and

against a plaintiff between whom a several judgment on the ac-

tion is possible. This requirement, as will be seen in the sequel,

may sometimes fail of working complete justice between the par-

ties. Thus, for example, when a surety is sued, and a cross-

demand against the plaintiff exists in favor of the principal debtor,

the surety cannot interpose this claim because it is not in his own

favor. To obviate this and similar difficulties, the codes of In-

diana and of Iowa have added special provisions covering the class

of cases described, and authorizing one defendant, under certain

specified circumstances, to avail himself of a counter-claim or set-

of the transaction nor is it connected with N. C: 561, 32 S. E. 889. See also Kirby

the subject of the action. v. Jameson (1896), 9 S. D. 8,67 N. W.

The counter-claim is the creature of 854; Gurske v. Kelpin (1901), 61 Neb.

the code, and the code provides for it in 517, 85 N. W. 557 ; Bank of Arkansas City

two cases, (1) a cause of action arisinpj v. Hasie (1897), 57 Kan. 754, 48 Pac. 22.]

out of the transaction set forth by plaintiff ^ See su}>ra, §§ * 583, * 584.

or connected with the subject of the ac- ^ gee supra, § * 584 (n.), where these

tioii, (2) in an action on contract, any sections of the statutes are given in full,

other contract existing at the commence- The New York Code of Civil Procedure

ment of the action. This limitation as to provides (§501) that "the counter-claim

existence at the commencement of the mu.st tend, in .some way, to diminish or

action applie.s only to the second class : defeat the plaintiff's recovery."

Piedmout Bank v. Wilson (1899), 124

The ec nd roup embrace tho e in which the " counter-claim '
ub tanti lly identical with the first ub ii vision of the ection
JU quoted, and in which a " et-off ' i al o defined in sub tantial a0 r ement with the second subdivi ion. The following are
the fonnul adopted in this group: "The counter-claim mu t
be one ex:i tin in favor of a defendant and against a plaintiff
between whom a several judgment might be had in the action,
and ari ing out of the contract or transaction et forth in the
complaint as the foundation of the plaintiff's claim, or connected with the subject of the action." "A set-off can only be
pleaded in actions founded on contract, and must · be a cause
of action arising upon contract, or ascertained by a decision of
the court. ' The codes of Indiana and of Iowa cannot be referred to either of these two general groups : their provision
are quite different in language from the common type, and much
broader in meaning. They will be found quoted at large in ection first of this chapter. 1 In several of the States a special provi ion is made for the introduction of new parties made necessary
by the pleading of a" counter-claim" or" set-off.'' 2 The counterclaim in the ordinary form must be in favor of a defendant and
gainst a plaintiff between whom a several judgment on the act ion i po sible. This requirement, as will be seen in the sequel,
may ometimes fail of working complete justice between the partie . Thus, for example, when a surety is sued, and a cro sdemand again t the plaintiff exists in favor of the principal debtor,
the urety cannot interpose this claim because it is not in hi own
favor. To obviate this and similar difficulties, the codes of Indiana and of Iowa have added special provision covering the cla
of ca e e cribed, and authorizing one defendant, under cert m
pecified circum tances, to avail himself of a counter- laim or t f the t ran action nor is it connected with
the ubj ct f the action.
The co unter·claim i the creature of
the code, and the code provide for it in
two · e , (1) a cause of a ction ari iog
out of th tran action set forth by plaintiff
or onnect d with the su bj ct of the action, (2) in an action oo contract, any
other contra t exi ting at the com mencem nt of the ac ti on. Thi limitation as to
exi tence at the co mmencement of the
a tion appli
only to th econd cla :
l ' iedm ut Bank v. Wilson {1899), 124

N. C: 561. 32 . E. 889. See also Kirby
v. Jame on (1896), 9 S. D. 8, 67 N. W.
54;
urke 1. K elpin (1901), 61 Neb.
5 17, 5 N . W . 55 7 ; Bank of Arkansas , it. ~
. Ha ie (1 97), 57 Kan. 754, 4
ac. 22.J
1
ee supra,
* !5 3, * 5 4.
2
ee upra,
* 5 4 (n.), where the e
e tion of th statute a re given in full.
The Jew ork ode of i\•il Pr edure
provides (§ 501) that "the c unter-claim
mu t tend, in ome way, to dimioi h or
defeat the plaintiff's r co ry."
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off existing in favor of a co-defendant, when the liability of both

to the plaintiff is joint, or one is a surety for the other.^ From a

comparison of the various clauses above quoted or referred to, it

is plain that the judicial decisions giving a construction to the

sections of the codes embraced in the first and second groups can

all be used in constructing the full theory of the " counter-claim "

which forms so marked and important an element in the new pro-

cedure. In all these States, the " counter-claim " singly, or the

" counter-claim " and " set-off " taken together, are not only the

same in substance, but are defined in almost exactly the same

language, so that the interpretation given by the courts of one

State can aid in determining the questions which may arise in

another. The decisions made in Indiana and Iowa, however,

must to a certain extent stand by themselves; for they are based

upon statutes which are in many respects special in their terms,

and different in their meaning.

§ 603. * 727. Arrangement of Subject-Matter for Discussion.

The subject-matter of this section will be arranged in the fol-

lowing order, and distributed into the following subdivisions:
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I. A general description of the "counter-claim," its nature,

objects, and uses. II. The parties in their relations with the

counter-claim ; including the requirements that the demand must

be, 1. In favor of the defendant who pleads it; and 2. Against

the plaintiff; and, 3. When it may be set up in favor of one or

some of several defendants or against one or some of several

plaintiffs ; that is, when a several judgment may be had in the

action between such defendant and plaintiff. III. The subject-

matter of the counter-claim, or, in other words, the nature of the

causes of action which may be pleaded as counter-claims. This

most important subdivision will include several heads: viz.,

1. Whether a counter-claim must be a legal claim for damages,

— like the set-off or the recoupment of the former system, — or

whether it may be for equitable or other special relief; 2. When

the counter-claim is, or is alleged to be, a cause of action arising

out of the contract set forth in the complaint or petition as the

foundation of the plaintiff's claim ; 3. When it is, or is alleged

to be, a cause of action arising out of the transaction set forth

in the complaint or petition as the foundation of the plaintiff's

claim ; 4. When it is, or is alleged to be, a cause of action

1 See supra, § *584 (n.), for these sections in full.

off existing in favor of a c -defendant, when the liability of both
to th plaintiff is joint, or one is a m· ty for the other. 1 From a
comparison of the variou claus above quoted or r [ ,rr cl to it
i plain that the judicial deci ions giving a con tru ·t,i n to the
sections of the code embraced in the first ancl
oncl gro ips an
all b used in constructing the full theory of the " ount r-claim "
which forms so marked and important an elem nt in t h new pr cedure. In all these States, the "counter-claim" singly, or the
"counter-claim " and " set-off " taken together, are not only the
s·1me in substance, but are defined in almost exactly the sam
language, so that the interpretation given by the courts of one
State can aid in determining the questions which may ari e in
another. The decisions made in Indian a and Iowa, however
must to a certain extent stand by themselves ; for they are ba ed
upon statutes which are in many respects special in their terms,
and different in their meaning.
§ 603. * 727. Arrangement of Subject-Matter for Discussion.
The subject-matter of this section will be arranged in the following order, and distributed into the following subdivisions:
I. A general description of the "counter-claim," its nature,
objects, and uses. II. The parties in their relations with the
counter-claim; including the requirements that the demand must
be, 1. In favor of the defendant who pleads it; and 2. Again t
the plaintiff; and, 3. When it may be set up in favor of one or
some of several defendants or against one or some of several
plaintiffs; that is, when a several judgment may be had in tlie
action between such defendant and plaintiff. III. The subjectmatter of the counter-claim, or, in other words, the nature of the
causes of action which may be pleaded as counter-claims. This
most important subdivision will include several heads: viz.,
1. Whether a counter-claim must be a legal claim for damages,
- like the set-off or the recoupment of the former system, - or
whether it may be for equitable or other special relief; 2. When
the counter-claim is, or is alleged to be, a cause of action arising
out of the contract set forth in the complaint or petition as the
foundation of the plaintiff's claim; 3. vVhen it is, or is alleged
to be, a cause of action arising out of t.he transaction set forth
in the complaint or petition as the foundation of the plaintiff s
claim: 4. When it is, or is alleged to be, a cause of action
1

See supra, §

* 584 (n . ), for these section·

in foll .
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connected with the subject of the action. The discussion of these

topics will require the special examination and interpretation of

certain phrases and clauses of the statute, upon the true meaning

of which they all to a great extent depend : namely, («) the in-

terpretation of "the foundation of the plaintiff's claim," or when

is a contract or transaction "the foundation of the plaintiff's

claim "? (6) interpretation of "arising out of," or when does a

cause of action "arise out of" a contract or transaction? (c)

interpretation of "transaction," (c?) and of "subject of the

action;" (e) and of "connected with the subject of the action,"

or when is a cause of action "connected with the subject of

the action"? Resuming the statement of subordinate heads:

5. In actions founded on contract, a counter-claim founded on

another contract, which embraces in particular (a) the power of

electingf between actions in form founded on contract and those

in form founded on tort ; and (h} the requirement that the cause

of action must exist at the time when the suit was commenced.

IV. Set-off as defined in several of the codes. V. Certain mis-

cellaneous rules applicable to all counter-claims and set-offs.
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VI. The special provisions found in the codes of certain States,

and especially in those of Indiana and of Iowa. VII. The reply.

This arrangement, although perhaps not strictly scientific, is in

exact conformity with the order pursued by the statute, and is,

therefore, the one best adapted for our present purpose. A full

discussion of all the topics mentioned will certainly cover the

whole ground, and will develop the complete theory of the

"counter-claim" as it appears in the codes.

§ 604. * 728. Couuter-Claim to be compared -with Cross-Demands

of Former System. It will materially aid in determining the exact

province and scope of the counter-claim if we compare it with

the cross-demands in legal actions permitted by the former

system of procedure. I shall therefore, by way of preface,

and without going into unnecessary details, state the funda-

mental principles upon which those cross-demands were based,

and the general rules which governed their use.

§ 605. * 729. The Cross-Demands Allowed by the Former Pro-

cedure. The cross-demands in legal actions allowed by the former

procedure were "set-off " and " recoupment of damages." Origi-

nally the common law acknowledged no such defence or pro-

ceeding on the part of a defendant: the primitive notion of an

connected with the subj ect of the action. The discu ion of he e
t pie will require th pecial examination and interpr tation £
certain phra e and cl
of h tatut , upon the true meaning
of which they all to gr t xt nt depend: nam ly, ( a) the int erpretation of the f un ation of the plaintiff's claim," or when
i a contract or transaction 'the foundation of the plaintiff s
claim ? (b) interpretation of 'ari ing out of," or when d es a
cau e of ac ion "ari e out of ' a on ra.ct or tran ·action? (c)
interpret ti n of ' transaction," (Cl) and of ' ubject of the
action · " (e) and of "connected with the subject of the action,"
or when i a cau e of acti n "connected with the subject of
the action"? Re urning the statement of subordinate head :
5. In actions founded on contract, a counter-claim founded on
another contract, which embraces in particular (a) the power of
electing between actions in form founded n contract and tho
in form founded on tort; and (b) the requirement that the cau e
of action must exi t at the time when the suit was commenced.
IV. et-off as defined in several of the codes. V. Certain mi cellan ou rul
applicable to all counter-claim and et-off .
VI. The special provision found in the code of certain State ,
and e pecially in those of Indiana. and of Iowa. VII. The reply.
Thi arrangement, althoug h perhap not s rictly scientific, is in
exact conformity with the order pursued by the statute, and i ,
therefore, the one b st adapted for our pre ent purpose. A full
discu ion of all the topic mentioned will certainly co er the
whole ground, and will develop the complete theory of the
' counter-claim" a it appears in the codes.
604. * 72 . Counter-Claim to be compared with Cross-Demands
of Former System. It will materially aid in determining the exact
province and cope of th counter-claim if we compare it wi h
the cross-demands in J gal actions p rmitted by the former
cy tern f procedure. I hall therefore, by way f pr face
an without going into unnec ary d t il , state the fundamental principl s upon which th
er -dema ds
r b ed
and t he general rule whi h g ern d th ir u e .
. 605. * 72 . The Cross-Demands Allowed by the Former Procedure. The er s- emand in legal acti n allowe by the f rm r
procedure were et- ff' and 'r coupm nt f d mag . ' Origilly the c mm n law ackn 1 dged n
uch d f n e r ro., din 0 n tlt part f a l f ndant: th primi i
n ti n f a
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action did not admit the possibility of a defendant being an actor

and interposing a claim against the plaintiff to be tried in the

one suit. The legislature effected the change, and invented the

*' set-off."^ Being entirely of statutory origin, the "set-off,"

when used in actions at law, was necessarily kept within the

limits prescribed by the terms of the enactment, and was not

extended beyond their fair import. The court of chancery, not

acting directly in pursuance of this legislation, but being guided

rather by its analogies, was never restricted to its exact provi-

sions, and created an "equitable set-off " broader and more com-

prehensive than that administered by the courts of law. The

original English statute permitted a set-off only in the case of

mutual "debts." As this word had a well-known technical

meaning in the legal procedure, it served to restrict the use

of the set-off to the single class of demands which were at the

common law described by the term "debt; " namely, those which

arise from contract, and are fixed and certain in their amount.

There could not, therefore, be a set-off of general " damages "

resulting from the breach of contracts, but only of those claims,
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the amount of which had been ascertained and settled by the

promise itself, so that there could be no discretion in the jury,

and no "assessment" by them. Tliis original notion of the set-

off was generally perpetuated in the legislation of the various

States prior to the Codes of Procedure; although in some its

scope had been enlarged, and made to embrace any pecuniary

demand arising from contract, whether "debt" or "damages."

Where the original notion was preserved, the exact language

of the English statute was not always retained; but its force

and effect were not materially changed. I have given in the

note an abstract of the New York statute as an example of the

legislation, since it does not substantially differ from that of

other States.^

1 (^Gen. Elec. Co. v. Williams (1898), own right, as being the original creditor

123 N. C. 51, 31 S. E. 288-3 or ^^ being the assignee and owner. 3. It

- 2 R. S. p. 354, § 18, p. 335, §§ 21, must be for the price of real estate or

22; 2 Edm. Stat, at Large, p. 3G5, § 18, personal property sold, or for money

p. 367, §§ 21, 22. The defendant may paid, or for services done; or, if not one

set off demands which he has against the of these, the amount must be liquidated,

plaintiff in the following cases : 1. It must or be capable of being ascertained by

arise upon a judgment or upon a contract, computation. 4. It mu.st have existed

express or implied, sealed or unsealed, at the time of the commencement of the

2. It must be due to the defendant in his suit, and must then have belonged to the

action did not admit the
ibility of a defendant being an actor
and int rpo 'ing a claim again ' t th plaintiff t b tri d in the
one uit. The legislature eff ct <l the hange, and inv nted the
·" set-off. ' 1 Bein 0 entirely of tatutory origin, the "s t-off, "
wh n u d in acti n at law, was neces arily k pt within the
limits prescribed by the terms of the enactment, and was not
xtended beyond their fair import. The court of chancery, not
acting directly in pursuance of this legi lation, but being guided
rather by its analogie , was never restricted to it exact provisions, and created an "equitable set-off" broader and more comprehensive than that administered by the courts of law. The
-original English statute permitted a set-off only in the case of
mutual "debts." As this word had a well-known technical
meaning in the legal procedure, it served to restrict the u e
of the set-off to the single class of demands which were at the
common law described by the term "debt;" namely, those which
ari e from contract, and are fixed and certain in their amount.
There could not, therefore, be a set-off of g eneral "d amages "
resulting from the breach of contracts, but only of th ose claim,,
the amount of which had been ascertained and set tled by the
promise itself, so that there could be n o discretion in the jury,
and no "asse sment" by them. This original not.ion of th e setoff wa generally perpetuated in the legislation of the various
States prior to 'the Codes of Procedure; although in some its
scope had been enlarged, and made to embrace any pecuniary
demand arising from contract, whether "debt" or "damages. ''
Where the original notion was preserved, the exact language
of the English statute was not always retained; but its force
and effect were not materially changed. I have given in the
note an abstract of the New York statute as an example of the
legislation, since it does not substantially differ from that of
-other States. 2
1 [Gen. Elec. Co. v. Williams (1898),
123 N. C. 51, 31 S. E. 288.J
2 2 R. S. p. 354, § 18, p. 355, §§ 21,
22 ; 2 Edm. Stat. at Large, p. 365, § 18,
p. 367, §§ 21 , 22 . The defendant may
et off demands which he has against the
plaintiff in the followin g cases: 1. It must
ari se upon a judgment or upon a contract,
express or implied, seal ec l or unsealed.
2. I t must be due to the defen dant in his

owu rig ht, as being the orig inal credi tor
or as being the assignee and owner. 3. I t
must be for the price of real estate or
personal property sold, or for money
paid, or for services done; or, if not one
of th ese, the amount must be liquidated,
or be capable of being ascertained by
computation. 4. It mu. t have e -j ted
at the time of the commencement of th e
suit, and must then have belonged to the
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§ 606. * 730. Discussion of New York Statute of Set-ofiF. It is

not necessary to discuss this statute, nor to cite cases illustrat-

ino- its meaning. It has been dispLaced by the more compre-

hensive provisions of the code. It is clear that if the plaintiff's

action was on a contract and for a "debt," — for the more ex-

tended language of the statute describes only a "debt," — and

the defendant held another " debt " due from the plaintiff per-

sonally, and existing in his own favor, and which did so erist at

the commencement of the action, he could plead such demand as

a set-off; and if it exceeded the amount of the plaintiff's claim,

he could have judgment against the plaintiff for the surplus.

Also in an action for the same kind of demand, brought by a

plaintiff who had really assigned the claim, and was therefore a

nominal party only, or brought by a plaintiff who was a trustee,

or sued on behalf of another person, or brought by an assignee of

negotiable paper transferred after it became due, the defendant

defendant. 5. The action itself must be

founded upon a similar demand wliicli
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could itself be a set-off. 6. If there are

several defendants, the demand must

be due to them jointly. 7. It must be a

demand existing against the plaintiff in

the action, unless the suit be brought in

the name of a plaintiff who has no real

interest in the contract upon which the

suit is founded ; in which case no set-off

of a demand against tlie plaintiff shall be

allowed, unless as hereinafter specified.

It will be remembered, that, when this

statute was passed, things in action were

not generally assignable, so that an ac-

tion could be maintained by the assignee

as plaintiff : if actually transferred, the

action was brought in the name of the as-

signor as nominal plaintiff; while the

real owner — the assignee — was not a

party to the record. But full transfers

were permitted in the case of negotiable

paper : the succeeding subdivisions pro-

vide for the special circumstances arising

when there has been an assignment.

8. In an action on a contract not negoti-

able, which has been assigned by the

plaintiff (the plaintiff, therefore, being a

nominal party, and having no real in-

terest), a demand existing against such

plaintiff, or against the a.ssignee, at the

time of tlie assignment, and belonging to

the defendant before notice of tlie a.ssigu-

ment, may be set off to the amount of the

plaintiff's demand (that is, the demand

sued upon). 9. If the action is on negoti-

able paper, assigned to the plaintiff after

it became due, the defendant's demand

against tlie assignor thereof may be set

off to the amount of the claim in suit.

10. If the plaintiff is a trustee, or if he has

no real interest in the suit, the defendant's

demand against the person beneficially

interested may be set off to the amount of

the claim in suit. In all of these latter

cases, the defendant's demand, in order

to be a set-off, must fall within the de-

scription given in the former subdivisions.

If the amount of the set-off as established

equals the plaintiff's demand, the judg-

ment shall be rendered that the plaintiff

take nothing by his action ; if it be less,

CIVIL REMEDIES.

§ 606. * 730. Discussion of New York S tatute of Set-off. It is
not neces ary to di cu s bi tatute, nor to cite ca e illu tratina it meaning. It ha been di placed by the more compreh n ive pro i ion of the code. It is clear that if the plaintiff
action was on a contract and for a "debt,' - for the more extended language of the tatute describe only a "debt, ' - and
the defendant h ld another ' debt ' due from the plaintiff per" nally, and exi ting in hi wn favor, and which did so ri t at
tbe ommencement of the action, he could plead such demand a
a set-off ; and if it exceeded the amount of the plaintiff' claim
be could have judgment again t the plaintiff for the urplu .
Al o in an action for the same kind of demand, brought by a
plaintiff who ha.d really assigned the claim, and was therefore a
nominal party only, or brought by a plaintiff who was a trustee
or sued on behalf of another per on, or brought by an assignee of
negotiable paper transferred after it became due, the defendant
defendant. 5. The action it elf must be
founded upon a similar demand which
could itself be a set-off. 6. If th ere are
se\'eral defendant
the deman d must
be due to them jointly. 7. It must be a
d ruand exi ting against the plaintiff in
the action, unless the suit be brouo-ht in
the name of a plaintiff who has no real
intere t in the contract upon which the
suit i founded; in which ca e no set-off
of a demand again t the plaintiff shall be
allowed, unles as hereinafter specified.
It wil l be remembered, that, wheJJ this
statute was pa sed, things in action were
not generally a signable, so that an action could be maintained by the as ignee
a plaintiff: if actually tran £erred, the
action was brought in the name of the asignor a nominal plaintiff; while the
real owner - the a ignee - was not a
party to the record.
ut full transfer
were permitted in the ca e of negotiable
paper : the succeeding ubdivision provide for the pecial cir um tances ari ing
when there bas been an a ignment.
8. In an action on a contract not negotia ble, whi ch ha been a igned b the
pl ain tiff (the plaintiff, th erefore, b iog a
uom ina l party, aud having n r al int •r t). a d mand xi ·t ing again t uch
pla intiff. or agnin t t he a: ig ne , nt the
ti me of the a :ignment, a11 cl h long in g to
t he d fendaut liefore notice of th a; ·ig u-

ment, may be set off to the amount of the
plaintiff's demand (that i , the demand
ued upon). 9. If the action i on negotiable paper, a igned to the plaintiff after
it became due, the defendant' demand
again t the a signor thereof may be , et
off to the amount of the claim in uit.
10. If the plaintiff is a tru tee, or if he has
no real interest in the uit, the defendant'
deman<l again t the per on beneficially
intere ted may be set off to the amount of
the claim in uit. In all of these latter
cases, the defendant's demand, in order
to be a . et-off, mu t fall within the description given in the former ubdivisions.
If the amount of the set-off as establi bed
equal the plaintiff's demand, the judgment shall be rend ered that the plaintiff
take n_ thin by hi action ; if it be le ,
the plaintiff shall have judo-ment for the
residue only. If th re be found a balance
due to the defendant, judgm nt ball
be rendered for the defendant fo r the
amount thereof· except that no uch
judgment ball be rendered again t the
plaintiff when the contract upon which
th
uit i founded shall have b en
ig ned bef re the ommenc ment f the
uit, nor when the balanc i du from any
t h r p r on thac the plaintiff in th e
. (1 9-1. ), 142
acti on. [ teck v. . F. &I.
N. Y . 236, 3 7 . E . l ; Benn tt v. <,cli ou
Elcc . Co. (1900), 164 :r. Y. 131 , 5 .T. E. 7.
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might set off a similar kind of demand which he had against

either the assignor or the assignee in the first case before notice

of the assignment, or against the beneficiary in the second case^

or against the assignor in the third case; but he could not by

such set-off do more than defeat the plaintiff's recovery: he

could not have a judgment for any balance due to himself. The

reason for this latter rule is very plain ; for in neither of these

cases was the plaintiff the real ]party in interest and the debtor at

the same time.

§ 607. * 731. Origin of Set-off and Recoupment. Resemblances

and Dissimilarities. While set-off was entirely of statutory origin,

the doctrine and practice of " recoupment of damages " had their

inception in the law of judicial decision. From the notion of

absolute non-performance as a total defence, the progress w^as

easy and natural, through the partial defences of a part per-

formance and a reduction of damages by means of unskilful or

negligent performance, to the admission of a cross-demand in

favor of the defendant for damages resulting from the acts or

omissions of the plaintiff that amounted to a breach of the con-
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tract sued upon. In this manner the doctrine of recoupment

took its rise, and it was developed by decision after decision

until it became established in the courts of England and of

the American States, — a defence as well known and as widely

admitted within its scope as the statutory set-off. There were

resemblances and dissimilarities between these two defences.

Both were confined to actions upon contract, and must them-

selves arise from contract; but here the resemblance ends. A

set-off must be for a debt, a fixed certain sum, at least capable

of being ascertained by computation: recoupment was of dam-

ages, often entirely unliquidated, and depending upon an assess-

ment by a jury. A set-off was necessarily a demand arising upon

a different contract from the one in suit : recoupment was neces-

sarily of damages resulting from a breach of the very same contract

sued upon. In set-off the defendant might sometimes recover a

balance from the plaintiff: in recoupment this could never be

done.-' The doctrine may be summarily stated. In an action

upon a contract to recover either liquidated or unliquidated

damages or a debt, the defendant might set up by way of de-

fence and recoup the damages suffered by himself from any

1 nSt. Louis Nat. Bank v. Gay (1894), 101 Cal. 2SC, 35 Pac 87G.]

might set off a similar kind of demand which he had again t
either the assignor or the assjgnee in th first ca e b for notic
of the as jgnment, or against the ben fi ciary in the second case ,
or against the assignor in the third ca ; but he could not by
such set-off do more t han d f at the plaintiff's recovery: h
could not have a judgment for any balance due to himself. Th
reason for this latter rule is very plain; for in neither of the
ca es was the plaintiff the real p arty in interest an cl the debtor at
the sam e time.
§ 607. * 731. Origin of Set-off and Recoupment. Resem b lances
and Dissimilarities. W hile set-off was entirely of statutory origin,
the doctrine and practice of "recoupment of damages" had their
inception in the law of judicial decision . From th e notion of
absolute non-performance as a t otal defence, the progress was
easy and natural, through the partial defences of a part performance and a reduction of damages by means of unskilful or
negligent performance, t o the admission of a cross-demand iu
favor of the defendant fo r damages resulting from the acts or·
omissions of the pla.intiff that amounted t o a breach of the con tract sued upon. In this manner t he doctrine of recoupment
took its rise, and it was developed by decision after decision
until it became established in the courts of England and of
the American States, - a defence as well known and as widely
admitted within its scope as the statutory set-off. There were
resemblances and dissimilarities between these two defences .
Both were confined to actions upon contract, and must themselves arise from contract; but here the resemblance ends. A
set-off must be for a debt, a fixed certain sum, at least capabl e
of being ascertained by computation: recoupment was of damages, often entirely unliquidated, and depending upon an assessment by a jury. A set-off wa8 necessarily a demand arising upon
a different contract from the one in suit: recoupment was necessarily of damages resulting from a breach of the very same contract
sued upon. In set-off the defendant might sometimes r ecover a
balance from the plaintiff: in recoupment t his could n ever be
done. 1 The doctrine may be summarily stated. In an action
upon a contract t o recover eith er liquidated or unliquidated
damages or a debt, the defendant might set up by way of defenc e and recoup the damages suffered by himself from any
1

[ St. L ouis Nat. Bank

i"

Gay (1 94 ), 101 Cal. 2 G, 35 J>ac. Si u.]
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breach by the plaintiff of the same contract. At an early period

it was supposed that only damages arising from the plaintiff's

fraud in inducing the defendant to enter into the contract, or in

executing the same, could be recouped ; but it was subsequently

settled that fraud was not a necessary element, and that any

breach by the plaintiff of the same contract which he makes the

basis of his action would admit the defence of recoupment. The

rule was stated in the following manner in a case which arose a

short time before the new system of procedure was adopted : " It

cannot be denied, consistently with the doctrine now well estab-

lished, but that, in an action for a breach of contract, the de-

fendant may show that the plaintiff has not performed the same

contract on his part, and may recoup his damages for such breach

in the same action, whether they were liquidated or not, or may

at his election bring a separate action." ^ Recoupment was, how-

ever, used solely as a defence : it could do no more than defeat

the plaintiff's recovery; even though the defendant's damages

should exceed those proved by the plaintiff, he could have no

judgment for the surplus. ^
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§ 608. * 732. Illustrations of Recoupment. The nature, scope,

and intent of the doctrine may be illustrated by a statement of

some familiar instances in which recoupment was used; and it

will be readily seen in all of thera that the defendant's demand

was based upon a breach of the contract which was the founda-

tion of the action, although often of other stipulations or cove-

nants in that agreement than the one which it was alleged he

himself had broken. Thus, in an action brought to recover the

price of land, the defendant could recoup the damages arising

from the plaintiff's fraudulent representations concerning the

land, by which he had been induced to enter into the con-

tract ; ^ and in an action for the price of goods sold, damages

resulting from the plaintiff's breach of a warranty on the sale ; "*

and in an action for services, damages from the negligent or un-

skilful manner of their performance ; ^ and in an action on a lease

for rent or use and occupation, damages from the plaintiff's breach

1 Mayor, etc. of N. Y. v. Mabie, 1-3 * Reab «. McAlister, 8 "Wend. 109.

N. Y. 151, 153,per Denio J. ; and seeBat- « Rlanchard v. Ely, 21 Wend. 342;

terman u. Pierce, 3 Hill, 171 ; Murden v. Sickels r. Patti.son, U Wend. 257 ; Still >:

Priment, 1 Hilt. 75. Hall, 20 Wend. 51 ; Ives i-. Van Epps, 22

2 Sickels V. Patti.«on, 14 Wend. 257. Wend. 155.

* Van Kpi)s v. Harrison, 5 Hill, 63.

breach by the plaintiff of the am contract. At an early period
it wa upposed that only damage ari ing from the plaintiff's
fraud in inducing the defendant to enter into the contract, or in
executing the same, could be recouped; but it was subsequently
settled that fraud was n t a nece sary element, and that any
breach by the I lain.tiff of the ame contract which he make th
ba 'i f hi action would admit the defence of recoupment. The
rule wa stated in the following manner in a case which arose a
hart time before the new rtem of procedure was adopted : " It
cannot be denied, con i tently with the doctrine now well establi hed, but that, in an action for a breach of contract, the defendant may how that the plaintiff ha not performed the ame
contract on hi part, and may recoup hi damages for su h breach
in the same action, whether they were liquidated or not, or may
at hi election bring a separate action." 1 Recoupment wa , however, u ed solely as a defence: it could do no more than defeat
the plaintiff recovery; even though the defendant' damages
hould exce d those proved by the plaintiff, he could have no
judgment for the surplu ·. 2
. 608. * 732. Illustrations of Recoupment.
The nature cope,
and intent of the doctrine may be illu trated by a tatement of
ome familiar in tance in which recoupment was used; and it
will be readily seen in all of them that the defendant's demand
wa based upon a breach of the contract which was the foundation of the action, although often of other stipulations or cov nant in that agr ement than the one which it was alleged be
him elf had broken. Thu , in an a<?tion brought to recover the
price of land, the defendant ould recoup the damages arising
from the plaintiff fraudulent repre entation concerning the
Ian , by which he had been induced to nter into the c ntract; 3 and in an action for th price of good sold, damag
re ultin from the plaintiff' br a h of a warranty on the al ; 4
and in an action for ervi e , damag from the negli nt or unskilful mann r of th ir p rformance; 5 and in an action on a 1 a
for rent or u e and ccupati n damag fr m th I laintiff
r ach
1 ~fayor, etc. of · ... ~. Y. v. Mabie 13
N. Y. 151, 153, p r D nio J .; and ee Batterman v. i re , 3 riill , 171 ; Murd n v.
Prim nt, I Ililt. 75.
2 , i<'kel · ,._Pa ti~on, 14 W nd . 257.
3 Van E1 p •. Harri on, 5 Hill, 63 .

4

Reab . McAli ter, ·wend. 109.
BlanC'hard v. El.v, 21 W nd. 342;
i ·k I 1·. Patti. on, 1-A- W ud. 257; Lill '"
Rall , 20 \Y nd. 51; he v. Van pp , 22
W nd. 155.
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of a covenant to repair, or covenant for quiet enjoyment;^ or

damages from the plaintiff's fraud in inducing defendant to enter

into the lease. '^^ But recoupment is confined to damages from a

breach of the contract sued on.^ The same doctrine, which has

thus far been illustrated exclusively from New York cases, pre-

vailed in the other States to the same extent, and perhaps, in

some of them, had even a' wider application. A very few ex-

amples will suffice. In an action upon a promissory note, the

answer alleging that the note was given by the defendant for

the price of the plaintiff's services in constructing and mounting

a water-wheel, and that the work was done and the wheel made

and mounted in a very negligent and unskilful manner, to the

defendant's damage, was held to state a proper case for a re-

coupment of defendant's damages ; * and in an action upon a

sealed agreement to recover an amount due for certain sawing

done by the plaintiff in pursuance thereof, and also damages

from the defendant's failure to furnish the stipulated number of

logs to be sawed, damages arising from the plaintiff's breach of

other covenants were recouped;^ and damages from the plain-
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tiff's failure to build according to the specifications were per-

mitted to be recouped in an action for the price. ^ In Indiana,

where the defendant had given a note for the purchase-price of

land sold him by the payee, and the latter had afterwards wrong-

fully entered upon the land and taken and converted the growing

crops, it was held in an action upon the note that the damages

resulting from these wrongful acts of the plaintiff could not

be recouped, since they were independent trespasses, and not

breaches of the contract." The doctrine was applied in Missouri

to the following facts : The action was brought to recover rent

of a farm leased to defendant by a verbal agreement: the an-

swer set up, that, by further provisions of the same contract,

the plaintiff" stipulated to build and maintain a fence between the

premises leased and other land occupied by himself; that he neg-

lected to build the fence, and, by reason of his neglect, his cattle

1 Whitbeck v. SkiDner, 7 Hill, 53; Dor- Deming v. Kemp, 4 Saudf. 147; Terrell

•win I'. Potter, 5 Denio, 306; Mayor o. v. Walker, 66 N. C. 244, 251.

Mabie, 13 N. Y. 151. i Butler y. Titus, 13 Wis. 429.

2 Allaire v. Whitney, 1 Hill, 484; ^ Morrison v. Lovejoy, 6 Minn. 319.

Whitney v. Allaire, 1 N. Y. 305 ; 4 Denio, ^ Mason v. Hey ward, 3 Minn. 182.

554. 7 Slayback v. Jones, 9 Ind. 470.

^ Seymour v. Davis, 2 Sandf. 239 ;

of a covenant to repair, r cov nant for quiet nj ym n ; 1 or
damages from the pla,intiff's fraud in inducing d f ndant to nt r
into the lease. 2 But recoupment i confin d to damag s from a,
breach of the contract sued on. 3 The same doctrine, which ha
thu far been illustra.ted exclu ively from New York cas " prevailed in the other States to the ame extent, and perhaps, in
some of them, had even a · wider application. A very few .xamples will suffice. In an action upon a promi sory note, the
answer alleging that the note was given by the defendant for
the price of the plaintiff's services in constructing and mounting
a water-wheel, and that the work was done and the wheel made
and mounted in a very negligent and unskilful manner, to the
defendant's damage, was held to state a proper case for a recoupment of defendant's damages; 4 and in an action upon a
sealed agreement to recover an amount due for certain sawing
done by the plaintiff in pursuance thereof, and also damages
from the defendant's failure to furnish the stipulated number of
logs to be sawed, damages arising from the plaintiff's breach of
other covenants were recouped; 5 and damages from the plaintiff's failure to build according to the specifications were permitted to be recouped in an action for the price. 6 In Indiana,
where the defendant had given a note for the purchase-price of
land sold him by the payee, and the latter had afterwards wrongfully entered upon the land and taken and converted the growing
crops, it was held in an action upon the note that the damage::>
resulting from these wrongful acts of the plaintiff could not
be recouped, since they were independent trespasses, and not
breaches of the contract.7 The doctrine was applied in Missouri
to the following facts: The action was brought to recover rent
of a farm leased to defendant by a verbal agreement: the answer set up, that, by further provisions of the same contract
the plaintiff stipulated to build and maintain a fence between the
premises leased and other land occupied by himself; that he neglected to build the fence, and, by reason of his neglect, his cattle
1 Whitbeck v. Skinner, 7 Hill, 53; Dorwin 1;. Potter, 5 Denio, 306 ; Mayor v.
Mabie, 13 N. Y. 151.
2 Allaire v . Whitney, 1 Hill, 484;
Whitn ey v. Allaire, 1 N. Y. 305 ; 4 Denio,
554.
a Seymour v. Davis, 2 Sandf. 239 ;

Deming v. Kemp, 4 SandL 14 7; Terrell
v. Walker, 66 N. C. 244, 251.
4 Butler v. Titus, 13 \Vis. 429 .
6 Morrison v. Lovejoy, 6 Minn . 319.
6 Mason v. Heyward, 3 Minn. 182.
7 Slay back v. Jones, 9 Ind. 4 70.
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came upon defendant's farm, and destroyed crops thereon. The

damages thus sustained were held to be the proper subject of

recoupment.^

§ 609. * 733. Mere Defences Distinguished from Set-off or Re-

coupment, Counter-claim or Cross-Demand. Another species of

defence, which existed at the common law and still exists, is

sometimes confounded with recoupment or with coiniter-claim,

although it bears no real resemblance to either, and should be

carefully distinguished from both ; namely, the reduction of the

amount claimed to be due in suits for the price of goods sold or

of services rendered in most instances when the action is on a

quantum meruii or quantum valebant. In set-off and in recoup-

ment, the essence of the defence consists in a cause of action

against the plaintiff or some other person: whether a judgment

is recovered or not is immaterial, but a right of action always

lies at the bottom of the legal notion. In the defence referred

to, there is no such right: it is simply a process of subtracting

from the amount of the adverse claim, and therefore operates

directly upon that demand. Set-off and recoupment, on the
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other hand, do not attack the adverse claim itself; and for that

reason it is often said that they are not true defences : they

admit the plaintiff's cause of action, and set up an affirmative

cross-demand, so that the sums awarded for each may satisfy

one another, leaving only a surplus to be received by the party

who obtains the larger amount. The distinction is very plain ;

but it has sometimes been overlooked. One example will be a

sufficient illustration. In an action for the price of goods sold

and delivered, and of work and labor done amounting as alleged

to $197, the answer set up that the goods furnished and the

work done were worth no more than $173, and as to that sum

averred payment. On the trial, the defendant offered evidence

tending to show that the articles were to be of a certain kind and

quality ; that they were, on the contrary, very inferior in quality ;

and the consequent diminution in value and price. This evi-

dence was rejected on the ground that the reduction sought

could only be claimed by way of "recoupment of damages or

of set-off." The New York Court of Appeals, reversing this

ruling, pronounced the defence admissible, since it was in no

1 Hay V. Short, 49 .Mo. 139, 142. QFoote & Davis Co. v. Malony (1902), 115 Ga.

985,42 S. E. 41.3.]

came upon defendant' farm and d r yed crop ther on. The
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bu u tained w r h ld o be th pr per u bj ct of
r coupm nt. 1
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sense a claim for damages against the plaintiff, but simply a

diminution of the value of the goods and the labor, as that

had been established prima facie by the plaintiff.^ The same

principle applies through the whole range of possible defences,

under whatever forms they may be set up: if they simply attack

the cause of action, and show that by virtue thereof tlie plaintiff

ought not to recover at all, or recover all that he demands, they

are not, and cannot be, answers in the nature of "set-off" or

" recoupment " under the old system, or of " counter-claim " or

"cross-demand" under the new. Thus the defence of payment

cannot, by any mode of averment, be made a counter-claim ; ^

nor that of usury. ^ And generally, whenever the facts pleaded

are merely in bar of the action, and the relief demanded by the

defendant is only what would be the legal judgment in his

favor upon those facts, the answer is not a counter-claim, nor,

a fortiori, a cross-complaint, although it may be in the form of

the latter species of pleading.* From this preliminary statement

of the former defences which contained some of the elements

that are found in the modern counter-claim, and of others which
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have nothing in common with, but are sometimes mistaken for,

the counter-claim, I now proceed to a direct discussion of the

latter as it is defined and authorized by the codes, and shall

follow the order of treatment already indicated.^

I. A General Description of the Counter-Glaim ; its Nature, Objects

and Uses.

§ 610. * 734. Scope of Inquiry herein. Under this subdivision

I shall collect from leading judicial decisions such opinions, and

portions of opinions, as have in the clearest and most accurate

manner described the general nature, objects, and uses of the

counter-claim, and shall add the comments and explanations

that seem necessary to a full development of the subject. The

discussion is here confined to the general properties of the

counter-claim, and does not descend to its various special ele-

1 Moffet V. Sackett, 18 N. Y. 522. * Bledsoe v. Rader, 30 Ind. 354; Bel-

sen e a claim for darnag
again t the plaintiff, but simply a
diminution of the value £ the g otls anU. th labor, a that
had been tablish d prima f acie by the plaintiff. 1 The ame
principle applies through the whole rang of p sible d f nc ,
under what ver forms they may be set up: if they simply ttack
the cau e of action. and show that by virtue thereof th plaintiff
ought not to r cover at all, or recover all that h e d mands, th y
are n t, and cannot be, answers in the nature of "set-off " r
"recoupment" under the old system, or of "counter-claim" or
"cross-demand" under the new. Thus the defence of payment
cannot, by any mode of averment, be made a counter-claim; 2
nor that of usury. 3 And generally, whenever the facts pleaded
are merely in bar of the action, and the relief demanded by the
defendant is only what would be the legal judgment in his
favor upon those -facts, the answer is not a counter-claim, nor,
a fortiori, a cross-complaint, although it may be in the form of
the latter species of pleading. 4 From this preliminary statement
of the former defences which contained some of the elements
that are found in the modern counter-claim, and of others which
have nothing in common with, but are sometimes mistaken for,
the counter-claim, I now proceed to a direct discussion of the
latter ·as it is defined and authorized by the codes, and shall
follow the order of treatment already indicated. 5

2 Burke v. Thome, 44 Barb. 363. leau v. Thompson, 33 Cal. 495.

2 Prouty V. Eaton, 41 Barb. 409, 412, ^ QFor a history of legislation upon the

per T. A. Johnson J. subject of set-off, and references, see Steck

nSmith V. Building Ass'n (1896), 119 v. Colorado Fuel & Iron Co. (1894), 142

I. A General Description of the Counter- Claim; its Nature, ObJects
and Uses.
I

N. C. 257, 26 S. E. 40; Gen. Elec. Co. v. N. Y. 236, 31 N. E. V.^j

Williams (1898), 123 N.C. 51,31 S.E. 288.]

§ 610. * 734. Scope of Inquiry herein. Under this subdivision
I shall collect from leading judicial decisions such opinions, and
portions of opinions, as have in the clearest and most accurate
manner described the general nature, objects, and uses of the
counter-claim, and shall add the comments and explanations
that seem necessary to a full development of the subject. The
discussion is here confined to the general properties of the
counter-claim, and does not descend to its various special eleMoffet v . Sackett, 18 N. Y. 522.
Burke v. Thorne, 44 Barb. 363.
s Prouty v. Eaton, 41 Barb. 409, 412,
per T. A. Johnson J.
[Smith v. Building Ass'n (1896}, 119
N. C. 257, 26 S. E . 40; Gen. Elec. Co. v.
Williams ( 1898), 123 N. C. 51,31 S. E. 288.J
i

2

4 Bledsoe v. Rader , 30 Ind. 354; Belleau v. Thompson, 33 Cal. 495 .
s [For a history of legislation upon the
subject of et-off, and references, see Steck
v. Colorado Fuel & Iron Co. ( 1894), 142
N. Y . 236, 31 N. E . 7.J
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ments and features, which, depending upon the particular terms

of the statutes, demand a more critical examination.

Sell. * 735. One Class of Cases Included in Term ''Set-off'^

under Former Procedure not Included in Counter-CIaim. Mere De-

fence not a Counter-Ciaim. There are certain conclusions which are

evident upon the mere reading of the statute. Under the former

procedure, the term "set-off" included two quite distinct classes

of cases: namely, (1) those in which the defendant might recover

an affirmative judgment for a "debt"' against the plaintiff; and

(2) those in which the demand in his favor could only be used

defensively to diminish, or perhaps defeat, the recovery by the

plaintiff. The codes provide for both these classes of eases.

Those sections which permit the action to be brought by an

assignee of a thing in action, and allow under certain circum-

stances the same matters to be interposed as a defence against

him which would have been available against the assignor, and

those_ sections which permit the action to be brought b}' a trustee

of an express trust, and allow the same matters to be set up as a

defence against him which would have been available against the
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party beneficially interested, — these sections plainly embrace the

second class of "set-offs" above mentioned; namely, those in

which the demand could be used as a defence^ but not as the basis

of an affirmative recovery against the plaintiff. On the other

hand, these cases are not included within the description given

of a counter-claim. 1 A defence, even though it consists of a

claim for relief against some person^ but does not permit a recov-

ery against the plaintiff, is not a counter-claim. The first class

of "set-offs" above mentioned is embraced within the definition

of the counter-claim as given by those codes which constitute the

first group according to the division made in a former paragraph. ^

In the codes which constitute the second group, the same class

of " set-offs " is substantially described under the original name

which belonged to that species of answer in the old procedure.^

§ 612. * 736. Recoupment a Species of Counter-Claim. How-

Modified and Enlarged. The " recoupment of damages " has un-

dergone a most important modification. It is confessedly covered

1 ^Piedmont Bank v. Wilson (1899), 2 See§*726.

124 N. C. ."iGl, .32 S. E. 889; Lindsay, etc. » [ St. Louis Nat. Bank v. Gay (1894),

Co. V. Carpenter (1894), 90 la. 529, 58 101 Cal. 286, 35 Pac. 87G.]

N. W. 900 ]
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b}' the definition of counter-claim given in all the codes without

exception. In those forming the two principal groups according

to the classification heretofore made, it is described by the ex-

press language, "a cause of action arising out of the contract

set forth in the complaint as the foundation of the plaintiff's

claim;" in that of Indiana it is described by the language,

'' any matter arising out of or connected with the cause of action

which might be the subject of an action in favor of the defend-

ant, or which would tend to reduce the plaintiff's claim or

demand for damages;" and in that of Iowa by the language, "a

cause of action in favor of the defendants, or some of them, against

the plaintiffs, or some of them, arising out of the contract set

forth in the petition." ^ It is beyond dispute, then, that the re-

coupment of damages, as the same was authorized by the courts

under the old practice, is made a species of counter-claim by all

the codes. But its effects have been greatly enlarged. As it

has been transferred into a counter-claim, it partakes of all the

essential features conferred upon that kind of defence by the

statute. For this reason, the defendant, who would formerly
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have set up the facts in recoupment of damages, and who now

pleads the same facts as a species of counter-claim, may upon

the basis of those facts obtain a judgment for damages in his

favor against the plaintiff, if the proofs upon the trial warrant

such a result.

§ 613. * 737. Counter- Claim Broader than Set-off and Recoup-

ment. Kinds of Causes of Action that may be interposed as

Counter-claims. The two classes of affirmative relief mentioned

in the foregoing paragraphs, important as they are, do not ex-

haust the scope and efficacy of the counter-claim. The causes

of action which were the basis of a " recoupment of damages "

or of a " set-off, " as those terms were legally defined, all neces-

sarily arose from a breach of contract. The language employed

by the codes speaks of causes of action as constituting a counter-

claim, which do not arise out of contract. It mentions three

alternatives, — causes of action (1) arising out of the contract

set forth in the complaint, or (2) arising out of the transaction

set forth in the complaint, or (3) conriected with the subject of

the action. Unless we would accuse the legislature of tlie most

absurd and misleading tautology, tins language was intended to

^ See p. G97, ante, where statutes are given in full.

by the definition of count r-claim gi en in all th cod s wi bout
exception . In those forming the two princi1 al gr ups ace r ling
to the clas ification heretofore made, it i <.l crib d by the xpress language, "a cause of action ari ing out of the c ntract
set forth in the complaint a th foundation of the plaintiff' s
claim;" in that of Indiana it is described by the language,
~'any matter ari ing out of or connected with the au e of action
which might be the subject of an action in favor of the d fond ant, or which would tend to reduce the plaintiff's claim or
l mand for damages;" and in that of Iowa by the language, ' a
cause of action in favor of t he defendants, or some of them, against
the plaintiffs, or some of them, arising out of tlie contract set
forth in the petition." 1 It is beyond dispute, then, that the recoupment of damages, a the same was authorized by the courts
under the old practice, is made a species of counter-claim by all
the codes. But its effects have been greatly enlarged. As it
has been transferred into a counter-claim, it partak s of all the
essential features conferred upon that kind of defence by the
statute. For this reason, the defendant, who would formerly
have set up the facts in recoupment of damages, and who now
pleads the same facts as a species of counter-claim, may upon
the basis of those facts obtain a judgment for damages in his
favor against the plaintiff, if the proofs upon the trial warrant
such a result.
§ 613. * 737. Counter-Cla i m Broader than Set-off and Recoup ment.

Kinds of Causes of

Action that may be interposed as

The two classes of affirmative relief mentioned
in the foregoing paragraphs, important as they are, do not exhaust the scope and efficacy of the counter-claim. The causes
of action which were the basis of a "recoupment of damages "
or of a "set-off," as those terms were legally defined, all necessarily arose from a breach of contract. The language employed
by the codes speaks of causes of action as constituting a counterclaim, which do not ari e out of contract. It mentions three
alternatives, - causes of action (1) ari ing out of the contract
set forth in the complaint, or (2) arising out of the transaction
set forth in the complaint, or (3) connected with the subject of
the action. Unless we would accuse the legislature of t rn most
absurd and misleading tautology, thi language was intended to
Counter-Claims.
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affirm that there may be counter-claims which do not arise out

of contract. Arising out of the "transaction," and "connected

•with the subject of the action," are pUiced in opposition to "aris-

ing out of contract." As "recoupment of damages" and "set-

off " must be based upon the non-performance of a contract, it

follows that the counter-claim was designed to include other

demands to which neither of these two terms can apply. What

are these other demands ? I do not now attempt to answer this

question in detail : it is enough to point out the general nature

of all such possible cases. If causes of action are for the recov-

ery of money only, they must either be upon contract or for a

tort. Is there any possible cause of action upon contract, which

is neither a "set-off " nor a "recoupment of damages," and which

may be embraced within the definition of a counter-claim? There

is : a cause of action for the breach of a contract other than the

one sued upon, when the demand is for damages merely, to be

assessed by the jury, and not for a debt, is neither a "set-off"

nor a "recoupment," and yet is plainly described by the second

subdivision of the definition found in all the codes which form
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the first group, and by the definition of " set-off " found in all

those which make up the second group. As the word " trans-

action " seems to imply causes of action not necessarily upon

contract, those arising from tort may perhaps, under proper cir-

cumstances, be the subject of counter-claim ; but the discussion of

this particular question will be deferred to a subsequent part

of this section. I will now sum up the possible cases, or classes

of cases, which may be included within the broad definition of

the counter-claim as given in the codes of the first group : if we

pass to the second group, certain of these classes would fall

within the term " set-off " rather than counter-claim. Of the

causes of action which terminate in a recovery of money alone,

the counter-claim expressly embraces (1) the matters which

under the former procedure gave rise to a recoupment of dam-

ages; (2) the cases of "set-off" in which a judgment for debt

against the plaintiff was possible ; (3) demands to recover un-

liquidated damages for the breach of a contract not the founda-

tion of the plaintiff's suit, and possibly (-4) demands to recover

damages for torts, if the same arose out of the " transaction " set

forth in the complaint or petition, or are connected with the sub-

ject of the action. These exhaust all the possible instances of a

affirm that there may b counter-claims whicl do not ari e out
of con ra t. Ari ing out f he ' tran action," and "connected
with the ubject f tl e action," are plac d in oppo ition to " ari •
in out of contract. ' As ' rec upment of damage ' and setoff ' mu t be ba d upon the non-performance of a contract, it
follow, that th counter-claim was de igned to include other
d m n to which n ith r of the e two term can apply. What
are th e other dem nds? I do not now attempt to answer this
que tion in detail: it is enough to point out the general nature
of all uch po sible cases. If causes of action are for the recovery of money only, they must either be upon con.tract or for a
tort. Is there any possible cause of action upon contract, which
is neither a ' set-off" nor a "recoupment of damages," and which
may be embraced within the definition of a counter-claim? There
is: a cause of action for the breach of a contract other than the
one ued upon, when the demand is for damages merely, to be
a sessed by the jury, and not for a debt, is neither a "set-off '
nor a "recoupment," and yet is plainly described by the second
ubdivision of the definition found in all the codes which form
the fir t group, and by the definition of ' 4 set-off" found in all
tho e which make up the second group. As the word "tran action ' seems to imply causes of action not nece sarily upon
contract, tho e arising from tort may perhaps, under proper circum tance , be the subject of counter-claim; but the discu sion f
thi particular questi n will be deferred to a subsequent part
of thi section . . I will now sum up the possible cases, or class s
of ca e , which may be included within the broad definition of
the counter-claim as given in the codes of the first group: if we
pa ·s to the second group, certain of the e clas es would fall
within the term "set-off" rather than counter-claim. Of the
cau '
of action which terminate in a recovery of money alone
th
ounter-claim expre ly mbrace (1 th matter which
unde · the former procedure
ve ri e to a r upment of dam4
e ; (2 the ca e f
t-off" in which a judgment for e t
a in, t th plaintiff wa po i 1 · ( )
mand to recover unliquid ted dama
f r th breach of a ntract n t the foundation of th plaintiff
uit, and o ibly 4) demand t rec v r
dam ge for tort if the
f th "tran action " t
f r h in the complaint r ti ion, rare nn cted with the subj ct f the acti r . Th
~ h e u t ll th po ible instances of a
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mere pecuniary recovery. Counter-claim may also embrace cases

of an equitable nature in which affirmative relief is granted to

the defendant.^ Such cases are as plainly described by the gen-

eral language of the codes as those of a purely legal character

which seek only a pecuniary judgment. In order to shut out

these claims for equitable relief, and to limit the counter-claim

to causes of action for the recovery of money, the terms of the

statute must be read with restrictions interpolated into their

midst which were not placed there by the legislature. Were

it not that the ancient set-off and recoupment could only be

used in legal actions brought to recover money, no judge would

have thought that a like limitation must be put upon the lan-

guage of the codes. How far the counter-claim includes equi-

table relief will be fully discussed in the sequel. Finally, the

only other cases which could possibly come within the definition

of counter-claim are legal causes of action to recover possession

of lands, or to recover possession of chattels.

§ 614. * 738. Essential Elements and Test of Counter-Claim.

Must be a Cause of Action. Having thus enumerated the dif-
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ferent kinds of causes of action and of relief which may be used

by the defendant as counter-claims, I shall proceed to point out

some essential features and elements which must exist in each of

these cases ; that is, some essential elements which enter into the

very notion of the counter-claim. (1) It must be a cause of

action. 2 In other words, the facts must be such that they would

constitute the entire matter proper and necessary to be set forth

in the complaint or petition, if the defendant had chosen to insti-

1 [Kollock V. Scribner (1897), 98 Wis. Helmer v. Yetzer (1894), 92 la. 627, Gl

104, 73 N. W. 776.3 ^- W. 206; Bardes v. Hutchinson (1901),

•^ [llichardsy. Am. Desk & Seating Co. 113 la. 610, 85 N. W. 797; Ruinbou^^h v.

(1894), 87 Wis. 503, 58 N. W. 787; Union Young (1896), 119N. C. 567, 26 S. E. 143;

Mercantile Co. v. Jacoljs (1897), 20 Mont. Kahrs v. Kahrs (1902), 115 Ga. 288, 41

270, 50 Pac. 793; Waller v. Deranleau S. E. 649; Gulliver y. Fowler (1894), 64

(1903), — Neb. —,94 N. W. 1038; Bab- Conn. 556, 30 Atl. 852; Rhea ?•. Bagley

cock V. Maxwell (1898), 21 Mont. 507, 54 (1899), 66 Ark. 93, 49 S. W. 492; Giirske

Pac. 943; Askew v. Koonce (1896), 118 r. Kelpin (1901), 61 Neb. 517, 85 N. W.

N. C. 526, 24 S. E. 218; Stotsenburg v. 557; Lacey v. Lacey (1893), 95 Ky. 110,

Fordice (1895),142lnd. 490, 41 N. E.313; 23 S. W. 673; Arthurs v. Thompson

Nicholls V. Hill (1894), 42 8. C. 28, 19 (1895), 97 Ky. 218, 30 S. W. 628; Far-

S. E. 1017; Tron v. Yohn (1896), 145 rell v. Burbank (1894), 57 Minn. 395, 59

Ind. 272, 43 N. E. 437: Harris v. Ran- N. W. 485; White v. Blitch (1900), 112

dolph County Bank (1901), 157 Ind. 120, Ga. 775, 38 S. E. 80; Center Creek Water

60 N. E. 1025; Lindsixy, etc. Co. v. Car- Co. r. Lindsay (1900), 21 Utah, 192, 60

penter (1894), 90 la. 529, 58 N. W. 900; Pac. 559.^
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tute an independent action between himself as plaintiff and the

plaintiff as defendant.^ When a counter-claim is pleaded, the

defendant becomes, as far as respects the matters alleged therein,

an actor: there are substantially two simultaneous actions pend-

ing between the same parties, each of whom is at the same time

a plaintiff and a defendant. Since the counter-claim ' states a

cause of action, it is to be governed and judged by the rules

which apply to the complaint or petition r^ the facts alleged

must be sufficient to constitute the cause of action, and the

relief to which the defendant is entitled should be properly

demanded. In short, the pleader should, for the time being,

regard himself as acting for a plaintiff", and as drawing a com-

plaint or petition. This rule is so simple and so plain, that it

seems almost impossible to mistake it; and yet the books of

reports are full of cases in which facts have been set up as

counter-claims, which, if admitted to be true, would not have

entitled the party pleading them to any relief. The test thus

suggested is of universal application. Would the facts averred
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taken by themselves, if admitted, entitle the defendant to a

^ Q" An answer setting up a counter-

claim must contain the substantial requi-

sites of a complaint, and allege facts which

legally entitle the defendant to recover in

a suit instituted by him for tliat purpose

against the plaintiff ; and, if his pleading

omits any allegation tliat would he neces-

sary to state a cause of suit, it will he vul-

u e n ind pendent action etw n him lf a plainti · and he
plaintiff a"' l fen l nt. 1 "When a c unt r- laim i pl a d th
lefenclant becom
far
re p ct-. th mat er all g cl th
an c1,d or : there ar ·ub tantially \:
imultan ou action
inrr b twe n the am parti
a h of hom i at h
tim
a plaintiff an l a d fen lant.
th
unter- ]aim ta
1.:nu
f ction it i to b go rned and ju lged by th rul,
' hich appl to the complaint or petition : 2 h fact" alleg d
mu
be ufficient to con titute he cau
f a ion, nd th
r lief o wl ich the defendant i ntit] d houl l be properl
cl manded. In hart the pleader l ould for h time bein ,
r gard him elf a ac ing for a plaintiff, and a drawing a complaint or petition. Thi rule i
imple and o plain that it
eem alma t impo ibl to mi take it; and yet the bo k of
reports are full of ca es in which fact have b n set up a
counter-c]aim , which, if admitted to be true, would not ha
entitled he party pleading them to any relief. The e t thu
ugge ted i of universal application. ·would the fac a erred
taken by them elves, if admitted, entitle he defendant to a

nerable to a demurrer interposeil ou that

ground: " Le Clare (■. Thihault (1902), 41

Ore. 601, 69 Pac. 552. "A counter-claim

must, to be good, contain every allegation

which would be needed in a complaint

founded on the same cause of action : "

Daggs V. Phceni.K Nat. Bank (1898), Ariz.,

5.3 Pac. 201.

" To constitute a counter-claim, the

facts stated must amount to an independ-

ent cause of action ; when they merely

serve to defeat plaintiff's cause of action,

they amount to a defence, not a counter-

claim : " Walker v. Ins. Co. (1894), 143

N. Y. 167, 38 N. IC. 106. "A counter-

claim, as our decisions affirm, is not a de-

fence to a plaintiff's action, but it is a

cross-action by the defendant; and it must

state facts sufhcient in law to constitute a

cause of action ; otherwise it will Ije iield

bad on demurrer : " Indiana, etc. A.ss'n

V. Crawley (1898), 151 Ind. 413, 51 X. E.

466.

" A counter-claim is an action, and to

be properly pleaded it must be set forth

with all the allegations necessary to up-

hold an original petition founded on the

same cause of action : " Prichard's Execu-

trix V. Peace (1895), 98 Ky. 99, 32 S. W.

296. " An answer is a statement of defence.

It is not its office to demand affirmative

relief, unless upon a counter-claim ; nor

can it pro])erly be made to take tlie place

of a motion to cite in new parties. So far

as used for such purposes it may he dis-

regarded by the trial court : " Russell v.

Easterbrook (1898), 71 Conn. 50, 40 Atl.

905. A counter-claim which cliarges

fraud and misconduct in general terms,

without specifying particular acts, does

not state a cause of action : Alden v.

I [ " An answer setting up a
ounter- bad on demurrer: " Indiana, etc. A. 'n
claim must contain the ·ub tantial reqni- v. rawley {l 9 ), 151 Ind. 413, 51 T . E.
i e of acomplaint,andallegefact which 466.
le ally entitle the defendant to reco.-er in
" A counter-claim is an action, and to
a nit in tituted by him for that purpo e be properly pleaded it must be t fo rth
again t tbe plaintiff; and, if hi pl adiug with all the allegation ne e ary to upomit any allegation that would be nece - hold an original petition founded on the
ary t tate a cau ·e of uit, it will be vulame au e of action: " Prichard' Execunerable to a demurrer interposed ou that trix v. Peace (1 95), 9 Ky. 99, 32 ·. W.
ground:" Le Clarev. Thibault (1902), 41 296. "An an wer is a statement of defence.
re. 601, 69 Pac. 552. "A counter-claim I t i not it · office to demand affirmati 1•e
mu · t, to be good, contain every allegation reli f, unle upon a ounter- laim; nor
which would be ueedecl in a omplaint
an it properly be made to tak the place
founded on the ame au e of action : " of a motion to cite in new partie .
o far
Dagg v. Phamix 'at. Bank (1 9 ), Ariz., a u d for uch purp
it may be di 53 Pa . 201.
regarded by the trial court: " Ru ell v.
"To con titute a counter-claim, the Ea terbrook ( 1 9 }, 71 onn. 50, 40 A J.
fact tated mu t amount to an independ- 905. A counter-claim whi b harg
ent cau e of action; when they merely fraud and mi condu t in general t rm ,
er ve to defeat plaintiff' cau e of a tion, without pe ifying particular a t d
they amount to a defen e, n t a ounter- not . tate a au e of a ion: Alden L'claim:" V alker v. In. .
. (1 94), 143 Cbri tian on (1901), 3 Minn. 21, 5
~. Y. 167, 3
.i: • E. l 6.
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judgment in his favor against the plaintiff? If not, they do

not constitute a counter-chiim.

§ 615. * 739. Implies an Opposing Claim. Limitation herein. It

has sometimes been said that "counter-claim," ex vi termini^ im-

plies a claim, and also an opposing claim; and that, therefore,

judgment in hi favor again· th
not constitute a counter- la.im.
S 615.

* 7 9.

plaintiff?

Implies an Opposing Claim.

If not, they clo

Limitation herein.

It

there cannot be a valid counter-claim unless there is a demand

on behalf of the plaintiff. This is no doubt true within certain

limits. The counter-claim as well as the defence assumes that

the plaintiff sets up a claim in his complaint. There could be

no answer of any kind, defensive or affirmative, unless the plain-

tiff in the first instance filed or served a pleading containing some

demand. But a counter-claim does not necessarily imply that

the demand is a valid one. The term, if not invented, was applied

by the legislature to thi-; species of answer, which is allowed to

be used in cases where the plaintiff sets up certain specified causes

of action ; but the code nowhere requires that the cause of action

thus alleged sliould be a good one. To interpolate any such limi-

tation into the language,of the statute would be giving an unnec-

essary meaning to a very simple epithet chosen by the lawmakers

Generated for facpubupdates (University of Michigan) on 2014-06-17 15:35 GMT / http://hdl.handle.net/2027/uc2.ark:/13960/t02z1c23b
Public Domain / http://www.hathitrust.org/access_use#pd

to designate a particular kind of pleading. The plaintiff must

file a complaint averring facts which are said to constitute a cause

of action in his favor. The defendant is expressly permitted to

unite in his answer as many defences and counter-claims as he

may have. Suppose that he pleads some defence either by way

of denial or of new matter, and also a counter-claim. On the trial

he establishes his defence, and thus defeats the plaintiff's I'ecov-

ery upon the alleged cause of action. Does this success cut off

his power to go on and prove the facts constituting his counter-

claim, and to obtain the judgment thereon? Such a conclusion

would be a monstrous perversion of the statute, and would be a

virtual repeal of its express provisions which permit the defend-

ant to unite as many defences and counter-claims as he may have.

When the legislature authorized him to join defences and counter-

claims in this manner, it certainly intended that he should use

them all, and did not mean that he should go through the empty

form of pleading them, and afterwards abandoning those which

are affirmative in their nature because successful in those which

are negative.^ This conclusion is self-evident : it necessarily

1 QLe Chire '?. Thibault (1902). 41 Ore. can be permitted to jilead a couuter-claiiu

601, 69 Pac. .552: "Before a defendant as a defence to ]ilaintiff's cause of suit,

ha
metim s been aicl that "counter- ·la.im " x Ti tcr111 ini impli ' a laim, and al o an oppo ing ·laim; ancl that, ther for ,
th re cannot be a vali<.l counter-claim nless th re i::; a demand
on behalf of the plaintiff. This i. no doubt true within certain
limits. The counter-claim a. well as the cl f nee a· ·nme: that
the plaintiff et' up a claim in hi complaint. There ronlcl h
no answer of any kind, d fe nsive or :iffirmative, unle" the plaintiff in the first instance :filed or served a pleading containing om
demand. But a counter-claim cloe. not nece ·arily imply that
the demand is a valid one. The term, if not invented, wa. applied
by the legi. lature to thi:i ::;pecies of an ·wer, which i1; allowed to
b u ed in cases where the plaintiff set up certain pecifiecl cau es
of action; but the code nowhere rnquires that the cause of action
thus alleged should be a good one. To interpolate any uch limitation into the language.of the statute wo uld be giving an unnece sary meaning to a very simple epithet cho en by the lawmakers
to designate a particular kin l of pleading. The plaintiff must
file a complaint averring facts which are said to constitute a cau e
of action in his favor. The defendant is expressly permitted to
unite in his answer as many defences and counter-claims as he
may have. Suppose that he pleads some defence either by way
of denia,l or of new matter, and also a counter-claim. On the trial
he establi hes his nefence, ancl thus defeats the plaintiff's recovery upon the alleged cause of action. Does this succe s cut off
his power to go on and prove the facts con tituting hi ' counterclaim, and to obtain the judgment thereon? Such a ·onclusion
would be a monstrous perversion of the statute, and would be a
virtual repeal of its express provisions which permit the defendant to unite as many defences and counter-claims as he may have.
When the legislature authorized him to join defence' and counterclaims in this manner, it certainly intende l tha. he should use
them all, and did not mean that he should go through the empty
form of pleading them, and afterwards abandoning tho e which
are affirmative in their nature becau e i:;uccessful in those which
are negative. 1 This conclusion i self-evident : it nece arily
1 [Le Clare i•. Thiban1t( 1902),41 Ore.
601, 69 Pac. 552 : "Before a defendant

can be permitted to pleall a couuter -daim
a a defence to plaintiff's cani'e of . uit,
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results from the positive provisions of the codes, and cannot be

avoided without their virtual repeal. I have dwelt upon this

subject at some length, not because there can be any legitimate

and well-founded doubt concerning it, but because there are cer-

tain judicial dicta in a few cases which are supposed to convey a

different meaning.^

^ 616. * 7-40. Cause of Action Alleged must exist in Favor of

Defendant 'who pleads it. Exception hereto in Codes of Indiana

and Iowa. (2) The cause of action thus alleged must exist in

favor of the defendant who pleads it. As the counter-claim is de-

fined in nearly all the codes, a defendant is not permitted to set up

facts which entitle any other person, defendant or otherwise, to

relief. He himself must be the party entitled to the judgment de-

manded, so that he would be the proper plaintiff, or one of the

proper plaintiffs, if the cause of action had been made the basis of

an independent suit. It is not, of course, to be understood that a

counter-claim must always exist in favor of a single defendant :

two or more, when sued jointly, may have a joint cause of action
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he must admit the existence, at least,

of a part of his adversary's demands."

Syduer Pump Co. v. Rocky Mount Ice Co.

(1899), 125 N. C. 80, 34 S.E. 198: When

a non-suit has been entered, it is too late

to file a supplemental answer containing

a counter-claim, since when there is no

re "'ul
i rve provi i n of he cod
and annot be
·a, oi<l d. wi h u
irtual repeal. I ha e d' elt upon thi
u bj ct at
me 1 n h n t becau e th re can be any le itimate
and w 11-f und d doub c nc min i but b cau e ther are cerain judicial dicta in a few ca e
hich re u po e to c nvey a
liff rent meaning. 1
616. * 7-10. Cause of Action Alleged must exist in Favor of
Defendant who pleads it.

Exception hereto in Codes of Indiana

2 The a e of action thu alle ed must exi t in
fayor of he d fondant who plead i . As the counter-claim i defin d in nearl all the ode , a defendant i not permitted to et up
f c which entitle an ther per on def n ant or otherwis to
r li f. He him lf mu t be he part entitled to the jud ment deman
o that he woul be the proper plain iff or ne of the
ro r plain i_ff ' if he cau of action had been made the ba is of
an in<lependen suit. I is not of cour e to be under tood hat a
ounter-claim mu t alwa' xi t in fa or of a in le defend n :
wo or more, when ued j intly, may have a joint ca e of ac ion
and Iowa.

action pending there can be no counter-

claim. Davis V. Seattle National Bank,

(1898), 19 Wash. 65, 52 Pac. 526: "A de-

fendant may deny liability and at the

same time plead a counterclaim or offset,

without subjecting himself to the charge

of pleading inconsistent defences, if there

is no direct contradiction in the special

facts pleaded."]

1 See Mayor, etc. of N. Y. i-. Parker

Vein Stp. Co., 12 Abb. Pr. 300; 8 Bosw.

300; Bellinger v. Craigue, 31 Barb. 534;

Prouty V. Eaton, 41 Barb. 409. See also

Schenectady v. Furman, 61 Hun, 171,

post, § * 744, note. It is settled, however,

in Minnesota, that a counter-claim must

of necessity admit the cause of action set

up by the plaintiff, and that the defendant

cannot deny this cause of action, and at

the same time plead a counter-claim. In

one case the court said : " The nature of

a counter-claim would seem to render

necessary the admission by defendant of

a claim against him in favor of the plain-

tiff arising out of the contract or the trans-

action, as the case may require, which is

the cause of action, or the ground of the

plaintiff's claim set forth in the com-

j)laint. " All claim of the plaintiff being

denied, it was held there could be no

counter-claim. Steele v. Etheridge, 15

Minn. 501, 509; Mason i'. Hey ward, 3

Minn. 182; Whalon v. Aldrich, 8 Minn.

346, 348; Koempel v. Shaw, 13 Minn.

488; Morrison v. Lovejoy, 6 Minn. 319.

I add here the more recent cases which

illustrate the general nature and requi-

sites of the counter-claim, with respect to

all the features described in the para-

graphs of the text. Nothing in these

decisions requires any modification of the

views stated in the text ; in fact, my dis-

cussion of the counter-claim in all its

he mu t admit the exi tence, a least,
f a part of hi ad,'er-ary' d mand ."
'plner Pump o. v. R o ky Mount Ice o.
(l 99) 125 N . . 0,3'4, .E. 19 : Wh en
a non-suit has been entered it i too late
to file a. upplemental an wer ontaining
a counter-claim, in e when there i no
acti n pending th re an be no counter-laim.
avi v . eattl
ational Bank,
( 1 9 ) 19 Wah. 65, 52 Pa . 526 : "
defendant may deny liability and at the
ame time plead a counter-claim or off et,
with out ubjectio him elf to the charge
o f pleading incon i tent def nee if ther
i no dire t contradiction in the pecial
fact pleaded."]
1
ee Mayor, etc. of N. Y. v. Parker
Vein tp. o., 12 Abb. Pr. 300;
Bo w.
300; ellinger v. raigue, 31 Barb. 534;
ronty u. Eaton, 41 Barb. 409.
e al o
chen ctady u. Furman, 6 L Huu, 171 ,
Io t, § 44, note. It i ettl d, h wever,
in l\lian ota, th t a ount r-cl im mu t
f nece ity admit the au e of action et
up by the plaintiff and tha the defendant
annot deny thi
ause of action, and at
th ame time pl ad a c unt r-c.:laim. In
the court . aid: "The nature of
a count r-claim would s m L r nder
lhe a<lmi ' ion hy ucfoudaut of

a claim again t him in favor of the plaintiff ari ing out of the contract or the tran acti on a the ca e ma3· require, whi ch i
the cau e f a tion or the ground f the
plaintiff' claim et forth in the omplaint." All claim of the plaintiff beiuu
denied, it was held there could be no
counter-claim.
teele v. Etheridg , 15
Minn. 501, 509; Mason v. Heyward, 3
1inn. 1 2; Whalon v. Aldrich, 8 Minn.
3-rn, :1-l- ; Ko mp 1 v .
haw 13 Mino.
4
; Morri on v. Lovejoy, 6 Minn. 319.
I add here the more recent ca e which
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against the plaintiff; in which case it might be, and properly

should be, pleaded as a counter-claim by them all. To the gen-

eral lule above stated there is an exception already pointed out in

the codes of Indiana and of Iowa, which permits a surety when

sued to take advantage of a demand against the plaintiff in favor

of his principal, and a joint debtor, when sued, to interpose one in

favor of another joint debtor.

§ 617. * 741. Cause of Action must exist against the Plaintiff.

(3) The cause of action must exist against the plaintiff in the

suit, so that a judgment for the relief demanded can be rendered

against him. This feature of the counter-claim is evident upon

the most cursory reading of the statutory provision ; and yet the

books are full of cases in which matters have been set up as

counter-claims that showed no cause of action whatever against

the plaintiff, but one (if at all) existing against some other per-

son not a party to the suit.^ This error is most likely to arise in

actions brought by an assignee of a demand, where the defendant

has a claim which would be valid against the assignor. Such

claim may, under some circumstances, constitute a perfect defence
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to the suit, and it may be a set-off according to the provisions of

statutes prior to the code ; but it cannot be a counter-claim, for

the simple but most cogent reason that it does not entitle the

defendant to any possible recovery against the plaintiff.^

§ 618. * 742. Subject-Matter of Counter-Claini. General Classes,

^atutory Restrictions as to Scope and Character. Analysis of Statu-

tory Provisions. (4) In reference to their subject-matter, the codes

which form the first group separate counter-claims into two gen-

eral classes : namely, firsts those which arise out of a cause of

action different from the one alleged by the plaintiff; and sec-

ondly^ those which arise out of or are connected with the same

cause of action as the one alleged by the plaintiff. In the iirst of

1 [[U. S. T. Co. V. Stanton (1893), 139 maker, existing at the date of tlie transfer

N. Y. 531, 34 N. E. 1098; Dolbeer v. of the note, is not a counter-claim, but a

Stout (1893), 139 N. Y. 486, 34 N. E. defence: Lynch y. Free (1896), 64 Minn.

1102; Trester v. City of Sheboygan 277, 66 N. W. 277. Where an agent sues

again t t.be plaintiff; in whi h a e it might b
sho uld be, I 1 acl d as a unt r-claim by h m all.
r( 1 rnl abov
tatecl th r i an xcepti n < lr ady p Jin t
the c d
f Indiana ancl £ I \ a, which p rmi a, • ur ' wh n
u d to tak advantage £ ad mand again t th plaintiff in favor
of his principal, and a j int cl bt r, wh n u d, t, int rpo
n in
favor of anoth r j int d btor.

§ 617. * 7-!1.

Ca us e o f Action must exist against the Plaintiff.

(3) The cause of action must exist against th
laintiff in th
suit, so that a judgment for the relief demand d can be rend r cl
against him. This feature of the counter-claim is evident upon
the most cursory reading of the tatutory provi ion ; ancl yet the
books are full of cases in which matters have been et up a
counter-claims that showed no cause of action whatever aO'ainst
the plaintiff, but one (if at all) existing again, t some other person not a party to the suit. 1 This error i:s most likely to arise in
actions brought by an as ·ignee of a demand, where the defendant
has a claim which would be valid again t the as ignor.
uch
claim may, under ome circum stances, onstitute a perfect defence
io the uit, and it may be a et-off according to the provision of
statutes prior to the code; but it cannot be a counter-claim, for
the simple but most cogent reason that it does not entitle the
defendant to any possible recovery against the plaintiff.2
§ 618. * 742. Subject-M a t ter o f Counter-Claim. General Classes.

(1894), 87 Wis. 496, 58 N. W. 747 • Mom- in his own name, defendant may set up as

sen V. Atkins (1900), 105 Wis. 557, 81 a partial defence a demand against the

N. W. 647; Smith v. Dawley (1894), 92 principal, but this "is not really a couu-

la. 312, 60 N. W. 625.] ter-claiin," since it is not "a demand

2 [^Walker f. Ins. Co. (1894), 143 N. Y. which may be the basis of a judgment

167, 38 N. E. 106. In an action by the against the plaintiff:" Bliss v. Sueath

indorsee after maturity of a promissory (1894), 103 Cal. 43, 36 Pac. 1029-3

note, iin indebtedness of the payee to the

a t atutory Restrictions a s to Scop e a n d C harac ter.

Analysis of Statu-

In r ference to their subject-matter, the ocl
which form the first group separate counter-claims into two g neral classes: namely, first, those which arise out of a cau e o[
action different from the one alleged Ly the plaintiff; and econdly, those which arise out of or are connected with the arne
cause of action as the one alleged by the plaintiff. In the first of

tory Provisions.

( 4)

1 [
.
. T. Co. v. Stanton (l 93), 139
N. Y. 531, 34 N. E. 1098; Dulbeer v.
Stout (1 93), 139 N. Y. 4 6, 34 N. E.
1102 ; Trester v. City of
heboygan
(1894), 7 Wi . 496, 5 .N. W. 747 ; Momsen v. Atkins (1900), 105 Wis. 557, 1
N. W. 647; Smith v. Dawley (1894), 92
Ia. 312, 60 N. W. 625.]
2 [Walkerv. In. Co. (194), 143N. Y.
167, 38 N. E. 106. In an action hy the
indorsee after maturity of a µromiH ·ury
note , nn indcbtctlnc of the p:lyec to the

maker, existin g at th e date of the tran fer
of the note, is not a ·ounter-claim, but a
defence: Lynch v. Free ( 1896), 64 1inn.
27i, 66 N. W. 2i7. Where an agent sue
iu hi own name, defendant may ·et up a
a partial defence a d maod again t the
principal, but thi "i not really a c unter-claim," inc it ii:. n t "a demand
whi h may be the ba i of a judgment
again t th plaintiff:" Bli
v. neath
(l 94), 103 al. 43, 36 Pa·. 1029.J
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these classes the cause of action stated by the plaintiff must spring

from contract, and the counter-claim must arise out of another

contract. These counter-claims are identical with tlie "set-off"

of the codes which belong to the second group, and they embrace,

but are not restricted to, the '' set-offs " used in the former proce-

dure. They include that ancient "set-off," and also much more ;

for they cover all cases of damages as well as of debt resulting

from the non-performance of contracts ; and, according to the

construction supported by the overwhelming weight of authoritv,

they also extend to cases of equitable relief arising from contract.

In the second of these classes the cause of action that may be set

forth by the plaintiff is not defined or limited in any manner, and

may therefore, unless limitations not contained in the statute are

to be interpolated by the courts, be of any kind and nature. The

counter-claim, however, is restricted in its scope and character,

and must conform to one or the other of three requisites: (a) If

a contract is set forth in the complaint or petition as the founda-

tion of the plaintiff's demand, the counter-claim must arise out of

that same contract ; and this plainly eml)races the ancient recoup-
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ment of damages, although far broader in its operation than that

species of defence, (i) If a " transaction " is set forth as the

foundation of the plaintiff's demand, the counter-claim must arise

out of that " transaction ; " and, so far as " transaction " is some-

thing different from or additional to "contract," this is a provision

not identical in its effect with either "set-off" or "recoupment: "

it clearly embraces many instances of equitable cross-demand and

relief in favor of the defendant; and the only real doubt is,

whether it extends also to legal causes of action, (c) Whatever

be the nature of the claim asserted by the plaintiff, — for the

codes contain no restriction in respect to this matter, — any

counter-claim may be pleaded '•' which is connected with the sub-

ject of the action." ^ I have thus given a simple analysis of the

statutory provision, taking the language as the legislature has

used it without modification, neitiier adding to nor subtracting

from it. If the courts have at any time placed further limitations

upon the scope and operation of the counter-claim, if they have

ever refused to admit the broad and comprehensive classification

here made, they have done so by narrowing the general language

of the statute, and restricting its obvious import. How far judi-

1 QWarren i-. Hall (1895), 20 Colo. .508, 38 Puc. 707.]

la.
the au
h I lain iff mu ·prmg
from ontract and. h coun r- ·l im mu t ari e ou f n th r
nt1( d .
he e c unt r- 1 im ar i l n tical with he
t- ff ··
f the cle which b l n t the secon l gr up and th y embnt
ut ar not r . tri
o th
- ff
u cl in he f rmer I rocelure. Th y include that an i nt
-off, ' and al 'O much m r " ;
f r th
O\ r all a
£ damagp, a ' ell as f debt resul inrr
fr m he n n- rf rman e of ontr t ; and, a cording t the
n 'tru i n upp rt d by th v rwh lmin · weight of au th ri -,
x nd o ca 'es of quitable r lief arisin from n r~w~.
In the ec n of th e la '' the caus f acti n that may b
f r h by th plaintiff is n t defined or limited in any manner, ar d
ma therefore unl
limitation not c ntained in the tatute ar
be interpolat by the court be of any kind and nature. The
ounter-cl im, however, i re tricted in it
ope and char vr,
and mu t conform to one or the other of three r quisite : (a) If
contract i et. forth in the complaint or petition a ' the foundaion of the plaintiff ' demand, the counter-claim mu t arise u t f
that ame contrac t; and thi plainly embraces the ancient re oupment of damage , al th ugh far broader in it op ration than th· t
pecie of defence. (b) If a ~' tran acti n is et forth a h
f undation of the plaintiff' demand, the counter-claim mu t ari
ut of t hat '' tran action; " and, so far a "transaction" i omehing differ nt from r additional to "c ntract," this is a provisi n
n t identical in it effect with either ' set-off" or ' r coupment: '
it clearly mbr· ce many in tance of equit ble cro -demand. an 1
reli f in favor of he defendant; and the only real d ubt i
whether it extends al t legal a e f action. ( c) Wl t ver
be the natur of the claim
erted by the plaintiff - f r the
cod ' c n in no re triction in resp ct t thi matter, - an}
c unter-claim m y b plead d ' which i
onnectecl with th ub1
ject f tl e acti n.'
I h ve thu g iv n a imple analy i f th
statutory pr v· ion, takin the langu,
a. th 1 i ·latur ha
u ed it with ut ru ific tion, n itl er ad ling t n i· ibteactin
If the court hav at n tim placed fur h r limitati n ·
f the
unter-claim if h y h
an l
r pr h n. i
1 ific i n
wing th
n r l 1 n Uc
ri·tin
H w fr juli1

[Warr n v. Hall (l

5), 0 olo. 5 , 3 Pa . i67.J
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€ial decisions have gone in this process of limitation, and how

-.cial eci 10n hav gone in thi · proc : of limitati n, ancl how
mu h authority h ulcl b cone clecl to th ir int r1 r ta i n, I hall
attempt to ascertain and to d t rrnine in ub · qu nt ortion · of
thi e tion. My s le obj ct n w it:' to 1 t the tatute .·peak for
it elf by pre en ing an anal si and arrangem nt of it· vari n'
cla u 'es. It i c rtain, from thi in»pection of it very language
that there i no expre.· r triction upon the nature and eff ct of
be relief which may be demanded and obtained by me:in f a
.co unter-claim, - n exp re s r q uirement tlrnt it mu t b legal
rather than equitable, uor that it must be confined to a money
judgment in the form of debt or damage . Nor is there any express provision that the counter-claim must be something es entially a1?-tagonistic to, or tending to defeat or lessen, t he cau e of
action set forth by the plaintiff in hi ' complaint or petitjon. I t
will be seen, in the further discussion of thi · section, that the
incident last mentioned is declared by several carefully considered
deci~ions to be a nece"' ary element or feature of the counterclaim, implied in its very nature and in the name given to it by
the legislature. I do not question the correctness of this conclusion: I merely call attention to the fa.ct, that, in reaching it or any
imilar res ult, the courts have added to or taken from the express
t ermo of the codes.
§ 619. * 743. Illustrative Opinions. I shall now collect the
opinions of several eminent and able judges, selected from a
number of leading cases, in order that the reader may be able to
compare their conclu ions with the res ult of the foregoing analysi , and to ascertain the general principles upon which the comt
have proceeded in constructing the theory of the counter-claim as
it is now understood and accepted in the various States. These
selections and quotations will be found in the foot-notes .1 The

much authority shoukl be conceded to their interpretation, I shall

attempt to ascertain and to determine in subsequent portions of

this section. My sole object now is to let the statute speak for

itself by presenting an analysis and arrangement of its various

clauses. It is certain, from this inspection of its very language,

that there is no express restriction upon the nature and effect of

the relief which may be demanded and obtained by means of a

counter-claim, — no express requirement that it must be legal

Tather than equitable, nor that it must be confined to a money

judgment in the form of debt or damages. Nor is tliere any ex-

press provision that the counter-claim must be something essen-

tially aijitagonistic to, or tending to defeat or lessen, the cause of

action set forth by the plaintiff in his complaint or petition. It

will be seen, in the further discussions of this section, that the

incident last mentioned is declared by several carefully considered

decisions to be a necessary element or feature of the counter-

claim, implied in its very nature and in the name given to it by

the legislature. I do not question the correctness of this conclu-
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sion : I merely call attention to the fact, that, in reaching it or any

similar result, the courts have added to or taken from the express

terms of the codes.

§ 619. * 743. Illustrative Opinions. I shall now collect the

opinions of several eminent and able judges, selected from a

number of leading cases, in order that the reader may be able to

compare their conclusions with the results of the foregoing analy-

sis, and to ascertain the general principles upon which the courts

have proceeded in constructing the theory of the counter-claim as

it is now understood and accepted in the various States. These

selections and quotations will be found in the foot-notes.^ The

1 Leaveuworth v. Packer, .52 Barb, it must be something which resists or

132, 1.36, per Potter J. : "A counter-claim modifies the plaintiff's claim." See also

is a kind of equitable defence which is Clinton v. Eddy, 1 Lans. 61, 62 ; Boston

permitted, under the provisions of the Mills v. EuU, 6 Abb. Pr. n. s. 319, 321

code, to be set up, when it arises out of Pattison v. Richards, 22 Barb. 143, 146

the contract set forth in the complaint. Ogden v. Coddington, 2 E. D. Smith, 317

It is broader and more comprehensive Gleason v. Moen, 2 Duer, 639, 642 ; Schu-

than recoupment, though it embraces bart v. Harteau, 34 Barb. 447 ; Lignot v.

both recoupment and .set-off ; and it is Redding, 4 E. D. Smith, 285 ; Carrie c.

intended to secure to a defendant all the Cowles, 6 Bosw. 453 ; Wolf v. H., 13 How.

relief which either an action at law, or a Pr. 84 ; Davidson v. Remington, 12 How.

bill in equity, or a cross-suit, would have Pr. 310.

secured on the same state of facts. But

-

1 L eave nworth v. Packer, 52 Barb.
132, 136, per Potter J.: " A counter-claim
is a kind of equitable defence which is
permitted, und er the pro visions of the
code, to be set up, when it ari e out of
the cont ract set forth in the complaint.
It i broade r and more comprehensive
than recoupment, though it embraces
both recoupment and set-off; and it is
intended to secure to a defendant all the
r elief which either an action at law, or a
bill in equity, or a cross- uit, would have
ecured on the same state of facts. But

it must be omething which resists or
modifies the plain t iff's claim." See also
Clinton v. Eddy, 1 Lans. 61, 62; Bo ton
Mills v. Eull, 6 Abb. Pr. N. s. 319, 321;
Pattison v. Richard , 22 Barb. 143, 146;
Ogden v. Coddington, 2 E. D. Smith,317 ;
Glea on v. Moen, 2 Duer, 639, 642; Schuhart v. Harteau, 34 Barb. 447; Lignot v.
R edding, 4 E. D . Smith, 285; Currie i: .
Cowles, 6 Bosw. 453; Wolf v. H ., 13 How.
Pr. 84; David on v. Remington, 12 How.
Pr. 310.
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assignee of a demand liaving brought suit upon it, the defend-

ant alleged as a -counter-claim a contract with the assignor, a

breach thereof by him, and resulting damages, and prayed judg-

ment for the amount of such damages aganist the defendant.

No reply being served to this answer, the defendant urged that

its averments were admitted, and that he was entitled to judgment

on the record. In rejecting his claim, the New York Court of

Appeals described the counter-claim at large, and stated prin-

ciples of universal application.^

§ 620. * 744. Doctrine that Counter-Claim must be Antagonistic

to, and tend to defeat, lessen, or modify, the Claim of Plaintiff.

The doctrine is maintained in several cases, that, as an essential

feature or element of every counter-claim, the cause of action

a ignee of a l mand ha ing bro u h ui u on it he d £ ndn all
a coun r- laim a ontract wi h
br ach
him and r ultin dama
m n
£ uch
r
hi
r ad.mi tel
I n r j ting hi
, and
cri d th coun r-claim a
rrn 1
r al appli ati n .
Cl
620. * ,.. -!-!. Doctrine that Counter-Claim must be Antagonistic

which it sets up must be of such a nature that the relief obtained

by its means will necessarily interfere with, defeat, lessen, or

modify the relief granted to the plaintiff in virtue of the cause of

action alleged in his complaint or petition. In other words, the

two demands must be, to some extent at least, antagonistic, and
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tending to destroy or limit each other.^ In an action brought to

1 [jDolbeer v. Stout (1893), 139 N. Y.

486, 34 N. E. 1102.] Vassear v. Living-

ston, 13 N. Y. 248, per Deuio J. : "There

is nothing in the nature of a counter-

claim stated in the answer. There was

never any contract between the plaintiff

and the defendant ; and although the new

t o , and tend to defeat, lesse n , or modify, the

Claim of Plaintiff.

h cl rin i maintained in everal a e th, , a an
nti 1
f atm
r 1 m nt f
ry count r -claim, th cau
f acti n
which it · t up mu t be f uch a natur that th reli f bt in d
ill ne
arily inter£ re with, l f at, 1
r
b · i m an
modify the relief gran eel t the plaintiff in irtue of the cau e f
ac ion all ed in hi ~ complaint r petiti n. In other w rd ' tl
tw d mand mu t be, to ome extent at l a t, antag ni i and
tend.in · to d troy or limit ach o h r.2 In an a ion br
h t

matter was, if true, very pertinent to pre-

clude the plaintiff from recovering upon

the demand assigned to him, it had no

tendency to show an independent cause of

action in favor of the defendant against

the ])laintiff. Section 150 of the code de-

fines a counter-claim. It must be a claim

existing in favor of the defendant against

the plaintiff, arising either out of the con-

tract or transaction sued upon, or some

other contract. Here tlie defendant had

no claim against the plaintiff. If the

facts were truly stated, he had grounds

for defending himself against the plain-

tiff's suit, but none whatever for an

independent recovery against him. A

counter-claim must contain the substance

necessary to sustain an action on behalf

of tlie- defendant against the plaintiff, if

the plaintiff had not sued the defendant.

It is (juite obvKjus that nothing of that

nature is stated in this answer." In the

same case, the court below, after stating

the doctrine in a similar manner, added :

" A counter-claim which is not also a set-

off is not a defence. It is a distinct and

independent cause of action, which is not

1

[ Dolbeer r.

tout (1 93), 139 N. Y.

4 6, 34 . E. 1102.J
a ear v. Livington, 1.3 . Y. 24 , per Denio J. : "There
i nothin in the nature of a ounter-

claim stated in the an wer. There wa
never any ontract between the plaintiff
and the defendant; and although the n w
matter wa , if true, very pertin nt t pr lutle the plaintiff fr m recov ring up n
th demand a icrned to h im, it had no
tend ncy to how an independ nt cau e of
ac ion in favor of the defendant again t
the plaintiff.
'ection 150 f the coded fine a count r-claim. It mu t he a laim
x i ting in favor of the d f ndant again t
t he plaintiff, ari ing ith rout of the c ntr, ct or tran action uetl up n, r ome
other contract. II r the d f ndant bad
no laim again t th plain iff. If the
fa t w r truly tat d, be had groUJ d
f r defendin g him 1£ again t th plainuit, hut non e wh atev r f r an
t iff'
ind pe ncl nt r COY ·ry ag ain t him. A
c·r111 n tn-cl, im mu . t conta in th

used sinij)ly to repel the claims of the

plaintiff, but for which a judgment against

him is in all events demanded. Previous

to the code, it could not be set up by the

defendant at all ; and the permission to

set it up in an answer, although with a

change of its name, assuredly has not

changed its legal character. A recoup-

ment or a set-off is a defence ; but a de-

fendant who avails himself of such a

defence admits, in whole or in part, the

demand of the plaintiff as alleged in the

complaint : " s. c. 4 Duer, 285, 293, per

Duer J. See also Merrick r. Gordon, 20

N. Y. 93, 97, per Comstock J.

I

i

'lnite <Jbn ou · tbat noth ing of that

nature i . tated in thi an wer. '' In the
ame ca e, the cou r t bel ow, after . tating
the doctrine in a imilar mann r added:
t-
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foreclose a mortgage upon land, the holder of the legal title, to

whom the premises had been conveyed by the mortgagor, was

made a defendant ; but no personal judgment for the debt was

demanded against him in the complaint, and he was notified to

that effect in the usual manner. He pleaded a counter-claim,

setting up the following facts : that the plaintiff conveyed the

land to the mortgagor by a deed, with full covenants of title ;

that the mortgagor conveyed the same premises to the defendant

by a similar deed, and also assigned the plaintiff's covenants and

all rights of action for their breach ; that said covenants had

been broken by the existence of an outstanding paramount title

and prior incumbrances, and the defendant had been evicted

under the same, to his great damage, for which damages judg-

ment was demanded against the plaintiff. Evidence in support

of this answer was excluded at the trial, and the defendant ap-

pealed. The New York Court of Appeals, sustaining the ruling

below, announced the doctrine that the demands of the plaintiff

and of the defendant must be reciprocal, in order that there can
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be any place for a counter-claim.^ In an action to recover the

whole or in part the phiiii tiff's claim for

judgment. ... It must be a claim exist-

ing in favor of the defendant and against

the ])laintiff between whom a several

judgment may be had in the action."

Miser v. O'Shea (1900), 37 Ore. 231, 62

Pac. 491; Peterson v. Bean (1900), 22

Utah, 43, 61 Pac. 213, citing the text.]

f r clo a mortgage upon land, the hol r of the 1 gal title to
w h m th pr mi e had been on y d by th m rto·agor wa
mad a d fendant; but no per onal juugrn nt f r th debt wa
demanded against him in the complaint, and h wa notifi d to
that effect in the usual manner. H plead ed a ounter- ·laim,
setting up the following facts: that the plaintiff onveyed the
land to the mortgagor by a d ed, with full covenant of title;
that the mortgagor onveyed the arne premi e to the defendant
by a similar deed, and al ·o assigned the plaintiff' cov nant · and
all rights of action for their br ach; that said covenant had
been broken by the existence of an outstanding paramount title
and prior incumbrances, and the defendant had been evic.:ted
under the same, to his great damage, for which damages j udgment was demanded again t the plaintiff. Evidence in support
of this answer was excluded at the trial, and the defendant appealed. The New York Court of Appeals, sustaining the ruling
below, announced the doctrine that the demands of the plaintiff
and of the defendant must be reciprocal, in order that there can
be any place for a counter-claim. 1 In an action to recover the

1 National F. Ins. Co. v. McKay, 21

N. y. 191, 195, per Com.stock J.: "Upon

the defendant's own statement, I do not

see tliat anything was in litigation be-

tween him and the ])]aiutiff, or that any

judgment could be rendered against him

except one for costs for interposing a

groundless defence to the action. No

cause of action existed against him. The

complaint claimed nothing against him

personally, and stated no facts as the

foundation of such a decree. The an-

swer showed that he had no title or

interest in the mortgaged premises to be

affected by the decree. His defence must

therefore be deemed to have been put in

for the mere purpose of establishing a le-

gal cause for an independent suit on the

plaintiff's covenants, without any demand

against himself being at all involved in

the controversy. Witliout undertaking at

tills time to expound the provisions of the

code which relate to the counter-claim, I

am satisfied that they do not apply to such

a case as this. Of course the claim could

only be enforced in this case by a judg-

ment in the defendant's favor for the

damages sustained in consequence of the

eviction. But the plaintiff might, not-

witiistanding such a judgment, be entitled

to a decree for a foreclosure and sale. The

alleged counter-claim does not impair or

affect the right to that relief. I appre-

hend that a counter-claim, when estab-

lished, viust in some way qualify, or must

defeat, the judgment to which the plaintiff is

otherwise entitled. In a foreclosure suit, a

defendant who is personally liable for the

debt, or whose land is burdened by the

lien, may probably introduce an offset

to reduce or e.xtinguisli the claim. But

whole or in part the plain tiff's claim for
judgment. . . . It must be a claim existiug in favor of the defen<lant and against
the plaintiff between whom a several
judgment may be had in the action."
Miser v. O'Shea (1900), 37 Ore. 231, 62
Pac. 491; Peterson v. Bean ( 1900), 22
Utah, 43, 61 Pac. 213, citing the text.]
l Nationa.l F. In . Co. v. McKay, 21
N. Y. 191, 195, per Comstock J.: "Upon
the defe ndant's own statement, I do not
see that anything wa in litigation between him and the plaintiff, or that any
judgment could be ren<lerecl against him
except one for cost for interposing a
groundless defence to the action. No
cau ·e of action existed against him. The
complaint claimed nothing against him
personally, and stated no facts as the
foundation of such a decree. The answer showed that he had no title or
interest in the mortgaged premises to be
affected by the decree. Hi defence must
therefore be deemed to have been put in
for the mere purpo e of establishing a legal cause for an independent uit on the
plaintiff's covenants, without any demand
against himself being at all involved in

the controversy. vVithout undertaking at
this time to expound the provisions of the
code which r elate to the counter-claim, I
am sati. fied that they do not apply to such
a ca e as this. Of course the claim could
only be enforced in this ca e by a judgment in the <lefendant's favor for the
damage ustained in co nsequence of the
eviction. But the plaintiff might, notwithstanding uch a judgment, be e11titled
to a decree for a foreclosure and sale. The
alleged counter-claim does not impair or
affect the right to that. relief. I apprehend that a counter-claim, when tabli hed, must in some way qualify, or must
defi at, the judgment to which the plaintiff is
otherwise entitled. In a foreclo ure uit, a
defendant who is per. onally liable for the
debt, or who. e land i burdened by the
li en, may probably introduce an off et
to reduce or extinguish the claim. Ilut
where his per onal liability is not in question, and where he disclaims all intere t in
the mortgaged premi e , I do not ee how
he can demand a judgment against the
plaintiff on a bill, or a note, or a bond, or
a covenant. Sueh i virtually this case.
The defendant ha" a he insists, a cau e
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price of goods sold and delivered, the answer contained a so-called

counter-claim which purported to show that the plaintiff held lands

under a deed of trust, which he was m equity bound to convey to

the defendant, and prayed a judgment directing such conveyance.

The Supreme Court in New York decided that these facts, if prop-

erly pleaded, would not constitute a counter-claim in opposition

to the cause of action stated in the complaint ; and directly held

the doctrine that a counter-claim must in some sort defeat the

plaintiff's recovery, or interfere with the judgment that would

otherwise be rendered in his favor.^

of action against the plaintiff upon a bru-

ken covenant ; but that cause of action,

if it exists, does not enable him to resist

ric of good old and deli er d the an wer contained a o-called
· unter-claim which purported to how that the plaintiff held lan l
uuder a deed of ru t, which he a in equi y boun to con ey to
he def ndant an pr ed a judg ment directing such conveyance.
The uprem Court in New York decided that these facts, if pr prl pl a led ' ould not on titute a count r-claim in opp sition
to h cau e of a ti n tate in the complaint · nd lirectly held
h doctrin hat a co unter-claim mu t in ome ort defeat the
plaintiff' recovery, or interfer with the judgment that would
therwi e be rendered in his favor. 1

or modify the relief to which the plaintiff

is entitled." See also Agate v. King, 17

Abb. Pr. 159 (Gen. Term,' 1862). An ac-

tion to foreclose a mortgage against K.

and others. K. owned the land, but was
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not personally liable for the (lel)t, and uo

personal judgment against him was de-

• inanded. Hu set np, as a counter-claim, a

<lemand for §6,000 damages arising from

a breach by the plaintiff of a distinct con-

tract to convey land. This was held not

to be a counter-claim : it clearly did not

fall under the first subdivision : it did

not fall under the second subdivision, be-

cause, in an action to foreclose a mort-

gage as against all the defendants e.xcept

tlie one personally liable, the cause of ac-

tion does not arise out of contract ; and

also because no judgment was asked

against K. Some portions of the opijiion

do not agree with the reasoning of Com-

stocic J. quoted above: while the decision

reached is in harmony with that case, tiie

dicta of the judge are not entirely so.

And see Carpenter i\ Leonard, .5 Minn.

1.').5. In an action to foreclose a mort-

gage where the plaintiff asked for a jnd<r-

ment upon the bond for a deficiency, tiie

defendant's counter-claim of damages was

allowed: Hunt v. Chapman, 51 N. Y. 555.

The doctrine of Nat. V. Ins. Co. v. McKay

has been enacted in the New York C.

C. P., § 501. "The counter-claim must

tend, in some way, to diminish or defeat

the plaintiff's rectivery ; " Lipmau r.

Jackson Arch. Iron Works, 128 N. Y.

58. Under this pnivision it was held,

in Schenectady i-. Furinan, 61 Hun, 171,

that a counter-claim which is entirely in-

consistent witli any cause of action on

the plaintiff's part and which cannot be

j)roved as a claim until it is decided that

the plaintiff has no claim, does not 'tend

to diminish or defeat the plaintiff's re-

covery.' This rule, if established, will

evidently limit materially the principle

stated in §* 739, «n/f>,- but it is difficult

to see why the result necessarily follows

from the code provision cited. Tl;e

learned judi;e seems to admit that iiis

decision is inconsistent with Glen & Hail

iManuf. Co. v. Hall, 61 N. Y. 220 ; y -•',

§ *765 ; but the doctrine now embodied in

§ 501 of the code was firmly estaldisiu-d

wlien the latter case was decided. In

<Jf action a ·ain. t the plaintiff upon a br -

tha t a counter-claim whi h is entirely ink u cov nant; but that cau:e of a ction , con i tent with any cau e of a tion on
if it exi·t . doe not enable him to re i t the plaintiff's part and which caunot be
or modify the relief to whi ch the plaiutiff proved a· a claim until it is d cicl d th a t
i. enti tled."
ee al o Agate t. King , Ii the plaintiff h a no claim, do not' t end
.Abb. Pr. 159 { en . Te rm , 1 62). An ac- to dimi ni h or d efeat the plaiutiff' r tion to foreclo e a mortgage again:;t K. co,·e ry.' Thi rul , if e·tabl i ·bed, \1·i1l
and th.er. . K . owned the land, but wa. e'·ideutl.v limit materia ll y th e priucipl
not personally liabl e fo r th e delit, an d uo
tated in § * 739, ante; liu t it i: diflicnlt
p r ona.l jULlgmen t again t him wa · de- to ee why the r . ult uel'es a ril y follu1 ·:;
'J'iie
manded. H e :et up, a. :i eounter-c:la im, a fro m the code pro1·ision cited.
d mand for . '6,000 damage a ri ·ing front learned jndl! e seems to admit ·that Iii;.:
a breac h by the plaiutiff of a d is t in ct cun- deci. ion i: in con i tent wi th Glen & I !al l
tract to ·on vey la nd . Thi. wa held lJ Ot Mau uf. o. t'. Hall, 6 1 i:T. Y . 22G; ; •··',
t be a coun ter -claim: it clearly di d not § * 765; but the do trin e uow e rnhodi erl in
fall un der the fir t u bdivL iou: it d id § 501 of the eod e wa firmly establ ish c·d
llOt fall u nder the econd uhd ivi iou, be- when th e latter ca e was decided. 111
cau e, in an action to foreclo~e a mor t- • chen ctady v. Furman, the action wa ·
gage a a <Yain tall the defendant except brought to r ecoYer for work do ne, und r
the one pe r anall y li able, th e
u e of ac·- r e olutio ns of t he com mou coun ·il of a
tiou do · not ari e out of contract; and
a.ls
beeau
no jud~ment wa · a· l·ctl
against K.
ome p rtiuu of the op iJJion
do not a<Yree with t he r ascming of om.·tock .J. quo d abo,·e: whil the dee/. ;,,,,
reached i in harmouy with that case, the
d1rta of he judge ar not ntirely o.
A nil . ee 'arpP11 er l'. Leouard, 5 i\Iinu .
l :,:;
l n an a ·ti on t foreclose a mortgage where h plaint iff a k cl for a jn lgmeut uprrn the bond for a J fici eucy, th
lef tl'lant'.· 1·ou11tcr-elaim of clamaO' · wa
allow<' rl: Hun 1'. hapman , 5 1 . Y . 55fi .
Th rl•>C rine of at. F. Jn .. :o. t'. l\I J\a.v
lta been e nacted in the
C' P., § 5 l.
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§ 621. * 745. Application of Doctrine. Limitation Established

by New York Courts. Purely Judicial. Criticism. These ea.ses

must be considered as establishing the doctrine that the defend-

ant's cause of action, in order to constitute a valid counter-claim,

must to some extent defeat, modify, qualify, or interfere with, the

relief which would othei'wise bo obtained by the plaintiff. The

sweeping statements and broad generalities of the opinions ought,

however, to be limited within their proper bounds, by pointing

out the only possible instances in which the principle can apply.

any deduction even on account of the

matters stated in the answer. A coun-

ter-claim, to be available to a part}', must

§ 621. * 745. Application of Doctrine. Limitation Established
by New York Courts. Purely Judicial. Criticism. Th 'e ·ase.
mu t be con idered as tabli hing the cloctrin that th cl f >ndant' cause of action, in order to con titute a valicl ·ounter- ·la,irn,
mu. t to some extent def at, modify, qualify, or inter£ re with, th
relief which would otherwi be obtained by the plaintiff. The
weeping state ments and broad generaliti of th pinion ' ought,
however, to be limited within th ir proper bound. , by I ointing
out the only possible instances in which the principle can apply.

afford to him protection in some way

against the plaintiff's demand for judg-

ment, either in whole or in part. It must

therefore consist in a set-off, or claim hy

way of recoupment, or be in some way

connected with the subject of the action
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stated in the complaint. It must present

an answer to the plaintiff's demand for re-

lief; must show that he is not entitled,

either at law or under the applications of

just principles of equity, to judgment in

his favor, as, or to the extent, claimed in

the complaint. It must therefore con-

tain not only the substance of what is

necessary to sustain an action in favor of

the defendant against the plaintiff, but it

must also operate in some way to defeat,

in whole or in part, the plaintiff's right

to recover in the action. An answer

which does not meet this requirement is

insufficient, whether regarded as a de-

fence or as a counter-claim. If a person

be sued on a promissory note, he cannot

set up, by way of defence or counter-

claim, a contract with the plaintiff for the

purchase of lands, aud allege payment of

the purchase-price, aud claim a decree in

the action for a specific performance ;

nor could he, in such an action on a prom-

i.-isury note, have a foreclosure of a mort-

gage against the plaintiff, especially if the

latter were not personally liable for the

mortgage debt." The same principle was

again approved by the New York Court

of Appeals in a recent decision. " Coun-

ter-claim," it was said, "is a new term

introduced into the code, and which is

limited and defined therein. When the

action is upon contract, unless the coun-

ter-claim arises out of the contract or

transaction set forth in t!ie complaint as

the foundation of the plaintiff's claim, or

be connected witii the subject of the ac-

tion, it must be a legal or e(juitable cause

of action against the plaintiff arising upon

contract, and existing at the commence-

ment of the action. It is manifest, how-

ever, that every cause of action e.xisting

in favor of the defendant against the

plaintiff, arising upon contract, cannot be

the subject of a counter-claim. It must

be a cause of action upon which some-

thing is due the defendant which can be

applied in diminution of the plaintiffs

claim. For instance, a cause of action for

the specific performance of a contract in

any ded uction eve n on account of the
matters tated in the answer. A counter-claim, to be available to a party, mu t
afford to him protection in some way
against the plaintift's demand for judgment, either in whole or in part. It mu t
therefore consiRt in a set-off, or claim by
way of reco upment, or be in some way
connected with the suhj ect of the action
·tated in the complaiut. It must present
an answer to the plaintiff's demand for reli~f ; must show that he is not entitled,
either at law or under the applications of
just principles of equity, to judgment in
his favor, as, or to the extent, cla imed in
the com plaint. It must therefore contain not only the substance of what is
necesRary to sustaiu au action in ffwor of
the defendant against the plaiutiff, but it
must also operate in some way to defeat,
in whole or in part, the plaiutiff' · right
to recover in the a ction . An answer
which does not meet th is req uirement is
insufficie nt, whether regar<l ed as a defence or as a co unter-claim . If a person
Le sued on a promissory note, he cannot
et up, by way of defe nce or counterclaim, a contract with the plaintiff for the
purchase of lands, and allege payment of
the purchase-price, and claim a decree in
the action for a pecific performance ;
nor could he, in uch an action on a promissory nute, ha Ye a foreclosure of a mortgage against the plaintiff, e pecially if the
latter were not personally li able for the
mortgage tl ebt." The same principle was
again approved by the ew York Court
of Appeal in a recent decision . " Counter-claim," it was said, "is a new term
introduced into t he code, and which is
limited. and defined. therein. When the
action is upon contract, unlc th e co nn-

ter-claim a ri e out of the contract or
transaction set forth in the complai nt a.
the foundation of the plaintiff's claim, or
be connected with the subject of the action, it mu t be a legal or equ itable cause
of action against the plaiu tiff arising upon
contract, and ex isting at the co mmencement of t he action. I t i manifest, ho,vever, that every cause of action existing
in favor of th e defendant against the
plaintiff, arising upon con tract, cannot be
the subject of a co unter -claim. It n1 ust
be a cause of action upon which something i due the defe udant which can be
applied in dimi11utiou of the plaintiff's
claim. For instance, a cause of action for
the specific performance of a co11tract in
referen ce to real estate arises upon cont ract, an<l yet t:annot be set up as a cou nter-cla im, unless it grew out of, or i
con nected wi t h, the cause of action alleged
in the corn plaint. . .. The object of introducing counter-claims into the practice under the code wa to enable parties
to settle and adjust all their cross-clai ms
in a single action a far as they co uld ."
Waddell v. Darling, 51 N. Y. 327, 3.30.
See also Patti on v. Richards, 22 Barb.
143, 145. This doctrine was fully approved and adopted by the Supreme
Court of \V'iscon in in the very l'e('Cnt
case of Dietrich v. Koch, 35 Wis. 618,
626. In the ca e of Cavalli v. A ll eu, 5i
N. Y. 508, which was an action to reco,·er
th e posses ion of land, brought by a vendor against the vendee in possession, on
the ground that a balance · of the purchase-price remain ed unpa id, the defendant was permitted to et up as a
counter-claim a note which he held again t
th e plaintiff, and thus to extin g ui h the
amount due on the lan d ontract.
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It is said by one of the judges that the counter-claim " must con-

sist in a set-off or claim by way of recoupment, or be in some way

connected with the subject of the action stated in the complaint."

This rule could only be broken by counter-claims belonging to the

second subdivision. In respect to all those falling within the

fii-st subdivision, they all, by the very terms of the definition,

arise out of the same contract or transaction set forth in the com-

plaint, or they are connected with the subject of the action.

There is, therefore, in this class, no room for a possible violation

of the rule laid down by the learned judge. The counter-claim-

must, from its very nature, be connected with the subject of the

action ; and therefore the relief demanded by it and that prayed

for by the plaintiff cannot be entirely independent of each other.

It is in counter-claims of the second subdivision alone that the

doctrine can be employed and applied with any practical results.

And, of these cases, it is plain that all those in which the com-

plaint and the counter-claim both demand a money judgment

comply with the rule. It is only when one or the other seeks to

recover some equitable relief that its violation becomes possible.
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The limitation thus established by the New York courts may be,

and probably is, correct; but at the same time it is a judicial in-

terpolation into the statutor}- language, which contains no such

restriction. The legislature has said : " When the action arises

on a contract, ariy other cause of action also arising on a contract

may also be a counter-claim." What grant of authority could be

clothed in more general terms than this ? The courts, liowever,

say, " It is not true that any other cause of action arising on

contract may be a counter-claim : it must be connected with the

subject of the action, and must operate in some way to defeat, in

whole or in part, the plaintiffs right of recovery." This mode of

interpretation, when carried beyond very narrow limits, becomes

a usurpation of the law-making function, and an actual repeal of

statutory provisions.

§ 622. * 746. Decisions in other States. The decisions matle by

the coui'ts of other States present the same general notions in

respect to the nature and scope of the counter-claim.^ In Wis-

consin the counter-claim is recognized to the fullest extent as in-

cluding relief of an equitable nature, and as being available in

1 See Allen r. Shackelton, 15 Ohio St. U.5, 147, per Wilder J. ; Hill v. Butler, 6

Ohio St. 207, 21 C, jier Swan J.

I i aid b one of the judge ha he coun er-claim m t coni tin a et-off or claim b ' ay of r coup ent, r be in ome way
c unec ed \\-i.th he ubje t of the action tated in the complaint.
hi rule could only be broken b counter-claim belonging to the
econd ubdivi ,ion. In re pect to all tho e falling ·within h
fir t subdivision, hey all, by he very term of the definiti n,
ar" e out of he ame ontract or ran action et for h in the complaint, or the are onnected with he ubject of the action.
There i , therefore, in thi cla · , no room for a po ible violation.
of the rule laid do n by ·he learned judge. The counter-claim
mu t, from its v ry nature, be connected with the ubj ct of the
action · and therefore the r elief demanded by it and that prayed
for by the plaintiff cannot be entirely independent of each other~
I t i , in counter-claim of the econd ubdi vi ion alone that he
do trine can be emplo ed and applied with an practical r e ults.
And, of hese ca. e, it i plain that all those in which the complaint and the counter-claim both demand a money judo-men
comply with the rule . It i only when one or .the other se l to
recover ome equitable relief that i vi lation becomes po ible.
The limitation thus establi heel by the New York courts may be,
and probabl i , correct ; but at the ·ame time it i a ju ljcial interpolation into the tatu tory language, which contain n
uch
restriction. The legislature has said : "\.Vhen the action ari es
on a contract, any other cau e of action also arising on a contract
may also be a counter-claim. ' What grant f auth rity could be
clothed in more general terms than thi ? The -court , how ver,
ay, 'It is not true that any other cause of action ari ing on
contract may be a counter-claim : it must be connec ed wi h the
subject of the action and mu t operate in some way to defea in
whole or in part, the plaintiff's right of recovery." This mode of
interpretation, when carrie b yond very narr w limit , become
au urpation of he law-making function, and an actual rep al of
tatutory provision .
§ 622. * 746. Decisions in other States. Th decision m e b
the coill't of other
ate r ent the ame g neral n tion in
re pect to the nature and ·cope of he counter- laim. 1
n Wi on. in the counter- ·laim is rec gnir,ed t the f lle t exten a in·l ding relief of an quitable n, ure and a
eing ·availabl in
ee ..\ 11 n

1 •

(Jh 10

•

1· •

•

hackelton 15 J hio

t. 207, :!I G, }Jer · wan

J.

t. US, 147, p r Wild r J.; Hill

. Butler 6
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actions brought to obtain specific remedies, such as those affecting

or establishing the plaintiff's title to land. In a suit to quiet title

to land, the plaintiff alleged his possession and claimed his title

■under a certain tax-deed, which, with all the proceedings in rela-

tion thereto, was pai'ticularly described. The defendant answered

by way of counter-claim that he was in possession and asserted his

title under another tax sale and deed, which, with the proceedings,

was sufficiently set forth. He prayed judgment tliat the title

might be decreed to be in himself. This answer was held to be a

good counter-claim, the court declaring that it conformed in every

particular with the definition given by the code.^ The Supreme

Court of Missouri has also described the counter-claim in entire

conformity with the judicial definitions already given.^ The lan-

guage of the provision in the Indiana code is somewhat broader

than that which is found in most of the other codes. The inter-

pretation put upon it, however, will aid in ascertaining the general

spirit and object of the entire legislation which introduced this

class of defences. In an action to rescind a conveyance of land

made by the plaintiff to the defendant on the ground of an alleged
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fraud, the answer, pleaded as a counter-claim, denied the fraud,

insisted upon the validity of the deed, stated the plaintiff's con-

tinued and wrongful possession and acts of waste, and demanded

judgment for the possession of the land, for the rents and profits

thereof, and for damages on account of the waste. This answer

1 Jarvis v. Peck, 19 Wis. 74, per Dixon to the law ; but it is sufficiently plain and

C J. : " It does not deny the plaintiff's de- simple. When the defendant has a cause

mand, except so far as it is founded upon of action against the plaintiif, upon wliich

his possession, but seeks to extinguish it he might have maintained a suit, sucli

by an equitable cross-action. It is a claim cause of action is a counter-claim. The

which of itself would constitute a cross- parties, then, have cross-demands ; and, in

action in favor of the defendant against fact, there are two causes of action before

the plaintiff in a separate suit." See also the court for trial in the same suit. Both

Powdery. Bowdle (N. Dak. 1893), 54 N. W. parties are to a certain extent plaintiffs,

Rep. 404. and both defendants. The answer, then,

2 Holzbauer v. Heine, 37 Mo. 443, per does not substantially differ from a peti-

action brought to obtain sp cific r m die , uch a · tho e affec ting
or stabli hing the plaintiff's title to land. In a uit to quiet title
to land, th plaintiff alleged hi p · ' e sion and claim d hi · tiLle
under a certain tax-deed, which, with all the pr eedings in r lation thereto, wa particularly described. The defendant an wered
by way of counter-claim that he wa in po ·se ' ion and as erte<.1 hi
title under another tax ale and deed, whi h, with the proceedings,
was sufficiently et forth. He prayed judgment that the title
might be decreed to be in himself. This answer wa held to be a
good counter-claim, the court declaring that it conformed in every
particular with the definition given by the code. 1 The Supreme
ourt of Mi sonri has al o described the counter-claim in entire
conformity with the judicial definitions already given. 2 The language of the provision in the Indiana code is somewhat broader
than that which is found in most of the other co<.les. The interpretation put upon it, however, will aid in ascertaining the general
pirit and object of the entire legislation which introduced this
das ' of defences. In an action to rescin<.1 a conveyance of land
made by the plaintiff to the defendant on the ground of an alleged
fraud, the answer, pleaded a:s a counter-claim, denied the fraud,
insisted upon the validity of the deed, stated the plaintiff's continued and wrongful possession and acts of waste, and demanded
judgment for the pos ession of the land, for the rents and profits
thereof, and for damages on account of the waste. This answer

Wagner J. : " It must contain the sub- tion ; and the reply performs substantially

stance necessary to sustain an action on the same office as the answer to the peti-

behalf of the defendant against the plain- tion. Each party claims affirmative relief

tiff, if the plaintiff had not sued the de- from the other. If both parties establish

fendant. It must have a tendency to their claims, the judgment is rendered for

sliow an independent cause of action, — a one or the other, according as his demand

claim existing in favor of the defendant may be found to be in excess." See also

against the plaintiff, arising either out of Hay v. Short, 49 Mo. 139, 142, which cor-

the contract or transaction sued on, or out rects a dictum of Holmes J. in Jones v.

of some otlier contract. The term is new Moore, 42 Mo. 419.

to the law; but it i sufficiently plain and
simple. ·w hen the defendant ha a cau e
mand, except so far as it is founded upon of action against the plaintiff, upon which
his pos ession, but seeks to extinguish it he might have maintained a suit, such
by an equitable cross-action. It is a claim cause of action is a counter-claim. The
" ·hi ch of it elf would constitute a cros - parties, then, have cros -demands; and, in
action in favor of the defendant against fact, there are two cau ·es of action before
the plaintiff in a separate suit." See also the court for trial in the same suit. Both
Powderv. Bowdle (N. Dak. 1893), 54 N. W. parties are to a certaiu extent plaintiffs,
and both defendants. The answer, theu,
Rep. 404.
2 Holzhauer i:. Heine, 37 Mo. 443, per
does not substantially differ from a peti\Vaguer j.: '·It mu t contain the sub- tion; and the reply performs sub tantially
tance necessary to sustain an action on the same office a the an wer to the petibehalf of the defendant against the plain- tiou. Each party claim affirmative reli ef
t iff, if the plaintiff had not sued the de- from the other. If both parties establi h
fe ndant. It must have a tendency to their claims, the judg ment i rendered for
i;how an independent cause of action, - a oue or the other, according a hi demand
claim exist ing in favor of the defeDdant may be found to be in xces ." See al ·o
al$ai nst the plaintiff, ari ing either out of Hay v. Short, 49 Mo. 139, 1-!2, whi ch co rth e co nt ract or tran saction ued on, or out rects a dictum of H olmes J. in J one v.
of ome oth er co ntract. The term is Dew Moore, 42 :;\Io. 419.
I

Jarvis v. reek, 19 vVis. 74, per Dixon

C. J.: "It does not deny the plaintiff's de-
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was held to be a good counter-claim so far as it sought to recover

the possession and the rents and profits, but not in respect to the

demand for damages on account of the waste.'

§ 623. * 747. Cause of Limitation upon Counter-Claims. The

foregoing citations fully sustain both the conclusions reached

in the preliminary independent analysis of the statute, and the

course of reasoning upon which they were based. The feature

or limitation which is pointed out by some of the cases, as neces-

sarily involved in all counter-claims belonging to the second sub-

division, — namely, that the recovery therein must defeat, modify,

or interfere with the relief otherwise recoverable by the plaintiff,

— results from the fact that the codes make no provisions for two

independent and antagonistic judgments rendered in favor of the

adverse parties in the same action. One judgment alone is con-

templated by the statute, which shall determine the substantial

rights of the parties. Even in equitable actions, where relief may

be conferred upon defendants as against the plaintiffs or as

against each other, such relief must be compatible witli that

granted to the plaintiff, so that the whole may be contained in

Generated for facpubupdates (University of Michigan) on 2014-06-17 15:35 GMT / http://hdl.handle.net/2027/uc2.ark:/13960/t02z1c23b
Public Domain / http://www.hathitrust.org/access_use#pd

one judgment without opposition or contradiction. If an action

upon contract is brought to recover money alone, either debt or

damages, and a counter-claim for money, arising upon an entirely

distinct contract, is interposed, the resulting judgment would

1 Woodruff V. Garner, 27 Ind. 4, per ing a definition obviously less comprehen-

Frazer J. : " Was this counter-claim good sive than that given by the statute above

on demurrer 1 It is not questioned that quoted. The counter-claim comprehends

it averred facts sufficient in an independ- recoupment, and much more. It liardly

ent suit to entitle the defendant to a admits of a question that it embraces also

judgment; but it is urged that these facts what was known as the cross-hill in equity

could not be pleaded by way of counter- against the plaintiff. Unless this be so, it

claim in this suit. A counter-claim is de- would result that, in many cases, what

fined to be 'any matter arising out of, formerly might have been settled in one

or connected with, the cause of action litigation, would, under the code, require

which might be the subject of an action two or more separate suits to determine it.

a h ld to be a oocl count r-claim
far a it ought to recover
he po e ion and th rent and profit ' but not in re pect to the
cl man l for lamag on account of the wa te. 1
""4 7. Cause of Limitation upon Co unter-Claims. The
nclu ion ' r ach d
f r croino- ci ation fully u tain b th the
in th preliminary inclepend nt analy is of the ti.tute, and the
our· f r a nin upon whi h hey w re ba cl. Th f a,ture
or limitation which i' pointe
ut by om f h ca e'"' a nece aril r involv cl in all ounter- laim b lon in0 to the econd ubdivi i n - namely that the r cov r; her in mu ·t cl feat, m di£ r in erfere vrith the r lief o herwise reco-verable b the laintiff
- r ult from t he fa that the c de mak no provi ion f r hvo
ind pen den and antaO'onistic jud ment ' r ndered in fa, or of the
a lver'e partie in th am acti n.
ne judgment alone i onmplated by the , tatute, which hall d ermine the uL tantial
right of the partie . E en in equitable action , where r lief may
be onferred upon defendant a a ain t the plaintiff or a
<.wain t each other uch relief mu t be compatible with tha
granted to the plaintiff o that the whole ma be contained in
one judgment without oppo ition or contra liction. If an action
upon contract i brought to recover mane alone either debt or
lamaO'e' and a counter-claim for money ari ing u pon an en irel_~
di tinct contract, is in terpo 'ed, the resulting judgment would
i;

in favor of the defendant, or which would This is not the .spirit of the code." In ivast-

tend to reduce the plaintiff's claim for man i-. Linn, 20 Minn. 433, wliich was also

damages.' It may not lie ea.sy to define an action to quiet title, a similar coun-

the full meaning and application of this ter-claim for the recovery of tlie land in

statute ; and it will therefore be safer, and question by the defendant was sustained-

less likely to produce confusion, if the See also Powder v. Bowdle (N. Dak.

court sliail at present consider only the 1893), 54 N. W. Rep. 404. For an ex-

question of its influence upon the case im- haustive discussion of the counter-claim

mediately in judgment. To say, as was as defined by the Indiana code, and for

inadvertently done in Slayback i'. Jones, a statement of the rules in relation to its

9 Ind. 470, that the couuter-daim is the use, .«ee Campbell v. Routt, 42 Ind. 410,

same thing as recoupment, would be giv- 413-410.

1 Woodruff v.
arner 27 Ind . 4, per
Frazer J. : " Was this counter-claim good
on demurrer? I t is not questioned that
it averred fact ufficient in an independ ent nit to entitle the defendant to a
judgment; but it i urged that t he e facts
could not be pleaded by way of counterclaim in this uit. A counter-claim i defin d to be 'any matter ari ing out of,
or connected with, the au e of a ·tion
which might be th . ubje t f an action
in favor of the d f ndant., or which w nld
t nd to reduce t h plaintiff' claim f r
damage .' It may not be a y t cl fin
th full meaning and application f thi
. tatote; aud it will ther f r b af r and
1
lik 1,v to prod u e c ufu ion, if he
court hall at pr .ent con ider only h
qu . ticm (Jf it influence upon the ca e imm diatE:ly in judgm nt. T o ay, a wa
inarh Pr ntly donP in , lay ha k v . .J n ,
9 In rl. 470, that thf' <'ouut r- laim i
h
am thrng a r ·couprnent, would u ~ iv-

compr hen-
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necessarily be single, since it would be rendered merely for the

difference between tlie two adverse sums found due by the jury

or the court. The implied restriction upon the use of counter-

claims, therefore, applies only where one or both of the cross-

demands are equitable. It cannot be enforced in an action to

recover possession of lands or to recover possession of chattels,

since in neither of these instances does the cause of action " arise

out of contract," and a counter-claim under the second sub-

division is therefore impossible.

§ 624. * 748. How plead Counter-Claim. Characteristic Marks.

Reason herein. I shall finish this inquiry into the general nature

of the counter-claim by a brief statement of the mode in which it

should be formally pleaded. The defendant must, in some express

and definite manner, indicate his design of treating and relying

upon this particular portion of his answer as a counter-claim.

Whether it stands alone, and thus constitutes the entire answer,

or whether it is united with other defences or counter-claims, it

must be so distinguished by the formal language employed, that

the plaintiff and the court may recognize it at once as a counter-
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claim, and not as a simple defence. It is not enough that the

defendant state facts, which, if true, would constitute a cause of

action against the plaintiff : he must also state his intention to

regard these facts as constituting the affirmative cause of action,

and not to regard them as a defence. This intention must be in-

dicated either by naming the matter thus pleaded " a counter-

claim," — that is, by declaring that it is pleaded as such, — or by

concluding it with a prayer for a judgment granting the desired

relief. The better practice is — and it should be universal — to

use both of these characteristic marks; to commence the par-

ticular allegations with the formal statement that they are pleaded

as a counter-claim, and to end them with the usual prayer for

relief as in a complaint or petition. This practical rule of plead-

ing is fully sustained by the decided cases.^ There is one con-

1 I^Smith V. Coe (1902), 170 N. Y. 162, 41 Ore. 601, 69 Pac. 552; Prichard's Ex-

63 N. E. 57; Waller y. Deranleau (1903), ecutrix v. Peace (1895), 98 Ky. 99, 32

— Neb.—, 94 N. W. 1038; Nicholls v. S. W. 296; Indiana, etc. Ass'n ;'. Crawlev

Hill (1894), 42 S. C. 28, 19 S. E. 1017; (1898), 151 Ind. 413, 51 N. E. 466; Aldeii

Harris i;. Randolph County Bank (1901), v. Christianson (1901), 83 Minn. 21, 85

157 Ind. 120, 60 N. E. 1025; Helmer v. N. W. 824; Harrison v. State Banking

Yetzer (1894), 92 la. 627, 61 N. W. 206 ; & Trust Co. (1902), 15 S. D. 304, 89 N. W.

Gurske y. Kelpiu (1901), 61 Neb. 517, 85 477; Kylander v. Laursen (1902), 113

N. W. 557; Le Clare v. Thibault (1902), Wis. 461*^, 89 N. W. 488; Brauchle v. Noth-
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trolling reason why the defendant should designate, in a certain

tr Uin0 reason why the def ndant houl designate, in a certain

heifer (1900), 107 Wis. 457, 83 N. W. 633 ;

Barker i;. King (1897), 97 Wis. 53, 72

N. W. 222; Morgan v. Hayes (1898), 98

Wis. 313, 73 N. W. 786 ; Conway v.

Mitchell (1897), 97 Wis. 290, 72 N. W.

752; NoUman v. Evensoii (1895), 5 N. D.

344, 65 N. W. 686 ; Zion Church v. Parker

(1901), 114 la. 1, 86 N. W. 60; Walker

t'. Walker (1895), 93 la. 643, 61 N. \V.

930.

Rood I'. Taft (1896), 94 Wis. 380, 69

N. W. 183 : " III an action on a pronii.ssory

note given in part payment for a stallion,

there could he no recovery of damages

against the plaintiff for fraud and deceit

in the sale, or for a hreach of warranty,

unless such matter was pleaded as a
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counter-claim expressly so denominated,

and affirm;itive relief asked." " Where

matter is pleaded both as a defence and

a.s a counterclaim tlie defensive allega-

tions will not be construed as j)art of the

counter-claim, in the absence of appropri-

ate words of reference."

New Idea Pattern Co. v. Whelau

(1903), 75 Conn. 445, .53 Atl. 9.53: "A

counter-claim, when pleaded in an answer,

mast be pleaded 'as such,' and after the

matters of strict defence. Gen. St. § 612 ;

Practice Book, forms 356, 444."

Stotsenburg y. Fordice (1895), 142 Ind.

490, 41 N. E. 313 : " It is now well .settled

tliat where the plea is not, strictly speak-

ing, a defence to tlie cause of action, but

sets up a cross-demand, such as set-off or

counter-claim, it is not bad as failing to

respond to so much of the claim sued

upon as may be in excess of the set-off or

counter-claim, though it be directed to the

entire cause of action."

Tron V. Yohn (1896), 145 Ind. 272, 43

N. E. 437 : In an action to foreclose a

mortgage given for the purchase-money of

real estate, evidence of the difference in

the quantity of the land as claimed to have

been represented by the grantor and that

conveyed, is not admissible under a general

denial. "The relief sought by the evi-

dence was of an affirmative character, as

much so as payment, set-off, settlement,

accord and satisfaction, or account stated.

It was in tiie nature of a counter-claim."

Kahrs v. Kalirs (1902), 115 Ga. 28S, 41

S. E. 649 : A plea of setoff which fails to

set out the demand as plainly as if sued

on, is insufficient.

In Habcock v. Maxwell (1898), 21 Mont.

507, 54 Pac. 943, the court said : " Defend-

ant having characterized his pleading as

a defence, is bound by the choice he

makes, and may not afterwards be heard

to assert that it is a counter-claim. A

counter-claim nmst be described as such

where the question turns upon the want of

a reply. ' Such a rule is essential to pro-

tect a plaintiff from being misled by an

answer, and to prevent the snare of a

h lf r (1900), IOi' i . 457 ,
. W. 653;
B rk r t'. l in"' ( L 97), 9- Wi . 53, i2
. W . 222 ; l\lorgan v. Haye ( 1 9 ), 9
\ i . 313 , 73
. \V. 7 6;
onway v.
1'Iit h 11 (L 97), 97 \ i . 290, 72 N. W.
75_; Kollman v. Even ou (1 95), 5 N. D.
344, 65 r . W. 6 6; Zion hut· h v. arker
(1901), 114 Ia. 1, 6 N. W. 60; Walker
v. Walker (1 95), 93 Ia. 6-t-3, 61 N. W.
930.
R ood v. Taft (L !l6), 94 Wi . 3 0, 69
.r . W . l 3 : "In an a ·tion on a promissory
note given in part paym nt for a tallioo,
there cou ld be no reco '' ry of damage
again t the plaintiff fo r fraud a nd de ·eit
iu the a le, or for a breach of warranty,
unle.
uch matter wa plead tl a a
co un ter-claim exp res ly o lenominated,
and affirmati ,,e relief a ketl ." ""''h re
matter i pleaded both a a def nee and
a. a ou11ter·claim tile defcn i,· all ega·
tiou will not be con·tru rl a;; part vf the
cuuute r-claim, in the ab. e11ce of appropriat word · of referenc ."
~ew Idea Pattern
v. ' Vh Jan
(1903) 75 C no . 4-!5, 5.1 A I. 9::>3: "A .
<>onnter-claim, wh n plead ,] in an answer,
m 1st be pleaded 'a such,' and after the
matt r of. trict d fence . G n. t . § 612;
Practice Book, form 356, 44-l."
. ' tot-enburg v. Fordice (1 5), L+2 Tnd.
4-90 , -!-1 . ._ . E. 313: " l t i now well ettled
that where the plea i- not, . trictly peaking, a defence to the au e of acti u, but
et up a cro -demand, ·n h a- s L-off or
counter·claim, it i n t batl a failing to
r espontl to ·o mu h of the claim ued
upon a may be in exce of t he t-off or
counter-claim, though it be directed to the
entir cau e of action."
Tron v . Yohn (1 96), 1-! 5 Ind. 272 , 43
N. E. 437 : In an action t for clo e a
mortga e g iven for the purcha -money of
r al e tate, eviden ·e of the d iffe r uce in
the quantity of the land a claimed to have
be n repre ented by the g rantor a nd that
conv yed, i not ad mi ible under a"' neral
d nial. "The relief ought by the ev idence wa of an affirmative hara t r , a
much o a pa.vment,
t- ff,
ttlemcnt,
accord and . a i fa ·ti n, o r account tat d .
It wa. in th naLur
f a c uuter-claim."
Kahr v. I\: , li r (l!l02}, 1I5 a. 2 , 4 1
, · E. 6-1~ : A plea of ·ct. off which fail · to

et out the d man<l a plainly a if ued
on, i in utfici nt.
In Babco k v. Maxw 11 (L 9 ), 21 Mont .
50i 54 Pac. 943, the ourt aid: " Defendant having characteriz tl hi pl ading as
a defence, i bound by the hoicc he
mak , and may not aft rward be beard
t a · rt that it i a counter- ·laim. A
count r-claim mu t be de cribed as such
wher th qu stion turn upon the want of
a reply. ' ' u h a rul e i e · ·e11tial to pr tect a plaiutiff from b ing mi ·led by au
an w r, aml to prev ut th
nare of a
counter- ]aim lurkiu g un de r t he ·over of a
uppo:sed d fe nce, aud un cou · ·iously admi tted by a failure to reply.' "
' nion i\1 r antile Co. v. JacoiJ I 9i),
20 .Mont. 2i0, 50 Pac. 793 : l'laintiff had a
judgme nt again t defendants, and defendant , who were a lleged to be in olvent, had
a j udgment of 1
amouut again t plaint iff wh i ·h had been a igned a plaintiff
laimed, to defraud th plaintiff and oth r
credito r . Pl a intiff brouO' ht a n a ti n in
equit~' to h<w the a iO'ned judgment offet again ·t it: judgment. The an w r
adrnitt d the recove ry of the two judgments aml the a igument. hut d ni ed
that t h
a. :sig om nt f the judgm nt
was m ade fraudulently, and further d ui d ach and e''ery allegati n in th e c mplaint n t . pec ifically admitted.
n tit
trial th defe11clant were a ll wed to sh w
that the plain t iff had in it p 'e . ion b ok
a ount of the ·def ndant . uffici ent to
ati. fy it. judg ment again t them, and it Th e
acti n was ther upon di mi d .
action of th e trial co urt in admitting evid nee of thi ounter-claim wa u tained
on appeal, altho ugh no unt r-claim had
b en pl ad d. Thi ca e r e v r ed n r urt hold h a rin , 20 l\Tont. 554, th e
in g that a count r-claim mu t b pl ad ti
or it an not b pr ved.
' e, however, th following
Brighton, t . Irrigati rn
{ L 96). 1-1 l tah, 42, 46 Pa .
hat the ourt will n t
g n ral rule i
grant ad r for affirmati'' r Ii ft th
defendantwithoutaconn e r-c laim r r
omplaint, but in tbi: I articular a ·e th
ourt ' n. reciuir d, und r t.h pl adings . to
d t rmin th right. of the pa rt.i t th
aual and water: thereof, and a tl cree fo r
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and obvious manner, the special character of the pleading. In all

affirmative relief was proper without a

couuter-claim or cross-complaint. Perego

V. Dodge (1893), 9 Utah, 1, 33 Pac. 221 :

Where an answer alleges facts which en-

title defendant to affirmative relief, it will

be granted, even tliough no counter-claim

■or cross-complaint was filed.

City of Huron i-. Meyers (1900), 13

S. I).'420, 83 N. W. 553: Where facts

alleged in an answer amount to a couuter-

<;laini, they will be so considered although

iiot so designated, and hence are admitted

by failure of plaintiff to reply to them.

Farrell v. Burbank (1894), 57 Minn. 395,

59 N. W. 485. Allegations in an answer

manifestly set up as a counter-claim, and

praying for affirmative relief, -will be
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treated as a counter-claim, though not

designated as such in the answer.

Arthurs i\ Thompson (1895), 97 Ky.

218, 30 S. W. 628: Sub-sec. 4, Sec. 97,

Civil Code, provides that " a defendant

shall not have judgment upon a set-off or

counter-claim, unless the caption of the

answer contain the words ' answer and set-

off ' or the words ' answer and counter-

claim ; ' but a misdescription in the caption

of the nature of the defendant's claim shall

not prevent him from Iiaving judgment,"

etc. Held that this only made it neces-

sary to apprise the plaintiff that he asked

some relief over against him, and that the

caption " answer and counter-claim " mis-

takenly used instead of the caption " an-

swer and set-off " would not deprive the

defendant of such relief as he showed him-

self entitled to.

McDougald r. Hulet (1901), 132 Cal.

154, 64 Pac. 278 : A. leased a tract of land,

and B. and C. for a sufficient consideration

guaranteed the payment of the rent by the

lessee. The rent was not paid, and B.

brought an action, making A. and C. de-

fendants, asking to have it adjudged how

much was due A. under the lease, and that

C was bound to A. for such amount and

that plaintiff" was only surety, and further

it was sought to have judgment that C.

pay A. the amount so found and that plain-

tiff recover from C. all money paid and

losses sustained by reason of said guar-

anty. A. in his answer set out by way of

counter-claim and cross-complaint the facts

of the transaction, and asked for judgment

again.st plaintiff for tiie amount which

might be found ilue him under the lease.

The trial court found that a hvrge sum was

due A. under the lease, but refu.sed to give

A. judgment against jjlaintiff on the

ground tliat the amount due was not the

subject of a counter-claim. On appeal it

was held that this was error, and look

entirely too narrow a view of the matter.

The court .said, " Plaintiff could not have

prevented the recovery by IJoggs [A.] in

an independent suit. Why should he in

this ? We do not think it necessary to

<

ncl obvious manner, the special charact r of th i l atling. In all

.affirmative relief wa proper wi thout a
counter-claim or cro -co mplaiut. Perego
v. Dodge ( 1893), 9 tah, 1, 33 Pac. 221:
Where an an wer allege facts which entitle defendant to affirmative r li ef, it will
be granted, even though no couuter-claim
{)f cro s-complaint wa filed.
'ity of Huron v. Meyer (1900), 13
~. D. 420, 83 N. W. 553 : Where fact
alleged in an answer amount to a counterda im, they will be so cou ·idered although
not o de ·ignated, and hence are admitted
by failure of plaintiff to reply to them.
Farrell v. Burbank (1894), 57 Minn. 395,
.59 .N. W. 485. Allegation in an an wer
manife tly set up as a counter-~ laim, and
praying foi· affirmative r elief, will be
treated as a co unter-claim, though not
-de ignated a uch in the answer.
Arthur v. Thomp on (1 95), 97 Ky.
218, 30 S. W. 628: Sub-sec. 4. ec. 97,
Civil Code, pro,·ides that ' a defendant
shall not ha\'e judgment upon a et-off or
counter-claim, nole s the caption of the
an wer contain the words 'answer aud ·etoff' or the word ' an wer and counterclaim;' but a misde cription iu the caption
-0f the nature of the defendant's claim shall
not prevent him from having judgment,"
etc. Held that this only made it necesary to apprise the plaintiff that he asked
ome relief over against him, and that the
caption "answer and counter-claim " mi takenly u ed instead of the caption "anwer and set-off" would not deprive the
defendant of uch relief as he howed himelf entitled to.
McDougald v. Hulet {1901 ), 132 Cal.
154, 64 Pac. 278: A.leased a tract of land,
ancl B. and C. for a sufficient consideration
guaranteed th e payment of the rent by the
1essee. The rent wa not paid, and B.
brought an action, making A. and C. defendants, a king to ha,·e it adjudged how
much wa due A. under the lease, and that
C. was bound to A . for such amount and
that plaintiff was only surety, and further
it wa ought to have judgment that C.
pay A . the amount o found and that plaintiff recover from C. all money paiu and
1o ·ses su tained by reason of said guaranty. A . in his answer set out by way of
counter-claim and cro s-complaint the facts
-0f tl1 e t ran action, and a ked for judgment

again t plaintiff fen the amouut which
might be found ii ue hi 111 under the I a e.
The trial court foun'l that a larg urn was
du A. under the lea ·e, but r fu. d to gi\•e
A. judgm ut agaiu t plaintiff on the
g round that the amount due wa: not the
ubject of a counter-claim.
n appeal it
wa held that thi · wa~ error, and took
entirely too narrow a view of the matter.
The co urt aid, "Plaintiff could not ha\·e
prevented the recovery by llogg lA.J in
an independent uit. Why hould he in
this~
\Ve do not think it nece ary to
go into any nice di tinction • a. to the
name gi,·en to an an wer."J
Bate v. Hosekrans, 37 N . Y . 409, 411,
per H uut J. ; McConihe v. Hollister, 19 Wis.
2G9; Hutchings v. Moore, 4 Mete. (Ky.)
110 ; Wilder v. B o.rnton , 63 Barb. 547;
McAbee v. Hanclall, 41 Cal. 136.
ee
contra, Brannaman v. Palmer, tanton's
Code (Ky.), p. 90; Sullivan v. Byrne, 10
S. C. 122; Union at. Bk . v. Carr, 49
Iowa, 359; Equitable Life A . Soc. 1'.
Cuyler, 75 N. Y. 511, 514 , 12 Hun, 24i;
Bate· v. Rosekran , 4 Abb. N. . 276, 37
N. Y. 409; Wright v. D elafield, 25 .N. Y.
266; Burke v. Thorn, 44 Barb. 383; Burrall v. De Groot, 5 Duer, 362; Beers v.
·waterbury, 8 Bo w. 396; Stowell n.
Eldred, 39 Wis. 614; elleck v. Griswold,
49 id. 39; Gilpin v. Wil on, 53 Ind . 443;
H olme v. Hi chet, 56 al. 307 (per co11tra,
need not be so de ·ig uated).
ec, furth er,
in support of the conclusion of the text,
Brannan v. Pat.v, 58 Cal. 330; Carpenter
v. Hewel, 6 i Cal. 5 9; Fnch 1·. Treat, 41
Wi . 404; Dobbs~ .. Kellogg, 5-3 \Vi .. 44 ;
contra, Mill v. Rosenbaum, 103 Ind . 152;
Acer v. H otchkis , 97 N. Y. :395, 40 .
The Kentucky code, § 9 , ubd. 4, provides that " a defendant hall not h:He
judg ment upon a set-off or counter-~laim,
unle the caption of the a usw r con ta in
the words 'answer aud et-off,' or the
word 'an wer and counter-claim.'" It
is held, howeYer, that the plaintiff may
wai,·e the benefit of tbi subdivi ion by
replying to the an wer and rounter-claim
Ca on i -. ason, 79 Ky . 55 ; utter 1·.
J ohn on, 0 Ky. 426. By the Wi con. in
code (R. , . § 2656), as amended, the rule
of the text i embodied in the provision,
"Each counter-claim mu t be plea<l eJ a
55
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the States but oue or two, the phiintiff must reply to a counter-

claim, or its averments of fact are admitted to be true.^ He ought

the tate but one or wo, the pla.in iff mu t reply to a counterclaim r it av rment of fa tare admitted to be tru .1 He ough

such, and be so denominated, and the

answer shall contain a demand of the

judgment to which the defendant sup-

poses himself to be entitled by reason of

the counter-claims therein." The plaintiff

waives the defect that the counter-claim

is not so designated by demurring or

replj'iug to it as a counter-claim, even

though the objection is rai.sed on the trial :

Voechting v. Grau, 55 Wis. 312.

[^Township of Noble v. Aasen (1898),

8 N. D. 77, 76 N. \Y. 990: Failure to de-

mur to an alleged counter-claim on the

ground that the facts stated do not consti-

tute a counter-claim, waives this objection,

and the only point then open to the plain-
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tiff, which can be raised at any time, is

that the fiicts .stated in the answer do not

constitute a cause of action in favor of de-

fendant that could be enforced against

plaintiff under unj/ circumstances. See also

First Nat. Bank v. Laughlin (1894), 4

N. D. 391, 61 N. W. 473 ; Talty v. Torling

(1900), 79 Minn. 386, 82 N. W. 632;

Campbell ?;. Jones (1878), 25 Minn. 157;

Lace f. Fixen (1888), 39 Minn. 46, 38

N. W. 762 ; Walker v. .Johnson (1881), 28

Minn. 147, 9 N. W. 632.

Young V. Gant (1901), 09 Ark. 114, 61

S. W. 372 : Where a defendant sets up a

counterclaim to which plaintiff makes no

reply, if defendant does not move for

judgment on the counter-claim the reply

will be deemed to have been waived and

the issues treated as made. Lacey v.

Lacey (1893), 95 Ky. 110,23 S. W. 673 :

The objection that the wife's answer, in a

suit for divorce, seeking alimony was not

styled a " counter-claim " was waived by

the plaintiff's replying and joining issue

on the matter set up therein. See also

Warren v. Chandler (1896), 98 la. 237, 67

N. W. 242.]

1 QSloan i\ Rase (1899), 101 Wis. 523,

77 N. W. 895 ; City of Huron v. Meyers

0900), 13 S. I). 420', 83 N. W. 553 ; liavicz

V. Nickells (1 900), 9 N. 1). 536, 84 N. W. 353.

Illsly V. Grayson (1898), 105 la. 685,

75 N. W. 518. Action to recover rent,

aided by attachment. Defendant pleaded

a counter-claim for work and labor, etc.

To this plaintiff liled a rej)ly consisting of

a set-off for a balance due him upon a

note executed by defendant, etc. The

court, after quoting the sections of the

code bearing on the matter, said : " It

will be observed tiiat while they do not

mention either set-off or counter-claim in

referring to the reply, yet tliey do recog-

nize that defences, either negative or

affirmative, may be pleaded, provided the

matter pleaded be not inconsistent with

the petition. Plaintiff could not join the

matters pleaded in reply with his action

for rent ; for the statute says the land-

lord's lieu may be effected (that is, en-

uch, and be o denominated, and the
an wer hall coutain a demand of the
juJ meut to which the def uda.nt ~up
po'e him~elf to be ntitled by reason of
the counter- laim therein." The plaintiff
waiY the defect that the counter-claim
i· not o <le iguat d by demurring or
replying to it a a counter-claim, even
though the objection i rai ed on the trial:
oechting v. ran, 55 Wi . 312.
[Town hip of Joble v. Aa en (1 9 ),
. W. 990: Failure to de8 J. D. 77, 76
mur to an alleged counter-claim on the
grouud that the fa t tate<l do not con titute a counter-claim, waives thi objection ,
and the only point then open to the plaintiff whi h can be rai ed at any time, i
that the fact .. tatecl in the answer do not
c n titute a cau e of action in favor of defendant that could be enforced again t
plaintiff under any circumstances. 'ee al o
Fir t Nat. Bank v. L aughlin {l 94), 4
N. D. 391, 61 . W. 473; Talty v. Torling
(1900), 79 Minn. 3 6, 2
. W. 632;
Campbell v. Jone {l 7 ) , 25 finn . 157 ;
Lace v. Fixen (l
), 39 Minn. 46, 3
r. W. 762; Walker v. Johnson (1 81), 28
Minn. 147, 9 . W. 632.
Young v. Gaut {1901), 69 Ar~. ll4, 61
. W. 372: Where a defendant ets up a
counter-claim to which plaintiff make no
reply, if defendant doe not moYe for
judgment on the counter-claim the reply
will be deemed to have been waived and
the i ue treated a made. Lacey v.
Lacey (1 93) , 95 Ky. llO, 23 . W. 6 3:
The objection that the wife's an wer, in a
nit for divorce eekin<>' alimony was not
tyled a "c unter-claim" \ a waived by
the plaintiff' replying and joining i ue
on the matter et up therein.
ee al o
Warren v. haudler (I 96), 9 Ia. 237, 67

. w.

242.J

o e ( 1 99), 101 Wi . 523,
95; ity of Huron v. Meyer
. D. 420, 3 N.". 553; I avicz
v. Nickell ( l 900), 9 .1: • I . 536, 4 . W. 353.
Illsly v. Gray .on (1 9 ), 105 Ia. 6 5,
75 .1: • W. 51 . Action to recover r nt,
l

[

loan v.

77
. W.
(1900), 13

aided by atta hment.
·fen<lant pleaded
a ounter-claim for w rk aml lalJor, etc.
'1 o thi plaiutiff fil cl a reply cunsi:sting of

a et-off for a balance due him upon a
n te executed by defenda.nt, etc. The
·ourt, after quoting the ection of the
code oeariug on the matter, aid : " I t
will be ob erved that while they do not
m ntion either ·et-off or counter-claim in
referring to the rep1y, yet they do recognize that defences, either n O"ati 1-e OI"'
affirmative, may be plead d, provided the
matter pleaJe<l he n t incon i tent with
the petiti n. fiaintiff could not join the
matt r. pleaded in reply with hi action
for rent; for the tatute ay the landlord' lien may be effected {that i , enforced) by action for the rent alone 'IYitbiu
a limited time. D efendant had the undoubted right to plead hi couuter-daim;
but, if i10 et-off i allowed by wa)' of
reply, he may thu , aft r liti ation n ue ,
apply auy un ettle<l item of account to
hi obligation for rent, alth UO'h he may
at the ,arne rime be owiu<>' l1i. landlord
a much larger um on general account.
It may be that uch :i reply would not he
proper in a ca. e where the item in ·luded
therein could have been embraced in the
petition. But where the tatute ex pre ly
inhibit sucn a course, it certainly must
be true that plaintiff may interpo e in hi
reply, a a matter of defence, any et off
he may have to defendant' counter- laim .
. .. The case of Cox v. Jordan, 6 Ill.
560; Galligan v. Fan nan, 9 Allen, I 92;
Mortland v. Holton, 44 Mo. 5 ; Miller v.
Lo ee 9 How. Pr. 356; Turner v. 'impon, 12 Ind. 413; Blount v. Rick, 107 Jo d.
_3 ; and tarke v. Dick , 2 lud. A pp. 125,
em to u ·tain tit ri ht to plead in
re1 ly a et-off to d fendaot'· ·ounter-claim,
pro1·id d there i no departure frum the
antecedent ground of complaint."
Dunham v. Tra i (1902), 2· Ttah, 65.
69 Pac. 46 : In au action on a written
contract, the au wer, after <l nying the
all <>'ati n f the complaint alle ed that
a mutual mi take had b n made in the
contract, anti prayed t hav it corr cted,
to which no reply wa fil d. H ld, that
thi con tituted a
unter- ·laim and uot
m r ly matter inc] fen e, and the counterclaim wa admitted by failure t r ply.
A hl ud Land & Li,•e tock Co. v.
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not to be subjected to this penalty unless he is told in the most

express terms that the pleading is a counter-claim. It would have

been better if the courts had laid down the most exphcit rule, and

liad required the defendant to name his pleading : but the cases

do not go to this length ; and a prayer for relief, appended to the

proper allegations of fact, will su2)ply the place of a name. It

has been held that when the defendant has set up facts wliich

really constitute a defence, but has mistakenly called them a

counter-claim, formally pleading them as such, he must stand by

the designation, and cannot treat them as a defence, and have the

benefit of them as a bar to the plaintiff's recovery.^ This ruling,

however, is without any cogent reason in its favor, would often

work injustice, and seems opposed to some of the cases already

quoted.2

Woodford (1897), 50 Neb. 118, 69 N. W.

769 : " Where to a counter-claim well

pleaded the plaintiff interposes no reply,

a verdict in his favor in excess of the
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amount claimed in his petition, less the

amount of such couuter-cl;iim, should be

not to b subjected to this penalty unl ·s he is tokl in the most
cxpres8 terms that the pleading is a counter-claim. It would have
ueen better if the courts had laid down th mo t explicit rule, and
had required th defendant to name hi pleading: but the ca· 'I'\
do not go to this length; and a I rayer for relief, append cl to the
proper allegations of fact, will su1 ply the place of a name. It
has been held that when the defendant has et up fact which
really com;titute a defence, but has mistakenly ·alled them a
counter-claim, formally pleading them as such, he must stand by
the designation, and cannot treat them as a defence, and have the
benefit of them as a bar to the plaintiff's recovery. 1 This ruling,
however, is without any cogent reason in its favor, would often
work injustice, and seems opposed to some of the ca es already
quoted. 2

set aside as unsupported by the pleading : "

Medland v. Walker (1895), 96 la. 175, 64

N. W. 797 : Failure to plead to a counter-

claim does not have the effect of admitting

its allegations where every fact pleaded iu

the counter-claim is put in issue by the

allegations of the petition and the amended

and substituted answer.

Bank of Columbia v. Gadsden (1899),

56 S. C. 313, .33 S. E. 575 : Where a plea

of set-off is purely defensive, going merely

to defeat jdaintiff's recovery, and not

authorizing any affirmative relief against

the plaintiff, the plaintiff is not bound to

reply to it, as required in case of a coun-

ter-claim, but may on the trial plead the

statute of limitations ore tenus, under sec-

tion 189, providing that new matter in

the answer not relating to a counterclaim

" is to be deemed controverted by the ad-

verse party as upon a direct denial or

avoidance, as the case may require."

Replying set-off to set-off: Small v. Ken-

nedy (1893), 137 Ind. 299, 33 N. E. 674:

"It has often been held by this court

that a plaintiff may reply a set-off to a

set-off, and upon the same principle there

is no reason why he may not reply a

counter-claim to a counter-claim." Per

contni : Hammer v. Downing (1901), 39

Ore. 504, 64 Pac. 651 : A reply of a setoff

to a plea of setoff is bad, and constitutes

a departure iu pleading.]

1 Ferreira v. l)e Tew, 4 Abb. Pr. 131

(Sp. Term), per Brady J.; Campbell v.

Koutt, 42 Ind. 410, 415. See also McAbee

V. Randall, 41 Cai. 136, where the defend-

ant, liaving named his answer a " counter-

claiin," was not permitted to treat it as a

" cruss-complaint."

■^ See De Leyer v. Mich.'\els, 5 Abb.

Pr. 203.

\^Disinhsalof Actionas Affecthnj Couriter-

Chiim : Judd v. Gray (1900), 156 Ind. 278,

59 N. E. 849; Adams v. Osgood (1898),

55 Neb. 766, 76 N. W. 446; Rodgers r.

Pari^er (1902), 136 Cal. 313, 68 Pac. 975;

Islais, etc. Water Co. r. Allen (1901), 132

Woodford (1897), 50 Neb. 118, 69 N. W.
769: "Where to a counter-cl aim well
pleaded the plaintiff interposes no reply,
a verdict in his farnr in excess of the
amount claimed in his petition. less the
amount of such counter-claim, should be
."et aside as unsupported by the pleading: "
Medland v . \Yalker (1895), 96 Ia. 175, 64
N. W. 797: Failure to plead to a counterclaim does uot have the effect of admitting
its allegations wh ere every fact pleaded in
the cou nter-claim is put in issue by the
allegations of the petition and the ameuded
and substituted answer.
Bank of Colu mbia v. Gadsden (1899 ),
56 S. C. 313, 33 S. E. 575: Where a plea
of set-off is purely defensive, going merely
to defeat plaintiff's recovery, and not
authorizing any ~ffirmati ve relief against
the plaintiff, the plaintiff is not bound to
reply to it, as required in case of a counter-claim, but may on the trial plead the
statute of limitations ore tenus, under section 189, providing· that n ew matter in
the answer not relating to a counter.claim
"is to be deemed controverted by the adverse party as upon a direct denial or
avoidance, as the case may require."
Replying set-off to set-off: Small v. Kennedy (1893), 137 Ind. 299, 33 N. E. 674:
"It has often been held by this court
that a plaintiff may r eply a set-off to a
set-off, and upon the same principle there
is no reason why he may not reply a
counter-claim to a counter-claim." Per
contra: Hammer v. Downing (1901 ), 39

Ore. 504, 64 Pac. 651 : A reply of a et-off
to a plea oI set·off is bad, and constitutes
a depnrture in pleading.]
1 Ferreira v. De Pew, 4 Abb. Pr. 131
(Sp. Tenn), per Brady J.; Campbell v.
Routt, 42 Ind. 410, 415. See also McAhee
v. Randall, 41 Cal. 136, where the defendant, having named his au;;wer a "counterclaim," was not permitted to treat it as a
"cross-complaint."
z See De Leyer v. Michael , 5 A bb.
Pr. 203.
[ Dismissafof Action as Affecting CounlerCfaim: Judd v. Gray (1900), 156 Ind. 278,
59 N. E. 849; r\dams v. Osgood (1898),
55 Neb. 766, 76 N. W. 446; Rodgers r.
Parker (1902), 136 Cal. 313, 6 Pac. 9i5;
Islais, etc. Water C'o. v. Allen (1901 ), 132
Cal. 432, 64 Pac. 713; Southern Pac. H.
R. Co. v. Pixley (1894), 103 Cal. 118, 37
Pac. 194; Maffett v . Thompson (189 ), 32
Ore. 546, 52 J'ac. 565; Bardes r. Hutchin son (1901), 113 Ia. 610, 85 N. W. 797;
Rumbaugh v. Young (1 96), 119 N. C'.
567, 26 S. E. 143; Axiom Min. Co. v.
Little (1894), 6 S. D. 43 , 61 ~. W. 441;
Washington Nat. Bank v. aunders (1901),
24 ·wash ..121, 61 Pac. 546.
Amount of Coui.ter-Claim as Affecting
Jurisdiction: Howard Iron Works v. Buffalo Elevating Co. (1903 ), 176 N. Y. -, 68
N. E. 66; Griswold v. l'ieratt (1895), 110
Cal. 259, 42 Pac. 20; Freeman v. eitz
{1899), 126 Cal. 291, 58 Pac. 690; Martin
v. Eastman (1901), 109 Wi. 286, 85
N. W. 359; General Elec. Co. v. \Yilliams
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II. Tlie Parties in their lielations with th' Counter- Claim.

II. The Pa1·tie in their R elations with the ounter- l im.

^ 625. * 749. 1. Relations of Defendant to Counter-Claim. Must

be a Demand in Favor of Defendant -who pleads it. Test. Ill all

the States whose codes do not contain a provision in favor of

sureties or joint-debtors, the rnle is established without exception

that the counter-claim must be a demand existing in favor of the

defendant who pleads it ; in other words, the defendant cannot

set up and maintain as a valid counter-claim a right of action sub-

sisting in favor of another person, even though there may be close

legal relations between himself and such other person. The sure

test is very simple. Could the defendant have maintained an in-

dependent action upon the demand if he had made it the basis of

a separate suit? If he could not, then he cannot use it as a

counter-claim. To this proposition there is no judicial dissent

nor exception ; and the cases which I shall cite are intended to

illustrate the various circumstances in which the rule has been

applied.^

§ 626. * 750. Case of Surety. Relief in Equity. The most
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common case is that of a surety. When sued alone, or together

with the principal debtor, he cannot interpose as a valid counter-

(1898), 12.3 N. C. .')1, 31 S. E. 288; Hay-

good V. Boney (1894), 43 S. C. 63, 20

S. E. 803 ; Buiich v. Potts (1893), 57 Ark.

257, 21 S. W. 437.]

1 QNorthera Trust Co. r. Hiltgen(1895),

62 Miiiu. 361, 64 N. W. 909; Taylor v.

Matte.soii (1893), 86 Wis. 113, 56 N. W.

829; Einenson v. Schwindt (1900), 103

Wis. 167, 84 N. W. 186; Sullivan v.

625.

* 7±9.

1.

Relations of Defendant to Counter-Claim.

Must

be a Demand in Favor of Defendant who pleads it. Test. In all
the ta
who
ode do n t ontain a pro i i n in favor of
uretie · r j int-d bt r , h rul i
' abli h d without x pti n
tha t he counter-claim mu t be a d mand existing in favor of the
defendan wh plead it ; in oth r ' ords, the defen ant ann t
' t up and maintain a a valid counter-claim a ri ht of action subi ting in favor Eanother p r on, even though there may b lo"e
·1e0 al r lati n between him elf and uch other per on. Th ure
te ·t i ' very . impl . Could he d f ndant have main tained au inlependent action upon the d mand if h had made it the ba i f
a ·eparate uit ? If he could not, then he cannot u e it a a
counter-claim. T this propo ition th re i no judicial di nt
n or exception ; and the ca e.::; which I hall cite are intended t
illu"trate the various circums tances in which the rule has been
applied. 1
626. * 750. Case of Surety. Relief in Equity. The m t
common ca e i that of a surety. When sued alone, or tog her
with he principal debtor, he canno t interpo e a a valid count r-

Nicoulin (1901), 113 la. 76, 84 N. W. 978;

Lehaiioii Steam Laundry v. Dyckraau

(1900), Ky., 57 S. W. 227."

Newton v. Lee (1893), 139 N. Y. 332,

34 N. E. 90.) : " In an action to recover

for good.s alleged to liave been sold

and delivered to defendants, the latter,

after a general denial, set up in their

answer ' for a further and separate auswer

and defence ' that the transactions set

forth in tlio complaint were between the

plaintiffs d.s.siijnor and a corporation, un-

der a written contract between vendor

and vendee; that the vendor failed to

perform its contract, by means whereof

the vendee was damaged in a man-

ner .set forth ; that defendants ' became

I)rivy to the contract' by guaranteeing

performance on the part of the vendee.

Said damages defendants claimed they

were ' entitled to recoup and set off as a

counter-claim against the jjvetended cause

of action set forth in the complaint.'

Held, that the second defence, assuming

the facts therein stated to 1)0 true, had no

relation to the cause of 'action set forth in

the complaint ; ' that it set up ' new matter '

within tlie meaning of the provision of

the Code of Civil Procedure authorizing

a demurrer to a counter-claim ; and so,

that an order overruling a demurrer

thereto was error. It seems, that if de-

fendants had been sued as guarantors or

sureties, they could not have availed tlicm-

selves, in exoneration of tlicir liability, of

a cause of action for (lam.iges for breacli

of the contract with their principal."

Computing Scale Co. v. Churchill

(1901), 109 Wis. .303, 85 N. W. .337:

{I 9 ), 123 N. '. 51, 3 1 S. E. 288; Hayg o d 1'. Boney {l 94), 43 S. C. 63, 20
·. E. 03; Bunch v. Potts (1 893), 57 Ark.
257, 21

.

w.

437 .J

ort hern Tru t Co. v. Hiltgen (1895),
62 Minu. 361, 64 N. VV. 909; Taylor v .
.Mattes o { l 93), 6 Wi . 11 3, 56 N. W.
2 ; Erne r ·on v. chwindt (1900), 10
Wi ·. 16i, 4 N. W. 186; ullivan v.
... icouli n ( 190 1) , 11 3 Ia. 76, 84 N. W . 9i ;
Leb non
team Laundry v. Dy kman
{I 0 ), I'y., 57 , . W. 227.
-ewto u u. Lee ( l 9 ), 139 N. Y. 332,
. 4 • r. E 9 :; : " In an action to recover
f r g o<l ~ a.llen- d to have been old
and deliv r
t d fendant , the latter,
aft r a g neral denia l, et up in their
an.-wer ·for a further aud eparate an wer
and <l feu cc' that the tran a ion
et
forth i 11 t li · eo nt plaint w re between the
phintiff'. :i.·:ign r am! a co rporation, unr a wri .t n ·outract between vendor
nd v 11 1 , th t th vend r fai l d t
whereof
1 [ .

performance on the part of the vend e.
Said damage defendants claimed th y
w re 'e ntitl ed to recoup and et off a a
coun ter-claim again t the pret nd d cau e
of action et forth in the complaint.'
Fl Id, that the .econd defcn , a ' umi ug
th e fact therein tated to he tru , had uo
r elat ion to the cau e f 'a ti n et forth i 11
th complaint; that it et up 'n w matter'
within the meanin g of th pr vi iou of
the ode f ivil Proced ur authori zinn-
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claim any cause of action existing in favor of that principal, —

not even one arising from a breach by the plaintiff of the very

contract in suit.^ There are instances in which eqnity will un-

doubtedly relieve the surety when the principal debtor is insol-

vent, and holds valid claims against the plaintiff which lie might

assert ; but such equitable relief would not be in the form of a

counter-cljiim : it would he defensive merely, and would not in-

clude any recovery against the plaintiff by the surety. If the

principal debtor and the surety are sued together, and the former

interposes the counter-claim existing in his own favor and suc-

ceeds on it, the result, of course, operates as a defence in aid of

the surety : the plaintiff's demand being partly or wholly extin-

1 Gillespie v. Torrance, 25 N. Y. .306,

308, 310, per Selden J. ; s. c. 4 Bosw. 3!) ;

7 Abb. Pr. 462 ; La Farge v. Halsey, 1

Bosw. 171, 4 Abb. Pr. 397; People v.

Brandreth, 3 Abb. Pr. n. s. 224 (Ct. of

claim any cause of acti n existing in favo r of that principal n ot even one arising from a breach by the plaint iff of li v ry
contract in suit .1 There ar instance , in which equity \Vill undoubtedly relieve t he surety when the principal <lebt.01 i , in ·olvent, and hol<ls valid clrLims against the plaintiff which li e mi ht
assert; but such equitable reli f vrnuld not b in the form of a
counter-claim: it would be defen ·ive mer ly, and would no mclude any recovery against the plaintiff by the urety . If th
principal debtor and the surety are sued t ogether, and the former
interposes the counter-claim existing in his own favor aml succeeds on it, the result , of course, operate· as a defence in aid of
the surety: the plaintiff's demand being partly or wholly ex tin-

A pp.), per Hunt and Porter JJ. ; East
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Iviver Bank v. Kogers, 7 Bosw. 493 ;

Lasher v. Williamson, 55 N. Y. 619;

O'Ulenis v. Karing, 57 N. Y. 649; Gilles-

pie V. Torrance was an action against

an indorser of a note. lie alleged, as a

counter-claim, that he iudorsed for the ac-

commodation of Van P., the maker; that

the note was given for the price of timber

sold by the plaintiff to Van P. ; that plain-

tiff warranted the quality of the timber to

the buyer, — a breach of tliis warranty,

and conse(pient damages Ui Van P., for

which defendant demanded judgment.

This attempted counter-claim was re-

jected for the reasons stated in tlie text.

The opinion of Selden J. is very elaborate

and instructive. While holding that the

surety has no legal counter-claim nor set-

off, Mr. Justice Selden is of opinion that

he would be relieved iu equity if the prin-

cipal debtor was insolvent. This equita-

ble relief, however, would not be in the

shape of a recovery against the plaintiff.

In La Farge i'. Halsey, the defendants were

sureties for the lessee on a lease, and

were sued for rent in arrear. They set

up, as a counter-claim, damages sustained

by the lessee from a breach by the plain-

tiff of an agreement made between him-

self and the tenant. This was overruled,

because the right of action was in the

lessee alone. East River Bank i'. Rogers

was the ordinary case of a guarantor sued

for the debt secured. He pleaded, as a

counter-claim, a debt due from tlie plain-

tiff to his principal, and it was struck out

as frivolous. As to counter-claim in favor

of a surety, see also Morgan v. Smitii, 7

Hun, 244, citing Lewis v. McMillan, 41

Bnrb. 420; Smith v. Felton, 43 N. Y. 419,

and Gillespie i'. Torrance, supra ; Davis v.

Toulmin, 77 N. Y. 280; Scott i,'. Timber-

lake, 83 N. C. 382; Coffin v. McLean, 80

N. Y. 560; Harris v. Rivers, .53 Ind. 216;

Stockton Sav. & L. Soc. v. Giddings, 96

Cal. 84; Thalheimer v. Crow, 13 Col.

397.

[Bishop V. Mathews (1899), 109 Ga.

790, 35 S. E. 161: A defendant in an

action brought against him individually

1 Gillespie v. T orran ce, 25 N. Y . 306,
308, 310, per Selden J.; . c . 4 Bosw. % ;
i Abb. 1->r. 462; La Farge v. Halsey, 1
Bosw. 171, 4 Abb. Pr. 39i; P eo ple v.
Brandreth , 3 Abb. Pr. N . . 224 (Ct. of
,\pp.), per Hunt and Porter JJ. ; E a ·t
Hirer Bank v. Hogcrs, 7 B osw. 493;
Lasher v. Williamson , 55 N . Y. 619 ;
0 ' Blenis v. J(arin g, 5 i N. Y. 649; Gillespie v . Torrance was an action against

was t he ordi nary case of a guaran to r . ued
fo r t he debt ecurecl. He pl a.d ee! , as a
counter-claim, a debt cl ue fro m th e plainti ff to his princi pal, and it was struck out
as fri volous. A to cou nter-claim in favor
of a surety, see also Morgan v. 'mith , 7
Hun , 244, citin g Lewis v. McMillan, 41
Bnrb. 420 ; Smit h v. F elton , 43 N. Y . 4 19,
and Gille pie v. Torrance, supra ; D avi. 1-.
T oulmin, 77 N. Y. 280 ; Scott v. T imberla ke, 83 N. C. 382; Coffin v. McLean , 80
N. Y. 560; Harris v. Rivers, 53 In d. 216 ;
Stockton Rav. & L. Soc. v. Giddi ngs, 96
Cal. 84 ; Thalheimer v. Crow, 1.3 Col.

an indorser of a note. H e allegeu. as a
co unter-claim, that he ind or ed for the accommodation of Van P., the maker; that
t he note was given for the price of timber
, old by the plaintiff to Van P . ; that plain- 397.
tiff warranted the quality of th e timber to
[Bi hop v. Mathews (1 899), 109 Ga.
th e buyer,-a breach of this warranty, 790, 35 S. E. 161 : A defeud an t in a n
and con equent damages to Van P., for action brought again t him in dividuall y
which defendant demanded judgment. upon a demand for the payment of whi ch
This attempted counter-claim was re- he is individually liable, cannot, without
jected for the reasons stated iu th e text. showing some equitable re;1 ou fo r being
The opinion of Selden J. is very elaborate allowed so to do, such a. the insoh ency
and in tructive. While holding that th e of the plaintiff, et off ngain. t t he plainsurety has no Legal counter-claim nor set- tiffs claim a debt due by t he la.tter to a
off, Mr. Justice Selden is of opinion that partner ship of which the defe ndan t i or
he would be relieved in equity if the prin- had been a membe r.
Crowley v . . 8 . Fi delity & Guara nty
cipal debtor was insolvent. This equitable reljef, however, would not be in the Co. ( 1902), 29 Wash. 268, 69 Pac. 784 :
shape of a recoi·ery against the plaiutiff. "In an action agai nst th urety upon a
In La Farge v. Hal ey, the defendants were buildin g cont ractor's bo nd t o reeover th e
sureti e for the lessee on a lease, aucl amount of u npaid bill : for mate rial the
w r e ~ u ed for rent in ar rear. They set owner was compelled to pay. the defen du p. a a co unter-claim, damages sustained ant is enti tled to offset th e va lue of extra
by the le see from a breach by the plain- work performed by t he contractor, and
tiff of an agreement made bet ween him- fo r t his purpo e may introdu ce eY idence
f'elf and th e tenant. Th is was overruled, showing that t here was a di sp ute h twee n
heC'a u ~e t he ri ght of action wa
in th e the owner and eontractor a to t he r a · onlcs ce alone. E ast River Bank v. Hogers able va l ue of uch ex tral', t ."]
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gLiished, the surety would iiecessaiily obtain the benefit of such

§ 627. * 751. Rule not Confined to Sureties. Other Instances.

The rule is not confined to sureties. It requires, in general, —

the only exception being the case where a separate judgment is

possible, — that the counter-claim should exist in favor of all tlie

defendants, and that all the persons in whose favor it exists

should be defendants in the action, and that it should be pleaded

in their common behalf. Thus, where one is sued, a demand in

favor of himself and a former partner not a party to the suit is

inadmissible as a counter-claim ; '^ and, conversely, in an action

against partners upon a firm liability, a counter-claim interposed

by one of them, alleging a demand for damages accruing to him

individually from the breach of a separate contract between him-

self and the plaintiff, must be rejected, because it is not in favor

of all the defendants who are thus jointly sued.^ A person sued

in a representative capacity — for example, as a receiver — to re-

cover trust-funds in his hands, or to enforce the performance of
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his fiduciary duty, cannot avail himself, by way of counter-claim,

of a demand due to himself in his personal and private capacity ; *

1 O'Blenis v. Karing, 57 N. Y. 649;

Springer v. Dwyer, 50 N. Y. 19; Greeu

V. Conrad (Mo. Supreme, I89.'l), 21 S. W.

Hep. 839 ; Becker v. Northway, 44 Minn.

61. Where tiie principal debtor and the

plaintiff are insolvent, the surety, who

is jointly bound with his principal, may

set off his individual claim again.st the

ur t

w uld

11

e arily ob ain he b ne t of

uch

11 . l

extinction.^

1. Rule not Confine d to Sureties. Other Instances.
nfin d t
uretie . I r quir , in gen ral, Th rul i n
h onl exc pti n b ing the c e wh r a l ara jud m nt i
hat h
unter-cla.im ·h uld x1 in favo r of all th
p ible
and hat 11 he p r.. n m who
favor it xis t
fendan
f n ants in he action and that it sh uld be plead d
hould b
b half. Thu , where ne is ued, a demand i1
in th ir
a former par n r not a party to the suit i ·
a counter- laim ; 2 and conver 1 , in an action
a ain t part11er upon a firm liability a ounter- laim interpo e
a ruing to him
b r n f them, all ging a demand f r dama
indi idually from th brea h of a parat contract between himlf and th plaintiff, mu t be r j ct d, b au e it i not in fav r
of all th d fendant who are thus jointly sued. 3 A p rson su d
in a rep re entativ apacity-f r xampl , a a r ei er - t r v r tru t-fun l in hi hand , or to en force the performan e f
hi :fidu iary duty, cannot a ail him elf, b.) way of counter-claim ,
fa demand due to him elf in his per onal and pri ate capacity· 4

plaintiff, notwithstanding tlie statutory

j)rovision that the " counter-claim must

be one existing in favor of a defendant

and against a plaintiff between wliom

a several judgment might be had in

the action." Clark c. Sullivan, 2 N. Dak.

103.

2 Campbell v. Genet, 2 Hilton, 290.

See Bird v. McCoy, 22 Iowa, 549, — a

peculiar case in which parties were held

included as defendants in the Jirm nmne

against which the action wa.s brought.

See also, a.s to suits again.st ])artners

and other joint debtors, V^^eil v. Jones, 70

Mo. 560 ; Great West. Ins. Co. v. Pierce,

1 Wyo. Ter. 45; Wilson v. Ruukcl, 38

Wis. 526; Harris v. Rivers, .53 Ind. 216;

1 O'Bleu i
v. K arin g, 57 .r . Y . 649;
. ' pri nger 1:. D wyer, 50
Y. 19; reeu
v. 'ourad (Mo. up re me, 1 93) , 21 . W.
J ep. 39; Becker v . N r t hway, 44 Minn.
6 l. Where the pri n ipal d btor and t he
plaintiff are in oh'eut, t he urety, who
i. jointly bound wit h hi. principal, may
. et off hi ind i ,·idual la im again t the
plain iff, n t wi th taudiu g t he tatut ry
pro,•i 1ou that t he " oun ter- laim mu t
he one exi tin g in fa v r of a defend a nt
aud again t a plain tiff betw n whom
a everal judgm nt mio-h t b had in
th action."
la rk v. 'ulli,·an, 2 . D ak.
T.

103.

and ra.'es cited /jo.s<, in notes to §§ * 758,

♦ 75'J.

3 Peabody v. Bloomer, 5 Duer, 678, 6

Duer, .53, 3 Abb. Pr. 353, per Woodruff

J. : " To an action against several joint

debtors for a debt due by them as part-

ners, one of them cannot avail himself,

either by way of set-off or counter-claim,

), 11 I

of such a defence." See this case, and

especially the opinion of Hoffman, J. at

Special Term on tlie subject of joitit

liabi/iti/. See also Wilson v. Kunkel, 38

Wis. .526.

[^Sullivan v. Xicouliu (1901), 113 la.

76, 84 N. W. 978 ; Brown v. Fresno Raisin

Co. (1894), 101 Cal. 222, 35 Pac. 639;

Baxter r. Sherman (1898), 73 Minn. 434,

76 N. W. 211 ; McKinnon v. Palen (1895),

62 Minn. 188, 64 N. W. 387; Pope Mfg.

Co. V. Cycle Co. (1899), 55 S. C. 528, 33

S. E. 787; Smith v. Diamond (1893), 86

Wis. 359, 56 N. W. 922.;]

* Johnson v. Gunter, 6 Busii, 534 ; AV

i5'.J.

T:\.

art r 1· Tippin .'
:3 I ,'J S . E. 941) I B1. lll>p
D), l O!J Ua. 790 , 35 :-1. E.

UNTE R-CLAnr.
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1

and the converse of this particular rule is also equally true.^

Under any and all circumstances, a counter-claim consisting of a

demand in favor of a third person not a party to the action, and

having no relations with the issues involved therein, is entirely

inadmissible.^

§628. * 752. 2. Relations of Plaintiff to Counter-Claim. Must be

a Demand against Plaintiff. Test. Application of Rule most Frequent

and th converse of thi parti ular rul
al
qually tru .1
Under any and all circum ta.n , a
mt r- laim
n i ting of a
.demand in favor of a t hircl p r on n t , l arLy t th acti n, and
h, ving no relation with the i
inv lv d th r in, i ntir ly
inadrni ::;ibl .2
S:. 628. * 7 52. 2. R elations o f Plaintiff to Counter-Claim.
Must be

in what Cases. The very conception of a counter-claim implies

that it is a cause of action against the plaintiff. The test is here

•equally simple and plain as in the case of the defendant. Would

the facts, if alleged in a separate action against the plaintiff, make

out a cause of action against him, and show him liable to the ap-

propriate relief? If not, they do not and cannot constitute a

€ounter-claim. This rule, althougli universal, is most frequently

applied in actions brought by assignees of the demands in suit.

When the plaintiff is such an assignee, no demand accruing to

the defendant against the assignor can possibly be enforced as a

counter-claim.^ Such liability of the assignor may, under certain
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161; Davis t'. Haddeii (1902), 115 Ga. 466,

41 S. E. 608 ; Edwards v. Williams (1893),

39 S. C. 86, 17 S. E. 4.57; Gallagher v.

Germania Brewing Co. (1893), 53 Minn.

214, 54 N. W. 1115; Gerdtzen v. Cockrell

(1893), 52 Minn. 501, 55 N. W. 58; Ore-

gon Gold-Mining Co. v. Schmidt (1901),

a D emand agains t P laintiff.

Test.

Application of Rule most Frequent

The very c n eption of a com ter-claim impli
that it i a cause of action against the plaintiff. The te t is her
·equally simple and plain a iu the ca e of the defenclant. Would
the facts, if alleged in a separate action again ' t the plain tiff, make
<mt a cause of action against him, and show him liable to the appropriate relief? If not, they do not and annot con titute a
counter-claim. This rule, although universal, i' rnotlt frequently
applied in actions brought by assignees of the demands in suit.
vVhen the plaintiff is . uch an assignee, no demand accruing to
the defendant against the assignor can po Ribly be enforced as a
counter-claim.3 Such liability of the assignor may, under certain
in w hat Ca ses.

Ky., 60 S. W. 530; Ileadington v. Smith

(1901), 113 1a. 107,84 N. W. 982: In a

suit brought in a representative capacity,

defendant cannot use as a counter-claim

a cause of action existing against the

plaintiff as an individual.]

1 Gansner i'. Franks, 75 Mo. 64 ; Lanier

V. Branson, 21 S. C. 41.

[Lewis V. rickering (1899), 58 Neb.

63, 78 N. W. 368 ; Le Clare r. Thibault

<1902), 41 Ore. 601, 69 Pac. 552 : " Invok-

ing the maxim that equity will not suffer

a wrong without a remedy, it has been

held that a counter-claim ari.sing in a

different right will sometimes be allowed

in a suit by reason of circumstances tliat

render it equitable to do so."']

- Bates V. Rosekrans, 37 N. Y. 409,

411; Babbett v. Young, 51 Barb. 466;

Ernst V. Kuukle, 5 Ohio St. 520 ; Dolph

V. Rice, 21 Wis. 590, 593; Briggs v. Sey-

mour, 17 Wis. 255; Carpenter v. Leonard,

5 Minn. 155; Mealey v. Nickerson, 44

Minn. 430 (stockholders cannot set off a

claim in favor of the corporation). See,

however, Mooreliead c. Hyde, 38 Iowa,

382, — a case in which the defendants

were held to be trustees of an express

trust in a contract made with tlie plain-

tiff, and a counter-claim by them was

sustained.

3 [;Sniith V. Dawley (1894), 92 la. 312,

60 N. W. 625; Hoaglin v. Henderson

(1903), 119 la. 720, 94 N. W. 247 ; Newton

V. Lee (1893), 139 N. Y. 332, 34 N. E. 905 ;

Emerson v. Schwindt (1900). 108 Wis. 167,

84 N. W. 186 : "A counterclaim ' must be

one existing in favor of the defendant

and against a plaintiiS between whom a

several judgment might be had in the

action.' " In this case tlie defendant in a

suit brought by the assignee of a land

contract for foreclosure sought to main-

161 ; Davi v. Hadden (1902}, 11 5 Ga. 466,
41 . E. 60S; Edwards v. William (1 93),
39 S. C. 86, 17 , . E. 457; Gall agh er v.
Germania Brewiug Co. (1 93}, 53 l\ Iinn.
214, 54 N. W. 111 5; Gerdtzen v. Cockrell
(1 9.3 ) , 52 Minn. 501, 55 X. \V. 5S; Oregon Gold-Min ing Co. v. Schmidt (1901),
Ky., 60 . W. 530; Il ead ington v. Smith
(1901), 11.3 Ia. l Oi, 84 N. \V. 9 2: In a

uit brought in a representative capacity,
d efendant cauuot use a · a counter-claim
a cause of action ex isting again · t the
phtintiff as an individual.]
1 Gansne r v. Franks, 75 Mo. 64; Lani er
v . Brunson, 21 S. C. 41.
[Le wis v. Pickering ( 1899), 58 Neb.
63, 78 N. \V. 36 ; L e Clar e c. Thibault
(1902), 41 Or e . 601, 69 Pac. 552: "Invoking the maxim t hat equity will not s uffe r
a wrong witho ut a remedy, it ha been
h eld tlMt a counte r-c laim arising- iu a
different right will sometimes be allowed
in a uit by reason of circumstances that
r en de r it equitable to do so ." ]
2 Bates 1.: . Rosekran s, 37 ._ . Y. 409,
411 ; Babbett v. Young, 51 Barb. 466;
Ern st v. Kunkle, 5 Ohi o t. 520; D olph
v. Rice, 21 Wi . 590, 59 3; Bri <Tg, 1· . Seymour , 17 Wi s. 255; Ca rp 11ter v. L onard ,
!> Minn. 155; ~1ealey v. Ni cker:;ou , 44

Miun. 430 (stockholder cannot se t off a
claim in favor of th e (·orporntion) . See,
however, Moore head 1·. ll yde, 38 Iowa,
3 2, - a case in whirh the defenclant:-1
were held to be tru:,;tces of a u cxpre:<s
trust in a con tract made wi th the plai11 tiff, and a co u nter-claim uy the m wa:;
su tained.
3 [ Sm ith v. Dawley (1894}, 92 Ia. 312,
60 N. vV. 625; Hoaglin i·. lleudersou
(1903), 119 Ia. i:W, 94 N. W. 2.J-i; Xewton
v . Lee ( 1893), 139 N . Y. 332, 34 .l\. E. 905;
Emerson v. Schwindt (1900). 108 Wis. 16i,
8.J- N. W . 186: "A counter ·claim 'mu, t be
one existing in fav or of the de teucl:w t
and again st a plaintiff between whon 1 a
several judgme nt might be had in th e
action.'" In thi case the defendant in a
suit brought by the a ignee of a lan1l
contract for fo reclosure ·ought to maintain a couuter-claim for legal sen·ices
r endered the a sig nor, a r eceiver. H eld,
that it onld not be maintained. See also
Computing Scale Co. v. Chur hill (1901) ,
l 09 Wi . 303, 5 N. W. 337; Taylor 1
Matte on (1 93), 6 Wi . 113, 56 •. W .
829; Gibson v. Trow (1900), 105 Wi s. 2 ,
81 N. W. 4 11.
Tew Whatcom v. B ellingham Bay Imp
Co. (1 96), 16 \\'ah. l .3 8, 47 Pac. 1102.
1•
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circumstances, be a good defence in bar of the recovery : but, as

it is not a liability of the plaintiff, it cannot be a counter-claim ;

it is impossible, by means of a valid demand against A. alone, to

ire um tance , be a go l d fenc in bar of the recoYery: but
he pt intiff it annot be a count r-claim ·
i i
no
ibl , b · mean f a valid cl mand a am ~ . al ne to
it i

obtain a judgment against B. The decisions are unanimous, and

sustain the doctrine stated above under all possible circumstances.^

The rule is applied by the cases cited in the note to every species

" In an action by a city to recover benefits

for street improvements, the defendant

cannot offset a claim for materials fur-

nished the contractor who had charge of

making the improvements." See also

Sheafe v. Hastie (1897), l6 Wash. 563, 48

Pac. 246 ; Parker v. Carolina Bank (1898),

53 S. C. 58.3, 31 S. E. 673 ; Efird r. Land

Co. (1899), 55 S. C. 78, 32 S. E. 758 ; Lau-

ragleun Mills i'. Ruff (1900), 57 S. C. 53,

35 S. E. 387 ; Rumbough i\ Young (1896),

119 N. C. 567, 26 S. E. 143; Wilkinson v.
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Bertock (1900), 111 Ga. 187, 36 S. E. 623 ;

Northern Trust Co. r. Hiltgen (1895), 62

Minn. 361, 64 N. W. 909; Harrison v.

State Banking & Trust Co. (1902), 15

S. D. 304, 89 N. W. 477; Field v. Austin

(1901), 131 Cal. 379, 63 Pac. 292; Bloch

Queensware Co. v. Metzger (1901 ), 70

Ark. 232, 65 S. W. 929; Bernstein v.

Coburn (1896), 49 Neb. 7.34, 68 N. W.

1021 ; Johnson v. Geneva Pub. Co. (1894),

122 Mo. 102, 26 S. W. 676 ; Washington

Sav. Bank v. Butchers', etc. Bank (1895),

130 Mo. 155, 31 S. W. 761.3

' Boyd V. Foot, 5 Bosw. 110; Vassear

V. Livingston, 13 N. Y. 248, 252, per Denio

J.; s. c. 4 Duer, 285, 293, per Duer J.;

Dillaye v. Niles, 4 Abb. Pr. 253 ; Ferreira

V. De Pew, 4 Abb. Pr. 131 ; Thompson

'•. Sickles, 46 Barb. 49 ; Mcllvaine ;•.

Egerton, 2 Robt. 422; Wolf v. H., 13

How. Pr. 84, i)er E. Darwin Smith J. ;

Davidson v. Remington, 12 How. Pr. 310;

Gleason r. .Moen, 2 Duer, 639 ; Cumings

V. Morris, 3 Bosw. 560 ; Wiltsie v. Nor-

tiiam, 3 Bosw. 162; Duncan v. Stanton,

30 Barb. 5.33, 536; Tyler v. Willis, 33

Barl). 327 ; Spencer v. Babcock, 22 Barb.

326, 33') ; Weeks r. Pryor, 27 Barb. 79 ;

Van de .Sande v. Hall, 13 How. Pr. 458,

per Paige J. ; Linn v. Rugg, 19 Minn. 181,

185; Swift I'. Fletcher, 6 Minn. 550;

McConihe v. Holli.ster, 19 Wis. 269. In

this case the defendant prayed e<iuitaV)le

relief that the mortgage, etc., sued on by

an assignee, might be cancelled on account

of the mortgagee's fraud in obtaining it.

Tiic court held tliat this answer was in

form a counter-claim, but that it could

not be relied on as such by the defendant

and the relief granted, because the assignor

was a necessary party ; and the opinion

implies that, if he had been made a party,

the relief could have been granted. Not-

withstanding this array of authorities,

and the explicit language of the codes,

the doctrine has sometimes been over-

looked by courts. Thus, in Page v. Ford^

12 Ind. 46, and Slayback i'. Jones, 9 Ind.

470, the Supreme Court of Indiana en-

tirely failed to notice tiiat the demands

· In an a tion by a city to recoYer ben fit
f r tre t improvem ut , the d f udant
cannot ffs et a claim for materia furui hed the contractor who had charge of
makinCT the imprO\'emeut ."
ee al o
heafe v. H ti e l 97) 16 \Va h. 563. 4
Pac. 246; Parker v. Carolina Bank (1 9 ),
53
. 5 3 31 . E. 673; Efird 1·. Land
0. (1 99) 55
. 7 , 32 . E . 75 ; Lauragleun ~lill.· v. Ruff (1900), 57
. 53,
35 . E. 3 · Rombough i •. YounCT (l 96),
11 .... C. 567 26 . E . 143 ; Wilkin on .
B erto k (1900), 111 Ga. 1 7, 36 . E. 623;
... ·orthern Tru t Co. v. Biltgen (1 95), 62
;\[inn . 36 1, 64 X. \Y. 909 · Harri on
tate Banking & Tru t
o. (1902), 15
.'. D. 304,
N. W. 4ii; Field v. A11 · tin
( 1901), 131 al. 3 i9, 63 Pac. 292; Bloch
o. v. Metzger (1901 ), ~o
.Ark. 232, 65 . W. 929 · B eru tein v.
' olmrn ( I 96 ) 49 Neb. 734 6 I . W.
1021; Jolrn ~o n v. Genen\ Pub. o. (l 94),
122 .\[o. 102, 26 . W. 676; Wa hiugton
• a\'. Bank v. Butcher ',etc. B ank {l 95),
13 Mo. 155, 31 . W. 761.J
I Boyd v. Foot, 5 Bosw. 110 ; Ya.~ ear
r. Living ·ton, 13 X Y. 24 , 252, per D enio
J. ; . . 4 Duer, 2 5, 293, per Duer J.;
T illaye v. ile , 4 Abb. Pr. 253; Ferreira
v.
e Pew, 4 Abb. Pr. 131; Thomp on
ickle
46 Barb. 49; l\fcilvaine v.
E ert n, 2 R bt. 422; Wolf v. H., 13
H uw. Pr. 4, p r E. Darwin mith .J.;
J , vid on v. Hemington 12 H ow. Pr. 310;
lea on i '. ~Iu n, 2
uer 639; uminCT
1·. Morri , 3 Bo:w. 56 ; \ ilt ie v. Xortham, 3 Bo w. 162;
nnC'an 1:. tauton,
3 Ba rb. 533, 536; T •]er v. Willi , 33
B r b. 327 · · pencer i•. Babe ·k 22 Barb.
32fi, 3.3;1; W k 1•. Pryor, 27 Barb. 79;
\'an d .'aJHl v. H a ll, 13 IJ ow. Pr. 45
Jl<'r Paige ,J. ; Linn c. T ugg. 19 :\[inn . 1 1,
l 5; . 'wift i•. Fletcher, fi ;\[inn. 55 ;
::'11" 'onihe '" TTolli.tPr, l \ i -. 269. In
hi· c·a-.e the <1 f ucla11 pray cl eqn i ahl
r lief tha thP. mort~ag ', tc., ·u 1! on by
an a. iguc ', might be caucell •tl on ac ·ount

of the mort a<Tee' fraud in obtaininCT i .
Th court h Id that thi ' an wer wa in
form a c unter-claim, but that it ould
not be r li ed n a . u ·h by the d fendant
and the r lief a ra11t d, b can e the<\ iguor
wa · a nece ary party · and the opinion
impli e that, if he had been made a part.'··
the r elief ould haYe been granted. .i. ~ otwith tanding thi arra of authori ie · ,
an 1 the explicit lan guage of the cod ,
the doctrine ha
ometim e been m·erlooked b court . Thu , in Page v. F rd,
12 Intl. 46 and lay back v. Jone., 9 Intl .
470, th
upr me ourt of In liana ntirely failed to n tice that the demand
exi ·tillg a, aiu t an a i<rnor, which were
·et up b: the defendant a<Tain t th a ign ee (the plaintiff), conl l not po. ibly
be counter-claim ; aud that the di cu --ion
of the ourt upon other point - wa therefore wholly unnece ary. In the later
case of Perry v. he ter l 2 Abb. Pr. ~. .
13 1, Ir. Ju ti ·e ?llon 11 i · charg ab! wi h
the ame palpable over · i ht. Th acti on
wa un an appeal bond giYen by two
defendant to A., and by him , i ned to
the plaintiff. One f the defendant et
up a demand in hi own favor aloue again t
A., the as ignor, a a count r-claim. The
learn ed jud e <liscu e at great lenCTth
the que ti 11 wh th r one def ndant in
uch an action can r ly upon a claim due
to him elf alon ; and finally r a he the
con lu ion that, a the undertaking of
the def ndant w, · joint the cl mand of
he ingle left ndant i n t availabl . Ile
i wholly obli,•ion. to t11 fac that n
uch claim ould h int rp ed at all in
the a tion again t th plaintiff.
e ab ,
a furth r illu tratiou of tb t xt. Fr e-

not uuder ·

16i.
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of assignee, private and official ; and is established with absolute

unanimity.

§ 629. * 753. Counter-claim must be a Cause of Action ; merely-

Defensive Matter not Sufficient. It is an essential element in the

legal notion of a eountev-claim that it must be a cause of action ;

must consist of a right to some affirmative relief, and not be

matter simply defensive, either in bar of the plaintiff's recovery,

or in reduction of its amount. Thus, in an action for the price of

work, labor, and material, the defendant in his answer set up pay-

ments made by him in excess of tlie plaintiff's demand, but did

not in a formal manner call liis pleading a counter-claim, nor

demand judgment for the surplus. At the trial he insisted that

his allegations were admitted because the plaintiff had not replied.

His contention was overruled, not upon tlie defects of form,

but upon the absence of any cause of action. The payments as

stated to have been made being voluntary, no right to recover

back the excess existed ; and the answer was nothing more than

the defence of payment.^ And payments or disbursements made

by a trustee or holder of a fund, and set up by him in his answer
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to an action for an account and enforcement of the trust brought

by a beneficiary, do not create any right of action, and cannot,

therefore, be a counter-claim,^

§ 630. * 754. In Actions by Married Women ; by Widov^s. Must

be against Plaintiff in Capacity in ■which he sues. Against Plaintiff

alone and against all the Plaintiffs. Exception. In actions by

married women to recover demands due to them personally as a

part of their separate property, or their personal earnings, and the

like, debts and liabilities of their husbands cannot be successfully

^ Holzbauer v. Heine, 37 Mo. 443 ; an action of ejectment, where the de-

and see McPherson v. Meek, 30 Mo. 34.5; fendant alleges ownership in himself, and

Lash i\ McCormick, 17 Minn. 403 (partial asks that his title be ciuieted again.st the

failure of consideration) ; Kent y. Cantrall, plaintiff, such answer is a counter-claim:

44 hid. 452, 459; McCrary v. Demiug, 38 Venable v. Dutch, 37 Kan. 515; Allen i-.

Iowa, 527, 531; Lathrop v. Godfrey, 6 Douglass, 29 Kan. 412; Sale v. Bugher,

N. Y. S. C. 96, —a peculiar case, in which 24 Kan. 432.

a demand against the plaintiff's assignor, - Duffy r. Duncan, 35 N. Y. 187, 189.

who, it was alleged, was the real party It has been held tliat no counter-claim i.s

in interest, was sustained ; citing Hunt v. possible against the State beyond the de-

Chapman, 51 N. Y. 555; Fir.st Nat. Bk. feating the action brought by it, becau.se

of Memphis y. Kidd, 20 Minn. 234, 242, — a judicial proceeding cannot be main-

an action to foreclose a mortgage, in tained against it : the counter-claim can

of as ignee, privat and offi •ial; and is . . tabli. h cl 'vi th ab. olu t •
unanimity.
§ 6 29. * 753. Counter-Claim must be a C ause of Action ; merely
Defensiv e Matter not Sufficient. It is an '' ntinl lem nt in U1 •
legal notion of a connter-claim that it mu.·t b a. Mu ·e (l aetion;
must con ist of a right to ome affirmative r li f, and not b,.
matter imply d f n ive, either in bar o( the 1Iaintiff8 r tovery,
or in reduction of its amount. T'hns, in an action for the price of
work, labor, and material, the defenda,nt in his an. wer •t up pa_xments made by him in exc ss of the plaintiff's demand, but clicl
not in a formal manner call hi.· r leading a counter-claim, nor
demand judgment for the surplus. At the trial he in i ·t cl that
his allegations were admitted because the plaintiff had not r pli cl.
His contention was overrnled, not upon the defects of form,
but upon the absence of any cause of action. The payments a,
stated to have been made being voluntary, no right to r cov r
back the excess exi ted ; and the answer was nothing mor than
the defence of payment. 1 And payments or disbursements made
by a trustee or holder of a fund, and set up by him in his a,nsweito an action for an account and enforcement of t he tru t brought
by a beneficiary, do not create any right of action, and cannot,
therefore, be a counter-claim.2
§ 630. * 754. In Acti o n s b y Mar rie d W o men ; by Widows. Must
be a gainst P l aintiff i n Capac ity in w hich he s ues.

Against Plaintiff

In actions by
married women to recover demands due to them personally a a
part of their separate property, or their personal earnings, and the
like, debts and liabilities of their husbands cannot be successfully
alone and a gainst a ll t he P l aintiffs .

E xce p t ion.

which defendant claimed that the debt he used as a de/eure, but no further

should be enforced upon other lands be- Commonwealth w. Todd, Q Bush, 708.

fore proceeding against those in suit. In

1 Ilolzbauer v. Heine, 37 Mo. 443 ;
and see McP herson v. Meek, 30 Mo. 345;
Lash v. McCormick, 17 Minn. 403 (partial
failure of consideration); Kent v. Cantrall,
44 Ind. 452, 459; McCrary v. Deming, 38
Iowa, 527, 531; Lathrop v. Godfrey, 6
N. Y. S. C. 96, - a peculiar case, in which
a demand against the pla intiff' assignor ,
who, it was alleged, was the real par ty
in interest, was sustained; citing Hunt v.
Chapman, 5 1 N . Y . f>55; Fi rst Nat. Bk.
of Memphis v. Kidd , 20 Minn. 234-, 24-2, an action to foreclose a mortgage, in
which defendant claimed that the debt
h ould be enforced upon other lancl before proceeding aga in t those in uit. In

an acti on of ejectment, where the defendant alleges owner ' hip in him self, and
asks that hi. title be quieted against the
plaintiff, su<·h an wer is a c unter-claim :
Venable v. Dutch, 37 Kan. f>l5; All n i•.
Douglas, 29 Kan . 412; ale v. Bugher ,
24- Kan. 432.
2 Duffy v. Duncan, 35 •. Y. l 7, l 9.
It, lias been held that no count r-claim i.
po sible agaiu t the , t ate beyond the d feating th action brought hy it, hecan. e
a judicial proceeding cannot be maintainrd again t it: th con11tcr-claim tan
he u,ed a a dr'f( 11r~, but no further
Commonwealth i . Todd, .9 Bu h, 70 .
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interposed as counter-claims ; ^ and in a suit by a widow to re-

cover dower in land conveyed by her liusband during the mar-

riage without ■ her release, the defendant cannot counter-claim

damages arising from the breach of a covenant of warranty in the

husband's deed; for no right of action exists against her.^ The

demand must also be against the plaintiff in the same capacity as

that in which he sues. Thus, where the action is by the plaintiff

in his private and personal capacity, a claim against him as an

executor or an administrator cannot be made a valid counter-

claim.^ But, in an action by an executor on a note given to the

testator, the defendant can set up by way of counter-claim a de-

mand for damages caused by tlie fraud of the deceased in the sale

of land for the price of which tlie note was given.* Not only

must the counter-claim be a right of action against the plaintiff,

but it must, in general, be against the plaintiff alone, and against

all the plaintiffs.^ The exception to this rule is expressly pro-

1 Paiue V. Hunt, 40 Barb. 75.

2 Hill r. Golden, 16 B. Mon. .5.51, 5.54.
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3 Merritt v. Seaman, 6 Barb. .3-30. The

plaintiff .sued on a note given to liini as

executor after the death of the te.stator,

and the counter-claim was a debt duo

in rp ed as count
and in a m by a w1 w to r c v r
w r in lan conv
by h r hu b ncl durin he marnag without · h r r 1 a
defen , nt cann t
unter-claim
nant of warr n in th
·m
ari.'ing fr m th br ach of a
hu band l e · f r n right £ action xi
again t h r. 2 The
demand mu t al be a ain t the plaintiff in the ame a acity a~
that in whi h h u
Th , where th action is by he laintiff
in hi ' pri ate and p l" nal c pacity, a laim again t him a an
execu r or an a mini trator cann t b mad a valid ounterclaim.a But, in an action by an execut r n a note gi n to th
te tat r, he def ndant an t up by wa f c lint r-claim a d man f r damag
au ed b; he fraud of the deceased in the ale
of 1 nd for h pnc of whi h the not \ a gi en. 4 N t only
mu t th oun r- laim be a ri h f action again t th plaintiff,
but it mu t, in gen ral, be against the plaintiff alone, and again t
all the lain iffa. 5 The exception t thi · rule i expr ssly pr -

from the testator. In support of its de-

v.

ci.siou that these demands ilid not affect

court cited Fry v. Evans, 8 Wend. .530 ;

Mercein v. Smith, 2 Hill, 210; but see

Westfall V. Duugau, 14 Ohio St. 276.

See, also, in support of the rule in

Merritt v. Seaman, Patterson r. I'at-

ter.son, 59 N. Y. 574; Harte v. Ilouchin,

capacity, the
Wencl. 530;
210; but. e
t. 276.
hio
the rule iu

.50 lud. 327 ; McLaui,Wilin v. Winn?r,

63 Wis. 120; Harris v. Taylor, 5.3

Cunu. 500 ; in an action by an assignee

for creditors for the price of goods sold

I

after the assignment, an indebtedness of

the assignor cannot be set off : James v.

McPhee, 9 Col. 486; Otis v. Shams, 128

N. Y. 45. Conversely, where the plaintiff

sues i)i a representative capacity, a demand

against him in his private capacity is not

a j)ri)pcr subject for a counter-claim :

Wakeman v. Everett, 41 Hun, 278; Gel-

shenen i: Harris, 26 Fed. Rep. 680.

When a receiver, trustee, e.xecutor, or ad-

ministrator sues to recover a debt due to

the estate, a demand by the defendant for

services rendered on behalf of the estate

on the iilaiiiliff's employiiU'iit is a good

counter-claim. Davis v. Stover, 58 N. Y.

473 I Barbee v. Green, 86 N. C. 158 (set-off

of claim for funeral expenses) ; Patterson

V. Patterson, 59 N. Y. 574 (same). The

New York Code of Civil Procedure, § 502,

subd. .3, contains the following provision :

" If the plaintiff is a trustee for another, or

if the action is in the name of a plaintiff,

who has no actual interest in the contract

u])on wiiich it is founded, a demand

against the plaintiff shall not be allowed

as a counter-claim; but so much of a de-

mand existing against the person whom

he represents, or for whose benefit the

action is brought, as will satisfy the

plaintiff's demand, must be allowed as a

countei--claim, if it might have been so

allowed in an action brought by the per-

son beneficially interested." See Pender-

tover, 5 N. Y.
. 15 (,et-off
of elai m for fun ral x p n e. ) ; Patters 11
v. Patter. on, 59
. Y. 574 (vame). The
New York 'ode of i,·il Pro· uure, § 5 :.,
·ubd. 3, 11tain. the foll wing pr vU 11 :
' If the plaintiff i · a trust e for another. or
if the a ·tion is in the uame of a plaintiff,
wh has 110 a ·tual inter "t in th ·ontra ·t
upon whic·h it is found d, a d manu
a gai11. t th plaintiff hall not he all ow rl
as a c:o uut r-<.:laim · but o mu h f a d 4i3; Barb e v . Gr en,

the plaintiff in the same capacity, the

' P.r\'il'C
It

CJll

111plo.\ 111<•J1t i

a crood

6 N.
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vided for by the codes, and only exists in those cases where a

separate judgment may be rendered for or against the person

against whom the counter-claim is [)leaded.^ This exceptional

case will be examined in the following subdivision.

§ 631. * 755. 3. "When the Counter-Claim may be in Favor of One

or More of Several Defendants, and agaiiast One or More of Several

Plaintiffs. "When Possible. Question herein Stated. The provision

found in nearly all the codes, that the counter-claim must exist

" in favor of a defendant and against a plaintiff between whom a

several judgment might be had in the action," implies that when-

ever the single defendant or all the defendants jointly may recover

against one or some of the plaintiffs and not against all, or when-

ever one or some of the defendants and not all may recover against

the single plaintiff or all the plaintiffs jointly, or whenever both

of these possibilities are combined, a counter-claim may be inter-

posed against the one or some of the plaintiffs and not against all,

and by the one or some of the defendants and not by all. Such a

instructive to contrast this rule as it lias
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Leeu inferred from the language found in

the coiles generally with the very different

rule that results from the freer provisions

of the Iowa statute. luan action brought

hy a single plaintiff to recover damages

for the non-performance of a contract to

vi<leJ fo r by the code , and only exi t in thos
a.se wh r a.
eparate judgment may be r ncler cl f r r again t the p rso
again.~ t wh m the counter-claim is pl aded. 1
T hi exc ptional
Dase will b examined in th foll wing subdivi ion.

§ 631.

* 755.

3.

When t h e Coun ter - Claim may be in Favor of One

o r More of Several Defendant s , and against One or More of Several
Plaintiffs. When Possible. Q u estio n h erein S tated. Th provision
found in nearly all the code , that the ·ounter-claim must ex.i t
"in favor of a defendant and against a plaintiff between who:u a
everal judgment might be had in the action," implies that whenever t he single defendant or all the defendants jointly may recover
against one or some of t he plaintiff::; and not against all, or whenever one or some of the defendants and not all may recover against
the , ingle plaintiff or all the plaintiff::; jointly, or whenever both
of the e possibilities are combined, a counter-claim may be interpo eel against the one or some of the plaintiffs and not against all,
and by the one or some of the defendants and not by all. Such a

sell and deliver cattle, tlie defendants

alleged the following facts as a counter-

claim, and proved the same at the trial ;

that subsequently to the agreement sued

iipon, they entered into a second and dif-

ferent contract with the plaintiff and

certain other persons composing a part-

nership under the firm name of Gadsden

& Co., by which they agreed to deliver,

and the firm to receive, the same cattle

at the same time and place, but at an en-

hanced price; that this second contract

was substituted instead of the former

one ; that they had fully tendered per-

formance, but the purchasers had wholly

refused to accept and pay for the cattle,

to their damage, for wliicli tliey demanded

judgment against the ])laintiff, Gadsden

&. Co. of course not being parties to the

suit. This counter-claim was sustained,

the court sa3nng : " The defendants could

hold him [the plaintiff] liable in this ac-

tion for the damages sustained for not

rc'ceiving tlie cattle: that is to say, though

others may have been jointly liable with

him [the plaintiff], the defendants could

recover their damages in this action

against him. The defendants could have

sued the plaintiff on this contract, and, if

so, they could set up their counter-claim,

.and hold him for his refusal to receive.

And within the rule recognized by this

court in Ryerson i\ Hendrie, 22 Iowa,

480, this would be so, though the contract

was made with the new parties as a part-

nership." lledman v. Malvin, 23 Iowa,

296, 299. See also Musselman v. Galli-

gher, 32 Iowa, 383; Baird v. Morford, 29

iowa, 531, 534; Sherman v. Hale, 7f»

Iowa, 383; Allen v. Maddox, 40 Iowa,

124 (a cause of action may be pleaded as

a "set-off," under the first subdivision of

the code section, by one defendant, where

several are jointly sued ; or, when it ex-

in tructirn to contrast thi rnle as it has
beeu inferred from the l:rng nage found in
t he code,; geuerally with the very different
Tnle that rc~ nlts from th e free r proYi ions
of the Iowa tatute. In an action brought
by a ingle plaiutiff t o recove 1· damages
for the non-performance of a contract to
ell and deliver cattle, th e defendant
alleged the following facts as a co unterclaim, and proved the same at the trial;
that sub eq uen tly to th e agreement ·ue<l
u pon, they entered into a seco nd arnl different contract with the plain t iff :-.nd
<'e rtain other person compo in g a partn ership under the firm name of Gadsden
& Co., by whi ch they agreed to leliver,
a.nd the firm to receire, the same cattle
at the ame time and place, but at an enhanced price; that this second contract
was ubstituted instead of the former
011e; that they had fully tendereLl perfo1·mance, but the purcha ers had wholly
rnfused to accept and pay fo r the cattle,
to their damage, for whi ch they demanded
judgment again t the plain tiff, Gadsde n
& Co. of co urse not being parti e to the
nit. This counter-claim wa , sustained,
the court :4ayi 11g: "The defendant could
hol1l him [the plaintiff] liable in thi action fur the damages ustainecl fo r not
r ecei' iug t.he cattle; that is to ay, though

others may have been join t ly liable with
him [th e plaintiff], the defendants could
rl.!cover their damage:' in thi s act iou
against him. The defendant could have
sued t he plain t iff on this contra·:t. a11d, if
so, they co uld set up their counte r-claim,
and hohl him for hi eefusal to receive .
And within the rule recognized by thi::;
court in Ryerson v. Heudrie, 22 Iowa,
480, thi would be so, though the cout ract
was made with the new parties as a partnership." Hedman i· . Malvin, 23 Iowa,
2!16, 299. See also Musselman v. Gall ig her, 32 Iowa, 3 3; Baird v. Morfo rd, 29
I owa, 53 l, 534; Sherman v. Hale, 76
Iowa, 383; Allen v. l\l addox, .JO Iowa,
124 (a cause of action may be pleaded a
a "set-off," under the fir t sn bd i vision of
the code section, by one defendant, wh er
several are jointly sued; or, when it exists again t several , it may be pleaded
against the sin g le plaintiff).
1 [ Drake v. Arnn zi ni (1894), 20 Col.
104, 36 P ac. 846. Where a plaintiff i ·
jointly liable with another to the defendant, a counter-cla im will not lie again t him
alone upon t hat li ability.
H olg ate 1•.
Downer (1899), W yo. 334, 5i Pac. 918:
"It is the general rule, bo b in law an<l
equity, t hat joint an<l parate deht ca11not be et off agaiu ·t each itbcr.":!

CIYIL RE)lEDlE ' .
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severance in the recovery is possible when the right sought to be

maintained on the one side, and the liability to be enforced on the

other, are not originally joint. The discussion is therefore re-

duced to the question. When may a severance in the judgment be

had, so that it may be rendered for a part of the plaintiffs and

against the others, and against a part of the defendants and for the

others? From the answer to this inquiry we shall ascertain be-

e,- ran ·e in t h reco'iT ry i: Io ibl when th
b
maintain cl on the ne i le and th liabili t
other, ar not rig inall JOlll . Th li u
du · cl to th qu ·ti n \Vh n ma· a
had, . that i ma b r n l r d for
again ·t th oth r and a ·ain ta I art
th r, '? From th an w r t thi inq uir ' e hall a c rtain
w n what par ie
a eY ral jud m n m, :r b h, l in th ac i n · ''
an<l ·1 a forth r
1 eq u nc , when th
ount r-claim ma be
aO"ain tone or mor of h plaintiff , r in favor £ one r mor of
th d f n lant . In pur ·uin th
i cu i n I hall
llect and
xamine m f he 1 ading judicial leci i n which hay gi' n a
c n truction t the lau and hall end avor to a ' rtain from them
th
neral prin ipl and rul that may l t rmine in each particular a e, when a counter-claim f thi fo rm and nature i " prop r. 1
T

tween what parties " a several judgment may be had in tlie action ; "

and as a further consequence, when the counter-claim may be

against one or more of the plaintiffs, or in favor of one or more of

the defendants. In pursuing the discussion, I shall collect and

examine some of the leading judicial decisions which have given a

construction to the clause, and shall endeavor to ascertain from them

the general principles and rules that may determine, in each particu-

lar case, when a counter-claim of this form and nature is proper.^

§ 632. * 75G. (1) Against One or Some of the Plaintiffs. Illustra-

tive Case. An action for an accounting and recovery of the

amounts found due was brought by three plaintiffs against two

defendants under the following circumstances. The five parties
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had entered into an agreement for the publication of a newspaper :

the defendants were to be the actual publisliers, and to have charge

of the business ; and, after paying all the expenses, the net pro-

632.

ceeds were to be divided into five equal parts, of which the defend-

* 756. (1)

Against One or Some of the Plaintiffs.

Illustra-

ants were to retain two, and one of the other " three parts shall

be paid by [defendants] in cash to each of the other parties to

this agreement," — the plaintiffs. The answer, besides other sepa-

rate defences, contained a counter-claim consisting of a judgment

recovered by the defendant R. against the plaintiff H., and as-

signed to both the defendants before the suit was commenced.

This counter-claim was set up against the plaintiff II. alone.

The New York Court of Appeals held that although the action

was inform joint, yet the right of each plaintiff was seveml ; and

a several judgment, declaring the simi to which each was entitled,

was necessary.2 Nothing can be more firmly settled than the

' [^r>el)anon Steam Laundry v. Dyck- fendants had averred and proved payment

man (1900), Ky., 57 S. W. 2il ; Murphy r. in full of his .-<hare, the defence as to such

Colton (1896), 4 Okla. 181, 44 Pac. 208; jdaintiff would have been effectual; and

Van Ktten )•. Kosters (1896), 48 Neb. 152, yet the other two idaintiffs would have

66 N. W. 1106.] been entitled to judfrment for the several

2 Taylor I-. Hoot, 4 Keyes.. 335 :" Hence, amounts of their share.*. . . . The same

a.« to eitlier of the jilaintiffs, if the de- principle is :i])idicable to a defence in the

An action for an accounting and reco er of he
found due ' a brought by three plaintiff ae/tin t tw
clefendantc; uncl r the following ircum tances . The five parti ·
had ntered int an agreement for he publication £ a new pap r:
the defendant wer to be th actual publish r , and to ha e harge
of t l e bu ines · and aft r paying all he ex:1 en e , th net r ue l. w re to b divided into fi e equal part , of which th def nclan were to retain two and one of the other ' thr e part hall
be paid b [defendants J in ca h to ea h of the other par i
o
thi agreement' - the plaintiff . The answer, be ide o her pamte <lef nc , ontained a ount r-claim cowi tin of a judgm nt
recov red by the def ndant R . a ain ·t the plaintiff H., and a ign cl to b th the cl fendant b f re the uit wa ommen d.
Thi counter- laim wa
t up a ·ain
th plain iff .H. al n .
Th
ew ork ourt of l peal b ld that al h u h the acti n
v ral · ncl
wa.· in form j int, y t the ri ht f a h pl in tiff w
a .·
ral judgm n cl clarin th um t ' hi h ea l wa en i 1 1
thin
firmly ·et 1 l than th
wa · nee · ary .2
tive Case.
<~monn

J

I [L banon
t am Laundry t•. Dy kman ( 1900 , Ky ., 57 . W. 227 ; Iurphy v.
'olto11 (196),4 kla. l 1, 44 Pa. 20 ;
'an Etten 11 • Ko.tr. ( 1 96), 4 .1.' L. 152,

G

i ••

a

2 Tn,Jor1· I oot,4 Key .. 1.'35: " Jle11t·P,
to C'itltr·r of th,. plaintiff~, if be d -

\\'.
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general rule, that in the absence of a statutory provision to the

contrary, where an action is brought by a partnership on a claim

due the firm, no demand in favor of the defendant against one or

some of its members can be used as a counter-claim ; ^ but an ap-

parent exception to this rule has been admitted. If the business

had been carried on by one or more of the firm as ostensible part-

ners, a debt owing by him or them may be interposed as a counter-

claim, although all the members have united in the action. By

their mode of conducting the business, the ostensible partner or

partners had been held out to the world as the real firm, and they

could sue or be sued without joining the others as parties to the

proceeding.^ The case of a demand against the plaintiff or plain-

tiffs on the recoixi, and others who are not parties to the suit, being

pleaded as a counter-claim, has already been considered. It does

not present exactly the question now under consideration, but de-

pends for its solution upon the same general principles. It is

settled by the decisions, that a joint indebtedness or liability due

from the plaintiff and from others not parties to the suit cannot

be used as a counter-claim against the plaintiff, because such a
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cause of action cannot be severed and a judgment rendered against

a part only of the persons liable.^

nature of a counter-claim. . . . Tlie plain- S. D. 404, 64 N. W. 188 ; Folsom v. Pail-

tirt"s jiosition is undoubtedly correct, that ing (1899), 58 Neb. 478, 78 N. W. 926.]

where the cause of action is strictly joint, '^ Van Valen v. Russell, 13 Bar!). 590,

and the recovery, if had, is for the joint 592, per Edwards J. ; citing 7 Duruf. &

benefit of the plaintiffs, the defendant E. T. li. .361 (note c) ; Ec p. Enderby, 2

cannot set off or counter-claim tlie iiidi- Barn. & C.389; Smith ;•. Watson, 2 Barn,

vidua! debt of either plaintiff to defeat & C. 401. See also Rush v. Tliom[)son,

or reduce a joint recovery." Such, how- I12lnd. 158. " Where a factor dealing for

ever, was not the present case, because a principal, but coucealitig that ])riucipal,

there was no joint demand on the part delivers goods iu his own name, tiie jier-

of the plaintiffs. The counter-claim was son contracting with him laas a right to

therefore sustained. See also, as illus- consider him to all intents and purposes

trating the general conclusions of the text, as the principal; and though the real

Freeman v. Lorrillard, 61 N. Y. 612, 617; principal may appear and bring an action

Field (;. Hahn, 65 Mo. 417. upon that contract against the purchaser

1 Nipper v. Jones, 27 Mo. App. 538 ; of the goods, yet that purchaser may set

Peclc V. Snow, 47 Minn. 398; Morganthau off any claim he may have against the

r. King, 15 Col. 413. factor in answer to the demand of the prin-

I^Owsley r. Bank of Cumberland cipal;" per Lord Mansfield, in Rabone r.

(1902), Ky., 66 S. W. 33; Gotthauer v. Williams, 7 Durnf. & E. T. It. 360 (n.) ;

Cunningham (1896), 4 Okla. 551,47 Pac. followed in Hogan v. Shorb, 24 Wend.

479 ; Witherington v. Huntsman (1897), 64 458 ; Pratt ?•. Collins, 20 Hun, 126 ; Tanne-

Ark. 551, 44 S. W. 74; McDonald v. Mac- baum v. Marsellus (N. Y. City Ct. 1893),

kenzie (1887), 24 Ore. 573, 14 P.ac. 868; 22 N. Y. Suppl. 928.

Adams v. Baker (1898), 24 Nev. 162, 55 3 gee supra, § *754; Schubart ;-. Har-

Pac. 362; Sweeney v. Bailey (1895), 7 teau, 34 Barb. 447 ; Belknap u. Mclutyre,

g n ral rul , that in the ab en of a statut ry provi. ion to the
conLrary, wh r an a tion i ' br u ht by a partn r ·hip on a ·laim
due th firm, no demand in favor of th def nclant again t on r
som of it memb r ·an b u cl a a ounter-claim ; 1 but an apparent exc ption to thi rul ha,s been aclmitt d. If th bu. in ' 8
ha<l been carried on by one or more of the firm a ost n ·ible p, rtner , a debt owing by him or them may b interpo d a a count rcla.im, altl ough all the members have united in the action. By
their mode of conducting the bu ine , the o ten, ibl partner or
partner had been held out to the world as the real firm, ancl they
could ue or be sued without joining the others a parties to the
proceeding. 2 The case of a demand against the plaintiff or plaintiffs on the record, and otheri:; who are not parties to the suit, being
pleaded as a counter-claim, ha already been considered. It doe
not pre ent exactly the question now under consideration, but depends for its solution upon the same general principles. It is
ettled by the decisions, that a joint indebtedness or liability due
from the plaintiff and from others not parties to the suit cannot
be used as a counter-claim against the plaintiff, because such a
cause of action cannot be severed and a judgment rendered against
a part only of the persons lia.ble. 3
nature of a counter-claim . . . . The plaintiff's po ition is undoubtedly correct, that
where the cause of action is strictl y joint,
and the recovery, if had, is for the joint
benefit of the plaintiffs, the defeudant
cannot set off or counter-claim the individual debt of either plaintiff to defeat
or reduce a joint recovery."
uch, however, was not the pre ent case, because
there was no joint demand. on the part
of th e phtintiffs. The counter-claim was
therefore su, tained. See also, as illustrating the general conclusions of the text,
:Freeman v. Lorri llard, 61 N. Y. 612, 617;
Field v. Hahn, 65 Mo. 417.
1 Nipper v. Jones, 27 Mo. App. 538;
Peck u. Snow, 47 Minn. 398; Morganthau
1·. King, 15 Col. 413.
[Owsley v. Bank of Cumberland.
(1902), Ky., 66 S. W. 33; Gotthauer i:.
Cunningham ( 1896), 4 0 kla. !151, 4 7 Pac.
479; Witherington v. Huntsman (1897), 64Ark. 551, 44 S. W. 74; McDonald v. Mackenzie ( 1887), 24 Ore. 573, 14 Pac. 868;
Adam v. Baker (1898), 24 Nev. 162, 55
Pac. 362; Sweeney v. Bailey {1895), 7

S. D. 404, 64 N. W. 188; Folsom v. Pailing (1899), 58 Neb. 478, 78 N. W. 926.J
2 Van Valen v. Ru ell, 13 Barb. 590,
592, per Edwards J.; citing 7 Durnf. &
E.T. R. 361 (note c); E-c p. Enderby, 2
Barn. & C.389; Smith r. Watson, 2 narn.
& C. 401. See a lso Ru h v. Thompson,
112 Ind. 158. "Where a factor dealing for
a principal, but concealing that principal,
delivers goods iu his owu name, the person contracti11g with him ha a right to
con ider him to all intents and pnrpos ~s
as the principal; and though the r eal
principal may appear aud bring au acti o11
upon that contract against the purchaser
of the good , yet that purchaser may set
off any claim he may have against the
factor in answer to the demand of the principal; " per Lord Mansfield, in Rabone v.
Williams, 7 Durnf. & E.T. U. 360 (n.) ;
followed in Hogan v. Shorb, 24 Wend.
458; Pratt v. Collins, 20 Huu, 126; Taunebaum v. Marsellus (N. Y. City Ct. 1893) ,
22 N. Y. Suppl. 928.
3 See supra, § * 754; Schubart v. Harteau, 34 Barb. 447; Belknap v. Mcintyre,
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7~ I. Sev e ral Judgment between Some of

t~1e P arties.

J5 633. * 757. Several Judgment between Some of the Parties.

Conflict of Opinion.

Inquiry Presented herein. Conflict of Opinion. Upon the general

· n ·al

question, When can a several judgment be rendered between some

of the parties to an action ? there has been much contiict 01 judi-

cial opinion, and discrepancy of decision. It resolves itself into

l 'lOil .

the broader inquiry, How far has the common-law doctrine of

joint rights and liabilities been changed by the new procedure ?

The judges of one school have denied any modilication in these

legal notions, and have restricted tlie language of the statute to

equitable proceedings. Another school have gone to the opposite

extreme, and liave declared the ancient rules as to joint right and

liability to be utterly abolished, so that a severance among the

plaintiffs or defendants in the recovery may be had in all cases.^

2 Abb. Pr. .3G6 ; Myn(ler.se v. Snook, 1

Lans. 488; Spofford v. Kowan, 124 N. Y.

108 ; McCulloch t: Vibbard, 51 Hun, 227 ;

Ingols V. Plimpton, 10 Col. 5-35 ; Wood

V. Brush, 72 Cal. 224. Contra in Iowa.

q mr
th comm n-law l ctrin
f
join ri h an l liabiliti ·
n hang cl b th n w pr cedur ..,
Th judg
cho 1 hav d niecl any m dificati n in the ·e
legal no ion and hav re trict d he lan 0 ua · f he · t~ ut to
bl l ro cling .
n t h r ·hool ha,,· one to th oppo i
x r m and have de lare l the ancient rul s a: o joint ri ht an
liability to b u terly aboli he l
that a · verance am n the
plaintiff. or defen lant in the r coyery may be had in all ca e .1

r

i
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Redman v. Malvin, 23 Iowa, 296; and in

North Carolina, Sloan v. McDowell, 71

N. C. 356-3.58 ; Neal i-. Lea, 64 N. C. 678 ;

Harris v. Burwell, 65 N. C. 584. This

ruling is not based upon any peculiar

stature, but upon the general provision of

the code, § 248, that a " judgment may be

given for or against one or more of sev-

eral plaintiffs, and for or against one or

more of several defendants ; " which is

the same as found in all the other codes.

Where, in Kentucky, an action was com-

menced against a resident of the State by

a uon-rcsident firm, a demand against one

of the plaintiffs \va.s allowed as an equita-

ble set-off or counter-claim, because the

defendant could not sue upon it in that

State. Wallenstein v. Selizman, 7 Bush,

175. Where the subject of the counter-

claim is a tort for which each and all of

the wrongdoers are liable, it is no ob-

jection that the tort was committed by a

firm composed of the plaintiffs and others

not parties to the suit. Walker v. Johnson,

28 Minn. 147.

^ See Cowles v. Cowles, 9 How. Pr.

301. The action was brought by two

jjlaintiffs upon a promissory note, made

payable to them on demand. The defend-

ant alleged facts tending to show that the

note was the sole property of the plaintiff,

C, and .'Stated a demand in his own favor .

against C, in every respect proper and

sufficient to constitute a counter-claim, if

the latter had been the only plaintiff.

This answer having been struck out on

motion, the General Term, upon apjieal,

pronounced it a valid counter-claim, and

available to the defendant as pleaded.

Two questions, it was said, are raised.

" First, in an action upon contract by two

or more plaintiffs, can one of them have

judgment in his favor, the evidence estab-

lishing the cause of action in him alone ?

Secondly, if so, can the defendant, upon

showing the cause of action to be solely in

the one plaintiff, avail himself of a set-off

against that plaintiff in a case where he

would have had the right to do so had the

action been commenced by thai plaintiff

2 Abb. Pr. 366; :\Iynder e v. nook,
Lan . 4 ; poffonl v. J owan, 124 N . Y.
10 · !Ile ulloch v. Vibbard, 5 1 Hun, 22i;
Ingols v. Plimpton, 10 ol. 535 · Wood
i·. Brn h 72 Cal. 2:24.
Contra in Iowa,
Redman v. Malvin, 23 Iowa, 296; and in
orth
arolina ' loan v. :McDowell, i l
. C . 356-:35 ; .,.ea! 1: . Lea, 64 N . C . 67 ;
Harri v. Burwell, 65 N. C. 5 4.
Thi
ruling i not ba ed upon any peculiar
tatnte, but upon the g e neral provi ion of
the cocle, 2-1 , that a" jutlgment may be
gi,·en for or ag ain t one or more of e,·.
ral plaintiff , ancl for or again t one or
more of e eral defendant ; " which i
the am e a · found in all th oth er ode .
Wher , in Kentucky an act ion wa. comm enced aO'ain ta re:icleut of the . tate by
a non-r id nt firm, a d mand again t one
of the plaintiff ' w a; allowed a an eq ui table et- ff or couuter-clai m, becau. th e
d efendant oultl uot ue up n it io that
'ta te. Walle n te in v. ' elizman, 7 Bu ·h,
175. \ h re the ubj ect of the ounter"laim i a tort f r whi ch a ch and all of
t he wrong doer are ilable, it i no objection th a t th tort wa
mmitt d by a
firm comp os d f th plaintiff and other
no t p a rti to th uit. \ alk r v. John on,
~ :\li o n. 14"7 .
1 , •e C'owl e" v.
owle , 9 How. Pr.
3G l .
T he action wa b ro ug ht by tw
plaintiff upon a promi. ~o ry not , mad
payable to them on demaucl. T he cl ef •tHla11t alle!{P<l fa('t.' teuclin"' to . how that tlte
uotf' w:i tlte ·ol property of th plaint iff,
., and tatr·d a d ·1uau 1 iu hi own fa,·o r 1

a ain t C., in every r e pect p r pe r and
ufficient to con titute a counter- ·I im. if
the latter had been the ooh plaintiff.
Thi an ·wer having be n ~ tru c k ut ou
motion, the General Term, upou app al,
pronounced it a valid ounter-daim, and
available to the d fendant a pleaded.
Two que tion , it wa a id, are rai d .
' Fir t, in an action upon con ract by two
or mor e plaintiff , cau one of th m J aye
judgment in hi fav r, the eYiden e e tabli hrnrr the cau e of action in him alone?
econdly, if o, can the defendant, upo n
howing the cau ·e of action to be lely in
t he on plaintiff, avail him elf of a t - ff
aga in. t that plaintiff in a ca. e wher he
w uld have bad the right to do o bad the
a ction been ommenced by that pl iutiff
alone ? " .Ooth of th e e que tion were
an:::wered in tile affirmatiY . I t wa , aid
that the new pro edure ext nded the rule
of quity t a ll legal acti n , and
far
abrogat d the leO'al notion f joint right
and liability: that th . ection permittiooa jud ment "t be given fo r r a"'ainst
one or mor of
,. ral plaintiff , nd fo1·
r aO'ain tone or m or of . v ral d fend-

ri g ht n d upon i · , ,. ral, and not
jlJ int ; an cl that, a~ ,-era! jutl rrme nt b innt hu · macl e po ible, th c n ·lu ion a to the
prnpri ty of t he ounter-claim ag in. t on
plaint iff foll owed in ,·itably from th e x pre . la n!,! uage of he tat utc . In oth •r
worrl , 110 matt r what h h fo r m of the
a('tiun, a lthough th· plaiu tiff · han• alle...,ed
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This loose or liberal interpretation has, however, been utterly' re-

pudiated by other eases, whieli, as it seems to me, establish, by a

very decided preponderance of judicial authority, the doc-trine as

now generally accepted in those States whose codes compose the

two groups mentioned at the commencement of the section.^ The

doctrine established by these decisions is, that if the demand in

suit was originally joint and several, although the action upon it

is joint, and a fortiori if it was several, a several judgment miyhl

a joint riglit in themselves, the defendant

may controvert this Jillegation, show a

several right in one of them alone, and

This loo e or liberal interpr tation ha·, h we
pudiated by other ca e ·, \ hich a it 'e m.· to
clodri11, a:
very d ided prepond ranc of jucli ·ial authorit
now g nerally acce ted in tho e 'tate · who ·c ·ocl .· · mpo. , t,}p
t wo groups men tion d at the comm nc m nt of th
ction .1 Th~
doctrine established by the, deci ·ion· i., that if th· c1 'mand in
suit wa originally joint and sev ral, although the a ·tion up m i
i joint, and a fortio ri if it wa several, a ·evern.l judgm nt mit1ht

interpose a counter-claim against that one.

This decision, it will be noticed, does not

go to the length of holding that, when two

or more plaintiffs sue upon a legal right

which is confessedly joint, the deteudaut,

while admitting this joint cause of action

and the union of all the plaintiffs therein,
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may assert a coniiter-claim against one, or

some of them less tliau all. The reasoning

of the learned judge seems logically to lead

to that result, for it argues that a several

judgment is possible in all cases upon con-

tract ; and, if possible, the counter-claim is

expressly permited. See also the dicliiin

of Folger J. in Simar t'. Canaday, 53 N. Y.

298, 301. The same construction is given

to the provision in North Carolina. Sloan

V. McDowell, 71 N. C. 356, 357; Neal v.

Lea, 64 N. C. 678 ; Harris v. Burwell, 65

N. C. 584.

^ A few cases will illustrate this pre-

vailing doctrine. In Mynderse v. Snook,

1 Lans. 488, 491-493, the court discusses

the general doctrine of joint and several

liabilities and judgments ; and from its

able opinion I make the following ex-

tracts : " The demand which the defend-

ants had was against the plaintiff and V.

jointly as partners and joint contractors

with them. It was for damages arising

from an alleged breach of the contract by

these two partners. This claim, as is ap-

parent, was not against tlie plaintiff, but

against the firm of which lie was an indi-

vidual member. Properly there could be

no several judgment between the parties

to this action on account of tl)at claim.

It was not upon its face or in law a claim

against a plaintiff individually. This is

the test (Code, § 150). It was a partner-

ship debt if a demand existed. Partners

are not joint and several debtors, but joint

debtors only. Nothing is better settled

than the general rule tliat a creditor of a

partnersiiip is not entitled, as matter of

law, to bring a separate action, and have

a separate judgment, against one of the

several partners when tiieyare all living "

The court then examined and criticised

certain cases relied upon by the duli; ad-

ants. The language of Ingrahani J. in

Schubart v. Harteau, 34 Barb. 447, was

declared to be a mere dictum, and its cor-

rectness as such was pointedly denied.

Briggs V. Briggs, 20 Barb. 477, and Par-

sons V. Nash, 8 How. Pr. 454, were dis-

tinguished from the case at bar. The

a joint ri g ht in t hemselves, the defendant
may controvert thi all egation, show a
se veral rig ht in one of t hem alone, and
interpo e a co unter·claim against that one.
Thi s dee isiun, it will be noticed, doe not
go to the length of holding that, when two
or more plain t iffs sue u pon a legal r ight
whi ch is confessedly join t, the defendant,
while adm itting t his joint cause of action
and the union of all the plaintiffs therein,
may asser t a counter-claim against one, or
some of th em less t han all. T he rea on ing
of the learned judge seems logically to lead
t.o that result, fu r it a rgues t hat a several
judg ment is possible in all cases upon contract ; and, if possible, t he counter-claim is
expressly permi ted. S ee also the dictum
of F olger J . in Sima r v. Canaday, 53 . Y.
298, 301. The sam e constru ction is g iven
to the provision in N or th Carolina. Sloan
v. McDowell, 71 N. C. 356, 357 ; Neal v.
L ea, 64 N. C. 678 ; H arris v. Burwell, 65
N. C. 584.
1 A few cases will illustrate this p revailin g doctrine. 1n Mynd erse v. Snook,
l Laos. 488, 491-493, the court d i cus es
t he gener al doctrine of j oint a nd several
li abili ties and judgments; a nd fro m its
able opini on I m ake the foll ow ing ext racts: " The demand whi ch the defenda nts had was against the plaintiff and V.
join tly as partners an d joint contractor
with them. It was fo r damages arising
from an alleged breach of t he contract by
these two partners. T his claim, as is apparent, was not against the plaintiff , but
against the firm of which he was an individual member. Properly there could be
no several judgment between the parties
to this action on account of that claim.
It was not upon its face or in law a claim
again;;t a plaintiff individually. Thi:; i
the test (Code,§ 150). It was a pnrtnership debt if a demand existed. Partuer

are not joint and several debtor , hnt joint
debtor only.
othing i better ttled
than the general rul that a creditor of a
partnership i not entitled, as matter of
law, to bring a separate action, and ha,·e
a eparate judgment, again f one of th
several partuers when they are all lh·iug"
The court then examined and critici ed
certain ca e relied upon by tbe lie 'cuJant. . The language of Ingraham .J. in
chubart v. Harteau, 34 Barb. 44i, wa
declared to be a mere dictum, and it corr ectness as uch was pointedly denied.
Brigg- v. Briggs, 20 Barb. 4 77, and Parsons v. r a h, 8 How. Pr. 454, were di:::tinguished from the case at bar. The
poin t of di tiuction in both was the fact
that the l iability of the defendant therein
was several a well a joint; so that a
several jutlgment again t each of them
would have been po ible. "The grounds
of t hese deci ion ," the court continue ,
"were u ndoubtedly correct if the demand
on which the action was brouO'ht wa everal as well as joint, so that the plaintiff
m ight have had a everal judgment in the
action again t either defeudaut. It fulfi lled, in that view of it, precisely the requirement of the code. Neither of the. e
ca es supports the dictum in Schnbart v.
Harteau. Accordiug to the rul there
laid down, the right to iuterpo e aud
p rove a demand by way of counter-claim
depend upon the manner and form of the
pleadings in the action, rather than upon
the general principle of the law. Thi ,
J ?,m sure, i not the true meaning I · 150
of the code. By that ection, the demand
must be of such a nature ancl character,
that, upon the general rule and principle
of Jaw, a . everal judgment m:i.'·
hall
upon it in the action. Jf it is not .uch, the
party offering it i · not entitled to use it
in that way."

s
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have been recovered, and the counter-claim against part of the

jjhiintiffs, or in favor of a part of the defendants, is possible : when

the demand in suit is originally joint, a severance is impossible.

§ 634. * 758. (2) In Favor of One or Some of the Defendants.

Settled Rule herein. In the following cases the counter-claim

was interposed by one or some of the defendants against the single

plaintiff, or all tlie plaintiffs if more than one. The same general

principles of joint and several right and liability control this class

of actions and the one just considered, and the same decisions are

authorities in both.^ The rule is settled that, in an action against

defendants who are joint contractors and jointly liable, a separate

judgment against one or more less than all is not possible except

in a few special personal defences ; that in an action, though joint

in form, against defendants who are joint and several contractors,

and a fortiori against defendants who are severally liable, such a

separate recovery may always ba had. The doctrine thus stated

has been applied to the case of defendants sued upon a bond in

terms joint and several.^
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^ Peabody v. Bloomer, 5 Duer, 678,

679, per Wouilruff J. ; s. c. sab noin. Pea-

body V. Beach, 6 Duer, 53 ; 3 Abb. Pr.

353. The same construction was fifiven to

the statute by Mr. Justice Marvin, and

applied to the admissibility of a counter-

claim, in Parsons v. Nash, 8 How. Pr.

h Y b n rec Y rel and th
unter- laim
I art of the
ibl : \ h n
plc intiff ·, r inf, Y r f < part f th cl f
ibl .
the demand in nit i ri inall - j >int a
634 .
7- .
In Favor of One or Some
Settled Rule herein. In h
w· int rp d by n r
in0 le
laintiff r all th plain iff if m re th n one.
, m geneml
principle f j in and ,-eral ri 0 ht an liabili y ontr 1 thi' la '
f tin and the m jut n ider cl, encl he am d i i n ar
authoriti in b th. 1 r he rul i e tl d that in an acti n again t
cl f ndan ' \Yho ar /oint ontractor and jointl liabl , a ep rate
jud ment ag in t on r mor 1 ss than all i no t p ibl ex ep
in few p cial r nal def nee·· that in an a ion, thou h joint
in f rm, a0 ain t def ndant wh are y'oint and several on tractor ~
an a fortiori a , in defendant · who are e erally liable, u h a
p rat r COY ry m y alway · b.., had. Th d ctrine thu tat cl
ha b en appli d to the ca of defendant . u d upon a b nd in
term joint and everal. 2

454 ; and as his reasoning has been fre-

quently approved, and his conclusions

.adopted by other-courts, I shall ijuote his

opinion, not as a binding authority, — fur

it was delivered at Si)ecial Term, — but

as an argument. The three makers of a

joint and .several note, H., N., and P.,

were sued in a joint action, H. being the

principal debtor, and the others his sure-

ties. The answer was a counter-claim of

a judgment in favor of II. alone against

the plaintiffs lor an amount greater than

t'le sum secured by the note. It wa.s ad-

mitted on the trial; and the plaintiffs

moved to set aside the verdict. After

referring to § 150, the judge proceeds:

*' The counter-claim is to be a claim ex-

isting in favor of a defendant and against

a plaintiff between whom a several judg-

ment might Ite bad in the action. This

clearly indicates that there may be cases

where the set-off or counter-claim m.ay

not be due to or iii favor of all the de-

fendants ; and to ascertain between whom

a several judgment may be had in the

action, we must look to other ]>rovisions

1 P eabody i:. Bloomer 5 Duer, 6i ,
679, per Wood ruff J .; . . sub nom. Peabody v. Beach, 6 Duer, 53 ; 3 Abb. Pr.
.353. The ame con truction wa given to
the tatute by Mr. Ju t ice Marvin, and
applied to the admi ibili ty of a counterclaim, in Par on v. Na h,
How. Pr.
4 54; and a hi r ea oning ha been frequently appro\·ed, aud hi conclu ion
adopt d by other .cou rt , I shall qu te hi
opin i n, not as a binding aut hority, - for
jt w del ivered at pecial T rm, - buG
, an argument. Th e three mak r
fa
j >int and . everal n te, H., N., and I .,
were . ue<l in a joint action, H. bein<Y the
]Jrinci pal deb tor, aud the th r hi . ur t ie·. The an::wer wa. a counter- claim of
a j u lv1 nent in farnr of II. al ne again t
th..: pbintiff for a11 amount r at r than
t 1<' : u m s r nr <I hy ti c note. I t wru atlmitted on the tri, I; and the plaintiff
rncJ\"Pcl t1J et a irl e the Y rrlict. After
referriug t . 150. th jndg pr ('e d :
" T h· 1·ount r-daim i. to be a claim x-

fondant ; and to a certain between whom
a everal judgment may be had iu the
action, we mu t look to othe r provi ion
of the ode, particularly §§ 136 and 214.
In my opinion, in an an wer pr per for a
et.off or
unter- laim agaiu t everal
defendant severally li able, or jointly and
everall.lf liabl e, any on of them may
av;1i l him elf f hi
et-off or ounterlaim, or any number of the d fondant ·
to whom th
et-off or ouuter- laim i
tber -

1

of the code, particularly §§ 136 and 274.

In my opinion, in an answer proper for a

set-off or counter-claim against several

defendants severaUi/ liable, or jointly and

severallji liable, any one of thera may

avail himself of his set-off or counter-

claim, or any number of the defendants

to whom the set-off or counter-claim is

jointly due may avail themselves there-

of." On the general subject of counter-

claims in favor of all or a part of the

defendants, see also Batligate v. Haskin,

59 N. Y. 533, 539, 540 (in an action to

foreclose a mortgage made to secure a

joint bond given In' the mortgagor and

A. as his surety, a debt due from the

plaintiff to the mortgagor is a good

or ('1Ju11ter-cl im m, y
no t be due tu or i'1 farnr of all the d -

ha.
th
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§ 635. * 759. Where Partnership may be sued in Firm Name.

Illustrative Cases. A peculiar question has arisen in tliose States

whose codes permit a partnership to be sued l)y its firm name.

]n such an action, a counter-claim in favor of all the persons

actually composing the firm may be pleaded and proved, although

it discloses the existence of partners who had not been mentioned

as such in the petition or complaint.^ In an action upon an in-

junction bond executed by the plaintiff in an equity suit and

sureties, the principal defendant was permitted by the Kentucky

Court of Appeals to counter-claim damages sustained by himself

individually from the wrongful acts of the plaintiff committed

while the injunction was in force.^ As one of two or more joint

debtors cannot rely upon a demand due to him separately, upon

the same principle a defendant cannot interpose a counter-claim

in favor of himself and another, or others jointly who are not

parties to the suit.^ Bonds having been issued in the name of a

town in aid of a railroad under color of statutory proceedings, the

town brought an equitable suit against all the holders thereof to

have the proceedings declared void, and the bonds themselves can-
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celled. One of the defendants individually set up as a counter-

claim a debt to himself from the town for money loaned. This

answer was overruled on the merits, the court holding that it did

not fall within the definition of any species of counter-claim.

The omission to rest the decision upon the obvious ground, if it

same effect, Briggs v. Briggs, 20 Barb. ^ Tinsley v. Tinsley, 15 B. Mon. 454.

477, 479 ; Gordon v. Swift, 46 lud. 208, Altliough the particular question under

209; Johnson?;. Kent, 9 Ind. 252 ; Blau- discussion was not alluded to hy the

kenship v. Rogers, 10 Ind. 333; Knour v. court, its very silence must be taken as an

Dick, 14 Ind. 20; Utley r. Foy, 70 N. C. admission that such a counter-claim in

303 ; Newell v. Salmons, 22 Barb. 647 ; favor of one defendant was proper.

Perry v. Chester, 12 Abb. Pr. n. s. 131, ^ Stearns v. Martin, 4 Cal. 227, 229;

133. If, however, the defendants are Hopkins v. Lane, 87 N. Y. 501 ; Proctor

joint debtors, no such counter-claim is v. Cole, 104 Ind. 373 ; but see Seaman v.

admissible. Pinckney v. Keyler, 4 E. 1). Slater, 49 Fed. Rep. 37 (when one of the

Smith, 469 ; Slayback v. Jones, 9 Ind. owners of a vessel is sued for the entire

§

635.

~'

759.

Where Partnership may be sued in Firm Nam e.

A p uliar que Li n h< B ari · n in th e 'tatl' ·
who code p rmit a partn rhif Lu l> ,'u d hy it · firm mun .
In u h an a ti n, a ount r-claim in fa r of all th p r n
.a tually comr o in 0 the firm may b I 1 ade l and 1 r ve<l, although.
it li lo s the xistence of partner who had not b en m ntion
a uch in the .I etition or complaint.1 In an acti n upon an injunction bond executed by the plaintiff in an quity uit and
sureties, the principal def ndant was permitted by the K ntucky
Court of Appeal to counter-claim damag s u tain d by him elf
individually from the wrongful acts of th plaintiff committed
whil the injunction was in force. 2 As one of two or more joint
debtors cannot rely upon a demand due to him parately, upon
the ·ame principle a defendant cannot interpose a counter- ·laim
in favor of himself and ·another, or others jointly who are not
pa.rtie3 to the sui t. 3 Bonds having been i sued in the name of a
town in aid of a railroad under color of statutory proceeding , the
town brought an equitable suit against all the holder.:; thereof to
have the proceedings declared void, anrl the bonds themselves cancelled. One of the defendant· incli vidually set up as a counterclaim a debt to himself from the town for money loaned. Thi
.an wer was overruled on th@ merits, the court holding that it did
not fall within the definition of any species of counter-claim.
The omi sion to rest the decision upon the obvious ground, if it
Illustrative Cases.

470; Roberts i'. Donovan, 70 Cal. 108; amount of damages, resulting from the

Mortimer v. Chambers, 63 Hun, 335 ; breach of a charter-party, and is to be

Coleman v. Elmore (Ore.), 31 Fed. Rep. compelled to pay the entire sum, he can

391 (action against partners). setoff the amount due upon the charter-

[[Murphy i'. Colton (1896), 40kla. 181, party). Where the plaintiff brought suit

44 Pac. 208; Brodek r. Farnum (1895), 11 against two defendants, and the action

"Wash. 565,40 Pac. 189 ; Adams v. Baker failed against one, it was held that a joint

(1898), 24 Nev. 162, 55 Pac. 362 ; Sweeney demand in favor of the defendants could

r. Bailey (1895), 7 S.D. 404, 64 N. W. 188.^ not be setup as a counter-claim: Cope-

1 Bird V. McCoy, 22 Iowa, 549. land v. Young, 21 S. C. 275.

56

same effect, Briggs v. Briggs, 20 Barb.
477, 479; Go rd on v. Swift, 46 Ind. 208,
209; Johnson v. Kent, 9 Ind. 252; Blankenship v. R ogers, 10 Ind. 333; Knour v.
Dick, 14 Ind . 20; Utley v. Foy, 70 N. C.
303; Newell v. Salmons, 22 Barb. 6H;
Perry v. Chester, 12 Abb. Pr. N • . 131,
133. If, however, th e defendants are
joint debtors, no such counter-claim is
admis ible. Pinckney v. Keyler, 4 E. D.
Smith, 469; ~layback v. Jon es, 9 Ind.
4i0; Roberts '" Donovan, 70 Cal. 108;
Mortimer v. Chambers, 63 Hun, 335 ;
Coleman v. Elmore (Ore.), 3 1 Fed. Rep.
391 (action again t partner ) .
[Murphy v. Colton (1896), 4·0kln. 181,
44 Pac. 20 ; Brodek v. Farnum (1895), l l
Wash. 565, 40 Pac. 189 ; Adam v. Baker
(1898 ), 24 Nev. 162, 55 Pac. 362; weeney
v. Bailey (1895) , 7 S. D. 404, 64 N . W. 18 .]
I Bird v. McCoy, 22 Iowa, 549.

2 Tinsley v. Tin ley, 15 B. Mon. 454.
Although the particular question under
discussion was not allud ed to by th e
court, its very si lence mu t be tak en as au
admission that uch a counter-claim in
favor of one defendant was proper.
a Stearns v. Martin, 4 Cal. 227, 2~9;
Hopkins v. Lane, 87 N. Y. 501 ; J>roctor
v. Cole, 104 Ind. 373; but see Seaman v.
Slater, 49 Fed. Rep. 37 (when one of the
owners of a vessel is . ued for the entire
amount of damages, re ulting from the
breach of a charter-party, and i to be
rompelled to pay the entire , um, h can
et off the amount due upon the charterparty). Where the plaintiff brought ui t
against two defendant, , and the action
failed again t ne, it wa held that a j int
demand in favor of the defendant co uld
not 1 e set up as a ounter-claim : opclaud v. Youn g , 21 . . 2i 5.
56

882

!\'IL RE)IEDIE ' .

882

CIVIL REMEDIES.

existed, that a counter-claim in favor of one defendant was im-

proper, was a plain though silent admission that this objection

was untenable. In such an action a teparate judgment is not

only possible, but is, in fact, absolutely necessary.^

§ 636. * 7G0. Construction Given to Language of Iowa Code in

Musselman v. Galligher. As the lowa code is unlike that of any

other State in this respect, I quote somewhat f reel}' from a

case which gives a construction to its language, and ex-

plains its peculiar provisions. In an action against a husband

and wife jointly, three counter-claims or cross-demands were

pleaded as follows : (1) By both defendants jointly to recover

damages caused by the plaintiff's malicious prosecution of the

wife ; (2) by the husband alone to recover damages caused by

the malicious prosecution of his minor children ; (3) by the

husband alone to recover damages caused by the malicious

prosecution of himself. The judgment of the court, giving a

construction to the statute, and passing upon the validity of this

counter-claim, will be found in the foot-note.^

606.
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1 Venice v. Breed, 65 Barb. 597, 605,

■■^ Musselman i-. Galligher, 32 Iowa,

383, 389. There are, Jirst, " set-off," which

is an independent cause of action arising

on contract or ascertained bv the decision

of the court, and can be pleaded only in

. i ted that a counter-claim in favor £ one cl fendan wa rn a a plain thou 'h il nt admi
bjection
l r I er
'"a untenabl . In "Ll ·h an action a parat
n i no
nly po ibl but i in fa t ab olut l
.' 636. * 7 0. Construction Given to Language of Iowa Code in
Musselman v. Galligher.
he Iowa od i unlik that of any
other tate in this re p ct, I quot
om what freely from a
ive a on ruction to it languag , and exa e ' bi h
1 lain ' it p culiar provi i ns. In an action age. in ·t a hu band
and wife jointl - hree c unter- laims or cro. -demand were
1 l aded a folio' : (1) By both cl fondants jointl to r cover
lamage au eel by the plaintiff maliciou pro ecu ion of the
-n'if · (2) by the hn band alone to r cover lamage caused b the maliciou pro ecution of hi minor children· (3 by th
hu band alone to recover damag
can ed by the malicion
ro cution of him elf. The judgment of the court, gi' in a
construction to the statute, and passing upon the alidit of thi
counter-claim, will be found in the foot-note. 2

an action on contract ; secondli/, " counter-

1

Venice v. Breed, 65 Barb. 597, 605,

claim," which is a cause of action in favor

606.

of the defendants, or some of them, against

the plaintiffs, or some of them, arising out

of the contract or transaction set forth in

the plaintiff's petition as the foundation

of his claim, or connected with the sub-

ject of the action ; thirdli/, " cross-demand,"

which is a statement of am/ new matter

constituting a)ij/ cause of action in favor

of the defendant, or all the defendants, if

more than one, against tlie plaintiff, or (tU

the plaintiffs, if more than one, and which

the defendant or defendants might have

brought when the suit was commenced,

or which was then held, whether matured

or not, if matured, when pleaded. "The

' cross-demand ' is more comprehensive

than either the set-off or the counter-

claim. A set-off is only pleadable in an

action on a contract, and must itself arise

on contract. A counter-claim must ari.se

out of the cause of action, or be connected

therewith. A ' cross-demand,' however,

arises upon any independent cause of

action, whether on contract or tort. But

a 'cross-demand,' unlike a counter-claim,

nuisf exist in favor of all the defendants,

if there are more than one, and against all

the plaintiffs, if there are more than one.

This is the plain reading of the statute ;

so that, when there are several defend-

ants, a ' cross-demand ' in favor of one

only cannot be pleaded." Applying these

principles, the answer in question was

held to be wholly bad. The demands

Avere certainly not set-offs, since they

arose out of torts : they were not counter-

claims, because they did not arise out of,

nor were they connected Avith, the plain-

tiff's cause of action. If it is said tliey

were " cross-demands," they were inad-

missible, because they were in favor of

2 Mu elman v. Galligher, 32 Iowa,
3 3, 3 9. There are, jfrst," et-off," which

i an independent cau e of action ari ing
n contract or a certain d by the deci ·ion
of the court, and can be pleaded only in
an action on contract; condl.IJ, ' counterclaim," which i a cau e of action in favor
of th e defendant , or ome qf them, again t
the plaintiff , or ome qf them, ari ing out
of the contract or tran action et forth in
the plaintiff' p tition a the foundation
of hi " laim, or conne ted with the ubj ·t of the a tion; tliird(lJ, "er -demand,"
whith i a tatem nt of any new matt r
co11 tituting any cau,e f action in favor
of the defendant, r all the d fendant., if
m re than one, again t the plaintiff, or all
the plaintiff , if mor than on , and whi ·h
th defendant or defendant mio-ht ha>e
brought wh n the uit was commenced,
or which wa then held, wh ther matur cl
or no , if matured, wh en pl adecl. "The
'cro -demand' i. mur
ompr h n ive
than ither th . t-oft or th ·ount rdaim. A ;ct.-<1ff i on ly pl adabl in • n
a1·ticm on a ·cJutr. ct, and mu t it elf ari e
cm cont.raet. A ron11t r-claim mu. t ari
out <if the cau.-c c,f action, or lie c<muc:ctctl

therewith. A 'cro -d mand,' however,
ari e upon any independent cau e of
action, whether on contract or tort. But
a 'cro. -<lemand,' unlike a counter-claim,
mu t: exi t in favor of all the defendant ,
if there are more than one, and again tall
the plaintiff , if there are more than one.
Thi i the plain reading of the tatute;
so that, when there are everal defendant , a 'cro -demand' in favor of one
only cannot be pl acled." Applying the e
principles the an wer in que tion wa
held to be wholly bad. The demand
were certainly not ·et-off , ince the
aro e out of tort : they wer not counterclaims, b au they <lid not ari e out of
n r w re th y c nnected with, the plainau e of action. If it i
aid they
tiff
were "cro. -demand ," th y were inadmi ible, b au they were in farnr of
one defendant al ne. Th laim of dam-
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§ 637. * 761. Rules Established in most of the States. By tlu'

decisions which have been reviewed in the foregoing paraoiaplis,

§ 637. * 761.

Rules Establis h ed in most of the States.

By Llw

certain specific rules are clearly established for all the States

whose codes may he classed in either of the two general groups

mentioned at the commencement of this section. First, when

the defendants in an action are joint contractors, and are sued

as such, no counter-claim can be made available which consists

of a demand in favor of one or some of them. Secondly, when

the defendants in an action are jointly and fcverally liable, al-

though sued jointly, a counter-claim, consisting of a demand in

favor of one or some of them, may, if otherwise without objection,

be interposed. Thirdly, since it is possible, pursuant to express

provisions of all the codes, for persons severally liable to be sued

jointly under certain circumstances in a legal action, — tliat is, in

an action brought to recover a common money judgment, — a

t ounter-claira in favor of one or more of such defendants may be

pleaded and proved. Fourthly, in all equitable suits wherein

persons having different interests, and against whom different

reliefs are demanded, may be, and constantly are, united as co-
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defendants, a counter-claim existing in favor of one or more of

such defendants may be interposed, free from any objection based

entirely upon the situation of the parties. Fifthly, when two or

more persons have a /om^ right of action, and unite as plaintiffs

to enforce the same, a counter-claim cannot be admitted aoainst

one or some of them in favor of any or all the defendants.

Sixthly, when two or more persons have separate rights of action,

and they are properly united as plaintiff's in one action to enforce

these rights, a counter-claim may be set up against one or more

of them, as the case may be. Seventhly, if two or more plaintiffs

should bring an action joint in form, and should allege and claim

to recover upon a joint cause of action, — even a contract, — but

in fact the joinder was improper because as to some, or perhaps

all but one, there existed no right of action, a recovery could be

had in favor of the one or more who established a cause of action,

and the complaint be dismissed as to the others ; and it would

seem to follow as a necessary corollary that a counter-claim might

be interposed against the one or more of the plaintiffs under such

circumstances in whose favor a separate judgment could be ren-

dered. Lastly, in equitable actions, counter-claim, in favor of

one or some of the defendants, and against one or some of the

c ecision · whi h luwe been reYi we(l in ih foregoing parag1:apl1s
certain specific rules are clearly establi ·h cl for all tlic ~ta ks
'vho..: odes may l·e class d in eith ,r of th, two g ,11eml groups
mentioned at th commencement of this :-;ec;tion. Find, wlH•11
the defendants in an action are ,foint c:ontractors, <m<l are ,·ne<l
as such, no counter-claim can be made available whieh CClnsist:
1
of a demand in favor of on or some of them.
ec·onclly. wh ·n
the defendants in an action are Jointly and r<crrrr•ll,,1 lia hl , , lthough sued jointly, a counter-claim, con isting of a demand in
favor of one or some of them, may, if otherwise witl1ont ohjeetion,
Le interposed. Tkirdly, si11c it i. pos'"ible, pur:uant to e.·pres
provisions of all the codes, for persons severally liable to be u cl
jointly under certain circum 'tances in a legal action, - that, is, in
an action brought to recover a c.;ommon money judgment, - a
counter-claim in favor of one or more of such defendants may b
pleaded and proved. Fourthly, in all equitable suits wherein
persons having different interests , and against whom different
reliefs are demanded, may be, and constantly are, united as codefendants, a counter-claim existing in favor of one or more of
su 'h defendants may be interposed, free from any objection based
enti rely up::m the situation of the parties. F ifthly, when two or
more persons have a Joint rig ht of action, and unite as plaintiff
to enforce the same, a counter-claim cannot be admitted against
one or some of them in favor of any or all the defendants.
Si1:thly, when t wo or more persons have separate rights of action,
and they are properl y united as plaintiffs in one action to enforce
t hese rig hts, a counter-claim may be set up against one or mor
of them, as the case may be. Seven thly, if t wo or more plaintiff
should bring an action joint in form, and should allege and claim
to recover upon a joint cause of action , - even a contract, -- but
in fact the joinder was improper because as to some or p rhap
all but one, there existed no righ t of action, a recovery could b
had in favor of the one or more who established a cau e of action,
and t he complaint be disrnisseu as to the oth rs; and it would
seem to follow as a necessary corollary that a ounter- laim might
be interposed against the oue or more of the plaintiff· under u h
circnmstance. in whose favor a 'eparate judgment could be r ndered. Lastly, in equitable actions counter-claim in foyor of
one or some of the defendants, and against one or some of th

s
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plaintiffs, must be permissible as a general rule, since in equity

the common-law doctrine of joint right and liability does not

generally prevail, and separate judgments, or judgments confer-

ring separate relief, among the parties, are almost a matter of

course.

§ 638. * 762. Counter-claim may fail for "Want of Necessary-

plaintiff must b perm· ibl a a g n ral rul , mce m equi
h
ommon-1 w d ctrine f joint ri ht c; nd liabili y doe n t
·enerall
r ail and parat judgment , or judgment conf rarate r li f among th partie', re almo t a matter of

Parties, especially those of an Equitable Character. Illustrative Case.

Counter-claims otherwise proper may be inadmissible or ineffect-

ual for the want of the necessary parties before the court, since

the same rules as to parties must apply to them as would be ap-

* 76.;.i.

Counter-Claim may fail for Want of Necessary

Parties, especially those of an Equitable Character.

Illustrative Case.

plied if the facts alleged and the relief demanded were stated in a

complaint or petition as the basis of a separate action. This

objection will more frequently present itself in counter-claims

that are equitable in their nature. As the relief must be denied

to the plaintiff in an equitable action unless he has brought all

the necessary parties before the court, and mat/ be denied unless

he has brought in all the proper parties, and as tlie defendant

pleading a counter-claim is in the same condition as an ordinary

plaintiff, while the plaintiff against whom it is pleaded is in the
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position of an ordinary defendant, it follows, first, that the relief

demanded by the counter-claim must be refused if all the neces-

sary parties are not present ; and, secondly, that it may be refused

if any proper parties have been omitted. These propositions

require no argument or citation in their support. They result

inevitably from the fact that the counter-claim is in its nature

a cross-action, governed by the same rules which control a suit

when proceeding in the ordinary and direct manner. Several

examples of legal actions in which the counter-claim has failed

for want of the necessary parties have already been quoted ;

namely, those decisions in which counter-claims against the plain-

tiff in the action, and others jointly liable with him, or in favor

of the defendant and others jointly interested with liim liave been

overruled.^ A single additional authority will suffice to illustrate

a principle which really needs no illustration. In an action to

foreclose a mortgage, brought by an assignee thereof, the mort-

gagee not being a party to the»record, the defendants alleged, as

an equitable counter-claim, facts tending to show that the mort-

gage and the note secured by it were procured to be executed by

the mortgagee's fraud, and that the plaintiff' took with notice of

1 See supra, §§ * 754 et seq.

ount r- laim
therwi 'e proper may b inadmi ibl or ineff ctual f r he want f the n ce ary partie befor the court, inc
h am rul a to partie mu appl to th m a would be appliecl if he fact all g d and the relief <l mantled were tated in a
c mplaint or p titian a the ha i.· of a s parate acti n. Thi
objecti n will m re fr quently present itself in ounter-claim
that are equitable in their na ure. As the relief rnust be deni d
to the plaintiff in an equitable action unle he ha brought ll
the neces ary par ie before the c urt, and 1nay b denied unle
he ha brought in all the proper parti , and a the defendan
pleadino· a counter-claim is in the same condition a an ordinar
plaintiff while th plaintiff again t whom it i pleaded i in th
po ition of an ordinary defendant, i follow fir t that the relief
lemanded by the counter-claim 1nu t be refu ed if all the nee :sary partie are not pre ent · and, secon ly, that it 1nay be refu
if any proper partie have been omitted. The .. e propo ition'
require no argument or citation in their support. They re ult
inevitably from the fact that the counter-claim i in its natur
a era -action, gov rned by the ame rule which control a uit
wh n proceeding in the or linary and direct manner. Several
example of legal ac ion in which the counter-claim ha failed
for want of the nece ary parti hav alread b en uot
namely tho'e dee· ion in which counter-claims agair t th
tiff in th action, and oth r jointly liabl with him, r in favor
f the def ndant an other jointly int r t d wi h him have b 11
errul 1 A ingle ad · i nal authodt will uffice to illu rat "
a rinci le which r ally n d n ill ra,tion. I n an cti n t
f reel
a m rtg
bro ugh b , an ,
th r f, l
ag n t b in
h r c rd
f ndan
ll
, n equitable unt r- lai1 J
h w h t th
h n
hem rtgage
1
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the fraud, and prayed that the note and mortgage niiglit be can-

celled, and the plaintiff enjoined from enforcing them. The

court said: " It is evident that, if the allegations of this answer

were in the form of a complaint in a separate action asking that

the note and mortgage be surrendered and cancelled, the railroad

[the mortgagee] would be a necessary party defendant. The de-

fendant then could not set up the facts alleged in his answer as

a counter-claim in this action, for the reason that a new party

must be brought before the court." ^ In a few States this diffi-

culty is very properly met and obviated by express provisions of

their codes, which authorize the addition of new parties in order

that the relief demanded by the counter-claim or set-oif may be

granted.2

III. TJie Suhjcct- Matter of Counter- Claims, or the Nature of the

Causes of Action which may he pleaded as Counter- Claims.

§ 639. * 763. Introductory. This general subdivision is natu-

rally separated into three heads, which I shall proceed to examine

in the order stated. A. Nature of the subject-matter generally,

with special reference to the question whether the counter-claim

the fraud, and prayed that the not and mortgag mighL b ·a11c.;clle l, a.nd the r laintiff njoinecl from nfor ·ing th m. Tlie
court said: "It i vident that, if th all gation. f this an ·w ·r
were in th form of a complaint in a I ara.t acti n a king that
the note and mortgage be surr ncler d and can ell cl, th raihoa<l
[the mortgagee] would be a nee sary party cl f n<lant. Th defendant then could not t up the facts alleg cl in his an w r a:
a ounter-claim in this action, for the rea on that a n w party
must be brought before the court." 1 In a few , 'tate this difficulty is v ry properly met and obviated by express provi ion f
their cod s, which authorize the addit ion of new partie in ord r
that the relief demanded by the counter-claim or et-off may be
granted.2
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may be an equitable cause of action and may result in the gi-ant-

ing of equitable relief, or whether it must be restricted to legal

causes of action and reliefs. B. The particular questions which

III. The Silb}ect-Matter of Counter- Claims, or the Nature of the

arise under the first clause or brancli of the statutory definition.

C. Those Avhich arise under the second clause or branch of the

same provision.

A. Whether a Counter-Claimmayhe an Equitable Cause of Action,

a7id the Means of Ohtaining Equitahle Relief ; or whether it must

he restricted to Legal Causes of Action and Reliefs.

§ 640. * 764. An Equitable Counter-Claim may be interposed in

an Equitable or Legal Action. From the decisions cited in the

foot-note, the following doctrines and rules are clearly and firmly

1 McConihe v. Hollister, 19 Wis. 2G9. ally interested ; as, for example, tlie

See also Coursen v. Hamlin, 2 Duer, 51.3 ; grantor in the deed to be reformed. The

Cummings v. Morris, 2.5 N. Y. 625. But case of Hicks v. Sheppard, 4 Lans. 335,

see Du Font v. Davis, 35 Wis. 631, 640, which holds the contrary, was expressly

641, which holds that an equitable coun- di.sapproved. See also Pennoyer ?;. Allen,

ter-claim of reformation, and the like, 50 Wis. 308.

may be sustained, and the relief granted, - See these sections quoted at large,

witliont the presence of parties collater- ,s)/y)?-a, §* 584, note.

Causes of Action which may be pleaded as Counter- Claims.

§ 639. * 763. Introductory. This g enera,l subdivision is naturally separated into three heads, which I shall proceed to examine
in the order stated. A . Nature of the sul>ject-matter generally,
with special reference to the question whet.her the counter-claim
may be an equitable cause of action arnl may result in the granting of equitable relief, or whether it must be restricted to legal
causes of action and reliefs. B. The particular question. which
arise under the first clause or branch of the statutory definition.
C. Those which arise under the second clause or branch of the
same provision.
A. Whet her a Counter- Claim may be an Equitable Gause of Action,
and the M eans of Obtaining Equitable Relief~· or whether it must
be .r estricted to Legal Causes of Action and Reliflfs.

§ 640. * 764.

An Equitable Counter-Claim may be interposed in

From the decision' cited in the
foot-note, the following doctrines and rule are clearly and firmly
an Equitable or Legal Action.

l McConihe v . Hollister, 19 Wis. 269.
See also Cour en v. Hamlin, 2 Duer , 513 ;
Cummings v. Merri . , 25 N. Y. 625. But
see Du Pont v. Davis, 35 Wis. 631, 6'10,
641 , which holds tbat an equitable counter-claim of reformation, and the like,
may be ustained, and the relief g ranted,
witlion \; th e presence of partie collater-

ally in terested ; a , for xampl , the
granter in th e deed to be reformed. Th
case of Hicks v. , heppard, 4 Lan . 335,
which holds th e contrary, ,..,-as xpre 'sly
di. approved. , 'ee al o Pennoyer v. Allen ,
50 \Vi .; . .'30 .
:!

See the. c ections quoted at large,
* 584, note.

s1111ra , §
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established. In an equitable action, a counter-claim consisting of

an equitable cause of action, and demanding equitable relief, may

be interposed if it possesses all the other elements required by the

definition, and may, in many if not most cases, be pleaded by one

or more of the defendants less than all against one or more of

the plaintiffs. The language of the statute does not confine the

use of this afiirmative species of defence to legal actions, nor

require that it should necessarily be of a legal nature itself.

Adapting itself to the character of the action in which it is intro-

duced, in those which are legal it resembles, although much

broader and more comprehensive, the former set-off and recou}>

ment, wiiile in those which are equitable it often takes the place

of a cross-bill or complaint. In a le(jial action, also, an equitable

counter-claim may be set up and aftirmative relief may be granted

by its means. As the codes in express terms permit equitable

defences in such actions, and as in the self-same provision, and

by means of the same language, the statute authorizes the joining

of as many defences and counter-claims, whether legal or equitable^

or both, as the defendant may have, to deny the possibility of an
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equitable counter-claim in a legal action, would make it necessary,

if any consistency were preserved, to deny also the possibility of

an equitable defence. The courts, as may be seen from the cita-

tions made below, have, with a few unimportant exceptions, been

unu'illing to nullify the language, and defeat the design of the

legislature in this manner, and following its plain meaning and

import, they have freely admitted and sustained the equitable

counter-claim in all actions, whether legal or equitable, where

that form of relief was appropriate, and was authorized by the

descriptive terms of the statute.^

1 HicksviUe & C. S. B. R. Co. v. Long 490; Cavalli v. Allen, 57 N. Y. 508, 514.

Island H. Co., 48 Barb. 355, .360 ; Fi.sher See, per contra, that the counter-claim

r. Moolick, 13 Wis. 321 ; Sample r. Rowe, must always be a legal cause of a('tion,

24 Ind. 208 ; Lombard v. Cowham,' 34 Jones v. Moore, 42 Mo. 413, 419. Tlie

Wis. 486, 491,492, and cases cited, which following cases furnish additional exam-

show that in Wisconsin every equitable pies of equitable counter-claims. Lawe

defence mii.^t be a counter-claim. Vail v. i: Hyde, 39 Wis. 345 (no kf/al counter-

.lones, 31 Ind. 407 ; Charlton v. Tardy, 28 claim jjossible in an action of ejectment) ;

Lid. 452 ; l)u Pont v. Davis, 35 Wis. 631, Stowell v. Eldred, 39 id. 614 ; Perkins r.

639-641; Spalding r. Alexander, 6 Bush, Port Washington, 37 id. 177; Ingles r.

160; Jarvis v. Peck, 19 Wis. 74; Grimes Patter.«"^n, 36 id. 373; Glen & Hall Man.

V. Duzan, 32 Ind. 361 ; Woodruff v. Gar- Co. r. Hall, 61 X. Y. 226, 236; Cook v.

nor, 27 Ind. 4 ; lui.stman v. Linn, 20 Minn. Jenkin.s, 79 id. 575 ; Winslow v. Winslow,

·t bli ·h cl. In an equitable action, a unter-claim con i ting f
an qui abl cau e of a tion, and clemanclirg quitable r lief, may
be int rpo ed if it I os e e all the other 1 m nts requir cl by the
d finiti n, and may, in many if not mo t ·a ', b 1 lea led b ne
r more f the d f ndant...; le
than all again t one or mor f
th plaintiff ' . The language of the statute do · not confin the
f thi affirmative pecie' of defen e t 1 0 al action , n r
us
require that it 'hould nece"' arily be of a legal nature it elf.
Adapting it.. elf to the character of the a tion in which it i introduced, in tho e which are legal it r s mble ' , although mu ·h
broa 1 r and more comprehen ive, the form r et-off and recour ment, while in those which are equitable it often take the pla
of a cro -bill or complaint. In a legal action, also, an equitahl
counter-claim inay be set up and affirmative relief may be granted
by it mean . A the codes in expre terms permit equitabl
defence in such actions, and a in the elf-same provi ion, and
by mean of the ame language, the statute authorize the joinin 0 ·
f a many defence and counter-claims, whethe1· legal or equitabl ' ,
or both a the defendant may have, to d ny the pos ibility of an
equita.ble counter-claim in a legal action, would make it neces::;ary,
if an) com;i tency were preserved, to deny al::;o the possibility of
a.n equitable defence. The courts, a may be seen from the itations made below, have, with a few unimportant exceptions, been
un rilling to nullify the language, and defeat the design of th
legi ·le tu1'.e in thi manner, and following its plain meaning an 1
im1 urt, they h ve freely admitted and u tain d the equitabl
co unter-claim in all actions, whether 1 gal or eq uitabl , wh re
th t form of relief wa · appropriate, and wa authorized by the
le 'criptiYe term of the statute. 1

4.i3; Andrews v. Gillespie, 47 N. Y. 487, 52 Ind. 8; Ilinkle v. Margeruni, 50 id.

l Hi ksville & C. ·. B. R. Co. v. Long
J laud H. :o., 4 Barb. 355, 360; Fi ·her
v. M oli l·, 13 Wi . 21; • ample v. Rowe,
-+ Ind. 20 ; Lombard v. 'owham, 34
\ i. 4 6, 4'31, 492, antl ca e
itetl, whi h

how that i11 \ i. c n in e \· ry equitable
•lefc n ·e m11. t be a c unter-claim. Vail v.
.foue:,: 1 foil. 4G7; Charlt 11 v. Tar<l.r, 2
lucl . 45:l; l>u P on t t'. Da\·i" 35 \Vi" 631,
6:39-641 ; .'palcling v. Al xand r, 6 Bu b,
16 ; .Jarvi t'. l'e·k, 19 Wi. i4;
rim
I'. ] uzau, 32 Intl . 361; vVoo<lruff v.
arn<'r, ·.n Ju d 4; Ea trnan v. Linn, 20 l\1inn.
"' l1; A1111r w. i·. ' illc pi , 47 ~ . Y. 4 i,

490; Cavalli i:. Allen, 57 N. Y. 50 , 514.
ee, p r contra, that the counter- ·lairn
mu t alway b a legal cau ·e of a ti n,
Jone l'. Moor , 42 Mo. 4 13, 4 19. Th
following a: . furni h additional xampl
of quitabl
ou nter-claim . Lawe
i·. Hyd , 39 \Vi . . 345 (no legal
ount rlaim po ibl in an action of j tm u ) ;
dow 11 v. Eltlr tl, 39 iu. 614; P rkin l'.
Port W biugt n, 37 i<l. 177; Ing!
Patter. "n, 36 id. 373; 1 n & Hall ;\fan.
o. v. Hall, Gl ~'. Y. 226,236; C ok i·.
Jenkin , 79 id. 575; \Viu . l w ti. Win . low,
52 Intl.
; llinkl i: . l\larg rum , r-o i.l.
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7b5.

Limitation upon Equitable Relief Granted to Defend-

§ 641. 7<35. Limitation upon Equitable Relief Granted to Defend-

ant: in Actions of Equitable Character ; in Actions of Legal Character.

Doctrine Maintained by Supreme Court of New York. Illustrative

ant: in Acti ons of Equitable Character; in Actions of Legal Character.
Doctrine Maintained by Supreme Court of New York.

Illustrative

Case. Whether all alUnnative ec^uitable leUef granted to a de-

fendant must be Hmited to the cases in which a counter-claim is

possible, that is, whether a defendant is unable to set up a case

for equitable affirmative relief, and obtain a judgnient therefor in

his favor against the plaintiff, unless he can bring the facts con-

stituting his cause of action within some one of the species of

counter-claim defined by the codes, is another question.^ There

240; McManus r. Smith, 5;J id. 211 ; Gos-

sard V. JFerguson, 54 id. 519; Teiigue i'.

Fowler, 56 id. 569 ; Morrisou ?'. Kramer,

\Vhether all aflinna.ti v
q uitable reli ·f grctllt ·cl to a <ll'fendant must be limit 1 to th
s in whi ·h a c unt r- ·laim i.
po 'ible, that is, whether a d f ndant i: nnahl to ~ t n1 a 'lt.
for equitable affirmative r li f, and obtain a jmlo·m •nt th ref r m
l1is favor again t the plaintiff, unl ' he can bring tli fact ·011stituting his cau e of action within
m on of the .·p
of
1
counter-claim defined by th codes, i anoth r qu ·tion. Th r
Case .

58 id. 38 ; Tabor v. Mackee, 58 id. 290 ;

Conaway v. Carpenter, 58 id. 477 ; Jeffcr-

sonville," M. & I. II. Co. v. Oyler, 60 id.

383; Hamp,sou v. Fall, 64 id. 382 ; Schafer

V. Schafer, 68 id. 374 ; Movie v. Porter, 51
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€al. 639; Whedbee r. Reddick, 79 N. C.

521; Moser v. Cochrane, 13 Daly, 159;

Dempsey v. Rhodes, 93 N. C. 120; Boyd

V. Beaiuiiu, 54 Wis. 1 93.

Q^c<ilze»). Torrison (1903), 118 Wis. 315,

95 N. W. 114; Momsen v. Noyes (1900),

105 Wis. 565, 81 N. W. 860; Hotaling i:

Tecumseh Nat. Bank (1898), 55 Neb. 5,

75 N. W. 242; Maffett v. Thompson

(1898), 32 Ore. 546, 52 Pac. 565; Ber-

thold V. O'Hara (1893), 121 Mo. 88, 25

S. W. 845; Willis v. Barron (1898), 143

Mo. 450, 45 S. W. 289 : " It is the settled

law of. this court that an unsettled part-

nersliip account cannot be pleaded as a

counter-claim." Salladin i: Mitchell (1894),

42 Neb. 859, 61 N. W. 127 ; Lahiff v. Hen-

nepin County, etc. Ass'n (1895), 61 Minn.

226, 63 N. W. 493 ; Vaule v. Miller (1897),

C9 Minn. 440, 72 N. W. 452; Smith v.

Dickinson (1898), 100 Wis. 574, 76 N. W.

766 : meaning of equitable counter-claim.

A debtor of an insolvent bank has an

equitable right to set off a claim he holds

against the bank against his indel)teduess

to the bank, whether or not liis indebted-

ness lias matured at tlie time of the bank's

insolvency: Mercer v. Dyer (1895), 15

Mont. 317, 39 Pac. 314.

Matthews v. Weiler (1893), 57 Ark.

606, 22 8. W. 569 : Defendant, in order to

" get even " with plaintiff for alleged dam-

ages due to plaintiff furnishing a second

hand instead of a new soda-water gener-

ator, ordered certain other goods from

pLiintiff, and then refused to pay for

them, //p/f/, that in an action by plain-

tiff for tlie i)rice of tho.se goods, defendant

could not have an ecjuitable counter-claim

for the unliquidated damages connected

with the generator, even tiiough tlie

plaintiff was a non-resident and had no

property in the State. Ecpiity will not aid

fraud.]

1 ([Trester i\ City of Sheboygan (1894).

87 Wis. 496, 58 N. W. 747; Harden v.

Lang (1900), 110 Ga. 392, 36 S. E. 100 ;

Bell w. O her & Sons Co. (1900), 111 Ga.

668, 36 S. E. 904; FoUendore v. Follendore

(1896), 99 Ga. 71, 24 S. E. 407; Giles r.

240; lcManus v. o..:mith, 5:3 id. 211; Go anl 1·. Ferguson, 54 id. 519; Teague v.
:Fowler, 56 id. 569; Morri ·on v. Kramer,
58 icl. 38; Tabor v. Mackee, 5 Hi. 290;
Conaway v. Carpenter, 5 it!. 4i7; Jeffcronville, M. & I. n. o. v. Oyler, 60 icl .
383; Hampson v. Fall, 64 i<l. 382 ; Schafer
v. Schafer, 68 icl. 3i 4 ; Moy le v. Porter, 51
Cal. 6;39; Whedbee v. H.ecldick, 79 N. C.
52 l ; ~Ioser v. Cochrane, 13 Daly, 159 ;
Demp ey v. Rhodes, 9.'.J N. C. 120; Boyd
v. Beaudin, 54 'Vi . 193.
[:-=r, he 1•. Turri!'o11 ( l 90"J), 11 ;\ri . 315,
9.> X. W. 114; l\Iomsen v. Noyes (1900),
105 Wi::;. 565, 81 N. W. 860; Hotaling i'.
T ecumseh Nat. Bank (189 ), 55 Neb. 5,
75 N. W. 242; Maffett t'. Thompson
(1 98), 32 Ore. 546, 52 Pac. 565; Bertholu v. O'Hara (1893), 121 Mo. 88, 25
S. W. 845; Willis v. 13arron (1898), 143
Mo. 4.50, 45 S. W. 2 9: "It is the settled
hw of this court that an unsettled partner hip account cannot be pleaded as a
counter-claim." Salladin i·. ~fitehell (1894),
42 Neb. 859, 61 N. W. 127; Lahi:ff 11. Hennepin County, etc. Ass'n ( l 95 ), 61 Minn.
.226, ti3 J.. • W. 493; Vaule v. l\liller (189i),
69 Minn. HO, 72 N . W. 452; Smith v.
Dickin on (1898) , 100 Wis. 574, 76 N. W.
766: meaning of equ itable counter-claim.
A debtor of an insolvent bank has an
equitable right to set off a claim he holds
against the hank against hi inuebtednes
to the bank, whether or not his iudehted.ne · ha matured at the time of the bank'
in olvency: Mercer v. Dyer (I 95), 15
Mont. 317, 39 Pac. 314.
Matthews i•. Weiler (1893), 57 Ark.
606, 22 S. W. 569 : Defendant, in order to
"get even" with plaintiff for alleged dam.ages due to plaintiff furnishing a econd

hand instea<l of a new ocla-water g nerator, ord r <l eertain other good:s from
plaintiff, ancl then refu ed to pay for
them. llr4d, that in an action by plaintiff for the priC" of those good., def 11da11t
could not have an quitable counte1·-dairn
for the n11liqniclatecl damages connected
with the generator, eYeu though th
plaintiff was a 11011-resident and had no
prnperty in the 'tate. Equity will not aid
fraud.]
1 [Tre terv. City of
heboygan ( 1 94 ).
. W. 747; Harden 1•.
7 Wis. 496, 5
Lang ( 1900), 110 Ga. 392, 36 . E. I 00 ;
Bell v. Ober & ou Co. ( 1900), 111 a.
66 , 36 S. E. 904; Follenclore v. Follendor
(1896), 99 Ga. 71, 24 . E. 407; Gile 1•.
Bank of Georgia (1 97), 102 Ga. 702, 29
S.E.600;Dal,rv.Brenna11(l 94), ; " i -.
36, 57 I. W. 963; Richardson v. Doty
(1835), H Neb. 73, 62 N. W. 254.
See Arm tronO' i" Mayer (190.'l), :Xeh. - , 95 [ . \V. 51, from whith th following quotation is made: "A con,;idcrable portion of the plaintiff's argumC'nt in
this conrt i deYoted to the propo.' ition
that the claim for damag . set np h.'· thC'
defemla11t· are not a,·aila.ble 8.$ counterclaims under ::;ecLions 100, 101, od Ci,-.
Proc., and w re not maiutai11ahle in th
present cause for that rca on. Bnt we
think a defendant in an action i. 11 t restri ted to the counter-claim ])l'O\"id d fur
in aicl sectious, hut, in a prop r ca,-c,
may seek affirmati,·e relief eith r again t
the plaintiff or again t co-defendant:. ThP
code of thi
tate c n tain. no prm·if:io11,..
with reference to cro ~-p tition . X 'crthele , the practice of filing them ha:long obtained iu thi juri clictio11, and the
right to bring a cro - uit auxiliarx to a11<l
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are decisions which answer tliis question in the afl&rmative, and

hold that all such relief must be denied unless the defendant's

cause of action is a proper counter-claim. This doctrine was

recently maintained by the Supreme Court of New York. An

action was brought to restrain the defendant from using a trade-

mark alleged to be the sole property of the plaintiff. The answer

asserted that the trademark in question belonged in fact exclu-

sively to the defendant, that the plaintiff had no right to it, but

was unlawfully and wrongfully using it, and thereby interfering

with and injuring the defendant's business, and concluded by

praying for an injunction, an account, and judgment for damages.

At the trial, the defendant's allegations were fully sustained by

the proofs, and he obtained the judgment demanded. This judg-

ment was reversed on appeal, the court saying : " To entitle the

defendant to aifirmative relief, the answer must set up a counter-

dependent upon the original suit, yet dis-

tinct for many purposes, lias been recog-

nized, at least, repeatedly."
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Peter v. Farrel. etc. Co. (1895), 53

Ohio St. 534, 42 N. E. 690: Sec. 5070,

R. S., declaring what an answer shall

ar de i ion which an w r thi que tion in th affirm ti e an
h ld that all u h reli f m t be leni d unl
l def n lan
f acti
ounter-claim. Thi doctrine wa
upr m
urt of
w Y rk. An
, ction wa brou h
re r in th defendant fr m u in a rademark all · l t be th ole pr pert of the plaintiff. Tl e an w l
erte hat the tradem rk in qu s ion belon l in fact ex lui ly to he defendant, hat the plaintiff had n right to it, but
wa unlawfully and wron ·full u ing it and h r b int rf rin
with an l injurin the d fen la1 t bu ine ' and concluded b praym f r an injunction, an account, an l judgm It f r dam
t th trial he cl f n lant allegations w re fully sustained l ·
hi jucl ·the pr of and he obtained the judgment demand d.
ment wa re er ed on ar peal, the court 'a ing : 'To en itle he
defendant to affirmative relief, the an wer mu t et ur a coun er-

contain, and sec. 8072, declaring that a

counter-claim must be one ..." in favor

of a defendant and against a plaintiff be-

tween whom a several judgment might

be had in an action," do not abridge the

former powers of equity. But taking the

code as a whole, in view of its spirit and

purpose, and in view of sec. 5071, which

provides that " The defendant may set

forth in his answer as many grounds of

defence, counter-claims, and set-offs as he

has, whether they are such as have been

heretofore denominated legal or equitable,

or both," and " he may claim therein re-

lief touching the matters in question in

the petition against the plaintiff or any

other defendants in the same action," the

court must be held to have the right to

grant relief whenever a party shows even

a contingent right to property or a fund

which is the subject of an equitable

action, even though his claim is not one

which could be made the subject of a

several jutlgment in liis favor against a

fdaintiff.

Stenberg v. State (1896), 48 Neb. 299,

67 X. W. 190: "The fode of Civil Pro-

cedure relating to set-offs authorizes such

defences to be interposed before, but not

after judgment. A court of equity, wiiere

proper grounds exist therefor, may al-

low a set-off in cases not provided for by

statute."

'* The rule is well settled that the in-

solvency of a party against whose de-

mand a counter-claim is sought to be

interposed is a sufficient ground for equit-

able interference in cases not provided for

by statute : " Le Clare v. Thibault (1902),

41 Ore. 601, 69 Pac. 552.

" The sy-s^tem of pleading, consisting of

complaint, demurrer, answer, and reply,

meets the necessities of all parties, in all

cases, and in all courts. The answer set-

ting up new matter constituting a coun-

ter-claim, where a defendant seeks

affirmative relief against a plaintiff, and

dependent upon the original uit, yet di - cedure r lating to et-off authorize· uch
tinct f r many purpo e , ha been recog- defence. to be interpo. ed before, but not
aft r judgment. A c urt f equity, wh re
niz d, at lea t, repeatetlly."
Peter v. Farrel, etc. Co. (I 95), 53 proper ground exi t theref r, may alOhio t. 534, 4-2
. E. 690:
ec. 5070, low a et-off in case not provided for by
R. ., d claring what an an wer hall tatut ."
"The rule i well ettled that the incontain, and ec. 5072, leclaring that a
ol vency of a part again t who e decounter-claim mu t be one ... " ill favor
ought to be
of a defendant and again t a plaintiff be- mand a counter- ·!aim i
tween whom a ev ral judgment might interpo el i a ufficieut ground for quitbe had in an action," do n t abridge the able interference in ca e not provided f r
former power of equity. But taking the by . tatute:" Le lare v. Thibault (l 902),
code as a whole, in view of it pirit and 4- 1 Ore. 601, 69 Pa . 552.
purpo e, and in iew of ec. 5071, which
"The y tern of plead ing, con i tino- of
provide that "The rlef ndant may et complaint, demurrer, an. w r, and re1 ly,
forth in hi au wer a many ground of meet th ne e itie
f all partie in all
defence, ounter-claim" and ·et-off a. he
e , and in all ourt . Th an wer eth , whether they are uch a have b en tin a up new matter on tituting a
heretofore deriominated legal or equitabl , ter-claim
where a defendant
or both," and" he may laim ther in relief touching th matter in que tion in
the petition again t the plaintiff or any
ther defendant in he ame action," the
court mu. t b h lcl to hav the right to
grant relief wh nev r a party how v n
a coatincrent ri crht
property or a fund
which i t he nhj e t of an eqnitaJ,]
a ction, eveu thou crh hi rlaim i n t one
whi<:h coul cl h macl th . ubj t f a
. He ral j uclgrneut in hi.· favor a g ain t a
plain t iff .
• 'ti>nbn_g 1• • • ta
(l 96), 4
T h. 299,
,; • ~. \V. HJ O: " T l1e ode of ivil Pro-
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claim.^ The claim of defendant for relief is not a counter-claim

within the meaning of that term as used in the code. It does not

arise out of the ti'ansaction set forth in the plaintiff's complaint,

nor does it arise on contract." ^ The general subject of tl.e

afhrmative equitable relief which may be obtained by a defendant

has been already discussed, and the discussion need not be re-

peated. Undoubtedly, in the great majority of instances, any

equitable affirmative relief properly conferred upon a defendant

would fall within some description of a counter-claim ; in order

that it should not be a counter-claim, it must be a cause of action

entirely independent of that set forth by the plaintiff, and not

arising from a contract. Under the equity practice and system

of pleading which prevailed prior to the codes, the matters which

could be set up by a defendant in a cross-bill, as the foundation

for affirmative relief to him, must have some connection with the

matters originally charged against him by the plaintiff's bill, even

if his demand did not directly arise out of such original matters;

an entirely distinct and independent cause of action could not be

alleged by the defendant in a cross-bill ; if he had such a claim,
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he could only enforce it by a separate suit.^ The codes do not

seem to have, in any express manner, enlarged the scope and

operation of the defendant's equitable affirmative relief otherwise

than by the provisions relating to the counter-claim. In actions

of a legal nature it is very clear that no affirmative relief can be

obtained by a defendant, unless his cause of action or demand is

a proper counter-claim.

§ 642. * 766. Additional Instances. I shall close this branch of

the subject by mentioning some special instances, or actions of a

particular character, in whicli it has been held that a counter-

claim is not possible, or that the affirmative relief demanded by

the defendant could not be the subject of a counter-claim.^ In

an action for a limited divorce on the ground of cruelty, the de-

fendant's answer, charging adultery by the plaintiff and demand-

i Wright V. Delafiekl, 25 N. Y. 266; * (^Meredith v. Lyon (1902), — Ne|).

Garvey r. Jarvis, 54 Barb. 179. — , 92 N. W. 122 : "A claim not reduced

2 Glen & Hall Man. Co. v. Hall, 6 to judgment, for tlie statutory penalties

Lans. 158, 161, 162. This decision was for failure to release paid chattel mort-

reversed on appeal, and the counter-claim gages, does not furnish such a cross-dc-

■was su.stained as valid. Glen & Hall mand as can be used for the basis of an

Manuf. Co. v. Hall, 61 N. Y. 226, 2.36. equitable action to cancel another mort-

3 Daniell's Chan. PI. and Prac. 1647; gage, between the same parties, which has

Storey's Eq. PI. §§ 389, 397. not been paid."J

clairn. 1 Th claim of d fen nt for relief i no a counter-cl.tim
within th mea.ning of that term a u d in th Oll . I t 1 s not
ari:e out f th tran action t forth in the plaintiff': omplaint
nor does it ari e on contra t." 2 Th gen ral :ubj ct of t1.e
aflirmativ qui tabl r li f which may b btain d by a <l f •ndant
ha ' b n already di cu ed, and th di u ion ne cl not be r l eated. Undoubtedly, in th gr at maj rity of ill'tanc :-;, any
quitable affirmative relief properly conf rr cl upon a defendant
would fall within some description of a ·ounter-claim; in onl r
that it should not be a counter-claim, it mu t b a cau of a ·tion
entirely independent of that et forth by the I laintiff, and not
ari::;ing from a contrac t. Under the equity practice and y. tern
of pleading which prevailed prior to the code::;, the matters which
could be et up by a defendant in a cro -bill, a th foundation
for affirmative relief to him, must have some connection with the
matter. originally charged against him by the plaintiff' bill, ven
if his demand did not _d irectly arise out of such riginal matter';
an entirely distinct and independent cause of action could not be
rJleged by the defendant in a cross-bill ; if he had such a claim,
he could only enforce it by a separate suit.3 The code do not
seem to have, in any express manner, enlarged the scope and
operation of the defendant's equitable affirmative relief otherwise
than by the provisions relating to the counter-claim. In action
of a legal nature it is very clear that no affirmative relief can be
obtained by a defendant, unless his cause of action or demand is
a proper counter-claim.
§ 642. * 766. Additional Instances. I shall close this branch of
the subject by mentioning some special instances, or actions of a
particular character, in which it has been held that a counterclaim is not pos ible, or that the af.firmati ve relief d mantled by
the defendant could not be the subject of a counter-claim. 4 In
an action for a limited divorce on the ground of cruelty, the defendant's answer, charging adultery by the plaintiff and demand1 Wri g ht v. D elafi eld, 25 N. Y. 266 ;
Garvey 11. Jarvis, 54 B arb. li9.
2 Glen & Hall Man.
o. v. Hall, 6
Lans. 158, 161, 162. Thi deci ion was
r evered on appeal, aon th e c unter- ·laim
was . u tained a valid. Glen & Hall
Manuf. Co. v. Hall, 61 N. Y. 226, 236.
3 Daniell' Chan. P l. and Prac. 1647;
Storey's Eq. P l. §§ 389, 397.

4 [Meredith v. Lyon (1902) Neb.
- , 92 N. W . 122 : "A claim not r duced
to judgment, for the tatutory penalti
for failure to rel a c paid hatt 1 mortgage , does not furnish uch a cro -d mand a can be u~en for the ba i of an
quitable action to cancel another mortgage, between the ame parti e , which ha
not been paid."]
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lll

ing an absolute divorce, is not a proper counter-claim ; ^ nor, in

an action for an absolute divorce because of adulter}', is an answer

alleging cruelty and praying for a judicial separation.- In some

States a mechanic's lien is enforced, not by any special proceed-

ings, but by an ordinary equitable suit. An answer in an action

for such a purpose, alleging that the premises described in the

complaint formed the defendant's " homestead," and were there-

fore, pursuant to statute, free from all lien or charges in favor of

mg
f r

pr
hom

creditors, was held not to be a counter-claim, since it stated no

cause of action against the plaintiff, and was, in fact, tantamount

to a denial.-"'

§ 643. * 7(37. Is Couuter-Claim Possible iu Action to recover Pos-

session of Chattels ? It would seem that, in an action to recover

C<L 1 ' e

Ea

tion again

aJ.,' and w r
fr m all li n or har 0 ·
a c unt r-ch im, in
n
the laintiff, and \: a , in f< ct, tant mou nt

llie possession of specilic chattels, no counter-claim is possible,

unless, perhaps, equitable relief may be awarded under some very

exceptional circumstances.'* A judgment for a return to the de-

1 Heurv r. Meurv, 3 Kobt. GU ; 17

Abb. Pr. 411.
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[^Butsee Woodrick r. Woodrick (1894),

141 N. Y. 457, 36 N. E. 395, frutii which

we quote : " This is an appeal from a

judi^ineut of the general term of the .sec-

a l ni, 1.

t

3

767. Is C o unter-Claim Possible i n Acti o n to recover PosI would se m that, in an a tion to re o er
the po
" ion of pe ific hattel , no
unter-cla.im is po ibl ,
unle
perhap , quital>le relief may be awarded und r som ery
exc 1 ti nal circum tar e ., 4 A judgmen for a return t the d 643.

-;;;

session of Chattels ?

uud department, affirming a judgment iu

favor of defenilant for an absolute divorce,

and from au order denying motiou for a

new trial. The jdaintiff sued for a limited

divorce, alleging that the defendant was

guilty of cruel and iulmmau treatment.

T!ie defendant denied tlie charges of tlie

complaiut, and set up by way of counter-

<'laim the adultery of plaintiff, and ])raved

for a judgment of absolute divorce. The

jury found against the plaintiff on her own

cause of action, and also on the defend-

.int's couuter-claim. It is now insi.-ted on

belialf of plaintiff that she was entitled to

judgment of separation on the evidence ;

that the finding of the jury that she com-

mitted adultery is uusuj»porled liy evi-

dence ; and that there were errors of law

on the trial that must lead to a reversal

of the judgment. In view of the verv

.serious con.sequences to tlie jdaiutiff Col-

lowing the affirmance of the judgment au<l

tlie in.ii.-^tence of her counsel that finding

her guilty of adultery was legal error, we

have looked into tlie facts of this case

with great care, ami are unable to say tliat

eitliei- of liie findings of the jury is un-

i

Heury r. Henry, 3 Robt. 6 1-l; 17

bb. Pr. 41 l.
[But ·ee Woodrick i·. Woodrick ( l 9-!),
141 N. Y. 45 i , 36 . .E. 395, from whi ·h
we quote: "Thi i an appeal from a
judrrme ut of the general term f the ·ecoud department, affirming a j udgment in
favur of d fendant for an ab. olnte d ivorce,
and from au ord r denying motion fo r a
!Jew t rial. The plaintiff ued fo r a limited
divorce, alleging that th defendant wa
guilty £ cru 1 and inhuman treatm e nt.
T lie def udant d uied the char<- .- of the
co mplaint, and ·e t np by wa.'· of co unter<'laim t!ie adu ltery of plaintiff, and prayed
for a j ud g ment of ab ulu te rli,· 01T~- The
jury fouoii again tthe plaintiff o u li>r O\\'ll
·ause o: a ti ou, and also on th cl fellll:i:1 •• cou u Pr-C'!aim.
It is now in , i~t tl ou
hels lf o plaint iff that he wa: ntitl e d to
jud~l!1 nt u( : e paratio!l 11 th e Yi1l uce;
L! ..lt tl.e liudi 11g- of t he ju ry that he comm itte i a lu!te r:· i - un Uf porL d hy e,·j.
i\e, e: an I tlrn t her ,,. re rror. of la'
on he tria.l ha t mu t 1 ncl t

supported by evidence. Tliis case was

properly submitted to the jury and tlielr

verdict is conclusive on the questions of

fact." The judgment was affirmed.]

^ Diddelli". Diddell, 3 Abb. Pr. 167;

Griffin i-. Griffin, 2'5 How. Pr. 183; Tor-

hune V. Terhuue, 40 How. Pr. 258; but

see Armstrong i'. Armstrong, 27 Ind. 186;

McNaniara c. McNamara, 9 Abb. Pr. IS,

in which such relief was grautetl to the

defendants.

•^ Knglebrocht r. KickerL, 14 Minn.

1 40.

•* CPhipi)s r. Wilson (1899), 125 N. C.

106, 34 S. E. 227 ; Minneapolis Threshing

Co. r. Darnall (1900), 13 S. D. 279, 83

N. W. 266; Davis v. Culver (1899), 58

Neb. 265, 78 N. AV. 504; Palmer r.

Palmer (1894), 90 la. 17, 57 N. W. 645;

w it h gr'a.L <'are , au rl nr • 111mlile to . av tint
it 1 •• vf 1.1 c fin <liug · of th j iry
un-

i·

upported hr ev id nee. Thi::; as was
properly ubmitted tu the jury and the ir
·erd ict i. · 11 ·lu: i1· e n the qµe ·tion o f
fact." Th e judgm ot w a affirmed.]
t Diddell v. Diddell, 3 \b b. Pr. 167 ;
Griffin v. G riffin , 23 II ow. Pr. l 3: Trrhune v. T e rhun e, 40 H ow. Pr. 25 ; but
. ee Arm tr ug v. Arm trong, 27 In d. l 6;
McNama ra v. Mc a mant, 9 Abb . Pr. l ,
in whi ·It u ·h r eli ef was granted to th e
defendaut .
a Englebrech t v. Rickert, 14 M inn.
1-t.0 .
4 [I hipp
. Wil OD ( 1 99), 125 N.
106, 34 '. E. '227 ; .M inneap lis Th re hiug
Co. v. Darnall {1900), 13
D. :!79, :l
1 ' . W. 266; D avi
v. uh' r ( I 99), 5
Tel.J. 265, 7
. \'Ir. 50-t.; Paln1 r t'.
]'al 1 r (1 94), 90 Ia. 17 , 57 '. W . 645;
Bauuiu g r . far! au (l 94), 101 nl. 2
35 Pac. 772 ; Hennebau in t. Atkin 11
( l 9 ), 103 Ky . 555, 45 ·. , , . 14;
Eu - i·. Moni o n (1 95), 91
24,
\V. 1000.
ee al o * 791 , and ca.

' 'i.. ·

T .

cited.
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fendimt of the chattels in coutrovorsy is not a counter-claim, for

it is expressly provided for by the codes, the very issue in

the action being, Which party is entitled to the possession? and

the court by its judgment awarding tlie [)OSsession, or the value

in money if possession cannot be given, to the one who establishes

the right ; if, therefore, the plaintiff had taken the goods into his

own custody by the authorized preliminary proceedings, they or

their value must be restored when the action fails.^ If a counter-

claim can be interposed in this suit, it must be either (1) a de-

mand for money, or (2) a demand for the possession of certain

other and different chattels, or (3) a demand for some kind of

equitable relief. A counter-claim for money could not be ad-

mitted under the principle established by the cases, that the

relief must have so7ne connection with that asked for by the plain-

tiff, and must tend to diminish or modify it in some manner. A

judgment for money obtained by the defendant could not inter-

fere with or be counter to a judgment awarding possession of

chattels to the plaintiff.^ The same difficulties attend the second

alternative. It seems impossible that when the plaintiff seeks
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to recover possession of certain specific chattels, the defendant's

right to the possession of other and distinct articles, could arise

out of the same transaction which is the foundation of the plain-

tiff's claim or could be connected with the subject of the plaintiff's

action. The "transactions," wliich are the foundations of their

respective causes of action, must, from the very nature of the

case, be different. It is not pretended that the action, or the

also d.amages in tryiug to operate ma- hiought to recover the chattels under such

chinery returned to the plaintiff, and for circumstances, the defendant might, per-

which the mortgaged property Avas in liaj).s, set up as a counter-claim au inde-

part taken iu exchange. "3 pendent demand due to himself from the

^ .See De Lever v. Michaels, .'> Abb. Pr. plaintiff on contract, and thus diminish or

20.3, in which this doctrine was affirmed, extinguish the unpaid balance of the pur-

although it plainly ueeds uo authority in chase price. Sucli a counter-claim would

its support. be analogous to the similar one in a suit

- See Moffat v. Van Doren, 4 Bosw. by a vendor of laud against the veudee,

609; Williams v. Irby, 15 S. C. 458; Tal- which was sustained in Cavalli v. Allen,

bott V. Padgett, .30 S. C. 167. It is pos- 57 N. Y. 508. The difficulty suggested iu

sible, perhaps, that the plaintiff's right to the text, that a money judgment does

f ndant of t he hattels in ontro er, i. not a ounter-claim, fo l'
it is expr ' ·ly pro vi led [ r by the ·ml •,, th, ' ·ry i .· ue i11
th e action being , \Vhieh 1 ar y is nti 1 <l io th: po8,' : ·ion '! au cl
the court by it' judg ment awarding the po se: ·ion, or t h· YJ,l tte
in mon y if po,
ion cann ot be give n, t ih 011 e ' lw . ta.l>li: he:-;
t he rirrht · if, theref re, t h i laintiff had taken th good · int > lii:
own ' U 'tody by th authorized pr liminary proceedrng: t h y or
t h ir value mu t be r stor d when tl e acti n fail ' .1 If a ·otmterclaim can b interpo ed in thi ui. , it mu ·t b ither (1) a. lcrnand for money, r (2) a demand for th po 'e sion of certain
other an<l different chattel , or ( 3) a. demand fo r , ome kincl
equi table relief. A counter-claim for mon y c uld not be admitted under the principle establi hed by the case , t hat th
relief must have sonie connec tion with that ask ed fo r by th plaintiff, and must tend to diminish or modify it in ome mann r. A
judgment for money pbtained by the defendan t could not interfere with or be c•ounter to a judgment awarding posses ion of
chattels to the plaintiff. 2 The same difficulties attend the second
alternative. It seems impossible that when the plaintiff seek·
to recover possession of certain specific chattels, the defendant'
right to the possession of other and di stinct articles. coulcl arise
out of the same .transaction which is the foundation of the plaintiff's claim or could be connected with the subject of th e plaintiff's
action. The "transactions," which are the foundations of t heir
respec tive causes of action, must, from t he very nature of t he
case, be different. It is not pretend ed that t he action, or the

the possession might depend upon the de- not tend to diminish or modify the relief,

fendant's failure to pay a stipul.ated sum recovery of possession, asked for by the

of money, as in the case of a conditional plaintiff, was not considered in the cases

sale and delivery, when the property was of Wilson r. Hughes, 94 N. C. 182 ; Walsh

to remain in the vendor until tiie price v. Hall, 66 N. C. 233, iu both of which a

was paid, although possession had been counter-claim of damages was allowed,

transferred to the veudee. In an action /■

al o damages in trying to operate ma· brought to recover the chattels under s uch
chin ery return ecl to t he plaintiff, an d for circum sta nces, the cl cfend an t might. perwhi ch t he mortgaged property was in haps, set up as a counter-claim an ind pendent demand due to him:elf fro m t,he
part taken in exchange. "]
plaintiff on contract, and thu di mini ·h or
1 See D e L eyer v. Michaels, 5 Abb. P r.
203, in which thi doctrine was affirmed, exting uish t he u npaid balance of the puruch a 'OLmter-claim woultl
althoug h it plainly needs no auth ority in chase price.
be analogous to th e . imilar one in a sni t
its impport.
2
ee Moffat v. Van Doreu, 4 Bos w. by a venclor of land a.gain t the ve u<l .
609 ; Williams v. Irby, 15 S. C. 458; Tal- which was s ustain cl in Cavalli L'- Allen,
bott v. Padgett , 30 S. C. 167. It i po - 57 . Y . 50 . The difficulty ; ugge ted in
ible, perh aps, that t he plain tiff' rig ht to the text, that a money judg ment do
t he pO$. e sion mig ht depend upon the de- not tend to dimini. h or modify the relief,
fendant's fa ilure to pay a . tipulated sum r ecovery of pos e sion, a:;;ked fo r by th e
of money, as in the ca e of a condi tional plaintiff, wa not con. id creel in the ca ·e
of \Vil on v. Hug he, 94 N . . l 2; Wal h
sale a nd deli very, when the property wa
to remain in th e vendor un til the price 1·. Hall, 66 N. C. 233, in both of wh ich a
was paid, although po session had been counter-claim of da mages wa. allowed.
t ransferred to the vend ee. In an action
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cross-demand, is based upon contract. And, finally, the relief

granted to the defendant would be entirely independent of that

conferred upon the plaintiff ; the two would be complete and

entire each by itself, and thus there would be in effect two judg-

ments, not modifying or interfering with each other, and not re-

lating to the same subject-matter. This reasoning, and the

conclusion reached by it, have been sustained by judicial decision,

and thus seem to be supported alike by principle and by authority.^

It is possible, perhaps, though hardl}' probable, that equitable re-

r lief
f that

1

cro
rant c1
nf Jrr 1 up n th
ntire
m nt not mo lif -in ·
t the ·am

lief may, under certain exceptional circumstances, be recoverable

by the defendant in an action similar in its nature and object to

the ancient replevin or detinue. Courts of equity, however, very

^rely interfered in controversies concerning the title to and

possession of chattels.

B. The Particidar Questions which arise under the First Clavse or

Branch of the Statutory Definition.

§ 644. * 768. Language of the First Clause. The Three Subjects

Embraced -within this Language. Particular Phrases Requiring Con-

struction. Method of Interpretation Adopted by the Courts.
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The language of the first clause or Ijraneh of the definition,

which is found in all the codes except those of Indiana and Iowa,

and which is now to be interpreted, is: '' xV cause of action aris-

ing out of a contract or transaction set forth in the complaint

[petition] as the foundation of the plaintiff's claim, or connected

B.

The P articular Que tions which arise 'Ulnder the First Glau e or
B ranch of the Statutory D efinition.

with the subject of the action." Following the order of this

language, it is plain that three different subjects are embraced

644.

within it, and the whole discussion must therefore be separated

into three corresponding divisions : namely, 1. Cases in which the

cause of action alleged as a counter-claim arises out of the con-

* 76

.

Language of the First Clause.

Embraced within this Language.
struction.

Method

of

The Three Subjects

Particular Phrases Requiring Con-

Interpretation

Adopted

by the

Courts.

tract set forth in the complaint ; 2. Those cases in which it arises

out of the transaction set forth in the complaint ; 3. Those cases

in which it is connected ivith the subject of the action. A com-

plete examination of these three subdivisions requires a construc-

tion of certain particular phrases which form a part of the

statutory definition. These are (a) " foundation of the plaintiff's

claim," or when is a contract or transaction the foundation of the

1 Loven.sohn v. Ward, 45 Cal. 8. This separate chattels cannot be set up as a

case expressly holds that a claim to counter-claim.

rc<'ovfT the possession of distinct and

The language of the fir t lau
r l ranch f he d nniti n
whi h i found in all the od
xcept tho of Indiana and Iowa,
and which i novv to b intel'preted i ·: "A cau ~e of a io11 ari ing out of a contrac t or tran action et forth in th
orrq iaint
[ etitionJ as the foundation of the I lain tiff claim, or onne te
with the su bjec of th action. ' Following the or l r of thi
language, it i plain that thr e diff rent ubj t. ar m raced
within it an l tl e whol di u ion mu t th refor
parat d
in o hre c IT l ondin di i i 1 : namel , 1.
in whi h h
au of a ion all ged a a
unt r- laim ri s ut of th contract et f rth in the mplaint · 2. Tho
a
in whi h it ari
ut f th tran action et forth in the omplaint · 3. Th
ca' e
in which it i · connected with th ·ubj t of th a i n. A
mpl t xamin i n f h
hr e . 1b livi i ns r quir a n truction of
rtain particulc r phra .
} i h f rm a part of th
. t ut ry l finiti n. Th
ar (a
foun l i n f h laintiff
claim ' r w h n i c • n ra t r tmn a ti n th f uncl ti n f h
1 L oYell.'ohn 1'. W ard, 45
al. . Thi.
c·a ·c r.,·pr . l.\· hol1l: that a tlairn t
r<·1·1JV(• r tit
po: •r.,. icrn of r]i ... t i11c t a11<1

parat ·hattel · ·an not Le
ouut r- ·laim.

et up a ' a
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plaintiff's claim? (&) "arising out of," or when does a cause of

action arise out of a contract or transaction ? (c) " transaction ;"

(fZ) " subject of the action ; " (c) " connected witli," or when is

a cause of action connected with the subject of the action?

Although the signification of all these phrases and terms must be

determined, for upon it depends the interpretation to be given to

the entire provision, yet it will be impracticable to take them up

and examine them separately. Each is so connected with the

others, that, in ascertaining their sense, all must be considered

together. The courts have invariably pursued this method ; and

their opinions, from which our interpretation will be taken, have

always construed the statutory clause as a whole, and have not

attempted to distinguish and analyze its constituent parts. I

shall therefore pursue the order already mentioned, and shall dis-

cuss the three subdivisions into wliich the subject has been sepa-

rated, and in so doing shall incidentally define the legal import of

the several phrases and terms above enumerated. The decisions

which have given, or have attempted to give, a construction to

the clause are numerous and conflicting. I shall freely refer to
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these cases, citing those which represent all theories and schools

of interpretation, and shall endeavor to collect from them such

doctrines and practical rules as seem to be correct upon principle

and to be supported by the weight of authority. As a prelimi-

nary step to the discussion of the three subordinate heads, I shall

quote and analyze certain judicial opinions which have treated of

the clause as a whole, and have proposed general rules by which

its meaning may be determined. Having thus ascertained these

general rules, I shall inquire what particular cases or classes of

cases do or do not fall within one or the other of the three sub-

divisions before mentioned.

§ 645. * 769. Illustrative Case. Meaning of Term " Transaction."

The cases now to be cited throw more or less light upon the

meaning of the statutory clause as a whole, and also, to a certain

extent, upon that of the special phrases and terms which it con-

tains ; and from them some general principles of interpretation

can be inferred. The lower floor of a building having been

leased, the landlord brought an action for rent due. The answer

was pleaded as a counter-claim. It alleged that the plaintiff

occupied the upper floors of the building ; that he wantonly and

negligently suffered waterpipes to get out of repair and to leak.

plaintiff' claim? (b) "ari ing ut f
r wh n
cau · of
action ari e out of a
ntra t r tran action? ( c
tran acti n ;''
(d) " ·ubj t of th a tion · ' )
'Onn ted with ' or \ h 11 i
a cau ~ of acti n c nn t d with th . ubj , t f th < eti n '!
Although the ignifi ation f all th "' plna.8 , aml t rm. · mu t b
determined, for upon it der end the int rpr tati n t b giv n to
the entire provision, y t it will b impra ticabl t take them up
and examine them eparat ly. Ea h is o onn ctecl with th
other , that, in a certaining th ir en , all mu t b con.. idered
toge.ther. The ourts have invariably pur, u cl thi meth d; and
their opinions, from which our interpretation will b tn-k n, have
always construed the tatutory clau 'e a a whole, and have not
attempted to distinguish and analyze its constituent part:'. I
hall therefore pursue the order alr ady m ntion d, and .. hall cliscu s the three subdivisions into which the subj ct has lie n eparnted, and in so doing .shall incidentally define the legal imp rt of
the several phrases and terms above enumerated. The cl ci 'ions
which have given, or have attempted to give, a con ·truction to
the clause are numerou and conflicting. I hall freely refer to
these cases, citing those which represent all theorie · and chools
-0f interpretation, and shall endeavor to collect from them such
doctrines and practical rnles as seem to be correct upon principl
and to be supported by the weight of authority. As a preliminary step to the discussion of the three subordinate heads, I ·hall
quote and analyze certain judicial opinions which have treated of
the clause as a whole, and have proposed general rules by which
it meaning may be determined. Having thus a certained these
·eneral rules, I shall inquire what particular ca e or cla e of
ea es do or do not fall within one or the other of the three ubdivisions before mentioned.
§ 645. * 769. Illustrative Case. Meaning of Term" Transaction."
The cases now to be cited throw more or le s light upon the
meaning of the statutory clause as a whole, and al o, to a certain
.extent, upon that of the special phrases and term which it contains; and from them some gener::il principles of int rpr tation
can be inferred. The lower floor of a building having b n
leased, the lan<l.lord brought an action for rent due. The an w r
was pleaded a a counter-claim. It alleged that th plaintiff
occupied the upper floors of the building. that h wantonl arnl
negligently suffered waterpipe to g t out of repair a.ml to 1 ak,
r
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and by this means caused filthy water to come upon the defendant's

premises ; also that plaintiff wantonly and negligently caused

( n l b thi., m an cat cl fil h - wat rt come upon the d f n lant'.,
pr m1
; a.1 o that pl, in iff wantonly and n gligen 1
au d
filthy wa er t b thr wn from hi room up n def ndant'
pr mi., ,., ; that
h e act damag wer cau 'ed o the defendant in an amount , I cifiecl, for \\-hich jmlgm nt a d mand d
ag, in t he plain iff.
lemurr r to thi · an \Yer haYiLn· b en
u 'tain 1 th defen lant app al 1 to the
w York ' ur
f
1
ppeal , which affim d he d
n below. As already aid in,
T

T

hlthv Avater to be thrown from his rooms upon defendant's

premises ; that by these acts damages were caused to the defend-

ant in an amount specified, for which judgment Avas demanded

against the plaintiff. A demurrer to this answer having been

sustained, the defendant appealed to the New York Court of

Appeals, which affirmed the decision below.^ As already said in a

1 Edgerton v. Page, 20 N. Y. 281, 285.

j_

From the opinion of that court the follow-

ing extracts are taken : " The demand of

the defendant set out in the answer does

not arise out of the contract set forth in

the complaint. That contract is for the

payment of rent upon a lease of the de-

mised premises. The defendant's de-

mands arise from the wrongful acts of

the plaintiff in permitting water to leak
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and run into the premises, and in causing

it to be thrown upon the premises and

property of the defendant. These acts

are entirely independent of the contract of

hiring, upon which the action is brought.

The deniauds are not connected with the

subject of the action ; that is, the rent

agreed to be paid for the use of the premises.

Tlie defendant's demands are for a series

of injuries to his property deposited upon

the premises, and for impairing the value

of the possession. It would be a very

liberal construction to hold that, in an

action for rent, injuries arising from

trespasses committed by the lessor upon

the demisr-d premises might be inter{>osed

as a counter-claim. The acts of the plain-

tiff in this case are of a similar nature.

They are either acts of trespass or of

negligence from which the injuries to the

defendant accrued. Such a construction

could only be supported by the idea that

tlie subject of the action was the value of

the use of the premises. But where there is

an agreement as to the amount of the

rent, that value is inmiaterial. Unless

the acts of the plaintiff' amount to a breach

of the contract of iiiring, tliey are not

connected with the subject of the action."

The opinion procteeds to show that the

acts complained of were not a breach of

an implied covenant of (|uiet enjoyment,

and concludes : " Tliere is nothing in the

answer in this case tending to sliow that

any of the acts of the plaintiff were done

under any claim of right whatever. They

did not, therefore, amount t» a breach of

the contract created by the lease ; and the

injuries sustained by the defendant do

not, therefore, constitute a counter-claim

connected with the subject of the action."

To the same effect are the decisions and

tlie general interpretation given to the

clause in JNIayor, etc. of N. Y. v. Parker

Vein Stp. Co.^ 12 Abb. Pr. .300, 301 ; per

Woodruff .T. ; Askins v. Hearns, 3 Abb.

Pr. 184, 187, per Emott J. ; Sclmaderbeck

V. Worth. 8 Abb. Pr. 37, 38, per Ingra-

ham .1. ; Drake v. Cockroft, 4 E. D. Smith,

34, 39, per Woodruff J. ; Bogardus v.

1 Edg rton v. Page, 20
. Y. 2 1, 2 5.
From the opinion of that c urt the following xtract are taken : "Th demand f
the d fenclant et out in th an w r doe
not ari e out of the contract
t forth in
the complaint. That contract is for the
payment f rent upon a 1 a e of the demi ed premi.es.
The defendant'. dema11d ari. e from the wrongful act of
th plaintiff in permitting water to leak
an1l run into the premi e , and in cau ing
it to be thrown upon the premi e and
property of the defendant. These acts
ar entirely independent f the contract f
hiring, upon which the action i brought.
The cl mand are not connected with the
u uject of the action ; that is, the rent
agreed to bP paid for th use of the premises.
The defendant' demands are for a erie
f injurie to hi property a po ited upon
the vremi e , and for impairiug the valne
of the po e ion. It would be a very
liberal con truction t hold that, in an
action for rent, injuries arising from
tre. pas e com mi ted by the le or upon
the demi Pd premi e might be interpo d
as a ounter-claim. The act f the plaintiff in thi ca e are of a imilar nature.
They are either act of tre pa s or f
negligen e from which th injurie to the
defeodant ac rue<l.
nch a construction
could only he upporte<l by the idea that
th ubject of th action was the 1:alue ~f
the us of the premise . But where t.here is
an agr ment a to th amount f the
reut, that value i · imma.t rial.
nles
th art. of th plaintiff am u11t to a br ach
of t.he contract of liirirJO', th y ar 11 t
c·o1111ect cl with the uhj ·t of the a tion."
Th opi11io11 pro<· 1•1l o h iw hat h
acts cornplain 1l of wer 11 t a br arh £
an irnpli ·<l c·rH nant <•f qui t njoym ut,
au<l cou ·Jude.,·: •· "'IH•rf' i nothing iu th
au ·wer iu thi · ca e tending to :how that

an of the a t of the plaintiff w re d ne
under any claim f riP-ht whatev r . Th y
clicl not, th r I re, amount t0 a breach of
the contract reated by the l ea e; and th
injuries su ·tai u tl by the defen<l ut lo
not, therefore, ·on titute a counter-claim
onnected with the ubject of the action."
To the am
ffect are the deci · ion· and
the gcueral interpr tation gi,·eu to he
lau e in .i\fay r, t . of
Y. i·. Parker
V in Stp. C ., 12 Abb. Pr. 300, 301 · per
Woor1ruff .J.; A kin v . H earn , 3 Abb.
Pr. l -!, 18i, per Emott J.;
hna<lcrb ck
t'. Worth. 8 Abb. Pr. 3 7, 3 , per Ingraham .J.; Drake v. Cockroft, 4 E. D. mi th,
34, 39, per Woodruff J.; Bogardu~ i·.
Parker, 7 How. Pr. 303 305 · Barhyte i·.
Hughe , 33 Barb. 320 321 per lerkc J.
The e ca e all give a very narr w m aning to the term "tran action,'' a111l incline
to the po ition that a cau e of acti u on
contract, a nd one for tort, or two rau e
of a tion for tort, can n ever be aid to
ari. e out of the same tran a t i n. Th e
la t ca e cited, B arhyte v . Hu he , goe
o far a to hold that " tran action " and
T.
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former chapter, the difficulty in arriving at the true interpretation

of the term " transaction " hes in the fact that it had no strict

legal meaning before it was used in the statute. Being placed in

immediate connection mth the word " contract," and separated

therefrom by the disjunctive " or," one conclusion is certain at all

events ; namely, that the legislature intended by it something dif-

ferent from and additional to " contract." The most familiar rules

of textual interpretation are violated by the assumption that no

such signification was intended. The only question at all doubt-

ful is, How far did the law-makers design to go, and how broad a

sense did they attach to the word? Is it to be used in its

widest popular meaning, or must it be narrowed into some

limited and technical meaning, and thus be made a term of legal

nomenclature? While in common speech a single assault or

slander or lie would not be called a " transaction," yet the whole

series of events grouped around such a central fact, and connected

with it, would, I think, be so designated in popular language, and

a fraudulent scheme, or in other words a cheat, is a most familiar

example of the class of events to which the term is usually
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applied. But taking the word " transaction " in the Hmited sense

of a " negotiation of business," or some other similar expression,

it is certainly a mistake to say that torts cannot arise out of it

different from and adverse to the plaintiff's cause of action. In

the first place, it is certain that a cause of action based upon the

plaintiff 's /rawc? may arise out of such a "transaction," for it may

spring from a contract pure and simple. In the second place, as

the " negotiation" or " business " or " conduct of affairs " may be

concerned with property, with the title to or possession of land or

chattels, it is easily conceivable that a distinct cause of action in

can be no counter-claim, — not the same Wilson Manuf. Co. (Ore. 1892), 31 Pac.

transaction); Carpenter w. Manhattan Life Rep. 661; Sheehan v. Pierce (Supreme,

Ins. Co., 22 Hun, 49 (in an action for dam- June, 1893), 23 N. Y. Suppl. 1119 (in an

ages from a tort, defendant may counter- action of slander, a slander of the defend-

claim a demand for tort, if connected with ant uttered by the plaintiff in the course

the subject of the action or arising out of of the same conversation cannot be couu-

the same transaction) ; on the general sub- ter-claimed). Facts showing that the de-

ject of arising out of the same transaction, fendant has been damaged by tlie bringing

see Bernheimer v. Wallis, 11 liun, 16; of the action do not constitute a valid

Bradhurst I'. Townsend, 11 id. 104 ; Gilpin counter-claim: Kansas Loan & Inv. Co.

f. Wilson, .53 Ind. 443 ; Teague i'. Fowler, v. Hutto, 48 Kan. 166. A counter-claim

56 id. 569 ; Douthitt v. Smith, 69 id. 463 ; cannot be pleaded in an action for a

Whedbee V. Reddick, 79 N. C. 521; James statutory peualty : Woodward v. Conder,

former chapter, th lif.ficulty in arriving at the tru int rprctation
of th term " tran a tion " li in the fa t that it had no ·trict
legal meaning befor it wa · used in the i:;tatute. Being placed in
immediate connection with t he w rd
· ntract,' and " c rat <l
th refrom by the di ·junctiv "or, ' ne on lu ion i certain at all
events ; namely, that the legislature int nd d by it som thing different from and additional to" contract." The mo t familiar rul
of textual interpretation are violated by the a · umption that no
uch signification was in tended. The only que ti n at all doubtful is, How far did the law-mak r design to go, and how broad a
sense did they attach to the word? I s it to b u ed in its
widest popular meaning, or must it be narrowed into ome
limited and technical meaning, and thus be made a term of legal
nomenclature? While in common speech a single assault or
slander or lie would n ot be called a "transaction," yet the whole
eries of events grouped around uch a central fact, and connected
with it, would, I think, be so designated in popular language, and
a fraudulent scheme, or in other words a cheat, is a most familiar
example of the class of events to which the · term is u sually
applied. But taking the word "transaction" in the limited sen e
of a " negotiation of business," or some other similar expression,
it is certainly a mistake to say that torts cannot arise out of it
different from and adverse to the plaintiff's cause of action. In
the first place, it is certain that a cause of action based upon the
plaintiff's fraud may arise out of such a "transaction," for it may
spring from a contract pure and simple. In the second place, a
the "negotiation" or "business" or "conduct of affairs" may be
concerned with property, with the title to or possession of land or
chattels, it is easily conceivable that a distinct cause of action in

V. Cutter, 53 Cal. 31 ; Wait v. Wheeler & 33 Mo. App. 14?".

can be no counter-claim, - not the same
transaction); Carpenter v. Manhattan Life
Ins. Co., 22 Hun, 49 (in an action for damage from a tort, defendant may l:OUnterclaim a demand for tort, if conn ected with
the subject of th e action or arising out of
the same tran saction) ; on the general ubject of arising out of the same transaction ,
see Bernheimer v. Walli , 11 Hun , 16 ;
Bradhurst v. T own end, 11 id. 104; Gilpin
v. Wil on, 53 Ind . 443 ; T eague v. Fowler,
56 id. 569 ; Douthitt v. Smith, 69 id. 463 ;
Wh edbee v. R eddick, 79 N. C. 521; Jam e
v. Cutter, 53 Cal. 31; Wait v. Wh eeler &

Wilson Manuf. Co. (Ore. 1892), 31 Pac.
R ep. 661 ; Sheehan v. Pierce (Supreme,
June, 1893 ), 23 N. Y. uppl. l ll 9 (in an
action of slander, a slander of the defendant uttered by the plaintiff in the cour e
of th e same conversation cann ot be counter-claimed). Facts howiug that the defendant has been damaged by the bringing
of the action do not on titute a vali<l.
counter-claim : Kan a Loan & In,-. C'o.
v . Hutto, 48 K an. 166. A ounter-claim
cannot be pleaded iu an a ·tion for a
tatntory penalty: vVoodward v. Cond r,
33 l\1o. App. 147.
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favor of the defendant may arise out of a tort to property com-

mitted by the plaintiff in the course of the " business " or " nego-

tiation" or "conduct of affairs," such as a claim for the taking or

conversion of goods, or for a trespass to or wrongful detention of

land. Indeed, the difficulty in conceiving of distinct torts arising

from one and the same "transaction " is confined almost entirely

to the cases of torts to the person. It may be noticed that most

of the decisions already cited, in which the possibility of distinct

torts having such a common legal origin is denied, directly relate

to personal wrongs alone ; and the reasoning of the courts is ex-

tended from them to all torts, without any discrimination between

their different classes, and the different rules which may govern

them.^

§ 646. * 770. Case of Scheunert v. Kaehler. Criticism. The

cases thus far cited have all been decided by courts of New

York ; I shall now quote a few which have arisen in other

States. A complaint alleged that the plaintiff delivered certain

flour to the defendant to be sold on commission, but that the latter

had converted the same, or the proceeds thereof, to his own use,
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and prayed judgment for its value as damages. The answer set

up the following facts as a counter-claim : that defendant had

leased a flouring-mill to the plaintiff, who covenanted in the lease

that he would furnish to defendant constant employment during

the continuance of the term for two teams in drawingf flour to

Milwaukee at a stipulated sum for each load, and further cove-

nanted that all the flour sent from the mill should be delivered

to the defendant at Milwaukee, to be sold by him on commis.sion,

in pursuance of which agreement the flour mentioned in the com-

plaint was in fact delivered ; that the plaintiff had neglected and

refused to perform both of liis said covenants, by reason of which

the defendant had sustained damages to a specified amount, and

judgment was demanded for such sum. A demurrer was inter-

posed to this counter-claim, and was sustained by the Supreme

Court of Wisconsin.2 This opinion, quoted at large in the note,

1 [^Blue V. Capital Nat. Bank (1896), ter-claim may be pleaded to an action of

145 Inil. .518, 43 N. E. 65.') ; Watts !-. tort, — a question not necessary to be de-

Gantt (1899), 42 Neb. 869, 61 N. W. 104 ; cided, — and assuming also th.iV no objec-

Sheildey v. Dixon County (1901), 61 Neb. tion exists, because tiie coiitr.act for the

409, 85 N. W. 399.] ' breach of which the defendant claims

2 Scheunert v. Kaehler, 23 Wis. 523, damages is not set forth in the cnnijilaiiit,

per Dixon ('. J. : " Assuming that a coun- but tliat the counter-claim would be ad-

fa or of the defendant may ari e out of a tort to property committed by the plaintiff in the cour e of the "busine s " or'' negotiation" or ' conduct of affair ," such as a claim for the taking or
conver ion of g ads, or for a trespa s to or wrongful detention of
land. Indeed, the difficulty in conceiving of di tinct torts arising
from one and the ame "transaction" is confined alma t entirely
to the case of tort to the per on. It may be noticed that most
of the deci ion already cited, in which the po ibility of distinct
torts having uch a common legal origin i enied, directly relate
to per anal wrong alone; and the reasoning of the courts is extended from them to all torts, without any di crimination between
their different classes, and the different rules which may govern
them.1
§ 646. * 770. Case of Scheunert v. Kaehler. Criticism. The
ca e thus far cited have all been decide,d by courts of New
I' ark; I hall now quote a few which have arisen in other
'tate . A complaint alleged that the plaintiff delivered certain
flour to the defendant to b sold on commi ion, but that the latter
had converted the same, or the proceed thereof, to his own use,
and prayed judgment for its value a damages. The an wer "e
up the folJowing fact as a counter-claim: that defendant had
leased a fl urin -mil1 to the plaintiff, who covenanted in the lea e
that he would furni h to defendant constant employment during
the continuance of the term for two teams in drawing flour to
Milwaukee at a stipulated um for each load, and further covenanted that all the flour sent from the mill should be delivered
to the defendant at Milwaukee, to be old by him on commis ion
in pur uance of which agreement the flour mentioned in the complaint wa in fact delivered; that the plaintiff had neglected and
r efo. e t perform both of hi a.id covenants, by reason of which
the defendant had u tained damag s to a specified amount, and
judgment wa demanded for such sum. A demurrer was interp · d to thi counter-claim, and wa su tained by the Supreme
ourt of Wi con in. 2 Thi opinion, quoted at large in the note,
1 [Blue v. Capital Nat. Bank (l 96),
145 Ind. 51 . 43 N. E . 655; Watt v.
Gantt ( l 9 ), 42 eb. 69 61 N. W. 104- ;
b ibley v. ixon ounty {190 1), 61 Neb.

409,
2 •

per

. 399 .J
h unert v. Kaehler, 23 Wi . 523,
ixuu C'. J.: " A urnin g that a co un-
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necessarily lecads to the conclusion that when the plaintiff luis an

election to adopt one or the other of two forms of remedy, one on

the contract for the breach thereof, and tJie other in tort for a

missible, if at all, under the last clause of

necessarily 1 ads to the conclu ion that when the plaintiff ha: an
election to adopt one or the other of two form of rem ·<ly, on· on
the contract for the brea h th re f, a.nu th other in tort for a

the subdivision as being counected with

the subject of tlie action, tiie question re-

solves itself into an inquiry as to the ori-

gin of the cause of action stated in the

complaint, — whether it arises upon the

contract set forth in the answer, or origi-

nates ill fixcts outside of and disconnected

with that contract. If the former, then

the counter-claim would seem to be clearly

within the statute; but, if the latter, then

it would uot be." The oi)inion states that

the plaintiff might have sued upon con-

tract for a violation of it, or might have

sued in tort for the wrong done him, and
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tliat he had chosen the latter form of ac-

tion, and adds : " The subject of the action

is the tort or wrong doue in the conversion

of the money; that is the foundation,

aud the sole foundation, of the plaintiff's

claim in this form of action ; for, unless

the money was unlawfully converted,

tlie action cannot be maintained." The

counter-claim was therefore held to be

inadmissible. See also, Akerly v. Vilas,

21 Wis. 88, 109, 110, which "holds that

the counter-claim must be direct!// con-

nected with the subject of the plaintiff's

action, or so connected that a cross-bill

would have been sustained, or a recoup-

ment allowed under the former practice,

when it is claimed to fall within the last

clause of the first subdivision ; and Vilas

;'. Mason, 25 Wis. 310, 321, where, in

an action brought upon a contract, — on

a lease against the tenant, — a counter-

claim for the conversion of chattels which

the defendant had placed upon the de-

mised premises, was sustaiued, on the

ground that both causes of action arose

out of the same transaction ; also Ains-

worth r. Bowen, 9 Wis. 348.

\lln the very recent case of Stolze v.

Torrison (1903), — Wis. — , 95 N. W. 114,

the court by Cassoday C. J., said: "As

indicated, the ' transaction set forth in the

<-omj)laint as the foundation of the plain-

tiff's claim' was the wrongful breaking

.mid entering the close of which the plain-

tiff was at the time in the quiet and peace-

able possession, and malicious prosecution

aud conspiracy in support of such conduct.

The equitable counter-claim sought tt> bo

interposed is to establisii the title of Tor-

risou to the locus in quo under a tax (k-cd

and asubse(iuent conveyance aud the stat-

utes of limitation, mentioned in the fore-

going statement, and tcj have the jdaiiitiff'a

as.sertion of title adjudged to be unfonnded.

It is very obvious that such equitable

counter-claim did not arise out of the

transaction set forth in the complaint as

the foundation of the plaintiff's claim. On

the contrary, it arose entirely independent

and outside of that transaction, and the

missible, if at all, under the last clan ·e of
the subdivision as being couuec:tcd with
the subject of the action, the que tion reso lve· itself into au inquiry as to the origin of the cause of action tated in the
complaint, - whether it aril:le upo11 the
<:ontrnct set forth in the answer, or originate in facts out ide of aud ctisconnected
with that contract. If the former, then
the counter-claim would seem to be clearly
withiu the tatute; but, if the latter, then
it would not be." The opinion • tates that
the plaintiff might have sued upon contract for a violation of it, or might have
ued in tort for the wrong doue him, and
that he had chosen tbe latter form of action, and adds: "The subject of the action
is the tort or wrong done in the conversion
of the money; that is the foundation,
and the ole foundation, of the plaintiff'
dairn in this form of action; for, unless
the money was unlawfully converted,
the action cannot be mRintained." The
counter-claim was therefore held to be
inadmi,;sible. See also, Akerly v. Vilas,
21 Wis. 88, 109, 110, which holds that
the counter-claim must be direct!.'{ connected with the subject of the plaintiff's
action, or so connected that a cross-bill
woulJ have been sustained, or a recourmen t allowed under the former practice,
when it is claimed to fall within the last
danse of the first subdivision; and Vilas
1•. Mason, 25 Wis. 310. 321, where, in
an action brought upon a contract, - ou
a lease agaiu t the tenant, - a counterdaim for the conversion of chattels which
the defendant had placed upon the demised premises, was su taiued, on the
ground that both cause of action arose
out of the same tran action; also Ainsworth 1-. Bowen, 9 'Vis. 348.
[In the very recent ca e of Stolze v.
Torrison ( 1903 ), - Wis. - , 95 :N. W. 114,
the court by Cassoday C. J ., said: "As
indicated, the' transaction set forth in the
romplaint a the foundation of the plaintiff's claim' was the \Vrongful breaking
nnd entering the close of which the plaintiff was at the time in the quiet and peace.able possession, and maliciou prosecution

a11d cou · piracy i11 : up port of such coucluct.
The equitabl e couu tcr-daim sought t11 !i
interpo ct! i · Lo stablis h the tit) of ' I cirri, ou to the lorus m quo under a tax dct·tl
and a ub:-.equent com· yan ce and th i-;tatute of limitation, mention ed in the for going statement, and to ha,·c th e plaintiff'
assertion of title adjudg cl to be unfounded.
It is very obvious that . uch equitable
counter-claim did not ari e out of the
transaction . et forth in the complaint as
the foundation of the plaiutiff's claim. On
the contrary, it aro e entirely independent
and out. ide of that transaction, and the
trespa.. es of the defendants alleged are
ought to be justified by virtue of it. Nor
is it legally 'connected with the ubject of
the action' set forth in the complaint. It
did not arise out of the tort or tre pa · e.
alleged in tbe complaint, nor is it legally
connected with such torts or tre.pa se .
'The ubject of the action' i. not the
land, nor the title to the land, but the
torts alleged. Bazemore v. Bridger , 105
N. C. 191, 10 S. E. 88 . The peaceable
posse~sion of the plaintiff was ufficient
without actual title to support tre pa s vi
et armi [citing many Wisconsin ca es].
Besides, malicious pro ecution might he
maintained without such posses ion . 'A
counter-elaim must he a claim whi ch, if
e tahlisherl, will defeat, or in some wny
qualify, tlie judgment to which plaintiff
is otherwise entitled' [citing Wis<· on ~ in
case ]. This court ha held that. wh n e
the complaint . tated 'a cause of action in
tre. pass quare clausnm , with all egati ons
of the iujnry, destruction, antl carrying
away of per onal property in aggraYat ion
of damages,' the defendant ould not in te rpose an 'equitable counter-claim, a. ow11er
in common wi th the plaintiff of the per onal
property injured or taken , to ha,-e the
plaintiff account for the u e of defendant'.
share of the propert~', and to have the
property olcl, and the proceed. di,·irlet!
between the parties, uch a claim J)(l t.
arising out of the tre pa complained oi ,
nor being connected with the subject of
the action.'"]

57

9

898 CIVIL REMEDIES.

H'lL REMEDIE

conversion, and the like, the ability of the defendant to plead a

counter-claim depends upon the kind of action selected ; in other

words, the propriety of the counter-claim does not depend upon

the actual facts out of which the plaintiff's remedial rights arise,

but upon the mere nature of the remedy which he elects to en-

force, and of the means which he employs for such enforcement.

The result would be, that by changing the kind of action the

plaintiff may cut off a counter-claim otherwise admissible. In my

opinion, it was not the intention of the legislature, in adopting

the reformed procedure, that the essential rights of defendants

should be made to rest in this manner upon the form of remedy

chosen by the plaintiffs.

§ 647. * 771. Cases in Indiana and Kentucky. Discussion of

the Meaning of the Phrases " Arising out of," " Connected w^ith," and

" Transaction " in these Cases. In a case already quoted under a

former head, an action brought to set aside a deed of lauds on

account of the defendant's fraud, to which a counter-claim was

pleaded denying the fraud, alleging the validity of the convey-

ance, the plaintiff's continued possession of the land and pernancy
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of the rents and profits, and praying a judgment awarding pos-

session, quieting title, and giving damages, the Supreme Ccjurt of

Indiana sustained the answer, and granted the relief demanded

by the defendant.^ The same court has discussed the legal mean-

ing of the phrases "arising out of" and "connected with," and

has arrived at one general principle, at least, which may aid in

1 Woodruff V. Garner, 27 Ind. 4, per the plaintiff directly, and is therefore

Frazer J.: "The plaintiff's cause of ac- authorized by the statute." 'riie"traus-

tion is the alleged fraud of the defendant action " set forth in the complaint was

in procuring the deed .sought to be re- not simply the alleged fraud : it was the

scinded. The defendant's cause of action entire business or matter i)f agreeing to

averred in the counter-claim does not sell and ])urchase tlie laud, and of exe-

arise out of the plaintiff's cause of action, cuting and delivering the deed in pursu-

for it cannot even exist consistently with ance of such agreement. The jilaintiff

it. If tlie fraud alleged by the plaintiff averred that the defendant was guilty of

was perpetrated, then tlie defendant can- fraud ; and such fraud wa.s therefore a

not have any riglit of action whatever, jjcirt of the transaction, according to the

So the defendant found it necessary to plaintiff's version. The defendant's cause

on er ion an the like, he bili of he defendan
count r-ct im dep nds up n th kin of a t ion el c ed · in ther
word he ro rie of the ounter-cl im do n t der nd upon
he ac ual fact ut of which th lain iff's r medial right ari. e,
bu upon the mer
hich h lect to enmpl
for uch enforce nt.
force and f the mean
The re ult woul be, hat by changing the kin
f acti n the
plaintiff may cut off a counter- laim other is admi ible. In my
opini n i was n t he intention of the- legislature in adop ing
the reform d pr c dure, that the e ntial right of d f ndants
should be made to r t in thi manner upon th form of r emed
cho en b the plain i
647. * 771. Cases in Indiana and Kentucky.
Discussion of
the Mea ning of the Phrases "Arising out of " " Connected with " and
"Transaction " in these Cases. In a ca e alreadj qu t ecl. under a
f rmer head an a tion brought to set a ide a deed of lan 1 on
account of the def ndant fraud to which a count . . r-claim wJ.
plead cl denying the fraud, alleging the validity of he
'e an_ce the plaintiff
ontinued po se ion of he land and p rn n
of the r nt and profits and praying a judgment awarcli . po ourt of
ses ion qui ting ti le, and giving cl· mages, the 'upr m
Indiana u tain d the answer, and granted the r lief demanded
by the defendant. 1 The arne court ha discu ed th le · 1 m aning of le phra e
ansmg ut of ' and connec l wi h
ha' arri d at ne general principle at 1 a t whi l me · aid in

deny the fraud. Hut the deed sought to of action arose out of tlie s.inio transac-

be set aside constitutes part of the trans- tion, — in fact it »'a.<! the entire tran.saction,

action upon which the plaintiff and the except the element of fraud, which he as-

defendant both rely for a recovery. It is serted did not exist. No plainer illustra-

the link which forms the direct connec- tion of a cause of action arising out of

tion between the two diverse causes of th<' transaction wliich was also tiie foun-

actiou. So the counter-claim for possession d.iiion of the plaintiff's claim could be

l Woodruff v. Garner, 27 Ind. 4, per
Frazer J. : "The plaintiff cau e of action i the all eg d fraud of the defend ant
in procurin g t he d a u g ht t be recinded. Th e d fendant' ca t1se f a ti n
averred iu the

the plaintiff directly, and i
au thorized b the tatute. ' The ' tran .

action. , o the couut r-claim for po :e::ion
trJnucc ·J with the cau e of actiou of

da io11 of the
iwagi11e<l.

is connected with the cause of actiou of imagined.
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determining their application to all particular cases. The action

was to recover money deposited with the defendant who had re-

fused to deliver it when demanded. The defendant pleaded by

way of counter-claim that the plaintiff liad falsely charged him

with stealing the money deposited, and had slandered him by

uttering such charge in the presence of others, and prayed judg-

ment for damages. In sustaining a demurrer to this answer the

court suggested a rule of construction which may be followed in

all cases.^ The High Court of ApjDcals in Kentucky has con-

strued the phrases " arising out of the transaction " and '- con-

nected with the subject of the action " in a very liberal and broad

manner. An action was brought on an injunction bond given by

T. and sureties. The plaintiff had originally commenced proceed-

ings to obtain possession of a farm in the occupancy of T. T.

had thereupon brought an equitable suit to restrain these proceed-

ings, had obtained a preliminary injunction, and had given the

bond in question. The suit being dismissed, this action was

brought on the bond, the plaintiff therein claiming damages for

being kept out of possession of the farm by means of the injunc-
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tion during the continuance of the suit. The defendant T.

pleaded a counter-claim, alleging that notwithstanding the injunc-

tion, and before it was dissolved, the plaintiff — the defendant in

the injunction suit — wrongfully took possession of the land and

seized the crops thereon, and converted the same to his own use,

and demanding judgment for the damages thus caused. At the

trial the defendant had a verdict which was sustained on appeal.^

1 Conner r. Winton, 7 Ind. 523. " The have had some connection with, the origi-

question is, What is tlie legal effect of nal transaction in the view of the parties,

the words 'arising out of or 'connected and which, at the time the contract was

Avith ' ? Do they refer to those matters made, they could have intended miglit,

which have an immediate connection with in some event, give one part\' a claim

the transaction ? or do they include also against the other for compliance or non-

tliose whicli have a remote relation with compliance witli its provisions. We refer

it hy a chain of circumstances which were in this connection, of course, to actions

not had ia view at its inception? Sup- ex contractu only. About actions for tort

pose C. [the defendant] liad beaten W. it is not necessary to say anything at

[the plaintiff] for uttering the slander, present."

could W. have replied the damages oc- ^ Tinsley v. Tinsley, 15 R. Mon. 454,

casioned by the battery to those resulting 459, per Marshall J. " It is not required

cl t )rmining their appli ation t all particular ases. The action
' a· t r co r money clepo it cl with th defendant who had r 'fo e<l to <l li er it when cl mantled. The def n<lant plead cl by
wa of counter-claim that th plaintiff had fal ly harg d him
with . tealing the m ney cl po ited, and had lan l red him 11y
uttering sucl charge in th pr en e f thers, ancl prayed judgment for damage . In u taining a demurrer to thi an w r th
c urt sugge. ted a rule of construction which may be follow din
all case .1 The High ourt of Appeal in Kentucky ha construed the phrases " ari ing out of the transaction " and ' 4 connected with the subject of the action" in a very liberal ancl broa<l
manner. An action was brought on an injunction bond giv n by
T. and ureties. The plaintiff had originally commenced procee ings to obtain posses ion of a farm in the occupancy of T. T.
had thereupon brought an equitable suit to restrain these proceeding , had obtained a preliminary injunction, and had given the
boncl in que ·tion. The suit being dismissed, this action was
brought on the bond, the plaintiff therein claiming damages for
being kept out of posses ion of the farm by means of the injunction during the continuance of the suit. The defendant T.
pleaded a counter-claim, alleging that notwithstanding the injunction, and before it was clis ol ved, the plain tiff - the defendant in
the injunction suit - wrongfully took possession of the land and
seized the crops thereon, and converted the same to his own use,
and demanding judgment for the damages thus caused. At the
trial the defendant had a verdict which was sustnined on appeal. 2

from the slander ? and couli the parties that the counter-claim itself shall be

have settled all their quarrels in the ac- founded in contract, or arise out of the

tion to recover the money ? We do not contract set forth in the petition ; but it is

think that the statute contemplates any sutticient that it arise out of the trans-

such practice. A counter-claim is that action set forth in the petition, or be con-

which might have arisen out of, or could nected with the subject of the action. As

1 Conner r. Winton, 7 Incl. 523.
"The
question i , What i the legal effect of
the words 'arising out of' or 'connected
with' ? Do they refer to those matters
which have an immediate connection with
the transaction? or do they include al'O
those which have a remote relat ion with
it by a chain of circum tances whi ch were
1Jot- had iu view at it· inception ? Suppo e C. [the defendant) had beateu W.
[the plaintiff] for uttering the slander,
could W. have replied the damages occasioned by the battery to tho e r e ulting
from the slander? and could the partie '
have settled all their quarrels in the action to recover the mouey 1 \Ve <lo not
think that the tatute contemplates any
such practice. A cou11ter-claim i that
which might baYe ari en out of, or could

have had some conneetion with, the original tran action in the view of the partie.,
and which, at the time the contract wa
made, they could have intended might,
in some eYent, give one part.1· a claim
again. t the other for compliance or noncompliance with its provi ' ions. We refer
in thi connection, of cour. e, to a tions
ex co11traclu only. A bout actions for tort
it i not necessary to ay anything at
pre ent."
2 Tinsley i•. Tinsley, 15 R . l\Ion. 454,
459, per )far hall .J. " It i not required
that the counter.claim it-elf
hall be
founded in contract, or ari e out of the
contract et forth in the petition; but it i '
sutli<-ient that it ari e out of the tran ac tim1 set forth iu the petition, or be connected with the ubject of the actiou. A
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§ 648. * 772. Cannot defeat Counter-Claim by Choice of Form of

Action. Thompson v. Kessel. The New York Court of Appeals

648.

has passed upon the question, How far the form of the action

Action.
chosen by the plaintiff, when he has an election to sue for a tort

or on a contract, can affect the defendant's right to interpose a

counter-claim, and has declared that it can produce no effect ; if

the defendant would have been able to plead a counter-claim to a

cause of action upon an implied promise, growing out of a certain

state of facts, the plaintiff cannot, by adopting an action in form

for a tort under the same circumstances, cut off" or abridge this

substantial privilege ; the chief design of the new procedure was

to suboixlinate form to substance and not substance to form. An

action was brought to compel the delivery of certain bills of lad-

mg, the plaintiffs alleging that the shipment was on their account,

and that the goods and the bills of lading thereof belonged to

themselves, and were wrongfully detained by the defendants.

The answer put these averments in issue, and also set up by way

of counter-claim that, since the commencement of the action, the

plaintiffs had wrongfully taken possession of the goods, and had
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converted the same to their own use, and prayed judgment for

the value thereof. The court pronounced the defendants' demand

to be a cause of action plainly arising out of the transaction set

forth in the complaint, or at least connected with the subject of

tlie action, being, as it was, for the value of the very goods which

the plaintiffs sought to reach, and added the following: " I do

not think it lies with the plaintiffs to allege that their taking was

a mere tort for the purpose of defeating the counter-claim. And,

even if an action sounding in tort might be maintained by the

defendants for the taking, I am still of opinion that the cause of

action for the value of the goods would constitute a good counter-

claim in such a case as this." ^

tlie petition states the occupation of tlie constitute the ground of a counter-claim."

laud by Mrs. T. [tlie present defendant In Wadley v. Davis, 63 Barb. 500, the

and the plaintiff in the equity suit] during same principle was approved and fol-

the j)eudeucy of the injunction, and claims lowed ; and a demand arising from tort

damages therefor, any interference by the to property was held to be a proper coun-

plaintiff which rendered such occupation terciaini in an action on contract,

less profitable or less valuable to the oc- * Tliomjjson i*. Kessel, ."JO N. Y. .383,

cuj)aut constituted a cause of action aris- 389, per Johnson J. The same doctrine

ing out of the transaction set forth in the has been recently approved and cnforce<I,

petition, and is connected with the plain- after an exhaustive examination of tlie

tiff's cause of action ; and although it authorities, by the Supreme Court of Mi.s-

amuunt to a tresp-xsa or otiier tort, it ni.iy sonri, in (Jordon r. I>rniier, 49 Mo. ."iTO,

-72.

Cannot defeat Counter-Claim by Choice of Forro of

The

\ York

ur of pp ah
f the ac ion
u for(. t rt
a

r on ' c n ract a.n a
counter-claim, nd ha d clared b it
th clef ndant w uld ha e b n able t
a e of a. ti n u on an im1 li d promi , rowing ut of a c r ain
·tate of fac , th plain iff cann t,
tin an acti n in f rm
for
ort under th ame cir umstan e , cu o
r abridge thi
sub ' tantial pri vil
· the hi f de 'i n f the new procedur was
' uh rd.in te f rm to sub tance and not ub t nee t form.
n
, ction wa brought t compel he deliv r of certain bill f lading, the plaintiff all ging that the bipn nt a on their ac unt,
and that the good and the bills f ladin thereof belonged t
them lve , and w r wrongfully detain d by the def n ant .
he an wer put the e averments in is ue, and also s t up by "ay
of counter-claim that, ince the comm ncemen of the action, he
plaintiff had wrongfuUy taken po es i n of th good and had
converted the ame to their own u e, an prayed judgm nt f r
the value thereof. The court ronounced the defendant ' d mantl
t be a cause of action plainly ari ing out f the transacti n et
forth in the complaint, or at least connected with the ubj ct of
the action, being a it wa, , for the valu f the ver g
which
the plaintiff· sought to reach, and added the f 11 wing: I do
not think it lie with the plaintiff to alleg that heir taking ' a
a mere tort for the purpo e of
f a in tl e ounter-claim. \...ncl
e en if an action uncling in tort mi ht be maint in d by h
fondant for the taking, I am till f
ini n that the cau
f
action for the value f he go d would c nstitute go d c unter,h im in uch a ca e a this . 1
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§ 649. * 773. Xenia Branch Bank v. Lee. I sliall end this par-

ticular branch of the subject by quoting from a very able and

instructive decision made b}^ the Superior Court of New York

City, in which the statutory definition was fully analyzed as to all

its parts, and an attempt was made to reach the basis of a true

interpretation. The action was brought to recover damages for

the wrongful conversion of certain bills of exchange. The plain-

tiffs had been the owners of the bills, which were drawzi by

divers persons on different payees ; they indorsed the same and

delivered them to the Ohio Life Insurance and Trust Company,

for the purpose of collection only ; this company transferred them

to the defendants, who now retain them; it was alleged that the

defendants took the bills with notice of all these facts, and were

not holders in good faith for value. The complaint stated a de-

mand and refusal, an unlawful detention and conversion, and

demanded judgment for the value of the securities as damages ;

it was strictly for an alleged tort. The answer was pleaded as a

counter-claim. It set up the drawing of the bills, their indorsement

by the plaintiffs, their delivery to the Ohio Trust Company, their
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transfer to the defendants for full value and without notice, de-

mand of payment, nonpayment and notice thereof to the plaintiffs,

and prayed judgment against the plaintiffs as indorsers for the

amount due on the drafts. In other words, it was like an ordinary

complaint in an action by the indorsees against the indorsers to

571, per Bliss J., supra, § * 569 ii. And see the petition are, tliat the defendants came

Brady v. Brennan, 25 Minn. 210; Kitchie into the possession of certain sacks of the

(-. Ilayward, 71 Mo. 560; Kamerick v. plaintiff, and wrongfully converted them

Castlenian, 23 Mo. App. 4S1. Kitchie y. to their own use. The details of the traus-

Ilayward was an action for the wrongful action, the evidential facts, arc not stated,

conversion of certain sacks. The defend- but the ultimate facts only, those which

ant answered that the plaintiff had con- will entitle the plaintiff to relief, when

tracted with him for the sale and delivery established by other facts at the trial. . . .

of a quantity of potatoes of a given quality. It (the transaction) must be held to in-

to be delivered in sacks ; that plaintiffs elude all the facts and circumstances out

sent him potatoes in the sacks in contro- of which the injury comj)lained of by him

versy, but the potatoes were of an inferior arose, and if these facts and circmnstauces

§ 649. * 773.

I hall ml this particular branch of the ubj ·t by quoting from a, very able a.ml
in trucLive <l.eci ion ma.cl by the . 'n1 erior 'ourt of Tew "ork
,ity, in ' hich th statutory cJ cfiniLion wa' fully analyzed a· to all
it· parts, and an attem1 t wa made o r ,tch the ba is of a true
interpretation. The ac:tion was brought to r cov r damage· for
the wrongful cony r ion of ertain bills of exelrnnge. The plaintiff had been the owners of the bills, which wer drawn by
divers persons on different payees; they in<l.ornecl the sam, and
<leliverecl them to the Ohio Life Insnrance an<l_ Trust Company
for the purpose of collection only; this company tran ferre<l_ them
to the defendants, who now retain them; it wa · alleged that the
<lefencla.nts took the bills with notice of all the 'e fa,ct...,, and were
not holders in good faith for Yalue. The complaint stated a demand and refusal, an unlawful detention and conversion, and
demanded judgment for the value of the securities as damages;
it was strictly for an alleged tort. The answer was pleaded a a
counter-claim. It set up the drawing of the bills, their indorsement
by the plaintiffs, their deli very to the Ohio Trust Company, their
transfer ·to the defendants for full value and without n otice, dema,nd of payment, nonpayment and notice thereof to t he plaintiffs,
and prayed judgment against the plaintiffs as indorsers for the
amount due on the drafts. In other words, it was like an ordinary
complaint in an action by the indorsees against the indorser to
Xenia Branch Bank v. Lee.

quality, and asked damages, by way of also furnished to the defendant a ground

counter-claim, for the breach of contract, of action against the jtlaintiff, the defend-

The court, through Hough J., said: " If ant will be entitled to jjresent such cause

the facts stated by the defendant be true, of action as a counter-claim, showing

he certainly has a cause of action against b\' proper averments that it is a part of

the plaintiff. It is not, however, a cause the same transaction which is made the

of action arising out of any contract set foundation of the plaintiff's claim. In this

forth in the petition, for no contract is view of the case, it is immaterial what form

therein set forth. The facts set forth in of action is adopted by the plaintiff."

571, per Bliss J ., supra,§ * 569 u. And see

Brady v. B rennan, 25 Minn. 210; Hitchie
i .. I laywar d, 71 Mo. 560; Kam eri c k i:.
'a t leman, 23 Mo. App. 481. Ritchie v.
Hayward was an action for the wrougfn l
co nversion of cer tain sacks. The defendant answered t hat the plaintiff had contracted wit l1 him fo r t he sale and de li very
of a quantity of potatoes ofa g iven quality,
to be deli vered in sacks; that plaintiffs
sent him potatoes in the ack in coutrove rsy, but the potatoes wer e of an inferior
quality, and asked damage , by way of
co unter-claim, for the breach of ontract.
Th e court, through Hough .J., aid: " If
the facts stated by th e defendant b true,
he eertainly has a cau e of action again t
th e plaintiff. It i not, however, a cau e
of action arising out of any contract set
fo rt h in the petition, for no ontract i
there in set forth. The facts et forth in

the petition are, th at the defendant- came
into the posse sion of certain . acks of the
plaintiff, and wrougfully converted them
to their own use. The details of the transaction, the evidential facts , are not stated,
but the ultimate fart only , tho,e which
will entitle the pl aintiff to relief, when
established by other facts at the trial. . . .
It (the transaction) must be held to include all the facts and ci rcumstance out
of which th e injury complain ed of by him
aro e, am! if t hese fact aud circum tance
al ' O furni heel to the defendant a groun d
of action against th plaintiff, the defendant will be entitled to pre eut ·uch ause
of action a. a counter-claim , bowing
by proper averm nt that it ii; a part of
the same tran action which i made the
foundation of the plaintiff' claim . In this
view of the ca e, it is immaterial what for m
of action is adopted hy the plaintiff."
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recover the sum due on a bill or note. A motion to strike out

this counter-claim was denied at the special term, and the plain-

tiffs appealed to the general term, which, after stating the facts

and the questions presented by the record, and reciting the two

subdivisions of § 150 of the New York Code, pronounced the

opinion found in the note.^

1 Xenia Branch Bank v. Lee, 7 Abb.

Pr. 372, 389, per Woodruff J.: "This

r co\· r th um due on a bill or note . A mo ion to trike ou t
counter-claim We d nied at th
pecial term an the laiuap ealed
he g n ral t rm whi h, af er tatin0 th fa
nd he q ue ti n
c.l b ' he r
rc.l nd recitin the t o
ubdi Yi ·i n of
w York
ronounced he
1
pinion found m the no e.

till'

T

division of tlie section shows that there

may be a counter-claim when the action

itself does not arise on contract ; for the

second clause is expressly confined to

actions arising on contract, and allows

counter-claims in such cases of any other

causes of action also arising on coutracc;

and this may embrace, probably, all cases

heretofore denominated ' set-off,' legal

or eiiuitalde, and any other legal or equi-
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table demand liquidated or unliquidated,

whether within the proper definition of

set-off or not, if it arise on contract. Glea-

soa V. Moen, 2 Duer, 642. The first sub-

division would therefore be unmeaning

as a separate definition, if it neither con-

templated cases in which the action was

not brought on the contract itself in the

sense in which these words are ordinarily

used, nor counter-claims which did not

theni-selves arise on contract. The first

subdivision, by its terms, assumes that the

plaintiffs' complaint may set forth, as the

foundation of the action, a ' contract ' or

a ' transaction.' The legi.slature, in using

both words, must be assumed to liave

designed that each siiould have a mean-

ing ; and, in our judgment, their construc-

tion should be according to the natural and

ordinary signification ofthe terms. In this

sease, every contract may be said to be a

transaction; but every transaction is not

a contract. Again, the second subdivision

having provided Jor all counter-claims

arising on contract, and all actions arising

on contract, no cases can be supposed to

which the first subdivision can be applied,

unless it be one of three classes ; viz.,

1st. In actions in which a contract is

stated as the foundation of the plaintiffs'

claim, couuter-<lairas which arise out of

the same contract; or, 2d. In actions in

wliich some transaction, not being a con-

tract, is set fortli as the foundation of the

plaintiffs' claim, counter-claims which

arise out of the same transaction ; or,

3d. In actions in which either a contract,

or a transaction which is not a contract,

is set forth as the foundation of the plaiu-

tiffs' claim, counter-claims which neither

arise out of the same contract nor out of

tlie same transaction, but which are con-

nected with the subject of the action."

After some discussion upon the difference

between the provision in the first subdi-

vision and that in the second subdivision

in reference to actions and couuter-claims

based upon contract, in whicli he points

out tliat, in tlie former, the language is

"contract wiiich is XA\g foundation of the

ari e out of the ame ran action ; or,
1 Xenia Branch B ank v. Lee, 7 Abb.
3d. In act ion in whi b either a con tract,
Pr. 372, 3 , per W oodr uff J .: 'Thi
di\•i ion of the e tion how that the re or a t ran a tion which i not a c ntr a t,
ma be a
nnter-cla1 m when the action i et forth a the fo undation of t i! pla initself doe not arise on contract · for the tiff ' l im, counter-claim which neithe r
seco utl clau "e · ex pre ly confined to ari ·e out of the ame contract no r out of
acti on an mg on ontr ct, and allow
the ame tran action, but which a re concounter-claim in uch case of any other nect d with the ubj ect of the act,iou."
ca
of acti n al o ari -iu on c utract; A fter ome di cu ion upon the difference
and this may embrace, probably, all ca e
between the provi ion in th e fir t ubdiheretofo re denominated ' et-off,' I gal vi ion and that in the econtl ubdivi ion
or equitaLle, and any othe r 1 gal or equi- in reference to action and conuter- lairns
table demand liquidated or unliquid ated, ba ed upon contract, in which he p int
'"hether within the proper definition of out that, iu the f rm er, the language i
et-off or not, if it ari e on contract.
lea- "contract whi ·h i the fuu11datio11 of th
on v. :\[oen, 2 Duer, 642 . Th e fir t . ub- plaintiff ' daim," an<l, iu th latter, "a di,·i ion would therefore be unmeauing tiou arisrn.? on c ntract," aucl that thi
a a. ep rate defiuitiuu, if it neitiler con- language appropriately applie , in the
templated ea e in which the action wa
first uLdi ''i.:iou to certain cla e of acnot brought on the contraet it-elf in the tion in which a contract i: the fou11dation
en. e in which the e word are ordiuarily of the plaintiff' claim, althou"'h the action
u-etl, ll<Jl' counter-claim which ditl not doe D t t ri ctly ari e on the c ntract, au<l,
them elve ari e on contract. The fir t
econd ub<li Yi · ion, t all t ho"
ubdivi ion, by it term , as ume that the action which are tri ·tly brought on th
plaintiff ' complaint may et forth, a the c utract, - the 1 a.med jud<re pr eetl ·
fouudat ion of the a tioo, a' con tr ·t' or with the main ubje ·t: 'But, e ondly,
a: 'tran action.' The legi lat Lire, iu u iog the , ubdi vi ion authorize in action m
both word , mu t be a· urned to ha,·e
de~icroetl that eaeh houhl have a meaning ; aud, in our judgment, their con truction houlcl be according to the naturtd and
ordinar!J signification of the terms. Iu thi
·eru e, every contract may be aid t be a
t ran actio n; but ev ry trao action i not
a cuutract. Again, the ec n<l ubclivi 'ion
having provid d .for all counter-claim
ari iug on contract, and all a tion ari ·ing
on co11tract, no
e can be upp . cl to
which th fir t ubdivi ion can b applied,
uule . it b one of thre cl ·e ; viz.,
I t.
11tract i:
tat
plain t,iff ,•
c·lai111, couater-daim which ari ·e out of
11 :ame contract; or, 2d. In action i11
wlii<'h "m
ran ·acti1>1, ur>t 11 ing a contra1· , i et forth
th foun<lation of h
pLLi11 t1ff. ' c·lai in, cvuu• Cl'-claim · "hich
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§ 650. * 774. Meaning of Term " Transaction." Differences of

Opinion as to the Import of Statutory Terms. While the foregoing

decisions do not furnish any general formulas for determining in

all cases what is the " transaction " set forth in tlie plaintiff's peti-

tion or complaint, or what is the " subject of the action," or when

§ 650. * 77 4.

Mea n ing of T erm "Transac tion."

D iffere n ces of

While the for going
decision do not furni h any general f rmula. for <let rmining in
all ca s what i , th "tran ac ion" et forth in the plaintiff p titian or complaint, or what i the " ubject of th action,'' or wh n
the defendant's ause of action "ari es out of the transaction set
forth in t he complaint,' or when it i ' ' connected with the subj ct
of the action," they do t hrow ome light upon the true intent of
the legislature in u i11g these phrases, and th y settle some principles which, when properly applied, may a . . sist in constructing
th universal rules so much needed by the profession and the
bench. It is very evident that there has existed in the minds of
judges a radical differe nce of opinion in respect to the import of
the controlling terms of the statutory definition, and especially in
respect to the wor d "transaction." One school would narrow its
meaning so as to deprive it of all separate significance in the
·clause where it is found. They would make it either synonymous with " contract," or would regard it as being merely the
very cause of action which the plaintiff has alleged in his pleading as the ground of recovery.1 The other school give to the
word a broader and more comprehensive meaning.2 E x vi termini
it imports something different from" contract," and is to be taken
in its ordinary and popular sense. It is more extensive than

Opin ion a s to the I m port o f Statutory Terms.

1

the defendant's cause of action " arises out of the transaction set

forth in the complaint," or when it is " connected with the subject

of the action," they do throw some light upon the true intent of

the legislature in using these phrases, and they settle some prin-

ciples which, when properly applied, may assist in constructing

the universal rules so much needed by the profession and the

bench. It is very evident that there has existed in the minds of

judges a radical difference of opinion in respect to the import of

the controlling terms of the statutory definition, and especially in

respect to the word " transaction." One school would narrow its

meaning so as to deprive it of all separate significance in the

clause where it is found. They would make it either synony-

mous with " contract," or would regard it as being merely the

very cause of action which the plaintiff has alleged in his plead-

Generated for facpubupdates (University of Michigan) on 2014-06-17 15:35 GMT / http://hdl.handle.net/2027/uc2.ark:/13960/t02z1c23b
Public Domain / http://www.hathitrust.org/access_use#pd

ing as the ground of recovery.^ The other school give to the

word a broader and more comprehensive meaning.^ Ex vi termini

it imports something different from " contract," and is to be taken

in its ordinary and popular sense. It is more extensive than

not enter into the defendants' case, and ruff reaches the conclusion that, even if

vice versa. But, from the 'nature of the the defendants' cause of action does not

sul)ject, this must alivai/s he so. The legis- arise out of the " transaction " set forth

lature were not so absurd as to mean that in the complaint, it "is directly and im-

the defendant might counter-claim when mediately cotiuected with the subject of

the very facts alleged by him, with all the action. The subject of the action is

tlieir particulars, were identical with those either the right to the possession of the

alleged by the plaintiff. . . . So, if the bills of exchange, or it is the bills them-

transaction set fortli as the foundation of selves. The defendants' counter-claim is

the plaintiffs' claim be regarded as more not only connected with, but is inseparable

narrow, and as being the transfer of the from, either or both. The object of the ac-

bills by the Ohio Trust Company to the tion is </a wages; but the S!(/)/ec^ is the lulls of

defendants, then, as before, the defend- exchange, or the right to their possession."

ants' counter-claim arises out of the same i See, for example, Mulberger r.

transaction ; to wit, the transfer. The Koenig, 62 Wis. 558.

circumstances that the defendants have 2 [^Stolze r. Torrison (1903). 118 Wis.

to superadd an allegation of demand, pro- 315, 95 N. W. 114; Blue v. Capital Nat.

test, and notice to the plaintiffs as indor- Bank (1896), 145 Ind. 518, 43 N. E. 655 ;

sers, does not alter the ca.se. This added Watts v. Ganct (1894), 42 Neb. 869, 61

fact is only a means of showing ^ow the N. W. 104; Gilbert v. Loberg (1894), 86

defendants' cause of action arises out of Wis. 661, 57 N. W. 982; Story & Isliam

the transaction relied upon, and is made Co. i'. Story (189.3), 100 Cal. 30, 34 Pac.

complete." Finally, Mr. Justice Wood- 671, quoting the text.]

not enter into the defendants' case, and
vice versa. B ut, from the ·nature of the
uhject, this must always be so. The legislature were not so abs urd as to mean that
th e defe ndant might counter-claim when
the very facts alleged. by him, with all
their particulars, wer e identical with th ose
alleged by the plaintiff . . . . So, if the
transaction set fo r th as the foundation of
th e plaiuti.ffs' claim be regarded as. more
narrow, anc.1 as being t he t ransfer of the
bills by the Oh io Trust Company to the
defendant , then, as before, the defend.ants' counter-claim arises out of the same
transactio n ; to wit, the transfer. The
cir um tances that the uefe ndan ts have
to uperadd an allegation of demand, prote t, and notice to the plaintiffs as iudor. er , does not alter the case. This add ed
fact i only a means of showing how the
defendants' cause of action arises out of
the transaction relied upon, a nd is made
complete." Finally, l\fr. Just ice W ood-

ruff reach es the conclusion that, even if
the defendants' cause of action does not
arise out of the "transaction" set forth
iu the complaint, it "is directly and immediately corrnecteu with the ·uLject of
the action. The su bject of the action i
either the right to the posses,,iou of the
bills of exchauge, or it is the bill: themselves. The uefendants' counter-clairn i·
not only connected with, but is inseparable
from, either or both. The object of th e action is damages; but the subject is the bill:' of
exchange, or the right to their po essio11 ."
1 See, for example,
Mulberger r .
Koenig, 62 Wi . 55 .
2 [Stolze v. Torri on (1903). 118 n i .
315, 95 N. W . l l-1 ; Blue v. Capital Nat.
Bank (1896) , U5 Ind. 518, 43 N. E. 655;
Watts v. Gantt (1894), 42 'eb. 869, 61
N. W. 104; Gilbert v. Loberg (1 94), 6
Wis. 661, 57 I . W . 98~ ; tor r & I ha.m
Co. v. Story ( l 9:-3), l 00 Cal. 30, 3-! Pac.
671, quoting the text.]
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" cause of action *' or " subject of the action ; " for out of it the

defendant's " cause of action " is said to " arise," and it is also to

be set forth in the com^jlaint or petition, not as the " cause of

action," but as the '' foundation " of the plaintiff's claim. It must,

therefore, be something — that comhinatiun of acts and events, cir-

cumstances and defaults — ivhich, viewed in one aspect, results in the

plaintiff's right of action and, viewed in another aspect, results in the

defendant" s right of action. As these two opposing rights cannot

be exactly the same, it follows that there may be, and generally

must be, acts, facts, events, and defaults in the transaction as a

whole, which do not enter into each cause of action, but are con-

fined to one of them alone. ^

§ 651. * 775. Meaning of " Subject of Action." No Agreement

in Judicial Opinions. Construction Proposed by Author. In re-

au e of action or
ubject of he action· · f r ou of it the
d f ndan '
au e of acti n i ~ aid to • ari e, and it i al o to
b et for h in le c m1 laint r p ition, n t a he cau e f
action ' but a he foundation of the plaintiff claim. It mu~ ,
therefore, be omethin - that conibinat~un of acts and events circum ·tunce and default· - which viewecl in one a :pect, results in the
plaintiff right of action and, viewed in another a :p ct results in the
defendant' right of action. A the e bYo op o ·ing rights cannot
be exactly the ame it follow hat ther ma b and generall
mu t be ac
fact , event. ancl l faults in he tran a ion as a

gard to what constitutes the " subject of the action," there is

no agreement whatever in the judicial opinions. Some of them

have treated it as identical with the " cause of action," which is

plainly incorrect. As I have already shown, the " cause of action "

consists in, 1st, the primary light, and the facts from which it
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flows ; and, 2d, the breach of that right, and the facts consti-

tuting such breach. These taken together create a remedial

right, and are the cause of action. The remedy itself is cer-

tainly the " object " of the action. The " subject " is certainly

not the cause of action ; but when we have reached this conclu-

sion we find very little judicial aid in arriving at any other and

more affirmative one. Some judges have said that in all posses-

sory actions, and all actions to establish property, the " subject of

the action " denotes the things to assert a right over which, or to

obtain the possession of which, the action is brought, as the land

in ejectment and in many equity suits, or the chattels in replevin.

Some have said that the " subject " denotes the same in other

classes of actions, not brought to recover possession or expressly

^ Tlie reader should consult the analy- repeat in the text the former full discus-

sis of cases, and the discussion in relation sion ; hut it is plain that the decisions

to the same word given iu a former chaj)- there cited, and tiie results there reached,

ter (Chap. III., Sec. 2). The language ai>ply \vith equal force to the questions

of the clause there under examination is now under consideration. There is an

almost identical with that of the present evident connection between the subject

pa.'jsage ; and the same meaning must, of of uniting causes of action in one coin-

course, be attributed to the words " trans- plaint, and the uniting them in one con-

action " and "subject of the action" in troversy, although tlicy are set forth in

both sections of the statute. I do not the adverse pleadings.

whole which do not enter into each cause of action, but are confined to one of them alone. 1
· 651. * 775. Meaning of " Subject of Action." No Agreement
in Judicial Opinions.
Construction Proposed by Author. In regard to what constitutes the
ubJect of the action," there is
no agreement whate er in the judicial opinions.
ome of them
have r ated it a identical with the " cause of action, ' hi h i
lainly incorrect. As I ha e already ·hown, the cau e of action '
con ists in 1 t, th
rimar right, and the facts from which it
flow · and, 2d, the breach of ·hat right, and the fact on ·tinting uch breach. The e taken together create a remedial
ri ht and are the cause of action. The rem dy itr·elf i erainly the 'object
f the action. The ' subj c
is ertainl
not the au e f action ; but when w have r ached hi concluion we find very little judicial aid in arriving at any ther nd
m re affirma i e on .
me judge ha e aid ha in all po e or action and all actions t e~tabli h pr pe1ty, the '' ubj t of
he action cl n e the things to as rt a right v r which, or to
obtain the po e sion of whi h the acti n i br u ht, a he land
in ejectment an l in many equi
uit
r h hattel in r ple in.
ome have said that he " ubject den t the ame
her
la ses f action , not rought to recover
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to establish title, but in which, nevertheless, the plaintiff's right

to recover is based upon his property in a specific thing, as for

the conversion of chattels, or for trespass to lands or chattels ;

while some have applied the same principle to actions not based

upon any alleged propertij of the plaintiff in a specific thing, and

have gone to the extent of holding that, in actions upon contract

to recover the debt due or damages for the non-performance

thereof, the "subject" is the very contract itself, — the instru-

ment in suit, as, for example, in an action upon a bill or note, the

" subject," according to this view, would be the bill or note sued

upon. Other judges have said that the " subject " is the right

which is sought to be enforced in the action ; meaning thereby

the 'primary right, which has been infringed upon as distinguished

from the remedial right, and from the delict and the remedy.

Thus in the case last quoted, which was an action for the con-

version of bills, Mr. Justice Woodruff declared that the subject

was either the bills themselves, or the plaintiff's original right to

their possession. It would, as it seems to me, be correct to say

in all cases, legal or equitable, that the " subject of the action " is
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the plaintiff's main primary right, which has been broken, and by

means of whose breach a remedial right arises. Thus, the right

of property and possession in ejectment and replevin, the right of

possession in trover or trespass, the right to the money in all cases

of debt, and the like, would be the " subject " of the respective

actions. Although in a certain sense, and in some classes of

suits, the things themselves, the land or chattels, may be regarded

as the " subject," and are sometimes spoken of as such, yet this

cannot be true in all cases ; for in many actions there is no such

specific thing in controversy over which a right of property exists.

The primary right, however, always exists, and is always the

very central element of the controversy around which all the

other elements are grouped, and to which they are subordinate.

In possessory and proprietary actions, this right, which will then

be always one of property or of possession, will be intimately

associated with the specific thing itself which is the object of tlie

right ; but this relation is not and cannot be universal. It seems,

therefore, more in accordance with the nature of actions and more

in harmony with the language of the statute to regard the "sub-

ject of the action " as denoting the plaintiff's principal primary

right to enforce or maintain which the action is brought, than to

to stabli h titl , but in ' Thich, neverthele , the plaintiff.' light
to recov r i:s ba cl upon hi· property in a specific thing, a.B for
th conversion of clutttels, or for tre pass to land or dmtt ,1 ;
while ome have ap1 lied the same prineiple to a ·tio1rn not ba ·ed
upon any alleged property of the plaintiff in a specific thiJJg and
have gone to the exte11t of holding that, in action upon contract
to recover the debt du or damages for the non-1 erformanc
th reof, the " ubject '' is the very contract itself, - th instrument in suit, as, for example, in an action upon a bill or note, th
''subject," according to this view, would be the bill or note ·u d
upon. Other judges have said that the " ubject" is th right
which is sought to be enforced in the action ; meaning thereby
the primary right, which has been infringed upon as distingui ·hed
from the remedial right, and from the delict and the remedy.
Thus in the case last quoted, which was an action for the conversion of bills, Mr. Justice vVoodruff declared that the subject
was either the bills themselves, or the plaintiff's original right to
their possession. It would, as it seems to me, be correct to say
in all cases, legal or equitable, that the "subject of the action " i
the plaintiff's main primary right, which ha been broken, and by
means of whose breach a remedial right arises. Thus, the righ t
of property and posse sion in ejectment and replevin, the right of
possession in trover or trespass, the right to the money in all case ~
of debt, and the like, would be the "subject" of the respective
actions. Although in a certain sense, and in some classes of
suits, the things themselves, the land or chattel , may be regarded
as the " subject," and are sometimes spoken of a such, yet thi
cannot be true in all cases; for in many actions there is no su ·h
specific thing in controverRy over which a right of property exi ·t ·.
The primary right, however, alway exists, and is always the
very central element of the controversy around which all the
other elements are grouped, and to which they are subordinate.
In possessory and proprietary actions, this right, which will th n
be always one of propert or of po se ·sion, will be intimately
associated with the specific thing itself which i the oby'ect of the
right; but this relation is not and cannot be universal. It ·eern ,
therefore, more in accordance with the nature of action and more
in harmony with the language of the statute to regard the "subject of the action " as denoting the plaintiff's principal primary
right to enforce or maintain which the action is brough , than to
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regard it as denoting the specific thing in regard to which the

legal controversy is carried on.' In this manner alone can we

arrive at a general rule applicable to all possible cases, and the

rule thus reached fully satisfies all the requirements of the legis-

lative language, and can be invoked in all classes of actions.

While I suggest and adopt this meaning of the term " subject,"'

I freely concede that no decision, so far as I have discovered,

pronounces this interpretation to be the only one admissible;

many cases sanction it, none directly reject it ; but none, on the

other hand, have gone so far as to declare in its favor to the exclu-

sion of all other meanings. The construction proposed, as it has

been judicially approved in many instances, would remove all

doubt and conflict of opinion, and would furnish a simple and

practical rule of universal application.^

§ 652. * 77(3. The Phrase " Connected with." Connection must

be Immediate and Direct. h\ respect to the phrase " connected

with" the subject of the action, one rule may be regarded as set-

tled by the decisions, and it is recommended by its good sense,

and its convenience in practice. The connection must be im-
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mediate and direct. A remote, uncertain, partial connection is

not enough to satisfy the requirements of the statute.^ The crite-

rion proposed by the Supreme Court of Indiana in one of the cases

cited is as certain and practical as the nature of the subject admits,

and only needs to be known to be universally accepted. It is,

that the connection must be such that the parties could be sup-

posed to have foreseen and contemplated it in their mutual acts ;

in other words, that the parties must be assumed to have had this

connection and its consequences in view when they dealt with each

other. I now pass, according to the order already stated, to the

three branches into which the subject-matter is naturally separated.

I. Cases in which the Cause of Action alleged as a Counter- Claim

arises out of the Contract Set forth in the Complaint or Peti-

tion as the Foundation of the Plaintiff's Claim.

<^ 653. * 777. First and Second Subdivisions of Statute overlap

to a Certain Extent. Mr. Justice Woodruff, in tlie opinion last

1 Sharp V. Kin.<iman. 18 S. C. 108. Gl N. \V. 104 ; Ilav.s ,: McLain (1899) 66

CvStolzc V. TorrLson (190.-}), 118 Wi.s. Ark.400,508. W. 1006; Gurske ?;. Kelpiu

.31., 9.5 N. W. 114.: (1901),61 Xob.517.85X.\V.557; Walscrr.

• LWatts «•. Gaiitt (1894), 42 Neb. 869, Wear (1807), 141 .Mo. 443, 42 S. W. 928.]

rerr rel i a den tin the
cific thing m reg, r to which the
l al con r Y r. i arri(} l on.1 In hi mann r alone can we
arriY at a general rul appli ·:i.bl o all
ible ca
and the
rul h u reached full a i ·fi all the re
e legi la i
lt n rnge, an can b in oked in
ction .
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quoted, declares that the second subdivision of the definition was

intended to embrace all cases in which the plaintiff's cause of

action arises on contract, and the defendant's counter-claim also

arises on contract, either the same or another, and that the clause

of the first subdivision above mentioned was designed to include

only those cases in which the contract is set forth by the plaintiff

as \he foundation of his action, although the action itself is not 07i

the contract. This is, I think, attributing too much nicety and

precision of thought to the legislature, and assumes that it would

never enact any duplicate provisions. The first subdivision no

doubt covers the cases mentioned by Judge Woodruff, but it also

embraces many others. Undoubtedly, the codifiers and the legis-

lature in drawing and adopting the first subdivision had in mind

the doctrine of recoupment, and so framed the language that it

should include cases of recoupment and all others, legal and equi-

table, analogous to it, — that is, all cases in which the right of

action of the plaintiff and that of the defendant arise from the

same contract. It desc^'ibes, therefore, not only the special and

infrequent classes of instances in which the plaintiff's claim is
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not technically on the contract, although a contract is set forth as

its foundation, but also air other instances in which the plaintiff's

action is strictly brought on the contract, while the defendant's

counter-claim in both cases arises from the same contract. The

central idea of this subdivision then is, that one and the same

contract is the basis of both parties' demand for relief.^ Passing

to -the second subdivision, the central thought is equally plain,

viz., that the plaintiff's cause of action, and that of the defendant,

spring from different contracts ; in other words, the codifiers and

the legislature had in mind the familiar case of set-off, both legal

and equitable. But, in framing the clause, tlie language was

made broader than was necessary, and it actually covers all cases

in which the plaintiff's cause of action is on contract, and the

defendant's counter-claim is also on contract the same or another.

The law-makers have thus in fact given us two provisions author-

1 QBrosnan v. Kramer (1901), 135 Cal. the lessor against the lessee at the time of

.36, 66 Pac. 979 : Where a lease is entered the foreclosure sviit is not a claim arising

into between two parties, and on the same " out of the transaction set forth in the

date the lessee loans money to the lessor complaint as the foundation of the ))lain-

secured by a mortgage ou the leased tiff's claim or connected with the subject

premises, and an action of foreclosure is of the action," whicli is barred by failure

subsequently brought by the lessee, a de- to set it up. Citing the text. Richardson

maud for unpaid rent existing in favor of v. Penny (1900), 10 Okla. 32, 61 Pac. 584.3

quoted le lar that he
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of the fir t ubdivi i n above 111 ntionecl wa, de ·ign <l. to in lud
only those a e in which the contract i: ·et forth by the plaintiff
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never enact any duJ_Jlicate provisions. The firt subdivi ion no
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embrace many othen:;. Uncloubtedly, the codifier and th 1 gi lature in drawing and adopting the first subcli vision had in mind
the doctrine of recour ment, and so framed the lanO'uage that it
hould include cases of recoupment and all others, l gal and equitable, analogous to it, - that is, all cases in which the right of
action of the plaintiff and that of the clefentlant arise from the
~ame contract. It describes, therefore, not only the . pecia.l and
infreq uent classes of instances in which the plaintiff's claim i ·
not technically on the contract, although a contract i. et forth as
it., foundation, but also all other instances in which the plaintiff's
action is strictly brought on the contract, while the defendant ·
counter-claim in both cases ari "'es from the same contract. The
cen trn.l idea of this subdivision then is, that one and th same
contract is the basi of both parties' demand for rvlief.l P~tS::,ing
to -the second subdivision, the central thought is equally plain,
viz., that the plaintiff' cause of action, and that of the defendant
prin from different contracts ; in other words, the codifiers and.
the legi lature had in mind the familiar case of set-off, both legal
and equitable. But, in framing the clause, the language was
made broader than wa nece sary, and it actually covers all ca e.,
in which the plaintiff's cause of action is on contract, and the
defendant's counter-claim is also on contract the ame or another.
The law-makers have thus in fact given us two provision author1 [Brosnan v. Kramer (1901), 13:> Cal.
36, 66 Pac. 979 : Where a lea e is ntered
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complaint as the foundation of the plaintiff' · claim or connected with the. ubject
of the action," which is barred hr failure
to et it up.
itin ~ the text. Richardson
v.Peuny( l !lOO),lOOkla.32, 61 Pac.5'4.]

908 CIVIL REMEDIES.

izing a counter-claim arising from the same contract as that from

which the plaintiff's cause of action results, but only one author-

izing a counter-claim springing from another contract than the

one upon Avhich the plaintiff's demand is based. The same case

mav therefore be often referred to both of these subdivisions ; but

I shall, following what seems to be the plain design of the statute,

consider under the first all those instances in which the demands

of both parties arise from the same contract, and postpone to the

second all those in which each demand arises from a separate

contract. That this is the correct construction of the whole pro-

vision is made certiiin, when we turn to the form which it assumes

in all the codes which constitute the second group according to.

the classification stated at the commencement of this section.^

§ 654. * 778. General Proposition Stated. Illustrative Examples.

It may be stated as a general proposition that in all actions to

recover a money judgment, debt or damages, upon a contract, or

where a contract is set forth as the foundation of the plaintiff's

claim, a counter-claim of a money judgment against the plaintiff

for his breach or non-performance of any stipulations of the same
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agreement, or for his fraud in procuring the same to be entered

into, is admissible. The following examples will illustrate this

proposition.- In an action for rent brought by the lessor or by

1 The following recent decisions give Ohio St. 550; Hade i\ McVay, 31 id. 2.31 ;

examples and illustrations of counter- Fraker v. Galium, 24 Kan. 679.

claims arising out of the contract, etc.: - I^Mack v. Snell (1893), 140 N. Y.

More I.-. Uand, 60 N. Y. 208, 214 ; Kin;,' v. 193, 35 N. E. 493 ; Rood v. Taft (1896),

Knapp, 59 id. 460; Boyd v. Schlesinger, 94 Wis. 380, 69 N. W. 183; Smith v.

59 id. 301, 305 (action to cancel a contract Building Ass'n (1896), 119 N. C. 257, 26

for the sale of land by plaintiff to de- S. E. 401 ; Kuhn v. Sol. Heaveurich Co.

fendant, as a cloud upon plaintiff's title, (1902), 115 Wis. 447, 91 N W. 994.

counter-claim for the specific performance Where lessees enter into and retain

of the contract) ; Howard v. Johnston, possession of the rented premises under a

82 id. 271 ; Nat Bk. of Auburn v. Lewis, covenant in the lea,«e that the landlord

81 id. 15; Cook v. Jenkins, 79 id. 575; will make improvements, which he fails to

Levy V. Loeb, 85 id. 365 ; Read v. Decker, do, the le.>i.sees, wiien sued for the rent,

.^ Hun, 646; Morgan v. Smith, 5 id. 220; may recoup tlie damages resulting from

Elwell r. Skiddy, 8 id. 73; Nichols v. such breach of the covenant, or set up

Townscnd, 7 id. 375 ; Griffin v. Moore, the resulting damages as a counter-claim.

52 Ind. 295; Mc.Mahan v. Spinning, 51 iil. Such counter-claim arises out of the con-

187; Hinkle v. Margeruni, 50 id. 240; tract sued upon as the foundation of the

Black V. Elmer, 54 id. 544; Morri.son ;'. landlord's claim, and is connected with

Kramer, 58 id. 38; Howe Machine Co. r. tiie subject of the action: I'ionecr Press

Reber, 66 id. 489 ; Merrill v. Niirhtingalc, Co. r. Ilutciiinsou (1896), 63 Minn. 481,

39 Wis. 247 ; Bonnell v. Jacobs, 30 id. 59 ; 65 N. \V. 938.

Cr(iUir)ger v. Parze. 48 id. 229; Caleb c. ^Latney c. Ferrill (1897). 100 Ky.3Gl,

Morgan, 83 N. C. 21 1 ; Craig v. Ileis, 30 38 S. W. '4:14 : Wiiere a wife, tliroiigli her
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the grantee of the reversion against the lessee or an assignee of

the term, where the lease contains a covenant to repair on the

part of the landlord, damages sustained by the defendant from a

breach of this covenant may be alleged, and recovered as a coun-

ter-claim. The damages in one such case, where the demised

premises were a hotel, were held to be the sum paid by the defend-

ant for making the necessary repairs, together with the amount

of loss occasioned by the inability to use certain rooms in the

hotel while they were out of repair.^ In an action by the buyer

against the seller to recover damages for the non-delivery of

goods bargained and sold, the latter may counter-claim the un-

paid price of that part of the goods already delivered under the

contract.^ When sued for the price of two articles sold under

one agreement, the defendant may set up and recover damages

resulting from the fraudulent representations of the plaintiff in

respect to one of tliem, even though such damages exceed in

amount the whole price agreed to be paid for both.^ A person

having sold his business and good-will at a certain price, and hav-

ing covenanted in the same agreement not to engage therein at
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the same place, and the damages for a breach of this covenant

having been liquidated and fixed at a specified sum, in an action

brought by the vendee to recover this amount of liquidated dam-

husband as agent, made false and fraud- 51 Pac. 664 : A tenant may set up a coun-

ulent representations in the sale of a tract ter-claim for breach of the implied cov-

of land with reference to a vein of coal euant for quiet enjoyment, in an action

thereon, and its location, thickness and brought by the landlord for rent, where

quality, which induced the purchaser to the landlord has disturbed tbe tenant in

buy the land, and the wife caused such his possession. See also Hunter r. Hatha-

false representations to be made and knew way (1900), 108 Wis. 620, 84 N. W. 996 ;

they were untrue, in an action to enforce Illsly y. Grayson (1898), 105 la. 685.75

a vendor's lien for deferred payments, the N. W. 518; Frederick i'. Daniels (1902),

defendant may set off the damage he has 74 Conn. 710, 52 Atl. 414. J

sustained by reason of such false repre- ^ Leavenworth v. Packer, 52 Barb.

sentations against the purchase price. 132, 136.

Driver v. Salt Lake Gas Co. (1900), ^ Rawley v. Woodruff, 2 Lans. 419,

22 Utah, 143, 61 Pac. 733 : The suing out and see Hoffa ?;. Hoffman, 33 Ind. 172,

and serving of an injunction prohibiting where damages from fraud were counter-

defendant from exercising a right under claimed in a foreclosure suit. When, in

the contract sued on by plaintiff, is a an action on a contract, the defendant set

breach of the contract by plaintiff suffi- up a counter-claim of damages from the

cient to form a basis for a counter-claim plaintiff's fraud, he cannot, at the trial,

by defendant, and a counter-claim setting rely upon a mistake in making the agree-

up such facts states a cause of action.] raent: fraud and mistake are distinct

1 Myers v. Burns, 35 N. Y. 269; Cook grounds of recovery or defence ; an<[ proof

V. Soule, 56 N. Y. 420; 1 N. Y. S. C. 116 ; of one cannot be given when the otlier

Benkard r. Babcock, 2 Robt. 175. alone is pleaded : Dudley v. Scranton, 57

I^Hanley v. Banks (1897), 6 Okla 79, N. Y. 424, 427.

the o-rnntee of the rever. ion again t ihe les ee or an as igne of
the term, wher t h lease contain, a covenant t r pair on th
part of th lancllord, dn,mage sn tainecl by the clefendant from a
breach of thi covenant may be alleged, and re 'OV red a a c unter-claim. The damage in one such a e, wher th d mi cl
premise were a hotel, wer held to be the sum paid by the def nclant for making the nece. sary repair , togeth r with the am unt
of lo s occasioned by the inability to u ·e certain rooms in th
hotel while they were out of repair. 1 In an action by the buyer
against the seller to recover damages for the non-delivery £
goods bargained and sold, the latter may ounter-claim the unpaid price of that part of the goods already delivered under the
contract. 2 When sued for the price of two articles sold und r
one agreement, the defendant may set up and recover damages
resulting from the fraudulent representations of the plaintiff in
re pect to one of them, even though such damages exceed in
amount the whole price agreed to be paid for both. 3 A person
having sold his business and good-will at a certain price, and having covenanted in the same agreement not to engage therein at
the same place, and the damages for a breach of this coven ant
having been liquidated and fixed at a specified sum, in an action
brought by the vendee to recover this amount of liquidated damhusband as agent, made false and fraud- 51 Pac. 664 : A tenan t may set up a counulent repre entations in the sale of a tract ter-claim for breach of the impli ed covof land with reference to a vein of coal enant for qui et enj oyme nt/ in an action
thereon, and its location, thickn ess and brought Liy th e landlord for rent, where
quality, which induced the purchaser to the landlord has di turbed the teua11 t in
buy the land , and the wife cau ·ed such his po ess ion. See also Hunter v. Hathafalse representation to be made and kn ew way (1900) , 108 Wis. 620, 84 1 . W . 996;
they were untrue, in au action t o enforce Illsly v. Grayson (1 98), 105 Ia. 685. i5
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2 L eavenwo rt h v. Packer, 52 Barb.
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Driver v. Salt Lake Gas Co. (1900).
22 Utah, 143, 61 Pac. 733 : Th e suin g out and see Hoffa v. Hoffman, 33 Ind. 17 2,
and serving of an injunction prohibiting wh ere damages from fraud were co un terdefendant from exercising a ri g ht und er claimed in a foreclosure suit. When, in
the contract sued on by plaintiff, is a au action on a contract, the defendant set
breach of the contract by plaintiff suffi- up a counter-claim of damage from tlie
cien t to form a basi for a co un te r-claim pl aintiff's fraurl, he cannot, at the trial,
by defendaut, and a counter-claim setting rely upon a mistake in making the agreeup such fact tates a cause of act ion .]
ment: fraud and mista ke ar e di tinct
1 Myer v. Burns, 35 N. Y . 269 ; Cook
grou nd of recovery or defence; and proo(
v. Soule, 56 N. Y. 420; 1 N . Y. S . C. 116; of one cannot be g iven when t he othel'
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ages on the ground that the vendor had violated his agreement,

the defendant was permitted to recover the unpaid portion of the

purchase price as a counter-claim.^

§ 655. * 779. Examples Continued. It is settled by numerous

decisions, although there were at first some expressions of a con-

ndor had vi lated his a0 'eem nt
n the grou d tha th
th d f 11 ant wa permitte
r the unpaid l or i n i he
1
count r- laim.
a
I 1

trary opinion, that in an action to recover the price of goods sold

and delivered, or bargained and sold, the purchaser's demand of

damages for the plaintiff's breach of his warranty of the quality of

the goods may be pleaded as a counter-claim ; in fact, there can be

no simpler and plainer illustration of a counter-claim arising out of

the very contract set up by the plaintiff as the basis of his recovery.^

When the plaintiff, wlio had been employed as a superintendent

of the defendants' manufactory under a written agreement stipu-

lating for his services in that capacity at a specified salary for a

year, brought an action for his wages, alleging that he had been

wrongfully chscharged, a counter-claim of damages sustained by

the defendants in their business, through the negligent and unskil-

ful conduct of the plaintiff in violation of the provisions of the
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same contract, was pleaded, and was fully upheld by the court.^

1 Baker v. Connell, 1 Daly, 409 ; and

see Ains worth r. Bowen, 9 Wis. .348 ;

Snow V. Holmes, 71 Cal. 142.

2 Lemou v. Trull, 13 How. Tr. 248;

Warren v. Van Pelt, 4 I-:. D. Smith, 202 ;

Dounce v. Dow, 57 N. Y. 16; Love v.

Oldham, 22 Ind. .51 ; French v. Saile,

damages resulting from a breach of war-

hat in an action
n cleli" red or bargained and old
am g for he plaintiff breach of hi
the g d' ma be pl aded a a un rno ·m 1 r and plainer illu trati n of a
the ry con rac et up b he plainti
h ba i of hi r CO\ er .2
"'When he plaintiff who had b n mpl y d a a up rint n l nt
of the f ndants manufactory und r a writt n agr n nt stipulating for hi ervice in that capa it at a specified alar for a
ear brough an action for hi wag allegin that he h, cl b n
wron fully li charged a c unter-claim of dama. e u ' a.in d by
h def nclan in their busines. hrou h the negligent a <l un ' kilful condu of the plain iff in Yi lation f th provi
f th
am contrac , wa plead d, and ' a ' full~ uph 1 b

ranty in recoupment. Haygood r. Boney

(1894), 43 S. C. 63, 20 S. E. 803 : Where

suit is brought to recover wages for ser-

vices rendered as a farm hand, the de-

fendant may .set up as a counter-claim the

damages he has sustained by reason of

Stanton's Code (Ky.), 96; Morehead v. plaintiff's careless and negligent use of a

Haisell, id. 90 ; Earle v. Bull, 15 Cal. 421 ;

Hoffa V. Hoffman. 33 Ind. 1 72. See contra,

Nichols I'. Bo(;rum, 6 Abb. Pr. 290. This

case has been expressly overruled. See

also Nichols i: Townsend, 7 Hun, 375,

citing Gurney r. Atlantic, etc. 11. Co., 58

N. Y. 358; Dounce v. Dow, 57 id. 16 :

Day V. Pool, 52 id. 416; and see Merrill

V. Nightingale, 39 Wis. 247; Bonnell r.

Jacobs, 36 id. 59 ; Giffert r. West, 33 id.

617; Schurmeier v. English, 46 Minn.

306 ; Rugland c. Thompson, 48 Minn. .539 ;

Mass. Loan & T. Co. v. Welch, 47 Minn.

183 ; Maders v. Lawrence, 49 Hun, 360.

(^Heebner i-. Shepard (1895), 5 N. D.

56, 63 N. W. 892.

Laney r. Ing.iUs (1894), 5 S. D. 183,

l Bak er v. Connell, l Daly, 469; and
ee
in worth 1<. Bowen, 9 Wi . 34
now v. Holme , 71 Cal. 142.
2 Lemon v. Trull , 13 How. Pr. 2-! ;
Warren v . Van P elt, 4 E. D. mith, 202;
Dounce v. Dow, 57 N. Y. 16; Love i·.
Jdham, 22 Ind. 51; French v. aile,
, tant011 '
ode (Ky.), 96; foreh ead v .
llal ell, id. 96; Earle 1:. Bull, 15 al. 421;
Hoffa v. H offman , 33 Ind. 172.
ee contra,
'i ·bol v. Bo rum 6 bb. Pr. 290. Thi
ca e ha been xpr ly overruled. , ee
v. 'fown,end, 7 Hun , 375,
citing urney 1·. Atlantic etc. R. o., 5
. Y. 35 ; J ounc v. D ow, 57 id . 16 ;
ay v. Pool, 52 id . .+16; and ee 1 rrill
v. ightingale, 39 Wi . 247; B onn 11 t'.
.Jacob", 36 id. 59; iff rt . We t, 33 id.
617; ch urm ei r v. Engli,h, 46 .:\!inn.
306; Rngland t•. Th omp on, 4 :\liun. 539;
Ma . L an & T.
. v. W lch, 47 Iinn.
l 3; l\la<l r v. L awr nre, 49 Hun, 36 .
[TIP bn r L'. , h panl (1 95), 5 ~' . D.

58 N. W. 572: Where an action is brought

on a promissory note given for the pur-

chase yjrice of a warranted article of nior-

chaudise, the defendant may plead the

horse while working under said contract.]

3 Lancaster, etc. Man. Co. ?'. Colgate,

12 Ohio St. 344; Stoddard v. Treadwell,

20 Cal. 294. But see Barker r. Knicker-

bocker Life Ins. Co., 24 Wis. 6.30, in wiiich,

under exactly similar circumstances, the

defendant's claim that the contract should

be cancelled was refused, on the ground

that the facts made out a jierfect defence

at law; but no counter-claim of damages

was pleaded. It is the rule in Wisconsin

that, in general, where the invalidity of

the plaintiff's claim appears in an action

513, 63

.L

•

\V.

92.

Lanr·y 1•. Ing-a.ii (I 94), 5
5 .. T. ,V , !ii:l: 'V hPr an arrion i ·hr twht
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§ 656. * 780. Examples Continued. I have collected and placed

in the foot-note a number of additional cases in which the an-

swers were sustained as valid counter-claims on the ground that

they arose out of the contract set forth in the compliant or peti-

tion; in some of them, however, the court merely said that they

arose either from the " contract or transaction set forth " bv the

plaintiff, and did not distinctly determine which of these expres-

sions was strictly the proper one to be used.^

II. Cases in ivliicli the Cause of Action Alleged as a Counter- Claim

arises out of the Transaction Set forth in the Complaint or

Petition as the Foundation of the Plaintiff's Claim.

§ 657. * 781. Plan of Discussing this Subdivision. I shall in

§ 656. * 780. Examples Continued. I have ollected and plac cl
in the foot-note a number of additi nal ca. e in whi h the a.us wers were u tained a alid count r- laim on the ground that
they arose out of the contract et forth in the complaint or p titian; in some of them, however, the court merely said that th y
aro e either from the '' contract or transaction et forth ' by the
plaintiff, and did not di tinctly <let rmine which of these expressions was strictly the proper one to be used.1

this subdivision pursue the same plan as in the last, and collect

De Witt, 12 Daly, .319 (action for services

by attorney) ; Schweickhart v. Stuewe,

71 Wis. 1 ; Muth v. Frost, 7.5 Wis. 166;

Black Riv. Imp. Co. v. Holway (Wis.

1893), .53 N. W. Rep. 418; Aultman v.
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Case, 68 Wis. 612; McGregor v. Auld

(Wis. 1892), 53 N. W. Rep. 845; Harlan

V. St. Paul, M. &M. R. Co., 31 Minn. 427;

II.

Oases in which the Cause of Action Alleged as a Oou;,,ter- Olaim
arises out of the Transaction S et for th in the Complaint or
Petition as the Foundation of the Plaintiff's Olaim.

§ 657. * 781. Plan of Discussing this Subdivision. I shall m
this subdivision pursue the same plan as in the la t, and collect

Zigler V. McClellan, 1 5 Ore. 499 ; Empire

Transp. Co. v. Boggiano, 52 Mo. 294.

I^Punteuey-Mitcliell Mfg. Co. v. North-

wall Co. (1902), — Neb. — , 91 N. W. 863 ;

McCormick Harvesting Mach. Co. v. Gus-

tafson (1898), 54 Neb. 276, 74 N. W. 576;

Parry Mfg. Co. v. Tobin (1900), 106 Wis.

286, 82 N. W. 154 ; Mallory Commission

Co. V. Elwood (1903), 120 la. 632, 95N. W.

176; Hobbs v. Bland (1899), 124 N. C.

284, 32 S. E. 683.]

1 Racine Cy. Bk. v. Keep, 13 Wis. 209 ;

Butler V. Titus, 13 Wis. 429 ; Koenipel v.

Shaw, 13 Minn. 488 ; Gleadell v. Thomson,

56 N. Y. 194, 198; Isham v. Davidson, 52

N. Y. 237 ; Whaloa v. Aldrich, 8 Minn.

346; Mason v. Hey ward, 3 Minn. 182;

Dale V. Masters, Stanton's Code (Ky.),

97 ; Dennis v. Belt, 30 Cal. 247 ; Wilder

I'. Boynton, 63 Barb. 547 ; Burton v.

Wilkes, 66 N. C. 604, 610; Hay v. Short,

49 Mo. 139; Scott v. Menasha (Wis.

1893), 54 N. W. Rep. 263 (action on cou-

pons, counter-claim for cancellation of the

bonds to which they were attached) ;

Church V. Spiegelberg, .31 Fed. Rep.

601 ; Moser v. Cochrane, 107 N. Y. 35

(action to recover earnest money paid on

a contract for purcliase of land, counter-

claim for specific performance) ; King v.

Knapp, 59 N. Y. 462 (same) ; Patton v.

Royal Baking Powder Co., 114 N. Y. 1 ;

Smith V. Wall, 12 Col. 363 ; Seaman v.

Slater, 49 Fed. Rep. 37 ; Thomson v. San-

ders, 1 18 N. Y. 252 (counter-claim of dam-

ages for plaintiff's fraud in procuring the

contract) ; More v. Rand, 60 N. Y. 208

(same). See McKegney v. Widekind, 6

Bush, 107, as to the extent of the relief

which may he granted to the defendant

in a legal action, and when the contract

must be reformed by an equitable pro-

ceeding. For examples of vnlid coun-

ter-claims where the defendant had an

election to sue for a tort or on contract,

see Gordon v. Bruner, 49 Mo. 570 ; Tinsley

V. Tinsley, 15 B. IMon. 454; Norden v.

De Witt, 12 Daly, 319 (action for services (action to recover earnest money paid on
by attorney); Scbweickhart v. Stuewe, a contract for purchase of land, counter71 Wis. l; Muth v. Frost, 75 Wis. 166; claim for specific performance); Kiug v.
Black Riv. Imp. Co. v. Holway (Wis. Knapp, 59 N. Y. 462 (same); Patton v.
1893) , 55 N. W. Rep. 4 18; Aultman v. Royal Baking Powder Co., 114 N. Y. l ;
Case, 68 Wis. 612; McGregor v. Auld Smith v. Wall, 12 Col. 363; Seaman v.
(Wis. llj92), 53 N. W. Rep. 845; Harlan Slater, 49 Fed. Rep. 37; Thomson v. Sanv. St. Paul, M . & M. R. Co., 31 Minn. 427 ; ders, 118 N. Y. 252 (counter-claim of damZigler v. McClellan, 15 Ore. 499; Empi re ages for plaintiff':; fraud in procuring the
Transp. Co. v. Boggiano, 52 Mo. 294.
. Y. 20
contract) ; fore v. Rand, 60
[ Punteney-Mitchell Mfg. Co. v. North- ( ame). See McKegney v. Wi<.l.ekind, 6
wa11 Co. {1902) , - Neb.-, 91 N . W. 863; Bu h, 107, as to the extent of the relief
McCormick Harve ting Mach. Co . v. Gus- which may be g ranted to the defendant
tafson {1 898 ), 54 Neb. 276, 74-N. W. 576; in a legal action, and wh en the contract
Parry Mfg. Co. v. T obin (1900 ), 106 Wis. must be reformed by an equitable pro286, 82 N. W. 154; Mallory Commission ceeding. For examples of Y:'..lid counCo. v. E lwood (1903), 120 Ia. 632, 95 N. W. ter-claims where the defendant had an
176; Hobbs v. Bland (1899), 124 N. C. election to sue for a tort or on con tract,
284, 32 s. E. 683.]
see Gord on v. Bruner, 49 Mo. 570; Tiu ley
1 Racine Cy. Bk. v. Keep, 13 Wis. 209;
v. T in sley, 15 B. Mon. 454; Norden v.
I3utler v. Titus, 13 Wis. 429; Koempel v. .Jones, 33 Wi . 600, 604; but, 71er contra,
Shaw, 13 Minn. 4 ; Gleadel l v. Thomson, see Slaybacl· v. Jones, 9 Ind. 470 Dam56 N. Y. 194, 19 ; Isham v. David on, 52 ages re ulting to the defendant from a
N. Y. 23 7 ; Whal ou v . .Aldrich, 8 Minn. wrongful issue of an attachment in the
346; Mason v. Heyward, 3 Minn. 182; action may be counter-claimed, if uch
Dale v. Ma ters, Stanton's ode (Ky.), act of the plaintiff wa a breach of the
97; Dennis v. Belt, 30 Cal. 2-!7; Wilder contract sued on, vVaugenheim v. Graham,
v. Boynton, 63 Barb. 547 ; Burton v. 39 Cal. 169, 176; but uch damages cannot
Wilke , 66 N. C. 604, 610; Hay i~. Short, generally be rec oYered by way of a coun49 Mo. 139; Scott 1:. Menasha (Wis. ter-claim, Hembrock v. Stark, 53 Mo. 58 ;
1893) , 54 . W . Rep. 263 (action on cou- Nolle v. Thomp on, 3 l\I tc. (Ky.) 121.
pons, counter-claim for cancellation of the A counter-claim of dama~Ps from a perbonds to which they were attached) ; sonal tort, a e. g, a slau<ler, is in1po. ible.
Church v. Spiegelberg, 31 Fed. Rep. Conner i-. Winton, 7 Ind. 523; ferritt
601 ; Moser v. Cochrane, 107 N. Y. 35 Milling Co. v. :Eiulay, 110 .J. . 411.
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the various classes of cases in which counter-cLaims, legal or

equitable, have been sustained as properly arising out of the

transaction set forth in the complaint, and also those in which

such attempted counter-claims have been overruled ; and I shall

add whatever comments, or extracts from judicial opinions, seem

necessary to the clear inference and statement of the general

principles and practical rules established by tiie courts. The

import of the term " transaction," and of the phrase " arising out

of," has been already discussed with some fulness. Without re-

peating this discussion, the cases cited will illustrate and com-

plete it.

S 658. * 782. Classification and Arrangement of Cases to be cited.

The cases cited will be classified and arranged into groups accord-

ing to their nature ; that is, according to the relief demanded by

the respective litigants. The first of these classes will contain

cases in which the actions are legal, and both parties seek to re-

cover a judgment for money alone. This will be subdivided into

(1) Those in which the plaintiff's cause of action and the defend-

ant's counter-claim are in form for debt or damages upon contract
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express or implied ; (2) Those in which the plaintiff's cause of

action is in form for debt or damages upon contract express or

implied, and the defendant's counter-claim is for damages arising

from a tort, either (a) for conversion of goods, or (b) for tres-

passes or injuries to property or to person, or (c) for fraud ; (3)

Those in which the plaintiff's cause of action is in form for dam-

ages arising from a tort, and the defendant's counter-claim is for

debt or damages upon contract ; and (4) Those in which the de-

mands of both parties are for damages arising from a tort. The

second will contain legal actions in which the judgment is other

than for money; and the third will embrace equital)le actions.

§ 659. * 783. First Class. (1) Where the Plaintiffs Cause of

Action and the Defendant's Counter-Claim are in Form Debt or Dam-

ages upon Contract Express or Implied. A complaint alleged that

the defendant luid in his possession $115, of which two thirds l:>e-

longed to the plaintiff, and was received by the defendant to his

use, and demanded judgment therefor ; the answer, besides a de-

fence of denial, stated by way of counter-claim that the plaintiff

had himself in fact received all the money in question (iftll5) ;

that one third thereof belonged to the defendant, and was received

by the plaintiff to the defendant's use, and prayed judgment for

t e y,mou cla, e of ca e in which counter-cl ims, legal or
qui able ha.ve be n u tained a prop rl ari in 0 out of he
ran ·acti n t f r h in th c mplc i1 , and als th e in which
u h attem tel c uut r-claim ha.' e b en
errulecl · and
shall
add wh,
fr 111 judi ial pinion ;
m
t
an
atem nt of h
'ener l
urt . Tl e
tabli hed b the
arising out
erm tra.n a ti n, nd f th phras
of, h, be n ah ady di cu ed with
me fulne . With ut reen. ing thi di cu "io n, the ca
it d will illu trate and comple it.
65 8 . * 7 2. Classifi c ati o n an d A r ran gement of C a ses to be cited.
The ca e ited will be cla ified and arranged into group · according to t h ir na ure; that i ·, according to the relief d man ed by
the re pective litigants. The fir t of these cla es will contain
ca e in which he action are legal, and both parti s eek to reco er a judgment for mone alone. Thi will be ubdivi ed int
(1) Tho e in which the plaintiff' cau e of action and the def ndant' counter-claim are inform for debt or damages upon ontract
ex pre or implied; ( 2) Tho e in which the plaintiff's cause f
action i in form for debt or damage upon contract expre
r
implied, and th defendR.nt's co unter-claim is for damage ari ing
from a tort either (a) for conver ion of goods, or (b) f r tr se or injurie to property or to per on, r ( c) for fraud ; ( 3)
Those in which the plaintiff cause of action i in form for <lama e aril'ing from a ort, and the defen an t c unter-claim is f r
de btor damage upon contract· and (4) Th e in which the deman of both partie are f~n' dama · arising from a tort. The
econd will contain leD'al action in which the judgment i other
tlrnn f r mone · ; and the third will em brae quitabl action .
659. *
3. First Class. (1) W here the P l aintiff's C ause of
Ac tion and the Defendant's Counter-Claim a r e in Form D ebt or D am-

COU .. TER-CL.\Il\f.
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such sum. This answer was adjudged to be a proper counter-

claim arising out of the transaction set forth in the complaint ; and

the plaintiff having failed to reply, the allegations thereof were

admitted.^ Several of the decisions quoted in the last preceding

subdivision may also be regarded as examples of the class de-

scribed under the present head; the contract set forth by the

plaintiff might be considered a " transaction." Their facts need

not be repeated, and their titles will be found in the foot-note.^

§ 660. * 784. (2) Cases in which the Plaintiffs Cause of Action

is upon Contract, and the Defendant's Counter- Claim is for Damages

Arising from a Tort. No little conflict will be found among the

decisions which are embraced within this group. The judges

have been constantly influenced by the established doctrine of

uch um. Thi an w r was adjudged to b a proper ·ountcrclaim a.ri in out of th tran ac ion set forth in the omr la.int; uml
th pt intiff having failed t r I ly, tl all gation' ther of wer
aclmitted.1
ev ra.l of the cleci ion quote l in th la t preceding
ubdivi ion may al o be regarded as e amples of th cla d cribed under the pre ent head; the ontract set forth by the
plaintiff might be con id red a ' transaction.'' Their fact need
not be repeated, and their title ~ will be found in the foot-note. 2
~ 660. * 78-1. (2) Cas es in w h ich the Plaintiffs Cause of Action

the former procedure, which excluded without exception any set-

off or recoupment or cross-demand that did not spring from con-

tract.^ Some have gone to the length of holding that a cause of

1 Clinton V. Eddy, 1 Lans. 61. In an

action upon a note, the defendant vvas
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not permitted to recover back t;surious

interest paid by him to the -plaintiff on

former loans as a counterclaim, because

the demand did not arise out of the same

transaction ; nor as a set-off, because it

i s up o n Con trac t, and t h e D efendant's Counter-Claim is for Damages

No little conflict will be found among the
decisions which are embraced within this group. The judges
have been coh tautly influenced by the established doctrine of
the former procedure, which excluclecl without exception any etoff or recoupment or cross-demand that did not pring from contract.3 Some have gone to the length of holding that a cause of
Arising fro m a T o r t .

did not arise on contract, Smead v. Chris-

field, I Disney, 18; but it seems a demand

to recover back usurious interest paid for

the very loan which is the basis of the

action would be a valid counter-claim,

Martin v. Pugh, 23 Wis. 184. A claim

for the loss, by the negligence of the

holder of the note, of certain collateral

security for its payment, is a proper

counter-claim, First Nat. Bk. of Ft. Dodge

V. O'Connell (Iowa, 1892), 51 N. W. Rep.

162.

QPunteney-Mitchell Mfg. Co. v. North-

wall Co (190-2), — Neb. — , 91 N. W. 863 ;

Dowdcli ',-. Carpy (1902), 137 Cal. 333, 70

Pac. 167 ; Adams v. Warren (1900), 27

Col. 293, 61 Pac. 609; Wintringhara v.

Hayes (1894), 144 N. Y. 1, 38 N. E. 999.

In an action by an administrator to re-

cover the price of articles purchased by

defendant at the administrator's sale,

debts due the defendant ffom the intestate

could not constitute a counter-claim as

thev did not grow out of the same trans-

action, nor a set-off because not mutual :

Hancock v. Hancock's Adm'r (1902), —

Ky. — , 69 S. W. 757. See also Griswold v.

Pieratt (1895), 110 Cal. 259, 42 Pac. 821.]

■^ Racine Cy. Bank v. Keep, 13 Wis.

209 ; Butler v. Titus, 13 Wis. 429 ; Koem-

pel r. vShaw, 13 Minn. 488; Whalon v.

Aldrich, 8 .Minn. 346 , .Mason i'. Heyward,

3 Minn. 182; Dale v. Masters, Stanton's

Code (Ky.), 97; McKeguey v- Widekind,

6 Bush, 107 ; Stoddard v. Treadwell, 26

Cal. 294 ; Dennis v. Belt, 30 Cal. 247 , Hay

V. Short, 49 Mo. 139; Gordon v. Bruner,

49 .Mo. 570; Wilder c. Boynton, 63 Barb.

547 ; McKinnon v. Morrison, 104 N. C. 354.

3 [Rood v. Taft (1896), 94 Wis. 380,

69 N. W. 183 ; Hunter v. Hathaway (1900),

108 Wis. 620, 84 N. W. 996 ; Loomer v.

Thomas (1893), 38 Neb. 277, 56 N. W.

973 ; President, etc. of Ins. Co. v. Parker

(1902), 64 Neb. 411, 89 N. W. 1040; Young

1 Clinton v. Eddy, l Lans. 61.
In an
action upon a note, the defendant was
not permitted to recover back 1 : s uri ou ~
interest paid by him to the -plaiutiff on
former loan as a counter-claim, because
the demand did not arise out of the ame
transaction ; nor a a ~e t- o ff, because it
did not arise on contract, Smead v. Chrisfield, 1 Disney, 18; but it eems a demand
to recover back usurious interest paid for
the very loan whi t h is the ba -is of the
action would be a valid counter-claim,
Martin v. Pugh, 23 Wis. 184. A claim
for the loss, by the negligence of th e
holder of the note, of certain collateral
security for its payment, is a proper
counter-claim, First Tat. Bk. of Ft. Dodge
v. O'Connell (Iowa, 1892), 51 N. W. Rep.

Ky.-, 69 S . W. 757 . .' eealso Griswold u.
Pieratt ( 1895), 11 O Cal. 259, 42 Pac. 82 l. J
2 Racine Cy. Bauk i-. Keep, 1:3 Wis.
209; Butler v. Titus, 13 \Vi s. 429 ; Koempel z:. Shaw, 13 \Iinu . 488; \Vhalou v.
.Aldri ch, 8 :\I inn . .'346, .i\lason v. Heyward ,
3 Minn . I 2; Dale v. :VIasters, tantou'
Co<le (Ky.), 97; i\IcK eguey l' Wid ekind,
6 Bu h, 107 ; Stoddard "· Treadw ell , 26
Cal. 294 ; Dennis v. Belt, 30 Cal. 247. Hay
v. Short, -19 Mo. 139 ; Gordon v. Bruner,
49 Mo. 5i0; Wilder c . Boynton, 63 Barb.
547 ; McKinnon 11 • Morrison, 10-1 N. C. 354
3 [Rood v. Taft ( 1896), 94 Wi . 3 O,
69 N. W. 1 3; Hunter z:. Hathaway (1900),
108 Wis. 620, 8-1 N. W. 996; Loomer 1•.
Thomas (1893), 38 eb. 2i7, 56
W.
973; President, etc. of Ins. Co. v. Parker
(1902), 64 Neb. 411, 89 N. W . 1040; Young
162.
[Punteney-Mitchell Mfg. Co. v . .r orth- v. Borzon e ( 1901) , 26 Wa h. 4, 66 Pac.
. D.
wall Co ( 190'2). - Neb.-, 91 N. W. 863; 135; Mc Hard t'. William ( 1896),
381, 6fi N. W. 930.
Dowdell~. Carpy (1902), 137 Cal. :333, 70
In an action for the value of O'Oo<ls,
Pac. 167; Adams v. Warren ( 1900), 27
Col. 293, 61 Pac. 609; Wintringham v. ware , and merchandi e -old and deliver<>d,
Hayes ( l 94), 144 N. Y. 1, 38 N. E. 999 . and for . ervices rendered, defendant canuot
In an action by an administrator to re- plead as counter-claim a cause of act ion
cover the price of articles purchased by for wilfully and maliciou ly cau ing a writ
defendant at the administrator's sale, of attachment to i ue again t him, where
debt due the defendant fi>om the intestate th e fact on which the alleged co untercould not con titute a counter-claim as claim re t aro ·e ub equent to and were
they did not grow out of the ame trans- wholly independent of tho e all eged in
action, nor a set-off because not mutual : the complaint: J one 1: . wauk (l 93), 54
ltnn. 259, 55 N. W. 1126.J
Hancock v. Hancock' Adm'r ( 1902) , 58
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fiction in favor of the defendant resulting from a tort cannot

possibly arise from th0 " transaction " set forth by the plaintiff as

the foundation of his claim ; others, however, have given a more

liberal and comprehensive interpretation of the term.^ Their dif-

fering \dews can best be seen by a comparison of their judicial

opinions. In an action for the price of a safe sold and delivered,

the defendant pleaded a counter-claim, that the plaintiff had con-

verted to his own use a safe, the propert}^ of tlie defendant, for

the value of which he demanded judgment.^ The Common Pleas

of New York City held that this answer was based upon tort ;

1 [^Waring v. Gaskill (1895), 95 Ga.

731, 22 S. E. 659 : A note was given to

plaintiff by the defendant as drawer, with

certain shares of stock as collateral, under

action in fav r of the def n lant r sulting from a or
annot
Io ibl · , ri ·e fr m the tran action•., t for h b · the plain iff a
the foundation f hi " claim · oth r h \feyer hay gi \' n a more
liberal and mpreh n ive int rpr t, ti n f he t rm .1 Their diff ring Yiew" can b ·t be e n b · a c mpari on f h ir judicial
1pm10n .
n an action for the price of a afe old ancl leliverecl
the lefendant pleaded a ounter-claim ha h I lain iff had con·er e l to hi \VU u e a . afe the pr perty of the d fendan for
the value f wl ich he lemancl d jud m nt. 2 Th
mmon Plea
of ~ e' York ity held that thi an wer wa ba ed upon ort;

the agreement that the collateral should

not be sold unless ten days' notice was

[Waring v. Ga kill (1 95), 95 a.
. E. 659 : A note wa given to
plaintiff by the defendant a drawer, wi h
certain hare of to k as ollateral, un der
the agreement that the collateral hould
not be . old unle ten day ' notice was
gi,·en to the defen<lant. The tock wa ·
olJ without the required notice being
j,·en, aad did not bring the amount of
the note. In an action on the note the
court held that defendant might plead
iu recoupmeut the damage occa ion cl by
the conver ion . Yet the Georgia tatute
define~ r ecoupment as ba ed only upon
ro • -obligati n or independent coYeuant
ari ing under the am rontract. But ee
~lashburn v. Inman (1 95 ). 9i Ga. 396,
where the court aid: "Thi ca e fall
within the general rule, that, to an a tion
. ounding in contract, the defendant cannot plead a a et-off a claim ari. ing
ex delicto ."
In Hecht v. nook (1902), 114 Ga. 921,
41 '. E. 74, he court aid: "There i
nothi ng in the tatute of this tate which
authorize a defeudant in a uit at law t
et off, a~ a matter of legal defenc t a
uit on a contract, damage ari ing from
a tort committed by he plain iff; or t
~et off, in a uit for damage ari iog from
the ommi ion of a t rt b th e defendant
a claim growino- out of a contract between
the plainti ff and the defendan t."
Blue v. apital .. ·at. Bank {l 96), 145
Jud. 51 , 43
. <. 65~: ] " an land r
he the ulij ct of a c: unter-claim in an
a ·tion upon a promi ory not for b rrowed mo11ey 1 Jn ur judgment it rannot. .
count r- ]aim i that whi h
might hi\\'e ari. n out of, or could J1a,·e
orne connection with, the original ran 1

given to the defendant. The stock was

73 l 22

sold without the required notice being
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given, and did not bring the amount of

the note. In an action on the note the

court held that defendant might plead

in recoupment the damages occasioned by

the conversion. Yet the Georgia statute

defines recoupment as based only upon

cross-obligations or iudependent covenants

arising under the same contract. But see

.Ma.<hburn r. Inman (1895). 97 Ga. 396,

where the court said : '' This case falls

witliin the general rule, that, to an action

sounding in contract, the defendant can-

not plead as a set-off a claim arising

ex delicto."

In Hecht «;. Snook (1902), 114 Ga. 921,

41 S. E. 74, the court said : " There is

notliing in the statutes of this State which

authorizes a defendant in a suit at law to

set off, as a matter of legal defence to a

suit on a contract, damages arising from

a tort committed by the plaintiff ; or to

set off, in a suit for damages arising from

the commission of a tort by the defendant,

a claim growing out of a contract between

the plaintiff and the defendant."

Blue 1-. Capital Nat. Bank (1896), 145

Ind. 518. 43 N. E. 655:] "Can slander

be the subject of a counter-claim in an

action upon a promissory note for bor-

rowed money ? In our judgment it can-

not. . . . ' A counter-claim is that which

might have ari.'sen out of, or could have

some connection with, the original trans-

action, in view of the parties, and which,

at the time the contract was made, they

could have intended might, in some event,

give one party a claim against the otiier

for compliance or non-compliance with its

provisions.' Conner v. \Y'vau>i\, 7 Ind. 523.

A tort cannot be regarded as growing

out of or connected with contract, within

the meaning of the statute, simply because

the contract had suggested it, or was

remotely an incident to it."

- QCarson's Executors v. Buckstaff

(1898), 57 Neb. 262, 77 N. \V. 670: "A

debtor, wheu sued by his creditor, may

plead as a counter-claim or set-off, the

actual value of any collateral security

which the creditor has converted to his

action, in Yiew of the partie , and whi<'h,
at the time the contract w · made, they
could have intended might, in om vent,
give one party a claim again t the other
for compliance or non-compliau e with it
provi ion .' Ganner v. \ i~t1;u, 7 Ind . 523.
A tor cannot be regar ded a g rowing
out of or connected with contra t , within
the meaning f the tatute, imply l>ecau e
the contra t had ugge tecl it, or wa
rem otely an incident to it.'
2 [ Car on'
Executor
v. Buck taff
(1 9 J, 5i Jeb. 262, 77 l'. \\. 6i0: " A
debtor, when ued by hi
reditor may
plead a a counter-claim or et-off. th e
actual l"alue of any collateral ecurity
which the creditor ha. convert d to hi

tran. acti n
complaint.]

COUNTKR-Cr.AIM. 015

that the defendant liad not so framed it as to waive the wrong

and sue upon an implied promise for the price, and that the

pleading was not a proper counter-claim. Having thus fully

disposed of the issues, the court went on to declare that if the

defendant miglit waive the tort and bring suit in form for the

price, the demand would not be a valid counter-claim, because

the cause of action would not arise upon contract ; ^ and upon a

complaint for the price of goods sold and delivered, the Superior

Court of New York City rejected a counter-claim for the Avrong-

ful conversion by the plaintiff of other goods belonging to the

defendant.^ No allusion was made in the latter decision to the

doctrine of election of remedies between an action for the tort,

and one in form upon contract ; and in neither of the cases could

it be pretended that the defendant's demand, in whatever shape

it might be put, arose out of the transaction stated by the plain-

tiff. On the other hand, when, in a suit ujDon a promissory note.

the defendant pleaded as a counter-claim that he had pledged

certain stocks with the plaintiff as security for the debt ; that the

latter had wrongfully sold them, and prayed judgment for their
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value, — the Supreme Court of Wisconsin, in reversing a judg-

ment for the plaintiff rendered on the trial, assumed that the facts

constituted a good counter-claim.^

§ 661. * 785. Damages from Trespasses, Nuisances, Negligences,

and the Like. In an action by the lessor for rent, an answer,

which stated that during the continuance of the term the plaintiff

erected an oven, furnace, and other apparatus for a bakery under

the store demised to and occupied by the defendant, and by the

use thereof had filled the premises with smoke, soot, and steam,

and had injured the defendant's goods, and demanded judgment

for the damages so caused, was treated as a valid counter-claim

by the New York Superior Court.* But in a similar action the

1 Piser r. Stearns, 1 Hilt. 86. * Ayres v. O'Farrell, 4 Kobt. 668; 10

■^ Kurtz V. McGuire, 5 Duer, 660. See Bosw. 143. When the cause was first

also Steinhart v. Pitcher, 20 Minn. 102; before it, the court held that by replying

Street v. Bryan, 6.5 N. C. 619, actions the plaintiff had waived all objection ; on

on contracts in which counter-claims of the second appeal, t)ie counter-claim was

damages arising from unconnected torts more definitely approved,

were rejected. [^Kiihn )•. Sol Heavenrich Co. (1902),

» Ainsworth v. Bowen, 9 Wis. 348; 1 I.t Wis. 447, 91 N. W. 994 ; Hawley Bros.

s. p.. Cass V. Higenbotam, 100 N. Y. 248; Hardware Co. v. Brownstone (1899), 123

Weston V. Turver (Supr. Ct., Gen. Term, Cal. 643, 56 Pac. 468.]

1888), 17 N. Y. St. Rep. 502.

tha he d f n lant had not o framed it a to \vai
wrong
a11cl :m up n an impli cl romi ·e for t he pri · , and that the
pl a.din
not a prop r ounter-claim . Having thus fully
dispo. eel f th i ·u , the om t wen L on to de ·lare tliat if th
clef n lant might waiv t h t ort and Lring suit in form for th
pri , the demand would n t b a valid ·01mter-claim, becau:
the cau e of action w ukl not ari e upon contract : 1 and upon a.
complaint for the price of good old aml d liv reel the Superior
Court of ew York City rejected a counter- ·laim for the wro n;ful ·onver. ion by the plaintiff of other good belonging to the
clefendant. 2 No allusion was made in the latte r deci ·ion to th
doctrin of election of rem dies between an action fo r the tort,
and one in form upon contract; and in neither of t he ca e could
it be pretended that the defendant's demand, in whatev r hap
it might be put, arose out of the transaction tated by the plai ntiff. On the other hand, when, in a suit upon a promissory note,
t he defendant pleaded as a counter-claim that he had pledged
certain stocks with the plaintiff as ecurity for the debt ; that th
latter had wrongfully old them, and prayed judgment fo r th ir
value, - the Supreme Court of Wi consin, in rever ing a judgment for the plaintiff ren lered on the trial, assumed that the fact
constituted a good counter-claim. 3

§ 661. * 785.

Damages from Trespasses, Nuisances, Negligences,

In an action by the lessor for rent, an an wer,
which stated that during the continuance of the term the plaintiff
e.r:ected an oven, furnace, and other apparatu for a bakery under
the store demised to and occupied by the defendant, and by th
use thereof had filled the premises with smoke, soot, and team
and had injured the defendant's goods, and demanded judgment
for the damages so cau sed, was treated as a valid counter-claim
by the New York Superior Court. 4 But in a similar action th
and the Like.

1

Piser v. Stearn , 1 Hilt. 86.
Kurtz v. McGuire, 5 uer, 660.
P,e
abn teinhart v. Pitcher, 20 Minn. 102;
,' treet v. Bryan. ·65 N. . 619 , action
on ontract in whi ch counter-claims of
da mage arising from un connected tort.s
wert r jected.
a .\insworth r . B owen . 9 vVi . 348 ;
F. P .. Ca . v. Higenbota m, 100
. Y. 24 ;
\Y csto n v. Turver ( upr. t., Gen. Term,
1
) , Ii N . Y. St. Rep. 502.
2

4 Ayres v. ()'Farrell, 4 Robt. 66 ; 10
B osw. 143. When th e cau e wa fir t
before it, t he court held t hat by r plying
th e plai ntiff had wai 1·e1l all objection; on
the ec nd appeal, the coun ter-claim wa
more defi nit 1.1' approved.
[Kuh n r . ~ o l. lleav nri ch o. (1902),
l 15 W iR. 447, 9 1 . W . 994; Haw! y Bro .
Hard ware C'o. v. Brown tone (1 99), 123
Cal. 643, 56 P ac. 46 .]
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New York Common Pleas rejected a counter-claim which alleged

that at the time of the letting mentioned in the complaint the

plaintiff leased other premises to the defendant, and that he had

· w ~ork
th<t (. t th

before the commencement of this suit wrongfully broken into said

premises and taken therefrom certain chattels of the defendant,

mm n
tim
d h

th
h d

which he had injured, destroyed, or lost, and prayed judgment

for the value of the goods so taken. The court declared that

this cause of action clearly did not arise out of the contract or

transaction set forth in the complaint, nor was it connected with

the subject of the action : it was a naked and independent act of

Th cour
an out of l
on ra ·t or
f rth in he complc int, nor wa i c nnecte with
t of the a tion: it wa a naked and inde endent a t of

trespass.^

§ 662. * 786. Same Subject. Similar decisions have been made

hi ·

in other actions than those for the recovery of rent. In a suit

upon a note given for the purchase price of land conveyed to the

defendants, they were not permitted to counter-claim damages

for the plaintifif's wrongful entry upon the land so conveyed, and

tr

cutting and carrying away a growing crop the title to which had

passed by the deed.^ It has, however, been recently held by the

Supreme Court in New York, that a cause of action for a tort may
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arise out of the transaction set forth by the plaintiff ; and such a

counter-claim was fully sustained in an action on contract.^

1 Drake v. Cockroft, 4 E. D. Smith, counter-claims of damages from trespasses

34,39. See also Gallup v. Albany R. Co., to land were sustained; but a counter-

7 Lans. 471 ; Edgerton v. Page, 20 N. Y. claim of damages arising from a personal

281, 285; Mayor, etc. of N. Y. v. Parker tort cannot be sustained, Conner r Win-

Vein Stp. Co., 12 Abb. Pr. 300; McKeu- ton, 7 Ind. 523; Merritt Milling Co. v.

sie V. Farrell, 4 Bosw 192, 202; Avery Finlay, 1 10 N. C. 41 1 j^Ander.son o. John-

■V. Dougherty, 102 Ind. 443; Thorp v. son (1900), 106 Wis. 218, 82 N. W. 177].

Philbin, 15 Daly, 155; Brugman v. Burr, * Wadley v. Davis, 63 Barb. 500. The

30 Neb. 406 ; which were all actions for discussions of tlie text are further illus-

rent in which counter-claims for damages trated by tlie following recent ca.ses :

from torts of the lessor were rejected. Brady v. Brennan, 25 Minn. 210 (action

In Littman v. Coulter, 23 Abb. N. Cas. GO, on contract, counter-claim for conversion

however, an action for rent, the defendant by waiving the tort) ; Goebel v. Hough,

was allowed to counter-claim damages for 26 id. 252 (action by a lessor for rent,

the conversion by the plaintiff of the counter-claim of damages for plaintiff's

defendant's goods, under a claim of lieu wrongful trespass on the premi.ses) ; Dev-

thereon for the rent. rios '• Warren, 82 N. C. 356 (])laintiff

■^ Slayback v. .Jones, 9 Ind. 470; and ami defendants were co-tenants of land;

see Humbert v. Brisbane, 25 S. C. 506 ; jilaintiff sold his share to defendant and

per contra, see Gordon v. Bruner, 49 Mo. took defendant's bond fur the price; in

570, 571 (which w!us decided on the an .action on the i)ond, defendant could

doctrine of election) ; Tinsley v. Tinsloy, not counter-claim damages done to the

15 B. Mon. 454, 459; Smith r. Fife, 2 land by the plaintiff before the sale);

Neb. 10, 13; Aj)persou's Adin. v. Triplett Harris i'. Kivcrs, 53 Ind. 216 (in action

(Ky. 1890), 13 S. W. 791 ; in all which, on a jironii.s.sory note, no set-off for tort

7 6. Same Subject.
imilar d ci i n la e been made
rn ther acti us than ho f r the recov ry f r nt. In a uit
u1 on a no given for the pur ha price of land onv .,
t th
l fen lant , t h y w re not p nnitt d to c unter- laim dama
for the plaintiff' wrongful ntry upon the land
onv ed, and
cu tin and carrying away a growing rop the titl t which had
la ' etl bv the deecl. 2 It ha , howe r been recently held by the
upreme ouft in New York, t hat a au e of c cti n f r a tor may
ari e out of he ran action t f rth by th plain iff · and uch a
counter-claim wa fully su tained in an action on ·on ract.3
662.
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§ 663. * 787. Damages Arising from Fraud. CroSS-demailds for

iLiniages resulting from fraud will naturally occur, and, it would

seem, might be easily sustained. But there have been decisions

which reject even such counter-claims. In an action on two

promissory notes, the defendants — the makers — alleged that

they executed a trust deed of land as security for their notes, and

proceeded to state acts of fraud committed by the plaintiff in col-

lusion with the trustee in the deed, by whic-h the land was sacri-

ficed and bought in by the plaintiff at far less than its value,

and prayed judgment for the damages resulting from the fraud.

The Supreme Court of Missouri overruled this counter-claim in

an opinion which contains many palpable errors, and which has

been disregarded by subsequent decisions of the same tribunal.^

The Supreme Court of Indiana, however, sustained a counter-

claim in every way analogous to the one just described.^ It would

seem that little or no difficulty would be met in giving such a

construction to the statutory definition as will embrace the cases

of damages resulting from the plaintiff's frauds. If the action

was on contract, such damages formed a most familiar example
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of the former " recoupment ; " and it is only necessary to extend

that doctrine to analogous cases in which a " transaction " is to

be substituted in place of a contract.

§ 664. * 788. (3) Cases in which the Plaintiffs Cause of Action is

for a Tort and the Defendant's Counter-Claim is in Form upon Con-

tract. The examples of this class of controversies have generally

been actions for the wrongful conversion of goods in which the

counter-claim of debt or damages upon contract was interposed,

and rested either upon the theory that both demands arose out of

the one transaction set forth by the plaintiff, or upon the notion

that the plaintiff's cause of action might be regarded as founded

upon an implied contract, the tort being waived. Such an action

having been brought in form for the conversion of goods, the an-

swer contained a counter-claim setting up a liability of the plain-

possible); Collier v. Ervin, 3 Mont. 142 (1901), 1.57 Ind. 120, 60 N. E. 1025: The

(action on contract, no counter-claim for rule is well settled in this State that a

~ 663.

* 787.

ro -d mantls for
llamag s r sulting from fraud will naturally oc ur, and, it would
::-;e m, mi0 ht b a ily ustain cl. But there have b n de ·i ions
vhich r j ct ven uch
unter-claims. In an action on tw
promi sory note , th cl fendant - the mak rs - alleg d thnt
th y executed 'L trust deed f land a ' ecuriLy for their notes, an<l.
proceeded to tate act of frau l committ d by the plaintiff in collusion with the trustee in the deed, by which the land was acrificed and bought in by the plaintiff at far less than its value,
and prayed judgment for the damages resulting from the fraud.
The Supreme ·c ourt of Missouri overruled this counter-claim in
an opinion which contains many palpable errors, and which has
been disregarded by subsequent decisions of the same tribunal. 1
The Supreme Court of Indiana, however, su tained a counterclaim in every way analogous to the one just described. 2 It would
seem that little or no difficulty would be met in giving uch a
construction to the statutory definition as will embrace the cases
of damages resulting from the plaintiff's frauds. If the action
was on contract, such darnages formed a most familiar example
of the former "recoupment;" and it is only necessary to extend
that doctrine t o analogous case· in which a "transaction " is to
be substituted iu place of a contract.
§ 664. * 788. (3) Cases in which the Plaintiff's Cause of Action is
D amages Arising from Fraud.

for a Tort and the Defendant's Counter-Claim is in Form upon Con-

a tort unless it arose out of the same claim or demanil arising out of tort cannot

transaction, etc.). be pleaded as a set-off against a cause of

1 Jones V. Moore, 42 Mo. 413, per action arising out of contract. Abraham-

Holmes .1. son i\ Laml)er.son (1898), 72 Minn. 308, 7."}

2 Vail V. Junes, 31 Ind. 467. N. W. 226.]]

[[Harris r. Randolph County Bank

The examples of this class of controversies have generally
been actions for the wrongful conversion of goods in which the
counter-claim of debt or damages upon contract was interposed,
and rested either upon the theory that both demands arose out of
the one tnmsaction set forth by the plaintiff, or upon the notion
that the plaintiff's cause of action might be regarded as founded
upon an implied contract, the tort being waived. Such an action
having been brought in form for the conversion of goods, the answer contained a counter-claim set.ting up a liability of the plain-

tra c t.

pos ible); Collier v. Ervin, 3 Mont. 142
(action on contract, no counter-claim for
a tort unless it arose out of the same
transaction , etc.).
1 Jon es v. Moore, 42 Mo. 413, per
Holmes .J.
2 Vail v. Jon es, 31 Ind . 467.
[Harris v. Randolph County Bank

(1901 ), 157 Intl. 120, 60 N. E. 1025 : Th
rule is well s ttled in thi
tate that a
claim 0 1· demaud ari. ing out of tort cannot
be pleaded as a . et-off again t a au e of
action arising out of contra ct. Abraham so n 1•. Lamber on (189 ), 72 Minn. 30 , 75

. w.

226.J
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tiff as a stockholder in a certain manufacturing corporation,

averring- all the facts required by the statute to create a personal

tiff

'l

' t ckh 11 r m a

responsibility iu him for a debt of the company. This attempted

counter-claim was of course overruled, as it had not the least con-

nection with the transaction stated iu the complaint, nor with the

subject of the action.^ I submit the following doctrine as correct

ou principle, and as derived from a true interpretation of the

statute. Whenever the facts are such that an election is given

to the plaintiff to sue in form either for a tort or on contract, and

t

if he sues on contract the defendant may counter-claim damages

for the breach of that contract, the same counter-claim may also

be interposed when the suit is in form for the tort : the facts being

exactly the same in both phases of the action, the counter-claim

would clearly arise out of the real transaction which was the

foundation of the plaintiff's demand.''^ The term " transaction "

refers to the actual facts and circumstances from which the rights

result and which are averred, and not to the mere form and manner

in which these facts are averred. Although there are decisions

which repudiate this interpretation of the codes, and reject the
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liberal rule drawn from it, I think the doctrine thus stated is now

approved and supported by the decided weight of judicial opinion

as expressed in the more recent authorities."^

1 Chambers v. Lewis, 28 N. Y. 454; McMillan, 83 id. 270; Ring i'. Ogdeu, 44

11 Al)b. I'r. 210. See also Allen v. Ran- Wis. .'JOS ; Ferris v. Arm.strong Manuf.

dolph, 48 lud. 496. In Scheunert r. Co. (Supreme, 1890), 10 N. Y. Suppl. 750;

Kaehler, 2.3 Wis. 52.3, which was an action Loewenherg v. Rosenthal, 18 Ore. 178;

for the conversion of good.s, a counter- hut Spouseuberger v. Lemert, 23 Kan.s. 55,

claim of damages from the breach of the held that in an action against a constable

contract between the parties out of which for his failure or neglect to serve ])ri)cess

the plaintiff's cause of action arose was properly, the defendant's fees in the same

rejected, the court adding that it must case were a good set-off or counter-claim,

also have been rejected even had the [^Harden v. Lang (1900), 110 Ga. 392,

plaintiff l)rought his suit in form on the 36 S. E. 100; Bell v. Ober & Sons Co.

as deri d fr m a rue in rpreta ion f tl e
r he fa ·t · are • u h th t an lection i g1 n
u in form ither for a tort r n ontract, , rnl
he def ndaot m y unter-claim dama
hat
ntra t, th
am
unt r-claim may al
be interp · d wl n th ui i in form for the tort : the fact b in
x tl the ame in both pha e of th a ion, the counter-claim
would l arly ari e out of the real transaction ' hi h wa th
f undation of h plaintiff demand . ~ Th term " ransacti n
r fer t the actual fact and ircum tan · from whi h the righ
re ult an wl ich are averr d, a.nd not t the mereforni and mann ,.
m hi h the fa ts are averred. Al hou ·h th re are de i i n
whi h r p diate thi interpretation f the ode , and reje t l
libenil rul drawn from it, I think th cloctrin thu tated is n w
a pr v an upportecl by the 9-ecid d w i0 ht of judicial o m1 n
a,
ed in the more recent au horitie .3

contract, which he might have done, be- (1900), 111 Ga. 668,36 S. E. 904; Follen-

cause the right of action would still in dore v. Follcndore (1896), 99 Ga. 71, 24

cl

IJ,

44

fact be for a tort. The following recent S. E. 407 ; Giles i-. Bank of Georgia (1897),

cases show that the courts are strongly 102 Ga. 702,29S. E. 600; Britton !-'. Ferrin

inclined to hold that a counter-claim on (1902), 171 N. Y. 2.35, 63 N. E. 954;

contract is impossible in an action for tort, Hecht v. Snook (1902), 114 Ga. 921, 41

since the two could not in the nature of S. E. 74.]

things arise out of the same transaction : '^ Hitchie i'. Ilayward, 71 Mo. 560;

People 1-. Deni.son, 84 N. Y. 372, 379 ; Kamcrick v. Castleman, 23 Mo. App.

Smitli V. Hall, 67 id. 48; Ilumplirey v. 481.

Merritt, 51 Ind. 197; He.ss ;•. Young, 59 " QStory & Ishani Co. c. Story (1893),

id. 379; Boil v. Simms, 60 id. 162; Man- 100 Cal. 30, 34 I'ac. 671; Wimmer r.

ucy v. Ingram, 78 N. C. 96; Ilolliday r. Simon (1894), 9 Utah, 378. 35 I'ac. 507;

I

Mo. !56 ;
1 ·

11 ·

. v. t ry (1 93),
ii· Wim1n r 11.
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§ 665. * 789. Same Subject. The tort complained of by the

plaintiff may not be a conversion of chattels. The fact that a

cause of action upon contract in favor of the defendant may arise

out of the transaction set forth in the complaint or j)etition in an

action in form for damages resulting from a tort, was distinctly

recognized, and the doctrine that a counter-claim setting up such

a demand should be jwlmitted, and should not be rejected in defer-

ence to notions which the new procedure was designed to sup-

plant, was clearly and cogently enforced by the Supreme Court

of Indiana in an opinion from which I make a quotation.^

Warren v. Hall (1895), 20 Col. 508, 38

Pac 767.

" In replevin by a lessor to obtain pos-

session of his lessee's furniture, under a

665.
7 9. Same Subject. The tor 01111 laincd of by the
plaintiff may not. b a
n r. ion of ·hatl ls. The fact that a
cau e f action upon ontract in fav r f he d fen<lant may arise
out f the tran action et forth in the complaint r 1 etition in an
acti n in form for damag r ' ulting from a t rt, was di tin ·tly
recognized, and the doctrine that a counter-claim ' tting up ·n ·h
a demand hould b admitted, and shoul<l not b r j cted in d ferenc t notion which th new procedure wa d igned to upplant, was clearly and cogently enforced by the upreme ourt
of Indiana in an opinion from which I make a quotation. 1

provision of the lease authorizing it to be

taken and sold to satisfy unpaid rent, the

lessee may counter-claim for damages for

breach of the lessor's covenant, in the

Generated for facpubupdates (University of Michigan) on 2014-06-17 15:35 GMT / http://hdl.handle.net/2027/uc2.ark:/13960/t02z1c23b
Public Domain / http://www.hathitrust.org/access_use#pd

same lease, to keep the demised premises

in repair," citing § * 788 of the text :

Collins V. Morrison (1895), 91 Wis. 324,

€4 N. W. 1000.3

1 Judah V. Vincennes Univ. Trs., 16 Ind.

56, 60. The plaintiffs — trustees of the

Vincennes University — sue to recover

the value of certain bonds belonging to

the corporation, received by the defendant

as its attorney, and converted by him to

his own use. He admits the receipt and

detention of the securities, and alleges,

by way of counter-claim, that the Uuiver-

sity was indebted to him for certain pro-

fessional services, particularly described,

including his services in procuring these

very bonds, among others, to be issued to

it by the State, and prays judgment for

the amount of such indebtedness. In

pronouncing upon the validity of this

answer as a counter-claim, the court say :

" The point is, that the action is in form

trover, — an action ex delicto, — and that,

under such action, the defendant cannot

avail himself of any claim which he may

have against the plaintiffs for services

rendered, or money expended, on their

behalf, even if it was in tiie recovery of

the identical property which is the sub-

ject of the present action. We are clear

that it was the intention of those who

initiated and inaugurated tlie present

•Code of Procedure that parties litigant

might, and perhaps should, determine in

each suit all matters in controversy be-

tween them which could legitimately be

included therein, keeping in view their

substantial rights. As proceedings so dis-

tinct as those were at" law and in equity

are no longer required to be separated,

but are now blended in one action, we

are unable to see any reason for requiring

two actions to determine a controversy

in which the rights of each party are so

dependent upon the rights of the other as

in the case at bar. There is most surely

an equitable view of this question, as pre-

sented iu the case at bar, which renders

it distinct and different from an ordinary

case iu which one should convert the

Warren v. Hall ( 1895 }, 20 Col. 50 , 38
Pac. 767.
" In r plevin by a le sor to ohtain poses, ion of his lessee's furniture, unc! r a.
provi ion of the lease authorizing it to be
taken and sold to satisfy unpaid rent, the
le ee may counter-claim for damage for
breach of the le sor's covenant, in th e
·ame lea e, to kee p the demised premi se
in repair," citing § * 78 of th e text:
Collin v . Morrison (1895}, 91 Wis. 324,
64 N. W. 1000.J
1 Judah v. Vincennes Univ. Trs., 16 Iud.
56, 60. The plaintiffs - trustees of the
Vince nnes Univer. ity - sue to recover
the value of certain bonds belonging to
the co rporation, rece ived by the defendant
as its attorney, and conrnrted by him t o
his own u e. He admits the receipt and
detention of the ·ecuritie. , and alleges,
by way of counter-claim, that the U uiv erity was indebted to him for certain professional e rvi ces , particularly described,
including his services in proc urin g these
very bonds, among others, to be i sued to
it by the tate, antl prays judg ment for
the amount of such iudebtedue . Iu
pronouncing upon th e rnlidity of thi ·
an wer a a counter-claim, the court ay :
"The point is, that the action i in form
trover, - au action ex delicto, - and that,
under uch actiou, the defendant cannot.
avail him -elf of any claim whi ch he may
have against the plaiutiff for er vice
rendered , or money expended, on th ir
behalf, ve u if it was iu the recove ry of
the identical property which is the ·ubject of the pre eut act ion . W e are clear
that it wa the intention of tho ·e ·who
iuitiated and inaugurated the pr ent
{' u of Procedu re that partie lit igant

might, and perhap hould , determine in
each suit all matter in controver y between th em which <'onld legitimately be
included therein , kee ping in view their
substautial ri g ht . A proceeding o di tin ct as tho e were af law and in equity
are no longer requ ired to be eparated,
but are now bl ended iu one action, we
are unable to see any reaso n for requiring
two a cti ons to cletermiue a controver y
in which the ri g hts of eac h party are o
dependent upon the rig hts of the other as
in the case at bar. There is most surely
an equitable view of thi question, as presented iu the ca e at bar, which rend ers
it di tinct and different from au ordinary
ca e in which one should convert the
property of another, and then set up a a
defence that the owner wa inde bted to
him for some other aud distinct tran action. " Sec also Birch v. Hall (Supreme,
1888}, 3 N. Y. Suppl. 74i. The uprerne
Conrt of Korth Carolina has recent!.,- approved this doctrine in the mo t emph atic
and general m anner, holding that oppus·
in g demands ou contract and for tort ml~'
arise out of the .ame tran act ion, Bitting
v. Thaxton, 72 J. C. 54 1, 549. In 't.
L oui , F . & \V . H. o. v. henault, 36
Kan s. 51, the trca urer of the plaintiff. a
railroad company, who wa sued for the
conver iou of the <'Ompauy's fun d , wa
all owed to count r-claim demand aJ?;aiu · t
the plaintiff, in payment of whi ch he had
appropriated the money. In Cow Run
Co. v. Lehmer, 41 hio t. 3 4, an attiou
for t he cou ,·er ion of oi l deli,•er d to the
defendant for torag , the allowance for
evaporation. an<l the charge for torag ,
both pro,·id ed for by th coutract, were
held to be proper subjec ts for cou:.iter-

Cl\'IL ffE,JEDJE .
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^ 666. * 790. (4) Cases in -wrhicli the Demands of both Parties are

for Damages Arising from Tort. Countei-elaims of damages from

torts, when attempted to be enforced against causes of action for

damages also arising from other torts, have, with few exceptions,

been rejected.- The courts have been inclined to adopt, or at least

to assume, a general principle that such a cross-demand can never

arise from the transaction set forth by the plaintiff as the founda-

tion of his claim. It will be seen, however, that this doctrine has

not been universally accepted.^ In all the cases placed in the

foot-note, the proposed counter-claims were over-ruled on the

ground that the cross-demands were for unconnected torts.'-^

Opposed to this array of authorities, all announcing the same

general doctrine, there are a few cases which sustain a counter-

claim of tort against a tort under special circumstances.^ The

claim. For a case in which such a coun-

ter-claim was rejected becau.sc it did not

" arise out of the same transaction," etc.,

see Pattison v. Riciiards, 22 Barb. 143. See

Generated for facpubupdates (University of Michigan) on 2014-06-17 15:35 GMT / http://hdl.handle.net/2027/uc2.ark:/13960/t02z1c23b
Public Domain / http://www.hathitrust.org/access_use#pd

the additional cases cited ante under

§*788.

* 7 ..

. ( 4)

Cases in which the Demands of both Parties are

ounter- laim f damag . ·from
u e of ction for
ort wl en attemp d
b nfor ed agai1 t
cl mag al" ari ing fr m her orts he
with fe\ xc pti n
been r je ted.- Th
urt h 'e b en inclined
ad t, or at 1 ast
t a ume a g neral principl hat uch a er
-d man an n
r
ari e fr m the ran ·a i n e forth by he plaintiff a le f undaion of hi claim. It will be een however that thi d trine ha.·
no been uni er all
ccept d.1 In all he ca e placed in he
foo note the proposed counter-claim were ov r-rul d n the
gr und tha the cro -demand were for unconn ted tort .2
pposed to thi array of authoritie all announcing the me
general doctrin
.here are a few ca e wl ich U"tain a counterclaim of tor again t a tort under pecial circum tan e .3 The

for Damages Arising from Tort.

[;Smith V. Building Ass'n (1896), 119

N. C. 2.57, 26 S. E. 40; Lovell v. Ham-

mond Co. (1895), 66 Conn. .500, 34 Atl.

511.]

1 (^Gilbert v. Loberg (1894), 86 Wis.

661, 57 N. W. 982: "In an action by a

landlord against tenants for waste the

defendants may counter-claim for the

value of personal property placed by tliem

on the premises durin<^ their tenancy, and

claim. For a ca e in which such a counter- laim was rejected becau e it did not
" ari e out of th ame tran action," tc.,
ee Patti on v. Richard , 22 Barb. 143. ee
the additioual ca e cited ante under
*i .
[ 'mith v. Building A 'n (1 96), 119
N.
. 257, 26 . E. 40; Lovell v. Hammond Co. (1895 ), 66 Conn. 500, 34 Atl.

which the landlord has converted by pre-

venting its removal."

Keuaker v. Smith (1901), 109 Ky. 643,

60 S. W. 407 : In an action to recover

damages for trespass and destruction of

crops by defendant's cattle, defendant can-

not plead as a counter-claim the damages

wlii(-h he has suffered from trespasses by

plaintiff's cattle, though tliey resulted

from plaintiff's breach of his agreement

to keep up a portion of the division fence,

as the claim of defendant did not arise

oat of the same trausacti(jn stated in the

petition. 3

2 Askius V. IIearn.s, 3 Abb. Pr. 184,

187; Schnaderbeck i: Worth, 8 Abb. Pr.

37; Barhyte v. Hughes, 33 Barb. 320;

Henry v. Henry, 3 Hobt. 614, 17 Abb.

Pr. 411; Murden i: Prirnent, 1 Hilt. 75;

Shelly r. Vanarsdoll, 23 Ind. 543 ; Love-

joy V. Robin.son, 8 Ind. 399 ; Macdougall

V. Maguire, 35 Cal. 274, 280 ; the last case

holding that the objection is not removed

by replying and going to trial instead of

demurring. See, further, Ward v. Black-

wood, 48 Ark. 396 ; Kothschild r. Whit-

man, 132 N. Y. 472 ; Allen v. Coates, 29

Minn. 46 ; Heckman v. Swartz, 55 Wis.

173; Terre Haute & I. R. Co. v. Pierce,

95 Ind. 496 ; Keller t: B. F. Goodrich Co.,

117 Ind. 556 ; Lake Shore & M. S. Ry. Co.

V. Van Auken, 1 Ind. App. 492; Roths-

child V. Whitman, 57 Hun, 135; Sheehan

V. Pierce (Supreme, .June, 1893), 23 N. Y.

Suppl. 1119 (in an action of slander, a

counter-claim for slander not allowed).

'■^ Tarwater v. Hannibal & St. ,lo. R. R.,

42 Mo. 193. In Mc Arthur v. Green Bay,

511.]

[ Gilbert v. Loberg (1 94), 6 Wis.
. W. 9 2 : " In an action by a
landlord again t tenants f r wa te the
defendant
may ounter-claim for the
value of peronal property placed by them
on the premi e duriug their tenan y, nd
which the laudl rd h con,·erted by preventing it removal."
Renaker v. mi h {1901 ), 109 Ky. 643,
60 . W. 407 : In au acti n to recover
damage for tre pa and d tructioo of
crop by <lefeodant' cattle, defendant cannot plead a a ounter-claim the damages
which he ha uffered from tr pa e by
plaintiff' cattle, though they re ·ul ed
from plaintiff' lir a h of hi acrr ment
to keep up a portion of he di vi ion fence,
a the claim of d fenrlant did not ari e
out o[ th sam trau action . tated io be
p tition. J
2 A kins r•. IJParu , .'3 \ bb. Pr. l 4,
1 i; . 'cliuarl ,rli ~k i·. Worth, Abb. Ir.
37; B rhyt, c. JJuglws, 33 Barb. 320;
JJPury t'. Hetrry, .'3 Holit. 614, 17 Abb.
Pr. 411; • furrlen c. l'rirnent, 1 Ililt. 75;
1

661, 5 i

belly v. ' anar doll, 23 Ind. 543; Lov I ud. 399; Ma dougall
joy v. Robin on
v. Maguire, 35 Cal. 274, 2 0; the la~t ca e
holding that the obj ction i not r mo,·ed
by replying and going to trial in teacl of
demurring.
ee fnrther, Ward v. Blackrk. 396; Roth ·child v. Whit·
wood, 4
man, 132 N. Y. 472; Allen r. oate , 29
:VIinn. 46; Heckman v. wartz, 55 \Vi ·.
l 73 ; Terre Haute & I. R. o. v. Pierce,
95 Ind. 496 ; Keller v. B. F. oodrich Co.,
117 Ind. 556; Lake hor & I. .
v. Van Auken, 1 Ind. App. 492 ·
child v. Whitman, 57 Hun, 135; heeban
v. Pierce ( upreme, June, 1 93), 23 . Y.
uppl. l ll9 (in an acti n of land r, a
counter-claim for lander not allow d).
a Tarwatex v. Hannibal & t. Jo. R.R.,
42 Mo. 193. In M
rthur v. r n Ba ,
.tc. anal o., 34 \Vi . 139, 146, the a tion
wa br ught for injuri don to th I laintiff' boat while pa.sin er thr ngh th anal,
caus,ed by a break iu th
·anal allegeLl
to hav re ult u from def ndaut n gligence · th defendant et up, a a ounterclaim, that the br ak its lf wa au. d by
the 1 lai11tiff' n crligencc, and pra ed a
unter
juclcrment for the damacr . Thi.
·laim wa
u. taiu d, th ·ourt
" If it do s not ari e ou of he
t.ion . et f rth io t11
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court of last resort in Kentucky has even gone to the extent of

liolding that, in an action for an assault and battery, a counter-claim

of damages for an assault and battery committed by the plaintiff

at the same time, and as a part of the same affray, can be inter-

posed, because it arises out of the same transaction, thus giving

to that word a very broad and liberal meaning.^

§ 667. * 791. Second Class. Legal Actions in which the Judg-

ment is other than for Money. I pass now to the consideration of

legal actions in which the judgment is other than for money ; tliat

is, for the recovery of chattels or of lands. In all instances of

this class, the question would present itself, and would be the

controlling one, whether the counter-claim has such a relation to

the plaintiff's cause of action that a recovery upon it would defeat,

lessen, or modify the relief which would otherwise be obtained

by him.'-^ The practical question therefore is. When, if ever, may

there be a counter-claim of money in an action brought to recover

possession of chattels ? In some exceptional cases such counter-

claims have been allowed, and in my opinion properly allowed.

For example, an answer stating the circumstances under which
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the goods demanded by the action came into the defendant's

possession, that the plaintiff was indebted to him in a specified

ajit had sold him in exchange for a tract course of those events which must, of ne-

of laud, and the defendant counter-claimed cessity, be fully established and considered

damages arising from the plaintiff's fraud- in the trial of plaintiff's demand." See

ulent representations in reference to the also Pelton i\ Powell (1897), 96 Wis. 473,

land so exchanged. This case certainly 71 N. VV. 887. See Stolze v. Torrisou

carries the doctrine of counter-claim to (190.3), — Wis. — , 9.5 N. W. 114, distin-

its extreme limits. guishing these two cases and saying of

1 Slone V. Slone, 2 Mete. (Ky.) 339. the former that it is " au extreme case."

In Heigel v. Willis (Supreme, 1889), 3 Horton y. Pintchunck (1900), 110 Ga. 355,

N. Y. Suppl. 497, an action for damages 35 S. E. 663 : In an action for malicious

comt of l, ~t r ort in Ken tu ·ky ha Y n gone to th
x nt of
h l ling that, in an a tion for an as a ult and battery, a · unt r-daim
of <lama.
for an a~ ault a.ntl b, tt ry mmitt d by th pl iutiff
a.t tb ame time, and as a part of th am affray, can b int rvos <l, becau e it ari es out of th ame tntn a t.ion, thu g1vrng
to that word a very broad and lib ral m aning. 1
§ 667. * 791. Second Class. Legal Actions in which the Judgment is other than for Money. I I a ~ s now to th con.'i<lerati n of
legal actions in which the judgment is other than for money; that
is, for the recovery of chattels or of land . In all in tances of
thi cla s, the question would present itself, and would be the
con trolling one, whether the counter-claim has such a relation to
the plaintiff's cause of action that a recovery upon it would def at
les en, or modify the . relief which would otherwise be obtained
by him. 2 The practical question therefore is, When, if ever, may
there be a. counter-claim of money in an action brought to recover
possession of chattels? In some exceptional cases such counter·laims have been allowed, and in my opinion properly allowed.
For example, an answer stating the circum tances under which
the goods demanded by the action came into the defendant's
possession, that the plaintiff was indebted to him in a specified

caused by the defendant's driving his prosecution defendant may set off a cause

wagon against the wagon of the jjlajntiff, of action for assault and battery, and if

a counter-claim for injuries resulting to the damages for the latter exceed in

the person and property of the defendant amount those for the former, the defend-

from the same collision was held proper, aut may enter up judgment for the ex-

Contra to tliese decisions, see several re- cess. Savage v. Davis (1902), 131 N. C.

cent cases presenting similar facts, cited 159, 42 S. E. 571 : Defendant had plain-

in last note but one. tiff arrested and brought before a justice

QGutzman v. Clancy (1902), 114 Wis. of the peace on a charge of having ob-

589, 90 N. W. 1081 : Holding "that the tained five tons of guano from him, the

word ' transaction ' in the statute is broad defendant, by false pretences. Plaintiff

enough to include an entire, continuous sued defendant for malicious prosecution,

phvsical encounter, and that, upon couu- and defendant pleaded the value of the

ter-claim, defendant may have recovery for guano as a set-off. Held proper.]

his damages resulting from any assault '^ See ante, § * 767.

committed upon him by plaintiff in the

a1;t ha<l sold him in exchange for a tract
of land. and the defendant counter-claimed
damages arising from the plaintiff's fraudulent representations in reference to the
land so exchanged. Thi s case certain ly
carries the doctrine of counter-claim to
its extre me limits.
1 Sl one v. Slone, 2 Mete. (Ky.) 339.
Jn Heigel v. Willis ( upreme, 1889), 3
N. Y. uppl. 497, an action for damages
caused by the defendant's driving his
wagon against the wagon of the plajutiff,
a counter-claim for injuri es re ulting to
th e perso11 and property of the defendant
from the same colli ion was held ]Jroper.
Contra to the e decisions, see several r cent cases presenting similar facts, citeu
iu last note but one.
[Gutzman v. Clancy (1902 ), 114 Wi .
589, 90 N. W. 1081 : Holding "that the
word 'transaction ' in the statute is broad
enoug·h to include an entire, ontinuous
physical encounter, and that, upon counter-claim, defendant may have recovery for
hi s damages resulting from any as , ult
committed upon him by plaintiff in the

course of those events which mu t, of necessity, be fully establi . hed and con idered
ee
in the trial of plaintiff's demand."
also Pelton v. Powell (1897), 96 Wis. 473,
71 •. W. 88i. See 'tolze v. Torri ou
(1903), - Wis. - , 95 .... W. 114, di tingu ishing these two cases and saying of
the former that it is "au extreme ca e."
Horton v. Pintchuuck ( 1900), 110 Ga. 355,
35 S. E. 663 : In an action for maliciou
pro ecution rlefenclant may set off a cau e
of action for a~ sault and battery, and if
the damages for the latter exceed in
amount those for the former, the def ndant may enter up judgment for th exces . Savage v. Da1·is (1902), 1.31 N. C.
159, 42 S. E. 5il : Defendant had plaintiff arre ted and bronght before a ju ·tice
of the peace on a charge of having obtained fh e t n of guano from him, the
defendant, by fal e pretence . Plaintiff
ued defendant for maliciou pro ecution,
and d fendant plead cl the value of the
guano a a , et-off. Held proper.]
2 'ee ant e,§* 767.
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amount, that the chattels were dehvered to him as a security for

such debt, and that he held them by virtue of the lien thus

created by the pledge, and demanding judgment for the debt

itself, was adjudged a proper counter-claim.^ The New York

Court of Appeals has also sustained the counter-claim under

circumstances involving the same principle.^ The result of these

authorities is, that a cause of action on contract for money may

so arise out of the transaction which is the foundation of the

plaintiff's claim that it can be interposed as a counter-claim in an

action brought to recover the possession of chattels.^ The case

^ Brown v. Buckingham, 11 Abb. Pr.

387 (Sp. Term). See also Walsh v. Hall,

66 N. C. 233, 237 ; Wilson v. Hughes, 94

N. C. 182; but see per contra, Gottler v.

amo rnt tha tl e cha tel were d livered o him a a ecurity for
uch l bt and that he h ld them by virtu of the li n hu
er
1l b . . h pl lg and d manding judg m nt for the debt
djudg
a proper cou nter- claim. 1 The New York
ustained the counter-claim under
p al ha al
cir um auce in olving the same principle. 2 The result of these
autl ri ie i hat a au e of action on contrac for money may
ri e out of tl e tran action which i the foundation of the
pl inti:ff cl im that it can be interpo ed a a counter-claim in an
action brought to recover the po es ion of chattels.a The ca e

Babcock, 7 Abb. Pr. 392 (n.). It should

be noted that in neither of the North Car-

olina cases was the objection considered,

that the counter-claim does not tend to
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defeat or modify the plaintiff's recovery.

2 Thompson i-. Kessel, 30 N. Y. 383,

389 ; per contra, see Moffat v. Van Doren,

4 Bosw. 609. If the plaintiff sues for

damages, as well as to recover possession,

the counter-claim is, of course, proper,

although the claim of damages was not

allowed by the jury ; see ante, § * 739 ;

Lapham v. Osborne, 20 Nev. 168. By ex-

press provision of the Iowa Code, § 3226,

there can be no counter-claim in an action

for the recovery of specific personal prop-

erty. With respect to lethal counter-

claims in the action of ejectment, see

Lawe V. Hyde, 39 Wis. 34.5 ; Reed v.

Newton, 22 Minn. 541 ; Haggin v. Clark,

51 Cal. 112; Moyle v. Porter, 51 id. 639;

Whitlock V. Redford, 82 Ky. 390; Car-

penter V. Hewel, 67 Cal. 589.

" QRennebaum v. Atkinson (1898), 103

Ky. 555, 45 S W. 874 ; Banning v. Mar-

leau (1894), 101 Cal. 238, 35 Pac. 772.

Plaintiff sold defendant a tiireshing

outfit, and took back a chattel mortgage

for a pijrtion of the purchase price. Plain-

tiff subsequently also required defendant

to insure the property, and agreed that it

Would procure the insurance. The prop-

erty was subserjuently damaged by fire, but

no insurance had been taken out. Plaintiff

brought replevin, and defendant pleaded

as a counter-claim the loss he had sus-

tained by reason of plaintiff's failure to

procure the insurance. Held proper, as

arising out of Uhe contract or transac-

tion set forth by plaintiff: Minneapolis

Threshing Co. v. Darnall (1900), 13 S. I).

279, 83 N. W. 266.

" In an action of replevin, brought by a

non-resident mortgagee, to recover posses-

sion of machinery sold to defendant and

mortgaged to secure the purcha.se price,

the defendant . . . may counter-claim dam-

ages for breach of warranty of the goods

sold, and also damages in trying to oper-

ate machinery returned to the pbiintiff

and for which the mortgaged property

was in part taken in exchange:" Ault-

man Co. v. McDonough (1901), 110 Wis.

263, 85 N. W. 980.

l Brown v. Buckingham , 11 Abb. P r .
3
( p. Term).
ee al o Wal h v. Hall,
66 N. . 233, 237 ; Wil on v . Hugh e , 9~
N. . 182 ; but ee per contra, Gottler v .
Babcock, 7 A bb. Pr. 392 (n.). It hould

be noted that in neither of the North arolina ca e was the objection con idered,
that the count r-claim doe not tend to
defeat r modify the plaintiff' recovery.
2 Thomp on v. K
el, 30 . Y. 3 3,
389 ; per contra, see Moffat 1. Van D oren,
4 Bo w. 609. If the plaintiff ne fo r
damaO'e , as well a to recover po e ion,
the counter-claim i , of cou r e, proper,
althou h the claim of damages wa not
all wed by the jury ; ee ante, § * 739 ;
Lapham v. 0 borne, 20 Nev. 16 . By expre provi iou of the Iowa ode, § 3226,
there au be no counter-claim in an action
for the r ecovery of pecific per onal property.
With re pect to legal counter·
claim in the aciion of ej ctmeut, ee
Lawe v. Hyde, 39 Wi . 345 ; Reed v.
......ewtoo, 22 Minn . 541; Haggin i:. lark,
51 al. 112; :\1oyle v. Porter, 51 id. 639;
Whitlock v. Redford, 2 Ky . 390; Carpente r v. Hewe!, 67 al. 5 9.
a [Rennebaum v. Atkinson (189 ), 103
Ky. 555, 45 .' \Y. 74; Banning 1. farleau {l 94-), 101 al. 2.3 , 35 Pac. 772.
P lai 11 t iff sold defendant a tine hing
ou tfi , an d took back a cha t 1 mortg age
for a prJ r tion of the purclta e pri e. Plaintiff . uL qu e utly al o required d efendant
to i11 ur th e property, a11 rl agreed that it
would procure th iu uran c . Th e property w
uL er~ u e ntly d am ge<l by fir , but
no in uran had been taken out. Plnintiff
brou ht rep! vin , aod d f nd nt pl acted
aa a coun er-claim t.h lo. lie had u .
tained by re . ou of plaint.iff' failu re to

procure the insurance. Held proper , as
arising out of (the co ntract or transaction set forth by plaintiff : Minneapolis
Thre hing o. u. Darnall ( 1900), 13 . D.
279, 83 N. W. 266 .
"In an action f r eplevin, brought by a
n on-re ide nt m ortgagee, to recover pos. e .
sion of machinery old t o defendant and
mortgaged to ecure the purch a e pri ce,
the defendant .. : may counter-claim damage for breach of warranty of the good
old, and al o damages in tryiug to perate macb in ry returned to the plaintiff
and for which the mortgaged property
was in part tak en in exchange:" Ault·
roan Co. v. McDonough ( 1901), 110 \ i"
263, 85 N. W . 9 o.
S ec tions 3226 and 3245 of the , ode for bid
the allowance of co unter-claims iu actiou
to r ecover per nal property : Palmer t'.
Palmer {l 94), 90 Ia. 17 , 57 N. W. 645 .
Plaintiff br ough t an action for the po e ·ion of per onal property, and d fendant sought to et up a co unter-claim f r
damage
u. tai ned by reason of the unlawful eizur of i property. Held uot
a prop r •ounter- l:tim, a i t di not a ri e
ont of th
au e of a c ion and dicl
not exi t at the
mmeucem nt of th e
action. Phipp, u. Wil on {l 99), 125
I 6, 34 . E. 2_ 7.
"In a r eplevin action for prope rty
covered by a ·hattel mortgage iven t
ecur the paym nt of a note wned by
plaintiff, the d f udant, under a general
d nial, may h w that plaintiff at the
co mm nc meut f he uit wa and till
i , ind bted to him for labor in an amount
ual to th amount due on th e n te:"
I avi u.
uh r (1 99 ), 58 Neb. 265, 7
N. W . 504.]
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of a pecuniary counter-claim in an action to recover possession of

lands has already been fully discussed.^

§ 668. * 792. Third Class. Cases in which the Plaintiffs Cause

of Action or the Defendant's Counter-Claim, or both, are Equitable in

their Nature. The general subject of equitable counter-claims has

already been examined, and illustrated by numerous exampl&s.

It is thoroughly settled as a fundamental doctrine of the new

procedure in relation to pleading, that an equitable counter-

claim may be interposed to a legal cause of action, and a fortiori

to one which is itself equitable. I shall not repeat the discus-

sion to be found in a former part of this section, but shall simply

collect in the note a few examples which will illustrate the modes

by which such species of cross-demands may arise out of the trans-

actions set forth by the plaintiff in his complaint or petition.^

1 HDinan y. Coneys (1894), 143 N. Y.

544,38 N. E. 715 ; Wigmore v. Buell ( 1897),

116 Cal. 94, 47 Pac. 927 ; Wilkins v. Sut-

tles (1894), 114 N. C. 550, 19 S. E. 606;
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Nevvlaad v. Morris (1902), 115 Wis. 207,

91 N. W. 664.

of a, pecuniary counter-claim in an action to recov r po es ion of
land, has already been fully discu 'ed.1
§ 668. * 792. Third Class. Cases in which the Plaintiff's Cause
of Action or the Defendant's Counter-Claim, or both, are Equitable in
their Nature. The general ubject of eq uitabl count r-clairns ha·
already been examined, a.nd illu trated by num r u, xamples.
It i thoroughly s ttl d a a fundamental doctrine of the new
procedure in relation to pleading, that an equitable counterclaim may be interposed to a legal cause of action, and a fortiori
to one which is itself equitable. I sp.all not repeat the discussion to be found in a former part of this section, but shall simply
collect in the note a few examples which will illu trate the modes
by which such species of cross-demands may arise out of the tran ac tions set forth by the plaintiff in his complaint or petition. 2

In ejectment a defendant cannot set off

a demand for improvements to an amount

greater than the claim for mesne profits,

and obtain affirmative relief for the dif-

ference. The set-off can be u.sed defen-

sively only: Dudley v. Johnson (1897),

102 Ga. 1, 29 S. E. 50. But see Mills u.

Geer(1900), 111 Ga. 275, 36 S. E. 673,

where it was held that under the act of

December 21, 1897, in a suit to recover

land, the defendant who has bond Jide

posses.sion of such land under adverse

claim of title may plead as a set-off the

value of all permanent improvements

bona fide placed thereon by himself or

other ionayjafe claimants under whom he

asserts title.

Falck V. Marsh (1894), 88 Wis 680,

61 N. W. 287 : " In ejectment the grantee

of a life tenant by quitclaim deed cannot

counter-claim for the value of improve-

ments made and taxes paid by him while

holding under such deed, as against the

owner of the fee. Such a deed cannot be

made the basis of an adverse holding of

the fee in remainder."

"Comp. Laws Dak. 1887, § 5455, de-

clares that, in an action for the recovery of

real property npon which permanent im-

provements have been made by a defend-

ant claiming to hold under color of title

in good faith, the value of such improve-

ments must be allowed as a counter-

claim:" Skelly V. Warren (1903), — S. 1).

— , 94 N. W. 408 (Syllabus).^

2 Sandford v. Travers, 40 N. Y. 140,

143 ; Akerly v. Vilas, 15 Wis. 401 ; Allen

V. Shackelton, 15 Ohio St. 145, 147 ; Mo-

berly v. Alexander, 19 Iowa, 162; Hill

V. Butler, 6 Ohio St. 207, 216; Foss v.

Newbury, 20 Ore. 257. The foregoing

were foreclosure .suits of purchase-money

mortgages, in which the mortgagor coun-

ter-claimed damages for the breach of the

covenants of title in the plaintiff's deeds,

or for the breach of some other collateral

agreement, or for the plaintiff's fraud;

but in such an action a counter-claim for

1 [Dinan v. Coneys (1894). 143 N. Y .
544,38 N. E . 715; Wigmore v. Buell (1897),
116 Cal. 94, 47 Pac. 927; Wilkins v. Suttles (1894), 114 N. C. 550, 19 S . E . 606;
Newland v. Morris ( 1902) , 115 Wis. 207,
91 N. W. 664.

In ejectment a defendant cannot set off
a demand for improvements to an amount
g reater than the claim for mesne profits,
and ob tain affirmative relief for the di fference. The set-off can be u 'ed defeni vely on ly: Dudley v. ,John son (1897),
102 Ga. 1, 29 S. E. 50. But see Mills v.
Geer (1900), 111 Ga. 27~, 36 S . E. 6i3,
where it was held that under th e act of
December 21, 1897, in a suit to recover
land, the defendant who has bond fide
posses ·ion of such land un der adverse
claim of title may plead as a set-off the
value of all permanent improvements
bona fide placed thereon by him elf or
other bona fide claimants under w horn he
asserts title.
Falck v. Marsh ( 1894 ) , 88 Wis 680,
61 N. W . 287: "In ejectment the grantee
of a life tenant by quitclaim deed cannot
cou nter-claim fo1· the value of improvement made and taxes paid by him while
holding und er such deed, as against the
owner of the fee. Such a deed cannot be
made the bas is of an adverse h ldioO" of
the fee in re mainder."
"Com p. Laws Dak. 1 87, § 545~, declares that, in an action for the recovery of
real property upon which permanent im-

provements have been made by a defendant claiming to hold under color of title
in good faith, the value of such improvements must be allowed as a counterclaim:" Skelly v. Warren ( 1903) , - S. D.
- , 94 N. W . 408 ( 'yllab us).]
2 Sandford v. Travers, 40 N. Y. 140,
143; Akerly v. Vilas, 15 Wis. 40 1 ; Allen
v . Shackelton, 15 Ohio St. 145, 147 ; Moberly v. Alexander, 19 Iowa, 162; Hill
v. Butler, 6 Ohio t. 207, 216; Fos. v.
Newbu ry, 20 Ore. 257 . Th e foregoing
were fo reclosure suit of purcha e-money
mortgages, in whieh t he mortgagor couJJter-claimed damage for the breach of the
covenants of title in the plaintiff's rleed ,
or fo r the breach of ome othe r collat ral
agreement, or fo r the plaintiff's fraud;
but in such an action a counter-claim for
a slander of title in re. pert to the land
cannot be us tain ed : A kerly c Vila , 2 l
Wis. 88, 109 ; Briggs v. cymo ur, 17 Wi .
255. It has been intimated that in a
mortgage foreclosure suit a counter-claim
of debt or damage on any contra t i
proper : Briggs v. eymour, 17 Wi . 255.
The following were action for other kiud
of equitable rel ief : Grime i•. Duzan, 32
Ind. 361; Woodruff i• arncr, 27 Ind. 4
(actions to et aside a deed of lanr! );
Ea tman u. Liun, 20 !inn . 4.'33 (to quiet
title); Vai l v. J ones, 31 In d. 467; Powder v. Bowdle (N. 1 ak. 1 93), 54 N. W .
Rep. 404 (to qni t titl ) ·; Grignon l'.
Black, 76 Wis. 674 (action to enjoin wa tc,

9 ~4
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III. C>i8f'S in which the Cause of Action Alleged by the Defendant

III. C.1 e in which the au. e of A ction Allege d by the
a
Counter- laim is or is not connected with t h
the A ction.

as a Counter-Claim is or is not connected with the Subject of

the Action.

§ 669. *793. References to Cases already Cited. Little need

be added under this particular head to what has been alread}* said

in the foregoing subdivisions. The cases cited in the preliminary

general discussion contain all the most important attempts to

give a judicial construction to the phrase "connected with the

subject of the action : " many of those which have been quoted to

explain and illustrate the clause " arising out of the transaction,"

etc., were also referred by the courts which decided them to the

language of the statutory definition now under consideration, —

tliat is, the counter-claims were held valid because they were '' con-

nected with the subject of the action," as well as because they

" arose out of the transaction set forth in the complaint." Finally,

it may be said that each one of the cases in which the counter-claim

was overruled is an illustration of a demand in favor of the

defendant not connected with the subject of the action.^
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counter-claim to quiet title to the prem-

ises) ; but if the cross-demand does not

arise out of the transaction which is the

foundation of the plaintiff's cause of

action, and is not connected with the sub-

ject of liis action, it cannot lie a counter-

claim, Town of Venice v. Breed, 65 Barb.

597, 605; Tallman v. Barnes, 54 Wis. 181.

§ 669. * 7 3.

D~

enda nt
ubJ"ect of

Little ne
b add d und r hi ar i ular h ad to what ha been already aid
in he foreo-oin subdivision . The ases cit d in th pr limin ar
eneral di u ion ontain all the mo t important a temp · to
i ve a judicial con tructi n to the phras ' connected wi th the
·ubject of the action: " many 0£ tho e hich hav- b n quoted o
explain and illu t rate the clau e "ari ing out of he tran ctiou,"
etc., were al o referred by th courts which decided th
t he
langua e of the tatu tory definition n w under con iderati n hat i the counter-claim were held valid bee u e t hey were ' connected with the ubject of the action a well a b cau
they
aro e out of the t ran action et forth iu t he complain t. '
iually,
i ma be aid that each one of the ca e in which the counter-claim
wa overruled is an illustration of a demand in farn r of the
defendant not connected with the subj ect of the a tion. 1
R eference s to C a s e s alre ad y Cite d .

See recent cases cited ante under § *7r)4 ;

also in last note under § *824. [^Rens-

berger i-. Britton (1903), — Col. — , 71 Pac.

379J

1 {^President, etc. of Ins. Co. v. Parker

(1902), 64 Neb 411, 89 N. W. 1040; Mc-

Hard c. Williams (1896), 8 S. I). 381, 66

N. W. 930; Aultman Co. i\ McDonough

(1901), 110 Wis. 263, 85 N. W. 980; Pio-

neer Press Co. V. Hutchinson (1896), 63

Minn. 481, 65 N. W. 938; Sheiblev v.

Dixon County (1901), 61 Neb. 409, 85

N. W. 399; Stolze v. Torrison (1903),—

Wis — , 95 N. W. 114; Kuhn r. Sol.

Ileavenrich Co. (1902), 115 Wis. 447, 91

N. W. 994; Duffger v. Dempsey (1895),

13 Wash. 396, 43 Pac. 357 ; B.irr v. Post

(1898), 56 Neb. 698, 77 N. W. 123 ; Wilcke

V. Wilcke (1897), 102 la. 173, 71 N. W.

201.

.Stillwell V. Duncan (189S), 103 Ky. .59,

44 S. W. 357 : In an action of quare

cJausum /regit, based on the bare possession

of the plaintiff, defendant may plead title

and also maintain a counter-claim for dam-

ages to the property during the time that

plaintiff was in possession. Such counter-

claim is connected with the subject of the

action, which is the land in controversy.

To an action for work and labor in

cutting timber trees, defendant filed a

counter-claim for damages by reason of

plaintiff negligently permitting fire to

escape while engaged in the work for

which he sues. Held a proper matter for a

counter-claim as connected with the sub-

ject-matter of the action : Branch v. Chap-

pell (ISOiV), 119 N. C. 81,25 S. E. 783.

Plaintiff sued defendant for a libel

published in defendant's paper. Just pre-

vious to the libel the plaintiff, a stockholder

of defendant company, maliciously and

co unter-claim to qui et ti tle to the prem i .·) ; b ut if t he cro -deman d doe. not
ari -e out of the tran ac ti on wh ich i t h e
foundati on
f the plainti ff ' cau e of
a ction, and i, not conn ct cl with the . ubj ct of hi action , it cann ot lie a c u nter·
cla im , T o wn of Venice v. B reed 65 B ar h.
597 , 605 ; Tallman v. Barn , 54 Wi . l 1.
' ee r ece nt ca. e cited ant under § * 764 ;
al o in la. t n ote u nder § * 24. [R en berg er u. Britton ( 1903 ), ol. - , 7 1 P ac.
.'379 .J
1

[ P re. ident, etc. of I n . . Co. v.

ark r

(I 02 ), 6-l ;:\ b -! ll , 9 ,T . \V . 1040; \ifcH ard c. William · (1 96),
. D. 3 1, 66
• ~. W . 9.'30; Aultman o. v. M cD onough
( 190 1), 110 Wi . 263, 5
. W . 9 O; ioneer Pre
o. u. Hutchin on (1 96 ), 63
l ino . 48 1, 65 , . W . 9.'3 ;
heibl ey .
ounty (1901). 6 1
eb. 409, 5
D ixon
... T. '
• 3
; 't0lze v. T orri oo ( 1903), \V i· - , 95 L . W . 114 ; Kuhu
ol.
lJ avenrich Co. (1902), 115 Wi . 447, 9 1
J.T. W . g 4 ; D ugger v. D emp ey (1 95),
13 v·a h 3 6 43 P ac. 357 ; B a rr v. o t
(I 9 ), 56 . . ~eh . 69 • 77 . W. 123 ; Wilr k
l. Wilr.. ( L </ ), 102 fa. li 3, il
T. w.
201.
. illwr>ll "· Duncan (l . ' ), 103 Ky. 59,

44
. W . 357 : In an action of qua re
clau · um f'regit, ba ed on the bar e p o e ion
of the p lain t iff, defe ndant may plead ti tle
a n d al · o maintain a coun t r-claim for damage t o the prop rty d u ri ug th i me that
pla intiff w a i n po e · ion.
uch oun terclaim i con nected with t he ubj ect of the
acti on, whi ch i the la nd in cont rornr y .
To an action fo r work a nd lahor in
cu ttinO' ti mber tree , d ef ndan t filed a
co u nter-claim fo r da mag
by rea on of
plaintiff negl igently pe rmittinO' fire to
e cape wh ile en aged in th work fo r
whi ch he ue. . H eld a prop r matter fo r a
counte r-claim a con n ecte1l wi h the u bject-ma.tt r of the action : B r n b J). happ 11 (I 96), 11
. l , 25 . E . 7 3.
Pla intiff hu d d f ndant fo r a li bel
pnbl i h d in d e fen dant' paper . Ju t previon to the l ibel th plaintiff. a to khol d r
of d fenda.nt ompauy mali ciou ly and
without pr bah!
au e, a de fe ndant alleg cl, m menc d a . uit fc r di olution of
th ompany to th d f ndant 's damag ,
and th
fact d f udaut plead <l a a
cou n ter-claim. H eld that th a c ion fo r
m ali cion • pro. PCntion w :i
the nbjr>t't of t h actiou a nd lwnr :i
prope r m a t t r fo r ou nter - lairn < incin -

92.j
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92:

§ 670 * 794. Construction of the Phrases " Subject of the Action,"

" Counected with," and " Arising out of." The language of the

§

670.

* 79-!.

Construction of the Phrases " Subject of the Action,"

" Connecte d with," and " Arising out of."

phrase is exceedingly general and vague. To construe it requires

nati Daily Tribune Co. r. Bruck (1900),

phra ·e i ' xceedingly general and vagu .

The 1 nguage of th
To on ·true it requir

61 Ohio St. 489, .56 N. E. 198.

lu au action on a judgment the defend-

ant may, by way of counter-claim, set up

facts which would justify a court of equity

in cancelling the judgment on the ground

that no summons was ever served on him,

such cause of action being counected with

the subject of the plaintiff's action ; that

is, the ju(]gment : Vaule w. Miller (1897),

69 Minn. 440, 72 N. W. 452. In an action

to quiet title to real property, a cross-

complaint alleging ownersliip and demand-

ing possession and damages pleads matters

" connected with the cause of action " in
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the complaint and constitutes a proper

counter-claim : Gill'enwaters v. Campbell

<189.5), 142 lud. 529, 41 N. E. 1041.

I'laintiff brought an action to have a

mortgaj^e upon certain land reformed.

Defendant, the mortgagee, admitted the

mistake in the mortgage, and by way of

counter-claim asked to have the mortgage,

as reformed, foreclosed. As a second

counter-claim defendant asked to have a

second mortgage upon the same land, be-

tween tlie same parties, reformed and

foreclosed. Held, both counter-claims were

proper, the first as a cause of action aris-

ing out of the contract or transaction set

forth in plaintiff's complaint, the sec-

ond as connected with the subject of the

action : Lahiff v. Hennepin County, etc.

Ass'n (1895), 61 Minn. 226, 63 N. W.

49.3.

A tenant in common, who had control

of the renting of premises held in com-

mon, was sued by his co-tenant for his

share of the rents, and the defendant

counter-claimed for damages sustained

by him because the plaintiff wrongfully

induced lessees of such premises to leave

before their leases expired, thereby caus-

ing him to lose his share of rents which

would have accrued but for such inter-

ference. The court sustained the counter-

claim on the ground that it was a demand

connected with the subject of the action,

entering into a somewhat full discussion

of the phrase " subject of the action,"

and holding it to be the rent of the lots :

Dale V. Hall (1897), 64 Ark. 221, 41 S. W.

761.

In a suit to compel specific perform-

ance of a contract to convey land, a de-

fendant cannot, by way of counter-claim,

ask foreclosure of a mortgage on the same

land given by plaintiff to defendant. The

decision turned upon the question whether

the two demands were connected with the

subject of the action. The court said, '' Is

it [the counter-claim asking for fore-

closure] connected with the subject of the

action ? It is sometimes difficult to de-

termine when a cianse of action set forth

nati Daily Tribune Co . v. Bruck {1900),
61 Ohio t.4 9, 56 N. E . 19.
In an action on a judgment the defendant may, by way of counter-claim, set up
fact which would ju tify a court of equity
in cancelling the judgment on the ground
that no summons wa ever erve<l on him,
such cause of action being connected with
the ubj ect of the plaintiff's action ; that
i -, the judgment: Vaule v. Mill er (1897 ),
69 Minn . 440, 72 N. W. 452 . In an action
to quiet title to real property, a cross{!Omplaint alleging ownersh ip and demanding posses. ion and damages plead matt er
"connected with the cause of action " in
the complaint and constitutes a proper
co un ter-clai m: GiHenwaters v. Campbell
{l 9f'>), 142 Ind. 5~9 , 41 N. E. 10.u .
Plaintiff brought an action to have a
m ortg:t6e upon certain land reform ed.
Defend:mt, th e m ortgagee, admitted tbe
mistake in the mortgage, and hr way of
counter-clai m asked to have the mortgage,
a reformed, foreclo ed. A a second
coun ter-cla im defendant asked to have a
eco nd mortgage upon the same land, between the same parti es, reform ed and
foreclo ·ed. Held, both counte r-claims were
proper, the first as a cause of action arising out of the contract or transaction set
forth in plaintiff's complaint, the second as conn ected with the subject of the
action: Lahiff v. Hennepin County, etc.
As 'n (1895), 61 Minn. 226, 63 N. W.
493.
A tenant in common, who had control
of the renting of premises held in common, was sued by his co-tenant for his
share of the rents, and the defendant
counter-claimed for damages sustained
by him because the plaintiff wrongfully
indu ced lessees of such premises to leave
before their leases expired, thereby causing him to lo e his share of rents whi ch
would have arcrued but for uch interference. The court sustained the counterclai m ou the ground that it was a demand
connected with the subject of the action,
entering into a somewhat full di cus ion
of the phra e "subject of the action ,"
and holding it to be the rent of the lots:

Dale v. Hall (1 97), 64 Ark. 221, 41

. W.

761.

In a uit to compel pecific performance of a contract to convey land, a defendant cannot, by way of counter-cla im,
ask foreclo ure of a mortgage on the am
land given by plaintiff to defendant. The
decision turned upon the question whether
the two demands were connected with the
subject of the action. Th e court aid," I
it [the counter-clai m a king fo r foreclosure] connected with the ubject of the
action ? It is . ometimes difficult to determine wh en a cau e of action s t fo rth
in a co unter-claim is connected with the
subj ect of the action. \Ve think, however,
in this ca e that the cause of action set up
in the counter-claim is a separate and independent cause of action, not connected
with the cause of action set forth in the
original complaint. The original action
was to enforce specific performanc~ of a
contract to convey land. The cro complaint asked a decree to foreclo e a mortgage upon the land. I t seems clear that
there was no connection between the causes
of action." The opinion proceed, upon
the assumption that the terms "cause of
action " and " subject of the action " are
exactly synonymous, which i dearly
erron eous. Wood J., in his di sentiup;
opinion, is more di criminating, and considering the land itself as the ubject of
the action he find s no rea on to reject the
counter-claim: Hays v. McLain (1 99), 66
Ark. 400, 50 S. \V . 1006.
A suit wa broug ht by a grantor to set
aside a deed to city lot on the ground of
fraud, and defendant pleaded a prior fraud
of plaintiff practised upon him in the purcha e by defendant from a third per on of
farm lands , for which defendant conveyed
these city lots. Held, not a proper co unter-claim : R en bercrer t'. Britton (1903),
- Col.-, 71 Pac. 3i9.
Smith v. Buil ding A 'n (1 96), 119
N. C. 257, 26 . E. 40: In an action to
recover twi ce the amount of u urious interest paid , the def ndant may
t up a
counter-claim for the debt on which the
intere t wa paid, wheth er the original

CIYIL RE.\IEDIE
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a satisfactory interpretation of the terms " subject of the action "

and " connected with." It may, I think, be regarded as settled

a a isfactor · int r r tati n f th t rm
antl connect cl with.
It may I think

ubj

t

f th acti n '
·ettl d

er gard d a

action be considered in tort or contract,

since such counter-claim arises " out of

the contract or transaction set forth in

tlie complaint as the foundation of the

plaintiff's claim, or is connected with

the subject of the action."

First Nat'l Bank r. Heun (1901), 63

Kan. 334, 65 I'ac. 698 : In an action to

foreclose a mortgage by one holding it by

assignment in trust for certain outstand-

injx obligations, said mortgage iiaving

been left in the hands of the mortgagee

to be cared for and renewed if necessary,

the assignee of property {i. e. vendee)

may counter-claim loss resulting from

failure of mortgagee or trustee to notify
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insurance company of transfer of property.

Dowdell i: Carpy (1902), 137 Cal. 333,

70 Pac. 167 : Where a decree of fore-

closure was reversed only as to certain

property included in the mortgage, and

acti on be o n ~ id red in tort or coutract,
• in ce u ch e unt r-claim nri e " out of
th e contract o r tran acti n ·et forth in
th complaint a the foundation of the
pl. intiff'
·laim, or i connected with
t h ubject of th action."
.Fir ·t i'\at'l Bank v. l enn (1 901) , 63
J an. 334, 65 Pac. 69 : In an a tion to
for do · a mortgag by on holding it by
a i0 nment in tru. t fo r certain out tandin~ obl igati n ' said mortgage having
been l ft in the hand. of the mortgagee
t h cared for and renew d if nece ary,
th a ·ignee of property (i. e. vendee)
may connter.cJaim lo
re ulting from
failure of mor tgagee or tru tee to notify
in uranc ompanyoftran ·f rof pro perty.
Dowdell v. arpy (1902), 137 al. 333
70 Pa . 167 : \: here a d cree of fore-

was finally affirmed as to all other prop-

erly included tiiereiu, the mortgagee, in

an action for restitution by tlie mort-

f^'igor, mny counter-claim the amount of

the deficiency judgment against them.

Sncl) judgment arose out of the same

transaction and was connected with the

subject of the action.

See First Nat. Bank of Snohomish v.

Parker (1902), 28 Wash. 234, C8 Pac. 756 :

An action to foreclose a mortgage on real

estate, the complaint being in the usual

fuirn. The counter-claim was " that plain-

tiff, through its cashier Snyder, brought

an action in 1896 for the possession of the

mortgaged premises against the defend-

ant, and in said action had a writ of res-

titution issued ; tiiat plaintiff thereupon

went into possession of the })remises, and

retained such possession until tlie final

determination of the action, when defend-

ant was restored to the possession of the

premises : that by reason of plaintiff's re-

tention of the possession of the mortgaged

premises defendant was damaged in the

sum of SI 970, and the specification of the

damages is made. Plaintiff demurred to

the affirmative defences and counter-

claim Tlie demurrer of the defence was

sustained and that to the counter-claim

overrulfd. A jury was called to assess

the damages alleged in the counter-claim.

The court, after reducing the assessment

of damages to some extent, affirmed the

finding of the jury, and allowed $1,000

counter-claim, and decreed foreclosure for

the remainder due u))ou the mortgage.

Both parties appealed. " Plaintiff assigns

as error the overruling of the demurrer

to the counter-claim, and the reduction of

the amount due upon the mortgage in the

amount of the counter-claim. It is main-

tained by counsel for plaintiff that the de-

murrer to the counter-claim should have

been sustained, that tlie allowance of any

c !aim

u , i11Pcl :w d
•H rru \P1l.

the damaO'e alleged in the ounter-claim.
Th cour t, after r <lucing th a e ment
of damage to orne x ent, affirm ed the
findin O' of th jurx and all wed :S I, 00
ounter-clai m, and derreed for clo ure for
t he r ruaind r <lue upou the mortgage.
B oth partie app aled. " Plaintiff a . ign
a
rror the 0' ' rrulin of the d em urr r
to the counter-claim, and th e r du tiou f
th amount due upon the mortgage in the
amount of the counter-claim. It i maintain d by coun el for plaintiff th at th d murrer to th c unter-claim houl<l have
been u tained, that the a llowance of any
count r-claim in th e action wa error, an<l
that the damage p cified were not the
ubje t of count r-claim within Bal. Co<l ,
§ 4913 ." In di po in()' of th e <JU e tioo, th e
court b~- R eavi
. J . aid : " ubd. I of
the ction permit a counter- laim 'man
action ari ing out of the ontra t or t ra n action set forth in the omplaiut as th
foundation of the plaintiff' !aim, or connected with the ubje t of th action .'
The on truction of thi: ection and
imilar lang uage in other code ha not
been umform or clear.
e Pomeroy,
Rem die & Remedial RiO'hts,
77':>
[ * i75]; ollier 1>. Ervin , 3 Mont. 142.
The general rule i that the tatute authorizing a counter-claim sh ulcl be lib erally con trued. It i aid in 22 Am . &
Eng. Enc. Law, p. 396: 'In acti n in
whi h either a ontract or a tran action
et f rth a the

C
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that the connection here spoken of must be direct and immediate.

At the same time it must be considered as sometliing different from

" arising out of; " in other words, the defendant's cause of action

may be sufficiently " connected witli the subject of the action,"

although it do not '•'•arise out of the transaction." It can hardly

be said, however, that the courts have definitely settled what is

a sufficient connection of itself, when not so complete that the

defendant's cause of action could also be said to arise out of the

transaction set forth by the plaintiff ; unfortunately, in nearly all

tlie cases where the judges have held that the counter-claim was

connected with the subject of the action according to the true

meaning of the statute, they have also said that it arose out of the

transaction stated in the complaint. The most that can be as-

serted with any degree of assurance is, that the connection must

be immediate and direct, and something that the parties can be

assumed to have contemplated in. their dealings with each other.^

I shall merely cite in the note a few cases which contain a dis-

cussion of the clause, and serve to illustrate and explain its scope

and operation.^
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absolute in form, which, however, was

adjudi^ed to be a mortgage and only a lien

on the premises. In the case at bar the

action is to foreclose a lien upon the same

property. It would seem that, by the acts

authorized by the plaintiff in taking and

holding possession of the premises, and

which were found to be injurious, the sub-

ject-matter of the lien was damaged, and

that the conn ction her , pok n of mu t be dir ct and imm cdiat '.
At the same time it must b consi ler <la · s me thing differeut from
"ari ·ing out of ;" in other w rtl ., th dc fenclnnt 8 eau. e of action
may be suffi iently "comiecteJ, with the :::;ubj ct of the a ·tion,''
aithough it d no~ " arise out of the transaction." IL can hardly
be said, however, that the court have cl finitely . ettled what i ·
a sufficient connection of itself, when not so complete that th
defendant' cause of action could also b ·aid to ari out of th
transaction set forth by the plaintiff; unfortunately, in n a.rly all
the cases where the judges have held that the counter-claim wc~s
connected with the subject of the action according to the true
meaning of, the statute, they hav e al o said that it aro e out of th
transaction stated in the complaint. The most that can be a serted with any degree of assurance is, that the connection mu:t
be immediate and direct, and something that the partie can be
assumed to have contemplated in. their dealings with each other. 1
I shall merely cite in the note a few cases which contain a discussion of the clause, and serve to illustrate and explain its sc?pe
and operation.2

that the defendant is entitled to such

damages, and we think in this case that

the realty may properly be held as con-

nected with the subject of the action.

Metropolitan T. Co. v. Tonawanda, etc.

R. R. Co., 43 Hun, 521 ; Tinsley v. Tinsley,

15 B. Mon. 454. Upon the record here we

are not disposed to disturb tlie finding of

the amount of the counter-claim. "3

1 [Sheibley v. Dixon County (1901). CI

Neb. 409, 85 N. W. 399 • " The phrase

' connected with the subject of the action '

should be construed liberally to prevent a

multiplicity of actions." Le Clare i'.

Thibault (1902), 41 Ore. 601, 69 Pac. 552 :

" The connection of the counter-claim

with the subject of the suit, to render it

available, must be direct and immediate,

and such as it is reasonable to assume

that the parties had in contemplation

when dealing with each other." Text

§ * 794 cited.3

2 Ashley v. Marshall, 29 N. Y. 494 ;

Vose I'. Galpen, 18 Abb. Pr. 96; Xenia

Branch Bk. v. Lee, 7 Abb. Pr. 372 ; 2

Bosw. 694 ; McAdow v. Ross, 53 Mo 199,

207 ; Jones i-. Moore, 42 Mo. 413 ; McAr-

thur V. Green Bay & Miss. Canal Co , 34

Wis. 139, 146; Eastman y. Linn, 20 Minn.

4.33 ; Walsh v. Hall, 66 N. C. 233, 237 ;

Bitting V. Thaxton, 72 N. C. 541, 549;

Thompson v. Kessel, 30 N. Y. 383, 389 ;

Vilas V. Mason, 25 Wis. 310, 319; Judali

r. Vincennes Univ. Trs., 16 Ind. 56, 60;

Wadley v. Davis, 63 Barb. 500 ; Waugen-

heim »■ Graham, 39 Cal. 169, 176; Kolle

V Thompson, 3 Mete. (Ky.) 121. See

Glen & Hall Manuf. Co. v. HalJ, 61 N. Y.

226, 236, where it was held that the subject

of the action was the device constituting

the trade-mark. See also Powder v. Bow-

absolute in form, which, however, was
adjudged to be a mortgage and only a lien
on the premises . In the case at bar the
action is to foreclose a lien upon the same
property. It would seem that, by the acts
authorized by the plaintiff in taking and
holding possession of the premises, and
which were found to be injurious, the subject-matter of the lieu was damaged, and
that the defendant is entitled to such
damages, and we think in this ca e that
the realty may properly be held as connected with the subject of the action.
Metropolitan T. Co. v. Tonawanda, etc.
R.R. Co., 43 Hun, 521; Tinsley v. Tinsley,
15 B . Mon. 454. Upon the record here we
are not disposed to disturb the finding of
the amount of the counter-claim ."]
1 [Sheibley v. Dixon County (190!) , 61
Neb. 409, 85 N. W. 399 · "The phra e
'connected with the subject of the action'
shonld he construed liberally to prevent a
multiplicity of actions." Le Clare v.
Thibault ( 1902), 41 Ore. 601, 69 Pac. 552:
"The connection of the cou nter-claim
with the subject of the suit, to render it
available, must be direct and immediate,
and such as it is reasonable to as ume

that the parties had in contemplation
when dealing with each other." Text
§ * 794 cited.]
2 Ashley v. Marshall, 29 N. Y. 494 ;
Vose v. Galpen, 18 Abb. Pr. 96; X enia
Bran ch Bk. v. Lee, 7 A bb. Pr. 372 ; Z
Bosw. 694; McAdow v. Ho s, 53 Mo 199,
207; Jones v. Moore, 42 Mo. 413 ; McAr·
thur v. Green Bay & Miss. Canal Co., 34Wis. 139, 146 ; Eastman v. Linn, 20 i\linn.
433 ; Walsh v. Hall, 66 N. C. 233 , 237;
Bitting v. Thaxton, i2 N. C. 541, 549 ;
Thompson v. Kes el, 30 N. Y. 3 3, 3 9;
Vilas v. Mason, 25 Wis. 310, 319 ; Judah
v. Vincennes Univ. Tr ., 16 Ind. 56, 60 ;
Wadley v. Davis, 63 Barb. 500; Waug nheim" Graham , 39 al. 169, li6; ' olle
v Thompson, 3 Mete. (Ky .) 121.
e
Glen & Hall Manuf. Co. v. Hali, 61 N. Y.
226 , 236, wh ere it wa held that th subj ct
of th e action wa the device con. ti tu tin g
the trade-mark. , ee al o Powder v. Bowdle ( . Dak. 1 93}, 54 N. W . R ep. 404;
Grange v. Gilb ert, 44 Hun, 9 ; Mulberger
v. Koenig, 62 'Vis. 5 5 (the "subject of
the action" is identical with the far t
con tituting the plaintiff cau~ of action); Lehmair v. Gri wold, 40 N. Y.

928 CIVIL REMEDIES.

C CunUr- Claims Embraced u'ithin the Second Subdivision of the

Statutory Definition and Set-offs.

§ 671. * 795. Statutory Provision. Limitatiou upon the Discus-

sion herein. The form of this provision, as fouud in the codes

which make up the first group, as originally classified at the

commencement of this section, is, "" 2. In an action arising on

contract, any other cause of action also arising on contract, and

existing at the commencement of the action." This is substan-

tially the definition of "set-off " given in the codes of the second

group. The language of this clause plainly includes all cases

of counter-claim based on contract when the plaintiff's cause of

action is also on contract. Since, however, the first branch of

the definition covers all those instances where the counter-claim

and the plaintiff's right of action both spring from the same con-

tract, the discussion of this second subdivision will be confined

to the instances in which, the cause of action being on contract,

the counter-claim arises from a different contract.^ For the

reasons before given, and which need not therefore be repeated,

this construction of the two parts into which the entire definition
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is divided seems to mo to be in conformity with the plain intent

of the legislature and the evident design of the statute.

§672. * 796. statute enlarges Former Legal "Set-off" and is

Broader in its Operation than " Equitable Set-oflF." DiflBcult Ques-

tions herein. Order of Treatment. In reference to the most

important and controlling requisite of this provision and that

defining set-off, no questions of difficulty can arise, since the

language itself is so simple and direct that no room is left for

Super. Ct. 100 (same) ; Carpenter v. Man- r. Kinsman, 18 S. C. 108 (" subject of the

hattau L. Ins. Co., 93 N. Y. 552 (in con- action " denotes tlie plaintiff's main pri-

version, the "subject of the action" is mary right, to support or enforce which

the chattel converted) ; Adams v. Loo- the action is brought). [^Watts v. Gantt

mis (Supreme, 1889), 8 N. Y. Suppl. 17 (1894), 42 Neb. 8G9, 61 N. \V. 104; Hays

(same) ; Revere F. Ins. Co. v. Chamber- v. McLain (1899), CO Ark. 400, 50 S. W.

liu, 56 Iowa, 508 (in an action to cancel 1006; Gurske v. Kelpin (1901), CI Neb.

an insurance policy, the "subject of the 517, 85 N. W. 557 ; Walserc Wear (1897),

action " is the policy itself, and a cause 141 Mo. 44.3, 42 S. W. 928/]

of action thereon for loss of the property i Qllarden v. Lang (1900), 1 10 (Ja. 392,

insured is a proper counter-claim); Cor- 36 S. K. 100; Rell ;•. Oben & Sons Co.

nclius V. Kessel, 58 Wis. 237 (in eject- (1900), 111 (la. 668. 36 S. E. 904 ; Jones y.

ment, tlie " subject of the action " is the Swank (1893), 54 Minn. 259, — N. W. — ;

land in controversy) ; Lapham v. Osborne, Conner r. Scott (1897), 10 Wash. 371, 47

20 Nev. 168 (in replevin, the "subject of Pac 76] ; Richard.son r. Penny (1900), 10

the action " is the ch:>ttf'l in controversy) ; Okla. 32, 61 Pac. 584.]

Humbert v. Brisbane, 25 S. C. 506 ; Sharj)
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doubt as to the construction. If the plaintiff's cause of action

arises on contract, any counter-claim, legal or equitable, or set-

off, also arising on contract, is admissible, provided the general

rule heretofore stated is complied with, that the relief granted

to the defendant shall in some manner interfere with, lessen, or

modify, if not destroy, that otherwise obtained by the plaintiff.

This clause greatly enlarges the scope of the former legal "set-

off," for it admits demands for unliquidated damages as well as

for debts or amounts ascertained and fixed by the stipulations of

the parties.^ It is also much broader in its operation than the

"equitable set-oft"," which was permitted by courts of chancery,

for affirmative equitable relief may be obtained by the defendant

which would come within no description of an "equitable set-off,"

as the term was formerly understood. So far as relates to the

subject-matter, therefore, in all actions to recover money, either

debt or damages arising on contract, any counter-claim of debt

or damages arising on another contract is valid. When the relief

asked for by the plaintiff, or that demanded by the defendant, is

equitable, whether the counter-claim is proper must depend upon
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the nature of these reliefs ; that is, upon the fact of their inter-

fering with each other so that one tends to destroy, or at least to

modify, the other. While there can be little or no difficulty,

therefore, in applying this provision, so far as the subject-matter

of the counter-claim is concerned, certain collateral questions are

presented, either expressly or impliedly, by the clause, which are

not always so easy of solution. One of these is involved in the

requirement that the cause ot action constituting the counter-

claim must be "existing at the commencement of the action."

Another is implied in the phrase "arising on contract." Can

a cause of action be said to "arise on contract" when it results

from facts which amount to a tort, and would enable the injured

party to bring an action in form ex delicto ? In other words, can

either party resort to an election between two kinds of proceed-

ings, and thus make his suit or counter-claim in form "arising

on contract " so as to satisfy the requisites of the statute? In

treating of the topics thus suggested, I shall, first, consider

the general requirement that the cause of action constituting the

1 QShelton v. Conant (1894), 10 Wash. (1894), 41 Neb. 149, 59 N. W.359 ; Boyer

193, 38 Tac. 1013 ; Niver ;'. Nash (1893), v. Robinson (1901), 26 Wash. 117, 66 I'ac.

7 Wash. 558, 35 Pac. 380 ; Burge v. Gandy 119.]

59

doubt as to the con truction. If the · plaintiff' cam; of actiun
arise
n contract, any c unt r-claim, 1 gal or equitable, r s to:ff, also arising n contract, i admissibl , provided th g n ral
rule heretofore stated is complied with, that th r li f grant <l
to the defendant shall in me manner int rfer with, les n, r
modify, if not destroy, that otherwis obtain cl by the plaintiff.
Thi clause greatly enlarges the scope of th f rm r legal ' to:ff, '' for it admits demands for unliq uidate<l damages as well a
for debts or amounts ascertained and fixed by the stipulations f
the parties. 1 It is also much broader in its operation than the
"equitable set-off," which was permitted by courts of chancery,
for affirmative equitable relief may be obtained by the defendant
which would come within no description of an" equitable set-off,"
as the term was formerly understood. So far as relates to the
.subject-matter, therefore, in all actions to recover money, either
debt or damages arising on contract, any counter-claim of debt
or damages arising on another contract is v~lid. When the relief
asked for by the plaintiff, or that demanded by the defendant, i
equitable, whether the counter-claim is proper must depend upon
the nature of these reliefs; that is, upon the fact of their interfering with each other so that one tends to destroy, or at least to
modify, the other. While there can be little or no difficulty,
therefore, in applying this provision, so far as the subject-matter
of the counter-claim is concerned, certain collateral questions are
presented, either expressly or impliedly, by the clause, which are
not always so easy of solution. One of the e is involved in the
requirement that the cause ot action constituting the counterclaim must be "existing at the commencement of the action."
Another is implied in the phrase "arising on contract. "
an
a cause of action be said to "arise on contract' ' wh en it re ult
from facts which amount to a tort, and would enabl the injur d
party to bring an action in form ex delicto ? In other word , can
either party resort to an election between two kind of ro eding , and thus make his suit, or counter-claim in form an mg
on contract" so as to satisfy the requisit s of th statute? In
treating of the topics thus suggested, I hall, fir st, consid r
the general requirement that the caus of action con tituting th e
1

l [Shelton v. Conant (1894), 10 Wash.
193, 38 Pac. 1013; Niver v. Nash (1893 ),
7 Wash. 558, 35 Pac. 380; Burge v. Gandy

(1894), 41 Neb. 149, 59 N. W.359 ; Boyer
v. Robinson (1901), 26 Wash.117, 66 l'ac.

119.J
59
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counter-claim must be existing at the commencement of the

action; and shall, secondly^ collect and classify the various cases

which have been determined by the courts, and which furnish

examples of counter-claims arising from different contracts. In

this review the question how far a party may, for the purposes

of complying with this statute, elect between an action for a tort

and an action on contract, will be answered.^

§ 673. * TUT. Requisites of Counter-Claim under this Clause of

the Statute. The codes do not require that the contract out of

which the counter-claim arises should have been originally made

with the defendant. The demand may have once been in favor

of some third person, and by him assigned to the defendant.

When this is the case, the provision under review, as found in

most of the codes, makes it necessary that the assignment should

be fully completed before the action is commenced, or else the

cause of action could not be "existing" in the defendant at the

"commencement of the action." ^ In the second place, the right

of action, which is the basis of the counter-claim, must have

accrued before the commencement of the action; the debt or
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damages must be both due and payable, or the claim for equi-

' The following are recent decisions 826; Sweetser v. People's Bank (1897),

illustrating this class of counter-claims: 69 Minn. 196,71 N. W. 934.

Bathgate r. Haskin, 59 N. Y. 533, 539, Thomas v. Exchange Bank (1896), 99

540; I'atterson v. Patterson, 59 id. 574, la. 202, 68 N. W. 780: One Pearson was

1 Hun, 323; Tavlor r. The Mayor, etc., 82 indebted to a bank in the sum of -SlOOQ.

N. Y. 10; We.stervelt v. Aciiley, 62 id. He had on deposit in said bank $1044.50.

505 ; 2 Hun, 258 ; 4 T. &, C. 444 ; Van He then drew drafts upon the hank to the

Brunt V. Day, 81 N. Y 251 ; 17 Hun, 166 ; amount of $1195, and immediately there-

Clapp V. Wright, 21 Hun, 240; Wilson v. after made a general assignment for the

counter-claim must be existing at the commencement of the
ac ion· and hall secondly ollect and cla if the various
es
whi h haY be n d terrnined by the court , and which furni h
e arr pl s f count r- laims ari ing from different con tracts . In
thi r Yi w he ques ion how far a party may for the purposes
of compl ·ing with thi sta ute elect between an c ion for a tort
and an acti n on outra t "·ill be answered.1
§ 673. * 7 7. Requisites of Counter-Claim under this Clause of
the Statute . The codes do not require that the contract out of
which the counter-claim ari es should have been originally made
with the defendant. The deman may have once been in favor
of some third person, and by him assigned o the def n an t.
When this is the case, the provision under re\ i w as found in
most of the code makes it necessary that the assignment should
be fully completed before the action is commenced, or el e the
cau e of action could not be "existing" in the def ndant at the
commencement of the action." 2 In the second place, the ri0 ht
of action, which is the basis of the counter-claim, must have
accrued before the commencement of the action; the debt or
damages must be both due and payable, or the claim for equi-

Runkel, 38 W^is. 526; Chapman v. Plum- benefit of creditors. Tlie bank learned of

mer, 36 id. 262; Foulks v. Rhodes, 12 the assignment before the drafts were

Nev. 225; Carver r. Shelly, 17 Kan. 472; presented, and refused payment for the

Greer v. Greer, 24 id. 102 ; Quinn c. rea.wn that it wislied to set off its claim

Smith, 49 Cal. 163; Wheelock v. Pacific against the deposit, altliough its claim was

Pneumatic Gas Co., 51 id. 223; Humphrey evidenced by a note not due. Held, that

V. Merritt, 51 Ind. 197; Hart v. Housten, when the debtor is insolvent a bank may

50 id. 327; Grover & B. Sewing Mach. Co. offset as against a debt not due any sum

V. Newby, 58 id. 570; Town r. Bringolf, which it may be owing to the debtor, nn-

47 Iowa, 133; Tolman v. Johnson, 43 id. less the account which it owes has been

127. pledged to some ^ippcific purpose or im-

[|First Nat. Bank v. Riggins (1899), pre.s.sed with a trust.]

124 N. C. 534, 32 S. E. 801 ; Helms v. 2 Kgyn.dds v. Smith, 28 Kan. 810;

Harclerode (1902), 65 Kan. 736, 70 Pac. Enter !\ Que.sse, 30 8. C. 126; Skaggs v.

866; Mercer I'. Dyer (1895), 15 Mont. 317, Given, 29 Mo. App. 612; Todd v. Crut-

39 Pac. 314; Waiters y. Eaves (1898), 105 singer, 30 Mo. App. 145; Ru.ssell i;.

Cia. 584, 32 S. E. 609 ; St. Paul, etc. Trust Koouce. 104 N. C. 237. QIack v. Hosmer

Co. V. Leek (1894), 57 Minn. 87, 58 N. W. (1596), 97 la. 17, 65 N. W. 1009.]

t The following are recent deci ions
illu trating thi cla of counter-claim :
Bathgate v. Ha kin, 59 . Y . 533, 539,
540; Patter on v. Patter on, 59 id. 574,
l Hun, 323; Taylor v . The .M ayor, etc., 2
. . ". Y. 10; We ·tenelt 11. A ckl e: 62 id.
505; 2 Hun , 25 ; 4 ·T . & C. 444; Van
Brunt v. D ay , 1 N. Y . 25 l ; 17 Hun, 166;
Clapp v. Wright, 21 Hun , 240 ; Wil on v.
Runk el, 38 Wi . 526 · Chapman v. Plumm er, 36 id. 262; Foulk v. J h ode , 12
ev. 225; arver v. hell v, l i Kan . 472;
reer v. Greer, 24 id . 102 ; Quinn u.
mith, 49 al. 163 ; Wh eelock v. Pacific
P neumatic Ga o., 51 id. 223 ; Humphrey
v. Merritt, 51 Ind. 197 ; Hart v. Hou ten ,
50 id. 3 27 ; Gro,·er & B. ewing Mach. o.
t'. Tewby, 5 itl . 570; T own v. Bringolf,
47 Iowa, 133; Tolman v. Johnson, 43 id .
127 .
[First Nat. Bank v. Riggin (l 99),
124
. 534 , 32 •. E. Ol ; Helm ,,..
H arclerode ( I 902), 65 Kan. 736, iO Pac.
66; Mercer v. Dyer (l 95), 15 font. 3 1i ,
39 l'ac. 3 14; W alter o. ave (1 9 ), 105
na. 5 4, 32 . E. 609; , t. Paul , tc. Tru t
o. v. L eck (1 94 ), 5i :\Tinn. 7, 5 N. W .

826; Sweet er v. People' Bank (l 97),
69 Minn. 196, 71 N. W. 934.
T-bomas u. Exchange Bank (l 6) 99
Ia. 202, 6
. W. 7 0: One Pear on was
indebted to a bank in th e sum of ·."1000.
He had on depo it in aid bank $1044.50 •
He then drew draft upon the bank to the
a.mount of $1 195 and immediately thereafter made a general a ignment for the
benefit of credit r . The bauk l arned of

0

again t the d p it, although it laim wa
videnced by a note not due. H eld, that
when the debtor i in olvent a bank may
off et a again t a debt not due any um
whi h it may l; owing to the d bt r , unle: th ac ount whi h it owe ha been
pledg d to om .·p ·ific purpo e or im·
pre ed wit h a tru t. J
2 R e~· n old
v. , mi th, 2 Kan . 8 10 ;
Enter v. Qu . s 30 . . 126 ; kagg t.
iven, 29 M . pp. 612; T odd v. rut.inger , 30 :\fo. App. 145 ; Ru ell v.
I\o1Jn ·c, 104 1.... • 23 7. [.Jack t '. H osmer
( 18 6) , 97 Ia. l 7, 65 N. W . l 09. J

cou
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table relief must be perfect, so that a suit to enforce it could be

maintained, or else the cause of action would not be " existing "

in the defendant at the time specified in the statute. ^ If, then,

an existing right of action is assigned to the defendant after the

action against him is commenced ; or if a claim on contract is

transferred to him before that time, but does not become due

and payable or enforceable until after the suit is begun; or,

lastly, if a claim is existing in favor of the defendant at the

time the action is commenced by virtue of a contract originally

made with him, but does not become payable or enforceable until

after that time, — in none of these cases can the demand be set

up by him as a counter-claim in the action. The answer must

also allege that the demand was existing in favor of the defend-

ant when the action was commenced. ^ These positions are fully

sustained by the decisions.^

1 Russell V. Koonce, 104 N. C. 237;

Mayo V. Davidge, 44 Hun, 342. In one

or two of the codes, however, it is suffi-
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cient that the demand is due and payable

wlien pleaded, if it was held by the de-

fendant at the time the action was com-

t able relief must be p rfect so that a suit to enforce it could
maintained, or else th e cau e of action woul not be exi ting "
in the defendant at th tim s1 cified in the statut .1 If hen
an existing right of action is as igned to the defendant aft r the
action against him is commenced· or if a claim on contract i8
transferred to him before that time, but does not become du
and payable or enforceable until after tbe uit i begun· or
lastly, if a claim is exi ting in favor of the defendant at the
time the action is commenced by Yirtue of a contract originally
made with him, but does not become payable or enforceable until
after that time, - in none of these cases can the demand be · t
up by him as a counter-claim in the action. The answer must
also allege that the demand was existing in favor of the defendant when the action was commenced. 2 These positions are fully
sustained by the decisions. 3
1

menced. Shannon v. Wilson, 19lnd. 112.

I~ee also Chapman v. I'lummer, 36 Wis.

262.

- McGuire v. Lamb (Idaho, 1888), 17

Pac. Rep. 749.

•3 Rice V. O'Connor, 10 Abb. Rr. 362 ;

Van Valen v. Lapham, 5 Duer, 689 ; Gan-

non V. Dougherty, 41 Cal. 661 ; Rickard

V. Kohl, 22 Wis. 506 ; Newkirk v. Neild,

1 Russell v . K oonce, I 04 N. C. 237 ;
May o v. Davidge, 4-± Hun, 342. In one
or two of the codes, however it is suffitieut that the demaud is due and payable
whe n pleaded, i f it wa held by the defend ant at the time the action wa commenced. Shannou i· . Wilson, 19 I nd. 112.
~ee a] 'o Chapman i·. l'l umm ~ r, 36 Wis.

19 Ind. 194. If the demand had been

actually transferred to the defendant by

an absolute verbal assignment before the

commencement of the action, although

the written assignment of the same was

executed after that date, it can be used as

a counter-claim. West i\ Moody, 33 Iowa,

137, 139; Cottle v. Cole, 20 Iowa, 485;

Conyngham v. Smith, 16 Iowa, 471. It is

held, in North Carolina, that, if the coun-

ter-claim is not barred by the statute of

limitations at the time the suit is com-

menced, it is good, although the statutory

lime may have elapsed when it is actually

pleaded. Brumble v. Brown, 71 N. C.

513. 516.

[^Lawrence v. Congregational Church

(1900), 164 N. Y. 115, 58 N. E- 24 : "An

owner who after the termination of the

original building contract without the

fault of the builder, and after the latter

had commenced an action to foreclose his

mechanic's lieu and had assigned the lieu

and cause of action, but without knowl-

2G2.
2 McGuire v. Lamb (Idaho, 1888) , 17
Pac. Rep. 749.
J Hice v. O'Connor, 10 Abb. Pr. 362;
Van V alen v. Lapham, 5 Duer, 689; Gannon v. Dougherty, 41 Cal. 661; Rickard
v. Kohl , 22 Wis. 506; Newkirk t>. Neild,
19 Ind. 194. If the demand had beeu
actually trausferred to the defendant by
an absolute ver bal assignment before the
commencement of the acti on, although
the written assignment of the same wa
executed after that date, it can be used as
a counter-claim, West r. Moody, 33 Iowa,
l-'37, 139 ; Cottle v . Cole, 20 Iowa, 485 ;
Conyn g ham v. Smith, 16 I owa, 471. It is
held, in North Carolina, that, if the coun·
ter-claim is not barred by the statute of
limitations at the time the suit is commenced, it is good, although the statutory
time may have elapsed when it is actually
plearled. Brumble v . Brown, 71 T. C.

513. 516.

edge of the assignment, entered into a

[Lawrence v. Congregational Church

new contract with the assignor with refer-

(1900), 164 N. Y. 11 5, 58 N. E 2-l: "An

ence to the same subject-matter, is not

entitled to set off against the assignee any

damages arising out of the assignor's

failure to perform the new contract, but is

entitled to set off whatever he actually

paid to the assignor upon the assigned

claim, after the assignment, in good faith,

and without notice."

" A judgment which has been super-

seded and is pending for review in an

appellate court cannot be pleaded as a set-

off in another action between tlie same

owuer who after the termination of the

original building contract without the
fault of the builder, and after the latter
!Jad commenced an action to fo reclose his
mechanic's lien am.l had a signed the lieu
and cau e of action, Lut without knowledge of the a ·signment, entered into a
new contract with the asi:;ignor with refereuce to the same subject-matter, is not
entitled to set off against the atisignee any
damages ari sing out of the as ignur's
failure to perform the new contract, but is
entitled to set off whatever he ac·tually
paid to the assignor upon the a~signed
claim, after the a. signment, in good faith,
and without notice."
"A judgment which has been upcrseded and is pending fo r re view in an
appellate court cannot be pleaded a a setoff in auother action between the ame
par ties." "In the absence of equitable
consideration a defeudant can only plead
as a set-off a claim or judgm nt upon
which. at the commencement of the action,
he might have maintained an independent suit agaiu t the plaintiff : "
v. John. ton (I ' 99\, 5 .. ~eb. 4-1, i
482.
ee also. habata 1•. John ton {1 9i)
53 ~eb 12, i 3 .. ;. W. 27S; .:;un
v. Driscoll (1 95), 46 Keb 5i5, 65 ... W. 194;
Buq~e i ·. Gandy (1 94), 41 .1. Te~ 149, 59
N. W . 359; ~Iom cu r. ~o.ve ( 1900), 105
Wi . 565, 81 . W. GO; Jon
i·.
wank
(1 93), 54 :\1 inn. 259, 55 .i: • W. 1126; Bank
of .\.rkan as City v. Hasie {1897), 5i Kan.

93.J
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§ 674. * 798. May, but need not, counter-claim Unliquidated

Damages. Claim for Contribution by Surety. Pleading. I now

proceed to inquire, What causes of action on contract may be

counter-claimed under this second branch of the definition ? It

may be stated as the universal rule that, in an action on contract

to recover debt or unliquidated damages, the defendant may

counter-claim debt or damages arising on another contract, .

whether such damages are unliquidated or ascertained. ^ But in

the absence of statutory requirement he is not obliged to do so ;

he may refrain from urging his demand in this manner, and may

enforce it in a separate action. ^ A few early cases lay down a

751, 48 Pac. 22; St. Louis Nat. Bank v.

Gay (1894), 101 Cal. 286, 35 Pac. 876;

Rood V. Taft (1896),94 Wis. 380, 69 N. W.

183.

"Under Code Proc. Sec. 195, subd. 2,

rd:ay, but need not, counter-claim U nli q uidated

D am ge.s.
C aim for Contribution by Surety. Pleading. I n w
proceed to inquire What cau es of action on contract may be
counter-claimed under this con branch of the
finition? It
may b tated a the univer al rule that, in an acti n on contract
to reco r debt or unliquidated damages, the d fendant may
counter-claim debt or damage arising on another contra t .
whethe r such damabes are unliquidated or ascertained. 1 But in
the ab ence of t tutory requirement he is not obliged to d so ·
he may refrain from urging hi demand in this manner, and may
enforce it in a separate action. 2 A few early ca es lay down a

a cause of action which can be pleaded as

a counter-claim, where it does not arise
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out of the contr.'\ct or tran.saction set

forth in the complaint, must exist at the

75~. 4 Pac. 22;
t . Louis Nat. Bank v.
Gay (1 94) , 101 Cal. 286, 35 Pac. 76 ;
Rood u. Taft ( 1896), 94 Wi . 380, 69 N. W.

coinmeiicemeut of the action : " Conner i-.

1 3.

Scott (1897), 16 Wash. 371, 47 Pac. 761.

Kirhy v. Jameson (1896), 9 S. 1). 8, 67

N. W. 854 : In an action on a due bill,

defendant set up a so-called counter-claim

consisting of an account bearing date

subse luent to the commencement of the

action, and there was no affirmative proof

that it existed at the time the suit was

brought. Held not a proper counter-

claim.]

1 ^Hancock i». Hancock's Adm'r (1902),

Ky., 69 S. W. 757; Niver v. Nash (1893),

7 Wash. 558, 35 Pac. 380 ; Shelton v. Co-

nant (1894), 10 Wash. 193, 38 Pac. 1013,

citing the text; Waller v. Deranleau

(1903), —Neb. — , 94 N. W. 1038; Lit-

tle's Adm'r w. City Nat. Bank (1903),—

Ky. — , 74 S. W. 699.]

2 Lignot I'. Redding. 4 E. D. Smith,

285 ; Schubart v. Harteau, 34 Barb. 447.

per Ingraham .1. ; Atwater v. Schenck, 9

Wis. 160, 164, per Colo .1., an action on a

note, counter-claim of the amount due for

tlie price of land sold ; Conway v. Smith,

13 Wis. n25, 139, per Paine J., counter-

cbiiiii of dainages for non-performance of

.'I building contract by the builder; Bid-

well I'. Madison. 10 Min. 13, action by a

bank on a note, counter-claim of damages

from the negligence of the bank in not

collecting another note left with it for col-

lection ; Ijouisville, etc. R. Co. v. Thomp-

son, 18 B. Mon. 735, 742, action iiy a

railroad to recover stock-subscription,

counter-claim of damages from a breach

of an agreement to pay for land taken by

the railroad ; Williams v Weiting, 3 N. Y.

Sup. Ct. 439, 440, action by a veteri-

nary surgeon to recover for professional

services ; counter-claim, that defendant

bought a span of horses, relying upon

plaintiff's knowledge and recommenda-

tion, and promise to pay for them if they

were not good, etc., — breach, and dam-

ages. Held, a good counter-claim ; that

plaintiff's promise was binding, the de-

fendant's prejudice in buying them being

"Under ode Proc. ec. 195 , ubd . 2,
a cause of act ion which can be pl eaded as
a couute r-clai m, whe re it does not arise
out of the contract r tran,,actiou et
forth in the complaint, mu t exist at the
commeucement of the action:" Conner v.
cott ( 1 97), 16 Wah. 371, 47 Pac. 761.
Kirby v. Jame on (1 96), 9 S. D. 8, 67
N. W. 5-i: In an action on a due bill,
defeudaut et up a so-called co unter-claim
coo i ting of an account bearing date
sub e 1uent to the commenceme nt of the
action, aud there wa no affi rmative proof
that it cxi ted at the time the uit was
brought. Held not a proper counterclaim.]
1 [Hancock v. Hancock's Adm' r ( 1902),
Ky., 69 . W . 757; Niver v. Na. h ( 1 93),
7 Wa h. 55 , 35 Pac. 3 0; helton v. Conant ( 1 94), 10 Wash . l 93, 38 Pac. 1013,
citi og the text; Waller u. D eranleau
(1903), - . eb. - , 94 N. W. 1038; Little' Adm' r v. ity Nat. Bank ( 1903), Ky. -, 7 . W. 699.J
2
Li g no v.
edding, 4 E. D . mith,
2 5; • hubart v. Hart au, 34 Bar b. 447,
per In g raham .J .; Atwater v. , chencl-, 9
Wi ·. 160, l!H, p r ole .J., an action on a
note, <'ounter-claim of h amount due for
th pric of laucl old ; onwav v. rnith,
l 1 Wi .. 125, 139, p r Paine J.,
unter·
<'L1i111 <Jf <la111age for n n-performan e of
a l111 il di11g co ntra t hy the build r ; idwc !l I'. ~fa.1 ! 1. rm, I Min. 13, a tion by a
b uk n a rrntc, ount r-claim f damage

from the negligence of the bank in n t
collecting another note left with it for ollection ; Loui ville, etc. R o. v. Thompon, 18 B. 1\Ion. 735, 742, actio u u.v a
rail road to recover
tock· u b cription,
counter-claim of damage from a brea ·h
of au a re meut to pay for land takeu L
the railroad; Williams v Weiting, 3 N. Y.
up.
t. 439, 440, action by a •eterinary urgeon to recover for profe · ional
service ; counter-claim, that defendant
bought a pan of hor e , relying npon
plaintiff's knowledge and recommendation , and promise to pay for th em if they
were not good, etc., - breach, and damages. Held, a good counter-claim; that
plain tiff' promi e wa binding, the defendant prejudice in buying th em being
a suffi ient con ideration. Th e defendant
need not et up · hi cro -demand a, a
counter-claim: ee D ou o-1 v. Fir t Nat.
Bk. of Ha ting , 17 Iino . 35; Emeron' Adm. v. erriforcl, Bu h, 229, and
ca e cited; Woody v. J ordan, 69 N.
l 9, 197; ppfalt v. W ermann, 30 Neb.
189. For an example of thi
pecie of
counter- laim or et-off, ee Mullend re t '.
cott, 45 Iud. 113 ; urti v. Barne . 30
Barb. 225, action for good . old, ounterclaim of damage ~rom the brea h of un
aruitration bontl; Wilker OU v. Farnham, 2 Mo. 672, acti n for rent, counterclaim for improv ment under expre
pr mi e of plaintiff to pay for them ; Midland o. v. Broat ( 1inn. l 92), 52 N. W .
ep. 972 (counter-claim on a statutory
bond giv n on the i ue of a writ of ne
exeat). An action on an undertakin to
obtain an atta hment i au "a ti n n

CO lJ.:-\TE £t-CLAL\I.
C0U^"^ER-CLA1M.

U3:

different doctrine, and require the damages to Le liquidated so

that they would constitute a good set-off under the ancient rules ;

but these decisions are palpably erroneous, and are completely

overruled.^ The right of action must of course arise out of

contract, or be on contract; and it has been doubted whether

the claim for contribution by one surety against a co-surety so

arises from contract that it may be counter-claimed in an action

brought upon another contract.^ This doubt, in my opinion, is

altogether too refined. Whatever may have been the equitable

origin of the claim of one surety against another, it is very

well settled that he could maintain a common law action of

assumpsit to recover his contributory share. This shows that the

law treated the liability as one arising from an implied promise.

In presenting his counter-claim the defendant must conform to

all the requirements of pleading by plaintiffs in stating their

causes of action. All the facts constituting the cause of action

must be averred in the same manner and with the same degree of

particularity as would be requisite were the pleading a complaint
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or petition. 3

contract;" Wickliani v. Weil (Com. PI.

I8'J2),L7 N. Y. Suppl. 518. It was held,

liowever, by the New York Supreme

(Jourt, General Term, iu Furber i'. Mc-

Carthy (Supreme, 1889), 7 N. Y. Suppl.

t>13, that an undertaking to obtain an

order of arrest is a statutory indemnity

different doctrine, and require the damage to Le liquidated so
that they would con titute a good set-off uml r the an ·i nt rul · ·
but th se decision are palpably erron ou , an<l are ompl •tely
ov rruled. 1 The right of action mu 't of course ari ·e out of
contract, or be on contra.ct; and it has Leen <loubt · l wh ther
the claim for contribution by one surety against a co-surety o
arises from contract that it may be counter-claimed in an action
brought upon another contract. 2 This doubt, in my pmrnn, i
altogether too refined. Whatever may have been the equitahl
origin of the claim of one surety against anoth r, it i v r ,
well settled that he could maintain a common law action of
assumpsit to recover his contributory share. This shows that the
la w treated the liability as one arising from an implied promjs .
In presenting his counter-claim th e defendant mm;t conform to
all the requirements of pleading by plaintiffs in stating their
causes of action . All the facts constituting the cau e of action
must be averred in the same manner and with the same <legr e of
µarticularity as would be requisite were the pleading a complaint
or petition. 3

in the nature of penalty, and not a con-

tract; contra, see Cornell v. Donovan, 14

l^aly, 295. An action to collect taxes is

not an action on contract; Kansas City

V. Kidenour, 84 Mo. 253 ; Catling v. Car-

teret Cy. Com'rs, 92 N. C. 536 ; Anderson

V. Mayfield (Ky. 1892), 19 S. VV. Rep. 598.

That the counter-claim or set-off may be

of unliquidated damages, see also Parsons

V. Sutton, 66 N. Y. 92 ; Mills v. Carrier,

30 S. C. 617; Empire Transp. Co. v. Bog-

giaiio, 52 Mo. 294 ; Morrison v. Lovejoy,

6 Minn. 319, 352 ; Gardner v. Rishcr, 33

Kan. 93 ; Wheelock v. Pacific Pneumatic

Gas Co., 51 Cal. 223.

1 See, e. ^., Evens i'. Hall (Cine. Super.

Ct., Sp. T.), 1 Handy, 434. This construc-

tion is given to the provision in Nebraska ;

it is held that a claim for unliquidated dam-

ages even on contract cannot be set off

under a clause identical with the second

subdivision in the codes of the first group.

Boyer v. Clark, 3 Neb. 161, 168, 169.

The provision is similarly construed in

Arkansas ; Mathews v. Weiler (Ark. 1893),

22 S. W. Rep. 569 ; and in Kentucky ;

Shropshire v. Conrad, 2 Mete. 143; but

the unliijuidated claim may be used de-

fensively, when the plaintiff is insolvent

or a non-resident ; Taylor r. Stowell, 4

Mete. (Ky.) 175; Forbes v. Cooper, 88

Ky. 285 ; and see Garner v. Jones ( Ky.

1893), 21 S. W. Rep. 647; but not. when

to allow it to be used would be to aid the

defendant in tlie execution of a fraudu-

lent design ; Mathews v. Weiler (Ark.

1893), 22 S. W. Hep 569. See also Frick

r. White, 57 N. Y. 103, ante, in note to

§ *163.

(^Beaty v. Johnston (18';)9), 66 Ark. 529,

52 S. W. 129 ; Garner i;. Jones (1893), 94

Ky. 135, 21 S. W. 647; Huber v. Egner

contract;" Wickham v. Weil (Com. Pl.
1 U2 ), L7 . Y. Suppl. 518 . It was held,
however, by the New York Supreme
Cu urt, General Term, in Furber v. McCarthy (Supreme, 1889), 7 N. Y. Suppl.
hl3, that au undertaking to obtain an
order of arrest is ·a statutory ind emn ity
in the nature of penalty , and uot a contract; contra, see Cornell v. Donovan, 14
Daly, 295. An action to collect taxes is
not an action on coutract; Kan a City
v. Ridenour, 84 Mo. 253; Gatling v. Carteret Cy. Com'rs, 92 N. C. 536; .Anderson
11. Mayfield (Ky. 1892), 19 S. W. Rep . 598.
That the counte r-claim or set-off may lie
of unliquidated damages, see also Par on
11 .
u tton, 66 N. Y. 92 ; Mills v. Carrier,
30 S. C. 617; Empire Transp. Co. v. Boggiano, 52 Mo. 294; Morrison v. Lovejoy,
6 Minn. 319, 352; Gardner v. Rish er, 35
Kan . 93; Wheelock v. Pacific Pneumatic
Gas Co., 51 Cal. 223.
1 See,e. g.,Evens v. Hall (Cine. Super.
Ct., Sp. T.), l Handy, 434. This con truction is given to the provision in Nebra ka;
it is held that a claim for unliquidated damages even on contract cannot be set off
under a clause identical with the eco nd
subdivision in the codes of th e fir t group.

Boyer v. Clark, 3 Neb. 161, 16 , 169.
The pro vision is similarly con trued in
Arkansas; Mathews v. W eiler (Ark. 1893)
22 S. W. Rep. 569; and in Kentucky ;
Shropshire v. Conrau, 2 Mete. 143; but
the unliquidated claim may be used defensively, when the plaintiff i in olvent
or a non -resident; Taylor v . ....towel!, 4
Mete. (Ky.) li5; Forbes 1 . Cooper, 88
Ky . 285; and ee Garner v. Jones (Ky.
1893), 21 . W. Rep. 647; but not. when
to allow it t() be used wouhl lie to aid the
defendant in the cxe<· uti on of a fraudulent design; l\lathE\ws v. V1'eiler (Ark.
1893) , 22 8 . W . Hep 569.
'ee al o Frick
v. White, 5i ~. Y. 103, an te, in note to
§ * 163.
[U eaty v. J ohn ton (1 \J9), 66 Ark. 529,
52 S. W . 129 ; Garner v. Jot e (1 93), 94
Ky . 135, 21 . \\ . 647 · Huber v. Egner
( 1901 ), Ky., 61 ~. W. 353; Virginia .hemical Co. v. Moore (1 901), 61 . C. 166,
39 . E. 346.]
2
chmidt t'. Coulter, 3 l I inn. 492.
s, Holgate v. Broome,
Minn . 243, a
counter-claim h ld bad becau e defendant
did not Late hi. cau ·e of a ·tion fo r g-ood
sold and ueliv red with ufficient fuloe s.
[ 'ee §~ * i3 , "" i 4 J

9 3-!
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5 675. * 799. May set up as a Counter-Claim the Following : A

Judgment against the Plaintiff ; Rights of Actions Allowed only by

Statute and Regarded as Arising on an Implied Promise ; Demand

675.

* 799.

May set up as a Counter-Claim the Following: A

Judgment against the Plaintiff; Rights of Actions Allowed only by

Growing out of Unsettled Partnership Transactions. In ail action

Statute and Regarded as Arising on an Implied Promise; Demand
on an ordinary contract the defendant may set up as a counter-

claim a judgment which he has recovered against the plaintiff,

and this without leave first obtained from the court, where such

leave is necessary- in order to sue on the judgment. ^ The doc-

trine also applies to those rights of action which, although

allowed only by statute, are regarded as arising on an implied

promise, and under the old system would have been enforced

by an action ex contractu. As, for example, where the plaintiff'

sued to recover back money lost by a wager and paid to the de-

fendant, a counter-claim of a similar demand against the plain-

tiff, originally in favor of a third person and duly assigned to the

defendant, was sustained by the New York Supreme Court.2 It

is now established in opposition to some of the earlier decisions

which have been expressly overruled, that a demand growing

out of the unsettled partnership transactions between the plain-
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tiff and defendant may be pleaded as a counter-claim. It is

necessary, however, that the defendant should not only aver the

existence of such unsettled transactions and ask an accounting,

but allege that upon such accounting a balance will be found due

him from the plaintiff, and he must demand judgment therefor.

Without the averment of such a balance, the counter-claim will

be bad on demurrer. ^

1 Wells V. Henshaw, 3 Bosw. 625 ; N. D. 455, 75 N. W. 908 ; Long v. Collins

Clark V. Story. 29 Barb. 295 ; Cornell v. (1901), 15 S. D. 259, 88 N. W. 571 ; Col-

Donovan, 14 Daly, 295; Taylor v. Root, cord y. Conger (1900), 10 Okla. 458, 62

4 Keyes, 335 (judgment in an action of Pac. 276; Kcifer i-. Summers (1893). 'l37

«'*"^^'")- Ind. 106, 35 N. E. 1103; Lundberg v

LSweeney v. Bailey (1895), 7 S. 1). David.son (1897), 68 Minn. 328, 71 N. W.

404, 64 N. W. 188; Adams v. Baker 71, 395 ; Lindliolm y. Ita.sca Lumber Co

(1898), 24 Nev. 162, 55 Pac. 362; Dunn (1896). 64 Minn. 46, 65 N. W. 931 ; Prav

';. Uvalde Asphalt Paving (1903), 175 r. Life Indemnity Co. (1897) 104 La 114

N. Y. 214, 67 N. E. 439; De Camp v. 73 N, W. 485; llier v. Anheuser-Hu.scli

Thomson (1899). 159 N. Y. 444, 54 N. E. Brewing A.ss'n (1900), 60 Neb 320 83

H: Pendleton v. Beyer (1896), 94 Wis. N. W. 77; Welsher v. Libbv, McNeil &

Growing out of Unsettled Partnership Transactions. In an action
on an ordinary contract the defendant may set up as a counterclaim a jud ment which he has recovered again t the pl in iff
and his wi hout leave first obtained from the court where such
lea e is nece .. sary in order to sue on the judgment. 1 The doctrine al o applies to tho e rjghts of action which, although
allowed only by statute, are regarded as arising on an implied
promise, and under the old system would have been enforced
by an action ex contractu. As, for example, where the plaintiff
sued to recover back money lost by a wager and paid to the de£endan t, a counter-claim of a similar demand against the plaintiff, originally in favor of a third person and duly a igned to the
defendant, was sustained by the New York Supreme Court. 2 It
is now established in oppo ition to some of the earlier deci ions
whi h have been expreo..::sly overruled, that a demand gr0wing
out of the unsettled partnership transactions between the plaintiff and defendant may be pleaded as a counter-claim . It is
nece ary, however, that the defendant should not only aver the
existence of such unsettled transactions and ask an accounting,
but allege that upon such accounting a balance will be foun due
him from the plaintiff, and he must demand judgment therefor.
Without the averment of such a balance, the counter-claim will
be b d on demurrer.a

31. 68 N. W. 415; Spencer i-. Johnston Libby (1900), 107 Wis. 47, 82 N. W. 693 ;

(1899), 58 Neb. 44. 78 N. W. 482 ; Pity of Richmond v. Bloch (1900),'38 Ore. 317. 60

S.imerset v. Banking Co. (1900), 109 Ky. Pac. 388 ]

549, 60 S. W. 5 ; Powell ,'. Nolan (1902), ^ McDougall v. Walling, 48 Barb 364.

27 Wa.sh. 318, 67 Pac. 712 ; Northwe.stern, » Il.-ndrv r. Il-ndrv. 32 Ind. r..:<}; Wad-

etc. Bank r. Ranch (1901). Idaho, 66 Pac doH ,-. Darling. 51 N.Y. 327, 330 ; Clift v.

807; Cleveland i-. McCanna (1898), 7 Northrup, 6 Lans. 330 ; ;)er co;i^ra', Ham-

1 Wells v. Henshaw, 3 Bosw. 625;
Clark v. tory, 29 Barb. 295 ; Cornell v.
Donovan, 14 Daly 295; Taylor v. Root,
4 K eye , 335 (judgment in an action of
slander).
[ weeney v. Bailey ( 1895 ), 7 . D.
40:l, 64
. W . 18 ; Adams v. Baker
( 189 ), 24 Nev. 162, 55 Pac. 362; Dunn
v.
valde A phalt Paving (1903), 175
. Y. 21 4, 67
. E. 439; De Camp 1 .
''homson ( 18 ), 159 N. Y. 444, 54 N. E.
I L ; Pendleton 11. Beyer ( l 96), 94 Wi .
31, 6
. W . 415; , pencer . John ton
(I 9 ), 5 Neb. 44, 7
. W . 482; C'ity f
• >m r et . Banking .. (1900). l
"f y.
:l4 , 60 .. W. 5; Powell 11. 1"olau (19 2),
:.!7\V1qh . .'318, 67 Pac. 712; , orthw .t rn,
«tc. :rn k '" Rauch ( 1901 ). frlaho, fi6 Par.
07;
levelancl v. McCauna (189 ), 7

N. D . 45!i, 75 N. W. 90 ; Long v. Collins
(1901), 15 . D. 259, 88 N. W. 571; Colcord 11. Conger (190 ), 10 Okla. 45 , 62
Pac. 276; K ifer v. ummers {l 93), 137
Ind. I 06, 35
. E. 1103; Lundb rg v.
David on (I 91 ), 6
1.inn. 32 , i l N. V.7 •
71, 395; Lin dhol m v. !ta.ca Lumber Co.
(1 96), 6.+ Minn. 46, 65 N. W. 931 ; Prav
v. Life Ind mnity
. (1 97) , 104 Ia. 11.i.
73
. W . 4 ; ; IIi er . Anheu · r-B u h
Brewing A 'u (190 ) , O Teb. 320, 3
N. W . 77; Wei he r v. Libby, M
il
Libby (19 O), 107 Wi . 47, _ . W. 693;
Ri hmond v. Bloch (1900), 3
re. 317, 60
Pa. 3 .]
2 • Tr i ongall '' · Walling, 4 Ba.rh 364.
3 lIPncJr \' 1• . If••n1Jry, 32 n 1 ." '9; vV aclclr>JI 1•. Darling, 5 1 •. Y. 32 7, 33 ; lift i.
rthrup, 6 Laos. 330; per co11lru, Ham-
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§ 676. * 800. Counter-claim against an Executor de son tort.

In an Action by a Pledgor. An executor de son tort becomes

liable to those interested in the estate to the extent of the value

of the property wliich he appropriated ; this is not the liability

of a mere tort-feasor towards the owner of the thing injured: it

is the same liability which flows from the ordinary trust relation

of executor towards the creditors and legatees, enforceable by

actions of accounting, etc. It has been held, therefore, that such

responsibility of the plaintiif may be interposed as a counter-

claim by a defendant sued on contract, when he is a creditor of

the estate with which the plaintiff has wrongfully intermeddled.^

An action by a pledgor of stocks against the pledgee, to recover

damages for their wrongful sale at private sale and without notice,

has been said to be on contract and not for conversion, and for

that assigned reason a counter-claim based upon another contract

was held admissible. ^

mond V. Terry, 3 Lans. 186 ; Ives v. Miller,

19 Barb. 196 ; Iliff v. Brazill, 27 Iowa, 1.31 ;
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Haskell v. Moore, 29 Cal. 437.

1 McKenzie v. Pendleton's Adm., 1

Bush, 164. The cause of action accruing

§ 676. * 800.

93

Counter-Claim against an Executor de son tort.

An executor de son tort
com s
liable to those interested in the estat to the e rtcnt of the value
of the property which he appropriated; this is not the liability
of a mere tort-£ as or towards the owner of the thing injured: it
is the same liability which flows from the ordinary trust relation
of executor towards the creditors and legatees, enforceable by
actions of accounting, etc. It has been held, therefore, that such
responsibility of the plaintiff may be interposed as a counterclaim by a defendant sued on contract, when he is a creditor of
the estate with which the plaintiff has wrongfully intermeddled.1
An action by a pledgor of stocks against the pledgee, to recover
damages for their wrongful sale at private sale and without notice,
has been said to be on contract and not for conversion, and for
that assigned reason a counter-claim based upon another contract
was held admissible . 2
I n an Action by a Pledgor.

to a bank against its cashier for wrong-

fully permitting an overdraft, is a cause

of action on contract, namely, the con-

tract of employment as cashier; or may

be treated as a cause of action for a

breach of his bond given for the faithful

performance of his duties as cashier ; and

hence is a valid set-off: Board, etc. of St.

Louis Pub. Schools v. Broadway Sav. Bk.

Est., 12 Mo. App. 104, affirmed 84 Mo. 56.

As a general rule, when a receiver, execu-

tor, administrator, or trustee sues to re-

cover a debt due to the estate in his

hands, a demand of the defendant for

services rendered on the employment of

the plaintiff beneficial to the estate is a

good counter-claim, Davis v. Stover, 58

N. Y. 473.

2 Seaman v. Reeve, 15 Barb. 454. The

following cases give a construction to the

language of the clause defining " set-off"

as it is found in the second group of codes :

Evens v. Hall, 1 Handy, 434 ; Smead v.

Christfield, 1 Disney, 18 ; Anthony v. Stin-

soi), 4 Kan. 211 ; Collins v. Groseclose, 40

Ind. 414, 416 ; Curran {•. Curran, 40 Ind.

473, 480-484, and cases cited; West v.

Moody, 33 Iowa, 137, 139; Remington r.

King, 1 1 Abb. Pr. 278 ; Williams v. Brown,

2 Keyes, 486 ; Schieffelin ;;. Hawkins,

1 Daly, 289 ; Berry v. Brett, 6 Bosw. 627 ;

Roberts v. Carter, 38 N. Y. 107 ; Miller r.

Elorer, 15 Ohio St. 149; Stanberry v.

Smythe, 13 Ohio St. 495 ; Ross u. Johnson,

1 Handy, 388; McCulIough v. Lewis, 1

Disney, 564 ; Mortland v. Holton, 44 Mo.

58; Jones v. Moore, 42 Mo. 413 ; Lamb v.

Brolaski, 38 Mo. 51 ; Kent v. Rogers, 24

Mo. 306; Brake v. Corning, 19 Mo. 125 ;

Mahan v. Ross, 18 Mo. 121 ; Pratt v. Men-

kens, 18 Mo. 158; House v. Marshall, 18

Mo. 368; Smith v. Steinkamper, 16 Mo.

150; Griffin v. Cox, 30 Ind. 242; Blew r.

Hoover, 30 Ind. 450; Stilwell f. Chappell,

39 Ind. 72 ; Grossman v. Lauber, 29 Ind.

618; Lewis v. Sheaman, 28 Ind. 427;

Dayhuff v. Dayhuff's Adm., 27 Ind. 158;

mond v. Terry, 3 Lans. 186; Ives v. Miller, Moody, 33 Iowa, 137, 139; Remington r.
19 Barb. 196 ; Iliff v. Brazill, 27 Iowa, 13 l; King, 11 Abb. Pr. 278; Williams v. Brown,
Haskell v. Moore, 29 Cal. 437.
2 Keyes, 486; Schieffelin v. Hawkin ,
1 McKenzie v. Pendleton's Adm., 1
1 Daly, 289; Berry v. Brett, 6 Bosw. 627 ;
Bush, 164. The cause of action accruing Roberts v. Carter, 38 N. Y. 107; Miller v.
to a bank against its cashier for wrong- Florer, 15 Ohio St. 149; Stanberry v.
fully permitting an oYerdraft, is a cause Smythe, 13 Ohio St. 495; Ross v. Johnson,
of action on contract, namely, the con- l Handy, 388; McCullough v. Lewis, 1
tract of employment as cashier; or may Disney, 564 ; Mortland v. Holton, 44 Mo.
be treated as a cause of action for a 58; Jones v. Moore, 42 Mo. 413; Lamb v.
breach of his bond given for the faithful Brolaski, 38 Mo. 51; Kent v. Rogers, 24
performance of his duties as cashier ; and Mo. 306; Brake v. Corning, 19 Mo. 125;
hence is a valid set-off: Board, etc. of St. Mahan v. Ross, 18 Mo. 121 ; Pratt v. l\IenLouis Pub. Schools v. Broadway Sav. Bk. kens, 18 :Mo. 158 ; House v. Marshall, l
Est ., 12 Mo. App. 10..i, affirmed 84 Mo. 56. Mo. 368 ; Smith v. Steinkamper, 16 Mo.
As a general rule, when a receiver, execu- 150; Griffin v. Cox, 30 Ind . 242; Blew v.
tor, administrator, or trustee sues to re- Hoover, 30 Ind. 450; Stilwell v. Chappell,
cover a debt due to the estate in his 39 Ind. 72; Grossman v. Lauber, 29 Ind .
. hands, a demand of the defendant for 618; Lewis v. Sheaman, 28 Ind. 427;
sen-ices rendered on the employment of Dayhuff v. Dayhuff's Adm., 27 Ind . 15 ;
the plaintiff beneficial to the estate is a Sayres v. Linkart, 25 Ind. 145 ; Ki11!! t'.
good counter-claim, Davis v. Stover, 58 Conn, 25 Ind. 42!5; Keightley v. Walls,24
Ind. 205; Durbon v. Kelley's Adm ., 22
N. Y. 473.
2 Seaman v. Reeve, 15 Barb. 454. The
Ind. l 83 ; Indianapoli & Cine. R. Co. t'.
following cases give a construction to the Ballard, 22 Ind. 448; Fankboner v. Fanklanguage of the clause defining "set-off" boner, 20 Ind. 62 ; Shannon v. Wilson, 19
as it is found in the second group of codes: Ind. ll 2 ; Schoonover v. Quick, 17 Ind.
Evens v. Hall, l Handy, 434; Smead v. 196 ; Tri h v. Snel on, 16 Ind. 365 ; Reilly
Christfi.eld, 1 Disney, 18; Anthony v. Stin- v. Rucker, 16 Ind. 303; Knouer v. Dick,
son, 4 Kan. 211; Collins v. Groseclose, 40 14 Ind. 20; Fox v . Barker, 14 Ind. 309;
Ind . 414, 4l6; Curran t• . Curran, 40 Ind. Bool v. "'\V'at on, 13 Ind. 3 7; Turner v.
473, 480-484, and cases cited; West v. Simpson, 12 Ind. 413; Blanken hip v.
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§ 677. * 801. Statement of Established Doctrine. Question of

Doubt herein. It may be regarded as a doctrine established by

the overwhelming weight of authority, that, whenever by the

j^rinciples of the law, independent of the new procedure, a cause

of action may be treated as arising either from tort or on con-

tract, and the party holding the right may elect between the

two kinds of remedial proceeding, and does in fact elect to sue

on contract, the demand thus determined to be upon contract

may be counter-claimed against a plaintiff's cause of action aris-

ing on another contract, or when itself set up by a plaintiff, it

may be opposed by a counter-claim arising out of another con-

tract. ^ The only question of doubt in the practical application

of this doctrine relates to the necessity of indicating the election

in the pleading itself; or, in other words, whether the demand

ma)' not be thus used as a counter-claim, or against a counter-

claim, even though the pleading contains no averments showing

the election to have been actually made. While the courts

have generally sustained this doctrine, they are not absolutely

unanimous. The Supreme Court of Minnesota holds that the
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code has abolished this rule and the right of electing between the

different forms of action ex contractu and ex delicto ; or, rather,

has destroyed all possibility of the advantage which could once

have been derived under the circumstances above mentioned

from such an election. ^ This opinion is based upon a close

Rogers, 10 Ind. 333; Johnson v. Kent, 11 Cal. 93; Nagleeu. Minturn, 8 Cal. 540;

9 Ind. 252 ; Lovejoy i-. Robinson, 8 Ind. Marye v. Jones, 9 Cal. 335 ; Howard v.

399; Woodward c. Laverty, 14 Iowa, 381 ; Shores, 20 Cal. 277; Collins v. Butler, 14

Cook v. Lovell, 11 Iowa, 81; Campbell v. Cal. 223; Lubert v. Chauviteau, 3 Cal.

Fox, 11 Iowa, 318 ; Eyre f. Cook, 10 Iowa, 458; Ricketson v. Richardson, 19 Cal.

586; Stadler v. Parmelee, 10 Iowa, 23; 330; Corwin i. Ward, 35 Cal. 195.

Donahue v. Prosser, 10 Iowa, 276 ; Reed v. QCentral Nat. Bank v. Haseltine (1900),

Chubb, 9 Iowa, 178; Sample i". Griffith, 155 Mo. 58. 55 S. W. 1015; Momsen v.

5 Iowa, 376; Davi.o i-. Milburn, 3 Iowa, Atkins(1900), 105 Wis. 557,81 N.W. 647.]

163; Dorsey r. Reese, 14 B. Mon. 157; i See Norden c. Jones, 33 Wis. 600, 604.

Lausdale r. Mitchell, 14 B. Mon. 350; See Ogilvie v. Lightstone, 1 Daly, 129;

Clark V. Finnell, 16 B. Mon. 337 ; Graham Starr Cash Car Co. v. Reinhardt (Com.

r. Tilford, Stanton's Code, 98 ; Thatcher v. PI. 1892), 20 N. Y. Suppl. 872 ; Barnes v.

Cannon, 6 Bush, 541; Eversole i'. Moore, McMullins, 78 Mo. 260; Green i;. Conrad

3 Bu.sh, 49; Haddix u. Wilson, 3 Bu.sh, (Mo. 1893), 21 S. W. Rep. 839; Challiss

523; Miller ;•. Gaither, 3 Bu.sh, 152; i- Wylie, 35 Kan. 506; Smithy. McCar-

Brown v. Phillips, 3 Bush, 656; Taylor i: thy, 39 Kan. 308; Smith r. Young, 109

Stowell, 4 Mete. (Ky.) 175; Shropshire f. N. C. 224 (counterclaim not allowed, as

Conrad, 2 id. 143; Geoghegan r. Ditto^ jdaintiff did not elect to waive the tort).

2 id. 433; Finnell r. N'esbitt, 16 \i. Mon.' - Folsom r. Carii, 6 Minn. 420. The

354; Naglee r. Palmer. 7 Cal. 543 ; Hobbs rule in Indiana is the same : Richey r.

V. Duff, 23 Cal. 596; Russell v. Conway, Ely, 115 lud. 232.
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and logical adherence to tlie letter and to the spirit of the

code, which require that the facts constituting the cause of

action should be averred in a pleading, and abolish all forms

of action.

§ 678. * 802. Illustrative Examples in Equitable Actions. In

all the foregoing examples the actions were legal. Some illus-

trations will now be given of those that are equitable. Many

species of equitable actions may arise on contract within the

meaning of the statute, and equitable remedies may thus be

obtained as counter-claims under the second branch of the defi-

nition. A suit was brought to compel the conveyance of land

alleged to be held by the defendant in trust for the plaintiff.

The defendant was a lawyer, and the plaintiff had been his

client. As such attorney, he had agreed, it was said, to bid

in the land at a public sale, and to hold it for the plaintiff: he

did, in fact, purchase it in his own name, but retained it for

himself, and refused to convey. In his answer to these allega-

tions, the defendant, besides denials, pleaded, as a counter-claim,

a debt due from the plaintiff for professional services in relation
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to this and other matters. Evidence to sustain this counter-

claim was rejected at the trial, for the reason that the defendant

had forfeited all claim to compensation on account of his fraudu-

lent practices. The Superior Court of New York City, in re-

versing this decision, held, that, as the action was on contract,

the counter-claim was admissible, and, even if the defendant

had been guilty of wrong in one matter, his right to compensa-

tion in respect of other matters was not affected ; also, that, on

the facts as proved, he had committed no fraud or breach of his

fiduciary duty in the instances charged against him.^ In an

action to foreclose a purchase-money mortgage, it is well settled

that the mortgagor may interpose a counter-claim for the dam-

ages sustained by him from the breach of covenants in the

plaintiff's deed of conveyance. Both causes of action arise

from contract, though from different contracts. ^

§ 679. * 803. Counter-Claim of Money Demand on Independent

Contract Interposed in Action to foreclose Mortgage. The COUnter-

1 Carrie v. Cowles, 6 Bosw. 452. See Hall v. Gale, 14 Wis. 54; Walker u. Wil-

also .Judah v. Vincennes Univ. Tr.s., 16 son, 1.3 Wi.«. 522 ; Lowry r. Hurd, 7 Miun.

Ind. .56. .356, 36.3 ; Cov r. Dowuie, 14 Fla. 544. 5fi2.

2 Eaton V. Talmadge, 22 Wis. 526, See also §* 792, note, ante; Merritt t;. Gou-

528; Akerly v. Vilas, 21 Wis. 88, 109; ley, 58 Hun, 372.

an cl 1 gical adherence o the lett r and to the ·piri t of th
od which requir that th facts eon ·tituting th cau:e of
action should be averrecl in a pleading, a.nu abolish all form:
f action .
· 678. * 02. Illustrativ e Examples in Equitable Actions. In
all the foregoing exampl s th action wer legal.
ome illu trations will now be given of tho e that are equitable. :\Ian
pecie of equitable action may ari e on contract within the
meaning of the statute, and equitable reme<li s may thu · be
obtained as counter-claims under the second branch of the <l finition. A suit was brough t to compel the conveyance of land
alleged to be held by the defendant in tru t fo r the plaintiff.
The defendant was a lawyer, and the plaintiff had b en hi
client. As such attorney, he had agreed, it was said, to bid
in the land at a public sale, and to b old it for the plaintiff: he
did in fact, purchase it in his own name, but retained it for
himself, and refused to convey. In his answer to these allegations, the defendant, besides denials, pleaded, as a counter-claim,
a debt due from the plaintiff for professional services in relation
to this and other matters. Evidence to sustain this counterclaim was rejected at the trial, for the reason that th e defendant
had forfeited all claim to compensation on account of his fraudulent practices. The Superior Court of New York City, in reversing this decision, held, that, as the action was on contract,
the counter-claim was admissible, and, even if the defendant
had been guilty of wrong in one matter, his right to compensation in respect of other matters was not affected; also, that, on
the facts as proved, he bad committed no fr~ud or breach of his
fiduciary duty in ·the instances charged again t bim. 1 In an
action to foreclose a purchase-money mortgage, it is well ettled
that the mortgagor may interpose a counter-claim for the damages susta.ined by him from the breach of covenant in the
plaintiff's deed of conveyance.
Both causes of action arise
from contract, though from different contracts. 2
§ 679. * 803. Counter-Claim of Money Demand on Independent
Contract Interposed in Action to foreclo s e Mortgage. The counter1 Currie v. Cowle , 6 Bo w. 452.
al o Judah v. Vincenne Univ. Tr
Ind . f>6.
2 Eaton v. Talmadge, 2~ Wi .
528; Akerly v. Vilas, 21 " is. 8 ,

See
., 16
526,
109 ;

Hall v. Gale, 14 Wi . 54; W alker v. Wilson, 13 Wi.. 522; Lowry 1-. Hurd, 7 Minn
356, 363 ; Coy v. Downie, 14 Fla. 544, 562
• ee aLo §' i92, note, ante; Ierritt v. Gouley, 58 11 un, 372.

3

CIVIL RE:-.IEDIES.

938 CIVIL REMEDIES.

Iara conany m rt ag
fen -

claim of a money demand on an independent and separate con-

tract may be interposed in the action to foreclose any mortgage

of land, purcliase-mone}', or other, by the mortgagor or defend-

ant personally liable for the mortgage-debt, and against whom

a decree for a deficiency could be rendered: in respect to such

defendants, both causes of action arise on contract, and tho

recovery on the counter-claim directly interferes with that on

a

the complaint. In respect to other defendants who are not

parties nor privies to the contract of mortgage, but whose

liens, or encumbrances, or rights of property in the land are

simpl}- cut off by the decree, it may well be doubted whether

the cause of action in the foreclosure suit can be said to arise

on contract. This question was recently passed upon by the

New York Court of Appeals; and the doctrine above stated

was fully sustained, and made the basis of decision.^

IV. Some Miscellaneous Provisions in Belation to Coiinter- Claims.

§ 680. * 804. Opportunity to interpose Counter-Claim not a Bar

to another Suit thereon. Provision of Code herein in few States.

As a counter-claim is always a separate and independent cause
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of action, wliich the defendant may enforce against the plain-

tiff, is he obliged to avail himself of it when sued? Or may he

r

mplain.
artie nor
ntract
lien or
or n ht
f
decree it
im ly it off b)
the c u e of a ti on in th for l
on contract. Thi qu tion \rn r c
ew Y rk ourt of Appea
and tl.e d
wa fully u ta in cl and mad th ba i

omit to set up the demand in his answer, and make it the sub-

ject of another action brought by himself? In other words, is

the opportunity thus furnished by the codes to try and determine

his own claim in the prior suit against himself a bar to his subse-

quently maintaining a second suit for the purpose of determining

r\ . , ome "IJ;Iisccllaneous Pr01:is1:on iii Relation to ounter- Claim
680. * 0-±. Opportunity to i nte rpose Counter-Claim n ot a Bar

the issues which might have been so disposed of in the former

one? In the absence of statutory prohibition, no such effect is

produced by the provisions of the codes which authorize the

counter-claim. The defendant has an election. ^ He may set

1 Iluut V. Chapman, 51 N. Y. 5.55,5.57. 80 X. W. 59: J. suod defendant in 1898 on

See also Charlton f. Tardy, 28 Ind. 452 ; defendant'.s guaranty that a heating appa-

Bathgate v. Ha.skin, 59 N. Y. 5.33, 5.39, ratus con.structed in J.'.s hou.^io by defend-

540 ; Kichinoud v. Lattin, 64 Cal. 273. In ant woulii give .sati.sf action, and defendant

Oregon, a legal counter-claim to a suit in ])leaded in bar that in 1897 lie sued J. in

equity is not allowed, unless it be con- a jii.stice's court for a balance due on the

nected with the subject of the suit. See price of the apparatus, and that J. set up

Ore. Code, § 393 ; Sears v. Martin (Ore. tlie breach of guaranty, and tliat, on ap-

1892), 29 I'ac. Hej). 890 ; Hurrage i'. Bo- peal to the district court,.!, had judgment.

nanza fi. ^ <^. Min. Co., 12 Ore. 1G9. Held that since no counter-claim had been

■^ QJones V. Witousek (1901) 114 la. 14, pleaded, the judgment of the district court

to another Suit thereon.

Provision of Code herein in few States.

A a counter-claim i · al IT"ay, a er arate ml incl 1 n l nt au·
of action wbi h the defendant lllay nforct; again the plainiff, i · h oblig cl to aYail him 1£ of it when u cl'.
r may he
omit to et up th cl m·ancl in hi· an "er aud mak it th
uLj ct of anoth r action brought by him ·elf? In ther wor L, i,
th opp rtunity thu · furni bed b · h co<l · t ry and let rmin
bi· O\Yn claim in th prior u it a ·aiu ·t him · lf a. liar o hi ub qu ntl maintainiu a e ·ond suit f r h purpo
f d t rmmm
th
which mi ht b aY be n s li p
l f
form r
ff t i:
I n th au nc of tatutor . pr hibiti n 1
cl by th prov1 ·1 n of th
ocl · whi h
th
counter - I aim . Th l fend an h a. a 1 lee ti i . 2
1

v hapman, 51 ~ . Y. 555, 5:-1.
harlton v. Tardy, 2 Intl. 45:l;
Bathgat t'. H kin, 5
• Y. 53-3, 539,
54-0; Hi hmoud v. Lattiu, 4 'al. -1 3. In
rcgon, al gal ount •r-daim to a uit iu
equity i not allow d, unlc it be uun c rl with th
ubj' ·t of th ·uit. , · •
re. Codr· .' an ; . car v. ;1Iartiu (< >ri'.
l 9:2), ~' l'ac. J Pp. 90; Burra~ 1·. Bonanza f,
<l .:'lfiu. u, 12 CJre. 169 .
.i [.Joue. t'. \ itou ck (I OJ) 11-1- Ia. l
T.

COUNTER-CLAIM.

939

up his cause of actiou as a eountei-elaiin, and have both oppos-

ing demands adjudicated ; or he nuiy withhold it, and prosecute

it in a separate action brought for that purpose.^ The codes of

a few States expressly require the defendant's cross-right to be

interposed as a counter-claim, if a proper one for that purpose ;

and, if he fails to do so, he cannot enforce it by a direct action.^

was no bar to the action for damages for

up hi· cau e of action a a. ounter-claim, and haYe Lu th opposing deman l adjmli ated; or he may withhold it, and pr . eculu
it in ·1 er antte action br ught for hat pur1 o.· 1 The otl 8 of
a f w tate expre ly reguir the clef ndant
'-right to lw
interpos d as a counter-claim, if a pror r on
that purr o · ;
and, if he fail to do o, he annot uforce it by a dir t acti n. z

breach of guaranty, since J. was not

obliged to plead the couuter-claim in the

former action. " It is well settled that a

set-off or couuter-claim may or may not be

pleaded, as the defendant shall elect ; and

unless it is pleaded, the right to sue upou

it as an independent cause of action, or to

rely upon it in defence of another action

by the same plaintiff, is in no wise affected

or impaired by a judgment for or against

the defendant. In other words, if the
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matter of set-off or counter-claim is pre-

sented and passed upon in a suit, it is

barred by the judgment ; if not, the de-

fendant may make it the subject of a sep-

arate and distinct action : Hunt i\ Brown,

146 Mass. 253 ; Roach v. Privett, 90 Ala.

391 ; Minnaugh v. Partlin, 67 Mich. 391."

Contra, Bellinger r. Craigue, 31 Barb.

5.34; Mauney v. Hamilton (1903), 132

N. C. 295, 303, 43 S. E. 903 : A defendant

is not bound to make use of a counter-

claim as such, but may make it the basis

of a separate suit.

Murphy v. Russell (1901), Idaho, 67

Pac. 427 : The statute relative to counter-

claims was intended to prevent a multi-

plicity of suits, and " a cause of action

arising out of the transaction set forth in

the complaint as the foundation of plain

tiff's claim or connected therewith, in

favor of the defendant, must be set forth

iu the answer as a counter-claim, and

could not be made the basis of another

suit." Stevens v. Home Savings Ass'n

(1897), Idaho, 51 Pac. 779; Beaty v.

Johnston (1899), 66 Ark. 529, 52 S. W.

129.3 Lowry v. Hurd, 7 Minn. 356, 363 ;

Ricker v. Pratt, 48 Ind. 73.

1 Welch V. Hazelton, 14 How. Pr. 97 ;

Lignot V. Redding, 4 E. D. Smith, 285 ;

Gillespie v. Torrance, 25 N. Y. 306, 308,

310, per Selden J.; Bellinger v. Craigue,

31 Barb. 534, 530. See also Giles v. Aus-

tin, 62 N. Y. 486 ; Brown v. Gallaudet, 80

id. 413; Inslee v. Hampton, 8 Hun, 230;

Swenson v. Cresop, 28 Ohio St. 668;

Uppfalt V. Woermann, 30 Neb. 189.

- ^CaUfornia : " If the defendant omits

to set up a counter-claim in tlie cases men-

tioned iu the first subdivision of the last

section, neither he nor his assignee can

afterwards maintain an action against the

plaintiff therefor." Code Civ. Pro., § 439 ;

Idaho; Same provision as in California.

Code Civ. Pro., 1901, § 3213; Indiana:

"If any defendant ])ersonally served with

notice omit to set up a counter-claim aris-

ing out of the contract, or transaction set

forth iu the complaint as the ground of

the plaintiff's claims, or any of them,

wa no bar to the action for damages for
breach of guaranty, ince J. wa · nut
obligerl to plead the counter-claim in the
former action. "It i well settled that a
et-off or co uuter-claim may or may not he
pleaded, as the defendant shall elect; and
unless it is pleaded, the right to sue upou
it as an independent can e of action, or to
rely upou it in defence of another action
by the same plaintiff, i in no wise affected
or impaired by a judgmeut for or against
the defendaut. In other words, if the
matter of set-off or counter-claim is preented and passed upon in a suit, it is
barred by the judgment; if not, the defendant may make it the subject of a separate and di tinct action : Hunt v. Brown,
146 Mass. 25:3; Roach v. Privett, 90 Ala.
391 ; Minnaugb v. Partlin, 67 Mich . 391."
Contra, Bellinger v. Craigue, 31 Barb.
534; Mauney v. Hamilton (1903), 132
N. C. 295, 303, 43 S. E. 903 : A defendant
is not bound to make use of a counterclaim a such, hut may make it the basis
of a separate suit.
Murphy v. Russell (1901), Idaho, 67
Pac. 427: The statute relative to counterclaims was intended to prevent a multi··
i:ilicity of suits, and "a cause of action
arising out of the transaction set forth in
the complaint as the foundation of plai,1 ·
tiff's claim or connected therewith, in
favor of the defendant, must be set forth
in the answer as a couuter-claim, and
co uld not be made the l asis of another
·uit." Stevens v. Home Savings Ass'n
(1897), I daho, 51 Pac. 779; Beaty -z:.
Johnston (1899), 66 Ark. 529, 52 S. W.
129.J Lowry v. Hurd, 7 Minn. 3!">6, 363;
Ricker v . Pratt, 48 Ind. 73.
1 W elcb v. Hazelton, 14 How. Pr. 97;
Lignot v. Redding, 4 E. D. Smith, 285;
G illespie v. Torrance, 25 N. Y. 306, 308,
310, per Selden J.; Bellinger v. Craigue,
31 Barb. 534, 539. See also Gile· v. Austin, 62 N. Y. 486 ; Brown v. Gallaudet, 80
id. 413; Inslee v. Hampton, 8 Hun, 230;

wenson v. Cresop, 28 Ohio
t. 668;
Uppfalt v. Woermann, 30 N b. 1 9.
2 [Cal!fornia: "If the defen1lant omit.
to set up a counter-claim in the ca : mention ed in the first subdivisiuu u[ the la t
sectiuu, neiLher he nor hi a,;sigu e cnu
afterward maintain nn action again t the
plaintiff therefor." Code Civ. Pro.,§ 439;
Idaho : Same provif'ion a. in CnMoruia.
( \ide Civ. Pro., mot, ~ 3213; lodiann:
" .I f any defendant per. onally served with
notice omit to ·et up a counter-claim arisiug out of the contract, or transaction . ct
forth in the complaint as the grouud of
the plaintiff's claims, or any of them,
he cannot afterward maintain au action
again t the plaintiff therefor, except at
bis own costs." Burns' t., 1901, § 35.i;
Iowa: "J utlgment obtained in an at:Liuu
by ordinary proceedings shall not be annulled or modified by any order in an
action by equitable proceedings, except
for a defence which has ari en or been discovered since the judgment was rendered.
But such judgment does not prevent the
recovery of any claim, though such claim
might have been used by way of counterclaim in the action on which the judgment
was recovered." Code, 1 97, § 34.iO;
]{rmsas: "If the defendant omit to ~et
up a counter-claim or set-off, he cannot
rerornr co ts against the plaintiff in auy
subsequent action thereon; but thi ·ectiou
shall not apply to cau es of action which
are stricken out of or wi thdrawn from
the answer, as in sectiou · ninety- emu
and one hundred and twenty." Code,
1901, § 96; .Minnesota : •·The pleading
of a set-off or counter- laim by a defendant in any action, in any of the court of
this State, shall not be h ld or con traed
to be an admission of any cau e of action
on the part of plaintiff again t ucb defendant."
t., 1894, § 523 ; 11Iontana:
Sarne a the California tatute.
ode,
1895, § 697; Nebra ka:
ame as the
Kansas statute. Coue, 1901, § 102; Ohio.
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§ 681. * 805. Form of Verdict, Finding, and Judgment. When

the plaintiff's demand is proved and found by the jury or court,

and the amount of the eounter-chiim as proved and found equals

it, the verdict must be for the defendant, and a judgment ren-

dered dismissing the action ; if the counter-claim as found be less

than the plaintiff's demand as found, a verdict should be given

for the plaintiff for the excess of his recovery over that of the de-

fendant; finally, if the counter-claim as found is greater than the

plaintiff's demand as found, a verdict should be given for the

defendant for the excess.^ If the plaintiff should fail entirely to

prove his cause of action as alleged, the defendant would be en-

titled to a verdict for the whole amount of his counter-claim as

established by his proofs. The foregoing rules presuppose that

both demands are for the recovery of money, either debt or

damages. If the plaintiff's cause of action, or the counter-claim,

is for the recovery of some special relief, legal or equitable, the

judgment rendered must be according to the circumstances of

the case. As has been shown in the foregoing citations, there

may be instances in which it would be impossible for the defend-
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ant to take anything by his counter-claim, unless the plaintiff's

cause of action should be entirely defeated. There is a dictuyji

in an Indiana case to the effect that, where the action is for the

recovery of money, a pecuniary counter-claim, less in amount

than the sum demanded by the plaintiff, is inadmissible, because,

as was said, it was not a complete bar or answer to the action.^

This dichim was founded upon an entire misconception of the

object and uses of the counter-claim. It is not, in any true

sense, a defence in bar of the plaintiff's cause of action. It

may be pleaded when the plaintiff's claim and right to recover

Same as Kansas statute. Bates' St., 1904, 42 Iowa, .526; luslce r. Hampton, 11 Hun,

§ .5.348; Oklahoma: Same as Kansas 15G. Wlieii a counter-claim is jileaded

statute, St., 189.3, § 3974; Utah: Same as the plaintiff cannot dismiss or discontinue

California statute. Rev. St., 1898, § 2970; the whole action without defendant's con-

iryortuny .■ Same as Kansas statute. Rev. sent, so as to prevent the counter-claim

St., 1899, § 3546.] from being tried. Turnell v. Vaughan,

1 Moore v. Caruthers, 17 B. Mon. 669, 80 N. C. 46; Amos r. Humboldt Loan

681; Hay v. Short, 49 Mo. 139, 142; Ass., 21 Kan. 474; Sale v. Bugher, 24

Hogan V. Shnart, 11 Mont. 498; Hitch- id. 432 ; Gwathuey ?'. Cheatham, 21 Hun,

cock D. Baughan, 44 Mo. App. 42. With .576; Tabor v. Mackkee. 58 Ind. 290;

respect to the recovery and judgment, see Whedhee v. Leggett, 92 N. C. 469 ; Fran-

Grove c. Schweitzer, 36 Wis. 554; Wes- cis v. Edwards, 77 N. C. 271.

tervelt v. Ackley, 62 N. Y. .505 ; 2 Hun, - McClintic's Adm. v. Cory, 22 Ind.

O.-. Form of Verdict, Finding, and Judgment. \Vb n
th plainti. · · d mand i Ir Y d and f un l
tb jury r urt
an l h amount of h
unt r-claim a: Ir v cl an f unc.1
ual
it h Y n.li t mu ·t be f r b l f n lant and a ju 10 m nt r nif the c unt r- laim a· f und b 1 l"
a Y r li
h ul l b 0 iv n
xc
ry Y r tlrn t of th 1 f nclc n · finall - if th c unt r-claim a f un l i · gr at r than h
plaintiff dem and a foun l a Y r li t } uld b
iven f r th
d f ndant for th x
If th plaintiff b uld fail ntir ly t
prove hi cau
f a tion a all ged th l fen<lant oulcl l
ntitl l t a. vercli t for h wh 1 am unt f hi
ount r- laim a
· abli ·h cl by hi proof ·. Th for
in rul · rr upp
that
bo h cl mand
f r th r over; of mon y, ith r c1 bt or
If
au e of acti n or he
mt r-claim
p cial r lief legal r quitabl
judgm nt rendered mu t b a cording o th
ircum tan e
tb cas . A ha been hown in th foregoin 0 cita ion th r
ma be in tance in which it would b impo ibl for th defendant t take anything b hi counter-claim, unl . th plaintiff
au· of action hould b entir l d feat d. Tber i · a dictzmi
in an Indiana ca e to the ff ct that where th acti n i f r the
recov ry of money a pecuniary counter-claim le
in amount
than th um d mantled by th plain tiff, i inadrni ibl b cau ,
a wa ·aid it wa not a omplet bar or an
r t h acti n. 2
Tl i dicti1,m wa founded up n an ntir misconception f the
bj t and u
of the coun r-claim. It i' not, in any tru
a d f n
in bar f h plaintiff cau
of ac i n . It
1 ad d when the laintiff
laim and right t
., 681.

258 ; Heine v. Meyer, 61 N. Y. 171 ; Derr 170, 173, per Worden J.

V. Stubbs, 83 N. C. 539; Hall i-. Clayton,

17 , 113, pr Wordeu J .

CltO.S:::>-CU;\ll'LAl . ' T.
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thereon are admitted; but, at the same time, it .is alleged that

the defendant has also a right on his side to recover a sum from

the plaintiff upon an independent cause of action, which will

equal, and so destroy, or exceed, or diminish the amount which

would otherwise be the plaintiff's due. Undoubtedly, when the

plaintiff's complaint shows that he is entitled to a certain sum,

say $500, — and the defendant, not controverting these allega-

tions by any defence in bar, simply interposes a distinct cross-

demand for a less amount, — say $300, — the plaintiff's right to

a judgment for the difference is at once admitted ; and the plead-

ings may be so framed, by the express provisions of some, if not

all, of the codes, that he is immediately able to recover the sum

so admitted upon the record, while the issues as to the remainder

are left to be tried. To say that a defendant shall not avail

himself of a smaller demand, and thus lessen the amount of

the i^laintiff's recovery, because he cannot allege facts which

would defeat that recovery altogether, is palpably unjust, and

is warranted by no requirements of the statute.

§ 682. * 806. Cross-Complaints. Provisions of the Codes. Dif-
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ference in Practice. Illustrative Cases. The practice in a few of

the States admits a "cross-complaint" by a defendant, not only

against the plaintiff, but against other defendants. ^ Although

there is a general similarity, if not substantial identity, in the

provisions of the various codes concerning the granting of relief

to defendants against the plaintiff's or against each other, yet a

very great difference in the actual practice founded upon these

1 f See § *585 (n.), where the statutory Van Sautvoord, in his work on Pleading

provisions are set out at length. (p. 574), after discussing generally the

" It is said that the counter-claim of purpose of the cross-bill under the old

the code was intended to preserve to a practice, says : ' All these various matters

defendant all remedies he formerly had, which, under the eijuity practice, were

either in an action at law or by a bill in proper subjects for a cross-bill, where the

equity or a cross-bill on similar facts, object was for relief and not for dis-

2 Wait, Pr. 476, and cases cited. Said covery, are sui)posed to be within the term

Bosworth J. in Gleason i-. Moen, 2 Duer, "counter-claim," as used in the Code, and

639: 'The counter-claim secures to the may be set up by the defendant in the

defendant full relief, which a separate action:'" Kollock ?•. Scrihner (1897), 98

action at law, or a bill in chancery, or a Wis. 104, 73 N. W. 776. See also Trestor

thereon ar admitted; but, aL the :am tim it .i: alleged that
the d £ n lant has also a right on his :i l' tu r •cuv r a .·um from
the plaintiff upon an incl p ml 11t ·au·
[ aetion, whi ·h will
qual, an
d ·troy, or x d, or dimini ·h the amount , hi ·h
woulJ. th rwise b the plaintiff' du . Undoubt. dly, when Llie
plaintiff complaint shows that h is entitled to a rtain ·um, ay $500, - aud t he defendant, not controverting tlrns all gation by any defence in bar, simply interp ·es a <li tinct er ssdemand for a le amount, - ay $300, - the plaintiff' · right to
a judgment for the difference i at once admitted; and the pl aJ.ings ' may be so framed, by the express provision of some, if noL
all, of the codes, that he i immediately able to recover the sum
o admitted upon the record, while the issues a to th remainder
are left to be tried. To ay that a defendant shall not avail
h imself of a smaller demand, and thus lessen the amount 0£
the plaintiff' recovery, because be cannot allege facts whicl1
would defeat that recovery altogether, is palpably unjust, and
1
warranted by no requirements of the statute.
§ 682. >'/'. 806. Cross-Complaint s. Provision s of the Codes. Differ ence in Practice. Illustrative C a ses. The practice in a few of
the States admits a "cross-complaint" by a defendant, not only
against the plaintiff, but against other defendant ·. 1 Although
there is a general similarity, if not substantial identity, iu the
provisions of the various codes concerning the granting of relief
to defendants against the plaintiffs or against each other, yet a
very great difference in the actual practice founded upon the e

cross-bill, could have secured to him on r. City of Sheboygan (1894), 87 Wis. 406,

an allegation or proof of the same facts, 58 N. W. 747 ; Gillenwaters >,'. Campbell

but it relates to only such causes of action (1895), 142 Ind. 529, 41 N. K. 1041 ; Peter

as exist against the plaintiff, and might, v. Farrel, etc. Co. (1895), 53 Ohio St. 534,

in their nature, be the basis of an action 42 N. E. 690. See also § *765 and

against him at the suit of the defendant.' notes.]

1 [ ee § * 585 (u.), where the statutory
provisions are et out at length.
" It is a id that the counter-claim of
the code was intended to pre en ·e to a
defendant all remedie he formerly had ,
e it her in an action at law or by a bill in
equ ity or a cross-bill on similar facts.
2 w ·ait, Pr. 476, and cases cited.
aid
Bo"worth J. in Glea 011 v. Moen, 2 D11er,
639 : ' The counter-claim sec ures to the
defendant full relief, which a . eparate
action at law, or a bill iu chancery, or a
rross-bill, could have secured to him on
au allegation or proof of the same fact ,
but it relate · to only such cau e of action
a ex i t agai11 t the plaintiff, and mig ht,
in their nature, be the basis of an acti n
against him at the sui t of the defendant.'

Van Sautvoord , in his work on Pleading
(p. 574), after discussi nD" generally the
purpo e of the TOS ·bill under th old
practice, say : 'All these various matter
which, under the eq11iLy practice, w re
proper ubj ect for a cro, -hill, wher the
object wa fo r relief and not for cli. covery, are uppo cl to be within t h term
" counter-claim ," a u. ell iu th
ode, and
may be set up by the defendant in th
action:"' Kollock r . cribn r (l 9i), 9 ~
Wi . 104, 73 . W. 776.
ee al o Tr st<'L"
v. City of heboygan ( 1 94), 87 Wi . 496 ,
5 N. W. 747; :rill nwat r " · Campbell
(I 95), 142 In d. 529, 41 N. E. 10.J.l ; P ter
v. Farrel, et . Co. ( I 95), !53 bio t. 53.J.,
42 N. E. 690.
ee a lso § *765 a11ll
n tes.]
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provisions has grown up in the several States. In most of them,

the clauses of the statute referred to are practically a dead letter;

Wijile in a few they have been accepted and acted upon accord-

ing to their evident intent.^ A wide departure has thus been

made in the latter commonwealths from the methods which

prevailed before the introduction of the reformed procedure.

This practice, in respect to cross-complaints against plaintiffs

and against other defendants, will be best illustrated by a refer-

ence to the facts and decisions of a few prominent cases taken

as examples.- In an action brought by Joanna ^Morris against

1 In some of these States the cross-

complaint or petition is used in cases

M-Iiere, under the equity practice, the de-

fendant would be entitled to file a cross-

ion a gr wn up in he several tate
I n mo of the m ~
the l, u e of th
a.turn ref rre<l o are prac icall · a dea<l le r;
s:d jn a fo th y b -ve been accepted and acted up n ac ordi~1 · to t.ieir evil nt intent.1 A
·id d partur ha bu b n
mad rn the la er common eal h from he methods which
JreYc il d before he in r duction f the r formecl procedur .
Thi' rn. tic in r pect to c.ro -compl, in age in. plaintiff
and again t other def ndant will be be t illu tra ed b a r f rnc t the fac an l d ci ion of a few prornin nt case
a _ amp1e . 2 I n an action brought by Joanna ::\Iorri agams
o

·1

bill, but which do not fall under the

statutory definition of a "counter-claim,"

or where new parties must be brought in.

In a few of these St:ites, however, it would
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seem tliat the cross-complaint or petition

is used in all cases where the defendant

seeks to obtain affirmative relief, so that

the "counter-claim" is actually enforced

by means of such a cross-pleading. The

following are some of the most important

recent decisions illustrating its use in vari-

ous States: Marr v. Lewis, 31 Ark. 203;

Trapnall v. Hill, 31 id. 346 ; Earle v. Hale,

31 id. 473; Abbott v. Monti, 3 Call,

oC ; Monti v. Bishop, 3 id. 605 ; Mills v.

Uuttrick, 4 id. 53; Tucker v. McCoy, 3

id. 284; Hatcher i'. Briggs, 6 Ore. 31;

Scheland v. Erpelding, 6 id. 258 ; Pond r.

Waterloo Agric. Works, 50 Iowa, 596 ;

Kellogg v. Aherin, 48 id. 299 ; Hervey v.

Savery, 48 id. 313; Wright v. Bacheller,

16 Kan. 259 ; Hopkins v. Oilman, 47 Wis.

581 ; Tippecanoe Cy. Com'rs i-. Lafay-

ette, etc. U. Co., 50 Ind. 85, 116, 117;

Kwing V. Patterson, 35 id. 326; Winslow

)•. Winslow, 52 id. 8; Daly v. Nat. Life Ins.

Co., 64 id. 1 ; Joyce v. Whitney, 57 id. 550 :

Shoemaker v. Smith, 74 id. 71 ; Williams

V. Boyd, 75 id. 286 ; Wilson v. Madison, 55

Cal. 5 ; O'Connor v. Frasher, 53 id. 435 ;

Kreichbaum v. Melton, 49 id. 50. See also

I'illow y. Sentelle, 49 Ark. 430; Marriott

V. Clise, 12 Col. 561 ; Mahaska Cy. State

Bank v. Christ, 82 Iowa, 56; Grimes ?•.

Grimes, 88 Ky. 20; Demartin ;•. Albert,

68 Cal 277; jlarrison c. McCormick, 69

Cal. 616; Shain v. Belvin, 79 Cal. 262;

Goldman v. Bashore, 80 Cal. 146; Heil-

bron I'. Kings River & F. Canal Co., 76

Cal. 11; Wadswonh r. Wadsworth, 81

Cal. 182 ; Mott v. Mott, 82 Cal. 413 ; Van

Bibbor 1-. Hilton, 84 Cal. 585; Winter v.

McMillan, 87 Cal. 256 ; Blakely v. Blakely,

89 Cal. 324 ; Clark v. Taylor, 91 Cal. 552^

2 I^Powell V. Nolan "{H'02), 27 Wash.

318, 67 Pac. 712; Zarrs c. Keck (1894),

40 Neb. 456, 58 N. W. 933 ; Patrick Land

Co. V. Leavenworth (1894). 42 Neb. 715,

60 N. W. 9.54; Smith v. Allen (1901), 63

Neb. 74, 88 N. W. 155 ; Berdolt v. Berdolt

(1898), 56 Neb. 792, 77 N. W. 399; Putt

r. Putt (1897), 149 Ind. 30, 48 N. E. 356;

Fleishman r. Woods (1901), 135 Cal. 256,

67 Pac. 276 ; Barnacle v. Henderson (1894),

old man v. Ba hore, 0 al. 146; Heill In some of the e , tate
the cro bron v. King. Ri,·cr &. F. anal o., 76
co:npl int or petition i u. ed iu ca e
where, under the equity practice, the de- Cal. 11; "ad:1rnrch 1-. \\;ul worth, l
al. 1 2 ; ;\fott z:. ?ilott, 2 al. 413 · Yan
endant would be entitled to file a. ro uill, uut which do not fall under the Bibber i·. Hilton, 4 al. 5 5; \Yin r v.
~tatutory clefiuition -of a "counter-claim,
:\Ic:'.\lillan, i al. 256; Blakely i-. Bh k ly,
9 al. 32-1; Clark v. Taylor, 91 al. 55 .
or 1·here new partie must be brought in.
2 [Powell i: . ... Tolan ·(1902) 2i \Va h.
In a few of the e :·tate. h weYer, it would
:-:eeni that the cro ·-complaint or petition 31 , 6i Pac. 712; Zarr c. reek (I 94),
i - n. cd in all ca.e '"·here the d f nclant 40 "Xeb. 456, 5 ... W. 933; Patril·k Land
.eek· to obtain affirmative relief, o that
o. v. Leasenworth (1 9-1-}. -1-2 Xeb. 7 15,
the "counter-claim" i actually enforced 60 X. W. 954; ,'mith v. _\.llen (1901}, 63
. IV. 155 · Berdolt v. Berdolt
hy mean of uch a cro . -pl acli1w. The Neb . i 4
followi1w are ome of the most important (l 9 }, 56 ... Teb. 792 ~i ... W. 399; ut
rec·ent deci ion illn.tra.ting it u. e in Yari- -v. Putt (1 97) 149 Incl. 30, 4 .i. • E. 356;
ou
tate : :Jiarr v. Lewi , 31 Arl·. 203; Flei hman v. \liTood (1901) 135 al. 256,
Trapnall i·. Hill, 31 id. 3-1-6; Earle v. Hale, 67 Pac. 276 · Barnacle i-. H 11der on (l 94),
31 id. 4-3; Abbott v. l\Ionti, 3
all, 42 J. 'eb. 16 60 X. YV. 3 2 · Ila lam v.
5G; ::\I uti v. Bi ·hop, 3 id. 605; :J-Iills v. Ha.lamp 99), 19 .,..tah, 1, 56 Pa" 243;
Buttrick, 4 id. 53; Tucker v. '1 · oy, 3 Am. Exch. B ank v. David on (1 97), 69
4; Hatcher v. Brigo-., 6 re. 31; :Minn. 319 72 . \Y. 129: ~faxw 11 v.
id.
, · heland v. Erpelding, 6 id. 25 ; P ud v. Northern Tru t o. (l 97), 70 :\Iino. 334,
Waterloo Auric. Work , 50 Iowa, 596; 73 X. W. 1 i3 · Wbeeler, tc. 1'Ifg. o.
Kellogg 1:. heriu, 4 id. 299; Hervey v. v. Bjelland (1 96}, 9i Ia. 3i, 66 .. W.
•'avery, 4 id. 313; \Vrio-ht v. acheller,
5; r'evada Ditch o. t'. Benn tt (l 96),
16 Kan. 259 · Hopkin 1·. ilmau, -1-i \Yi . 30
re. 59, -1-~ Pac. 472; Hill v. 1''ri11k
5 l ; ipp canoe y.
om'r v. Lafay- (1 95), 11 IY h. 562 40 Pac. 12 ;
rm, trong v. Mayer ( 1903) T h. - ,
ette, tc. R
o., 50 Ind. 5, 116, 117 ;
Ewino- v. Patter ·on, 35 id. 326; Win low 95 l T _ W. 51 ; I\ollock t'- ~ 'ribner ( l i' ),
9 \Vi. l0-1-, i3 ... T. W . ~76; Ballin t:.
r Wi11 low,. 2 id. 8; Daly t .... at. Life In .
hitney, 5i irl. 550: . r rchaut·' •xch. Bank (I 95), 9 \1i i.
f'o., 64 id . 1; .Joyce v.
• 'h•>emaker v. mith 74 id. il · II illiam
27 ,61 .W.111.
1-. oyd, 75 id. 2 6; Wil on v. Madison, 55
"While th
<'al. 5;
'onuor v. Fra ber 5:3 id . 435;
Kreichbaum '" :\1elton, 49 id. 50.
also
l'illow u. • entell , 49 Ark. 430 · ~larriott
i•.
Ji e, 12 ol. 561 ; laha ka v. tate
Bank v. hri .t, 2 Iow, 5G; ,,.;im. v.
rirnP.-,
Ky. 20; ]) martin r. Alli rt,
' ('al 2i"i ; Harri on i·. ~I ormick, 6
C.11. GIG; 'li:i.iu v. Beh·in, 79 C'al. 2G2;
T.

T.

T.
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Thompson and Dice, tlie complaint alleged that the plaintiff, as

widow of C. Morris, deceased, was owner in fee of certain land,

namely, one undivided third of land, of which her husband died

seized; that she was induced by the frauds of Thompson, in a

manner particularly described, to execute to him a deed of all

her said lands : a second paragraph states the same deed to have

been made to Thompson by mistake; that the heirs of her hus-

band also conveyed all their interest in the same land to T. at

the same time, who thus held the title to the entire tract; that

therefore T. conveyed five-sevenths of said tract to the defendant

Dice, who took with knowledge of the plaintiff's claim; prayer,

that her deed to Thompson might be declared void, that T.'s deed

to D. might be set aside, so far as it conveyed her land, that her

title might be established, etc. Dice answered, first, denials;

and, second, that he took from T. in good faith, without notice,

and for a full consideration. Thompson, as an answer, inter-

posed a cross-complaint against Dice, in which, after denying

any fraud, he alleged that he took a conveyance from the heirs

of C. Morris, deceased, of all their interest, which was an un-
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divided two-thirds of the tract; that by mistake his own deed to

D. conveyed a greater interest in the land than that which the

heirs of C. M. had owned, and which was all that he had in-

tended to convey to D. ; prayer, that his deed to D. might be

reformed by correcting the mistake. Dice answered this cross-

complaint, denying its averments. On the trial, D. moved for

a separate trial of the issues between himself and T., which was

and the latter by the defendant : " Pine " matters in (juestion in tlie petition," the

Tree Lumber Co. v. McKinley (1901), 83 summons issued on the petition would be

Minn. 419, 86 N. W. 414. sufficient notice to sustain a judgment

Joyce V. Growney (1900), 154 Mo. 253, rendered on the cross-petition ; but where

55 S. W. 466 : " The statute limits the the cross-petition sets up matters which

new matter that may be pleaded in the are not drawn " in question in the peti-

answer to that which is a defence to tion," and seeics affirmative relief against

the ])laintiff's suit or else a counter-claim a co-defendant, of a nature different from

against hivi; it does not authorize a that sought in the petition, a summons to

counter-claim or an equitable cross-action the party to be charged, issued on the

of one defendant against another, except petition, will not confer jurisdiction to

as one defendant may be entitled to such render judgment on the cross-petition,

Tbomp n ancl Di e, the complaint all g c1 that the plaintiff a·
widow of . l\Ioni , deceas cl, wa., own r in f ~e of c rtain lan<l,
nam ly~ n undiviclecl third of land, of which her husban di cl
eiz ed; that he was in lucecl by the fraud· of Th mp on in a
mann r particularly de cribed, to xecute t him a cl eel of all
h r said lands : a second paragraph stat s the same deed to hav
be n made to Thompson by mi 'take ; that the heirs of h r hu ,_
band also conveyed all their interest in the same land to T. at
the same time, who thus helcl the title to the entire tract; that
therefore T. conveyed :five-sevenths of said tract to the clef nclant
Dice, who took with knowledge of the plaintiff's '"'laim; prayer,
that h er deed to Thompson might be declared Yoic1, tliat T. deed
to D. might be set aside, so far as it conveyed her land, that h r
title might be established, etc. Dice answered, first, denials;
and, second, that he took from T. in good faith, without n ice,
and for a full consideration. Thompson, as an an wer, interposed a cross-complaint against Dice, in which, after denying
any fraud, he alleged that h e took a conveyance from the heirs
of C. Morris, deceased, of all their interest, which was an undivided two-thirds of the tract; that by mistake his own deed to
D. conveyed a greater intere t in the land than that which the
heirs of C. M. had owned, and which was all that he had intended to convey to D. ; prayer, that his deed to D. might be
reformed by correcting the miRtake. Di1ce answered this cro complaint, denying its averments. On the trial, D. moved for
a separate trial of the issues between himself and T ., which wa

relief against another as will enable him especially wlien the cross-petition is filed

to make good his defence to the plaintiff's after the defendant thereto is in default

suit." for answer to the petition, and a sum-

Southward V. Jamison (1902), 66 Ohio mons on the cross-petition in such case is

St. 290, 64 N. E. 135: So long as a cross- necessary.]

petition in an action is strictly confined to

and the latter by the defendant:" P ine "matters in question in the pet.ition ," the
Tree Lumber Co. v . McKinley (1901), 83 summons issued on the petition wonld be
Minn. 419, 86 N. W. 414.
suffi cient notice to sustain a judgment
J oyce v. Growney (1900), 154 Mo. 253, rendered on the cross-pe ti tion; but where
55 S. W. 466: "The tatute limits th e the cross-petition set up matters which
n ew matter that may be pleaded in th e are not drawn " in question in the petianswer to that which is a defence to tion," and seeks affirmative relief again t
the plaintiff's suit or else a counter-claim ·a co-defendant, of a nature differeut from
against him; it does not authorize a that sought iu the petition, a summon to
the party to be charged, i sued on the
cou n ter~cl aim or an equitable cross-actiou
of one defendant against another, except petition, will not confer juri diction to
a one defendant may be entitled to uch render judgmeH on th cro ·-p tition,
relief against another as will enable him e pecially when the cro -petition i filed
to make goo<l his defence to the plaintiff'
after the defendaut thereto is in d fault
suit."
fo r answer to the petition, a1 <1 a umouthward v. Jamison (1902), 66 Ohio mon on the cross-petition in such ca e i
St. 290, 6-1- . E. 135: o long a· a cro · - necessary.]
petition in au action is strictly confined to
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refused. The court found from the evidence that the plaintiff's

e cour

deed to T. was a mistake; that T. had reconveyed to her by

quitclaim; that on the same day T. conveyed to D., and in

T.

that deed also there was a mistake, namely, that it conveyed

five-sevenths of the whole tract instead of five-sevenths of an

undivided two-thirds, which was the amount intended to be

conveyed; and a judgment was rendered reforming this deed

from T. to D. On an appeal by D. from this judgment, the

court held that the matters averred in the cross-complaint, and

the relief sought by it, were so intimately connected with the

which wa
c nv- · d ·
judCI' ent wa
reel reforminCI' th' deed
fr m T.
n · n appeal by
from thi ju gment, he
th ma ter a erre in the ro -compl int and
c ur hel
t e relief . OUCl'ht J it
ere 0 intimatel r conn ct
with h
ubject of he principal uit by Mr . Iorri
b t he
hole
miCl'ht be pro erly liti ·ate together; th t he ro -compl int
ta e a good c u e of ac ion a ai
D. and tha the 1 tt r w
not enti led o a epara e trial of the i ·ue rai ed by h '
wer
1
to i . It ·
lain from he fac a hey were found by the
rial court that he real object of he uit by :Jir . l\I rri wa
to et rid of Thomp on deed to Die . Thomp on' deed back
t her elf had purported to recon e the title to her but wa
partially inoperative b rea on of the ou tanding d d from
Thomp on to Dice which wa" at lea t a cl u upon her title .
B making both of the e per ons defendants, he force Thomp on to attack hi own deed to Dice. A the matters of difference
betwe n Thomp on and Dice were clo ely blende with her own
claim again
oth, and a her remed o directly depen e u on
th re ul of the conte t between the~e wo partie it eem minen 1 proper that hi triangular le al duel hould be fough in
o e conte t a wa done.
6 8 3 . * 0 . Illustrative Cases Continued.
noth r deci ion
ame court how when a cro -com laint by def ndant
in ·t other defendan will not be u taine .
a hari
a. Yi '
e one hundr d and
under he name of F rrner
the am nt of c ,rt, in notes
o · : ld on credi
amoun in
rm wa an a ociation h m
m 11 1 e r'. r h bu ·in
wa condu
mg ag n
ancl rn r en l y th director .
ne
of a ·ociai n forba e th
ur ha or le of
1 not
in uit were gi \·en by th managin
bought on
L

subject of the principal suit by Mrs. Morris, that the whole

might be properly litig-ated together; that the cross-complaint

stated a good cause of action against D., and that the latter was

not entitled to a separate trial of the issues raised hy his answer

to it.^ It is plain, from the facts as they were found by the

trial court, that the real object of the suit by Mrs. Morris was

to get rid of Thompson's deed to Dice. Thompson's deed back

to herself had purported to reconvey the title to her, but was

partially inoperative by reason of the outstanding deed from
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Thompson to Dice, which was at least a cloud upon her title.

By making both of these persons defendants, she forced Thomp-

son to attack his own deed to Dice. As the matters of difference

between Thompson and Dice were closely blended with her own

claims against both, and as her remedy so directly depended upon

the result of the contest between these two parties, it seems emi-

nently proper that this triangular legal duel should be fought in

one contest, as was done.

§ 683. * 807. Illustrative Cases Continued. Another decision

by the same court shows when a cross-complaint by defendants

against other defendants will not be sustained. Gasharie and

Davis sue one hundred and seven defendants, partners trading

under the name of "Farmers' Home Store," and seek to recover

the amount of certain notes given by the firm for the price of

goods sold on credit, amounting to several thousand dollars.

The firm was an association having a president, directors, and

memljers. The business was conducted by a managing agent,

and overseen by the directors. One of the articles of associa-

tion forbade the purchase or sale of goods on credit. The notes

in suit were given by the managing agent for goods bought on

1 Dice V. Morris, 32 Ind. 283.

ice v. Morri , 32 Ind. 2 3.

CRU S-C .\f PL.\.L. T.
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credit. Twenty-eight of the defendants put in an answer by

way of a cross -coniphiint against the directors and managing"

agent, who were also defendants. Tliis pleading stated the

articles of association, alleged a violation of tlieni by the di-

rectors and managing agent in the said purchase upon credit,

and prayed that the judgment in favor of the plaintiffs might

be rendered against said directors and agent in the iirst in-

stance, and enforced out of their property. The plaintiffs, and

the directors and agent defendants, demurred to this cross-

complaint. The court held that it stated no defence to the

plaintiff's action, and presented no case for relief against the

directors and agent. While the code provides that " judgment

ma}"- be rendered for or against one or more of several plaintiffs,

or for or against one or more of several defendants, and it may,

when the justice of the case requires it, determine the ultimate

rights of the parties on each side as between themselves," and

while the court has thus the power to settle disputes between the

defendants, it will not do so to the detriment of the plaintiff.^

§ 684. * 808. Code Provision in Indiana. Procedure. Iowa
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and California. The Code of Indiana expressly authorizes the

court to determine the rights of the parties as between them-

selves on each side, when the justice of the case demands it.

The mode of procedure is not pointed out, and therefore the

general methods of chancery must be adopted, modified by the

spirit of the code. When a defendant seeks relief against a

defendant as to matters not appearing on the face of the original

complaint, he must file a cross-complaint setting up the matters

on which he relies, making as defendants thereto such of his

co-defendants and others as are proper; and process is necessary

to bring them in. It is plain that there must be notice and pro-

cess to the persons against whom relief is sought on the cross-

complaint.2 "The only real difference between a complaint and

a cross-complaint is, that the first is filed by the plaintiff, and

the second by the defendant. Both contain a statement of the

facts, and each demands affirmative relief upon the facts stated.

In the making up the issues and the trial of questions of fact,

the court is governed b}^ the same principles of law and rules of

1 Mauning v. Gasharie, 27 Ind. 399. 2 Fletcher v. Holmes, 25 Ind. 458, 465,

See Indiana Code (2 G & H. 218), per Frazer C. J. ; Meredith i-. Lackey, 16

§ 368. lud. 1.

60

credit. Twenty-eight of the d f nda.nt put in an an:w ·r by
way of a cros -c mplaint again t th clir ctor: ancl managing·
ag nt, who w re al
def ndant . Thi ' pl ading tai d th
articl
of a ciation all g cl a violation of th rn by th
ir ector and managing ag nt in the aid purcha 'e upon r it
and prayed that th judgment in fav r of th plaintiff might
be rendered again t a.id dir ctor and ag nt in the fir t instance, and enforced ut of their prop rty. Th plaintiff , and
the director and agent lef ndaut , demurred to thi. cro complaint. The court held that it fatted no def nc to th
plaintiff's action, and presented no ca
for r lief again t the
directors and agent. vVbile the code provide , that "judgm nt
may be rendered for or again tone or m re of ·everal plaintiff ,
or for or against one or more of everal defendant , and it may,
when the ju tice of the case requires it, det rmine the ultimate
rights of the partie on each side a between them elve " and
while the court has thus the power to ettle disputes between the
defendants, it will not do so to the detriment of the plaintiff.I
§ 684. * 808. Code Provision in Indiana. Procedure. Iowa
and California.
The Code of Indiana expre 'sly authorizes th
court to determine the rights of the parties as between themselves on each side, when the justice of the ca e demand it.
The mode of procedure is not pointed out, and therefore the
general methods of chancery must be adopted, modified by the
spirit of the code. When a defendant seeks relief against a
defendant as to matters not appearing on the face of the original
complaint, he must file a cross-complaint setting up the matter
on which he relies, making as defendants thereto such of his
co-defendants and others as are proper; and process is neces ary
to bring them in. It is plain that there must be notice and process to the persons against whom relief is sought on the cro scomplaint.2 "The only real difference between a complaint and
a cross-complaint is, that the first is filed by the plaintiff, and
the econd by the defendant. Both c.ontain a statement of th
facts, and each demands affirmative relief upon the fact tated.
In the making up the issues and the trial of que tion of fa t,
the court is governed by the same principles of law and rul of
1 Manning v. Gasharie, 2i Ind. 399.
2 Fletcher v. Holme , 25 Ind. 458, 465,
See Indiana Code (2 G & H. 218} , per Frazer C. J.; 1eredith i- . Lackey, I 6
§ 368.
Incl . I.
60
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the

practice in the one case as in the other. When a defendant

th r. When a defendan
affirma.ti e r li f he b m
om the
h origin::i,l a
1
Th ' a

liles a cross-coraphiint, and seeks affirmative relief, he becomes

a plaintiff, and the plaintiff in the original action becomes the

defendant in the cross-complaint." ^ The same rules as to set-

ting out written instruments and copies thereof apply to cross-

petitions which are prescribed in reference to original petitions.^

Where, however, the cross-petition is based upon a writing

which it does not set out in full, but which is annexed to the

r

petition in the action, this is sufficient; the rule is practically

complied with.^ An answer being denominated a counter-

claim by the pleader, cannot in California be treated as a

cross-complaint.^

1 Ewing V. Pattison, 35 Ind. 326, 330.

- QBallin v. Merchants' Exch. Bank

(1895), 89 Wis. 278, 61 N. W. 1118 ; Pine

Tree Lumber Co. v. McKinley (1901), 83

n t et ut in
t:pe
p i ion in the acb n, tbi
uffi i nt · th
i pra ui all
mpli d with . 8
n an er b ing deno inated a c unterlaim by the pleader, cannot in California be treated as a
ro -complaint. 4

Minu. 419, 86 N. W. 414; Smith v. Allen

(1901), 63 Neb. 74, 88 N. W. 155; Lang-
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ford V. Langford (1902), 136 Cal. 507, 69

Pac. 235 ; Hargreaves v. Tennis (1901), 63

Neb. 356, 88 N. W. 486 ; Mills v. Fletcher

(1893), 100 Cal. 142,34 Pac. 637 ; VVitten-

brock V. Parker (1894), 102 Cal. 93, 36

Pac. 374.

Leach v. Rains (1897), 149 Ind. 152, 48

N. E. 858 : " A cross-complaint, like an

original complaint, must state facts suffi-

cient to entitle the pleader to some affirm-

ative relief, and it cannot be aided by the

allegations of other pleadings in the ac-

tion." Schmidt f.Zahrndt (1897), 148 Ind.

447, 47 N. E. 335 : " A cross-complaint

must be sufficient within itself, without aid

from any otiier pleadings in the case. . . .

Yet for matters of mere description and

identification many of the allegations of

the complaint may be referred to." See

also Dudenhofer v. Johnson (1895), 144

Ind. 631, 43 N. E. 808; Island Coal Co. r.

Streitlemier (1894), 139 Ind. 83, 37 N. E.

340-3

3 Coe V. Lindley, 32 Iowa, 437, 444;

Ilyder v. Thomas, 32 Iowa, 56.

* McAbee y.^Randall, 41 Cal. 136.

Ewing v. Patti on, 35 Ind. 326, 330.
[Ballin v. l\Ierchant ' Exch. Bank
{l 95), 9 Wi . 27 , 61 . W. 111 ; Pine
Tree Lumber Co. v. McKinley {1901), 3
linn. 419, 6 N. W . 414; mith v. Allen ·
{1901), 63 Neb. 74,
. W. 155; Langford v. Langford (1902), 136 Cal. 507, 69
Pa . 235; HargreaYe i. Tennis (1901), 63
eb. 356,
N. W. 4 6 ; fills v. Fletcher
{I 91), 100 Cal. 142, 34 Pac. 637; Wittenbrock v. Parker (1 94), 102 Cal. 93, 36
Pac. 3i4.
Leach v. Rains {l 97), 149 Ind. 152, 48
N . E. 5 : "A cro -complaint, like an
riginal complaint, mu. t state fa t ufficient to entitle the pleader to some affirm1
2

ative relief, and it cannot be aided by the
allegation of other pleading in the action."
hmidt v. Zahrndt (1 97), 14 Ind.
447, 47 N. E. 335: '
cro -complaint
mu t be ufficient within it elf, with ut aid
from any other pleading in tb ca e. . ..
Yet for matters of mere de cription and
id ntification many of the all gation of
the complaint ma be referred to.'
ee
al o Dud nhofer v. John on ( l 95), 144
Ind. 631 , 43 N. R 86 ; I land
al Co. i•.
treitlemier (1 94), 139 Ind. 3, 3i N. E.
340.]
3 Coe v. L indley 32 Iowa, 437, 444 ;
Ryder v. Thomas, 32 Iowa, 56.
4 McA bee v._ andall, 41 Cal. 136.
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ACTIONS — continued.

CTI

' - contw ued.

restrictive construction by one school, 6, 7.

re tricti e con truction by one chool, 6, 7.
liberal and c rrect b the other - 1 .
distinc ion between legal and equitable right or causes of action,
no aboli hed
di tinction between legal and equitabl reliefs not aboli bed, 9.
distinction etween abolished, and one action
tablished for all
righ and relief 10-13.
octrine of unit in procedure appli d to pleading 14 15.
union of legal and equitable right and remedies in civil, 16-25.
union of both legal and equitable cause of action, and granting of
both legal and eq uitabl relief , 17 1 .
union of both cause of action and granting of legal relief only,
19, 20.
legal can e of action stated, and legal relief gran ed, where equitable
a k d, 11, -1.
equitable ca.u e of action tated, and equitable relief granted, where
legal asked, 11 22
equitable or 1 al relief prayed for but not granted where corresponding cau e of action not pleaded 23.
use of equi table right in upport of a leo-al cau e of action, 24.
mod of trial of 1 al and equitable i sue when united, 25.
ee D E FEXCE .
equitabl defence to le al 26-:j ;-.
legal remedy on equitable own ership or ri ht, 36-44.
action b equitable owner of land for pos ·es ion 36-41.
by one par ner again t another for a hare of firm property, 42.
special · partition, trover, 4 ..
nature of civil and es ential diff rence betw en them 4" -49.
diff rence are not in form of, bL1t in the primary rights and remedies, 45-47 .
right f lection between e contractu and ex delicto 48, 387.
impropriety of retaining f rmer nam of, 49.
by or again ' t one a representative for all other interest d, 2 5-29
ee

liberal and correct by the other, S-13.

distinction between legal and equitable rights or causes of action,

not abolished, 8.

distinction between legal and equitable reliefs, not abolished, 9.

distinction between abolished, and one action established for all

rights and reliefs, 10-13.

doctrine of unity in procedure applied to pleading, 14, 15.

imion of legal and equitable rights and remedies in civil, 16-25.

union of both legal and equitable causes of action, and granting of

both legal and equitable reliefs, 17, 18.

union of both causes of action and granting of legal relief only,

19, 20.

legal cause of action stated, and legal relief granted, where equitable

asked, 11, 21.

equitable cause of action stated, and equitable relief granted, where

legal asked, 11, 22
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equitable or legal relief prayed for, but not granted, where corre-

sponding cause of action not pleaded, 23.

use of equitable right in support of a legal cause of action, 24.

mode of trial of legal and equitable issues when united, 25.

equitable defences to legal, 26-35. See Dkfexces.

legal remedy on equitable ownership or right, 36-44.

action by equitable owner of land for possession, 36-41.

by one partner against another for a share of firm property, 42.

special ; partition, trover, 43.

nature of civil and essential differences between them, 45-49.

differences are not in forms of, but in the primary rights and reme-

dies. 4.5-47.

right of election between ex contractu and ex delicto, 48, 387.

impropriety of retaining former names of, 49.

by or against one as representative for all others interested, 285-298. See

Parties.

against persons severally liable on the same instrument, 299-307. See

Liabilities.

ADMINISTRATORS. See Executors and Administrators.

as parties, page 353, n.

PARTIE .

ADMISSIONS IN PLEADINGS,

against person

general rules respecting, page 736, n.

everally liable on the same in trument, 299-307.

LIABILITIE .

AGENCY,

how to plead, page 608, n.

AND ADMIL I TRATOR •

AGENTS. See Principal and Agent.

AGREED PRICE, ACTION FOR,

how to plead, page 668, n.

A

6 n.

ALLEGATIONS,

in foreclosure suits, 238.

in suits by or against one on behalf of all interested, 287, 288, 298.

where causes of action arise out of the same transaction, etc., .372.

NT.

I,

:!3

t neon l» h. lf f all in re ted 2 7, 28 , 29 .
out f t be ame tran ·a ti n etc.. 72.

ee
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AhLEGATIO:SS — CO nthtued.

sufficiency or insufficiency of, cases illustrating, 427-430.

of.piomise, whether proper in actions on implied contracts, 431-435.

insufficient, imperfect, incomplete, or informal, how objected to, 442-444.

redundant, immaterial, and irrelevant, what are, and how objected to,

445, 440.

proofs must correspond with, 417-455. See Proofs.

of one part of pleading aiding those of another, 466, 586.

admitted by failure to deny, 469, 508.

immaterial, nature of, and effect of denial of the same, 469, 508.

qualified admission of, effect of, 469.

admission of, by one of several defendants, effect of, 409.

effect of admission of, in one part of answer on denial in another, 469,

600.

defective, supplied by answer, 470.

effect of general denial depends upon plaintiff's, 546, 547.

what, necessary in counter-claims in different cases, 673-675.

See Pleadings; Complaint; Answer.
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ALTERATION OF INSTRUMENT,

is a defence of new matter, page 817, n.

ALTERED CONTRACT,

how to plead, page G69, n.

ALTERED INSTRUxMENT,

how to plead, page 609, n.

ALTERNATIVE,

allegations in the, page 600, n.

AMENDMENTS,

of parties, 308-325. See Parties.

of pleadings, 456, 457. ,

provisions of codes relating to, 329, 481.

ANSWER,

affirmative equitable relief in legal action on mere, 35.

nonjoinder or defect of plaintiffs, when raised by, 123, 124.

misjoinder when raised by, 128-133.

nonjoinder or defect of defendants, when raised by, 188, 189.

misjoinder, when raised by, 191, 193.

misjoinder of causes of action, when objected to by, 337, 342, 343.

principles of reformed pleading apply to, containing affirmative matter,

410, 563-565.

allegations not controverted by, admitted, 469, 508.

qualified admissions by, effect of, 469.

admissions by one of several defendants, effect of, 469.

effect of admissions in one part of, on denial in another, 469, 600.

defective complaints aided by, 470.

rules and doctrines concerning, 471-684.

provisions of codes relating to, 472-482.

in general, 472.

union of defences, 473.

counter-claims and set-offs, 474, 475.

ALLEGATIONS - continued.
sufficiency or in ufficiency of, ca s illu trating, 427 :30.
o:f.promi e, whether prop r in action on implied ontracts, 4:31-435.
insufficient, imp rfect, incompl te, 01· informal, how bj t d to, 12- 444.
redundant, immat rial, and irr leva.nt, what ar , and how objecte<l to,
445, 446.
ee 'PROOF • •
proofs must corre pond with, 447-45:'.
of one part of pleading aiding those of an ther, 466, r.. 6.
admitted by failure to d ny, 469, 50 .
immaterial, nature of, and ffect of denial of the sam , 469, 508.
qualified ad mi ion of, effect of, 469.
admission of, by one of several defendants, effect of, 469.
effect of admission of, in one part of answer on denial in another, 4.69,
600.
defective, supplied by answer, 470.
effect of general denial depend upon plaintiff's, 546, 547.
what, necessary in counter-claims in different ca es, 673-675.
See PLEA DINGS; CoMPLArnT; AN WER.
ALTERATION OF I"N"STRUMENT,
is a defence of new matter, page 817, n.
ALTERED CONTRACT,
how to plead, page 669, n.
ALTERED INSTRUMENT,
how to plead, page 669, n.
ALTERNATIVE,
allegations in the, page 600, n.
AMENDMENT ,
of parties, 308-325. See PARTIES.
of pleadings, 456, 457. ,
provisions of codes relating to, 329, 481.
ANSWER,
affirmative equitable relief in legal action on mere, 35.
nonjoinder or defect of plaintiffs, when raised by, 123, 124.
misjoinder when raised by, 12 -133.
nonjoinder or defect of defendants, when raised by, 1 8, 1 9.
misjoinder, when raised by, 191, 193.
misjoinder of causes of action, when objected to by, 337, 342, 343.
principles of reform ed pleading apply to, containing affirmative matter,
410, 56:3-565.
allegations not controverted by, admitted, 469, 508.
qualified admissions by, effect of, 169.
admissions by one of several defendants, effect of, 469.
effect of admis ions in one part of, on denial in another, 469, 600.
defective complaints aided by, 470.
rules and doctrines concernincr, 471-684.
provisions of codes r elating to, 472-482.
in general, 472.
union of defences, 473.
counter-claims ancl et-offs, 474, 475.

~a
950 INDEX.

(THE REFERE CES ARE TO THE

ECTION

EXCEPT WHEN OTHERWlll& INDICATED.)

[the references are to the sections except when otherwise indicated.]

AXSWEll — continued.

cross-complaints, 476.

sham and irrelevant, stricken ont on motion, 476.

pleadings responsive to; demurrer, reply, 477-479.

special [jrovisions in certain codes, 480.

amendments, 481.

general requisites of, and rules applicable to all, 483-500.

cla.s3es of; denials, new matter, 484.

questions of form, and those of substance, 485-496.

when the different questions arise, 485, 486.

how taken advantage of ; general and special demurrer, 487.

defective in form distinguished from those demurrable, 488, 489.

objections to form, how waived, 488, 491.

defective, cured by motion, 487, 490.

decisions illustrating, 490-496.

joint, by several defendants, 497.

partial defences, 498-500.

to be pleaded, 498, 569-572.
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how pleaded, 499. .")00.

defence of denials, 501-561. See Denials.

defence of new matter, 562-590. See New Matter.

union of defences in the same, 591-601. See Defences.

counter-claims, set-offs, and cross-complaints, 002-684. See Counter-

claims, Set-offs, and Cross-Complaints.

AXTICIPATING DEFENCES,

rule as to, page 069, n.

ARTICLES OF INCORPORATION,

Al'T' " 'E l - co11li1111ecl .
er -' m1l ai1L, 476.
b m an irrelevant tricken ont on motion, 47
pleadinCY r pon iv to· d murr r reply, 477-479.
speci l pro isi n iu certain cod 4 0.
am udm nt , 1.
gener 1 r qui ites of and rule. applicable to all, 4 3-500.
cla. e f · denial new ma t r, 4 4.
que tion of form, and tho e f ub tance, 4 5-496.
when th different question arise, 4 5, 4 6.
how taken dv ntage of· gen ral and pecial demurrer, 487.
defecti in form di tingui bed from those demurrable, 488, 4 9.
objection to form how waived, 48 , 491.
defective, cured by mo ion 4 7, 490.
decision illustrating 490-496 .
joint, by everal d feudants, 497.
partial defence , 498-500.
to be pleaded, 49 , 569-572.
bow pleaded 499, 500.
def enc of d 11iaL 501- -61.
ee DENIAL
defence of new mater, 562-:-90 .
e NF.w MATTER.
union of defence in the ame, 591-601.
ee DEFE c°E
counter-claim , t-off , and cro -complaints, 602-684.
ee COUNTERCLAIM , ET-OFF
and
-COMPLAINTS.

how to plead, page 669, n.

ASSAULT AND BATTERY,

joinder of plaintiffs, 148.

plaintiffs in suits for, to wife, 153, 154, 156, 157» 159.

joinder of defendants in actions for, 208.

defendants in suits against wife for, 221.

A

ASSIGNMENT,

of things in action at common law, 62.

not affected by code provisions, 63.

of things in action, effect of, upon defences thereto, 82-98.

provisions of codes relating to, 82.

defences to, are not counter-claims, 83, 95, 628.

former rules re-enacted by the codes, 84.

rule as to defences in favor of tlie debtor, 85.

thereto

equities between successive assignors and assignees, 86-89.

2-98.

cases illustrating, 87-89.

doctrine of estoppel against assignor, 88, 89.

summary of the discussion, 90.

demands against assignor, set-off in action by assignee, 91-97.

other defences not .set-offs, 98.

6-89.

plaintifts in suits to set aside, for benefit of creditors, 182.

how to plead, page 070, n.

See Assignors and Assignees.

fit of creditors, 1
I

Nl£E .

I NIJE.- .
[the references are to the sections except when otherwise indicated.]

ASSIGNMENT FOR BENEFIT OF CllEDlTOliS,

how to plead, page 670, n.

ASSIGNORS AND ASSIGNEES,

assignees of things in action to sue in their own names, 63-75, 165.

when the assignment is absolute, 61.

when equitable, 05, 73, 149.

when of negotiable paper, 66, 69, 78.

when conditional or partial, 70, 75.

illustrations, 71, 72.

assignor to be joined in certain States, 73, 165, 217, 236, 261.

when the assignment is made pending action, 74.

equities between successive, 86-89.

cases illustrating, 87-89.

doctrine of estoppel against assignor, 88, 89.

demands against assignor set off in action by assignee, 91-97.

but are not counter-claims, S3, 95, 628.

defences other than set-off, when available against assignee, 98.

parties in suits by assignees of creditors and in bankruptcy, 175, 253, n.
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against assignees of creditors, 182, 254, 255, 291.

against assignees in bankruptcy, 253, n.

assignees of judgment debtors, defendants in creditors' suits, 245, 246.

defendants in suits against corporations by assignees of stock, 261.

assignors not necessary defendants in suits by asi^ignees to foreclose

securities, 280.

assignees of mortgages defendants in suits to redeem, 284.

See Assignments.

ASSUMPSIT,

action of, origin and appropriate use, 406.

use of forms of pleading in, 15, 436-438.

right to waive tort and bring, 48, 387, 458-464. See ToRTS.

impropriety of present use of word, 49.

nature of pleading in, at common law, 404.

ASSUMPTION OF RISK,

is a defence of new matter, page 817, n.

ATTORNEY, QUALIFICATION OF,

how to plead, page 670, n.

AWARD,

defence of arbitration and, new matter, 578.

B.

BANKRUPTCY,

parties in suits by or against assignees in, 175, 253, n.

defence of discharge in, new matter, 588.

BAR,

95 1

[TRE REFERENCES ARE TO THE SE CT IONS i! XOEPT WlfEN OTRERW ISE INOIC .\TED.)

INDEX. 951

A

IGNMENT FOR BENEFIT OF T EDIT 1 ,
how to plead, page 670, n.
ASSIGN RS AND A IG EE ,
as ignees of things in action to u in their own names, 63-75, 165.
when the a ignmenL i ab olute, 64.
when equitabl , 65, 73, 149.
when of negotiable paper, 66, 69, 7 .
when conditional or partial, 70, 75.
illustrations, 71, 72.
assignor to be joined in certain tates, 73, 165, 217, 236, 261.
when the assignment i made pending action, 74.
equities between succe sive, 86-89.
cases illustrating, 87-89.
doctrine of estoppel again ta signor, 8, 89.
-demands against assignor set off in action by assignee, 91-97.
but are not counter-claims, 83, 95, 628.
defences other than set-off, when available again t a signee, 98.
parties in suits by as ignees of creditors and in bankruptcy, 175, 253, n.
against assignees of creditors, 182, 254, 255, 291.
against a ign es in bankruptcy, 253, n.
assignees of judgment debtors, defendants in creditors' suits, 245, 246.
defendants in suits against corporations by assignees of stock, 261.
assignors not necessary defendants in suits by as ignees to foreclose
securities, 280.
assignees of mortgages defendants in suits to redeem, 284.
See ASSIGNMENTS.
ASSUMPSIT,
action of, origin and appropriate use, 406.
use of forms of pleading in, 15, 436-438.
right to waive tort and bring, 48, 387, 458-464. See TORTS.
impropriety of present use of word, 49 .
nature of pleading in, at common law, 404.
ASSUMPTION OF RISK,
is a defence of new matter, page 817, n.
ATTORNEY, QUALIFICATION OF,
how to plead, page 670, n.
AWARD,
defence of arbitration and, new matter, 578.

extent of pleas in, at common law, and change made by codes, 498, 569,

570.

difference between pleas in, and those in abatement under the codes, 574.

joining of pleas in abatement with those in, 597.

B.
BANKRUPTCY,
parties in suits by or against assignees in, 175, 253, n.
defence of discharge in, new matter, 588.
BAR,
extent of plea in, at common law, and change made by code , 49 , 569
570.
difference between pleas in, and those in abatement under the codes, 574.
joining of pleas in abatement with those in, 597.

9 2

IX DEX.

952 INDEX.

[the references are to the sections except when otherwise INDICATED.3

(Tl'!B RRFERENCES ABE TO THE

BILL

E.

ECTlON

'ee

EXCEPT WHEN OTHERWISE INDICATED. )

EGOTIABLE

p APER.

BILLS OF EXCHANGE. See Negotiable Paper.

BONA FIDES,

is a defence of new matter, page 817, n.

E
i a defence of new matter, page 17, n.

BOND,

how to plead, page 670, n.

BREACH OF COVENANTS,

how to plead, page 670, n.

BREACH OF PROMISE TO MARRY,

BOXD
how to lead, pa e 670, n.
REA H F
VE
NT,
ho

to plead page 670 n.

how to plead, page 670, n.

BREACH OF WARRANTY,

how to plead, page 670, n.

c.

CANCELLATION,

defendants in action for, 276-278.

BREA H
how to
BREA H
bow oo

F PROMI E T

MARRY,

plead, page 670, n.

F WARRANTY,
6-o, n.

plead, page

CAPACITY,

how to allege, page 670, n.

c.

CAPACITY TO SUE,

meaning of want of, 124
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CAUSES OF ACTION,

A CELLATION

defendant in action for, 276-278.

no change made by reformed procedure in, 8.

union of both legal and equitable, and granting of both legal and equitable

reliefs, 17, 18.

granting of legal relief only, 19, 20.

APA ITY,
how to allege, page 670, n.

APA ITY TO

'"E

legal stated, and legal reliefs granted, where equitable asked, 11, 21.

equitable stated, and equitable reliefs granted, where legal asked, 11, 22.

equitable or legal reliefs prayed for, but not granted where coiTespond,

not pleaded, 23.

use of equitable rights in support of legal, 24.

mode of trial when legal and equitable are united, 25.

joinder of, 3:51, 309.

provisions of the codes, 332-334.

misjoinder of, bow may occur and be objected to, 336-345.

to be separately stated, 336.

how objected to; demurrer, answer, waiver, 337.

effect of sustaining objection, 337-339.

forms of misjoinder of, 340.

proper, mingled in one count, 341.

separately stated, but improperly joined, 342, 343.

improper, mingled in one count, 344, 345.

meaning of "cause of action,"' 340-348, 412-414, page 461, n.

not defined by the courts, 346.

elements which form, 347, 348, 412-414.

distinctions between, and "object of action," and remedial

right, 347, 348.

test to determine number of, 349-351, page 467, n.

splitting, page 470, n.

meaning of want of 124

CAU ES OF ACTION,
no change made by reformed procedure in 8.
union of both legal and equitable, and granting of both legal and equitable
reliefs 17, 1 .
grantiug of legal relief only, 19, 20.
legal tated, and legal reliefs granted where equitable asked 11, 21.
equitabl stated, and equitable relief granted, where legal asked, 11 22.
equitable or legal reliefs prayed for, but not granted where colTespond,
not pleaded 23.
use of equitable rights in support of legal, 24.
mode of trial when legal and equitable are united, 25.
joinder of, 331, 399.
provi ions of the code , 332-334.
misjoinder of, how may occur and be objected to, 336- 345.
to be separately s ated, 336 .
how objected to; demurrer, answer, waiver, 337.
effect of u taining objection, 337- 339.
forms of mi joinder of 340.
proper rniugled in one count, 41.
separately tated, but improperly joined, 342 343.
improper mingled in ne count,
4 3 5.
meaning of cau e f acti n, 46-34 , 412-414 page 461, n .
not defined by th cour s, 346.
elemen whi h form . 47, 348, 412-414.
di. tine ion be w en, and ' bject of action, ' and remedial
right · 47 4 .
test to
rmin nun ber of, 349-351, page 4.67, n.
splitting pag 47 , n.

INDEX. 953

[the BEFERENCES ABE TO THE SECTIONS EXCEPT WHEN OTHERWIBB INDICATED.]

CAUSES OF ACnO'S — contiyiued.

cases where but one, stated, but several reliefs demanded, 352-356,

page 470, n.

■when arising out of tlie same transaction, or transactions connected

with the subject of action, 357-372.

nature of cases described by this clause, 357, 358.

judicial interpretation of clause, 359-365.

meaning of " transaction," 366-368.

meaning of " subject of action," 369.

examples, 370, 371.

necessary allegations by plaintiff, 372.

•when joined must affect all parties, 373-384.

need not affect all alike, 374.

examples of misjoinder, 375-378.

must affect all plaintiffs as well as defendants, 377.

examples of proper joinder, 379.

multifariousness, doctrine of, discussed, 380.

Mr. Calvert's positions examined, 381-384.
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■when against a single defendant, or against all defendants alike,

385-395.

in actions on contract, 386, 387.

election between tort and contract, 387.

in actions relating to lands, 388.

for injuries to property, 389.

for injuries to character, 390.

special cases, 391.

illustrations of law of Iowa and Indiana, 392.

examples of improper joinder, 394, 395.

must affect all parties in the same capacity, 396.

miscellaneous cases, 397-3.99.

distinction between legal and equitable, 415, 416.

nature of facts constituting, 417-419.

facts only, constituting, to be pleaded, 13, 347, 418, 424, 425.

material facts only, constituting, to be pleaded, 411, 420-422, 426.

ex contractu alleged, and ex delicto proved, 452-455.

separate, how stated in complaint, 466.

one, in two or more different counts, 467.

manner of demurring when several, 468, 497.

prayer for relief whether forms a part of, and effect on, 11, 21, 22, 471.

counter-claims must be, 614.

CESTUI QUE TRUST. See Trustee.

CHAMPERTY,

is a defence of new matter, page 817, n.

CHATTELS,

action analogous to trover by equitable owner of, 43.

plaintiffs in actions concerning, 138-143.

of wife, plaintiffs in actions concerning, 151-154.

parties in equitable suits concerning, by holders of joint rights, 169.

defendants in actions concerning, 198, 199, 210, 211.

in actions concerning wife's, 220, 222, 223.

954
954 INDEX.

(THE RRPEBBNCBS ARE TO T HB

ECTION

EXCEPr WHEN OTHBRWI.SR INDICATED. )

[thb kepb&bnces are to thb sections except when otebbwue indicated.]

CHATTELS — continued.

joinder of causes of action relating to, 389, 397.

defences admissible under general denial in actions for goods sold, 552,

585.

in actions for conversion of, 55;3, 580, 581.

in actions to recover possession of, 5;38, 554.

defences when new matter in actions to recover possession of, 554, 579.

counter-claims in actions to recover possession of, 643, 667.

in actions for goods sold, 655.

COLLATERAL SECURITY,

is a defence of new matter, page 817, n.

COMMITTEES,

of lunatics, etc., suits by, in their own names, 110.

defendants in suits against, 253, n.

COMMON COUNTS. See Pleadings.

COMMON LAW,

pleadings under, 14.

COMPLAINT OR PETITION,
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provisions of codes relating to, 326-330.

joinder of causes of action in, 3;Jl-399. See Causes of Action.

general principles of pleading, 400-464. See Pleading.

form of, 465^71.

separate causes of action, how stated in, 466.

one cause of action in two or more counts, 467.

demurrer, joint or separate, where several causes of action, or several

defendants, 468.

■what allegations of, admitted by failure to deny, 469.

qualified admission of, allegations of, 469.

defective allegations of, supplied by answer, 470.

prayer for relief, 471.

COMPROMISE,

is a defence of new matter, page 817, n.

CONCLUSIONS OF LAW. See Law.

CONDITION IN CONTRACT,

is a defence of new matter, page 817, n.

CONDITIONS PRECEDENT,

how to plead, page 071, n.

CONDITIONS SUBSEQUENT,

necessity for negativing, page 672, n.

CONSENT AND CONNIVANCP;

is a defence of new matter, page 817, n.

CONSIDERATION,

necessity of pleading, page 672, n.

CONSTRUCTION OF PLEADINGS,

rules as to, page 592, n.

CONTRACT LIMITING LIABILITY,

is a defence of new matter, page 817, n.

HA.
EL ' - co11tinued.
joinder of cau e. of cti n relating to, 3 9, 397.
d fence admi ible under general denial in actions for goods sold, 552,
5 5.
in action for conv r ion of, 55· 580, 5 1.
in action to recov r p e ion of, 53 , 5"4.
defence when new matter in action to recover possession of, 554, 579.
counter-claim in actiou to reco er possession of, 643, 667.
in action for oods old 655.
C LL TE AL 'E URITY,
is a defence of new matter, page 817, n.
C M HTTEE ,
of lunatic , etc. uit by, in their own names, 110.
defendants in uit again t, 253, n.
C MM
OUNT .
ee PLEADINGS.
COMMO
L W,
pleading under, 14.
C MPLAINT R PETITION,
provision of codes relating to, 326-330.
joinder of cau es of action in, 331-399.
ee CAu ES OF ACTION.
general princi pl of pleading, 400-464.
ee PLEADING.
form of 465-471.
separate cau e of action, how stated in, 466.
on e cause of action in two or more counts, 467.
demurrer, joint or separate, where several cause of action, or several
defendant , 468.
what allegations of, admitted by failure to deny, 469.
qualified admis ion of, allegations of, 469.
defective allegations of, supplied by answer, 470.
prayer for relief, 471.
COMPROMI E,
is a defence of new matter, page 817, n.
CONCLUSI N OF L '\V. ' ee LAW.
C NDITI
ONTRACT,
i a defence of n w matter, page 817, n.
CO DITI
RECEDENT,
lead, page 671, n.
C
ITI
U E
ENT,
nece ity fo r negativing, page 672, n.
C .. ' ENT A
N IV
17, n.
4..

c
c
C

ILITY,
is a defence of n w ma ter, pag 17, n.

INDEX.
INDEX. 955

[the eeperences are to the sections except when otherwise indicated.]

CONTRACTS,

equitable defences to action.s on, ol.

actions by those for whose benefit, are made with others, 77.

actions by those with whom, or in whose names, are made for otiiers, 78,

103-105.

actions by holders of joint rights arising from, 14;i-145.

actions by holders of several rights arising from, 146.

actions at common law against persons jointly liable on, 144.

under the reformed procedure, 146-205.

actions against persons jointly and severally liable on, 206.

actions against persons severally liable on, 207.

wife's, defendants in suits on, 21.9, 220, 223.

joinder of causes of action arising from, 385-387.

ari.sing from torts with those arising from, 392, 394, 395.

allegation of promise on implied, improper, 431-435.

use of common counts in actions on, 436-438.

cause of action arising from, alleged, and tort proved, 452-455.

election to waive tort and sue on, 48, 387, 458-464. See Touts.
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what defences to be specially pleaded in actions on, 583-586.

counter-claims where there is an election between tort and, 646, 648,

656, n„ 664, 677.

counter-claims arising from, set forth by plaintiff, 653-656, 659.

counter-claims where plaintiff's claim is on, and defendant's for tort, aris-

ing from the same, 660-663.

where plaintiff's claim is for tort, and defendant's on, 664, 665.

counter-claims arising from other, in suits on, 671-679. See Specific

Performance.

CONTRIBUTION,

defendants in actions for, 253, n., 282.

[ TRE REFERENCES ARE TO THE SECTIONS EXCEPT WHEN OTKERWfBE INOIOA TBO.]

CONTRACTS,
equiLabl defence to action . on, . 1.
action · by those for who e ben fit, are made wiLh others, 77.
actions by those with whom, or in who e nam s, ar made for others, 78,
103-105.
actions by holders of joint right arising from, 143-14.5.
actions by holders of several rights arising from, 146.
actions at common law against per ons jointly liable on, 144.
under the reformed procedure, 146-205.
actions against persons jointly and severally liable on, 206.
actions against persons severally liable on, 207.
wife' , defendants in suits ou, 219, 220, 223.
joinder of causes of action arising from, 385-387.
arising from torts with those arising from , · 92, 394, 395.
allegation of promise on implied, irnprope1·, 431- 435.
use of common counts in action on, 436-438.
cause of action arising from, alleged, and tort proved, 452-455.
election to waive tort and sue on, 48, 387, 458-464. See TORTS.
what defences to be specially pleaded in actions on, 583- 586.
counter-claims where there is an election between tort and, 646, 648,
656, n., 664, 677.
counter-claims arising from, set forth by plaintiff, 653-656, 659.
counter-claims where plaintiff's claim is on, and defendant's for tort, arising from the same, 660-663.
where plaintiff's claim is for tort, and defendant's on, 664, 665.
counter-claims arising from other, in suits on, 671-679. See SPECIFIC
PERFORMANCE.

CONTRIBUTORY NEGLIGENCE,

necessity and manner of negativing, page 673, n.

is a defence of new matter, page 817, n.

CONVERSION,

how to allege, page 673, n.

CORPORATE EXISTENCE,

necessity of alleging, page 674, n.

CORPORATION BY-LAW,

is a defence of new matter, page 818, n.

CORPORATIONS,

doctrine of set-off in case of insolvent, 96.

suits by certain municipal, 107.

against, 217.

demurrer on ground of legal capacity of, to sue, 125, n.

parties in actions against stockholders of, 146, 184, 218, 259.

in actions by stockholders, 258, 260.

suits by and against quasi, and certain other, 107, 217.

defendants in suits to wind up, 257, 258.

in suits against, by assignees of stock, 281.

denying existence of, 559.

95G

CONTRIBUTION,
defendants in actions for, 253, n., 282.
CONTRIBUTORY NEGLIGENCE,
necessity and rnanirnr of negativing, page 673, n.
is a defence of new matter, page 817, n.
CONVERSION,
how to allege, page 673, n.
CORPORATE EXISTENCE,
necessity of alleging, page 674, n.
CORPORATION BY-LAW,
is a defence of new matter, page 818, n.
CORPORATIONS,
doctrine of set-off in case of insolvent, 96.
suits by certain municipal, 107.
against, 217.
demurrer on ground of legal capacity of, to sue, 125, n.
parties in actions against stockholders of, 146, 184, 218, 259.
in actions by stockholders, 258, 260.
suits by and against quasi, and certain other, 107, 217.
defendants in suits to wind up, 257, 258.
in suits against, by assignees of stock, 261.
denying existence of, 559.
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[the references are to the sectioks except when otherwise indicated.]

COUNTER-CLAIMS,

amount as affecting jurisdiction, j)age 8G7, n.

dismissal of action as affecting, paye 867, n.

defence to actions by assignees of things in action not, 83, 95, 628.

3, 95, 628.

in what States replies are necessary to, 478, 479.

classes of, 602, 603.

provisions of codes relating to, 474, 47"i, 602.

cross-demands by the former system, 604-608.

set-off, 605, 606.

recoupment, 607, 608.

reduction of damages in quantum meruit and quantum valebant, 609.

general description, nature, objects, and uses of, (510-624.

embraces set-off and recoupment, 610-612, 619, n.

other demands embraced, 613, 619, n., 622.

must be a cause of action, G14, 629.

whether valid claims by plaintiff are implied by, 615.

must be in favor of defendant, 616, 62r>-627.

must exist against plaintiff, 617, 628-630.
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subject-matter of, 618.

judicial constructions of, 619-623.

must defeat or interfere with plaintiff's recovery, 620, 621, 623.

how pleaded, 410, 565, 614, 624.

parties iu their relations with, 625-638.

the defendant, 616, 625-027.

the plaintiff, 617, 628-630.

when in favor of, or against, one or more of several defendants or

plaintiffs, 631-638.

against one, or some, of plaintiffs, 632, 633.

in favor of one, or some, of defendants, 634-636.

summary, 637.

want of necessary parties, 638.

subject-matter of, or nature of causes of action which may be, 639-679.

may be equitable causes of action, 35, 013, 622, 640-643, 668.

in actions to recover possession of chattels, 613, 067.

under the first branch of the definition of, 644-670.

interpretation of this clause, "transaction," and "connected

with the subject of action," 613, 618, 645-652.

where there is an election between tort and contract, .646, 648,

6.56, n., 664.

(1) arising from the contract set forth by plaintiff, 653-656.

(2) arising from the same transaction, 657-668.

in legal actions where both parties demand a money

judgment, 659-660.

where both are on contract, 659.

where plaintiff's claim is on contract, and defendants

for tort, 660-063.

for trespasses, nuisances, or negligences, 661, 662.

for fraud, 063.

where plaintiff's claim is for tort, and defendant's on

contract, 004. 665.

where both claims are for torts, 606.

pro i ion of od relatin to 4H 4T 602.
t m 6 4-608.
cro s-demands by the former
e -off 6 5, 606.
recoupment, 607, 608.
reduction of damage in quantum m ruit and quantum valebant, 609.
general de cription natur object , and u · of 610-624.
mbrace et-off and recoupment 61 - 12 619, n.
other demand embraced, 013 619, n., 6:...~.
must be a cau e of action, GH, 629.
wheth r valid laims by plaintiff are implied by, 615.
mu t be in favor f defenda nt 616 62. -627.
mu t exi t again t plaintiff, 617, 6:.8-630.
ubj ct-matter of 61 .
judicial con tructions of, 619-623.
must defea or interf re with plaintiff's recovery, 620, 621, 623.
how pleaded 410 565, 614, 624.
partie in their r lations with, 625-6 8.
the defen dan t, 616 6:.5-627.
the plai n tiff, 617, 6- -6· 0.
when in favor of or again t, one or more of several defendants or
plaintiff , 631-63 '.
again t on e or some of plaintiffs, 632, 633.
in favor f on , or s me, of defeudants 634-636.
summary, 637.
want of neces ar par ie 6
subject-matter of or nature of cau e of action which may be, 639-679.
may be equi abl cau e f action • ~ 613, 6'.L, 640-643, 668.
in action to recover p es. ion of chatt 1 6 ·
67.
under the fir t branch of th definition f, 644-670.
interpr ta ion of thi
lau e, "tran a tion '' and " connected
with the ubj ect of action, ' 613 61 , 645-652.
where there is an election betwe n tort and contract, .646, 648
6. 6 n., 664.
(1) arising from the contract set forth by plaintiff 653-6 6.
(-) ari ·ing from the. ame tra1 action, 6-7- 66 .
in legal actiou where both parties demand a money
jud m n o-9-6 66.
here b th are n contrac , G59.
wher plain iff claim is on con ract and d fendant
f r tor , 660- 68.
for tr pa
nui ances, or n gligence 661 662.
f r fraud
defendant's on
wb re plain ti ff
contra , GG 4.,
wh r· bo h ·lai ro a1e f r l rts, 666.
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COUNTER-CLAIMS — continued.

in legal actions for the possession of lands or chattels,

643, 667.

ill equitable suits, 668.

(.3) connected with the subject of the action, 669, 670.

under the second branch of the definition, and set-offs, 671-679.

subject-matter of, 67ii.

when the right of action must accrue to defendant, 673.

allegations necessary in different cases, 673-675.

what causes of action are subject for, 665-679.

where there is an election between tort and contract, 677.

in equitable suits, 678, 679.

whether defendants are obliged to plead, 680.

form of verdict and judgment in, 681,

COUNTS,

COUNTER- LAlM - continued.
in legal a ·tion. for the po session of land. or chattels,
643 667.
in equit abl suits, 668.
(3) conn ected with the subject of the action, 669, 670.
under the second brauch of the definition, and set-offs, 671-679.
subject-matter of, 67:....
when the right of action must accrue to defendant, 673.
allegations nece ary in different cases, 673-675.
what causes of action are subject for, 665-679.
where there is an election between tort and contract, 677.
in equitable suits, 67 , 679 .
whether defendants are obliged to plead, 680.
form of verdict and judgment in, 681.

use of the word, at common law and under reformed procedure, 336.

use of the common, under the reformed procedure, 436-438.

in actions on express contracts, 437.
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criticism of the rules, 438.

one cause of action in two or more different, 467.

COVENANT,

nature of pleading in, 404.

CREDITORS AND DEBTORS,

suits by partnership creditors against purchasers agreeing to pay firm

•debts, 77.

COUNTS,
use of the word, at common law and under reformed procedure, 336.
u e of the common, under the reformed procedure, 436-438.
in actions on expres contracts, 437.
criticism of the rules, 438.
one cause of action in two or more different, 467.
COVENANT,
nature of pleading in , 404.

assignment of things in action subject to defences of debtor, 85, 91-97.

joinder of creditors as plaintiifs, 143-146.

survivorship among joint creditors, 143.

parties in actions by creditors of corporations, 146, 184, 218, 259.

joinder of creditors in suits by or against assignees for creditors or In

bankruptcy, 175, 182, 253, n., 254,255, 291.

creditors' actions, plaintiffs in, 180-182.

defendants in, 243-247.

joinder of debtors as defendants, 200-207.

survivorship among joint debtors, 203-205.

satisfaction and discharge in case of joint debtors, 215.

parties in actions by creditors of estates, 166, 216, 251.

creditors when defendants in foreclosure suits, 233, n., 235, 239.

in action for partition, 250, 272, 274.

See Rights; Liabilities.

CROSS-COMPLAINTS,

affirmative equitable relief in legal action obtained by, 35.

provisions of codes relating to, 476.

general nature of, 682-684.

CROSS-DEMANDS. See Counter-Claims.

CUSTOM,

necessity for pleading, page 674, n.

CREDITORS AND DEBTORS,
suits by partnership creditors against purchasers agreeing to pay firm
<lebts, 77.
assignment of things in action subject to defences of debtor, 85, 91-97.
joinder of creditors as plaintiffs, 143-146.
survivorship among joint creditors, 143.
parties in actions by creditors of corporations, 146, 184, 218, 259.
joinder of creditors in suits by or against assignees for creditors or in
bankruptcy, 175, 182, 253, n., 254, 255, 291.
creditors' actions, plaintiffs in, 180-182.
defendants iu, 243-247 .
joinder of debtors as defendants , 200-207.
survivorship among joint debtors, 203-205.
satisfaction and discharge in case of joint debtors, 215.
parties in actions by creditors of estates, 166, 216, 251.
creditors when defendants in foreclosure suits, 233, n., 235; 239.
in action for partition, 250, 272, 274.
See RIGHTS; LIABILITIES.
CROSS-COMPLAINTS,
affirmative equitabl e relief in legal action obtained by, 35.
provisions of codes relating to, 476.
general nature of, 682- 684.
CROSS- DEMANDS. See COUNTER-CLAIMS.
CUSTOM,
necessity for pleading, page 674, n.
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D.

DAMAGES,

D.

in joint torts, 215.

where parties are jointly and severally liable, 215, n.

how stated in complaint, where two or more causes of action, 466.

whether payment can be proved in mitigation of, 535.

defences in mitigation of, how pleaded, 569-572.

defence of recoupment of, new matter, 581.

recoupment of, under former procedure, 607, 608.

reduction of, in quanlum meruit and quantum valebant MnAerrei. proc, 609.

demands for liquidated and unliquidated, embraced in counter-claims,

613, 654, 055, 674.

damages sustained by defendant, is a defence of new matter, page 818, n.

general and special allegations, page 674, n.

DEBT,

nature of pleading in, 404.

DEBT DUE,

averment of, in action to foreclose, page 675, n.
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DEBTORS. See Creditors and Debtors.

DEFECT IN REGISTRATION,

DA.MA
in joint tort , 215.
wb r partie are join 1 and severally liable 215 n.
ho stat d in com laint wher two or mor cau e of action 466.
bether pa ment an be pr ed in mitiaation of 535.
d fence in miti ation of how plead d 5 9-572.
def nee of recoupment of new matter, 581.
recoupment of under f rmer procedur , 607 60 .
reduc ion of in quantum meruil and quantum va~ebant und r ref. proc. 609.
demand for liquidated and unliquidated embrac d in counter.claim
61 , 5-4 5-5 674 .
damage su ained by d fendant i a defence of new matter, page 1 , n.
general and pecial allegation , page 674 n.
DEBT
nature of pleading iu, 404.

is a defence of new matter, page 818, n.

DEFECT OF PARTIES,

reached by demurrer, 124.

DEFENCES,

EBT DUE
averment of, in action to foreclose page 675, n.
EBT R.

ee

CREDITOR

A

u DEBTOR

meaning of, 27-2.9.

equitable, to legal actions, 26-35.

former mode of defeating a legal action by an equitable right, 26.

EFECT IN EGI TRATION,
is a defence of new matter, page 1 , n.

nature of equitable, 27, 28.

whether it requires aflBrmative relief, or a right to it, on the part of

the defendant, 29, 30.

in actions on contract, 31, 34.

in actions to recover land, 32, 33.

in special cases, 34.

how pleaded, 33.

joinder of, with other, 34.

when affirmative relief will be granted to defendant, 35.

effect upon, by assignmetit of things in action, 82-98. See Assignment.

separate, by wife when sued with husband, 225.

joint or separate demurrer where several, 468, 497.

sham and irrelevant, stricken out on motion, 476.

new matter of codes when, 484.

partial, to be pleaded, 498. 560-572.

how pleaded, 499-500.

of denials, 501-561. See Denials.

of new matter, 562-590. See New Matter.

union of, in the same answer, .591-601.

provisions of codes relating to, 473, 591.

DEFECT F PARTIE ,
reached b demurrer, 124.
DEFENCE,
meaning of 27-29.
equitable, to legal actions 26-35.
former mode of defeating a legal action by an equitable right, 26.
nature of equitable, 27, -8.
whether it requires affirmative relief, or a right to it, on the part of
the defendant, 29, 30.
in actions on contract, 31, 34.
in actions to r cover land, 32, 33.
in special cases, 34.
bow pleaded 33.
joind r of, with other 34.
wh n affirmative relief will be granted to defendant, 35.
effect upon by as ignmeot of thing in action, 82-9
ee A IG 'MENT.
separate, by wife wb n ued with husband, 225.
joint ors parate d murrer where s veral, 46 497.
ham and irrelevan , tricken out on motion, 476.
n w mat r of cod
when, 4 4.
artial, to b pleaded, 49 -69-572.
h w 1 aded 499- 5 O.
f d n i al 5 1- 61.
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DEFENCES — continued.

how the separate, to be stated, 592-596.

must be complete, 592.

separate spcfific denials, how alleged, 593-596.

kinds of, that may be joined ; those in abatement and those in bar.

597.

inconsistent, 598-601.

DEFENCES - conlintied.
how th er arate, to be tated, 5fJ2-596.
must be omplete 592.
separate specific deuials, how alleged 593-59 .
kinds of, that may be joined ; t hose in abatement and those in bar1
597.
inconsistent, 598-601.

DEFENDANTS,

who may be joined as, 185-284.

code provisions, 185.

principles of the reformed procedure concerning, 187.

manner of raising questions as to proper, 188-194.

nonjoinder, or defect of, 188, 180.

misjoinder of, 190, 194.

where all are improperly sued, 190.

where some are improperly sued, 191-193.

in legal actions, 195-218.

owners or occupants of lands, 195-197.
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owners or possessors of chattels, 198, 199.

persons jointly liable on contracts, 200-205.

survivorship, 203-205.

persons jointly and severally liable on contracts, 206.

persons severally liable on contracts, 207.

persons liable for torts, 208-215.

settlement of decedents' estates, 216, 248-252.

in special cases, 217, 218.

in actions against husband and wife, or either of them, 219-225.

general nature of the legislation as to, 219.

against wife concerning her separate property, 220, 222.

for torts of wife, 221, 222.

personal liability of wife on contracts, 220, 223.

concerning homesteads, 224.

separate defences by wife when sued with husband, 225.

in equitable actions, 226-284.

general principles ; necessary and proper parties, 226-229.

foreclosure of mortgages, 230-242.

general doctrine, 230-232.

mortgagors and their grantees, 233, 234.

creditors, 233, n., 235, 239.

heirs and representatives, 233, n., 234, 275.

assignor.s, 217, n., 233, n., 236.

where several notes are given, 237.

occupants of the land, 238.

persons remotely interested in result, 238.

subsequent and prior encumbrancers, 233, n., 239.

wife of mortgagor, and of subsequent owners, 233, n., 240,

241.

case of homesteads, 242.

speci.al cases, 242.

in creditors' actions, 243-247.

DEFE NDANT ,
who may b joined as, 185- 284.
code provi ions, 185.
principles of t he r eformed pr ocedure concerning 187.
manner of r aising question s as to proper , 188-194.
non joinder, or defect of, 188, 189 .
m isjoinder of, 190, 194.
where all are improperly sued, 190.
where some are improperly sued, 191- 193.
in legal actions, 195-218.
owners or occupants of lands , 195- 197.
owners or possessors of chattels, 198, 199.
persons jointly liable on contrac t , 200-205.
survivorship, 203-205.
per sons jointly and severally liable on contracts, 206.
persons severally liable on contracts, 207.
persons liable for torts, 208- 215.
settlemen t of decedents' estates, 216, 248- 252.
in special cases, 217, 218.
in actions agai nst husb and and wife, or either of them , 219-225.
general nature of the legislation as to, 219.
against wife concerning her separate property, 220, 222.
for torts of wife, 221, 222.
personal liability of wife on contracts, 220, 223 .
concerning homesteads, 224.
separate defeu ces by wife when sued with husband, 225.
in equitable actions, 226- 284.
general principles ; necessary and proper parties, 226-229.
foreclosure of mortgages, 230-242.
general doctrine, 230-232.
mortgagors and their grantees, 233, 234.
creditors, 233, n. , 235, 239 .
heirs and representat ives, 233, n., 234, 275.
assignors, 217, n., 233, n. , 236.
where several notes are given, 237.
occupants of the land , 238.
persons remotely interested in result, 238.
subsequent and prior encumbrancers, 233, n., 239.
wife of mortgagor, and of subsequent owners, 233, n., 240
241.
case of ho mest eads, 242.
pecial ca es, 242 .
in creditors' actions, 243-247.
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DEFENDANTS — cimunucd.

nature of creditors' actions, 243.

judgment debtor or his representatives, 244, 247.

his assignees, 245, 246.

his trustees, 247.

in actions concerning decedents' estates, 216, 248-252.

personal representatives and heirs when necessary, 249,

2.50.

legatees, distributees, or beneficiaries, when not proper, 216,

251.

when necessary, 175, 216, 252.

in actions involving trusts, 253-256.

trustees necessary', 253.

when beneticiaries necessary, 254, 255.

in enforcement of implied trusts, 256.

in actions against corporations and stockholders, 257-261.

to wind up corporations, 257, 258.

by creditors against stockholders personally liable, 146, 184,
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218, 259.

by stockholders against corporations, 260.

by assignees of stock. 261.

in actions for specific performance, 263-265.

in actions to quiet title, 266-269.

all adverse claimants to be joined, 266-269.

where mistakes in deeds, etc., are to be corrected, 268.

in actions for partition, 270-274.

general rules of equity concerning, 270, 271.

creditors and lieu-holders when to be, 270-272.

wife of tenant in common, 273, 274.

personal representatives when to be, 273.

in actions concerning partnership matters and for an accounting,

262, 275.

in actions for rescission or cancellation, 276, 278.

in actions for enforcement of liens, 279-281. '

mechanics' liens. 279.

pledges of securities, 280.

in actions for contribution, 282.

in actions by tax-payers, 283.

in actions to redeem, 284.

in actions by or against one person in behalf of all interested, 285-298.

See Actions.

persons severally liable upon the same instrument aa, 299-307. See Lia-

bilities.

proper joinder of, connected with proper joinder of causes of action, 373-

384. See Causks of Action.

•when all causes of action are against a single, or against all alike, 385-

399. See Causes of Actio.n.

manner of answering or demurring when several, 468, 497.

effect of admi.ssions by one of several, on others, 469.

defences relating to joinder or capacity of, new matter, 587.

in their relations wi'.ii c(junter-clairas, 62.5-038. See Couxter-Ci.ai.ms.
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[the references arb to the sections except when otherwise iwdicatbd.]

DEFENDANTS — continued.

whetlier, must plead counter-claims, GSO.

pleadings on the part of. See Answkr; De.mals; New Matter ;

DEFE JDANT -continued.
whether, must pl ad coun er-claim., G 0.
pleadings on the part of.
'ee A ~ WER; D
Cou TER- LAIM · CRo -C M:PLAl.i:'T .

' IAL

TEW MATTER;

Countek-Claims ; Cross-Complaints.

DELIVERY,

how to plead, page 676, n.

DELIVERY,
how to plead, page 6-6, n.

DEMAND,

necessity of alleging, page 676, n.

DEMURRERS,

general rules as to, page 608, n., page 708, n.

nonjoinder or defect of parties plaintiff as gi-ound of, 123, 124.

for want of legal capacity to sue, 125.

misjoinder of plaintiffs, whether a ground of, 126-133.

nonjoinder or defect of parties defendant, as ground of, 188, 189.

misjoinder of defendants as ground of, 190-194.

to complaint, provisions of codes relating to, 327.

when proper in misjoinder of causes of action, 337.

effect of sustaining, for misjoinder of causes of action, 337-339.
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proper causes of action mingled in one count, as ground of, 341.

to causes of action separately stated, but improjjerly joined, 342, 343.

to improper causes of action mingled in one count, 314, 345.

to insufficient, imperfect, incomplete, and informal allegations, 442-444.

to redundant, immaterial, and irrelevant allegations, 445, 446.

joint or separate, where several causes of action, defences, or defendants,

468, 497.

to answer, provisions of codes relating to, 477.

to answer, confined to new matter in, 486.

use of general, 487.

motion substituted for special, 487.

to special defences equivalent to general denials, 519, 522, 523.

statute of limitations, when to be raised by, 589, 590.

DENIALS,

of immaterial allegations, 469.

effect of admission in one part of answer on. in another, 469, 600.

questions that arise upon, are those of form, 485.

defence of, 501-561.

kinds of, .501, .502.

external forms of, general or specific, 504.

specific, nature and objects of, 50-5-507.

allegations admitted by failure to deny, 469, 508.

in form of a negative pregnant, .509-514.

negative pregnant defined, 509.

cases holding that no issues are formed by, 510-512.

contrary cases, 513, 514.

argumentative, and specific defences equivalent to general, 515-523.

argumentative, described, 515-518.

examples of argumentative, 519.

special defences equivalent to general, 520-523.

Indiana rule, 522, 523.

61

DEMAND,
necessity of alleging, page 676, n.

DEMURRER:s,
general rules a to, page 608, n., page 708, n.
nonjoinder or defect of parties plaintiff as ground of, 123, 124.
for want of legal capacity to sue, 125.
misjoinder of plaintiffs, whether a ground of, 126-133.
nonjoinder or defect of parties defendant, as ground of, 1 8, 189.
misjoinder of defendants a ground of, 190-194.
to complaint, provisions of codes relating to, 327.
when proper in misjoinder of causes of action, 337.
effect of sustaining, for misjoinder of causes of action, 337-339.
proper causes of action mingled in one count, as ground of, 341.
to causes of action separately stated, but improperly joined, 342, 343.
to improper causes of action mingled in one count, 3±4, 345.
to insufficient, imperfect, incomplete, and informal allegation , 442-444.
to redundant, immaterial, and irrelevant allegation , 445, 446.
joint or separate, where several causes of action, defences, or defendants,
468, 497.
to answer, provisions of codes relating to, 477.
to answer, confined to new matter in, 486.
use of general, 487.
motion substituted for special, 487.
to special defences equivalent to general denials, 519, 522, 523.
statute of limitations, when to be raised by, 5 9, 590.

DENIALS,
of immaterial allegations, 469.
effect of admission in one part of answe r on, in another, 469, 600.
questions that arise upon, are tho e of form, 485.
defence of, 501-561.
kinds of, 501, 502.
external forms of, general or specific, 504.
specific, nature and obj ects of. 505-507.
allegations admitted by failure to deny, 469, 508.
in form of a negative pregnant, 509-514.
negative pregnant defined, 509.
cases holding that no issues are formed by, 510-512.
contrary case , 513, 514.
argumentative, and specific defence equivalent to general, 51'"'-523.
argumentative, described, 515-51 .
examples of argumentative, 519.
special def nces equivalent to general, 520-523.
Indiana rule, 522, 523.
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DENIALS — continued.

EXCEPT WHEN OTHEB

E Thl)ICATED.)

E IAL - continued.
general of all allegations not otherwise admitted or referred to,
.- 4-527 .
allegations of issuable fact and not conclusion of law to be denied
52 - 5: o.
of knowledge or information 531 532.
i sues rai ed by and what proved und r them 5°3-55 .
ame rule applicable to pecific a to general 533.
general c mpared with general is ues at common law 5· 4.
nature and office of, and issue formed b general, 535-545.
ca e de cribi ng general, 5 5-541.
what plaintiff must, and defendant permitted to, pro
under general -42.
material i suable facts put in is ue by general, 543-545.
general nature of evidence and defences provable under general,
546-549.
effect of general depends upon allegations of plaintiff 546

general, of all allegations not otherwise admitted or referred to,

524-527.

allegations of issuable facts and not conclusions of law to be denied,

528-5:50.

of knowledge or information, 531, 532.

issues raised by, and what proved under them, 53.3-558.

same rules applicable to specific as to general, 533.

general, compared with general issues at common law, 534.

nature and office of, and issues formed by general, 535-545.

cases describing general, 535-541.

what plaintiff must, and defendant permitted to, prove

under general, 542.

material, issuable facts put in issue by general, 54-3-545.

general nature of evidence and defences provable under general,

546-549.

effect of general, depends upon allegations of plaintiff, 546

547.
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■what cannot be proved under, .548, 549.

547.

some particular defences admissible under general, 550-558.

what cannot be proved under, 54 549.
some particular defence ad mis ·ible under general, 550-55
in action . for er ice o
for i11juries through negligence, 551.
on n te , and for good old 552 .
for conver ion of chattels 553 580 .
in actions to recover po es ion of chattel , 53 554.
in actions to recover po se ion of land, 555.
for malicious injuries, 556.
in certain equitable action , 557.
o her mi cellaneo u action . 65
some pecial statutory rule., 559 :-an.
d n. i.ng corporate exi tence 559.
denying partner hip exi. tence in \\ i consin, 559.
in ac ions on written i n.' trument$, 560.
eneral, cannot b treated as sham. 0Gl .
di. tinction between , and new rnatter, 5ti7 568.
separate sp cific, how alleged, 5 3-596.

in actions for services, 550.

for injurie.s througli negligence. 551.

on notes, and for goods sold, 552.

for conversion of chattels, 553, 580.

in actions to recover possession of chattels, 538, 554.

in actions to recover possession of land, 555.

for malicious injuries, 556.

in certain equitable actions, 557.

other miscellaneous actions. 558.

Bome special statutory rules, 559, 5Go.

denying corporate existence, 559.

denying partnership existence in Wisconsin, 559.

in actions on written instrument.-^. 560.

general, cannot be treated as sham. 561.

distinction between, and new matter, 567, 568.

separate specific, how alleged, 593-596.

DESCRIPTION,

rules as to, in pleading, page 676, n.

DETINUE,

joinder of defendants in action of, 211.

nature of pleading in, 404.

DEVISEES AND LEGATEES,

DE

RIPTI ON,
rules a to, in pl ading, page 676, n.

personal representatives necessary parties in suits by, 166, 175.

are not parties in suits by personal representatives, 175.

parties in suits by residuary, or where legacy is charged on land, 175,

216, 2.52.

parties in suits by legatees for accounting, 172, 173.

DETIN .,.E,
joinder of defendants in action of, 211.
nature of pleading in 404.

EVI EE

iiJ

LE ATEE ,

to be parties in suits to set aside will.s, 178, 2.52.

are not parties in suits by creditors of estate, 216, 251.

legatees when to sue for debts due the estate, 216.

per onal repre entatives neces ary parties in uits by 166 175.
are not par ies h1 uit by personal r pr en ta ive , J75.
arti s in suits by re iduary, or wh re legac i charged on land, 175,
216 252.

L ' DE .· .
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DOING EQUITY,

•

(THE REFERE »C£S ARE TO THI: SECT I ONS EXCEPT WR£.

G"t.J

OTHERW I I!! I l>ICATI:D . ]

DOING E
ITY
nece ity of allegation, page 67{), n.

necessity of allegation, page 676, n.

DOUBLE AGENCY,

is a defence of new matter, page 818, n.

DO TBLE A 'EN CY,
is a defence of new matter page 1 , n.

DURESS,

how pleaded as a defence, r,64.

DUTY,

necessity of alleging, page G7G, u.

E.

DURE ,
bow pleaded a a defence .-64.
D TY,
necessity of alleging, page 67G, n .

EJECTMENT,

equitable defences to, 32, 33.

not maintainable at common law by equitable owner or holder, 36.

whether maintainable under the reformed pmceihire, 37-41.

E.

impropriety of present use of word, 49.

by owners in common and joint owners, at common hiw, lo.").

under the reformed procedure. 135-187.

under reformed procedure resembles ancient real actions, 195.

defendants in, 195-197.
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joinder of other causes of action with, 388, 389, 397, 398.

nature of pleading in, at common law, 404.

defences admissible under general denial in, 555.

what defences in, to be specially pleaded, 582.

equitable defences to, to be specially pleaded, 555, 582.

ELECTION,

to waive tort and sue on contract, 48. See Tort.

ELECTION CONTEST,

necessary allegations, page 676, n.

EQUITABLE ACTIONS,

distinction between legal and, abolished, 4, 10-13.

EJECT 1ENT,
equitable defences to, 32, 33.
not maintainable at common law by equitable own er or holder, 36.
whether maintainable under the refor med proced ure, 37- -!l.
impropriety of pre ·ent use of word, 49.
by owner in common and joint own er. at comlll o11 b v,: l :).'5 .
under the reformed procedure, 135-1 :37.
un<ler reformed procedure re embles anci en t real ac ion. 195.
defendantR in, 195-197.
joinder of other cau es of action wi th, 3 , 3 9, 391, 398.
n a ure of pleading in, at common law, 404-.
defence admissible under general denial in, 555.
what defences in, to be specially pleaded, 5 2.
equi table defences to to be pecially pleaded 555 5 2.

principles as to union of legal and, adopted by the courts, 5-15. See

Actions.

plaintiffs in, 161-184. See Plaintiffs.

ELECTIO~,

to waive tort and sue on contract, 48.

See

TORT.

defendants in, 226-284. See Df.fendants.

against personal representatives of joint debtors, 203-205.

provisions concerning suits by or against one on behalf of others apply

to both legal and, 290.

counter-claims, when permissible in, 637, 668, 678, 679.

EQUITABLE ASSIGNEES,

to be plaintiffs, 65, 73, 78, 149.

EQUITABLE CAUSES OF ACTION,

distinction between legal and, 415, 416.

EQUITABLE DEFENCES,

to legal actions, 26-35. See Defences.

to be specially pleaded in ejectment, 555, 582.

ELECTIO~

CONTE T
necessary allegations, page 676, n.

EQ IT ABLE ACTIONS,
distinction between legal and, abolished, 4, 10-13.
principles as to union of legal and, adopted by the courts 5-15.

ee

ACTION .

plaintiffs in, 161-1 4.
ee PLAINTIFF .
defendant in, 226-2 4. See DEFE~DA~T
against personal repre entativ of joint debtor 20 ~-205.
provi ion concernin o- ~ uits by or again t one on behalf of other appl
to both legal and 290.
counter-claim , when permis ible in, 637, 668, 678, 679.

EQUITABLE A IGNEES,
to be plaintiff , 65, 73 7 , 149.

EQ !TABLE CA E OF ACTION,
di tinction between legal and, 415, 416.
EQ ITABLE DEFEXCE ,
to legal action , 26-35.
ee D EFE ~C E .
to be specially pleaded in jectment, 55,- , 582.

4
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EQUITABLE RIGHTS AND REMEDIES,

E

. .!TABLE RI HT

AN

REMEDIE . ,

union of le <Yal and, in the i il action 1 -~5.
legal rem edy on equitable owner hip or righ
equitabl dem and as subjects for co unter-claim , 61

union of legal and. in tlie civil action, 16-25. See Actu)N's.

legal remedy on equitable ownership or right. 36-41. See Actions.

equitable demands as subjects for counter-claims, 613, 622, 64U-643, 668.

EQUITY,

doctrines of, applied to parties to the civil action, 50, 61, 113-117, 187.

to plaintiffs, 113-117.

to defendants, 187.

doctrine of latent equities, 86.

equities between successive assignors and assignees, 86-89.

doctrines of, adopted in actions concerning wife, 1.52.

rules of, concerning actions to quiet title, 266.

partition, 270, 271.

as to parties in actions by or against one on behalf of others, 289,

297, n.

pleadings in, 401.

ESTATES OF DECEDENTS,

defendants in actions concerning, 216.

E UI Y
doctrine of, applied to partie to the ci il action 50, 61 11· - 117 1 7.
t plaintiff , 113-117.
to defendant , 1 7.
do tri ne of latent eqnities, 6.
equities l>etw en ucce ive a sig nor and a igne
6- 9.
doctrine of adopted in action con cernin wife 132.
rule of, oncerniog ac ion to quiet ti le, :266 .
parti ion, -'1 0 _71.
a to artie in action · by or against one on behalf of others, 289,
297 n.
pleadin gs in 401.
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in equitable actions, 248-252.

ESTOPPEL,

E ' TATE

OF DECEDENT ,

defendant in action concerning, 216.
in equitab le actions, 24 -2 5:..

against assignor of things in action, 88, 89.

defence of, new matter, 588.

how to plead, page 676, n.

EVIDENCE,

E T PPEL,
again t a ignor of things in action ,
defence of new matter, 5 8.
h ow to plead, page 676, n.

not to be alleged in pleading, 411, 420-422.

, matters of, not admitted by failure to deny, 469, 508, 544.

admissible under the general denial, 542, 546-549.

89 .

determined by allegations of complaint, 546, 547.

what admissible, 548, 549.

EVIDEN E,
not to be alleged in pleading, 411, 420-422.
matter of , no t ad mitted by failure to deny, 469, 508, 544.
ad mis ible under the general denial, 5L, 546-549.
determin d by allegations of complaint, 546, 547.
what admis ible, 548, 5±9.

EXCEPTION IN CONTRACT,

is a defence of new matter, page 817, n.

EXCEPTIONS IN STATUTES,

how to plead, page 677, n.

EXCEPTIONS TO RULE OF LAW,

pleading, page 677, n.

EX CONTRACTU ACTIONS,

EXC EPTIO

causes of action ex contractu alleged, and ex delicto proved, 452-455.

IX

NTRA T

i a def nee of new matter page 817, n .

election to use, 48, 387, 458-464. See Tokts.

counter-claims where election between ex delicto and, 646, 648, 656, n.,

EX EPTION
how to plead, page 677, n .

604, 077.

EX DELICTO ACTIONS. See Ex Contractu Actions.

EXECUTION, ISSUANCE AND RETURN OF,

EX EPTI

EXECUTION OF INSTRUMENT,

pleading, page 677, n.

T

ULE OF LAW,

pleading, pag 677 n.

pleading, page 677, n.

-,x

RA TU

TI

S,

can e of action ex contractu alleged. and ex deliclo proved 452-455.
election to u , 48, 3 7, 45 -464.
e T 1T .
counter-claims here election bet' e n ex deli to and
, 64 6 ~ 6, n.,
60 , 677.

ELI T

E

ee E

,XE

E

pleadiwr,

age 677, n.

RM • T,

I
1 di11g1 page 677,

11.

n

E,

'

INDEX. 9G5
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EXECUTORS AND ADMINISTRATORS,

set-off against, of claims due from decedents, 97.

suits by, in their own names, 109.

.suits by, under the reformed procedure, 143.

cannot sue for torts to hxnd after death of owner, 136.

are indispensable parties in administration suits, 160, 249, 250.

plaintiffs in suits against, for accounting, 172, 173.

persons interested in estate not parties in suits by, 175.

must all be parties in suits by, 175.

executors parties in §uits to set aside wills, 178.

suits against, under the reformed procedure, 203-205, 253.

suits by creditors to be onlj' against, 216, 251.

actions by legatees or distributees, for debts, when, incapacitated, 216.

when parties defendant in foreclosure suits, 233, n., 234, 235.

of judgment debtors, defendants in creditors' suits, 244.

of trustees, when co-defendants with surviving trustees, 253.

as parties, 256, n.

when parties in suits for specific performance, 107, 263, 264,
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when defendants in actions for partition, 273.

of mortgagee, defendants in suits to redeem, 284.

joinder of causes of action by, or against, in representative and personal

capacity, 378, 396.

capacity to sue, not put in issue by general denial, 587.

counter-claims by, or against, 627, 630, 676.

EXHIBITS,

Function of, in pleading, page 543, n.

F.

FACTS,

what, and how pleaded in pleading by allegation, 400.

in equity, 401.

at common law, 402, 404-406.

under the reformed procedure, 411, 420-426, 528-530.

nature of, constituting cause of action, 417-419.

only, constituting cause of action to be pleaded, 13, 347, 418, 424, 425.

issuable, and not legal conclusions to be denied, 528, 530, 545.

material and issuable, only, put in issue by general denial, 543-545.

constituting new matter, how set forth, 563, 505.

what, and how stated, in counter-claims, 505, 614, 624.

FAILURE TO SAVE GOODS,

is a defence of new matter, page 818, n.

FALSE IMPRISONMENT,

right of action in cases of, several, 148.

plaintiffs in suits for, 157, 159.

FELLOW SERVANT, INJURY BY,

is a defence of new matter, page 818, n.

FICTIONS,

abolished, 328.

966 INDEX.
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FIRE SET BY INSURED,

i.s a defence of new matter, page SIS. n.

FORCIBLE ENTRY AND DETAINER,

pleading iu actions of, page 677, n.

FORECLOSURE,

pleading in actions of, page 677, n.

FOREIGN LAWS,

how to plead, page 677, n.

FORFEITURE,

i3 a defence of new matter, page 81 S, n.

FRAUD,

how pleaded as a defence. 563.

counter-claim.s for. where plaintiff's demand is on contract, 663.

actions for, by husband and wife, 15.5.

how to plead, page 678, n.

G.

GENERAL DENIALS,

specific defences equivalent to, 520-.523.
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of all allegations not otherwise admitted or referred to, 524-527.

issues raised by. and what proved under them, 533-558. See Denials.

cannot be treated as sham, 561.

defences in mitigation not to be proved under, 571, 572.

verification of, page 787, n. 1.

GENERAL ISSUES,

compared with general denials, 534.

GRANTORS AND GRANTEES,

when grantee cannot sue in his own name for breach of covenants, 75.

suits by mortgagees against grantees assuming mortgage debt, 77, 218.

suits by grantees in name of grantors, 81.

grantees of mortgagors as defendants in foreclosure suits, 233, 234, 242.

GUARANTORS,

whether, can be sued jointly with principal debtors, 306, 307.

GUARDIAN AND WARD,

suits by guardians of infants, lunatics, etc., in their own names. 110.

suits by guardians for seduction or injuries to wards, 5S, 150.

defendants in suits against guardians of lunatics, idiots, etc., 253, n.

GUARDIANS,

as parties, 256, n.

H.

HEIRS,

parties in suits to set aside, or enforce trusts of, wills, 178, 252.

when to be sued jointly for decedents' debts, 216.

when parties defendant in foreclosure suits. 233, n., 234.

of judgment debtors not defendants in creditors' suits, 244.

9 7
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neces ·ary defendants in suit to reach lands of d ced 11t. _52,
wl1en parties in suits for pecific performance, 177, 26!3, 261.

necessaiy defendants in suits to reach lands of decedents, 252, 254.

when parties in suits for specific performance, 177, 263, 264.

HOMESTEADS,

wife a defendant in actions concerning, 224, 242.

~ 54.

HOM E 'TEADS,
wife a defend ant in actions concern ing, 224, 242.

HUSBAND AND WIFE,

actions by, concerning wife's property, person, or character, 151-160.

actions against, or wife alone, 219-225.

general nature of the legislation, 219.

against wife concerning her separate property, 220, 222.

for torts of wife, 221, 222.

personal liability of wife on contracts, 220, 228.

wife a defendant in actions concerning homesteads, 224, 242.

separate defences by wife when sued with husband, 225.

husband, when defendant in foreclosure suits, 233, n., 239.

■wife, when defendant in foreclosure suits, 233, n., 240. 241.

defendants in foreclosure of mortgage on homestead, 242.

wife of tenant in common, party in action for partition, 273, 274.

defence that party is a married woman, new matter, 587.
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counter-claims in suits by married women, 630.

HYPOTHETICAL PLEADING, page 601, n.

I.

H

BAND AND W I F E,
actions by, cone rning wif 's proper ty , person , or character, 151-160.
actions against, or wife alone, 219- 225.
general nature of the legislation , 219.
again t wife concerning her eparate proper ty 220, 222 .
for torts of wife, 221 , 222.
per onal liability of wife on contract , 220 , 22::3.
wife a defendant in actions concerning homesteads, 224, 242.
separate defences by wife when s ued with htt band , 225.
husband, when defe ndant in foreclosu re sni ts, 23:3, n. , 239 .
wife, when defendant in foreclosure sui ts, 233, n., 240, 241.
defendant s in fo reclosure of mortgage on homestead, 242.
wife of tenant in common, party in action for p· rtition , 273, 274.
defen ce that party is a married woman, new matter, 5 7.
counter-claims in suits by married wo men, 030.

IDIOTS,

whether guardians of, can sue in their own names, 110.

HYPOTHETICAL PLEADIN G, page 601, n.

are proper defendants in actions against guardians, 253, n.

IMMATERIAL ALLEGATIONS, page 612, n.

I.

INCONSISTENT ALLEGATIONS, page 612 n.

INFANTS,

suits by guardians of, in their own names, 110.

INFORMATION AND BELIEF,

pleading on, page 601, n.

INJURY,

IDIOTS,
whether guardians of, can sue in th eir own n ames, 110.
are proper defendants in actions against g uardians, 253, n.
IMMATERIAL ALLEGATIO N , page 612 , n.

necessity of averring, page 678, n.

INJURY BY FELLOW SERVANT,

is a defence of new matter, page 818, n.

INJURY TO PERSON,

INCONSISTENT ALLEGATIONS, page 612 n.
INFANTS,
suits by guardia ns of, in their own names, 110.

meaning of statutory term, page 679, n.

INNOCENT PURCHASER,

allegation of, page 679, n.

INSURANCE,

suits by third persons, to whom it is stipulated the loss shall be paid, 77.

INFORMATION AND BELIEF,
pleading on, page 601, n.
INJURY,
necessity of averring, page 67 8, n.

INTEREST,

allegations respecting, page 679, n.

INTERVENTION,

assignor of part of a demand allowed to intervene, 75.

INJURY BY FELLOW SE RV A ~T ,
is a defence of new mat ter, page 818, n .
INJURY TO PERSOX,
meaning of statutory term , page 679, ri.
INNO CE NT P R CHA ER,
allegat ion of , page 679, n.
!~SUR A

CE,
s uits by t h ird persons, to whom it is stip tilated the lo s shall be paid 77.

INTE R E T,
allegations respectiug, page 679 n.
IN TERVE NTION,
assignor of part of a demand allowed to i ntervene, 1-.

9
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I

T ER YE~ TI ... - continued.

INTERVENTION — continued.

provisions of the codes concerning, 310.

nature of provisions concerning, found in codes generally, 320-322.

when permitted, 321.

examples, 322.

Io

Iowa and California system of, 323-325.

-3-325.

cases illustrating, 323.

cases in California, 324. n.

importance of the system, 325.

INVALIDITY OF ST.-VTUTE OR ORDINANCE,

allegation of, page 679, n.

IRRELEVANT ALLEGATIONS, page 612, n.

IRREPARABLE IN.IL'RY,

allegation of, page 680, n.

JOINDER OF CAUSES OF ACTION, 331-399. See Causes of Action.

JOINDER OF DEFENDANTS, 18.3-281. See Defendants.

INA
E,
allegation f pa
I
ELEV ANT ALLE ATI N , page 612, n.
I REPARA LE I ",JL"RY,
allegation of, pa e 6 0, n.
I

JOINDER OF PLAINTIFFS, 111-184. See Plaintiffs.

JOINT OWNERS OF CHATTELS,

J.
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legal actions by, 138-142.

JOINT OWNERS OF LAND,

legal actions by, 135-137.

JUDGMENTS,

for excess of claims of debtors against assignees, impossible, 83, 95, 628.

how far binding, and how taken advantage of in actions by or against

one on behalf of others, 29."}-297.

where persons severally liable on upon the same instruments are joined,

304.

defences of former, new matter, 578.

how to plead, page 680, n.

on counter-claims, 681.

JURISDICTION,

pleading facts showing, page 680, n.

want of, is defence of new matter, page 819, n.

JUSTIFICATION,

defence of, how pleaded, 564, 580, 581.

L.

LACHES,

is a defence of new matter, page 818, n.

LAND.S,

equitable defences in actions to recover, 32, 33.

whether eciuitable owner can maintain action for possession of, 36-41.

plaintiffs in suits concerning, by owners of, 135-137.

J
J

F CA

OF

331-399.
ee AU
1.
e DEFE , TD A .TT
ee PLAI TlFF .

J
J

E

OF ACTION.

D,
legal actions by, 135-137.
J ,.
:\IENT ,
f r exce of claim of debtors again t as ignee , imp s ible , 3, 95 62
how far binding, and how taken advantacre of in action by or again
one on behalf of other. , 29.)-297.
where per ous everally liable on upon the same in ruments are joined,
04.
defences of form r n w matter, 578.
b w to plead, page 6 0, n .
on counter-claims, 681.
J ~ RI I TI ~.
pleading fa ts h winer, pag 6 0, n.
want of, i defence of new matter, pag 19, n .
J TI I ATT .i.: ,
d fenc of, how pleaded, 564, 5 0, - 1.

L.
L
page 1

n.

quitable cl f nc
wh tlwr eqyitable wn r can aintain acti n for os es ion of 36-41.
laintiff in ·uils coucernincr, by own r f }. 5-1 7.

I TDEX.
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LANDS — continued.

plaintiffs in suits concerning wife's, 151-lCO.

owners of, out of possession, suits by, for injuries to, 149.

jiarties in equitable suits concerning, by holders of joint rights; parti-

tion, boundaries, etc., 168.

holders of Intiire estates in, to be parties in equitable suits concerning,

170.

joinder of owners of sepaiate interests in, in equitable suits concerning, 183.

defendants in actions, other than for torts, against owners or occupants

of, 195-197.

for joint torts to, 213.

defendants in suits concerning wife's, '220, 222.

joinder of causes of action relating to, 388, 389, 397-399.

defences admissible under general denial in actions to recover, 555.

what defences to be pleaded as new matter, 582.

LAW,

conclusions of, pleaded at common law, 402, 404.

not to be pleaded under the codes, 411, 423-425. See Legal Con-
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CLUSIO.N'S.

cases illustrating, 424, 42.').

may be pleaded when common counts are used, 436-438.

not to be denied in pleadings, 528-530, 545.

LEGAL ACTIONS,

distinction between equitable and, abolished, 4, 10-13.

principles as to union of equitable and, adopted by the courts, 5-15. See

ACTIOXS.

equitable defences to, 26-35. See Defkxces.

plaintiffs in, 13.5-150. See Pl.\intiffs.

defendants in, 19.5-218. See Defendants.

LEGAL CONCLUSIONS,

not to be pleaded, page 564, n. See Law.

LEGAL EFFECT,

pleading according to, page 542, n.

LEGAL RIGHTS AND REMEDIES,

union of equitable and, in one civil action, 16-25. See Actions.

legal remedy on equitable ownership or right, 36-44. See Actions.

LIABILITIES,

joint, joint and several, and several, 187-242. See Defendants.

joinder of persons severally liable upon the same instrument, 299-307.

provisions of the codes relating to, 299-300.

effect of, on, 301.

judicial interpretation, 302, 303.

judgment in, 304.

code provisions apply to joint and several, 305.

surety or guarantor, and principal debtor, 306, 307.

counter-claims in case of joint, joint and several, and several, 634, 637.

LIBEL AND SLANDER,

right of action in cases of, generally several, 148.

partners uniting in suits for, 147.

69
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LAND ' - continued.
plaintiffs in uits concerning wife's, 151-100.
owner of, out of poss ssion, suit by, for injuries to, 110.
parties in equitable suit concerning, by holders of joiut right ; partitio11, boundarie , etc., 16 .
bolder · of fotnre e 'tates in, to be parties iu qui table uits conceruiug,
176.
join ler of owners of separate intere ts in, in equitable suits concerning, 1 3.
defendant in actions, other than for tort , against own r.· or occupants
of, 195- 197.
for join t torts to, 213.
defenda.uts in suits concerning wife's, 220, 222.
joinder of cau es of action relating to 3 ' , 3 9, 3D7-3DD.
defences admissible under general denial in actions to recover, 555.
what defences t o b pleaded as new matter, 5 2.
LAW,
conclusions of, pleaded at common law, 402, 404.
not to be pleaded under the code , 411, 423-425.
ee L EGAL CONCL U IO:N .

cases illustrat ing, 424, 425.
may be pleaded when common co un ts are used, 436-438.
not to be denied in pleadings, 528-530 5-15.

LEGAL ACTIONS,
distinction between equitable and, abolish ed, 4, 10-13.
principles as to union of equitable and, adopted by the courts, 5-15. See
ACTIO s.
equitable defences to, 26-35. See DEFENCES.
plaintiffs in, 135-150. See PLAI:NTIFF .
defendants in, 195-218. See D EFEN DANTS.
LEGAL CONCLUSIONS,
not to be pleaded, page 564, n. See LAW.
LEGAL EFFECT,
pleading according to, page 542, n.
LEGAL RIGHTS AND REMEDIES,
union of equitable and, in one civil action, 16-25. See ACTION .
legal remedy on equitable ownership or right, 36-44 . See ACTIONS.
LIABILITIES,
joint, joint and several, and several, 1 7-242.
ee DEFE :NDANT .
joinder of persons severally liable upon the same instrument, 299-307.
p rovisions of t he codes relating to, 299-300.
effect of, on, 301.
judicial inte!'pretatio1J, 302, 303.
judgment iu, 304.
cqde provisions apply to joint and everal 305.
surety or guarantor, and principal debt.or, 306, 307.
counter-claims in case of joint, joint and everal, and everal, 634 637.
LIBEL AND SLANDER,
right of action in ca es of, generally several 14 .
partners uniting in uits for, 147.

970
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LIBEL AND 6LASDER — continued.

plaintiffs in suits for, to wife, 154. 156, 157, 159.

defendants in suits for, 208. 214.

in suits against wife for, 221.

causes of action for, joined with other, 390.

allegations in actions for, page 680, n.

LICENSE,

defence of, new matter, 712.

LIENS,

plaintiffs in actions to foreclose vendors'. 169.

holders of distinct, not joined as plaintiffs in actions to enforce, 181

holders of, when defendants in actions for partition, 270-272.

defendants in actions to enforce, 279-281.

mechanics', 279.

pledges of securities, 280.

See MORTGAGKS.

LIMITATIONS, STATUTE OF. See Statute of Limitatioxs.
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LIQUID ATIOX,

is a defence of new matter, page 818, n.

LUNATICS,

whether guardian of, can sue in his own name, 110.

are proper defendants in actions against guardians, 253, n.

M.

MARRIED WOMEN. See Husband and Wife.

MLSJOINDER OF PARTIES,

effect of, 126-133.

MISNOMER OF DEFENDANT,

is a defence of new matter, page 818, n.

MISTAKE,

parties in actions to quiet title by correcting. 268.

parties in actions to correct, 268, n.

MORTGAGES,

equitable defences in actions to foreclose, 33.

suits by mortgagees against grantees assuming mortgage debts, 77, 218.

plaintiffs in suits to foreclose and redeem, 16!), 170.

defendants in suits to foreclose, 230-242.

general doctrine; necessary and proper parties, 230-232.

mortgagors and their grantees, 233, 234.

creditors when necessary or proper defendants, 235, 239.

heirs when necessary, 233, n., 234.

personal representatives when necessary. 233, n., 234, 235.

assignor of mortgage note when not necessary, 217, n., 233, n., 236.

when several notes are given, 237.

occupants of the land, 23S.

persons remotely interested in result, 238.

INDE.'.

INDEX. 971
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[the references are to the sections except when- otherwise indicatbd.]

MORTGAGES — conlinued.

subsequent and pri<n- encumbrancers, 2-;3, n.. 230.

wives of mortgagors and subsequent owners, 233, n., 240, 241.

beneficiaries, in suits against trustees, 2;j3, n., 241, n.

case of homesteads, 242.

persons claiming adversely to mortgagor, 242.

trust deeds foreclosed as, 242.

defendants in suits to redeem, 284.

counter-claims insults to foreclose, G68, n., 678, 679.

MOTIONS,

general rules as to, page 600, n., page 717, n.

[TffE REFERENCES ARE T O THE BECT!O~S EXCEPT V:flEX OTHP.RWI E I NO!CATIM>)

:MORTG GE - continued .
ub quent and pri r encumbrancer., _:):3, 11. , 23!l.
wive. of mortgagor and ub equent owners, 233, n., 24 , 241.
beneficiarie , in suit against tru ' tee 203, n., 241, u.
ca e of home tead , 2 2.
persous claiming adver ely to mortgagor, 242.
trust deed foreclosed as, 242.
defendants in uits to redeeru 2 '!.
counter-claims in suit~ to foreclo ·e, 668, n., 678, 679.

misjoinder of plaintiffs objected to by, 126-133.

of defendants, 190-1.94.

proper causes of action mingled in one count, corrected by, 341.

causes of action separately stated but improperly joined, corrected by, 343.

improper causes of action mingled in one count, corrected by, 344, 34.5.

to correct insufficient, imperfect, incomplete, or informal allegations, 442-

444.
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to correct redundant, immaterial, and irrelevant allegations, 445-446.

sham and irrelevant answers and defences stricken out on, 476.

use of, to correct defects of form in answer, 487, 490.

argumentative denials corrected by, 518.

specific defences equivalent to general denial corrected by, 522, 523.

MULTIFARIOUSNESS,

discussed and defined, 380, page 508, n.

MUNICIPAL CORPORATIONS. See Corporations.

NAMES OF PARTIES,

pleading, page 680, n.

NEGATIVE AVERMENTS,

necessity of, page 681, n.

NEGATIVE PREGNANT,

MOTION ,
general rules as to, page 600, n., page 717, n.
misjoinder of plaintiff objected to by, 126-133.
of defendants, 190- 194.
proper cau es of action mingled in one count, corrected by, 341.
causes of action separately stated but improperly joined, corrected by, 343.
improper causes of action mingled in one count, corrected by, 344, 345.
to correct insufficient, imperfec t , incomplete, or informal allegation , 442444.
to correct redundant, immaterial, and irrelevant allegations, 445-446.
sham and irrelevant answers aud defences stricken out on, 476.
use of, to correct defects of form in answer, 487, 490.
argumentative denials corrected by, 518.
pecific defences equivalent to general denial corrected by, 522, 523.
MULTIFARIOUSNESS,
discussed and defined, 380, page 508, n.
MUNICIPAL CORPORATIONS.

See CORPORATIONS.

denials in the form of, 509, 514.

definition of, 509.

cases holding that no issues are formed by, 510-512.

N.

contrary cases, 513, 514.

NEGLIGENCE,

defences admissible under general denial in actions for, 551.

NAMES OF PARTIES,
pleading, page 680, n.

counter-claims for, where plaintiff's demand is on contract, 661, 662.

how to plead, page 681, n.

NEGOTIABLE PAPER,

equitable defences to actions on, 34.

suits by assignees of, 66-69, 78.

doctrine of estoppel as applied to transfer of quasi, 88, 89.

transferred after maturity, subject to equities, 91, n., 92, n., 94.

defendants in actions on joint notes, 200.

NEGATIVE A\ ERMENTS,
necessity of, page 681, n.
NEGATIVE PREGNAr T,
denials in the form of, 509, 514.
definition of, 509.
cases holding that no i sue · are formed by, 510-512.
contrary cases, 51 3, 514.
NEGLIGENCE,
defences admis. ible under general denial in actions for , 551.
counter-claims for, where plaintiffs demand is on contract, 661, 662.
how to plead, page 6 1, n.
NEGOTIABLE PAPER,
equitable defences to actions on, 34.
uits by assignees of, 66-69, 78.
doctrine of estoppel as applied to transfer of qua, i, 8 , 89.
transferred after maturity, subject to equities, 91, n. 92 n., 94.
defendants in actions on joint notes, 200.

972 INDEX.
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NEGOTI AHLE PArEll — continue,!.

actions against persons severally liable on, 207, '_'99-;J()7.

assignor of mortgage note not necessary defendant in foreclosure suit,

J 17, n., 23o, n., 2>(j.

parties in foreclosure suits when sr-vcral notes given, 'JM.

defences admissible under general denial in actions on, 052, OGO.

defence of want of consideration, new matter, 5H5.

NEW iMATTEK,

classes of answers containing, when defensive and when not, 4Sl.

questions that arise upon, may be either of substance or form, 485.

demurrer confined to, 4S6.

difference between, and pleas by way of confession and avoidance, 549.

defences of, 562-590.

how pleaded, 410, 5G3-5G7.

when to be pleaded, and when general denial sufficient, 548, 549, 567,

568.

distinction between, and denials, 507, 508.

in mitigation of damages, how jileaded, 509-572.
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in abatement, how pleaded, 573, 574. 587.

particular defences held to be, 575-590.

payment, 576, 577.

arbitration and award, 578.

former recovery, 578.

in actions to recover possession of chattels, 554, 579.

in actions for torts, 580, 581.

in actions concerning lands, 582,

in actions upon contracts, 583-58(i.

joinder an<l capacity of parties, 587.

miscellaneous defences; license, estoppel, accord and satisfaction,

etc., 588.

statute of limitations, when to be pleaded as, and when raised

by demurrer, 555, 557, 589, 590.

NEW PAirriES,

bringing in, 308-319. See J'aktiks.

NEW PROMISE,

allegation of, page 083, n.

NON-IN'COKrORATIOX.

is a defence of new matter, page 818, n.

NON-PAYMENT,

allegation of, page 683, n.

NOTICE,

when necessary to protect assignee from set-off, 85, 91, 94.

kind of, necessary to protect assignee from transactions between assignor

and debtor, 95.

defence other than set-off, available from time of, 98.

nuisancp:,

counter-claims for, where plaintiff's deman<l is on contract, 061, 662.

See Toiris.

IKDEX. 973
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o.

OB.JECT OF ACTIOX,

what is, 347.

OFFICERS,

auiti by public, 107.

against, 217.

ORDINANCE-S,

how to plead, page 679, n., page 68i, n.

P.

PARENT AND CHILD,

action by mother or father for seduction of daughter, 58, 150.

action by parents for injuries to child, 58, 150.

PARTIE.S,

to the ci^al action, 50—325.

doctrine of, 50, 00, 61.

coDQmon law and equity theories contrasted, 50.

provisioos of codes relating to, 51-59.

general theory of code provisions, 00, 01.

terest.
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real party in interest to be plaintiff, 62-81. .See Real Party r>' In-

effect of assignment of things in action upon defences thereto, 82-98.

See Assignment.

when trustees of express trusts may sue, 99-110. See Tkusteks

defect of. reached by demurrer, 124.

misjoinder of, effect of, 126-133.

who may be joined as plaintiffs, 111-184. See Plaintiffs.

who may be joined as defendants, 185-284. See DEf exdants.

when one may sue or be sued on Vjehalf of aU interested, 285-298.

proFioions of codes concerning, 285.

interpretation of, 286, 288-290.

facts to be alleged, 287, 288, 298.

examples of decided cases, 291, 292.

nature of action, and effect upon those represented. 29.3-297.

who are parties, and how persons may become. 293. 294.

how far the judgment is binding, and how taken advantage of,

25.>-297.

persons severally liable on the same instrument, 299-307. See Liabili-

ties.

bringing in new, :^tS-319.

provisions of codes concerning, 308, .309.

three proceedings provided for. 311-314.

when necessary to complete determination of controversy. 315-319.

when code provisions are peremptory, 316.

when discretionary, 317.

examples. 318.

importance of provisions, 319,

974 INDEX.

[the BEIXnENCBS ARE TO THE SECTIONS EXCEPT WHEN OTHEBWISB INDICATED.]

PARTIES — co/i^/iue^/.

intervening of, 320-325. See Intervention.

proper joinder of causes of action connected with proper joinder of, 364-

399. See Causes op- Action.

defences relating to joinder and capacity of, are new matter, ."iS?.

in their relations with counter-claims, 625-638. See Countek-Claims.

PARTITION,

action for, by tenant in common holding legal or equitable title, 43.

parties interested to be before court in action for, 168, 274.

defendants in actions for, 270-274.

general rules of equity concerning, 270, 271.

creditors and lien-holders, when to be, 270-272.

wife of tenant in common, 273. 274.

personal representative when to be, 273.

PARTNERS,

actions by, or against, other, to recover shares of firm property, 42, 262.

actions by, or against, in name of partnership, 59, 81, 149.

actions by creditors of partnership against purchasers promising to pay
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firm debts, 77.

joining as plaintiffs in actions for personal torts, 147.

actions by, concerning chattels, 140, 144.

rights and powers of surviving, 141.

account between, parties in, 171, 262, 275.

whether dormant, should be plaintiffs at common law and under code, 144.

whether they should be defendants, 202.

refusing to join as co-plaintiffs, may be made defendants, 187, n.

joinder of, as defendants, in actions on contract, 201.

in actions for personal torts, 214.

in actions to enforce mechanics' liens, 279.

provisions of codes concerning joinder of " coparceners " and " copartners,"

300.

denying existence of partnership in Wisconsin, 559.

counter-claims by, or against, 627, 632, 635, 675.

PARTNERSHIP,

allegation of, page 684, n.

PASSENGER,

how to plead relation of, page 684, n.

PAYMENT,

whether, can be proved in mitigation of damages, 535.

defence of, when new matter, 535, n., 511, 576, 577.

PENALTIES,

pleading in actions for, page 684, n.

PERFORMANCE,

how to plead, page 684, n.

PETITION. See Complaint.

PL.UXTIFFS,

real parties in interest to be, 62-81. See Real Party in Interest.

who may be joined as, 111-181.

INDEX. 975

[the references are to TirE SECTIONS EXCEPT WHEN OTHERWISE INDICATED.]

PLAINTIFFS — conlinued.

provi.sions of the codes concerning, 111.

principles of the reformed procedure concerning, lli'-117.

equitable theory adopted, 113-117.

judicial construction, llS-llJli.

manner of raising questions as to proper, 123-lo3.

nonjoinder, or defect of, 123, 124.

want of legal capacity to sue, 125.

misjoinder, how objected to, and effect of, 126-133.

in legal actions, 135-150.

owners in common and joint owners of land, 135-137.

of chattels, 138-142.

holders of joint rights arising from contracts, 143-145.

of several rights, 146.

holders of joint rights arising from personal torts, 147.

of several rights, 148.

in special cases, 149, 150.

in actions by or between husband and wife, 151-1 GO.
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in equitable actions, 161-184.

theory of parties in equity, 161-163.

owner of legal estate made party in action by equitable owner,

164-167.

by beneficiary, 164.

by assignees, 165.

by legatees, distributees, etc., 166.

holders of equitable rights to be parties, 168-178.

where holders have joint rights or interests, 168, 169.

in actions for partition, boundaries, etc., 168.

concerning personal property, 169.

to foreclose and redeem, 169, 170. •

for accounting, 171-173.

by trustees, 174.

by executors, etc., 175.

by assignees in bankruptcy, etc., 175.

of future estates to be parties, 176.

in actions for specific performance, 177.

heirs-at-law or devisees when parties, 178, 252.

holders of antagonistic interests not to be joined a.s, 179.

joinder of holders of separate, but not antagonistic, interests,

180-183.

creditors. 180-182.

beneficiaries, 182.

other holders of distinct interests, 183.

holders of distinct liens, 184.

actions by or against one person on behalf of all interested, 285-298. See

Parties.

proper joinder of, connected with proper joinder of causes of action. 373-

884. See Causes of Action.

defences relating to joinder or cajjacity of, new matter, 587.

in their relations with counter-claims, 625-638. See Counter-Claims.

pleadings on the part of. See Complaint ; Rei'LY.

976 INDEX.
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PLEADING.

theory of, iu the civil action, 14. 15.

doctrine of unity in procedure as applied to, 14, 15.

of equitable defences, 33.

three types of, prior to codes, 400-406.

by allegation, 399.

in equity, 401.

at common law, 402-406.

technicality of, 403.

requisites in different actions; ejectment, trover, debt, assumpsit,

etc., 404.

nature of allegations in, 405.

assumpsit, illustrating, 406.

principles uf the reformed, 407.

old systems abolished, and codes the only sources of authority, 408,

409.

apply to answers containing affirmative matter, 410, 478-565.

"cause of action " defined, 346-348, 412-414.
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distinction between legal and equitable causes of action, 415, 416.

nature of facts constituting cause of action, 417-419.

facts only, constituting cause of action to be pleaded, 13, 347, 418,

424, 425.

material facts only to be pleaded, 411, 420, 423, 426.

evidence not alleged, 411, 420-422.

in legal actions. 411, 420.

in equitable actions, 411, 421, 422.

legal meaning not alleged. 411, 423-425.

sufficiency or insufficiency of alleg., cases illustrating, 427-430.

promise, allegation of, improper in actions on implied contracts, 431-

435.

comn)on counts, use of. 15, 436-438.

in actions on express contracts, 437.

criticism of the rule, 438.

to be liberally construed, 439-441.

insufficient, imperfect, incomplete, or informal allegations, how ob-

jected to, 442-444.

redundant, immaterial, and irrelevant allegations, how objected to,

445, 446.

proofs must correspond with allegations, 447-455. See Phooks.

amendments of, 456, 457.

election between actions ex contractu and ex delicto, 48, 3S7, 458-464.

See Torts.

on the part of plaintiff. See Co.mi'Laint; IIkply.

on the part of defendant. See Axswku; Dk.\i.\ls; New Matter;

Counter-Claims ; Cross-Complaints.

POSSESSION,

how to plead, page 685, n.

PRAYER,

for, and granting of both legal and equitable reliefs, 17, 18.

granting' of legal relief only, 19, 20.

L'

l::X.

77
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[the references are to the sections except when otherwise indicated.]

PRAYER — continued.

for equitable relief, but legal granted, where necessary facts for legal

alleged, 11, 21.

legal relief, but equitable granted, where necessary facts for equitable

alleged, 11, 22.

for equitable or legal relief, effect of, where facts alleged are not proved, 23.

for relief, effect of, 11, 21, 22, 471.

for relief as supplying name of counter-claim, 624.

PRINCIPAL AND AGENT,

actions by principal as real party in interest on contracts made by agent,

70, 105, n.

actions by agent on contracts made for principal's benefit, 79, 103, 105.

when agent must join in suit with prin., 1G4.

jointly sued for torts, 213.

PRIVILEGE,

is a defence of new matter, page 818, u.

PROMISE,

allegations of, on implied contracts, 431-435. /
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PROOFS,

must correspond with allegations, 447-45-").

immaterial and material variances, and total failure of, difference

[Tim REF ERENCES ARE TO THE SECTIONS EXCE PT WREN OTHERWI E TNDIC.\TED.)

PR.A. YEI - continued.
for equitable relief, but legal g ranted, where neces ary facts for legal
alleged, 11, 21 .
legal relief, but equitable granted, where neces a.ry facts for equit ble
all g~d, 11, 2:...
for equitable or legal relief, effect of, where fac t alleged a.re not proved, _3_
for relief, effect of, 11, 21 , 22 , 471.
for relief as supplying name of counter-claim, 624 .
PRINCfPAL AND AGENT,
action by principal as real party in interest on ontract made by agen t,
79, 105, n.
actions by agent on contracts made for principal's benefit , 79, 103, 105.
when agent mu t join in suit with prin. , 164.
jointly ued for torts, 213.

PRIVILEGE,
is a defence of new matter, page 818: n.

PROi\IISE,
allegations of, on implied contract , 431-435.

between, 447, 448.

variances, cases illustrating, 440.

total failure of, cases illustrating, 450, 451.

causes of action ex contractu alleged, and ex delicto proved, 452-455.

Q.

QUIET TITLE,

defendants in actions to, 266-269.

nature of the action, 266.

PROOFS,
must correspond with allegations , 447-455.
imm aterial and material variances, and total failure of, difference
between, 447, 448.
varia nces, cases illustrat ing, 449.
total failure of, cases illustrating, 450, 4£H.
causes of action e:r contractu alleged, and ex delicto proved, 452-455.

all adverse claimants to be joined, 266-269.

where mistakes in deeds, etc., are to be corrected, 268.

pleading in actions to, page 685, n.

E.

RATIFICATION,

Q.
QUIET TITLE,

how to plead, page 685, n.

of altered instrument, is a defence of new matter, page 818, n.

REAL PARTY IN INTEREST.

definition, 62, n. 1.

to be plaintiff, 62-81.

assignment of things in action at com. law, 62.

defendants in actions to, 266 - 269.
nature of the action, 266.
all adverse claimants to be joined, 266-269.
where mistakes in deeds, etc., are to be conected , 268.
pleading in actions to, page 685, n.

assignees to sue in their own names, 63-76, 165.

when the assignment is absolute, 64.

when equitable, 65, 73, 149.

R.

when of negotiable paper, 66-69, 78.

62

RATIFICATION,
how to plead, page 685, n.
of altered instrum ent, is a defence of new matte r, page 818, n.

REAL PARTY IN INTEREST,
definition, 62, n. 1.
to be plaintiff, 6:2 -81.
assignment of things in action at com. Jaw, 62.
assignees to sue in their own names, 63-76 , 165.
when the assignment is absolute, 64.
when equitable, 65, 73, 149.
when of negotiable paper, 66-69, 7
62

978 INDEX.
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REAL PARTY IX 1}^TEREST — continued.

when conditional or partial, 70, 75.

illustrations, 71, 72.

assignor to be joined in certain States, 73, 1G5, 217, 23fi, 261.

when the assignment is made pending action, 74.

possibility of one suing " to the use of " another, 76.

suits by one for whose benefit a promise is raad^; to another, 77-218.

by the person to whom the promise is made, 78.

special instances ; principal and agent, etc., 79, 105, u.

suits by taxpayers to restrain, remove, or redress public wrong, etc., 80.

suits by grantees of land in names of grantors, 81.

defence that party is not, new matter, 587.

RECEIVERS.

actions by and against, 258, n.

how to plead capacity of, page 685, n.

RECITAL,

pleading by way of, page 601, n.

RECOUPMENT,
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defence of, new matter, 581.

under the former procedure. 607, 608.

embraced by counter-claim, 612, 019, n.

See Countkk-Claims.

REDUNDANT ALLEGATIONS, page 612, n.

REFORMATION,

parties in actions for, 278, n.

how to plead, page 685, n.

RELEASE,

is a defence of new matter, page 818, n.

RELIEF,

prayer for. See Prayer.

different kinds of, from one cause of action, page 466, n. .

REMEDIES,

definition of, 2.

distinction between, not abolished by reformed procedure, 9.

union of legal and equitable rights and, in one civil action, 16-25. See

Actions.

legal, on equitable ownerships or rights, 36-44. See Actions.

differences between civil actions are only in primary rights and, 4.5-47.

distinction between, and causes of action, 250, 251.

REPLEVIN,

impropriety of present use of word, 49.

joinder of plaintiffs in, at common law and under reformed procedure,

138-142.

of defendants, 108, 211.

causes of action in, united with other, 307.

defences admissible under general denial in, 538, 554.

when new matter, 554-579.

counter-claims in, 643, 667,

pleading in actions of, page 68.5, n.

U79

li'ii E X.
INDEX. 'J79
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[the references are to the sections except when otherwise indicated.]

REPLY,

general rules as to, page 703, n.

defects in complaint not cured by, 470.

provisions of codes relating to, 478, 479.

RESCISSION,

defendants in actions for, •270-278.

is a defence of new matter, page 818, n.

RIGHTS,

REPLY
general rule as to, page 703, n.
defects in complaint not cur d by, 47
provisions of code relating t 47 , 179.
RE

IO
defendant in action for 27G- :.. 78.
i::; a defence of new matter, page 1 , n.

primary duties and. what are, 1.

remedial duties and, described and defined, 1-3.

no alteration or direct effect upon primary duties and, 8.

effect of misconception of remedial, l)y plaintiffs, 11.

union of legal and equitable remedies and, in one civil action, 16-25.

See Actions.

legal remedies on equitable estates or, 34-44. See Actions.

differences between civil actions are only in primary, and remedies, 45-47.

joint and several, 112-178. See Plaintiffs.

distinction between remedial, and causes of action, 348.

S.
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counter-claims in case of joint, joint and several, and several, 633, 637.

SEDUCTION,

action by parents for seduction of child, 58, 150.

RIGHT ",
primary dutie and, what are, 1.
remedial dutie and, describ d and defined, 1-..
no alt~ration or direct effect upon primary duties and, 8.
effect of mi conception of remedial, by plaintiffs, 11.
union of legal and equitable remedie ' and, in one civil action, 16-25.
ee ACTIONS.
lega l remedies on equitable estates or, ~+-4--1.
e
TIOW.
diffPrences between civil aetion are onl.v in primary, and remedie 4--47.
joint and everal, 112-17 .
ee PLAINTIFF .
distinction between remedial, and cause of action, · 48.
counter-claims in case of joint, joint and everal, and several, 633, 637.

by woman for her own, 58, 150.

pleading in actions for, page 686, n.

SET-OFF,

to things in action when assigned, 82-98. See Assignment.

provisions of codes relating to, 475. 002.

under the former procedure, G05, 606.

under the codes, 671-679. See Counter-claims.

embraced by counter-claims, 611, 619, n., 672.

SETTLEMENT,

is a defence of new matter, page 818, n.

SLANDER,

allegations in actions for, page 680, n.

SPECIFIC DENIALS,

nature and objects of, 505-507.

mode of alleging separate, 593-596.

See Dfnials.

SPECIFIC PERFORMANCE,

plaintiffs in actions for, 177.

defendants in actions for, 263-265.

s.
SEDUCTION,
action by parents for seduction of child, 58, 150.
by woman for her own, 58, 150.
pleading in actions for, page 6 ' 61 n.
SET-OFF,
to thing in action when a signed 8:2-98. See A n rG ME
provisions of codes relating to, 475. 602.
under the former procedure, 605, 606.
under the codes, 671-679 . See CQUNTER-CLAIMS.
embraced by counter-claim , 611, 619, n., 672.

T.

ETTLEi\IE T,
is a defence of new matter, page 818, n.

parties to the contract, their heirs and representatives, 263.

persons acquiring subsequent interests, 263-265.

heirs or representative.s of vendor and vendee, 264.

defences admissible under general denial in actions for, 557.

LANDER,
allegations in actions for, page 680, n.
PECIFIC DENIAL ,
nature and object of, 505-507.
mode of alleging s parate, 5!B-596 .
See J R~IALS.
PECIFIC PERFOR;.\lA~ E,
plaintiffs in action · for, 177.
defendant in action for 26: -265.
parties to the contract, their heir and repre entatives 263.
p er ons acquiriug sub equent intere t , 263-26.).
heirs or repre ·entative. of' endor and ve n<lee, :2 -!.
defences admissible uuder general denial in action. for, 537.

980

I~DEX.

980 INDEX.
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[thb bbferences are to the sections except when otherwise indicated.]

STATUTE OF FRAUDS.

s.

TATUTE

pleading cont ract ' itbin, page 686 n.
i a defence of new matter page 818, n.

pleading contracts within, page 686, n.

is a defence of new matter, page 818, u.

STATUTE OF LIMITATIONS,

whether to be specially pleaded in ejectment, 555.

TATUTE

F Lil\lITATIO

whether
b specially pl aded' in ej ctmen ·, 555.
in pecific performance 557.
when and bow lead d, and when rais d by demurrer, 589, 590.

in specific perfonnance, 557.

when and how pleaded, and when raised by demurrer, 589, 590.

STATUTES,

how to plead, page 079, n., page 686, n.

STATUTORY BARS,

TAT TE,
how to pl ad, page 679, n., page 6 6, n.

must be pleaded specially, page 818, n.

STOCK,

estoppel, as applied to transfer of certificates of, 88, 89.

defendants in suits by assignees of, 201.

STOCKHOLDERS,

T T T RY BAR,
mu t be pl aded pecially page 18, n.
'T

parties in actions against, 146, 184, 218, 259.

in actions by, 258, 200.

K
e toppel as appli ed to transfer of certificate of, 88, 89.
defendants in uit by a ignees of -61.

allegations in actions against, page 086, n.
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SUBJECT OF ACTION,

TO KH LDER
parti sin actions again t, 146, 184 21 , 259.
in actions by, 25 260.
allegations in actions against, page 686, n.

meaning of, 309, 381-384, page 493, n.

as used in connection with counter-claims, 613, 618, 651, 652, 669, 670.

SUBROGATION,

is a defence of new matter, page 818, n.

SUICIDE,

SUBJECT

SUMMONS,

when service of, on husband is service on wife, 225.

F ACTION,

meaning of, 369, 381-38±, page 493, n.
as u ed in connection with couuter-claims, 613, 618, 651, 652, 669, 670.

is a defence of new matter, page 818, n.

UBR GAT[ N,

as indicating election between actions ex contractu and ex delicto, 464.

is a defence of new matter, page 1 , n.

SURETIES,

contribution among, 282, n.

SUICIDE,
is a defence of new matter, page 18, n.

when liable on the .same or separate mstriiments, joinder of, 300, 301.

whether can be sued jointly with principal debtor, 307.

counter-claims by, 625, 626.

UMMONS,
when ervice of, on husband is service on wife, 225.
as indicating election between action . e.c contractu and ex delicto, 464.

SURGEON,

how to plead qualification of, page 686, n.

RETIE,

SURVIVORSHIP,

among joint creditors at common law and under codes, 143.

contribution among, 282, n.
when liable on the ame or separate in trument. joinder of, · 00, 301.
whether can be ued jointly with principal debtor 307.
counter-claims by, 625, 626.

among joint debtors, 203-205.

T.

TAX-P.\YER.S,

actions by, to restrain, remove, or redress public wrong, etc., 80.

RGE N,

joinder of, as plaintiffs, 183.

defendants in actions by, 283.

how to plead qualification of, page 6 6, n.
'R IV RSI-UP,
a m n joint er ditor at common law and under codes, 143.
amon joint debtors -03-205.

actions by one for benefit of other, 292.

T.
T

or redre s public wrong, etc., 80.

I
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TENDER,

how to plead, page 686, n.

THEORY OF CASE,

necessity of theory in pleading, page 656, n.

THINGS IN ACTION,

(THE REFER ENCES ARE TO TRE

T

81

!JEX.

ECTIONS EXCEPT WHEN OTHERWISE INDICATED.)

TENDEl,
h w to plead, page 686, n.

THE RY

F CA E,

nece sity of theory in pleadi ng, page 656, n.

defences to suits by assignees of, 82-98.

See Assignment.

THIRD PERSONS,

action by, for whose benefit contracts have been made, 77.

TIME.

THIN

' IN A TION,

defences to suits by assignees of, 82-98.
s e As I NM ENT .

THIRD PERSONS,

pleading, page 687, n.

TITLE,

how to plead, page 687, n.

TORTS,

action by, for whose benefit contracts ha.ve been made, 77.

TIME,
pleading, page 687, n.

to person or character, plaintiffs in suits for, 147, 148.

to lands, plaintiffs in suits for, lo6.

to chattels, plaintiffs in suits for, 140-142.

to person, property, or character of wife, plaintiffs in suits for, 1.53-160.

212.
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defendants in suits for, where tort may be treated as breach of contract,

defendants in suits for, 208-215.

of wife, defendants in suits for, 221, 222.

"when causes of action arising from, can be joined with those on contracts,

392, 394, 395.

proved, where causes of action arising from contracts alleged, 452-455.

election to waive tort, and sue on contract, 48. 387, 458-464.

as regards joining of causes of action, 387.

doctrine of election discussed, 48, 387, 458, 459, 462.

cases in which election permitted, 460-462.

manner of indicating election, 463, 464.

justification by one of several defendants, good for all, in action for 497.

defence of justification for, how pleaded, 564, 580, 581.

defences of new matter, in actions for, 580, 581.

what demands arising from, are counter-claims, 613, 636, 649, 656, n.

counter-claims where election between tort and contract, 646, 648, 656, n.,

664, 677.

counter-claims where plaintiff.s' claims are on contracts, and defendants'

for, 660-663.

for trespasses, nuisances, or negligences, 661, 662.

for fraud, 663.

counter-claims where plaintiffs' claims are for, and defendants' on con-

tracts, 664, 665.

counter-claims where both claims are for, 666.

TRANSACTION,

meaning of, 359-368, page 491, n.

judicial interpretation, 355-365.

true interpretation, 366-368.

as used in connection with counter-claims, 613, 618, 636, 6.50.

TlTLE,
how to plead, page 687, n.

TORT,
to person or character, plaintiffs in suits for, 147, 148.
to lands, plaintiffs in suits for, 136.
to chattels, plaintiffs in suits for, 140-142 .
to per on, property, or character of wife, plaintiffs in suits for, 153-160.
defendants in suits for, where tort may be treated as breach of eontract,
212.
defendants in suits for, 20 -215.
of wife, defendants in uits for, 221, 222.
when cau es of ac tion arising from, can be joined with tho eon contracts,
392, 394, 395.
proved, where causes of action arising from contracts alleged, 452-455.
election to waive tort, and sue on contract, 48, 3 7, 458-464.
as regards joining of causes of action, 387.
doctrine of election di cussed, 48, 3 7, 458, 459, 462.
cases in which election permitted, 460-462.
manner of indicating election, 463, 464.
justification by one of several defendants, good for all, in action for 497.
defence of justification for, how pleaded, 564, 5 0, 581.
defences of new matter, in action for, 580, 581.
what Jemands arising from, are counter-claim , 613, 636, 649, 6.'56 n.
counter-claims where election between tort and contract, 646, 64 , 656 n,
664, 677.
counter-claims where plaintiff..,' claims are on contract , and def ndants'
for, 660-663.
for trespasses, nui -ance., or negligences, 661 , 662.
for fraud, 663.
counter-claim:'l where plaintiff ' claims are for, and defendants' on contracts, 66-1-, 665.
counter-claims where both claims are for, 666.

TRANSACTION,
meaning of, 359-36 , page 491, n.
judicial interpretation, 355-365.
true interpretation , 366-36 .
as u ed in connection with c ·unter-claims, 613 61

636 650.
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TRESPASS,

impropriety of ^iresent use of word. 49.

plaintiffs in actions for, to lands or chattels, 135, 136, 138, 140-142.

by owners of lands out of jiossession, 149.

defendants in actions for, 210, 213.

joinder of causes of action for, with other, 388, 389, 395.

how to plead in actions for, page (388, u.

counter-claims for, where plaintiff's demand is on contract, 661, 662.

TROVER,

action analogous to, by equitable owner of chattels, 43.

impropriety of present use of word, 49.

plaintiffs in action of, 138, 140-142.

defendants in action of, 210, 211.

joinder of causes of action for, with other, 389, 397.

nature of pleading in, at common law, 404.

counter-claims on contracts, in actions of, 664.

TRUSTEE AXD CESTUI QUE TRUST,

trustees of expres.s trusts, when may sue, 99-110.
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provisions of codes concerning, 99.

meaning of the term, 100-102.

persons '• with whom, or in whose name, a contract is made for the

benefit of another," 103-105.

special instances of, 106.

public officers ; counties ; towns, 107.

persons expressly authorized by statute to sue, 108.

executors and administrators, 109.

guardians of infants, lunatics, etc., 110.

ownership of trustees joint where land is conveyed to several, 135.

trustees when co-plaintiff's in actions by l)eneficiaries, lfi4.

accounting, parties in suits against trustees for, 173, 182, 253, n., 254, n.,

255.

cestuis que trustent when co-plaintiffs in actions by trustees, 174.

to be parties in foreclosure suits against trustees, 233, n., 241, n.

defendants in suits against trustees, in creditors' actions, 247.

in administration suits, 252.

beneficiaries, defendants in suits against trustees to redeem, 284.

joinder of causes of action by or against trustee, in personal and repre-

sentative capacity, 378, 396.

counter-claims by or against, 627, 630, 076, n.

TRUSTS,

of will, heirs-at-law to be j^arties in suits to enforce, 178.

plaintiffs in suits to administer, 173, 182.

defendants in actions involving, 253-256.

trustees necessary, 253.

personal representatives of trustee, when to be joined with surviving,

253.

beneficiaries, when necessary, 254, 2.55.

( THE REFERENCE

ARE TO THE SECTION

EXCEPT WHEN OTBERWI E INDICATED.)

TRE PA
im propriety of pre ent use of wor , 49.
laintiff i n action for, to la.nd or chatt ls, 1 5 13 , 1 , 140-142.
y owner of land ou t o I
e. ion 149.
defend ant in action· for, 1 , 213.
j ind r of cau es f action for, wi th o her,
, 3 9, 395.
how to plead in action for, page
n.
coun ter-claim for wher plaintiff's d mand is on contract, 661, 662.
TROYER,
a tion anal gous to, b r equitable owner of chattels, 43.
impropriety of pre ent u e of word, 49.
plaintiffs in action of, 138, 140-142.
<l fend nts in action of 210, 211.
joind r of causes of action for, with other 3 9 397.
nature of pleading in, at common law 404.
counter-claim on contracts, in actions of, 664.
TRU TEE AND CESTUI Q E TRU T
trust e of expre tru t when may sue, 99-110.
provi ion of ode· concerning, 99.
meaning of the term, 100-102.
person ' with whom, or in whose name, a contract is made for the
benefit of another," 103-105.
special in ances of, 106.
public officers ; counti ; towns, 107.
persons xpre ly authorized by tatute to sue, 108.
executors and admini trators, 109.
guardian of infants, luna ics, etc. 110.
owner hip of tru tee joint where land i · conv ed o everal, 135.
tru t ee wh n co-plaintiff in actions by benefi iari , 1 4.
accounting, partie. in uits against trustee for 173, 182, 253 n., 254 n.,
25~.

ce tu.i's que tru tent when co-plaintiff in actions by trustees 174.
to be parties in foreclo ure suit against tru tees, 23' n., 241, n.
defendants in suit again t tru tee , in creditor ' action , 247.
in administra~ion uits r2.
eneficiari . , defendants in uits against tru tees to redeem, 2 4.
joinder of cau e of a tion by or against trustee, in p rsonal and repr entative capa ity, 37 396.
counter-claim · by r against 627, 630, 676 n.
TR .,. y ,·
nforc 17 .

where there is a breach of trust, 253, 255, n.

in enforcenienl of implied, 256.

in

d,

~ 5 j,
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ULTRA VIRES,

is a defence of new matter, page 818, u.

UNCERTAINTY,

cases of, in pleading, page GOI, n.

UNDUE influi:nce,

is a defence of new matter, page 819, n.

unreasonableness,

is a defence of new matter, page 819, n.

USE,

suing to use of another, 76.

V.

VALUE,

allegations of, in pleading, page 689, n.

VARIANCES,

between proofs and allegations, 447-455. See Proofs.

VENDOR AND VENDEE,

equitable defences in actions by vendor to recover lands, 33.
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plaintiffs in suits to foreclose vendor's lien, 170.

parties in actions by or against, for specific performance, 177, 263-265.

VERIFICATION.

rules respecting, page 669, n.

w.

WAIVER,

how to plead, page 689, n,

of formal defects, page 603, n.

is a defence of new matter, page 819, n.

WANT OF FUNDS,

is a defence of new matter, page 819, n.

WANTONNESS,

how to plead, page 689, n.

WARD. See Guardian and Ward.

WIFJL See Husband and Wifk.

WILLS,

parties in actions to set aside, 178, LJ52.

WRITTEN INSTRUMENT,

how to plead, page 689, n.

